Filed 5/31/23 Chui v. Chui CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying 

on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by 

rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

BENJAMIN TZE-MAN CHUI, 

as Trustee, etc., et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHRISTINE CHUI, Individually 

and as Personal Representative, 

etc.,

Defendant and Appellant;

JACQUELINE CHUI, a Minor, 

et al.,

Appellants;

JACKSON CHEN, as Guardian, 

etc.,

Respondent.

 B310325

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BP154245)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Gus T. May, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Bohm Wildish & Matsen and James G. Bohm for Defendant 

and Appellant Christine Chui.
2

Ambrosi & Doerges and Mary E. Doerges Frey; Law Offices 

of Angela Hawekotte, Angela Hawekotte; Bohm, Wildish & Matsen, 

James G. Bohm, Nicholas P. Carrigan; Pastor Law Group and 

Nathan Pastor for Appellant Michael Chui.

Law Offices of Michael S. Overing, Michael S. Overing and 

Edward C. Wilde for Appellant Jacqueline Chui.

Hinojosa & Forer, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for 

Respondent Jackson Chen.

________________________________

In this probate and trust litigation, the court appointed 

Jackson Chen as guardian ad litem for minors Jacqueline Chui 

and Michael Chui.

1 After the minors’ mother, Christine Chui,

filed a petition to remove Chen as the minors’ guardian ad litem, 

Chen requested the court appoint counsel to defend him against 

Christine’s attacks, which the court granted. Sixteen months later, 

Chen filed a petition to recover approximately $534,890 as his and 

the appointed counsel’s fees, to be paid from the minors’ share of

the trust estate. Jacqueline and Michael, then 17 and 15 years 

of age, respectively, hired counsel to assert their objections to the 

fee petition and to petition for removal of Chen as their guardian 

ad litem. Chen successfully moved to disqualify the minors’ 

counsel, and the court struck the minors’ removal petitions. The 

court also appointed counsel to represent Jacqueline and Michael 

at the hearing on the fee petition. After the court granted Chen’s 

fee petition, Jacqueline, Michael, and Christine appealed. 

1 Many of the parties share the same last name. To enhance 

readability and to avoid confusion, we refer to them by their first 

names. We intend no disrespect.
3

We agree with Jacqueline that the denial of her right to 

have her chosen counsel represent her with respect to Chen’s fee 

petition constitutes a denial of due process, and that Chen has 

failed to show that the error was harmless. We therefore reverse 

with directions to hold a further hearing on the fee petition. In 

light of this holding, we decline to address other issues raised on 

appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Background

King Wah Chui (King) and Chi May Chui (May) had three 

children: Robert Tak-Kwong Chui, Margaret Tak-Ying Chui Lee, 

and Esther Chao. Robert and his first wife Helena Chang Chui had 

a son, Benjamin Tze-Man Chui. Robert and Helena divorced, and 

Robert married Christine. Robert and Christine had two children,

Jacqueline and Michael.

King and May are the settlors of a trust and three subtrusts 

(collectively, the King Trust). The assets of the King Trust consist 

primarily of interests in residential apartment complexes and 

related business entities, other real property, and financial 

accounts.

May died in 2004. 

In October 2012, Esther, a beneficiary under the King Trust,

filed a petition in the probate court concerning two subtrusts of the 

King Trust, commencing Los Angeles County Superior Court case 

No. BP137413. Esther alleged that King had become incapacitated,

that Robert and Margaret were acting as co-trustees of the King 

Trust, and that Robert and Margaret had wrongfully delegated 

their fiduciary responsibilities to Robert’s wife Christine.

In January 2013, Esther petitioned to have a guardian 

ad litem appointed for Jacqueline and Michael, who were then 
4

10 years old and 8 years old, respectively. Esther asserted that 

Robert, the minors’ father, “[was] in a coma” and that Christine, 

who had allegedly mismanaged the King Trust, “cannot act as 

[guardian ad litem because] she will protect herself and not her 

children.” Esther predicted that the case “will be heavily litigated,” 

and therefore the court should appoint “a probate lawyer with trial 

experience . . . to protect [the minors’] rights.”

In March 2013, the court granted Esther’s petition and 

appointed Chen as the minors’ guardian ad litem in the case.

In April 2013, the court appointed Benjamin (Robert’s son 

by his first marriage) and Margaret as co-trustees of the King 

Trust. Robert died in June 2013. King died in 2014.

