### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-00-00755-CV
Renee She ree

(Hopper ) O’Caro lan, Appell ant
v. Gary D. Hopper, Appell ee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT

NO. 98-10618, H ONORABLE JOHN K. DIET Z, JUDGE PRESIDING
Appe llantRenee O’ Carolan (“O’Ca rolan”) se eks to reverse the trial cou rt’ s prop er

ty div is ion as rendered

in the fi nal div orce decre e. In

two poin ts of e rror, she con

tend s the tria l court abused i ts di scre tion i n i ts di sproportionate a

ward of the c omm

uni ty property

to appel l ee Ga ry Ho ppe r ( “Ho ppe r” ) a nd in awa rd ingspousal mai ntenance as a

su bs ti tute f or a jus t an

d f ai r di vi si on of t he co mmun it y pr o pe r t y. W e w ill re ver se t he t rial co ur t ’s pr op er t y divisi on a nd r emand for a new pr op er t y divisi

on. Factual

and Procedur al Back

ground T he pa r t ies we r e ma rr ied fo rt we nt y-s ix years be f ore the d ate of the d i vorce . The

re were two chil

dren of the m

arriage;only

one was unde

r age eighteen at the tim

e of the decree.1 All estim ates of earni

ngs and val

ues f or pro perty are drawn

from the parties’ testi

mony at t r ial. The re is no invent or y in the r eco rd . At t he hea ring o n m oti on f or new tri al , cou

ns el f or app ellant claimed t hat a su bpo ena had b een issued f or t he production of f

in anci al records at t rial

but those re co rd s we re not pr od uce d. Co unse l for a ppe llee res po nded t hat he had just disco ver ed t he subpoena i

n the f il e. It appears t hat these records have nev er been produced.
2 T his cond

i tion i s al so kn own a s A rnol d-Ch i ari malfo rmat ion and involves a her niatio n of t he cerebel lum int o t he spi

nal can al , caus i ng a di spl acemen t of the bra i n stem . Dorl and, American Illustrat ed Medical Dictionary 399 (2 2d ed . 1951)
. 3 Dr. W an

da Le pp ard te sti

f i ed at t he mot ion fo r ne w t rial. Ac co rd ingt o t he r eco rd fro m the m oti on f ornew trial

, she h ad tes ti f i ed i n c ha m be rs at the di

vor cehe ari ng , but that te sti

mony wa s n ot rec or ded. She h ad been counsel in g O’Carolan

in connection with dom

estic ab use. They

had discu ssed t he Chiar i diagno sis and it s impact on O ’Car olan. 2 Hopper earned

at least $13 0, 000 in 199 9 and was earni ng be tween $8,000 and $9,000
a mo n th at t he tim

e of the di

vorce. 1 O’ Ca ro lan ha d be en u nemp lo yed fo r five mo nt hs be fo re th e h e ar ingon the

di vorce . Duri

ng th e prev i ous two y

ears , she worke d onl

y part-ti me f or a concessi onai re. Her high

est earnings, $10 .0 0 pe r ho ur , o ccu rr ed in 19 97 a nd 1998. O’Carolan

had
an ass ociate (two- ye ar) degree in fas hion me rchandi si ng. O’Carolan

testifi ed that she had

ne urosurg ery

i n F ebruary

2000 r elated to Ch

i ari Type I malformat ion. 2 O’ Ca ro lan t es t ifi ed th at sh e ex perien ce d sh ort- ter

m mem ory l oss , di f f i cul ty concentratin

g, and m uscle weakness
. 3 Hopper ac kn o wle dg ed t ha t O’ Ca r o lan ha d h ad pr o ble ms in t he pa st r eq ui r ing ki dn ey s ur ge ry, bla dd er su r ge ry, a h yst er ec t o my, an d d isc su r ge ry.

