J-A19001-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ANTHONY SANDS, 

 Appellant No. 633 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 20, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004798-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 27, 2015 

 Appellant, Anthony Sands, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 6 

to 23 months’ incarceration, imposed after he was convicted of fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a), recklessly 

endangering another person (REAP), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, hindering 

apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5105, and obstructing administration of law, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 5101. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight 

of the evidence to sustain his convictions. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial, 

as follows: 

On December 25, 2012, Officer Lance Hoyson of the City 

of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police was dispatched to a residence 

located at 611 Mellon Street in the Highland Park section of the 

City of Pittsburgh to investigate the whereabouts of Bennie 

Wilson, the defendant's brother. Bennie Wilson was the subject 

of various arrest warrants and police officers received 
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information that Bennie Wilson was inside that residence. Officer 

Hoyson proceeded to the residence to conduct surveillance. 

While he was watching the residence, Officer Hoyson observed a 

dark-colored, late model sedan drive from the driveway adjacent 

to the residence. This vehicle began to circle the area and Officer 

Hoyson testified that the driver of the vehicle was showing some 

interest in Officer Hoyson's vehicle. Officer Hoyson was 

concerned that the driver of the vehicle may have identified him 

as a police officer or that the driver was acting as a lookout for 

Bennie Wilson. Officer Hoyson moved his vehicle down the street 

while still maintaining a clear view of 611 Mellon Street. The 

dark-colored sedan continued to circle the area. While at his new 

vantage point, Officer Hoyson observed Bennie Wilson run from 

the front porch of 611 Mellon Street and enter the passenger 

side of the dark-colored sedan. Officer Hoyson had known 

Bennie Wilson from prior encounters. 

Officer Hoyson radioed Officer Aaron Spangler, who was in 

a different surveillance position near the residence, to advise of 

his observations. Officer Spangler radioed back that he saw the 

vehicle and Officer Spangler began pursuit. Officer Spangler 

followed the vehicle and maintained radio communication with 

Officer Hoyson. 

Officer Spangler testified that he was part of the 

surveillance team conducting surveillance at 611 Mellon Street. 

While Officer Hoyson was located near the residence, Officer 

Spangler located himself on East Liberty Boulevard right before 

the intersection with Mellon Street. He heard Officer Hoyson's 

radio call about Bennie Wilson entering the dark-colored sedan. 

The dark-colored sedan proceeded toward Officer Spangler's 

direction and Officer Spangler began pursuit in his unit. He 

activated the emergency lights and siren. The dark-colored 

sedan stopped and Officer Spangler exited his police vehicle and 

approached the driver's side of the dark-colored sedan. Other 

police units responded to the scene. Officer Kevin Swimkowsky 

arrived on scene and approached the passenger side of the 

vehicle. 

As he approached the driver's side window, Officer 

Spangler observed Bennie Wilson sitting in the passenger seat. 

Officer Spangler ordered the driver to shut the vehicle off. The 

driver was sitting back with his hands still on the wheel. The 

driver did not comply with Officer Spangler's commands to shut 

the vehicle off. Officer Spangler began shouting at the driver. At 
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this point, Officer Spangler could not see Bennie Wilson's hands 

and the driver persisted in his refusal to shut the vehicle off. 

Officer Spangler then drew his service firearm. The driver looked 

at Officer Spangler and quickly accelerated the vehicle. The 

vehicle headed directly toward a police patrol wagon that had 

been parked to the right front side of the dark-colored sedan in 

an effort to block it in. Officer Steven Schueler was standing 

outside the patrol wagon. As the dark-colored sedan approached 

him, Officer Schueler fired his service firearm toward the driver's 

side windshield of the dark-colored sedan. The dark-colored 

sedan made slight contact with the patrol wagon. The darkcolored sedan then sped off. At trial, Officer Spangler identified 

[Appellant] as the driver of the dark-colored sedan. 

After the dark-colored sedan sped off, Officer Spangler and 

other officers began pursuit. Officer Spangler reached speeds 

between 50-60 miles per hour during the chase. The posted 

speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The police officers eventually 

lost pursuit and the defendant's vehicle avoided capture that 

evening. 

Officer Spangler was shown a photo array the day after the 

incident to help him identify the driver of the dark-colored 

sedan. Upon viewing the array, Officer Spangler pointed to a 

person in the array that [was not Appellant].[1] Officer Spangler 

credibly explained that the person in the array looked similar to 

the driver of the dark-colored sedan but he testified that he [was 

not] 100[ percent] certain. He was shown another photo array 

on January 23, 2013 and he positively identified [Appellant] as 

the driver when shown that photo array. He also identified 

[Appellant] as the driver during the trial. 

Neither [Appellant] nor Bennie Wilson were apprehended 

on the night of the incident. However, the vehicle was recovered 

that night. Trial evidence established that there were bloodstains 

on the emergency brake in the center console area of 

[Appellant’s] vehicle. There was blood on the passenger door, 

the passenger seat and the passenger door threshold. DNA 

evidence confirmed that the blood on the passenger's seat and 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Commonwealth noted in closing argument that Appellant’s photograph 

was not included in the array shown to Officer Spangler the day after the 

incident. N.T. Trial, 12/2/13, at 98. 
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inside door handle matched the DNA sample extracted from 

[Appellant’s] blood. DNA testing indicated that [Appellant] could 

not be excluded as a contributor of the DNA found on the inside 

door handle from the driver's side door, on the steering wheel 

and on the gear shift of the vehicle. Fingerprint evidence 

determined that Bennie Wilson's fingerprints were located on the 

driver's side door of the vehicle. Trial evidence also established 

that Bennie Wilson did not have any injuries consistent with a 

gunshot wound. 

[Appellant] was arrested on January 17, 2013 on charges 

unrelated to this case. [Appellant] had, though, been developed 

as a potential suspect in this case. While [Appellant] was being 

transported to the Allegheny County Jail after his arrest, police 

officers noticed that he had an injury to his right hand which was 

wrapped in a bandage. [Appellant] would not disclose the nature 

of his injury to the police officers. After consulting with the 

officers involved in the January 17th arrest, the officers involved 

in this case arrested [Appellant] for his actions in this case. 

[Appellant] also testified in this case. [Appellant] said that 

he was sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle and that his 

brother, Bennie Wilson, was the driver. [Appellant] said that 

after the police stopped the vehicle, his brother, Bennie Wilson, 

pulled off, attempting to elude the police. [Appellant] testified 

that the police fired two shots into the vehicle, one of which hit 

his right hand. [Appellant] also testified that sometime after he 

and his brother got away from the police, he was interviewed by 

police officers. [Appellant] admitted that during that interview, 

he told the police officers that the injury to his hand was an old 

injury. [Appellant] testified that the reason he told the police 

that the injury to his hand was an old injury was that he was 

"scared for [his] life" of the interviewing police officers, even 

though they had not threatened him in any way because 

"[e]very police officer is the same to [him]." 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/24/14, at 2-6. 

 Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the abovestated offenses. It acquitted him of a charge of aggravated assault. On 

February 20, 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to 6 to 23 months’ 

incarceration for the conviction of fleeing or attempting to allude a police 
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officer. The court did not impose any further penalty for Appellant’s 

remaining offenses. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which 

was denied on March 20, 2014. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, as 

well as a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal. Herein, Appellant presents three questions for our review: 

1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellant] fled or attempted to elude officers, and 

recklessly endangered another person, by his actions while 

driving a vehicle? 

2. Was the evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellant] obstructed the administration of law by 

thwarting attempts to serve warrants upon his brother? 

3. Were the verdicts of guilty so contrary to the weight of the 

evidence as to shock the conscience and require a new trial? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

 Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions of REAP and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. 

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moreno, supra at 136. 

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Here, Appellant attacks both of these convictions by arguing that the 

evidence failed to prove “that he was the person driving the vehicle on the 
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evening of December 25, 2012, that sped away from a roadside stop and 

nearly hit an officer, causing the officer to shoot twice at the car.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 15. Initially, two of Appellant’s arguments in support of 

this issue do not qualify as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; 

instead, they properly are considered as weight-of-the-evidence claims. 

Specifically, Appellant maintains that the testimony of “the nine law 

enforcement officers” who took the stand at trial was so contradictory that it 

could not support the trial court’s conclusion that he was the driver of the 

vehicle. Appellant also attacks the reliability of certain of those officers’ outof-court, and in-court, identifications of him as the person driving the vehicle 

on December 25, 2012. This Court has found that each of these types of 

claims go to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713-714 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A 

sufficiency of the evidence review ... does not include an assessment of the 

credibility of the testimony offered by the Commonwealth. Such a claim is 

more properly characterized as a weight of the evidence challenge.”) 

(citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 557-558 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (assessing an argument that a witness’ identification of the 

defendant “was tainted and unreliable” as a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence). Accordingly, we will not address these two arguments in 

reviewing Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

 Appellant also argues, however, that “[t]here are ... issues surrounding 

the sufficiency of the physical evidence[]” presented by the Commonwealth. 
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He essentially maintains that the DNA, blood, and fingerprint evidence 

discovered in the car did not necessarily prove he was the driver of the 

vehicle. Appellant intertwines this argument with his claim that the officers’ 

testimony was not credible. See Appellant’s Brief at 25-26 (“Taken together 

with the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the identification testimony 

in this matter, the DNA/blood evidence and fingerprint evidence combine to 

establish that the evidence [was] insufficient to support the verdicts of guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Standing alone, Appellant’s assertion that 

the physical evidence did not prove his guilt is unconvincing. We reiterate 

the well-established principle that the Commonwealth’s evidence “may be 

entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Koch, 39 A.3d at 1001 (emphasis added) (citing 

Moreno, 14 A.3d at 136); see also Commonwealth v. Haight, 50 A.3d 

137, 140 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence.”). Thus, even if Appellant is correct that 

the physical evidence did not demonstrate his guilt, that fact alone would 

not render the totality of the evidence insufficient to support his convictions. 

We also point out that the trial court did not rely on the physical 

evidence to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was the 

driver of the vehicle. Instead, the court cited the following evidence to 

support that determination: 
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 Officer Spangler specifically identified [Appellant] as the 

driver of the vehicle during the incident in question. Officer 

Spangler testified that he was able to observe [Appellant] during 

the incident that he subsequently selected [Appellant] from a 

photo array. This Court found the testimony of Officer Spangler 

to be credible. He had an opportunity to observe [Appellant] 

during the incident, albeit for a short period of time. His 

observations came from a vantage point that was only feet away 

from [Appellant] while he was standing near the driver’s side 

window of the vehicle. During the initial photo array, which did 

not include [Appellant’s picture], Officer Spangler was not 

certain of the identity of the driver. After reviewing a second 

photo array that included [Appellant’s picture], Officer Spangler 

positively identified [Appellant]. Moreover, the evidence was 

clear that Officer Schueler fired shots through the windshield 

toward the driver’s side of the vehicle. [Appellant] admitted he 

was shot during the incident. Numerous police officers testified 

that Bennie Wilson was in the passenger seat during the incident 

and trial evidence established that Bennie Wilson did not suffer 

any gunshot wounds during the incident. This Court believes the 

evidence was more than sufficient to establish that [Appellant] 

was the driver of the vehicle. 

TCO at 7-8. We agree with the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

convictions of REAP and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer is 

meritless. 

 In Appellant’s next issue, he avers that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction of obstructing administration of law, defined in 18 

Pa.C.S. § 5101, as follows: 

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of 

law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical 

interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other 

unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by 

a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure 

to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other 
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means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative 

interference with governmental functions. 

 Appellant argues that to prove the offense of obstructing the 

administration of law, the Commonwealth had to demonstrate that he 

“knowingly interfere[d] or obstruct[ed] the officers from carrying out their 

purpose.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. He maintains (without citation to any 

legal authority) that to meet this burden, the Commonwealth was required 

to demonstrate that Appellant knew the officers were attempting to execute 

arrest warrants for Wilson on December 25, 2012. Appellant avers that the 

Commonwealth did not proffer any evidence to prove this fact. 

 In response, the Commonwealth provides a detailed summary of the 

circumstantial evidence which proved that Appellant knew Wilson was 

wanted by police, and that Appellant intentionally, and physically, interfered 

with Wilson’s apprehension: 

 As set forth in detail in the previous argument, the 

evidence sufficiently established that [A]ppellant, Wilson’s 

brother, was the driver of the suspect vehicle, a black Mazda 

sedan with out-of-state plates. The Commonwealth submits the 

above evidence would allow a fact finder to reasonably infer that 

[A]ppellant knew police were looking for his brother. When 

[A]ppellant, as the driver of the suspect vehicle, pulled out of 

the driveway beside 611 Mellon it is reasonable to conclude that 

he saw Officer Hoyson’s vehicle. At the time, there was still 

daylight and [A]ppellant drove directly toward the marked patrol 

car which was parked only a half block from the residence. 

Within a short period, [A]ppellant drove past the patrol car two 

more times before the officer moved to a different, but nearby, 

location. Plainly, [A]ppellant did not believe police were looking 

for him since the patrol car made no move to follow him when he 

originally left, and he elected to continue to pass Officer 

Hoyson’s vehicle instead of simply leaving the area. 
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 Further support for a finding that [A]ppellant knew Wilson 

was wanted by police is the fact that upon his final return to 

Mellon Street, after the officer had moved his car to the second 

position, [Appellant] briefly stopped in front of 611 where Wilson 

ran across the porch and jumped into the waiting vehicle which 

immediately drove off. Such evidence allows for the logical 

inference that while circling, [A]ppellant contacted his brother 

and alerted Wilson to the officer’s presence and made an 

arrangement to pick him up in order to get him out of the area. 

Soon thereafter, however, Officer Spangler attempted to 

initiate a traffic stop of the suspect vehicle by activating his 

lights and sirens and pulling directly behind [A]ppellant, who was 

planning to make a left turn. At the time, a vehicle unrelated to 

the case was in front of [A]ppellant. As he approached the 

driver’s side, Officer Spangler both recognized Wilson as the 

passenger and noticed that the vehicle had not been placed in 

park which caused him to begin shouting at the driver to turn off 

the car and remove the keys. Rather than comply with the 

officer’s orders, [A]ppellant looked at the officer, revved the 

engine and accelerated in the direction of another officer, 

causing [that officer] to fire at the vehicle. Although [A]ppellant 

was shot in the hand, he still managed to flee from the scene 

and avoid capture by engaging in a high-speed chase. The 

Commonwealth submits that if [A]ppellant had no knowledge 

that his brother was wanted by police, there would have been no 

reason for him to ignore Officer Spangler’s orders, drive toward 

another officer and flee from the attempted stop. 

Most of [A]ppellant’s conduct, as described above, likewise 

demonstrated his intentional interference with the officers’ 

apprehension of his brother. Appellant provided Wilson with a 

means of leaving the residence, which [Appellant] knew to be 

under police surveillance. He also disobeyed one officer’s 

repeated orders to turn off the vehicle, instead electing to 

accelerate toward another officer to thwart any attempt to 

apprehend Wilson during the traffic stop. Even the fact that this 

officer was forced to fire his weapon at the vehicle, causing 

[A]ppellant to be shot in the hand, did not deter him from 

preventing his brother’s capture. Based on the foregoing, the 

evidence was sufficient to establish that [A]ppellant had 

obstructed the administration of law by physical interference. As 

a result, his conviction for a violation of [section] 5101 should be 

affirmed. 
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 26-28 (footnote and citation to record omitted). 

 We agree with the Commonwealth that, assessing the totality of the 

evidence presented at trial, in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, it was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that Appellant 

knew the officers were attempting to apprehend Wilson, and that Appellant 

intentionally and physically interfered with the officers’ efforts to do so. We 

conclude that this was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction 

of obstructing administration of law. 

 Lastly, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to support his 

convictions. 

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 

been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-1136 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Appellant presents a lengthy argument in support of his weight-of-the 

evidence claim; however, only two of his specific arguments were preserved 

in his Rule 1925(b) statement and addressed by the trial court in its opinion. 
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Accordingly, we will confine our review to those claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(ii) (“The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error 

that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all 

pertinent issues for the judge.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not 

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). 

 First, Appellant argues that Officer Spangler’s identification of 

Appellant as the driver was unreliable, as he identified another individual in 

the initial photo array. Appellant emphasizes that Officer Spangler’s initial 

identification “was made within a day of the events, without hesitation, [and 

was] based on the facial markings of the individual....” Appellant’s Brief at 

32. Appellant maintains that, consequently, that initial identification was 

“unquestionably more reliable than the subsequent identification of 

[Appellant], and [it] should have been the basis for the trial court to 

reasonably doubt the identification of [Appellant].” Id. 

 In rejecting this claim, the trial court reasoned that, 

the trial evidence does not indicate that Officer Spangler 

positively identified anyone as the driver during the original 

presentation of a photo array. Rather, as Officer Spangler 

testified, he wasn’t certain that anyone in the photo array was 

the driver when he viewed the first array. This Court believes 

that Officer Spangler’s in-court identification was credible and it 

was buttressed by the identification of [Appellant] during the 

presentation of the second photo array. 

TCO at 12. 
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 The trial court’s decision is supported by the record. During crossexamination of Officer Spangler at trial, he was shown a copy of the initial 

photo array and was asked if it was “fair to say that [he] identified the male, 

number seven, in that photo array, a gentleman named Melvin Washington?” 

N.T. Trial, 11/25-27/13, at 75. Officer Spangler replied, “No.” Id. at 76. 

The officer then explained, “My correct statement was this gentleman looks 

familiar, he has distinguishing face marks, but I can’t be 100 percent sure 

that I told Detectives Rush and Sattler that the face marks look similar to 

the person that I saw driving....” Id. Officer Spangler was later asked about 

the second photo array he was shown, which contained a picture of 

Appellant. Officer Spangler testified that “[a]s soon as they showed me this 

photo array, ... I pinpointed the face, the nose. He turned and looked right 

at me as I had him -- my weapon was already drawn. I had him in my 

sight.” Id. at 78. Officer Spangler also identified Appellant, in court, as the 

person he saw driving the vehicle. Id. at 68. 

 Based on this record, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s rejecting Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim regarding the 

reliability of Officer Spangler’s identification. The court heard testimony 

about Officer Spangler’s out-of-court identifications of Appellant, and 

observed the officer identify Appellant during the course of trial. The court 

was free to determine the credibility of those identifications, and it did not 

abuse its discretion in believing Officer Spangler’s two identifications naming 

Appellant as the driver. 
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 Next, Appellant attacks the weight of the evidence by arguing that the 

blood and DNA evidence placed him in the passenger seat of the vehicle. 

Appellant maintains that “[m]uch speculation on the record occurred as to 

how exactly blood got on the passenger seat and passenger door 

handle/armrest from [Appellant] if [Appellant] was, in actual fact, the 

driver.” Appellant’s Brief at 31. Appellant asserts that, amidst all of this 

speculation, “the trial court [did] not and cannot account for the blood spots 

on the threshold of the passenger side door.” Id. at 32. Appellant inquires, 

“How could [Appellant], if he was driving while shot in his right hand, and 

escaping a police chase at high speed, have bled onto an area that requires 

the passenger door to be open?” Id. Appellant goes on to claim that the 

trial court gave “no weight whatsoever” to the “uncontradicted expert 

opinion [of Detective Adams] that the fingerprints of Benny Wilson found on 

the outside of the driver’s door were consistent with someone sitting in the 

driver’s seat and reaching over the door frame and holding the door.” Id. at 

32. 

 In rejecting this argument, the trial court stated: 

While there was evidence presented at trial that [Appellant’s] 

blood and DNA were found in the passenger compartment of the 

vehicle, [Appellant] was also not excluded as a contributor to 

DNA found on the driver’s side door handle, the steering wheel 

and the gear shift. Officer Schueler testified that he fired his 

weapon toward the driver’s side area. [Appellant] himself 

admitted he had been shot. The trial evidence in this case 

supported the verdict. 

TCO at 12-13. 
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Again, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence argument. While some of the 

physical evidence indicated that Appellant was the driver of the vehicle, 

there were other aspects of that evidence which indicated he was the 

passenger. However, the court did not consider the physical evidence in a 

vacuum, but assessed it in conjunction with the officers’ testimony, which 

the court found to be credible. In light of the totality of all of the evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth, the trial court’s verdict does not shock 

one’s sense of justice, and the court did not palpably abuse its discretion in 

rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/27/2015