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NOT FOR PUBLICATION [Docket No. 1, 19] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

CAMDEN VICINAGE 

LOUISA CORBETT, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 Defendant. 

 

 

Civil No. 11-256 RMB 

 OPINION 

Louisa A. Corbett 

625 Jacksonville Rd. 

Mt. Holly, NJ 08060 

Pro Se Plaintiff 

David L. Brown, Esq. 

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney 

Social Security Administration 

Office of General Counsel 

26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904 

New York, N.Y. 10278 

Attorney for Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

 

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Bumb, United States District Judge: 

 Plaintiff Louisa A. Corbett (“Plaintiff”) appeals the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

regarding Plaintiff's disability insurance benefits, old-age or 

retirement insurance benefits, and widow’s insurance benefits, 

under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.1

 (“the 

Act”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court will AFFIRM 

the decision of the Commissioner.2

I. Background

 Plaintiff, a widow since April 1974, worked as a Federal 

Civil Service employee at Fort Dix, New Jersey from 1973 until 

she was terminated on June 26, 1982. (R. at 23, 81). As an 

employee of the federal government, the Social Security Act 

(“Act”) did not cover plaintiff’s earnings for that term. 

Instead, Plaintiff participated in the federal government’s 

pension plan for civil employees, known as the Civil Service 

Retirement System (“CSRS”). (R. at 23). 

                                                       

1

 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3). 

2

 Plaintiff has also moved for an evidentiary hearing and the imposition 

of sanctions against Defendant. [Docket No. 19]. That motion is DENIED. 

No hearing is necessary because a court’s review of a social security 

determination on appeal is limited to “the record that was made before 

the ALJ.” Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Neither has plaintiff presented new, material evidence and “good cause 

for not having produced the evidence earlier,” that would justify 

remand to the ALJ for a new hearing. Id. (recognizing that the 

appropriate procedure in such circumstances is remand). And sanctions 

are unwarranted as Plaintiff has cited no legal basis for an imposition 

of sanctions. 

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 Following her termination, Plaintiff was employed privately 

with the Boy Scouts in Westampton, New Jersey for one year and 

then was rehired as a federal Civil Service employee in 1984 at 

the McGuire Air Force Base, where she worked until she was 

terminated in 1994. (R. at 81). Due to changes to the Act made 

in 1983, which required that federal employees hired on or after 

January 1, 1984 be covered by Social Security, the Act covered 

Plaintiff’s earnings during this latter term of federal 

employment. (R. at 23). Following her termination at McGuire, 

Plaintiff returned to the private sector and worked for ADP in 

Mount Laurel, New Jersey from 1994 until 1996. (R. at 81). 

 On August 16, 1999, Plaintiff filed an application for 

Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and her 

application was approved. (R. at 17). On October 26, 2000, 

Plaintiff filed an application for Widow’s Insurance Benefits 

(“WIB”) on the record of her deceased husband Alfredo D. 

Corbett. (R. at 17). Under the Act, an individual who qualifies 

for two Social Security benefits is only eligible to receive the 

greater of the two and, in Plaintiff’s case, it was determined 

that the greater amount was her widow’s benefits. (R. at 17). 

Therefore, Plaintiff was awarded disability benefits on her 

account plus the additional amount she was eligible for due to 

her husband’s account, so that the amount paid to her was equal 

to her widow’s benefits alone. (R. at 17). 

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 In 2002, Plaintiff turned 62 and applied for her CSRS 

pension. (R. at 82). In a letter dated November 1, 2002, the 

Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) informed Plaintiff that 

her application was approved and she would begin receiving her 

monthly annuity. (R. at 88). A month and a half later, Social 

Security informed Plaintiff that because she was receiving a 

CSRS pension (non-covered pension) and social security benefits 

the Windfall Elimination Provision (“WEP”) mandated that her 

social security benefits be recalculated and reduced under the 

WEP formula. (R. at 18). 

