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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

July 23, 2015 

v No. 320628 

Wayne Circuit Court 

SALAH AL-SHARA, LC No. 13-005911-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SAAD, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial conviction of larceny by conversion 

(property valued between $1,000 and $20,000), MCL 750.362; MCL 750.356(3)(a). The trial 

court sentenced defendant to 18 months’ probation. Because the prosecution presented 

insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the 

requisite criminal intent, we reverse. 

 This case arises out of a contract between complainant, who wished to purchase a 

vehicle, and defendant, who was a licensed buyer and seller of automobiles. The contract was 

oral and memorialized only by a receipt for a deposit of $4,000 paid by complainant to 

defendant. 

 As part of his business, defendant will often search the country for a particular type of 

used car on behalf of a customer. He testified that he will typically purchase a requested car at 

auction, where a pre-purchase inspection of the vehicle is not possible, but prices are 

significantly lower. He then has the car delivered to Detroit where he pays to have any necessary 

repairs performed before delivering the vehicle to his customer. Complainant agreed that this 

was her understanding of how defendant would obtain a vehicle for her. 

 On November 30, 2012, complainant and defendant met and complainant stated that she 

wanted to purchase a black 2010 Mercedes SLK with low mileage. Defendant stated that he 

could obtain such a vehicle and that he would charge her $25,000, minus the value of her tradein, and that he required a $4,000 deposit. Delivery was to be made in 30 to 60 days. 

Complainant paid defendant the $4,000, and defendant gave her a receipt listing the amount as a 

“deposit.” Complainant testified that she understood that this “deposit” was a down payment 

and fully refundable. Defendant testified that he had required a deposit from complainant 

because he had been asked by her on several occasions in the past to locate cars, but that each 
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time he had previously purchased a vehicle at auction for her, she changed her mind and did not 

complete the purchase, causing defendant to lose money. Defendant testified that he told 

complainant that he would require her to leave a nonrefundable deposit on this occasion to 

ensure that she did not change her mind. 

 Complainant and defendant agree that defendant showed her a picture of a vehicle that 

matched her request. Complainant testified that she understood that defendant would be selling 

her that exact vehicle. Defendant testified that he showed complainant a photo of the type and 

quality of vehicle he thought he could obtain for her at auction and that the agreement was for a 

vehicle of that type, not the precise vehicle in the picture. The receipt did not reference any 

particular VIN number, referencing the vehicle only by make, model, and year. 

 Defendant testified, and the prosecution did not dispute, that he purchase the pictured 

SLK at a Houston auction for approximately $17,000 and paid an additional $600 to ship the 

vehicle north. Defendant further testified that when he purchased the car, he thought that it only 

had collision damage, but when it was inspected after being brought to Detroit, he learned that 

the transmission was cracked and that repair or replacement would be too costly given the price 

quoted. At some point thereafter, he sold the unrepaired car at auction at a loss. 

 Defendant testified that, after learning about the cracked transmission, he contacted 

complainant, explaining to her that the car was “no good” and that he would “find another one” 

for her. He thereafter requested her email address so that he could send her photos of three other 

vehicles that met her specifications. Complainant did not dispute this testimony. However, she 

refused to provide her email address to defendant, told him that she no longer wished to purchase 

a vehicle through him, and requested that he return the $4,000. Defendant refused to return the 

money, stating that it was a nonrefundable deposit, that his costs were in excess of that amount, 

and that he was willing to provide her with an equivalent vehicle. 

 Rather than pursuing a breach of contract claim or other appropriate civil remedy, 

complainant elected to file a police report with the Belleville Police Department against 

defendant for larceny. On March 12, 2013, police arrested defendant at his home for larceny by 

conversion. They seized $7,000 in cash and several vehicles at defendant’s home, despite the 

fact that it is clear that the subject SLK was not present. Some of the seized vehicles belonged to 

a car dealer with whom defendant did contract work. Complainant texted defendant: “Give [the 

sheriff] my $4000 and this could all be over.”1

 Defendant, through his counsel, was forced to 

obtain a court order requiring that the police returned all the seized property. 

 Defendant was arraigned in circuit court on July 10, 2013 and a bench trial was scheduled 

for October 10, 2013. On October 10, complainant failed to appear and the trial court dismissed 

 

1

 Complainant also admitted to stating to a prosecutor that she wanted $20,000 from defendant. 

She explained that this statement was made in “jest.” 
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the case without prejudice.2

 The charge was later reinstated and a bench trial conducted on 

November 30 and December 20, 2013. On January 10, 2014, the trial court found defendant 

guilty of larceny by conversion. 

 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion 

that he possessed the requisite specific intent for larceny by conversion.3

 A fundamental principle in our criminal justice system requires that, to convict a criminal 

defendant, the prosecution must prove every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See People v Allen, 466 Mich 86, 90; 643 NW2d 227 (2002). “[W]hen determining 

whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). “[A] reasonable doubt is an 

honest doubt based upon reason. It is a state of mind that would cause the [factfinder] to hesitate 

when acting in the graver and more important affairs of life.” People v Jackson, 167 Mich App 

388, 391; 421 NW2d 697 (1988) (citations omitted). 

 Larceny by conversion, codified as MCL 750.362, provides in relevant part: 

 Any person to whom any money, goods or other property, which may be 

the subject of larceny, shall have been delivered, who shall embezzle or 

fraudulently convert to his own use, or shall secrete with the intent to embezzle, 

or fraudulently use such goods, money or other property, or any part thereof, shall 

be deemed by so doing to have committed the crime of larceny . . . . 

