1

Filed 7/16/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SPRINT TELEPHONY PCS, L.P. et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et 

al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A140540

 (San Francisco County

 Super. Ct. No. CGC11511398)

Appellants Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P., Sprint Spectrum L.P., Wirelessco, L.P.,

Nextel of California, Inc., and Nextel Boost of California, LLC (collectively referred to 

as Sprint or the company) filed this action seeking a refund on taxes they paid on 

property assessed by respondent State Board of Equalization (the Board). The 

Legislature has mandated that for a telephone company to file such a judicial tax-refund 

action it must first file a petition for reassessment with the Board stating “in the petition 

[that] it is intended to . . . serve [as a claim for refund].” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5148, 

subds. (f), (g)(1).)1 Sprint filed a petition for reassessment but did not state in it that the 

petition was also intended to serve as a claim for refund. Relying on the plain language 

of the statute, the trial court granted summary judgment in the Board’s favor. We affirm. 

Although requiring a telephone company to state in its reassessment petition that it is 

claiming a refund as a prerequisite for filing a judicial tax-refund action serves limited 

practical purposes, the requirement is plain and compulsory.

 

1 All statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise 

specified.
2

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

A. The Statutory Framework for State-assessed Property.

California property owners who dispute the government’s assessment of their 

property for tax purposes may generally request to have the property reassessed at a 

lower valuation and request a refund of paid taxes that were based on an excess valuation. 

They must make both requests before bringing a judicial tax-refund action. In many 

situations, the same government body considers these two requests and can grant or deny 

the relief sought. And in many situations, property owners may submit the two requests 

either together or separately. When taxpayers of county-assessed property seek 

reassessments and refunds, for example, they may either state in their applications for 

reassessment that they want a refund or they may file a separate claim for refund with the 

county. (§ 5097, subds. (b) & (c); see also §§ 1603-1604.)

This case involves a unique assessment-and-refund procedure applicable to certain 

entities, including telephone companies such as Sprint, that typically hold property in 

multiple counties.2 The California Constitution requires the Board annually to assess 

telephone companies’ property at fair-market value. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 19; see also 

§ 721.) The Board’s assessment is allocated among the jurisdictions in which the 

property is located, and the assessment roll is transmitted to city and county auditors. 

 

2

Specifically, the procedure applies to “(1) pipelines, flumes, canals, ditches, and 

aqueducts lying within 2 or more counties and (2) property, except franchises, owned or 

used by regulated railway, telegraph, or telephone companies, car companies operating 

on railways in the State, and companies transmitting or selling gas or electricity.” (Cal. 

Const., art. XIII, § 19; see also § 721.) Those entities’ property is assessed on a unitary 

basis, that is, the property’s “ ‘value depends on the interrelation and operation of the 

entire utility as a unit. Many of the separate assets would be practically valueless without 

the rest of the system. Ten miles of telephone wire or one specially designed turbine 

would have a questionable value, other than as scrap, without the benefit of the rest of the 

system as a whole.’ ” (ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San 

Francisco (1985) 37 Cal.3d 859, 863.) In this opinion, we refer to the procedure’s 

applicability to telephone companies because Sprint is one, but we recognize that the 

procedure applies to other types of state assessees as well.
3

(§§ 722, 745; Verizon California Inc. v. Board of Equalization (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 

666, 672 (Verizon California).) Each county is responsible for collecting the taxes owed 

by the telephone company in that county. (§§ 2152, 2601-2602.) In this way, the Board 

and the individual counties play separate roles. The Board is responsible for assessing 

the property at a statewide level, but the individual counties are responsible for collecting 

the taxes that have been allocated to them.

When the Board assesses a telephone company’s property, it must notify the 

company by mail of the assessed valuation and the date a reassessment petition is due for 

contesting it. (§ 731.) If the Board grants a reassessment petition by reducing the 

property’s assessed value, it enters the revised valuation on the tax roll for the fiscal year 

in which the determination is made or for the following fiscal year. (§ 744, subd. (b).) If 

the reduced assessment is entered on the roll for the following fiscal year, the reduction is 

to reflect the difference between the original and new assessed values, plus nine percent 

of that difference in lieu of interest. (§ 744, subd. (c).)

