IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1584

Filed July 22, 2015

DEBORAH A. McHOSE,

Petitioner-Appellee,

vs.

PROPERTY ASSESSMENT APPEAL BOARD,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P. 

McLellan, Judge.

The Property Assessment Appeal Board appeals from the district court’s 

reversal of its appeal decision, affirming the board of review’s modified property 

assessment. REVERSED. 

Jessica Braunschweig-Norris and Brad Hopkins of Iowa Property 

Assessment Appeal Board, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas G. Ross of Thomas G. Ross Law Office, Des Moines, for 

appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.

The Property Assessment Appeal Board (PAAB) appeals from the district 

court’s reversal of its appeal decision on judicial review, which affirmed the board 

of review’s modified property assessment. The district court erred in concluding 

substantial evidence did not support the PAAP’s ruling; we therefore reverse. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Deborah McHose protested her property’s 2013 assessment in the 

amount of $106,800 to the Polk County Board of Review, claiming it was 

assessed for more than authorized by law under Iowa Code section 

441.37(1)(a)(2) (2013). The board of review granted the protest in part, reducing 

the total assessment to $103,000.

McHose then appealed to the PAAB, asserting the value of her 

condominium was $71,900—the 2013 purchase price of the unit. At the 

contested-case hearing, McHose—a Coldwell Banker realtor—testified she 

purchased the unit for $71,900 cash, closing on January 6, 2013. The property 

was originally listed in May 2011 for $125,900. On December 27, 2012, 

approximately ten days before McHose entered into the purchase agreement, the 

subject property was listed for $110,900. This listing price was in excess of the 

most recent sales of identically sized properties that ranged from $103,000 to 

$106,000. McHose was the appointed agent at the time of purchase and paid 

cash for the property. There was no appraisal completed at the time of the 

transaction. McHose, because she was a tenant in the same building, testified 

she was aware of the interiors of some of the other condominiums. McHose 
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reported that during the listing period seven other condominiums in the building 

came on the market and sold. 

McHose stated the unit at issue had a stale odor, needed painting, had 

worn carpets, the tile flooring need to be replaced, the master toilet did not work, 

and there was no hot water service at the master sink. She opined the layout 

and kitchen were functionally obsolete. She also reported electrical fixtures 

needed to be brought up to code. McHose testified she spent approximately

$20,000 to complete repairs, upgrade the electrical, and replace the kitchen. 

McHose believed the property’s purchase price was the most appropriate 

indication of its fair market value. She presented no other evidence of the 

property’s market value.

Deputy Assessor Jim Willet testified for the board of review. Willet noted 

the multiple listing service stated the unit was in “very good condition.” The 

property record card lists the subject property’s condition as “Normal.” Willet also 

noted ten condominiums in the same complex sold between 2011 and early 

January 2013. Of these sales, Units 6A, 3A, and 1D were the exact same age, 

square footage, and condition as the subject property and sold for prices ranging 

from $103,000 to $106,000 between June 2012 and January 2013. He also 

stated the square footage range for these units was from $93.64 to $90.99. 

Willett testified the assessor used $90.00 per square foot to assess McHose’s 

property at $103,000.

The PAAB determined the sales price alone was not determinative of the 

subject property’s assessed value as of January 1, 2013. The PAAB found three 

comparable properties sold for significantly more near the same time period and 
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suggested that McHose’s purchase price may not accurately reflect the 

property’s fair market value. PAAB affirmed the amended assessment.

McHose sought judicial review in the district court. The district court

reversed the PAAB and remanded with directions to set the assessed value at 

$71,900. The PAAB now appeals. 

II. Assessment review.

“Any property owner or aggrieved taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the 

owner’s or taxpayer’s assessment may file a protest against such assessment 

with the board of review . . . .” Iowa Code § 441.37(1)(a). Appeals from the 

action of the board of review may be taken to either the PAAB or the district 

court. Id. § 441.37A. PAAB, a statewide board, was “created for the purpose of 

establishing a consistent, fair, and equitable assessment appeal process.” Id.

§ 421.1A (1). 

III. Standard of Review

Tax appeals taken to a district court following a decision of a board of 

review are tried de novo. See id. § 441.39. Our review of such cases is de novo. 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Campiano v. Bd. of Review, 771 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Iowa 

2009). However, the district court’s and our review in the instant appeal is not de 

novo. 

Unlike a tax appeal from a board of review, the decision of the PAAB 

“shall be considered final agency action for purposes of further appeal.” Iowa 

Code § 441.37A(3)(b). “A person or party aggrieved or adversely affected by a 

decision of the [PAAB] may seek judicial review of the decision as provided by 

chapter 17A and section 441.38.” Id. § 441.38B. The district court considering a 
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petition for judicial review acts in an appellate capacity and may reverse or 

modify an agency’s decision if the agency’s decision is erroneous under a 

section of the Act and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. See id. 

§ 17A.19(10) (2013).

“When dealing with the issue of whether substantial evidence supports the 

agency’s findings, the district court and the appellate court can only grant relief to 

a party from the agency’s decision if a determination of fact by the agency ‘is not 

supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record 

is viewed as a whole.’” Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 855 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Iowa 2014)

(quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). Substantial evidence supports an agency’s 

decision even if the interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair 

difference of opinion. “Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to 

a fair difference of opinion does not mean the [agency’s] decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence. An appellate court should not consider 

evidence insubstantial merely because the court may draw different conclusions 

from the record.” Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007). 

When we review a district court decision that reviewed an agency action, our task 

is to determine if it would reach the same result as the district court in applying 

the Act. Gits Mfg., 855 N.W.2d at 197. If we reach the same result, we affirm; if 

not, we reverse. Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 2014). 

IV. Discussion

In reversing the PAAB, the district court wrote, “[W]hile comparable sales 

may be utilized[,] the court finds when the whole record is viewed the more 

persuasive measure of the fair market value of McHose’s unit is the sales price.” 
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The district court also found certain evidence “less convincing” than did the 

PAAB. This constitutes an improper reweighing of the evidence. See Arndt, 728 

N.W.2d at 394.

“Making a determination as to whether evidence ‘trumps’ other evidence 

or whether one piece of evidence is ‘qualitatively weaker’ than another piece of 

evidence is not an assessment for the district court . . . to make when it conducts 

a substantial evidence review of an agency decision.” Id. The PAAB’s decision 

is supported by the testimony of Deputy Assessor Willet and the comparable 

sales he noted. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the 

decision of the PAAB, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

We reverse the district court; the appeal decision of the PAAB is affirmed.

REVERSED.