2015 IL App (4th) 140730 

 

NO. 4-14-0730 

 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

 

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

STEPHEN C. COLEMAN, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from 

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County 

No. 13CF749 

 

Honorable 

Peter C. Cavanagh, 

Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

Justice Steigmann dissented, with opinion. 

 OPINION 

 

¶ 1 On August 22, 2013, the State charged defendant, Stephen C. Coleman, with 

manufacture/delivery of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2012)) and possession of cannabis 

(720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2012)). On July 20, 2014, the trial court granted defendant's motion 

to suppress statements he made to parole officers because he was not provided warnings pursuant 

to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The State appeals, arguing the court erred in 

granting defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 3, 2014, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to 

parole officers on August 6, 2013. At issue was defendant's purported statement he had 

marijuana under his mother's bed. Defendant argued his statement resulted from a custodial 

FILED

July 20, 2015 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 - 

interrogation where the parole officers failed to advise him of his Miranda rights prior to 

questioning. 

¶ 4 On February 26, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to 

suppress. Defendant testified he was visiting his mother at 546 West Miller Street in Springfield 

at approximately 9:30 a.m. on August 6, 2013, and was on parole at the time. When he called 

the Department of Corrections for his monthly check-in, defendant was told his parole officer 

was looking for him. Defendant provided his mother's address. Shortly thereafter, a parole 

agent, Mark Brady, and another parole agent, Mark Schafer, arrived at defendant's mother's 

residence. Defendant testified his registered address was 1338 North 8th Street and he had not 

changed his parole address. 

¶ 5 Agent Brady asked defendant to provide a urine sample. Defendant and the two 

agents went into his mother's apartment. Defendant's mother and girlfriend were inside the 

apartment. However, defendant was kept separated from these individuals during the encounter. 

Defendant provided the sample in his mother's bathroom in Brady's presence. While defendant 

was providing the sample, Agent Schafer was searching what he believed was defendant's 

bedroom. Schafer found a lockbox with money inside. According to defendant, after Schafer 

found the money, Brady cuffed defendant. They then questioned him about the money. 

¶ 6 The agents took defendant back into the bathroom. Shortly thereafter, they began 

questioning him about allegations he was selling drugs. He was still handcuffed at that time. 

They also asked if he had drugs in the residence. The agents did not advise defendant of his 

Miranda rights prior to questioning him. 

¶ 7 Defendant testified he was not afraid of the parole officers and had been 

handcuffed (behind his back) for approximately five minutes before the agents questioned him 
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about dealing drugs. The agents did not take out any weapons during the encounter and no 

police officers were present. 

¶ 8 On redirect examination, the following exchange occurred between defense 

counsel and defendant: 

 "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Defendant], did you believe 

you were—when they handcuffed you, did you believe that you 

could leave?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you thought that you could 

leave when they had you handcuffed? 

[DEFENDANT]: Yes. I hadn't done anything wrong. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm not asking you to admit that 

you did anything wrong. Did you believe you were under arrest 

when they put you in handcuffs? 

[DEFENDANT]: No." 

Defendant also testified he was kept apart from his mother and girlfriend while he was being 

questioned by the agents. He could not hear them talking, and he did not think they could hear 

him talking. 

¶ 9 After defendant testified, the State moved to dismiss defendant's motion to 

suppress, arguing defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case a Miranda violation had 

occurred. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, stating:

"The investigation of this violation of probation was an appropriate 

investigation. I do find there was a valid waiver based upon 
- 4 - 

People's 1, the plain language of the parole mandatory supervised 

release agreement.

 Also, the court is clearly troubled by the testimony of the 

Defendant, that he did not feel at the time of the questioning that 

he was under arrest at that time. So with regard to Miranda, the 

Court does not find there's a prior violation [sic] and that the 

burden has not shifted." 

¶ 10 On July 15, 2014, defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its 

dismissal of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued the court erred in failing to shift the 

burden to the State to show defendant's questioning complied with Miranda or fell into one of 

the rule's exceptions. The court granted defendant's motion to reconsider and held another 

hearing on the suppression issue that afternoon. 

¶ 11 At the hearing, the State first called parole agent Brady. Brady testified he is not 

considered a general criminal investigator. When he witnesses evidence of a new crime by a 

parolee, he calls the local police to work on the new crime. He never gives Miranda warnings to 

parolees during compliance checks. 

¶ 12 Brady testified he did a compliance check on defendant at the Miller Street 

address because defendant had reported a change of address to that location. Brady testified he 

suspected defendant was selling drugs because of numerous calls the parole office had received. 

Defendant told Brady the apartment on Miller Street was his. Brady told defendant he was going 

to conduct a compliance check and asked defendant to provide a urine sample. Defendant agreed 

to do so and told Brady he would test positive for marijuana. While defendant was providing the 

urine sample, parole agent Schafer began searching defendant's room in the apartment. 
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¶ 13 While defendant was providing the urine sample, Agent Schafer found a "locked 

box" in defendant's bedroom. Brady took defendant into the bedroom and requested defendant 

open the box. Defendant consented and opened the box. Brady then handcuffed defendant 

behind his back. According to Brady, handcuffing a parolee during a compliance check is 

standard operating procedure. The box contained a large amount of cash and some other items. 

Brady asked defendant how he acquired a large amount of cash considering he was unemployed. 

Defendant said he earned the money doing yard work. 

¶ 14 After asking defendant about the money in the box, Brady and Schafer asked 

defendant three or four more questions. Brady testified the agents told defendant they suspected

he had been selling marijuana. The agents told defendant they wanted him to be honest with 

them and asked defendant whether he had anything in the home. Defendant told the agents he 

had some marijuana under his mother's bed. Defendant had only been handcuffed a few minutes 

when he told the agents about the marijuana. During the questioning, defendant was 

cooperative.