The com m un i ty prope rt y cons iste d o f: a ho use on t wo acr es o f land in Dripp ing Springs, val

ued at $13 0, 000 -1 50, 000 , c ar ryinga debt of $86,000- 87,000; an an nui ty l if e i nsuran ce pol ic y with c ash v

al ue of $10,000-11,000; a 1985 Honda m ot orcycl e val ued at $500; a 199 5 Chev roletCa maro, wit h a net value o f $15 00; a 19 98 C hevr olet picku p wit h a net val ue of $1000; and various i

tems of personal propert y e ither wi

th a mi ni ma l v al ue or not val

ued.3 While m ar ried , t he par t ies had fil

ed fo r ba nkr upt cy, d ischar ging the i r pre-s ep ara

ti on debts. O’Carolan

owed approxim

ately $60,000 for medi

cal expenses in

curred after

she an d Hopper separ ated. Sh e d o es no t hav e a veh icle o r t ele pho ne a nd r ec eive s a ss ist anc e in t he fo rm o f fo o d stamps. The di

vor ce wa s a wa r de d o n no - fau lt gr o un ds
. T he de cr ee aw ar de d t he ho us e, all three veh ic le s, the li

fe i nsuran ce poli cy and n ume r ous items of p er so nal pr op er t y to Ho ppe r. The decree also awa rd ed a ll ret irement funds, IRAs and pensi ons fr o m Ho pp er ’s emp lo yment t o him, al though he had testif

ie d that t hey had n o remai ni ng va lue . O’Carolan

was awarded

va r io us it ems of per so nal pr op er t y. Ho ppe r w as o rd er ed t o p ay the debt agai nst the house an

d veh ic le s as wel

l as any debt he i nc urred a f ter the p arti es’ sep aration. A ny debt O ’C arol

an i nc urred af ter s ep ara ti on was assign ed to her, incl

uding the $60,000 in m

edical expenses. The parties were appoi

nted joint man ag ing co nse rva t o r s o f t he ir s ev en t ee n- yea r - o ld
son an d H o pp er wa s a wa r de d t he r igh t t o de t er mine t he pr inc ipa l re sid en ce o f t he ch ild. No ch ild supp ort was ordered. The trial court ordered Ho pper to pay O’Carolan

spousal supp ort for two y

ears accordin g to the fol

lowi ng sch edul e: $1,000 p er month for three months; $1, 500 per mont h for t he next eigh teen months; and $2,000 per month for t he last t hree months.
Discussion In a divo rc e de cr ee, t he t rial co ur t shall or der a division o f the par t ies’ es t at e in a
ma nne rthat t he court “deems just and right.”

Tex. Fam . Code Ann . § 7.001 (West 1998). Although t he trial court does not have t o d ivide t he co mmunity pro per t y equa lly , it s division must be equi

table
. Zieba v. Mar

tin , 928 S.W.2d 782, 790 (T ex. App .—H ou st on [ 14t h Dist. ] 19 96, no w rit) ; Schuster4 O’Carolan alle ged and testif

ie d concerni

ng Hopper’s abuse and adul tery. Hopper denied th ose al le ga tions. The f

act-fi nder i s the sole

judge of the wei

ght and credi

bi li ty of the ev

ide nce. Simons v. City of Austin , 921 S. W. 2d 52 4, 53 1 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 199 6, wr it d enied) . B eca use t he div orce was granted on no-fa ult grounds, we concl

ud e f au l t w as n ot co n si

dere d i n th e p rop er

ty division. 4 v. Schuster , 690 S.W.2d

644 , 64 5 (T ex . A

pp. —A us ti n 1 985 , no wri

t). Th e tri al cou rt’ s d i screti on is not u nl im ited, and there must be some reasonable bas i s for an une qu al d ivis io n o f t he pr o pe r t y. Zieba , 928 S. W.2d at 79 0. The t rial cour t, in exercisi ng i ts discretion, may

consider man

y f acto rs, including the p ar t ies’ ea rning c apa cities , e duc at ion, business op po rt unit ies, p hysical co ndit ion, fi nan ci al co ndit ion, age , size of se par at e es t at es, nat ur e o f the pr op er t y, and t he bene fits t hat t he spouse who did n

ot cause the b

reakup of the m

arriage woul

d have enj oyed h

ad the ma

r riage continue d. Mu rff v

. Mu rff , 615 S.W.2d696 , 69 9 (T ex. 1 981 ); Walston v. Walston , 971 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. A

pp.—W aco 199 8, pet. de

ni ed). We re view t he trial

cou rt’ s d i v i si on of prope rty usi ng an abuse of dis cretion standard. Mu rff , 615 S. W.2d at 700 ; Walston , 9 71 S. W .2d at 6 91. Le gal

an d f ac tual suf f i ci en cy are not indepe ndent gro unds of error but relevant factors in assess i n g wh ether th e tr i al cou rt a b us ed i ts discr et ion. Doyle v

