In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐1351

CHARLES S. HOWLETT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JEFFREY HACK, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐00475‐TWP‐MJD — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2015 — JULY 21, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. In the early hours of October 25, 2009,

the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department received a

911 call reporting that someone had broken into Jeffrey

Hack’s house. Officer Steven Beasley responded to the call

and eventually arrested Hack’s neighbor, Charles Howlett.

Howlett was later charged with a variety of offenses related

to the alleged break‐in, but a jury ultimately acquitted him.
2   No. 14‐1351

He then filed this suit, alleging false arrest and malicious

prosecution on the part of Beasley, the City of Indianapolis,

Hack, and several others. The district court granted sum‐

mary judgment to all of the defendants. Howlett now ap‐

peals, though only with respect to Beasley, the City, and

Hack. We affirm the district court’s resolution of all claims

against Beasley and the City as well as the federal malicious‐

prosecution claim against Hack. We conclude, however, that

the court should have relinquished supplemental jurisdic‐

tion over the state‐law claims against Hack, and so we re‐

mand for that limited purpose.

I

On October 25, 2009, the Indianapolis Police received a

call about a break‐in and assault at 418 South Butler Avenue.

Officer Beasley was quickly dispatched to the scene and

spoke to Jeffrey Hack, the alleged victim of the assault. Hack

told Beasley that he had been asleep in his home when his

neighbor, Charles Howlett, woke him up suddenly, grabbed

and threatened him, and eventually thrust a hand down the

front of Hack’s pants. Hack guessed that Howlett had en‐

tered the house by prying open a bathroom window, and he

told Beasley that Howlett did not have permission to enter

the home (through the window or otherwise). After Hack

punched Howlett, Howlett quickly left through the bath‐

room window. Hack described Howlett as rather tall and

wearing a white t‐shirt and tan pants.

Beasley then walked across the street to Howlett’s home,

but Howlett did not answer the door. After an unidentified

person gave Beasley Howlett’s cell phone number, Beasley

called and the two spoke briefly. Howlett promised to return

home. Beasley recalls that Howlett also added, without
No. 14‐1351 3

prompting, that he did not enter Hack’s bathroom or “g[e]t

into his neighbor’s pants,” though Howlett now says that he

never made these statements. When Howlett returned to his

home and met Beasley, he denied breaking into Hack’s

house. Howlett was wearing a tan collared shirt, not a white

t‐shirt. Nevertheless, Hack identified Howlett as the person

who had entered his home and assaulted him. Beasley, who

had never met either man before, arrested Howlett for the

offenses of residential entry and invasion of privacy. A few

days later, the Marion Superior Court determined that there

was probable cause for the arrest, and Howlett was formally

charged with burglary, criminal confinement, residential en‐

try, intimidation, and battery. After a jury trial held on April

14, 2010, he was acquitted of all charges.  

Howlett then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the

district court, alleging that Beasley, the City of Indianapolis,

Hack, and three other people violated his rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by

arresting and maliciously prosecuting him; he also asserted

the latter two theories as free‐standing state‐law claims.

(Howlett also alleged that Beasley withheld exculpatory evi‐

dence, that Hack and the others retaliated against him, and

that all the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy, but he

does not pursue these claims on appeal.) The district court

had jurisdiction over Howlett’s federal claims under 28

U.S.C. § 1331; his state‐law claims fell within the court’s

supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  

The court granted summary judgment to all the defend‐

ants on the false‐arrest allegations, finding that the two‐year

statute of limitations in Indiana Code § 34‐11‐2‐4 barred

these claims. It granted summary judgment to the defend‐
4   No. 14‐1351

ants on Hack’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claims be‐

cause 1) Hack had not established that there was a lack of

probable cause, 2) the civilian defendants did not initiate a

prosecution or cause one to be started, and 3) Beasley and

the City had absolute immunity under Indiana Code § 34‐13‐

3‐3(6). The court also found that Hack’s malicious‐

prosecution claim under § 1983 had to be dismissed: it failed

on the merits with respect to all defendants, and with respect

to the civilians, it was also barred because an adequate rem‐

edy exists under state law. Hack has appealed the district

court’s decision in favor of Beasley, the City, and Hack, only

with regard to his malicious‐prosecution claims (under both

federal and state law) and false‐arrest claims (under state

law).

