MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John A. England

Special Assistant to the Public Defender 

of Indiana 

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher W. Hovis,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

July 16, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

92A03-1412-PC-418

Appeal from the Whitley Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable James R. Heuer, 

Judge

Case No. 92C01-0212-FC-201

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Christopher W. Hovis appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his petition 

for postconviction relief. He challenges the postconviction court’s admission of 

certain exhibits and the voluntariness of his guilty plea on a habitual offender 

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count. Finding that the exhibits were relevant and thus admissible and that his 

habitual offender guilty plea was not involuntarily made, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts as summarized in an unpublished memorandum decision on Hovis’s 

second belated direct appeal are as follows:

On July 9, 2002, Hovis, Ronrico Hatch (Hatch), James Piatt (Piatt), 

and two unnamed persons visited a cornfield in Whitley County, 

Indiana under the guise of locating marijuana in the cornfield. 

According to Hovis, Hatch and Piatt were involved in a dispute over 

marijuana money. While walking through the cornfield, Hatch fired 

several gunshots at Piatt, and Piatt shot Hatch once. Piatt was fatally 

wounded, and Hatch received a bullet wound in his abdomen. Hovis 

left Piatt’s body in the cornfield and took Hatch to a hospital, where he 

claimed that Hatch had been shot by an unknown person in Shoaff 

Park, located in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

The following day, on July 10, 2002, Hovis and his brother took Piatt’s 

car and drove to Whitley County, where they set the car ablaze and 

destroyed it. On July 11, 2002, Hovis and his brother returned to the 

cornfield with the intention of killing Piatt if he were still alive. Piatt 

was dead when they found him, so they dragged his body further into 

the cornfield where it would not be visible from the road. Piatt’s body 

remained there for 47 days until it was discovered on August 25, 2002. 

At that point, Piatt’s body had decomposed to the extent that it could 

not be embalmed and Piatt's mother was unable to have an open 

casket for Piatt’s funeral. Piatt’s family searched the cornfield and 

found two pieces of Piatt’s braided hair, one of which was attached to 

part of Piatt’s skull.

On December 19, 2002, the State filed an Information charging Hovis 

with Count I, assisting a criminal, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-44-3-2; 

Count II, arson, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-43-1-1(d); Count III, 

moving a body, a Class D felony, I.C. § 36-2-14-17(b); and Count IV, 

habitual offender. On January 2, 2003, the trial court held an initial 

hearing, at which point Hovis entered a plea of not guilty. On June 23, 

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2003, Hovis filed a motion to withdraw his former plea of not guilty 

and to enter a plea of guilty to all Counts. 

On August 25, 2003, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and 

merged Hovis’ convictions for Counts II and III with Count I, finding 

that the same factual bases supported each conviction. [Hovis admitted 

to being a habitual offender.] The trial court sentenced Hovis to eight 

years for assisting a criminal, with an enhancement of twelve years for 

being an habitual offender. In total, Hovis received a sentence of 20 

years' incarceration in the Indiana Department of Correction, with no 

time suspended.

Hovis v. State, No. 92A03-1011-CR-613 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2011).

[3] With respect to the habitual offender count, a clerical error in the charging 

information misstated the sentencing year for the first predicate offense as 2001 

instead of 2000. Other evidence, including the presentence investigation report

(“PSI”), showed that Hovis’s first predicate offense was a felony auto theft 

conviction (“Cause DF-25”) for which he was sentenced to one and a-half 

years’ probation on March 24, 2000. On or about May 11, 2000, he committed 

theft and was charged with three counts of class D felony theft (“Cause DF617”). Because he was on probation when he committed theft, the State filed a 

petition to revoke his probation on August 2, 2000. On November 14, 2000, 

while the probation revocation was still pending in Cause DF-25, Hovis pled 

guilty and was convicted in Cause DF-617. On December 4, 2000, the trial 

court revoked Hovis’s probation in Cause DF-25 and remanded him to the 

Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). At the same hearing, the trial 

court sentenced him in Cause DF-617 to one year in the DOC, to be served 

consecutive to his sentence in Cause DF-25. 

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[4] In January 2006, Hovis filed a petition for postconviction relief. He filed 

belated direct appeals in 2010 and 2011, the first of which was dismissed and 

the second of which resulted in the affirmance of his sentence.1

 In January 

2014, he filed an amended petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his 

guilty plea to the habitual offender count was not voluntarily entered. 

[5] At the May 2014 postconviction hearing, Hovis argued that the prosecutor 

misled him concerning his eligibility as a habitual offender. The State offered 

Postconviction (“PC”) Exhibits A through G over Hovis’s relevancy objections. 

These exhibits comprise copies of chronological case summaries (“CCS”), 

charging informations, probable cause affidavits, and sentencing orders from 

Causes CF-25 and CF-617. The postconviction court admitted the exhibits and 

took judicial notice of Hovis’s 2003 PSI. On August 7, 2014, the 

postconviction court issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law denying 

Hovis’s petition.

[6] Hovis filed a motion to correct error and request for an evidentiary hearing. At 

the hearing, he introduced copies of DOC records concerning his commitments. 

The State was granted leave to file a written response, and the postconviction 

court subsequently denied Hovis’s motion to correct error. Hovis now appeals. 

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

1

 The sentencing issues raised in Hovis’s second belated direct appeal are distinct from the issues raised in 

this appeal.

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Discussion and Decision

[7] Hovis contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition for 

postconviction relief. The petitioner in a postconviction proceeding “bears the 

burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Ind. Postconviction Rule 1(5); Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 

2013). When issuing its decision to grant or deny relief, the postconviction 

court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ind. Postconviction 

Rule 1(6). A petitioner who appeals the denial of his postconviction petition 

faces a rigorous standard of review. Massey v. State, 955 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind. 

2011). In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge 

witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences most favorable to the judgment. McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 199 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (2014). “A post-conviction court’s findings 

and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which 

leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

Passwater, 989 N.E.2d at 770 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other 

words, if a postconviction petitioner was denied relief in the proceedings below, 

he must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably 

to a conclusion opposite the one reached by the postconviction court. Massey, 

955 N.E.2d at 253. Postconviction relief does not offer the petitioner a super 

appeal; rather, subsequent collateral challenges must be based on grounds 

enumerated in the postconviction rules. McKnight, 1 N.E.3d at 199. These 

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rules limit the scope of relief to issues unknown or unavailable to the petitioner 

on direct appeal. Id.

Section 1 – The postconviction court acted within its 

discretion in admitting State’s Postconviction Exhibits 

A through G.

[8] Hovis challenges the postconviction court’s admission of State’s PC Exhibits A 

through G. We review a postconviction court’s ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 521 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial

court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Members v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006).

[9] Hovis maintains that the State’s PC Exhibits A through G were inadmissible on

relevancy grounds. See Ind. Evidence Rule 402 (“Evidence which is not 

relevant is not admissible.”). Indiana Evidence Rule 401 defines relevant 

evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence.” 

[10] With respect to the relevancy of the challenged exhibits, the postconviction 

court found that “State’s Exhibits A through G clearly establish that 

Christopher W. Hovis was an Habitual Felony Offender when he was 

sentenced, herein, on August 25, 2003, pursuant to his guilty plea.” Appellant’s 

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App. at 141. State’s PC Exhibits A through C consist of the CCS, probable 

cause affidavit, and guilty plea and sentencing transcripts respectively, all for 

Cause DF-25. State’s PC Exhibits D through G consist of the CCS, charging 

information, probable cause affidavit, and judgment of conviction respectively, 

all for Cause DF-617. Exhibit D is highly probative as it explains Hovis’s 

assertion that he remembered being sentenced for Causes DF-25 and DF-617 at 

the same time by the same judge, “right around Christmas.” Tr. at 12. This

exhibit, comprising the CCS for Cause DF-617, shows that on December 4, 

2000, the trial court imposed sentence on Cause DF-617. At that time, the trial 

court (and CCS) did reference Cause DF-25 because Hovis had previously been 

sentenced to probation in that case and had violated that probation and been 

remanded to the DOC. Thus, the trial court simply ruled that Hovis’s sentence 

for Cause DF-617 would run consecutive to his reinstated sentence for Cause 

DF-25 following his probation revocation. As such, Hovis’s recollection of 

simultaneous sentencing in Causes DF-25 and DF-617 is inaccurate. 

[11] Considered individually and together, State’s PC Exhibits A through G contain 

dates and other information relevant to establishing the substance and sequence 

of Hovis’s prior unrelated felony convictions as required under the habitual 

offender statute. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(c). Thus, the exhibits were not 

inadmissible on relevancy grounds. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 

the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. 

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Section 2 – The postconviction court did not clearly err 

in denying Hovis’s petition for postconviction relief. 

[12] Hovis contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding that he had failed to 

meet his burden of establishing grounds for postconviction relief. His sole 

contention is that his plea of guilty to the habitual offender charge was not 

voluntarily made but was the result of allegedly misleading conduct by the 

prosecutor. “Pleas entered after coercion, judicial or otherwise, will be set 

aside. Defendants who can prove that they were actually misled by the judge, 

the prosecutor, or defense counsel about the choices before them will present 

colorable claims for relief.” White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905-06 (Ind. 1986).

[13] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 (2001) outlines the requirements for a habitual 

offender count in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the state may seek to 

have a person sentenced as a habitual offender for any felony by 

alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, 

that the person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony 

convictions.

....

(c) A person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony 

convictions for purposes of this section only if:

(1) the second prior unrelated felony conviction was 

committed after sentencing for the first prior unrelated felony 

conviction; and

(2) the offense for which the state seeks to have the person 

sentenced as a habitual offender was committed after 

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sentencing for the second prior unrelated felony conviction.

[14] In its order denying Hovis’s petition for postconviction relief, the 

postconviction court found as follows with respect to the habitual offender 

count:

4. The information for Habitual Felony Offender filed on December 

19, 2002, contains a clerical error in that the sentencing date of the first 

felony conviction alleges “the 24th day of March, 2001,” and the 

correct date is the “24th da[y] of March, 2000.”

 

5. State’s Exhibits A through G clearly establish that Christopher W. 

Hovis was an Habitual Felony Offender when he was sentenced, 

herein, on August 25, 2003, pursuant to his guilty plea.

6. Weatherford v. State[,] 619 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1993) is applicable to 

this proceeding.

7. The Petitioner was not “misled” by the State as a result of the 

clerical error.

Appellant’s App. at 140-41.

[15] In Weatherford, our supreme court explained that in postconviction cases, “[w]e 

have considered possible defects in habitual offender proofs as ‘fundamental 

error’ such that they may be raised notwithstanding failure to do so on direct 

appeal. Where we have granted relief, however, the evidence has demonstrated 

that the commission/conviction/sentencing were not in the proper order.” 619 

N.E.2d at 917 (emphasis added). The Weatherford court emphasized that a

postconviction petitioner “must demonstrate that his various convictions did 

not in fact occur in the required order.” Id. at 918.

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[16] Here, the habitual offender information contained a typographical error, listing

the sentencing year for the first predicate offense as 2001 rather than 2000, 

therefore taking it out of sequence. The prosecutor read the information aloud 

in court, complete with error, and Hovis admitted that he was a habitual 

offender. Hovis now claims that this conduct misled him “regarding his 

eligibility for habitual offender status” and thus induced him to enter a coerced, 

involuntary guilty plea. Reply Br. at 2. We fail to see how. If the sentencing 

date listed in the information for Cause DF-25 had appeared to be in sequence 

when it actually was not, then his claim would have merit. Here, however, the 

reverse occurred. The information contained a date that was clearly out of 

sequence and which, if true, would have invalidated the habitual offender 

count. If anything, the clerical error and prosecutor’s examination of him using 

the erroneous date would have given him the false hope that he did not qualify 

as a habitual offender. In contrast, the PSI clearly outlines the correct sequence 

of the commission, conviction, and sentencing for his predicate offenses, and 

Hovis admitted to the trial court at sentencing that he had read and reviewed 

the PSI. Petitioner’s Ex. 3. The only concerns that Hovis raised as to the 

accuracy of the information contained in the PSI concerned a pending criminal 

charge in Allen County. Id. at 16. 

[17] In short, Hovis’s prior unrelated felonies and sentencing dates were, in fact, in 

the proper sequence, and he has failed to establish that the State used the 

clerical error in the information to induce him to enter a guilty plea that he 

otherwise would not have entered. As such, he has failed to establish clear 

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error in the postconviction court’s finding that he was not misled into pleading 

guilty to the habitual offender count. Consequently, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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