¶ 15 Brady then asked defendant's mother if he could search her bedroom, and she 

consented. Brady found boxes under her bed containing marijuana. After finding the drugs, the 

parole agents called the Springfield police to the scene. 

¶ 16 According to Brady, the entire encounter only took 15 to 20 minutes. Neither 

parole agent drew his firearm. Brady testified they did not threaten, bribe, or trick defendant into 

making any admissions. They also did not threaten him with arrest or a parole violation prior to 

his statement regarding the marijuana. Further, the police had no involvement in initiating the 

compliance check or in how the check was conducted. Defendant remained handcuffed while 

they waited for the Springfield police to arrive. 
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¶ 17 On cross-examination, Brady stated he had several anonymous tips defendant was 

selling marijuana prior to conducting the compliance check. Defendant was reportedly selling 

marijuana from his parole address on North 8th Street. It was also reported he was going in and 

out of his car during these drug sales. 

¶ 18 Brady testified no drugs were found in defendant's car, on his person, or in what 

they believed was defendant's bedroom. Brady acknowledged his report noted defendant was 

not handcuffed until after defendant said he earned the money found in the bedroom by 

performing yard work. While the agents were questioning defendant, he was not allowed to 

consult with anyone and was kept separate from his mother and girlfriend. Brady testified the 

questioning occurred in the bedroom of the apartment. Both Brady and Schafer were armed. 

Brady was wearing his gun on the outside of his clothes, where it was visible. 

¶ 19 Parole agent Schafer testified the agents had no intent to arrest defendant when 

they asked him if there were any drugs in the house. While searching defendant's room, Schafer 

found a lockbox. When defendant finished the drug test, Schafer told Brady he needed 

defendant to open the lockbox. Brady then questioned defendant about money found in the 

lockbox. Defendant was handcuffed after he opened the lockbox. Once he was handcuffed, 

defendant was not going to be allowed to leave. In fact, Schafer testified defendant was never 

allowed to leave of his own volition that morning. Schafer testified defendant was not given his 

Miranda warnings. According to Schafer, it is standard for agents to ask whether there is 

anything illegal or there are any weapons the agents should know about. Schafer testified no one 

else was permitted in the room with the agents and defendant. Defendant's mother and girlfriend 

were directed to stay out of the bathroom. Agent Schafer testified neither defendant, his mother, 
- 7 - 

nor his girlfriend was going to be allowed to leave the apartment during the encounter. Cannabis 

was later found in defendant's mother's room. 

¶ 20 On July 30, 2014, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The 

court stated:

"The resident check of the parolee's residence, certainly it 

would be permissible for drug testing, questioning, search, even 

the cuffing of the Defendant-parolee for the safety of the officers, 

and I really don't see where any of that would be a violation of the 

parole agreement. However, the facts and circumstances in this 

case, in the Court's view, turned a resident check of a parolee to 

that of a custodial interrogation which invoked the right to 

Miranda warnings.

 You know, if the—at the point, I should say, of the 

questioning, which certainly would be permissible as regards to 

compliance with parole terms, but investigation of a new crime 

wherein there was a tip, and I did hear testimony of the parole 

officer that stated that the Defendant was not free to leave while 

handcuffed and being questioned. Those are very important 

factors in this particular case.

We have security personnel acting in a coordinated effort 

bringing in a partner to question the suspect after making 

arrangements to be paged and go see the parolee-Defendant, search 

his home, handcuffed him, with the knowledge that there was a tip, 
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and I think that's the key, and I'm just trying to make the point that 

the tip is very, very crucial in this case, which otherwise may have 

been an impermissible parole check. 

The tip leads the parole officer there, and when coupled 

with the tip, evidence of a new crime, that being the money, for 

this Court, that is enough—in the context of a handcuffed parolee 

and testimony that he was not free to leave is enough to invoke his 

right to Miranda." 

On August 13, 2014, the State filed a certificate of impairment and declaration it intended to 

appeal. 

¶ 21 This appeal followed. 

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 The State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress. 

According to the State, Agents Brady and Schafer were under no duty to advise defendant of his 

Miranda rights. Because of the conditions related to his mandatory supervised release, the State 

contends defendant was required to truthfully answer his parole officer's questions. Further, the 

State argues defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. Because the State 

concedes defendant was not Mirandized prior to making the statements at issue, the question 

becomes whether defendant's statements resulted from a custodial interrogation.

¶ 24 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 25 Suppression rulings present a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Pitman, 

211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813 N.E.2d 93, 100 (2004). A trial court's factual findings should be upheld 

unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, whether the evidence 
- 9 - 

should be suppressed is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at 512, 813 N.E.2d at 

101. 

¶ 26 B. Custody for Miranda Purposes 

¶ 27 Our supreme court has stated courts should engage in a two-part inquiry to 

determine whether a person is in custody, necessitating Miranda warnings prior to questioning 

the individual. First, courts should look at the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 

Second, courts should determine whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would 

have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave given those circumstances. People v. 

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505-06, 810 N.E.2d 472, 481 (2003). 

¶ 28 Although defendant was on parole, the United States Supreme Court has made the 

following clear: "A defendant does not lose [his fifth-amendment] protection by reason of his 

conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the time 

he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a 

subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he has been convicted." Minnesota v. 