We have identified the essential elements of larceny by conversion: 

(1) the property at issue must have some value, (2) the property belonged to 

someone other than the defendant, (3) someone delivered the property to the 

defendant, irrespective of whether that delivery was by legal or illegal means, (4) 

the defendant embezzled, converted to his own use, or hid the property with the 

intent to embezzle or fraudulently use it, and (5) at the time the property was 

embezzled, converted, or hidden, the defendant intended to defraud or cheat the 

owner permanently of that the property. [People v Mason, 247 Mich App 64, 72; 

634 NW2d 382 (2001) (quotation marks omitted).] 

 It is undisputed that defendant kept the $4,000 he obtained from complainant. However, 

this act alone is insufficient to satisfy the fourth and fifth necessary elements. Rather, defendant 

 

2

 Following this dismissal, defendant apparently offered complainant $4,000 to resolve the 

matter. The trial court ultimately refused to admit evidence of such offers but, as will be 

discussed below, whether this ruling was in error is irrelevant. 

3

 Whether a defendant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. 

People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). 
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must have intended to “defraud or cheat” complainant, i.e., he must have knowingly intended to 

unlawfully keep the $4,000. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to establish this 

fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Both defendant and complainant offered reasonable interpretations of the contract and 

accounts of its formation and terms. The fact that they apparently misunderstood each other does 

not render defendant criminally liable. If that were the case, then nearly every party found liable 

for breach of contract would also be guilty of larceny by conversion. The party being sued for 

breach of contract virtually always believes she is entitled to the funds in her possession; the fact 

that she is later adjudicated to be in breach of the contract does not render her criminally liable. 

For criminal liability to attach to defendant’s actions, there must be a finding that defendant 

subjectively believed that the deposit was a fully returnable down payment and that no substitute 

vehicle could be provided. The trial court did not make such a finding and, after a review of the 

record, we cannot discern a basis for such findings. 

 In finding defendant guilty, the trial court relied on our opinion in Mason, 247 Mich App 

64. However, that case is wholly distinguishable, both factually and legally. 

 Legally, in Mason, we were tasked with reviewing the circuit court’s grant of the 

defendant’s motion to quash five counts of larceny by conversion. Id. at 65. We review such an 

issue for an abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court in finding that there was not 

probable cause to bind the defendant over on the charges. Id. at 70-71; MCL 766.13. By 

contrast, in this case, we review defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge de novo, and 

the prosecution must have proved the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Harverson, 291 Mich App at 177. Moreover, because a full trial was held in this case, we have 

the benefit of an entire record, as opposed to merely the evidence introduced at a preliminary 

examination. 

 Factually, Mason involved five separate complainants who had entered into written 

contracts with the defendant to purchase mobile homes. Id. at 66-69. The terms of the contracts 

were clear. Each complainant had provided the defendant with a down payment and, in some 

cases, additional monies. Id. The defendant accepted these payments, often depositing them in 

his personal accounts rather than those used for the business. Id. Each complainant, when they 

attempted to pick up the purchased mobile home, learned that the defendant’s business had 

closed and that the defendant would neither provide them with a mobile home nor refund any 

money. Id. 

 In Mason, the contracts were written and there was no dispute as to their terms. By 

contrast, in this case, the contract was oral and there are several disputes as to its terms. In 

addition, defendant sought to satisfy the contract by providing a different vehicle of the ordered 

make and model, but complainant refused to consider them. In Mason, the defendant made the 

highly attenuated argument that once the cash deposits were paid to him, the cash was titled to 
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him and he could not convert his own property.4

 Here, defendant relies not on some legal 

fiction, but on his understanding of the contract.5

 As noted above, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant intended to retain the money while possessing the subjective knowledge that doing so 

was unlawful, i.e., in violation of the contract between himself and complainant. There was 

insufficient evidence to allow the trial court to reach such a conclusion; in fact, there was 

substantial evidence that defendant subjectively believed he was entitled to retain the $4,000 and, 

further, that this belief was either consistent with the contract or a good-faith error by defendant. 

See People v Hillhouse, 80 Mich 580, 586; 45 NW 484 (1890) (“There is a wide difference 

between a trespass, though willful, and larceny. The felonious intent is an essential and 

inseparable ingredient in every larceny, and if a person takes property under a claim of right, 

however unfounded, he has not committed larceny.”). Complainant’s testimony concerning her 

understanding of the contract, unsupported by any other evidence, is insufficient, as a matter of 

law, to establish defendant’s specific criminal intent. 

 We reverse defendant’s convictions and remand for an entry dismissing the charge 

against him with prejudice.6

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

 

4

 The same was true in People v O’Shea, 149 Mich App 268; 385 NW2d 768 (1986), the other 

case cited by the prosecution. 

5

 Moreover, although not legally dispositive, the fact that the Mason defendant illegally retained 

the down payments of five separate complainants under similar circumstances provides 

persuasive evidence that he was conducting a criminal enterprise. By contrast, in this case, we 

are presented with a single instance that appears to have been based on a genuine and good-faith 

contractual dispute. 

6

 Because there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction, and because the 

proper remedy is dismissal with prejudice, we need not address defendant’s evidentiary 

argument. See People v Mitchell, 301 Mich App 282, 294; 835 NW2d 615 (2013).