Filed 7/24/15 Richard L. v. Parham CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RICHARD L.,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

TAMMERA S. PARHAM,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 G048988

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00599568)

 O P I N I O N 

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Franz E. 

Miller, Judge. Reversed.

Richard L., in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant

Lynberg & Watkins, Courtney L. Hylton and Caitlin I. Sanders for 

Defendant and Respondent.

* * *
2

Plaintiff Richard L. appeals from a judgment of dismissal following a 

sustained demurrer without leave to amend. Now an adult, he alleges that while in the 

sixth grade in a public school district he was the victim of childhood sexual molestation 

at the hands of a chess teacher who was not an employee of the school district. Plaintiff 

alleges that defendant Tammera Parham, the former principal of the school, caused his 

injury by negligently permitting the chess teacher to come on the public school campus to 

recruit children to his private chess club. The court sustained the demurrer on the ground 

that plaintiff had not presented a claim to the school district pursuant to the Government 

Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et. seq.).

1

 

We reverse. Section 950.4 provides an exception to the claim presentation 

requirement where the plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, “that the injury 

was caused by an act or omission of . . . an employee of the public entity in the scope of 

his employment as a public employee.” Nothing in the complaint indicates that during 

the claims presentation period, plaintiff was aware, or had reason to be aware, that 

defendant’s alleged negligence was a legal cause of his damages. Plaintiff alleges the 

opposite to be true. During the claims presentation period, neither he nor his mother 

knew or had reason to know that defendant’s negligence was a legal cause of plaintiff’s 

injury. Assuming these facts to be true, under section 950.4, plaintiff was not required to 

present a claim. 

FACTS

Plaintiff alleged the following facts in his operative complaint.

During the fall of 1997, plaintiff was a sixth grade student at Mariner’s 

Elementary School, a public school in the Newport Mesa Unified School District. In late 

 

1

All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise 

stated.
3

1997, Robert M. Snyder, a known child molester that operated a youth chess club called 

“Chess for Juniors,” requested from defendant, the principal of the school, permission to 

perform chess presentations in classrooms for the purpose of recruiting children into his 

club. Snyder had made many similar requests to perform chess presentations at other 

schools in the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area, and these requests had been 

regularly denied. Defendant approved Snyder’s request without any investigation of his 

background and in violation of Education Code section 51520.

2

 

Plaintiff was introduced to Snyder when he made a presentation in 

plaintiff’s sixth grade class at Mariner’s Elementary School during the fall of 1997. 

Plaintiff expressed an interest in chess, and thus his teacher called plaintiff’s mother and 

encouraged her to enroll plaintiff in the chess club.

3

 On that recommendation, plaintiff’s 

mother enrolled him in the chess club.

When Snyder discovered plaintiff was from a single-parent family without 

a father, Snyder befriended plaintiff’s mother and showered plaintiff with attention. In 

November 1997, plaintiff’s mother consented to plaintiff attending a chess tournament in 

Scottsdale, Arizona.

It was there that the molestation began. Snyder awoke plaintiff at night 

when he put his hand down plaintiff’s underpants and began to masturbate plaintiff. 

 

2

Education Code section 51520, subdivision (a), states, “During school 

hours, and within one hour before the time of opening and within one hour after the time 

of closing of school, pupils of the public school shall not be solicited on school premises 

by teachers or others to subscribe or contribute to the funds of, to become members of, or 

to work for, any organization not directly under the control of the school authorities,

unless the organization is a nonpartisan, charitable organization organized for charitable 

purposes by an act of Congress or under the laws of the state, the purpose of the 

solicitation is nonpartisan and charitable, and the solicitation has been approved by the 

county board of education or by the governing board of the school district in which the 

school is located.”

3

Throughout plaintiff’s complaint he refers to his guardian. At oral 

argument on the demurrer plaintiff made clear that his “guardian” was in fact his mother. 
4

Frightened and unsure how to respond, plaintiff did not resist. Snyder went on to engage 

in acts of oral copulation and forced plaintiff to masturbate him.

For approximately one year afterwards, Snyder molested plaintiff on a 

regular basis. The abuse happened at chess tournaments and during “chess lessons” at 

Snyder’s residence for which plaintiff was checked out of school.

“[A]pproximately May 25th, 1998, [Snyder] sexually assaulted Plaintiff in 

a particularly egregious manner. Plaintiff was aware of the wrongfulness of what had 

been done to him, yet Plaintiff had won several local chess tournaments and had nearly 

won a national championship, and took pride in his prowess at the game. Plaintiff feared 

no longer being able to continue playing chess competitively and the shame, 

embarrassment, and humiliation that would accompany coming forward with allegations 

of sexual abuse.” Plaintiff alleged in his second amended complaint that because of his 

“preventative steps and resistance, [he] was not sexually assaulted by [Snyder] 

following” the May 25, 1998 incident. However, in his opposition to the demurrer 

plaintiff informed the court that he continued being molested until December 6, 1998.

Sometime after January 9, 1999, plaintiff worked up the courage to confide 

what had happened to his mother. His mother reported the incident to the police, but 

because of a lack of willing witnesses and insufficient evidence, Snyder was not 

prosecuted. However, rumors were circulating about Snyder’s tendencies, and he fled to 

Colorado. There, he continued to sexually assault children. But there, unlike here, he 

was criminally prosecuted and is currently serving a sentence of 12 years to life in prison.

In his complaint, plaintiff acknowledged he had not presented a claim to the 

school district under the Government Claims Act, but sought to be excused from 

presenting a claim pursuant to section 950.4, which states, “A cause of action against a 

public employee or former public employee is not barred by [the failure to file a claim] if 

the plaintiff pleads and proves that he did not know or have reason to know, within the 

period for the presentation of a claim to the employing public entity . . . that the injury 
5

was caused by . . . an act or omission of an employee of the public entity in the scope of 

his employment as a public employee.” In support of his excuse, plaintiff alleged, 

“neither Plaintiff nor any guardian or legal representative . . . knew or had reason to know 

that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an act or omission of the Newport Mesa Unified 

School District or by an act or omission of an employee of the Newport Mesa Unified 

School District in the scope of his or her employment as a public employee during the 6 

months following the last act of molestation,” 

Defendant demurred on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to present

a timely claim with the school district. The court sustained the demurrer, stating the 

“facts pled show plaintiff and his mother knew of [the] molest[ation] and that it occurred 

at school, which shows they had reason to know of [the] claim.” Plaintiff timely 

appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal.

DISCUSSION

The issue on appeal is whether, under the facts pleaded in the operative 

complaint, plaintiff has stated facts which, if true, bring him within the section 950.4 

exception to the Government Claims Act claim presentation requirements.

Legal Backdrop

Under the Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), “[b]efore suing a public 

entity, the plaintiff must present a timely written claim for damages to the entity.” (Shirk 

v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 208 (Shirk).) “A claim relating to a 

cause of action for . . . injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six 

months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) “Timely claim 

presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . ‘“‘a condition precedent to 

plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant’”’ [citations], and thus an element of 
6

the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Shirk, supra, at p. 209.) With certain exceptions, once a 

claim has been presented and rejected, a plaintiff has six months to file a lawsuit. 

(§ 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) These time periods are not generally tolled while the plaintiff is a 

minor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 352, subd. (b).)

In 2008, the Legislature added section 905, subdivision (m) (stats. 2008, ch. 

383, § 1), which provides an exception to the claim presentation requirement for 

“[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery 

of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. This subdivision shall apply 

only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.”

4

 Because 

the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in 1997 and 1998, subdivision (m) does not 

apply here.

Prior to the amendment of section 905, the prevailing law was that the 

claim presentation procedure applied to childhood sexual molestation claims without 

exception and that the tolling provision of Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1 did not 

apply. (K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1238 [“Code 

of Civil Procedure 340.1 sets forth a special statute of limitations for victims of childhood 

sexual abuse. [Citation.] However, sexual abuse victims who bring suit against a public 

entity are bound by the much shorter statute of limitations set forth in section 945.6,” fn. 

omitted]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1268-

1269 [“In 1998, the Legislature amended section 340.1 to permit victims of childhood 

sexual abuse to sue persons or entities other than the actual abuser. 

[Citation.] . . . [Citations.] To the extent that section 340.1 now authorizes suits against a 

person or entity other than the actual perpetrator, nothing in that statute or the legislative 

history of the 1998 amendment to that statute reflects an intent on the part of the 

 

4

Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.1 provides generally that the statute of 

limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse expires at the earliest eight years after 

plaintiff attains the age of majority, i.e., age 26.
7

Legislature to excuse victims of childhood sexual abuse from complying with the Act 

when the defendant is a public entity or public employee”].)

This conclusion was confirmed by our high court in Shirk, supra, 42 

Cal.4th 201. There, the plaintiff alleged she was sexually molested by her school teacher 

from 1977 to 1979. (Id. at p. 205.) She never filed a claim. (Ibid.) In 2002, she met 

with the teacher and surreptitiously recorded a conversation where the teacher admitted 

the abuse. (Ibid.) After meeting with a mental health practitioner in 2003, she presented 

a claim to the school district pursuant to the Government Claims Act. (Ibid.) She filed 

suit against the teacher and the school district shortly thereafter. (Id. at p. 206.) The 

plaintiff contended her claim was timely because a 2002 amendment to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 340.1 contained a provision that revived for one year childhood sexual 

molestation causes of action “brought against a person or an entity that had ‘reason to 

know’ or was ‘on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, 

representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable 

safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct.’ [Citations.] . . . [T]his change 

revived for the year 2003 those causes of action brought by plaintiffs over the age of 26 

years against nonabuser persons or entities that would otherwise have been time-barred 

as of January 1, 2003, ‘solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had 

expired’ as of that date.” (Shirk, at p. 208.) 

The issue before the Supreme Court was: “Does that provision also apply 

when a plaintiff suing a public entity has failed to first present a timely claim to the 

entity, as required by the government claims statute (Gov. Code, § 911.2)? Our answer is 

‘no.’” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 205.) As the court explained, the amendment made 

“no reference whatsoever to any revival of the period in which to present a claim under 

the government claims statute” (id. at p. 212), as opposed to the statute of limitations (id.

at p. 213 [“the government claim presentation deadline is not a statute of limitations”]). 

In reaching this conclusion, of course, the court implicitly held that the claims 
8

presentation requirements apply to childhood sexual molestation claims without 

exception and without tolling.

Nonetheless, plaintiff’s claim may still survive if section 950.4 applies, 

which states, “A cause of action against a public employee or former public employee is 

not barred by [the failure to present a claim] if the plaintiff pleads and proves that he did 

not know or have reason to know, within the period for the presentation of a claim to the 

employing public entity . . . that the injury was caused by . . . an act or omission of an 

employee of the public entity in the scope of his employment as a public employee.” 

“[A] tort claim can only be pursued against a public employee where a companion 

respondeat superior action is not barred against the employing public entity by reason of 

noncompliance with the claim filing procedures, except, per section 950.4, the action can 

proceed if the claimant can plead and prove that within [the claims presentation period] 

he did not know or have reason to know that a public employee was the cause of his 

injury and damages.” (Williams v. Braslow (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 762, 772-773, first 

italics added.) 

Section 950.4 “is a remedial statute intended to provide relief from 

technical rules which could provide ‘“a trap for the unwary and ignorant claimant.”’” 

(Leake v. Wu (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 668, 673 (Leake).) “The rule that remedial statutes 

are to be liberally construed [citations] applies with particular force when, as here, strict 

application of a statutory requirement will result in barring the claim of an incapacitated 

plaintiff and ultimately deny her a day in court. [¶] The Legislature and the courts are 

concerned with protecting the rights of incapacitated persons, as with those of minors 

who cannot act for themselves.” (Draper v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 52 Cal.3d 502, 

507 [interpreting § 946.6, which governs petitions to present a late claim under the 

Government Claims Act].)
9

Plaintiff Alleged Facts Which, If True, Would Constitute an Exception to the Claims 

Presentation Requirements of the Government Claims Act

We conclude plaintiff adequately pleaded facts from which a jury could 

conclude plaintiff did not know, and had no reason to know, during the claim 

presentation period, that defendant’s alleged negligence was a legal cause of his injury. 

We begin our analysis by considering the accrual date of plaintiff’s cause of 

action. “The date of accrual of a cause of action marks the starting point for calculating 

the claims presentation period.” (V.C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 499, 508.) “A cause of action accrues for purposes of the filing 

requirements of the Tort Claims Act on the same date a similar action against a nonpublic 

entity would be deemed to accrue for purposes of applying the relevant statute of 

limitations.” (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 444, fn. 3.)

“A civil cause of action for child molestation generally accrues at the time 

of the molestation.” (Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556, 

567 fn. 2.) However, courts sometimes apply the continuing violation doctrine to delay 

the date of accrual. Under the continuing violation doctrine, “[w]here the molestation is 

continuous, accrual is measured from the date of the last molestation.” (K.J. v. Arcadia 

Unified School Dist., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239.) In the usual case, application 

of the continuing violation doctrine is a benefit to the victim, as it delays the cutoff period 

for filing a claim with the public entity. 

Here, however, under the alleged facts of this case, measuring the accrual 

from the date of the first molestation will likely bring the victim within the section 950.4 

exception to the claim filing requirement. But measuring the accrual from the date of the 

last molestation will make it less likely that the exception will apply. For section 950.4 to 

apply, plaintiff had not to have known, nor had reason to know, of defendant’s alleged 

negligence during the six-month claim presentation period. Snyder’s molestation of 

plaintiff lasted a little over one year, beginning in November 1997, and ending either in 
10

May 1998 (according to the complaint) or in December 1998 (as plaintiff acknowledged 

in his opposition to demurrer). In January 1999, plaintiff told his mother what had 

happened, and the matter was reported to the police. Plaintiff does not allege exactly 

when he first learned or had reason to know of defendant’s negligence as a legal cause of 

his injury, but he affirmatively alleges it was not within six months following the last act 

of molestation. Under the facts alleged, the earliest we could infer he gained this 

knowledge was during the police investigation of the incidents following the January 

1999 report. And that inference also assumes the police reported to plaintiff or plaintiff’s 

mother that Snyder was a known pedophile and that a background check would have 

revealed that fact to whoever sought the information. Having that knowledge in hand 

would have given plaintiff “reason to know” (§ 950.4) that defendant likely failed to 

perform a background check prior to admitting Snyder on campus. If the cause of action 

accrued in December 1998, the police investigation was still within the claims 

presentation period, and, assuming plaintiff learned of Snyder’s past during that

investigation, section 950.4 would likely not apply. On the other hand, if the claim 

accrued in November 1997, the first incident of molestation, neither plaintiff nor his 

mother would have had reason to know of Snyder’s past as a child molester during the 

following six months, and the section 950.4 exception would likely apply. So unlike the 

usual situation, where a plaintiff wants to delay the claim-filing deadline, here plaintiff 

wants it to be as early as possible. So the issue boils down to this: Can the continuing 

violation doctrine be used against plaintiff to defeat his claim?

We conclude it may not. We begin with the fundamental premise that a 

cause of action generally accrues when all of the elements of a cause of action have 

occurred: “Traditionally at common law, a ‘cause of action accrues “when [it] is 

complete with all of its elements” — those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and 

causation.’” [Citation.] This is the “last element” accrual rule: ordinarily, the statute of 

limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.’” 
11

(Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) Under 

this rule, undoubtedly plaintiff could have sued defendant immediately after the first 

molestation.

“The continuing violation doctrine serves a number of equitable purposes. 

Some injuries are the product of a series of small harms, any one of which may not be 

actionable on its own. [Citation.] Those injured in such a fashion should not be 

handicapped by the inability to identify with certainty when harm has occurred or has 

risen to a level sufficient to warrant action. [Citations.] Moreover, from a courtefficiency perspective, it is unwise to impose a limitations regime that would require 

parties to run to court in response to every slight, without first attempting to resolve 

matters through extrajudicial means, out of fear that delay would result in a time-barred 

action. [Citations.] Allegations of a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may, 

in a given case, justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in 

its entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially 

inside the limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1197-1198.)

What is important for our purposes is that the continuing violation doctrine 

is an equitable doctrine. (See Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 813-

814 [describing the derivation of the continuing violation doctrine from the doctrine of 

equitable tolling].) As we noted above, the exception in section 950.4 is a remedial 

statute to be interpreted liberally. Combining these principles, we conclude that in a 

childhood molestation case, the equitable continuing violation doctrine may not be used 

as a sword against the plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff’s cause of action accrued upon the 

first incident of molestation.

Next, we examine whether the court was correct in concluding, as a matter 

of law under the alleged facts, that plaintiff knew or had reason to know within the first 

six months of the molestation that his injury was caused by an act or omission of 

defendant. At the outset, we clarify that the relevant time frame is the six-month claims 
12

presentation period — it does not include the time period during which plaintiff could 

have petitioned to file a late claim. (Moore v. Morhar (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 896, 901-

902 (Moore) [“a claimant who becomes chargeable with, or acquires, knowledge under 

section 950.4 during the period in which a late claim could be filed, may not be barred 

from proceeding against a public employee,” fn. omitted].)

Quite obviously plaintiff knew that someone at the school — be it the 

defendant or the teacher — permitted Snyder to come on campus. Was this enough to 

know, under section 950.4, that defendant’s act or omission “caused” plaintiff’s injury? 

We conclude it was not. Again, this is a remedial statute. To know that a public 

employee had some tangential involvement somewhere along the way is not enough to 

know that the public employee was the legal cause of the injury. It is only when plaintiff 

knows or has reason to know that a public employee’s wrongful conduct caused the 

injury that the plaintiff is on notice to file a claim. Here, nothing in the complaint 

suggests that plaintiff knew the alleged fact that defendant permitted Snyder on campus 

wrongfully, without performing a background check, and in contravention of her legal 

duty to first obtain the school board’s permission. 

Nor can we say as a matter of law, based on the pleadings, that plaintiff had 

reason to know of defendant’s wrongful conduct. Plaintiff was being abused at the time. 

He was in the middle of a year-long nightmare. We will not impose upon an abuse 

victim the legal obligation to immediately launch a full-scale investigation to determine 

whether defendant, or any other school employee negligently failed to discover Snyder’s 

background before allowing him on campus. And plaintiff was not aware of any fact that 

would have made defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct obvious. Accordingly, we 

conclude plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, would excuse him under section 950.4 

from filing a claim under the Government Claims Act.
13

Defendant urges us to adopt a more rigorous investigation requirement 

based on the holdings of Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 896 and Leake, supra, 64 

Cal.App.3d 668. We decline to do so.

In Moore, plaintiff visited Los Angeles where she injured her foot on 

cracked curbing. (Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 899.) Based on the advice of her 

counsel, she filed an application for leave to file a late claim with the City of Los Angeles 

(the City). (Ibid.) The City granted the application to file late, but denied the claim on 

the merits. (Ibid.) The City explained that the curb in question was under the jurisdiction 

of the County of Los Angeles (the County). (Ibid.) Plaintiff did not inform her counsel 

of that fact. (Ibid.) Plaintiff filed suit against the City and the County. (Ibid.) 

Subsequently, seven months after filing a claim with the City, plaintiff filed an 

application to file a late claim with the County, which was denied. (Id. at p. 900.) She 

also petitioned the court to file a late claim, which was likewise denied. (Ibid.) The court 

sustained a demurrer. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the plaintiff claimed she was excused from the claim 

presentation requirement pursuant to section 950.4. She claimed “that her mistaken 

belief that the City was involved, or, concomitantly, her ignorance of the fact that the 

defective curbing lay just outside the City in an unincorporated area within County 

jurisdiction, was reasonable.” (Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 902.) The court 

rejected the argument: “a claimant under section 950.4 should exercise reasonable 

diligence in ascertaining the facts giving rise to his or her cause of action. [Citation.]

Surely, since appellant was aware of the claim-filing procedure and time restraints, a 

perusal of a city map would have been reasonable and would also have revealed that the 

situs of her injury was within County territory. By the same token, she must have known 

that an employee was in charge of the condition of curbs.” (Ibid.)

This case is easily distinguished. What constitutes reasonable diligence for 

an adult who stubbed their foot on a curb is not what can be reasonably expected of a 
14

childhood sexual abuse victim. The Legislature recognized this simple fact when it 

extended the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse victims to their 26 birthday. 

(See Code Civ. Proc., §340.1.)

In Leake, the children of the decedent, through their guardian ad litem, 

brought suit against an anesthesiologist present at a surgery where their mother died. 

(Leake, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at pp. 669-670.) The trial court granted summary judgment 

on the ground that the anesthesiologist was a county employee and plaintiffs had not 

complied with the Government Claims Act. (Leake, at p. 670.) “The dispositive issue,”

according to the court of appeal, was “whether plaintiffs’ affidavits in opposition to the 

motion for summary judgment created a triable issue of fact [citation] as to plaintiffs’

claim to fall within the exception provided by Government Code section 950.4.” (Id. at 

p. 671.) Both the guardian ad litem, who was 70 years old with only an eighth-grade 

education, and the plaintiffs’ attorney, declared that they did not know the 

anesthesiologist was a county employee until after the litigation commenced. (Id. at p. 

672.) Both understood that as a licensed physician, the anesthesiologist was an 

independent professional, not an employee of the county-owned hospital. (Ibid.)

The Leake court affirmed based on the “‘inexcusable neglect’” of the 

attorney. (Leake, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 673.) “Despite the fact that the county 

hospital was named as a defendant, no claim was ever filed with the county, and it 

appears that the county was never even served with summons and the complaint. The 

attorney apparently conducted no investigation, such as simple inquiry to the hospital, to 

determine whether the doctors might have been county employees. Instead, the attorney 

chose to rely solely on his understanding or personal experience that a doctor is an 

independent contractor. The attorney’s failure to make even a minimal inquiry into the 

matter was not the conduct of a reasonably prudent person nor the type of mistake or 

neglect for which the statutes afford relief.” (Ibid.)
15

Leake is easily distinguished on essentially the same basis as Moore. What 

constitutes reasonable diligence on behalf of an attorney cannot be expected of a 

childhood sexual abuse victim. Notably, the Leake court did not fault the guardian ad 

litem; solely the attorney.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to 

overrule the demurrer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Plaintiff shall be 

awarded costs on appeal.

IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.