This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1486

Mary D. Isaacson,

Relator,

vs.

The Anthem Companies, Inc.,

Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,

Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2015

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development

File No. 32321052-3

Thomas Klosowski, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

The Anthem Companies, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri (respondent employer)

Lee B. Nelson, Munazza Humayun, Department of Employment and Economic 

Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Hooten, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

Relator challenges the decision of the unemployment law judge that she is

ineligible for unemployment benefits, arguing that she had a good reason to quit caused 

by the employer because she was demoted and her job responsibilities were changed. We 

affirm.

FACTS

On September 10, 2012, WellPoint, a business division of respondent The Anthem 

Companies, Inc., hired relator Mary D. Isaacson to be its director of specialty exchanges, 

a product management director position. WellPoint is a health insurance company that 

markets and sells health insurance plans throughout the country. Isaacson has substantial

experience in developing and marketing these insurance plans, and she was hired to 

create and market WellPoint’s dental, vision, life, disability, and workers’ compensation 

plan offerings—so-called “specialty” plans—within the confines of the Affordable Care 

Act. In WellPoint terminology, she would “own[] the strategy development” regarding 

WellPoint’s specialty healthcare plans. As part of her job, Isaacson regularly met with 

senior management at WellPoint in order to discuss issues of strategy and policy 

regarding these insurance plans. Isaacson was supervised by a staff vice president for 

specialty product development, and he gave Isaacson positive performance reviews from 

the time of her hiring until June 2013.

Isaacson’s former supervisor retired in June 2013, and she began reporting directly 

to the successor vice president. Isaacson and the new vice president soon began to 
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disagree over the scope of Isaacson’s job responsibilities as the director of specialty 

product development. In October 2013, the vice president posted a job opening for a 

director of portfolio execution in the specialty division. This newly created position was

“[r]esponsible for overseeing the planning and execution” of the specialty plans at 

WellPoint, was a managerial-level position, as opposed to the exempt-level position 

Isaacson held, and came with greater compensation than Isaacson’s position. The vice 

president admitted that his intention in creating this position was to take the role of 

strategy development for specialty healthcare reform away from Isaacson and give it to a 

new hire. This new position would also change the reporting structure for Isaacson, as 

she would now be directly reporting to the new hire. A product specialist who previously 

reported to Isaacson would also report to the new hire.

Isaacson interviewed for the new position, but was not selected. The vice 

president testified that she was the lowest-ranked applicant in the interview process. 

After Isaacson was not hired for the new position, she retained her current position but no 

longer developed strategy. Instead, she was more narrowly tasked with developing 

WellPoint’s specialty insurance products. Isaacson’s yearly salary, benefits, and work 

hours remained the same. Isaacson, however, claimed that she was not qualified for the 

“new” position she now held because she lacked the technical skills required to directly 

oversee the execution of these insurance plans. The vice president disputed this claim 

and believed that Isaacson would simply be carrying over the responsibilities and 

experience that she had regarding insurance product design.
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In January 2014, Isaacson received a “mixed” review of her job performance from 

the vice president. He gave her a satisfactory ranking on the technical aspects of her 

position, but gave her a “mixed result” regarding her collaboration and communication 

within WellPoint. Isaacson was upset about this performance review, as she believed that 

the vice president, who had been her direct supervisor for only six months at that point, 

had selectively chosen negative feedback focused on Isaacson’s mannerisms at meetings 

and had ignored the fact that she had met her performance goals and had received past 

positive reviews from prior supervisors. Isaacson sent a complaint to human resources in 

late January regarding this performance review, as well as the conflict between her job 

and the newly created position. After meeting with a human resources director, Isaacson 

succeeded in having the vice president “soften” the language within the review.

The new director of portfolio execution started working in mid-February. On 

February 17, Isaacson sent another complaint to human resources, alleging age 

discrimination demonstrated by the creation of the new position and the negative 

performance review she received. On February 18, Isaacson submitted a formal notice of 

resignation, which took effect on March 3.

Isaacson then applied for unemployment benefits, and respondent Department of 

Employment and Economic Development deemed her to be ineligible for benefits

because she quit her job. She appealed the determination of ineligibility, and two 

different unemployment law judges (ULJs) held three telephonic hearings on April 25, 

May 21, and June 6, 2014. Isaacson and her former supervisor testified on her behalf, 
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while the vice president and a WellPoint human resources director testified on behalf of 

the employer.

