J-S32029-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JOEL ADCOCK A/K/A JOEL MICHAEL 

ADCOCK, 

 Appellant No. 1894 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 28, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001197-2014 and 

CP-02-CR-0005846-2013 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON AND MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

Appellant, Joel Adcock, a/k/a Joel Michael Adcock, appeals from the 

judgment of sentence entered on October 28, 2014, as made final by the 

denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion on November 6, 2014. We 

affirm. 

On August 4, 2014, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of 

aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault, and one count of 

terroristic threats.1 During the guilty plea colloquy, the Commonwealth

recited the factual basis for Appellant’s plea: 

Had the Commonwealth proceeded to trial on [docket 

number CP-02-CR-0005846-2013,] the Commonwealth 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), and 2706(a)(1), respectively. 
J-S32029-15 

- 2 - 

would have called Detective Rich Usner, [] Detective Scott 

Holzwarth, [] both from the Allegheny County Police

Department, as well as [L.S.] and [J.A.], who would have 

testified that on March 28[,] 2013, the victim, [L.S.], who 

was 62 at the time, was in her [own] apartment. It should 

be noted that [Appellant] and his girlfriend lived above the 

victim, Your Honor. 

[L.S.] had her friend, [J.A.], visiting her from California. 

While [J.A.] was staying with [L.S.], [L.S.] told the police 

that on the morning of March 27, 2013, she complained to 

her landlord that the neighbors were making too much noise 

at odd hours. [L.S.] also told [Appellant’s] girlfriend, and 

the girlfriend had told [L.S.] that she would talk to 

[Appellant] and everything would be okay. 

On the evening of March 27, 2013, [L.S.] would have

testified[, she] heard a loud knock on her door, opened the 

door and that [Appellant] came in and grabbed her by the 

throat, choked her and pulled her hair out, telling her that 

he was angry and was going to kill her for telling on him. 

[J.A.] would have testified that she tried to help her friend 

and was struck several times and fell to the floor by 

[Appellant]. [J.A.] was able to call 911 for help, and the 

police did arrive, but [Appellant] was gone at that time. 

[L.S.] was treated at UPMC Mercy Hospital, which she did 

suffer significant injuries, which we would have provided the 

hospital records from Mercy Hospital. 

. . . 

As to [docket number CP-02-CR-0001197-2014,] we would 

again have called Detective Holzwarth and Detective Usner 

from the Allegheny Police Department as well as Officer 

Price and Officer Kidder from the McKees Rocks [P]olice 

[D]epartment and [V.L.], who would have testified that on 

January 10[, 2014, Appellant] was staying with [V.L.] while 

he was on electronic monitoring awaiting his cases on the 

[CP-02-CR-0005846-2013] case. They had been longtime 

friends. 

While [Appellant] was staying with [V.L.], he was angered 

by one of her three children that had shot him with a toy 
J-S32029-15 

- 3 - 

dart. He became angry and screamed at her child. When 

[V.L.] confronted [Appellant] about yelling at her child, she 

told police he became enraged, yelled[ “d]on’t talk to me 

like that,” picked her up, choked her and threw her down on 

a wooden floor in the dining room. 

[V.L.] then was able to call 911, and [Appellant] left during 

this time. [V.L.] would have testified that she did get 

medical treatment and did suffer minor injuries. 

N.T. Guilty Plea, 8/4/14, at 5-7 and 8-9. 

Following Appellant’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth provided 

Appellant with notice that, in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717, it 

intended to seek the mandatory minimum sentence of two years’ total 

confinement for Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction, as the victim of 

the crime was more than 60 years of age (and Appellant was under 60 years 

of age) at the time of the offense. Commonwealth’s Notice, 8/4/14, at 1; 

see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717(a). In relevant part, Section 9717 declares: 

§ 9717. Sentences for offenses against elderly 

persons 

(a) Mandatory sentence.--A person under 60 years of 

age convicted of the following offenses when the victim is 

over 60 years of age and not a police officer shall be 

sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment as follows: 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) and (4) (relating to 

aggravated assault)--not less than two years. 

. . . 

