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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

: 

STEPHEN SIMONI, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 10-6798 (JAP)

:

v. : OPINION

:

EDWARD DIAMOND, KATHRYN J. LUCIANI, :

MERIDIAN HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., :

MERIDIAN HEALTH, INC., MERIDIAN :

HOSPITALS CORP., MERIDIAN HEALTH, :

DONNA M. CUSSON, JERSEY SHORE :

UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, ERICKA D. :

CLARK DISTANISLAO, JENNIFER S. LOVEY, :

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND ALLIED :

EMPLOYEES, AFT/AFL-CIO, AND HPAE :

LOCAL #35058, :

:

Defendants. :

:

PISANO, District Judge

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff, Terry Roe’s1(“Plaintiff”) motion for partial summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the first cause of action under 28 

U.S.C. § 185, i.e. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) [docket 

#51]. Defendants, Meridian Health Systems, Inc., Meridian Health, Inc., Meridian Hospitals 

Corp., Meridian Health, and Jersey Shore University Medical Center (collectively “Defendants”) 

oppose this motion [docket #55]. The Court considered the papers filed by the parties and rules 

on the written submissions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. 

 

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Terry Roe is a pseudonym. Plaintiff’s actual name is Stephen Simoni. 

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For the reasons that follow, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment 

[docket #51]. 

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of an employment relationship beginning on August 10, 2010, where 

Plaintiff began working as a nurse at Jersey Shore University Medical Center. See Plaintiff’s 

Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Plaintiff’s SUMF”), at ¶ 3. Shortly after Plaintiff 

was hired, he attended a hospital wide orientation for newly-hired nurses where he completed 

forms to enroll as a member of the Health Professionals and Allied Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO 

(“HPAE” or “Union”), effective immediately. Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶¶ 4, 6. The forms completed 

at orientation permitted Defendants to withhold money from Plaintiff’s paychecks for transmittal 

to the Union. Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶ 4. Further, while at orientation, Plaintiff received documents 

including a “rights” sheet which described the key question deciding discipline grievances as 

whether management had ‘just cause’ for imposing it, and Plaintiff also received the HPAE 

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶¶ 6-7. 

The CBA provides, in relevant part:

1. Agreement Scope

This agreement covers all employees ... and includes permanent 

full-time or permanent part-time employees as defined in Article 

Four, employed as a Graduate or Registered Nurse, Certified 

Registered Nurse Anesthetist, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Nurse 

Clinician, Nursing Education Instructor and per diem nurses (herein 

called “employee”) employed by the Hospital, excluding all other 

employees including Nurse Managers, Assistant Nurse Managers, 

Nurse Practitioners, Clinical Nurse Coordinators and other 

Supervisors as defined by the [NLRA]. 

******

4. Employee Status 

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...

4.08 Probationary Period: All employees regardless of status will be 

on probation for ninety (90) calendar days following employment 

....

******

12. Discipline and Discharge

12.01 The Hospital shall reserve the right to discipline, suspend or 

discharge any employee only for just cause .... 

12.02 The designated Union representative, the Union office and the 

employee involved shall be advised, in writing, of any discharge, 

suspension or disciplinary action. A copy of the notice given to the 

employee shall be mailed to the Union within twenty-four (24) hours 

....

13. Grievance Procedure 

....

13.02 Step I-Chief Nurse Executive: Grievances shall be raised by 

the employee and/or union representative with the Chief Nurse 

Executive or his/her designee in writing within ten (10) working 

days from occurrence giving rise to the grievance or within ten (10) 

working days from the time the employee should have reasonably 

been aware of such occurrence, whichever is later. If the matter is 

not resolved within five (5) working days of presentation of the 

grievance, it may be taken to Step II. The employee, at his/her 

request, shall have the right to have a Union representative present. 

