14-2738-cv (L) 

A Star Grp., Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or 

after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a 

party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary 

order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by 

counsel.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

2 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th 3 day of July, two thousand fifteen. 

4 

5 PRESENT: 

6 ROBERT D. SACK,

7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

8 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

9 Circuit Judges.

10 __________________________________________ 

11 

12 THE A STAR GROUP, INC., 

13 

14 Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, 

15 

16 v. Nos. 14-2738-cv (L), 14-

17 2877-cv (XAP), 14-2882-cv 

18 (XAP), 14-2884-cv (XAP) 

19 

20 MANITOBA HYDRO, KPMG LLP (CANADA),

21 KPMG LLP (US), MANITOBA PUBLIC UTILITIES 

22 BOARD, 

23 

24 Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

25 __________________________________________

26 

27 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT- Jesse Strauss, Strauss Law PLLC, New 

28 CROSS-APPELLEE: York, New York. 

29 
 

2 

1 

2 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE-CROSS- Michael R. Hepworth and Robert J. Alessi, 

3 APPELLANT MANITOBA HYDRO: DLA Piper LLP (US), New York, NY. 

4 

5 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES- Daniel B. Goldman and Kevin P. 

6 CROSS-APPELLANTS KMPG (CANADA) Broughel, Paul Hastings LLP, New York, 

7 and KPMG (US): NY. 

8 

9 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE- Kenneth E. Lee, Seth L. Levine, Lara J. 

10 CROSS-APPELLANT MANITOBA Fogel, and Miriam L. Alinikoff, Levine 

11 PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD: Lee LLP, New York, NY. 

12 

13 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

14 of New York (Crotty, J.). 

15 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

16 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the June 30, 2014 judgment of the District Court is 

17 AFFIRMED. 

18 Plaintiff The A Star Group, Inc. (“AStar”) brings this action against defendants 

19 Manitoba Hydro (“Hydro”), KPMG LLP (Canada) and KPMG LLP (US) (collectively, 

20 “KPMG”), and the Manitoba Public Utilities Board (the “PUB”) for breach of contract, 

21 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misappropriation of trade secrets, 

22 unfair competition, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, and copyright 

23 infringement, in violation of New York and federal law. AStar appeals the District Court’s 

24 grant of defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims and entry of judgment dismissing the 

25 action with prejudice. Defendants cross-appeal the District Court’s denial of their request 

26 for attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

27 underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary 

28 to explain our decision. 

29 AStar is a New York-based risk consulting and software firm. AStar served as a 

30 consultant for Hydro, a Canadian hydro-electric power company, and purports to have 

31 discovered that Hydro was exposed to significant losses and that its customers faced public 
 

3 

1 safety risks. Styling itself a whistleblower, AStar disclosed its view of Hydro’s risks to the 

2 PUB, a branch of the provincial government of Manitoba charged with regulating utility 

3 rates. In connection with the disclosure, AStar provided the PUB with reports containing its 

4 risk analyses, which it later withdrew. Thereafter, Hydro hired KPMG, a consulting firm 

5 that AStar alleges to be its competitor, to assist in Hydro’s investigation of and response to 

6 AStar’s reports. AStar’s claims in this suit arise from defendants’ allegedly unauthorized use 

7 and distribution of its reports and related materials, which AStar asserts contained its 

8 proprietary and confidential information. 

9 The District Court dismissed AStar’s claims against the PUB for lack of subject 

10 matter jurisdiction. The parties do not dispute that the PUB is a foreign governmental entity 

11 entitled to the immunities provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 

12 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., unless AStar can show that a statutory exception applies—a 

13 hurdle that the District Court found AStar failed to clear. The District Court dismissed 

14 AStar’s claims against Hydro and KPMG under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), ruling that neither 

15 Hydro nor KPMG violated any agreement with AStar and that the complaint was devoid of 

16 factual allegations supporting the remaining state-law claims. The District Court determined 

17 that AStar’s infringement claim under the Copyright Act (the “Act”), 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 

18 was deficient because AStar did not complete registration of its works before filing suit. It 

19 declined, further, on futility grounds, to allow AStar to amend the complaint to reflect the 

20 works’ subsequent registration, explaining that AStar did not plausibly allege an infringement 

21 claim in any event, absent allegations regarding how or when defendants improperly copied 

22 the works. Finally, it denied Hydro’s request under section 505 of the Act for attorneys’ 

23 fees—a request made on behalf of all defendants—on the ground that AStar’s position was 

24 “not entirely frivolous or unreasonable.” See A Star Grp., Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro, No. 13 Civ. 

