FILED 

JULY 21, 2015 

I In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

I 


I 

l 

, 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

I JOHN D. KOVACS, ) No. 32473-7-111 

) 

1 Respondent, ) I ) 

v. ) 

) 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & ) PUBLISHED OPINION 

! 

1 

j ) 

INDUSTRIES, ) 

Appellant. ) 

BROWN, AC.J. - The Department of Labor & Industries (DLI) appeals the j 


1 superior court's reversal of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' (the Board) 
 j 

decision finding John Kovacs' application for workers' compensation benefits untimely. 

DLI contends RCW 51.28.050 bars claims not filed within one year from the date of 

injury, arguing Mr. Kovacs filed his application one day late. We agree with DLI, reverse 

the superior court, and reinstate the Board's decision. 

FACTS 

Mr. Kovacs alleged he was injured while working for his employer on September 

29,2010. He filed an application for workers' compensation benefits with DLI on 
No. 32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 


September 29, 2011.1 DLI initially allowed his claim but later rejected it as untimely 

after his employer protested under RCW 51.28.050's one-year statute of limitations. 

Treating the matter as a motion for summary judgment based on stipulated facts, the 

Board affirmed DLI 's order. Mr. Kovacs appealed to the Spokane County Superior 

Court. The superior court reversed the Board's decision and found Mr. Kovacs' 

application for benefits was timely filed. DLI appealed. 

ANALYSIS 

The issue is whether Mr. Kovacs' application for benefits was timely filed under 

RCW 51.28.050. DLI contends Mr. Kovacs had to apply for benefits within one year 

from the date of his injury, September 29,2010, and argues his application, filed on 

September 29,2011, was one day too late. 

RCW 51.28.050 provides: "No application shall be valid or claim thereunder 

enforceable unless filed within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred or 

the rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued." The language in RCW 51.28.050 is 

"inflexible," and an untimely application for benefits is void ab initio. Leschner v. Dep't 

of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911,923-24,185 P.2d 113 (1947). DLI and Mr. Kovacs 

disagree on the meaning of the statute. DLI argues RCW 51.28.050 means an 

application for benefits must be filed within one year from the date of injury. Mr. Kovacs 

argues RCW 51.28.050 means the one-year time limitation begins on the day after the 

1 September 29, 2010, was a Wednesday. September 29, 2011, was a 

Thursday. 

2 

No. 32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Oep't of Labor & Indus. 


injury consistent with RCW 1.12.040, the general counting statute for civil actions. If the 

statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it. 

The facts are stipulated; the question is whether RCW 51.28.050 is reasonably 

capable of more than one meaning. If so, we review questions regarding statutory 

interpretation de novo. Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC v. Grant County, 156 Wn.2d 

84,89, 124 P.3d 294 (2005). The court's "chief goal in analyzing and applying a statute 

is to give effect to the legislature's intent, 'and if the statute's meaning is plain on its 

face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of 

legislative intent.'" Id. (quoting Oep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 

1, 9-10,43 P.3d 4 (2002)). When a statute is unambiguous, its meaning is derived from 

the wording of the statute itself. O'Keefe v. Oep't of Labor &Indus., 126 Wn. App. 760, 

766, 109 P.3d 484 (2005). 

The Industrial Insurance Act (the Act) is "liberally construed for the purpose of 

reducing to a minimum the suffering and economic loss arising from injuries ... 

occurring in the course of employment." RCW 51.12.010. All doubts about the Act's 

meaning are resolved in favor of the injured employee. Shafter v. Oep't of Labor & 

Indus., 140 Wn. App. 1,7,159 P.3d 473 (2007). While courts have the ultimate 

authority to interpret a statute, substantial weight is given to the Board's interpretation of 

the Act. Rose v. Oep't of Labor & Indus., 57 Wn. App. 751, 757, 790 P.2d 201 (1990); 

see O'Keefe, 126 Wn. App. at 766 (the Board's significant decisions are nonbinding 

persuasive authority). 

