[Cite as Powell v. Owens, 2022-Ohio-666.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Dietra M. Powell, : 

 

 Petitioner-Appellant, : No. 21AP-388 

 (C.P.C. No. 21DV-862) 

v. : 

 (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Lance G. Owens, : 

 

 Respondent-Appellee. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 8, 2022 

 

On brief: Dietra M. Powell, pro se. Argued: Dietra M. 

Powell. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

NELSON, J. 

{¶ 1} It certainly may be that Petitioner-Appellant Dietra M. Powell is not entitled 

to the civil protection order that she seeks against Respondent-Appellee Lance G. Owens. 

But because the trial court erred both in cutting off entirely the testimony of the one witness 

Ms. Powell sought to call (other than herself) at the hearing on the matter and in refusing 

to allow Ms. Powell even to offer the documentary evidence she sought to present, we are 

not in a position at this stage to assess the merits of the trial court's denial of Ms. Powell's 

petition. We will remand the matter to permit evaluation on the basis of a more complete 

record. 

{¶ 2} We glean from the hearing transcript that Ms. Powell and Mr. Owens had a 

brief relationship that produced a child, and that Mr. Owens's wife has obtained a civil 

protection order against Ms. Powell. Ms. Powell accuses Mr. Owens of "stalking" her, and 
No. 21AP-388 2 

claims to be in fear for her physical safety and that of her daughter. Her concerns arise 

against the backdrop, she says, of threatening texts from a year earlier that allegedly 

included depictions of guns with high-capacity magazines and a warning that "he was going 

to shoot up the car if he seen me in a car with another person." See, e.g., July 21, 2021 Tr. 

at 6 (Ms. Powell's opening statement: "Lance Owens was stalking me" [in May of 2021, the 

month her petition was filed]), 25 (Ms. Powell's testimony of alleged threats from February 

of 2020). 

{¶ 3} Ms. Powell represented herself at the July 2021 hearing on her May 17, 2021 

petition and on another, overlapping petition that is not at issue here; Mr. Owens was 

represented by counsel. When Ms. Powell summoned a witness to testify to the content of 

a May 2021 telephone conversation that she represented as having been between herself 

and Mr. Owens with the third party also on the line, Mr. Owens's lawyer objected that the 

witness was not in a position to identify his client as the male participant in the 

conversation: The witness had not known Mr. Owens at the time. See Tr. at 13-14; compare 

id. at 11 (Ms. Powell had asked the witness to initiate a call to a number that Ms. Powell said 

was that of Mr. Owens), 14 (Ms. Powell explains that "she was a witness to a conversation 

on the phone that we had between me and Lance Owens"). The trial court sustained the 

objections, noting that the witness "wouldn't be able to testify to even the conversation that 

you are saying to be able to even know firsthand that it was him." Id. at 16 (with Ms. Powell 

protesting that "[w]e had a very detailed conversation. Lance answered to his name in this 

conversation"). 

{¶ 4} Ms. Powell reiterated that her witness "was on the phone on three-way and is 

my witness that listened to Lance threaten me on this conversation. I am just trying to 

make a point that I do have a witness to him threatening me in this conversation." Id. at 

17. Having sustained the objection to questions about the speaker's identity, the trial court 

then shut down the entire (proposed) testimony about the substance of the call. "Is that 

[allegedly threatening telephone conversation] the extent of what you had her here to testify 

for?", the trial court asked Ms. Powell. Id. at 18. Advised that it was, the trial court turned 

to the witness (by Zoom) and said: "Okay. All right. Ma'am, there is no further questions 

for you at this time. * * * * [Y]ou are free to go." Id. at 18. 
No. 21AP-388 3 

{¶ 5} The fact that the witness did not know Mr. Owens (or whoever the male 

speaker was) does not mean that she was not a direct witness to what was said. Ms. Powell 

(who knew Mr. Owens intimately) later testified that she had called Mr. Owens and that he 

was the male on the line. But by that point, the trial court had precluded Ms. Powell's friend 

from providing her account of what was said in the call (as opposed to who the participants 

were) and had abruptly dismissed that witness. We are left not knowing what the witness 

would have said about the alleged threats (and whether, for example, the witness would 

have provided nuance or context that might have reflected a direct and immediate threat of 

physical harm in a way that Ms. Powell's own account of the conversation, with its 

references to what might be taken as threats of financial "ruin," failed to convey). Under 

these circumstances, we can identify no evidentiary bar to a witness providing a first-hand 

account of what she heard, while leaving identification of the other speaker to Ms. Powell. 

