In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-1080

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID L. BRADFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 15-CR-30001 — David R. Herndon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 31, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 19, 2018

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SYKES,

Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted David Bradford of 

conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and related 

drug and firearms offenses. His appeal raises three claims of 

error. First, he contests the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence recovered in a search of his home pursuant to a 

warrant. His chief complaint is that the warrant application 
2 No. 17-1080

relied on statements from a confidential informant but

omitted information damaging to the informant’s credibility.

Second, he challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to 

exclude evidence that he used the firearms seized in the 

search or directed others to use them. Last, Bradford claims

that the government failed to prove a crack-cocaine conspiracy. We reject these arguments and affirm.

I. Background

A grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against

Bradford stemming from his drug-distribution operation in 

East St. Louis, Illinois. A jury convicted him on six of the 

seven charges: conspiracy to distribute and possess with 

intent to distribute controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 846; transfer of a firearm to a felon, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(d)(1); two counts of distribution of cocaine base, see 

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, see id. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); 

and possession of a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). (The jury acquitted on the remaining charge of

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 

crime. See id. § 924(c).) We limit our account of the facts to 

the background necessary to understand the issues raised on 

appeal.

Federal law enforcement opened an investigation of

Bradford after he participated in a suspicious firearm purchase with his girlfriend Delenthegia Beard-Hawkins and 

their friend Danielle Smith. (The latter’s first name might be 

misleading; Smith is a man.) In late February 2014, the trio 

went to an Illinois gun store where Bradford and Smith 

examined two .50-caliber Desert Eagle semiautomatic pistols. But it was Hawkins who ended up purchasing one. The 
No. 17-1080 3

gun cost about $1,500, and because Hawkins did not have 

enough cash, Bradford pitched in a couple hundred dollars. 

Bradford also purchased a laser sight for another type of 

firearm. The clerk offered to ship the firearm to a gun store 

in Missouri where Hawkins lived so she could pick it up 

there.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(“ATF”) received information about the transaction and 

launched an investigation. Agents learned that both 

Bradford and Smith were convicted felons, so it was illegal 

for them to possess a firearm. See § 922(g)(1). 

On March 4 ATF agents surveilled Hawkins as she 

picked up the Desert Eagle at a Missouri gun store and 

drove it to Bradford’s home in East St. Louis, Illinois. When 

she arrived, Smith was on the front porch. Hawkins handed 

him the firearm, and when the two started walking toward 

the front door, agents arrested them. Bradford approached 

from around the corner, and he too was arrested. 

Hawkins told the agents that she had three firearms in 

her home—two handguns and an AK-47 rifle—and that she 

would sometimes bring them to Bradford’s house and leave 

them there. She also admitted to being a regular marijuana

user, making it illegal for her to possess a firearm. See 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Though she denied purchasing the 

Desert Eagle for Bradford, she reported that he kept a 9mm 

pistol under his pillow and that she had seen two other 

firearms and ammunition at his house in the days leading 

up to her arrest.

All three were detained in the St. Clair County Jail on a 

48-hour hold. Based on Hawkins’s information, on March 6 
4 No. 17-1080

ATF agents obtained a warrant to search her home and 

Bradford’s. In Bradford’s bedroom they recovered indicia of 

ownership of a Draco pistol (a box, an owner’s manual, and 

a serial-number tag), as well as empty magazines, gun 

holsters, a gun lock, and miscellaneous firearm parts. They 

did not find any firearms or the laser sight Bradford purchased at the Illinois gun store. At Hawkins’s home agents 

found a handgun, ammunition, and magazines, but they did 

not locate the second handgun or the AK-47 she said she 

kept there. The 48-hour hold expired that evening, and 

Bradford, Hawkins, and Smith were released. A few days 

later, Hawkins surrendered a Draco pistol to the ATF. As 

expected, the pistol matched the serial number on the tag 

recovered from Bradford’s bedroom. 

