UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-2010

CHRIS WHITE, 

 Plaintiff − Appellee, 

 v. 

EATON CORPORATION SHORT TERM DISABILITY PLAN; EATON 

CORPORATION LONG TERM DISABILITY 

PLAN, 

 Defendants − Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(8:04-cv-01848-HFF) 

Argued: October 29, 2008 Decided: January 21, 2009 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, and John 

T. COPENHAVER, JR., United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Anna K. Raske, BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF, 

L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Robert Edward Hoskins, 

FOSTER LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey D. Zimon, BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, 

COPLAN & ARONOFF, L.L.P., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

2 
PER CURIAM: 

 This case involves the decision of Eaton Corporation 

(“Eaton”) to terminate the short term disability (“STD”) 

benefits of one of its former employees, Christopher White. 

White received STD benefits under the Eaton Corporation Short 

Term Disability Program (the “Plan”) from June 27, 2003 through 

November 12, 2003, at which time Eaton determined that White was 

capable of returning to work as a machinist and terminated his 

benefits. After exhausting Eaton’s internal appeals process, 

White brought suit in federal district court, arguing that Eaton 

abused its discretion in denying further STD benefits. The 

district court concluded that Eaton did abuse its discretion and 

that White was entitled to further STD benefits. We affirm. 

I. 

 White began working for Eaton as a machinist on January 29, 

2001. He began experiencing back pain in 2002 and underwent 

surgery to repair a herniated disk on August 23 of that year. 

Dr. Michael Kilburn performed the surgery, and by November of 

2002 it appeared that White’s back pain was no longer an issue. 

White’s back pain resumed the following summer, however, and on 

June 26, 2003, he ceased his employment with Eaton. He then 

returned to Dr. Kilburn on July 8, 2003 and again on July 17, 

3 
2003. These visits resulted in Dr. Kilburn providing White with 

a lumbar epidural steroid injection and a work release. 

 On August 19, 2003, White visited Dr. Kilburn again, but 

this time White informed the doctor that he was in litigation 

with Eaton about a possible worker’s compensation claim. Dr. 

Kilburn noted that White was “doing well” and “no longer [had] 

any appreciable pain in his left leg,” but chose to refer him to 

another doctor, Dr. Kevin Kopera, because an appraisal of 

White’s workplace duties was “outside the realm of [Kilburn’s] 

expertise.” (J.A. at 527.) Dr. Kopera evaluated White on 

September 9, 2003 and made the following observations: 

Mr. White was limited greatly in terms of flexion and 

extension at the waist and both of these movements 

tended to aggravate his low back pain. Lateral 

bending in each direction appeared to be less 

restricted but also produced some amount of 

discomfort. . . . Mr. White did have some increased 

symptoms with the left straight leg raise test in a 

sitting position in terms of increased discomfort. 

(J.A. at 592.) These observations led Dr. Kopera to conclude 

that White was suffering from “[c]hronic low back pain with 

lumbar degenerative disc disease and possible residual left 

sided lumbar radiculopathy.” (J.A. at 592.) Concerning White’s 

ability to work, Dr. Kopera observed that White “appear[ed] 

limited in his ability to bend and lift and seems to be limited 

at this point primarily to sedentary work activities.” (J.A. at 

592.) Ten days after the visit with Dr. Kopera, White visited 

4 
his primary care physician, Dr. Oliver Willard, who noted that a 

July 3, 2003 MRI of White’s back showed “recurrent disc 

extrusions left & right of center at L5-S1” and a “[s]mall 

posterolateral disc protrusion L4-5.” (J.A. at 594.) 

 On October 30, 2003, White performed a Functional Capacity 

Evaluation (“FCE”) arranged by the Plan’s Claims Administrator, 

Broadspire Services, Inc. (“Broadspire”). The purpose of the 

FCE was to establish “[White’s] physical status, [as well as] 

restrictions and limitations” on his ability to return to work 

as a machinist. (J.A. at 532.) Importantly, the FCE concluded 

that White “did not demonstrate ability to meet the following 

job demand categories: Walk and Reach Immediate.” (J.A. at 

532.) Despite this observation, the FCE ultimately found that 

White’s “[p]hysical abilities do match the job description of a 

machinist.” (J.A. at 533.) It therefore concluded that White 

“demonstrated the ability to physically return without 

modifications.” (J.A. at 533.) 