 On September 2, 2003, Plaintiff was notified that another 

change, this time an increase, in her Social Security benefits 

was needed. (R. at 18). The Social Security administration had 

discovered that her 1985 earnings were erroneously reported as 

non-covered earnings, when, in fact, they were covered. As a 

result Plaintiff’s disability benefits were increased 

retroactive to August 1999. (R. at 18). 

 In a letter dated May 30, 2006, Social Security advised 

Plaintiff that at 65 years and six months Plaintiff had reached 

full retirement age (“FRA”) and her disability benefits have 

been converted to retirement benefits as of March 2006. (R. at 

96). This change also affected her widow’s benefits, which were 

previously reduced because of age. Now at FRA she was entitled 

to the full amount. (R. at 24). 

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 Plaintiff believed she was not receiving the maximum 

benefits she was entitled to, and filed several “Requests for 

Reconsideration.” The Social Security Administration responded 

to each of her requests accordingly, giving her detailed 

accounting of her benefits. (R. at 18). Plaintiff, nonetheless, 

remained unconvinced of the propriety of her benefit amount and 

requested a conference. On September 20, 2007, Plaintiff met 

with employees of the Social Security Administration. (R. at 

19). On January 19, 2008, a formal “Notice of Reconsideration” 

was issued including a “Reconsideration Determination” 

discussing in length the issues in the case and the calculation 

of Plaintiff’s benefits. (R. at 19). The Reconsideration 

Determination affirmed that, in fact, Plaintiff was receiving 

the maximum benefit possible based on her own and her deceased 

husband’s record. (R. at 19). 

 Plaintiff requested a hearing to appeal the Reconsideration 

Determination. On September 17, 2008, a hearing was held before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Daniel Shoemaker, at which an 

attorney represented Plaintiff. (R. at 20). The ALJ issued his 

opinion on January 27, 2009, in which he found that: (1) the WEP 

applied to Plaintiff’s disability and retirement benefits; (2) 

Plaintiff’s widow’s benefits were not subject to the Government 

Pension Offset, but were properly reduced based on her receipt 

of disability benefits and, later, retirement benefits; (3) the 

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Administration had calculated Plaintiff’s benefits correctly, 

using the proper formulas; and (4) the calculations the 

Administration were correct because Plaintiff did not meet her 

burden to dispel the “presumption of regularity” that attaches 

to the actions of Social Security employees. (R. at 25). He 

therefore concluded that Plaintiff “has been and is receiving 

the correct benefit amount, as set out in the Reconsideration 

Determination dated January 19, 2008.” (R. at 26). 

 Plaintiff then requested review of the ALJ’s decision from 

the Social Security Appeals Counsel. On December 8, 2010 the 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request, and the ALJ’s 

decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. (R. at 7). On January 18, 2011, Plaintiff, 

having exhausted her administrative remedies, filed the above 

captioned action, seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. 

II. Standard of Review

 The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of any 

“final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.” 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court may enter a judgment 

“affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the 

cause for a rehearing.” Id. The Court must uphold the 

Commissioner's factual decisions if they are supported by 

“substantial evidence in the record.” Id.; Knepp v. Apfel, 204 

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F.3d 78, 83 (3d. Cir. 2000). However, the ALJ’s legal 

conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Poulos v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007)(“We review the ALJ's 

application of the law de novo.”); Lombardy v. Dir., Office of 

Workers' Comp. Programs, 355 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 

2004)(“Matters of law are subject to plenary review by this 

Court.”). 

III. Discussion

 Plaintiff makes three arguments on appeal: (1) that the 

Administration’s legal determinations were erroneous; (2) that 

the Administration erred in its calculation of her benefits and 

in administering her payments; and (3) that Plaintiff’s rights 

to due process were violated. The Court addresses each of 

Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 

 A. The Administration’s Legal Determinations

 Plaintiff makes two legal arguments: (1) that the ALJ erred 

in concluding that her disability and retirement benefits were 

subject to the WEP; and (2) that the Administration erred in 

determining her entitlement to widow’s benefits. 

