NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROGER A. ANDERSON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DAVID J. SHULKIN, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-2197

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 15-3830, Senior Judge Alan G. 

Lance, Sr.

______________________ 

Decided: November 13, 2017

______________________ 

 ROGER A. ANDERSON, Cottage Grove, MN, pro se.

 ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

CLAUDIA BURKE; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, DEREK SCADDEN, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
2 ANDERSON v. SHULKIN

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, REYNA, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Roger A. Anderson appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

affirming the Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision denying 

Mr. Anderson’s claimed entitlement to an earlier effective 

date for his service-connected ischemic heart disease. For 

the reasons discussed below, we dismiss this appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Anderson is a veteran who served in the United 

States Army. He served on active duty from September 

1967 to September 1970, and his service included a period 

in the Republic of Vietnam where he presumptively was 

exposed to Agent Orange. 

In July 2001, Mr. Anderson initiated a claim with the 

St. Paul, Minnesota Regional Office (“RO”) seeking service 

connection for his Type 2 diabetes and high blood pressure. In a February 2002 rating decision, the RO granted 

his request for service connection for his diabetes and 

high blood pressure, and assigned an effective date of July 

9, 2001. 

Ten years later, in July 2011, Mr. Anderson filed a 

claim with the RO seeking service connection for a blunted heart rate response to exercise with possible myocardial ischemia. In an October 2011 rating decision, the RO 

denied service connection for a lack of clinical diagnosis of 

this condition. Mr. Anderson filed a notice of disagreement against the decision, but he did not file an appeal. 

Accordingly, the RO’s October 2011 decision became final 

one year after it issued. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302.
ANDERSON v. SHULKIN 3

In November 2012, Mr. Anderson sought to reopen his 

claim for service connection for heart disease. The RO

granted the request, noting that ischemic heart disease 

was recently added to the list of disabilities recognized as 

being related to herbicide exposure and that 

Mr. Anderson established a clinical diagnosis in a January 2013 examination. The RO assigned a 100-percent 

disability rating and an effective date of November 9, 

2012, the date Mr. Anderson had sought to reopen his 

claim. 

In March 2014, Mr. Anderson appealed the RO’s effective date determination to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(“Board”). On September 21, 2015, the Board denied 

Mr. Anderson’s claim, and maintained the November 9, 

2012 effective date. 

In making this decision, the Board cited the applicable law governing Mr. Anderson’s effective date for his 

heart condition. “[T]he effective date of an evaluation and 

award of pension, compensation or dependency and indemnity compensation based on an original claim, a claim 

reopened after final disallowance, or a claim for increase 

will be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement rose, whichever is the later.” App. 8; 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. The Board reasoned that the 

later date of Mr. Anderson’s November 2012 request to 

reopen his claim for service-connected heart disease

controlled. The Board next addressed Mr. Anderson’s 

three arguments. 

First, Mr. Anderson argued the information he submitted in support of his 2001 claim for diabetes and high 

blood pressure also supported his claim for serviceconnected heart disease. The Board disagreed. While 

recognizing that a veteran may claim benefits informally 

and that the Board had a duty to “fully and sympathetically develop a Veteran’s claim to its optimum,” the Board

reasoned that Mr. Anderson “did not assert prior to 
4 ANDERSON v. SHULKIN

2011—either expressly or impliedly—that he had a heart 

disorder which should be service-connected.” App. 10.

Second, although Mr. Anderson alleged that he had 

heart disease in 2001, the Board reasoned that even if 

true, this date was not controlling because the later date 

between the onset of a condition and a request to reopen 

service connection controls. App. 11. 

Third, Mr. Anderson sought an earlier effective date

based on certain regulations enacted in response to the 

Nehmer v. United States Veterans’ Administration class 

action litigation. However, the Board explained that 

those regulations would apply only if Mr. Anderson had 

submitted a claim for service-connected heart disease 

before August 2010. In this case, the Board reasoned, the 

earliest date Mr. Anderson submitted a claim for serviceconnected heart disease was July 2011.

Mr. Anderson appealed the Board’s decision to the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Appeals Court”). The Veterans Appeals Court 

affirmed, finding that the Board did not clearly err in 

determining that November 9, 2012 was the proper effective date for Mr. Anderson’s service-connected heart 

disease. App. 2. Mr. Anderson argued that the information he provided in support of his 2001 claim for diabetes and high blood pressure also supported his claim for 

heart disease, but the Veterans Appeals Court disagreed. 

It found that “the Board explicitly found that 

[Mr. Anderson] expressed no intent to file a heart disease 

claim in 2001, despite the submission of medical evidence” 

and the Veterans Appeals Court found no error in this 

determination. App. 3. In response to Mr. Anderson’s 

argument that the evidence was in equipoise such that he 

was entitled to the benefit of the doubt, the Veterans 

Appeals Court reasoned that “the Board specifically 

determined that the evidence of record was not in equi-
ANDERSON v. SHULKIN 5

poise, and the appellant has not demonstrated that this 

determination was incorrect.” App. 4.

Mr. Anderson sought reconsideration and panel review of the Veterans Appeals Court’s decision. In February 2017, the Veterans Appeals Court denied his 

reconsideration request but granted the motion to the 

extent it sought panel review. In March 2017, 

Mr. Anderson moved for review by the full Veterans 

Appeals Court, which the Veterans Appeals Court denied 

on April 7, 2017. Mr. Anderson timely appealed to this 

court. 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review Veterans Appeals Court decisions is limited by statute. Unless an appeal raises a 

constitutional issue, we lack jurisdiction to review “a 

challenge to a factual determination” or a “challenge to a 

law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular 

case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

Mr. Anderson does not challenge the validity of any 

statute or regulation or the interpretation thereof. See 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). The Veterans Appeals Court’s review 

of the Board’s denial of an earlier effective date for 

Mr. Anderson’s service-connected heart disease involves 

only the application of law to fact.

Mr. Anderson makes a number of arguments that all 

hinge on whether the information he provided in 2001 

amounted to a claim for service-connected heart disease. 

However, “the factual findings of when a disability was 

claimed or service connection established are not subject 

to our review.” Butler v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010). Nor do we possess jurisdiction to review the 

Veterans Appeals Court’s conclusion that the Board

satisfied its obligation to sympathetically construe 

Mr. Anderson’s claims. See Ellington v. Peake, 541 F.3d 

1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Finally, we lack jurisdiction 
6 ANDERSON v. SHULKIN

to review the Veterans Appeals Court’s conclusion that 

the Board correctly determined that the evidence was not 

in equipoise. See Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F.3d 1072, 

1075 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Because Mr. Anderson’s arguments 

all center on the application of law to fact, namely whether his 2001 claim amounted to a claim for serviceconnected heart disease, we lack jurisdiction to hear this 

appeal.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Anderson’s appeal from the Veterans Appeals 

Court is dismissed. 

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.