No. 03-14-00697-CV

In The Court of Appeals 

 For The Third Court of Appeals District 

Austin, Texas 

PAMELA MEHL, 

Appellant 

v.

 DAVID STERN, 

Appellee 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE 250TH DISTRICT COURT 

 TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-002071 

 BRIEF OF APPELLEE DAVID STERN 

Brent A. Devere (Lead Counsel) 

Attorney at Law 

SBN 00789256 

1411 West Avenue, Suite #200 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Tel: 512-457-8080 

Fax: 512-457-8060 

Email: BDevere@1411west.com 

Counsel for Appellee David Stern 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00697-CV

6167008

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/21/2015 11:17:34 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/21/2015 11:17:34 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..............................................................iii-iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.................................2

STATEMENT OF FACTS...........................................................3-4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...................................................5-6

ARGUMENT...............................................................................6

A. The restricted appeal should be dismissed in light of the 

fact that Mehl filed a motion for new trial

in the district court...........................................................6-8

B. Venue was established in Travis County as a matter of law

and therefore does not constitute error 

apparent on the face of the record.......................................8-9

C. Judgment for Rescission of the original conveyance

is not error..................................................................9-12

D. Judgment for $20,000.00 damages is not error........................12-13

E. Double recovery for rescission and damages is not error............13-14

F. Judgment for attorneys’ fees is not error................................14

G. Failure to join IndyMac is not error......................................15

H. Three day notice required for receiver is not applicable..............16

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER.....................................................17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................19
ii

APPENDIX

A. Judgment (CR. 15-26)...................................................TAB A

B. Motion for New Trial (CR. 32-33).....................................TAB B
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 CASES

Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique,

134 S.W.3d 845(Tex. 2004)........................................................6

Champion v. Estlow, 

456 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. filed)...................8

Cooper v. Hamilton County,

2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 30, 2014,

pet. denied)............................................................................15

Glenn v. Lucas,

376 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.).........................11

Goldman v. Olmstead,

414 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied)...........................13

Grynberg v. Christiansen,

727 S.W.2d 665, (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)...........................15

McGoodwin v. McGoodwin,

671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984).......................................................12

Scott v. Gallagher,

209 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).............9

Scott v. Sebree,

986 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)........................14

Scott v. Wichita County,

248 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).............9

TAC v. Boothe,

94 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)...............................6

Taylor v. State

293 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)............................6
iv

Walton v. First Nat'l Bank of Trenton,

956 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).................11

RULES / STATUTES

Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1)..................................................................7-8

Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4)...................................................................7-8

Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(1).......................................................................8-9

Tex. R. Civ. P. 695.........................................................................16

Tex. R. Civ. P. 39...........................................................................15

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §105.003...........................................................6
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This case is a restricted appeal in connection with 

a default judgment obtained by Appellee Stern.

Trial Judge: The Honorable Jon Wisser

250th Judicial District Court

of Travis County, Texas

Course of Proceedings: David Stern, Appellee, filed suit against Pamela 

Mehl, Appellant, primarily to seek rescission of a 

50% real estate property conveyance that was

originally made pursuant to a property settlement 

agreement (CR 3-12). 

Stern further sought monetary damages, and the

appointment of a receiver (CR 3-12). Stern’s 

Original Petition was the live pleading in this case 

(CR 3-12). 

Mehl was properly served at the office of her 

attorney (CR 13-14). Stern subsequently obtained 

a default judgment against Mehl (CR 15-26).

Mehl filed a motion for new trial in the trial court 

but failed to pursue said motion (CR 32-33).

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court granted a default judgment for Stern 

(CR 15-26).

Mehl subsequently pursued this restricted appeal

notwithstanding the fact that she also filed a 

motion for new trial in the trial court (CR 32-33 

and CR 34-60).
2

 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

Stern does not seek oral argument in this appeal. 
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Stern filed Plaintiff’s Original Petition in the Travis County District Court 

on June 26, 2014 (CR 3-12). The primary basis of the lawsuit was to rescind a real 

estate conveyance of Stern’s 50% interest to Mehl after Mehl defaulted on the

preexisting third party mortgage (CR 3-12). Stern primarily sought rescission of 

the conveyance in his capacity as a creditor pursuant to a vendor’s lien as well as 

under a breach of contract claim (CR 3-12). Stern further sought monetary 

damages in connection with the arrears as well as damages to his credit (CR 3-12). 

Finally, Stern sought the appointment of a receiver primarily to protect the 

property from the underlying lienholder (CR 3-12).

On July 3, 2014, Stern served Mehl in person with a citation and a copy of 

the lawsuit at the office of an attorney (CR 13-14). Moreover, the process server 

filed an affidavit of service with the court on July 8, 2014 (CR 14).

Stern did not dispute that the subject real property is located in Williamson 

County. However, Stern alleged several theories in Plaintiff’s Original Petition in 

support of Travis County as the appropriate venue, and Stern incorporates 

Plaintiff’s Original Petition in this regard (CR 3-12).
4

Mehl failed to timely file an answer in the lawsuit and further failed to 

timely object to the venue of the lawsuit (CR 2).

On July 29, 2014, the Travis County District Court formally entered a 

default judgment against Mehl in favor of Stern. For the purposes of brevity, Stern 

incorporates the judgment of July 29, 2014 and all resulting relief (CR 15-26).

Stern filed supporting documents in support of the default judgment (CR 27-

29). Stern further filed an Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees (Supp. CR 15-17). Stern 

also filed a Non-Military Affidavit and Certificate of Last Known Address (Supp. 

CR 18-21 and Supp. CR 13-14).

On or about October 13, 2014 Mehl file a Motion for New Trial in Travis 

County District Court (CR. 32-33). However, Mehl failed to pursue the matter.

On or about November 4, 2014, Mehl filed a restricted appeal in this cause

(CR. 34-60).
5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The fact that Mehl filed an arguable timely motion for new trial in the Travis 

County District Court precludes her from also pursuing a restricted appeal (CR 32-

33). Mehl subsequently abandoned the motion for new trial instead of scheduling 

it for a hearing with the trial court.

There is no error apparent on the face of the record in so much as 1) Mehl 

has not alleged any defect whatsoever in the service of process, 2) Mehl waived 

any challenge to venue and 3) all the relief in the judgment is supported by the

clerk’s record.

The clerk’s record contains considerable evidence in support of the 

judgment, including a copy of the warranty deed which recites the obligations of 

Mehl to assume the underlying mortgage on the subject property. There is further 

written evidence of the many delinquent payments on the underlying mortgage by 

Mehl, all of which support the rescission and damages that are the basis of the 

judgment. Finally, the record contains an affidavit of attorneys’ fees.
6

Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Mehl, there is no requirement of a 

reporter’s record in a no answer default judgment hearing (as opposed to a post 

answer default hearing). Taylor v. State, 293 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2009, no pet.). Furthermore, this case is not a family law case that might require a 

reporter record under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §105.003.

ARGUMENT

A. The restricted appeal should be dismissed in light of the fact that 

Mehl filed a timely motion for new trial in the district court.

The requirements for a restricted appeal are the following: 1) A notice of 

restricted appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment is signed; 2)

The notice is filed by a party to the lawsuit; 3) The party did not participate in the 

hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and the party did not file a 

timely post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of 

law; and 4) Error must be apparent on the face of the record. Alexander v. Lynda’s 

Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004) and TAC v. Boothe, 94 S.W.3d 315

(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). 
7

The record is clear that the trial court entered a default judgment on July 29, 

2014 (CR 15-26). However, on October 13, 2014, Mehl filed a Motion for New 

Trial in the trial court (CR 32-33).

Although the deadline for a motion for new trial is typically thirty days after 

the entry of judgment, both Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4) 

extend the deadline for a motion for new trial if the defendant does not receive

actual or constructive notice of the judgment within twenty days of the entry of 

judgment. Instead, under such circumstances the time period for the motion for 

new trial deadline begins when the defendant first acquired actual knowledge of 

the default judgment and not later than ninety days after entry of the judgment.

Mehl admits in Appellant’s Brief that she never received the notice of 

judgment from the district clerk and that she first became aware of the default 

judgment in October, 2014 (Appellants Brief, Page 11, paragraphs #13 and #14).

Therefore, by her own admission, the motion for new trial was timely filed 

since it was filed on or about October 13, 2014, well within 30 days of when Mehl 

supposedly first became aware of the judgment in October of 2014, and less than 

90 days after the date of judgment (CR 32-33). Under such circumstances, Mehl’s 
8

motion for a new trial was timely filed and she could have pursued relief from the 

trial court under both Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4). 

Consequently, Mehl should not be able to pursue this restricted appeal.

B. Venue was established in Travis County as a matter of law and does 

not constitute error apparent on the face of the record.

Mehl argues at length that Travis County was an improper venue for the 

underlying proceeding, including the appointment of the receiver, in light of the 

fact that Williamson County is the mandatory venue. Therefore, according to 

Mehl, the filing of the lawsuit in Travis County constitutes reversible error 

apparent on the face of the record.

However, the law is clear that venue is waived if a defendant fails to timely 

object in the trial court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(1) establishes the procedure for 

objecting to venue and also clearly states that a failure to timely object is a waiver 

of venue. Champion v. Estlow, 456 S.W.3d 363, 364-365 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2015, pet. filed).
9

Several courts have confirmed that even mandatory venue is waived if a 

party fails to timely object under Tex. R. Civ.P. 86(1). Scott v. Wichita County, 

248 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) and Scott v. 

Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 

Moreover, both courts have confirmed that venue is not jurisdictional and is 

waived by a defendant who fails to timely object to venue. 

In short, venue, including mandatory venue, is not jurisdictional. The failure 

of Mehl to timely file an objection to venue prior to the judgment date constituted a 

waiver of venue. Therefore, the district court correctly acquired venue in Travis 

County as a matter of law when it entered a default judgment in this proceeding. 

C. Judgment for rescission is supported by the record

One of the key aspects of the underlying judgment was the rescission of 

the original 50% land conveyance from Stern to Mehl in light of Mehl’s failure to 

tender the required payments to the underlying mortgagee. 
10

The judgment itself incorporates the original warranty deed as an exhibit

whereby Stern conveyed his 50% interest to Mehl (CR 15-26). The warranty deed

from Stern to Mehl further contains clear language that obligated Mehl to timely 

pay all mortgage payments on the existing mortgage and further that she was 

required to indemnify Stern from any default (CR 19-26).

In addition, unlike a more typical real estate transaction that involves an 

assumption of a prior mortgage, Mehl was already a 50% owner of the property 

prior to the conveyance of Stern to Mehl of his 50% interest (CR 19-26). In 

addition, the judgment does not disturb Mehl’s preexisting 50% interest and only 

focuses on the subsequent 50% interest Mehl received from Stern.

Stern sought rescission of the underlying conveyance in his original petition 

pursuant to both a trespass to try title claim to foreclose on his implied vendor’s 

lien AND pursuant to a breach of contract claim (CR 3-12). In addition, paragraph 

#8 of the original petition referenced a deed of trust to secure assumption in 

support of Mehl’s obligations with respect to the conveyance from Stern to Mehl

(CR 3-12).
11

There is case law that supports that a party may seek the remedy of 

rescission through a judicial proceeding as a result of failure of a party to pay a 

secured debt. Walton v. First Nat'l Bank of Trenton, 956 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. denied) and Glenn v. Lucas, 376 S.W.3d 268, 276 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). Stern further offered evidence of 

the delinquency of the mortgage payments by Mehl which could easily support a 

basis of foreclosure of a vendor’s lien and rescission of the original 50% interest

(CR 27-29).

The arguments by Mehl that a rescission does not address a supposedly 

larger settlement agreement have no merit. Firstly, the focus of the underlying 

judgment was to specifically address a default by Mehl in connection to the 

conveyance by Stern of his 50% interest in the subject property. 

Mehl has never directly challenged in her brief the existence of the vendor’s 

lien and the right of Stern to seek rescission of the conveyance in his capacity as a 

creditor in the transaction. Instead, Mehl argues that it is improper to allow a 

rescission of only the property conveyance without also addressing the larger 

settlement agreement.
12

The Texas Supreme Court recognized an implied vendor’s lien in connection 

to the transfer of a particular piece of real estate between spouses pursuant to a 

divorce decree. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984). 

Therefore, the fact that there is a larger settlement agreement does not invalidate 

efforts by Stern to seek rescission of the underlying real estate transaction.

Stern exercised his right to seek rescission of the transaction based on his 

implied vendor’s lien and based on a breach of contract claim after Mehl defaulted 

on the obligation and exposed Stern and the property to great financial harm. The 

vendor’s lien and any contract claims are directed solely at the conveyance itself. 

Therefore, as long as Stern prevails under either an implied vendor’s lien or a 

breach of contract claim, he would be entitled to rescission.

D. Judgment for $20,000.00 damages is not error

Contrary to Mehl’s assertion that there is no evidence in support of the 

monetary damages, Stern offered evidence of the delinquency of the underlying 

mortgage which totaled approximately $16,471.50 (CR 27-29). Moreover, Stern 

specifically alleged in paragraphs #10 and #11 of his original petition that there 

was a material default with at least five delinquent mortgage payments (CR 3-12). 
13

Stern further alleged in paragraph #19 of his original petition damages to his credit, 

a fact that could easily be supported by the record in light of many months of 

delinquent payments for the main mortgage (CR 3-12 and CR 27-29).

Therefore, an award of $20,000.00 was necessary to address the significant 

arrears on the mortgage and/or to compensate Stern for damages to his credit.

E. Double recovery for rescission and damages

In the case at bar, Stern sought monetary damages in addition to rescission

of the conveyance. A rescission of the conveyance alone would not have remedied 

the damages to Stern’s credit report and would not have remedied the significant 

mortgage arrears. Therefore, an award of monetary damages was essential to

facilitate the rescission of the conveyance.

There is case law, in the context of a judgment for specific performance, in 

support of an award of monetary damages when such damages are incidental to the 

order of specific performance and fall short of damages awarded from a breach of 

contract claim. Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 361-362 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2013, pet. denied).
14

In essence, the additional monetary compensation harmonizes the rescission

award with any incidental damages so as to place the party in the pre default 

situation. As previously stated, Stern offered evidence of delinquent payments and 

damages to his credit (CR 3-12 and CR 27-29).

The cases cited by Mehl are inapposite as they appear to focus on rescission

based on fraud rather than in connection to a vendor’s lien/foreclosure. 

For example, the Sebree case cited by Mehl involves statutory fraud and specific 

performance and does not address a rescission based on a judicial foreclosure

and/or a loan default. Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, 

pet. denied).

F. Judgment for attorneys’ fees is not error.

Stern offered an affidavit of attorneys’ fees at the original default hearing 

(Supp. CR 15-17). Therefore, any argument by Mehl that the attorneys’ fees are 

not supported by the record have no merit.
15

G. Failure to join Indymac and TRCP 39

Assuming for the sake of argument that Indymac or any other lienholder is 

an indispensable party, the failure to join said party does not render the judgment

void and does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Cooper v. Hamilton County,

2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 30, 2014, pet. denied). 

Instead, in the most extreme sense, the judgment would be voidable only as to the 

interest of the omitted third party. 

As a practical matter, the lienholder, not Mehl, would have standing to 

challenge the judgment to the extent its interest in the property was affected by the 

judgment. There is nothing in the judgment that threatens the validity of any lien 

on the property one way or the other (CR 15-26). 

Moreover, the harm to the lienholder would need to be substantial to justify 

a challenge of the judgment. Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
16

H. Three day notice required for receiver

In light of the fact that Stern served Mehl with the actual lawsuit and the 

request for receiver, any issue of her notice is moot (CR 3-12). Obviously, Mehl

had over twenty days from the date of personal service of the lawsuit to file an 

answer, a time far greater than the requisite three notice she complains of in her 

brief. 

Moreover, Tex. R. Civ. P. 695, the receiver statute, deals with adverse 

parties. Stern contends that only Mehl, as an owner of the property, is an adverse 

party in this lawsuit. 

Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that the receiver has 

subsequently filed post judgment motions and provided notice to Mehl by and 

through her counsel (Supp. CR 49-51).
17

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The filing by Mehl of a motion for new trial precludes her right to also

pursue a restricted appeal. There is no error apparent on the record in the context 

of venue in light of the fact than Mehl waived any venue challenge. It is also 

undisputed that Mehl was properly served with the lawsuit and there was no defect 

in the affidavit of service. Finally, the record contains evidence in support of the 

judgment in all respects: a judgment for title based on rescission pursuant to 

foreclosure of a vendor’s lien and breach of contract, as well as monetary damages, 

attorneys’ fees and all other relief in the judgment. 

WHEREFORE Appellee, David Stern, respectfully requests that this Court

affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellee prays for other and further relief to 

which he may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Brent A. Devere

Brent A. Devere

Texas Bar No. 00789256

1411 West Avenue, Suite #200

Austin, Texas 78701

Tel. (512)-457-8080 Fax. (512)-457-8060

Email: BDevere@1411west.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,

DAVID STERN
18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft 

Word 2013 and contains approximately 3455 words as determined by the computer 

software word count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Brent A. Devere

Brent A. Devere
19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.2, I certify that a copy of this

Appellee’s Brief was filed through the electronic filing system. Under Texas Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 9.5, I further certify that a copy of this brief was served on 

July 21, 2015 upon the following counsel for Appellant via electronic notification

after 5:00 P.M.:

The Lefler Law Firm VIA EMAIL: slefler@leflerlegal.com 

Sandra M. Lefler 

1530 Sun City Blvd., Suite 119 

Austin, Texas 78633 

Telephone: (512) 869-2579 

Telecopieur: (512) 583-7294 

Email:slefler@leflerlegal.com 

 /s/ Brent A. Devere

 Brent A. Devere
TABA 
Notl69 sent. ~ lntenocutOry l'lone 

isp Part~s · _,fii_._ - - ---

Dlsp code: CVD I CLS . YA1 ( \{ 

Redact pgs:: _ __::. ___ --:o::---==:::-

Judg;--rb\ \J Clerk Q--:J 

DC BK14217 PG560 

Filed in The District Court 

of Travis County, Texas 

JUL 2 9 2014 

CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-002071 

DAVID STERN, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

PAMELA MEHL, 

Defendant 

* IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

* 

* 

* 

* 250n1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

* 

* 

* 

* TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

JUDGMENT FOR TITLE TO REAL ESTATE AND DAMAGES 

The hearing on this cause was held on July 29, 2014. Plaint in: David Stern, appeared, by 

and through counsel and Defendant, Pamela Mehl, although duly cited to appear by filing an 

answer herein, failed to file an answer within the time allowed by law. 

I. On the claim of Breach of Contract, the Court find s in favor of Plaintit1~ David Stern, and 

against Detendant, Pamela Mehl. 

2. On the claim ofTrespass to Try Title, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff, David Stern, and 

against Defendant, Pamela Mehl. 

15 
DC BK14217 PG561 

Pursuant to the pleadings and evidence on file, the Court finds and ORDERS as follows: 

A. The Court recognizes a vendor's lien, equitable lien and a deed oftrust to secure 

assumption for and in favor of David Stern on the Property (The ''Property" is otherwise known 

as 700 Grove Lane, Georgetown, Texas 78626. Williamson County along with all improvements 

and mobile homes, and is further described on Exhibit I attached herein) by virtue of David 

Stern's prior 50% conveyance of the Property to Pamela Mehl. 

B. The Court hereby awards David Stern judgment for title and possession of 50% of 

the Property based on a rescission of the prior conveyance under document #20 13063557 of the 

Williamson County Real Property Records. 

C. The Court further awards David Stern actual damages against Pamela Mehl in the 

amount of$20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand and 00/ 100 Dollars). 

D. The Court awards David Stern, attorneys' fees in the amount of$2,500.00 (Two 

Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars), against Defendant, Pamela Meh I. 

E. Plaintiff. David Stern, is entitled to post judgment interest on the total amount of 

the judgment awarded hereinabove, at the rate of 5% per annum trom the date this judgment is 

signed until paid . 

