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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 14-CF-87

JAMAL RANDELL SOLOMON, APPELLANT,

V. 

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CF2-16-13)

(Hon. Ronna Lee Beck, Trial Judge)

(Submitted March 31, 2015 Decided July 23, 2015)

Ian A. Williams was on the brief for appellant.

Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, 

and Elizabeth Trosman, Laura Coates, and Stratton C. Strand, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and KING, 

Senior Judge.

FISHER, Associate Judge: The District’s unlawful possession of a firearm 

(“UPF”) statute prohibits any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable 

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing a firearm. 

D.C. Code § 22-4503 (a)(1) (2012 Repl.). A recent amendment to the Youth 
2

Rehabilitation Amendment Act of 1985 (“Youth Act”) extended this prohibition to 

persons whose convictions have been set aside under the Youth Act. D.C. Code 

§ 24-906 (f)(8) (2012 Repl.). After this amendment took effect, Jamal Solomon 

was arrested for and convicted of UPF; his prior conviction for unauthorized use of 

a vehicle (“UUV”), D.C. Code § 22-3215 (b), (d) (2001), which had been set aside 

pursuant to the Youth Act, served as the predicate felony. Because his UUV 

conviction had been set aside before § 24-906 (f)(8) was enacted, Solomon 

contends that, as applied to him, the provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of 

the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On January 3, 2008, Solomon pled guilty to one count of UUV. Under the 

Youth Act, the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment but suspended 

execution of that sentence, placing him on supervised probation. After finding that 

Solomon had successfully completed the conditions of his probation, on July 16, 

2009, the court ordered that he “be unconditionally discharged from the imposed 

sentence” and set aside his conviction. 
3

In 2011, the Council of the District of Columbia amended the Youth Act, 

expressly permitting a set-aside conviction to serve as a predicate crime for UPF. 

D.C. Code § 24-906 (f)(8) (“A conviction set aside under this section may be used 

. . . [i]n determining whether a person has been in possession of a firearm in 

violation of [the UPF statute].”). After his arrest on January 1, 2013, Solomon was 

charged with firearm-related crimes, including one count of UPF. Solomon moved 

to dismiss the UPF charge on ex post facto grounds, but the trial court denied his 

motion. A jury trial ensued, and appellant was found guilty of UPF and possession 

of an unregistered firearm.

II. The Youth Act Amendment

Solomon contends that the 2011 amendment to the Youth Act retroactively: 

(1) redefined his past “legally innocent” conduct—his set aside UUV conviction—

as an element of a crime, (2) reinstated his exposure to punishment for his UUV 

conviction, and (3) transformed the UUV conviction from an event with no 

evidentiary value to proof of an element of a crime. “We review this constitutional 

law question de novo.” Jones v. United States, 719 A.2d 92, 93 (D.C. 1998) 

(referring to claim of ex post facto violation). 
4

A. The Ex Post Facto Clause

“[A] law violative of the ex post facto clause may be identified by two

critical elements; it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring 

before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” 

Dean v. United States, 938 A.2d 751, 770 (D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). 

However, “every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law,” Calder v. Bull, 

3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798) (emphasis added), and “[n]ot all changes in law which are 

disadvantageous to a defendant violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,” Thomas v. 

United States, 50 A.3d 458, 465 (D.C. 2012). 

“Ex post facto law” is a term of art limited to the following four categories 

of laws: “1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, 

and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. 

Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 

committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 

punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law 

that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, 

than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 

convict the offender.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 
5

37, 41-52 (1990) (the four types of laws identified in Calder are an exhaustive list 

of ex post facto laws).

B. The Amendment Is Prospective

The Youth Act amendment applies to offenders who committed their 

predicate crimes both prior to and after its enactment. However, the former youth 

offender is not exposed to criminal liability unless he possesses a firearm after the 

effective date of the amendment. The amendment therefore operates 

prospectively, giving youth offenders whose convictions were set aside fair 

warning of the UPF statute’s expanded proscription. See Carmell v. Texas, 

529 U.S. 513, 566 (2000) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause . . . serves to assure that 

legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on 

their meaning until explicitly changed.” (citation omitted)). In this case, Solomon 

received constructive notice that he was not to possess a firearm as of June 3, 2011, 

the amendment’s effective date. In spite of this notice, he chose to possess a 

firearm on January 1, 2013, and was thereafter prosecuted for his post-amendment 

conduct. 
6

Notwithstanding this fair warning, Solomon contends that the setting aside 

of his UUV conviction constituted official assurance that his prior conviction was 

“forgiven” and therefore could not be used against him in the future to prove an

element of UPF. We disagree. The set-aside did not in any sense “forgive” his 

past conduct. It was not a pardon. Moreover, at the time he pled guilty to UUV, 

Solomon knew or should have known that a set-aside conviction could be used to 

his detriment for a variety of purposes, including to determine whether he had

committed a second or subsequent offense for purposes of imposing a recidivist 

penalty, to determine the appropriate sentence for any subsequent crime, and for 

impeachment purposes. See D.C. Code § 24-906 (f)(1)-(6) (effective June 8, 

2001). Because a set-aside conviction could already be used as a “prior” 

conviction for purposes of a subsequent offense, the Council likewise determined 

that it could serve as a “prior” conviction under the UPF statute. D.C. Council, 

Report on Bill 18-963 at 8 (Dec. 1, 2010).

