NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LAWRENCE JAMAAL WATSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0821

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-152876-001

The Honorable Sherry K. Stephens, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry Reid

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WATSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Lawrence Jamaal Watson appeals from his convictions and 

resulting sentences for possession of narcotic drugs, resisting arrest and 

aggravated assault, arguing his constitutional rights were violated when a 

police officer opened an opaque film canister that contained crack cocaine

during a consensual search. Because Watson has shown no reversible error, 

his convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2012, Watson was charged with possession or use of 

narcotic drugs, a Class 4 felony (Count 1); resisting arrest, a Class 6 felony 

(Count 2); aggravated assault, a Class 5 felony (Count 3) and aggravated 

assault of a peace officer, a Class 3 felony (Count 4). Watson was on release 

leading up to, and at, trial. After Watson failed to appear for trial, the court 

issued a bench warrant. Because Watson had been advised of the trial date 

in open court, the court found Watson “knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily chose to absent himself from these proceedings” and proceeded 

with the June 2013 trial in absentia. 

¶3 The trial evidence showed Officers Montoya and Siljander 

were providing off-duty security at an apartment complex in West Phoenix.

While patrolling, Officer Montoya encountered Watson but did not 

recognize him as a tenant. Officer Montoya asked Watson if he would 

accompany her to the apartment office to determine whether the friend he 

was allegedly visiting was a tenant. Watson agreed and walked back 

towards the office with her. During the walk to the apartment office, Officer 

 

1 On appeal, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the conviction and resolves all reasonable inferences against 

defendant. State v. Karr, 221 Ariz. 319, 320 ¶ 2, 212 P.3d 11, 12 (App. 2008).
STATE v. WATSON

Decision of the Court

3

Montoya testified Watson appeared nervous, was fidgeting, sweating 

profusely and constantly looking back and forth. 

¶4 Once in the office, Officer Montoya asked Watson, “you don’t 

have anything we need to worry about, you don’t have guns, drugs, knives, 

grenades, anything like that on you?” Watson answered “no, let me show 

you.” Watson then handed her a variety of items, including a lighter, some 

paper, and a small, opaque white film canister that made a rattling sound. 

Officer Montoya testified that the container was the sort often used to hold 

drugs.

¶5 Officer Montoya shook the canister and examined it. Watson 

said nothing but began walking toward the door. Officer Montoya then 

opened the container, saw rocks of crack cocaine and commented “you got 

a little crack there.” Watson then ran toward the door. Officer Montoya told

Officer Siljander, who had just walked into the office, to restrain Watson. 

Officer Montoya managed to slam the office door shut before Watson could 

escape. Watson threw a wild punch at Officer Montoya, but missed. 

¶6 By this time, Officer Siljander had grabbed Watson from 

behind in a bear hug. During a subsequent struggle, Officer Siljander and 

Watson fell to the floor. Ultimately, Officer Montoya used Officer 

Siljander’s flashlight to strike Watson. One strike hit Watson in the head but 

Watson continued to struggle. After about a minute of struggling, Officer 

Siljander testified that he felt Watson tugging on his holster, so he alerted 

Officer Montoya that Watson was “going for [his] gun.” Officer Montoya 

drew her gun and placed it to Watson’s head. Watson then stopped 

struggling, said “I’m done” and was taken into custody. 

¶7 After being read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436 (1966), Watson agreed to speak with police officers. Watson said he 

found the drugs in an alley and had been rolling pieces of the crack rocks 

into cigarettes to smoke. Watson admitted that he was under the influence 

of the drug when he assaulted the officers. 

¶8 The jury found Watson guilty on Counts 1–3 and not guilty 

on Count 4. On August 8, 2013, officers arrested Watson in Illinois and he 

was transported to Arizona. The superior court sentenced Watson to 4.5 

years in prison for the possession conviction; 2 years in prison for resisting 

arrest and 3 years in prison for aggravated assault, all imposed concurrently

and with credit for 130 days of presentence incarceration. Watson filed a 

timely appeal from his convictions and resulting sentences.
STATE v. WATSON

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

I. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Appeal. 

¶9 The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction based on 

Watson’s absconding and the resulting delay in sentencing. “A defendant 

may not appeal” a “final judgment of conviction . . . if the defendant’s 

absence prevents sentencing from occurring within ninety days after 

conviction and the defendant fails to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence at the time of sentencing that the absence was involuntary.” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-4033(C) (2015).

