J-S32030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.X.O., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.A., MOTHER No. 66 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered December 11, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2014 AD 61

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.O., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.A., MOTHER No. 68 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered December 11, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2014 AD 61A

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2015

T.A. (“Mother”) appeals the decrees dated December 11, 2014, and 

entered on December 12, 2014, that granted the petitions filed by the Blair 

County Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF,” “BCCYF,” or the “Agency”), 

seeking to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to M.X.O., a male born 

in March 2006, and A.M.O., a female born in December 2007, (collectively, 

the “Children”), pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.

 

1

In the same decrees, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental 

rights of the Children’s father, T.O. (“Father”). Father has not filed a notice 
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The trial court adequately and accurately set forth the factual 

background and procedural history of this appeal in its opinion entered on 

January 27, 2015, which we incorporate herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/27/15, at 1-13. The trial court stated that, on September 25, 2104, after 

the 48-month permanency/dispositional review/goal change hearing held on 

September 22, 2014, the court entered a permanency review order changing 

the permanency goal for the Children to adoption pursuant to section 

6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). Id. at 12.

On October 28, 2014, CYF filed petitions for the involuntary 

termination of the parental rights of both Mother and Father with regard to 

both of the Children. On December 4, 2014, the trial court held a hearing 

with regard to CYF’s Motion for 51st Month Interim Permanency/Dispositional 

Review Hearing, which was combined with the involuntary termination 

proceedings. At the time of the hearing, A.M.O. was living in South Dakota 

with Mother’s aunt, S.B., who is the twin sister of Mother’s mother, L.A. 

M.X.O. was removed from S.B.’s home, and was residing in a Residential 

Treatment Facility (“RTF”) in Pennsylvania. At the hearing, CYF presented 

the testimony of Taylor Zindel, the CYF ongoing caseworker assigned to the 

Children. N.T. Hearing, 12/4/14, at 10-11. CYF then presented the 

 

of appeal from the decrees terminating his parental rights, nor is he a party 

to the instant appeal.
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testimony of A.M.O.’s pre-adoptive foster mother, S.B., via telephone. Id.

at 28 and 31. Mother testified on her own behalf. Id. at 42.

After the hearing, in orders dated December 11, 2014, the trial court 

made the following factual findings regarding Mother.

[Mother] still has not established any structure or stability 

in her life. By her own admission, she is an addict and 

recognizes this will be a life-long struggle for her. She is 

still residing with her parents, who have a history of 

domestic violence and [] addiction []. They have been ruled 

out as a resource for the [C]hildren. [Mother] has not had 

any personal visits with the [C]hildren since they were 

transitioned to South Dakota. She is permitted to have 

written communication that is supervised by each child’s 

therapist. M.X.O. has not demonstrated any interest in 

receiving such letters, until just recently when he wrote a 

letter in return to his mother. [Mother’s Exhibit 1]. 

[Mother] is in intensive outpatient treatment at Home 

Nursing Agency for co-occurring drug and alcohol and 

mental health issues. Per the report dated December 1, 

2014, her responsiveness is considered “good,” her attitude 

toward service is “excellent,” and her progress toward goals 

is “good.” [Petitioner’s Exhibit 1]. The sexual abuse 

allegations wherein [Mother] was named as the perpetrator 

and M.X.O. as the victim child were unfounded. [Mother] 

passed a polygraph test, and M.X.O. underwent a forensic 

interview, and there was no evidence that these allegations 

were true.

[Mother] has been in and out of treatment for years, and 

still struggles with her addiction issues. She has also 

undergone counseling for personal relationships, anger 

management, art therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and 

other mental health services. Despite a multitude of 

services, [Mother] has been unable to demonstrate that she 

can consistently provide a safe, secure[,] and stable 

placement for approximately four years now. [Mother] 

testified that she would relinquish her rights if the 

[C]hildren would be adopted by her cousin. She has had 

three [] [driving under the influence] convictions. [Mother] 

has a mental health diagnosis of post[-]traumatic stress 
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disorder[,] anxiety[,] depression[,] bi-polar condition[,] and 

obsessive compulsive disorder. She is currently on three [] 

different medications.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/15, at 14, quoting Trial Court Order, 12/11/14, at 

¶ 3 (some internal capitalization omitted). 

On December 12, 2014, the trial court entered the decrees 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, pursuant 

to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. On January 

23, 2015, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.

On December 22, 2014, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 

On appeal, Mother raises two issues:

I. Whether the [trial court] gave sufficient weight and 

consideration to the progress [Mother] made in mental 

health treatment in finding that clear and convincing 

evidence existed to terminate [her] parental rights?

II. Whether clear and convincing evidence existed that the 

developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs of the 

[C]hildren would be met by terminating parental rights? 

Mother’s Brief at 6.

Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental 

rights because the court failed to give sufficient weight and consideration to 

the progress she has made in mental health treatment. See Mother’s Brief 

at 13. Mother asserts that she made progress in her mental health 

treatment that alleviated the circumstances that led to the placement of the 
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Children. Mother also contends that the trial court erred and/or abused its 

discretion in finding that CYF established, through clear and convincing 

evidence, that the termination of her parental rights to the Children would 

serve their best interests. Mother argues that the Children’s developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs are not being met in their current placements. 

Mother asserts that the Children’s needs were better met when they had 

regular contact with her. 

We review the appeal from the termination of parental rights in 

accordance with the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in 

dependency cases, our standard of review requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to 

determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused 

its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., 

there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. [The R.J.T. Court] 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties 

during the relevant hearing and often presiding over 

numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts 

could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 
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dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead 

[appellate courts] must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some internal 

citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” 

Id., quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under sections 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We will focus on sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and, (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 
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refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In 

re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows.

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds 

for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated 

by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent 

has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by 

the parent.” If and only if grounds for termination are 

established under subsection (a), does a court consider “the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child” under § 2511(b). 

[The Supreme] Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be 

made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the 

parent, can seldom be more difficult than when 

termination is based upon parental incapacity. The 

legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, 

concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing 

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who 

refuses to perform the duties. 
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In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986), 

quoting In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 

1978). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d at 337. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long 

period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

The trial court explained its decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2) as follows:

[Mother] first argues that [the trial court] did not give 

sufficient consideration and weight to the evidence that 

[Mother] has made progress in her mental health treatment 

and that allegations of sexual abuse as against M.X.O. were 

unfounded. . . . [The trial court does] not believe that 

[Mother] has made sufficient progress in her mental health 

treatment. Even as recently as our Permanency Review 

Order of December 11, 2014, [the trial court] specifically 

found that “[d]espite a multitude of services, [Mother] has 

been unable to demonstrate that she can consistently 

provide a safe, secure and stable home environment for her 

children.”

[Mother’s] mental health issues are significant, as she has 

been diagnosed with [post-traumatic] stress disorder, 

anxiety, depression, bipolar and obsessive compulsive 

disorder. Despite her significant mental health diagnosis, 

she has never consistently invested in mental health 

treatment over the course of time.

Relative to the allegations of sexual abuse wherein [Mother] 

was identified as the perpetrator and M.X.O. as the victim, 

such was determined to be unfounded. Quite frankly, [the 

trial court was] taken aback when this allegation arose, and 
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not surprised when this allegation was deemed to be 

unfounded. As a result, [the trial court] afforded absolutely 

no weight to this allegation of sexual abuse in [its] findings, 

nor in [its] decision to involuntarily terminate the parental 

rights of [Mother].

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/15, at 15 (some internal capitalization omitted). 

There is ample, competent, clear and convincing evidence in the 

record to support the trial court’s determination that Mother has not 

demonstrated any ability to remedy the circumstances which led to the

Children’s placement, nor is there any indication that she could remedy such 

circumstances in the foreseeable future, even with continued services in 

place. After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court aptly 

discussed the evidence against the requirements of section 2511(a)(2). We 

will not impose our own credibility determinations and re-weigh the 

evidence. We must defer to the trial judge’s determination, as the factual 

findings are supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are 

not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption 

of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.

After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of section 2511(b) 

are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child 

pursuant to section 2511(b). Id. at 1008.
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In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court 

held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 

A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed 

between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care 

for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is 

attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). It is 

appropriate to consider a child’s bond with her foster parent. See In re: 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

With regard to Mother’s second issue, the trial court explained its 

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b) as 

follows.
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In her second error complained of on appeal, [Mother] 

argues that the court did not give sufficient consideration 

and weight to the evidence that [Mother] has a bond with 

the [C]hildren despite the efforts of the current foster 

parent (S.B.) to sever that bond. First of all, there is 

absolutely no credible evidence whatsoever that S.B. has 

engaged in any action or efforts to sever the bond between 

[Mother] and the subject children. [Mother] reached out to 

S.B., the maternal great-aunt (who is the twin sister of the 

[Mother’s] own mother) to assume custody of the [C]hildren 

during the course of this dependency proceeding. In all 

respects, [the trial court] found S.B. to be very credible and 

sincere in her willingness to serve as a permanent resource 

for these children, despite their significant issues. The 

significant issues that the [C]hildren are suffering are 

directly related to the traumatic and chaotic history that 

they had while residing in the care, custody and control of 

[Mother]. [The trial court has] no question that [Mother] 

loves her children, but [it does] not find that a healthy bond 

exists by and between them. In fact, both children stated 

on numerous occasions that they desired to remain with

their maternal great-aunt, S.B., in South Dakota rather than 

return to [Mother’s] care in Pennsylvania. In fact, M.X.O. 

became visibly distraught and was shaking when he learned 

that he was returning to Pennsylvania, being fearful that 

such return meant returning to the custody of [Mother].

