IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-13-00409-CR

ADAM LAMAR BROOKS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 1

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 11-01734-CRM-CCL1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Adam Lamar Brooks was convicted of indecent exposure and sentenced to 120 

days in jail with a $1,000 fine. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (West 2011). He was 

also required to surrender his peace officer license. Because the trial court did not err in 

denying Brooks’ motion to suppress, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Rebecca Bosquez saw a green SUV pull into a parking space near her at the Post 

Oak Mall. She saw the driver of the vehicle put up shades in the front window of the 
Brooks v. State Page 2

SUV, expose his penis, and begin to masturbate. Because she did not have a phone, she 

asked another person in the parking lot to summon mall security. When the man in the 

SUV decided to leave, she followed the vehicle and saw the license plate, which read 

MRADAM. After another incident was reported at the same mall several months later 

involving the same vehicle, a College Station Police officer made contact with the driver 

of the SUV who was identified as Brooks. Brooks was a City of Bryan police officer. 

Brooks was later asked to go to the College Station Police Department where he spoke 

to Sgt. Craig Boyett. Although he admitted that he went to the Post Oak Mall regularly 

and that no one, even relatives, drove his green SUV, Brooks denied masturbating in 

the mall parking lot. Bosquez could not identify Brooks from a photo line-up; so Boyett 

decided to fabricate a photo line-up and have a department secretary indicate on the 

line-up that Brooks was identified, “100%.” Boyett confronted Brooks with the 

fabricated line-up and told him numerous times that Brooks had been identified as the 

perpetrator. Brooks and Boyett discussed the help that would be available to Brooks, 

but then Brooks left the police station still denying that he committed the offense. 

About 15 minutes later, Boyett called Brooks, again mentioning that Brooks had been 

identified as the perpetrator. After a series of dropped calls and call-backs, Brooks 

confessed.

In his written motion to suppress, Brooks contended his oral statements were 

inadmissible pursuant to articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal 
Brooks v. State Page 3

Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.22, 38.23 (West 2005).1 The trial court 

heard and denied Brooks’ motion to suppress prior to trial. Then, on the day of trial, 

Brooks moved to reopen his motion to suppress so that he could testify. The trial court, 

a different judge than the judge who heard the initial motion to suppress, allowed 

Brooks to reopen and heard Brooks’ testimony. The court took the testimony under 

advisement, and the issue of the admissibility of Brooks’ statements was retried before 

the jury. Each time testimony regarding Brooks’ admission of the offense was 

presented, Brooks objected and the trial court overruled each objection.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Robinson, 334 

S.W.3d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006). If the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence 

supports those findings. Id. We then review the trial court's legal rulings de novo 

unless the findings are dispositive. Id.

A defendant who moves for suppression under Article 38.232 due to the violation 

of a statute has the burden of producing evidence of a statutory violation. State v. 

Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 772 

 

1 Brooks does not complain on appeal about the admission of statements, if any, in violation of article 

38.22.

2 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005) ("No evidence obtained by an officer . . . in violation 

of . . . [the] laws of the State of Texas . . . shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of 

any criminal case.")
Brooks v. State Page 4

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Only when this burden is met does the State bear a burden to 

prove compliance. Id. 

Further, a defendant must show a causal connection between a statutory 

violation and the obtaining of evidence before the evidence is rendered inadmissible. 

Pham, 175 S.W.3d at 772-773. If the defendant produces evidence that there is a causal 

connection, the State may either try to disprove this causal evidence, i.e. disproving that 

there is a causal connection in existence at all, or, the State may make an attenuation-oftaint argument. Evidence is not obtained in violation of a provision of law if there is no 

causal connection between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence. 

Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the evidence would 

not be excluded pursuant to article 38.23.

Relying on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 

452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), Brooks argues that Boyett violated section 37.09 of the Texas 

Penal Code, “Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence,” by fabricating a photo 

line-up and telling Brooks numerous times that he had been positively identified as the 

person masturbating in the mall parking lot. The State argues that Wilson was wrongly 

decided and should be overturned. We are not in a position to overturn an opinion by 

the Court of Criminal Appeals. Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that 

fabricating a photo line-up violates section 37.09, we still must decide whether there 

was a causal connection between the line-up and Brooks’ confession. 

Brooks testified at the reopened suppression hearing that he confessed because 
Brooks v. State Page 5

of Boyett’s use of the fabricated photo line-up. This is at least some evidence of a causal 

connection between the violation of article 37.09 and obtaining Brooks’ confession 

which shifts the burden to the State to disprove the connection. The State produced 

evidence that when Boyett called Brooks to tell him that a warrant had been issued for 

Brooks’ arrest, Brooks told Boyett that Brooks did not confess because of Boyett’s 

interviewing techniques but because the spirit of God touched Boyett to call Brooks 

after Brooks left the station at a time when Brooks had decided to tell Boyett the truth. 

In findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that Brooks’ suppression 

hearing testimony was not credible and concluded there was no causal connection 

between the fabricated lineup and Brooks’ confession. The record supports this finding 

and conclusion. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding and conclusion 

regarding the lack of a causal connection, we need not discuss whether any “taint” of 

the confession was attenuated. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling 

Brooks’ motion to suppress by overruling Brooks’ objections and admitting testimony 

regarding Brooks’ confession in evidence.

Brooks’ sole issue is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice
Brooks v. State Page 6

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 23, 2015

Do not publish 

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