Since the commencement of litigation in 2012, at least 

seven other probate and trust administration cases have been 

filed and deemed related to the case Esther commenced (case 

No. BP137413).

2 In one case (case No. BP145759), Christine was 

appointed guardian of the estates for Jacqueline and Michael. And 

in litigation concerning an insurance trust established by Robert 

and his first wife Helena (case No. BP145642 (the ILIT case)), the 

court appointed Christine guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and 

Michael. It does not appear that the court formally appointed a 

guardian ad litem in any other related case until March 3, 2020, 

2 The related cases are Los Angeles County Superior Court 

case Nos. BP143884 (concerning Robert’s estate); BP145642 

(concerning Robert and Helena’s irrevocable life insurance trust 

(ILIT)); BP145759 (concerning the guardianship of the minors); 

BP154245 (concerning the estate of King and May); BP155345

(concerning Trust A); BC544149 (concerning litigation regarding 

Robert’s estate); and BP162717 (concerning the King Chui and Chi 

May Chui life insurance trust).
5

when the court appointed Chen guardian ad litem for Jacqueline 

and Michael in most of the related cases.

B. The May 2018 settlement and the first guardian 

ad litem agreement

In May 2018, Esther, Christine, Benjamin, and Margaret

resolved disputes among themselves in a settlement agreement, 

the terms of which were set forth orally in court. Among other 

terms, Christine “disclaim[ed] any rights as a beneficiary of [the 

King Trust],” and agreed that only Chen (or his designee or courtappointed successor) can bring a claim on behalf of Jacqueline or 

Michael prior to their reaching the age of majority. Chen was not

present when the agreement was announced. The provisions of 

the agreement “affecting [Jacqueline’s and Michael’s] interests and 

rights” were expressly subject to approval by Chen. And, because 

the agreement compromised Jacqueline’s and Michael’s rights 

under the Trust, it also required the court’s approval. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 372.)

In August 2018, Chen (as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline 

and Michael), Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther—but not 

Christine—signed what we described in Chui v. Chui (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 873, 885–886 (Chui I) as the “first GAL agreement.” 

In November 2018, Chen filed a petition to approve the first GAL 

agreement.

Meanwhile, beginning in July 2018, Christine filed various 

motions and petitions challenging the validity and enforceability 

of the original oral settlement and the first GAL agreement. This 

litigation is summarized in two prior opinions from this court: 

Chui I, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 873, and Chui v. Chui (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 929 (Chui II). The court rejected each challenge. 

In addition to pursuing efforts to invalidate the first GAL 

agreement, Christine filed a motion in December 2018, to remove 
6

Chen as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and Michael and appoint 

herself in his place. Christine alleged, among other misconduct, 

that Chen committed fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment, 

intentional interference with an expected inheritance to the minors, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress to the minors, intentional 

misrepresentations and nondisclosure to the court, and breach of 

fiduciary duty.3

In response to Christine’s motion, Chen applied ex parte 

to the trial court for approval to retain counsel “to represent him

as guardian ad litem in these proceedings.” Chen acknowledged 

that the court ordinarily appoints a guardian ad litem “with the 

expectation that [the] appointed [guardian ad litem] represents 

him[self] or herself.” Chen stated, however, that because of “the 

high level of rancor Christine has demonstrated toward [Chen] and 

the nature of the allegations she is now making against [him],” it is 

in his and the minors’ best interests “to retain counsel to represent 

him in defending against the claims made in Christine’s [m]otion.” 

Chen represented that attorney Jeffrey Forer had agreed to reduce 

his billing rate from $675 per hour to $500 per hour in representing 

Chen.

On January 16, 2019, the court granted Chen’s application 

and appointed Forer of Hinojosa & Forer (H&F) “to represent . . . 

Chen,” reserving “the right to reallocate . . . Chen’s fees.” The 

court did not further describe Forer’s or H&F’s role in the case. 

In the same order, the court vacated Christine’s motion to remove 

Chen “as improperly filed,” without prejudice to the filing of a 

procedurally proper petition to remove Chen.

3 The motion, together with an accompanying memorandum 

of points and authorities and supporting evidence, encompass more 

than 800 pages of our record.
7

On February 1, 2019, Christine filed a petition to remove 

Chen as guardian ad litem alleging nine causes of action against 

Chen. Christine sought an order removing Chen as guardian 

ad litem and appointing her in his place, an order voiding all 

actions Chen had taken in the case, and sanctions against Chen 

“related to his intentional fraud and concealment to the court to 

harm the minors.”4 (Capitalization omitted.) Our record does not 

disclose whether Chen filed any response to this petition.