(b) Eligibility for parole.--Parole shall not be granted 

until the minimum term of imprisonment has been served. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717. 
J-S32029-15 

- 4 - 

Appellant proceeded to sentencing on October 28, 2014 and, during 

the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth requested that the trial court 

impose the two-year mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to Section 

9717. See N.T. Sentencing, 10/28/14, at 17-18. However, during the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court provided absolutely no indication that it 

felt itself bound by the Commonwealth’s mandatory minimum request or 

even that it took the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing term into 

account as a factor in sentencing Appellant. Rather, during the hearing, the 

trial court orally noted that the standard sentencing range for Appellant’s 

aggravated assault conviction was 48 to 66 months in prison. N.T. 

Sentencing, 10/28/14, at 3. The trial court then considered the sentencing 

factors on the record and, after doing so, the trial court imposed upon 

Appellant a standard-range sentence of five to ten years in prison for the 

aggravated assault conviction.2 Specifically, the trial court stated on the 

record at sentencing: 

The court notes the presentence report has detailed

[Appellant’s] criminal history. He has a prior record score of 

[two] out of four misdemeanor convictions. There are 

summaries in his criminal activity – criminal history in the 

presentence report. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 For Appellant’s two simple assault convictions and one terroristic threats 

conviction, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve three consecutive 

terms of six to 12 months in prison, with the terms running consecutively to 

the aggravated assault sentence. Thus, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to serve an aggregate term of six-and-a-half to 13 years in prison for the 

four convictions. 
J-S32029-15 

- 5 - 

[The assistant district attorney] referenced [an earlier] 

assault [Appellant committed] in 2007. It was eerily similar 

to what occurred on this date where [Appellant] attacked 

his girlfriend, grabbed her by the hair and threw her to the 

floor and kicked her in the face and the back after the 

victim had talked to her mother about [Appellant’s]

treatment of her. But, in any event, not exactly on all four 

squares but, again, possessing similarities to the attack that 

occurred here. 

. . . 

[T]he court undertakes, consistent with Title 42, a review 

and consideration of [Appellant’s] background, which is not 

necessarily a pleasant one and is detailed in the 

presentence report, referred to in his letter to the court; 

also the court made note of it in terms of him being abused 

as a child and subject to an environment filled with alcohol 

and physical assault. 

This court also notes his mental health diagnosis and some 

necessity for treatment within the health system, whether 

that’s in a state penitentiary or at some point in time when 

he’s released. The court again is taking those factors into 

consideration, his statement of remorse and accountability, 

incorporated by [Appellant’s attorney] today, expressed by 

him in his letter. 

The court is taking into account the statements made by 

[the assistant district attorney] on behalf of the two victims 

who are not here. The court notes that the second assault 

– that is, the assault on [V.L.] – was one that occurred after 

he was arrested and charged with the assaults on [L.S.] and 

[J.A.]. In fact, taking him into the home with [V.L.], he 

betrayed her confidence and trust in him. 

The court notes the long-standing significant injuries to 

[L.S.], detailed in the presentence report, repeated by her 

today; and, of course, the psychological and emotional 

impact of an unprovoked attack in which she could not 

defend herself by virtue of her lack of physical prowess as 

well as the surprise of that attack, similar in nature to [J.A.] 

and [V.L.]. 
J-S32029-15 

- 6 - 

The court is struck by the similarity of the 2007 attack in 

which [Appellant] was sentenced and had ample 

opportunity, at a minimum, to reflect upon that and change 

his behavior on his own volition or resources of the court 

system or the community. He never did that. In fact, [it 

has] repeated itself and almost resulted in the death of 

[L.S.] in this case in March of 2013. 

The court again is taking into account the rehabilitative 

needs of [Appellant], his history. The court also notes a 

statutory obligation as to the impact of the crime on the 

victims, the danger he may present to the community and 

protection of the community. The court must place great 

weight on the protection [of] the community and the danger 

that he presents to the community. 

Again, I’ve considered all factors in this matter, but in this 

regard, the court believes that he is a danger to the 

community and especially women in the community who he 

has contact with, whether under the influence of alcohol or 

not. 

Consequently, the court will sentence him as follows: at the 

aggravated assault as to [L.S.], he will be sentenced to a 

period of incarceration of [five to ten] years. At the count 

of simple assault as to [J.A.], he’ll be sentenced to a 

consecutive period of incarceration of [six] to 12 months. 

At the count of terroristic threats, he’ll be sentenced to a 

consecutive period of incarceration of [six] to 12 months. 