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). The State acknowledges a parolee, like a probationer, does 

not lose his privilege against self-incrimination. However, citing Murphy, the State argues the 

Supreme Court has not extended the requirements of Miranda warnings to prearranged, routine 

parole interviews with parole officers. Further, the State argues the parole agents were under no 

duty to advise defendant of his Miranda rights because defendant was under parole supervision 

and was required, as a condition of his mandatory supervised release, to truthfully answer his 

parole officer's questions relating to his adjustment in the community while on parole. See 730 

ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(14) (West 2012). 
- 10 - 

¶ 29 However, based on the facts here, Murphy supports the trial court's decision to 

suppress defendant's statements in this case. In Murphy, the defendant, who was on probation, 

admitted to his treatment counselor he committed a rape and murder in 1974. Murphy, 465 U.S. 

at 423. Upon receiving this information, the probation officer contacted the defendant to set up a 

meeting to discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of his probationary period. Id. The 

probation officer did not contact the police prior to the meeting but knew she would report to the 

police any incriminating statements the defendant made. Id. At the meeting at her office, the 

officer told the defendant she had information from his treatment counselor evidencing his 

continued need for treatment. Id. at 423-24. Subsequently, defendant admitted committing the 

rape and murder but attempted to persuade the probation officer he did not need further treatment 

because "several extenuating circumstances explained the prior crimes." Id. at 424. 

¶ 30 The probation officer told the defendant she had a duty to report to the police 

what the defendant told her and encouraged him to turn himself in to the authorities. Id. The 

defendant left after the interview. Id. Two days later, he informed the probation officer he was 

not turning himself in on advice of counsel. Id. A grand jury later indicted the defendant for 

first degree murder. Id. at 425. The defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing it was 

made in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The trial court denied his motion, but 

the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. Id.

¶ 31 The United States Supreme Court noted an individual's obligation to appear and 

truthfully answer questions does not, in and of itself, convert otherwise voluntary statements into 

compelled statements. Id. at 427. According to the Court, individuals on probation or parole 

are: 
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"in no better position than the ordinary witness at a trial or before a 

grand jury who is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and 

obligated to answer on the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the 

privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat of selfincrimination. The answers of such a witness to questions put to 

him are not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 

unless the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the 

privilege. This much is reasonably clear from our cases. 

 *** 

 *** It has long been recognized that '[t]he Constitution 

does not forbid the asking of criminative questions,' [citation], and 

nothing in our prior cases suggests that the incriminating nature of 

a question, by itself, excuses a timely assertion of the privilege. 

[Citation.] If a witness—even one under a general compulsion to 

testify—answers a question both he and the government should 

reasonably expect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only 

whether the particular disclosure was 'compelled' within the 

meaning of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 427-28. 

¶ 32 The Supreme Court noted, when the government asks a witness questions 

reasonably likely to elicit incriminating evidence, the witness must assert the privilege rather 

than answer if he does not want to incriminate himself. Id. at 429. 

"If he asserts the privilege, he 'may not be required to answer a 

question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will 
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incriminate him, at least without at that time being assured that 

neither it nor its fruits may be used against him' in a subsequent 

criminal proceeding [citation] (emphasis in original). But if he 

chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary since 

he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty as 

the result of his decision to do so." Id.

¶ 33 The Supreme Court then discussed the well-known exception to this general rule 

with regard to custodial interrogations. Id. To lessen the risk of an individual being compelled 

by the isolation of police custody, the Court in Miranda "required the exclusion of incriminating 

statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth 

Amendment privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the 

consequences of his failure to assert it." Id. at 430. The Court noted "this extraordinary 

safeguard 'does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations 

for which it was designed.' " Id. Because the defendant's statements were not made during a 

custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court found Miranda did not apply. Id. at 431. 

¶ 34 Noting the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the defendant was not in 

custody when he made the incriminatory statements, the Court stated: 

"Since [the defendant] was not physically restrained and could 

have left the office, any compulsion he might have felt from the 

possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to 

revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a 

suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 

persistent custodial interrogator." Id. at 433. 
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¶ 35 Unlike Murphy, the parole agents handcuffed defendant in this case, and custody 

is at issue. The State points out "custody" has been narrowly circumscribed for Miranda

purposes. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court 

has stated:

 "The determination of whether a defendant is 'in custody,' 

and, therefore, whether the warnings set forth in Miranda are 

required, involves ' "[t]wo discrete inquiries ***: first, what were 

the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given 

those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she 

was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." ' 

[Citation.] When examining the circumstances of interrogation, 

this court has found a number of factors to be relevant in 

determining whether a statement was made in a custodial setting, 

including: (1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the 

questioning; (2) the number of police officers present during the 

interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of family and friends of 

the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as 

the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or 

fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at 

the place of questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental 

makeup of the accused. [Citations.] After examining and 

weighing these various factors, we then must make an objective 

determination as to whether, under the facts presented, 'a 
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reasonable person, innocent of any crime' would have believed that 

he or she could terminate the encounter and was free to leave." 

People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 150, 886 N.E.2d 986, 994-95 

(2008). 

¶ 36 According to the State, "Under the narrow standard appropriate in the Miranda

context, it is clear that defendant was not in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda

protection since there was no formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest." We disagree.

¶ 37 In looking at the factors we are to consider, we find the following. First, 

defendant was in a location familiar to him. He was not taken to an interrogation room or jail. 

Further, defendant was subjected to relatively brief, around 20 minutes, questioning. Second, 

two parole officers were present, both of whom were armed. Brady's weapon was ordinarily 

holstered on the outside of his clothing—so it would have been in plain view. Third, defendant 

was separated from his mother and girlfriend while he was questioned in the bathroom. Fourth, 

defendant was physically restrained by handcuffs. Fifth, defendant was at his mother's residence 

when the parole officers arrived. Sixth, defendant was 30 years old. Defendant's intelligence 

and mental condition are not discernible from the record. 

¶ 38 In this case, the parole agents handcuffed defendant and then questioned him 

about illegal drug activity of which they had advanced knowledge. When a law enforcement

officer places handcuffs on an individual, the officer is making a show of force and physically 

restraining the individual. Handcuffing an individual by a state officer is indicative of an arrest. 

When a reasonable person is placed in handcuffs by law enforcement, he will not feel free to 

leave until the handcuffs are removed. Defendant's subjective belief he was free to leave was 
- 15 - 

unreasonable and irrelevant to our determination. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 

323 (1994). 

