alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### McELWAIN v. WICKWIRE SPENCER STEEL CO.

No. 242.

District Court, W. D. New York.

Jan. 17, 1940.

William L. Clay, of Rochester, N. Y., for plaintiff.

Dudley, Stowe & Sawyer, of Buffalo, N. Y. (Roy P. Ohlin, of Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant.

KNIGHT, District Judge.

This is a suit to recover on account of alleged negligence. Issue has not been joined. Defendant moves to strike certain portions of the complaint and for a bill of particulars.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, requires that a pleading shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” and that each averment of a pleading shall be “simple, concise and direct.” It is not amiss to call attention to this rule, which has not been followed, though this motion is not made to strike the entire pleading.

While some of the paragraphs to which the motion to dismiss as directed contain redundant matter, it seems sufficient here to deny the motion to dismiss as to these and require the service of a bill of particulars in the respects hereinafter specified.

1. Allowed.

2. Denied.

3. Allowed to the extent that the plaintiff is required to state the machines or type of machines claimed to have created impurities.

4. Denied.

5. Denied.

6. Allowed.

7. Allowed to the extent that the plaintiff is required to state the nature of his injuries, the duration and the extent of disability therefrom.

This motion is made before the joinder of issue. The two provisions of Rule 12(e) are to be read with substantially the same effect, and the bill of particulars required must be strictly limited to matters necessary for a party to prepare for trial. The purpose of the bill of par*178ticulars under the old rules is supplanted by the provisions of the new rules for discovery, interrogatories and production of documents. The way to obtain proofs before trial is through other provisions of the rules. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 1, p. 654; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Harrisburg T. Co., D.C., 27 F.Supp. 987; Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. W. Va. Pulp & P. Co., D.C., 25 F.Supp. 598. In many other cases the effect of the provisions of Rule 12 (e) has been construed. With the exception of the particulars allowed, as hereinbefore, it seems to me the other demands are in the main allowable under new Rules 26 to 37, inclusive.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302OF THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Sean O. Casey, M.D., certify that:

 

1.              I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Qof Virtual Radiologic Corporation;

 

2.              Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.              Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

 

4.              The registrant’s other certifying officer andI are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))for the registrant and have:

 

(a)         Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;

 

(b)        Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)         Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the caseof an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

 

5.              The registrant’s other certifying officer andI have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofthe registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

(a)         All significant deficiencies and material weaknessesin the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b)        Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.

 

 
|   | Date:  | July 31, 2008 | By:    | /s/ Sean O. Casey, M.D. |
|--------|--------|--------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|   |   |               |   | Sean O. Casey, M.D.     |
|   |   |               |   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
#### Shanda Batts, Appellant, v Medical Express Ambulance Corp. et al., Respondents.

[853 NYS2d 54]

*295Defendants satisfied their burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiffs claims of permanent and significant limitations by submitting the affirmation of their expert orthopedist. Although defendants initially submitted the affirmation unsigned, the court properly permitted them to serve a signed, otherwise identical, copy of the affirmation with their reply papers, which caused no prejudice to plaintiff *(see Aguilar v N.Y.C. Water Works,*298 AD2d 245 [2002]; *DiLeo v Blumberg,*250 AD2d 364, 365 [1998]).

Plaintiffs unsworn MRI report noting a disc herniation at L5-S1 was admissible, as it was cited in the affirmations of both plaintiffs and defendants’ medical experts *(see Pommells v Perez,*4 NY3d 566, 577 n 5 [2005]). However, in the absence of additional objective medical evidence of attendant significant physical limitations, it failed to establish an issue of fact *(see Lloyd v Green,*45 AD3d 373, 374 [2007]). The finding of a limited range of motion in plaintiffs lumbar spine was not made as a result of a medical examination until nearly 15 months after the accident and is too remote to raise a triable issue as to causation *(see Lopez v Simpson,*39 AD3d 420, 421 [2007]; *Lloyd*at 374). Moreover, plaintiff offered no expert assessments, either quantitative or qualitative, of the condition of his cervical spine and left shoulder *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350-351 [2002]).

Defendants’ objective medical evidence indicating that plaintiff did not suffer disabling injuries as a result of the accident established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that he experienced substantial curtailment of his daily activities for 90 of the first 180 days following the accident *(see Lloyd,*45 AD3d at 373-374; *Lopez,*39 AD3d at 421). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in the form of competent objective evidence substantiating his 90/180-day claim *(see Ortega v Maldonado,*38 AD3d 388 [2007]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Gonzalez and Acosta, JJ.
<PAGE>



                                   Exhibit 21
                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

The following are the subsidiaries of Sterling Financial Corporation:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                    Subsidiary                           State of Incorporation or Organization
  --------------------------------------------          ---------------------------------------
<S>                                                     <C>
  Bank of Lancaster County, N.A.                             (National Banking Association)
  1 East Main Street
  PO Box 0300
  Strasburg, PA  17579

       Town & Country Leasing, LLC                                    Pennsylvania
       1097 Commercial Avenue
       East Petersburg, PA  17520

       Sterling Financial Trust Company                               Pennsylvania
       101 North Pointe Boulevard
       Lancaster, PA  17601-4133