In his order denying unemployment benefits, the ULJ determined that Isaacson 

quit because of the changes to her position and that these changes were attributable to 

WellPoint and personally adverse to her. However, the ULJ also determined that these 

circumstances were insufficient to cause an average, reasonable worker to quit and 

become unemployed, and he therefore found Isaacson ineligible for benefits. Isaacson 

requested reconsideration and the ULJ affirmed his decision, reiterating that Isaacson had 

not experienced changes to her job that were significant enough to cause an average, 

reasonable worker to quit. The matter comes before this court on a writ of certiorari by 

Isaacson.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal, Isaacson argues that the ULJ erred as a matter of law by determining 

that she did not have a good reason to quit caused by WellPoint. We review a ULJ’s 

decision to determine whether a relator’s substantial rights have been prejudiced by legal 

errors, findings and conclusions not supported by substantial evidence, or a decision that 

is arbitrary and capricious. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4)–(6) (2014). We review 

the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the decision and give deference to 

its credibility decisions. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 

2006). However, credibility determinations must be supported by substantial evidence 

and the ULJ must set forth a valid reason for crediting or discrediting testimony that may 

significantly affect the ultimate decision of the ULJ. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) 
6

(2014); see Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 

2007).

As conceded by the parties and found by the ULJ, Isaacson quit her position with 

WellPoint and then applied for unemployment benefits. An unemployment-benefit 

applicant who quits his or her job is ineligible for benefits unless he or she falls under a 

statutory exception. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2014). An applicant who quits his or 

her job can receive benefits if he or she “quit the employment because of a good reason 

caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). The statute defines “[a] good reason caused by 

the employer for quitting” as a reason: “(1) that is directly related to the employment and 

for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that 

would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than 

remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a) (2014). While the applicant’s reason for 

quitting is a question of fact, see Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air, Inc., 393 N.W.2d 380, 382 

(Minn. App. 1986), whether that reason constituted good cause to quit is a question of 

law that we review de novo, Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. App. 

2012). 

The only dispute between the parties on appeal is whether the circumstances 

surrounding Isaacson’s employment with WellPoint were sufficient, as a matter of law, to 

have caused an average, reasonable employee to quit. “The standard of what constitutes 

good cause is the standard of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, 

and not to the supersensitive . . . .” Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 311 Minn. 34, 44 

n.5, 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n.5 (1976) (quotation omitted). This is a fact-specific analysis, 
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Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(b), and circumstances relevant to the reasonableness of the 

employee’s choice to quit “include loss of wages, the extent of the change of job duties, 

the reasonable career expectancies of the employee because of his tenure with this or 

other employers, and the employee’s remaining chances for advancement after the 

demotion,” Cook v. Playworks, 541 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 1996). “[T]he 

circumstances which compel the decision to leave employment must be real, not 

imaginary, substantial[,] not trifling, and reasonable, not whimsical; there must be some 

compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances.” Ferguson, 311 

Minn. at 44 n.5, 247 N.W.2d at 900 n.5 (quotation omitted).

Here, the ULJ found that Isaacson quit her job due to the changes in her position at 

WellPoint and determined that these changes were attributable to the actions of WellPoint 

and were personally adverse to Isaacson “because they reduced her responsibility and 

visibility within the organization,” thereby finding that the first two elements of “good 

cause” under section 268.095, subd. 3(a), were met. But, the ULJ then determined that, 

while “[t]hese circumstances might . . . cause an average, reasonable worker to consider 

other job opportunities within and outside of the company,” the circumstances were 

insufficient to cause an average, reasonable worker to altogether quit employment

because Isaacson retained the same salary and continued to perform work that she had 

already been performing in her position. The ULJ also rejected Isaacson’s claim that she 

was unable to perform her new responsibilities, instead finding more credible the 

testimony of WellPoint representatives that these responsibilities were fully in line with 

the duties Isaacson had already been performing as a product management director. In 
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his order after Isaacson’s request for reconsideration, the ULJ further found that 

Isaacson’s concerns regarding career advancement opportunities and loss of earning 

potential were not credible and there was no “specific evidence . . . offered to show the 

alleged negative impact” stemming from the change in her job duties.

Isaacson challenges the ULJ’s analysis, arguing that the change in her job 

responsibilities at WellPoint was a significant “demotion” that would have compelled an

average, reasonable employee in her position to quit and that she therefore had good 

cause to quit under section 268.095, subd. 3(a). She primarily argues that she was given 

“substantially less responsibility [than] what she had originally accepted employment 

for” and that this reduction in her substantive responsibilities would, as a matter of 

common sense, adversely affect her future career opportunities and potential for future 

salary increases. She further claims that the ULJ wrongly focused on the fact that her 

salary remained the same and that she could perform her new job responsibilities, and 

that the ULJ incorrectly required specific evidence of the effect her “demotion” would 

have on her future career opportunities and pay.