Before 1987, there was a three-step process for seeking refunds of taxes paid on 

excess valuations of property owned by telephone companies. The company was 

required to file (1) a petition for reassessment with the Board, (2) a claim for refund in 

each county where it had property, and (3) an action for refund in the superior court of 

each county in which it sought a refund. (Verizon California, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 678, relying on Legis. Analyst, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2120 (1987-1988 Reg. 

Sess.) Sept. 2, 1987, p. 2.) This meant that numerous claims and judicial tax-refund 

actions were sometimes necessary. (E.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of 

Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283.) Some legislators considered this process to be 

“cumbersome” and believed it “overburdened state assessees and counties.” (Verizon 

California, at p. 678, relying on Off. of Assem. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 

Assem. Bill No. 2120 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 3, 1987, p. 2.)

A judicial tax-refund action for taxes levied on telephone-company property is 

now governed by section 5148, which was enacted in 1987 “to streamline the appeals 

process for state assessees.” (Verizon California, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 678; see 
4

also Stats. 1987, ch. 1262, § 6.) Under this statute, telephone companies are no longer 

required to file refund claims in each county before seeking judicial relief. But they must 

still comply with certain procedural requirements, including first filing a petition with the 

Board for a reassessment and paying any disputed tax. (§ 5148, subds. (e) & (g).) The

reassessment petition must state that a refund is claimed. Section 5148, subdivision (f) 

provides: “A timely filed petition for reassessment . . . shall constitute a claim for refund 

if the petitioner states in the petition it is intended to so serve.” (Italics added.) 

Subdivision (g), in turn, sets forth the applicable statute of limitations: “The action [for 

refund] shall be commenced only after payment of the taxes in issue and within four 

years after the latest of the dates that the State Board of Equalization mailed its decision 

or its written findings and conclusions on the following: [¶] (1) A petition for 

reassessment filed under section 741 and intended to constitute a claim for refund.” 

(Italics added.) In other words, the statute of limitations on a judicial tax-refund action is 

four years, and the limitations period begins to run when the Board mails its decision on a 

reassessment petition that stated a refund was claimed. (§ 5148, subds. (f) & (g).)

The plain language of these subdivisions requires telephone companies to file a 

reassessment petition with the Board stating a refund is claimed as a prerequisite for 

bringing a judicial tax-refund action. For simplicity and readability, we shall refer to this 

prerequisite as the “the notice requirement.” The reasons for the notice requirement are 

not intuitive because the Board does not issue refunds. (§ 5148, subd. (i).) Why should 

the Board need to be told that a refund is claimed when only the counties, not the Board, 

issue refunds?

When the legislation enacting section 5148 was being considered, the Board sent a 

letter to Governor George Deukmejian raising concerns about the notice requirement. 

The letter explained that the proposed legislation “provides that a petition for 

reassessment may be designated a claim for refund by the petitioner, but fails to provide 

for a procedure when the petition is not designated a claim for refund and the assessee 

later decides to litigate its rights. If failure to designate the petition as a claim for refund 
5

will cut off all future litigation rights, that should be clearly stated in order to avoid 

entrapping taxpayers.”

After section 5148 was signed into law over the Board’s objection, the Board 

implemented a measure to help state assessees avoid these entrapment concerns by 

creating a standard, one-page form for reassessment petitions that could hardly have 

made it easier for telephone companies to satisfy the notice requirement (standard form 

BOE-529-A). The version of this form used by Sprint included the statement “This is a 

request for refund according to Revenue and Taxation Code section 5148(f)” next to two 

boxes, one for “Yes” and one for “No.”

3

Once a telephone company satisfies all the applicable prerequisites, it may bring a 

judicial tax-refund action by filing a single complaint (§ 5148, subd. (a)) that names the 

Board and all the counties from which a refund is sought (id., subd. (b)). Allowing these 

actions to be brought in one county, rather than requiring a separate action in every 

county in which the telephone company has property, greatly reduces the number of 

judicial tax-refund actions that telephone companies must file to obtain tax refunds.

