NUMBER 13-15-00264-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE ROBERT MATTHEW VILLARREAL

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes1

Relator, Robert Matthew Villarreal, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus on June 16, 2015. Through this original proceeding, relator seeks to compel 

the trial court to consider and rule on relator’s motion for nunc pro tunc judgment regarding 

relator’s 2011 third-degree felony conviction for the possession of a controlled substance

 

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not 

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); see 

id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
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in a drug -free zone. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134(d) (West, Westlaw 

through Ch. 46 2015 R.S.).2 We deny the petition for writ of mandamus as stated herein.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show: (1) that he has no 

adequate remedy at law, and (2) that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act. In re 

State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If 

relator fails to meet both of these requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus 

should be denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of App. at Texarkana, 236 

S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). 

A remedy at law, though it technically exists, “may nevertheless be so uncertain, 

tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate, or ineffective as to be deemed 

inadequate.” Greenwell v. Ct. of App. for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 648–

49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (orig. proceeding). The act sought to be compelled must be a 

ministerial act that does not involve a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. 

Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210. The ministerial-act requirement is satisfied if the relator can 

show a clear right to the relief sought. In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122. A 

clear right to relief is shown when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational 

decision “under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or 

case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles.” Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 

805, 810 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122. 

 

2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 11-08-11,496A in the 135th District

Court of DeWitt County, Texas. The Honorable Kemper Stephen Williams is the respondent in this case. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2.
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Consideration of a request or motion that is properly filed and before the court is a 

ministerial act. State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) 

(orig. proceeding); see White v. Reiter, 640 S.W.2d 586, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). 

There is no adequate remedy at law for a trial court’s failure to rule because 

“[f]undamental requirements of due process mandate an opportunity to be heard.” See 

In re Christensen, 39 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, orig. proceeding) 

(citing Creel v. Dist. Atty. for Medina Cnty., 818 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1991)). Thus, in 

proper cases, mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act. See In re Blakeney, 

254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that where the trial court fails to 

respond to a nunc pro tunc motion, the appropriate remedy is to seek relief in the appellate 

courts by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Ybarra, 149 S.W.3d 

147, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam) (regarding the clerical correction by nunc 

pro tunc motion of pre-sentence jail time credit). 

II. BURDEN OF PROOF

It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus 

relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re 

Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding); see 

Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. 

proceeding) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled 

to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”). In addition to other requirements, the relator must 

include a statement of facts supported by citations to “competent evidence included in the 

appendix or record,” and must also provide “a clear and concise argument for the 
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contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record.” 

See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. The relator must also file an appendix and record 

sufficient to support the claim for mandamus relief. See id. R. 52.3(k) (specifying the 

required contents for the appendix); id. R. 52.7(a) (specifying the required contents for 

the record); see also Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661.

III. BACKGROUND

By one issue, relator contends that mandamus should issue ordering the trial court 

to hear and rule on relator’s motion for nunc pro tunc judgment to correct his time served. 

Relator contends that the judgment of conviction entered failed to properly credit him with 

the time served incarcerated while awaiting sentencing. In the instant case, relator’s 

petition for writ of mandamus was filed in substantial compliance with the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure and contains sections for the identity of parties, the table of contents, 

an index of authorities, a statement of facts, a statement of jurisdiction, the issues 

presented, argument and authorities, and prayer. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52. 

Although the certification does not follow the specific format required by the appellate 

rules, relator has verified the contents of the petition as true and correct. See id. R. 

52.3(j). The petition includes argument supported by appropriate citations to authority 

and to documents included in the appendix. See id. R. 52.3(h). 

Relator contends that the respondent has disregarded his motions for nunc pro 

tunc judgment “for over a year despite efforts in bringing it to his attention.” Relator 

asserts that he has filed two separate motions for nunc pro tunc judgment, which the 

District Clerk’s office presented to the respondent, but which have not yet been ruled on 

and more than a year has passed.
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Relator filed an appendix with his petition. The appendix to the petition includes 

three items of supporting documentation:

(1) relator’s judgment of conviction:

(2) A letter dated September 17, 2013 from Deputy District Clerk Rachel 

Hernandez directed to the respondent, the District Attorney, and 

relator’s trial attorney stating “Enclosed please find a copy of the 

Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc (Credit for Time Served) filed 

September 13, 2013, by the defendant . . . .”

(3) A letter dated August 12, 2014 from Deputy District Clerk Shawna 

Tucker directed to the respondent, the District Attorney, and relator’s 

trial attorney stating “Enclosed please find a copy of the Motion to 

Enter Nunc Pro Tunc Order filed August 11, 2014, by the defendant 

. . . .”

Relator did not file a record with his petition for writ of mandamus.

