Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 121 / Thursday, June 25, 2009 / Proposed Rules 30259 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 52 

[EPA–R04–OAR–2008–0676–200820(b); 

FRL–8903–7] 

Approval and Promulgation of Air 

Quality Implementation Plans; 

Tennessee; Approval of Revisions to 

the Knox County Portion 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: EPA is taking direct final 

action to approve a revision to the Knox 

County portion of the Tennessee State 

Implementation Plan (SIP) submitted by 

the State of Tennessee on April 21, 

2008. The revision pertains to the Knox 

County Department of Air Quality 

Management (KCDAQM) Regulation, 

Section 25.0 ‘‘Permits,’’ specifically 

subsection 25.6—Exemptions. This 

revision removes ‘‘mobile sources’’ from 

the list of exempted air contaminant 

sources, with respect to operating 

permits and reserves subsection 25.6.A. 

This revision is part of KCDAQM 

strategy to attain and maintain the 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards 

for 8-hour ozone, particulate matter 

(PM)2.5 and PM10. This revision was 

certified by the Tennessee Department 

of Environment and Conservation to be 

at least as stringent as the State of 

Tennessee’s existing requirements in 

Chapter 1200–3–9–.04 ‘‘Exemptions,’’ 

and is being approved pursuant to 

section 110 of the Clean Air Act (CAA). 

In the Final Rules Section of this 

Federal Register, EPA is approving the 

State’s SIP revision as a direct final rule 

without prior proposal because the 

Agency views this as a noncontroversial 

submittal and anticipates no adverse 

comments. A detailed rationale for the 

approval is set forth in the direct final 

rule. If no adverse comments are 

received in response to this rule, no 

further activity is contemplated. If EPA 

receives adverse comments, the direct 

final rule will be withdrawn and all 

public comments received will be 

addressed in a subsequent final rule 

based on this proposed rule. EPA will 

not institute a second comment period 

on this document. Any parties 

interested in commenting on this 

document should do so at this time. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before July 27, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, 

identified by Docket ID No. EPA–R04– 

OAR–2008–0676, by one of the 

following methods: 

1. http://www.regulations.gov: Follow 

the on-line instructions for submitting 

comments. 

2. E-mail: benjamin.lynorae@epa.gov. 

3. Fax: (404) 562–9019. 

4. Mail: ‘‘EPA–R04–OAR–2008– 

0676,’’ Regulatory Development Section, 

Air Planning Branch, Air, Pesticides and 

Toxics Management Division, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

Region 4, 61 Forsyth Street, SW., 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303–8960. 

5. Hand Delivery or Courier: Ms. 

Lynorae Benjamin, Chief, Regulatory 

Development Section, Air Planning 

Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics 

Management Division, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

Region 4, 61 Forsyth Street, SW., 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303–8960. Such 

deliveries are only accepted during the 

Regional Office’s normal hours of 

operation. The Regional Office’s official 

hours of business are Monday through 

Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., excluding 

federal holidays. 

Please see the direct final rule which 

is located in the Rules section of this 

Federal Register for detailed 

instructions on how to submit 

comments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Ms. Twunjala Bradley, Regulatory 

Development Section, Air Planning 

Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics 

Management Division, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, 

Region 4, 61 Forsyth Street, SW., 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303–8960. The 

telephone number is (404) 562–9352. 

Ms. Bradley can also be reached via 

electronic mail at 

bradley.twunjala@epa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: For 

additional information see the direct 

final rule which is published in the 

Rules section of this Federal Register. 

Dated: June 15, 2009. 

Beverly H. Banister, 

Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4. 

[FR Doc. E9–14871 Filed 6–24–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD 

INVESTIGATION BOARD 

40 CFR Chapter VI 

[Docket No. CSB–09–01] 

Chemical Release Reporting 

AGENCY: Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Clean Air Act requires 

that the Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board (CSB) establish a 

regulation which would require that 

accidental chemical releases be reported 

to the CSB or to the National Response 

Center. With this advance notice of 

proposed rulemaking, the CSB seeks to 

obtain comments on how best to 

proceed with implementing this 

requirement. The CSB will use this 

information in the development of a 

proposed and then a final rule. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received by the CSB on or before August 

4, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit written 

comments, identified by docket number 

CSB–09–01, by either of the following 

methods: 

• E-mail: anpr@csb.gov. Include 

CSB–09–01 in the subject line of the 

message. 