B. Sprint’s Attempt to Seek a Refund.

In May 2008, the Board notified Sprint that it had assessed the value of the 

company’s unitary property in the state at $2.5461 billion. Two months later, Sprint filed 

with the Board a reassessment petition contending that the value was actually about half 

the amount assessed by the Board, or $1.343511 billion. Included in the petition was the 

Board’s standard form BOE-529-A, which contains seven sections. All sections except 

one—section 4, which as described above is for designating a reassessment petition as a 

claim for refund—were filled out. Neither box (“Yes” or “No”) was checked to indicate 

that the petition was to serve as a claim for refund, and Sprint filed nothing else with its 

petition to signify that it wanted the petition to be considered a claim for refund. Instead, 

the petition focused solely on reducing the assessed valuation of its property. Sprint later 

alleged that it “intended” its reassessment petition to serve as a claim for refund. But the 

 

3 As we discuss in more detail below, not everything the Board has done has been helpful 

in providing guidance on the notice requirement.
6

Board treats a petition for reassessment as a claim for refund only when the petition 

indicates that it is to serve as one.

4

In December 2008, the Board granted Sprint’s reassessment petition in part by 

reducing the assessed value of Sprint’s property to $2.0397 billion. This reduced 

assessment was entered on the tax roll for the following fiscal year. (§ 744, 

subds. (b) & (c).) In February 2010, Sprint filed refund claims with each of the 51 

counties where it has property even though section 5148 does not contemplate such 

filings. The Board received notices of these claims, and this was presumably the first 

time the Board learned that Sprint was claiming a tax refund. At least 10 of the counties 

rejected Sprint’s claims, and no refunds were granted.

Sprint filed this action in June 2011 against the Board and 51 counties.

5

 As 

amended, the complaint sought a judgment ordering reassessment of Sprint’s property at 

a value less than $1.343511 billion (the value Sprint originally submitted to the Board in 

its reassessment petition). Sprint also sought a total tax refund of at least $9 million

under section 5148.

The counties responded by filing demurrers, which the trial court overruled.

6

 The 

Board later filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Sprint had failed to 

exhaust its administrative remedies by not complying with the notice requirement. The 

trial court agreed and granted the motion. The parties stipulated that the ruling disposed 

 

4

Petitions for reassessment commonly do not request a refund. A “majority” of petitions 

filed with the Board are for reassessment only, and anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of 

petitions do not include a checkmark next to either the “Yes” or “No” box on form BOE529-A.

5

The complaint named the following counties, which are respondents in this action: 

Alameda, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, 

Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Los Angeles, Madera, Marin, 

Mariposa, Merced, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Orange, Placer, Plumas, Riverside, 

Sacramento, San Benito, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San 

Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Siskiyou, 

Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, Ventura, Yolo, and Yuba.

6 By order dated March 27, 2012 in case No. A134533, this court denied a writ petition 

filed by the counties challenging the trial court’s order.
7

of the sole cause of action and that judgment could be entered against all defendants. The 

county defendants have joined the Board’s brief in this court.

II.

DISCUSSION

Although Sprint’s appellate briefs span more than 85 pages, the company’s 

arguments boil down to the proposition that the company was not required to comply 

with the notice requirement because it serves no real purpose and the counties were not 

prejudiced. The two trial judges who considered this issue were sympathetic to Sprint’s 

argument. The judge who ruled on the demurrers considered Sprint’s potential waiver of 

litigation rights by failing to check a box on a preprinted form to be based on a “hypertechnical reading of [section] 5148,” and the judge who ruled on the subsequent motion 

for summary judgment requested supplemental briefing and remarked this was “a tough 

one” because “the State has this position you didn’t check the box, so you get hit for 

millions of dollars.”

We were similarly concerned with the fairness of a strict application of the notice 

requirement, and we sent the parties a letter asking them to be prepared to discuss at oral 

argument whether legitimate reasons exist for it. After considering the briefing and 

counsels’ arguments, we conclude that the notice requirement, while serving few 

practical purposes, is not irrational and must be enforced in accordance with the statute’s 

plain language.