 With respect to the WEP, the Administration properly 

concluded that Plaintiff was subject to this provision. The WEP 

applies to “a benefits claimant who becomes eligible for 

benefits after 1985 and also becomes available for a benefit 

from non-covered employment.” Elshinnaway v. Comm’r of Social 

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Sec. Admin., 244 F. App’x 459, 462 (3d Cir. 2007); 42 U.S.C. § 

415(a)(7). Here, Plaintiff worked for the federal government 

from 1973 to 1982 in non-covered employment, and from 1984 to 

1996 in covered employment. (R. at 88, 474). In November 2002, 

Plaintiff began receiving her CRSR pension. (R. at 88). 

Plaintiff therefore became eligible for Social Security benefits 

after 1985, as required by the statute, and was also eligible 

for benefits for non-covered employment. Accordingly, the 

Administrator’s conclusion that Plaintiff was subject to the WEP 

was both supported by substantial evidence and legally correct.3

 The Administration’s determination with respect to 

Plaintiff’s widow’s benefits was also legally correct. 

Plaintiff argues that she is improperly receiving reduced 

widow’s benefits. Specifically, she asserts that she is not 

subject to the Government Pension Offset (“GPO”), and is 

therefore entitled to 100 percent of her widow’s benefits. 

Pl.’s Brief at 2. That conclusion does not follow. 

                                                       

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 Plaintiff, without any factual or legal support, argues that she “is an 

exception to the” WEP. Pl.’s Brief at 4. There appears to be one 

exception to WEP that could be potentially applicable to Plaintiff. 42 

U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D) provides an exception to WEP for individuals who 

have thirty or more years of covered earnings of a minimum amount. 

Elshinnawy, 244 F. App’x at 463. However, Plaintiff has produced no 

evidence that this exception applies. And, in any event, the 

Administration appears to have considered the potential applicability of 

this exception previously and concluded that Plaintiff had only 15 years 

of eligible covered employment. (R. at 160). 

 

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 The Administration agreed with Plaintiff that her widow’s 

benefits are not subject to GPO. (R. at 24). However, as noted 

by the ALJ in his opinion (R. at 21), they are subject to 

another reduction. Where an individual, like Plaintiff, is 

entitled to disability benefits or to retirement benefits based 

on their own account, and is also entitled to widow’s benefits, 

their widow’s benefits are reduced by an amount equal to the 

disability or retirement benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.407. “The 

effect of the provision is to limit the recipient to the larger 

of the two benefits.” Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1169 n.1 

(4th Cir. 1986). The Administration’s conclusions as to 

Plaintiff’s widows’s benefits were therefore supported by 

substantial evidence and legally correct. Accordingly, the 

Administration’s legal determinations are affirmed. 

 B. Calculation and Administrative Errors

 Plaintiff asserts that the Administration made errors in 

calculating her benefits under the applicable formulas and in 

administering her payments. She claims that the Administration: 

(1) failed to properly account for her 1985 earnings (Pl.’s Br. 

at 7); (2) incorrectly applied the WEP formula (Pl.’s Br. at 3); 

(3) improperly offset her CSRS pension (Pl. Br. at 4); (4) 

failed to properly credit her with an upward adjustment of her 

widow’s benefits upon reaching FRA (Pl.’s Br. at 2); (5) owed 

her for widow’s benefits prior to her initial receipt of such 

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benefits (Pl.’s Br. at 2)(“Ms. Corbett is a Widow . . . since 

4/4/1974 and did not receive any Widow’s Benefits until October 

2000 and it was reduce [sic] to $214.”); and (6) failed to send 

Plaintiff her May 1996 widow’s benefits (Pl.’s Br. at 2). 

 Plaintiff has not, however, presented this Court, or the 

Administrator, with any evidence of these claims. In the 

absence of such evidence, the actions of Social Security 

officials are entitled to “[a] presumption of regularity [and 

this Court must] assumes that they have properly discharged 

their official duties.” Kephart v. Richardson, 505 F.2d 1085, 

1090 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Frisby v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & 

Urban Dev. (HUD), 755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985)(“Agency 

action is entitled to a presumption of regularity. The burden of 

proof rests with the party alleging irregularity.”). In 

addition, Plaintiff’s claim of a missed check appears to be 

beyond the scope of the administrative process she invoked and, 

therefore, outside the proper scope of this appeal. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.930 (providing only for an administrative hearing 

for benefits determination, not to resolve failures to pay 

benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(providing for judicial review of a 

final decision of the Commissioner). Finally, Plaintiff’s claim 

that she was entitled to an earlier award of widow’s benefits 

was not raised below and will therefore not be considered here. 