¶ 39 The State argues the parole officers did nothing wrong in handcuffing defendant. 

Further, according to the State, "[t]he fact defendant was handcuffed does not automatically 

establish that he was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes." 

¶ 40 The Supreme Court has held, for fourth-amendment purposes, a search warrant 

founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain occupants of 

the premises. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981). Further, this court has held 

handcuffing a suspect does not transform a Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) into an 

arrest. People v. Waddell, 190 Ill. App. 3d 914, 928, 546 N.E.2d 1068, 1076 (1989). However, 

"[h]andcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest." United States v. Newton, 

369 F.3d 659, 676 (2004) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (2d Cir. 1984)). 

¶ 41 In this case, the parole officers' ability to detain defendant with handcuffs is not 

at issue. Defendant does not argue the parole agents violated his rights by handcuffing him. 

Instead, defendant argues his statements were inadmissible because he was handcuffed—and 

thus in custody—and then made the statements at issue in response to interrogation about a 

criminal act for which he had not been charged. 

¶ 42 The State concedes in its brief the parole agents' "home visit evolved into an 

investigation of a parole violation that focused on the possession of drugs inside defendant's 

residence." However, the State argues the agents' investigation: 

 "was not specifically designed to elicit admission of an unrelated 

and independent crime. Therefore, even though the parole officer 

questioned defendant regarding the anonymous tip concerning 
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drug sales, the compliance check was not turned into a custodial 

interrogation. Whether there were any drugs, weapons, or 

anything illegal in the home that the parole officer should know 

about was a standard question asked during every parole 

compliance check." 

However, in this case, the parole agents already suspected defendant was dealing drugs. Further, 

only after the agents found the large amount of money in the safe, which furthered their 

suspicions about ongoing illegal activity, did they handcuff defendant and interrogate him about 

the presence of drugs, weapons, or anything illegal in the home. A reasonable person would 

have assumed a routine parole visit had transformed into an arrest because defendant was only 

handcuffed after the parole agents found a large amount of money and questioned how he 

acquired it.

¶ 43 The State cites an opinion from the Court of Appeals of New Mexico for the 

proposition the handcuffing in this case was entirely reasonable and not coercive. See State v. 

Hermosillo, 336 P.3d 446 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014). The New Mexico court found the defendant 

was not in custody under the specific facts of that case and, therefore, no Miranda warnings were 

required. Id. at 448. The New Mexico court stated "[t]he following factors guide our inquiry 

[into whether the custody requirement is met]: 'the purpose, place, and length of interrogation[,] 

... the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical 

surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure 

applied to the defendant.' " Id. at 450 (quoting State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40, 126 N.M. 

535, 972 P.2d 847). Illinois courts look at different factors to determine whether a suspect is in 

custody, including "any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as the show of weapons or 
- 17 - 

force, physical restraint, booking or fingerprinting." Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150, 886 N.E.2d at 

995. As a result, we do not find Hermosillo persuasive.

¶ 44 The State also relies on United States v. Newton, 181 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173 

(E.D. N.Y. 2002), for the proposition handcuffing a defendant does not transform a detention 

into custody for Miranda purposes. In Newton, like the case sub judice, the defendant was on 

parole. The defendant's mother had reported to a parole officer the defendant possessed a gun, 

which he kept in a box by the door of her home, and threatened to kill her and her husband. Id. 

at 159. The defendant occasionally stayed as an overnight guest at his mother's home. Id. The

next day, three parole officers and three police officers went to the defendant's mother's home. 

Id. at 160. When the defendant answered the door, his parole officer asked him to step outside 

and turn around. Id. The officer then handcuffed the defendant but advised the defendant he 

was not under arrest. Id. 

¶ 45 The officers then took the defendant back inside the residence and sat him on a 

chair just inside the door. Id. The defendant's parole officer asked where the defendant's mother 

was, and defendant said she was in the back of the residence. Id. Another parole officer then 

began questioning the defendant, asking whether the defendant had any contraband in the home. 

Id. The defendant responded, " 'only what is in the box.' " Id. When asked what was in the box, 

the defendant said, " 'a two and two.' " Id. The parole officer opened the box and found an 

unloaded .22-caliber firearm, a fully loaded magazine, and several loose rounds. Id. The officer 

testified the defendant's parole was revoked automatically and he was then under arrest. Id. No 

one read the defendant the Miranda warnings before or during his questioning or arrest. Id.

¶ 46 The federal district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the statements 

he made in response to the parole officers' questions. Id. at 175. The court found the defendant 
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was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. Relying on the Second Circuit's opinion in United 

States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1987), the district court found the proper test to apply 

to determine custody for Miranda purposes was "whether the 'questioning was conducted in 

custodial settings that have inherently coercive pressures that tend to undermine the individual's 

will to resist and to compel him to speak.' " Newton, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (quoting Morales, 

834 F.2d at 38). The court found focusing on "the presence of indications that the defendant was 

not free to leave is over-inclusive." Id. at 169. According to the court: 

 "I believe that the Morales formulation adheres more 

closely to Miranda's central concern that the police will use 

coercive environments and psychological tactics to compel 

subjects of questioning to confess. The language in [Tankleff v. 

Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1998),] that focuses on 

the presence of indications that the defendant was not free to leave 

is over-inclusive. There are many situations in which there are 

powerful indications that the suspect was not free to leave in which 

coercive pressures to confess are absent. [Citations.] Indeed, even 

a fully law-abiding citizen would not feel free to leave during 

nearly all interactions with the police. *** In my view, the 

Morales formulation is the appropriate approach to determine 

whether a person is in custody ***." Id.