In April and May 2019, the court held a trial on Chen’s 

petition to approve the first GAL agreement. Forer represented 

Chen in connection with the trial and subsequent proceedings.

In July 2019, the court denied the petition. Chen, the court 

stated, had not proven “that the agreement is in both or either 

of the [minors’] best interests.”

C. The second guardian ad litem agreement

In December 2019, Chen, Benjamin, Margaret, and Christine 

participated in a mediation, which produced an agreement among 

the parties except for Christine. The agreement, which we referred 

to in Chui I as the second GAL agreement, was memorialized in 

writing in January 2020. (Chui I, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) 

Chen promptly filed a petition for approval of the second GAL 

agreement and a petition to remove Christine as the minors’ 

guardian ad litem and guardian of the person and estate of the 

minors in any case in which she had those roles, and to have 

4 Christine filed subsequent petitions to remove Chen in 

December 2019 and February 2020. Although the procedural 

history concerning each of Christine’s petitions for removal of 

Chen is not clear in our record, it appears they were ultimately 

resolved in Chen’s favor in an order issued on March 3, 2020.
8

himself appointed as the minors’ guardian ad litem in all cases

related to the May 2018 settlement.

After a hearing held on March 3, 2020, the trial court issued 

an order: (1) denying Christine’s petition to remove Chen as 

guardian ad litem; (2) granting Chen’s petition to be appointed 

guardian ad litem in all related cases, but one; and (3) granting

Chen’s petition to approve the second GAL agreement. In denying 

Christine’s petition to remove Chen, the court stated that “there is 

no basis to remove Chen where he has successfully done his job by 

negotiating an approvable settlement for the minors, leaving them 

far better off than they were under the [first] GAL agreement.”

5

(Capitalization omitted.) According to the court, its failure to 

appoint Chen guardian ad litem in the related cases previously 

was due to “its own oversight” and that, by appointing Chen, the 

court was “first and foremost remedying an administrative defect.”

Christine, Jacqueline, and Michael, each represented by 

different attorneys, appealed from the court’s March 3, 2020 orders. 

In January 2021, Forer, on behalf of Chen, filed a motion in this 

court to dismiss the appeals filed by Jacqueline and Michael, which 

we denied.

In March 2022, we affirmed the order in Chui I. (Chui I, 

supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 873.)

D. Chen’s fee petition

On May 15, 2020, Chen filed a petition in the trial court for 

approval of his and H&F’s fees and costs (the fee petition). Chen 

5 As we noted in Chui v. Chui (Mar. 2, 2022, B306918) 

[nonpub. opn.], Jacqueline and Michael’s “collective net value under 

the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement would . . . be 

approximately $22 million—approximately $5 million more than 

what they were entitled to receive under the terms of the Trust.”
9

sought: (1) $210,915 as fees for his services as guardian ad litem, 

plus costs of $1,456; and (2) $323,975 for H&F’s fees, plus $7,102.35 

in costs. In support of the petition, Chen states that he spent “no 

fewer than 468.7 hours” as guardian ad litem in the underlying 

cases and that his ordinary billing rate is $450 per hour. Chen 

attached to his declaration billing statements showing particular 

tasks and the time spent on each, and an itemized list of costs 

advanced.

Chen supported the claim for H&F’s fees and costs with a 

declaration by Forer, which describes the work Forer and his H&F

colleague Shannon H. Burns performed in connection with the case. 

Forer states that his regular billing rate is $675 per hour, but that 

he billed his time in this case at $500 per hour “as agreed upon 

by [the] [c]ourt.” Burns’s regular rate is $500 per hour, and she 

charged her time at the rate of $375 per hour in this case. Forer 

billed 452.5 hours on the case, and Burns billed 261.4 hours. H&F’s 

itemized billings for the case are attached to the declaration.

In his petition, Chen did not specify the source from which 

payment for the fees and costs would be made. In a supplement 

to the fee petition, Chen clarified that he is seeking payment for 

his and H&F’s fees and costs only from Jacqueline’s and Michael’s 

shares of the King Trust.

While the fee petition was pending, Jacqueline, who was

then 17 years old, retained the firm of the Law Offices of Michael S.