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/15, at 15. 

Mother also contends that S.B., as the legal custodian of the Children, 

has impeded her contact with the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 20. 

Mother claims that A.M.O. was excited to receive a holiday art project from 

Mother, but S.B. testified that A.M.O. “raged” after receiving it. Id. at 21. 

She asserts that M.X.O.’s behavior worsened as a result of the lack of 

contact with Mother. Id. She blames M.X.O.’s being moved to an RTF in 

South Dakota in January of 2013 on S.B., as M.X.O.’s legal custodian. Id. 

Mother also suggests that M.X.O. was moved to the RTF in Pennsylvania in 
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January of 2014, partly because he was getting out of control at visits with 

S.B., and was having “meltdowns” with her. Id. at 21. Mother contends 

that S.B. is not meeting the Children’s needs and welfare, because the 

Children were doing much better when they were receiving regular contact 

and visitation with Mother. Id. at 22. 

The trial court responded to Mother’s additional argument as follows.

[Mother] raises on additional argument as it relates to 

M.X.O. She submits that [the trial court] failed to give 

significant consideration to the best interest of M.X.O. as 

the termination of parental rights resulted in [his] being 

confined to a residential treatment facility hours away from 

family members and without realistic expectation of ever 

being returned to a family setting within a reasonable period 

of time. In response, [the trial court] acknowledge[d] that 

[it is] troubled that M.X.O. is currently in a residential 

treatment facility and would certainly prefer him to be in a 

home setting with a family member. It was the initial hope 

and goal that the transfer of the [C]hildren to their maternal 

great-aunt, S.B., in South Dakota would result in 

permanency, with the specific goal being changed at the 

time of such transfer to P.L.C. (relative). It does appear 

that permanency with S.B. will be achieved for A.M.O. 

Unfortunately, the relationship between the siblings is not a 

healthy one[,] and they needed to be separated for the 

reasons [the trial court] set forth in [its] Permanency 

Review Orders. However, S.B. has ensured that there is 

ongoing contact and communication between the siblings. 

Necessary services for A.M.O. are being provided in S.B.’s 

home. Unfortunately, M.X.O.’s needs were much more 

significant and have resulted in separation from his sibling, 

and a return to Pennsylvania[,] and placement in a 

residential treatment facility that is best suited to address 

his significant needs. It remains the goal of [the trial] court 

and BCCYF to place M.X.O. with a family member. A 

potential family resource has been identified[;] however, it 

is necessary that M.X.O.’s behavior be stabilized before he 

can be safely transitioned into a family setting. Even 

though [the trial court is] troubled with M.X.O.’s situation, 
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[it is] fully satisfied that a return to [Mother’s] custody is 

not the answer.

Therefore, based on the above, [the trial court] respectfully 

submit[s] that BCCYF established by clear and convincing 

evidence the statutory grounds for involuntary termination 

of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), 

(a)(8) and (b). 

[The trial court] also submits that the record established by 

clear and convincing evidence, after taking into 

consideration the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the subject children, that the 

termination of parental rights of [Mother] (and [Father]) 

would best serve [the Children’s] needs and welfare. As a 

result of the foregoing, [the trial court] respectfully 

request[s] your Honorable Court to affirm [the trial] court’s 

entry of the TPR Decrees of December 11, 2014. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/15, at 15-16 (emphasis in original).

There is ample, competent, clear, and convincing evidence in the 

record to support the trial court’s finding that S.B., the Children’s maternal 

great-aunt, meets all of A.M.O.’s needs and welfare, and that M.X.O.’s 

significant needs and welfare are being met in the RTF where he resides in 

Pennsylvania. Although the trial court did not expressly discuss the effect of 

severing the bond between the Children and Mother in its December 11, 

2014 orders, the court indicated in its opinion that it found clear and 

convincing evidence that a return of the Children to Mother would not be 

healthy for them, especially for M.X.O. The trial court found that A.M.O., 

who had been in placement with S.B. for 51 months, desires to remain with 

S.B.
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The competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s 

determination that that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

serve the Children’s best interests and that the Children would not suffer any 

harm from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Our Supreme Court 

has stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a 

parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, and 

that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor some positive 

emotion towards the abusive parent.” See In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267, 

quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

Supreme Court stated, “[t]he continued attachment to the natural parents, 

despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to 

correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the children 

cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” See In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the 

trial court’s decision. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

While Mother may claim to love the Children, a parent’s own feelings 

of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of 

parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We 

stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or 
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her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act.

Orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/22/2015