 The court found "the core concerns of Miranda were not implicated" in the parole officer's 

questioning of the defendant. Id. at 173. According to the court: 
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"While there were indications that [the defendant] was not free to 

leave, a reasonable person in his position also would not have felt 

placed in a coercive environment in which he has no choice but to 

submit to the parole officer's will and confess. This conclusion is 

supported by an analysis of the factors courts have used to 

determine whether an individual was in custody." Id. 

The court noted Newton was at home and the officers told him he was not under arrest. Id. 

¶ 47 While the district court's reasoning might support reversing the trial court in this 

case, the Second Circuit did not find so when the defendant in Newton appealed. The Second 

Circuit found the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. The Second Circuit stated: 

 "We take this opportunity to clarify how the free-to-leave 

test referenced in Tankleff and the coercive-pressures test 

referenced in Morales both serve to identify circumstances 

requiring Miranda warnings. The free-to-leave inquiry constitutes 

a necessary, but not determinative, first step in establishing 

Miranda custody. The 'ultimate inquiry' for determining Miranda

custody, however, is that articulated by the Supreme Court in 

California v. Beheler: 'whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint 

on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 

arrest." [Citations.] In such cases—i.e., where a person formerly 

at liberty is subjected to formal arrest or arrest-like restraints—

specific coercive pressures need not be proved to establish 
- 20 - 

Miranda custody; rather, coercive pressures are presumed from 

the fact of such custody. [Citation.]

United States v. Morales is not at odds with this 

conclusion; it simply presents circumstances where it made little 

sense to ask whether the defendant had been questioned pursuant 

to formal arrest or arrest-like restraints. Morales was a prison 

inmate at the time of the challenged questioning; thus, 

incarceration, not liberty, was his status quo. We have declined, 

however, to equate such incarceration with custody for purposes of 

Miranda. [Citations.] It is in the particular context of prison 

interrogation that Morales's focus on the coercive pressures of a 

custodial setting must be understood. Thus, while the Morales

formulation of custody relied on by the district court may be useful 

in cases involving interrogation of individuals already incarcerated 

on other crimes, for a person not so confined, the appropriate 

inquiry remains simply whether his freedom of action has been 

'curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." ' [Citation.] 

No consideration of additional coercive pressures is required." 

(Emphasis added.) Newton, 369 F.3d at 670-71. 

In addition, the Second Circuit stated: 

"[A]lthough coercive pressure is Miranda's underlying concern, 

custody remains the touchstone for application of its warning 

requirement. The test for custody is an objective one: 'whether a 
- 21 - 

reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood 

himself to be subjected to the restraints comparable to those 

associated with a formal arrest.' United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 

1472 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Focusing 

on this objective standard has the advantage—certainly from the 

perspective of the hundreds of thousands of law enforcement 

officers who must daily apply Miranda—of establishing a regular 

course of procedure. It does not require officers to administer 

Miranda warnings based on a self-assessment of their actions as 

'coercive'; rather, it instructs them to administer warnings 

whenever they place a person under formal arrest or apply 

restraints generally understood as comparable to those of a formal 

arrest." Id. at 671-72. 

¶ 48 Based on the facts in Newton, which have many similarities to the case sub judice, 

the Second Circuit held "a reasonable person would have understood that his interrogation was 

being conducted pursuant to arrest-like restraints." Id. at 677. According to the Second Circuit: 

"Although a reasonable person told, as [the defendant] was, that he 

was not under arrest would likely have understood that he was not 

about to be removed from his home to the police station—a 

significant factor in assessing the degree to which one is at 'the 

mercy' of the authorities, [citation]—a reasonable person would 

also have understood that as long as the handcuffs remained in 

place, his freedom of movement, even within his home, would be 
- 22 - 

restricted to a degree comparable to that of an individual placed 

under formal arrest. The record does not indicate whether [the 

defendant] was told that the specific reason for a safety concern in 

his case was that the officers were searching for a gun. Thus, we 

cannot assume that a reasonable person in his situation would have 

understood that the handcuffing would likely last only until the 

officers had completed their search. Neither can we assume an 

understanding that removal or maintenance of the handcuffs 

depended on the outcome of the search rather than on the suspect's 

responding to questions posed. Because Miranda's safeguards 

'become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is 

curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest,' [citation]

(internal quotation marks omitted), we must conclude that 

handcuffing [the defendant], though reasonable to the officers' 

investigatory purpose under the Fourth Amendment, nevertheless 

placed him in custody for purposes of Miranda." Id. 

We find the Second Circuit's reasoning persuasive. 

¶ 49 In the case sub judice, defendant's freedom was limited to a degree associated 

with a formal arrest. As stated earlier, a reasonable person in defendant's position would have 

believed a parole visit had morphed into an arrest, considering defendant was cuffed only after 

the parole agents found a large amount of cash and questioned him as to how he acquired the 

money. 
- 23 - 

¶ 50 Finally, we address the State's argument the trial court erred in granting 

defendant's motion to suppress because defendant testified he believed he was free to leave, even 

when handcuffed. Citing several decisions from this court, the State argues the threshold issue 

implicit in any defendant's motion to suppress a statement is whether the defendant subjectively 

believed he was in custody during the interrogation. See People v. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d 

461, 469, 565 N.E.2d 1349, 1354 (1991); People v. Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d 160, 164-65, 638 

N.E.2d 390, 393 (1994); People v. Griffin, 385 Ill. App. 3d 202, 211-12, 898 N.E.2d 704, 712 

(2008); People v. Wright, 2011 IL App (4th) 100047, ¶ 36, 960 N.E.2d 56. 

¶ 51 The Third District has rejected the subjective-belief line of reasoning found in this 

court's opinions cited by the State. See People v. Carroll, 318 Ill. App. 3d 135, 742 N.E.2d 1247 

(2001). In Carroll, after receiving information the defendant had implicated himself in the death 

of his brother 36 years earlier, two police officers went to the elderly care facility where the 

defendant lived to speak with him. Id. at 137, 742 N.E.2d at 1248. The defendant agreed to the 

officers' request to accompany them to the local police department. Id. The police officers had 

informed the defendant he was not under arrest, nor in custody, and was free to leave at any time. 

