alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Occupational Outlook Quarterly • Fall 2005

36

For some workers, employment roads less traveled 

are the only way to go. 

Current Population Survey data show that as many 

as 14 million people—about 11 percent of all workers—

were employed in alternative arrangements in February 

2005. Unlike most traditional work arrangements, alternative arrangements do not always guarantee steady or 

lasting work. But they often have other advantages, such 

as variety, flexibility, or greater control over work schedules and assignments.

The chart shows the three categories of alternative 

employment arrangements for which data on worker 

preferences are collected. These data indicate which 

workers are happiest with their alternative arrangements. 

Independent contractors were the most likely to prefer 

their arrangement over a traditional one. Independent 

contractors provide a product or service to customers 

they obtained on their own. These workers enjoy a large 

degree of autonomy, as most are self-employed; they also 

tend to have higher-than-average earnings, which may 

add to the appeal of their jobs. 

Not all workers in alternative employment arrangements favored their situations. Some workers may accept 

an alternative arrangement, particularly over the shortterm, when they are unable to find a traditional job. This 

might explain why more than half of all temporary workers reported that they would prefer traditional employment. 

Data are from the February Supplement to the Current Population Survey. For more information, write to 

the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Labor 

Force Statistics, 2 Massachusetts Avenue NE., Room 

4675, Washington, DC 20212; call (202) 691-6378; or 

visit online at www.bls.gov/cps.

Preferences of workers in 

alternative arrangements

Note: The percents in the chart do not sum to 100 because of rounding and because some workers 

did not respond or said that their preferences depended on circumstances.

Occupational Outlook Quarterly • Fall 2005

36

Preferences of workers in alternative arrangements, February 2005 

(percent)

Independent contractors On-call workers Temporary help agency workers

9%

32

56

45 46

82%

Prefer traditional arrangement

Prefer alternative arrangement
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dekania Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Vernhes, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ---------------- |  | -----------------------
|                        |  |  | 
|Date: November 19, 2008 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ PAUL VERNHES
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  | Paul Vernhes           
|                        |  |  |  |     |  |                  |  | Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of BNP Residential Properties, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Philip
S. Payne, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



  /s/ Philip S. Payne

Philip S. Payne
Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer


February 23, 2004






                                       69
<PAGE>
@conference{1206941,
  author = {Shelly Bagchi and Patrick Holthaus and Gloria Beraldo and Emmanuel Senft and Daniel Hernandez Garcia and Zhao Han and Suresh Kumaar Jayaraman and Alessandra Rossi and Connor Esterwood and Antonio Andriella and Paul Pridham},
  title = {Towards Improved Replicability of Human Studies in Human-Robot Interaction: Recommendations for Formalized Reporting},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-03-13 04:03:00},
  publisher = {Companion of the 2023 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction, Stockholm, SE},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936040},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3568294.3580162},
  language = {en},
}
[ J
- 16 - 201 8 ] [M.O.
- Wecht, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA,

Appell ee

v.

JORDAN ALEXANDER CLEMONS ,

Appell ant : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 738 CAP Appeal from the J udgment of S entence entered on 5/15/15 in the Court of Common Pleas, Washington County, Criminal Division at No. CP

- 63

- CR

0000236

- 2012

SUBMITTED: April 9 , 2018

CONCURRING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: January 23, 2019

I join Sections I

- IV and VI

- X of the majority opinion, and concur in the result as to Section V. Section V relates to the assertion that the trial court erred in not providing a voluntary intoxication instruction. Although I agree Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim, I would not conclude that “the record is devoid of any evidence proving that [Appellant] actually ingest ed any intoxicants” during the relevant timeframe. Majority Opinion, slip op . at 38 (emphasis added) . As the majority notes , there was evidence
that Appellant may have used drugs at some point in time close to the incident, and h e

was perceptibly intoxic ated when he was taken in for questioning by the police. Although these proofs do not establish the time at which Appellant may have ingested[J

- 16

- 2018 ] [M.O.

– Wecht, J.]

