IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00030-CR

DARRYL DEWAYNE WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 19th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-750-C1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The jury convicted Darryl Dewayne Williams of delivery of a controlled substance, 

cocaine, in a drug free zone. The jury found the enhancement paragraphs to be true and 

assessed punishment at confinement for life. We affirm.

Background Facts

There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Officer John Allovio, with 

the Waco Police Department, testified that he received information from a confidential 

informant that Williams was selling cocaine. Officer Allovio asked the confidential 
Williams v. State Page 2

informant to call Williams and arrange a purchase of cocaine. Officer Allovio and the 

confidential informant drove to Williams’s residence, and they each purchased cocaine 

from Williams. The residence was located within 1000 feet of a school. 

Jury Charge

In his first issue, Williams argues that the trial court erred in not supplementing 

the jury charge instruction on the effect of good conduct time. Article 37.07 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal procedure states: 

Sec. 4. (a) In the penalty phase of the trial of a felony case ... the court 

shall charge the jury in writing as follows:

"Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to 

a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration 

imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may 

award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, 

diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at 

rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may 

also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.

"It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant 

will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.

"Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced 

to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the 

actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, 

whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may 

earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than four years, he must 

serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole 

does not guarantee that parole will be granted.

"It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good 

conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on 

decisions made by prison and parole authorities.

"You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct 

time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct 
Williams v. State Page 3

time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are 

not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this 

particular defendant."

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.07 §4(a) (West Supp. 2014). The trial court instructed 

the jury as required by Article 37.07 §4(a). Williams’s trial counsel did not object to the 

charge.

Williams argues that the instruction improperly implies that a person may be 

released from prison early and without supervision solely due to accruing good conduct 

time. He contends that the trial court should have supplemented the instruction to avoid 

confusion.

We have previously decided this issue against Williams’s position, and we are not 

persuaded to reconsider our ruling. See Lopez v. State, No. 10-12-00282-CR, 2013 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 1229 (Tex.App. – Waco Feb. 7, 2013, pet. ref’d); Paez v. State, No. 10-12-00091-CR, 

2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 9121 (Tex. App. – Waco November 1, 2012, pet. ref’d); Mathews v. 

State, No. 10-12-00046-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS7480 at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 

2012, no pet. h.); Gaither v. State, No. 10-11-00129-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5252 at *3, 

(Tex. App.—Waco June 27, 2012, no pet. h.). We overrule the first issue.

In his second issue, Williams complains that the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury during the punishment phase of the trial not to consider “sympathy” in its 

deliberations. The trial court instructed the jury, “Do not let personal bias, prejudice, 

sympathy or resentment on your part, or any such personal emotion on your part, enter 

into your deliberations or affect your verdict in this case.” 
Williams v. State Page 4

Williams did not object to the jury charge on this basis. We have also previously 

decided this issue against Williams’s position, and we are not persuaded to reconsider 

our ruling. See Lopez v. State, No. 10-12-00282-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1229 (Tex.App. –

Waco Feb. 7, 2013, pet. ref’d); Paez v. State, No. 10-12-00091-CR, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 9121 

(Tex. App. – Waco November 1, 2012, pet. ref’d); Mathews v. State, No. 10-12-00046-CR, 

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS7480 at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2012, no pet. h.); Gaither v. 

State, No. 10-11-00129-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5252 at *4, (Tex. App.—Waco June 27, 

2012, no pet. h.). We overrule the second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 23, 2015

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