J-A05011-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ESTATE OF: STEPHEN T. GALLAGHER, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: JOSEPH A. HALLMAN : No. 1125 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree March 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): O.C. No. 891 DE OF 2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and ALLEN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 23, 2015

Appellant, Joseph A. Hallman, appeals from the decree entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary 

judgment in favor of Appellees Michael J. Gallagher, Jr., Administrator of the 

Estate of Stephen T. Gallagher, Joann P. Gallagher, and Michael J. Gallagher, 

Sr. (collectively “Gallagher Appellees”), and denied Appellant’s cross-claim 

against Appellee Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”). We affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

In April 2003, the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”) contracted with Aetna 

to provide group life insurance coverage to Penn employees. Stephen T. 

Gallagher (“Decedent”) became a Penn employee in September 2003 and 

purchased two Aetna life insurance policies through the Penn Health & 

Welfare Program group coverage plan, GP-811778 (“Plan”). The Plan 
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provided in relevant part as follows:

Beneficiaries

You may name or change your beneficiary by filing [a] 

written request at your Employer’s headquarters or at 

Aetna’s Home Office. Ask your Employer for the Forms. 

The naming or any change will take effect as of the date 

you execute the request. Aetna will be fully discharged of 

its duties as to any payment made by it before your 

request is received at its Home Office.

Any amount payable to a beneficiary will be paid to those 

you name. Unless you state to the contrary, if more than 

one beneficiary is named, they will share on equal terms. 

* * *

If no named beneficiary survives you or if no beneficiary 

has been named, payment will be made as follows to those 

who survive you:

 Your spouse, if any.

 If there is no spouse, in equal shares to your children.

 If there is no spouse or child, to your parents, equally or 

to the survivor.

 If there is no spouse, child, or parent, in equal shares to 

your brothers and sisters.

 If none of the above survives, to your executors or 

administrators. 

(Exhibit 10 of the Gallagher Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 

4/25/13; R.R. at 192b-193b). ADP, Inc. administered the Plan and its online 

database, Enterprise. 

Decedent and Appellant were in a relationship and began to live 

together in early 2005. In May 2005, they executed a lease addendum 

which added Appellant to Decedent’s lease. Decedent and Appellant 

subsequently moved into a house they jointly owned and took out a 
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mortgage. They registered as same-sex domestic partners with Penn on 

January 26, 2006. At some point following that registration, Decedent 

added Appellant as a dependent under Decedent’s medical insurance. 

Decedent and Appellant separated in late 2008 or early 2009, at which 

point Appellant moved out of their jointly-owned home. Appellant continued 

to stay in touch with Decedent after the separation. For example, Appellant 

states he cared for Decedent’s dogs while Decedent was on an international 

business trip and drove Decedent home from the hospital after Decedent 

had outpatient surgery. On December 3, 2008, however, Decedent removed 

Appellant from Decedent’s medical insurance coverage. On that same date, 

Decedent also electronically added Appellee Joann Gallagher as his 

contingent life insurance beneficiary under the Plan. Decedent made no 

change to his primary life insurance beneficiary at that time. Decedent died 

on May 27, 2011. 

Upon Decedent’s death, Appellant became sole owner of the jointlyowned house subject to a substantial mortgage. Decedent’s life insurance 

policies were payable at a combined value of $354,000.00. Aetna received 

information from ADP identifying Appellant as Decedent’s primary life 

insurance beneficiary. On May 31, 2011, Aetna received separate death 

claims from Appellant and from Decedent’s brother, Appellee Michael J. 

Gallagher, Jr. On June 24, 2011, Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr., in his 

capacity as administrator of Decedent’s estate, filed a petition for citation 
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against Appellant and Aetna, which sought an award to the estate of the 

benefits under Decedent’s life insurance policies. The Orphans’ court initially 

denied the petition on July 6, 2011. Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr. filed 

exceptions on July 26, 2011. On July 29, 2011 the court vacated the July 6, 

2011 decree and issued a citation directing Appellant and Aetna to show 

cause why the court should not grant the relief requested in the petition for 

citation. 

On September 20, 2011, Aetna filed a petition for interpleader of the 

proceeds of Decedent’s life insurance benefits. Appellant filed a motion for 

summary judgment on March 30, 2012. Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr. filed 

a petition for leave to file a substituted petition for citation on April 4, 2012. 