II

A

Because this appeal comes to us from a grant of summary

judgment, we take a fresh look at the case, construing all

facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party. See Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 701 (7th

Cir. 2015). We begin with Howlett’s claims against Officer

Beasley and the City.

False Arrest  

Under Indiana law, a false‐arrest claim accrues once the

complaining party is detained pursuant to legal process,

such as an arraignment. See Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d

25, 30–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

384 (2007)). Howlett filed this lawsuit on April 11, 2012, ap‐

proximately two and a half years after his October 28, 2009,

arraignment. The district court noted that Indiana’s statute
No. 14‐1351 5

of limitations for personal injury tort claims requires suits to

be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

See IND. CODE § 34‐11‐2‐4(a). A quick look at the relevant

dates convinced it that Howlett’s false‐arrest claim was time‐

barred.  

Howlett argues that a different statute of limitations,

which governs actions against public officers and sets a five‐

year limitations period, should apply. See IND. CODE § 34‐11‐

2‐6 (“An action against: (A) a sheriff; (B) another public of‐

ficer; or (C) the officer and the officer’s sureties on a public

bond; growing out of a liability incurred by doing an act in

an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty,

must be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of

action accrues.”). Beasley is certainly a public officer for this

purpose. Indiana defines a public officer as an “individual

[who] holds a position for which duties are prescribed by

law to serve a public purpose,” and the taking of an oath,

while not required, “is a strong indicator” of a person’s sta‐

tus as a public officer. Barrow v. City of Jeffersonville, 973

N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); see also Blake v. Kat‐

ter, 693 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that police offic‐

ers are public officers and applying § 34‐11‐2‐6’s predecessor

statute to claims of civil rights violations against police offic‐

ers). Beasley’s duties are prescribed by the Indiana Code at

section 5‐2‐1‐17; they include serving public purposes such

as “preserv[ing] the peace, maintain[ing] order, and pre‐

vent[ing] the unlawful use of force or violence.” IND. CODE

§ 5‐2‐1‐17(b)(1). Beasley is required by Indiana law to “take

an appropriate oath of office.” IND. CODE § 5‐2‐1‐17(c)(1). Fi‐

nally, Beasley was acting in an official capacity when he ar‐

rested Howlett.
6   No. 14‐1351

The argument that the public‐officer statute applies is

thus not a frivolous one. Both this statute and the general

tort statute appear to apply to facts before us. Howlett urges

that the former, § 34‐11‐2‐6, is meant to encompass all ac‐

tions against public officers acting in their official capacity,

while the latter, § 34‐11‐2‐4, applies to all other personal in‐

jury suits (i.e., those taken against non‐public officers). The

language of § 34‐11‐2‐6 is broad, and there is no hint that its

wide coverage should be curtailed by shorter statutes of lim‐

itations provided for specific types of claims. Rather, § 34‐11‐

2‐6 might have been meant to create a uniform statute of lim‐

itations for all suits—including those for personal injury

claims—when those suits are filed against public officers.  

We acknowledge that at least two decisions have applied

the two‐year statute of limitations to false‐arrest actions

brought against police officers. See Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d

588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013); Johnson, 885 N.E.2d at 30. Neither of

these cases, however, discussed the possible applicability of

the five‐year limitations period; rather, the courts simply as‐

sumed that the two‐year personal injury statute was appli‐

cable. And although we have recognized that Wilson v. Gar‐

cia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), overruled our 1982 decision in Blake,

to the extent that Blake looked to Indiana’s five‐year statute

of limitations for a federal § 1983 claim, see Coopwood v. Lake

Cnty. Cmty. Dev. Dep’t, 932 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1991), we

have suggested that the five‐year statute might be the right

one to use for state‐law claims. See Campbell v. Chappelow, 95

F.3d 576, 580 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996). Fortunately, we do not have

to resolve this issue, because Howlett’s state‐law claim, even

if we assume for the sake of argument that it is not time‐

barred, cannot withstand summary judgment.
No. 14‐1351 7

For a claim of false arrest to succeed under Indiana law,

there must be an “absence of probable cause.” Row v. Holt,

864 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind. 2007). Howlett therefore had to

raise a genuine issue of fact on the question whether Beasley

had probable cause to arrest him. He has not done so. An

officer has probable cause for an arrest when “at the time of

the arrest the facts and circumstances within the knowledge

of the officer[] and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy

information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man of rea‐

sonable caution in believing that the arrestee had committed

or was committing an offense.” Smith v. State, 271 N.E.2d

133, 136 (Ind. 1971); see also Riggenbach v. State, 397 N.E.2d

953, 954–55 (Ind. 1979).

