Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Plano Molding Co.,

2015 IL App (2d) 140292

Appellate Court 

Caption

BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. PLANO MOLDING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-14-0292

Filed March 26, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County, No. 12-MR-175;

the Hon. Robert P. Pilmer, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Thomas B. Orlando, Matthew S. Ponzi, and Robert T. Boylan, all of 

Foran, Glennon, Palandech, Ponzi & Rudloff, P.C., of Chicago, for 

appellant.

Christopher T. Sheean, of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, of Chicago, 

for appellee.
- 2 - 

Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, appeals from an order granting the 

cross-motion of defendant, Plano Molding Company, for summary judgment and denying 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Plaintiff is an Illinois insurance company. Defendant is an Illinois corporation with its 

principal place of business in Plano, Illinois. Defendant designs, manufactures, and sells 

storage boxes, which are produced from steel injection molds. In 2004, defendant ordered two 

steel injection molds, which were manufactured in China. World Commerce Services, LLC 

(World), arranged for shipment of the molds from China to Illinois. World issued a bill of 

lading identifying defendant as the “consignee.” Paragraph 2.3 of the bill of lading defined 

“merchant” as including the “Shipper, the Receiver, the Consignor, the Consignee, the Holder 

of the Bill of Lading and any person having a present or future interest in the Goods or any 

person acting on behalf of any of the above-mentioned parties.” Paragraph 10(2) of the bill of 

lading provided as follows: 

“Merchant warrants that the stowage and seals of the containers are safe and proper and 

suitable for handling and carriage and indemnifies Carrier for any injury, loss or 

damage caused by breach of this warranty.”

¶ 4 The molds were loaded into a shipping container and transported by sea to California by 

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., and “K” Line America, Inc. (collectively K-Line). Union Pacific 

Railroad Company (Union Pacific) then transported the molds overland by rail. On April 21, 

2005, the train derailed in Oklahoma. The derailment was allegedly caused by the molds 

breaking through the floor of the container and falling onto the tracks below. As a result of the 

derailment, various cargo owners whose goods were damaged, or their insurers, sued K-Line 

and Union Pacific for damages. K-Line and Union Pacific then sued defendant in federal 

district court in Illinois, seeking reimbursement for the claims they settled as well as 

compensation for damage to K-Line’s own shipping containers and damage to Union Pacific’s 

own equipment. Defendant tendered defense of the suit to plaintiff. 

¶ 5 Plaintiff insured defendant under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy. Plaintiff 

defended defendant pursuant to a reservation of rights until the Seventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals determined that K-Line’s and Union Pacific’s only causes of action against defendant 

stemmed from its contractual obligations under the bill of lading. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. 

v. Plano Molding Co., 696 F.3d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s grant of 

summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims but reversing grant of summary 

judgment as to the plaintiffs’ contract claims based on the bill of lading, remanding for 

disposition of the contract claims). Following that ruling, plaintiff filed the instant declaratory 

judgment action in the circuit court of Kendall County based upon a policy exclusion that 
- 3 - 

provided that the insurance does not apply to property damage “for which the insured is 

obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract agreement.” 

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed a counterclaim for declaratory 

relief and a cross-motion for summary judgment based upon an exception to the exclusion in 

the policy for an “insured contract.” The policy defines an “insured contract” as: 

“That part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your business *** under 

which you assume the tort liability of another party to pay for bodily injury or property 

damage to a third person or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be 

imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement.”

The trial court granted defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal. 

¶ 6 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 7 When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that only a question of 

law is involved and invite the trial court to decide the issues based on the record. Pielet v. 

Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. However, the mere filing of cross-motions for summary 

judgment does not establish that there is no issue of material fact, nor does it obligate the court 

to render summary judgment. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. Summary judgment should be 

granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pielet, 

2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29. We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Pielet, 

2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30. 