Around this time the ATF obtained additional information from confidential informants that Bradford was 

selling crack cocaine. Smith was one of those informants; he 

began cooperating with the ATF after his arrest. Agents used 

Smith to conduct two controlled crack-cocaine buys from

Bradford, recording both transactions. Smith called 

Bradford’s cell phone and asked to purchase crack. On

April 18 the two met at Bradford’s house, and Smith purchased 23.8 grams of crack for $1,400. Several days later 

Smith called Bradford and asked for more. On April 29 the 

two met again at Bradford’s house, and Smith paid $2,250 for 

33.8 grams of crack.

A few weeks after the controlled buys, Smith observed 

marijuana and various firearms in Bradford’s home. Specifically, Smith reported to Special Agent Adam Ulery that on 

May 29 he observed an SKS rifle in Bradford’s bedroom 

closet, a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber pistol and an XD 
No. 17-1080 5

.40-caliber pistol on Bradford’s bed, as well as a Tommy-gun 

rifle under Bradford’s mattress. Smith also reported that 

Bradford sometimes kept firearms in his white Cadillac.

Ulery had observed a white Cadillac parked in front of 

Bradford’s residence; it was registered in Bradford’s name.

Smith continued his cooperation, telling agents on June 8 

that he observed Bradford carrying a Springfield XD 

.40-caliber pistol and saw marijuana packaged for sale at 

Bradford’s house. He also reported that Bradford told him he 

had pistol-whipped a person named D-Bow in retaliation for 

stealing marijuana from him. Later that same day, Smith

witnessed a firearms transfer at Bradford’s residence; he 

reported that Bradford handed a bag containing several 

firearms to another person inside the home. Finally, Smith

told the agents that earlier on June 8 he saw an SKS rifle and 

a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber pistol in Bradford’s bedroom. 

On June 9 Agent Ulery applied for another warrant to 

search Bradford’s home. He swore to the facts we’ve just 

recited and noted his experience investigating the use of 

firearms in drug-trafficking crimes. He explained that a 

confidential informant had supplied information about 

Bradford’s drug dealing and the firearms he kept in his 

home, and also that the informant had participated in two 

recorded crack buys from Bradford. He described these facts

in some detail, and he also stated that the informant “ha[d] 

proven reliable in this and in other criminal investigations 

over the last three months.” Though he mentioned Smith’s 

role in the illegal firearm purchase that prompted the March 

6 warrant, he did not identify Smith as the informant.

A magistrate judge issued the warrant that same day. The 

search of Bradford’s home yielded three rifles, a digital scale, 
6 No. 17-1080

and two sandwich baggies each containing about one ounce 

of marijuana.

As we’ve noted, Bradford was indicted on charges of

conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and six related 

drug-distribution and firearms crimes. He moved in limine 

to suppress the evidence recovered in the March 6 and 

June 9 searches of his home. The motion was denied in all 

respects; only the second search remains at issue. As relevant 

here Bradford argued that the June 9 warrant was invalid 

because the agent’s application omitted negative information 

relevant to Smith’s credibility.

At the suppression hearing, Agent Ulery testified that by

the time of the June 9 warrant application, Smith had served 

as an informant in two other investigations involving controlled buys and those transactions had confirmed his

reliability. He told the court that Smith had advised the ATF 

that he had two prior felony convictions—one for possession 

of a controlled substance and the other for armed robbery—

but he actually had three: possession of a controlled substance, residential burglary, and possession of a firearm by a 

felon. Finally, Ulery testified that Smith was on probation 

when he began cooperating and that the ATF had paid him 

for his services. None of this information—Smith’s record, 

his probation status, and the fact that he was a paid informant—was included in Ulery’s warrant application. 

Ruling on the motion, the district judge acknowledged 

that Ulery had omitted important information about Smith’s

credibility from the warrant application. But the judge 

reasoned that Smith’s statements were otherwise detailed, 

timely, and adequately corroborated, and that the applica-
No. 17-1080 7

tion contained sufficient additional information to support 

probable cause for the search.

