United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2015*

Decided July 22, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3802

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ARTANADA A. WHITE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division.

No. 3:97‐CR‐27 RLM

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

Artanada White challenges the denial of his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

for a reduced sentence. This is not the first time that the district court has rejected

White’s request for a reduced sentence based on guidelines amendments. When White

filed his most‐recent motion, the court relied on misstatements in the probation office’s

report and repeated by the government, and ruled that White was ineligible for a

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐3802    Page 2

sentence reduction. Because White may be eligible for a reduced sentence, we vacate the

decision and remand for further proceedings.

White was convicted in 1997 of distributing and conspiring to distribute crack

cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1); 846 (1994). In the presentence report, a

probation officer attributed to White more than 18 kilograms of crack and also

recommended a 4‐level upward adjustment for playing a leadership role in the

conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(1), 3B1.1(a) (1997). The sentencing court rejected

both positions. Rather than calculate the precise drug quantity, the court decided only

that White was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack. There had been testimony

at trial that White sold more than 18 kilograms. See United States v. White, 151 F.3d 1034,

1998 WL 447303, at *1, *3–4 (7th Cir. 1998) (nonprecedential disposition) (granting

appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

and dismissing appeal). The district court acknowledged that the drug quantity likely

exceeded 1.5 kilograms but noted that this quantity was enough under the existing

guidelines to assign White the highest base offense level under § 2D1.1. The sentencing

court imposed no increase for leadership role, leaving White with a total offense level of

38 rather than the 42 calculated by the probation officer. A level of 38 combined with

White’s Category VI criminal history yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 360

months to life, and the court imposed a total of 420 months.

In 2007 the Sentencing Commission retroactively adjusted the base offense levels

in § 2D1.1(c) for most offenses involving crack. See U.S.S.G. App. C, vol. III, amends. 706,

711. In a letter to the district court, White requested a sentence reduction and

appointment of counsel. The court appointed a lawyer, but that attorney withdrew on

the representation that White was ineligible for a sentence reduction. Counsel reasoned,

based on the 18 kilograms of crack attributed to White in the presentence report, that the

revisions to § 2D1.1(c) could not benefit him. The district court then denied White’s

requested reduction with the explanation that White’s “sentencing range remains the

same after the amendments.” White filed but abandoned an appeal from that decision,

and he did not seek a sentence reduction when § 2D1.1 was again amended in 2010 and

2011 in response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111‐220. See U.S.S.G.

App. C., vol. III, amends. 748, 750.

Then in November 2014 the guidelines were amended a third time, and White

filed the pro se § 3582(c)(2) motion underlying this appeal. This time he requested a

sentence reduction based on Amendments 782 and 788, which retroactively lowered

by 2 the base offense level for all drug crimes covered by § 2D1.1, and increased
No. 14‐3802    Page 3

to 25.2 kilograms the quantity of crack required for a base offense level of 38. See U.S.S.G.

Supp. to App. C, amends. 782, 788.

In response to this motion, a probation officer asserted, in an addendum to the

presentence report, that at White’s sentencing in 1997 the district court had “found the

defendant to be responsible for the distribution of approximately 18 kilograms of

cocaine base.” On that basis the probation officer concluded that White’s total offense

level had dropped from 42 to 40. In fact, though, the various retroactive amendments

including those in 2014 had reduced the base offense level for 1.5 kilograms of crack

to 32, and the imprisonment range for White, if based on that quantity, would be 210

to 262 months. Yet the probation officer reported to the district court that, with a revised

offense level of 40, White’s imprisonment range remained at 360 months to life. The

government overlooked the probation officer’s mistake in saying that the sentencing

court had found the drug quantity to be “approximately 18 kilograms.” Instead the

government joined in asserting that White was not eligible for a sentence reduction. The

district court denied White’s motion, reasoning that the imprisonment range had not

changed. The court did not say whether this conclusion rested on a redetermination of

the drug quantity.

The government concedes that a remand is necessary because the miscues by the

probation officer and its own lawyer apparently misled the district court into thinking

that White’s imprisonment range could not have changed. We agree with the

government’s concession.

White may be eligible for a sentence reduction. If a defendant was sentenced

based on a guidelines range that later was lowered by the Sentencing Commission, the

district court has discretion under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce the sentence. United States v.

Taylor, 778 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1189–90

(7th Cir. 2012). In determining whether a defendant’s guidelines range has been

lowered, the court must apply any retroactive amendments while leaving all other

applications of the guidelines unchanged. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b); United States v.

Stevenson, 749 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wren, 706 F.3d 861, 862–63

(7th Cir. 2013). By relying on the probation officer’s addendum, the district court did not

do that. Like the original presentence report, the addendum attributes to White

18 kilograms of crack and a 4‐level upward adjustment for acting as a leader. But the

sentencing court had explicitly stopped counting at 1.5 kilograms and rejected the

recommended 4‐level increase.
No. 14‐3802    Page 4

In ruling on White’s motion, the district court could have revised its factual

finding about the quantity of crack attributed to White, as long as the revised finding

was supported by the record and consistent with the sentencing judge’s initial

determination. See United States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010). But the court’s

order does not suggest that its decision rests on a reassessment of the drug quantity

rather than acceptance of the probation officer’s inaccurate addendum. We don’t know

whether White is eligible for a sentence reduction, but the government acknowledges

that he probably is. Even if the district judge had not stuck with the original finding of

1.5 kilograms, a revised finding of 25.2 kilograms—significantly above the probation

officer’s initial estimate of 18 kilograms—would be necessary for White’s imprisonment

range to remain unchanged. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1)(2014). And if the district court

finds White responsible for the same quantity as at sentencing—1.5 kilograms—then his

amended guidelines range would be 210 to 262 months. Where exactly the new range

falls is for the district court to decide on remand.

Accordingly, the order denying White’s motion under § 3582(c)(2) is VACATED,

and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.