 Eaton denied White’s claim for continued STD benefits on 

November 12, 2003, in reliance upon the conclusions of the FCE. 

White exercised his right to appeal this determination, asked 

for additional time to prepare his appeal and submitted 

additional evidence in support of his appeal. This additional 

evidence consisted of affidavits from White and Dr. Kopera, as 

well as medical records from Dr. Kopera, Dr. Willard, and 

5 
physicians at Piedmont Internal Medicine (“PIM”). White also 

submitted his MRI results from 2002 and 2003. 

 Dr. Kopera’s and White’s affidavits both described White’s 

symptoms and concluded that he was unable to return to work. In 

particular, Dr. Kopera noted that White “suffers from a number 

of back problems including degenerative disc disease, left 

lumbar radiculopathy, and severe and chronic back pain.” (J.A. 

at 569.) He concluded that White was “completely and totally 

disabled” based on White’s “physical problems and the side 

effects of his prescription medications.” (J.A. at 573.) 

 White also submitted his MRI from July 3, 2003, the report 

for which stated “[t]here is some degeneration of the L5-S1 disc 

as previously demonstrated with some chronic discovertebral 

changes in the endplates surrounding the L5-S1 disc.” (J.A. at 

604.) In addition, the report remarked that the “L4-5 

demonstrates a very small left posterolateral disc protrusion 

with no nerve root impairment” and that the L5-S1 had “recurrent 

disc extrusions.” (J.A. at 604.) There was also evidence of an 

“asymmetric left posterolateral disc bulge or broad-based disc 

protrusion at this level, which does not appear to impinge on 

the left L5 nerve root in the neutral foramen.” (J.A. at 604.) 

 This information was forwarded to a Broadspire peerreviewer, Dr. Michael Goldman, D.O., for further evaluation. 

Dr. Goldman, who did not examine White personally, concluded 

6 
that White “has no specific neuromuscular or musculoskeletal 

definitions that would contraindicate his returning to 

occupational activities.” (J.A. at 612.) He summarized: 

“Therefore, based on my review of all of the medical records 

available to me, it is my opinion that the medical records as 

reviewed fail to support functional impairment that preclude the 

claimant from returning to his occupational activities from 

11/12/03 to the present time.” (J.A. at 612-13.) 

 By letter dated February 14, 2004, Broadspire informed 

White that it was upholding the original decision to deny 

continuation of his short-term disability benefits. The letter 

stated its conclusion as follows: 

While the affidavits of Dr. Kopera and your client 

state general complications of his medications 

preclude his return to work, there was insufficient 

objective, quantifiable medical evidence presented to 

substantiate this assertion. There were no specific 

neuromuscular, musculoskeletal or cognitive deficits 

confirmed that would preclude your client from 

performing his normal job duties. 

(J.A. at 615.) This letter also informed White of his right to 

a final appeal within 180 days. White again requested 

additional time to appeal, but never filed additional medical 

evidence in support of his claim. On April 16, 2004, as part of 

the final appeal, Broadspire employed another peer reviewer, Dr. 

Robert Ennis, to examine all of White’s medical documentation. 

Dr. Ennis concluded “the claimant’s medical records do not 

7 
support a functional impairment that would prevent him from 

working between 11/13/03 and the present time.” (J.A. at 623.) 

 Finally, Broadspire submitted White’s file to the Medical 

Review Institute of America (MRIoA) for independent review. In 

its May 12, 2004 report, the MRIoA concluded that “[a] review of 

the records does not support the patient’s claim of disability. 

He has continuing complaints of back pain, but multiple physical 

exams have shown limited objective findings. . . . Most 

importantly, the FCE – the best test of his functional abilities 

– demonstrates that he is capable of performing his regular 

work.” (J.A. at 512.) 

 Eaton issued White a final determination letter on June 3, 

2004, upholding Broadspire’s denial of benefits for White 

effective November 13, 2003. The determination letter stated 

its conclusion as follows: 

The objective findings described in the medical 

records, functional capacity evaluation, peer reviews 

and the independent medical reviews do not support a 

finding of ongoing disability which would prevent Mr. 

White from performing the essential duties of his 

regular position as a machinist as of November 13, 

2003. In addition, each medical reviewer of Mr. 

White’s information concluded that the objective 

information did not support a finding that Mr. White 

was unable to perform the essential duties of his job. 