However, the circumstances of Isaacson’s change in job responsibilities simply 

were not significant enough to have warranted an average, reasonable employee to 

altogether quit employment. First, Isaacson not only retained the same salary, but also 

maintained the same benefits package, job title, and job classification within WellPoint. 

Also, as found by the ULJ and supported by the record, Isaacson’s “new” duties were 

consistent with her responsibilities prior to the restructuring of her position. Essentially, 

the only adverse effect suffered by Isaacson was her loss of “responsibility and visibility 
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within the organization” when she was stripped of her higher-level strategic planning 

functions and access to senior management.

Isaacson argues that this “demotion” constituted good cause to quit by relying on 

two cases in which employees were deemed to have good cause to quit: Marty v. Digital 

Equip. Corp., 345 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. 1984), and Holbrook v. Minn. Museum of Art, 405 

N.W.2d 537 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. July 15, 1987). In Marty, the 

employee was deemed eligible for unemployment benefits when she was terminated and 

then offered a new position in the company that, while having the same initial salary, had 

a lower maximum potential salary and required substantially less skill than her prior 

position because the new position involved mostly clerical work. See 345 N.W.2d at 

774–75. Similarly, in Holbrook, an assistant museum curator had good reason to quit 

when her position was eliminated and she was then offered two half-time positions 

involving primarily clerical work for which she was “clearly overqualified,” despite the 

fact that her pay would not be reduced. See 405 N.W.2d at 538–39.

Based on this caselaw, Isaacson is correct that the lack of change in her salary, by 

itself, is not determinative of whether an average, reasonable employee would have been 

compelled to quit in her situation. However, the facts of these two cases are otherwise 

distinguishable from the circumstances here. In both Marty and Holbrook, employees 

were removed from positions that involved work suitable to their qualifications—human 

resources tasks in Marty and art research and documentation in Holbrook—and then

offered replacement jobs that were primarily clerical in nature. Marty, 345 N.W.2d at 

774–75; Holbrook, 405 N.W.2d at 538. In each case, the employee had “a right to reject, 
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without loss of benefits, a job which require[d] substantially less skill” than the employee 

possessed. Holbrook, 405 N.W. 2d at 538 (quoting Marty, 345 N.W.2d at 775). Here, 

Isaacson was not wholly stripped of the substance of her position and relegated to clerical 

work; rather, her job became more narrowly focused on designing insurance products, 

consistent with much of the work she had previously performed at WellPoint and with

other past employers. “[T]he extent of the change of job duties” in this case is simply not 

as extensive as the reassignments in Marty or Holbrook. See Cook, 541 N.W.2d at 369,

Isaacson further argues that this court should recognize that “demotion” is

“universally recognized” as detrimental to her future career prospects, and that to require 

her to produce specific evidence of such detriment would be inconsistent with the 

unemployment-benefit scheme and caselaw. Under Cook, we are to consider “reasonable 

career expectancies of the employee” and “the employee’s remaining chances for 

advancement after the demotion” in evaluating whether good cause exists. 541 N.W.2d 

at 369.

However, neither Marty nor Holbrook relied on abstractions of future detriment in 

concluding that good cause to quit existed; rather, the record produced in both of those 

cases showed that the replacement positions offered to those relators entailed a significant 

reduction in salary potential from their prior positions. See Marty, 345 N.W.2d at 775 

(“[T]he difference in salary potential between the two positions was 10.6%.”); Holbrook, 

405 N.W.2d at 539 (“[T]here was evidence that the pay scales for [the new] positions 

were lower than the pay scale for her assistant curator position.”). Here, Isaacson did not 

raise such concrete concerns about her salary potential. Isaacson testified that her rate of 
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pay did not change and that she was unsure whether her eligibility for performance 

bonuses was affected.

Isaacson’s concerns about the advancement of her career are similarly tenuous. At 

the hearing in this case, Isaacson claimed that the fact that she no longer regularly met 

with senior management at WellPoint “diminished” her role such that “get[ting] an equal 

position outside of WellPoint [would be] very challenging.” But, the ULJ found that this 

claim was “not credible because it constitutes only speculation,” as she offered “no 

specific evidence . . . to show the alleged negative impact” of the shift in her job 

responsibilities upon her career prospects. Our review of the record substantiates the 

ULJ’s findings. Coupled with the fact that her job duties were not extensively changed, 

these concerns, while valid, do not rise to a level that “would compel the average, 

reasonable worker to quit.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(3).

We conclude that Isaacson lacked good reason to quit because an average, 

reasonable employee under these circumstances would not have quit and become 

unemployed.

Affirmed.