The aggregate sentence at that information, thus, is [six] to 

12 years. 

At the count of simple assault as to [V.L.], he’ll be 

sentenced to a period of incarceration of [six] to 12 months 

which will run consecutive to the period of incarceration 

imposed at the earlier information. Thus, the aggregate 

sentence on both informations is [six-and-a-half] to 13 

years. 

N.T. Sentencing, 10/28/14, at 18-23 (some internal capitalization omitted). 
J-S32029-15 

- 7 - 

On November 6, 2014, the trial court denied Appellant’s timely postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, on November 18, 2014, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises one claim on 

appeal: 

Whether [Appellant’s] sentence is illegal where – in violation 

of his right to jury trial under Article I, Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and/or the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution – the 

mandatory minimum sentence provision of 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] 

§ 9717 was applied at Count 2 at CP-02-CR-0005846-2013 

irrespective of any stipulation to a factual predicate 

triggering application of said provision? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Stated another way, Appellant claims that the trial court sentenced 

him to the mandatory minimum term of two years in prison for aggravated 

assault, pursuant to the mandatory minimum sentencing statute at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9717. Appellant claims that his sentence for aggravated assault 

is thus illegal, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion 

in Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). 

Appellant’s claim fails, as the trial court clearly did not sentence Appellant 

under Section 9717. Therefore, since Section 9717 is inapplicable to 

Appellant’s case, Appellant’s claim cannot succeed.

“Legality of sentence questions are not waivable and may be raised 

sua sponte by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 118 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Further, “[i]ssues relating to the legality of a 

sentence are questions of law. Our standard of review over such questions 
J-S32029-15 

- 8 - 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Ali, 112 

A.3d 1210, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal corrections omitted). 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States 

Supreme Court held: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489. Further, in Alleyne, the United States 

Supreme Court expanded “Apprendi’s basic jury-determination rule to 

mandatory minimum sentences.” Alleyne, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 

2167 (Breyer, J., concurring). Specifically, the Alleyne Court held that, 

where an “aggravating fact” increases a mandatory minimum sentence, “the 

fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. [The fact] must, 

therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162-2163. 

Therefore, under Alleyne, Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum 

sentencing statutes were generally rendered unconstitutional insofar as the 

statutes provided that: the “aggravating facts” contained in the statutes 

were not elements of the crime; notice of either the “aggravating facts” or of 

the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute was not 

required prior to conviction; the applicability of the mandatory minimum 

statute was to be determined at sentencing; the Commonwealth need only 

prove the “aggravating facts” by a preponderance of the evidence; a judge – 

and not a jury – was to act as the fact-finder for purposes of determining the 
J-S32029-15 

- 9 - 

“aggravated facts;” and, if the “sentencing court refuses to apply [the 

mandatory minimum sentence] where applicable, the Commonwealth shall 

have the right to appellate review of the actions of the sentencing court.” 

See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(b) and (d).3 

In the case at bar, however, the trial court did not sentence Appellant 

to the mandatory minimum sentence contained in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717. 

Certainly, as has been noted above, the trial court did not reference the 

mandatory minimum statute once during the sentencing hearing and the 

trial court did not declare that it believed it was required to sentence 

Appellant to a mandatory minimum term.4 Instead, during the hearing, the 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We note that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717 is written differently than the mandatory 

minimum sentencing statutes that this Court construed and held 

unconstitutional in cases such as Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 

(Pa. Super. 2014), and Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) and that our Supreme Court interpreted and held 

unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ___, 98 MAP 

2013 (Pa. 2015). Specifically, Section 9717 does not contain any provision 

explicitly declaring that: the “aggravating facts” contained in the statutes 

were not elements of the crime; notice of either the “aggravating facts” or of 

the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute was not 

required prior to conviction; the applicability of the mandatory minimum 

statute was to be determined at sentencing; the Commonwealth need only 

prove the “aggravating facts” by a preponderance of the evidence; a judge – 

and not a jury – was to act as the fact-finder for purposes of determining the 

“aggravated facts;” and, if the “sentencing court refuses to apply [the 

mandatory minimum sentence] where applicable, the Commonwealth shall 

have the right to appellate review of the actions of the sentencing court.” 

See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(b) and (d). 