25 4501(PAC), 2014 WL 2933155, at *6 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014). 
 

4 

Upon de novo review,1 1 we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed AStar’s 

2 claims against the PUB for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed AStar’s 

3 claims against Hydro and KPMG under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

4 We affirm these rulings substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its well5 reasoned opinion and order. See A Star Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 2933155. 

6 As to AStar’s copyright claim, we affirm, but for reasons other than those principally 

7 relied on by the District Court. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 

8 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1994). The District Court based its dismissal on AStar’s failure to 

9 register its works before filing suit. When AStar filed its complaint on June 28, 2013, it had 

10 submitted two applications for registration one day prior, on June 27. Registration was not 

11 granted until July 2. Our Court has not yet determined, however, whether a merely pending 

12 application for registration satisfies the Act’s requirement that a work be registered before a 

13 related infringement suit is filed. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (providing that “no civil action for 

14 infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until 

15 preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with” the 

16 Act); see Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2014). Our Sister 

17 Circuits have adopted varying approaches to the question. See Psihoyos, 748 F.3d at 125 

18 (collecting cases). 

19 We need not reach the issue here, however, because even assuming an answer in 

20 AStar’s favor, its allegations do not state a claim for relief. AStar described itself in its 

21 complaint as “the owner of copyright rights to Timetrics software and related 

22 documentation, including without limitation, Timetrics screenshots, graphic representations, 

23 data compilations, source code, object code, programming tools, and documentation related 

24 to Timetrics technology, and derivative works thereof,” and sought damages for 

25 infringement of all of these alleged works. App. 72, 82. AStar applied and registered for 

 

1 See, e.g., Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. 

Co. v. P.T. Jamsostek (Persero), 600 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 

5 

1 copyrights only on “Screen Shots” of “text, compilation, [and] artwork,” however, and 

2 deposited with the U.S. Copyright Office certain operational risk reports, in the form of 

3 charts and graphs, apparently generated by the Timetrics software. Supplemental App. 159, 

4 161, 164-83. It describes these registered materials on appeal as “graphical representations 

5 of its code.” Appellant’s Br. 32. But a party may not amend its pleadings through 

6 statements in its briefs. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998). 

7 Even were we to consider this new formulation of AStar’s infringement claim, the complaint 

8 does not adequately allege defendants’ ostensibly infringing use of the copyrighted screen 

9 shots. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim 

10 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). We conclude, therefore, that AStar fails to 

11 state a viable copyright infringement claim. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. 

12 Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In order to establish a claim of copyright 

13 infringement, a plaintiff with a valid copyright must demonstrate that . . . the defendant has 

14 actually copied the plaintiff’s work . . . .”(internal quotation marks omitted)).

15 As to the defendants’ cross-appeal, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse 

16 its discretion by denying defendants’ request under the Act for attorneys’ fees. Section 505 

17 of the Act allows a district court “in its discretion” to award reasonable attorneys’ fee to the 

18 prevailing party on a Copyright Act claim. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Defendants argue principally 

19 that an attorneys’ fees award is warranted here because before AStar initiated this action, 

20 defendants advised AStar that its copyright claim was defective for want of registration and 

21 AStar failed to cure this defect. As discussed above, however, whether a pending application 

22 meets the Act’s registration requirement remains an open question in this Circuit, and for 

23 this reason among others we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in 

24 denying the attorneys’ fees request. 

25 

26 * * * 
 

6 

1 We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them to be without 

2 merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 

3 

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court