Overing (the Overing firm) to represent her. On June 15, 2020, the 

Overing firm filed on Jacqueline’s behalf a petition to remove Chen 

as her guardian ad litem.

6 On October 1, 2020 the Overing firm 

filed an amended petition to remove Chen as her guardian ad litem 

6 Michael, who was then 16 years old, also retained counsel

and filed a motion to remove Chen as his guardian ad litem.
10

(Jacqueline’s removal petition). Among other arguments, 

Jacqueline asserted that Chen had never met or communicated 

with her during his seven-year representation of her and had 

recently taken positions contrary and hostile to her interests. 

In Jacqueline’s view, Chen does not have “even the slightest 

concern or knowledge for her good. He is simply the man who 

is spending her inheritance without the courtesy of even saying 

‘hello.’ ” Jacqueline sought an order authorizing her “to appear 

without a guardian ad litem” or, in the alternative, “to proceed 

with a different guardian ad litem until her 18th birthday.” She 

also requested that the court deny “Chen any fees for his actions 

as guardian ad litem.” (Italics omitted.)

Chen responded to Jacqueline’s removal petition by filing: 

(1) a motion to disqualify the Overing firm from representing 

Jacqueline; (2) an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Jacqueline’s 

removal petition; and (3) a demurrer to Jacqueline’s petition.

Among other arguments, Chen asserted that Jacqueline did not 

have standing to seek Chen’s removal because, as a minor, she 

“lacks legal capacity to make decisions or to contract,” “to hire an 

attorney,” or “to act independently.”

On September 30, 2020, prior to the court’s ruling on Chen’s 

various challenges to Jacqueline’s removal petition, the Overing 

firm filed a “special appearance” objection to the fee petition. 

(Boldface and capitalization omitted.) According to the objections, 

Chen’s and H&F’s billings reveal “systematic overcharging” by 

H&F. The Overing firm identified 49 events that appear on the 

billing statements of both Chen and Forer. For many of these 

events, Forer billed substantially more time than Chen, implying 

that either Forer overstated his time performing the task or Chen 

understated his. Jacqueline further argued that Forer had been 

retained for the limited purpose of representing Chen “in defending 
11

against the claims made” in Christine’s motion to remove him as 

guardian ad litem, and that Forer billed for work in excess of his 

appointment; indeed, Jacqueline asserted, Chen has been using 

“Forer to attack Jacqueline while expecting her to pay for his 

attacks.” Jacqueline also argued that Forer failed to disclose a 

conflict of interest, and that Forer and Chen committed malpractice 

and breached duties owed to Jacqueline. Jacqueline requested that 

Chen’s fee petition be denied or, at least, that the court conduct an 

evidentiary hearing.

7

On October 5, 2020, Chen filed a “preliminary reply” 

to Jacqueline’s objections to the fee petition. (Boldface and 

capitalization omitted.) In the preliminary reply, Chen asserted 

that Jacqueline does not have standing to object to the fee petition. 

The only parties with standing to object, Chen argued, are the 

trustees of the King Trust. Chen concluded that the court should 

strike Jacqueline’s objections.

8

On October 6, 2020, Christine filed objections to Chen’s 

fee petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. Christine 

asserted that Chen and/or Forer should not recover fees, because

among other reasons, they committed acts of “dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, reckless or intentional misrepresentation to the [c]ourt,” 

“breach[es] of duty against” the minors, “intentional interference 

with expected inheritance,” and “moral turpitude and corruption 

7 There is a reference in our record to a notice of joinder in 

Jacqueline’s objections filed by counsel for Michael. The referenced 

document, however, does not appear to be in our record.

8 On appeal, Jacqueline asserts in her opening and reply 

briefs that the court struck her objections. She does not, however, 

cite to the record for any order explicitly striking her objections. 

Chen, however, does not dispute the point.
12

in waiving the [m]inors’ interests, rights, and claims to over 

$100 million.” She further alleged: Chen failed to bring any benefit 

to the minors; Chen had a conflict of interest in representing both 

minors and colluded with “adverse litigants”; Chen was derelict in 

his duty during a trial concerning the settlement agreement; H&F

is “allied with” adverse parties; Chen should not recover for work 

performed on cases prior to his appointment on such cases; and 

Chen’s and H&F’s fees are excessive, duplicative, and unreasonable. 

Christine further asserted that, if fees are paid, they should be paid 

from the King Trust “in general, not from the children’s shares.”

Christine supported her objections with a declaration from 

Andre Jardini, an attorney specializing in auditing legal bills.