It is undisputed that Hack, the alleged victim, positively

identified Howlett as his assailant. Beasley was entitled to

rely on this identification. See Capps v. State, 229 N.E.2d 794,

796 (Ind. 1967) (“A police officer may base his belief that

there is reasonable and probable cause for arresting a person

on information received from another.”); see also Askew v.

City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2006)

(“[A]llegations by eyewitnesses supply probable cause when

the statements, if true, show that a crime has occurred.”).

There could be a problem if a reasonable officer would have

known that the accuser is acting out of malice or because of a

grudge. See Askew, 440 F.3d at 895. But there is no indication

that Beasley knew or should have known that Hack made

his accusations because he harbored ill will toward Howlett.

The discrepancies about the color and type of shirt How‐

lett was wearing at the time of the incident do not create a

question of material fact for probable‐cause purposes. These

are minor details that can be disregarded. Id. at 896 (discuss‐
8   No. 14‐1351

ing discrepancies in the type of weapon the alleged assailant

was wielding). In any case, as we have noted, Beasley did

not arrest Howlett solely on Hack’s description. Whether the

alleged criminal was wearing a tan, collared shirt or a white

t‐shirt at the time of the break‐in is too insignificant to negate

the conclusion that, taking into consideration all that was

known to Beasley, Beasley had probable cause to arrest

Howlett. The district court was correct to grant summary

judgment to Beasley, and to the City as Beasley’s employer,

on this claim.  

Malicious Prosecution

Indiana law recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution.

See, e.g., City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 378–

79 (Ind. 2001). The Indiana Tort Claims Act, however,

shields government employees such as Beasley and entities

such as the City from these claims. See IND. CODE § 34–13–3–

3(6) (“A governmental entity or an employee acting within

the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss

results from ... [t]he initiation of a judicial or an administra‐

tive proceeding.”); see also Serino, 735 F.3d at 595. As a re‐

sult, Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim against

Beasley and the City necessarily fails.

Howlett also alleged a federal claim of malicious prose‐

cution, based on his Fourth Amendment rights. Such a claim

is not actionable if there is an adequate state‐law remedy.

Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2001). Be‐

cause the Indiana Tort Claims Act immunizes governmental

entities and their employees from malicious‐prosecution

suits, there is no adequate state remedy and Howlett is enti‐

tled in principle to pursue his federal claim. See Julian v.

Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 845–49 (7th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless,
No. 14‐1351 9

“[f]ederal courts are rarely the appropriate forum for mali‐

cious prosecution claims” because there is no “federal right

not to be summoned into court and prosecuted without

probable cause.” Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 664 (7th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.

2010)). Thus, in a § 1983 malicious‐prosecution suit, the

“plaintiff must allege a violation of a particular constitution‐

al right, such as the right to be free from unlawful seizures

under the Fourth Amendment, or the right to a fair trial un‐

der the Due Process Clause.” Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d

670, 673 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Serino, 735 F.3d at 592) (al‐

teration and quotation marks omitted).  

Howlett cannot rely on his allegedly unlawful seizure,

not only because the arrest was proper (because it was sup‐

ported by probable cause) but also because a warrantless ar‐

rest “cannot serve as the basis for a malicious prosecution

action.” Serino, 735 F.3d at 593–94 (explaining that a mali‐

cious prosecution must involve “a deprivation of liberty pur‐

suant to legal process” and that a person who has been arrest‐

ed without a warrant is subject to legal process only once he

is arraigned). Howlett does not allege any post‐arraignment

constitutional violation. His complaints against Beasley deal

primarily with alleged falsehoods and a failure to investigate

that occurred before the arraignment, and even before the

arrest. Even if we understood Howlett to be alleging that

Beasley lied or withheld evidence in order to have Howlett

charged (thus perhaps implicating the due process right to

fair proceedings), nothing in the present record would allow

such allegations to withstand summary judgment. Howlett

has not shown either a lack of probable cause or the presence

of malice, both of which are necessary for an Indiana mali‐

cious‐prosecution claim. See Welton, 770 F.3d at 674 (even if
10   No. 14‐1351

plaintiff has properly pleaded a constitutional violation, he

still must show the elements of a state‐law claim, which un‐

der Indiana law includes malice and lack of probable cause).