Sprint itself acknowledges that section 5148, subdivisions (f) and (g) contain a 

“literal requirement” that an assessee give notice that its petition is intended to serve as a 

claim for refund in order to maintain a judicial tax-refund action. But it contends the 

“literal prerequisite to the commencement of a tax refund action” should not apply here, 

and it goes so far as to characterize the notice requirement as a “fictional administrative 

tax refund procedure.” We are not persuaded.

California Constitution, article XIII, section 32, provides: “After payment of a tax 

claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, 

in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.” (Italics added.) “This 
8

constitutional limitation rests on the premise that strict legislative control over the manner 

in which tax refunds may be sought is necessary so that governmental entities may 

engage in fiscal planning based on expected tax revenues.” (Woosley v. State of 

California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 789.) “Because article XIII, section 32 vests the 

Legislature with plenary control over the manner in which tax refunds may be obtained, a 

party ‘must show strict, rather than substantial, compliance with the administrative 

procedures established by the Legislature. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (IBM Personal 

Pension Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1299.)

In granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied on this

well-settled principle requiring strict compliance with tax statutes. Sprint contends that it 

should be excused from such compliance because the notice requirement is not a 

“substantive administrative tax refund procedure” and is therefore not a “jurisdictional 

prerequisite” to filing a judicial tax-refund action. (Boldface and solid capitalization 

omitted.) Instead, Sprint argues, courts “must analyze each statute to determine what the 

Legislature intended.”

We begin by observing that Sprint is not contending that it should be excused from 

the notice requirement on the basis of substantial compliance. Indeed, it could not so 

contend because it admits that there was no compliance with the notice requirement. 

Sprint points to nothing in either its reassessment petition or in any other document 

demonstrating that it was claiming a refund when it filed its petition. It is therefore 

imprecise to say that Sprint forfeited its refund simply because it failed to check a box; it 

is more precise to say that Sprint forfeited its refund because it failed to indicate in any 

way when it filed its reassessment petition that it wanted a tax refund.

7

 

7 At oral argument, and consistent with the text of section 5148, subdivision (f) that 

provides a reassessment petition shall constitute a claim for refund if a petitioner so states 

“in the petition” (as opposed to on any specific form), the Board’s appellate counsel 

represented that even without the “Yes” box being checked the Board would consider the 

notice requirement satisfied if there was some other indication on the petition or in a 

cover letter that the telephone company wanted the petition to be considered a claim for

refund.
9

Sprint essentially asks us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to require 

compliance with the notice requirement. We cannot do so. A court’s role in construing a 

statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. 

(Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000.) The court first looks to the words 

of a statute, “giving the language its usual, ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity in 

the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of 

the statute governs.” (Ibid., italics added.) “[R]esort to legislative history is appropriate 

only where statutory language is ambiguous.” (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. 

Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29, italics added.) Here, Sprint 

identifies no ambiguity in the statute and acknowledges that its literal terms require a

telephone company to request a refund with the Board as a prerequisite to filing a judicial 

tax-refund action. We must conclude that the legislative intent is reflected in the statute’s 

plain language and meaning.

Sprint stresses that counties are not authorized to pay refunds based on petitions 

filed with the Board. It argues that, as a result, a claim to the Board “is not part of a 

procedure establishing a substantive right to recover taxes, and for that reason cannot 

serve as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the commencement and maintenance of a taxrefund action under section 5148.” As we understand it, this argument is that the Board’s 

lack of authority to pay refund claims renders the notice requirement pointless. But this 

is just another way of arguing that we should ignore the plain meaning of the statute. 

And we may not do so even accepting that, as a practical matter, the Board does not 

notify counties that a telephone company claims a refund from them.

In any event, we cannot say the notice requirement is entirely pointless even 

though it advances few practical purposes. The Board is the entity charged with 

assessing telephone-company property, and the judicial-refund process requires that all 

affected counties be included in a single action. (§ 5148, subds. (a) & (b).) Since the 

Board is a mandatory party in any such action, requiring telephone companies to notify it 

that they are claiming a refund informs the Board that it may face litigation on the issue.

(§ 5148, subd. (b) [“action shall name the board”], italics added.) Furthermore, requiring 
10

telephone companies to state in their reassessment petitions that they are claiming a 

refund enabled the Legislature to establish a clear, uniform, and early date—the day the 

Board mails its reassessment decision—for the start of the statute of limitations period for 

a judicial tax-refund action. (§ 5148, subds. (f) & (g).)