Jardini opined that Chen’s billing rate of $450 per hour is excessive 

and that some of Chen’s time was duplicative of Forer’s time. He 

concluded that Chen should be reimbursed, if at all, for 304.6 hours 

of time (instead of the 468.7 hours Chen claimed) at the rate of $250 

per hour, for a total of $76,150. Jardini further opined that staffing 

at H&F “was inappropriate and excessive,” the hours billed for 

certain tasks were excessive, there was unnecessary duplication 

of effort and “double billing entries,” “inappropriately vague billing,” 

and block billing. He concluded that H&F should be reimbursed 

for no more than 572.52 hours (instead of the 713.9 hours Forer 

claimed) for a total of $242,652.59. 

On October 20, 2020, the trial court granted Chen’s motion 

to disqualify Jacqueline’s and Michael’s attorneys and struck their 

petitions to remove Chen as their guardians ad litem, apparently 

on the basis that the petitions had been filed by the minors’ chosen 

counsel. The court subsequently appointed Adam Streltzer to 
13

represent Michael and Jacqueline “to review and respond” to

Chen’s fee petition.9

On December 24, 2020, Streltzer filed a report with his 

recommendations regarding the fee petition. Streltzer stated 

that, in addition to reviewing Chen’s fee petition and supporting 

documents, he reviewed the objections to the petition filed by 

Christine and Jacqueline, and Chen’s response to Jacqueline’s 

objections.

10

Streltzer noted that his review of the papers filed in 

the case revealed “a tendency towards overly-litigious behavior” 

among the “litigating parties” and that the litigants’ goal appeared 

to be “simply to win at all costs and destroy the opposition without 

regard to the cost or scope of the proceedings or any diminution 

of the subject inheritance(s).” It was thus “a surprise [to Streltzer] 

that the amounts sought by . . . Chen and his lawyer are not 

significantly higher than claimed.”

9 The court stated that its appointment of Streltzer and

Simon was made pursuant to Probate Code section 1470 and 

in case No. BP145759, which is concerned with the guardianship 

of the estates of Jacqueline and Michael.

10 Streltzer further stated that he reviewed a “first 

supplement to Jackson Chen, guardian ad litem’s petition for 

guardian ad litem fees and attorney’s fees and costs,” filed on

June 3, 2020, and Michael’s “notice of joinder and joinder in 

Jacqueline Chui’s (special appearance) objection to [the fee 

petition].” (Capitalization omitted.) Neither of these documents 

is included in our record on appeal. According to Streltzer, in 

Chen’s “first supplement,” Chen “clarifies that he seeks payment 

of [the requested fees and costs] only from his wards’ respective 

share of the subtrusts established under the [King Trust].” 

(Capitalization omitted.)
14

Streltzer pointed out that the probate court has a general 

standing order limiting the hourly rate for appointed counsel 

to $250 per hour, except in cases involving unusual problems 

requiring extraordinary expertise. Streltzer concluded that Chen 

had not satisfied his burden to justify an hourly rate above this 

limit. He explained that, although the case has been extremely 

litigious, difficult, and complex, “the issues before [the] [c]ourt 

are, substantively, merely traditional probate and trust law 

disputes concerning inheritance rights in real and personal

property, including business entities,” and that “the requirement 

of ‘unusual problems requiring extraordinary expertise’ ” had not 

been satisfied. Because the court had authorized Chen to retain 

counsel, Streltzer explained, “there is even less compelling reason 

for . . . Chen to charge his regular hourly attorney rate.” Moreover, 

even if Chen could justify the higher rate prior to the appointment 

of counsel to represent him, Streltzer agreed with Christine’s 

expert, Jardini, that it would not be appropriate to compensate 

Chen at a rate above of $250 per hour after the appointment of 

counsel.

Streltzer objected to Chen’s claim as to 26.3 hours of time 

spent attending depositions other than his own and time spent

reviewing and revising certain law and motion papers. Streltzer 

thus recommended that Chen should be awarded fees for 442.40 

hours of work (instead of the 468.7 hours Chen claimed) at the 

rate of $250 per hour (instead of the rate of $450 per hour sought 

by Chen).

As for Forer’s fees, Streltzer found that the billing rates 

Forer charged were fair and reasonable. He agreed with Christine’s 

expert, however, that Forer’s claim should be reduced because there 

were instances when multiple attorneys were used “when a single 

attorney would suffice,” when “lower-cost” employees were available 
15

to perform work, and where certain time is described in block 

billing. When these reductions are taken into account, Streltzer 

concluded that Forer’s claim of $323,975 should be reduced by 

$18,890.02 to $305,084.98.