We already have explained why probable cause existed here.

A plaintiff may show malice through “evidence of personal

animosity ... a complete lack of probable cause or a failure to

conduct an adequate investigation.” Id. (quoting Golden

Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland, 557 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir.

2009)). Howlett showed nothing of the kind. Finally,

Beasley’s investigation was adequate: he spoke with both the

victim and the accused, and he had the victim identify his

assailant in person. Summary judgment was thus appropri‐

ate on this claim.  

B

Next, we address Howlett’s claims against Hack. The on‐

ly federal claim against Hack is for malicious prosecution.

Unlike Beasley and the City, Hack is not immune from a

state‐law malicious‐prosecution suit. Indiana Code § 34–13–

3–3(6) immunizes only governmental entities and employees

from these suits; for all other defendants, the state permits

malicious‐prosecution suits to proceed. See Reichhart, 748

N.E.2d at 378–79. But this poses an insurmountable problem

for Howlett: because he is entitled to pursue his malicious‐

prosecution claim in state court, he has an adequate state‐

law remedy and may not proceed with his federal § 1983

claim. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750–51.

This resolves all of Howlett’s federal claims. What re‐

main are his state‐law false‐arrest and malicious‐prosecution

claims against Hack. In a situation like this one, where the

state‐law claims have not been the focus of the litigation, the

better practice is for the district court to relinquish its juris‐
No. 14‐1351 11

diction over them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Williams Elec‐

tronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007)

(describing the “presumption that if the federal claims drop

out before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdic‐

tion over the state‐law claims”). The district court offered no

reason for declining to dismiss the remaining supplemental

claims. In our view, that is what should have happened.

Once the judgment is revised to show that these claims were

dismissed without prejudice, Howlett will be free to seek to

pursue them in state court.  

III

We conclude with a few words about Howlett’s request

that we certify two state‐law issues to the Indiana Supreme

Court. He would like us to ask that court to rule on whether

§ 34‐11‐2‐4 or § 34‐11‐2‐6 governs the statute of limitations

for false‐arrest claims against police officers, and on whether

the filing of a criminal case by a prosecutor effectively bars a

malicious‐prosecution claim against persons (including po‐

lice officers) who supplied information that led to the prose‐

cution. These questions do not, however, meet the criteria

for certification found in Circuit Rule 52.  

The present case does not turn on the answers to either of

those questions. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275

F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001). The statute of limitations ques‐

tion is not dispositive, because Howlett’s false‐arrest claim

against Beasley and the City fails because probable cause

supported the arrest, and because we are directing the dis‐

trict court to relinquish jurisdiction over the claim against

Hack. We were able to resolve most of the malicious‐

prosecution claims without having to delve into the issue of

whether persons who supply information to a prosecutor
12   No. 14‐1351

can be liable for malicious prosecution. Finally, we have en‐

sured that Howlett may pursue his remaining state‐law

claims against Hack in state court. We see no reason to bur‐

den the Indiana Supreme Court with such matters, and we

therefore deny Howlett’s request for certification.

IV

In summary, we conclude that even if Howlett’s state‐

law false‐arrest claim against Beasley and the City is timely,

it was properly dismissed because Beasley had probable

cause to arrest Howlett. Beasley and the City are immune

from Howlett’s state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim. How‐

lett’s § 1983 malicious‐prosecution claim against Beasley and

the City cannot survive summary judgment because Howlett

did not allege a separate constitutional injury and, even if he

did, he has not submitted evidence that Beasley acted out of

malice or lacked probable cause. Howlett cannot maintain

his § 1983 malicious‐prosecution claim against Hack because

Howlett has an adequate state remedy. Finally, we decline to

certify any questions to the Indiana Supreme Court.  

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court

granting summary judgment to the defendants in all re‐

spects but one. We REMAND the case to the district court

with instructions to change the dismissal of Howlett’s state‐

law claims against Hack to one without prejudice, so that he

may pursue them in state court.