. Doyle , 95 5 S .W .2d

47 8, 4 79 (Tex . A

pp .—A usti n 19 97 , no pet.). To c on sti tute
an ab us e o f dis cr et io n, t he pr o pe r t y div isio n mu st be man i f estl y unf ai r. See Mann v. Mann , 607 S.W.2 d 243, 2 45 (Tex . 1980)
.

Not only do es a re view o f the record show a to tal ab sence of evi dence to support an unequal div isio n o f pr o pe r t y in Ho pp er ’s fav o r , t he majo r i ty of f actorswou

l d suppor

t a disprop orti

on ate div is ion i n O’C arolan’ s f

avor. Hopper did no t alle ge an y fau lt on O’ Ca rol an ’s pa rt. 4 The pa rties ’ a ge s were roug

h l y th e s am e. There is n

o ev i den ce th at O ’C arol an

h ad an y se pa ra te5 Hop per t es t ified t ha t his a nd O’ Ca r o lan ’s ad ult da ug ht er lives wit h him and h e i s pa ying fo r coll ege. Th

ere w as n o evi den ce c once rni ng th e col l ege a ttende d an

d i ts cost, however. 5 estate. T he r ec o r d s ho ws t ha t Ho pp er ha d a sig nific an t ly greater income, ear ning cap acit y, and busi nessoppor tunities, im

port ant facto rs for consi

derat ion in t he di vis io n o f c o mmunit y pr o pe r t y. SeeFinch v. Finch , 8 25 S .W. 2d 2 18, 222 (T ex. App. —Ho ust on [ 1st Dist .] 199 2, no wri t). Disp ari

ty in ea rning ca pa cit y is g en er ally a fa ct o rwe igh ing in

favo r o f awar ding a d ispro po rt ionat e sha re of t he
com m un i ty to the lower

i nc ome earn er, here O ’Ca

rola n. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas , 525 S.W.2d 200, 202 (T ex. Civ. Ap p.— Ho ust on [ 1st Dist. ] 19 75, no w rit) ; Zieba , 928 S. W.2d at 790-91; Schuster , 690 S.W .2d at 64 5. The re was no e videnc e o f healt h pr oblems o n Ho ppe r’s par t . T he evi dence sh owedthat O’Carolan

suf fered f rom a sev ere brai n m al form ation. The problem s caused by t his br ain malf

o rmat io n a nd it s a t t en da nt su r ge ry wo ul d i mp air O’ Ca r o lan ’s fu t ur e e ar nin g a bilit y. The par t ies have o ne minor child who wa s to li ve wi th Hopper, however, t here was
no evi dence that

the n eeds of the m i nor ch i l d provi ded a

ba si s f or the disproportionate a

ward of t he
com m un i ty es t at e. T he mi

nor chi ld turned ei

ghteen wi thin ten weeks of the en

try of the decree. Al thought he ch ild w as ex pe ct ed t o at t en d o ne mo r e ye ar o f hig h sc ho o l, there was no evi

dence that divest ingO’Ca ro lan of her shar e o f the com m un i ty prope rty wasne ces sary

to provide f

or the support of t he child in view o f Ho ppe r’s ear ning ability. O’C ar olan’ s de monst ra t ed inability t o e ar n a suf f i cien t li vi ng wage c oul d sup

port the trial

court’s f ail ure to awa

rd ch i l d sup port to Hopper. 5 The re is no evi dence that the nature of the property compe ll ed an uneq ual di stri bu ti on in Hopper ’s favor. O’ Car olan o ccu pied t he ho use , t he pr incipal asse t , a t t he t ime of t rial. T he t est imony conc er ning t he value and mark et ability of t he hou se is r at her co nfusing. Appa re nt ly, the6 The t ot al amou nt sche duled t o be paid o ver t he two years, $36,000, appears to be an attempt at awardin

g O’Carolan

more than one-h

al f the equi

ty i n the h ouse. 6 house needed repai

rs, some of them

storm-related and cove

red by in suran ce pro cee ds. How ev er, Hopper had refuse d to a uth ori ze th e ex pen di ture of th at m on ey. H e s ai

d h e h ad b een un ab l e to in spectthe h

ouse c l osel

y enough to sa

tis f y hi m sel f that the repai rs wer e nec essa ry, yet he al so test if ie d about t he de t ails o f t he ne ce ss ar y r ep air s, su gg es t ing fa milia r it y wit h t he pr o pe rt y. Al though the trial courtseem

ed to t hi nk that Hopper was better able to deal w ith s upervi si ng the repai

rs, and perhaps sho uld occupy the h

ouse until hi s son f in is hed h igh sc hool , this coul

d be accom

pli shed i n va rious ways, such as

awardin g occupancy

to Hopper fo ra p er io d o f t ime d ur ing wh ich he co uld supervise t he repairs, and then order in g the pro pert y sold with the pro ceeds to be di vided between the par ties. We n ot e that Hopper had requested t hat the propert y b e sold an d the proceeds div

ide d. It appears that t he trial

court treat ed

spousal maintena nce a s if it wer e pr op er t y and attempted to us e that m ainte nance in li

eu o f awar ding any pr op er t y to O’Ca ro lan. 6 Spousal
ma in tenance, howe

ver, i s n ot property . The

l egi slati ve purp o se i

n en actin g provisi ons f or spousal
ma in tenance was to pro vi

de temporar y an

d rehabili tat iv e suppor t for a spo use who se abilit y for se lfsupp ort is l

acking or has deteriorat ed over t im e while en gaged in h

omemaki ng activi ties and whose capi talass ets are

i ns uf f i cien t to provi de support. SeeAct of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S ., ch. 655, § 10. 01( a), 199 5 Te x. Ge n. Law s 354 3, 3 577 ; see also Bar bar a Ann Kaze n, Division of Property at the Time of Divorce , 49 Ba y l or L. Rev. 41 7, 4 38 ( 19 97 )
. I t is an a wa rd fro m fut ur e inc o me o f a spouse, subj ect t o s t rict re st rict ions, which t er minates on t he death of ei ther party. Tex. Fam . Code7 Spo usal mai n ten an ce i s ta x ab l e to th

e p ay ee sp ous e a n d ded uc ti b l e to the pay or spouse . 2 6 U.S.C.A . §§ 71( a), 215 (a) (W est 198 8).
8 We not e t hat Ho ppe r a sser t s in hi s bri ef that O’Ca rolan co nc ed es in

her bri ef that sh e does notqu ali fy fo rsp o us al ma int en an ce . We findno su ch co nc es sio n. Ho pp er ap pa r en t ly mis read a st at ement co nt aining

a doubl e negati

ve; contrary to Ho pper’s asse rtion, O’Carolan

contends thatshe qualif ie s for spo usa l maintenanc e and asse rt s t hat t he t rial co ur t wo uld have be en wi thi n i ts d i screti on to award her both a sh

are of the comm

uni ty property and spousal

ma in tenance. 7 Ann. §§ 8.001-.305 (We st Supp . 2002)
. 7 Main tenance is l

im ited to not more than three years, unless t he spouse recei

vi ng m ai ntenan ce suf fers f rom an i ncapaci tating phy sical or mental dis abi li ty such that that spous e ca

nn ot support hi

m sel f or hers elf

through appropri ate em ploym en t. Id . § 8.054 . T h e amou nt of mai

ntenance is li

mi ted to the lesser o f $2500 pe r month o r t wenty perc ent o f the payor’s
av erage monthl y gross i nc ome . Id . § 8.055(a). A mai ntenan ce orde r i s s ub j ec t to modif

i ca ti on on a “p ro per showi

ng of a m

aterial and sub stantial

chan ge i n ci rcumstances of ei

ther party.” Id
. § 8.057 (c). The tria

l court awa

rded s pousa l mai nten ance f or twenty

-f our m onths
. Give n O’Caro lan’s

h ea l th pr o ble ms a nd lac k o f e ar nin g c ap ac it y, sh e m ay ha ve be en a p rope r ca nd i da te f or spousal ma in tenance, bu t su ch an aw ar d s ho uld no t be mad e in lieu o f an y int er es t in t he av aila ble
com m un i ty pr o pe r t y. 8 Under t he tr ial cou rt ’s pa

y men t sc h ed ul e, th e $ 20 00per m

on th pa y men t f or t he final thre e mont hs exce ed s tw en ty perce nt of Hopper’ s i

nc ome of $9 , 00 0 p er mo nt h a nd wo uld be subjec t t o mo dificat ion, po t ent ially re duc ingthe am oun t of su pport O’C arol an

rece i ve s. Id
. §§ 8.055(a)(2), 8.057. Sim il arly , if Hopper were to suf

fer a s ubstanti al r ed uc t io n in inc o me, he co uld
move to reduce

supp ort on that b asis. Id. § 8 .057( c) . F i n al l y , un der the tr i al cou rt’ s prop er

ty division, if

Hopper died d ur ingt he pa yment sc hedu le, O ’Car olan w ou ld have no pr op er t y of her ow n, no proce ed s f

rom t he s ale o f co mmunit y pr o pe rt y, no inco me st re am fr o m Ho pp er , ye t st ill be left9 Based o n t he r ec o r d fr o m t he h earin g on the motion f

or newtrial , the court had ex pressed conc ern t o D r. Lep par d in chambe rs t ha t O’ Ca r o lan ’s med ica l co nd it io n c o uld ca us e h er so me pr o ble ms in

ma nagi ng a l ump s um of m oney from the sale proceeds from

the house. However, that conc ern does not lead

t o t he co nclusio n t hat divest ing O’Ca ro lan of her co mmunity pro per t y is the so lut io n t o t ha t po t en t ial p r o ble m. 8 wi th a signifi cantl y i mpa ired ea rni ng capaci ty. In these ci

rcumstances, an awar d o f spousal
ma in tenance leaves O ’Car olan vu lnerable t o a re duc t ion in t he t ot al amou nt of mo ney rec eived in a
wa y th at a f i x ed di v i si on of th e c om m un i ty prope rty wou l d n ot. The court seem

ed to co nsi

der only a roughdollar equiv

al ence b etween

t he eq uit y in t he house and the a

mount of spousal

support, without considerin g t he i r f unda menta lly

different natures and purpo ses. 9 Spousal supp or t is includable a s t axable inco me to t he r ecipient and de du ct ible from

the pay or’s in come, ma kin g i t even m

ore evide nt that t he total sum

of spousal supp ort recei

ved b y O ’Carolan

should not be bal

anced agai

nst the val

ue of co mm

un i ty property awarded to Hopper. Fur t her mor e, t he tim e val ue of m oney le ssen s the worth of support pay abl e over twenty-f our months

as compared to a lum

p sum reali zed from a sale of the property. A revi ewof t he record persuade s us

that awardi

ng a l l of the com

m uni ty property

to Hopper an

d onl y spous al supp ort to O’Ca rola n is m an i f estl y unf ai r. See Mann , 607 S.W.2d at 245.

Conclusion We ho ld that the tria l courtab us ed it s d isc r et io n in a wa r din g o nly sp o us al s up po r t in lieu of a ny

comm uni ty property to O’Carolan. Insuf fi ci ent evi dence supports an un

equal property div i si on in H o pp er ’s fav o r , pe r su ad ing us t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ’s div isio n o f co mmun it y pr o pe r t y is manifestly unfair. Acco rd ingly, we r ever se t hat par t of t he t rial co ur t ’s judg ment a nd rem an d f ora9

new propert y di

vi si on. This

judgm ent does not aff

ect t he disso lut ion o f the marr i ag e or a ny i ss uenot add re ssed in this o pinion.

Bea An n Sm ith, Justice Bef ore Chi ef J

ustice A boussie, Justices

B. A. Sm ith an d Puryear Reversed a

nd Rem anded File d: March 14, 2002 Publish