Id. at 137, 742 N.E.2d at 1249. 

¶ 52 The police officers transported the defendant to the police station in an unlocked 

police car, and the defendant was not handcuffed. Id. After arriving at the police station, the 

officers took defendant into an 8-foot by 12-foot windowless interview room. Id. Once again, 

the officers told the defendant he was not under arrest and could leave at any time. Id. The 

officers never read defendant his Miranda rights. Id. During the 30- to 45-minute interview, the 

defendant eventually confessed. Id. Following his admission, the officers asked the defendant to 

provide a taped statement, again informing the defendant he was not under arrest and was free to 
- 24 - 

leave at any time. Id. The police officers still had not given him Miranda warnings. Id. The 

defendant then provided a taped statement concerning his involvement in his brother's death. Id. 

After his statement, the defendant was photographed and taken back to his residence. Id. 

¶ 53 The trial court found the defendant was not in custody when he made his initial 

statements to the police. Id. at 138, 742 N.E.2d at 1249. However, the court found the defendant 

should have been given Miranda warnings after he admitted to murder "because, upon admitting 

to the crime of murder, a reasonable person would believe that he was in custody." Id. As a 

result, the court suppressed the defendant's taped confession. Id. 

¶ 54 On appellate review, relying on this court's opinions in Gorman, Goyer, and

People v. Lewis, 269 Ill. App. 3d 523, 646 N.E.2d 305 (1995), the State argued the defendant 

was required to present evidence he subjectively believed "he was in custody in order to trigger 

the protections afforded by Miranda." Carroll, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 742 N.E.2d at 1250. 

Citing People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 440, 599 N.E.2d 941, 948 (1992), and Stansbury, 511 

U.S. at 319-22, the Third District rejected "the subjective test proposed by [those] cases as it 

contradicts the vast majority of legal precedent and other authority which states that the test for 

custody is strictly an objective one." Carroll, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 139, 742 N.E.2d at 1250. The 

Third District then stated:

"It is apparent that defendant voluntarily accompanied the two 

officers to the department and that he was informed, even after his 

fourth oral statement, that he was not under arrest and free to leave 

at any time. Additionally, at no time was defendant physically 

restrained. 
- 25 - 

 However, it is equally apparent that the investigation had 

become focused exclusively upon defendant at the time his taped 

confession was made. Moreover, defendant knew that the officers 

suspected him of murder because he had just, moments earlier, 

inculpated himself in the crime. Considering these facts, the trial 

court's finding that any reasonable person in defendant's position 

would have believed himself to be in custody despite the officers' 

assurances to the contrary was not manifestly erroneous. Thus, 

Miranda warnings should have been issued and, because they were 

not, the subsequent taped confession was properly suppressed." Id. 

¶ 55 The United States Supreme Court has made clear "the initial determination of 

custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views 

harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Stansbury, 511 

U.S. at 323. Our own supreme court has held we are to look at and weigh the factors discussed 

above, in paragraph 35, and "we then must make an objective determination as to whether, under 

the facts presented, 'a reasonable person, innocent of any crime' would have believed that he or 

she could terminate the encounter and was free to leave." Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150, 886 N.E.2d 

at 995 (quoting Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506, 810 N.E.2d at 482). 

¶ 56 However, as the State notes, this court has included the subjective test in the 

previously cited opinions. The language relied on by the State in Gorman and all of the cases 

relying on Gorman was unnecessary to the disposition of those cases and constitutes obiter 

dictum. Generally, obiter dictum is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis
- 26 - 

rule. People v. Grever, 222 Ill. 2d 321, 336, 856 N.E.2d 378, 386 (2006). In Gorman, this court 

stated: 

 "We begin our analysis by addressing a threshold issue that 

is implicit in defendants' motions to suppress their statements: Was 

there evidence before the trial court of a subjective belief on the 

part of the defendants that they were in custody during their 

interrogations? This threshold issue is not often acknowledged 

because defendants bringing motions to suppress typically testify, 

as did defendants in the present case, that they believed themselves 

to be in custody. However, the case could arise where no such 

testimony is offered. This issue may be clarified by asking the 

following: In deciding a motion to suppress, would the trial court 

have to examine the objective indicia of custody discussed in 

Brown had the defendant at the hearing on the motion testified that 

at all times he believed that he was not in custody and that he was 

free to leave the company of the police interrogators whenever he 

wished? See, e.g., People v. Urban (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 310, 

314, 553 N.E.2d 740, 742 (finding the State's contention that 

defendant was free to leave at any time unrebutted by defendant). 

Each of the three defendants in the present case testified 

that he believed he was in custody at the time he made the 

statements that are the subject of his motion to suppress. 

Accordingly, the requirement of evidence on this threshold issue 
- 27 - 

has been met, and we proceed with the rest of our analysis, 

beginning with a discussion of interrogations conducted in police 

stations." (Emphases added and in original.) Gorman, 207 Ill. 

App. 3d at 469, 565 N.E.2d at 1354. 

As is clear from the above quote, any discussion regarding the impact of the defendant's 

subjective belief as to whether he was in custody was unnecessary in deciding Gorman and is 

only advisory. 

¶ 57 Further, in Goyer, after devoting six paragraphs to this issue, this court noted: 

"[I]n this case, the State failed to argue this threshold issue before 

the trial court. Furthermore, neither party briefed this issue on 

appeal. Accordingly, we decline to resolve defendant's claim on 

this basis." (Emphasis added.) Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 166, 638 

N.E.2d at 394. 

In Griffin, this time in an "Epilogue" that was not needed to decide the case, this court wrote:

"In many cases, this issue is not argued because a defendant 

typically testifies—as did defendant in this case—that she believed 

she was in custody. Regardless, we reaffirm our holding in Goyer

that a defendant who seeks to suppress his statements on the 

ground that he was in custody during the police interrogation must 

first testify that he did in fact believe he was in custody during the 

interrogation." (Emphasis added.) Griffin, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 212, 

898 N.E.2d at 712. 
- 28 - 

Finally, in Wright, this court again engaged in a discussion of this so-called "threshold" issue, 

acknowledging: 

 "As previously noted, defendant did not testify at the 

hearing on the motion to suppress that he believed he was in 

custody when Renken questioned him. However, because the 

State failed to argue this threshold issue before the trial court and 

neither party has briefed this issue on appeal, we decline to 

address the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 

on this basis." (Emphasis added.) Wright, 2011 IL App (4th) 

100047, ¶ 37, 960 N.E.2d 56. 

¶ 58 Other than the Gorman-Goyer line of cases, our research has failed to uncover 

any case finding it appropriate to look at the subjective beliefs of either the interrogator or the 

interrogated to determine whether an individual was in custody for Miranda purposes. Nor have 

the parties brought such a case to our attention. 

¶ 59 As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has made clear the initial 

determination of custody depends on "the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the 

subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." 

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. The legal theory found in the dicta of Gorman, Goyer, Griffin, and

Wright contradicts both United States and Illinois Supreme Court precedent, and we decline to 

apply it. 

¶ 60 We do note the reasoning found in the dicta in the Gorman-Goyer line of cases 

cited above has some instinctive appeal. However, if courts applied the subjective-belief 

threshold requirement discussed in the Gorman-Goyer line of cases, the individuals most in need 
- 29 - 

of being advised of their rights—the uneducated, irrational, or those who simply lack common 

sense—would not require Miranda warnings even if they clearly were in custody for Miranda 

purposes. Although we mean no insult to defendant, the facts in this case clearly show why a 

subjective-threshold test should not be applied. We cannot excuse a failure to admonish a 

defendant pursuant to Miranda based on the mere fact the defendant incorrectly believed he was

not in custody for Miranda purposes. 

¶ 61 Here, the trial court made factual determinations based in large part on undisputed 

evidence. Defendant's parole officer was looking for him because of anonymous tips indicating 

defendant was selling drugs. When the officers located defendant, they separated him from the 

other people in the house. Both parole agents were armed with firearms and defendant was 

required to cooperate with his parole officer. Once the lockbox with a large amount of cash was 

found, an officer handcuffed defendant. The cash was some evidence defendant may have been 

selling drugs, as the tip suggested. Handcuffing the defendant and then proceeding to question 

him about an independent crime objectively would have led a reasonable person to believe he 

was not free to leave or to terminate the encounter. Defendant was physically restrained and his 

freedom of movement was restricted. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was 

entitled to be informed of his rights under Miranda before he was questioned because he was in 

custody for Miranda purposes. 

¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 63 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's suppression order. 

¶ 64 Affirmed. 

¶ 65 JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting. 
- 30 - 

¶ 66 Twenty-four years ago, this court wrote about a hypothetical case in which a 

defendant made a motion to suppress his statements because they were the product of a custodial 

interrogation and he was not given the Miranda warnings, and yet "the defendant at the hearing 

on the motion testified that at all times he believed that he was not in custody and that he was 

free to leave the company of the police interrogators whenever he wished." (Emphasis in 

original.) Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 565 N.E.2d at 1354. Three years later, this court 

again considered how it would resolve the same hypothetical case and wrote the following: "[I]f 

a defendant testifies that he believed he was not in custody but instead free to leave any time he 

wished during his questioning by the police, would the trial court need to consider what a 

reasonable person in that defendant's circumstances would believe? We think not ***." 

(Emphasis in original.) Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 165, 638 N.E.2d at 393. 

¶ 67 The present case is the hypothetical case discussed in Gorman and Goyer come to 

life. Defendant moved to suppress his statements because he was not given the Miranda

warnings before being questioned when—he claims—he was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation. However, at the hearing on defendant's motion, he testified (when asked by 

defense counsel) that he believed he could leave the interrogation, and he specifically told his 

counsel that he did not believe he was under arrest even when the officers put him in handcuffs, 

explaining his belief by testifying that he "hadn't done anything wrong." 

¶ 68 The trial court initially denied defendant's motion, stating that the court was 

"clearly troubled by the testimony of the defendant that he did not feel at the time of the 

questioning that he was under arrest." Although the court ultimately granted defendant's motion 

to reconsider and later changed its ruling, defendant never recanted any of his earlier testimony. 
- 31 - 

¶ 69 The majority opinion does not dispute the trial court's finding that the defendant 

did not believe at the time of the questioning that he was under arrest—and, indeed, on this 

record, I do not see how it could—but instead it addresses that matter as follows: "Defendant's 

subjective belief he was free to leave was unreasonable and irrelevant to our determination. See 

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)." Supra ¶ 38. Because I believe that 

defendant's subjective belief that he was free to leave was not only relevant but dispositive in 

favor of the State, I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 70 In Goyer, this court wrote that when a defendant makes a motion to suppress his 

statements on the ground that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation and not advised of his 

Miranda rights, before the trial court can conclude that the defendant was in custody, the court 

must first find that (1) the defendant subjectively believed he was in custody and (2) a reasonable 

person in defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would also believe himself to be in 

custody. Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 165, 638 N.E.2d at 393. This court then drew a comparison 

to the standard applied to a claim of self-defense, as follows: 

 "We find analogous a defendant's burden in asserting selfdefense in a murder case. Self-defense has two prongs: (1) the 

defendant's subjective belief that his killing was justified, and (2) 

the objective reasonableness of that belief. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, 

ch. 38, par. 7-1.) If the defendant did not subjectively believe his 

actions were justified as self-defense, his claim at trial of selfdefense must fail no matter how third parties might have viewed 

the circumstances confronting defendant at the time he killed the 

deceased. In other words, it is irrelevant under those 
- 32 - 

circumstances whether the killing might have been done 

objectively in self-defense. Similarly, if a defendant's motion seeks 

to suppress his statements on the grounds that he was in custody 

during the police interview, yet the defendant himself testifies that 

he did not believe himself in custody, it is irrelevant whether a 

reasonable person similarly situated would agree." (Emphases in 

original.) Id. at 165, 638 N.E.2d at 394. 