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 

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that “at least when claimants are represented by counsel, they 

must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative 

hearings in order to preserve them on appeal”). Plaintiff’s 

claim of calculation and administrative error is therefore 

rejected. 

 C. Plaintiff’s Right to Due Process

 Plaintiff makes two due process based arguments. First, 

Plaintiff argues that her right to due process was violated 

because she was not allowed to testify before the ALJ and she 

“was not given the opportunity to explain any of [her] 

exhibits.” Pl.’s Brief at 10, 12. “The Social Security Act gives 

those claiming disability benefits a right to a hearing in which 

witnesses may testify and evidence may be received.” Ventura v. 

Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995)(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 

405(b)(1)). Due process requires that any hearing afforded 

claimant be full and fair. Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971)). A claimant also has a statutory 

right to be represented by counsel at the hearing. Mayes v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 190 F. App'x 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 406(a)). 

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, she was afforded all 

the rights required by due process and under statute. Plaintiff 

was given an opportunity to appear at hearing and did, in fact, 

attend a hearing before an ALJ, at which she was represented by 

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counsel. (R. at 453). Plaintiff’s counsel presented her case 

and her evidence before the ALJ. (R. at 458). The ALJ informed 

Plaintiff this was her opportunity to “to explain everything” 

she believed the ALJ needed to know and that she “should not be 

ashamed or embarrassed to tell [the ALJ] about anything 

[Plaintiff] believe[d] [was] important.” (R. at 456.) Plaintiff 

then had an opportunity to make her case and was questioned by 

the ALJ and her own attorney. (R. at 462-99). At the close of 

the hearing, the ALJ gave Plaintiff an additional opportunity to 

submit further evidence and clearly lay out her complaint. (R. 

at 493). And Plaintiff’s counsel, in fact, submitted additional 

evidence on October 7, 2008. (R. at 380). 

 Second, Plaintiff contends that the Administration violated 

her right to due process because it failed to provide her with 

“any clear and justifiable explanation of why [her] benefits 

were reduced.” Pl.’s Letter to the Court, July 25, 2011. Due 

process requires that “notice of benefits determinations . . . 

provide claimants with enough information to understand the 

reasons for the agency action . . . in all instances.” Kapps v. 

Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005). However, “the 

specific type of notice required will vary depending on the 

circumstances.” 

 Here, the Administration properly discharged its due process 

obligation to provide notice and explanation to Plaintiff of its 

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benefit determinations. Plaintiff’s file contains numerous 

notices and letters from the Social Security Administration 

explaining to Plaintiff its benefit determinations, and the 

bases for those determinations. Even if these notices were 

somehow deficient, and there is no reason to believe they were, 

any deficiency was remedied by the Administration’s other 

efforts to explain its determinations to Plaintiff. Several 

Social Security officials met with Plaintiff and attempted to 

clarify these issues. For example, on October 6, 2004 a Social 

Security District Office employee interviewed Plaintiff about 

these issues. (R. at 57). That employee reported that “as usual 

[he] spent a very long time going over things with [Plaintiff] . 

. . after she saw a service rep for perhaps an hour.” (R. at 

57). On June 20, 2005, another Social Security employee spent 

over an hour with Plaintiff going over the benefit computations. 

(R. at 63). Finally, as discussed above, a hearing was conducted 

before an ALJ who carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s case and 

prepared a detailed opinion explaining the bases for his legal 

determinations. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ due process claims are 

without merit. 

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IV. Conclusion

 For all these reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is 

AFFIRMED. 

 s/ Renée Marie Bumb 

 RENÉE MARIE BUMB 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: June 27, 2012

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