In response to Streltzer’s report, Chen argued that he is 

entitled to compensation at his regular rate of $450 per hour and 

that his time spent on the case should not be reduced. Forer did not 

contest the reductions to his firm’s fees that Streltzer had proposed.

At the hearing on January 8, 2021, counsel appeared on

behalf of Benjamin, Margaret, Christine, and Esther. Chen 

appeared as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and Michael, Forer 

as counsel for Chen, and Streltzer as “limited purpose specially 

appointed counsel” for Jacqueline and Michael. Streltzer informed 

the court that Jacqueline “is nearly the age of majority and that 

she requests that this court continue the hearing and defer ruling 

on [the fee petition] until after her 18th birthday in March so that 

she may herself represent to the court what she believes is in her 

best interest.” Streltzer further stated that he understands “that 

Michael Chui joins in that request.” The court denied the request 

for a continuance.

The court also denied Christine’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing, stating that the “court has discretion in attorneys fees 

matters in connection with a guardian ad litem appointment as 

to whether to rule on the declarations and the filings in the case 

already, and [found] that those are all sufficient. . . . [T]o the extent 

that there are any factual disputes, . . . either everything has been 

ruled upon already or those disputes are not materially relevant to 

the issue before the court today.”

Regarding Chen’s hourly rate, the court allowed the higher 

rate based on “the history of this case and the lengthy involvement 

in it.” The court then approved Chen’s fees as requested in the 
16

petition and the reduced amount of Forer’s fees in accordance 

with Streltzer’s recommendation and Forer’s concession. The court 

further approved of the request for reimbursement of costs. The 

court also directed Streltzer to file “a fee declaration” no later than 

February 8, 2021, and set a hearing on Streltzer’s fee request for 

February 23, 2021. (Capitalization omitted.)

In the court’s formal order concerning the fee petition, filed 

on February 1, 2021, the court ruled that the payments to Chen 

and Forer are to be made from Jacqueline’s and Michael’s “share 

of the sub-trusts established under the [King Trust] and NOT from 

the Trust as a whole.”

On February 2, 2021, Forer served notice of the court’s 

February 1, 2021 order on counsel for the parties and on the 

disapproved counsel for Jacqueline and Michael.

Christine and Jacqueline filed separate timely notices 

of appeal from the court’s February 1, 2021 order granting Chen’s 

fee petition. Michael did not appeal from the February 1, 2021

order, but did file a notice of appeal from an order entered on 

February 23, 2021.

DISCUSSION

A. Jacqueline’s appeal

Jacqueline contends that the order granting the fee petition

must be reversed because the court denied her the opportunity to 

be heard on the fee petition through counsel of her choosing. We 

agree. 

In his fee petition, Chen sought approximately $534,890 

in fees for his and H&F’s work to be paid from Jacqueline’s and 

Michael’s shares of the King Trust. When, as here, the result of 

a judicial proceeding may adversely affect a person’s interest in 

property, constitutional due process generally requires that the 
17

court provide the person with “a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard” in the proceeding. (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 

371, 379; see Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 [“the central 

meaning of procedural due process” is that “ ‘[p]arties whose rights 

are to be affected are entitled to be heard’ ”]; Mullane v. Central 

Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313–314 [to accord 

with due process, an adjudication resulting in the deprivation 

of property must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for 

interested parties to present their objections].) 

The right to be heard includes the right to be heard by 

counsel of one’s choosing. (See Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 

U.S. 45, 68 [the right to a hearing includes “the right to the aid 

of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the 

right”]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 

716, 727 [“refusing to allow petitioner’s counsel to participate in 

the proceeding” “was a denial of a hearing”].) This right generally 

applies to civil litigants, as well as criminal defendants. (Roa v. 

Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 925 [“constitutional 

due process guarantee[s]” “the right to be represented by retained 

counsel in civil actions”]; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court 

(1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 379, 382 [“in both civil and criminal cases 

the right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel”]; 

Adir International, LLC v. Starr Indemnity and Liability Company

(9th Cir. 2021) 994 F.3d 1032, 1039 [courts recognize “a civil 

litigant’s . . . due process right to retain and fund the counsel 

of their choice”].)11 The right is not satisfied by the court’s 

11 The right to be represented by one’s chosen counsel is not 

unlimited. The legislature and courts may, for example, require 

that counsel be a member of the bar and admitted to practice 

before the court in which he or she appears. (McCuin v. Texas 
18

appointment of counsel for a party when the party seeks and 

can provide his or her retained counsel. (People v. Crovedi (1966) 

65 Cal.2d 199, 206; see Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Assn. v. 

Morales (5th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 1178, 1181 [“[t]he right to counsel 

in civil matters ‘includes the right to choose the lawyer who will 

provide that representation’ ”].)12

“Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution 

and possess constitutional rights.” (Planned Parenthood of Missouri 

v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 74; see In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 

1, 13 [“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 

is for adults alone”].) More particularly, minors who have 

“sufficient capacity to exercise due process rights”—a state that 

presumably exists when the minor reaches 14 years of age—have 

the right to be heard in proceedings implicating such rights. (In re 

Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 931.) A minor who has a due process 

Power & Light Co. (5th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 1255, 1262.) And a 

party’s chosen counsel may be disqualified when justified by “the 

need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.”

(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, 

Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.) These limitations do not apply 

in this case.

12 In the proceedings below, Chen repeatedly stated that 

Jacqueline, as a minor, lacks legal capacity to retain counsel. 

This is incorrect. Generally, a minor may make a contract for the 

services of an attorney “in the same manner as an adult.” (Fam. 

Code, § 6700.) Although the minor may be able to disaffirm the 

contract with the attorney (ibid.) and a court must approve a 

contract for “attorney’s fees for services in litigation” (Fam. Code, 

§ 6602; Chui II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 937, fn. 12), there is no 

per se legal bar to a minor hiring counsel. Chen cited no apposite 

authority for his assertion, and he does not reassert this view on 

appeal.
19

right to be heard has the correlated right to be heard through 

counsel of his or her own choosing. (See In re Gault, supra, 387 

U.S. at p. 41 [juvenile has a due process right to counsel of their 

own choosing in delinquency proceedings].)

When the party asserting the right to a hearing is a minor 

for whom a guardian ad litem has been appointed, the assertion 

of the right to counsel and retention of counsel will ordinarily

be initiated by the guardian ad litem. (Akkiko M. v. Superior 

Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 525, 529.) When, however, the right 

the minor seeks to have counsel assert on his or her behalf conflicts 

with the interest of the guardian ad litem, the general rule that 

the guardian ad litem will retain counsel for the minor (or act as

the minor’s counsel) must give way to the minor’s right to have 

counsel of his or her own choosing. Thus, in Chui II, we held 

that the trial court erred by granting Chen’s motion to disqualify 

Jacqueline’s counsel and striking Jacqueline’s petition to remove 

Chen as her guardian ad litem. A “minor capable of making 

informed decisions,” we explained, has the right “to have counsel 

assist with [a petition to the court for removal of a guardian 

ad litem] and to appear on the minor’s behalf in court to advocate 

for the petition.” (Chui II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 937.) 

We expressly limited our holding in Chui II “to the right of 

a minor to have independent counsel in connection with a petition 

for the removal of his or her guardian ad litem” and expressed 

“no view as to whether or under what circumstances a minor for 

whom a guardian ad litem has been appointed may otherwise retain 

or be represented by counsel of their choosing.” (Chui II, supra, 86 

Cal.App.5th at p. 937.) The rationale that supported our narrow 

holding in Chui II supports the similarly narrow conclusion we 

reach here: Minors with standing to object to a guardian ad litem’s 

fee petition and capable of making informed decisions have the 
20

right to a hearing on their objections and to have counsel of their 

choosing assist them in the matter. In both situations—the minor’s 

petition to remove the guardian ad litem and the minor’s objections 

to the guardian ad litem’s fee petition—there is an inherent conflict 

between the minor and the guardian ad litem. In both situations, 

it would be patently unfair to give the guardian ad litem the power 

to select or act as the minor’s counsel or, as Chen sought in this 

case, to deprive Jacqueline of her right to seek his removal or to 

object to his fee petition at all. Like the decision to deny Jacqueline 

her right to counsel in seeking to remove Chen, the court erred in 

denying Jacqueline her right to have her chosen counsel appear on 

her behalf to oppose the fee petition. 

