NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 20-1424

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DARRYL PETLOCK,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00623-001)

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 10, 2020

Before: McKee, Porter, Fisher, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 11, 2021)

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OPINION*

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FISHER, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, pro se Appellant Darryl Petlock alleges a variety of errors when the 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

District Court declined to dismiss the Parole Office’s petition to revoke his term of 

supervised release, allowed him to proceed pro se at the revocation hearing, and declined 

to reduce his sentence for time spent in state custody. We will affirm.1

Petlock first argues that the District Court erred in granting his request to proceed 

pro se at the revocation hearing. A person on supervised release may waive his right to 

counsel in this context.2 “[I]n order for due process to be satisfied . . . the defendant’s 

waiver of rights under Rule 32.1 must be knowing and voluntary under a ‘totality of the 

circumstances.’”3 “This standard does not require ‘rigid or specific colloquies with the 

district court’” nor any “‘particular mantra.’”4 Rather, the District Court was simply 

required to “‘advise [Petlock] of both the rights afforded him . . . and the consequences of 

relinquishing those rights.’”5

It did just that. After Petlock expressed his desire to represent himself, the District 

Court engaged in an extensive colloquy which established that he was a competent, 

college-educated adult, with a paralegal certificate and coursework in criminal law, who 

had effectively represented himself in the state court prosecution which predicated the 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for an abuse of discretion, supportive factual findings for clear error, 

and legal issues de novo. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008).

2 United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1).

3 Id. (quoting United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 651-52 (5th Cir. 2006)).

4 Id. (quoting Hodges, 460 F.3d at 651-52).

5 Id. (quoting Hodges, 460 F.3d at 651-52).
3

revocation petition. Without equivocation, he stated it was his “personal desire” to 

proceed without counsel, a decision he made “freely” and with understanding of the

rights he was relinquishing and the attendant consequences.6 Thus, the Court properly 

ascertained Petlock’s “‘comprehension of the charges against him and . . . his 

appreciation of the nature of the rights afforded him,’”7 and did not err in granting his 

request to proceed pro se.

Petlock next alleges a variety of errors in urging us to conclude that the District 

Court wrongly revoked his term of supervised release. Petlock was granted supervised

release following drug-trafficking and firearms convictions in federal court. He violated a 

condition of his release when he committed aggravated manslaughter, to which he pled 

guilty in state court. He now complains about the validity of his state conviction. 

However, he never challenged his conviction on direct appeal or federal habeas review 

and a “supervised release revocation proceeding is not the proper forum in which to 

attack the conviction giving rise to the revocation.”8

Petlock’s critiques of the federal court proceedings also fail. He first argues that 

the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the revocation petition, because the

revocation arrest warrant “was not based upon Probable Cause and . . . was not supported 

6 Supp. App. 33.

7 Manuel, 732 F.3d at 291 (quoting Hodges, 460 F.3d at 652).

8 United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 363 (11th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases).
4

by oath or affirmation.”9 The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, 

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”10 Courts disagree about

whether this requirement extends to warrants issued for violating a condition of 

supervised release.11 We, however, need not decide this question, because the papers here 

would satisfy the oath or affirmation requirement if it did apply. In a 2012 Petition for

Warrant or Summons for Offender under Supervision, Petlock’s probation officer 

declared under penalty of perjury that Petlock violated a condition of his supervised 

release—the requirement that he not commit another crime—because he was charged 

with crimes including first degree murder. An Amended Petition (also backed by sworn 

declaration) was filed after Petlock ultimately pled guilty to manslaughter in state court.

These sworn statements satisfy the Fourth Amendment, which “requires only . . .

sufficient information, [provided] under oath or affirmation, which would support an

independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant’s issuance.”12

Petlock next complains of an “unconstitutional delay” when the District Court 

9 Appellant’s Br. at 55.

10 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 11 See United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 902-05 (9th Cir. 2004)

(Fourth Amendment requirement applies in the supervised release context); United States 

v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 519 (1st Cir. 2011) (Fourth Amendment does not 

apply); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2006) (Fourth 

Amendment does not apply).

12 United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516, 522 (3d Cir. 1973); see 

also United States v. Bueno-Vargas, 383 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[S]igning a 

statement under penalty of perjury satisfies the standard for an oath or affirmation.”).
5

waited to adjudicate the revocation petition until his state court charges were resolved.13

To the contrary, it is “reasonable for the District Court to wait for the adjudication of the 

state court charges before proceeding with the revocation hearing.”14 Petlock also claims 

he was never given numerous documents, including the Amended Petition and supposed

Brady material.

