alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 4205** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. SEAN VICTOR STERLING , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Distri ct of Maryland , at Baltimore
. Richard D. Bennett , District Judge. ( 1:06

- cr - 00179

- RDB

- 7 )

Submitted : November 3, 2010 Decided: November 1 2 , 2010

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.

M . Gordon Tayback, LAW OFFICES OF M. GORDON TAYBACK, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Tonya Kelly Kowitz, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not bind ing precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Sean Sterling appeals his convictions of two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2006)
. On appeal, Sterling cont ends that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he possessed the weapons in furtherance of a heroin conspiracy. We affirm. “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Foster , 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). We review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge by determining whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonab le doubt. United States v. Collins , 412 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005); see Glasser v. United States , 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We review both direct and circumstantial evidence, and accord the Government all reasonable inferences from the facts shown to th ose sought to be established. United States v. Harvey , 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). “[ I ] f the evidence supports different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe[.]” United
States v. Murphy , 35 F.3d 143, 148 ( 4th Cir. 1994). We will uphold the jury’s verdict if substantial evidence supports it,3 and will reverse only in those rare cases of clear failure by the prosecution. Foster After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Sterling’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately expressed in the materials before the court and argument wi ll not aid the decisional process. , 507 F.3d at 244

- 45.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.01

                                 CERTIFICATION

      I, Gary D. Halbert, the President of ProFutures, Inc., as general
partner of ProFutures Diversified Fund, L.P., certify that (i) the Form 10-K/A
for the year ended December 31, 2006 of ProFutures Diversified Fund, L.P..
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Form
10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2006 fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of ProFutures
Diversified Fund, L.P.



                   PROFUTURES DIVERSIFIED FUND, L.P.

                   By:  ProFutures, Inc., general partner



                   By:  /s/ Gary D. Halbert

                        ---------------------------------
                        Gary D. Halbert
                        President
                        April 26, 2007
November 10, 2016

8:30 a.m. Registration

9:00 a.m. Commissioner’s welcome and review of agency developments (Erica Groshen)

9:45 a.m. Changing the sequence of news releases in the Price Programs (Susan Fleck,

 Maurine Haver)

10:15 a.m. Break

10:30 a.m. Redesigning the BLS website (Emily Liddel, David Wessel)

11:30 a.m. Lunch – CIPSEA, Ryan-Murray Commission, NBER activities, Transition activities

 (Erica Groshen, Bill Wiatrowski )

1:00 p.m. Web scraping and a timely repository for fatality data (Steve Pegula, Alex Measure,

 Eric Frumin)

2:00 p.m. Possible new data products in the Consumer Expenditure (CE) and American Time

 Use Surveys (ATUS) (Steve Henderson, Rachel Krantz-Kent, Kathryn Kobe, Randy

 Eberts)

3:00 p.m. Break

3:15 p.m. Program update: Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) (Laurie Salmon) 

4:00 p.m. Meeting wrap-up

Data Users Advisory Committee (DUAC) Meeting 

Agenda
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (76,071,000)
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.21)
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#### Stacey M. Patterson, Respondent, v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority et al., Appellants.

[977 NYS2d 60]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ianacci, J.), entered January 10, 2013, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendants failed to address the plaintiff’s claim that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180 category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The defendants, however, submitted a transcript of the plaintiffs deposition testimony, which established that the plaintiff did not *683miss any time from work as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident *(see Beltran v Powow Limo, Inc.,*98 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2012]; *Jean v Labin-Natochenny,*77 AD3d 623, 624 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have denied the defendants’ motion on that ground. We affirm, however, on a different ground.

One of the defendants’ examining physicians found a significant limitation in the range of motion in the extension of the cervical region of the plaintiffs spine. That physician’s opinion that the injury to the cervical region of the plaintiffs spine was not a result of the subject motor vehicle accident was entirely conclusory *(see Landman v Sarcona,*63 AD3d 690, 691 [2009]; *Powell v Prego,*59 AD3d 417, 419 [2009]). Accordingly, the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]).

Inasmuch as the defendants failed to satisfy their prima facie burden, the denial of their motion was required, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition papers *(see Qader v Babayev,*98 AD3d 1013, 1014-1015 [2012]). Mastro, J.E, Balkin, Sgroi and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 7150** 

KEITH V. HARNED , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v.

SARA REVELL , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of No rth Carolina , at Raleigh

. Louise W. Flanagan , Chief District Judge. ( 5:09

- hc

- 02129

- FL )

Submitted : November 18, 2010 Decided: December 2, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published pe r curiam opinion

.

Keith V. Harned, Appellant Pro Se. Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Keith V. Harned , a fede ral prisoner, appeals the
district court ’ s order dismissing without prejudice his 28

U.S.C. A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) petition. We have
reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly,
we affirm for the reasons stated by the distric t court.

Harned v. Revell , No. 5:09

- hc

- 02129

- FL (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2010)

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Case 2:10-cv-06701-PGS-ES Document 4 Filed 01/13/11 Page 1 of 2 PageID: 45
Case 2:10-cv-06701-PGS-ES Document 4 Filed 01/13/11 Page 2 of 2 PageID: 46
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Chadwick Wayne ACISON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-2506.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 4, 2013.

Filed: March 6, 2013.

Troy K. Stabenow, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Jefferson City, MO (Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellant.

Jim Y. Lynn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

After Chadwick Acison stipulated to having violated his release conditions, the district court1 revoked his supervised release and imposed a sentence of 30 months in prison with no supervised release to follow. Acison appeals, arguing that the court imposed an unreasonable sentence. We disagree. The record shows that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors before imposing a revocation sentence that was authorized by statute and within the applicable Guide*634lines range. *See*18 U.S.C. § 3588(e)(3); *United States v. Petreikis,*551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.2009) (applying presumption of substantive reasonableness to revocation sentence within Guidelines range); *United States v. White Face,*383 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir.2004) (court need not list every 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor when sentencing defendant upon revocation of supervised release).

The judgment is affirmed. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

1

. The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00152-CR

NO. 02-14-00153-CR

DONNELL JUNIOR RANDLES APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NOS. 1179039D, 1312909R

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

In trial cause number 1179039D, the trial court revoked Appellant Donnell 

Junior Randles’s community supervision upon his plea of true to the State’s 

allegation that he violated his community supervision and sentenced him to ten 

years’ confinement for the underlying offense of felony DWI. In trial cause 

number 1312909R, Randles entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court found the 

enhancement allegation true and sentenced Randles to twenty-five years’ 

confinement.

Randles’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw 

and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel avers that in his professional 

opinion, these appeals are frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of 

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 

U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). This court informed Randles that he could file a 

pro se response to the Anders brief, but he did not do so. The State did not 

submit a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with 

counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing 

in the record that might arguably support the appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 
3

684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 23, 2015
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS OF STAGE II APPAREL CORPORATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  11,178
<SALES>                                       16,587
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              16,989
<CGS>                                         14,234
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 20,317
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               932
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (9,339)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      74
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</TABLE>
Administrative Offices Civil and Family Division Criminal Division Jury Office

(512) 854-9457 (512) 854-9457 (512) 854-9420 (512) 854-9669

fax: 854-4744 fax: 854-9549 fax: 854-4566 fax: 854-4457

Velva L. Price

Travis County District Clerk

Travis County Courthouse Complex

P.O. Box 679003

Austin, Texas 78767-9003

July 20, 2015

Mr. Jeffrey D. Kyle

Third Court of Appeals

P.O. Box 12547

Austin, Texas 78711-2547

Dear Mr. Kyle,

A supplemental clerk’s record in cause number, D-1-GN-15000374 and Court of Appeals number 

03-15-00368-CV, styled, LAURA PRESSLEY V. GREGORIO “GREG” CASAR, is due in your 

office today, July 20, 2015. Due to the size of the clerk’s record, it is necessary to split the record 

into three (3) volumes and hand number the second volume. Therefore, I am requesting an extension 

for filing the supplemental clerk’s record by July 27, 2015.

Thank you for your consideration.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (512) 854-4309

Sincerely,

Trish Winkler

Deputy Court Clerk II

(512) 854-4309
#### Bentley *against*Morse.

NEW-YORK,

October, 1817.

Where money, the briD"sanPaction Mmy'aiKl'Te8 theeromissioiohf prod1ifenthenrefence,'a subsetiyTbe ptointüf that if the d<¿ feudant had the receipt, he would refund money, h a morai’oMigation moneyfa¡s íh! oonsidcration. . Where money has been paid, and a receipt taken, and af~

IN ERROR, on *certiorari*to a justice’s court.

The plaintiff in error had an account, for work, against the defendant in error, which the latter paid, and took the receipt the plaintiff in error, for 24 dollars and 90 cents* In Jvo*vember,*1815, the plaintiff in error brought an action against the defendant in error, on his account, and recovered judgment. It did not appear that any defence was made. In December, in the same year, the parties happening to be together, the defendant observed to the plaintiff, that he had paid him a sum of m0nev. and held his receipt for it, (alluding to the receipt above *J*’ , . , - . t. . . . , mentioned.) and had been since compelled to pay him a second 7/ . , 7 time; the defendant denied any knowledge of the payment or of giving a receipt, but promised, that if the defendant had such receipt, he would repay him the amount of it. The present aet-(Qn wag founded on that promise ; and the defendant in error, who was plaintiff in the court below, at the trial, produced the receipt in evidence. The defendant below offered the record of the former judgment in evidence, as a bar to the action, but it was overruled, and a verdict and judgment were, rendered for the defendant in error.

*Per Curiam.*

In consequence of the omission of the defendant in error, to make a defence in the former action against him, and to produce his receipt to show the payment of the debt, he was forever barred from maintaining an action to recover back the money he had paid; and the question now is, * whether the promise to repay the amount of the money expressed in the receipt is valid in law.

The debt having been paid, the recovery in the former action was clearly unjust; and though, in consequence of his neglect, the defendant in error lost all legal remedy to recover back his money ;(a) yet there was such a *moral*obligation, on the part of the plaintiff in error, to refund the money, as would be a good consideration to support an *assy,mpsit*or express pro*473ihise to pay it. The moral obligation is as strong as any m the cases in which it has been held sufficient to revive a debt barred by statute or sortie positive rule of law. It is like the promise of an infant to pay a debt contracted during his non-age, or of an insolvent dr bankrupt to .pay a debt from which he is discharged fey his certificate, (a)

Judgment affirmed.

(a)

**Vide *Jones*v. *Scriven,*8 *Johns, Rep.*453. *White*v. *Ward,*9 *Johns. Rep.*232. *Marriott v. Hampton,*7 *Term. Rep.*269. *Looms*v. *Pulver,*9 *Jahns. Rep.*241.

(a)

 Vide. Secuten i). *Eislord,*7 Johns. *Rep.*36. *Cowp.*544.
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 22 - 0584

_________________ IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: LORI DELOIS GUENTHNER,

Petitioner and Appellee, and NEAL WAYNE GUENTHNER,

Respondent and Appellant. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five - justice panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to Neil Wayne Guenthner, to all co unsel of record , and to th e Honorable Colette B. Davies , District Judge . For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

February 15 2023

02/15/2023
Case Number: DA 22-0584
**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | • | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                combined predecessors of the                Partnership. |
|--------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                          |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Date:              May 9, 2008 |                                                                                                                                                                                                   | /s/ MICHAEL              E. MERCER  |
|                           | Michael                E. MercerChief                Financial Officer of EV Management LLC,general                partner of EV Energy GP, L.P.,general                partner of EV Energy Partners, L.P. |
|                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

----