J-S60032-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ROBERT L. TAMBUR

v.

RONALD COLEMAN AND HUNLOCK 

INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC. 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 956 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 14, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2018-CV-0000514-JU

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2019

Ronald Coleman (Coleman)1 appeals an order of the Columbia County 

Court of Common Pleas (trial court) directing the public sale of a share of 

stock. Coleman argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an 

evidentiary hearing as to his ownership of that property. We affirm.

I.

It is undisputed that in April 2018, the plaintiff in the underlying action, 

Robert L. Tambur (Tambur) obtained a judgment from Coleman totaling 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Appellant, Hunlock Investment Company, Inc., was the garnishee with 

respect to the property subject to the trial court’s order.
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$161,007.80 in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Tambur 

immediately attempted to enforce that judgment by transferring it to the trial 

court and directing the Sheriff of that jurisdiction (Columbia County) to serve 

a writ of execution on Coleman. Importantly, the sheriff was directed to levy 

Coleman’s interest in shares of Hunlock Sand & Gravel, Inc.

At the time the writ was executed, Coleman had already stated in his 

answer to interrogatories that he owned the only existing share of stock in 

Hunlock Sand & Gravel, Inc. See Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s 

Interrogatories Addressed to Defendant, Ronald Colman, at ⁋⁋ 4-5. Coleman 

also stated in his answers to requests for production that all documents 

pertaining to his ownership interest in the corporation were destroyed in a 

fire. See Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of 

Documents Addressed to Defendant, Ronald Coleman, at ⁋⁋ 1-2.

After the Sheriff served a writ of execution on Coleman as to his share 

in the corporation, Coleman implicitly admitted ownership once again by 

claiming that the stock certificate could not be provided because it no longer 

physically existed. In response, Tambur petitioned the trial court to order the 

public sale of the share and to have a stock certificate substituted if necessary. 

See Tambur’s Petition to the Court for Sale of Securities, 3/1/2019, at 1-2.

After holding a brief hearing, the trial court denied Coleman’s request 

for additional proceedings to determine his ownership of the subject stock and 
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the propriety of substituting the destroyed stock certificate.

2

 The trial court

granted Tambur’s petition. Coleman timely appealed that order.3

In his brief, Coleman presents three related issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to take 

testimony regarding ownership of the stock in question?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to take 

testimony regarding the nexus between the judgment in 

question and proposed stock?

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to determine 

the relationship between the proposed stock and the judgment 

currently before the court?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.4

Tambur counters that Coleman admitted he owns the sole share in 

Hunlock Sand & Gravel, Inc., and that to the extent his ownership is unclear, 

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2 Coleman suggested the share in question could have been jointly owned by 

himself and other individuals, potentially leading to an objection to the levy 

by the other owners.

3 This Court has jurisdiction in the present under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2), which 

grants an appeal as of right from an order that confirms, modifies, or dissolves 

an attachment “affecting the possession or control of property[.]” The 

standard of review as to a ruling which affects a property interest through a 

sheriff’s sale is “a clear abuse of discretion.” See Fidelity Bank v. Pierson, 

264 A.2d 682, 683 (Pa. 1970).

4 The trial court did not order Coleman to file a statement of issues complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); nor did the trial court file an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Rule 1925(a) provides that the trial 

court must provide an opinion outlining the basis of an appealed order, but 

only if “if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record[.]” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Here, the record is sufficiently clear to make the basis for 

the order apparent.
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Coleman could have disputed it by interpleading the Columbia County Sheriff 

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 3202-3216. See Appellee’s Brief, at 5-8.

II.

The trial court did not commit an error of law or deprive Coleman of his 

due process rights with respect to his interest in Hunlock Sand & Gravel, Inc. 

Because Tambur indisputably obtained a judgment against Coleman, Tambur

had a right to enforce it with respect to that property.

The record establishes that Coleman repeatedly claimed sole ownership 

of the only share of stock in Hunlock Sand & Gravel, Inc., and nothing in the 

record indicates the contrary. Consistent with Coleman’s own responses to 

interrogatories and requests for production, no third party has claimed to have 

any interest in the corporation or otherwise disputed Coleman’s sole 

ownership. Coleman offered the trial court no basis to call his own previous 

assertions of ownership into question.5

Moreover, had Coleman or any other party wanted to dispute that 

Coleman solely owned the property now subject to levy, they could have done 

so by interpleading the Columbia County Sheriff. See 42 Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 3202-

3216. Coleman has taken no such action and neither has any other party. 

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5 To the extent that another party could purport to own some of the subject 

stock, Coleman would lack standing to assert a constitutional due process 

claim on their behalf. By the same token, if Coleman somehow has anything 

less than full ownership of the stock as presently ascribed to him, then the 

order on review would only be depriving Coleman of a property interest he 

has no right to.
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Thus, because both the judgment Tambur obtained against Coleman and 

Coleman’s interest in the stock were conclusively established, the trial court 

had no obligation to prolong the proceedings on Tambur’s petition as Coleman 

requested.

Order affirmed.

Judge Shogan joins the memorandum.

Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/26/2019