13.03 Step II – Vice President of Human Resources: The 

employee/Union shall forward the grievance to the Vice President 

of Human Resources or his/her designee within five (5) working 

days after the receipt of the written response from the Department 

Manager. The matter will be investigated and meeting scheduled 

within ten (10) working days after the receipt of the written appeal. 

A written response to the grievance shall be given within five (5) 

working days after the meeting and returned to the grieving party. If 

there is no resolution, the grieving party may progress to Step III. 

13.04 Step III – Arbitration: The grievance may be submitted to 

arbitration by the Union within twenty (20) working days from the 

receipt of the answer in Step II.... 

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******

20. Scope of Bargaining

The Hospital and the Union acknowledge that during the 

negotiations which resulted in this Agreement, each had the 

unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals 

with respect to any subject matter not removed by law from the area 

of collective bargaining and that the understanding and agreements 

arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and 

opportunity are set forth in this Agreement, which constitutes the 

full and complete agreement between the parties notwithstanding 

any oral agreement or any past practices, policies or procedures ....

[Certification of Counsel in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss and/or Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint, docket #7, 

at Ex. E]. 

Defendants “Guidelines for Cooperation and Discipline” were incorporated into the CBA 

by reference and provided a four (4) step progressive disciplinary process for “all team members 

of Meridian Health and its partner companies, including Meridian Hospitals Corporation and its 

hospitals.” Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶ 9. The Guidelines also provided that “[n]o team member will 

be discharged from staff without the disciplinary review process.” Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶ 9. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Guidelines contained a “special note” specifying that only those “team 

members who are in a leadership role . . . are employed at-will” and that Plaintiff’s nurse’s position 

was not a leadership role. Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶¶ 10-11. 

On October 18, 2010, approximately two (2) months after being hired, Plaintiff was 

terminated from his employment with Meridian. Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶ 15. Following his 

termination, Plaintiff contacted the Union to pursue a grievance. Frederick DeLuca, a Union 

representative, filed a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff which Defendants denied. DeLuca also 

informed Plaintiff that he would not be taking Plaintiff’s grievance to arbitration. Dissatisfied with 

this response, Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 28, 2010. Plaintiff alleges that 

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Defendants failed to assert “just cause” existed for his termination and refused to provide Plaintiff 

access to the CBA’s grievance and arbitration provisions. Plaintiff’s SUMF, at ¶ 16. Conversely, 

however, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was a probationary employee during his first ninety 

(90) days of employment as provided in section 4.08 of the CBA and therefore, at the time of his 

termination, Plaintiff was not covered by the CBA nor entitled to the grievance and arbitration 

provisions. See May 10, 2011 Certification of Fred DeLuca submitted in support of the Union’s 

Motion to Dismiss (“DeLuca Cert.”), at ¶¶ 4-5; see also, Certification of Kathryn J. Luciani 

(“Luciani Cert.”), at ¶¶ 4-7. 

On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting seven (7) causes of 

action against the Union, individual Defendants, and the instant Defendants: (1) a hybrid Section 

301 claim under the LMRA, alleging that Defendants breached the CBA and the Union breached 

its duty of fair representation; (2) a claim under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act

(“NLRA”) alleging that Defendants’ conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice; (3) a claim under 

the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination against Defendants and individual Defendants Cusson 

and Diamond; (4) a defamation claim against Defendants and individual Defendants; (5) breach 

of contract claim against Defendants; (6) a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection 

Act against Defendants and individual Defendants Cusson and Diamond; and (7) a claim for 

tortious interference with prospective economic advantage against Defendants and individual 

Defendants. 

Shortly after Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, the Hospital and individual 

Defendants moved to dismiss all but the third cause of action contained in Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint for failure to state a claim. The Union also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 301 

claim under the LMRA. On October 6, 2011, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, and 

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declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Roe v. 

Diamond, CIV.A. 10-6798 JAP, 2011 WL 4736353 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011) aff'd in part, rev'd in 

part, 519 F. App'x 752 (3d Cir. 2013) and vacated, 10-CV-6798 JAP, 2013 WL 6451683 (D.N.J. 

