alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32

Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant
to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002


(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)


In connection with the Annual Report of UST Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the Company), on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the Report), Vincent A.
Gierer, Jr., Chief Executive Officer and President of the
Company, and Robert T. DAlessandro, Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do
each hereby certify, pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350),
that to his knowledge:



| |    |                                                                                                                                                            
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of
    section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934; and                              
|
| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and result of
    operations of the Company.

Dated: March 4, 2005



| |                                                  
| | -------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ VINCENT A. GIERER, JR.                       
| |                                                  
| | Chief Executive Officer and President            
|
| | /s/ ROBERT T. DALESSANDRO                       
| |                                                  
| | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided to UST Inc. and will be
retained by UST Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
U.S. BANK, N.A., SUCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ASSET INVESTMENT LOAN TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2003-BC13

v.
AARON A. THOMAS AND ANDREA MARTIN-THOMAS
PETITION OF: AARON A. THOMAS : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 396 MAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 6th day of October, 2014, the Petition for All owance of Appeal is DENIED

.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1

                            SUBSIDIARIES OF WESTCORP

WESTERN FINANCIAL BANK
WFS RECEIVABLES CORPORATION 2
WFS RECEIVABLES CORPORATION 4
WESTRAN SERVICES CORPORATION
WESTERN CONSUMER PRODUCTS
WFS FINANCIAL INC
WESTFIN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
WESTHRIFT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
WESTERN CONSUMER SERVICES, INC.
THE HAMMOND COMPANY, THE MORTGAGE BANKERS
WESTERN RECONVEYANCE COMPANY, INC.
WESTERN AUTO INVESTMENTS, INC.
WESTERN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATE SOLUTIONS
WFS FINANCIAL AUTO LOANS, INC.
WFS FINANCIAL AUTO LOANS 2, INC.
WFS INVESTMENTS, INC.
WFS FUNDING, INC.
WFS RECEIVABLES CORPORATION
WFS RECEIVABLES CORPORATION 3
WFS WEB INVESTMENTS
EXHIBIT 4.4 

[FORM OF NOTATION OF GUARANTEE] 

For value received, each Guarantor (which term includes any successor Person under the Indenture) has, jointly and severally,unconditionally guaranteed, to the extent set forth in the Indenture and subject to the provisions in the Indenture dated as of May 7, 2010 (the “*Indenture*”) among Susser Holdings, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company(the “*Company*”), Susser Finance Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“*SFC*” and, together with the Company, the “*Issuers*”), the Guarantors party thereto and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee (the“*Trustee*”), (a) the due and punctual payment of the principal of, premium and Additional Interest, if any, and interest on, the Notes, whether at maturity, by acceleration, redemption or otherwise, the due and punctual paymentof interest on overdue principal of and interest on the Notes, if any, if lawful, and the due and punctual performance of all other obligations under the Indenture of the Issuers to the Holders and the Trustee all in accordance with the terms of theIndenture and (b) in case of any extension of time of payment or renewal of any Notes or any of such other obligations, that the same will be promptly paid in full when due or performed in accordance with the terms of the extension or renewal,whether at stated maturity, by acceleration or otherwise. The obligations of the Guarantors to the Holders and the Trustee pursuant to the Note Guarantee and the Indenture are expressly set forth in Article 11 of the Indenture and reference ishereby made to the Indenture for the precise terms of the Note Guarantee. 

Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to them in theIndenture. 

 
[NAME OF GUARANTOR(S)]By: 
 
Name: Title:
#### EMC Mortgage Corporation, Respondent, v Maria Cielo Suarez et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[852 NYS2d 791]

*593Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the instant mortgage foreclosure action is not time-barred *(see*CPLR 213 [4]). While another entity purported to accelerate the appellants’ mortgage debt in a prior action commenced on April 8, 1997, the note was never assigned to that entity and it therefore never had authority to accelerate the debt or to sue to foreclose. Accordingly, the purported acceleration was a nullity and the six-year statute of limitations, which ordinarily would commence running on the date of acceleration *(see Clayton Natl. v Guldi,*307 AD2d 982 [2003]; *Lavin v Elmakiss,*302 AD2d 638 [2003]; *EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella,*279 AD2d 604 [2001]), did not begin to run on the entire debt at that time. Therefore, the plaintiffs commencement of this mortgage foreclosure action on October 12, 2005 was not time-barred. However, in the event that the plaintiff prevails in this action, its recovery is limited to only those unpaid installments which accrued within the six-year period immediately preceding its commencement of this action *(see generally Lavin v Elmakiss,*302 AD2d 638 [2003]; *Loiacono v Goldberg,*240 AD 2d 476 [1997]), and the Supreme Court properly permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint to reflect this limitation on recovery *(see generally*CPLR 3025 [b]; *Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York,*60 NY2d 957 [1983]). The appellants have not been prejudiced by the amendment, since the date of the default has not been altered, and the plaintiff is still required to prove that the loan was properly placed in foreclosure in 1997 in order to prevail.

The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the appellants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, as the conflicting evidentiary submissions of the parties on the motion and cross motion raised substantial questions of fact and credibility with regard to whether the appellants defaulted on the loan.

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Covello, Eng and Belen, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 23.2

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in post-effective
Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement No. 33-7053 on Form S-8, in Registration Statement Nos. 33-44700, 333-44024 and 333-46218 on Form S-8 of our report dated December 21, 2006, with respect to the Consolidated Financial
Statements of Archon Corporation included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the years ended September 30, 2006 and 2005.



|                 |  |                      
|---------------- |  | ---------------------
|Las Vegas, NV    |  |                      
|January 14, 2008 |  |                      
|                 | 
|                 |  | /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10814

Conference Calendar

__________________

KENNETH WAYNE MORNES,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DAVID EDGEWORTH, DR; J. CANNADY,

RN; DAVID WILLIAMS, SHERIFF,

TARRANT CTY TX,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CV-348-A

- - - - - - - - - -

February 29, 1996

Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Wayne Mornes challenges the dismissal of his

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). He argues that he was

denied adequate medical care while he was a pretrial detainee at

the Tarrant County Jail. We have reviewed the records and the

parties' briefs and AFFIRM for the reasons set forth by the

district court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6668

STEPHEN L. SKAGGS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM S. HAINES, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,

District Judge. (CA-00-692)

Submitted: July 25, 2002 Decided: August 1, 2002

Before WILKINS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen L. Skaggs, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Stephen L. Skaggs seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

2002). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the

district court. See Skaggs v. Haines, No. CA-00-692 (S.D.W. Va.

Apr. 17, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**951 CA 14-00404**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF AARON HAURI, CLAIMANT-RESPONDENT,

V ORDER

SPRINGVILLE-GRIFFITH INSTITUTE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (JILL L. YONKERS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
CHIACCHIA & FLEMING, LLP, HAMBURG (DANIEL J. CHIACCHIA OF COUNSEL), FOR CLAIMANT-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Shirley Troutman, J.), entered July 9, 2013. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted claimant’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim.
Now, upon reading and filing the stipulation withdrawing appeal signed by the attorneys for the parties on June 12 and 30, 2014,
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal is unanimously dismissed without costs upon stipulation.

Entered: September 26, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

KWAN YONG CHOI,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-10376

D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00206-AWI

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2015**

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Kwan Yong Choi appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges 

the 36-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea convictions for money 

laundering and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1) and 2. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 25 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-10376

Choi contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain 

adequately the extent of its downward departure under U.S.S.G § 5K2.23. We 

review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103,

1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The record, taken as a whole, reflects that 

the district judge “considered the parties’ arguments and [had] a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 

Choi further contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light 

of the alleged procedural error and his having already been punished for the 

underlying criminal conduct in South Korea. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing Choi’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Choi’s 

criminal history in Korea and the substantial financial and emotional impact of his 

crime on the victims. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-12-00162-CV

Susan Huddleston Gosney, Appellant

v.

Gary Lynn Gosney, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 240,737-B, HONORABLE ALAN MAYFIELD, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The clerk’s record and reporter’s record in this appeal were due for filing in this

Court on December 9, 2011. On April 2, 2012, appellant Susan Huddleston Gosney was notified

that no clerk’s record had been filed due to her failure to pay or make arrangements to pay the

district clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record. The notice requested that Ms. Gosney make

arrangements for the clerk’s record and submit a status report regarding this appeal with this

Court. Ms. Gosney was requested to file a response in this Court on or before April 12, 2012 or risk

dismissal of her appeal. To date, Ms. Gosney has not filed a status report or otherwise responded

to this Court’s notice, and the clerk’s record has not been filed.

If the trial court clerk fails to file the clerk’s record due to appellant’s failure to pay

or make arrangements to pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the record, the appellate court may

dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution unless the appellant was entitled to proceed without
payment of costs. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). In this case, Ms. Gosney has not established that she is

entitled to proceed without payment of costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1 (providing procedure for

establishing indigence on appeal). Because Ms. Gosney has failed to pay or make arrangements to

pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record, this appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution. 

__________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Henson and Goodwin

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: June 29, 2012

2
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tianyin Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report’), I, Guoqing Jiang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)T he information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.








Date:  August 22, 2011








/s/   Guoqing JiangGuoqing JiangChief Executive Officer & Chairman
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 127 (Monday, July 6, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 31983]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15759]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-70,695]


Leggett and Platt, Whittier, CA; Notice of Termination of 
Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on May 27, 2009, in response to a petition 
filed by the company on behalf of workers of Leggett and Platt, 
Whittier, California.
    The petitioners have requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 25th day of June 2009.
Elliott S. Kushner,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-15759 Filed 7-2-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Inconnection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pinnacle GasResources, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ending June 30, 2010,as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Peter G. Schoonmaker, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date:August 16, 2009

 
|   | /s/  Peter G. Schoonmaker              |
|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Peter  G. Schoonmaker                  |
|   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

1

----
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Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 7 of 20 PageID: 313

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 8 of 20 PageID: 314

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 9 of 20 PageID: 315

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 10 of 20 PageID: 316

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 11 of 20 PageID: 317

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 12 of 20 PageID: 318

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 13 of 20 PageID: 319

Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 14 of 20 PageID: 320

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Case 3:10-cv-06317-JAP -LHG   Document 25    Filed 10/10/11   Page 20 of 20 PageID: 326
Case 1:11-cv-00187-RMB-KMW Document 2 Filed 01/11/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 23
##### 



Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of Atlantis Plastics, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
    5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors:
   Date: April 5, 2007
    
    /s/ Paul G. SaariPaul G. SaariSenior Vice President, Finance and Chief FinancialOfficer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### Sohail Khan et al., Appellants, v Todd M. Finchler, Respondent.

[824 NYS2d 340]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), dated August 1, 2005, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant established, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955 [1992]; *Giraldo v Mandanici,*24 AD3d 419 [2005]), and the plaintiffs, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The defendant’s orthopedist noted in an affirmed medical report that the -magnetic resonance imaging films of the injured plaintiffs back “show[ed] preexisting degenerative disc disease” in the lumbar region and “age-related changes” in the cervical region. The records of the injured plaintiffs treating chiropractor included an X-ray examination report stating that there were “degenerative changes” in the cervical and lumbar regions of the injured plaintiffs spine. The affirmations of the injured *967plaintiffs physicians failed to address the findings of degeneration and age-related changes *(see Tudisco v James,*28 AD3d 536 [2006]; *Allyn v Hanley,*2 AD3d 470 [2003]; *Giraldo v Mandanici, supra; Lorthe v Adeyeye,*306 AD2d 252 [2003]). Moreover, the plaintiffs improperly relied upon the unsworn submissions of the injured plaintiffs treating neurologist *(see Pagano v Kingsbury,*182 AD2d 268 [1992]).

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to proffer competent medical evidence that an injury caused the injured plaintiff to be unable to perform substantially all of his daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days subsequent to the accident *(see Sainte-Aime v Ho,*274 AD2d 569 [2000]). Miller, J.E, Santucci, Goldstein, Skelos and Lunn, JJ., concur.