Because the denial of Jacqueline’s right to counsel of her 

own choosing deprived her of her federal constitutional right to 

due process, Chen has the burden of establishing that the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 

827 [respondent’s actions denying minor “of the assistance of 

fully informed counsel” was an “error of federal constitutional 

dimension,” and respondent had the burden of proving lack of 

prejudice].) Chen, however, fails to respond meaningfully to 

Jacqueline’s arguments on appeal and makes no attempt to show 

that the error was harmless under any standard. 

Nor can we conclude from our review of the record that 

the error is harmless. Although the court appointed Streltzer 

“to review and respond” to Chen’s fee petition, Streltzer did not 

address in his report or assert at the hearing many of the objections 

Jacqueline had asserted, and there is no indication in the record 

that the court considered Jacqueline’s objections on their merits. 

Neither Streltzer nor the court, for example, addressed the points

Jacqueline made that H&F sought fees for work that exceeded 
21

the limited scope of Forer’s appointment—to defend Chen against 

Christine’s attacks—and that any award of fees should not be paid 

out of her share of the King Trust. Indeed, Streltzer admitted that 

he had “not inquired of either Jacqueline or Michael as to their

positions concerning” Chen’s fee petition and expressly disagreed 

with the minors’ views in his report. Streltzer’s representation of 

Jacqueline did not render the denial of her right to her own counsel 

harmless. Accordingly, the order awarding Chen and H&F their 

fees and costs is reversed and the matter remanded for a new 

hearing where all interested parties can be heard.

B. Michael’s and Christine’s appeals

Michael did not appeal from the court’s February 1, 2021 

order granting Chen’s petition for fees. His notice of appeal, filed 

on April 21, 2021, states that he is appealing from an order made 

on February 23, 2021. Michael did not include an order with that 

date in his appellant’s appendix, as required (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rules 8.122(b)(1)(C) & 8.124(b)(1)(A)), and such an order is not 

otherwise included in the record on appeal. Michael did, however, 

include a copy of the court’s February 23, 2021 minute order with 

his civil case information statement filed with this court. When 

read together with documents in our record, it appears that the

February 23, 2021 minute order reflects the court’s granting of

a request for fees in the amount of $14,367.67 by Streltzer, the

attorney the court appointed to represent Michael and Jacqueline 

to review and respond to Chen’s petition for fees. Although 

the February 23, 2021 order refers to the court’s receipt and 

review of objections filed to Streltzer’s request for fees, no such

objections are included in our record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, 

rules 8.122(b)(1)(C) & 8.124(b)(1)(B) [appellant must include in the

appellant’s appendix documents filed or lodged in the case that are 
22

“necessary for proper consideration of the issues”].)13 Michael’s 

arguments on appeal are directed at the court’s award of fees to 

Chen and Forer; he does not assert any point of error with respect 

to the February 23, 2021 order. 

We requested Michael file a supplemental brief addressing 

the question whether we may deem his appeal from the February 

23, 2021 order abandoned, and dismiss his appeal on that ground. 

Michael filed the requested brief. He explains that his notice of 

appeal inadvertently refers to the February 23, 2021 order, and 

that he intended to challenge the court’s February 1, 2021 order 

granting Chen’s motion for fees. He requests that we “liberally 

construe his notice of appeal and allow him to proceed on the appeal 

of the [February 1, 2021] order.” 

Because Michael does not present any argument concerning 

the order made on February 23, 2021, we deem his appeal from that 

order to be abandoned. (See Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8.) 

The question Michael raises in his supplemental brief—

whether we should construe his notice of appeal as being from the

February 1, 2021—is moot because we are reversing that order for

the reasons given in our discussion of Jacqueline’s appeal, and the

effect of the reversal is to place the parties in the position they were

in “as if the matter had never been heard.” (Barron v. Superior 

Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 293, 300.) Michael will thus have the 

opportunity to assert his objections to Chen’s fee petition, with the 

aid of retained counsel if he so chooses, when the matter is heard on 

13 Nor did Michael include the required register of actions 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(1)(F) & 8.124(b)(1)(A)), which 

may reveal other pertinent documents concerning the February 23, 

2021 order.
23

remand. Because the order granting the fee petition is reversed,

we do not reach the issues raised by Christine’s appeal.

DISPOSITION

The order granting guardian ad litem Chen’s fee petition 

is reversed. The court is directed to hold a new hearing on the 

fee petition consistent with the views expressed herein.

Appellant Jacqueline Chui is awarded her costs on appeal.

Appellants Christine Chui and Michael Chui and respondent 

Jackson Chen shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.