¶ 8 At issue is the proper construction of paragraph 10(2) of the bill of lading. The primary 

objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Dearborn Maple 

Venture, LLC v. SCI Illinois Services, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 103513, ¶ 31. The plain and 

ordinary meaning of the language used in the contract is the best indication of the parties’

intent. Dearborn, 2012 IL App (1st) 103513, ¶ 31. An indemnity agreement is a contract 

subject to contract interpretation rules. Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 

308 (2008). It is well settled that indemnity contracts are strictly construed and will not be 

construed as indemnifying against a party’s own negligence unless such a construction is 

required by the clear and explicit language of the contract. McNiff v. Millard Maintenance 

Service Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1077 (1999). We also review the interpretation of a contract 

de novo. Asset Recovery Contracting, LLC v. Walsh Construction Co. of Illinois, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 101226, ¶ 57. 

¶ 9 The parties agree on a number of things. They agree that the bill of lading is a contract. See 

Kawasaki, 696 F.3d at 652 (a bill of lading can serve as evidence of a contract of carriage). 

Defendant agrees that “any liability that [it] [owes] to K-Line or Union Pacific *** emanates 

from the warranties set forth in the World Bill of Lading.” The parties, therefore, agree that the 

CGL policy’s contractual liability exclusion applies. That provision excludes coverage for 

property damage “for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the 

assumption of liability in a contract or agreement.”

¶ 10 However, the parties disagree whether the CGL policy’s exception to the exclusion for 

insured contracts applies. Defendant contends that the bill of lading is an insured contract 
- 4 - 

because K-Line and Union Pacific are seeking indemnification for tort losses they sustained. In 

other words, defendant focuses on K-Line’s and Union Pacific’s liability to the other parties in 

the underlying lawsuits. To the contrary, plaintiff contends that the bill of lading is not an 

insured contract, because defendant is liable only for its own breach of warranty; it has not 

assumed liability for K-Line’s and Union Pacific’s negligence. 

¶ 11 Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550 (2007), is 

dispositive. However, before we reach our discussion of Virginia Surety, we must look at two 

divergent lines of appellate court cases that it resolved. In Hankins v. Pekin Insurance Co., 305 

Ill. App. 3d 1088 (1999), the Fifth District of the Appellate Court examined an agreement 

between Hankins, who agreed to provide a shipping and receiving terminal, and Rudolf 

Express Company, which was permitted to use the terminal to deliver and pick up loads of 

materials. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. The parties’ agreement included a hold-harmless 

clause in which Hankins agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Rudolf for all claims “ ‘caused 

in whole or in part’ ” by Hankins’ negligence. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089-90. While this 

agreement was in effect, one of Hankins’ employees was injured unloading Rudolf’s truck and 

sued Rudolf. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. Rudolf filed a third-party complaint against 

Hankins, seeking indemnification and damages based in part on the agreement. Hankins, 305 

Ill. App. 3d at 1089. Hankins tendered the defense to Pekin under Hankins’ CGL policy, which 

contained a contractual liability exclusion and an exception for an insured contract identical to 

the policy language in our case. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089-90. Pekin refused the tender 

as to the counts related to the indemnity and hold-harmless agreement, and argued that the 

contractual liability exclusion applied. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1091. The trial court 

granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Hankins, ruling that the agreement was an 

insured contract under the Pekin policy, even though the agreement did not explicitly say that 

Hankins would be responsible for Rudolf’s negligence. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1091. The 

appellate court reversed. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1094. The appellate court held that the 

indemnity and hold-harmless agreement limited “Hankins’ liability to [his] own negligence 

and does not extend to the negligence of Rudolf.” Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. The 

appellate court expressed that the language in an insured contract must “clearly, explicitly, and 

unequivocally” reflect the parties’ intention that the indemnitor will indemnify the indemnitee 

against the indemnitee’s own negligence. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. 

¶ 12 This court disagreed with Hankins in Michael Nicholas, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of 

America, 321 Ill. App. 3d 909 (2001). In Michael Nicholas, which involved a construction 

subcontract agreement between the plaintiff and a developer, the plaintiff agreed to indemnify 

and hold harmless the developer from all claims attributable in whole or part to the plaintiff’s 

negligence. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 911. One of the plaintiff’s employees was 

injured and sued the developer, alleging violations of the Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 

150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994) (repealed by Pub. Act 89-2, § 5 (eff. Feb. 14, 1995))). Michael 

Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 911. The developer sued the plaintiff, seeking either complete 

indemnification or contribution based on its agreement with the plaintiff. Michael Nicholas, 

321 Ill. App. 3d at 911. The plaintiff tendered the suit to the defendant, its insurer under a CGL 

policy that contained an exclusion for contractual liability and an exception to the exclusion for 

insured contracts. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 911-12. When the defendant denied 

coverage, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d 

at 911. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on the policy exclusion, and the 
- 5 - 

trial court granted the motion, relying on Hankins. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 911. 