• Mail/Express delivery service: 

Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board, Office of General 

Counsel, Attn: C. Kirkpatrick, 2175 K 

Street, NW., Suite 650, Washington, DC 

20037. 

Instructions: All comment 

submissions must include the agency 

name and docket number. All comments 

received, including any personal 

information provided, will be made 

available to the public without 

modifications or deletions. For detailed 

instructions on submitting comments 

electronically, including acceptable file 

formats, see the ‘‘Electronic Submission 

of Comments’’ heading in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

Docket: For information on access to 

the docket to read comments received 

by the CSB, see the ‘‘Inspection of 

Comments’’ heading in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Christopher Kirkpatrick, at (202) 261– 

7600. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Statutory Requirement 

The CSB was established by the Clean 

Air Act Amendments of 1990. The 

statute directs the CSB, among other 

things, to: 

[I]nvestigate (or cause to be investigated), 

determine and report to the public in writing 

the facts, conditions, and circumstances and 

the cause or probable cause of any accidental 

release resulting in a fatality, serious injury 

or substantial property damages; and 

[R]ecommen[d] measures to reduce the 

likelihood or the consequences of accidental 

releases and propos[e] corrective steps to 


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make chemical production, processing, 

handling and storage as safe and free from 

risk of injury as is possible. * * * 

42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(6)(C)(i) and (ii). 

The CSB’s enabling legislation also 

includes a requirement that the CSB: 

[E]stablish by regulation requirements 

binding on persons for reporting accidental 

releases into the ambient air subject to the 

Board’s investigatory jurisdiction. Reporting 

releases to the National Response Center, in 

lieu of the Board directly, shall satisfy such 

regulations. The National Response Center 

shall promptly notify the Board of any 

releases which are within the Board’s 

jurisdiction. 

42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(6)(C)(iii). 

The statute also directs the 

Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce the 

reporting requirements promulgated by 

the CSB. See 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(6)(O). 

Although the CSB’s enabling 

legislation was enacted in 1990, the CSB 

did not begin operations until 1998. 

Since 1998, the CSB has not 

promulgated an accidental release 

reporting requirement as envisioned in 

the CSB enabling legislation. With the 

development of the Internet and other 

new information sources, the CSB has 

maintained that it could learn of most 

serious chemical accidents from these 

sources along with reports of chemical 

releases required to be filed with the 

National Response Center for purposes 

of timely identification of incidents 

appropriate for CSB on-site 

investigations. The CSB has not 

attempted to systematically conduct 

national surveillance activities of 

chemical incidents or releases. 

Recommendations To Implement 

Reporting Rule 

In 2004, the Inspector General 

recommended that the CSB implement 

the statutory reporting requirement: 

‘‘The CSB needs to refine its mechanism 

for learning of chemical incidents, and 

it should publish a regulation describing 

how the CSB will receive the 

notifications it needs.’’ (Department of 

Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 

General, A Report on the Continuing 

Development of the U.S. Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 

OIG–04–04, Jan. 2004, at 14.) Recently, 

the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) also recommended that the CSB 

fulfill its statutory obligation by issuing 

a reporting regulation. (U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, 

Chemical Safety Board: Improvements 

in Management and Oversight Are 

Needed, GAO–08–864R, Aug. 22, 2008, 

at 11.) 

The CSB recognizes that a reporting 

regulation is clearly required by the 

statute. Based on these audit 

recommendations and its own more 

recent experience, the CSB has 

concluded that a reporting rule would 

also be helpful to the CSB in improving 

the timeliness, completeness, and 

accuracy of the information it now 

collects on chemical incidents. For 

example, the CSB recognizes that there 

is sometimes a delay between some 

chemical incidents and media coverage 

and that a rule could potentially 

improve the CSB’s ability to learn of 

certain incidents in a timelier manner 

before an accident site is disturbed or 

evidence is lost. The CSB also 

recognizes that a requirement to report 

certain information on chemical 

incidents, in addition to fulfilling its 

statutory mandate, could help the 

agency develop better information on 

chemical incidents occurring in the 

United States, and help both the agency 

and other organizations to identify 

issues and trends, and thereby further 

the cause of preventing chemical 

incidents. For these reasons, the CSB 

now intends to promulgate and 

implement a reporting rule as required 

by its enabling legislation after 

collecting input from all interested 

parties. 