Bradford also moved in limine to exclude any evidence 

that he had used the seized firearms in other crimes or 

directed others to use them. The motion was cursory and 

entirely generic. It did not specify the evidence at which it 

was directed or explain why the evidence was inadmissible 

other than a bare assertion that it was irrelevant and prejudicial. In a written response, the government explained that it 

would seek to introduce evidence of four violent acts (or 

threats of violence) as direct evidence of the charged offenses.

First, the government sought to introduce evidence that 

Bradford ordered a shooting in retaliation for a threat 

against one of his subordinates in the drug-distribution 

conspiracy. Raphael Harris, Bradford’s cousin, sold marijuana for him at a housing complex in the area. The boyfriend 

of a woman who lived in that complex had threatened 

Harris, so Bradford loaned him a Mossberg rifle to “shoot 

up” the woman’s apartment. Harris did as Bradford directed 

and shot up the apartment. No one was injured.

The second set of events involved Bradford’s repeated 

threats and violence against a teenager nicknamed D-Bow, 

who had stolen marijuana from him. In retaliation for the 

theft, Bradford and Harris went to D-Bow’s house and

violently banged on the security bars on his bedroom window. Next, Bradford spotted D-Bow on a bike and chased 

him down with his truck. When D-Bow jumped off the bike

and fled on foot, Bradford ran over the bike. Bradford later 

confronted D-Bow directly and pistol-whipped him. 
8 No. 17-1080

The third incident centered on Bradford’s plan to rob one 

of his crack suppliers because the two had a falling-out.

Bradford solicited Smith and his brother to steal her car 

where she kept both drugs and cash. They didn’t go through 

with it. 

In the fourth and final episode, an associate of Bradford’s 

nicknamed Boo Man arranged for Bradford to purchase 

firearms at someone’s house. When Bradford, Boo Man, and 

two others entered the house, they were held up at gunpoint 

and robbed. Bradford later instructed Boo Man to shoot up

the house and loaned him a firearm for that purpose. Boo 

Man didn’t follow through.

In a written order, the judge summarily ruled that “the 

anticipated evidence outlined by the government” was

“relevant evidence directly related to the charges” because, 

as the government asserted, “it demonstrates how Bradford 

allegedly conducted his [drug] ‘business.’” The judge also 

ruled, again summarily, that the evidence was not “unduly 

prejudicial.” But the judge’s concluding line was cryptic: 

“[T]o the extent that Bradford’s motion goes to relevant 

evidence directly related to the charges ... , it is DENIED. 

However, to the extent that the evidence goes to conduct that 

is not relevant to the charges ... , it is GRANTED.”

The charges were tried to a jury over five days. The government’s case included, among other evidence, testimony 

from Hawkins, Smith, Raphael Harris, and Jeremy Harris 

(Raphael’s brother, who also sold drugs for Bradford). The 

government also presented evidence of the four violent 

incidents we’ve just discussed without objection from 

Bradford. The jury found him guilty on six counts: conspiracy, two of the three firearms crimes, and all three drug-
No. 17-1080 9

distribution counts (two involving cocaine base and one 

involving marijuana). The judge sentenced him to 35 years in 

prison and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. The Search Warrant

Bradford challenges the denial of his motion to suppress 

the fruits of the June 9 search. He maintains that the omission of information damaging to Smith’s credibility was fatal 

to the warrant application because it deprived the magistrate 

judge of information vital to the determination of probable 

cause.

“Probable cause is a practical, nontechnical inquiry that 

asks whether there is a fair probability, given the totality of 

the circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place.” United States v. Orozco, 576 F.3d 745, 748 

(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 

(1983)). We give “great deference” to the probable-cause 

determination of the magistrate who issued the warrant. 

United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Gates, 462 U.S. at 236); see also United States v. McIntire, 

516 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2008).

When a warrant application is based on information from 

an informant, our cases have identified five factors that are 

particularly relevant to the warrant’s facial validity: “the 

level of detail, the extent of firsthand observation, the degree 

of corroboration, the time between the events reported and 

the warrant application, and whether the informant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 

816. Although the sufficiency of a warrant application is a 

highly fact-specific determination, we have said that “infor-
10 No. 17-1080

mation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias is 

crucial.” Id. Omitting this information deprives the magistrate of important data in the probable-cause calculus. The

omission is not necessarily fatal, however. “[E]ven where 

some credibility information is omitted, a strong showing on 

the primary factors can salvage the warrant.” Id. at 818; see 

also United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 

2016). 

Agent Ulery’s warrant application left out adverse information bearing on Smith’s credibility: his three felony convictions, one of which he failed to disclose to law 

enforcement; his probation status; and the payments he 

received for his services as an informant. And Smith did not 

appear before the magistrate for questioning. Still, we’re 

satisfied that the June 9 warrant was facially valid. Smith’s 

information was fresh, firsthand, quite detailed, and corroborated, all of which supports the magistrate’s finding of 

probable cause.

A few examples suffice to show that Smith’s information 

was both sufficiently detailed and adequately corroborated.

His descriptions of the firearms Bradford kept in his home 

were quite specific as to gun type, and he also identified 

their precise location within the home. Hawkins provided 

corroboration; the information agents had gathered from her 

confirmed that Bradford kept multiple firearms in his home. 

And the Draco pistol she turned over to the ATF matched 

the serial-number tag recovered in the earlier search of 

Bradford’s home. Smith also reported that Bradford sometimes kept his firearms in his white Cadillac, and the ATF 

confirmed that Bradford owned one. Finally, the warrant 

application chronicled the controlled buys, which confirmed 
No. 17-1080 11

Smith’s reports that Bradford was dealing crack and marijuana from his home.

Bradford insists that the information from sources other 

than Smith was too stale to support a finding of probable 

cause. The most recent controlled buy took place around six 

weeks before the warrant was issued, and Hawkins had 

described the firearms in Bradford’s home three months 

earlier. It’s true that “‘[s]taleness’ is highly relevant to the 

legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object” 

like crack cocaine or marijuana. United States v. Seiver, 

692 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2012). But “depending on the 

circumstances, evidence of the sighting of a gun (or related 

items) does not automatically grow stale as time passes.” 

United States v. Hicks, 650 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(collecting cases). And more recent information supporting 

probable cause can freshen information that might otherwise 

be stale. See United States v. Prideaux-Wentz, 543 F.3d 954, 958 

(7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Newsom, 402 F.3d 780, 783 (7th 

Cir. 2005).

Smith’s last report to the agents did just that. On June 8, 

the day before the warrant issued, he observed firearms and 

drugs packaged for distribution in Bradford’s residence. This 

information, like his earlier reports, was firsthand and

specific. In particular, he identified the firearms Bradford 

possessed by type and location in the residence.

Smith hangs his hat on United States v. Glover, but that 

case is distinguishable. There, as here, the affidavit in support of the warrant omitted facts damaging to the informant’s credibility. Glover, 755 F.3d at 815. But that is where the 

similarity ends. In Glover the information from the informant 

was only minimally corroborated and provided little detail.
12 No. 17-1080

Id. at 817. Given the weak showing on the primary factors

relevant to probable cause, the omission of adverse credibility information was fatal to the warrant application. Id. at 

818. In contrast, Smith’s information was quite detailed and 

more robustly corroborated. And his information stood 

alongside ample additional evidence from the ATF’s investigation. Considering the warrant application as a whole, the 

omission of facts bearing negatively on Smith’s credibility 

was not fatal to the magistrate’s probable-cause finding.

B. Other-Acts Evidence Under Rules 404(b) and 403

Bradford also challenges the admission of evidence of the 

four violent incidents we’ve described above. He argues that 

this evidence should have been excluded as impermissible 

character evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence or alternatively under Rule 403 because the risk of 

unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative 

value.

The parties first debate whether we should consider this

issue at all, as well as the appropriate standard of review. 

The government argues that the judge’s ruling on Bradford’s 

motion in limine simply postponed the decision on admissibility until trial, so Bradford either forfeited or strategically 

waived the issue by not reasserting his objection at trial. 

Accordingly, the government asks us to review for plain 

error or decline to review the issue altogether. See United 

States v. Ridley, 826 F.3d 437, 442, 443 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Bradford urges us to review for abuse of discretion, insisting 

that he preserved his objection by raising it in a motion in 

limine.
No. 17-1080 13

The Rules of Evidence provide that “[o]nce the court 

rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a 

party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” FED. R. EVID. 103(b). A 

“definitive ruling” is one that “definitively settle[s] the issue 

of admissibility.” United States v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 927 (7th

Cir. 2002). But Rule 103 also states that objections to the 

admission of evidence must be made with specificity. See FED.

R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Gulley, 722 F.3d 

901, 906 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a generalized motion 

in limine is insufficient to preserve a Rule 404(b) objection 

for review).

Bradford’s motion in limine did not satisfy Rule 103(a)’s 

specificity requirement. It did not identify the specific evidence he feared would be admitted or explain why it was 

inadmissible. On appeal he relies on Rules 404(b) and 403, 

but his motion in limine mentioned neither rule. The government’s response listed the four incidents we’ve described 

above and characterized these episodes as direct evidence of 

the charged crimes insofar as they showed how Bradford ran 

his drug business.

Based on these submissions, it’s no wonder the judge’s 

ruling was equivocal. The order appears to simultaneously 

accept the government’s argument and punt the whole issue 

over to trial. It concludes: “[T]o the extent that Bradford’s 

motion goes to relevant evidence directly related to the 

charges ... , it is DENIED. However, to the extent that the 

evidence goes to conduct that is not relevant to the charges ... , it is GRANTED.” That’s not a definitive ruling. So 

Bradford had to lodge a timely and specific objection at trial
14 No. 17-1080

to preserve the issue for appeal. He did not do so. His arguments under Rules 404(b) and 403 are entirely new.

That means our review is constrained by the plain-error 

standard, which is a difficult hurdle for a challenger to clear.

Reversal is unwarranted unless Bradford can establish a

“clear or obvious” error that affected his substantial rights. 

United States v. Swan, 486 F.3d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 2007). Even 

then, we will not “exercise our discretion to correct the error 

unless it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Bradford has not carried this burden.

Rule 404(b) bars the admission of “[e]vidence of a crime, 

wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). The 

government contends that the testimony regarding the four 

violent episodes was direct evidence of the charged drug 

conspiracy and firearms crimes, taking it outside the ambit 

of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 717 

(7th Cir. 2010).

Evidence that “tend[s] to prove the elements of the offense” does not violate Rule 404(b). United States v. Vargas, 

689 F.3d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 2012); Gorman, 613 F.3d at 717. 

More to the point here, “evidence directly pertaining to the 

defendant’s role in a charged conspiracy” falls outside the 

scope of Rule 404(b). United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407, 414 

(7th Cir. 2010). To win a conviction on the conspiracy count, 

the government had to prove that Bradford “knowingly and 

intentionally” joined an agreement to distribute drugs.

United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). To

convict him of possessing a firearm in furtherance of that 
No. 17-1080 15

conspiracy, the government had to prove that the firearms 

listed in the indictment did indeed “further, advance, move 

forward, promote or facilitate the drug-trafficking crime ...

by providing the dealer, his stash, or his territory with 

protection.” United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 

2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 

As we’ve explained, the government introduced testimony that Bradford loaned a Mossberg rifle to Raphael Harris, 

one of his distributors, with instructions that he shoot up the 

apartment of a woman whose boyfriend had threatened him.

The Mossberg is listed in the indictment among the firearms 

that Bradford possessed in furtherance of the drugdistribution conspiracy. It’s also listed in the felon-inpossession count. So the testimony about Bradford’s transfer 

of this particular firearm was properly before the jury on 

these counts. It was also properly before the jury as direct 

evidence of the charged conspiracy—though not because it 

demonstrates how Bradford conducted his drug business, as 

the government (primarily) argues. The notion that othercrimes evidence is always admissible to prove how the 

defendant ran his criminal enterprise is unsound.

A narrower justification for introducing this evidence is 

that a drug-distribution conspiracy requires more than a 

mere buyer-seller relationship; it requires evidence of a 

shared stake in the illegal venture—for example, the “provision of tools to advance the distribution.” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 

813. Evidence that Bradford gave Harris the Mossberg rifle

to use in a show of force to preserve authority in his assigned drug territory is just this sort of direct evidence of a

conspiracy. 
16 No. 17-1080

A similar rationale might also cover Bradford’s retaliation 

against D-Bow for stealing marijuana from him. Here again, 

evidence that Bradford and Harris used intimidation and 

violence to protect their drug-trafficking enterprise from 

perceived threats tends to prove that they participated in a

conspiracy. See United States v. Love, 706 F.3d 832, 838 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (finding sufficient evidence of a drug-distribution 

conspiracy in part because the defendant and his coconspirators beat up an individual who the defendant suspected of 

robbing his crack house); United States v. James, 540 F.3d 702, 

707 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that the defendant “protected the [drug ring’s] territory through violence” as evidence of the defendant’s participation in a drug-distribution 

conspiracy).

The third episode is a closer call. Bradford had a fallingout with one of his suppliers and solicited Smith to steal her 

car, knowing that she stored drugs and cash in it. Perhaps it 

could be inferred that Bradford would distribute the stolen 

drugs or that he plotted against his supplier to intimidate a 

would-be rival in order to protect his own drug trade. See, 

e.g., United States v. Stephenson, 53 F.3d 836, 844–45 (7th Cir. 

1995) (involving evidence of the defendants’ attempt to steal 

drugs with plans to distribute the stolen product); United 

States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 367–68 (5th Cir. 2013) (involving 

evidence that the defendant robbed rival drug dealers to 

maintain a monopoly over the drug trade). The government’s brief touches on these purposes to justify its introduction of this evidence, but the argument is not developed.

In the fourth and final incident, Bradford gave a firearm 

to a coconspirator nicknamed Boo Man and told him to 

shoot up a house where the two had been robbed as they 
No. 17-1080 17

were purchasing firearms. This episode is comparable to the 

retaliation against D-Bow, though only loosely so.

Our point in tracing these plausible alternative justifications relates to the plain-error standard of review. It’s far 

from “clear or obvious” that admitting this evidence violated

Rule 404(b). And even if it was error, Bradford has not 

demonstrated that admitting this evidence violated his 

substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness and 

integrity of his trial.

As a fallback, Bradford argues that the evidence should 

have been kept out under Rule 403’s balancing test, which 

permits exclusion of “relevant evidence if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.” This argument requires only brief comment. Bradford 

insists that the probative value of this evidence was diminished because he did not “actively dispute” that he possessed firearms. The premise of this argument is correct: an

important consideration in Rule 403 balancing is the extent 

to which the defendant actually contests the fact that the 

evidence tends to prove. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 

857 (7th Cir. 2014). “[I]f a defendant offers to concede or 

stipulate to the fact for which the evidence is offered, additional evidence may have little probative value.” Id. But 

Bradford never offered to stipulate that he possessed the 

firearms listed in the indictment. As a more general matter, 

because Rule 403 is a balancing test, it’s hard to show plain

error. We see no such error here.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Crack Conspiracy

Finally, Bradford insists that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. This argu-
18 No. 17-1080

ment requires little comment. It should be clear from our 

description of the trial evidence that the government proved 

Bradford’s participation in an ongoing crack-distribution 

conspiracy, not just two isolated crack-cocaine transactions. 

And even if Bradford is right that the evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement to distribute crack, the conspiracy conviction would still stand. Bradford was charged with 

conspiracy to distribute both crack cocaine and marijuana. He 

does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

his participation in a marijuana-distribution conspiracy.

AFFIRMED.