Sprint’s argument about when the statute of limitations begins to run where a 

telephone company fails to comply with the notice requirement is confusing and 

inconsistent with section 5148. The company argues, without citing any direct statutory 

authority, that the statute of limitations would begin to run when the Board mails its 

decision on a reassessment petition, whether or not the petition was designated as a claim 

for refund. Sprint alternatively contends that if we conclude that the statute of limitations

under section 5148 is triggered only where a telephone company complies with the notice 

requirement, we should apply the catchall four-year limitations period in Code of Civil 

Procedure section 343 where a telephone company fails to comply with the notice 

requirement. In those situations, Sprint argues, the limitations period would begin to run 

when a company pays its taxes based on the inflated assessment. But we believe the 

Legislature contemplated only one procedure and meant what it said when it provided 

that a judicial tax-refund action must be initiated four years after the Board mails its 

decision on a reassessment petition that complied with the notice requirement. (§ 5148, 

subd. (g).)

In a related argument, Sprint complains that it is inconsistent for the law to insist 

on satisfaction of the notice requirement when the Board does not inform counties when 

petitions seek refunds and notifies them only of reassessment decisions. (§ 744, 

subd. (a).) True enough, counties have no right to participate in the administrative 

reassessment proceeding and become involved only when they are named in a judicial 

tax-refund action. (§ 5148, subds. (a) & (b); Verizon California, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 676.) We admit that we can discern few, if any, practical benefits to the counties

when telephone companies comply with the notice requirement, and we see little 

practical harm to them when they do not. But one of the purposes of section 5148 was to 

make the process more efficient by eliminating the requirement that notice of refunds be 
11

filed in each affected county. (Verizon California, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) 

Regardless of whether the notice requirement benefits counties, the new process makes it 

easier for telephone companies by allowing them to file one notice rather than multiple 

notices. While the Legislature could have undoubtedly enacted a statute allowing 

telephone companies to initiate judicial tax-refund actions without having first stated a

claim for refund in their reassessment petitions, we see no intrinsic inconsistency in the 

procedure it did enact. In short, we cannot ignore the plain language of section 5148, 

subdivisions (f) and (g) even accepting that the Board does not typically inform counties 

when refunds are claimed in reassessment petitions.

8

Sprint relies on inapposite authority involving the different prerequisites for filing 

a judicial tax-refund action for taxes paid on county-assessed property. (E.g., § 5097; 

Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1308-1309 [process to obtain 

refund from county separate from process of seeking reduced assessment from county].) 

The Legislature has specifically provided, however, that the refund process for countyassessed property does not apply to state-assessed property. (§ 5142, subd. (a).)

Sprint also places undue reliance on Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and 

County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769 (Geneva Towers), which analyzed the 

six-month statute of limitations in section 5141, applicable to tax-refund actions against 

individual cities or counties. That statute provides that a tax-refund action shall be 

commenced within six months after a city or county rejects a refund claim (§ 5141, 

subd. (a)) and that a claimant “may” consider the claim rejected and file suit if the city or 

county fails to mail notice of action on the claim within six months (id., subd. (b)). 

Geneva Towers held that although a claimant may bring an action six months after filing 

a refund claim when it was not notified of action on the claim, it is not required to do so. 

(29 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Thus, under section 5141 the limitation period does not begin to 

 

8 We also reject Sprint’s argument that the notice requirement conflicts with California 

Constitution, article XIII, section 32’s provision requiring taxes to be paid before a 

taxpayer may maintain a judicial refund action. Requiring notice in a reassessment 

petition that a refund is sought in the event of a valuation reduction does not interfere in 

the least with this provision.
12

run until the public entity denies the claim for refund, even if it takes no action on the 

claim for several years. (Geneva Towers, at pp. 772, 774, 782.) The analysis in Geneva 

Towers is straightforward and inapplicable here. The court found that a taxpayer filing a 

refund claim under the statutory scheme could reasonably expect that no further action 

was required until the public entity ruled on the claim. (Id. at p. 781.) Accordingly, the 

court concluded that requiring the taxpayer to file suit within six months of the claim 

despite a lack of action from the entity “would create a trap for the unwary.” (Ibid.)