The functional capacity evaluation performed on 

October 30, 2003, specifically concluded that 

“physical abilities do match the job description of 

machinist.” 

8 
(J.A. at 509.) White responded by filing a civil action, under 

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 

U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 1999), on June 10, 2004 in the 

United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. 

On September 4, 2007, the district court entered an opinion and 

order, granting summary judgment in favor of White. The 

district court determined that Eaton abused its discretion by 

relying on the FCE, which the district court claimed suffered 

from an “internal contradiction.” (J.A. at 721.) The district 

court was also troubled by Eaton’s treatment of White’s MRI – it 

noted that “[d]efendants’ rejection of the findings of the 

abnormalities observed above, without any explanation as to why 

they were doing so, was not the result of a deliberate and 

principled reasoning process.” (J.A. at 724.) Consequently, the 

district court ordered Eaton to pay White STD benefits from 

November 13, 2003 onward. (J.A. at 705.) 

II. 

A. 

 We review a district court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment de novo, and we employ the same legal standards applied 

by the district court. Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 

605 (4th Cir. 1999). When, as in this case, an ERISA benefit 

plan vests discretionary authority to make benefits eligibility 

9 
determinations with the plan administrator, a reviewing court 

evaluates a denial of benefits under an abuse of discretion 

standard.1 Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 

232 (4th Cir. 1997). Under this standard, an administrator’s 

decision “will not be disturbed if it is reasonable,” even if we 

“would have come to a different conclusion independently.” Id. 

To be reasonable, the decision must be “the result of a 

deliberate principled reasoning process” and be “supported by 

substantial evidence.” Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 

(4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 

reasonableness inquiry is guided by eight non-exclusive factors: 

(1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and 

goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials 

considered to make the decision and the degree to 

which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary's 

interpretation was consistent with other provisions in 

the plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan; 

(5) whether the decisionmaking process was reasoned 

and principled; (6) whether the decision was 

consistent with the procedural and substantive 

requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard 

relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the 

fiduciary’s motives and any conflict of interest it 

may have.2

 1

 The Plan provides: “The Plan Administrator shall have 

discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits 

and to construe any and all terms of the Plan, including, but 

not limited to, any disputed or doubtful terms.” (J.A. at 496.) 

2

 We note that a conflict of interest can no longer operate 

to reduce the deference given to a fiduciary’s discretionary 

decision to deny benefits. See Champion v. Black & Decker 

(U.S.) Inc., No. 07-1991, slip op. at 8 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2008) 

(Continued) 

10 
Booth v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 342-43 (4th Cir. 

2000). We turn now to the merits of Eaton’s appeal. 

B. 

 In Donovan v. Eaton Corp., 462 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2006), we 

affirmed a district court’s grant of long-term disability 

benefits to another Eaton employee. In that case, as here, 

Eaton claimed that there was a lack of objective evidence of 

disability and denied benefits. Id. at 324-26. We found that 

decision unreasonable, however, because of Eaton’s “wholesale 

disregard” of evidence supporting the employee’s claim. Id. at 

329. Specifically, Eaton focused on a statement by the 

employee’s doctor that suggested she was still capable of 

performing sedentary activities, without addressing a subsequent 

statement by the same doctor in which the doctor determined that 

the employee was totally disabled. Id. We also observed that 

Eaton’s in-house peer reviewers ignored evidence favorable to 

Donovan’s claim, including Donovan’s own statements regarding 

her pain levels and ability to engage in everyday activities. 

Id. at 327. 

 

(addressing the impact of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 

128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008), on our standard of review when a 

conflict of interest exists). When there is a conflict of 

interest, we must apply the abuse of discretion standard and 

treat the conflict of interest as only one factor among the 

several that we examine in a reasonableness determination. Id.

11 
 We believe that this case is substantially similar to 

Donovan. In both cases, Eaton has either failed to elaborate 

on, or outright ignored, evidence favorable to the claimant. 

These deficiencies in the Plan’s decision-making process are 

reflected especially in its treatment of White’s FCE, its 

failure to address conflicting explanations of White’s job 

requirements, and its failure to adequately address medical 

evidence supporting White’s claims. We address each of these 

shortcomings below. 

 First, the Plan relied heavily on White’s FCE in making its 

determination that White was capable of performing his job 

requirements. In the final determination letter provided to 

White, Eaton specifically referenced the FCE: 

The functional capacity evaluation performed on 

October 30, 2003 specifically concluded that “physical 

abilities do match the job description of a machinist. 

Therefore, the evaluee has demonstrated the ability to 

physically return without modifications.” The 

conclusions of the functional capacity evaluation were 

based on the results of objective, physical tests. 

(J.A. at 509.) The FCE’s conclusion that White was capable of 

meeting the job description of a machinist does not comport with 

its actual observations of White’s physical abilities. The FCE 

specifically concluded that White could not fulfill his job’s 

walking requirements, and the FCE’s subsequent determination 

that White could fulfill the requirements of his job is 

12 
irreconcilable with this observation. The Plan made no mention 

of this fact in its final determination. 

 The Plan’s failure to account for the internal 

inconsistencies in the FCE is especially problematic due to the 

reliance placed on the FCE by the medical reviewers who 

evaluated White’s claim. The in-house peer reviews by Dr. 

Goldman and Dr. Ennis both referenced the FCE’s conclusions 

regarding White’s ability to return to work. In his review, 

Dr. Goldman remarked: 

The result of [the FCE] suggested that the claimant 

gave a reliable effort. His functional abilities 

demonstrated that his abilities met specific job 

demands in the following categories: High lift, mid 

lift, low lift, carry up to 20 pounds, push cart up to 

40 pounds, pull cart up to 40 pounds and standing. . . 

. The conclusion was that his physical abilities did 

match the job description of a machinist; therefore 

the claimant had demonstrated the physical ability to 

return without modifications.3

(J.A. at 612.) Dr. Ennis remarked that the FCE “indicate[d] 

that the claimant was able to perform work activities, which 

were consistent with his job description as a machinist . . .” 

(J.A. at 623.) Finally, the opinion provided by the independent 

medical reviewer appears to have given the FCE great weight. It 

explained: “Most importantly, the FCE – the best test of his 

 3

 We note that Dr. Goldman did not mention that the FCE 

demonstrated that White’s abilities did not meet the specific 

job demands in the walking category. 

13 
functional abilities – demonstrates that he is capable of 

performing his regular work.” (J.A. at 512.) None of these 

doctors noted the discrepancies in the FCE or suggested that 

such discrepancies were accounted for in how they incorporated 

the FCE into their ultimate conclusions. And, there is no 

indication that the Plan considered the reviewers’ failure to 

account for the inconsistencies in the FCE when the Plan relied 

on the reviewers’ conclusions in denying White’s claim. 

 Second, Eaton’s final determination also failed to address 

conflicting explanations of White’s job requirements. White’s 

FCE showed that White was capable of lifting one to ten pounds 

constantly, eleven to twenty-five pounds frequently, and twentyone to fifty pounds occasionally. A worksheet completed by 

Eaton’s human resources department stated that White’s job 

required that he lift up to 100 pounds. But, on November 6, 

2003 – less than one week after White’s FCE limited his lifting 

ability to fifty pounds or less – Eaton’s human resources 

department sent an e-mail clarifying that White “in reality” 

never lifted more than fifty pounds. (J.A. at 553.) The e-mail 

was sent by Susan Watts, the same Eaton employee who signed off 

on the original worksheet indicating that White did in fact have 

to lift more than fifty pounds. The final determination recites 

these different descriptions of White’s lifting requirements, 

14 
but fails to acknowledge the clear inconsistency between the 

two. 

 The final determination also failed to even mention White’s 

affidavit, which described his job duties. Specifically, White 

averred: 

As a machinist and production worker I was required to 

set up wheel changes on machine production runs. My 

job entailed was that I was required to lift the 

wheels which weighed up to 100 lbs. with a crane which 

meant I had to climb into the machine, hook the wheel 

up to the crane, and operate the crane to pull the 

wheels out. I was also required to climb up onto 

tables which were approximately four and a half (4 

1/2) feet tall. I was also required to climb onto 

machines that were approximately five (5) feet tall in 

order to get into the machine to change the wheels. I 

was also required to run a machine which required that 

I load the feeder then once the parts move through the 

machine they were then placed in a bin at the end of 

the machine. I was then required to lift that bin and 

place the parts in a drier. Once the parts were dried 

I had to remove them from the drier and put them in a 

bin and move the parts to the next part of production. 

In that job I was required to lift from 50 to 100 lbs. 

and sometimes over 100 lbs. 

