Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1502-CR-78 | July 22, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

C. Brent Martin

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Roger Pringle,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 22, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

03A01-1502-CR-78

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Circuit Court; the Honorable 

Stephen R. Heimann, Judge;

03C01-1109-FD-5086

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1502-CR-78 | July 22, 2015 Page 2 of 5

[1] Roger Pringle appeals the denial of his motion for permission to file a belated 

appeal. As Pringle was not diligent in pursuing relief, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 5, 2012, Pringle agreed to plead guilty to burglary. On April 4, 2012,

the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Pringle to eighteen years 

incarceration. On June 4, 2012, Pringle, acting pro se, asked for a transcript of 

his guilty plea hearing and the record of proceedings. The trial court denied the 

motion on the ground there was “no action pending before the court requiring 

such a record.” (App. at 6.) On July 31, 2012, Pringle, still pro se, filed a 

motion for sentence modification. The trial court denied the motion without a 

hearing. On November 26, 2012, Pringle filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief.1

 Pringle listed as grounds for relief, among other things, 

“Sentencing errors,” (id. at 139), and he requested appointment of counsel. 

[3] On September 15, 2014, Pringle, by counsel, filed his verified Motion for 

Permission to File a Belated Notice of Appeal. The State objected, and the trial 

court denied his motion. 

Discussion and Decision

[4] When, as here, the trial court does not hold a hearing on a motion to file a 

belated notice of appeal, we are reviewing the same information available to the 

 

1

 Neither party directs us to anything in the record that indicates whether or how the court ruled on the 

petition. 
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trial court. Therefore, we review de novo the ruling on such a motion.2

 St. Clair 

v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 2009). 

[5] Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2 provides:

An eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of guilty may 

petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of appeal 

of the conviction or sentence if; (1) the defendant failed to file a timely 

notice of appeal; (2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not 

due to the fault of the defendant; and (3) the defendant has been 

diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal 

under this rule. 

[6] The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he was without fault in the delay of filing and was diligent in pursuing a 

belated appeal. Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 422-23 (Ind. 2007), reh’g 

denied. There are no set standards of fault or diligence, and each case turns on 

its own facts. Id. at 423. Several factors are relevant to the defendant’s 

diligence and lack of fault in the delay of filing. These include the defendant’s 

level of awareness of his procedural remedy; the defendant’s age, education,

 

2

 The State asserts a ruling on a petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal under PostConviction Rule 2 is to be affirmed “unless it was based on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual 

determination (often described in shorthand as ‘abuse of discretion’),” (Br. of Appellee at 6) (quoting 

Moshenek v. State, 868 N.E.2d 419, 423-24 (Ind. 2007)). But that is not our standard for review of this case, as 

no hearing was conducted. Moshenek was explicit that when there is no hearing our review is not so 

deferential: 

The trial court is in a better position to weigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, 

and draw inferences. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). In Baysinger [v. 

State, 835 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)], the trial court did not hold a hearing before 

denying the defendant’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. 835 

N.E.2d at 224. The Court of Appeals owed no deference to the trial court’s factual 

determinations because they were based on a paper record. 

Id. at 424. 
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and familiarity with the legal system; whether the defendant was informed of 

his appellate rights; and whether the defendant committed an act or omission 

that contributed to the delay. Id. 

[7] We acknowledge evidence Pringle is not well-educated. He dropped out of 

school in tenth grade and had been in special education classes due to learning 

disabilities. Still, we cannot find the trial court erred to the extent it determined 

Pringle was not diligent in pursuing permission to file a belated appeal. 

[8] At Pringle’s guilty plea hearing he was told a person who pleads guilty gives up 

the right to appeal the conviction but retains the right to appeal his sentence. 

Pringle was asked if he understood that, and he said he did. Pringle signed a 

Waiver of Rights document that advised him he was not waiving his right to 

appeal his sentence. He discussed the document with his counsel and he 

testified he did not have any questions about it. Pringle was aware of his appeal 

rights even though he was not again advised of those rights at his sentencing 

hearing. 

[9] The record does not reflect Pringle planned to challenge his sentence on direct 

appeal. Two months after he was sentenced, Pringle requested a transcript of 

his guilty plea hearing and the “record of proceedings.” (App. at 6.) In its 

Order denying permission to file the belated notice of appeal, the trial court 

found Pringle’s objective for requesting the transcript and record was not to 

appeal his sentence but to prepare a petition for post-conviction relief. 
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[10] Over three months after he was sentenced, Pringle filed a motion for sentence 

modification, but did not attempt to appeal the sentence. Almost eight months

after sentencing, Pringle petitioned for post-conviction relief. He raised a 

number of claims, one of which was “sentencing errors” in the form of an 

allegation the prosecutor3 used as an aggravator the fact Pringle was on welfare. 

The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects the trial court did not use that 

as an aggravator. 

[11] Pringle had substantial familiarity with the legal system, which our Supreme 

Court recognized in Moshenek as a factor in determining diligence and lack of 

fault in the delay of filing. 868 N.E.2d at 423. While he has apparently never 

brought a direct appeal, he had numerous felony and misdemeanor convictions 

in Indiana and elsewhere. Pringle was aware of his right to appeal his sentence 

and had extensive experience with the criminal justice system, but he did not 

seek permission to file a belated appeal for over two years after he was 

sentenced. The trial court did not err in denying Pringle’s motion and we 

therefore affirm.

[12] Affirmed. 

Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

 

3

 In the petition, “Judge Munroo” [sic] is crossed out and “prosecutor” is handwritten in its place. (App. at 

143.)