Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 23, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00565-CR 

NO. 14-14-00566-CR

CAMILE ERMINE STANLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 1384147 & 1384148

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Camile Ermine Stanley challenges two convictions for 

intoxication manslaughter, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

trial court’s deadly-weapon finding and that the trial court erred in failing to make 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After drinking two alcoholic beverages, appellant drove her car the wrong 

way on a freeway. She crashed, head-on, into another car whose occupants were a 

young couple engaged to be married—complainants Emily Preston, the driver, and 

Kevin McDougall, the passenger. Almost immediately after the first collision, a 

third driver also hit the young couple’s car. Fire consumed the twice-hit vehicle. 

Both Emily and Kevin died at the scene. 

Appellant pleaded guilty without an agreed punishment recommendation 

from the State, to two counts of intoxication manslaughter. Appellant confessed to 

the truth of the allegation that she used her vehicle as a deadly weapon during the 

commission of the offense. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty pleas. At 

the punishment hearing, the trial court assessed punishment at twelve years’ 

confinement for each offense, the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court 

also made a deadly-weapon finding in each judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Did the evidence support the deadly-weapon finding?

In appellant’s first two issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the deadly-weapon finding. Article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure requires the State to offer sufficient evidence to support any judgment 

based on a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a felony case tried to the court. Tex. 

Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 1.15 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.); Ex Parte 

Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The State must 

“introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said 

evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no 

event shall a person charged be convicted without sufficient evidence to support 

the same.” Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 1.15.
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A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, including challenges to 

the sufficiency of the evidence. Ex Parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 682; Keller v. 

State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d). 

By pleading guilty, appellant has waived the right to challenge the legal sufficiency 

of the evidence1 to sustain her conviction. On appeal from judgments based on 

felony guilty pleas to the court, our “sufficiency” review is limited to determining 

whether sufficient evidence supports the judgments of guilt under article 1.15. See

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 1.15; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605.

Appellant pleaded guilty to the last paragraph of the indictment. In addition, 

appellant confessed to the truth of the allegation that she used her vehicle as a 

deadly weapon during the commission of the offenses. Appellant read and signed 

a “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial 

Confession” that contained the following statement: “I understand the above 

allegations and I confess that they are true and that the acts alleged above were 

committed on April 14, 2013.” The record establishes that appellant freely, 

intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily confessed to using a deadly weapon 

during the commission of the offenses. A presumption of truthfulness and 

regularity applies to documents filed in the trial court. Breazeale v. State, 683 

S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Valdez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 778, 783 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.). Appellant’s judicial confessions

are sufficient evidence to show she used a deadly weapon, and the record need not 

otherwise provide proof. Cf. Knight v. State, 481 S.W.2d 143, 143 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1972); Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605. Appellant’s first and second issues are

 1 Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence and the factual sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting the deadly-weapon findings in two separate issues. Even if the legalsufficiency standard applied, there would be no separate factual-sufficiency review. See Temple 

v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
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overruled.

B. Did the trial court err in failing to make findings of facts and 

conclusions of law?

In her third issue, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to make 

findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its deadly-weapon findings, 

despite appellant’s timely request that the trial court do so.

2 Appellant cites no

authority, and research has revealed no cases, holding that a trial court is required 

to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding a deadly-weapon finding

following a plea of guilty to an indictment containing a deadly-weapon allegation. 

Instead, appellant points to the rule that a trial court, upon request, must make 

findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its ruling on a motion to 

suppress and argues that rule should be applied when the trial court makes a 

deadly-weapon finding. See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006). We conclude that a deadly-weapon finding following a felony guilty 

plea to the court is not a context analogous to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence. Cf. Mattias v. State, 731 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1987) (holding a trial court is not obliged to make findings of fact and conclusions 

of law when the trial court sits as trier of fact in a criminal case). We decline 

appellant’s invitation to create new law requiring trial courts to issue findings of 

fact and conclusions of law regarding deadly-weapon findings made following an 

appellant’s guilty plea to the court in a felony case. The trial court did not err in 

failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id. Appellant’s third 

issue is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

Appellant’s guilty pleas provided sufficient evidence that she used her 

 2 Appellant does not assert that her guilty pleas were involuntary.
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vehicle as a deadly weapon. The trial court did not err in failing to make findings 

of fact and conclusions of law regarding the deadly-weapon findings. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Busby.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).