Filed 9/28/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re Marriage of DERIC 

ANDREW and TRACEY MARIE

RANGELL.

________________________________

DERIC ANDREW RANGELL,

Appellant,

v.

TRACEY MARIE RANGELL,

Respondent.

B313786

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 17NWFL00714)

APPEAL from findings and an order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, May Santos, Temporary Judge. 

(Pursuant to Cal. Const, art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

The Appellate Law Firm, Berangere Allen-Blaine, Aaron 

Myers; Mark Kuntze for Appellant.

The Severo Law Firm and Michael V. Severo for

Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from post-judgment findings and an order 

determining the amount of attorney fees and sanctions payable 

by Deric Andrew Rangell to ex-wife Tracey Marie Rangell.

1 The 

family court ordered Deric to pay a total of $70,000 ($22,000 and

$48,000) in attorney fees and costs in the nature of sanctions.

Deric appealed. He argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in ordering him to pay “excessive” attorney fees and 

“an egregious amount of sanctions as a result of [Tracey’s] 

litigation.” He contends the trial court erred because he 

cooperated throughout the case, produced the accounting and 

documents requested, and “demonstrated willingness to settle.”

Having reviewed the record in detail, we firmly disagree 

with Deric. We find no error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background Information

Deric and Tracey married on July 2, 1996. They separated 

on July 18, 2016. They have no minor children.

On September 1, 2017, Deric filed a petition for dissolution 

of his marriage to Tracey. Tracey filed her response and request 

for dissolution on October 6, 2017.

II. Tracey’s Request for Order for Accounting and 

Sharing of Rental Income, and Attorney Fees

On March 13, 2018, Tracey filed a request for order (RFO) 

for Deric to provide an accounting for all rental income received 

1 We hereinafter refer to the parties by their first names, 

Deric and Tracey.
3

from their three investment properties2 since the parties’ date of 

separation and to provide one-half of all profits derived from 

same. Tracey’s RFO also included a request for Deric to 

contribute $10,000 to her attorney fees and costs “given the 

disparity in the respective parties’ incomes.” She explained she 

earns approximately $2,400 per month while Deric’s monthly 

earnings are “in excess of $15,000.” Deric also collects $3,360 in 

monthly rental income from their rental properties, of which he is 

in sole control and from which he has “excluded” Tracey. 

According to Tracey, Deric “has refused to account and share the 

profits from these investment properties . . . since [their] 

separation.”

In support of her RFO, Tracey provided a Keech3

declaration from her counsel Dorothy L. Carfrae (Carfrae) as to 

attorney fees and costs. Included as an exhibit was a copy of 

Carfrae’s billing statements to date.

On July 24, 2018, Deric filed his responsive declaration 

opposing Tracey’s RFO and request for attorney fees. He 

requested that each party bear their own fees. He provided one 

paragraph in support of his opposition, stating that he and 

Tracey “are on essentially equal financial footing” and that “much 

of [Tracey’s] financial situation was affected by her conviction for 

fraud and subsequent house arrest.” Deric stated on his income 

and expense (I&E) declaration that he earns $3,150 in rental 

2 The parties’ rental properties are located at: 1) 5910 Myrtle 

Avenue in Long Beach, California; 2) 806 North Washington 

Street in Ardmore, Oklahoma; and 3) 1500 McLish SW in 

Ardmore, Oklahoma.

3 In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860.
4

property income and $6,250 in “other” income. He estimated 

Tracey’s monthly income as $13,333.

At the hearing on Tracey’s RFO held July 31, 2018, the 

court “consider[ed] Family Code4 section 2030” and “examin[ed] 

[Tracey’s attorney’s] Keech declaration.” The court found “there 

is a disparity with respect to each party’s access to funds.” The 

court further found Deric is “able to pay for his representation as 

well as [Tracey’s]” and awarded $8,000 in attorney fees to Tracey. 

The court ordered Deric to pay this sum to Carfrae within 

45 days (i.e., by September 14, 2018). The court ordered an 

Evidence Code section 730 expert evaluation to be conducted as 

to the financial circumstances of the parties, including an 

accounting for rental property income from the three properties. 

The court ordered Deric to advance the costs for the evaluator, 

subject to reallocation at a later date. The hearing was continued

to revisit pending issues.

During the January 23, 2019 hearing, the court found Deric 

had not paid for the 730 evaluation and Tracey’s attorney fees “as 

previously ordered.” The court ordered Deric to advance the 730 

evaluator’s (CPA Michael Krycler of Krycler, Ervin, Taubman & 

Kaminsky) costs “by next week.” Deric was further ordered to 

pay Carfrae the previously ordered $8,000 within one week. 

Deric was admonished about not following the court’s order.

4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Family Code.
5

III. Settlement Agreement and Judgment of Dissolution

During a hearing held April 29, 2019, the parties signed 

and filed a settlement agreement, the terms of which were to 

form the basis of the parties’ judgment of dissolution (judgment). 