- 2

drugs or alcohol, they do make it more likely that he was under the influence of some sort of intoxicant at the t ime of the murder. I nonetheless concur in the result because, in my view, the evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Appellant
acted subject to diminished capacity at the relevant time

. See generally Commonwealth
v. Markman , 5 91 Pa. 249 , 284

- 85, 916 A.2d 586 , 607 (2007) (explaining that defendants are constitutionally entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense for which there is sufficient record evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in his favor). With that said, when there is some evidence along these lines, determining
whether it is sufficient to entitle the defendant to the requested instruction may be an imprecise undertaking . As such, it would be preferable if, in close cases , trial courts
sim ply gave the instruction and let the jury weigh the facts accordingly. Such practice
would enhance the fairness of the trial , avoid the risk of error resulting in the grant of a new trial, and reduce the need for appellate courts to make those types of su fficiency
determinations on a cold record

.
<PAGE>
                                                                     Exhibit 4.9

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                           HALLIBURTON CAPITAL TRUST I

     This Certificate of Trust is being executed as of November 29, 2001 for the

purpose of creating a business trust pursuant to the Delaware Business Trust

Act, 12 Del. C. (SS) 3801 et seq. (the "Act").

     The undersigned hereby certify as follows:

     1.   Name: The name of the business trust is Halliburton Capital Trust I

(the "Trust").

     2.   Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the Delaware

resident trustee of the Trust meeting the requirements of Section 3807 of the

Act are as follows:

          Chase Manhattan Bank USA, National Association
          500 Stanton Christiana Road
          Building 4 - 3rd Floor
          Newark, Delaware 19713

     3.   Effective. The Certificate of Trust shall be effective immediately

upon filing in the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware.

     4.   Counterparts. This Certificate of Trust may be executed in one or more

counterparts.

<PAGE>

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the trustees of the

Trust, have duly executed this Certificate of Trust as of the day and year first

above written.

                                           CHASE MANHATTAN bank USA,
                                           NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
                                           as Delaware Trustee


                                           By: /s/Denis Kelly
                                              ----------------------------------
                                              Name: Denis Kelly
                                              Title: Assistant Vice President


                                            /s/Susan S. Keith
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Susan S. Keith, as Trustee


                                            /s/John M Allen
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           John M. Allen, as Trustee


                                            /s/Bruce A. Metzinger
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Bruce A. Metzinger, as Trustee


                                       -2-
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 6616** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ARTHUR LEE WALKER, a/k/a Ace, a/k/a Florida , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia , at Martinsburg
. Gina M. Groh , Chief District Judge. ( 3:13

- cr - 00011

- GMG

- RWT

- 1; 3:14

- cv - 00077

- GMG

- RWT; 3:13

- cr - 00023

- GMG

- RWT

- 2; 3:14

- cv - 00078

- GMG

- RWT )

Submitted : September 13 , 2016 Decided: September 15, 2016

Before TRAXLER, AGEE , and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Arthur Lee Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia; Jarod James Douglas, Robert Hugh McWilliams, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Arthur Lee Walker seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Walker has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conte ntions are3 adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### Snapper Realty, LLC, Respondent, v Duane Reade et al., Appellants, and Sunoco, Inc. (R & M), Respondent.

[821 NYS2d 472]

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff has an easement over the property of the defendant-counterclaim-plaintiff Dorothy Basson Martin Trust, the defendants-counterclaim-plaintiffs appeal from stated portions of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dollard, J.), entered March 7, 2005, which, upon a decision of the same court dated November 23, 2004, inter alia, denied those branches of their motion which were for summary judgment on their second counterclaim for compensatory and punitive damages for trespass, for injunctive relief, and for an award of costs and the imposition of a sanction upon the plaintiff pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, and dismissed the second counterclaim pursuant to CELR 3212 (b).

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim for injunctive relief and to recover damages for trespass. The defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in response to the plaintiffs prima facie showing that neither it nor its employees entered upon or caused anyone to enter upon the defendants’ property at any time *(see Golonka v Plaza at Latham,*270 AD2d 667, 669 [2000]; *Kaplan v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook,*12 AD3d 410, 412 [2004]; *see also Ward v City of New York,*15 AD3d 392, 393 [2005]).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for an award of costs and the imposition of a sanction against the plaintiff *(see*22 NYCRR 130-1.1; *Chang v SDI Intl. Inc.,*15 AD3d 520, 521 [2005]).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Luciano, J.E, Rivera, Lifson and Covello, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tianyin Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report’), I, Quoqing Jiang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.








Date:  November 13, 2009





/s/  Guoqing Jiang





Guoqing Jiang


Chief Executive Officer & Chairman
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4(c)

                             LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS
                               December ___, 2001


[shareholder name]
[shareholder address -1]
[shareholder address -2]

Dear Shareholder:

Uroplasty, Inc. has commenced a Rights Offering to its shareholders. Under the
terms of the Rights Offering, each shareholder of record as of December ___,
2001 is being given the right to purchase two shares of Uroplasty Common Stock
and one common stock purchase warrant for each share owned as of the Record
Date. The total subscription price in order to exercise each right is $2.00. The
warrant permits the purchase of one additional share of Common Stock by the
holder for a two year period for $2.00 per share. In addition, shareholders who
exercise all of their rights will receive an Oversubscription Privilege, which
allows them to purchase additional shares of Common Stock, subject to
availability.