(I note that the above quote remains consistent with Illinois law. See People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 

2d 104, 127-28, 646 N.E.2d 587, 598 (1995) ("In order to instruct the jury on self-defense, the 

defendant must establish *** (5) he actually and subjectively believed a danger existed which 

required the use of the force applied; and (6) his beliefs were objectively reasonable."); People v. 

Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225, 821 N.E.2d 307, 311 (2004) (reiterates the Jeffries standards regarding 

self-defense and adds that "[i]f the State negates any one of these elements, the defendant's claim 

of self-defense must fail").)

¶ 71 Criminal proceedings are individualized, with their focus being on not just what a 

defendant did, but often what he was thinking when he did it. Similarly, legal protections (such 

as the right to assert self-defense) and procedural protections (such as the right not to be subject 

to a custodial interrogation absent Miranda warnings) are also individualized. To demonstrate 

the individualized nature of self-defense, consider the following scenario: 

 "An argument occurs between Smith and Jones in a tavern 

parking lot, and Smith takes out a gun and shoots Jones three 

times, killing him. Several witnesses testify to having seen this 

action, and each adds that during the argument, they saw Jones 
- 33 - 

suddenly reach into his belt and quickly withdraw some shiny 

object in his hand that each witness at first thought was a gun. In 

fact, that object turned out to be a chrome-colored cell phone. 

Assume that Smith's defense counsel, planning all along to assert 

that Smith shot Jones in self-defense, calls Smith to testify about 

what happened during the shooting. However, Smith surprises his 

attorney (and probably everyone else in the courtroom) by 

testifying as follows: 'Yeah, I saw Jones reach into his belt as if he 

were reaching for a gun, but I knew he didn't have a gun, and I 

never feared that he was going to shoot me. Jones never carried a 

gun, and I was never afraid of him. I didn't shoot Jones because I 

feared him, but because I got sick of his big mouth and the fact that 

he was now running around with my old lady.' " 

¶ 72 Even if the trial court might have been inclined to instruct the jury on self-defense 

absent this testimony (I know I would be), can a self-defense instruction still be given in the teeth 

of the defendant's denial that he was acting in self-defense or believed that he was in danger? 

Clearly not, because of the individualized nature of self-defense, as explained by the Illinois 

Supreme Court in Jeffries and Lee. 

¶ 73 I concede that there is no case law explaining this point regarding custodial 

interrogation as there is regarding self-defense, but that is because defendants in cases like the 

present one almost always testify that they, in fact, believed they were under arrest or otherwise 

not free to go when they were interrogated. As far as I can tell, with the exception of the 

Gorman-Goyer line of cases, courts of review have never directly commented upon the need for 
- 34 - 

a defendant to affirmatively state that he believed he was in custody as a threshold requirement 

for his claim that his statements should be suppressed because they were given absent the 

Miranda warnings. (Certainly, I am aware of no case like this, in which a defendant seeking to 

suppress statements he made to the police in the absence of the Miranda warnings explicitly 

eschews the notion that he was in custody.) Instead, courts typically go directly to the question 

of the reasonableness of such a belief by asking whether a reasonable person in the defendant's 

position would have understood himself to be subjected to the restraints comparable to those 

associated with a formal arrest. See supra ¶ 47. But, regarding a claim of custodial 

interrogation, as in the case of the hypothetical involving Smith's shooting Jones in the tavern 

parking lot, it makes no difference that an objective, reasonable observer of Jones' behavior 

might have believed himself to be in danger of Jones' pulling a gun and shooting him if the 

defendant standing trial did not. 

¶ 74 As earlier stated, there is not much precedent from higher courts regarding the 

Gorman-Goyer line of cases, but there is at least one Illinois Supreme Court decision that seems 

to support that line. In People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 651 N.E.2d 100 (1995), one of the 

issues was whether the suspect was subjected to a custodial interrogation, requiring the giving of 

Miranda warnings. The supreme court analyzed the issue before it as follows: 

"Initially, it should be noted that defendant's statements 

during her first visit to the Bensenville police station around 8:15 

a.m. on July 23, 1991, are not subject to her Miranda claims 

because, as the defendant herself stated at trial, she came to the 

station voluntarily and understood that she was free to leave at any 

time, which she did several hours later. Likewise, her written and 
- 35 - 

oral statements at 6 p.m. on July 23, 1991, fingering Gonzalez for 

her husband's murder were not subject to Miranda warnings 

because, as defendant testified, she understood she was not under 

arrest at the time of this statement and was free to leave. Thus, no 

basis exists for arguing that any of the statements by defendant 

during these time periods can be suppressed because defendant 

was not in custody when they were made." Id. at 422, 651 N.E.2d 

at 106-07. 

¶ 75 What is significant about the above analysis is that the supreme court never 

mentioned the need to apply an objective standard to the suspect's situation, concluding instead 

that, given the defendant's testimony, she understood she was not under arrest. Apparently, that 

conclusion by the supreme court was dispositive. The supreme court concluded no basis exists

for arguing that those statements could be suppressed, apparently not concerning itself with the 

objective standard of how a reasonable person other than the defendant might have viewed her 

situation.