3 

No. 32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 


The Board's authority directly addressing the issue at hand is the significant 

decision of In re Carey, No. 03 13790 (Wash. Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals Mar. 30, 2005). 

The employee was injured on November 20, 2001, and filed an application for benefits 

on November 20,2002. In re Carey, No. 03 13790 at 1-2. The Carey Board relied 

principally on Nelson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 9 Wn.2d 621, 115 P .2d 1014 

(1941), in finding the employee's application untimely under RCW 51.28.050 as it was 

filed one day late. In re Carey, No. 03 13790 at 4-6. 

The Nelson court stated: "This court has established the rule that the one year 

period in which the claim must be filed commences to run on the day of the accident." 

Nelson, 9 Wn.2d at 632; see also Crabb v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 186 Wash. 505, 

508,58 P.2d 1025 (1936) (stating the issue was whether reporting a fall which resulted 

in a sprained ankle complied with RCW 51.28.040 such that an additional application 

after the lapse ofone year from the date of injury for other injuries from the same fall 

were permitted); Beels v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 301,307,34 P.2d 917 

(1934) (finding 'a claim for benefits timely iffiled not from within one year from the date 

ofinjury to spouse but rather within one year from the time of death of a spouse); 

Sandahl v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 170 Wash. 380, 381-84, 16 P.2d 623 (1932) (in 

determining whether a claim was filed in time, the legislature intended the claim be filed 

within one year from the date of the injury); Read v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 163 Wn. 

251,252, 1 P.2d 234 (1931) (finding a claim untimely when not presented within one 

year from the date of the accident). While this rule interpreted Rem. Rev. Stat. § 

4 

No. 32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 


7686(d) that provided "[n]o application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable 

unless filed within one year after the day on which the injury occurred or the rights of 

dependents or beneficiaries accrued," the operative language of RCW 51.28.050 is 

identical. Nelson, 9 Wn.2d at 631-32. Moreover, Nelson and the cases cited therein 

involved a determination of whether the claim was timely filed; thus, contrary to Mr. 

Kovacs' assertion, the respective discussions regarding when RCW 51.28.050 begins to 

run are not dicta. 

One case, Wilbur v. Department of Labor & Industries, 38 Wn. App. 553, 686 

P.2d 509 (1984), seems to supports Mr. Kovacs' position. There, Division Two of this 

court summarily stated the employee, who was injured on August 5, 1977, had to file his 

claim for benefits "on or before Monday, August 7, 1978 (August 5, 1978, one year after 

the injury, fell on a Saturday)." Id. at 556. But in so stating, the Wilbur court did not 

discuss either RCW 51.28.050 or RCW 1.12.040. Moreover, the issue before the 

Wilbur court was not whether the application was timely filed under RCW 51.28.050; 

rather, the issue was what the term "filing" meant and/or whether the employee's 

untimely filing was excused by a rule of law or equity. Wilbur, 38 Wn. App. at 556. 

Thus, it is the language in Wilbur that is dictum. The two cases discussing RCW 

51.28.050 after the Wilbur decision reiterate the rule that the one-year statute of 

limitations begins to run on the date of the accident. See Elliott v. Dep't of Labor & 

Indus., 151 Wn. App. 442, 448-50,213 P.3d 44 (2009) (finding application for benefits 

untimely where employee who witnessed a coworker die failed to file within one year 

5 

No. 32473-7-111 

Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 

from the date of the incident even though the employee's symptoms did not immediately 

appear); Rectorv. Dep'tofLabor& Indus., 61 Wn. App. 385, 390-91, 810 P.2d 1363 

(1991) (finding application for benefits untimely where employee failed to file a claim 

within one year of when the accident occurred). 

Two additional factors strengthen OLl's argument. First, despite the Washington 

Supreme Court's interpretation of RCW 51.28.050 as starting the limitations period on 

the day of the injury, the legislature has not changed this language. See Sandahl, 170 

Wash. at 382-84 (comparing the language of predecessor statute with RCW 51.28.050). 