The proceeds of the Rights Offering are being used primarily to continue funding
the clinical research studies for our Investigational Device Exemption required
by the FDA, which is needed in order to make Macroplastique available for sale
in the United States, and secondarily for other general corporate purpose.

Enclosed is a Prospectus dated December ___, 2001, together with a Rights
Subscription Certificate, which expires January 31, 2002. The Rights
Subscription Certificate must be completed and returned by the end of the Basic
Offering Period on January 30, 2002 in order for it to be valid. Following this
period, rights not previously exercised will be made available for exercise on a
pro rata basis by those shareholders who exercised all of their rights pursuant
to the Basic Subscription Privilege. Subscription Certificates for those
purchases will be distributed after January 30, 2002 to shareholders who
exercised all of their rights in the Basic offering.

To subscribe to the Offering, please read the Prospectus and the enclosed
instructions and then complete and return the Rights Subscription Certificate
with payment to Uroplasty, Inc., 2718 Summer Street NE, Minneapolis, Minnesota
55413-2820. Please contact us if you have any questions concerning this
offering.

Very truly yours,



Daniel G. Holman
President/CEO
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 7409

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Petitioner

- Appellee ,

v. DUANE LETROY BERRY , Respondent

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. ( 5:20

- hc

- 02085

- BR )

Submitted : December 22, 2020 Decided: December 29, 2020

Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Duane Letroy Berry , Appellant Pro Se. Genna Danelle Petre, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Duane Letroy Berry

— a former federal criminal defendant against whom a civil commitment proceeding is pending

— seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting h is request to hold evaluations and deadlines in abeyance and directing the clerk to terminate a hearing. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545

- 47 (1949). The order Berry seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdicti on. We deny Berry’s motions to
amend or correct the record or certified list , to recall and stay the order, and to substitute party. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before t his court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
ON

, 

.

.,

Plaintiff,

V.

ORDER

DIBO ATTAR,

Defendant.

CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Dibo Attar’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Cole,

Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard, P.A.’s (“Cole Schotz” or “Plaintiff’) complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 1 2(b)(7) [Docket No. 8]. On December 27,2011, Magistrate JudgeJoseph A. Dickson issued a Report and Recommendation that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss bedenied. No objections have been filed thereto. The Court has considered the submissions of the

parties, and Judge Dickson’s Report and Recommendation dated December 27, 2011, and for

substantially the same reasons stated therein,

IT IS on this 17th day ofJanuary, 2012,

ORDERED that this Court adopts Judge Dickson’s December 27, 2011 Report and

Recommendation and thus denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint.

s/ Claire C. Cecchi

HON. CLAIRE C. CECCHIUnited States District Judge
#### SMITH v. EMPLOYERS FIRE INS. CO. SAME v. NORTH RIVER INS. CO. SAME v. HOME INS. CO.

Nos. 950, 1027, 949.

District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

March 23, 1940.

Kremer, Branand & Hayes, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Burry, Johnstone, Peters & Dixon, of Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

HOLLY, District Judge.

The complaints in these cases allege that defendants had each issued a policy of insurance on a yacht on account of the owner, that plaintiff was the owner of the yacht and that after the issuance of the policies the yacht was damaged to an amount exceeding $84,000.

In each of these cases defendant has moved for a bill of particulars. The grounds for the motion are that defendants are informed that plaintiff had other insurance on his vessel, had been fully indemnified for his loss and has no interest in the suit; that if the particulars called for were given the fact that plaintiff had no financial or other interest in the litigation would appear upon the record, whereupon a motion to dismiss could be made and would have to be sustained, thereby ending the litigation promptly and with a minimum of expense.

 While I favor a liberal interpretation of the rules, and an early determination of the issues involved in a case is greatly to be desired, I do not think I should attempt to change the rules laid down by the Supreme Court. In drafting these rules the committee which _ had the matter in charge carefully distinguished between information necessary to enable a party to reply to a pleading and that necessary to present its defense. The former may be obtained by a motion for a bill of particulars, Rule 12(e), Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, the latter by interrogatories, Rule 33.

The motion for a bill of particulars will be denied. An order accordingly will be entered March 26, 1940.
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 19-2169

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

BERNARD LINDSEY,

Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court, issued on June 29, 2021, is amended 

as follows:

On page 4, line 4, replace "CDP" with "CPD"