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Filed 7/21/15 Lee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

QER LEE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

C073948

(Super. Ct. No. 

34200900035502CUPAGDS)

This products liability case arose out of a bus crash in 2008. The bus at issue was 

manufactured for defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) in 1993 according to 

specifications Greyhound provided. Although Greyhound did not own, operate, or 

otherwise control the bus after August 2005, plaintiffs sued Greyhound for the injuries 

and deaths resulting from the crash, claiming the bus was defective because it lacked 

passenger seat belts, other appropriate safety restraints in the passenger seats, and 

appropriate warnings. 
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Greyhound successfully moved for summary judgment, but Greyhound’s motion 

addressed only the lack of passenger seat belts; it did not address the lack of other 

passenger safety restraints or the lack of adequate warnings. On appeal, plaintiffs 

contend (among other things) that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 

because Greyhound failed to show that all of plaintiffs’ theories as to why the bus was 

defective lacked merit. We agree and will therefore reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed: The bus (or motorcoach) that is the subject of 

this action was a 1993 model MC-12 manufactured for Greyhound by Motor Coach 

Industries pursuant to a document known as the 1993 coach purchase agreement, which 

incorporated specifications Greyhound provided. At the time the bus was manufactured, 

neither Motor Coach Industries nor any other manufacturer of motorcoaches for sale in 

North America offered passenger seat belts as standard or optional equipment because 

design standards for the installation of such belts had yet to be developed. 

In December 1993, a year after purchasing the bus from Motor Coach Industries, 

Greyhound sold the bus to Nationsbanc Lease Investments (Nationsbanc). Greyhound 

then leased the bus back from Nationsbanc and operated the bus as part of its intercity 

fleet until August 2005. At that time, Greyhound returned the bus under the terms of the 

lease, and thereafter Greyhound did not own, operate, or otherwise control the bus. At no 

time during the period Greyhound controlled the bus from 1993 through 2005 did Motor 

Coach Industries or any other recognized source offer the installation of retrofit passenger 

seat belts because design standards for the installation of passenger seat belts had yet to 

be developed. 

In October 2008, the bus crashed in Colusa County, killing 11 passengers and 

injuring 29. At the time, the bus was being operated by Cobb’s Bus Service. The 

plaintiffs in this action are the passengers who were injured, the surviving heirs of the 

passengers who were killed, and three spouses of passengers who were injured.
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Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, filed in January 2012, contains causes of 

action for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, breach of express 

warranty, loss of consortium, wrongful death, and survival. In their general allegations, 

plaintiffs alleged that Greyhound “had the Motor Coach built to its specifications and 

participated in the planning, analysis, design, fabricating, manufacturing, testing, 

inspection, advertising, promotion, distribution and selling of the vehicle.” Plaintiffs 

further alleged that their “injuries and damages . . . were proximately caused by the 

absence of seatbelts or other appropriate safety restraints in the Motor Coach’s passenger 

seats, the absence of appropriate warnings, and the other wrongful conduct, acts and 

omissions alleged herein.” 

In their negligence cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that “[d]efendants so 

negligently and carelessly planned, analyzed, designed, tested, manufactured, fabricated, 

assembled, tested, inspected, labeled, marketed, promoted, advertised, distributed, 

merchandized, recommended, certified, sold, leased or otherwise furnished the Motor 

Coach . . . without passenger seatbelts being installed and without appropriate warnings 

or instructions that the Motor Coach was . . . a defective and dangerous product.” In their 

strict liability cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that “the Motor Coach was . . . unsafe for 

its intended use by reasons of defects in its design, manufacture, fabrication, assembly, 

testing or lack of testing, inspection or lack of inspection, labeling or lack of labeling, and 

warnings or failures to warn. Specifically and particularly, the Motor Coach lacked 

passenger safety belts or other passive restraint systems, and as a proximate result the 

Motor Coach while being used normally and in the intended fashion failed to protect 

against, and allowed, fatal and other injuries to the passengers. The Motor Coach was 

defective in that it lacked any form of a passenger restraint system, including seatbelts.” 

In September 2012, Greyhound moved for summary judgment or summary 

adjudication of all seven causes of action. In its notice of motion, Greyhound asserted 

that the cause of action for negligence had no merit for the following reasons:
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(1) Greyhound “did not own, operate, or otherwise control the subject motorcoach 

at any time after August 9, 2005 and therefore had no duty arising out of any alleged 

ownership, operation, or control at the time of the subject accident.”

(2) Greyhound “had no control over [Motor Coach Industries’] internal decision 

whether to offer passenger seat belts on its motorcoaches and therefore had no ability nor 

any duty arising out of such control.”