Sprint contends that the notice requirement in section 5148 likewise creates

“unpleasant and unfair surprises for many claimants.” (Geneva Towers, supra, 

29 Cal.4th at p. 781.) But in Geneva Towers the unpleasant and unfair surprise to the 

taxpayer was the government’s unreasonable interpretation of a statute. Here, there can 

be no similar surprise because, as Sprint concedes, section 5148 is unambiguous. (E.g., 

Verizon California, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 673 [before initiating tax-refund action 

under § 5148, telephone company submitted a petition to the Board naming counties 

where property was located and “stated that the petition was a request for refund”].) We 

agree with the Attorney General that “[t]here is no way around the fact that 

subdivisions (f) and (g) [of section 5148] plainly reference and contemplate the 

assessee’s filing of a petition that is intended to also serve as a claim for refund as a 

prerequisite for a suit for refund.”

We recognize that the application of the notice requirement in section 5148, 

subdivisions (f) and (g) means that Sprint forfeited its right to a refund because it failed to 

check the box on its reassessment petition or otherwise notify the Board that it intended 

its petition to serve as a claim for refund. And we note that since the initiation of this 

litigation, the Board has revised form BOE-529-A to make even clearer the rights that are 

forfeited when a reassessment petition fails to state that it is also a refund claim. 
13

(<http://www.boe.ca.gov/pdf/boe529a.pdf> [as of July 16, 2015].)9 The form still 

includes a section where the petitioner may elect to state that the reassessment petition is 

also a request for refund. But instead of including both “Yes” and “No” boxes, the form 

now includes only a “Yes” box, followed by this direction: “Checking this box preserves 

the right to recover taxes arising out of a disputed assessment.” This provides a helpful 

explanation about the significance of failing to check the “Yes” box.

But with or without this form change, the requirements of section 5148, 

subdivisions (f) and (g) are plain that a telephone company wanting to preserve its right 

to file a judicial tax-refund action is required to state that its reassessment petition is also 

to serve as a claim for refund. Because Sprint failed to do so, the trial court properly 

granted summary judgment.

Before we conclude, we mention one last thing: the Board’s State Assessment 

Manual includes a description of claim-refund procedures that is both confusing and 

inaccurate. The manual states that assessees may file refund claims with the affected 

counties even when they have not complied with the notice requirement. Although this 

statement comports with the statutory scheme for filing refund actions on county-assessed 

property under section 5141, subdivision (a), it does not comport with the statutory 

scheme for filing a refund action on state-assessed property under section 5148. Because 

the manual does not explain this limitation, telephone companies could reasonably 

believe that the statement applies to them. We are deeply concerned about the inaccuracy 

 

9 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of the revised form. (Evid. Code, 

§ 452, subd. (c) [permissive judicial notice for “[o]fficial acts of the . . . executive . . . 

departments” of any state]; see also Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 894, 904, fn. 5 [judicial notice of Judicial Council forms].) 
14

of the statement, and we urge the Board to move quickly to correct it and to take other 

appropriate measures to prevent state assessees from relying on it.10

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

 

10 As concerning as this misleading statement is, it has no effect in this case because 

Sprint did not rely on it. Although Sprint submitted refund claims to counties, it claims 

to have done so only out of “an abundance of caution” and it expressly disavowed the 

applicability of statutes governing county-assessed property. When the Board below 

argued the applicability of a six-month statute of limitations period described in the 

manual, Sprint correctly noted that the manual directly conflicts with section 5148 and 

was thus “clearly illegal.”
15

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Dondero, J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

Sprint v. State Board of Equalization (A140540)
16

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Ernest H. Goldsmith

Counsel for Appellants: Richard Norman Wiley

Counsel for Respondent State 

Board of Equalization:

Office of the Attorney General, Kamala D. Harris,

Attorney General of California, Paul D. Gifford, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Joyce E. Hee, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Karen Wing Ka Yiu, Deputy 