When the legislature amends statutes, it is presumed to have acted with knowledge of 

the existing judicial construction placed on those statutes; where it does not change the 

statute, the legislature is deemed to have acquiesced to the judicial interpretation. See 

id. at 383-84; Buchanan v. Int'l Bd. Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 

Helpers, 94 Wn.2d 508, 511, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980). Second, statutes with similar 

language have been interpreted similarly. RCW 25.15.303, which states dissolution of a 

limited liability company does not affect any claim against that company unless the 

action "is not commenced within three years after the effective date of dissolution," has 

been interpreted to mean "there is a three-year limitations period from the date of 

dissolution in which to commence suit against a limited liability company." Chadwick 

Farms Owners Ass'n v. FHC LLC, 166 Wn.2d 178,193,207 P.3d 1251 (2009) 

(emphasis added). In relation to retirement benefits, RCW 41.40.200(1 )(c) requires an 

application for a disability retirement allowance from the Public Employees' Retirement 

6 

No. 32473-7-111 

Kovacs v. Oep't of Labor & Indus. 

System, Plan I be filed within two years from the date that the injury occurred. See 

Marler v. Oep't of Ret, Sys., 100 Wn. App. 494, 499,997 P.2d 966 (2000) (stating 

employee's claim was untimely where he did not file his application within two years of 

December 6, 1988, the date of injury). 

Mr. Kovacs argues RCW 51.28.050 does not control over RCW 1.12,040. RCW 

1.12.040 provides: "The time within which an act is to be done, as herein provided, shall 

be computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a 

holiday, Saturday, or Sunday, and then it is also excluded," When two applicable 

statutes irreconcilably conflict, "the more specific statute will prevail, unless there is 

legislative intent that the more general statute controls," Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., 

Inc., 143 Wn.2d 126, 146, 18 P.3d 540 (2001). As RCW 51.28.050 is more specific 

than RCW 1.12.040 and there is no contrary legislative intent, RCW 51.28.050 prevails. 

RCW 51.28.050 unambiguously means Mr. Kovacs had one year to file his 

application for bene'flts from the day of his injury, September 29, 2010; his application 

filed on September 29, 2011, was untimely. A year is "a cycle in the Gregorian calendar 

having 365 or 366 days divided into 12 months beginning with January and ending with 

December." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2648 (1993). With 

September 29,2010, counted as the first day, the year ends on September 28,2010.2 

2 This computation of one year is in accord with the Board's interpretation of a 

year. Carey, No. 03 13790 at 4 ("Each calendar year begins on January 1 and ends on 

December 31 .... [I]n order for an application filed on November 20,2002, to be 

timely, the one-year limitation period could not have begun to run until November 21, 

2001, the day after the alleged injury."); accord Irving v. Irving, 209 III. App. 318, 320 

(1918) (calculating a year by ascertaining "the day numerically corresponding to that 

7 

No. 32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. 


If we were to accept Mr. Kovacs' argument, we would have to ignore the meaning of 

"within" found in RCW 51.28.050 and accept a strained interpretation. Plus, we would 

have to ignore the clear rule stated in Nelson that is not dicta. 

Nevertheless, Mr. Kovacs argues his claim should be allowed because when 

there is a doubt as to the meaning of RCW 51.28.050, all doubts about the meaning of 

the Act are to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker. See Cockle v. Dep't 

of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 211,16 P.3d 583 (2001). "'But it is fundamental that, 

when the intent of the legislature is clear from a reading of the statute, there is no room 

for construction.'" Elliott, 151 Wn. App. at 450 (quoting Johnson v. Dep't of Labor & 

Indus., 33 Wn.2d 399, 402, 205 P.2d 896 (1949». In sum, RCW 51.28.050 requires a 

worker to file a claim within one year from the day of injury. 

