FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 JUNE 29, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-10080

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 02-00018-CR-CC-4-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus

JAVADO BARNER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________

(June 29, 2009)

Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, District Judge. *

KORMAN, District Judge:

The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern *

District of New York, sitting by designation. 
Javado Barner appeals from a judgment, entered upon a jury verdict,

convicting him of one count of possession of MDMA, commonly known as

ecstasy, with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The

ecstasy, which was the subject of the count of conviction, was obtained in one of a

series of home invasions in the Atlanta area that were committed by Barner and his

co-conspirators. While he did not personally participate in the home invasion

from which this ecstasy was stolen, he was provided with some of it for the

purpose of distribution. 

The basic facts underlying Barner’s conviction are fairly simple. 

Nevertheless, the case has had a long and complicated procedural history,

including his withdrawal of a plea of guilty to the fourth superseding indictment

and a successful appeal by the United States from an order of the district court

dismissing the fifth superseding indictment on the ground that “the facts of this

case warranted a presumption that [it] resulted from prosecutorial vindictiveness.” 

United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2006). We presume

familiarity with the factual and procedural history, and describe it below only to

the extent necessary to address the issues raised in this appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Barner challenges the district court’s admission of certain confessions and

2
statements, the denial of his motion to dismiss the fifth superseding indictment on

the ground it was motivated by actual vindictiveness, and the sufficiency of the

evidence. He also raises five separate claims of error relating to his sentence and

the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. While we affirm the judgment of

conviction, we remand the case for resentencing. 

A. The Pretrial Motions

Barner first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress certain confessions and admissions that he had made on December 19,

2001, December 31, 2001, and February 26, 2002. Although his brief on appeal

argues that the district court erred in admitting “four of Barner’s statements at

trial,” the brief does not identify or address the fourth statement that he claims was

erroneously admitted. We observe that Barner’s arguments in support of the

motion to suppress were addressed in the thorough and comprehensive report and

recommendation of the U.S. magistrate judge, which was filed after an evidentiary

hearing and which the district judge adopted. Because we agree that Barner’s

motion to suppress was properly denied, we address here only those arguments

that require some additional discussion.

The December 19, 2001 Statement 

On December 19, 2001, while incarcerated for an unrelated crime, Javado

3
Barner was visited at the Clayton County Jail by Craig Kailimai, of the Atlanta

Police Department, then assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms. 

During this interview Barner provided Kailimai with information about several

home invasions in the Atlanta area and about his own possession of ecstasy. 

While Barner denied personal involvement in any of the home invasions, he did

admit to having received ecstasy, taken from the home of Michael Ogburn by one

of the home invasion participants, which Barner intended to distribute. Although

Barner was given his Miranda warnings and signed an acknowledgment that he

understood his rights and that he was willing to waive them, he claims that he was

not fully advised of the nature of the crime about which he would be questioned. 

Specifically, he contends that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing

and voluntary because Kailimai failed to advise him that he was actually

conducting a drug investigation, rather than a home invasion investigation. This

argument is without merit.

The dichotomy between the home invasion investigation and the drug

investigation is artificial. In committing the home invasion robberies, Barner and

his co-conspirators targeted drug dealers. Indeed, the indictment alleged that

“[t]he conspiracy was to obtain . . . drugs, firearms, money and other valuables,

and to distribute the drugs and other valuables for profit.” More significantly, the

4
Supreme Court has “never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a

suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in

deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.

412, 422 (1986); see also Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987). 

Rather, he must simply be aware that he may remain silent and request a lawyer,

and that his statements may be used against him. Moran, 475 U.S. at 422-23. 

These rights were explained to Barner in the course of a tape-recorded interview.

Consequently, the December 19 statement was properly admitted. See Agee v.

White, 809 F.2d 1487, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1987). 

The December 31, 2001 Statement 

After the December 19, 2001 interview, Barner regularly called Kailimai to

provide further information and express his continued interest in cooperating. The

following testimony captures the flavor of what was essentially a dialogue that

continued after the December 19 interrogation:

Assistant U.S. Attorney: And did Mr. Barner continue to try to give you

information about Johnathan Dale and the other defendants in the case?

Kailimai: Yes, he had a willingness. He continued to want to give

information so much that he advised me that he would provide names or

possible—I think it was possible names and locations of other people that

the robbery crew had done home invasions on.

Q: And, so, after Mr. Barner made that offer to provide you with names and

5
locations, did you then go talk to him again at the Clayton County Jail on

December 31st of 2001?

A: Yes. I—during one of the conversations, when he said he could provide

that, I’d asked him to try and work on it and try to prepare something, and

then I would return. And, then, I did return on December 31st and obtain

that information.

Barner himself testified that the December 31 meeting with Kailimai took place in

the visitors’ booth, and that they “talked between the glass to each other, and the

first thing, like he said, he asked me did I have the list, and I think I pulled out the

list and gave him the names that were on the list.” The meeting was “real short.”

Barner alleges that his December 31, 2001 statement was taken improperly

without Miranda warnings and in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. Nevertheless, he does not support this claim with any legal argument or

citation of authority. We reject his Miranda claim, because Barner had earlier

been advised of his rights, and there was no need to do so at a subsequent

interview which he initiated. 

While “there is no requirement that an accused be continually reminded of

his rights once he has intelligently waived them,” Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d

118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975), a delay of twelve days between interrogation sessions

without repetition of the Miranda warnings would give us some pause. Indeed, in

Biddy v. Diamond, upon which the U.S. Attorney relies, the defendant was asked

6
whether she remembered the rights that had been administered twelve days earlier,

and she responded that she did. Id. Because of this acknowledgment, the Fifth

Circuit held that “a further delineation . . . of [the defendant’s] rights, which she

had stated that she understood from prior explanations, would have been

needlessly repetitious.” Id. 

Barner made no such acknowledgment. Nevertheless, other circumstances

obviated the need for the reiteration of the Miranda warnings. Of particular

significance is the fact that the December 31 interview was initiated by Barner,

and was conducted under circumstances that would not ordinarily require Miranda

warnings. Although Barner was in jail on another charge at the time, a form of

custody that would generally require the administration of the Miranda warnings,

Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968), “incarceration does not ipso facto

render an interrogation custodial,” Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.

1988). See also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990) (“[t]he bare fact of

custody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is

aware that he is speaking to an official.”). On the contrary, “in various settings,

the interrogation of jail and prison inmates has been held not to be subject to

Miranda.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 724 (3d ed. 2007).

One such setting is where an incarcerated defendant “initiated the police

7
inquiry,” the interview “arose out of [his] desire to speak with the police about the

[offense],” and the interview took place, not in a jail cell, but under circumstances

which suggested that the defendant was free to terminate the conversation. 

Leviston, 843 F.2d at 304. The reason for this exception derives from the purpose

of the Miranda warnings. As the Supreme Court has explained in an analogous

context, Miranda warnings are required because a “[c]ustodial arrest is said to

convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers’

will and to confess. It is unlikely that a probation interview [to which the

probationer was compelled to submit], arranged by appointment at a mutually

convenient time, would give rise to a similar impression.” Minnesota v. Murphy,

465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (internal citation omitted). 

While Barner was incarcerated and not on probation, he was not compelled

to submit to the meeting with Kailimai. Nor did the circumstances convey to

Barner the message that “he ha[d] no choice but to submit to the officers’ will and

confess.” Id. On the contrary, Barner initiated the interview because of his desire

to cooperate, the interview took place in the visitors’ room where he was separated

from Kailimai by a glass window, and the interview was brief. Indeed, the noncoercive atmosphere of the interview was captured by the following testimony of

Barner:

8
Q: Besides no Miranda, do you think there was anything coercive or 

involuntary about that meeting that you would like to add for the court?

A: No, it was real short. Like I say, I just gave him a list that he came and

asked for it and he went on, told me, if I’m not mistaken, told me keep in

contact, keep calling him.

In sum, as we have held in comparable circumstances, there was no need for

Kailimai to readminister Miranda warnings after he had previously done so on

December 19, 2001. See Huckelbury v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1544, 1545 (11th

Cir. 1986). 

Nor is there any merit to Barner’s Sixth Amendment claim. On this score,

we have little to add to the thoughtful discussion of this issue by the United States

magistrate judge, who rejected this argument on the ground that, because

“adversary judicial criminal proceedings” against Barner had not been commenced,

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. Kirby v. Illinois, 406

U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (“[t]he

Sixth Amendment right . . . is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all

future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced.”). 

The February 26, 2002 Statement

On February 26, 2002, after his attorney had entered into a proffer agreement

with the U.S. Attorney, Barner rode around the Atlanta area with federal agents to

9
point out several homes the robbery crew had invaded, including the home of

ecstasy dealer Michael Ogburn, from which the crew had taken the ecstasy given to

Barner to sell. Barner challenges the use of evidence obtained during this drivearound. Specifically, he argues that he had never been provided with a copy of the

proffer agreement and that his attorney was incompetent for having agreed to it. 

We need not reach this issue, because our review of the record persuades us

that Barner’s cooperation preceding the February 26 drive-around provided

compelling evidence of his guilt of possession of ecstasy with intent to

distribute—the count of conviction. Indeed, in the course of arguing that the

district judge erroneously denied him a three-point reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, Barner’s counsel relied on the fact that “Barner confessed on

December 19, 2001, while crying, to possessing MDMA—his crime of

conviction.” Barner also described the manner in which the MDMA, or ecstasy,

was obtained by his co-conspirators, the names of the individuals who stole it

during the course of a home invasion, and the neighborhood in which it occurred. 

Indeed, after the interview, Barner called Kailimai to express his desire to continue

to provide additional information concerning the home invasions. This

cooperation, as earlier noted, involved the preparation of a list of home invasions.

The only evidence obtained during the February 26 drive-around that related

10
to the crime of conviction was the precise address of the home invasion during

which the ecstasy that Barner was charged with possessing was stolen. This

information was helpful in enabling Kailimai to obtain a report that a burglary had

occurred “on that street and address, that the details or the items that were taken

from the burglary . . . with the exception, of course, [of] the mention of drugs . . .

almost specifically matched details that we had from what was taken during the

robberies.” While evidence identifying the specific addresses of the home

invasions may have been of particular significance to the overt acts alleged in

furtherance of the conspiracy charged in Count One of the fifth superseding

indictment, and the Hobbs Act counts to which they correspond, it was not of any

great consequence to the offense of conviction. Indeed, the only detail that Barner

appears to have provided with regard to what was taken in the Ogburn

robbery—the amount of ecstasy that was stolen—was not corroborated in the

police report that Kailimai obtained.

Moreover, aside from the confession, three of Barner’s accomplices, who

had pled guilty to charges contained in the fourth superseding indictment, testified

against Barner at trial. Under these circumstances, even if the evidence obtained

during the February 26 drive-around had been suppressed, the other evidence

against Barner was overwhelming. Nor was any evidence offered on the defense

11
case to controvert it. Indeed, referring to the defense summation, the Assistant U.S.

Attorney told the jury “there’s one thing [defense counsel] didn’t tell you. He

talked for 41 minutes and 25 seconds . . . He never said the Defendant didn’t do it.”

Thus, the admission of the drive-around evidence, even if erroneous, was plainly

harmless.

Nevertheless, Barner argues that, because the proffer agreement protected

him against “any new charges based upon . . . information” he provided during the

drive-around, Count Ten should have been dismissed prior to trial. This argument

fails for the same reason as Barner’s claim that the admission of statements that he

made during the February 26, 2002 drive-around required the reversal of the jury

verdict. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1988)

(harmless error rule embodied in Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) applicable to grand jury

proceedings). Indeed, prior to the holding in Bank of Nova Scotia we had held that,

even if a grand jury heard immunized testimony, an indictment would not be

dismissed if the use of the prohibited evidence was harmless. United States v.

Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.

Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1994). 

In sum, because of the compelling independent evidence before the grand

jury, Count Ten could not be said to have been based on the information obtained

12
from the drive-around. Nor is this conclusion undermined by the testimony of

Kailimai, upon which Barner relies, that “some of the information” obtained during

the February 26, 2002 meeting was used to bring “additional charges” in

“subsequent indictments” against Barner. These statements did not distinguish

between Count Ten—the count of conviction—and the Hobbs Act and 924(c)

charges that were added in the fifth superseding indictment and on which Barner

prevailed at trial. 

This conclusion also constitutes a sufficient answer to Barner’s argument

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. This argument is

predicated on the assumption that his confession and admissions should have been

suppressed. It fails, if only because the district court properly denied his motion to

suppress the December 19 and 31, 2001 confessions and admissions. Moreover,

Barner’s claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness is also without merit, if only because

he was acquitted of the counts added to the fifth superseding indictment, at which

his motion was directed. 

B. Sentencing Challenges

Our review of sentences after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),

consists of two elements. First, we consider challenges to the district court’s

calculation of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Second, we review the

13
sentence for reasonableness. See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1350, 1353

(11th Cir. 2006). “[A]s was the case before Booker, the district court must

calculate the Guidelines range accurately.” United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d

1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005). We review the district court’s interpretation of the

Sentencing Guidelines de novo and accept its factual findings unless clearly

erroneous. United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). An error

in the district court’s calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range warrants

vacating the sentence, unless the error is harmless. See United States v. Scott, 441

F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006). A Sentencing Guidelines miscalculation is

harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sentence without the

error. See id. 

The U.S. Attorney argues that we need not reach Barner’s challenge to the

manner in which the Sentencing Guidelines were applied here, because any error

was harmless. Specifically, he relies on the district court judge’s statement that

having weighed and considered the imposition of a sentence in this case

under both the [Sentencing Guidelines], as well as the factors outlined in 18

U.S.C. 3553, and the Court having concluded that a sentence under either

would be about the same, the Court has decided to impose a sentence of 87

months pursuant to the guidelines because the custody guideline range for

this case is fair and reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

surrounding the Defendant’s role in this conspiracy. 

Where a district judge clearly states that he would impose the same sentence,

14
even if he erred in calculating the guidelines, then any error in the calculation is

harmless. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). The

district judge here made no such statement. Instead, he indicated that the sentence

was “pursuant to the guidelines,” and the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 

This statement does not provide the basis for a holding of harmless error. 

Obviously, where the district judge chooses to sentence within the range

prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines, an error in their calculation cannot be

harmless. Moreover, even where he chooses to impose a sentence based on the

considerations prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, he must take into account the range

prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2006). 

Consequently, the Guidelines range must be calculated correctly in the first

instance. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Indeed,

“[a] misinterpretation of the Guidelines by a district court ‘effectively means that

[the district court] has not properly consulted the Guidelines.’” Crawford, 407

F.3d at 1179, quoting United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.

2005) (alterations in original). Because we cannot say that an error in the

application of the Sentencing Guidelines here would be harmless, we proceed to

address Barner’s challenges to his sentence in turn. 

15
The Withdrawal of the § 5K1.1 Motion

While four of Barner’s five arguments with regard to the sentence involve

objections to the manner in which the district judge calculated the guidelines, his

first objection does not directly do so. Instead, it goes to the issue of his

entitlement to a downward departure. Specifically, Barner argues that the Assistant

U.S. Attorney retaliated against him for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to a

jury trial by withdrawing the previously-filed § 5K1.1 downward departure motion. 

The record shows that, on July 12, 2002, Barner pled guilty to two counts of

the fourth superseding indictment—conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to

distribute, and possession of firearms in furtherance of that drug conspiracy. The

plea agreement contained the following provisions:

Based on the substantial assistance the defendant has provided in this case,

and pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Government

will file a motion at sentencing recommending that the Court depart

downward from the otherwise applicable offense level and will recommend

that the defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 144 months. 

* * *

The defendant agrees to continue to cooperate completely and truthfully with

the government including but not limited to providing testimony at trial. If

the defendant fails to cooperate truthfully and completely, or if the defendant

engages in additional criminal conduct or other conduct inconsistent with

cooperation, he will not be entitled to any consideration whatsoever pursuant

to this and the preceding paragraphs.

On December 4, 2002, Barner moved to withdraw his guilty plea, because of

16
the ineffective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, two days later, the Assistant

U.S. Attorney filed a § 5K1.1 downward departure motion based upon Barner’s

“substantial” assistance to the government during its investigation. On February

18, 2003, the district court permitted Barner to withdraw his guilty plea. A fifth

superseding indictment, containing the following charges, was then returned:

Count One, conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, drugs; Counts Two,

Four, Six, and Eight, attempt to affect interstate commerce by robbery; and Count

Ten, possession with intent to distribute ecstasy. Barner offered to plead guilty to

Count Ten, but the Assistant U.S. Attorney refused to dismiss the remaining

counts. 

Barner proceeded to trial. After the case-in-chief, the district court directed a

verdict of acquittal on Counts Two through Nine, permitting only Counts One and

Ten to be submitted to the jury. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on Count

One and guilty on Count Ten. On December 6, 2007, the Assistant U.S. Attorney

successfully moved to withdraw his previously-filed § 5K1.1 downward departure

motion.

It is well-established that, “[t]o punish a person because he has done what

the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). 

17
Thus, while the U.S. Attorney may refuse to file a § 5K1.1 motion for several

reasons and has considerable discretion to do so, United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d

825, 831 (11th Cir. 2000), “federal district courts have authority to review a

prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if

they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive,” Wade v. United

States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).

Where an offer of a § 5K1.1 motion is made “in the give-and-take of plea

bargaining, in which [the defendant] was free to accept or reject the prosecution’s

offer,” but the defendant does not substantially assist the prosecution and goes to

trial, “there [is] no . . . element of punishment or retaliation, and the government’s

later refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion [is] constitutionally permissible.” United

States v. Dorsey, 554 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted),

vacating United States v. Dorsey, 512 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). But we have not

yet had the opportunity to determine whether the subsequent withdrawal of a

previously-filed § 5K1.1 motion, as retaliation for a defendant having exercised

his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, is an “unconstitutional motive”

constituting a due process violation under Wade. Dorsey, 554 F.3d at 961. We

need not reach the issue here. 

Because the plea agreement obligated the Assistant U.S. Attorney to

18
recommend a sentence of 144 months pursuant to § 5K1.1, and because the district

judge imposed a sentence of only 87 months—a sentence at the bottom of the

Sentencing Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months—the withdrawal of the § 5K1.1

motion was arguably harmless. Indeed, after Booker, a judge basing a sentence

under the considerations outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 may take a defendant’s

substantial assistance into account even if a prosecutor withdraws (or does not file)

a § 5K1.1 motion. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33 (2d Cir. 2006).

Nevertheless, what concerns us more than the decision of the district judge to

permit the withdrawal of the § 5K1.1 motion is that the Assistant U.S. Attorney

may have misled the district judge as to the nature and extent of Barner’s

cooperation. Specifically, the following explanation was offered for withdrawing

the § 5K1.1 motion:

The Defendant did stop cooperating with the Government once he withdrew

his plea and once he denied his involvement in these armed robberies. The

Defendant was no longer cooperating . . . and once the Government started

talking to other cooperators and other coconspirators and determined that the

Defendant was in fact involved in the armed robberies when he was denying

that he was early on, the Defendant’s assistance to the Government really is

no longer viable. 

The district judge responded only that he “agree[d] with the position taken by the

Government,” and that, “in light of the fact that the Defendant did breach the . . .

plea agreement, the Court is going to resolve this issue in favor of the

19
Government.” The record, however, flatly contradicts the representations upon

which the district judge relied. 

First, as the U.S. Attorney observed in his motion for a downward departure,

which he filed on December 6, 2002 after Barner moved to withdraw his guilty

plea:

The defendant began to cooperate with the government prior to his arrest by

giving detailed information regarding the home invasions to agents of the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, (ATF). After his indictment, the

defendant continued to cooperate with the government.

The defendant was debriefed again by agents. More importantly, the

defendant took agents to several locations where home invasions previously

unknown to the agents had occurred. The defendant also gave specific

information to the agents which implicated several of his co-defendants. 

Even though the defendant did not testify in the grand jury, the information

he provided was relied on in obtaining an indictment against some of his codefendants. The defendant also discussed other crimes which had been

committed by his co-defendants.

The Government considers the defendant’s cooperation to be substantial.

Second, while Barner did initially deny his participation in the home

invasions, he admitted his involvement by March of 2002. The § 5K1.1 motion

was not filed until December 2002—nine months later—indicating that Barner’s

initial lack of candor did not undermine his “substantial” cooperation.

Moreover, notwithstanding the claim that Barner “stop[ped] cooperating

with the Government once he withdrew his [guilty] plea,” the motion to withdraw

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the § 5K1.1 application did not point to any assistance Barner refused to provide

after December 2002. Indeed, at oral argument on the instant appeal the Assistant

U.S. Attorney conceded that downward departure motions such as the one in this

case are not typically filed until cooperation is deemed complete. Significantly, the

Assistant U.S. Attorney, who filed the § 5K1.1 motion and who tried the case,

testified that “Mr. Barner’s cooperation had been completed by the time he pled

guilty,” and that she “filed a motion on Mr. Barner’s behalf because [she] thought

that his cooperation with regard to his co-defendants had been substantial.” After

the guilty plea was withdrawn, she never approached Barner about further

cooperation.

Because we are concerned that the statements explaining the reason for

withdrawal of the § 5K1.1 application caused the district court to base the sentence

on clearly erroneous facts without support in the record, we vacate and remand for

resentencing. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (“[r]egardless of whether the

sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range” the court of appeals

“must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,

such as . . . selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts”); see also United

States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1094 (11th Cir. 2008). 

21
The Application for Acceptance of Responsibility 

A remand for resentencing is also required because we agree with Barner

that the district court improperly denied him a three-point reduction for acceptance

of responsibility. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court may

reduce a defendant’s offense level by two, “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates

acceptance of responsibility for his offense,” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §

3E1.1(a) (2008), and by an additional point if the defendant assisted authorities in

the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by “timely providing

complete information to the government concerning his own involvement in the

offense,” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(b) (2001). Although a

motion by the U.S. Attorney is now required in order for the defendant to obtain

this additional point, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(b) (2008), it was

not required under the 2001 version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect when

the crime was committed. 

While an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is prototypically

applied to cases in which defendants have pled guilty, “[c]onviction by trial . . .

does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a

reduction.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 n.2. Indeed, a defendant

may receive an acceptance of responsibility reduction, 

22
for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that

do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a

statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each

such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted

responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.

Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1009 (3d

Cir. 1992).

We have a comparably unusual case here. Barner confessed to the factual

elements of the crime of conviction—possession of ecstasy with intent to

distribute—during his first meeting with Kailimai on December 19, 2001, several

months before he was indicted in this case in February of 2002. Briefly, as we

have discussed earlier, Barner volunteered several times that co-defendant Mark

Hill gave Barner ecstasy from the Michael Ogburn robbery for Barner to sell, and

recognized that by making such statements he was implicating himself. After this

initial and lengthy confession, Barner proceeded to cooperate with the government

to provide information as to his co-defendants, even alerting agents to the home

invasion of ecstasy dealer Michael Ogburn—the robbery which resulted in Barner’s

sole conviction for possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. 

Significantly, in preparation for Barner’s originally-scheduled sentencing

pursuant to his guilty plea, the pre-sentence report recommended that Barner

receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, recognizing that he “stated

23
contrition for his actions. He was debriefed by agents and agreed to cooperate with

the Government in its investigation of this case.” While Barner ultimately

withdrew his guilty plea and exercised his right to a jury trial, his actions have not

been inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility for possession with intent to

distribute ecstasy. 

Thus, upon the return of the fifth superseding indictment Barner offered to

plead guilty to the sole count of conviction—a fact which the district judge appears

not to have considered significant when imposing sentence. Barner had declined to

plead guilty to the full indictment to pursue legal defenses as to the remaining

counts—namely, that the conspiracy in which he participated was not a drug

conspiracy, and that the Hobbs Act did not apply to his conduct. He was

vindicated when the district court directed a verdict in his favor on Counts Two

through Nine, and the jury acquitted him on Count One. Significantly, Barner did

not take the stand in his defense, and never denied having possessed the ecstasy. 

Indeed, as we have previously observed, the Assistant U.S. Attorney told the jury

in his rebuttal summation that “there’s one thing [defense counsel] didn’t tell you. 

He talked for 41 minutes and 25 seconds . . . He never said the Defendant didn’t do

it.” Thus, “when the trial court decided whether to award the . . . reduction, it erred

in failing to consider the reasons for which [Barner] refused to plead to the entire

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indictment, along with the apparent validity of those reasons.” Rodriguez, 975

F.2d at 1009. We therefore remand for reconsideration of this issue by the district

court. Id. 

The Adjustment for Possession of a Firearm

Barner argues that the district court erred in increasing his offense level,

based upon the use of firearms during the robbery of ecstasy dealer Michael

Ogburn. Pursuant to Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1), a defendant receives a

two-level enhancement if “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was

possessed.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2008). A coconspirator’s possession of a firearm may result in a defendant receiving a firearm

enhancement if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) the possessor of the firearm was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was

in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the

conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession

was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). 

While the jury acquitted Barner of the drug trafficking conspiracy charge, the

district judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a conspiracy

in which Barner was a participant. This finding is amply supported by the record. 

Although Barner did not personally participate in the armed robbery of Michael

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Ogburn’s home from which the ecstasy that he was convicted of possessing was

stolen, he had participated in four or five home invasion robberies before the

Ogburn robbery, and he participated with his co-conspirators in a second home

invasion of the Ogburn home one month later, with the intention of stealing more

ecstasy and money. Moreover, there is no dispute that all of the home invasions

committed by this group of co-defendants involved the use of at least one, and

often several firearms. Under these circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable

that his co-conspirators used firearms in the Ogburn robbery during which the

ecstasy underlying the count of conviction was stolen. Consequently, the district

court did not clearly err by applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a

firearm to Barner. 

Barner’s Role in the Offense and Criminal History Category

Barner also challenges the denial of his application for a downward

adjustment because of his minor role in the offense, as well as the calculation of his

criminal history category. These claims are without merit and do not require

extended discussion. A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an

offense is a finding of fact, to be reviewed for clear error. United States v.

DeVaron, 175 F.3d 930, 934 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Moreover, the defendant

seeking such a downward adjustment bears the burden of proving his mitigating

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role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 945. After reviewing

the record, we conclude that the district court’s determination on this issue did not

constitute clear error. 

We likewise conclude that the district court did not err by assigning criminal

history category points based on a disposition of a prior offense in Georgia, in

which Barner received what is characterized in Georgia as a “First Offender”

discharge. Under the Georgia statutory scheme, “once the offender completes his

sentence—whether on probation or in prison—he is discharged without an

adjudication of guilt, and consequently does not suffer the civil disabilities

normally suffered by those who have been adjudged guilty of an offense under

Georgia law.” See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 727-28 (11th Cir. 1987) (en

banc), citing O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 (1985). Nevertheless, “if he committed a new

crime, [the defendant] could lose the benefit of his first offender status, and his

unadjudicated guilty plea . . . would be considered a prior conviction for the

purposes of the habitual offender act.” Id. at 809 F.2d at 727-28, citing O.C.G.A.

§ 17-10-7(a) (Supp. 1985). Under these circumstances, Barner’s claim that “[t]he

awarding of criminal history points for this offense completely contradicts the

order of the Clayton County judge and the First Offender Act,” is plainly without

merit. Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate the imposition of criminal

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history points, even if doing so undermined the purpose of the Georgia’s First

Offender Act. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 & n.9 & n.10 (2008). 

Indeed, we have so held in comparable circumstances. See United States v. Jones,

910 F.2d 760, 761 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Hagins v. United States, 267 F.3d

1202, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 2001). 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of conviction and remand for resentencing. We

have not discussed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, because such an

exercise cannot be undertaken until errors we have identified are addressed by the

district court. See Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (“[a]ssuming that the district

court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then

consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.”). 

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