J-S22027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM M. DANIELS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1226 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at Nos: CP-02-CR-0002083-1997, 

CP-02-CR-0002235-1996, CP-02-CR-0016251-1995

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: October 17, 2023

Appellant, William M. Daniels, appeals pro se from the order entered 

October 11, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, denying 

as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the relevant background of the instant 

appeal as follows.

[Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition on March 17, 2022[,]

arising out his judgment of sentence of life in prison entered on 

November 23, 1998. On . . . July 20, 2022[,] an order was 

entered notifying [Appellant] of the [PCRA court]’s intent to 

dismiss his PCRA Petition without a hearing. On August 15, 

2022[,] Appellant filed objections to the Notice of Intent to 

Dismiss. On October 11, 2022[,] an order was entered dismissing 

the PCRA Petition. On October 13, 2022[,] [Appellant] filed a 
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Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court.[1] On October 27, 2022[,] 

an order was entered directing [Appellant] to file a Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. [Appellant] filed 

his Concise Statement on November 7, 2022. The Concise 

Statement consists of six pages and 17 subparagraphs of alleged 

errors related to [newly] discovered evidence or unknown facts. 

[Appellant]’s Concise Statement alleges that it was error to 

dismiss his petition without a hearing as untimely because he 

established an exception to the one-year time limitation for filing 

a PCRA petition pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)[ii]. 

[Appellant] alleges that certain new measurements at the crime 

scene as described in a March 1, 2022 report of Rodney Troupe of 

Finley Consulting & Investigations, a private investigator hired by 

[Appellant], were previously unknown facts that he could not have 

ascertained with the exercise of due diligence and, therefore, his 

petition was timely filed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, 1- 2 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, 

[w]e review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 

2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and 

the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s 

ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any 

grounds if the record supports it. Id. We grant great deference 

to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011); 

Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007). 

Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard 

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1 Appellant filed three notices of appeal, one on each docket, listing all three 

dockets on each notice of appeal. Appellant, therefore, has substantially 

complied with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 

(Pa. 2018). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (en banc).
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of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,”

2 unless an 

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).3 “The PCRA’s 

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is 

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the 

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to 

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. (Frank) Chester, 895 

A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) 

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2

It is undisputed that the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely. 

Appellant was sentenced on November 23, 1998. On November 27, 2000, we 

affirmed the judgment of sentence. On June 22, 2001, our Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. If no petition for writ of 

certiorari is filed with the United States Supreme Court, like in the instant 

case, the judgment of sentence becomes final at the expiration of the 90-day 

period available to petition the United States Supreme Court. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA on September 

20, 2001. Appellant had one year to file a timely PCRA petition (i.e., 

September 20, 2002). The underlying petition was filed on March 17, 2022, 

which is more than 19 years after his conviction became final. Thus, the 

underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.

3 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and 

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of 

the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the 

date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
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(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 

(Pa. 2020)). As timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of 

Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this PCRA petition 

is timely filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). If 

it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the 

petition. Id.

On appeal, the thrust of Appellant’s claims for our review can be 

summarized as follows. Appellant first argues that the measurement 

inconsistencies noted in the Troupe report qualify as newly-discovered facts 

for purposes of the timeliness exception set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

9545(b)(1)(ii).4 Appellant next argues that the discovery of said 

inconsistencies also shows that the Commonwealth engaged in a Brady5

violation by failing to disclose to Appellant the true and correct measurements, 

which, in Appellant’s estimation, qualifies as governmental interference for 

purposes of the PCRA. Finally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in 

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4 At trial, Detective Canovari testified that the distance between the 

eyewitness (Tina Banks) and the location of the shooting (252 Alpine Avenue) 

was 413 feet. According to Private Investigator Troupe, the distance between 

Banks and the scene of the shooting was 510 feet and 5 inches.

5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady claim requires a 

petitioner to show that (1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence, (2) the 

evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant, and 

(3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth 

v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 244 (Pa. 2006). As explained below, the merits of 

Appellant’s Brady claim are not at issue here, only its timeliness.
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not holding a hearing on his petition. We will address the above claims ad 

seriatim.

The newly-discovered fact exception requires a petitioner to plead and 

prove two components: (1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated 

were unknown, and (2) these unknown facts could not have been ascertained 

by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 

618, 638 (Pa. 2017). Due diligence does not require “perfect vigilance nor 

punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, 

based on the particular circumstances to uncover facts that may support a 

claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558 

(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As such, “the due diligence inquiry is 

fact-sensitive and dependent upon the circumstances presented.” Id.

(citation omitted). “A petitioner must explain why he could not have obtained 

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth 

v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010).

As aptly noted by the PCRA court, Appellant cannot meet the 

requirements of the newly-discovered facts exception. The PCRA court found, 

and we agree, that Appellant 

has made absolutely no showing as to how or why the distance 

between [the location of the eyewitness and scene of the 

shooting] is a fact that could not have been discovered by the 

exercise of due diligence. There are no allegations that the 

location of Tina Banks was unknown; that the location of 252 

Avenue was unknown; that the location of the garage door frame 

where the bullets were removed was unknown; or that any of 
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these locations changed or moved between the time of shooting 

in 1994 and 2021 when Troupe made his measurements. 

[Appellant] argues that Troupe’s measurements indicate that the 

witnesses were not 413 feet away from the scene, but 501 feet 

and 5 inches away. However, there is nothing to support the 

contention that this fact could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence and presented at the time of trial, or at 

any time in the intervening years. It was not information that was 

exclusively within the possession or control of the Commonwealth 

or prosecutor. . . . In this case, the issue of ability of the witnesses 

to observe the scene at night, the perspective of the witnesses 

and the distance of the witnesses from the scene were all issues 

raised at the time of trial and throughout [Appellant]’s various 

PCRA petitions.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/17/23, at 7-8 (footnote omitted).

Because Appellant failed to explain why he could not have learned of 

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence, we conclude that 

Appellant failed to prove the applicability of the newly-discovered facts 

exception. 

Similarly, Appellant fails to meet the governmental interference 

exception. “Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental 

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to 

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government 

officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the 

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 

1268 (Pa. 2008). In other words, a petitioner is required to show that but for 

the interference of a government actor “he could not have filed his claim 

earlier.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). Here, 
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Appellant failed to explain (i) how the Commonwealth prevented him from 

raising the claim earlier, and (ii) why he could not have obtained the 

information about the Commonwealth’s alleged misconduct earlier with the 

exercise of due diligence. Appellant, therefore, failed to prove that his Brady

claims meets the governmental interference exception. 

Because Appellant failed to prove either the newly-discovered facts or 

the governmental interference exception, the PCRA court did not err in not

holding a hearing on Appellant’s petition. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 

947 A.2d 714, 723 (Pa. 2008) (defendant was not entitled to evidentiary 

hearing on petition for post-conviction relief that was untimely filed, and which 

did not establish any statutory exception to one-year limitations period for 

filing petition). 

Because the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely, and because

Appellant failed to prove the applicability of any exception to the PCRA time 

bar, we affirm the order of the PCRA court denying as untimely the underlying 

petition.

Order affirmed.
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10/17/2023