F. Costs are hereby taxed against Defendant, Pamela Mehl. 

G. Plaintift: David Stern, has a right to the Property, and the Property is in danger of 

being materially injured, thus requiring the appointment of a receiver. The Court appoints Nancy 

Perry as receiver. Receiver shall take an oath swearing to perform the duties of receiver 

faithfully, and receiver shall post a $200.00 (Two Hundred and 00/ 100 Dollars) bond that shall 

be conditioned on faithful discharge of duties as receiver and obedience to the orders ofthe 

Court. Receiver shall be vested with the powers to take charge and keep possession ofthe 

2 

16 
DC BK14217 PG562 

Property, receive rents, and sell the Property and hire real estate brokers and other agents to sell 

the Property, with such sale being subject to Court approval. The rent and sale proceeds shall be 

used to pay all valid secured liens on the property and property taxes due plus payment of all 

amounts due under this judgment, with the remaining proceeds, if any, being paid 50/50 to 

Plaintiff and Defendant. The receiver shall be entitled to compensation at $175.00 an hour and 

reimbursement of reasonable and necessary expenses, after application to and approval by the 

Court tor such fees and expenses. Receiver's fees and expenses shall be taxed as costs. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff, David Stern, may record this order in the real 

propetiy records as evidence of ownership ofthe Property, and is entitled to enforce this 

judgment through abstract, execution and any other process necessary, and all writs and 

processes for the enforcement and collect ion of this judgment and costs may issue. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this is a final judgment and finally dis poses of all 

parties and all claims and is appealable. 

:)c ~ SIGNEDthisthe, 1 dayofJul y, 2014. 

Approved as to Form: 

3 

17 
Q_ ____ _ 

l c.J ------ ---~. 

Brent A. Devere 

SBN#00789256 

1411 West Avenue, Suite #200 

Austin, Texas 7870 I 

Ph: 512-457-8080 

Fax: 512-457-8060 

Attorney for David Stern 

DC BK14217 PG563 

4 
DC BK14217 PG564 

EXHIBIT 1 

) 

I 

l 

19 1 

~ 
DC BK14217 PG565 

12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 7 of 34 

Special Warranty Deed 

Notice of confidentiality rights: If you are a natural person, you may remove or strike any 

or all of the following information from any instrument that transfers an interest in real 

property before it is filed for record in the public records: your Social Security number or 

your driver's license number. 

Date: May 3, 2013 

Grantor: David Stem 

Grantor's Mailing Address: 

b 1 00 c c tvr&.- OQ.. 4*-b 00 

LOI M& t-L~, cA 

Grantee: Pamela Mebl 

Grantee's Mailing Address: 

700 Grove Lane 

Georgetown, Texas 

Williamson County 

Consideration: 

A settlement agreement in a bankruptc~ case style In Re: Pamela Christina Mehl, filed 

under Case No. 12-12209 in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, and ten dollars and 

other valuable consideration paid by Grantee, and Grantee's assumption of the unpaid principal 

and earned interest on the note in the original principaJ sum of Two Hundred Fifty-six Thousand 

Two Hundred dollars ($256,200.00) dated August 11, 2004, executed by David Stern, and 

payable to the order oflndyMac Bank, F.S.B .. The note is secured by a vendor's lien retained in 

a deed dated August 11 , 2004, to David Stern and Pamela Mehl, and additionally secured by a 

deed of trust dated August 11, 2004, from David Stern and Pamela Mehl to Charles A. Brown, 

Trustee, recorded in clerk's file number 2004064127 of the official public records of real 

20 
DC BK14217 PG566 

12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 8 of 34 

property of Williamson County, Texas. Grantee agrees to indemnifY and hold Grantor harmless 

from payment of the note and from performance of Grantor's obligations specified in the 

instruments securing payment of the note. Grantor assigns to Grantee the casualty insurance 

policy on the property, all utility deposits for utility service at the property, and all funds held in 

escrow for payment of taxes and insurance premiums. 

Property (including any improvements}: 

The legal description is attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes 

Reservations from Conveyance and Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty: 

Grantor reserves no interest in any oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may 

be produced from the property. 

This deed is subject to all easements, restrictions, conditions, covenants, and other 

instruments of record. 

Grantor, for the consideration and subject to the reservations from conveyance and 

exceptions to conveyance and warranty, grants, sells, and conveys to Grantee all of Grantor's 

interest in the property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any 

way belonging, to have and hold it to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns 

forever. Grantor binds Grantor and Grantor's heirs and successors to warrant and forever defend 

all and singular the property to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns against 

every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof when the 

claim is by, through, or under Grantor but not otherwise, except as to the reservations from 

conveyance and exceptions to conveyance and warranty. 

When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns include the plural. 

Grantee assumes all ad valorem taxes due on the property for the current year. 

21 
DC BK14217 PG567 

12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 9 of 34 

STATEOF Gc.f.r", ~ COUNTY OF Ls A~) q_ t.. r 

This instrument 'WaS prepared based on information 

furnished by the parties, and no independent title 

search has been made. 

§ 

§ 

This instrument was acknowledged before me on J ""'.... 2. <..f 1 u 1J by David 

Stem. 

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF: 

@ H. Bryan Hicks, PLC 

901 2nd St. 

Marble Falls, TX 78654 

Tel: (830) 693-2165 

Fax: (830) 693-8185 

AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO; 

Pamela Mehl 

700 Grove Lane 

Georgetown, Texas 

22 
DC BK14217 PG568 

12-12209-hcm Claim#S Part 2 Filed 10/31 /12 Exhibit Page 27 of 34 

Nllllal ~-ntratt et paron oCI&nd aitvot..l in WUii..m..o• Cow!!y, T- ou1 o(U.cJCIMa.Ty .5vrvey, 

Al11ll'ld No. !I .... IJI. M. J. O&tcia Survct. Ahlltr4 No.~ IIIIi bcln1 tNt Trad! OOftW7ed lo 

RaJ"'OIId /1.. MPOR by Wtmn17 Deed d.lcod k.ol!'lt lO, l9t~ 1M JICOf6ed in Volume IUt, P•aelJS of 

the Official ll.ecetdr ofWilliiiiiiOI County &od dacn'blld bJIIllltCI tnd bouild1 u foilow1: 

B!OLNNT1'40 I& 10 lrot\ pip6 fc~ comot po.C ill IlK Noi1JIIiru of Oro•4 1.&~~& l'ot tbe ~ _,. ~t' thlltna 4~ in 1 Wllfll'dJ De..! to ~by J1111 fKll, recorded in Volum• 7lO,I'qt17l ollhc 

Willl&maon Cowoty ee.d 111.~ b&Uia tt.. Souu-.t coroor oC'Mrd Moon TtiiCll &nclthia ti'KI; 

• nmNC'e: s l ,. 16" l-'" w l7~ 76 r.- will! the North rrnc ororou!Anc 10 an lroa pln riJ\jnQ fet the 

ScUhcut Clllrnu or thl Tnct tl u d-.rlbcod in Mid Moen Wart&lll)l Oerd for the Sw!hwuc (#11(1 of 

-.ld Trxt I and 1M lnd; 

THliN~: lOll~ I h. QllnfiiO n ll11t oC nidi ,..a I &ncl T rwd tl; N (1' O>' t17" W ~58.05 r~ 1o an leon pin 

foo.md &ncl N 16' n• 47" W 4lJ ~S to &n iron pin found (01"\lltl'lor\hea.l- of' Mid TroQ nand ~n8 

I be Honh- corner or Mid T r•ct I 1111<1 Oil• tr""; 

iliENl;;~: wil\ lht ~'l line af lli4T n.a \, 

I) N 71" I>' I~ " !I. ~lUI fca10u lronp\Qfaund. 

2) N n• II' H" H tll.1Hn11e b iro11 pia feNnel, 

3) IOJ• II' H .. B 60.01 reel lo 111 )Jcm piR raunct. 

4) N 6r 19' 11" a 90.11 r..t 1o aa ~ ph1 fOUIIII bt lhoo Wnlli• oC &aid Jar;Qy cr.~& ror lilt 

Horthcan ~ oC ••ill Trte~ I lnd tlllllrlet; 

THENC;E; 1!0111 che W~t~t nne or !lid r!ICihy ltKt •a41he l!.qc U~~e of "'d Tl"'ll:: 1. 

I) S 12" W )0" E J70,a.4 foet 1o UWA pia~. 

2) S ltr ll' lJ" a H 1.151 ret t~ an ium pia klulld, · 

l) S ,. 40' ~.(" E 19S I9f~t lo lho pl!ICC ol'&cfU\niiiJu-4 tOIII&IIllnj 17.lJ auu ofJIIJIII. 

RECORDERS MEMORANDUM 

All or parts of the text on this page was 

not clearly legible for satisfactory recorci ion 

Exhibit "_A_ .. .__• 

I 

23 
• •r 

· .·,<!! . 

DC BK14217 PG569 

12-12209-hcm Claim#S Part 2 Filed 1 0/31 I 12 Exhibit Page 28 of 34 

AJl!Nl ccr'ILinlt.a or plftd of land lilualed in Willi~10n County, T~ uu.t ofll\1 John B•ry Sllrvey, 

Abl\ncl tolo. S I &lld '*Ill \1111 Trta U r.oJNeycd \0 II.&)UIOTII1 A. Moon 'lly Wlirn.nry Oeecl dllcd Ausull 

JO, I ~S lll'od ~(dod in Volume 1138 , P. 2J 5 of \he om~11 Rcc.orda afWilli~m~Gn Coo..~ty and 

dcaaibed by mclet 111d bounda ~ fbllowt: 

BEG!NNlNG a.t Ul iroa fin fou!\4 inlht NQI\b ltno of Grove 1..Anc for 10. Soo.ttu:..\ comc:r orlhat ~~~~ 

dciQ'I"bed In 1 Wln'IIIIY Dtlld 10 1\lebald A. Milct, Q Ill!, da\ed Novcfllbei 1, l9a.. Uld r~ in Volumo 

1095, Pas• 91J of &aid alli~ial rOCDrdt, bcia& the Soulltw..lt .:ornc:r orttld Mooro ~ and lhiJ 1rae1; 

THENCE: N u• l9' 00" w 19-1.76 feet wilh lbc We~~~~~~ of said Moore 1110.. na lho bet it of 

bearinp cile.d 1-.::reoo~.to 111 iran pin round for lilt l-IMbuJt C>Omd or wd M.ilca 1/'ut beifl& Lbe Northweat 

eorn1111 or S&id Moariii'CIIhia 1n1;1: 

THEHC'E: N 11• 2~ · )J" E 1)7.19 feet to an lr0<1 pln found for the Nonlnrell corn• oflt.l Trac& l aa 

clr:,t;ribN i~ the afortmenlioncd Moore Wan~nty ~ bcina lhe NMhca$1 t.Ornll' o( aaid Moor, Tr.a II 

lJ1d thia traa: 

TiiEI"CC.: aloag the C<>Glmortlin• ofaaid Tru:t lalldTr.a II, S 16° 53' 47'' E Hl.4) ra~to an iron pin 

~nd. U14 S o• Ol' O'l" E "SI.OHCC\ \c.., iron pin found in lha Nonh line or llid Gtavol.ane for the 

Soulh"cs >;Q('IICf of said Tra!Ot I .,d boina 11-c S011lbcas\ tllnlCir o( Ill ill. ind tl ~ thit tnd; 

rnENC£: S 11• ]4' 02" W 699,68 feet 10 lbt place of8qiiii\ID8811d containiQIIl6.67 acru orbml. 

<~ .. .. 

RECORDERS MEMORANDUM 

All or parts of the text on this page was 

not clearly legible for s>tisfactory 

rl"r.ortiAtinn 

Exhibit" ------ FILED AND RECORDED 

OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS 2e04064127 

~E.~~ 

98/tl/2004 12 :5& Pft 

~LLEN $69 . 00 

NANCY E. RISTER, COUNTY ~£RK 

UILLI~"SON COUNTY, T£X~S 

:-.:.·.··.··> ··: 

24 
DC BK14217 PG570 

1111 1111~ IIIII 11/llllllmllll/~ IIIII ~11 11~111111111 DEED 

5 PGS 

2009086302 

CAD Na. R039Gll 

Notice or Coalidentlality rlgbtll: If you are 1 natural penoa, yoa may remove or strike aay of the 

follmria11 i.Dformatioa from Ibis lastnuaent before it is filed for reeord ia ttac public: ncords: your 

toCial aecurity number or your driver's liause number. 

GENERAL WARRANTY DEED 

DATE: November 14, 2006 

GRANTOR: Linda Moore, aNa Linda R. Moore, Individually, and as lndependenl Executrix oflhc Eslall: of 

Ra~nd A. Moore, deceased, Kathy Moore. and RAndy Moore 

GRANTOR'S MAILING ADDRESS: 

GRANTEE.: David R. Slem and Pamela C. Mehl 

GRANTEE'S MAILING ADDRESS: 700 Grove Lane, Georgetown, Williamson Counly, Texas 78626 

CONSIDERATION: 

$10.00 and other valuable consideration, receipt of which is h<rtoby aelalowledgecl, and for lhe paym<nt ofwhieh no 

lien, eitber express or implied, is herein ~d. 

PROPERTY (including improvements): 

fEE SIMPLE nTI.E in and to lbe perimt'll:r desaiption of a JS foot wide road containin& S.l!S acres, 

sppro-Wnately one-half bcin& in the MJ. Garcia Survey, AMnlc! No. 246, and one-half in the John BelT)' Survey, 

Abstrac! No. 51. in Williamson Counly, Texas, and being a pan of an 85.20 acre tnct coaveyed to Charleo Pmzlcr, 

et ux, of record in Volume 420, Page 86, O.Cd R~ords of Williamson Cowtty, Texas, ll1d containing all of a JS foot 

ell shaped strip described in a deed from EIDa M. Lindell and A. WiUiam LindeU 1D Owles Penzler, dated July 23, 

)968, and recorded In Volume 509, Page 341, Deed Records of Williamson COUIII)', Texas; $aid 3S foot road being 

rna~ paniculazly described by metes and bounds as follows: 

BEGINNJNG at the lower Soutbwcst comer of t1u: said ell shaped >trip in tlu: NOT!h line of County Road IS2, ai!IO 

being the lower Southwest comer of a 139.17 acre tnct described in a deed to Etna MiUer and laura Millor, dilled 

October of 1957; 

'!'HENCE North 19 de~ 08 minules Wesi669.J7feet to an ell comer of the 139.17 acres and an ell comer of said 

ell shaped sllip; 

'fHENCE South 71 <kgrecs 20 minutzs 35 J<Conds West 2527.08 feet to • point oo or near lhe upper Southw<11 

comer of lhc I )9.17 acres and the upper Southwesr comer of lhc ell shaped strip; 

11-IENCE 71 deg=s 17 minutes Wcst 859.01 feet and South 71 degrees 18 minute5 40 seconds West 900.57 feet 

wilh lhe South line of the $aid 85.20 acre 1n1t1. as fenced, lo an iron pin set Ill !he Southeast comer of a 9.983 Len! 

tniC~ 

25 
I 

I 

DC BK14217 PG571 

TIU::NCE. South 70 degrees 57 minutes JO se<:onds West 100.0 feet and South 71 degrees 32 minutes 40 seoonds 

Wes1417.SJ feet with the South line of the 85.20 a<res and the South line of the 9.983 acres to an inln pin set at the 

Southeast comer of a 16.867 "'"' tr.ICt; 

THENCE North 19 degrees 00 minutes 45 seconds West 111 35 feet past an iron pin on line, continuing in all 554.29 

ft:e1 with the common line between lhc 16.867 acre !racl and the 9.983 acre tract to an iton pin set beside a fence 

comer po51; 

n!ENCE Nonh 27 degrees 37 minutes 40 seconds West 74 .92 to an iron pin set in the common line bctwun the 

16.867 acres and the 9.983 acres, and continuing with the same line in all 144.54 feet to a point on curve wi!h a 

radius of80.59; 

THENCE with the arc of the curve to the righ~ the chord bears South 54 degrees 19 minutes East 77.92 feet to the 

end of the curve; 

n!ENCE South 27 degrees 37 minutes 40 seconds East n.ss feet to • point; 

niENCE South 19 degrees 00 minulcs 45 seconds East 522.21 feet to a point; 

ntENCE North 71 de~ 32 minules 40 seconds East 382.69 feet and Nonh 70 degrees 57 minutes JO seconds 

East 99.94 feet to the East line of the said 9.983 aero tract; 

niENCE Nonh 71 degrees 18 minutes 40 seconds Eas1 900.67 feet and Nonh 71 de~es 17 minutes East 859.02 

feet to a point on or ncar the eommon line between the 85.20 acres and the I 39.17 acres; 

n!ENCE North 71 degrees 20 minutes East 2S6 1.53 feet to the Northwest eo mer of the ell shaped ttoct demibcd in 

Volume 509, Page 341, Deed Records of Williamson County, Texas; 

THENCE South 19 degltt3 09 minutt! 20 !.CCOftds P.ast 704.70 feet to the Southeast corner of the ell shaped tl"lct 

and to lhe Nunh line ofCOIJllty Road 1 ~2; 

TiiENCE South 71 degrees 08 minutes 20 seconds West 35.0 feet with the North line of County Road 152, to the 

POINT OF BEGINNING. 

RESERVATIONS FROM AND F.XCEPTlONS TO CONVEYANCI'. AND WARRANTY: 

This conveyance Is made and acupled subject ro: I) all reS1rictlons, coverwu.s, conditions, rights-of-way and 

as.scssments if any. affecting the ~bed property that are valid, existing and properly of record; 2) •II 

easements. indudifli specifically but without limita1ion any access, ingress and egress, or other easement granted to 

any other person fOJ the use of the subject roltd; and 3) lD taJtes for the year 2007 and subsequent yean. 

Grantor, for the conside1'81Jon and subj«t to the reservations from and uceptions to oonveyan« and 

warranty, graniS, sells and conveys to Grantee the property, tol!ether with ~11 and >i1111ular the rights and 

oppunenonces !Mmo in anywise belonging, to have and to hold it to Grantee, Grantee's heirs, executors, 

admlnislnltors, successors 1111d ossigns forever. Grantor hereby bin<h Grantor and Grantor's heirs, executors, 

administnltors, sue<:<:S50rs and aMigns to wanam and f=ver defend all and singular the property to Grantee and 

Grantee's heirs, executors adminisllalon, succCS50rs and assii!IJS ogain31 every person whomsoever lawfully 

claiming or to claim the same or lilY part thereof, cxupt u to the reservations and exceptions to convoyancc and 

watranty. 

@ ~ ~ \uUs PLG 

ct 0 { .;l '1-C- . 

m~ ~,\Y lt&~vFILED AND RECORDED 

OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS 2013063557 

~Ex~ 07/08/2013 02 :10PM 

CKASEBERG $40 .00 

NANCY E. RISTER , COUNTY CLERK 

WILLIAMSON COUNTY , TEXAS 

26 
TABB 
10/13/2014 9:09:50 PM 

CAUSE NO.D-1-GN-14-002071 

Amalia Rodriguez-Mendoza 

District Clerk 

Travis County 

d-1-gn-14-002071 

DAVID STERN 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PAMELAMEHL 

Defendant 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

DEFE~DANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 

COME NOW Pamela Mehl ("Defendant") and files this Defendant's Motion for New 

Trial and asks this Court to grant a new trial in the interest of justice and fairness. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

1. Plaintiff David Stern is Defendant Pamela Mehl ex-husband. This suit was as a 

result of a post divorce misunderstanding and what Defendant believes a breach of Plaintiffs 

duties as outlined in a final divorce decree issued in Williamson County, Texas. 

2. Defendant was properly served with service of process at her then attorney's 

office, but as Defendant will attest and verify her attorney failed to answer this suit. 

3. Plaintiff sued Defendant in this suit, served Defendant at her attorney's office but 

an answer was never filed . The divorce and all the matters and events in this cause occurred in 

Williamson County, Texas, however this suit was wrongfully filed in Travis County, Texas. 

4. Because this is the last possible day, this filing, as filed is sufficient as a Motion 

for New Trial, however will be supplemented tomorrow with additional detail, factual allegations 

by verified facts. 

Defendant ·s Motionfor New Trial 

Page I of2 

32 
II. PRAYER 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED and for these reasons, Defendant prays the 

Court to grant this motion in favor of Defendant for a new trial so that justice may be done. 

Respectfully submitted, 

THE KELLY LEGAL GROUP, PLLC 

PO BOX 2125 

Austin, Texas 78701 

512-505-0053 tel 

512-505-0054 fax 

'kcll 

By: 

St e Bar No. 2404 749 

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this the ~ day of October, 2014, a true and correct copy of 

this the Notice of Appeal, was served as stated below pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

Brent A. Devere 

1411 West Avenue, Suite 200 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 480-8170 Facsimile 

Electronic Mail To: BDevere@14ll west.com 

Def endant 's Motion for New Trial 

Page 2 of:Z 

D 

D 

D 

~ 

~ 

Hand Delivery 

CMRRR 

Regular U.S. Mail 

Confirmed Facsimile 

Electronic Mail 

33