Reversed. 

Brown, A.C.J. 

day in the following year ... and the calendar year expires on that day, less one"); 

Charles v. Big Jim Coal Co., 237 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1951) (claim made on December 10, 

1948, was one day too late when cause of action arose on December 10, 1947). 

8 
No. 32473-7-111 

LA WRENCE-BERREY, 1. (concurring) - The lead opinion is correct in reversing 

the trial court. Nelson v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 9 Wn.2d 621, 632, 

115 P .2d 1014 (1941) explicitly states, "This court has established the rule that the 

one year period in which the claim must be filed commences to run on the day of 

the accident." The statutory language interpreted in Nelson is the exact same 

language oftoday's RCW 51.28.050. As an intermediate court, we are bound by 

Nelson. 

I add this concurrence because I disagree with our reliance on the board's 

significant decision in In re Carey, No. 03 13790 (Wash. Bd. of Indus. Ins. 

Appeals March 30, 2005). It is true that we give deference to an administrative 

agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers. The purpose (and therefore 

the limitation) ofthis deference is explained in Thurston County v. Cooper Point 

Association: '" [I]t is well settled that deference is appropriate where an 

administrative agency's construction of statutes is within the agency's field of 
No. 32473-7-III 

Kovacs v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus. (Concurrence) 

expertise.'" 148 Wn.2d 1, 15, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002) (quoting City ofRedmond v. 


Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 61, 959 P.2d 1091 


. (1998)). Because the statute of limitations is not a field ofthe Department of 

Labor and Industries' expertise, we need not give any deference to Carey. Rather, 

we are bound by Nelson. 

I CONCUR: 

2 

No. 32473-7-111 

FEARING, J. (dissenting)­

What a difference a day makes. Twenty-four little hours. "What a Diffrence a 

Day Makes!" Dinah Washington hit song (1959). 

The Department ofLabor and Industries (DLI) ignores a critical word in the 

controlling statute, snubs a companion statute, promotes old bad dicta rather than new 

good dicta, and shuns the liberality intended for worker compensation statutes. I would 

affirm the trial court's ruling and therefore dissent. Principles of statutory construction 

and the public policy ofprotecting injured workers compel a ruling that John Kovacs 

timely filed his worker compensation claim when he filed for benefits on September 29, 

2011 for an injury sustained on September 29, 2010. 

RCW 51.28.050 controls and imposes a one year statute oflimitations for filing a 

worker compensation claim. The statute reads: 

No application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable unless 

filed within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred or the 

rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued .... 

The question on appeal is when did the one year commence to run. Two interpretations 

compete for dominance. First, "within one year after the day upon which the injury 

occurred" means the injured worker must apply for benefits on the day before the 

anniversary of the injury. Second, the statutory language permits an application for 
32473-7-III 

Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 

benefits on the anniversary of the injury. The difference lies in whether we count both 

the day of the injury and the date of filing an application for benefits. 

Based on stray remarks in Nelson v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 9 Wn.2d 

621,115 P.2d 1014 (1941), DLI argues that RCW 51.28.050 required John Kovacs to file 

his claim by September 28, 2011, a day before the anniversary of his injury. In Nelson, 

our high court wrote: 

This court has established the rule that the one year period in which 

the claim must be filed commences to run on the day of the accident. Read 

v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 163 Wash. 251,1 P.2d 234 [1931]; 

Ferguson v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 168 Wash. 677, 13 P.2d 39 

[1932]; Sandahl v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 170 Wash. 380, 16 

P.2d 623 [1932]. 

9 Wn.2d at 632. Remarkably, the Read, Ferguson, and Sandahl decisions, upon which 

Nelson relies, utter no statement that the period runs on the day of the accident. The 

Nelson language is not only dicta, but specious dicta. 

Wilbur v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 38 Wn. App. 553, 686 P.2d 509 

(1984) is the more recent and best dicta. Leroy Wilbur sustained injury in a car accident 

on August 5, 1977, while returning from a remote road construction job. He filed his 

application for worker compensation benefits on August 8, 1978. DLI and the superior 

court denied his claim because DLI did not receive his application within one year. This 

court affirmed the dismissal, but wrote: 

In the case at bench, Wilbur's claim had to be filed on or before 

Monday, August 7, 1978 (August 5, 1978, [one] year after the injury, fell 

on a Saturday). 

2 
32473-7-111 

Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 

Wilbur v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 38 Wn. App. at 556. Thus, this court recognized that 

filing one year later fulfilled the statutory limitation period. Such a reading comes 

naturally. 

DLI argues that Wilbur v. Department ofLabor & Industries is dicta since the 

quoted language was not necessary to the case's holding. I readily agree. Nelson is also 

dicta, since the court's ruling that the limitation period started running on the date of the 

injury contributed nothing to the ruling. In Nelson v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 

9 Wn.2d at 623 (1941), the worker applied for benefits one year and eleven days after the 

injury. The Supreme Court still ordered payment of benefits. 

The cases cited in Nelson are the same. In each case, the worker applied beyond 

the anniversary of the injury. In Sandahl v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 170 

Wash. 380, 16 P.2d 623 (1932), the worker applied for benefits a year and a half after the 

injury. In Ferguson v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 168 Wash. 677, 13 P.2d 39 

(1932), the worker filed his claim six years after his work injury. In Read v. Department 

ofLabor & Industries, 163 Wash. 251, 1 P.2d 234 (1931), the worker applied for benefits 

four years after his injury. In another case relied on by DLI, Rector v. Department of 

Labor & Industries, 61 Wn. App. 385, 386, 810 P.2d 1363 (1991), the injured laborer 

filed for benefits seventeen years after the injury. 

DLI argues that the Washington legislature amended RCW 51.28.050 after Nelson 

v. Department ofLabor & Industries without modifying the statute. DLI argues that the 

failure to amend the statute equates to the legislature adopting the Nelson dicta. 

3 
32473-7-III 

Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 

Reenactment on several occasions of the statute can be legislative approval and adoption 

of a court holding. Ellis v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 88 W n.2d 844, 848, 567 P .2d 224 

(1977). Nevertheless, I doubt that a busy legislature spent any time reflecting and 

consciously deciding to approve Nelson's dicta. That is why the rule ofstatutory 

interpretation is not one of absolute binding force. Ellis v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 88 

Wn.2d at 848. In Ellis, the Supreme Court refused to follow a holding in another Nelson 

worker compensation case, Nelson v. Industrial Insurance Department, 104 Wash. 204, 

176 P. 15 (1918), despite legislative reenactment ofthe statute, because ofthe lack of 

analysis by the earlier court. 

Assuming a legislature's silence is tantamount to approval, the Washington 

legislature also amended RCW 51.28.050 in 2007, thirteen years after the 1984 Wilbur 

decision. Ifwe follow the rule of parliamentary quietude, the latest silence should 

control. Under DLI's contention, the Washington legislature adopted the Wilbur dicta by 

its adopting a new version of RCW 51.28.050 in 2007. 

RCW 1.12.040 also controls our decision. The statute reads: 

The time within which an act is to be done, as herein provided, shall 

be computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the 

last day is a holiday, Saturday, or Sunday, and then it is also excluded. 

RCW 1.12.040 is of general application and applies to statutory time limits. State 

ex reI. Earley v. Batchelor, 15 Wn.2d 149, 130 P.2d 72 (1942); State v. Levesque, 5 

Wn.2d 631, 635,106 P.2d 309 (1940); State ex rei. Evans v. Superior Court, 168 Wash. 

176, 178-79, 11 P.2d 229 (1932); Allen v. Morris, 87 Wash. 268, 274, 151 P. 827 (1915). 