       Equipment Finance, Inc.                                        Pennsylvania
       118 West Airport Road
       Lititz, PA  17543

            EFI Holdings, Inc.                                          Delaware
            Wilmington, DE  19803

  Sterling Mortgage Services, Inc.                                    Pennsylvania
  101 North Point Boulevard
  Lancaster, PA  17601-4133

  T & C Leasing, Inc.                                                 Pennsylvania
  1097 Commercial Avenue
  East Petersburg, PA  17520

  The First National Bank of North East                      (National Banking Association)
  14 S. Main Street
  North East, Maryland 21901

  Bank of Hanover and Trust Company                                   Pennsylvania
  25 Carlisle Court
  Hanover, PA  17371

  HOVB Investment Company                                               Delaware
  103 Foulk Road, Suite 202
  Wilmington, DE  19803

  Sterling Financial Statutory Trust I                                Pennsylvania
  101 North Pointe Boulevard
  Lancaster, PA  17601

</TABLE>


                                       93
Labor Employer Reporting Instructions

Part IV – Particular Types of Compensation Payments

Chapter 2: RUIA Compensation and Multiple Employers

1

Prorating RUIA Contributions Among Multiple Employers

 

Unlike compensation under the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 

compensation and contributions under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) may 

be prorated among the multiple employers. If an employee of a national or system unit also 

worked for another covered employer in the same month, the employee's combined earnings are 

creditable up to the monthly RUIA maximum. If the combined earnings exceed the RUIA 

monthly maximum, the creditable RUIA compensation may be prorated or allocated between the 

two employers. The method of prorating is not set by the RRB but by an agreement between the 

two employers. Any method which yields the correct RUIA compensation is acceptable to the 

RRB. 

If the RUIA compensation is prorated between a national or system unit and another covered 

employer, the national or system unit must retain the records of the employee's earnings from the 

other employer for the full payroll retention period (5 years), provided by the employee. 

Information regarding employer record retention is in Part V, Chapter 9. 

Example of Prorating RUIA Contributions with Primary Employer 

One common method of apportioning RUIA compensation between two employers is for the 

system unit to report RUIA compensation only in the amount not reported by the primary 

employer. If the primary employer has reported RUIA compensation in an amount less than the 

monthly maximum, subtract the compensation reported by the primary employer from the 

monthly maximum. This remainder is the amount of RUIA compensation to be reported by the 

system unit. However, do not exceed the total earnings paid by the system unit for the month. 

Example of Prorating RUIA Contributions as a Percentage 

Another method of apportioning RUIA compensation is for each employer to report RUIA 

compensation in a ratio equal to the ratio of the gross earnings paid by the two employers.

• Determine the total earnings for the month and the total creditable RUIA compensation 

based on the total earnings. 

 

• Determine the ratio of the system unit earnings to the total earnings. 

• Multiply the creditable RUIA compensation by the system unit ratio. This will yield the 

system unit share of RUIA compensation under this method. 

These two methods of RUIA compensation prorating are illustrated in Appendix V.
Occupational Outlook Quarterly • Winter 2004-05

48

Teachers, prekindergarten and kindergarten

Typists

Secretaries

Private household cleaners

 and servants

Registered nurses

Licensed practical nurses

Dressmakers

Percent increase in men’s share of employment, 1983-2002

35,000

31,000

31,000

164,000

19,000

11,000

15,000

Men’s

employment,

2002

Source: Current Population Survey

39

42

44

71

78

277%

39

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Airplane pilots and navigators

Firefighting occupations

Automobile mechanics

Civil engineers

Millwrights

Supervisors, police and detectives

Automobile body and related repairers

Percent increase in women’s share of employment, 1983-2002

8,000

12,000

29,000

3,000

20,000

5,000

5,000

Women’s

employment,

2002

Source: Current Population Survey

167

174

177

186

315

360

369%

Many occupations are dominated by either female workers or male workers. Most physical 

therapists are women, for example, and most 

engineers are men. But according to data from the U.S. 

Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey, 

these differences have lessened in numerous occupations. 

People often look beyond traditional gender roles in 

choosing careers. In the charts below, each occupation 

had more than 95 percent of workers of one sex in 1983, 

and the share of workers of the opposite sex in each occupation increased in the years that followed. The charts 

show changes in employment share between 1983 and 

2002, the years for which comparable data are available.

Automobile body and related repairers had the greatest shift. At one time, almost all of these repairers were 

Some occupations becoming 

more gender-neutral

men—yet between 1983 and 2002, the share of women 

working in this occupation more than tripled. The upper chart shows the occupations in which women had 

the most significant increases, but women boosted their 

employment share in nearly all occupations. Similarly, as 

the lower chart shows, men have had some notable gains 

in occupations dominated by women. 

A percent increase in employment share describes a 

shift in the distribution of men and women in an occupation. But an increase in employment share does not 

indicate the actual number of jobs held by workers of a 

particular sex. For example, although men’s participation 

in dressmaking increased dramatically between 1983 and 

2002, relatively few male workers (11,000) were employed in the occupation in 2002.