Important Issues 

Some of the more important issues for 

the CSB’s consideration and for public 

comment are as follows: 

Purpose of Rule—Incident Notification 

and Collection of Incident Data 

In the past, the CSB has argued that 

the sole purpose of a reporting 

regulation is to inform the CSB of major 

incidents warranting the deployment of 

investigators. (GAO–08–864R, at 70.) 

GAO has suggested that the value of a 

reporting rule is broader than ensuring 

that the CSB receives mere notification 

of incidents, stating that a rule would 

‘‘better inform the agency of important 

details about accidents that it may not 

receive from current sources.’’ (GAO– 

08–864R, at 11.) GAO also suggested 

that the information obtained through a 

reporting rule could improve the CSB’s 

ability to ‘‘target its resources, identify 

trends and patterns in chemical 

incidents, and prevent future similar 

accidents.’’ (GAO–08–864R, at 7.) These 

goals are typically those of a 

comprehensive surveillance program. 

Due to this focus on surveillance goals 

and more accurate incident data (as 

opposed to mere notification), it is 

important to describe how the CSB has 

previously collected such information 

and what it hopes to achieve in 

promulgating a rule. 

The CSB described the process it uses 

for receiving notice of and determining 

whether to investigate chemical 

incidents in a 2006 report to Congress: 

The CSB has a designated chemical 

incident screener on duty 24 hours a day, 

seven days a week. A combination of 

notification services including the National 

Response Center, the National Transportation 

Safety Board [NTSB] Communications 

Center, and various news outlets, serve as 

sources of information to identify chemical 

incidents as they occur. The incidents in the 

database do not comprise an exhaustive list 

of all chemical incidents that occurred in the 

country on any given day. Incidents logged 

in the CSB incident-screening database are 

scored using a formula that measures several 

factors relevant to its potential selection for 

investigation. These factors include: Injuries/ 

fatalities; public evacuation; ecosystem 

damage; potential for consequences; learning 

potential; property losses; public concern; 

history of the company. 

The factors assessing public and worker 

injuries and fatalities are given greater weight 

in the scoring system. Once scored, the 

factors are averaged, and based on the 

numerical score the incident is then assigned 

a priority level * * *. Deployment decisions 

are made in accordance with the CSB 

incident selection protocol. The decision to 

deploy a team of investigators to the site of 

a chemical incident often needs to be made 

before an incident can be scored with 

complete certainty. Consequently, incidents 

may be re-scored if new information is 

obtained on site. 

(Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board, Report on Chemical 

Incident Screening Database, Feb. 2006, 

at 3.) 

With some refinements, this is 

essentially the process that the CSB uses 

today for learning of incidents and 

making investigation deployment 

decisions. The agency has discontinued 

its contract with the NTSB 

Communications Center, but continues 

to rely on reports from the National 

Response Center and from media 

sources. As the agency has added news 

services and as internet search engines 

have become more and more powerful, 

the number of incidents that are logged 

into the CSB’s system has increased 

substantially, from about 600 per year 

when CSB began keeping a somewhat 

rudimentary database of ‘‘screened’’ 

incidents, to over 1,000 incidents per 

year currently. The sole source of 

information for the majority 

(approximately two-thirds) of screened 

incidents is media reports. (OIG–04–04, 

at 14 n. 37; M.R. Gomez, et al., The CSB 

Incident Screening Database: 

Description, Summary Statistics and 

Uses, J. Hazard. Mater. 159 (2008) 119– 

129.) Reports of most serious incidents 

(which are the ones most likely to 

involve deploying investigators) are 


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very often received from media sources 

first, even if the incident is also reported 

to the National Response Center and the 

report forwarded to the CSB later. This 

is significant, because the CSB seeks to 

make deployment decisions as quickly 

as possible so that investigators can 

arrive at the accident site within the 

first 24 to 48 hours after the time of the 

initiating event, in order to begin the 

investigation while the evidence is less 

likely to be disturbed and the witnesses’ 

testimony is fresh. Thus, the CSB 

believes that a reporting rule would 

complement, rather than replace, the 

existing mechanisms by which the CSB 

typically learns of chemical incidents. 

