J-S39019-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFERY GOODWIN

Appellant No. 2155 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 1, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0527261-1994

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2015

Jeffery Goodwin brings this pro se appeal from the order entered on 

July 1, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that 

dismissed as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA).1 Goodwin contends his petition may be reviewed based 

upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 

S. Ct. 1733 (June 25, 2012). In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court 

recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the age of eighteen, 

holding that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at 

the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
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‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 132 S. Ct. at 2460. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

The PCRA court has aptly summarized the facts and procedural history 

underlying this appeal: 

[Goodwin] was found guilty after a jury trial of first degree 

murder before the Honorable Judge James A. Lineberger on May 

8, 1997. On the same day, [Goodwin] was sentenced by Judge 

Lineberger to serve a life sentence. After [Goodwin] filed his 

timely appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence on August 4, 1999. The Supreme Court denied 

allocatur on December 9, 1999. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 

745 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 749 A.2d 466 

(Pa. 1999).]

[Goodwin] filed his first post conviction relief petition through 

private counsel on December 8, 2000. The petition for relief was 

denied on February 19, 2003, after a notice of dismissal under 

criminal Rule 907 was sent by Judge Lineberger advising 

[Goodwin] that his issues were without merit. [Goodwin] filed 

his appeal on March 10, 2003. The Superior Court affirmed the 

lower court’s denial of his PCRA petition on August 16, 2004, and 

denied [Goodwin’s] application for reargument on October 21, 

2004. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 863 A.2d 1223 (Pa. 

Super. 2004)]. [Goodwin] filed his second PCRA petition on 

February 18, 2005. The lower court dismissed his second PCRA 

petition on August 2, 2005. No appeal was filed.

[Goodwin] filed his current post conviction petition on October 17, 

2011. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 1-2. 

On November 21, 2011, Goodwin filed a response to the PCRA court’s 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. On April 12, 2012, he filed an amended PCRA 

petition, and, on April 20, 2014, filed a memorandum of law in support of 

the amended petition. The docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012, Goodwin 
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filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” The PCRA Court 

determined that Goodwin’s PCRA petition was untimely filed and he did not 

prove that any PCRA exception applied to excuse the late filing. This appeal 

followed.2

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA

Court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal 

error.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2014) 

(quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2695 (2014).

All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the petition alleges, and the 

petitioner proves, that one of the three enumerated exceptions to the time 

for filing requirement is met. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is 

deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3). Here, Goodwin’s judgment of sentence became final on March 

8, 2000, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 

petition for allowance of appeal and no petition for writ of certiorari was filed 

in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13. Therefore, 

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2 The trial court did not issue an order requiring Goodwin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement.
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the present petition, filed on October 17, 2011 is patently untimely. 

Because Goodwin’s petition was untimely, he was required to plead and 

prove any of three statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Here, the only issue addressed by the PCRA court was whether 

Goodwin’s petition satisfied the PCRA’s exception for a new constitutional 

right of retroactive effect, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii),3 based on the United 

States Court decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) and 

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). The PCRA court concluded that 

these cases do not establish a time-bar exception.4

In this appeal, however, Goodwin does not contest the PCRA court’s 

decision with regard to Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. Rather, he 

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3 Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) requires a petitioner to plead and prove “a 

constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided

in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

4 The PCRA court added in a footnote:

All of the claims made by [Goodwin] have not been addressed as 

they have been previously litigated or waived as “any claim not 

raised in [his] PCRA petition is waived and not cognizable on 

appeal.” See 42 Pa.C.S. 9544(a); Pa.R.A.P. Rule 302 (stating 

“issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal.”).

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 4.
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presents five issues, claiming that he has satisfied Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) 

based upon Miller v. Alabama, supra.

5

 Specifically, Goodwin raises the 

following issues in his Statement of Questions Involved:

A. Did the Common Pleas Court commit an error by not ruling on 

[Goodwin’s] Miller claim?

B. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for adults in 

homicide cases violate state & federal equal protection 

clauses, as well as Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights?

C. Does life-without-parole terms for adults in homicide cases 

violate state & federal equal protection clauses, as well as Art. 

7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

D. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for individuals over 

17 violate the 8th Amendment & Art. 5 of the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights as well as Art. I § 13 of the Pa. 

Constitution?

E. Should a new trial with a life qualified jury be awarded 

because [Goodwin’s] age changes the possible punishment for 

1

st degree murder?

Goodwin’s Brief at 2. 

As already mentioned, the docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012, 

Goodwin filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” However, 

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5 We note that Miller v. Alabama, supra, was issued on June 25, 2012, 

and that Goodwin’s amended petition based upon that decision was filed on

August 7, 2012. Therefore, Goodwin complied with Section 9545(b)(2) 

which requires that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (emphasis supplied).
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that amended petition is not part of the certified record, and the PCRA court 

did not address this claim. In any event, for the following reasons, no relief 

is due.

First, our Supreme Court has held that the right announced in Miller 

v. Alabama, supra, does not apply retroactively. See Commonwealth v. 

Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 

(2014).6 Consequently, a petitioner cannot rely on Miller v. Alabama or 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) to establish jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 243 (Pa. Super. 

2014), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (2014).

Furthermore, Goodwin was 25 years old at the time he committed 

the offense,7and therefore Miller v. Alabama, which applies to “those

under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes,”8 does not benefit Goodwin.

Finally, none of Goodwin’s remaining Miller v. Alabama-related 

claims, issues B through E, satisfy the requirements of Section 

9545(b)(1)(iii). See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. 

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6 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery 

v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015), which again presents the Miller v. 

Alabama retroactively question. Nonetheless, until the United States 

Supreme Court issues its decision, Cunningham remains the final word on 

the issue in Pennsylvania. 

7 See Goodwin’s Brief at 7.

8 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Super. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (holding contention 

that Miller v. Alabama applies to persons over 18 whose brains were 

immature at the time of the crime does not bring the matter within Section 

9545(b)(1)(iii)). 

Therefore, there is no basis upon which to disturb the decision of the 

PCRA court that dismissed Goodwin’s third PCRA petition upon the 

conclusion that the petition was untimely and Goodwin failed to establish an 

applicable exception to the time bar.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2015