4

 Appellant’s sentencing hearing took place on October 28, 2014 – over one 

month after this Court decided Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
J-S32029-15 

- 10 - 

trial court orally summarized the totality of facts that led it to sentence 

Appellant to a standard-range term of five to ten years in prison. Further, 

we observe that: the trial court’s written sentencing order does not declare 

that it imposed a mandatory minimum sentence; the written sentencing 

guideline form declares that the trial court imposed a “standard range” 

sentence and, in the box where the court is required to specify the 

defendant’s “mandatory minimum” sentence, the court left the box blank 

(thus indicating that the trial court did not impose a mandatory minimum 

sentence); and, Appellant’s commitment papers specifically declare that 

Appellant did not receive a mandatory minimum sentence. Sentencing 

Order, 10/28/14, at 1; Sentencing Guideline Form, 10/28/14, at 1; Court 

Commitment, 11/4/14, at 1. Moreover, within the trial court’s opinion to 

this Court, the trial court specifically stated that the mandatory minimum 

sentencing term contained in Section 9717 was not considered even as a 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (filed August 20, 2014). In Newman, an en 

banc panel of this Court considered the mandatory minimum sentencing 

statute at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1 and held that the unconstitutional portions 

of the statute were not severable from the remainder of the statute. 

Therefore, Newman held that Section 9712.1 was unconstitutional in its 

entirety. We note that, given our holding in Newman, the trial court might 

have refused to apply 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9717 because it believed that the 

statute was also unconstitutional in its entirety. However, as a result of our 

current holding, we express no opinion on the constitutionality of Section 

9717. 
J-S32029-15 

- 11 - 

sentencing factor when the trial court constructed Appellant’s sentence.5 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/15, at 10. As the trial court explained: 

The trial court considered the sentencing guidelines, the 

presentence report, a letter from Appellant detailing 

remorse and accountability for his actions, Appellant’s 

childhood, Appellant’s mental health diagnosis and necessity 

for treatment, testimony from the victim, photographs of 

the victim taken at the emergency room immediately 

following the assault, the victim’s inability to defend herself 

against the unprovoked attack, the victim’s long-standing 

significant injuries, the similarities to an attack by Appellant 

against his girlfriend in 2007, and Appellant’s failure to 

rehabilitate himself after being sentenced on the 2007 

assault. After reviewing these factors, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of five to ten years because “the court 

believes that he is a danger to the community and 

especially women in the community who he was contact 

with, whether under the influence of alcohol or not.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/15, at 12 (some internal capitalization omitted). 

Finally, in Commonwealth v. Zeigler, this Court explicitly held that – 

where a mandatory minimum sentencing statute exists for a crime, but 

where the sentencing court exceeds the mandatory minimum term by 

____________________________________________ 

5

 We note that, even if the trial court viewed Section 9717 as a sentencing 

factor (which it did not), Appellant’s sentence would still not be illegal. 

Indeed, had the trial court viewed Section 9717 as a sentencing factor, the 

application would merely implicate the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732, 744 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (holding: a claim that the trial court relied upon impermissible factors 

at sentencing is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence). 

However, Appellant has not raised a discretionary aspects of sentencing 

claim on appeal. As such, even if the trial court relied upon Section 9717 as 

a sentencing factor in this case, Appellant’s current claim on appeal (wherein 

Appellant claims only that his sentence is illegal) would still fail. 
J-S32029-15 

- 12 - 

applying a standard guideline range sentence – the trial court has not 

“sentence[d] the defendant based on the mandatory statute, and [the 

defendant’s] sentence is not illegal on that ground.” Commonwealth v. 

Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 662 (Pa. Super. 2015). Specifically, in Zeigler, we 

held: 

we are aware that a mandatory minimum statute exists for 

[the defendant’s] aggravated assault crime since he

admitted to visibly possessing a firearm during its

commission. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. Based on decisions from 

this Court, imposing such a mandatory is illegal. However, 

the sentencing court exceeded the mandatory 

minimum sentence when it applied the standard 

guideline range sentence where a deadly weapon was 

used. Hence, the court did not sentence the 

defendant based on the mandatory statute, and his 

sentence is not illegal on that ground.

Id. (emphasis added). 

Therefore, since the trial court did not impose a mandatory minimum 

sentence in this case, Appellant’s claim that his sentence is illegal is 

baseless. The claim thus fails. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/24/2015