This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus 

from the State of Texas, acting by and through the District Attorney of DeWitt County, 

Texas. The State’s response states that the “trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

crediting relator’s jail time,” and argues, in pertinent part:

Since relator was in jail on other charges as per the DeWitt County Jail, and 

he was not served with this indictment on August 26, 2011, his jail time in 

this case started accruing on August 26, 2011. Relator was given credit 

from the time of service of the capias until the judgment. This was all the 

credit to which Relator was entitled. See Ex [Parte] Bobby Crossley, 586 

S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 

The State thus asks us to deny the petition for writ of mandamus and “uphold the findings 

and rulings” of the trial court. The State’s response to the petition failed to contain an 

appendix or record containing the trial court’s ruling on relator’s motions for nunc pro tunc 

judgment. Upon request by this Court to supplement its appendix, the State notified us 

that, although the trial court’s file contains relator’s nunc pro tunc motions, “[t]o date, no 

order regarding the motion for nunc pro tunc has been entered.” 
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The State’s response to the petition for writ of mandamus focuses on the merits of 

relator’s motions for nunc pro tunc judgment rather than the trial court’s exercise of its 

ministerial duty in ruling on the motions themselves. However, the substantive merit of 

relator’s motions is not before us in this original proceeding. “While it is a basic premise 

that an appellate court lacks the power to compel a trial judge to do a particular act 

involving or requiring discretion on his part, this Court is empowered to order a trial judge 

to exercise his discretion in some manner.” O'Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267, 269 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding). Thus, while we have jurisdiction to direct the 

trial court to make a decision on relator’s motions for nunc pro tunc judgment, we may not 

tell the court what that decision should be. See In re Cunningham, 454 S.W.3d 139, 143 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, orig. proceeding); In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re 

Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding); In re 

Ramirez, 994 S.W 2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).

IV. ANALYSIS

To obtain mandamus relief for the trial court’s refusal to rule on a motion, a relator 

must establish: (1) the motion was properly filed and has been pending for a reasonable 

time; (2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion; and (3) the trial court refused to 

rule. In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding); 

In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding); In 

re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding). The relator 

must show that the trial court received, was aware of, and was asked to rule on the 

motion. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding).
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In examining whether a motion has been pending for an unreasonable amount of 

time, we note that the trial court has broad discretion in managing its docket, but that 

discretion is not unlimited. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 

2007) (orig. proceeding); Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982). 

Accordingly, the trial court has a reasonable time within which to perform its ministerial 

duty. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661. Whether a reasonable time for the trial 

court to act has lapsed is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. See id. at

662; In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). 

The test for determining what time period is reasonable is not subject to exact 

formulation, and no “bright line” separates a reasonable time period from an unreasonable 

one. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d at 253; In re Chavez, 

62 S.W.3d at 228. We examine a “myriad” of criteria including the trial court’s actual 

knowledge of the motion, its overt refusal to act, the state of the court’s docket, and the 

existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. In 

re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; see Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228–29. Periods of eighteen 

months, thirteen months, and four months have been held to be too long for a trial court 

not to rule. See In re Kleven, 100 S.W.3d at 644–45 (eighteen months and four months); 

In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d at 684 (eighteen months); Kissam v. Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 

265, 266–67 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (thirteen months); 

see also In re Armstrong, No. 06-11-00100-CV, 2011 WL 5561705, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Nov. 16, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (thirteen months).
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In this case, relator’s initial motion for nunc pro tunc judgment has been pending 

since September 17, 2013, a period of more than twenty-one months. Relator’s second 

motion to enter a nunc pro tunc order has been pending since August 12, 2014, a period 

of more than ten months. We agree with relator that these periods of time appear to 

exceed a reasonable period within which to expect a ruling. See In re Blakeney, 254 

S.W.3d at 661; In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228.

Nevertheless, although relator has provided us with a record showing that his 

motions were filed, relator has not met his burden to show that the trial court received and 

was aware of the motions, that he was requested to rule, and that he failed or refused to 

act. Generally, entitlement to mandamus relief requires a relator to establish a legal duty 

to perform a non-discretionary act, a demand for performance, and a refusal. Stoner v. 

Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding); In re Cullar, 320 S.W.3d 

560, 564 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding). This is so because a court cannot 

be faulted for doing nothing when it is or was unaware of the need to act. In re Villarreal, 

96 S.W.3d at 710. Specifically with regard to the circumstances of this case, a court is 

not required to consider a motion that is not called to its attention. Metzger v. Sebek, 892 

S.W.2d 20, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). In this regard, the 

mere filing of a motion does not equate to a request that the trial court rule on the motion. 

See In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d at 861; In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d at 685; In re Chavez, 

62 S.W.3d at 228; Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426; cf. In re Shredder Co., 225 S.W.3d at 680 

(“Relator has made repeated requests for a ruling on its motion.”). Here, there is nothing 

in the limited record before this Court to establish that relator has ever requested a ruling 

on his motions or otherwise called the motions to the respondent’s attention. See Barnes, 
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832 S.W.2d at 426 (denying mandamus petition where relator did not ask for a hearing 

on his motions or take any action to alert trial court that it had not yet considered his 

motions). Stated otherwise, it appears the relator did not take any action to alert the trial 

court that it had not yet considered his two motions. Accordingly, relator has not furnished 

an appendix sufficient to support his claim for relief insofar as he has not demonstrated 

that his pleadings were presented to the respondent and the respondent has refused to 

rule on them. See In re Dimas, 88 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. 

proceeding); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, 

the response thereto, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that the petition should be 

denied. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice. In so 

holding, we do not reach the merits of relator’s pleadings or direct the trial court regarding 

how to rule on them. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; O’Donniley, 860 S.W.2d at 

269. 

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice 

Delivered and filed the

23rd day of July, 2015.