court awarded $3,000 of Brady's requested $27,825 in attorney fees based 

upon NSTR 27(b)(4). Brady appealed. 

Brady argues that the NSTR 27(b)(4) cap on attorney fees is 

unconstitutional and violates this court's rule-making powers under NRS 

2.120(1). 1We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, 

except where attorney fees issues implicate questions of law, which this 

court reviews de novo. Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 90, 

127 P.3d 1057, 1063 (2006). Constitutional issues are questions of law 

reviewed de novo. Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 939, 142 P.3d 

339, 345 (2006). 

A threshold issue that must be addressed is whether Brady 

waived any argument that NSTR 27(b)(4) is unconstitutional by failing to 

opt out of the short trial program. "Waiver requires the intentional 

relinquishment of a known right." Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 44, 49, 152 P.3d 737, 740 (2007). The 

required intent may be inferred from conduct that is "so inconsistent with 

an intent to enforce the right" that it is reasonable to believe that the 

party has relinquished the right. Id. 

Here, NSTR 4(a)(1) provides that participation in the short 

trial program is mandatory after court-annexed arbitration. NSTR 5(a)(1), 

'Although not briefed by either party, the parties' arguments 

implicate separation of powers. As we have clarified, NRS 2.120(2) is a 

"legislative recognition" of this court's inherent rule-making powers, not 

an unconstitutional limit on them. Berkson v. LePome, 126 Nev. 492, 499, 

245 P.3d 560, 565 (2010); State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 

953, 961, 11 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2000). Therefore, the issue that appellant 

seeks to raise in this appeal is not whether NSTR 27(b)(4) violates NRS 

2.120(2), but whether this court exceeded its inherent rule-making powers 

under the Nevada Constitution when it promulgated NSTR 27(b)(4). 

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, J. , J. 

however, provides that any party may remove a case from the short trial 

program by filing a demand for such removal within 10 days of service of a 

request for a trial de novo. After 10 days, a party may still make a motion 

to remove the case from the short trial program, which may be granted for 

good cause. NSTR 5(a)(1). Here, it is undisputed that Brady did not 

request that this matter be removed from the short trial program. This 

conduct is inconsistent with the intent to seek full attorney fees, see Nev. 

Yellow Cab Corp., 123 Nev. at 49, 152 P.3d at 740, and we therefore hold 

that Brady waived any right to seek an award of attorney fees under 

NSTR 27(b) greater than NSTR 27(b)(4)'s cap. 2Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judg o of the district court AFFIRMED. 

1 

2 l3ased on NSTR 5(a)(1)'s removal provisions, we reject Brady's 

argument that Farmers may, with impunity, always request a trial de 

novo after arbitration and only be subject to the short trial program 

attorney fee rules. 

Other avenues are also available for an award of attorney fees in the 

short trial program when faced with vexatious litigants, frivolous 

arguments or defenses, or harassment. See NRCP 11 (providing for 

sanctions for bad faith conduct, which applies to short trials under NSTR 

1(c)); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that the 

federal courts have the inherent power to sanction litigants, including 

awarding appropriate attorney fees, for bad faith conduct in litigation 

before the court). We thus also reject Brady's argument that NRS 

18.010(2)(b) should apply because it is the only remedy available to 

prohibit parties from behaving in a harassing manner in the short trial 

program 

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cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge 

Hon. Blair C. Parker, Judge Pro Tempore 

Law Office of David Sampson 

Upson Smith/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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