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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

KENNETH J. SPEICHER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

July 21, 2015 

v No. 313158 

Van Buren Circuit Court 

COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES, 

LC No. 11-600562-CZ 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and MARKEY and STEPHENS, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

ON REMAND 

 Plaintiff appeals by right two trial court orders arising from his underlying claim that 

defendant Columbia Township Board of Trustees (Board) violated the Open Meetings Act 

(OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq. In our previous opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of 

plaintiff’s request to invalidate the Board’s hiring of the township fire chief but reversed its 

denial of plaintiff’s motion for costs and attorney fees. Speicher v Columbia Twp Bd of Trustees, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 25, 2014 (Docket No. 

313158). The Supreme Court vacated our opinion and remanded for us to reconsider our 

attorney fee holding in light of its opinion in Speicher v Columbia Twp Bd of Trustees, 497 Mich 

125; 860 NW2d 51 (2014). Speicher v Columbia Twp Bd of Trustees, ___ Mich ___; 859 NW2d 

687 (2015) (Docket No. 148999). We again affirm the trial court’s denial of the invalidation of 

the hiring, and again reverse and remand with respect to plaintiff’s motion for costs and actual 

attorney fees. 

I. FACTS 

 The facts as described in our previous opinion have not changed and are quoted as 

follows: 

 In 2010, Columbia Township’s fire chief vacated office. In October 2010, 

to facilitate the hiring of a new chief, the Board appointed a Fire Chief Review 

Committee, comprised of fire chiefs from other jurisdictions and two members of 

the Board. The Committee’s purpose was to interview candidates for fire chief. 

Plaintiff was one of those candidates. The Committee interviewed candidates in a 
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meeting closed to the public. After the closed interviews, the Board held three 

meetings, open to the public, regarding the hiring of the new chief. After those 

open meetings, the Board selected a person other than plaintiff as the new fire 

chief. 

 Plaintiff sued the Board, alleging that the hiring process violated the 

OMA, and moved for summary disposition. The trial court ruled that the Board 

violated the OMA and enjoined it from committing further violations. These 

rulings are not challenged on appeal. However, the court refused plaintiff’s 

request to invalidate the Board’s appointment of the new chief, and refused his 

request for court costs and actual attorney fees. [Speicher, unpub op at 1.] 

II. INVALIDATION OF THE HIRING 

 Nothing in the Supreme Court’s remand order indicates that we must reconsider our 

affirmance of the trial court’s refusal to invalidate the Board’s hiring of the new chief. See 

Speicher, 859 NW2d at 687. Accordingly, we reiterate our previous analysis: 

 Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by refusing to invalidate the 

Board’s appointment of the new chief. We review a trial court’s decision whether 

to invalidate a decision made in violation of the OMA for an abuse of discretion. 

Morrison v East Lansing, 255 Mich App 505, 520; 660 NW2d 395 (2003). MCL 

15.270(2) provides that: 

[a] decision made by a public body may be invalidated if the public 

body has not complied with the requirements of [MCL 15.263(1), 

(2), and (3)] in making the decision or if failure to give notice in 

accordance with [MCL 15.265] has interfered with substantial 

compliance with [MCL 15.263(1), (2), and (3)] and the court finds 

that the noncompliance or failure has impaired the rights of the 

public under this act. 

Therefore, “[a] court has discretion to invalidate a decision made in violation of 

the OMA if it finds that violation impaired the rights of the public under the 

OMA.” Morrison, 255 Mich App at 520. 

 The trial court ruled that the Board’s noncompliance with the OMA had 

not “impaired the rights of the public.” Plaintiff asserts that this ruling was 

erroneous, relying on Menominee Co Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Co 

Clerk, 139 Mich App 814; 362 NW2d 871 (1984). In that case, 

[t]he Menominee County Treasurer resigned from that office 

effective as of November 7, 1983. Pursuant to [MCL 168.209,] 

defendants, the Menominee County Clerk, Prosecutor, and Probate

Judge, came together to appoint a suitable person to replace the 

former Menominee County Treasurer. Defendants met on a single 

occasion to discuss the qualifications required for the Menominee 

County Treasurer. At this gathering, various individuals were 
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discussed concerning their suitability for the treasurer position. In 

the context of discussion of various individuals’ suitability, 

potential conflicts of interest were discussed with regard to various 

potential appointees. No notice of any public meeting was posted 

before defendants came together to discuss and make their 

appointment. The discussion was held in private and was not open 

to the public. As a result of that discussion, defendant Krause, 

County Clerk, was empowered by defendants Jurmu, Prosecutor, 

and Rolfs, Probate Judge, to contact Bernard Lang, an individual 

residing in the county. Defendants unanimously appointed Lang 

the Treasurer of Menominee County. [Id. at 816-817.] 