(3) “[N]o manufacturer of motorcoaches for sale in North America in 1993 offered 

passenger seat belts as standard or optional equipment, and therefore [Greyhound] had no 

ability nor any duty to install or direct [Motor Coach Industries] to install passenger seat 

belts on the subject motorcoach at the time of manufacture.”

(4) “ ‘[R]etrofit’ restraints were not available from [Motor Coach Industries] or 

any other source at any time from 1993 through 2005 and therefore [Greyhound] had no 

ability nor any duty to retrofit or direct the retrofit of the subject motorcoach with 

passenger seat belts while the subject motorcoach was under its control.” 

As for the cause of action for strict liability, Greyhound asserted it had no merit 

“because [Greyhound] was not a part of the marketing enterprise for the subject 

motorcoach.” Greyhound asserted the warranty causes of action had no merit because 

plaintiffs had expressly abandoned those causes of action and asserted the remaining 

causes of action for loss of consortium, wrongful death, and survival had no merit 

because they were wholly derivative of the first four causes of action.

At the hearing on the motion, plaintiffs argued (among other things) that 

Greyhound’s motion did not address their theory that the bus was defective because it 

lacked “a passive restraint system.” Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary 

adjudication on all seven causes of action and summary judgment to Greyhound in 

February 2013. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and in their reply argued that 

Greyhound’s summary judgment motion had not addressed “the failure to warn theory or 

the passive passenger restraint hypothesis.” The trial court denied the new trial motion, 
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asserting that what was “[a]t issue was whether Greyhound should have installed seat 

belts for the passengers in the bus.” 

In April 2013, on the same day the trial court denied their new trial motion, 

plaintiffs appealed from the order granting summary judgment and from the judgment, 

even though no judgment had yet been entered.1 In August 2014, the court finally 

entered judgment in favor of Greyhound and plaintiffs timely appealed from that 

judgment.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs offer numerous arguments as to why the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Greyhound. We find the first argument -- that 

Greyhound failed to show that all of plaintiffs’ theories of liability lacked merit --

dispositive, and therefore we need not address plaintiffs’ remaining arguments.

As relevant here, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleged that Greyhound 

“had the Motor Coach built to its specifications and participated in the planning, analysis, 

design, fabricating, manufacturing, testing, inspection, advertising, promotion, 

distribution and selling of the vehicle.” Plaintiffs further alleged that their “injuries and 

damages . . . were proximately caused by the absence of seatbelts or other appropriate 

safety restraints in the Motor Coach’s passenger seats, the absence of appropriate 

warnings, and the other wrongful conduct, acts and omissions alleged herein.” In their 

negligence cause of action in particular, plaintiffs alleged that “[d]efendants so 

negligently and carelessly planned, analyzed, designed, tested, manufactured, fabricated, 

assembled, tested, inspected, labeled, marketed, promoted, advertised, distributed, 

 

1 On the same day the trial court denied the new trial motion and plaintiffs filed 

their notice of appeal, Greyhound served a notice of entry of judgment, asserting that 

judgment was entered in February 2013. The document Greyhound called the judgment, 

however, was merely the order granting the summary judgment motion. 
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merchandized, recommended, certified, sold, leased or otherwise furnished the Motor 

Coach . . . without passenger seatbelts being installed and without appropriate warnings 

or instructions that the Motor Coach was . . . a defective and dangerous product.” In their 

strict liability cause of action, they alleged that “the Motor Coach was . . . unsafe for its 

intended use by reasons of defects in its design, manufacture, fabrication, assembly, 

testing or lack of testing, inspection or lack of inspection, labeling or lack of labeling, and 

warnings or failures to warn. Specifically and particularly, the Motor Coach lacked 

passenger safety belts or other passive restraint systems, and as a proximate result the 

Motor Coach while being used normally and in the intended fashion failed to protect 

against, and allowed, fatal and other injuries to the passengers. The Motor Coach was 

defective in that it lacked any form of a passenger restraint system, including seatbelts.” 

Based on these allegations, plaintiffs contend their causes of action “for strict and 

negligent product liability w[ere] predicated on four main factual theories. First, that the 

Greyhound bus was defective as designed and manufactured because it lacked seat belts; 

second, that the bus was defectively designed because it lacked passive passenger 

restraints (ie. [sic] air bags and safety handles); and third, the bus lacked safety warnings 

that would have warned passengers before they got on the bus of the absence of safety 

equipment on the bus. . . . Fourth, [plaintiffs] alleged that [Greyhound] was separately 

liable under strict product liability theory for placing the defective product into the stream 

of commerce.” According to plaintiffs, however, Greyhound’s motion “attacked [only 

their] absence of seat belt theory and their stream of commerce theory. What 

[Greyhound] did not do was specifically address [their] other two theories of liability, to 

wit, that [Greyhound] was liable because the motorcoach lacked passive passenger safety 

restraints (ie. [sic] air bags or safety handle bars) and that the bus lacked safety warnings 

that the motorcoach was not equipped with any of these crash worthiness safety features.” 

In plaintiffs’ view, this omission was fatal to Greyhound’s motion because a defendant is 
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not entitled to summary judgment unless the defendant shows that all of the plaintiff’s 

legal theories are without merit. 

Plaintiffs are correct. “We review summary judgment appeals by applying the 

same three-step analysis applied by the trial court: First, we identify the issues raised by 

the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the movant established entitlement to 

summary judgment, that is, whether the movant showed the opponent could not prevail 

on any theory raised by the pleadings. Third, if the movant has met its burden, we 

consider whether the opposition raised triable issues of fact. We review these matters de 

novo.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

We begin with the issues raised by the pleadings. We agree with plaintiffs that, 

when liberally construed, the allegations of their second amended complaint can be 

reasonably read to assert that Greyhound was liable, either in negligence or in strict 

liability, because the bus did not have (1) passenger seat belts, (2) any “other appropriate 

safety restraints in [its] passenger seats,” or (3) appropriate warnings.2 (See Rosencrans 

v. Dover Images, Ltd. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1088 [“[w]hen reviewing a grant of 

a motion for summary judgment, we must resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the 

plaintiffs when looking at the complaint”].) Thus, the question is whether Greyhound 

showed that plaintiffs could not prevail on any of these theories of liability. We agree 

with plaintiffs that Greyhound did not make that showing.

In its motion, Greyhound asserted that plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligence 

had no merit for the following reasons:

 

2 The negligence cause of action does not specifically mention other safety 

restraints, but the general allegations do, and those general allegations were incorporated 

by reference in the negligence cause of action.
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(1) Greyhound “did not own, operate, or otherwise control the subject motorcoach 

at any time after August 9, 2005 and therefore had no duty arising out of any alleged 

ownership, operation, or control at the time of the subject accident.”

(2) Greyhound “had no control over [Motor Coach Industries’] internal decision 

whether to offer passenger seat belts on its motorcoaches and therefore had no ability nor 

any duty arising out of such control.”

(3) “[N]o manufacturer of motorcoaches for sale in North America in 1993 offered 

passenger seat belts as standard or optional equipment, and therefore [Greyhound] had no 

ability nor any duty to install or direct [Motor Coach Industries] to install passenger seat 

belts on the subject motorcoach at the time of manufacture.”

(4) “ ‘[R]etrofit’ restraints were not available from [Motor Coach Industries] or 

any other source at any time from 1993 through 2005 and therefore [Greyhound] had no 

ability nor any duty to retrofit or direct the retrofit of the subject motorcoach with 

passenger seat belts while the subject motorcoach was under its control.” 

As for plaintiffs’ cause of action for strict liability, Greyhound asserted it had no 

merit “because [Greyhound] was not a part of the marketing enterprise for the subject 

motorcoach.” 

In support of its motion for summary judgment on these grounds, Greyhound 

offered the following relevant undisputed facts: The bus was a 1993 model MC-12 

manufactured by Motor Coach Industries and sold to Greyhound pursuant to the 1993 

coach purchase agreement in December 1992. In 1993, neither Motor Coach Industries 

nor any other manufacturer of motorcoaches for sale in North America offered passenger 

seat belts as standard or optional equipment because design standards for the installation 

of such belts had yet to be developed. 

A year after buying the bus from Motor Coach Industries, Greyhound sold the bus 

to Nationsbanc Lease Investments in December 1993. Greyhound then leased the bus 

back from Nationsbanc and operated the bus as part of its intercity fleet until August 
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2005. At that time, Greyhound returned the bus under the terms of the lease, and 

thereafter Greyhound did not own, operate, or otherwise control the bus. At no time 

during the period Greyhound controlled the bus from 1993 through 2005 did Motor 

Coach Industries or any other recognized source offer the installation of retrofit passenger 

seat belts because design standards for the installation of passenger seat belts had yet to 

be developed. 