On July 17, 2012, the court denied Appellant’s summary judgment motion, 

granted Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr.’s request to file a substituted 

petition, and denied Aetna’s interpleader petition. The Gallagher Appellees 

filed an amended petition for citation on July 31, 2012.1 On August 21, 

2012, Appellant filed an answer and a cross-claim against Aetna for failure 

to pay out Decedent’s life insurance benefits to Appellant. 

The Gallagher Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment against 

 

1 Decedent’s parents, Appellees Joann P. Gallagher and Michael J. Gallagher, 

Sr., joined in the amended petition. The petition sought the award of 

Decedent’s life insurance benefits to his parents as default beneficiaries 

under the Plan, or to Appellee Joann Gallagher individually. In the 

alternative, the petition sought to impose a constructive trust on any 

benefits paid to Appellant to preserve the benefits during the litigation, so 

the benefits could be transferred to Decedent’s parents. 
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Appellant on April 25, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Appellant filed a crossmotion for summary judgment against the Gallagher Appellees, and a 

motion for summary judgment against Aetna on the cross-claim. On March 

5, 2014, the court denied Appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment; 

granted summary judgment in favor of the Gallagher Appellees; denied 

Appellant’s cross-claim against Aetna; and awarded the proceeds of 

Decedent’s life insurance policies under the Plan to Appellees Joann 

Gallagher and Michael Gallagher, Sr., pursuant to the default provisions of 

the Plan. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 1, 2014. The 

court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); and Appellant filed none. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE [ORPHANS’] COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW 

AND/OR ABUSE[] ITS DISCRETION BY ENTERING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE [GALLAGHER 

APPELLEES]...AND AGAINST APPELLANT BY:

DETERMINING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 

ELECTRONIC LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY 

DESIGNATIONS UTILIZED BY [PENN] AND 

ACCEPTED BY AETNA..., NAMING [APPELLANT] AS 

THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF TWO POLICIES 

TOTALING $354,000.00, WERE INVALID;

DISREGARDING COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE 

FORM OF SCREEN SHOTS OF THE COMPUTER 

RECORDS WHICH SHOW UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE 

LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION OF 

[DECEDENT], NAMING [APPELLANT] AS THE 

PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WAS INVALID;

DETERMINING THAT THE ELECTRONIC 
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DESIGNATION OF LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY IS 

A “PROGRAM MODALITY BY DEFAULT” AND RELYING 

UPON...THE HEARSAY LETTER DATED MARCH 8, 2012 

FROM HELEN C. LOGAN; AND

DETERMINING THAT [APPELLANT] IS NOT ENTITLED 

TO LEGAL FEES AND COSTS UNDER ERISA 

PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) FOR 

AETNA’S REFUSAL TO PAY THE LIFE INSURANCE 

PROCEEDS TO THE DESIGNATED PRIMARY 

BENEFICIARY.

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

In his sub-issues one through three, Appellant argues Aetna and 

Penn’s records established Appellant was named as primary beneficiary 

under Decedent’s life insurance policies when Decedent died. Appellant 

contends Penn’s screen shots of information in the Enterprise system, which 

constituted Aetna’s official record of beneficiary information, unequivocally 

identified Appellant as primary beneficiary. Appellant asserts the Gallagher 

Appellees failed to present evidence indicating Decedent named anyone 

other than Appellant as primary beneficiary or that the designation was 

somehow improper. Appellant insists he had no obligation to produce a 

paper form that Decedent had originally submitted to name Appellant as 

primary beneficiary. Appellant claims the Plan permitted electronic 

designation of beneficiaries as early as 2006, and ever since then. In 

support, Appellant states the language from the 2010 Aetna Plan Summary, 

which provided the policyholder “may” name or change a beneficiary via 

written request, was optional not mandatory. Appellant further contends the 
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court improperly relied on a letter from Penn’s Office of General Counsel, 

which suggested Appellant had somehow been “inadvertently” designated as 

a primary beneficiary by default when Decedent added Appellant to 

Decedent’s medical insurance coverage. Appellant asserts this letter is 

hearsay and speculation. For these reasons, Appellant concludes this Court 

should reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the Gallagher 

Appellees and enter judgment in favor of Appellant or, alternatively, remand 

for trial. We agree with Appellant that summary judgment on this issue was 

in error. 

Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment 

requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344, 

347 (Pa.Super. 2006). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 

564 Pa. 407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 

122 S.Ct. 2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). In reviewing a trial court’s grant

of summary judgment,

[W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing 

all the evidence of record to determine whether there 

exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and 

all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. 

Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be 

entered. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue 

of a material fact must be resolved against the moving 

party. 
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Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause 

of action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the 

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including 

the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce 

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or 

defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be 

submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no 

genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary 

element of the cause of action or defense, which could be 

established by additional discovery or expert report and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law, summary judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record 

that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the 

material facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient 

evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action 

or defense. 

Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial 

court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own 

conclusions. The appellate Court will disturb the trial 

court’s order only upon an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with 

law on facts and circumstances before the trial court 

after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the 

court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue 

for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its 

discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the 

trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow 

legal procedure.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act2(“ERISA”) governs 

“any employee benefit plan if the plan is established or maintained by any 

 

2 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461. 
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employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting 

commerce.” Tatterson v. Koppers Co., 458 A.2d 983, 985 (Pa.Super. 

1983) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(a)(1)). “Under ERISA, plan administrators 

and fiduciaries are required ‘to discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan 

solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,... in accordance 

with the documents and instruments governing the plan....’” In re 

Estate of Sauers, 613 Pa. 186, 205, 32 A.3d 1241, 1253 (2011) (quoting 

29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D)) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, the Orphans’ court reasoned as follows:

Based on the record presented, and in particular the 

documents and instruments governing the plan, 

[Appellant] has failed to sustain his burden of establishing 

that he was designated by [Decedent] as a beneficiary

under the procedures established by [the Plan]. The 

relevant provisions of that “Your Group Plan” sponsored by 

the University of Pennsylvania require a specific 

designation of a beneficiary as follows:

Beneficiaries

You may name or change your beneficiary by filing 

written request at your Employer’s headquarters or 

at Aetna’s Home Office. Ask your Employer for the 

Forms. The naming or any change will take effect as 

of the date you execute the request. Aetna will be 

fully discharged of its duties as to any payment 

made by it before your request is received at its 

Home Office.

Any amount payable to a beneficiary will be paid to 

those you name. Unless you state to the contrary, if 

more than one beneficiary is named, they will share 

on equal terms. 

* * *
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If no named beneficiary survives you or if no 

beneficiary has been named, payment will be made 

as follows to those who survive you:

 Your spouse, if any.

 If there is no spouse, in equal shares to your 

children.

 If there is no spouse or child, to your parents, 

equally, or to the survivor.

Throughout the long pendency of this dispute, [Appellant] 

has failed to present any designation—written or 

electronic—of a beneficiary selected by [Decedent] in 

compliance with the relevant procedures set forth in the 

Aetna policy. Instead, [Appellant] relies on 2 sets of 

computer screen shots, one produced by Penn and the 

other by Aetna.... These documents, however, are merely 

post-mortem records reflecting Penn and Aetna’s computer 

files, which, the record demonstrates, were dependent on 

information received from ADP. This is made clear in 

Aetna’s response to [Appellant’s] first set of 

interrogatories[,] which he presents in support of his 

summary judgment [motion]. When asked if it maintains 

“a record of the primary beneficiary for life insurance 

policies and coverage provided to [Decedent] under the 

[Plan],” Aetna replied:

Aetna does not maintain (i.e. store) historical 

information or records of beneficiary designations 

made by [Decedent]. Aetna has access only to 

current beneficiary designations which it receives 

through a file feed from ADP, the Plan Sponsor’s 

contracted vendor for administration of the technical 

aspects of the Plan.

The deposition testimony [Appellant] relies on to support 

his summary judgment motion likewise admits a lack of 

knowledge and deferral to ADP. The deposition of 

Geraldine Zima, Manager of Benefits Administration for 

Penn, is illustrative. In her deposition, Ms. Zima 

repeatedly emphasizes her limited knowledge of the 

procedures and information stored by ADP for life 

insurance beneficiaries. For instance, when she was asked 
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to interpret the three screenshots produced by Penn 

regarding [Decedent’s] designation of life insurance 

beneficiaries and more specifically “what information does 

this screenshot tell you about the beneficiary designation 

of [Decedent’s] life insurance policy,” Ms. Zima candidly 

replied: “You would have to talk to ADP about that. I don’t 

use this screen that much. I’m not familiar enough with 

it.” To her knowledge, these 3 screen shots constitute the 

entire and only record of the beneficiaries of [Decedent’s] 

life insurance. They were stored electronically in ADP’s 

Enterprise System and then [sent] directly to Aetna. 

In addition to this dearth in background information about 

the Penn and Aetna screenshots, [Appellant’s] summary 

judgment [motion] is undermined by the internal 

contradictions between these documents. While the Aetna 

screenshot gives an effective date for the beneficiary 

designation of [Appellant] of “7/1/10,[”] Ms. Zima was 

asked to explain the Penn screenshot’s effective date of 

“12/3/08.” At first she deferred, stating “You would have 

to ask ADP how to read that,” but then offered her opinion 

that [Appellant] had been named a beneficiary before 

12/3/08. This conjecture, however, is unsupported by any 

hard evidence. When specifically asked whether there was 

“any writing signed by [Decedent] designating [Appellant] 

as primary beneficiary that you have seen or have 

knowledge,” [Ms. Zima] replied: “I haven’t seen any 

paper” nor was she aware of “any document signed by 

[Decedent] designating [Appellant] as primary 

beneficiary.” Aetna likewise stated that it had never 

received any electronic signatures by [Decedent] and the 

“computer documents do not show when a designation was 

made. Aetna’s records show online designation as of 

7/01/10 of [Appellant].” 

There is no dispute that [Decedent] had named [Appellant] 

as beneficiary of his medical insurance or that he 

subsequently removed him in December 2008. In the 

dearth of a clear electronic or written beneficiary 

designation for [Decedent’s] life insurance, Ms. Zima was 

asked to speculate on how [Appellant’s] name came to 

appear as a beneficiary. In response, she suggests a 

computer default:
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Q: Well, isn’t that in contradiction of your 

statement that [Decedent] elected—isn’t this 

statement saying that he elected to give medical 

benefits to [Appellant], and that the Enterprise 

system, through some programming—some 

programming modality by default named [Appellant] 

in the life insurance beneficiary field?

A: It did not name him. It populated the name 

field. There was no designation as to primary or 

contingent. It was up to the employee to make that 

election or change it. 

This suggestion that [Appellant’s] name appears on the 

computer printouts by default contravenes the explicit 

terms of the insurance policy requiring a designation by 

the insured as to his life insurance beneficiary. The lack of 

any evidence of beneficiary designation is fatal to 

[Appellant’s] claim. Although he counters that the 

[Gallagher Appellees have] never produced any 

documentation of a different beneficiary designation, to 

maintain [their] burden of proof, the [Gallagher Appellees] 

do not have to do this. Under the explicit terms of [the] 

policy or plan, if the insured fails to designate a 

beneficiary, there is a default provision clearly mapped 

out. Under that default provision, the [Gallagher 

Appellees] prevail[] and the benefits should be awarded to 

the parents of [Decedent]. 

The other documents offered by [Appellant] to support his 

claim are irrelevant. The 2006 Amendment to the Master 

Services agreement between Penn and ADP as well as the 

Contract between Aetna and Penn effective April 1, 2006 

concerning ADP’s management of data merely define the 

relationship among these parties but were not incorporated 

into the Plan applicable to [Decedent]. The plan 

summaries that [Appellant] presented likewise were 

irrelevant to determination of the designated beneficiary 

but ironically those summaries would not have found 

computer screen shots sufficient to designate a 

beneficiary. The Summary Plan Description as of July 

2006, for instance, provides at page 38 as follows:

Enrollment and Beneficiary Designation
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When you enroll for coverage you complete an 

enrollment form and name a beneficiary to receive 

benefits in case of your death. You may name 

anyone as your beneficiary and can change your 

beneficiary at any time via the online enrollment 

system at www.upenn.edu/u@penn. 

No enrollment form, in paper or in electronic form, has 

been provided. The computer screen shots presented by 

Aetna as well as the screenshots and the touch logs 

produced by Penn as explained by Geraldine Zima in her 

deposition seriously contradict each other. 

Alternatively, the [Gallagher Appellees have] sustained 

[their] burden of showing that there was no designation of 

a beneficiary of [Decedent’s] life insurance policy under 

the terms of the relevant insurance policy. Normally, the 

[Gallagher Appellees] would have faced a daunting task in 

trying to establish this “negative.” [They were] assisted, 

ironically, by the failure of [Appellant] to present any 

documentation—electronic or otherwise—that he had been 

designated by [Decedent] as his life insurance beneficiary 

under the terms of the policy that the [Gallagher 

Appellees] presented as Ex. 10 in support of [their] 

summary judgment motion. The deposition testimony by 

Geraldine Zima, as previously analyzed, revealed that she 

was unaware of any designation of a beneficiary other than 

the three screen shots. At one point, in fact, she 

hypothesized that [Appellant’s] name had appeared as a 

life insurance beneficiary by computer default. The letter 

exchange the [Gallagher Appellees] presented with Helen 

C. Logan, Administrator of Legal Services at Penn’s [O]ffice 

of the General Counsel likewise buttresses Ms. Zima’s 

suppositions. When asked whether [Penn] had a 

document designating [Appellant] as a beneficiary of 

[Decedent’s] life insurance—either on paper or 

electronically, Ms. Logan responded by letter dated March 

8, 2012[:]

Penn refers questions about the ADP process to ADP, 

but it is Penn’s understanding that having just added 

[Appellant] to [Decedent’s] medical insurance as a 

domestic partner, [Decedent’s] screen defaulted to 

[Appellant’s] name in the life insurance beneficiary 
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field. One can simply erase the default name and 

type in another. 

Designation of a life insurance beneficiary by computer 

default is not an alternative to the personal selection of a 

life insurance beneficiary under [the Plan] that the 

[Gallagher Appellees] rel[y] upon in seeking summary 

judgment. While it is conceivable—though far from 

certain—that such a personal designation might be found 

among ADP’s documents, [Appellant] failed to pursue that 

route. In fact, [Appellant] does not seek to raise that 

argument in the present summary judgment. Moreover, 

the period for discovery is over. There is therefore no 

issue of fact nor one for trial. The [Gallagher Appellees 

have] met [their] burden of proof that no designated 

beneficiary can be proven, so that the default provisions of 

the insurance policy intended for such instances should be 

invoked. 

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed March 5, 2014, at 12-16). We cannot fully 

agree with the court’s analysis for the following reasons. 

Decedent took out life insurance policies under the Plan in 2003. As 

early as 2006, Decedent had a personal key and password he could use to 

log into the Enterprise database. Once in the system, Decedent was able to 

name or change his primary and contingent life insurance beneficiaries. 

Decedent could also submit a paper beneficiary designation form to Penn or 

Aetna. In either case, current beneficiary information was stored in 

Enterprise. Ms. Zima stated during her deposition that the information in 

Enterprise constituted Penn’s official and entire record of the beneficiaries for 

Decedent’s life insurance policies. Screen shots of Decedent’s record in 

Enterprise taken after his death displayed Appellant’s name as the primary 

beneficiary for Decedent’s life insurance policies. Both Penn and Aetna 
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produced these screen shots. Ms. Zima testified the Penn screen shots were 

received from ADP, which administers Enterprise. Likewise, in answers to 

interrogatories, Aetna stated it has access only to current beneficiary 

designations, and it receives this information in an electronic file feed from 

ADP. Aetna confirmed that the file feed it received from ADP listed Appellant 

as the primary beneficiary for Decedent’s life insurance policies. 

The “touch logs” of Decedent’s activity in Enterprise show no electronic 

designation of a primary life insurance beneficiary, which might suggest the 

designation was done on paper. Nevertheless, the absence of a paper form 

signed by Decedent, naming Appellant as primary beneficiary, is not 

automatically fatal to Appellant’s case. Aetna stated it stores no historical 

information or records of beneficiary designations. The up-to-date 

beneficiary information in the screen shots, however, suggests Decedent 

named Appellant as the primary beneficiary for the life insurance policies at 

some point in the past. Furthermore, the touch logs of Decedent’s activity in 

Enterprise showed he logged into the system in December 2008 to add 

Appellee Joann Gallagher as a contingent life insurance beneficiary,3and to 

remove Appellant from medical coverage. Ms. Zima testified that it was her 

understanding Appellant was already designated as Decedent’s primary life 

insurance beneficiary at that time. According to the touch logs, however, 

 

3

In Enterprise, Joann Gallagher’s name is misspelled as “Joan Gallagher” 

and her birthdate is incorrect, but the parties do not dispute that the entry is 

intended to refer to Decedent’s mother, Appellee Joann Gallagher. 
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Decedent did not alter, change or remove Appellant as the primary 

beneficiary then or at any other time that Decedent logged into Enterprise. 

The Gallagher Appellees’ assertion, that designating a medical dependent in 

Enterprise can automatically populate the primary life insurance beneficiary 

field with the same name, fails to establish what actually occurred in this 

case and is conjecture at this point. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, as the 

nonmoving party in the Gallagher Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, 

we conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Decedent 

designated Appellant primary beneficiary of Decedent’s life insurance 

policies. See Chenot, supra. At the summary judgment stage, any doubts 

concerning the reason Appellant is listed as Decedent’s primary beneficiary 

in Enterprise must be resolved in Appellant’s favor as the nonmoving party. 

See id. Summary judgment for either party would be inappropriate at this 

juncture in light of the conflicting claims regarding the identity of the 

primary beneficiary of the life insurance policies. The factfinder should have 

an opportunity to resolve this issue, which includes any questions regarding 

alleged inaccuracies in the screen shots as well as the knowledge and 

credibility of the witnesses.4 

 

4

Likewise, the Gallagher Appellees’ objection to the screen shots as 

unauthenticated is properly an issue for trial. Assuming without deciding the 

touch logs and Ms. Zima’s deposition testimony were insufficient to 

authenticate the screen shots, Appellant should have an opportunity to 

present testimony or other authentication evidence if the case proceeds to 
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In his fourth sub-issue, Appellant argues Aetna failed to comply with 

ERISA when it deferred action on Appellant’s claim for Decedent’s life 

insurance benefits. Appellant contends Aetna’s decision to file an 

interpleader petition, rather than approve Appellant’s claim, was 

unsupported by substantial evidence. Appellant asserts that even if Aetna 

acted reasonably when it filed the interpleader petition, it unjustifiably 

ignored evidence (including the screen shots) that subsequently became 

available. Appellant concludes Aetna breached its fiduciary duty under 

ERISA when it continuously refused to pay Decedent’s life insurance benefits 

to Appellant, the designated primary beneficiary. We cannot agree. 

Section 1132 of ERISA provides in relevant part as follows:

§ 1132. Civil enforcement

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought—

(1) by a participant or beneficiary—

* * *

 

trial. Additionally, the Gallagher Appellees’ “best evidence rule” objection 

misconstrues the evidentiary purpose of the screen shots, which was to 

show Decedent’s act of naming Appellant as a primary life insurance 

beneficiary. See Pa.R.E. 1002 (stating: “An original writing, recording, or 

photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules, other 

rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or a statute provides otherwise”) 

and Comment (stating “writings are not usually treated as subject to the rule 

if they are only evidence of the transaction, thing or event”). Rule 1002 did 

not require Appellant to produce the original beneficiary designation form, 

which would only be additional evidence of this “event.” See id.
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(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms 

of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of 

the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits 

under the terms of the plan;

* * *

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B). “Under Section 1132...plan administrators are 

subject to federal liability should a court find they acted in an arbitrary and 

capricious manner by interpreting an ERISA plan document in a manner 

which is improper as a matter of federal law.” Estate of Sauers, supra at 

210, 32 A.3d at 1256. “In deciding whether a fiduciary’s interpretation was 

arbitrary and capricious, we review only the materials available to [the 

fiduciary] during the decision-making process.” Pilieri v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 

718 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa.Super. 1998). “[U]nder the ‘arbitrary and 

capricious’ standard, a fiduciary’s interpretation of a plan will not be 

disturbed if it is reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and proper 

as a matter of law.” Id. “A decision is supported by substantial evidence if 

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to agree with the 

decision.” Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 214 F.3d 136, 142 

(3d Cir. 2000). 

Instantly, Decedent died on May 27, 2011. On May 31, 2011, Aetna 

received separate claims to Decedent’s life insurance benefits from Appellant 

and Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr. On June 1, 2011, after Aetna accessed 

records showing Appellant was the named primary beneficiary, Aetna sent 

Appellant a letter acknowledging receipt of his life insurance claim and 
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requesting a copy of Decedent’s certified death certificate in order to process 

the claim. During the ensuing two weeks, Aetna received numerous 

telephone calls from members of Decedent’s family seeking information 

regarding Decedent’s designated life insurance beneficiary. Decedent’s 

sister believed her mother was the beneficiary. Aetna received an email 

from Penn on June 14, 2011, while Appellant’s claim remained on hold 

pending Aetna’s receipt of the death certificate. That email indicated 

Decedent’s family might contest the beneficiary designation. On June 17, 

2011, Appellee Michael Gallagher, Jr. sent a letter to Aetna contesting the 

beneficiary designation. The letter stated in part:

Aetna has informed the family that an online change of 

beneficiary was made in July of 2010. [Decedent’s] 

relationship with [Appellant] ended approximately four 

years ago. [Appellant] expressed (in writing) his desire to 

be removed from [Decedent’s] life. Having [Appellant] 

listed as [Decedent’s] beneficiary is contradictory to 

[Decedent’s] intentions, statements, direction and efforts. 

* * *

[D]uring the past several months, [Decedent] made many 

statements to several individuals that Joann Gallagher is 

the primary beneficiary of his life insurance. We also 

believe there is written evidence of such.

As Administrator of the Estate, I am writing to determine 

what change was made in July, what the policy was before 

the change, and where the change originated from. It is 

possible [Appellant] knew [Decedent’s] login user name 

and password. 

I am also writing to ask if Aetna will accept a written 

statement, made by [Decedent] in the recent time before 

his death, [in] which Joann Gallagher is designated as 
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primary beneficiary? Additionally, will Aetna accept sworn 

and certified affidavits by [Decedent’s] attending 

professionals and health care providers asserting 

[Decedent] intended and believed Joann Gallagher was the 

primary beneficiary? Lastly, will Aetna accept a written 

statement from me, as Power of Attorney, and made while 

[Decedent] was alive, designating Joann Gallagher as 

beneficiary? 

(Appendix to Aetna’s Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, filed 5/29/13; R.R. at 523a-524a). On June 24, 2011, Aetna 

received a copy of the petition for citation against Appellant and Aetna, 

which sought the award of Decedent’s life insurance benefits to Appellee 

Michael Gallagher, Jr., as administrator of Decedent’s estate. Appellant 

provided Aetna with a copy of Decedent’s death certificate on July 6, 2011. 

Aetna proceeded to investigate the claim. Aetna discovered, inter alia, 

Decedent and Appellant had separated in 2009, and Decedent had removed 

Appellant as a medical dependent around that time. On July 27, 2011, the 

Orphans’ court issued a decree directing Appellant and Aetna to show cause 

why Appellee Michael Gallagher Jr.’s petition for citation should not be 

granted. In September 2011, Aetna filed its petition for interpleader and a 

response to the petition for citation. 

Under the circumstances, Aetna acted reasonably when it decided to 

interplead Decedent’s life insurance benefits. Aetna was faced with 

competing claims to the benefits, and the issue was hotly contested. Even 

after Appellant produced the Enterprise screen shots, the case continued and 

genuine factual disputes remain regarding the identity of Decedent’s primary 
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life insurance beneficiary. Aetna’s decision to defer payment on the 

competing life insurance claims pending the outcome of the litigation was 

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. See Pilieri, supra. 

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude Appellant presented facts 

sufficient to overcome summary judgment at this juncture. We further

conclude under these circumstances Aetna’s decision to defer payment on 

the competing insurance claims did not violate ERISA. Accordingly, we 

affirm the Orphans’ court decree to the extent it denied Appellant’s crossclaim against Aetna. We reverse that part of the decree which granted 

summary judgment in favor of the Gallagher Appellees and awarded the 

benefits of Decedent’s life insurance policies under the Plan to Appellees 

Joann Gallagher and Michael Gallagher, Sr. and remand for further 

proceedings. 

Decree affirmed in part and reversed in part; case remanded for 

further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/23/2015