NO. 12-17-00058-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ANTIONNE LEDELLE SKINNER, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 124TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Antionne Ledelle Skinner appeals his conviction for two counts of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver. In three issues, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his plea and whether the trial court considered the full range of punishment. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with four counts of possession of a controlled 

substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more, but less than four grams, with 

intent to deliver. Appellant appeared in open court and waived his right to a jury trial. 

Thereafter, the State abandoned counts II and IV, and after being properly admonished, 

Appellant entered an open plea of “guilty” to counts I and III. In support of Appellant’s plea, the 

State offered a stipulation of evidence signed by Appellant along with offense reports and 

laboratory analysis reports. The State argued for fifteen years imprisonment and Appellant 

argued for community supervision. The trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for ten 

years. This appeal followed. 
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence 

to support his guilty plea because “there was no certification from any testing facility concerning 

the contraband.” 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The standard of review announced in Jackson v. Virginia1is not applicable when the 

defendant enters a guilty plea. See Chindaphone v. State, 241 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). Once a defendant enters a valid guilty plea, the State is no longer 

constitutionally required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McGill v. State, 200 

S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Article 1.15 of the code of criminal 

procedure requires the State to introduce evidence showing the guilt of the defendant. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005). Such evidence “shall be accepted by the court as 

the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea 

without sufficient evidence to support the same.” Id.

To substantiate a guilty plea, there must be evidence “in addition to, and independent of, 

the plea itself to establish the defendant’s guilt.” Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009). A stipulation of evidence or judicial confession, standing alone, 

is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea so long as it establishes every element of 

the offense charged. See id. at 13. A “catch-all” stipulation may constitute a judicial confession 

and alone will support a conviction. See Adam v. State, 490 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1973) (stipulation that “all the acts and allegations in said indictment (count no. one (1) of said 

Indictment) charging the offense of Sale of a Narcotic Drug, to-wit: Heroin are true and correct” 

was sufficient). A written confession approved by the trial court can substantiate 

a guilty plea even if not introduced into evidence. Jones v. State, 373 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Rexford v. State, 818 S.W.2d 494, 495-

96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d)).

Analysis

On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 

and urges us to review the trial court’s judgment under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, which 

requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine if a 

 

1 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 560 (1979). 
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rational fact-finder could have found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 319, 

99 S. Ct. at 2789. However, Appellant entered a plea of “guilty” to the charged offense, and as 

previously stated, the Jackson analysis does not apply when a defendant pleads “guilty.” See

Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219. Thus, all that is required is evidence showing the defendant’s 

guilt. See id.; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15. 

A person commits an offense if the person knowingly manufactures, delivers, or 

possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1. TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a) (West 2017). The offense is a felony of the second degree if 

the amount of the controlled substance to which the offense applies is, by aggregate weight, 

including adulterants or dilutants, one gram or more but less than four grams. Id. § 481.112(c). 

Methamphetamine is a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1. Id. § 481.102(6) (West 

Supp. 2017).

In this case, Counts I and III alleged that Appellant knowingly possessed, with intent to 

deliver, a controlled substance listed in penalty group one of the Texas Controlled Substances 

Act, namely, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. 

Appellant signed a stipulation of evidence in which he judicially confessed to every element of 

both counts of the charged offense to which he pleaded “guilty.” The State offered the 

stipulation of evidence, Appellant did not object, and the court admitted the stipulation into 

evidence at Appellant’s plea hearing. Further, the State offered, and the trial court admitted, the 

offense reports and laboratory analysis reports confirming that the substances at issue were 

methamphetamine, all without objection from Appellant. According to the reports, one item of 

evidence yielded 1.13 grams of methamphetamine and the other yielded 1.02 grams. 

Nevertheless, Appellant argues the State was required to prove that he knowingly 

possessed methamphetamine in an amount more than one gram but less than four grams, with the 

intent to deliver and that, although the stipulation sets out those elements, the State has the 

additional burden of offering evidence to support the stipulation and guilty plea under Article 

1.15. Moreover, Appellant argues that the State’s failure to include a “certificate from the lab to 

show the bona fides of the exhibit” renders the laboratory analysis evidence “per se 

inadmissible” and, therefore, the evidence is “legally insufficient to establish possession of 
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cocaine by Appellant.”2 In support of Appellant’s argument he directs our attention to a line of

habeas corpus cases wherein the court of criminal appeals reversed convictions where laboratory 

analysis reports reflected that the substance alleged to be a controlled substance was not, in fact, 

a controlled substance. See e.g. Ex Parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

Particularly, in Mable, the court of criminal appeals held that subsequent testing of seized 

substances by a crime laboratory and discovery that they did not contain any illicit materials 

rendered the defendant’s guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance unknowing and 

involuntary and withdrawal of the defendant’s guilty plea was warranted. See id. Mable, 

however, is not persuasive here, given that laboratory analysis reports in this case, which the trial 

court considered, show that the alleged controlled substance was, in fact, a controlled substance, 

i.e., methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(6). Additionally, 

Article 38.41 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that certificates of analysis of 

physical evidence are admissible without the declarant appearing in court if the documents are 

filed and served on the opponent more than twenty days before trial begins and the opponent 

does not file a written objection by the tenth day before trial begins. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.41 (West Supp. 2017); see also Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 526-28 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, pet ref’d). Appellant’s suggestion that a laboratory analysis cannot be 

considered as evidence in the absence of a certificate of analysis is incorrect. Daniels v. State, 

06-16-00102-CR, 2017 WL 429602, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 1, 2017, no pet. h.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Article 38.41 merely provides one avenue by which 

the State can establish the results of a laboratory analysis. Id. Here, the State introduced the 

laboratory analysis report without any objection by Appellant, which is another avenue of 

admission into evidence. Id. This is particularly true in light of Appellant’s guilty plea and 

express waiver of his right to cross examine and confront witnesses in open court. See Deener, 

214 S.W.3d at 526-28 (affidavits and certificates authorized under Article 38.41 section four are 

testimonial within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 

L. Ed. 2d. 177 (2004), but failure to object results in the forfeiture of the right to confrontation).

Further, Appellant’s judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to substantiate his 

plea of “guilty.” See Chindaphone, 241 S.W.3d at 219; Adam, 490 S.W.2d at 190; Rexford, 818 

 

2 At one point in his brief, Appellant references cocaine. However, Appellant was charged with possession 

with intent to deliver methamphetamine, and throughout Appellant’s brief he correctly identifies the substance at 

issue as methamphetamine, therefore we assume Appellant mistakenly referenced cocaine in this part of his brief. 
5

S.W.2d at 496; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient 

evidence that Appellant committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance, 

methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more, but less than four grams, with intent to 

deliver. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

TRIAL COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL RANGE OF PUNISHMENT

In Appellant’s second and third issues, he contends that the trial court failed to consider 

the full range of punishment, including community supervision, and that the trial court’s failure 

to do so denied him due process of law. We will address these issues together. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer. Gagnon v. 

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973). It is a denial of due 

process for a trial court to arbitrarily refuse to consider the entire range of punishment for an 

offense or to refuse to consider the evidence and impose a predetermined punishment.

McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds 

by DeLeon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In the absence of a clear 

showing of bias, we will presume the trial judge was a neutral and detached officer. Earley v. 

State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1993, pet. dism’d).

Bias is not shown when (1) the trial court hears extensive evidence before 

assessing punishment, (2) the record contains explicit evidence that the trial court considered the 

full range of punishment, and (3) the trial court made no comments indicating consideration of 

less than the full range of punishment. Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006). In applying our state constitutional guarantee of due course of law, we follow 

contemporary federal due process interpretations. U.S. Gov’t v. Marks, 949 S.W.2d 320, 326 

(Tex. 1997); Fleming v. State, 376 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012), aff’d, 455 

S.W.3d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1159, 190 L. Ed. 2d 913 (2015).

Analysis

Appellant argues that the trial court did not consider the full range of punishment because 

of remarks the trial court made when sentencing Appellant. According to Appellant, “the trial 

court indicated that it was the role of ‘dealer’ and Appellant’s acts of ‘dealing’ that made it 
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impossible for the trial court to consider community supervision.” He specifically complains of 

the following comments by the trial court:

But really these are not possession-with-intent-to-deliver cases; these are clearly delivery cases. 

There’s really no way around it, Mr. Skinner, you are a drug dealer. That’s what the evidence 

shows.

...

...So you were dealing it. It wasn’t just small, petty amounts. It wasn’t state jail amounts you were 

offering. You chose to sell out of your home -- or out of your residence.

...

I look at the factors surrounding the deliveries. While these aren’t huge amounts, they’re still more 

than state jail amounts.

...

But four deliveries to one CI in a one-month period indicates to me there was a lot of dealing 

going on. You yourself testified that you had about four or five customers.

When I consider all the factors, -- your criminal history, the amount that was sold, that you 

weren’t using, you were just selling -- I cannot in good faith probate the sentence. 

However, a review of the record demonstrates the trial court considered many factors 

when assessing Appellant’s sentence. The trial court indicated that, when deciding to sentence 

Appellant to ten years imprisonment instead of community supervision, it considered Appellant’s 

criminal history, the frequency and timing of his deliveries of controlled substances to 

confidential informants, the amounts sold, and the fact that Appellant sold, but did not use drugs. 

See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645. Prior to assessing punishment, the trial court heard from three 

punishment witnesses, including Appellant himself and Appellant’s girlfriend and brother. See 

id. Furthermore, the trial court did not make any statements indicating a failure to consider the 

full range of punishment. See id. Appellant had no objection when the trial court asked if there 

was any reason at law why the sentence should not be formally pronounced.3

A review of the record indicates that the trial court held an extensive hearing, 

contemplated a myriad of factors, and considered and rejected Appellant’s request for 

community supervision. See id. The trial court’s comments simply do not reflect bias, partiality, 

or a failure to consider the full range of punishment. See id. Because the record does not 

indicate that the trial court arbitrarily refused to consider the entire range of punishment, we 

overrule Appellant’s second and third issues. See McClenan, 661 S.W.2d at 110.

 

3 Trial Court: Is there any reason at law why sentence should not be formally pronounced?

Defense Counsel: Judge, I think you said Counts I and II, and I thought --

Trial Court: All right. It should be Counts I and III....

Defense Counsel: No. Other than that, no.
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DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered February 14, 2018.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

FEBRUARY 14, 2018

NO. 12-17-00058-CR

ANTIONNE LEDELLE SKINNER,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 124th District Court 

of Gregg County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 45,575-B)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed for which execution may issue, and that this 

decision be certified to the court below for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.