2 Watson failed to appear at trial and, 

as a result of his absconding, sentencing did not occur until 141 days after 

his conviction. There is no indication in the record or on appeal that 

Watson’s absence was involuntary. 

¶10 A criminal defendant’s constitutional “right to appeal in all 

cases,” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24, is subject to forfeiture, including by waiver, 

see A.R.S. § 13-4033(C). Such waiver, however, must be knowing, voluntary 

and intelligent, with such an inference properly drawn “only if the 

defendant has been informed he could forfeit the right to appeal if he 

voluntarily delays his sentencing for more than ninety days.” State v. 

Bolding, 227 Ariz. 82, 88 ¶ 20, 253 P.3d 279, 285 (App. 2011). As applied, 

there is no indication Watson was told about the possible waiver of his right 

to appeal if he failed to attend trial. Accordingly, the record does not 

support a finding that Watson properly waived his right to appeal by 

absconding, meaning this court has jurisdiction over his timely appeal 

pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1). 

II. Watson’s Fourth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated. 

¶11 Watson argues Officer Montoya violated his constitutional 

rights by opening the film canister Watson had given her. Watson admits 

that he did not raise his Fourth Amendment challenge with the superior 

court, meaning review on appeal is limited to fundamental error. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 21.3(c); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶¶ 19–20, 115 P.3d 

601, 607 (2005). “Accordingly, [defendant] ‘bears the burden to establish 

that “(1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused 

 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. WATSON

Decision of the Court

5

him prejudice.”’” State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 493 ¶ 11, 297 P.3d 182, 185 

(App. 2013) (citations omitted).

¶12 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 

seizures by the government. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 

U.S. 248, 250 (1991). A warrantless search is reasonable, and thus 

constitutional, if the suspect consented to the search. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.

“It is well established that ‘the scope of a consent search is limited by the 

breadth of the actual consent.’” State v. Swanson, 172 Ariz. 579, 583, 838 P.2d 

1340, 1344 (App. 1992) (citation omitted). The scope of consent is an 

objective test determined by asking what the typical reasonable person 

would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 

suspect. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; State v. Ahumada, 225 Ariz. 544, 546 ¶ 7, 241 

P.3d 908, 910 (App. 2010).

¶13 Here, when he was not in police custody, Watson voluntarily 

accompanied Officer Montoya to the apartment office. Once in the office, 

Officer Montoya asked Watson “you don’t have guns, drugs, knives, 

grenades, anything like that on you?” Thus, the scope of the consent search 

would be “limited by the items about which the officer inquired as a 

predicate to the search.” Swanson, 172 Ariz. at 583, 838 P.2d at 1344. In 

response, Watson answered “no, let me show you” and voluntarily handed

Officer Montoya a variety of items, including the film canister holding the 

crack cocaine.

¶14 Watson’s verbal response, accompanied by the physical act of 

handing the items to the officer, was “clear and positive evidence” of 

consent “in unequivocal words” and deeds. See State v. Lynch, 120 Ariz. 584, 

586, 587 P.2d 770, 772 (App. 1978) (holding defendant’s answer that his 

driver’s license was in glove compartment gave consent for officers to 

search there); State v. Ballesteros, 23 Ariz. App. 211, 214, 531 P.2d 1149, 1152 

(1975) (finding partially opening a trunk in response to an officer’s request 

constituted consent to search the trunk). Officer Montoya could reasonably 

have interpreted Watson’s statements and actions in response to her 

question about drug possession as giving consent for her to open the 

canister. Furthermore, Watson did not object during the few seconds that 

passed when Officer Montoya examined and shook the canister, providing 

additional evidence of consent. See Lynch, 120 Ariz. at 586, 587 P.2d at 772.

Accordingly, Watson has not shown error or a violation of his constitutional 

rights. 
STATE v. WATSON

Decision of the Court

6

¶15 Even if the evidence was obtained and admitted in error, 

which it was not, Watson has not shown that the error was fundamental or

that it resulted in prejudice. After being read his Miranda rights, testimony 

during trial showed Watson admitted to possessing and using the drugs 

the day of the incident. Accordingly, Watson has not shown fundamental 

error or resulting prejudice from the admission of the evidence obtained 

from the film canister.

CONCLUSION

¶16 Because Watson has shown no reversible error, his 

convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed.