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it be said to charge the offense for which the defendant was convicted." Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the amended information informed Nelson of the State's 

theory that Nelson committed burglary by entering the victim's apartment 

while in the possession of a firearm with the intent to commit assault 

and/or battery. See NRS 205.0600), (4). We concludeS that the burglary 

charge in the amended information was sufficiently clear so as to apprise 

Nelson of the theories of prosecution and allow him to prepare a defense. 

See NRS 173.075(1), (2); Laney, 86 Nev. at 179, 466 P.2d at 670. Contrary 

to Nelson's claim, the amended information did not permit the State to 

change its theory of prosecution during trial, and the record does not 

support Nelson's assertion that the State alleged a "number of theories" 

for the burglary charge during closing argument. To the extent that 

Nelson contends that the information should have included the means or 

manner of assault and/or battery, Nelson fails to demonstrate that the 

lack of specificity as to assault and/or battery rendered the information 

deficient. See Bullis v. State, 83 Nev. 175, 176, 426 P.2d 423, 423 (1967) 

("Since the primary concern in a burglary indictment is with the unlawful 

entry, the intended [assault or battery] need not therein be described with 

the same specificity that might be required in charging the offense of 

[assault or battery]"). Accordingly, we conclude that the amended 

information was sufficient to support the judgment of conviction. 

Second, Nelson argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to set aside the verdict and enter a 

judgment of acquittal because the verdict was inconsistent. A motion for a 

judgment of acquittal must be filed "within 7 days after the jury is 

discharged." NRS 175.381(2). Because Nelson filed his motion 35 days 

2 
after the jury returned its verdict and was discharged, the motion was 

untimely and the district court did not have authority to grant it. See id.; 

cf. Ross v. Giacomo, 97 Nev. 550, 553, 635 P.2d 298, 300 (1981), abrogated 

in part on other grounds by Winston Prods. Co. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 

524, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006). 

Third, Nelson contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the conviction for burglary with the use of a deadly weapon. His 

sole argument in this regard is that because the jury acquitted him of 

battery, there was insufficient evidence that he committed burglary. This 

argument relies on Nelson's mistaken belief that to be convicted of 

burglary, he had to have actually committed the offense of battery when 

he entered the apartment. However, as the plain language of the burglary 

statute makes clear, Nelson needed only to have the intent to commit a 

felony, in this case battery and/or assault, when he entered the apartment. 

NRS 205.060(1). Nelson provides no argument as to how the elements of 

burglary were not proven or how the evidence adduced at trial was 

insufficient to support the conviction. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 

673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) ("It is appellant's responsibility to present 

relevant authority and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not 

be addressed by this court."). Therefore, we decline to consider his 

conclusory challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Fourth, Nelson claims that the district court's instruction to 

the jury about the specific intent required for burglary was inadequate. 

His sole argument in support of this claim is that the jury must have been 

confused about the intent instruction because it acquitted him of battery 

but convicted him of burglary. Because Nelson failed to object to the 

instruction below, we review for plain error. Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 

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545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). The district court properly instructed the jury 

on general intent, the elements of burglary, and the specific intent 

required for burglary. Nelson's challenge to the specific intent instruction 

appears to rely on his mistaken belief about the elements of burglary, and 

he fails to demonstrate that the jury instructions were misleading or 

erroneous. 

Fifth, Nelson argues that the district court violated the 

prohibition against double jeopardy by imposing a harsher sentence for his 

carrying-a-concealed-firearm conviction than it imposed in his original 

judgment of conviction. 2We disagree. Because Nelson's original 

judgment of conviction was reversed and his case was remanded for a new 

trial, Nelson v. State, Docket No. 61951 (Order of Reversal and Remand, 

July 22, 2013), the district court's imposition of a greater sentence upon 

reconviction did not violate double jeopardy principles, see North Carolina 

v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-26 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds 

by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Nelson's reliance on Dolby v. 

State, 106 Nev. 63, 787 P.2d 388 (1990), and Wilson v. State, 123 Nev. 587, 

170 P.3d 975 (2007), is misplaced. Neither of those cases involved an 

increased sentence upon retrial; rather, Dolby involved a sentencing 

correction initiated sua sponte by the district court, 106 Nev. at 65, 787 

2Nelson was initially convicted and sentenced to 12-48 months in 

prison for the offense of carrying a concealed firearm. However, this court 

reversed the judgment of conviction on appeal and remanded for a new 

trial because Nelson was denied his right to represent himself. Nelson v. 

State, Docket No. 61951 (Order of Reversal and Remand, July 22, 2013). 

Upon retrial, Nelson was again found guilty of carrying a concealed 

firearm and the district court sentenced him to 24-60 months in prison on 

that count. 

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P.2d at 389, and Wilson involved a resentencing mandated on appeal after 

the defendant's conviction was partially vacated, 123 Nev. at 589-90, 170 

P.3d at 976. In those situations, this court held that "when a court is 

forced to vacate an unlawful sentence on one count, the court may not 

increase a lawful sentence on a separate count." Wilson, 123 Nev. at 594, 

170 P.3d at 979 (quoting Dolby, 106 Nev. at 65, 787 P.2d at 389). That 

holding is not applicable here because all of Nelson's sentences were 

vacated on appeal and thus the sentence imposed by the district court on 

retrial was a new sentence and not an increase of an existing lawful 

sentence. 

Finally, Nelson contends that the district court erred in 

allowing the State to inform the district court at the sentencing hearing 

about the jury's reasons for acquitting Nelson of battery based on the 

State's post-verdict discussion with the jurors. He asserts that evidence of 

the jury's mental processes was inadmissible for any purpose under NRS 

50.065. Nelson did not object below, and we conclude that Nelson has 

failed to demonstrate any error in this regard. See Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 

80 P.3d at 95. After the district court denied Nelson's motion to set aside 

the verdict, the State, in response to Nelson's argument that the jury 

acquitted him of battery because they found that he acted in self-defense, 

informed the district court that the jurors had indicated during the postverdict discussion that the acquittal was based on insufficient evidence of 

battery, not on self-defense. Given that the State made this statement 

after the district court denied the motion to set aside verdict, Nelson 

cannot show that the mental processes of the jurors had any impact on the 

district court's ruling. And, regardless of this evidence, the district court 

had no authority to grant Nelson's untimely motion, as discussed above. 

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Nelson makes no allegation, and the record does not support, that the 

district court considered evidence of the jurors' mental processes in 

imposing sentence. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no relief is 

warranted and we 

ORDER the judgment of convriction AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

Poth 

Pickering 

J. 

J. 

J. 

cc: Hon. James M. Bixler, District Judge 

Nguyen & Lay 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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