4 

32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 


Early in our state's history, our high court accepted the statute as general and 

comprehensive of all questions involving a computation of time. State ex ret. Evans v. 

Superior Court, 168 Wash. at 180 (1932). DLI argues that RCW 51.28.050 is a specific 

statute and RCW 1.12.040 is a general statute and thus the former must control over the 

latter. A specific statute supersedes a general statute. Johnson v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist. 

No. 356,97 Wn.2d 419,428,645 P.2d 1088 (1982). Such an argument assumes that 

RCW 51.28.050 contains no ambiguity. John Kovacs's interpretation of the statute is a 

reasonable interpretation and thus there need not be any inconsistency between RCW 

51.28.050 and RCW 1.12.040. 

DLI's reading ofRCW 51.28.050 ignores a word implanted in the statute. RCW 

51.28.050 refers to "one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." (Emphasis 

added.) If the statute read "within one year a/the day" of injury, DLI's argument would 

improve. (Emphasis added.) Assuming any ambiguity in the statute, the term "after" 

should clarifY the legislature's intent that filing a claim exactly one year to the day of the 

injury suffices. "After" connotes that the one year begins to run the day following or 

"after" the injury. Thus, RCW 51.28.050 is consistent with the general statute RCW 

1.12.040. DLI's failure to recognize the word "after" in the statute violates the principle 

that we interpret statutes to give effect to all the language used. Cornu-Labat v. Hasp. 

Dist. No.2, 177 Wn.2d 221,231,298 P.3d 741 (2013). 

To illustrate DLI's strained reading of RCW 51.28.050, I note that DLI wrote in 

its appeal brief that September 29,2011 is one year and a day after September 29,2010. 

5 
32473-7-II1 


Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 


Br. of Appellant at 18-19. Washingtonians do not think in such terms. September 29, 

2011 is one year after September 29, 2010, not a year and a day. If it were otherwise, a 

Washingtonian born on December 16 would celebrate her birthday on December 15. 

I am mindful ofDLI's significant decision, in In re Carey, No. 03 13790 (Wash. 

Bd. Ins. Appeals Mar. 30, 2005), which rejected a claim filed on the one year anniversary 

of the injury. Carey should be rejected because the Board ofIndustrial Insurance 

Appeals (Board) based its decision on the bad dicta ofNelson v. Department ofLabor & 

Industries. The Board hypocritically characterized Wilbur as mere obiter dictum, while 

impliedly proclaiming Nelson is something more than dicta. The Board's decision also 

failed to analyze the critical word "after" in RCW 51.28.050. 

We accord substantial weight to an agency's legal interpretation to the extent that 

it falls within the agency's expertise in a special area of the law. Superior Asphalt & 

Concrete Co. v. Dep 't ofLabor & Indus., 84 Wn. App. 401,405, 929 P.2d 1120 (1996). 

The application of a statute of limitations is not within DLI's expertise, nor is a limitation 

period a special area of the law. The ultimate authority to interpret a statute rests with the 

courts. Waste Mgmt. ofSeattle, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 123 Wn.2d 621, 627­

28, 869 P.2d 1034 (1994). 

The Washington legislature enacted the worker compensation act to ensure that 

injured workers were adequately compensated. Rector v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 61 

Wn. App. 385, 390, 810 P.2d 1363 (1991). Worker compensation acts are considered 

remedial in character, the provisions of which should be construed broadly and liberally 

6 

32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 


in order to effectuate their purpose, which, among other things, is to benefit the working 

man and woman. Nelson v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d at 628 (1941). 