The CSB’s collection of incident 

information thus was an outgrowth of 

the CSB’s effort to make its incident 

selection process more transparent and 

predictable, and was not done with the 

intention of establishing a formal 

national surveillance system or creating 

a valid and reliable chemical incident 

database. However, GAO noted that the 

CSB has sometimes used the database, 

in testimony to Congress and in other 

contexts, to give a sense of the scope of 

serious chemical incidents. GAO further 

noted the problems of accuracy and 

completeness with the information on 

incidents in the database: 

We found that CSB lacks a long-term 

strategy to improve quality controls, and the 

data [in the database] remain somewhat 

inaccurate and incomplete. For example, 

when we analyzed a subset of accidents in 

the database involving fatalities and injuries, 

we found at least five accidents (about 6 

percent of the cases reviewed) where 

fatalities were not correctly recorded in the 

database. We also found seven accidents 

(about 4 percent of the cases reviewed) where 

data on injuries were missing as a result of 

incomplete data entry. Moreover, CSB does 

not have procedures to ensure that data has 

been entered accurately. The lack of datareporting regulations and these data quality 

problems limit CSB’s ability to target its 

resources, identify trends and patterns in 

chemical accidents, and prevent future 

similar accidents. 

(GAO–08–864R, at 7.) 

The CSB has already taken steps to 

improve the accuracy of information on 

chemical incidents that it collects, 

including software changes and 

supervisory controls on data entry. The 

CSB foresees that a reporting rule will 

further its current efforts to improve 

data collection and would permit more 

accurate surveillance of chemical 

incidents. 

Coordination With Other Chemical 

Incident Reporting Requirements 

The CSB has previously noted that 

EPA, the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA), and the 

Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR) all collect 

chemical incident information for 

various purposes. (GAO–08–864R, at 

70.) In drafting a new requirement, the 

CSB will seek to avoid unnecessary 

duplication with various other reporting 

requirements. 

Specifically, the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act 

(CERCLA) requires that companies 

immediately report to the National 

Response Center releases over the 

reportable quantities of any of several 

hundred listed hazardous substances 

and other substances with hazardous 

characteristics. See 42 U.S.C. 9603; see 

also 40 CFR 302.4 (table of hazardous 

substances reportable under this section 

of CERCLA). The Emergency Planning 

and Community Right to Know Act 

(EPCRA) requires that companies report 

hazardous chemical releases potentially 

affecting the public to the Local 

Emergency Response and State 

Emergency Response office. For certain 

companies, the EPCRA also requires 

annual reports of releases of listed toxic 

chemicals during the previous 12 

months. See 42 U.S.C. 11004, 11023. 

Facilities that are subject to the Risk 

Management Program (RMP) rule must 

report annually on any accidental 

releases that are reportable under that 

rule. See 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(B)(i)–(ii) 

(mandating the Risk Management 

Program and regulatory scheme); see 

also 40 CFR part 68 (the Chemical 

Accident Prevention Provisions (CAPPs) 

that include the RMP rules); 40 CFR 

68.130 (listing the reportable substances 

under the RMP). Workplace fatalities, 

including those caused by accidental 

chemical releases, must be reported 

within eight hours to OSHA. See 29 CFR 

1904.39. 

ATSDR has collected information 

about chemical incidents from more 

than a dozen states for several years— 

although the data have some limitations, 

such as the exclusion of incidents 

related to petroleum products. The 

program is called the Hazardous 

Substances Emergency Events 

Surveillance (HSEES), and information 

about its history can be found at 

http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HS/HSEES/ 

index.html. The ATSDR has expressed 

interest in building upon its current 

efforts. Its Web page also contains 

information about this effort. 

Threshold for Report 

The CSB’s current resources limit the 

number of detailed investigations it can 

conduct each year, and the CSB believes 

that an initial notification reporting rule 

should likely focus on selected, highconsequences events (for example, 

incidents that result in death, serious 

injuries requiring in-patient 

hospitalization, large public 

evacuations, very substantial property 

damage, or acute environmental 

impact). Such an approach to 

notification for high consequence events 

and reporting for others would reduce 

the reporting burden on industry and 

the volume of information to be 

collected and managed. Based on 

available information, the CSB believes 

there are likely to be at most a few 

hundred incidents throughout the 

country each year that would require 

reporting to the CSB if the threshold is 

set at a level to capture serious 

consequences or substantial near miss 

situations. Of course, limiting the 

threshold for reporting an incident 

would not limit the CSB’s investigatory 

jurisdiction. 

Statutory Definitions 

The CSB notes that existing chemical 

release reporting requirements are 

generally triggered by a list of chemicals 

and a threshold amount for each 

chemical. On the other hand, the CSB 

may investigate any incident resulting 

in serious consequences (fatality, 

serious injury, or substantial property 

damage) that involves an emission into 

the ambient air of any RMP-listed 

hazardous substance or other extremely 

hazardous substance, no matter what 

quantity is present or released. See 42 

U.S.C. 7412(r)(2)(A), 7412(r)(6)(C)(i). 

The CSB has not defined such terms as 

‘‘ambient air,’’ ‘‘extremely hazardous 

substance,’’ ‘‘serious’’ injury, or 

‘‘substantial’’ property damage, but 

would likely need to do so in 

promulgating a rule. 

Collection of Initial Report 

A rule could require that a report be 

made directly to the CSB through an 

electronic form on the CSB Web site, or 

to the National Response Center, as 

provided by the CSB’s enabling statute. 

With respect to the latter option, the 

legislative history of the CSB statute 

further explains: 

The regulations of the Board for accident 

reporting may provide that any person 

directed to make a report contact the 

National Response Center rather than the 

Board directly. This will assure coordination 

of such reports with responsibilities under 

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation and Liability Act, the Clean 

Water Act and the Hazardous Materials 

Transportation Act. If the National Response 

Center is to be the initial point of contact 

under such rules, then the Board shall assure 

that officials at the National Response Center 

promptly notify the Board or its officers 


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whenever an accidental release requiring an 

investigation has occurred. 

S. Rep. No. 101–228, at 236 (1989), 

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 

3620. 

Among other considerations, cost is a 

concern with using the National 

Response Center as a receiving point for 

reports to the CSB. The CSB received a 

preliminary estimate from the National 

Response Center that establishing and 

operating a dedicated CSB reporting line 

(toll-free telephone number) would cost 

$450,000 per year. 

Compliance Education 

Because the chemical accidents that 

the CSB can investigate may occur at a 

wide range of companies and operations 

but are relatively infrequent events, a 

rule could apply to many parties which 

could potentially, but likely will not, 

experience a serious chemical incident 

at some point. Most of those parties 

would have no direct contact with the 

CSB unless a serious incident occurred. 

Thus, the CSB must also consider how 

best to educate potentially affected 

parties about compliance with any final 

rule. 

Approaches 

The CSB has identified four general 

approaches for implementing the 

statutory requirement, as described 

below, but is open to additional 

suggestions: 

(1) A comprehensive approach would 

require the reporting of information on 

all accidental releases subject to the 

CSB’s investigatory jurisdiction. The 

CSB is concerned that this approach 

might be unnecessarily broad in scope, 

duplicative of other federal efforts 

concerning chemical incident 

surveillance, and may not be necessary 

for the CSB to learn of most significant 

incidents that would justify an on-site 

investigation. 

(2) A targeted approach would require 

reporting of basic information (e.g., 

location, date, and time of incident; 

chemical involved; number of injuries) 

for incidents that met significant 

consequence thresholds (incidents that 

result in death, serious injuries 

requiring in-patient hospitalization, 

large public evacuations, very 

substantial property damage, or acute 

environmental impact). Such an 

approach would be consistent with that 

taken by several other federal agencies, 

whose accident reporting rules 

incorporate the same or similar 

consequence-based criteria. Examples of 

this type of rule include the NTSB 

railroad accident notification rule (49 

CFR 840.3); Department of 

Transportation rules on notification of 

hazardous materials accidents (49 CFR 

171.15), gas pipeline accidents (49 CFR 

191.5), and hazardous liquid pipeline 

accidents (49 CFR 195.50); and the 

OSHA work-related accident reporting 

rule (29 CFR 1904.39). 

A related approach would require 

reports from certain high risk facilities 

no matter what the specific 

consequences of the incident. For 

example, the EPA Office of Inspector 

General recently issued a report which 

identified three different approaches to 

identifying high risk facilities covered 

by the RMP rule. (U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency, Office of Inspector 

General, EPA Can Improve 

Implementation of the Risk Management 

Program for Airborne Chemical 

Releases, 09–P–0092, Feb. 10, 2009, at 

17). Similar criteria could be employed 

in a rule to require that certain facilities 

promptly report incidents to the CSB. 

Based on such targeted reports, the 

CSB could determine whether the 

owner/operator would be required to 

submit additional, detailed information 

to the CSB for evaluation and further 

investigation. 

(3) A third approach would require 

owners or operators to report to the CSB 

more extensive information on chemical 

incidents in their workplace when 

notified by the CSB. The agency would 

continue to rely primarily on existing 

sources for initially learning of chemical 

incidents, but would follow up on a 

subset of the incidents (e.g., those with 

the most serious consequences, based 

on initial reports, and a sample of all 

others) to gather additional information 

through a questionnaire or on-line form 

that the reporting party would be 

required by the rule to complete and 

submit to the CSB. This approach would 

be primarily aimed at addressing the 

data quality problems of accuracy and 

completeness of information on 

incidents in the CSB’s incident 

database. It would also allow the CSB to 

collect more complete and in-depth 

information on incidents than is 

generally available in the minutes and 

hours immediately after an incident. For 

example, the information required could 

go beyond the location, date, and time 

of incident, and also include 

information on the materials involved, 

the nature of the incident (e.g., chemical 

reaction, untested presence of 

flammables, etc.), and type of operation, 

as well as more complete information 

on consequences. This approach would 

formalize what the CSB screening 

personnel currently do, i.e., follow up 

(primarily by telephone) with 

companies and responders on 

approximately 60 incidents each year to 

gather detailed information on the 

consequences, as well as the processes 

and chemicals involved, beyond what is 

contained in media or NRC reports. 

(4) A fourth approach to a reporting 

requirement could be based upon the 

presence or release of specified 

chemicals and specified threshold 

amounts. However, CSB investigations 

have shown that serious consequences 

may and do result from the release of 

relatively small amounts of chemicals, 

and from chemicals that are not likely 

to be listed. 

Information Sought 

The CSB seeks comments and 

information in advance of drafting a 

proposed regulation to implement the 

accidental release reporting 

requirement. In addition to comments 

addressing the issues and approaches 

described above, the CSB is also 

interested in comments that address the 

following specific questions: 

• Are there Federal, State, or local 

rules or programs for reporting chemical 

or other types of incidents that would be 

an appropriate model for the CSB to 

consider in developing a reporting 

requirement? 

• Should an initial report be made to 

the CSB or the National Response 

Center? 

• What information should be 

reported to the CSB? 

• How soon after an accident should 

reporting occur? 

• Should the rule be designed with 

distinct requirements for rapid 

notification of high-consequence 

incidents and more systematic (and 

slower) notification of other incidents? 

• What specific factors (such as lists 

of chemicals or specific consequences) 

should the CSB consider in drafting a 

proposed rule? 

• How should the CSB gather 

information on incidents (such as 

combustible dust explosions and 

reactive chemical incidents) that may 

not involve specifically listed hazardous 

substances? 

• How might this reporting 

requirement best be tailored to avoid 

duplication with existing sources of 

information on chemical incidents, 

including federal, state, or local 

reporting requirements? 

• How might the CSB best target 

compliance education efforts? 

Electronic Submission of Comments 

You may submit comments by e-mail 

to: anpr@csb.gov. Please include CSB– 

09–01 in the subject line of the message. 

Comments may be submitted in the 

body of the e-mail message or as an 

attached PDF, MS Word, or plain text 


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ASCII file. Files must be virus-free and 

unencrypted. Please ensure that the 

comments themselves, whether in the 

body of the e-mail or attached as a file, 

include docket number CSB–09–01 and 

your full name and address. 

Inspection of Comments 

All comments received by the CSB 

will be available to the public upon 

request. To obtain copies of the 

comments or arrange an appointment to 

inspect the comments at CSB 

headquarters (2175 K Street, NW., Suite 

650, Washington, DC 20037) during 

normal business hours, please call the 

CSB at (202) 261–7600. 

Dated: June 18, 2009. 

John S. Bresland, 

Chairman, Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board. 

[FR Doc. E9–14835 Filed 6–24–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6350–01–P 


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