31996 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day 

of June 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Rebecca Tadesse, 

Chief, Materials Decommissioning Branch, 

Decommissioning and Uranium Recovery, 

Licensing Directorate, Division of Waste 

Management, and Environmental Protection, 

Office of Federal and State Materials, and 

Environmental Management Programs. 

[FR Doc. E9–15790 Filed 7–2–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2008–0637] 

Notice of Availability of Technical 

Specification Improvement To 

Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to 

Licensee Control—Risk-Informed 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(RITSTF) Initiative 5b, Technical 

Specification Task Force—425, 

Revision 3 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of Availability. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared a 

model license amendment request 

(LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and 

model no significant hazards 

consideration (NSHC) determination. 

These are related to changes to standard 

technical specifications (STS) for 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF)—425, Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’’ 

(Agencywide Documents Access 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML090850642). The 

purpose of these models is to permit the 

NRC to efficiently process amendments 

that propose to relocate technical 

specifications (TS) surveillance 

frequencies. Licensees of nuclear power 

reactors could then request 

amendments, confirming the 

applicability of the safety evaluation 

and NSHC determination to their 

reactors. Previously, on December 5, 

2008, drafts of the model SE, model 

NSHC determination, and model LAR 

were published in the Federal Register 

for public comment (73 FR 74202– 

74210). Based on its evaluation of the 

public comments received in response 

to that notice, the NRC staff made 

appropriate changes to the models, and 

is including the final versions of the 

models in this notice. This notice also 

contains a description of each public 

comment and its disposition by the NRC 

staff. Based on its evaluation of the 

public comments, the NRC staff has 

decided to announce the availability of 

the model SE and model NSHC 

determination to licensees for 

referencing in LARs to adopt TSTF–425, 

Rev 3. Licensees of nuclear power 

reactors proposing to adopt these 

changes should follow the guidance in 

the model LAR and confirm the 

applicability of the model SE and model 

NSHC determination to their reactors. 

DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces 

that the attached model SE and model 

NSHC determination (which differ only 

slightly from the versions previously 

published) may be used in support of 

plant specific applications to adopt the 

relocation of TS Surveillance 

Requirements. The staff has also posted 

the model LAR (which also differs only 

slightly from the versions previously 

published) to assist licensees in 

applying for the proposed TS change. 

The NRC staff can most efficiently 

consider applications based upon the 

model application if the application is 

submitted within a year of this Federal 

Register Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michelle Honcharik, Mail Stop: O–12E1, 

Special Projects Branch, Division of 

Policy and Rulemaking, Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone 

301–415–1774. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

This notice makes available for 

adoption by licensees a change to the 

STS that modifies surveillance 

frequencies. Licensees opting to apply 

for this change are responsible for 

reviewing the staff’s evaluation, 

providing the applicable technical 

justifications, and providing any 

necessary plant-specific information. 

The NRC will process each amendment 

application responding to the notice of 

availability according to applicable NRC 

rules and procedures. 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3 involves the 

relocation of most time-based 

surveillance frequencies to a licenseecontrolled program, called the 

Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program (SFCP), and adds the SFCP to 

the administrative controls section of 

TS. The SFCP does not include 

surveillance frequencies that are event 

driven, controlled by an existing 

program, or are condition-based. 

Revision 3 of TSTF–425 addresses all 

four reactor vendor types. The owners 

groups participants proposed this 

change for incorporation into the STS. 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML090850642), can be viewed on 

the NRC’s Web page at: http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 

Applicability 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3, is applicable to all 

STS for nuclear power reactors and 

requires the application of the Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 04–10, Rev.1, 

‘‘Risk-informed Technical 

Specifications Initiative 5B, RiskInformed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies,’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML071360456). The NRC 

staff reviewed and approved NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1, by letter dated September 19, 

2007 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML072570267). Each licensee applying 

for the changes proposed in TSTF–425 

will need to include documentation 

regarding the probabilistic risk 

assessment [PRA] technical adequacy 

consistent with the guidance in Section 

4.2 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, ‘‘An 

Approach for Determining the Technical 

Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment [PRA] Results for RiskInformed Activities’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML070240001). 

Applicants proposing to use PRA 

models for which NRC-endorsed 

standards do not exist must submit 

documentation that identifies 

characteristics of those models. Sections 

1.2 and 1.3 of RG 1.200 provides 

guidance on the supporting information 

needed for new methods. Applicants 

must give supporting evidence for 

methods to be applied for assessing the 

risk contribution for those sources of 

risk not addressed by NRC endorsed 

PRA models. 

The proposed change to adopt TSTF– 

425 does not prevent licensees from 

requesting an alternate approach or 

proposing changes other than those 

proposed in TSTF–425, Rev. 3. 

Significant deviations from the 

approach recommended in this notice, 

or inclusion of additional changes to the 

license, however, require additional 

review by the NRC staff. This may 

increase the time and resources needed 

for the review or result in staff rejection 

of the LAR. Licensees desiring 

significant deviations or additional 

changes should instead submit a license 

amendment request that does not claim 

to adopt TSTF–425, Rev 3. 

Evaluation of Public Comments on the 

Model Safety Evaluation 

The NRC staff evaluated the public 

comments received on the model SE, 

model NSHC determination, and model 

LAR published in the Federal Register 

on December 5, 2008 (73 FR 74202– 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 31997 

74210). Fifteen comments were received 

from the pressurized and boiling water 

reactor owners groups, TSTF (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML090080162). The 

comments and NRC staff’s disposition of 

each comment follows. It should be 

noted that the following comments were 

made to the Federal Register Notice for 

Comment which referenced TSTF–425, 

Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML080280275). TSTF–425, Revision 3 

was submitted by the TSTF by letter 

dated March 18, 2009 (ADAMS 

Accession NO. ML090850642) to 

address NRC disposition of TSTF 

comment number 10. 

1. (TSTF) Reference; model 

application (73 FR 74204). Comment: 

‘‘The model application contains 

statements that are not consistent with 

a letter from a licensee to the NRC, and 

in many cases the model application is 

worded similar to the NRC-issued Safety 

Evaluation. For example, Section 2.1, 

paragraph 2, of the model application 

states, ‘The licensee has submitted 

documentation which identifies the 

quality characteristics of those models, 

as described in RG 1.200 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML070240001).’ We 

recommend that the model application 

be reviewed from the standpoint of a 

letter from a specific licensee to the 

NRC and modify the wording to be 

consistent with that task. For example, 

if Comment 2 is incorporated, the 

sentence above could be rewritten as 

discussed in Comment 6, below.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment regarding consistency of a 

letter from a licensee to the NRC and 

incorporated the recommended change 

into the model application, where 

appropriate. Disposition of Comment 

Nos. 2 and 6 are discussed below. 

2. (TSTF) Reference; model 

application (73 FR 74205). Comment: 

‘‘We recommend that the licensee’s 

documentation of PRA adequacy be a 

new Attachment 2 and the existing 

attachments be renumbered. This will 

allow standardization of the model 

amendment and allow reference to the 

attachment number in the Safety 

Evaluation.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and incorporated the 

recommended change into the model 

application as new ‘‘Attachment 2, 

Documentation of PRA Technical 

Adequacy.’’ 

3. (TSTF) Reference; model 

application (73 FR 74205). Comment: 

‘‘Attachment 3 of the model application 

includes the revised (clean) Technical 

Specification (TS) pages. Whether 

licensees are requested to include clean 

typed TS pages with license 

amendments varies among the NRC 

Project Managers. Given the number of 

pages affected by this amendment and 

the straightforward nature of the 

changes, this attachment should be 

marked as optional, allowing the 

licensee and the NRC Project Manager to 

decide whether clean TS pages should 

be submitted.’’ 

Disposition: Essentially, the 

commenter objects to providing final 

requested change. When an applicant 

desires to amend its TS, the 

combination of § 50.36 and 50.90 

require submission of the new, clean, 

unmarked TS and bases. An applicant 

could not reasonably decline to submit 

proposed TS and bases under the claim 

that the proposed pages were not 

‘‘applicable’’ to its request. Thus, an 

application is likely incomplete if it 

fails to contain final clean TS and bases. 

Regarding marked-up pages, 

applicants generally submit marked-up 

TS pages and bases. There is, however, 

no direct requirement for submission of 

the mark-ups. Should the Staff need the 

mark-ups for their amendment review, 

§ 50.90’s requirement that an LAR ‘‘fully 

describe[s] the changes desired’’ could 

be used to request a mark-up version. 

No changes were made as a result of this 

comment. 

4. (TSTF) Reference; model 

application (73 FR 74205) ‘‘Attachment 

5 of the model application includes the 

affected Bases pages. In the transmittal 

letter for TSTF–425, Revision 1, dated 

April 20, 2007, the TSTF stated, ‘‘In the 

CLIIP model application for TSTF–425, 

we request that NRC reflect that 

appropriate plant-specific changes will 

be made to the Technical Specifications 

Bases by the licensees under the 

Technical Specification Bases Control 

Program and that, therefore, revised 

Bases pages need not be included. This 

will significantly reduce the size of the 

plant-specific license amendment 

requests submitted to adopt TSTF–425.’’ 

‘‘As further discussed in the TSTF’s 

response to NRC’s RAI #8 (Letter from 

TSTF to NRC dated January 17, 2008, 

‘Response to NRC Request for 

Additional Information Regarding 

TSTF–425,’ Revision 1, ‘Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’ dated 

October 2, 2007), licensees have the 

option of retaining the existing 

description of the Frequency in their 

Bases (as adoption of TSTF–425 does 

not alter any existing Frequencies) or of 

adopting the recommended Bases in 

TSTF–425. In either case, neither the 

existing Bases nor the revised Bases in 

TSTF–425 include any information 

material to the NRC’s review. Therefore, 

we recommend that the model 

application be revised to not reference 

the inclusion of Bases changes. See also 

the related comment on the Safety 

Evaluation below.’’ 

Disposition: For more than 50 years, 

since the regulation governing license 

amendment requests, 10 CFR 50.90, has 

required that an applicant fully 

describes the changes desired, and also 

required the applicant to follow, as far 

as applicable, the form prescribed for 

the original operating license 

application. The NRC’s regulation at 10 

CFR 50.36 continues this philosophy of 

requiring applications to include 

technical specifications and bases. 

Thus, to meet the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.90, the applicant will need to 

submit the applicable TSs and bases. An 

applicant who does otherwise is at risk 

of failing to meet the requirements in 10 

CFR 50.90 of ‘‘fully describing the 

changes desired, and following as far as 

applicable, the form prescribed for 

original applications’’. No changes were 

made to the Federal Register Notice (73 

FR 74202–74210) as a result of this 

comment. 

5. (TSTF) Reference; model 

application (73 FR 74204). ‘‘Section 2.1, 

‘Applicability of the Published Safety 

Evaluation,’ first paragraph, states, 

‘[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety 

evaluation dated [DATE]. This review 

included a review of the NRC staff’s 

evaluation, the supporting information 

provided to support TSTF–425, Rev. 2, 

and the requirements specified in NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML071360456).’ It is not clear what 

information is included in ‘the 

supporting information provided to 

support TSTF–425, Rev. 2.’ In order for 

licensees to provide complete and 

accurate information, a more specific 

description is needed.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and revised Section 2.1 to 

read as follows: ‘‘[LICENSEE] has 

reviewed the safety evaluation dated 

[DATE]. This review included a review 

of the NRC evaluation, TSTF–425, Rev. 

2, and the requirements specified in NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML071360456).’’ The statement 

regarding ‘‘The supporting information 

provided to support TSTF–425, 

Revision 2’’ was replaced by ‘‘TSTF– 

425, Revision 2’’ since the TSTF 

includes information which explains 

and supports the STS changes and must 

be considered by the licensee as part of 

the license amendment request to 

determine if the TSTF is applicable to 

the licensee’s facility. 

6. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 2.1, ‘Applicability 

of the Published Safety Evaluation,’ 

contains two numbered paragraphs 

joined by an ‘and’ referring to 

documentation of PRA adequacy. These 

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31998 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 

paragraphs do not provide sufficient 

guidance to a licensee on what should 

be submitted. Using the change in 

Comment 2, we recommend that these 

paragraphs be replaced with the 

following, ‘Attachment 2 includes 

documentation with regard to PRA 

technical adequacy consistent with the 

requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200, 

Revision 1, Section 4.2, and describes 

any PRA models without NRC-endorsed 

standards, including documentation of 

the quality characteristics of those 

models in accordance with Regulatory 

Guide 1.200.’ Additional guidance, if 

available, such as preferred organization 

of the information, can be added to the 

model application in Attachment 2.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and revised Section 2.1, 

‘‘Applicability of the Published Safety 

Evaluation’’. The numbered paragraphs 

(1 and 2) of Section 2.1 are replaced to 

state the following: ‘‘Attachment 2 

includes [LICENSEE] documentation 

with regard to PRA technical adequacy 

consistent with the requirements of 

Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 1 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML070240001), 

Section 4.2, and describes any PRA 

models without NRC-endorsed 

standards, including documentation of 

the quality characteristics of those 

models in accordance with Regulatory 

Guide 1.200.’’ 

7. (TSTF) ‘‘We recommend Section 

2.2, ‘‘Optional changes and variations,’’ 

be replaced with, ‘The proposed 

amendment is consistent with the TS 

changes described in TSTF–425, Rev. 2, 

but proposes to modify the plantspecific Surveillances, which may 

include more or less Surveillances than 

those modified in TSTF–425, Rev. 2, 

and those plant-specific Surveillances 

may have differing Surveillance 

numbers. The plant-specific changes are 

consistent with the NRC staff’s model 

safety evaluation dated [DATE], 

especially the scope exclusions in 

Section 1.0 of that model safety 

evaluation, as revised.’’’ 

Disposition: Deviations or variations 

from that described in TSTF are 

recognized and addressed in Notice of 

Opportunity to Comment on Model SE 

on TS Improvement to Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b, TSTF– 

425, Revision 2 as published in the 

Federal Register for public comment (73 

FR 74203) which states: ‘‘The proposed 

change to adopt TSTF–425 does not 

prevent licensees from requesting an 

alternate approach or proposing changes 

other than those proposed in TSTF–425, 

Rev. 2. Significant deviations from the 

approach recommended in this notice, 

or inclusion of additional changes to the 

license, however, require additional 

review by the NRC staff. This may 

increase the time and resources needed 

for the review or result in staff rejection 

of the LAR. Licensees desiring 

significant deviations or additional 

changes should instead submit a license 

amendment request that does not claim 

to adopt TSTF–425, Rev 2.’’ No changes 

were made as a result of this comment. 

8. (TSTF) The proposed regulatory 

commitment in Attachment 4 to 

implement NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, should be 

deleted. The TS Administrative 

Controls, ‘Surveillance Frequency 

Control Program,’ required to be 

adopted as part of the amendment, 

states, ‘Changes to the Frequencies 

listed in the Surveillance Frequency 

Control Program shall be made in 

accordance with NEI 04–10, ‘RiskInformed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies,’ Revision 1.’ 

NRC Office Instruction LIC–105, 

‘Managing Regulatory Commitments 

Made by Licensees to the NRC,’ states, 

‘Regulatory commitments are 

appropriate for matters in which the 

staff has significant interest but which 

do not warrant either legally binding 

requirements or inclusion in Updated 

Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs) 

or programs subject to a formal 

regulatory change control mechanism.’ 

As TSTF–425, Rev. 2, proposes to have 

a Technical Specification requirement 

to implement NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, which 

is a legally binding requirement, a 

regulatory commitment to implement 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, is unnecessary.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and revised the Model 

Application by deleting the reference to 

and the ‘‘Attachment 4 Regulatory 

Commitments.’’ 

9. The ‘‘Proposed No Significant 

Hazards Consideration Determination’’ 

Criterion 3 discussion, should be 

revised as shown, ‘‘To evaluate a change 

in the relocated surveillance frequency, 

[LICENSEE] will perform a probabilistic 

risk evaluation using the guidance 

contained in NRC approved NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and provided additional 

clarification with reference to the SFCP. 

As a clarification of the ‘‘Proposed No 

Significant Hazards Consideration’’ 

Criterion 3 (73 FR 74205) discussion the 

statement was revised as follows: ‘‘To 

evaluate a change in the relocated 

surveillance frequency, [LICENSEE] will 

perform a probabilistic risk evaluation 

using the guidance contained in NRC 

approved NEI 04–10, Rev. 1 in 

accordance with the TS SFCP.’’ 

10. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 1.0, 

‘Introduction,’ states that all 

Surveillance Frequencies can be 

relocated except those meeting four 

conditions. The first three conditions 

are a restatement of the conditions 

described in TSTF–425, Rev. 2, Section 

2.0, ‘Proposed Change.’ The fourth 

condition, ‘Frequencies that are related 

to specific conditions (e.g., ‘battery 

degradation, age, and capacity’) or 

conditions for the performance of a 

surveillance requirement (e.g., ‘drywell 

to suppression chamber differential 

pressure decrease’), does not appear in 

TSTF–425, Rev. 2, and is not consistent 

with the markups in TSTF–425, Rev. 2.’’ 

The TSTF’s response to NRC’s RAI #2 

(Letter from TSTF to NRC dated January 

17, 2008, ‘Response to NRC Request for 

Additional Information Regarding 

TSTF–425, Revision 1,’ ‘Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b, dated 

October 2, 2007’), addressed this issue. 

It states, ‘The TSTF agrees that the 

specific conditions of battery 

degradation, age, and capacity are not 

within the scope of NEI 04–10. 

Surveillance 3.8.6.6 in NUREG–1430, 

–1431, –1432, –1433, and –1434 is 

revised to retain the conditions of 

battery degradation, age, and capacity, 

while relocating the Frequencies 

consistent with the NRC-approved 

Limerick lead plant submittal. The 

Limerick Surveillances, 4.8.2.1.e and 

4.8.2.1.f, contain the same requirements 

as ISTS Surveillance 3.8.6.6. The 60 

month Frequency is relocated to the 

SFCP. The 12 month and 24 month 

Frequencies associated with degraded 

batteries, or batteries exceeding 85 

percent of their expected life based on 

available capacity are relocated to the 

SFCP, but the criteria related to battery 

degradation, age, and capacity are 

retained.’ 

Therefore, based on this response and 

the NRC’s approval of the Limerick 

LAR, the Surveillance Frequencies 

related to specific conditions are not 

excluded from the scope of TSTF–425, 

Rev. 2. 

Disposition: The NRC Request for 

Additional Information (RAI) Regarding 

TSTF–425, Revision 1, dated October 2, 

2007 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML072120630) states as follows: ‘‘In 

NUREG–1433 SR 3.8.6.6, and NUREG– 

1434 SR 3.8.6.6, TSTF–425 will relocate 

the 12-month and 24-month 

surveillance frequencies associated with 

degraded batteries, or batteries 

exceeding 85 percent of their expected 

life based on available capacity. This is 

inconsistent with the proposed changes 

to similar SRs in NUREG–1430, 

NUREG–1431, and NUREG–1432, which 

would only relocate the 60-month 

frequency associated with non-degraded 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 31999 

batteries. The staff considers the specific 

conditions of battery degradation, age, 

and capacity as not within the scope of 

NEI 04–10. Provide a revision to TSTF– 

425 which retains, in NUREG–1433 and 

NUREG–1434, the SRs for degraded or 

old batteries.’’ As the NRC staff 

indicated in the RAI and TSTF states in 

their response (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML090080162), ‘‘TSTF agrees that the 

specific conditions of battery 

degradation, age, and capacity are not 

within the scope of NEI 04–10.’’ TSTF– 

425, Revision 2, requires the use of NEI 

04–10, Revision 1, in accordance with 

the TS Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program. Therefore, Surveillance 

Frequencies related to specific 

conditions remain an exception to 

relocation under the SFCP. No changes 

were made as a result of this comment. 

11. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 1.0, 

‘Introduction,’ (Federal Register page 

74205, first column) states, ‘The TS 

Bases for each affected surveillance is 

revised to state that the frequency is set 

in accordance with the Surveillance 

Frequency Control Program. Various 

editorial changes may be made to the 

Bases as needed to facilitate the 

addition of the Bases changes. Some 

surveillance Bases do not contain a 

discussion of the frequency. In these 

cases, Bases describing the current 

frequency were added to maintain 

consistency with the Bases for similar 

surveillances. These instances are noted 

in the markup along with the source of 

the text. The proposed changes to the 

administrative controls of TS to 

incorporate the SFCP includes a specific 

reference to NEI 04–10, ‘Risk-Informed 

Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, 

Risk-Informed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies,’ Revision 1 

(Rev. 1), (Reference 2) as the basis for 

making any changes to the surveillance 

frequencies once they are relocated out 

of TS.’ As discussed in Comment 4, 

licensees are not required to revise the 

Bases to adopt TSTF–425 and any 

voluntary Bases changes should not be 

submitted with the amendment as they 

contain no information material to the 

NRC’s review and can be made under 

the Technical Specifications Bases 

Control Program. In addition, Bases 

changes are not within the scope of the 

NRC’s review under 10 CFR 50.90 

because, as stated in 10 CFR 50.36(a), 

Bases are not part of the Technical 

Specifications. Therefore, the Bases 

changes should not be discussed in the 

NRC’s Safety Evaluation.’’ 

Disposition: As identified by 10 CFR 

50.90, Application for amendment of 

license, construction permit, or early 

site permit, which states: ‘‘Whenever a 

holder of a license, including a 

construction permit and operating 

license under this part, and an early site 

permit, combined license, and 

manufacturing license under part 52 of 

this chapter, desires to amend the 

license or permit, application for an 

amendment must be filed with the 

Commission, as specified in §§ 50.4 or 

52.3 of this chapter, as applicable, fully 

describing the changes desired, and 

following as far as applicable, the form 

prescribed for original applications.’’ 

Applicants requesting a license 

amendment, such as the adoption of 

TSTF–425, under 10 CFR 50.90 are, 

therefore, required to submit an 

application that includes the affected TS 

Bases ‘‘* * * fully describing the 

changes desired, and following as far as 

applicable, the form prescribed for 

original applications.’’ Therefore, while 

the Bases are not part of the TSs, 

affected TS Bases pages are required to 

be submitted with an application for a 

licensee amendment request. No 

changes were made as a result of this 

comment. 

12. (TSTF) Section 3.2, ‘‘The 

Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient 

Safety Margins,’’ should be revised as 

follows: ‘The engineering evaluations 

that will be conducted by the licensee 

under the Surveillance Frequency 

Control Program when Frequencies are 

revised will assess the impact of the 

proposed Frequency change with the 

principle that sufficient safety margins 

are maintained. The guidelines used for 

making that assessment will include 

ensuring the proposed Surveillance test 

frequency change is not in conflict with 

approved industry codes and standards 

or adversely affects any assumptions or 

inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such 

inputs are affected, justification is 

provided to ensure sufficient safety 

margin will continue to exist.’ This 

section is referring to Surveillance 

Frequency changes that will be 

performed by the licensee under the 

SFCP after approval of the license 

amendment, not to any evaluations 

provided with the license amendment 

request. 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and revised the first 

paragraph of Section 3.4 to state as 

follows: ‘‘The engineering evaluations 

that will be conducted by the licensee 

under the Surveillance Frequency 

Control Program when Frequencies are 

revised will assess the impact of the 

proposed Frequency change with the 

principle that sufficient safety margins 

are maintained. The guidelines used for 

making that assessment will include 

ensuring the proposed Surveillance test 

frequency change is not in conflict with 

approved industry codes and standards 

or adversely affects any assumptions or 

inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such 

inputs are affected, justification is 

provided to ensure sufficient safety 

margin will continue to exist.’’ 

13. ‘‘Section 3.4.1, ‘Quality of the 

PRA,’ references NEI 00–02, ‘PRA Peer 

Review Process Guidance.’ While NEI 

00–02 should continue to be referenced, 

NEI 05–04, Rev. 2, ‘Process for 

Performing Internal Events PRA Peer 

Reviews,’ should also be referenced.’’ 

Disposition: Staff accepted the 

comment as NRC has endorsed NEI 05– 

04 Rev.2, ‘‘Process for Performing 

Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews,’’ and 

NEI 05–04 can be referenced as an 

acceptable method. 

14. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 3.4.6, 

‘Acceptance Guidelines,’ first 

paragraph, should be revised to clarify 

that the acceptance guidelines are in 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, so that it is not 

implied that the Safety Evaluation 

contains additional requirements. For 

example, the first sentence could be 

revised to state, ‘In accordance with NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, [LICENSEE] will 

quantitatively evaluate the change in 

total risk (including internal and 

external events contributions) in terms 

of core damage frequency (CDF) and 

large early release frequency (LERF) for 

both the individual risk impact of a 

proposed change in surveillance 

frequency and the cumulative impact 

from all individual changes to 

surveillance frequencies.’’’ 

Disposition: Section 3.4.6, first 

paragraph, is rewritten to clarify that the 

Safety Evaluation does not add 

additional requirements. The revised 

text states as follows: ‘‘[LICENSEE] will 

quantitatively evaluate the change in 

total risk (including internal and 

external events contributions) in terms 

of core damage frequency (CDF) and 

large early release frequency (LERF) for 

both the individual risk impact of a 

proposed change in surveillance 

frequency and the cumulative impact 

from all individual changes to 

surveillance frequencies using the 

guidance contained in NRC approved 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, in accordance with 

the TS SFCP.’’ 

15. (TSTF) ‘‘Section 6.0, ‘References’, 

Item 2, should be revised as follows, 

‘NEI 04–10, Rev. 1,’ for consistency with 

the rest of the document.’’ 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and revised Section 6.0, 

‘‘References,’’ Item 2, to state: ‘‘NEI 04– 

10, Revision 1’’ to correct the omission 

of the revision number. 

For each application the NRC staff 

will publish a notice of consideration of 

issuance of amendment to facility 

operating licenses, a proposed no 

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32000 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 

significant hazards consideration 

determination, and a notice of 

opportunity for a hearing. The staff will 

also publish a notice of issuance of an 

amendment to the operating license to 

announce the relocation of surveillance 

frequencies to licensee-controlled 

document for each plant that receives 

the requested change. 

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of 

June 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Robert Elliott, 

Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, 

Division of Inspection and Regional Support, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

The following example of an 

application was prepared by the NRC 

staff. The model provides the expected 

level of detail and content for an 

application to revise technical 

specifications regarding risk-informed 

justification for relocation of specific TS 

surveillance frequencies to a licensee 

controlled program change. Licensees 

remain responsible for ensuring that 

their actual application fulfills their 

administrative requirements as well as 

NRC regulations. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 

20555. 

SUBJECT: PLANT NAME: DOCKET NO. 50— 

APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL 

SPECIFICATION CHANGE REGARDING 

RISK-INFORMED JUSTIFICATION FOR 

THE RELOCATION OF SPECIFIC 

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 

REQUIREMENTS TO A LICENSEE 

CONTROLLED PROGRAM 

Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the 

provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR Part 50.90), 

‘‘Application for Amendment of License, 

Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit,’’ 

[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an 

amendment to the technical specifications 

(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed amendment would modify 

[LICENSEE] technical specifications by 

relocating specific surveillance frequencies to 

a licensee-controlled program with the 

implementation of Nuclear Energy Institute 

(NEI) 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed Technical 

Specification Initiative 5B, Risk-Informed 

Method for Control of Surveillance 

Frequencies.’’ 

Attachment 1 provides a description of the 

proposed change, the requested confirmation 

of applicability, and plant-specific 

verifications. Attachment 2 provides 

documentation of PRA technical adequacy. 

Attachment 3 provides the existing TS pages 

marked up to show the proposed change. 

Attachment 4 provides revised (clean) TS 

pages. Attachment 5 provides the proposed 

TS Bases changes. Attachment 6 Proposed No 

Significant Hazards Consideration. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed license amendment by [DATE], 

with the amendment being implemented [BY 

DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, ‘‘Notice 

for Public Comment; State Consultation,’’ a 

copy of this application, with attachments, is 

being provided to the designated [STATE] 

Official. 

I declare [or certify, verify, state] under 

penalty of perjury that the foregoing is 

correct and true. Executed on [Date] 

[Signature] 

If you should have any questions regarding 

this submittal, please contact [NAME, 

TELEPHONE NUMBER] 

Sincerely, 

[Name, Title] 

Attachments: 

1. Description and Assessment 

2. Documentation of PRA Technical 

Adequacy 

3. Proposed Technical Specification Changes 

4. Revised Technical Specification Pages 

5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases 

Changes 

6. Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Regional Office, NRC Resident Inspector. 

Attachment 1—Description and 

Assessment 

1.0 Description 

The proposed amendment would 

modify technical specifications by 

relocating specific surveillance 

frequencies to a licensee-controlled 

program with the adoption of Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF)–425, 

Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate Surveillance 

Frequencies to Licensee Control—Risk 

Informed Technical Specification Task 

Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5.’’ 

Additionally, the change would add a 

new program, the Surveillance 

Frequency Control Program, to TS 

Section [5], Administrative Controls. 

The changes are consistent with NRC 

approved Industry/TSTF STS change 

TSTF–425, Revision 3, (Rev. 3) (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML080280275). The 

Federal Register notice published on 

[Date] announced the availability of this 

TS improvement. 

2.0 Assessment 

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety 

Evaluation 

[Licensee] has reviewed the safety 

evaluation dated [Date]. This review 

included a review of the NRC staff’s 

evaluation, TSTF–425, Revision 3, and 

the requirements specified in NEI 04– 

10, Rev. 1, (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML071360456). 

Attachment 2 includes [Licensee] 

documentation with regard to PRA 

technical adequacy consistent with the 

requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200, 

Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML070240001), Section 4.2, and 

describes any PRA models without 

NRC-endorsed standards, including 

documentation of the quality 

characteristics of those models in 

accordance with Regulatory Guide 

1.200. 

[Licensee] has concluded that the 

justifications presented in the TSTF 

proposal and the safety evaluation 

prepared by the NRC staff are applicable 

to [Plant, Unit Nos.] and justify this 

amendment to incorporate the changes 

to the [Plant] TS. 

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations 

[Licensee] is not proposing any 

variations or deviations from the STS 

changes described in TSTF–425, Rev. 3, 

and the NRC staff’s model safety 

evaluation dated [Date]. 

[The proposed amendment is 

consistent with the STS changes 

described in TSTF–425, Revision 3, but 

[Licensee] proposes variations or 

deviations from TSTF–425, as identified 

below and may include differing TS 

Surveillance numbers]. 

3.0 Regulatory Analysis 

3.1 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

[Licensee] has reviewed the proposed 

no significant hazards consideration 

determination (NSHC) published in the 

Federal Register [Date]([ ] FR [ ]). 

[Licensee] has concluded that the 

proposed NSHC presented in the 

Federal Register notice is applicable to 

[Plant Name, Unit Nos.] and is provided 

as an attachment to this amendment 

request which satisfies the requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 

Attachment 2—Documentation of PRA 

Technical Adequacy 

Attachment 3—Proposed Technical 

Specification Changes (Mark-Up) 

Attachment 4—Proposed Technical 

Specification Pages 

Attachment 5—Proposed Changes to 

Technical Specification Bases Pages 

Attachment 6—Proposed No Significant 

Hazards Consideration 

Description of Amendment Request: 

The change requests the adoption of an 

approved change to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) for 

[Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plants 

(NUREG–1430), Westinghouse Plants 

(NUREG–1431), Combustion 

Engineering Plants (NUREG–1432), 

General Electric Plants, BWR/4 

(NUREG–1433), and General Electric 

Plants, BWR/6 (NUREG–1334)], to allow 

relocation of specific TS surveillance 

frequencies to a licensee-controlled 

program. The proposed change is 

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described in Technical Specification 

Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF–425, 

Revision 3 (Rev. 3) (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML080280275) related to the 

Relocation of Surveillance Frequencies 

to Licensee Control—RITSTF Initiative 

5b and was described in the Notice of 

Availability published in the Federal 

Register on [Date] ([xx FR xxxxx]). 

The proposed changes are consistent 

with NRC-approved Industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Traveler, TSTF–425, Rev. 3, ‘‘Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b.’’ The 

proposed change relocates surveillance 

frequencies to a licensee-controlled 

program, the SFCP. This change is 

applicable to licensees using 

probabilistic risk guidelines contained 

in NRC-approved NEI 04–10, ‘‘RiskInformed Technical Specifications 

Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for 

Control of Surveillance Frequencies,’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. 071360456). 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration: As required by 

10 CFR 50.91(a), the [Licensee] analysis 

of the issue of no significant hazards 

consideration is presented below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change relocates the 

specified frequencies for periodic 

surveillance requirements to licensee control 

under a new Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program. Surveillance frequencies are not an 

initiator to any accident previously 

evaluated. As a result, the probability of any 

accident previously evaluated is not 

significantly increased. The systems and 

components required by the technical 

specifications for which the surveillance 

frequencies are relocated are still required to 

be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for 

the surveillance requirements, and be 

capable of performing any mitigation 

function assumed in the accident analysis. 

As a result, the consequences of any accident 

previously evaluated are not significantly 

increased. 

Therefore, the proposed change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

No new or different accidents result from 

utilizing the proposed change. The changes 

do not involve a physical alteration of the 

plant (i.e., no new or different type of 

equipment will be installed) or a change in 

the methods governing normal plant 

operation. In addition, the changes do not 

impose any new or different requirements. 

The changes do not alter assumptions made 

in the safety analysis. The proposed changes 

are consistent with the safety analysis 

assumptions and current plant operating 

practice. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

create the possibility of a new or different 

kind of accident from any accident 

previously evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve a 

significant reduction in the margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The design, operation, testing methods, 

and acceptance criteria for systems, 

structures, and components (SSCs), specified 

in applicable codes and standards (or 

alternatives approved for use by the NRC) 

will continue to be met as described in the 

plant licensing basis (including the final 

safety analysis report and bases to TS), since 

these are not affected by changes to the 

surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is 

no impact to safety analysis acceptance 

criteria as described in the plant licensing 

basis. To evaluate a change in the relocated 

surveillance frequency, [Licensee] will 

perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using 

the guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1 in accordance with the TS 

SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, methodology 

provides reasonable acceptance guidelines 

and methods for evaluating the risk increase 

of proposed changes to surveillance 

frequencies consistent with Regulatory Guide 

1.177. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do not 

involve a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

Based upon the reasoning presented 

above, licensee concludes that the 

requested change does not involve a 

significant hazards consideration as set 

forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), Issuance of 

Amendment. 

Proposed Safety Evaluation 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) Change TSTF–425; Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control 

1.0 Introduction 

By letter dated [ll, 20l], [Licensee] 

(the licensee) proposed changes to the 

technical specifications (TS) for [Plant 

Name]. The requested change is the 

adoption of NRC-approved TSTF–425, 

Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate Surveillance 

Frequencies to Licensee Control— 

RITSTF Initiative 5b’’ (Reference 1). 

When implemented, TSTF–425, 

Revision 3 (Rev. 3) relocates most 

periodic frequencies of technical 

specification (TS) surveillances to a 

licensee controlled program, the SFCP, 

and provides requirements for the new 

program in the administrative controls 

section of TS. All surveillance 

frequencies can be relocated except: 

• Frequencies that reference other 

approved programs for the specific 

interval (such as the Inservice Testing 

Program or the Primary Containment 

Leakage Rate Testing Program), 

• Frequencies that are purely eventdriven (e.g., ‘‘Each time the control rod 

is withdrawn to the ‘full out’ position’’). 

• Frequencies that are event-driven 

but have a time component for 

performing the surveillance on a onetime basis once the event occurs (e.g., 

‘‘within 24 hours after thermal power 

reaching ≥95% RTP’’). 

• Frequencies that are related to 

specific conditions (e.g., battery 

degradation, age and capacity) or 

conditions for the performance of a 

surveillance requirement (e.g., ‘‘drywell 

to suppression chamber differential 

pressure decrease’’). 

[The definition of ‘‘Staggered Test 

Basis’’ in TS Section 1.1, ‘‘Definitions,’’ 

is deleted. [Licensee] adopts TSTF–425, 

Rev. 3, and no longer uses this defined 

term in the technical specifications and 

proposes removing it from Section 1.1.] 

A new Administrative Controls Program 

is added to TS section 5 as 

[Specification 5.5.15 (NUREG–1433 and 

-1434) or Specification 5.5.18 (NUREG– 

1430, 1431, and 1432)]. The new 

program is called the SFCP and 

describes the requirements for the 

program to control changes to the 

relocated surveillance frequencies. The 

TS Bases for each affected surveillance 

are revised to state that the frequency is 

set in accordance with the Surveillance 

Frequency Control Program. [Various 

editorial changes have been made to the 

Bases to facilitate the addition of the 

Bases changes.] Some surveillance Bases 

do not contain a discussion of the 

frequency. In these cases, Bases 

describing the current frequency were 

added to maintain consistency with the 

Bases for similar surveillances. These 

instances are noted in the markup along 

with the source of the text. The 

proposed licensee changes to the 

administrative controls of TS to 

incorporate the SFCP include a specific 

reference to NEI 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, 

Risk-Informed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies,’’ Revision 1 

(Rev. 1) (Reference 2) as the basis for 

making any changes to the surveillance 

frequencies once they are relocated out 

of TS. 

In a letter dated September 19, 2007, 

the NRC staff approved Nuclear Energy 

Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) 04– 

10, Rev. 1, ‘‘Risk-Informed Technical 

Specification initiative 5B, RiskInformed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. 072570267), as 

acceptable for referencing in licensing 

actions to the extent specified and 

under the limitations delineated in NEI 

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04–10, Rev. 1, and the final acceptance 

SE providing the basis for NRC 

acceptance of NEI 04–10, Rev 1. 

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

In the ‘‘Final Policy Statement: 

Technical Specifications for Nuclear 

Power Plants’’ published in the Federal 

Register (FR) (58 FR 39132, 7/22/93) the 

NRC addressed the use of Probabilistic 

Safety Analysis (PSA, currently referred 

to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis or PRA) 

in STS. In this 1993 FR publication, the 

NRC states, in part: 

‘‘The Commission believes that it would be 

inappropriate at this time to allow 

requirements which meet one or more of the 

first three criteria [of 10 CFR 50.36] to be 

deleted from technical specifications based 

solely on PSA (Criterion 4). However, if the 

results of PSA indicate that technical 

specifications can be relaxed or removed, a 

deterministic review will be performed.’’ 

‘‘The Commission Policy in this regard is 

consistent with its Policy Statement on 

‘Safety Goals for the operation of Nuclear 

Power Plants,’ 51 FR 30028, published on 

August 21, 1986. The Policy Statement on 

Safety Goals states in part, probabilistic 

results should also be reasonably balanced 

and supported through use of deterministic 

arguments. In this way, judgments can be 

made about the degree of confidence to be 

given these [probabilistic] estimates and 

assumptions. This is a key part of the process 

for determining the degree of regulatory 

conservatism that may be warranted for 

particular decisions. This ‘defense-in-depth’ 

approach is expected to continue to ensure 

the protection of public health and safety.’’ 

‘‘The Commission will continue to use 

PSA, consistent with its policy on Safety 

Goals, as a tool in evaluating specific lineitem improvements to Technical 

Specifications, new requirements, and 

industry proposals for risk-based Technical 

Specification changes.’’ 

Approximately two years later the 

NRC provided additional detail 

concerning the use of PRA in the ‘‘Final 

Policy Statement: Use of Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment in Nuclear Regulatory 

Activities’’ published in the Federal 

Register (60 FR 42622, August 16, 1995) 

the NRC addressed the use of 

Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In this 

FR publication, the NRC states, in part: 

‘‘The Commission believes that an overall 

policy on the use of PRA methods in nuclear 

regulatory activities should be established so 

that the many potential applications of PRA 

can be implemented in a consistent and 

predictable manner that would promote 

regulatory stability and efficiency. In 

addition, the Commission believes that the 

use of PRA technology in NRC regulatory 

activities should be increased to the extent 

supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA 

methods and data and in a manner that 

complements the NRC’s deterministic 

approach.’’ 

‘‘PRA addresses a broad spectrum of 

initiating events by assessing the event 

frequency. Mitigating system reliability is 

then assessed, including the potential for 

multiple and common-cause failures. The 

treatment, therefore, goes beyond the single 

failure requirements in the deterministic 

approach. The probabilistic approach to 

regulation is, therefore, considered an 

extension and enhancement of traditional 

regulation by considering risk in a more 

coherent and complete manner.’’ 

‘‘Therefore, the Commission believes that 

an overall policy on the use of PRA in 

nuclear regulatory activities should be 

established so that the many potential 

applications of PRA can be implemented in 

a consistent and predictable manner that 

promotes regulatory stability and efficiency. 

This policy statement sets forth the 

Commission’s intention to encourage the use 

of PRA and to expand the scope of PRA 

applications in all nuclear regulatory matters 

to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art 

in terms of methods and data.’’ 

‘‘Therefore, the Commission adopts the 

following policy statement regarding the 

expanded NRC use of PRA: 

(1) The use of PRA technology should be 

increased in all regulatory matters to the 

extent supported by the state-of-the-art in 

PRA methods and data and in a manner that 

complements the NRC’s deterministic 

approach and supports the NRC’s traditional 

defense-in-depth philosophy. 

(2) PRA and associated analyses (e.g., 

sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and 

importance measures) should be used in 

regulatory matters, where practical within 

the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce 

unnecessary conservatism associated with 

current regulatory requirements, regulatory 

guides, license commitments, and staff 

practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be 

used to support the proposal for additional 

regulatory requirements in accordance with 

10 CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule). Appropriate 

procedures for including PRA in the process 

should be developed and followed. It is, of 

course, understood that the intent of this 

policy is that existing rules and regulations 

shall be complied with unless these rules and 

regulations are revised. 

(3) PRA evaluations in support of 

regulatory decisions should be as realistic as 

practicable and appropriate supporting data 

should be publicly available for review. 

(4) The Commission’s safety goals for 

nuclear power plants and subsidiary 

numerical objectives are to be used with 

appropriate consideration of uncertainties in 

making regulatory judgments on the need for 

proposing and backfitting new generic 

requirements on nuclear power plant 

licensees.’’ 

In 10 CFR 50.36, the NRC established 

its regulatory requirements related to 

the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.36, TS are required to include items 

in the following five specific categories 

related to station operation: (1) Safety 

limits, limiting safety system settings, 

and limiting control settings; (2) 

limiting conditions for operation; (3) 

surveillance requirements; (4) design 

features; and (5) administrative controls. 

As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), 

‘‘Surveillance requirements are 

requirements relating to test, calibration, 

or inspection to assure that the 

necessary quality of systems and 

components is maintained, that facility 

operation will be within safety limits, 

and that the limiting conditions for 

operation will be met.’’ These categories 

will remain in TS. The new TS SFCP 

provides the necessary administrative 

controls to require that surveillances 

relocated to the SFCP are conducted at 

a frequency to assure that the necessary 

quality of systems and components is 

maintained, that facility operation will 

be within safety limits, and that the 

limiting conditions for operation will be 

met. Changes to surveillance 

frequencies in the SFCP are made using 

the methodology contained in NEI 04– 

10, Rev. 1, including qualitative 

considerations, results of risk analyses, 

sensitivity studies and any bounding 

analyses, and recommended monitoring 

of SSCs, and required to be 

documented. Furthermore, changes to 

frequencies are subject to regulatory 

review and oversight of the SFCP 

implementation through the rigorous 

NRC review of safety related SSC 

performance provided by the reactor 

oversight program (ROP). 

[licensee] SFCP ensures that 

surveillance requirements specified in 

the TS are performed at intervals 

sufficient to assure the above regulatory 

requirements are met. Existing 

regulatory requirements, such as 10 CFR 

50.65, ‘‘Requirements for Monitoring the 

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ and 10 CFR 50 

Appendix B (corrective action program), 

require licensee monitoring of 

surveillance test failures and 

implementing corrective actions to 

address such failures. One of these 

actions may be to consider increasing 

the frequency at which a surveillance 

test is performed. In addition, the SFCP 

implementation guidance in NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1, requires monitoring of the 

performance of structures, systems, and 

components (SSCs) for which 

surveillance frequencies are decreased 

to assure reduced testing does not 

adversely impact the SSCs. 

This change is analogous with other 

NRC-approved TS changes in which the 

surveillance requirements are retained 

in technical specifications but the 

related surveillance frequencies are 

relocated to licensee-controlled 

documents, such as surveillances 

performed in accordance with the InService Testing Program and the 

Primary Containment Leakage Rate 

Testing Program. Thus, this proposed 

change complies with 10 CFR 

50.36(c)(3) by retaining the 

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requirements relating to test, calibration, 

or inspection to assure that the 

necessary quality of systems and 

components is maintained, that facility 

operation will be within safety limits, 

and that the limiting conditions for 

operation will be met and meets the first 

key safety principle articulated in 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.177 (Reference 

3) for plant-specific, risk-informed TS 

changes by complying with current 

regulations. 

Licensees are required by TS to 

perform surveillance test, calibration, or 

inspection on specific safety-related 

system equipment such as reactivity 

control, power distribution, electrical, 

instrumentation, and others to verify 

system operability. Surveillance 

frequencies, currently identified in TS, 

are based primarily upon deterministic 

methods such as engineering judgment, 

operating experience, and 

manufacturer’s recommendations. The 

licensee’s use of NRC-approved PRA 

methodologies identified in NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1, provides a way to establish riskinformed surveillance frequencies that 

complement the deterministic approach 

and support the NRC’s traditional 

defense-in-depth philosophy. 

These regulatory requirements, and 

the monitoring required by NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1, ensure that surveillance 

frequencies are sufficient to assure that 

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 are 

satisfied and that any performance 

deficiencies will be identified and 

appropriate corrective actions taken. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF–425, 

Rev. 3, provides for administrative 

relocation of applicable surveillance 

frequencies, and provides for the 

addition of the SFCP to the 

administrative controls of TS. TSTF– 

425, Rev. 3, also requires the application 

of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, for any changes to 

surveillance frequencies within the 

SFCP. The licensee’s application for the 

changes proposed in TSTF–425, Rev. 3, 

included documentation regarding the 

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 

technical adequacy consistent with the 

requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.200 

(RG–1.200) (Reference 4), ‘‘An 

Approach for Determining the Technical 

Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment Results for Risk-Informed 

Activities’’, Section 4.2. In accordance 

with NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, probabilistic 

risk assessment (PRA) methods are 

used, in combination with plant 

performance data and other 

considerations, to identify and justify 

modifications to the surveillance 

frequencies of equipment at nuclear 

power plants. This is in accordance 

with guidance provided in RG 1.174 

(Reference 5) and RG 1.177 in support 

of changes to surveillance test intervals. 

RG 1.177 identifies five key safety 

principles required for risk-informed 

changes to TS. Each of these principles 

is addressed by the industry 

methodology document, NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1. The second through the fifth 

principles, which relate to the technical 

aspects of the proposed change, are 

discussed below in Sections 3.1 through 

3.4. The first principle requires the 

proposed change to meet the current 

regulations. The staff finds that the 

change meets that requirement. 

3.1 The Proposed Change Is Consistent 

With the Defense-in-Depth Philosophy 

Consistency with the defense-indepth philosophy, the second key safety 

principle of RG 1.177, is maintained if: 

• A reasonable balance is preserved 

among prevention of core damage, 

prevention of containment failure, and 

consequence mitigation. 

• Over-reliance on programmatic 

activities to compensate for weaknesses 

in plant design is avoided. 

• System redundancy, independence, 

and diversity are preserved 

commensurate with the expected 

frequency, consequences of challenges 

to the system, and uncertainties (e.g., no 

risk outliers). Because the scope of the 

proposed methodology is limited to 

revision of surveillance frequencies, the 

redundancy, independence, and 

diversity of plant systems are not 

impacted. 

• Defenses against potential common 

cause failures are preserved, and the 

potential for the introduction of new 

common cause failure mechanisms is 

assessed. 

• Independence of barriers is not 

degraded. 

• Defenses against human errors are 

preserved. 

• The intent of the General Design 

Criteria in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 

is maintained. 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3, requires the 

application of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, for any 

changes to surveillance frequencies 

within the SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, 

uses both the core damage frequency 

(CDF) and the large early release 

frequency (LERF) metrics to evaluate the 

impact of proposed changes to 

surveillance frequencies. The guidance 

of RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 for changes 

to CDF and LERF is achieved by 

evaluation using a comprehensive risk 

analysis, which assesses the impact of 

proposed changes including 

contributions from human errors and 

common cause failures. Defense-indepth is also included in the 

methodology explicitly as a qualitative 

consideration outside of the risk 

analysis, as is the potential impact on 

detection of component degradation that 

could lead to increased likelihood of 

common cause failures. Both the 

quantitative risk analysis and the 

qualitative considerations assure a 

reasonable balance of defense-in-depth 

is maintained to ensure protection of 

public health and safety, satisfying the 

second key safety principle of RG 1.177. 

3.2 The Proposed Change Maintains 

Sufficient Safety Margins 

The engineering evaluation that will 

be conducted by the licensee under the 

Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program when Frequencies are revised 

will assess the impact of the proposed 

Frequency change with the principle 

that sufficient safety margins are 

maintained. The guidelines used for 

making that assessment will include 

ensuring the proposed Surveillance test 

frequency change is not in conflict with 

approved industry codes and standards 

or adversely affects any assumptions or 

inputs to the safety analysis, or, if such 

inputs are affected, justification is 

provided to ensure sufficient safety 

margin will continue to exist. 

The design, operation, testing 

methods, and acceptance criteria for 

SSCs, specified in applicable codes and 

standards (or alternatives approved for 

use by the NRC) will continue to be met 

as described in the plant licensing basis 

(including the [Updated] Final Safety 

Analysis Report and bases to TS), since 

these are not affected by changes to the 

surveillance frequencies. Similarly, 

there is no impact to safety analysis 

acceptance criteria as described in the 

plant licensing basis. 

Thus, safety margins are maintained 

by the proposed methodology, and the 

third key safety principle of RG 1.177 is 

satisfied. 

3.3 When Proposed Changes Result in 

an Increase in Core Damage Frequency 

or Risk, the Increases Should Be Small 

and Consistent With the Intent of the 

Commission’s Safety Goal Policy 

Statement 

RG 1.177 provides a framework for 

risk evaluation of proposed changes to 

surveillance frequencies, which requires 

identification of the risk contribution 

from impacted surveillances, 

determination of the risk impact from 

the change to the proposed surveillance 

frequency, and performance of 

sensitivity and uncertainty evaluations. 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3, requires application 

of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, satisfies the intent of RG 

1.177 requirements for evaluation of the 

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32004 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 

change in risk, and for assuring that 

such changes are small by providing the 

technical methodology to support risk 

informed technical specifications for 

control of surveillance frequencies. 

3.4.1 Quality of the PRA 

The quality of the [Licensee] PRA is 

compatible with the safety implications 

of the proposed TS change and the role 

the PRA plays in justifying the change. 

That is, the more the potential change 

in risk or the greater the uncertainty in 

that risk from the requested TS change, 

or both, the more rigor that must go into 

ensuring the quality of the PRA. 

[Licensee] used RG 1.200 to address 

the plant PRA technical adequacy. RG 

1.200 is NRC developed regulatory 

guidance, which addresses the use of 

the American Society of Mechanical 

Engineers (ASME) RA–Sb–2005, 

Addenda to ASME RA–S–2002 

Standard for Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 

Applications (Reference 6), NEI 00–02, 

PRA Peer Review Process guidelines 

(Reference 7) and NEI 05–04, Process for 

Performing Follow-On PRA Peer 

Reviews Using the ASME PRA Standard 

(Reference 8). The licensee has 

performed an assessment of the PRA 

models used to support the SFCP 

against the requirements of RG 1.200 to 

assure that the PRA models are capable 

of determining the change in risk due to 

changes to surveillance frequencies of 

SSCs, using plant specific data and 

models. Capability category II of ASME 

RA–Sb–2005 is applied as the standard, 

and any identified deficiencies to those 

requirements are assessed further in 

sensitivity studies to determine any 

impacts to proposed decreases to 

surveillance frequencies. This level of 

PRA quality, combined with the 

proposed sensitivity studies, is 

sufficient to support the evaluation of 

changes proposed to surveillance 

frequencies within the SFCP, and is 

consistent with regulatory position 2.3.1 

of RG 1.177. 

3.4.2 Scope of the PRA 

[Licensee] is required to evaluate each 

proposed change to a relocated 

surveillance frequency using the 

guidance contained in NEI 04–10, Rev. 

1, to determine its potential impact on 

risk, due to impacts from internal 

events, fires, seismic, other external 

events, and from shutdown conditions. 

Consideration is made of both CDF and 

LERF metrics. In cases where a PRA of 

sufficient scope or where quantitative 

risk models were unavailable, [Licensee] 

uses bounding analyses, or other 

conservative quantitative evaluations. A 

qualitative screening analysis may be 

used when the surveillance frequency 

impact on plant risk is shown to be 

negligible or zero. The licensee’s 

evaluation methodology is sufficient to 

ensure the scope of the risk contribution 

of each surveillance frequency change is 

properly identified for evaluation, and 

is consistent with regulatory position 

2.3.2 of RG 1.177. 

3.4.3 PRA Modeling 

The [Licensee] will determine 

whether the SSCs affected by a 

proposed change to a surveillance 

frequency are modeled in the PRA. 

Where the SSC is directly or implicitly 

modeled, a quantitative evaluation of 

the risk impact may be carried out. The 

methodology adjusts the failure 

probability of the impacted SSCs, 

including any impacted common cause 

failure modes, based on the proposed 

change to the surveillance frequency. 

Where the SSC is not modeled in the 

PRA, bounding analyses are performed 

to characterize the impact of the 

proposed change to surveillance 

frequency. Potential impacts on the risk 

analyses due to screening criteria and 

truncation levels are addressed by the 

requirements for PRA technical 

adequacy consistent with guidance 

contained in RG 1.200, and by 

sensitivity studies identified in NEI 04– 

10, Rev. 1. 

The licensee will perform quantitative 

evaluations of the impact of selected 

testing strategy (i.e., staggered testing or 

sequential testing) consistently with the 

guidance of NUREG/CR–6141 and 

NUREG/CR–5497, as discussed in NEI 

04–10 Rev. 1. 

Thus, through the application of NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, the [Licensee] PRA 

modeling is sufficient to ensure an 

acceptable evaluation of risk for the 

proposed changes in surveillance 

frequency, and is consistent with 

regulatory position 2.3.3 of RG 1.177. 

3.4.4 Assumptions for Time Related 

Failure Contributions 

The failure probabilities of SSCs 

modeled in the [licensee] PRA [include] 

a standby time-related contribution and 

a cyclic demand-related contribution. 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, criteria adjust the 

time-related failure contribution of SSCs 

affected by the proposed change to 

surveillance frequency. This is 

consistent with RG 1.177 Section 2.3.3 

which permits separation of the failure 

rate contributions into demand and 

standby for evaluation of surveillance 

requirements. If the available data do 

not support distinguishing between the 

time-related failures and demand 

failures, then the change to surveillance 

frequency is conservatively assumed to 

impact the total failure probability of 

the SSC, including both standby and 

demand contributions. The SSC failure 

rate (per unit time) is assumed to be 

unaffected by the change in test 

frequency, and will be confirmed by the 

required monitoring and feedback 

implemented after the change in 

surveillance frequency is implemented. 

The process requires consideration of 

qualitative sources of information with 

regards to potential impacts of test 

frequency on SSC performance, 

including industry and plant-specific 

operating experience, vendor 

recommendations, industry standards, 

and code-specified test intervals. Thus 

the process is not reliant upon risk 

analyses as the sole basis for the 

proposed changes. 

The potential beneficial risk impacts 

of reduced surveillance frequency, 

including reduced downtime, lesser 

potential for restoration errors, 

reduction of potential for test caused 

transients, and reduced test-caused wear 

of equipment, are identified 

qualitatively, but are conservatively not 

required to be quantitatively assessed. 

Thus, through the application of NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, [Licensee] has employed 

reasonable assumptions with regard to 

extensions of surveillance test intervals, 

and is consistent with regulatory 

position 2.3.4 of RG 1.177. 

3.4.5 Sensitivity and Uncertainty 

Analyses 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, requires sensitivity 

studies to assess the impact of 

uncertainties from key assumptions of 

the PRA, uncertainty in the failure 

probabilities of the affected SSCs, 

impact to the frequency of initiating 

events, and of any identified deviations 

from capability Category II of ASME 

PRA Standard (ASME RA–Sb–2005) 

(Reference 4). Where the sensitivity 

analyses identify a potential impact on 

the proposed change, revised 

surveillance frequencies are considered, 

along with any qualitative 

considerations that may bear on the 

results of such sensitivity studies. 

Required monitoring and feedback of 

SSC performance once the revised 

surveillance frequencies are 

implemented will also be performed. 

Thus, through the application of NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, [Licensee] has 

appropriately considered the possible 

impact of PRA model uncertainty and 

sensitivity to key assumptions and 

model limitations, consistently with 

regulatory position 2.3.5 of RG 1.177. 

3.4.6 Acceptance Guidelines 

[Licensee] will quantitatively evaluate 

the change in total risk (including 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 32005 

internal and external events 

contributions) in terms of core damage 

frequency (CDF) and large early release 

frequency (LERF) for both the 

individual risk impact of a proposed 

change in surveillance frequency and 

the cumulative impact from all 

individual changes to surveillance 

frequencies using the guidance 

contained in NRC approved NEI 04–10, 

Rev. 1 in accordance with the TS SFCP. 

Each individual change to surveillance 

frequency must show a risk impact 

below 1E–6 per year for change to CDF, 

and below 1E–7 per year for change to 

LERF. These are consistent with the 

limits of RG 1.174 for very small 

changes in risk. Where the RG 1.174 

limits are not met, the process either 

considers revised surveillance 

frequencies which are consistent with 

RG 1.174, or the process terminates 

without permitting the proposed 

changes. Where quantitative results are 

unavailable to permit comparison to 

acceptance guidelines, appropriate 

qualitative analyses are required to 

demonstrate that the associated risk 

impact of a proposed change to 

surveillance frequency is negligible or 

zero. Otherwise, bounding quantitative 

analyses are required which 

demonstrate the risk impact is at least 

one order of magnitude lower than the 

RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines for very 

small changes in risk. In addition to 

assessing each individual SSC 

surveillance frequency change, the 

cumulative impact of all changes must 

result in a risk impact below 1E–5 per 

year for change to CDF, and below 1E– 

6 per year for change to LERF, and the 

total CDF and total LERF must be 

reasonably shown to be less than 1E–4 

per year and 1E–5 per year, respectively. 

These are consistent with the limits of 

RG 1.174 for acceptable changes in risk, 

as referenced by RG 1.177 for changes 

to surveillance frequencies. The staff 

interprets this assessment of cumulative 

risk as a requirement to calculate the 

change in risk from a baseline model 

utilizing failure probabilities based on 

the surveillance frequencies prior to 

implementation of the SFCP, compared 

to a revised model with failure 

probabilities based on changed 

surveillance frequencies. The staff 

further notes that [Licensee] includes a 

provision to exclude the contribution to 

cumulative risk from individual changes 

to surveillance frequencies associated 

with small risk increases (less than 5E– 

8 CDF and 5E–9 LERF) once the 

baseline PRA models are updated to 

include the effects of the revised 

surveillance frequencies. 

The quantitative acceptance guidance 

of RG 1.174 is supplemented by 

qualitative information to evaluate the 

proposed changes to surveillance 

frequencies, including industry and 

plant-specific operating experience, 

vendor recommendations, industry 

standards, the results of sensitivity 

studies, and SSC performance data and 

test history. 

The final acceptability of the 

proposed change is based on all of these 

considerations and not solely on the 

PRA results compared to numerical 

acceptance guidelines. Post 

implementation performance 

monitoring and feedback are also 

required to assure continued reliability 

of the components. The licensee’s 

application of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, 

provides reasonable acceptance 

guidelines and methods for evaluating 

the risk increase of proposed changes to 

surveillance frequencies, consistent 

with Regulatory Position 2.4 of RG 

1.177. Therefore, the proposed 

[Licensee] methodology satisfies the 

fourth key safety principle of RG 1.177 

by assuring any increase in risk is small 

consistent with the intent of the 

Commission’s Safety Goal Policy 

Statement. 

3.4.7 The Impact of the Proposed 

Change Should Be Monitored Using 

Performance Measurement Strategies 

[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF–425, 

Rev. 3, requires application of NEI 04– 

10, Rev. 1, in the SFCP. NEI 04–10, Rev. 

1, requires performance monitoring of 

SSCs whose surveillance frequency has 

been revised as part of a feedback 

process to assure that the change in test 

frequency has not resulted in 

degradation of equipment performance 

and operational safety. The monitoring 

and feedback includes consideration of 

maintenance rule monitoring of 

equipment performance. In the event of 

degradation of SSC performance, the 

surveillance frequency will be 

reassessed in accordance with the 

methodology, in addition to any 

corrective actions which may apply as 

part of the maintenance rule 

requirements. The performance 

monitoring and feedback specified in 

NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, is sufficient to 

reasonably assure acceptable SSC 

performance and is consistent with 

regulatory position 3.2 of RG 1.177. 

Thus, the fifth key safety principle of 

RG 1.177 is satisfied. 

3.4.8 Addition of Surveillance 

Frequency Control Program to TS 

Section 5 

[Licensee] has included the SFCP and 

specific requirements into TS Section 

[5.5.15 or 5.5.18], administrative 

controls, as follows: 

This program provides controls for 

surveillance frequencies. The program 

ensures that surveillance requirements 

specified in the technical specifications 

are performed at intervals (frequencies) 

sufficient to assure that the associated 

limiting conditions for operation are 

met. 

a. The Surveillance Frequency 

Control Program contains a list of 

frequencies of those surveillance 

requirements for which the frequency is 

controlled by the program. 

b. Changes to the frequencies listed in 

the Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program shall be made in accordance 

with NEI 04–10, ‘‘Risk-Informed Method 

for Control of Surveillance 

Frequencies,’’ Revision 1. 

c. The provisions of surveillance 

requirements 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 are 

applicable to the frequencies established 

in the Surveillance Frequency Control 

Program. 

Summary and Conclusions 

The staff has reviewed the [Licensee] 

proposed relocation of some 

surveillance frequencies to a licensee 

controlled document, and controlling 

changes to surveillance frequencies in 

accordance with a new program, the 

SFCP, identified in the administrative 

controls of TS. The SFCP and TS 

Section [5.5.15, 5.5.18] references NEI 

04–10, Rev. 1, which provides a riskinformed methodology using plantspecific risk insights and performance 

data to revise surveillance frequencies 

within the SFCP. This methodology 

supports relocating surveillance 

frequencies from TS to a licenseecontrolled document, provided those 

frequencies are changed in accordance 

with NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, which is 

specified in the administrative controls 

of the TS. 

The proposed [Licensee] adoption of 

TSTF–425, Rev. 3, and risk-informed 

methodology of NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, as 

referenced in the administrative 

controls of TS, satisfies the key 

principles of risk-informed decision 

making applied to changes to TS as 

delineated in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174, in 

that: 

• The proposed change meets current 

regulations; 

• The proposed change is consistent 

with defense-in-depth philosophy; 

• The proposed change maintains 

sufficient safety margins; 

• Increases in risk resulting from the 

proposed change are small and 

consistent with the Commission’s Safety 

Goal Policy Statement; and 

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32006 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 127 / Monday, July 6, 2009 / Notices 

• The impact of the proposed change 

is monitored with performance 

measurement strategies. 

10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states ‘‘Technical 

specifications will include items in the 

following categories: Surveillance 

Requirements. Surveillance 

Requirements are requirements relating 

to test, calibration, or inspection to 

assure that the necessary quality of 

systems and components is maintained, 

that facility operation will be within 

safety limits, and that the limiting 

conditions for operation will be met.’’ 

The NRC staff finds that with the 

proposed relocation of surveillance 

frequencies to an owner-controlled 

document and administratively 

controlled in accordance with the TS 

SFCP, [Licensee] continues to meet the 

regulatory requirement of 10 CFR 50.36, 

and specifically, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), 

surveillance requirements. 

The NRC has concluded, on the basis 

of the considerations discussed above, 

that (1) there is reasonable assurance 

that the health and safety of the public 

will not be endangered by operation in 

the proposed manner, (2) such activities 

will be conducted in compliance with 

the NRC’s regulations, and (3) the 

issuance of the amendments will not be 

inimical to the common defense and 

security or to the health and safety of 

the public. 

4.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the NRC’s 

regulations, the [ ] State official was 

notified of the proposed issuance of the 

amendment. The State official had [(1) 

no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the staff]. 

5.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendment[s] change[s] a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or 

surveillance requirements. The NRC 

staff has determined that the 

amendment involves no significant 

increase in the amounts, and no 

significant change in the types, of any 

effluents that may be released offsite, 

and that there is no significant increase 

in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

NRC has previously issued a proposed 

finding that the amendment involves no 

significant hazards consideration and 

there has been no public comment on 

such finding published [DATE] ([ ] FR 

[ ]). Accordingly, the amendment meets 

the eligibility criteria for categorical 

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) 

and c(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 

no environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendment. 

6.0 References 

1. TSTF–425, Revision 3, ‘‘Relocate 

Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee 

Control—RITSTF Initiative 5b,’’ March 

18, 2009 (ADAMS Accession Number: 

ML090850642). 

2. NEI 04–10, Revision 1, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Technical Specifications Initiative 5B, 

Risk-Informed Method for Control of 

Surveillance Frequencies,’’ April 2007 

(ADAMS Accession Number: 

ML071360456). 

3. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ‘‘An Approach for 

Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,’’ 

August 1998 (ADAMS Accession 

Number: ML003740176). 

4. Regulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 1 ‘‘An 

Approach for Determining the Technical 

Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment Results for Risk-Informed 

Activities,’’ Revision 1, January 2007 

(ADAMS Accession Number: 

ML070240001). 

5. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ‘‘An Approach for 

Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 

Risk-Informed Decisions on PlantSpecific Changes to the Licensing Basis,’’ 

NRC, August 1998 (ADAMS Accession 

Number: ML003740133). 

6. ASME PRA Standard ASME RA–Sb–2005, 

Addenda to ASME RA–S–2002, 

‘‘Standard for Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 

Application.’’ 

7. NEI 00–02, Rev. 1 ‘‘Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment (PRA) Peer Review Process 

Guidance, Rev. 1, May 2006 (ADAMS 

Accession Number: ML061510621). 

8. NEI 05–04, ‘‘Process for Performing 

Follow-On PRA Peer Reviews Using the 

ASME PRA Standard’’, Rev. 0, August 

2006. 

[FR Doc. E9–15780 Filed 7–2–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 

Dealer Floor Plan Pilot Initiative 

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business 

Administration (SBA). 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: SBA is introducing a guaranty 

loan pilot initiative to make available 

7(a) loan guaranties for lines of credit 

that provide floor plan financing to 

support that sector of the Nation’s retail 

community that traditionally requires 

floor plan financing in order to acquire 

titleable inventory. SBA is creating this 

pilot initiative to help address the 

significant decline in the number of 

lenders that have provided the majority 

of this type of financing in recent years. 

In the automobile industry, this often 

included affiliates of the manufacturers 

themselves. Under the Dealer Floor Plan 

Pilot Initiative, which will be available 

through September 30, 2010, SBA will 

guarantee up to 75 percent of a floor 

plan line of credit between $500,000 

and $2,000,000 to eligible dealers of 

titleable assets, including but not 

limited to automobiles, motorcycles, 

boats (including boat trailers), 

recreational vehicles and manufactured 

housing (mobile homes). 

DATES: Effective Date: The Dealer Floor 

Plan Pilot Initiative will be effective on 

July 1, 2009, and will remain in effect 

through September 30, 2010. SBA will 

begin accepting applications on July 1, 

2009 and begin reviewing and 

approving applications the week of July 

6, 2009. 

Comment Date: Comments must be 

received on or before August 5, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by SBA docket number SBA– 

2009–0009 by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Mail: Dealer Floor Plan Pilot 

Initiative Comments—Office of 

Financial Assistance, U.S. Small 

Business Administration, 409 Third 

Street, SW., Suite 8300, Washington, DC 

20416. 

• Hand Delivery/Courier: Grady 

Hedgespeth, Director, Office of 

Financial Assistance, U.S. Small 

Business Administration, 409 Third 

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20416. 

SBA will post all comments on 

http://www.regulations.gov. If you wish 

to submit confidential business 

information (CBI) as defined in the User 

Notice at http://www.regulations.gov, 

please submit the information to Grady 

Hedgespeth, Director, Office of 

Financial Assistance, U.S. Small 

Business Administration, 409 Third 

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20416, or 

send an e-mail to 

dealerfloorplancomments@sba.gov. 

Highlight the information that you 

consider to be CBI and explain why you 

believe SBA should hold this 

information as confidential. SBA will 

review the information and make the 

final determination whether it will 

publish the information. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sloan Coleman, Office of Financial 

Assistance, U.S. Small Business 

Administration, 409 Third Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20416; (202) 205–7737; 

w.coleman@sba.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

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