Aug. 29, 2013). On October 8, 2011, Plaintiff appealed this Court’s ruling and on March 20, 2013, 

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Roe v. Diamond, 519 

F. App'x 752, 753 (3d Cir. 2013). Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal 

of Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, but reversed and remanded the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 301 

claim. In so doing, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Court and Defendants’ interpretation of 

the CBA in that it simply did not apply to probationary employees, and held that it is “certainly 

plausible to interpret the CBA as merely restricting ‘probationary’ employees’ eligibility for fringe 

benefits rather than wholly excluding any rights under the CBA.’” Id. at 758. Subsequent to 

remand, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Union Defendants from this matter [docket #54] and 

filed the instant motion for summary judgment on his Section 301 claim as against the Hospital 

Defendants [docket #51]. 

II. DISCUSSION

a. Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 

Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may be 

entitled to summary judgment merely by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support 

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) (B); Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “Facts that could affect the 

outcome are ‘material facts,’ and a dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is 

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sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Lamont v. New 

Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23)). 

Further, “[i]n a contract interpretation action, summary judgment is appropriate only where 

the contractual language is unambiguous—i.e., “subject to only one reasonable interpretation.” 

Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Arnold M. 

Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir.1999)). “If the nonmoving 

party presents a reasonable alternative reading of the contract, then a question of fact as to the 

meaning of the contract exists which can only be resolved at trial.” Id. at 418-19 (citing Newport 

Assocs. Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 789, 792 (3d Cir.1998); Tigg Corp. v. Dow 

Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1987); Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co.,

605 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir.1979)). Under New Jersey law, courts must always “‘consider all of the 

relevant evidence that will assist in determining the intent and meaning of the contract’” when 

making ambiguity determinations. Id. at 419 (quoting Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 

259, 901 A.2d 341, 346 (2006)). Stated differently, “[e]vidence of the circumstances is always 

admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. This is so even when the contract 

on its face is free from ambiguity.” Id. Thus, if after considering all relevant evidence to determine 

if any ambiguity exists, the contested provisions fall within that gray area, summary judgment is 

improper. Id. 

Moreover, “[i]t has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit 

against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.” DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1983) (citing Smith v. 

Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962)). “Ordinarily, however, 

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an employee is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in 

the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 

85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized “that this 

rule works an unacceptable injustice when the union representing the employee in the 

grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory 

fashion as to breach its duty of fair representation. In such an instance, an employee may bring suit 

against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance 

or arbitration proceeding.” Id. at 164 (citing Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 

842; Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231; United 

Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732; Bowen v. United 

States Postal Service, et al., 459 U.S. 212, 103 S.Ct. 588, 74 L.Ed.2d 402; Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 

U.S. 25, 90 S.Ct. 770, 25 L.Ed.2d 21 (1970)). Procedurally, this type of suit comprises two causes 

of action. “The suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach 

of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's 

duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations 

Act.” Id. “Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent. ‘To prevail against either the 

company or the Union, ... [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was 

contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the 

Union.’” Id. at 165 (citing Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 66–67, 101 S.Ct., at 1565–1566 (Stewart, J., 

concurring in the judgment), quoting Hines, 424 U.S., at 570–571, 96 S.Ct., at 1059). As such, 

the employee may “sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same 

whether he sues one, the other, or both. The suit is thus not a straightforward breach of contract 

suit under § 301, . . . but a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim, amounting to ‘a direct challenge 

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to ‘the private settlement of disputes under [the collective-bargaining agreement].’” Id. (citing 

Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 66, 101 S.Ct., at 1565 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment), quoting 

Hoosier, 383 U.S., at 702, 86 S.Ct., at 1111).