It is readily apparent from examination of the grounds Greyhound asserted for 

summary judgment and the facts Greyhound offered in support of its motion for summary 

judgment that Greyhound failed to address two theories of liability advanced in plaintiffs’ 

second amended complaint: specifically, the theory of Greyhound’s liability predicated 

on the lack of appropriate safety restraints other than passenger seat belts and the theory 

of liability predicated on the lack of appropriate warnings. Essentially, Greyhound’s 

motion rested on the fact that in 1993, when the bus was manufactured, neither Motor 

Coach Industries nor any other manufacturer of motorcoaches for sale in North America 

offered passenger seat belts as standard or optional equipment, and the fact that from 

1993 through 2005, when Greyhound controlled the bus, neither Motor Coach Industries 

nor any other recognized source offered the installation of retrofit passenger seat belts. In 

other words, Greyhound asserted -- and offered evidence to establish -- that the bus was 

not defective because Greyhound could not have provided passenger seat belts on the bus

at the time of its manufacture or at any time Greyhound was in control of the bus. In 

making this showing, however, Greyhound failed to address plaintiffs’ theory that the bus 

was defective because it lacked other appropriate passenger safety devices and the theory 

that the bus was defective because it lacked appropriate warnings of the lack of any 

passenger safety devices. By failing to address these two alternate theories of liability in 

its motion, Greyhound failed to carry its burden of showing that plaintiffs could not 

prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.
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On appeal, Greyhound offers several arguments on this subject, but none of them

is persuasive. First, Greyhound asserts that plaintiffs’ argument regarding types of 

passenger restraints other than seat belts is “new” because the second amended complaint 

“does not mention grip bars or airbags; the only safety restraint mentioned is seatbelts.” 

In effect, Greyhound asserts that its potential liability for failing to equip the bus with 

passenger safety restraints other than seat belts was not an issue raised by the pleadings 

and therefore was not an issue Greyhound was required to address in its summary 

judgment motion. This argument is not persuasive, however, because, as we have 

concluded already, the second amended complaint, liberally construed, does allege 

liability based on “the absence of . . . other appropriate safety restraints” and does assert 

that the bus was defective because “it lacked any form of passenger restraint system, 

including seatbelts.” (Italics added.) The failure to specifically mention grip bars or 

airbags, either in the complaint itself, or subsequently in answers to interrogatories,3is 

not fatal given that plaintiffs predicated their assertion of liability in their complaint more 

broadly on the lack of any appropriate passenger safety device, be it a seat belt or some 

other device.

Next, Greyhound asserts that “[t]his issue has been forfeited” because plaintiffs 

“did not raise this issue in their opposition to [Greyhound’s] motion, and proffered no 

evidence at all about these design features.” (Underlining omitted.) We disagree. To the 

extent Greyhound relies on the principal that “[i]ssues not pursued in the trial court 

generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,” that principal is inapposite 

 

3 Greyhound complains that plaintiffs did not mention grip bars or airbags in their 

answer to an interrogatory that sought the factual basis for plaintiffs’ allegation that 

Greyhound was negligent. Much like in their complaint, however, in that interrogatory 

answer plaintiffs asserted that Greyhound “knew the dangers posed to passengers in using 

the subject bus without passenger restraint devices” and that Greyhound “knew or should 

have known, of recommendations by governmental entities that busses should have 

passenger restraint devices available for passengers.” (Italics added.)
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because, as Greyhound itself acknowledges, plaintiffs did raise this issue in the trial court 

-- specifically, at the hearing on Greyhound’s motion. Plaintiffs also raised this issue in 

arguing their motion for a new trial. 

To the extent Greyhound contends plaintiffs had an obligation to raise the issue 

earlier, in their opposition papers to the motion for summary judgment, Greyhound offers 

no authority to support that contention. Moreover, Greyhound’s more specific

contention that plaintiffs were obligated to proffer evidence regarding “grip bars and 

airbags” in opposition to Greyhound’s motion evidences a fundamental misunderstanding 

of the summary judgment process. As we have explained, it was Greyhound’s burden, as 

the moving party, to show that plaintiffs “could not prevail on any theory raised by the 

pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939-940.) Until

Greyhound carried that burden, the burden never shifted to plaintiffs to produce any 

evidence at all, and plaintiffs cannot be faulted for failing to do so. (See ibid.)

Because Greyhound’s summary judgment motion addressed only the bus’s lack of 

passenger seat belts and did not address its lack of other passenger safety devices or its 

lack of appropriate warnings, Greyhound failed to carry its initial burden on summary 

judgment of showing that all of plaintiffs’ theories as to why the bus was defective were 

without merit. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and erred 

in granting summary adjudication on plaintiffs’ causes of action for negligence and strict 

liability, as well as the three derivative causes of action (loss of consortium, wrongful 

death, and survival). The trial court did not err, however, in granting summary 

adjudication on plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of implied and express warranties

because plaintiffs expressly conceded that they were no longer pursuing those causes of 

action. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with 

directions: (1) to vacate its order granting summary judgment and summary adjudication 
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as to all causes of action; and (2) to enter a new order denying summary judgment and 

summary adjudication of the causes of action for negligence, strict liability, loss of 

consortium, wrongful death, and survival, but granting summary adjudication of the 

causes of action for breach of implied warranty and breach of express warranty. 

Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

 ROBIE , J.

We concur:

 NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.

 MURRAY , J.