NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

:

NORMAN MORSE, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 10-6408 (SRC)

:

v. : OPINION

:

PAULA G. KAPLAN, et al, :

:

Defendants. :

____________________________________:

CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, by Defendants Paula Kaplan and Sara Youner (incorrectly

named in the Complaint as Younger) [docket entry no. 6]. Plaintiff has opposed the motion

[docket entry no. 7]. The Court has considered the papers filed by the parties and rules on the

written submissions and without oral argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

In short, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. §

1692 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (hereinafter “FDCPA”) stemming from two

debt collection letters written by Kaplan to Plaintiff. (Compl. at Ex. A and Ex. B). The Third

Circuit has held that whether a least sophisticated debtor would be misled by a particular

communication is a question of law. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 n.2 (3d Cir.

2000). Violations of §1692e (whether the letter is false, deceptive or misleading) will also be

decided as a matter of law because like the “the interpretation of language in contracts or similar

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written documents, [the analysis] does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, and

therefore, presents a question of law.” Id. (citing Terran v. Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432-33 (9th

Cir. 1997)). 

While the least sophisticated debtor standard “protects naive consumers, it also ‘prevents

liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient

of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with

care.’” Quadramed, 255 F.3d at 354-55 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Fin. Svcs., Inc., (4th Cir.

1996)). The critical language in the Kaplan letters reads as follows:

If any portion of this claim is disputed, you are to notify me within 30 days of your

receipt of this notice indicating the dispute. If within that time you do indicate a dispute

in writing, I shall provide you with the evidence supporting the validity of the debt. The

debt will be assumed to be valid if you do not respond within 30 days. 

(emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that the least sophisticated debtor would be confused as to

whether the debt would be assumed valid within thirty days of the date of the letter or within

thirty days of receipt of the letter. 

The relevant time period is clearly delineated in the first sentence above, “within 30 days

of your receipt of this notice.” It is clear that the debtor has 30 days to give notice indicating a

dispute. If such notice is received, evidence supporting the debt will be provided; if no notice is

given (“if you do not respond”), the debt will be assumed valid. It is obvious that all references

to a time period in this excerpt reference the original “within 30 days of your receipt of this

notice.” Any other interpretation would be “bizarre or idiosyncratic.” Accordingly, judgment is

granted in favor of Defendants as to Count One of the Complaint.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated section 1692g(a)(5) of the FDCPA by

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failing to indicate that “upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt

collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different

from the current creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has no cause of

action here because the original creditor was the current creditor. (Paula Kaplan Aff. ¶ 7). Thus,

judgment is granted in favor of Defendants as to Count Two of the Complaint.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the violations described above also violated section

1692e(10) which prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or

means in connection with the collection of any debt.” A collection letter ‘is deceptive when it

can be reasonably read to have two or more meanings, one of which is inaccurate.’” Quadramed,

225 F.3d, at 354 (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Court

has already determined that the “30 day” reference could not reasonably be read to have two or

more meanings. Likewise, failure to distinguish between an original and a current creditor was

the opposite of misleading as they are one in the same in the instant case. Therefore, judgment is

granted in favor of Defendants as to Count Three of the Complaint.1

 s/ Stanley R. Chesler 

Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J. 

DATED: June 8, 2011

Because judgment has been granted in favor of Defendants on all counts of the 1

Complaint, whether Ms. Youner should be dismissed from this action is moot. 

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