b. Analysis

As stated above, to prevail on a hybrid Section 301 claim, Plaintiff must show that the 

union breached its duty of fair representation and that Defendant wrongfully terminated his 

employment under the terms of the CBA. Before this analysis is even reached, however, the Court 

must first determine whether Plaintiff, as a probationary employee, was entitled to the protections 

of the CBA. Plaintiff asserts that on appeal, the Third Circuit conclusively determined that the 

CBA does indeed apply, and therefore the Court may determine summary judgment based solely 

on the hybrid Section 301 analysis. The Court disagrees with this contention. Plaintiff is confusing 

the standard applied by the Third Circuit in analyzing Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, 

rather than making a fact finding surrounding whether the CBA applied, the Third Circuit held that 

Plaintiff’s interpretation of the CBA was plausible, such that it was sufficient to withstand a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. Roe, 519 F. App'x at 758 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss cannot be used to resolve factual issues or to determine the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. 

5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990); see 

also, Republican Party of N. Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Finding that 

a fact is plausible hardly suffices to conclusively establish such fact for purposes of summary 

judgment, nor does it enable this Court to find that no genuine dispute of such material fact exists.

Determining whether the CBA applied to Plaintiff at the time of his termination is indeed a material 

fact, as it is dispositive of Plaintiff’s Section 301 claim. While Plaintiff’s interpretation of the 

contract is, as stated by the Third Circuit, certainly a plausible reading, Defendant has produced 

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sufficient evidence showing that a dispute exists regarding whether the parties intended the CBA 

to apply to probationary employees. See [Docket No. 61, at Exh. C (“The [CBA] section 4.08 h as 

[sic] always being [sic] interpreted and applied to mean that for the 1st 90 days an employee is at 

will. The basic contract language has never changed since 1983.”)]. 

While the CBA, on its face, appears to be free from any ambiguity, evidence of the 

circumstances is permissible to aid in interpreting an integrated agreement. Here, the language as 

contained in the CBA combined with the circumstances surrounding how the Defendants have 

continuously interpreted the CBA results in an ambiguity regarding whether a probationary 

employee is at-will. As explained above, where a “nonmoving party presents a reasonable 

alternative reading of the contract, then a question of fact as to the meaning of the contract exists 

which can only be resolved at trial.” See Mylan Inc., 723 F.3d at 418. Defendants have adduced 

sufficient evidence to present a reasonable alternative reading of the contract, namely, that 

probationary employees – like Plaintiff – are at-will and not covered by the protections of the 

CBA. It is not for this Court to determine what the parties intended by the language of the contract. 

Rather, it is a fact question properly left to the jury. For these reasons alone, Plaintiff’s motion for 

partial summary judgment must be denied.

In any event, Plaintiff’s motion primarily focuses on whether Defendants breached the 

CBA by terminating him without just cause. In making this argument, Plaintiff is assuming that 

the CBA applies and that he has already met his burden in showing that the Union breached its 

duty of fair representation, such that the sole remaining issue is whether Defendants had just cause 

for terminating Plaintiff. As set forth above, an issue of fact exists over whether the CBA applies; 

however, to the extent that it does, and assuming the Union breached its duty of fair 

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representation,2summary judgment would still be improper as a genuine dispute of fact exists 

surrounding the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s termination 

was justified because there is evidence of poor work performance and improper interactions with 

coworkers, such that this misconduct amounts to “just cause.” However, the CBA does not define 

what constitutes “just cause,” and the appropriate body to give meaning to this term in order to

determine whether the decision to terminate Plaintiff was justified, is the jury. As such, this Court 

must deny Plaintiff’s motion. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 

judgment [docket #51]. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 

Date: September 23, 2014 /s/ Joel A. Pisano

JOEL A. PISANO

United States District Judge

 

2 Plaintiff contends that the Union concedes breaching their duty of fair representation. The Court is assuming this 

fact for purposes of the analysis; however, nothing in this Opinion is to be construed as making a fact finding 

surrounding whether the Union breached its duty owed to Plaintiff. 

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