This court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that Hankins’ equation of “tort liability,”

as used in the policy definition of “insured contract,” with “negligence” was too narrow, as 

“tort liability” could encompass something other than negligence, such as joint and several 

liability. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 914. This court held that, because the plaintiff 

had waived the right to limit its exposure to what it paid its employee as worker’s 

compensation (the Kotecki cap (Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 165 

(1991))), it was potentially jointly and severally liable for the entire amount that the developer 

was required to pay to the injured employee. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 914. 

¶ 13 This court reaffirmed the principle of Michael Nicholas in West Bend Mutual Insurance 

Co. v. Mulligan Masonry Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 698 (2003). West Bend presented the same 

factual scenario and identical policy language as Michael Nicholas. West Bend, 337 Ill. App. 

3d at 704. Justice McLaren dissented on the basis that Michael Nicholas and the majority in 

West Bend “ignore the distinction between those matters that are imposed by law and those that 

have been assumed by the insured through the indemnification contract.” West Bend, 337 Ill. 

App. 3d at 709 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Justice McLaren pointed out that “[j]oint and several 

liability is not assumed by a tortfeasor,” and because it is imposed rather than assumed, it was 

“neither contained in nor contemplated” by the indemnification agreement or the insurance 

contract. West Bend, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 709 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Justice McLaren agreed 

with Hankins that an indemnification agreement must state that “any liability attached to the 

other party has been assumed by the insured.” West Bend, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 712 (McLaren, J., 

dissenting). 

¶ 14 In Virginia Surety, our supreme court overruled Michael Nicholas and West Bend. Virginia 

Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 570. The issue in Virginia Surety was whether a construction subcontract 

agreement was an insured contract. In the subcontract agreement, the subcontractor agreed to 

indemnify and hold harmless the owner, the general contractor, the architect, and their 

respective agents and employees from damages arising out of the subcontractor’s negligence. 

Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 553. One of the subcontractor’s employees was injured on the 

job and sued the general contractor. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 553-54. The general 

contractor filed a third-party suit against the subcontractor, which was insured by both the 

plaintiff and the defendant. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 553-54. The plaintiff defended the 

subcontractor, but the defendant refused the tender. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 554. The 

plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action against the defendant, alleging that the 

subcontract agreement with the general contractor was an insured contract within the meaning 

of the defendant’s policy. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 554. 

¶ 15 Our supreme court engaged in a long analysis devoted to the interplay between 

contribution and indemnification, which is not relevant for our purposes. Virginia Surety, 224 

Ill. 2d at 556-64. However, the result of the discussion was that our supreme court agreed with 

Hankins that a contract in which the insured agrees to indemnify against the insured’s own 

negligence is not an insured contract. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 565 (court said that it must 

look to the agreement and determine whether the agreement obligated the subcontractor to 

assume the general contractor’s liability). In looking at the subcontract agreement, the court 

said that it was “unambiguous.” Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 565. “By the plain language of 

the agreement, [the subcontractor], as the indemnifying party, is required to ‘indemnify’ [the 
- 6 - 

general contractor] only for [the subcontractor’s] own negligence.” Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d 

at 565. 