15 The record belies this claim. At his initial appearance in the revocation 

proceedings, the Amended Petition’s charges were read to Petlock and his counsel 

acknowledged that Petlock was “satisfied that he understands the charges against him.”16

He also fails to identify the purported Brady material left undisclosed or how any such 

items could have advanced a colorable defense to the petition, which was predicated upon 

his own guilty plea.17

Petlock raises a variety of other claims, which we have examined and conclude are 

unfounded. Some lack a basis in fact. He argues that after granting his motion to proceed 

pro se, the District Court “forced an Immediate Hearing” and “forced [him] to file all 

motions without discovery.”18 In reality, it scheduled his revocation hearing for three 

months later. Petlock claims he was “detain[ed] . . . for a prolonged period of time 

13 Appellant’s Br. at 34.

14 United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2004). 15 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

16 Supp. App. 18.

17 See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80 (1976) (“[A] guilty plea of manslaughter 

. . . constituted obvious violations of the terms of . . . parole.”).

18 Appellant’s Br. 24.
6

without a hearing,”19 but he actually consented to detention with reservation of the right 

to request bail at a later time. He claims the District Court deprived him of a preliminary 

hearing, ignoring that he expressly waived his right to that hearing.

Other claims Petlock raises lack a basis in the law. He offers no authorities that

establish his purported right to counsel as soon as the revocation detainer and petition 

were lodged against him,20 purported right to a speedy revocation hearing,

21 and

purported right to be unshackled during a juryless revocation hearing where the District 

Court expressed a “security concern.”22 Petlock claims he should been given an 

opportunity to attempt to suppress evidence and to present expert testimony to assist in 

his defense against the charge that he violated his supervised release. But, he fails to 

identify—and this Court does not perceive—any grounds for suppressing his state court 

conviction secured via his own guilty plea, nor the relevance of any expert testimony.

19 Appellant’s Br. 35.

20 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) (providing for prompt hearings 

when the person is taken into federal “custody,” not when a warrant is issued); 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A(a)(1)(E) (providing a right to counsel for those charged with violating a 

supervisory condition, but not requiring it at the time a petition is filed).

21 See United States v. Tippens, 39 F.3d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 

(“[T]he execution of a warrant for violation of supervised release is not subject to the 

Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial requirement.”); cf. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 

731 n.10 (1985) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never held that a person subject 

to a probation-violation detainer or a parole-violation detainer is entitled to a speedy 

revocation hearing).

22 Supp. App. 37; see United States v. Ayala, 917 F.3d 752, 763 (3d Cir. 2019) (In 

making shackling decisions, “[d]istrict courts need ‘latitude’ to make ‘individualized 

security determinations,’ because they are ‘uniquely positioned and qualified,’ to 

determine a defendant’s potential security risk (or lack thereof).”) (citations omitted).
7

Relatedly, Petlock has asked us to review his District Court filing entitled “Brief in 

Support of a Continuance and his Request for Documents.”23 We do not permit 

incorporation by reference to district court filings, so any arguments in that document are 

waived.24 Even if they had been properly raised, they would fail; they present the same 

unsupported assertions that Petlock should have received various documents, an 

opportunity to suppress evidence, and the aid of an expert.

Still others of Petlock’s arguments fail because, even if they were valid, he cannot 

demonstrate plain error. He complains that he was not permitted to file a reply brief in 

support of his amended motion to dismiss the revocation petition and a host of other 

documents. Petlock, however, did not request the opportunity to file these documents and 

cannot show plain error, having failed to identify any authority for his claimed 

entitlement to file them.25

Finally, Petlock argues that the District Court erred in not reducing his violation of 

supervised release sentence for supposedly overserving his state sentence. The 

Sentencing Guidelines provide that “the court shall adjust the sentence for any period of 

imprisonment already served on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the court 

23 Appellant’s Br. 51.

24 States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 206 n.18 (3d Cir. 2018).

25 See United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 380 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying plain 

error review where the defendant “failed to avail himself of several opportunities to 

oppose the Government’s motion”); United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 575 (3d Cir. 

2012) (“The absence of controlling precedent forecloses Turner’s plain error argument on 

this issue.”).
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determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited to the federal sentence 

by the Bureau of Prisons.”26 However, this provision applies only to an “undischarged” 

term of imprisonment,27 and when the District Court sentenced Petlock, he was not 

subject to any undischarged term, having completely served his state court sentence.

For these reasons, we will affirm.

26 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1).

27 Id.; see also United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 629 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014)

(collecting cases).