The worker compensation law was particularly framed to avoid legal terminology 

and the technicalities of law pleading. Nelson v. Dep 't ofLabor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d at 

629. The law was intended so that working people themselves could make and file 

claims and give the notice of injury without the expense of employing attorneys. Nelson 

v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d at 629. DLI places a technical construction on 

RCW 51.28.050 that creates a snare for working people, since DLI's reading conflicts 

with an interpretation given by a lay person. Litigants are entitled to know that a matter 

as basic as time computation will be carried out in an easy, clear, and consistent manner, 

thereby eliminating traps for the unwary who seek to assert or defend their rights. Stikes 

Woods Neighborhood Ass 'n, v. City ofLacey, 124 Wn.2d 459,463, 880 P.2d 25 (1994); 

Christensen v. Ellsworth, 134 Wn. App. 295, 301, 139 P.3d 379 (2006), rev'd on other 

grounds, 162 Wn.2d 365,173 P.3d 228 (2007). 

In Crabb v. Department ofLabor & Industries, 186 Wash. 505,58 P.2d 1025 

(1936), the claimant fell and sprained his ankle on December 20, 1932. He obtained 

worker compensation benefits for the injury and DLI closed his claim on March 15, 1933. 

On July 18, 1934, the claimant petitioned to reopen his claim on the basis that the fall 

also injured his neck but he was not aware ofthe neck injury until recently. In deciding 

whether to direct DLI to reopen the claim, the court needed to choose between two 

competing rules from other jurisdictions. The court, "[h]aving in mind the well-known 

7 

32473-7-III 


Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 


spirit and purpose of our industrial insurance act," adopted the liberal view and ordered 

reopening. Crabb v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 186 Wash. at 512. Assuming two 

competing readings of RCW 51.28.050 exist, this court should adopt the liberal view and 

affirm the trial court. 

In the end, this court must fulfill the intent of the Washington State legislature. 

The court's duty in statutory interpretation is to discern and implement the legislature's 

intent. Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769,779, 280P.3d 1078 (2012). Any statute of 

limitations period is arbitrary in nature, but DLI gives no reason as to why the 

Washington legislature would wish a rule calculating time to be different in the context of 

worker compensation law from the general rule found in RCW 1.12.040. DLI forwards 

no reason why our legislature would demand that an injured worker apply for benefits the 

day before the anniversary of the injury rather than on the anniversary of the injury. 

Many foreign decisions address the statutory language of "within one year" and 

support this dissent. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires that suit be brought 

"within one year" of the statute's violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). In Johnson v. Riddle, 

305 F.3d 1107, 1114 -15 (10th Cir. 2002), the court held that a suit filed on the one year 

anniversary of the violation was timely. 

Ohio maintained a statute that allowed a party, whose previous lawsuit was 

dismissed on grounds other than the merits, to initiate a new action "within one year 

after" the date of dismissal. In Schon v. National Tea Co., 19 Ohio App. 2d 222,250 

N.E.2d 890 (1969), the court held timely a refiling of the lawsuit on May 11, 1968 after it 

8 

32473-7-111 


Kovacs v. Dep 't Labor & Indus. (dissent) 


had been dismissed on May 11, 1967. Three hundred sixty six (366) days elapsed 

between the dismissal and refiling because of a leap year. 

A California statute barred a personal injury suit unless brought "within one year" 

of the injury. In Wixtedv. Fletcher, 192 Cal. App. 2d 706,13 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1961), the 

plaintiff instituted action on February 5, 1960 to recover damages for personal injuries 

suffered on defendant's premises on February 5, 1959. The appeals court held the suit to 

be timely. 

Oklahoma adopted a savings statute that required suits to recover real property be 

filed within one year of the effective date of the statute, April 18, 1949. In S. J. Sarkeys 

v. Martin, 286 P.2d 727 (Okla. 1955), plaintiff filed suit on April 18, 1950. The 

Oklahoma Supreme Court held the suit timely. 

Rogers v. Etter, 67 Tenn. 13 (1874) illustrates the timelessness of the timeliness 

rule advocated by John Kovacs. Under the Tennessee code, a woman could bring suit 

against a husband's executor "within one year" of discoverture. Eliza Rogers' husband 

died on November 9, 1869, and she brought suit on November 9, 1870. The Tennessee 

high court held her suit timely. 

I respectfully dissent: 

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