{¶ 6} Ms. Powell then took the stand herself. Among other things, she made 

reference to a DVD showing images of texts received from Mr. Owens's telephone the year 

before (with Ms. Powell not wanting to lose her own cell phone through placing it into 

evidence), and to printed copies of text messages also from 2020 and perhaps 2021. See id. 

at 19-25, 26 ("He sent me text messages in 2020 as well as in 2021"). After testifying that 

"I am in fear of physical harm from Lance," Ms. Powell referenced the 2020 pictures of the 

guns as "leading up to the conversation that we had" on May 13, 2021 that "made me file 

the protection order [petition]" on May 17, 2021. Id. at 25. The trial court, without inquiring 

whether she had more information to provide, then told Ms. Powell, "All right. Thank you," 

and called upon Mr. Owens's lawyer to conduct cross-examination. Id. 

{¶ 7} At some point, the lawyer advised the trial court: "[T]he point I'm making is 

that she is saying that she has text messages and she has emails from my client, yet there is 

a court order saying that the only way she is supposed to communicate with my client is by 

OFW [a family scheduling platform]." Id. at 39. After Ms. Powell responded, "Your client 

communicated with me," the trial court cut her off: "Right. Hold on, ma'am," and then 

declared: "She didn't submit any evidence of that. The only text messages she talked about 

were from 2020." Id. Ms. Powell tried to explain: "No, Your Honor. I have - -," and the 

trial court told her: "Hold on. I'm talking. But there were no text messages entered into 

evidence." Id. Returning to the point in a bit, the trial court said: "But she didn't present 
No. 21AP-388 4 

any evidence of any text messages," and eventually invited Mr. Owens's counsel to resume 

his cross-examination. Id. at 40-41. 

{¶ 8} The trial court then ruled that it was too late for Ms. Powell to offer any 

documents. Ms. Powell: "Hold on, Your Honor. I do have text messages from the 

defendant." Id. at 41. The Court: "No. This is not - - you already - - you had your 

opportunity for direct. We are just on cross-examination right now." Id. As we already 

have noted, however, the record does not reflect that Ms. Powell ever was afforded the 

opportunity to say that she had concluded her direct examination of herself. And when Mr. 

Owens's lawyer told the court that he was done with his cross-examination, the trial court 

ended Ms. Powell's testimony and the presentation of her case. Id. at 48-49 (after Mr. 

Owens's lawyer said, "I have no further questions," the trial court inquired of Ms. Powell: 

"Ma'am, you don't have any other witnesses?" Ms. Powell began to respond: "No, ma'am. 

All I had was the lady that - -." And the trial court then promptly launched into its ruling 

denying the requested civil protection orders and terminating the temporary civil 

protection orders that the court had issued ex parte on May 17 and May 27, 2021); see also 

July 22, 2021 Entry Denying Petition for Civil Protection Order. 

{¶ 9} On appeal, Ms. Powell advances one assignment of error: "The trial court 

erred and abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's action." Appellant's Brief at 4. Her 

argument is that the trial court "should have granted CPO due to evidence Dietra Powell 

tried to present to [the] trial court[]." Id. at 6. After all, she urges, she had "presented the 

defen[s]e attorney with copies of text messages and video audio as the trial court instructed 

parties to [do] * * * along with named witnesses. During testimony of appellant, Dietra 

Powell, stated to the trial court she would like to present the court[] with the text messages 

and video but she was denied by the trial court Judge." Id. She also cited as precedent a 

case in which a court granted a protective order "due to evidence of text messages, 

statements, testimony and video presented to the court." Id. at 8. Mr. Owens did not file 

an appellee's brief or otherwise seek to participate here. 

{¶ 10} We do not know the extent to which the testimony of Ms. Powell's telephone 

call witness would have been admissible or probative had the trial court allowed direct 

examination to go forward in the normal course. We do know the fact that the witness was 
No. 21AP-388 5 

not familiar at the time with Mr. Owens does not itself render her incapable of testifying as 

to the substance of the conversation she heard. 

{¶ 11} We do not know the extent to which the documents that Ms. Powell sought 

to identify and present at the hearing would have been admissible or probative had the trial 

court not short-circuited Ms. Powell's examination of herself or precluded her from further 

identifying the materials she sought to introduce during her hearing. We do know that Ms. 

Powell was not given a full opportunity to document her case. 

{¶ 12} Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion with broadly preclusive 

evidentiary rulings that were at best premature and impeded both reasoned resolution of 

the petitions and meaningful review of the result, we sustain Ms. Powell's single assignment 

of error. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, and remand the matter to that court for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision to determine whether Ms. Powell establishes that 

Mr. Owens by threat of force placed her in fear of imminent serious physical harm or 

otherwise engaged in conduct that would trigger a civil protection order. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur. 

NELSON, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned 

to active duty under the authority of the Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 6(C). 

___________________