¶ 16 Here, defendant attempts without success to distinguish Virginia Surety. Defendant argues 

that “tort liability,” as used in the policy definition of “insured contract,” can mean 

tort-liability-as-imposed-by-law, rather than negligence. Defendant ignores that Virginia 

Surety overruled Michael Nicholas and West Bend on that very point. This court said in those 

cases that “tort liability” for purposes of an insured contract could mean joint and several 

liability, which is imposed by law. Michael Nicholas, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 914; West Bend, 337 

Ill. App. 3d at 705-06. Justice McLaren dissented in West Bend, opining that an insured 

contract is one in which the tortfeasor’s liability is assumed, rather than imposed by law. West 

Bend, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 709 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Justice McLaren’s view prevailed with 

our supreme court. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 565. In Virginia Surety, our supreme court 

made it clear that courts are to look at the language of the agreement, and where it 

unambiguously provides that the indemnifying party is required to indemnify only for its own 

negligence, the agreement is not an insured contract. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 565. 

¶ 17 Defendant maintains that Virginia Surety and Hankins are limited to their facts and that we 

are not bound to follow Virginia Surety. However, nothing in the supreme court’s language in 

Virginia Surety indicated that it was limited to its facts. While Virginia Surety involved an 

issue that is not present in our case–the indemnitee’s right of contribution–that distinction does 

not negate Virginia Surety’s applicability to our scenario. The indemnification agreement in 

Virginia Surety provided that the subcontractor would indemnify the general contractor for 

losses caused by the subcontractor’s own negligence, despite any common liability imposed by 

law. Virginia Surety, 224 Ill. 2d at 565. Similarly, Hankins involved the indemnitee’s right of 

contribution. Hankins, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. However, the court determined whether the 

contract was an insured contract under the defendant’s policy solely by looking at the 

contract’s language, not considering any common liability imposed by law. Hankins, 305 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1093. Moreover, our supreme court discussed Hankins in Buenz without indicating 

that Hankins was limited to its facts. Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 315-16. Therefore, Virginia Surety

controls, and defendant’s citation to the dissent in People v. Trimarco, 364 Ill. App. 3d 549, 

556 (2006), as to the proper application of stare decisis, is misplaced. Accordingly, we now 

turn to the language of the bill of lading at issue in this case. 

¶ 18 Paragraph 10(2) of the bill of lading provided that “Merchant”–meaning defendant–agreed 

to indemnify “Carrier”–meaning K-Line and Union Pacific–“for any injury, loss or damage 

caused by breach of this warranty.” The language of the agreement unequivocally states that 

defendant warranted that the stowage and seals of the containers were safe and proper and 

suitable for handling and carriage. Therefore, defendant agreed to indemnify K-Line and 

Union Pacific for defendant’s breach of those warranties. The agreement says nothing about 

indemnifying K-Line and Union Pacific against their own negligence. It is generally held that 

an indemnity contract will not be construed as indemnifying the indemnitee against its own 

negligence unless such a construction is required by the clear and explicit language of the 

contract, or such intention is expressed in unequivocal terms. Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 316; 

Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp., 395 Ill. 429, 433 

(1947) (“It is quite generally held that an indemnity contract will not be construed as 

indemnifying one against his own negligence, unless such a construction is required by clear 

and explicit language of the contract ***.”).
- 7 - 

¶ 19 Defendant improperly focuses on the words “any injury, loss or damage” without regard to 

their context. See Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 316-17 (it is not simply the use of the phrase “any and 

all” that determines whether a contract provides indemnification for an indemnitee’s own 

negligence, but the phrase must be read in the context of the entire contract). In Buenz, our 

supreme court looked at the limiting language in the agreement in Hankins, among other cases, 

to determine whether the indemnity contract at issue covered the indemnitee’s negligence. 

Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 312-16. By “limiting language,” the supreme court meant phraseology 

that specifically limits indemnification to the indemnitor’s actions. Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 313. 

For instance, the court noted that in Hankins the agreement expressly restricted 

indemnification liability to negligence occasioned by the indemnitor. Buenz, 227 Ill. 2d at 

315-16. In contrast, the agreement in Buenz contained no such limiting language. Buenz, 227 

Ill. 2d at 317-18. 

¶ 20 Here, the language in the bill of lading is clear and unambiguous. It clearly was the 

intention of the parties to the contract that defendant’s indemnification liability would be 

restricted to its breach of the warranties contained in the contract. Consequently, under 

Virginia Surety, the contract is not an insured contract, and summary judgment should have 

been granted in plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of defendant and enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 

¶ 21 Reversed.