(J.A. at 564-65.) The affidavit testimony and the human 

resources worksheet are consistent and clear: White did have to 

lift over 50 lbs. as part of his job. Yet, the final 

determination letter did not mention the affidavit or address 

its impact on the Plan’s decision to credit the November 6 email as the authoritative description of White’s lifting duties. 

The Plan’s failure to explain why it credited the November 6 email instead of the original worksheet is a glaring omission 

15 
considering that, based on his FCE, White would be able to meet 

one of these sets of lifting requirements, but not the other. 

 Third, the Plan’s final determination letter failed 

adequately to address medical evidence in White’s favor. First, 

the final determination contained absolutely no discussion of 

the fact that White had undergone serious back surgery in 2002. 

Cf. Evans v. Eaton Corp., 514 F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (no 

abuse of discretion in a case where Eaton’s reports used a 

“measured tone, which acknowledges Evans’s serious medical 

problems without a hint of dismissiveness”). It also credited 

the independent reviewer’s opinion that White’s MRI findings are 

“unimpressive,” despite the fact that the MRI clearly evidenced 

abnormalities, including “degeneration,” a “very small left 

posterolateral disc protrusion with no nerve root impingement” 

of the L4-5, and an “asymmetric left posterolateral disc bulge 

or broad-based disc protrusion” of the L5-S1. (J.A. at 604.) 

Finally, and significantly, the Plan discounted the affidavit of 

Dr. Kopera. It concluded that “the Affidavit . . . did not 

provide any objective findings of disability.” (J.A. at 509.) 

Dr. Kopera’s affidavit, however, included his diagnosis that 

White “suffers from a number of back problems including 

degenerative disc disease, left lumbar radiculopathy, and severe 

and chronic back pain.” (J.A. at 569.) He also provided a 

rundown of White’s numerous prescription drug medications. 

16 
Eaton’s dismissal of Dr. Kopera’s affidavit cannot be reconciled 

with the Plan’s own medical information requirements. Medical 

diagnoses and medications are objective findings under the terms 

of the Plan.4 

C. 

 In sum, the Plan failed to address evidence favorable to 

White “thoughtfully and at length.” Evans, 514 F.3d at 326. 

It relied on a fundamentally flawed FCE, based its determination 

on a description of White’s lifting duties that was contradicted 

by evidence in the record and disregarded medical evidence 

favorable to White, even though the evidence met the Plan’s own 

definition of “objective findings.” Eaton’s failure to 

seriously engage in a discussion of White’s favorable evidence 

suggests that, as in Donovan, Eaton abused its discretion by 

denying White benefits. See Donovan, 462 F.3d at 329 (finding 

an abuse of discretion where there was a “wholesale disregard” 

of evidence in the claimant’s favor); Glenn v. Metropolitan Life 

Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding an abuse of 

discretion in a case where the administrator “offered no 

 4

 The plan lists the following as examples of objective 

findings: “physical examination findings (functional 

impairments/capacity); diagnostic test results/imaging studies; 

diagnosis; X-ray results; observation of anatomical, 

physiological or psychological abnormalities; and medications 

and/or treatment plan.” (J.A. at 488.) 

17 
18 

explanation for its resolution of [an inconsistency in the 

evidence] or, for that matter, whether it was given any 

consideration at all”), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).5

III. 

 For the above reasons, the district court’s decision 

finding an abuse of discretion by Eaton and granting White 

benefits is hereby 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

 5

 We also note that the final Booth factor – the existence 

of a conflict of interest – weighs in White’s favor because 

Eaton both funds and administers the Plan. See Booth v. Walmart 

Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 2000). “In such a 

circumstance, ‘every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar 

spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a 

dollar in [the employer’s] pocket’.” Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2348 

(quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 

(3d Cir. 1987)). Thus, Eaton was operating under a conflict of 

interest when it denied White’s benefits claim. 

A conflict of interest “should prove more important 

(perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a 

higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision, 

including, but not limited to, cases where an . . . 

administrator has a history of biased claims administration.” 

Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2351. White argues that Eaton has shown a 

history of biased claims administration and that Eaton’s 

conflict of interest should therefore weigh heavily in our 

balancing of the Booth factors. Because we do not consider 

Eaton’s conflict of interest central to our conclusion that it 

abused its discretion in denying White’s benefits, we decline to 

address how much importance to give the conflict in this case.