Attorney General, Robert Warren Lambert, David Lew

Counsel for Respondent City 

and County of San Francisco:

Office of City Attorney, Dennis J. Herrera, City 

Attorney, Jean H. Alexander, Chief Tax Attorney,

Thomas S. Lakritz, Deputy City Attorney

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Alameda:

Office of County Counsel, John Thomas Seyman, 

Deputy County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Amador:

Office of County Counsel, Gregory George Gillott, 

Deputy County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Butte:

Office of County Counsel, Bradley Justin Stephens, 

Deputy County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Calaveras:

Office of County Counsel, David Edward Sirias, 

Assistant County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Colusa:

Office of County Counsel, Marcos Alfonso Kropf, 

County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of El Dorado:

Office of County Counsel, Michael John Ciccozzi, 

Deputy County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Fresno:

Office of County Counsel, Peter James Wall, Deputy 

County Counsel
17

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Glenn:

Office of County Counsel, Huston T. Carlyle, County 

Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Humboldt:

Humboldt County Counsel, Scott Alexander Miles

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Imperial:

Office of County Counsel, Geoffrey Patrick Holbrook

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Inyo:

Inyo County Counsel, Dana Marie Crom

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Kern:

Office of County Counsel, Jerri Sue Bradley, Deputy 

County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Kings:

Office of County Counsel, Colleen June Carlson

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Lake:

Office of County Counsel, Anita Louise Grant

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Lassen:

Office of County Counsel, Rhetta Kay Vander Ploeg

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Los Angeles:

Office of County Counsel, Albert Ramseyer

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Madera:

Madera County Counsel, Douglas William Nelson

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Marin:

Office of County Counsel, Sheila Marise Shah 

Lichtblau, Deputy County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Mariposa:

Mariposa County Counsel, Steven Wayne Dahlem, 

County Counsel

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Merced:

Office of County Counsel, David Albert Olsen

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Mono:

Office of County Counsel, Marshall Skaggs Rudolph, 

County Counsel, John Carl Vallejo
18

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Monterey:

Office of County Counsel, Jerrold Allen Malkin

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Napa:

Office of County Counsel, Susan Beth Altman

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Nevada:

Nevada County Counsel, Alison Alberta Barratt-Green

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Orange:

Orange County Counsel, Laurie Ann Shade

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Placer:

Office of County Counsel, Brian Reid Wirtz

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Plumas:

Office of County Counsel, Richard Crain Settlemire

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Riverside:

Riverside County Counsel, Pamela Jean Walls

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Sacramento:

Office of County Counsel, Diane Elizabeth McElhern

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Benito:

San Benito County Counsel, Matthew Walter Granger

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Bernardino:

Office of County Counsel, Kevin Leigh Norris

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Diego:

Office of County Counsel, Thomas Edward 

Montgomery

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Joaquin:

Office of County Counsel, Robert Emmett O’Rourke

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Luis Obispo:

Office of County Counsel, Rita L. Neal
19

Counsel for Respondent 

County of San Mateo:

Office of County Counsel, Rebecca Maxine Archer

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Santa Barbara:

Santa Barbara County Counsel, Anne Michele Rierson

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Santa Clara:

Office of County Counsel, Neysa Ann Fligor

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Santa Cruz:

Office of County Counsel, Jason M. Heath

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Shasta:

Office of County Counsel, David Morgan Yorton, Jr.

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Siskiyou:

Office of County Counsel, Dennis M. Tanabe

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Solano:

Office of County Counsel, Carolyn Scarlata Keefe

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Sonoma:

Office of Sonoma County Counsel, Jennifer Christina 

Klein, Lauren Borella, Deputy County Counsels

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Stanislaus:

Office of Stanislaus County Counsel, Dierdre Elise 

McGrath

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Sutter:

Office of County Counsel, William Joseph Vanasek

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Tehema:

Tehama County Counsel, Arthur J. Wylene

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Tulare

Office of County Counsel, Julia C. Langley

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Ventura:

Office of County Counsel, Linda Kathryn Ash
20

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Yolo:

Office of County Counsel, Daniel Carl Cederborg

Counsel for Respondent 

County of Yuba:

Office of County Counsel, Maria Bryant-Pollard