Deric and Tracey stated on the record that they understood and 

accepted the terms and provisions of the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement provides, in relevant part:

“The real property at 806 North Washington Street, 

Ardmore, Oklahoma shall forthwith be listed for sale and sold 

with a mutually acceptable agent/broker . . . . From the net 

proceeds of sale, escrow shall make the following direct 

payments: 

a) The sum of $11,000 paid directly to . . . Carfrae[;]

b) The sum of $5,854 to Krycler [the 730 evaluator][;]

c) The sums owed to [the] I.R.S. and Calif[ornia] State 

Franchise Tax Board . . . for any jointly filed tax return [;]

The remaining net proceeds of sale shall be divided equally 

except [Tracey] shall be paid the sum of $10,000 from [Deric’s 

half] to equalize the [division of] assets and debts.

Escrow shall be directed to pay the remaining mortgage 

balance on the real property [located] at 1500 McLish Ave[nue]

SW, Ardmore, Oklahoma from [Tracey’s] share of the net 

proceeds of sale.” (Italics added.)

The court ordered Carfrae to “prepare the Judgment, serve 

it on [Deric] for approval . . . and submit to the [c]ourt for 

signature” by May 30, 2019.

On July 12, 2019, Carfrae sent the proposed judgment to 

Deric for his review and signature.
6

On November 22, 2019, the judgment was entered and 

signed by the court. The judgment memorialized the terms of the 

parties’ settlement agreement.

IV. Tracey’s Post-Judgment RFO for Control and Sale of 

Rental Property, Accounting and Sharing of Rental 

Income, and Attorney Fees/Costs

On October 23, 2019, Carfrae sent a letter to Deric in an 

attempt to “meet and confer” before filing a contempt action 

against him. Carfrae reminded Deric that per the April 29, 2019 

settlement agreement, he was to list the apartment building 

located at 806 North Washington Street in Ardmore, Oklahoma 

[Oklahoma Property]5 for sale “forthwith.” A demand was made 

that the Oklahoma Property be listed for sale on or before 

November 23, 2019.

On January 23, 2020, Tracey filed an RFO requesting that: 

1) the court grant her “control and management” over the 

collection of rents and sale of the Oklahoma Property; 2) the court 

order Deric to provide Tracey an accounting of all monies 

received from the Oklahoma Property since April 29, 2019; 3) the 

court award Tracey the rental proceeds Deric has continued to 

collect since the court’s April 29, 2019 order and said sum be 

payable out of Deric’s share of the proceeds of the sale of the 

Oklahoma Property; and 4) Tracey be awarded $15,200 in 

attorney fees and costs “in the nature of sanctions under [section] 

271” payable from Deric’s share of the sale proceeds.

In Tracey’s declaration filed in support of her RFO, she 

reminded the court that she first sought an accounting of rental 

5 The Oklahoma Property consists of six apartment units.
7

income received nearly a year before—via her March 13, 2018

RFO; however, to date, Deric had failed to provide any such 

accounting. Similarly, while the parties’ April 29, 2019 

settlement agreement and resulting judgment ordered that the 

Oklahoma Property be listed for sale “forthwith,” Deric “failed to 

use good faith efforts to sell.” Deric made himself the broker for 

selling the Oklahoma Property, without Tracey’s consent. Tracey 

provided as an exhibit a print-out of real estate websites that 

indicated the Oklahoma Property was “off market” or “not 

available for sale.” Moreover, Deric continued to collect rent from 

the Oklahoma Property, estimated at approximately $35,000, and 

did not provide one-half of the rental income to Tracey. Deric 

failed to pay any attorney fees to date, in violation of prior court 

orders and the parties’ settlement agreement/judgment. Tracey 

requested, as part of her current RFO, $15,200 in attorney fees 

and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions as a result of the 

fees “incurred by virtue of this post-judgment enforcement 

action.”

Tracey filed a declaration by her counsel Carfrae as to

attorney fees and costs. Carfrae stated she had practiced family 

law for over 30 years and that her current hourly rate is $375. 

Carfrae and her staff expended a total of 84.5 hours in the matter 

to date. She confirmed Deric had refused to pay the $11,000 fee 

award owed. She proposed it would be fair and equitable to order 

Deric to pay a contributive share in the sum of $15,000 for 

Tracey’s attorney fees and costs, in the nature of a sanction under 

section 271. Carfrae provided as an exhibit a copy of her billing 

statement, which showed an unpaid balance owed her office in 

the amount of $28,594.29.
8

On March 5, 2020, Deric filed his responsive declaration 

opposing Tracey’s RFO. He believed a “minimal amount of skill 

was needed to settle” and that Carfrae was “claiming to possess 

‘special skills and knowledge’ to justify these ridiculous fees [but] 

failed to display anything rising to the standard of ‘skillful or 

knowledgeable.’ ” Deric stated he “took action” and listed the 

property and “was not charging commission to increase the net to 

both sides.” It was Deric’s position that no request for accounting 

had been made until this current RFO filing by Tracey. He next 

stated the Oklahoma Property is not community property 

because it is owned by Vespia, Inc.—a corporation owned and 

operated by Deric, and of which he is the sole shareholder.

Deric provided as an exhibit a copy of a judgment and 

probation order against Tracey—dated more than a decade ago, 

August 6, 2008—as proof that she was previously found guilty of 

fraud and owed restitution in the amount of $972,162. Per the 

fraud judgment against Tracey, she “shall not transfer, sell, give 

away, or otherwise convey any asset with a fair market value in 

excess of $500 without approval of the Probation Officer until all 

financial obligations imposed by the [c]ourt have been satisfied in 

full.” He believed Tracey’s request for full control and 

management of the Oklahoma Property should be denied “due to 

her bad character as a known convicted felon.”

On July 14, 2020, Carfrae submitted an updated 

declaration regarding attorney fees and costs. To date, Carfrae 

and her office had expended a total of 89.3 hours in the matter 

and the unpaid balance owed to her office was $30,276.59. She 

confirmed Deric still had not paid the $11,000 in fees ordered 

more than a year before.
9

On July 22, 2020, the hearing on Tracey’s RFO took place. 

The parties agreed that each apartment unit of the Oklahoma 

Property pays $600 in rent per month; the parties further agreed 

the property needs repair. Molly Russ is the current realtor for 

the property. The court ordered an appraisal to take place within 

21 days. The court ordered Deric to provide Tracey with “an 

accounting” of the Oklahoma Property; Deric was “not to send

[Tracey] bank statements only, [but to also] prepare a line by line 

accounting of the property.” The court reserved the issue of 

attorney fees and continued the matter.

On August 13, 2020, Deric filed a supplemental declaration 

where he included, as exhibits, the “raw data files the CPA used 

to compile his work,” bank statements, and the accounting 

evaluation provided by the CPA. He did not provide receipts or 

proof of expenditures.

The continued hearing took place on August 27, 2020. The 

appraiser found the fair market value of the Oklahoma Property 

to be $274,000. The court ordered Deric to sell the Oklahoma 

Property to the highest bidder within 60 days; should Deric fail to 

do so, Tracey was to have exclusive control over the final asking 

price. The court ordered Deric to provide a full accounting, with 

receipts and proof of expenditures, for all rental income received 

until the date of production. The court ruled that all proceeds 

from the sale of the Oklahoma Property be directed from escrow 

to Carfrae’s attorney-client trust account (IOLTA). The court 

authorized Carfrae to make an immediate distribution of funds 

from her IOLTA pursuant to the terms of the judgment. The 

court awarded Tracey an additional attorney fee award of $7,140, 

to be paid from Deric’s share of the sale proceeds.

The matter was continued to January 21, 2021.
10

V. Tracey’s Ex Parte RFO re Sale of Oklahoma Property 

and Further Attorney’s Fees

On October 5, 2020, Tracey filed an ex parte RFO for the 

court to order Deric to “cooperate in all aspects” regarding the 

pending sale of the Oklahoma Property and to provide Tracey 

with the name, address, and telephone number of the escrow and 

title company he hired to handle the transaction. She also 

requested further attorney fees in the sum of $5,000 to be paid to 

her from Deric’s share of the sale proceeds.

The court granted Tracey’s ex parte RFO and reserved 

jurisdiction over the request for attorney fees in order to address 

it at the January 21, 2021 hearing.

VI. Tracey’s Ex Parte RFO re Transfer of Sale Proceeds

and Request for Attorney’s Fees/Sanctions

On January 12, 2021, Tracey filed an ex parte RFO for the 

court to order Deric to immediately transfer to Carfrae’s IOLTA, 

by 4:30 p.m., the sale proceeds in the sum of $241,311.69. Deric 

refused to share with Carfrae any information about the escrow 

and title company handling the sale. He completed the sale of 

the Oklahoma Property but the proceeds were never transferred 

to Carfrae’s IOLTA. Tracey requested an order “that for each day 

after January 12, 2021 that [Deric] fails to transfer the entirety 

of the Sale Proceeds to [Carfrae’s IOLTA] [Deric] shall pay to 

[Tracey] $1,000 in sanctions pursuant to [section] 271.” Tracey 

also requested an additional $10,000 attorney fee award in the 

nature of sanctions.

Deric opposed the ex parte RFO. He argued no exigent 

circumstances existed to warrant the requested orders. He 

argued the Oklahoma Property was owned by Vespia which could 
11

not be ordered to transfer the funds to Carfrae because it was 

never joined as a party in the dissolution action. He once more 

alluded to the fraud judgment against Tracey and argued it 

“prohibits the disbursement of funds to” Tracey.

The court granted Tracey’s requested orders but for the 

$10,000 additional attorney fee award. The court reserved 

jurisdiction to address attorney fees at the January 21, 2021 

hearing.

VII. January 21, 2021 Hearing

At the January 21, 2021 hearing, both parties were present 

along with Tracey’s counsel and Deric’s attorney Vernon C. 

Tucker (Tucker).

Tracey’s counsel informed the court they “received little to 

no compliance, virtually no compliance with the orders. [Deric] 

has taken the position that the funds should not be transferred to 

[the] trust account and that he did not need to transfer the funds 

as the corporation [(Vespia)] was the one who had the funds, not 

him.” Tracey’s counsel reminded the court that Vespia was 

awarded to Deric per the terms of the judgment, and that he “is 

the corporation. He is the sole shareholder, the president, and 

the only one in control of [the sale] funds.” Tracey’s counsel 

explained that Deric had sent Tracey written and verbal threats 

that should Tracey continue with her litigation, that he “will call 

the feds and indicate to the feds that she is going to come upon 

some money” so that they garnish any funds Tracey receives. 

Tracey’s counsel further informed the court Deric had refused to 

provide the names of any of the parties involved in the 

transaction, nor any information relating to the sale except an 

unsigned escrow closing statement. He continued “not [to] honor 

the orders to pay” attorney fees.
12

Tucker argued that according to the fraud judgment 

against Tracey, “any proceeds she’s to receive goes to that federal 

tribunal,” and that Deric “is not going to pay something where he 

knows that the funds are due to [a] criminal restitution order.”

The court disagreed and explained that “whether or not 

[Tracey] owes the government any money is not relevant to your 

position. [Deric] is not the holder of the money for the U.S. 

government. That’s her obligation. Whether it’s paid, not paid, 

[that’s of] no consequence to [Deric].” “If [Tracey] chooses not to 

pay it, that’s an action the U.S. government can bring upon her. 

Your client has no standing whatsoever to hold up any funds that 

are due her based on some action by the U.S. government that 

he’s not a party to.”

Tucker next argued that the sale proceeds were released to 

Vespia because the Oklahoma Property was held in Vespia’s 

name.

The court stated, “[S]o now, [Deric] want to split hairs with 

regards to, oh, I didn’t order that the corporation turn it over? Is 

that your position, now that he’s trying to find some other way 

not to pay her?” “[T]his is just another tactic of [Deric’s] to avoid 

paying [Tracey] anything with regards to the proceeds from the 

property . . . . It’s been a problem for quite some time. He just 

refuses to cooperate whatsoever to get her any funds that she is 

due.”

The court expressed frustration about the fact that Deric 

had not produced to Tracey a copy of the signed closing escrow 

documents. “[Deric] has, at every hearing, at every point, made 

attempts to thwart this process.” The court ordered him to call 

the title and escrow company, on the record, to obtain a signed 

seller’s final statement and closing escrow documents, and to 
13

send it to Carfrae by email immediately. The escrow officer 

complied and confirmed to the court that the proceeds transferred 

to the seller were $241,311.69. The court asked the escrow officer 

to provide the account information to which the proceeds were 

sent via wire transfer, but Deric stated he did not authorize the 

escrow officer to provide said information.

The court warned Deric that it would hold him in contempt. 

Deric was ordered to transfer the entirety of the proceeds to 

Carfrae’s IOLTA “by close of business tomorrow.” The court 

ruled: “For each day that he delays, it’s going to be $1,000. . . . 

I made that order before. I’m going to start from today. Because 

now, we know how much the money is, and we know he has the 

money.”

The court, on its own motion, set an order to show cause 

(OSC) hearing on February 24, 2021, and again “reiterate[d] that 

every day after tomorrow at 5:00 p.m. that the funds aren’t 

deposited to Ms. Carfrae’s trust account, I’m going to impose a 

$1,000 a day fine on your client.” “[Y]our client was thwarting 

the process and not doing what he was ordered to do, which 

caused [Tracey] to incur fees.”

VIII. February 24, 2021 Hearing and Ruling

On February 4, 2021, a notice of judgment lien for 

restitution in favor of the United States (federal notice) was filed 

in the family law case. The federal notice specified Tracey 

originally owed criminal restitution in the amount of $967,362,

but the amount left to satisfy the judgment is $160,357.98.

Tracey, her counsel, and Tucker appeared at the February 

24, 2021 hearing; Deric was not present. The court was informed 

that Deric did not transfer $241,311.69 in sale proceeds to 

Carfrae’s IOLTA by the January 22, 2021 deadline. Instead, 
14

Carfrae’s IOLTA received a transfer of $89,065.89 on January 25 

and $50,000 on January 26—totaling $139,065.89. Counsel does 

“not have adequate funds in [the] trust account to . . . pay the 

debts that are due to [Tracey] pursuant to” the settlement 

agreement, judgment, and court orders. Counsel apprised the 

court that from the funds transferred to her IOLTA, her office 

“has tendered checks to the I.R.S. in the sum of $12,966.09” for 

the parties’ community debt, $11,000 in attorney fees to Carfrae 

per the judgment, $5,854 to the 730 evaluator, $39,410.77 for the 

unpaid mortgage balance on the McLish property per the 

judgment. Deric refused to transfer the $10,000 equalization 

payment in contravention of the settlement agreement and 

judgment. Deric also failed to transfer $26,928 for Tracey’s onehalf of the $53,856 in estimated rental income and had not 

provided relevant receipts or statements to accurately account for 

rental income.

Tucker explained to the court that Deric is “still under the 

belief that, you know, the corporation was not enjoined, and the 

order was ineffective at the beginning.” He also alluded to the 

federal notice.

Tracey’s counsel argued that Deric’s behavior warranted

sanctions and that the $1,000 a day sanctions order amounted to 

$34,000 for his failure to transfer the full proceeds for 34 days 

since the last hearing. Additionally, Tracey “incurred $22,000 

[in] attorney’s fees in pursuing [these] post-judgment motion[s] 

for enforcement” and various ex partes.

The court expressed it is “at a loss as to why [Deric] 

continues to disobey any orders that I make and decide on his 

own what he’s going to transfer and what he’s not going to 

transfer.” Tucker explained he has “tried [his] hardest” to have 
15

Deric comply with the orders and that it is like “beating [his] 

head against the wall.” The court ruled that it is “going to assess 

the $1,000 per day, the sanctions that I told him about for not 

transferring the full amount. So far, that’s $34,000, increasing 

daily. . . . So I don’t understand why he continues to disobey a 

court order.”

The court ruled that Deric was to produce all rental 

accounting documents and transfer the $10,000 equalization 

payment, $26,928 in rental income, and $22,000 in attorney fees 

to Carfrae’s account. The court then gave Deric one more 

chance—it ruled that if Deric transferred the sums to Carfrae’s 

IOLTA by 5 p.m. on February 26, 2021, then it would “forget 

about the $34,000 in sanctions.” If Deric did not transfer the 

sums, the $34,000 in sanctions would be “reinstated” in addition 

to $1,000 a day for continuing in his failure to abide by court 

orders.

The OSC was continued to March 12, 2021.

IX. March 12, 2021 Hearing and Ruling

Only Tracey and her counsel appeared on March 12, 2021. 

The court was informed that Deric was no longer represented by 

Tucker, as a substitution of attorney form was submitted to the 

court.

Tracey’s counsel stated that despite the February 26, 2021 

deadline, no additional funds were transferred to the IOLTA 

account to date. The “sanctions for noncompliance” now total 

$48,000.

The court found: “If the transfer was completed, the [c]ourt 

would [have] forgive[n] $34,000.00 in sanctions. If not, the 

[c]ourt would reinstate the sanctions . . . plus [Deric] would be 

charged additional sanctions in the amount of $1,000.00 per day 
16

for non-compliance.” “[T]he sum owed by [Deric] is, including the 

$48,000 in sanctions at $1,000 a day for his failure to comply with 

the prior court order to deposit funds into the attorney-client 

account at Ms. Carfrae’s office, is going to be $90,107.91. That’s 

what is owed to [Tracey].” The $90,107.91 sum included the 

$22,000 attorney fees and costs ordered at the prior hearing.

On May 17, 2021, Tracey filed a “findings and order after 

hearing” memorializing the court’s orders.

On June 9, 2021, Deric filed his notice of appeal from the 

May 17, 2021 findings and order after hearing.

DISCUSSION

Deric contends the trial court’s findings and order 

awarding Tracey attorney fees and costs in the nature of section 

271 sanctions amounts to an abuse of discretion. He requests 

that we reverse the order.

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I. Standard of Review

A trial court has discretion to award attorney fees in the 

nature of sanctions against a party who frustrates the policy to 

promote settlement and cooperation in family law litigation. 

(Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340, 347; In re 

Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 995.) 

Thus, the appellate court reviews an award of attorney fees and 

costs for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Pearson (2018)

21 Cal.App.5th 218, 233; In re Marriage of Burgard (1999) 

72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82.) Under this standard of review, the trial 

court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless, considering all the 

evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order and 

indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could 
17

reasonably make the order. (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152 (Sagonowsky); In re E.M. (2014)

228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850.) “Discretion is abused when its 

exercise is arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious.” (In re Marriage of 

Battenburg (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1343.) We reverse 

“ ‘ “only if prejudicial error is found after examining the record of 

the proceedings below.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 

64 Cal.App.4th 459, 472.) We review findings of fact forming the 

basis of a sanctions award for substantial evidence. (Menezes v. 

McDaniel, at p. 347.)

II. Applicable Law

Section 271 provides the court with a powerful weapon to 

curb obstreperous conduct in family law proceedings by assessing 

attorney fees and costs as a sanction for frustrating the policy of 

the law to promote settlement and reduce litigation costs. (See 

§ 271; see Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law 

(The Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶ 14:4, 14:72 (Hogoboom & King).)

Section 271, subdivision (a) provides: “Notwithstanding any 

other provision of this code, the court may base an award of 

attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of 

each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law 

to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce 

the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the 

parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs 

pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making 

an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into 

consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, 

and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to 

this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on 

the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to 
18

obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate 

any financial need for the award.” (§ 271, subd. (a), italics 

added.)

Section 271, subdivision (b) provides: “An award of 

attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section 

shall be imposed only after notice to the party against whom the 

sanction is proposed to be imposed and opportunity for that party 

to be heard.” (§ 271, subd. (b).) Section 271, subdivision (c) 

provides: “An award of attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction 

pursuant to this section is payable only from the property or 

income of the party against whom the sanction is imposed, except 

that the award may be against the sanctioned party’s share of the 

community property.” (Id., subd. (c).)

The court must take into consideration “all evidence 

concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities,” in 

particular the party’s ability to pay; and in no event may the 

amount of the sanction impose “an unreasonable financial 

burden” against the sanctioned party. (§ 271, subd. (a); In re 

Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 291–292 [no 

showing trial court failed to consider sanctioned party’s ability to 

pay]; In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1083; 

see also In re Marriage of Pearson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 234.) The party requesting the award, however, is not required 

to demonstrate any financial need for the award. (§ 271, 

subd. (a).)

III. Analysis

We address Deric’s arguments on appeal.

First, he contends that he “cooperated with” Tracey and her

counsel “throughout the case” and “continuously agreed to terms 
19

and demonstrated willingness to settle.” He believes the trial 

court “abused its discretion by disregarding significant evidence 

of [his] attempts to comply.”

This contention could not be further from the truth.

The record is replete with evidence demonstrating Deric’s 

steadfast, continued disregard of the court’s orders and the terms 

of the parties’ settlement agreement and judgment. He delayed 

listing the Oklahoma property for sale. He delayed providing an 

accounting of rental income received, along with bank 

statements, receipts, and proof of expenditures. He delayed 

paying court-ordered attorney fees and costs to Tracey and her 

counsel. He repeatedly argued against transferring the sale 

proceeds to Carfrae’s IOLTA, despite the settlement agreement, 

judgment, and court’s multiple rulings ordering him to do so. He 

tried to avoid transferring the proceeds by coming up with 

excuses that have no bearing on the matter at hand, i.e., that the

property is owned by Vespia (a corporation under his sole control) 

and that the money was to be garnished from Tracey due to the 

fraud judgment and federal notice.

His flagrant disregard of the court’s orders began as early 

as July 31, 2018 when he failed to pay Carfrae $8,000 in attorney 

fees within 45 days and failed to pay the 730 evaluator’s fees. He 

was first admonished for not following the court’s order as early 

as January 23, 2019. He failed to list the Oklahoma Property for 

sale forthwith. He made himself the agent for the sale, against 

Tracey’s wishes and without her consent, despite the terms of the 

settlement agreement and judgment requiring the property be 

sold “with a mutually acceptable agent/broker.”

More than two years later, at the hearing on March 12, 

2021, Deric’s egregiously uncooperative conduct continued when 
20

he refused to make the $10,000 equalization payment, refused to 

provide Tracey with her one-half of the rental income, and 

refused to transfer the entirety of the sale proceeds to Carfrae, 

frustrating the policy of the law to promote settlement and 

reduce litigation costs. This warranted an imposition of attorney 

fees and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. (Robert J. v. 

Catherine D. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1520 [§ 271 authorizes 

a fee and costs award as a penalty for obstreperous behavior]; see 

also In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226 

[court acted within its discretion in awarding $5,000 to former 

wife for former husband’s failure to pay full amount of housing 

costs specified in marital settlement agreement].)

Second, Deric argues he should not be penalized for any 

delay because the parties’ judgment “was not entered until 

November 22, 2019—almost six months after the date ordered.” 

He also argues that the terms of the settlement agreement and 

judgment did not specify a “specific date” by which the Oklahoma 

Property should be sold, and only required it to be sold 

“forthwith.”

Deric’s second argument is not well-taken. While it is true 

that the court ordered Carfrae to prepare and submit the 

judgment by May 30, 2019, the record provides she sent it to 

Deric for his signature on July 12, 2019—five weeks late. The 

record does not specify what caused the delay from July 12, 2019 

until the court’s entry of judgment on November 22, 2019. Did 

Deric not timely return the signed judgment to Carfrae to enable 

her to submit it to the court for filing? We are aware it can take 

the court weeks or months to review a submitted proposed 

judgment. Did it take the family law court here some months to 

review, sign, and enter judgment? The record is silent as to these 
21

questions. Plus, Deric cannot take advantage of Carfrae’s delay 

of five weeks in submitting the judgment when he delayed abiding 

by the court’s orders and the settlement agreement/judgment for 

years.

Further, putting aside that the April 29, 2019 settlement 

agreement and November 22, 2019 judgment failed to include a 

date certain by which the property was to be sold, the fact 

remains that the court ordered the property to be sold 

“forthwith.” That means immediately. The record establishes

that the property was under Deric’s sole management and 

control. And based on the real estate website print-out provided 

by Tracey as an exhibit in support of her January 23, 2020 RFO, 

Deric still had not listed the property for sale by that date; the 

website print-out indicated that the Oklahoma Property was “off 

market” and “not available for sale.”

Third, Deric contends the trial court abused its discretion 

by awarding sanctions of “$1,000 per day for, conceivably, an 

indefinite period.”

We first correct Deric’s flawed logic—the court’s order of 

sanctions in the amount of $1,000 a day was not for an indefinite 

period. It was conditional for every day on which Deric failed to 

comply with the court’s repeated orders, the terms of the April 

29, 2019 settlement order, and the terms of the November 22, 

2019 judgment to transfer the entirety of the sale proceeds to 

Carfrae’s IOLTA. That Deric refused to obey the court’s orders 

for 48 days (not to mention, the preceding two years) resulting in 

$48,000 in sanctions, is no fault of anyone but Deric.

Here we pause to discuss In re Marriage of Hargrave (1995) 

36 Cal.App.4th 1313. A conditional § 271 sanctions award 

against wife was upheld on appeal based on “ampl[e]” evidence in 
22

the record showing wife “engaged in a series of stratagems to 

avoid the consequences of [her] failure to contest the 50-50 

division of tax liabilities and their agreement to file a joint 

return.” Wife persisted in her attempts to “undo” an improvident 

deal by first obtaining an IRS declaration of “innocent spouse” 

status and then using that as a basis for (unsuccessfully) 

opposing husband’s motion to enforce her obligation to pay onehalf of the taxes due. (In re Marriage of Hargrave, at p. 1323.) 

The reviewing court found these facts clearly justified a § 271 

sanctions award and warranted the trial court’s sanctions 

assessment made contingent on wife’s failure to pay her share of 

the taxes owed to the IRS within 60 days. (Ibid.) In re Marriage 

of Hargrave validates the trial court’s sanctions order against 

Deric.

We also remind Deric that the court originally granted the 

$1,000 a day sanctions order at the January 12, 2021 hearing on 

Tracey’s ex parte request; however, the court then cut Deric a 

break and did not include the additional $9,000 in sanctions per 

day from January 12, 2021 until January 21, 2021. The court 

stated on the record on January 21, 2021: “For each day that he 

delays, it’s going to be $1,000. . . . I made that order before [but] 

I’m going to start from today.” (Italics added.) We further 

remind Deric that the court was empowered to also assess 

interest at the legal rate on the attorney fees sanctions he owed 

to Tracey, but the court cut him a break there too. (See 

Sagonowsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1156–1157 [$45,000 

interest on attorney fees owed by husband was properly assessed 

against wife under § 271. The interest accumulated when wife’s 

“unscrupulous conduct” delayed husband’s enjoyment of his share 

of marital real property and denied him funds to pay his attorney 
23

fees.].) The lesson here to Deric is plain: he cannot repeatedly 

flout the court’s orders for years and expect to get away with it, 

when his conduct delayed Tracey’s enjoyment of her share of 

community property and caused her to incur additional attorney 

fees and costs in enforcing the court’s orders. “ ‘Somewhere along 

the line, litigation must cease.’ [Citation.] [Husband] has yet to 

absorb this message,” warranting sanctions. (In re Marriage of 

Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1317–318, 1320 [“When 

making the award, the family court shall consider [Husband’s] 

dilatory tactics . . . and the policy of imposing sanctions in an 

amount sufficient to deter future similar conduct.”].)

Fourth, Deric contends the trial court abused its discretion 

in failing to consider his financial circumstances when it imposed

a “high amount” of attorney fees and sanctions on him. He details 

the court’s March 12, 2021 order of $22,000 in attorney fees and 

$48,000 in sanctions, and argues, “Absent from the record is 

testimony or other evidence addressing [his] ability to pay 

attorney’s fees or whether the sanctions would cause a financial 

hardship to him. With such large sanctions, [Deric] ended up 

owing [Tracey] and her attorney almost the entire amount of the 

proceeds.”

We again disagree with Deric and find no abuse of 

discretion. We explain why.

We preliminarily address Deric’s argument that it is 

unclear whether $22,000 in attorney fees was awarded under 

section 271 or sections 2030 and 2032. The order was made 

pursuant to section 271. Tracey did not request the $22,000 as 

“need-based” pursuant to sections 2030 and 2032; she requested 

it under section 271 as follows.
24

Her January 23, 2020 RFO included a request for $15,200 

in attorney fees and costs “in the nature of sanctions under 

[section] 271” payable from Deric’s share of the sale proceeds. 

Carfrae provided a declaration outlining her experience, her 

hourly rate, the total hours of work expended, and an exhibit 

showing her billing statement with an unpaid balance of 

$28,594.29. She provided an updated declaration on July 14, 

2020 with an updated billing statement showing a balance of 

$30,276.59. The court reserved the issue of attorney fees at the 

July 22, 2020 hearing. A year later, on January 12, 2021, Tracey 

filed an ex parte RFO again requesting an additional award of 

attorney fees in the nature of sanctions. The court once more 

reserved jurisdiction to address attorney fees. The issue was 

finally addressed at the hearings on January 21, 2021, February 

24, 2021, and March 12, 2021, resulting in the court’s order of 

$22,000 in attorney fees and $48,000 in sanctions, both pursuant 

to section 271.

It is true that the only stricture imposed by section 271 is 

that the sanction may not impose an unreasonable financial 

burden on the party sanctioned. (§ 271, subd. (a).) It follows, 

therefore, that the party who wishes to contest their ability to 

pay any sanctions award (both at trial and on appeal) bears the 

burden to submit evidence or a current income and expense 

declaration in opposition to the sanctions request and to present 

their inability to pay argument at the trial court level, with 

reference to that evidence. (See In re Marriage of Corona, supra, 

172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227; In re Marriage of Fong, supra, 

193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 291–292; see also Hogoboom & King, 

supra, ¶ 14:265.3.) Deric, however, never argued before the trial 

court that he could not pay the fees ordered or that they imposed
25

an unreasonable financial burden on him. In fact, he did not 

even show up at the March 12, 2021 hearing where the court 

made these findings and order. Failure to raise this argument in 

the trial court results in its waiver on appeal. (In re Marriage of 

Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002; Perez v. Grajales (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591–592.)

We also find there is no unreasonable financial burden on 

Deric, as he has approximately $26,928 as his one-half of rental 

income and $102,000 in sale proceeds in his possession, which 

can be used to pay the attorney fees and sanctions award. 

Attorney fees in the form of sanctions are payable only from the 

property or income of the party against whom the sanction is 

imposed, except that the award may be against the sanctioned 

party’s share of the community property. (§ 271, subd. (c).) 

There is no suggestion in the record that the trial court 

disregarded evidence of Deric’s ability to pay or that it otherwise 

abused its discretion in awarding sanctions against him; thus, 

the imposition of fees as a sanction will be upheld. (In re 

Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 180.)

Finally, Deric argues the trial court “minimized the 

potential legal effects of the [federal notice]” and “was unwilling 

to consider the federal lien a legitimate hinderance in complying 

with its orders.”

Deric made this argument to the trial court on January 21, 

2021, which told him “whether or not [Tracey] owes the 

government any money is not relevant to your position. [You are]

not the holder of the money for the U.S. government. That’s her 

obligation. Whether it’s paid, not paid, . . . [that’s of] no 

consequence to [you].” “If [Tracey] chooses not to pay it, that’s an 

action the U.S. government can bring upon her. [You have] no 
26

standing whatsoever to hold up any funds that are due her based 

on some action by the U.S. government that he’s not a party to.” 

We agree with the trial court.

DISPOSITION

We affirm. Costs are awarded to Tracey Marie Rangell.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.
1

WILEY, J., Concurring.

Deric Rangell refused to obey a family court order. The 

order was that he turn over monies to his ex-wife. The court, 

patiently at first but then with increasing resolve, set deadlines 

for Rangell to act, eventually on pain of a sanction of $1,000 per 

day. For 48 days, Rangell defied the court. He appeals the 

$48,000 consequence of his disobedience, as well as a $22,000 

attorney fee the court imposed. The family court’s orders were 

proper under Family Code section 271. We must affirm. Doing 

so requires us to construe the Family Code. My statutory 

citations are to that Code.

When construing any code, our job is to effectuate its 

purpose. (E.g., Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 

128, 135 (Apple).) “The dominant mode of statutory 

interpretation over the past century has been one premised on 

the view that legislation is a purposive act, and judges should 

construe statutes to execute that legislative purpose. This 

approach finds lineage in the sixteenth-century English decision 

Heydon’s Case, which summons judges to interpret statutes in a 

way ‘as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.’ ” 

(Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014) p. 31, italics added.)

Our polestar is devotion to the statute’s purpose. (Apple, 

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 135.)

Section 271 identifies the mischief it aims to suppress, 

which is uncooperativeness and recalcitrance by litigants:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court 

may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to 

which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates 

the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where 

possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
2

cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of 

attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature 

of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the 

court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the 

parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not 

impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an 

unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the 

sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this 

section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and 

costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the 

award.” (§ 271, subd. (a), italics added.)

To summarize, section 271 authorizes “an award of 

attorney’s fees and costs . . . .” (§ 271, subd. (a), italics added.) 

The statute does not require the fees and costs to be past

expenditures. Evidently, then, the award may relate to 

anticipated future expenditures. Moreover, these awards are “in 

the nature of a sanction.” (Ibid.) The party requesting an award 

of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any 

financial need for the award. (Ibid.)

Section 271 sanctions must have some connection with 

attorney fees. (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 

1152–1157.)

Both portions of these sanctions had a proper connection to 

attorney fees. The $22,000 sum was to compensate Tracey 

Rangell for her past attorney fees. And the $1,000-a-day 

incentive sanction sought to avoid the need for future attorney 

fees. As the court stated, Deric Rangell “was thwarting the 

process and not doing what he was ordered to do, which caused 

[Tracey Rangell] to incur fees.”
3

This $1,000-a-day incentive sanction properly aimed to 

stanch future bleeding. A reasonable person would have noted 

the incentive, obeyed the order, and eliminated the need for more 

attorney hours and fees on this issue. The family court selected a 

reasonable daily penalty to motivate Deric Rangell to comply 

with its orders and to avoid future hearings and fees. The 

amount was appropriate: noticeable but not crushing.

But Deric Rangell proved immune to logic and ran up the 

bill.

This daily prospective penalty properly counted as an 

award of “attorney fees”: the conditional $1,000-a-day penalty 

created an appropriate incentive for Deric Rangell to stop 

prolonging the case. The penalty aimed to suppress the mischief 

and to advance the remedy.

Our ruling is important, not only to litigants and trial

courts, but also to the public at large, which has an abiding 

interest in effective judicial administration. The public rues the 

glacial pace and dismaying cost of litigation. When musing about 

suicide, Hamlet counts “the law’s delay” among the “whips and 

scorns of time.” Bleak House jeers at litigation that “so exhausts 

finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and 

breaks the heart” that wise counsel is to “Suffer any wrong that 

can be done you rather than come here!”

Section 271 empowers family courts to cope with the 

recalcitrance of litigants like Deric Rangell. For future litigants, 

the lesson is simple: defying court orders is a losing proposition.

WILEY, J.