The Menominee Court concluded that “[t]he denial of a public hearing in itself 

impaired the rights of the public. We find that, at the time the committee selected 

the treasurer, plaintiffs were denied their right to present their views.” Id. at 820. 

 Plaintiff relies on the Menominee Court’s statement that “[t]he denial of a 

public hearing in itself impaired the rights of the public” in arguing that the 

exclusion of the public from the Committee’s interview meeting impaired the 

public’s rights. However, plaintiff ignores the Menominee Court’s rationale that 

the plaintiffs were “denied their right to present their views” because the only

meeting held by the public body was closed. Therefore, Menominee is 

distinguishable from this case because the Board held three open meetings after it 

held the closed interview meeting. 

 Moreover, we find the trial court’s reliance on Morrison persuasive. In 

that case, we considered whether East Lansing’s inclusion of a parking lot on the 

site of a community center should be invalidated under the OMA:

the [Hannah Building Committee (HBC)] failed to provide notice 

of the vast majority of its meetings and although the steering 

committee failed to provide notice of all its meetings, the public 

was not completely excluded from the process. The public was 

invited to speak at three HBC meetings, two planning-commission

hearings, a work-session meeting of the city council, and the 

March 21, 2000, public hearing held by the city council. Plaintiffs 

and other members of the public expressed their concerns 

regarding the site plan on all those occasions, and each decisionmaking body heard their concerns. At the March 21, 2000, citycouncil meeting, which continued into the early morning hours, 

members of the public, including many of the plaintiffs, and 

council members discussed the proposed plan, including parking 

issues, at length before the council approved the plan. [225 Mich 

App at 521.] 

The Morrison Court concluded that, “[u]nder these circumstances, plaintiffs had a 

reasonable opportunity to learn about the community-center site plans and to 
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voice their concerns and opposition. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion in refusing to invalidate the plan of development and in 

failing to grant injunctive relief.” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that Morrison is distinguishable because “[t]he Morrison

court made it clear that the public had plenty of input with respect to” the parking 

and traffic issues. However, in Morrison, the public was invited to three HBC 

meetings, two planning-commission hearings, a work-session meeting of the city 

council, and a public hearing held by the city council. Id. The public was 

excluded from at least 16 HBC meetings and 19 “steering committee” meetings. 

Id. at 508-511. Nonetheless, this Court ruled that, even though the public was 

excluded from a vast majority of the relevant meetings, the seven open meetings 

provided “a reasonable opportunity to learn about the community-center site plans 

and to voice their concerns and opposition.” Id. at 521. In this case, the public 

was excluded from only one meeting – the closed interview – but was invited to 

the three subsequent meetings regarding the hiring of the new chief. Thus, in this 

case, the public had even more opportunity to voice their concerns than did the 

public in Morrison, where this Court declined to reverse the trial court’s denial of 

the plaintiffs’ request to invalidate the public body’s action.

 Alternatively, plaintiff argues that he was entitled to a trial on the issue of 

whether the public’s rights had been impaired. Specifically, plaintiff argues that 

the trial court “needed to examine the qualifications of all of the fire chief 

candidates and hear testimony of Township residents regarding the public interest 

in knowing the qualifications of the rejected candidates to reach a reasoned 

decision regarding impairment of the public rights.” However, a trial court’s 

determination of whether the public’s rights were impaired is not based on the 

relative merit of a public body’s decision, but on the public’s opportunity to 

participate in the public body’s decision-making process. Id. Testimony about 

the qualifications of the candidates and the importance of the position would not 

have furthered the purpose of the OMA, because that testimony would have been 

irrelevant to establish whether the public had access to and a means to obtain 

information about the qualifications of the candidates and the importance of the 

position. Moreover, the trial court possessed the discretion to determine, under 

the undisputed facts, whether the violation in this case impaired the rights of the 

public under the OMA. Id. at 520-521. 

 Accordingly, because the trial court properly found that the rights of the 

public were not impaired, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to invalidate 

the Board’s appointment of the new fire chief. [Spiecher, unpub op at 2-4.] 

III. COURTS COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 

 Plaintiff next argues that he was entitled to court costs and attorney fees under MCL 

15.271(4). We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for costs and attorney fees for an abuse 

of discretion. Keinz v Keinz, 290 Mich App 137, 141; 799 NW2d 576 (2010). MCL 15.271(4) 

provides: 
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[i]f a public body is not complying with this act, and a person commences a civil 

action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to 

enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the 

action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action. 