Male-dominated 

occupations in which 

women increased their 

share of employment, 

1983-2002

Female-dominated 

occupations in which 

men increased their 

share of employment, 

1983-2002
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL

- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 14a0827n.06
No. 14

- 1067

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT TERRIE M. HEIBEL, JOSEPH T. KRYWICKI, and SUSAN C. KRYWICKI , Plaintiffs

- Appellants ,

v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION,
Defendant

- Appellee , FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,
Intervenor

- Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEFORE: GIBBONS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; and DOW, District Judge. 
PER CURIAM. In 2008, Terrie Heibel and Joseph Krywicki signed a note and mortgage to purchase a house in Holland, Michigan, in which their daughter and grandchildren could live. After default and foreclosure on the home, the foreclosing creditor assigned its interest in the property to the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) , which by
that time had been placed in to conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) . Fannie Mae then brought an action to evict the daughter from the residence. In
response, Heibel, Krywicki, and their daughter initiated a separate state court action against

 The Honorable Robert M. Dow , Jr. , United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.No. 14

- 1067

Heibel, et al. v. Feder

al National Mortgage Association

- 2

- Fannie Mae a nd its predecessors in interest, alleging violation of their constitutional due process rights. After defendants removed and FHFA intervened as conservator, the district court held that Fannie Mae was not a government entity subject to such a constitutional limitation and dismissed the due process claim

. Heibel and her family ask us to review that decision, and
whether Fannie Mae is a government actor presents the sole question in th is appeal.
We have recently answered that exact question in the negative , fully cognizant of FHFA’s conservatorship

. S ee Rubin v. Fannie Mae , No. 13

- 1010, 2014 WL 480 0282, at *1

– 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014); Bernard v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg

. Ass’n , No. 13

- 1477, 2014 WL 4800123,
at * 4 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014)

. We have similarly rejected arguments that Fannie Mae’s twin, Freddie Mac, is a government actor for the purpose of constitutional claims. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Gaines , No. 13

- 1249, 2014 WL 4815274, at *1

– 2 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014);
Mik v. Fe d. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. , 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014). Given the full reasoning of those cases, n o more explanation is necessary here . We agree with the holding of
the district court and affirm its judgment.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

 

We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption"Experts" and the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement ofMagic Lantern Group, Inc. Form S-3 (No. 333-101974) of our report relating to thefinancial statements of Magic Lantern Group, Inc. as of December 31, 2003 and2002, and for the two years in the period ended December 31, 2003 which appearsin the Annual Report to Shareholder's for the year ended December 31, 2003.

 

                                                                    MAHONEY COHEN & COMPANY, CPA, P.C.

 

New York, NY May 26, 2004
[986 NE2d 436, 963 NYS2d 618]

#### In the Matter of Arisleda Duarte, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant.

Argued February 14, 2013;

decided March 21, 2013

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel,*New York City *(Fay Ng, Pamela Seider Dolgow*and *Janice Birnbaum*of counsel), for appellant.

*1068
      *Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP,*New York City *(Valentina M. Morales*of counsel), and *Nixon Peabody LLP,*Manchester, New Hampshire *(Morgan Nighan*of counsel), for respondent.

*Morningside Heights Legal Services, Inc.,*New York City *(Philip M. Genty*of counsel), for Columbia Law School Prisoners and Families Clinic, amicus curiae.

*Steven Banks, Legal Aid Society,*New York City *(Dori A. Lewis*of counsel), for Prisoners’ Rights Project of the New York City Legal Aid Society, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The appeal should be dismissed, without costs, as moot.

Respondent City of New York has asked us to review whether it was error for the Appellate Division to conclude that it was arbitrary and capricious for the New York City Department of Correction to deny petitioner’s application to enter the nursery program at the Rose M. Singer Center at Rikers Island. We agree with petitioner that this proceeding is moot because her child is now of an age that renders him ineligible for participation in the nursery program pursuant to Correction Law § 611. Moreover, in light of the Department of Correction’s revised nursery order, effective February 11, 2013, we decline to invoke the mootness exception *(see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]).

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Rivera concur.

Appeal dismissed, without costs, as moot, in a memorandum.
ACCEPTED

12-14-00145-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

7/20/2015 4:14:25 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 7/20/2015 4:14:25 PM CATHY S. LUSK Clerk
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 97-6300
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JAMES ROBERT CASEY, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-89-429-A, CA-96-1668-AM) Submitted: May 20, 1997 Decided: June 12, 1997 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.James Robert Casey, Appellant Pro Se. Michael R. Smythers, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104- 132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we denya certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Casey , Nos. CR-89- 429-A, CA-96-1668-AM (E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 1996). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
H. Res. 776 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

January 7, 2020. 

Resolved, That a committee of two Members be appointed by the Speaker to notify the President of the United 

States that a quorum of the House has assembled and that 

the House is ready to receive any communication that he may 

be pleased to make. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
****Exhibit 32.3****

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2012 of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Guillermo Sabater, Comptroller of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all in material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Guillermo Sabater                                       

Name:  Guillermo Sabater

Title:    Comptroller and