When his conviction was set aside, Solomon had no legitimate, or 

enforceable, expectation that the Council, in its legislative discretion, would not 

change the law in a way that restricted his future conduct. See Cases v. United 

States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942) (legislature may, without offending the 

prohibition against ex post facto laws, restrict an individual’s right to engage in 
7

future activity because of his past conduct, so long as the past conduct can 

reasonably be said to indicate unfitness to engage in the future activity); Jordan v. 

State, 56 S.W.3d 326, 332 (Tex. App. 2001) (legislature did not violate the Ex Post 

Facto Clause when it amended an existing felon-in-possession statute, which 

applied exclusively to persons convicted of violent felonies, to also prohibit any 

person convicted of a non-violent felony from possessing a firearm).

Regardless of whether Solomon’s prior conviction was “forgiven” for some 

purposes,

1

the Council retained the right to enact a new forward-looking law 

establishing a new crime or revising an existing one. See United States v. Brady, 

26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 1994) (no ex post facto violation where felon possessed a 

firearm in contravention of a felon-in-possession statute, even though his felony 

conviction preceded enactment of the statute); State v. Banta, 544 A.2d 1226, 1238 

(Conn. 1988) (felon-in-possession statute was not an ex post facto law; although 

 

1

 The purpose of the Youth Act “is to provide rehabilitation opportunities 

for deserving young adult offenders between the ages of 18 and 22.” 

D.C. Council, Report on Bill 6-47 at 2 (June 19, 1985). The Act’s set-aside 

provision “allows a successfully rehabilitated individual to start anew without the 

stigma of a conviction.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 18-963 at 8 (Dec. 1, 2010). 

It, for example, gives a former youth offender “the right to lawfully state on an 

application for school or employment that he/she has not been convicted of a 

crime.” Id. at 7. 
8

the defendant’s prior conviction preceded the enactment of the statute, the 

criminalized conduct—his possession of a pistol—did not). 

C. The Amendment Does Not Fit Within the Calder Categories

Even assuming that the Youth Act amendment operates retroactively by 

enlarging the uses that may be made of a set-aside conviction, Solomon has 

nevertheless failed to demonstrate that it disadvantages him in a manner prohibited 

by the Calder categories. It did not “make[] an action, done before the passing of 

the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. 

Solomon possessed the firearm after the 2011 amendment and, although he 

committed and was convicted of UUV before the amendment, his unauthorized use 

of a vehicle was not “innocent when done.” See D.C. Code § 22-3215 (b)

(prohibiting unauthorized use of a vehicle). That his conviction was eventually set 

aside does not change our analysis. A set-aside does not amount to an acquittal,

nor does it “alter the fact of conviction”; it merely “shields it from public view and 

effect.” Lindsay v. United States, 520 A.2d 1059, 1063 (D.C. 1987). 

Nor does the amendment “aggravate[] a crime, or make[] it greater than it 

was, when committed,” or “inflict[] a greater punishment, than the law annexed to 
9

the crime, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. In arguing to the contrary, 

appellant mistakenly asserts that § 24-906 (f)(8) inflicted additional punishment for 

his set-aside UUV conviction. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 613 (2003) 

(defining the second Calder category as a statute that inflicts punishment where the 

party was not, by law, liable to any punishment); Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 

249-50 (2000) (defining the third Calder category as barring “enactments which, 

by retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its 

commission”). However, the Youth Act amendment does not impose punishment 

for the offense underlying a set-aside conviction; instead, it imposes a forwardlooking firearms restriction on a class of former youth offenders. Because 

Solomon chose to possess a firearm, in contravention of this restriction, he was 

prosecuted and punished for his post-enactment conduct—not for his UUV. 

Lastly, because the Youth Act amendment preceded Solomon’s possession 

of a firearm, it simply could not have altered or changed the evidence required to 

convict at the time of the offense. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 390. The burden of 

proof and evidentiary standards at the time of the UPF offense remained the same 

through the time of prosecution. In a sense, perhaps, the Youth Act amendment 

did “transform” Solomon’s UUV conviction from an event with no evidentiary 

value to proof sufficient to establish an element of a crime. However, doing so did 
10

not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause because, as stated above, legislatures are 

permitted to impose future restrictions due to past behavior. 

Because the 2011 amendment to the Youth Act neither operates retroactively 

nor otherwise fits within the Calder categories, applying it to appellant did not 

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The trial court, therefore, properly denied 

Solomon’s motion to dismiss the UPF charge.

III. Conclusion

 

The judgment of the Superior Court is

 Affirmed.