 In Speicher, 497 Mich at 128, our Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff “was 

entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees based on his entitlement to 

declaratory relief under the OMA.” (Emphasis added). Finding that prior decisions of this 

Court had “strayed from the plain language of MCL 15.271(4)[,]” the Supreme Court held that, 

to obtain such an award under the statute, a plaintiff must obtain “injunctive relief.” Id. 

 In Speicher, the defendant Board changed its monthly scheduled meetings, held in 

conjunction with those of its Planning Commission, to quarterly scheduled meetings. Id. at 128-

129. The plaintiff brought suit under the OMA, “alleging that the decision to change the 

schedule was not made at an open meeting and that the February and March meetings were 

canceled without proper notice in violation of the OMA.” Id. at 129. The plaintiff sought (1) a 

declaration that the decision to cancel the regularly scheduled meetings violated the OMA, (2) an 

injunction forbidding the Board and Planning Commission from further noncompliance with the 

OMA, and (3) if he was successful, court costs and actual attorney fees. Id. at 129-130. 

 The trial court granted summary disposition in full to the defendants. Id. at 130. The 

plaintiff appealed to this Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part:1

The Court of Appeals concluded that while the meeting schedule change was 

properly made at an open meeting, defendants plainly violated the OMA by not 

timely posting the modified schedule. It therefore held that the trial court erred by 

failing to grant declaratory relief to plaintiff on that point. However, the Court of 

Appeals also held that the trial court properly denied injunctive relief for 

defendants’ technical notice violation because “there was no evidence that the 

Commission had a history of OMA violations, there was no evidence that this 

violation was done willfully,” and there was no evidence that the public or 

plaintiff was harmed in any manner. The Court of Appeals therefore ruled that 

“given that the technical nature of this OMA violation resulted in no injunctive 

relief being warranted, plaintiff is not entitled to any attorney fees or costs under 

MCL 15.271(4) on remand.” [Id. at 131 (citations omitted).] 

 The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which this Court granted, vacating the portion of 

its opinion regarding attorney fees. Id.; see Speicher v Columbia Twp Bd of Trustees, 303 Mich 

App 475; 843 NW2d 770 (2013). This Court, bound by its previous decisions, held that the 

plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees under MCL 15.271(4) because he had established that he 

was entitled to declaratory relief. Speicher, 497 Mich at 132. This Court opined that it only 

reached its decision because it was bound by precedent and, if not so constrained, would hold 

 

1

 See Speicher v Columbia Twp Bd of Trustees, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued January 22, 2013 (Docket No. 306684). 
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that a plaintiff may only obtain attorney fees under the statute if he obtains injunctive relief. Id. 

at 132-133. The defendants applied for leave to the Supreme Court. Id. at 133. 

 The Supreme Court, considering the meaning of “succeeds in obtaining relief in the 

action,” concluded that “court costs and actual attorney fees under MCL 15.271 may only be 

awarded when a plaintiff seeks and obtains injunctive relief.” Id. at 134 (emphasis in original). 

In other words, the Supreme Court rejected previous decisions of this Court, which held that a 

plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees if he obtained any relief, i.e., declaratory relief was 

sufficient to obtain such an award. Id. at 143. Although reiterated numerous times throughout 

its opinion, the Supreme Court perhaps most articulately stated its holding as follows: 

 Our conclusion is reinforced by viewing MCL 15.271 as a whole. The 

statute allows a person to seek injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin 

further noncompliance with the OMA. The statute then provides the proper venue 

in which to commence an action for injunctive relief. And final, the statute allows 

for a person to recover court costs and actual attorney fees for an action against 

the public body for injunctive relief if a person “succeeds in obtaining relief in the 

action.” Thus, as a whole, MCL 15.271 only speaks in terms of an injunctive 

relief and contemplates no other form of relief. [Id. at 141-142 (footnotes 

omitted).] 

 In the present case, unlike in Speicher, plaintiff sought and obtained the injunctive relief 

described above by the Supreme Court. In Speicher, the plaintiff sought a declaration that a 

public body had violated the OMA, as well as an injunction against the body for further 

noncompliance with the OMA. Id. at 129-130. The plaintiff eventually obtained the former, but 

not the latter, and the Supreme Court held that such success was insufficient to entitle the 

plaintiff to court costs and attorney fees under MCL 15.271(4). Id. at 131, 144-145. By contrast, 

in the present case, plaintiff sought, and obtained, both a declaration that the Board violated the 

OMA and an order enjoining the Board from further noncompliance with the OMA. Thus, under 

Speicher, id. at 134, plaintiff sought and obtained injunctive relief, which entitles him to court 

costs and attorney fees under MCL 15.271(4). 

 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for court costs and 

attorney fees and remand for calculation of such an award. We affirm the trial court’s denial of 

plaintiff’s request to invalidate the hiring. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens