Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, Remanded, and Opinion filed July 23, 

2014.

In the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00135-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.M.W.

On Appeal from the 328th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11-DCV-189139

OPINION

This is an appeal from the trial court’s SAPCR1 order granting a child 

support modification in favor of appellee J.S.F., the mother of J.M.W., an adult 

child who is mentally disabled. Appellant M.L.W., the father of J.M.W., contends 

the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) disregarding the general child support 

 1 Under the Texas Family Code, a suit affecting the parent-child relationship or SAPCR 

is defined as a suit “in which the appointment of a managing conservator or a possessory 

conservator, access to or support of a child, or establishment or termination of the parent-child 

relationship is requested.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.032(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. 

Sess.).
2

provisions and (2) improperly construing the statute governing the amount of 

support for an adult disabled child, as well as by (3) improperly including the 

income of Father’s new spouse and (4) ordering support that grossly exceeds the 

properly calculated amount. Father also argues that: (5) the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to reopen the evidence to admit his premarital agreement 

with his new spouse; (6) the court reversibly erred in failing to make required 

findings; and (7) the court’s award of attorney’s fees should be set aside or, in the 

alternative, modified.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by incorrectly 

analyzing and applying the law with regard to its determination of the amount of 

child support. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding the premarital agreement or in awarding attorney’s fees. Therefore, we

affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment, and remand for 

recalculation of the amount of child support and reconsideration of the amount of 

attorney’s fees.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother were divorced by final decree of divorce in January 1987 

in Montgomery County, Texas. They have one child, J.M.W., born in October 

1985. Mother was named managing conservator, and Father was named 

possessory conservator. Father was awarded periods of possession and ordered to 

pay $300 in monthly child support to Mother for the benefit of J.M.W.

Father remarried and had additional children with his second wife. Father’s 

child support obligations for these children ended in 2011. He married his third, 

current wife in 2002. Mother remarried and relocated to Katy in Fort Bend 

County, Texas.
3

J.M.W. resides with Mother. Father ceased providing any child or other 

financial support for J.M.W. when the child graduated from high school at age 19. 

Father also stopped regular periods of possession of J.M.W. and since then only 

has had possession of J.M.W. twice a year for a few hours each time. 

In April 2011, when J.M.W. was 25 years old, Mother filed an original 

petition to modify parent-child relationship in Montgomery County, seeking 

support from Father for the benefit of their adult disabled son. This suit was 

transferred to Fort Bend County and assigned to the trial court. The case was tried 

before the trial court in July 2013.

J.M.W. has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and 

bipolar disorder. Since age seven, J.M.W. has undergone courses of treatment by a 

psychiatrist and a psychologist. J.M.W. has become violent with and hit Mother 

more than once and has destroyed property in her home. J.M.W. has held only one 

job for six months at McDonald’s, which he lost due to angry outbursts.

During the day, Monday through Friday, J.M.W. participates in a workshop 

job program at Brookwood Community2 and earns a total of $758.00 annually for 

such work. Mother applied for and J.M.W. began receiving supplemental social 

security income and Medicaid benefits at approximately age 18. J.M.W. receives 

$473.24 monthly from these benefits. J.M.W.’s necessary monthly living expenses 

while residing with Mother amount to $2,196.

According to the psychiatrist appointed in this case,3 J.M.W. is incapable of 

 2 A scholarship fully covers this tuition.

3 After Father contested whether J.M.W. suffered from disabilities, Mother requested and 

the trial court granted an independent mental evaluation. Father previously filed a petition for 

writ of mandamus, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not appointing Father’s 

chosen expert and by requiring Father to pay for such evaluation. We denied his petition. In re 

Weisinger, No. 14-12-00558-CV, 2012 WL 3861960, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Sept. 6, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g).
4

self-support and independent living, and if the child did not live with Mother, 

J.M.W. would require full-time, structured residential placement. According to 

Mother’s disability benefits consultant, it would be in J.M.W.’s best interest to 

transition to residential placement while Mother is still alive, and Brookwood 

would be a good placement. Both Father and his wife testified that J.M.W.’s living 

at their home on a full-time basis would not be an option. The median monthly 

tuition for a full-time resident at Brookwood is approximately $3,300.

Mother testified that her monthly income from her position as a special 

education teacher is $1,620. The trial record reveals the following about Father’s 

income as a car salesman:

• Father’s 2009 W-2 reflects wages of $36,563.51, and his 1099’s 

show miscellaneous income of $3,800, for a total of 

$40,363.51.

• Father’s 2010 W-2 reflects wages of 35,160.04, and his 1099 

shows miscellaneous income of $1,275, for a total of 

$36,435.04. 

• Father’s 2011 W-2 reflects wages of $54,940.98, and his 1099’s 

show miscellaneous income of $7,500, for a total of 

$62,440.98. 

• Father’s 2012 W-2’s reflect wages of $33,649.06, and his 1099 

shows miscellaneous income of $2,850, for a total of 

$36,499.06.

• Starting in 2013, Father began working as a fleet sales manager 

with a monthly base salary of $4,000, plus a 25% commission.4

 

Father testified that he and his wife had a combined gross income of about 

$150,000 for tax years 2009 and 2010. Father and his wife’s 2009 joint tax return 

 4 Father also indicated he had about $65,000 in retirement benefits from his former 

dealership, a $25,000 life insurance policy through his work, and a $400,000 life insurance 

policy, of which his wife is the beneficiary.
5

reflects income and adjusted gross income of $151,965. Their 2010 joint return 

reflects income and adjusted gross income of $149,922. The wages portion of the 

tax returns includes both Father’s and Father’s wife’s wages.

5

 The returns reflect 

income from rental properties. Father’s wife owns rental properties acquired prior 

to their marriage, and Father owns no separate properties.

After both sides rested, the trial court announced its finding that J.M.W. met

the required standards to receive the benefits of child support as a disabled child. 

The court reconvened in September 2013 to determine the amount and manner of 

payment. Over Father’s objection, Mother argued that under section 154.306 of 

the Texas Family Code the trial court was able to consider Father’s wife’s 

resources for purposes of setting J.M.W.’s support.

The trial court signed a final order on October 4, 2013, ordering Father to 

pay $1,500.00 in monthly child support indefinitely, plus $1,500.00 in monthly 

support retroactive to April 2011. The court ordered Father to pay Mother’s 

counsel her attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $28,454.01.

Father requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Civil Procedure 296. Pursuant to section 154.1306 of the Texas Family 

 5 Father’s wife was employed by Anadarko as a tax manager.

6 Section 154.130, Findings in Child Support Order, provides:

(a) Without regard to Rules 296 through 299, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in 

rendering an order of child support, the court shall make the findings required by 

Subsection (b) if: 

(1) a party files a written request with the court not later than 10 days after 

the date of the hearing;

(2) a party makes an oral request in open court during the hearing; or

(3) the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the 

amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines under Section 

154.125 or 154.129, as applicable.

(b) If findings are required by this section, the court shall state whether the 
6

Code, Father also requested findings regarding whether application of the child 

support guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate, his monthly net resources,

Mother’s monthly net resources, the percentage applied to the first $8,550 of his 

monthly net resources for child support, and the specific reasons that the amount of 

support varied from the amount computed by applying the section 154.1257

 

application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate and shall state the 

following in the child support order:

“(1) the net resources of the obligor per month are $__________;

“(2) the net resources of the obligee per month are $__________;

“(3) the percentage applied to the obligor's net resources for child support 

is __________%; and

“(4) if applicable, the specific reasons that the amount of child support per 

month ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying 

the percentage guidelines under Section 154.125 or 154.129, as 

applicable.”

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.130 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.).

7 Section 154.125, Application of Guidelines to Net Resources, provides:

(a) The guidelines for the support of a child in this section are specifically 

designed to apply to situations in which the obligor’s monthly net resources 

are not greater than $7,500 or the adjusted amount determined under 

Subsection (a-1), whichever is greater.

(a-1) The dollar amount prescribed by Subsection (a) is adjusted every six 

years as necessary to reflect inflation. The Title IV-D agency shall 

compute the adjusted amount, to take effect beginning September 1 of the 

year of the adjustment, based on the percentage change in the consumer 

price index during the 72-month period preceding March 1 of the year of 

the adjustment, as rounded to the nearest $50 increment. The Title IV-D 

agency shall publish the adjusted amount in the Texas Register before 

September 1 of the year in which the adjustment takes effect. For purposes 

of this subsection, “consumer price index” has the meaning assigned by 

Section 341. 201, Finance Code.

(b) If the obligor’s monthly net resources are not greater than the amount 

provided by Subsection (a), the court shall presumptively apply the following 

schedule in rendering the child support order:

CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

BASED ON THE MONTHLY NET RESOURCES OF THE OBLIGOR

1 child 20% of Obligor’s Net Resources
7

percentage guidelines. 

The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court 

concluded that “[t]he application of the percentage guidelines found in § 154.125 

of the Texas Family Code (the “Customary Guidelines” herein) in this case is 

unjust and inappropriate” and that “[a]s an Adult Child, Texas Family Code 

§ 154.306 is the appropriate and correct statutory provision to determine the 

amount of child support [the child] needs.” The trial court did not otherwise 

include section 154.130 findings. Instead, the court issued a finding that the “total 

monthly financial resources of [Father] available to him for the payment of child 

support is $12,500.” The court stated in a footnote that it based this figure on 

Father’s joint tax returns.

Father requested additional or amended findings and conclusions pursuant to 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 298, again specifically requesting the section 

154.130 findings, as well as asking the trial court to segregate what portion of the 

$12,500 figure reflected his as opposed to his wife’s income. Father also filed a 

motion for new trial.

The trial court held a post-judgment hearing. At his hearing, Father argued 

that the court had to adhere to chapter 54 of the Texas Family Code in setting child 

support and reurged his position that the court could not use his wife’s income and 

property to calculate support. The court indicated that it “was persuaded 

otherwise” and, on December 12, 2013, signed a reformed order for support of 

disabled child.

 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). Effective September 1, 

2013, the initial “cap” on an obligor’s net resources under subsection (a-1) increased from 

$7,500 to $8,550.
8

The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the 

reformed order. The court included the same $12,500 finding and footnote, and 

concluded that “[t]he application of the percentage guidelines found in

§ 154.122[8

] of the Texas Family Code (the “Customary Guidelines” herein) in this 

case is unjust and inappropriate” and that “[a]s an Adult Child, Texas Family Code 

§ 154.306 is the appropriate and correct statutory provision to determine the 

amount of child support needs.”

Father again requested additional findings and conclusions pursuant to rule

298, incorporating his previous request for additional or amended findings and 

conclusions.

9

 Father also filed a motion to permit additional evidence and motion 

to modify, correct, or reform judgment, or alternatively, motion for new trial. 

Father sought to offer his and his wife’s prenuptial agreement entered in 2002, 

which purportedly states that separate earnings and income from separate property 

retain their separate character. The trial court held a hearing in February 2014 and 

denied Father’s motions. The trial court also denied Father’s request for additional 

findings and conclusions as to the reformed order. Father timely appealed.

 8 Section 154.122, Application of Guidelines Rebuttably Presumed in Best Interest of 

Child, provides: 

(a) The amount of a periodic child support payment established by the child 

support guidelines in effect in this state at the time of the hearing is presumed to 

be reasonable, and an order of support conforming to the guidelines is presumed 

to be in the best interest of the child.

(b) A court may determine that the application of the guidelines would be unjust 

or inappropriate under the circumstances.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.122 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). As indicated above, 

the trial court’s original conclusion referenced section 154.125.

9 Father specifically requested conclusions regarding the presumptive status of Father’s 

wife’s earnings as community property, and the sole management, control, and disposition of 

certain community property, and a finding that no legally or factually sufficient evidence 

established Father’s wife’s earnings were either her separate property, her sole-management 

community property, or mixed with community property subject to Father’s sole management in 

such a manner to make those earnings subject to joint management.
9

Father brings seven issues on appeal. Father challenges the amount of the 

child support award, arguing that the trial court: (1) disregarded the child support 

guidelines, (2) improperly construed section 154.306 of the Texas Family Code, 

(3) included or substantially considered the income from Father’s new spouse, and 

(4) grossly exceeded the guidelines. Father also argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by: (5) refusing to reopen the evidence to include his premarital 

agreement; (6) failing to make required statutory findings; and (7) awarding 

attorney’s fees, considering all the other errors.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standards of review

A trial court’s order setting or modifying child support will not be disturbed 

on appeal unless the complaining party can demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion. 

Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); In re A.M.P., 

368 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The court 

also enjoys broad discretion in determining the amount of retroactive child support, 

if any, to be ordered, and in determining whether to award attorney’s fees. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 106.002, 154.131(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. 

Sess.); Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996) (attorney’s fees); Cohen 

v. Sims, 830 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)

(retroactive child support).

Courts abuse their discretion when they act arbitrarily or unreasonably, or 

without reference to guiding rules or principles. Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; 

Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). 

Courts have no discretion, however, when determining what the law is, which law 

governs, or how to apply the law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.
10

1992). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are 

not independent grounds of error, but rather are relevant factors in assessing 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Flowers v. Flowers, 407 S.W.3d 452, 

457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). There is no abuse of 

discretion where some evidence of a substantive and probative character supports

the court’s exercise of its discretion. Id.

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. City of Rockwall v. 

Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008). “A fundamental rule of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” City of San 

Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003). We construe the words 

of a statute according to their plain meaning, Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of 

Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004), and in the context of the statute’s 

surrounding provisions, see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West, Westlaw 

through 2015 R. Sess.). We must not engage in forced or strained construction; 

rather, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See St. 

Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997).

B. Child support for adult disabled children

The trial court may order child support for a disabled child for an indefinite 

period. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.001(a)(4) (“The court may order either or 

both parents to support a child in the manner specified by the order . . . if the child 

is disabled as defined in this chapter, for an indefinite period.”), 154.302(a)10

 10 Section 154.302, Court-Ordered Support for Disabled Child, provides: 

(a) The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of a child 

for an indefinite period and may determine the rights and duties of the parents if 

the court finds that:

(1) the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires substantial care and 

personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will 
11

(West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). A suit to obtain support for an adult 

disabled child may be filed at any time, regardless of the child’s age, and may be 

filed as a suit for modification as provided by chapter 156. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 154.305(a)(1), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.).

Section 154.306, Amount of Support After Age 18, provides:

In determining the amount of support to be paid after a child’s 18th 

birthday, the specific terms and conditions of that support, and the 

rights and duties of both parents with respect to the support of the 

child, the court shall determine and give special consideration to:

(1) any existing or future needs of the adult child directly 

related to the adult child’s mental or physical disability and the 

substantial care and personal supervision directly required by or 

related to that disability;

(2) whether the parent pays for or will pay for the care or 

supervision of the adult child or provides or will provide 

substantial care or personal supervision of the adult child;

(3) the financial resources available to both parents for the 

support, care, and supervision of the adult child; and

(4) any other financial resources or other resources or programs 

available for the support, care, and supervision of the adult 

child.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.306 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.).

1. Interpreting section 154.306; Father’s first, second, and sixth issues

Father’s first two issues concern the trial court’s alleged failures to analyze 

or apply the law correctly. Father’s sixth issue regarding section 154.130 findings 

is similarly related to the trial court’s alleged legal errors. We conclude that the 

 

not be capable of self-support; and

(2) the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, on 

or before the 18th birthday of the child.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.302(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). 
12

trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion, and sustain Father’s first, second, 

and sixth issues.

Consistent with her position below, Mother argues that courts can solely 

consider and apply section 154.306 when awarding support for an adult disabled 

child. That is, courts need not look to any of the provisions from other chapters or

subchapters of the Family Code because the Legislature provided a specific, 

unique scheme for calculating support for adult disabled children in section 

154.306.

Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider 

and apply general provisions from other parts of the Family Code when it 

determined the amount of support.11 Father asserts section 154.306 provides that 

the trial court shall give “special,” not exclusive, consideration to its enumerated 

factors. That is, section 154.306 expands what courts consider in the case of adult 

disabled children but does not restrict the consideration and application of other 

general provisions from other parts of the Family Code. 

Father further points to section 154.304, General Procedure, which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by this subchapter, the substantive and 

procedural rights and remedies in a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship relating to the establishment, modification, or 

enforcement of a child support order apply to a suit filed and an order 

rendered under this subchapter. 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.304 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). 

Therefore, according to Father, in the context of determining support for an adult 

disabled child, courts must still consider the child support guidelines in subchapter 

C. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.121–.133 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. 

 11 On appeal, Father does not challenge the trial court’s statutory findings that J.M.W. is 

disabled and eligible for child support. See id. § 154.302(a).
13

Sess.). In other words, although courts ultimately may conclude in their discretion 

that applying the guidelines is unjust and inappropriate per section 154.122 (which 

the trial court did here), they must determine the presumptive amount of support 

per section 154.125, and then must consider the additional factors in section 

154.12312 and “specially” consider the particular factors outlined in section 

 12 Section 154.123, Additional Factors for Court to Consider, provides:

(a) The court may order periodic child support payments in an amount other than 

that established by the guidelines if the evidence rebuts the presumption that 

application of the guidelines is in the best interest of the child and justifies a 

variance from the guidelines.

(b) In determining whether application of the guidelines would be unjust or 

inappropriate under the circumstances, the court shall consider evidence of all 

relevant factors, including:

(1) the age and needs of the child;

(2) the ability of the parents to contribute to the support of the child;

(3) any financial resources available for the support of the child;

(4) the amount of time of possession of and access to a child;

(5) the amount of the obligee’s net resources, including the earning potential of 

the obligee if the actual income of the obligee is significantly less than what the 

obligee could earn because the obligee is intentionally unemployed or 

underemployed and including an increase or decrease in the income of the obligee 

or income that may be attributed to the property and assets of the obligee;

(6) child care expenses incurred by either party in order to maintain gainful 

employment;

(7) whether either party has the managing conservatorship or actual physical 

custody of another child;

(8) the amount of alimony or spousal maintenance actually and currently being 

paid or received by a party;

(9) the expenses for a son or daughter for education beyond secondary school;

(10) whether the obligor or obligee has an automobile, housing, or other benefits 

furnished by his or her employer, another person, or a business entity;

(11) the amount of other deductions from the wage or salary income and from 

other compensation for personal services of the parties;

(12) provision for health care insurance and payment of uninsured medical 

expenses;
14

154.306 in determining whether to deviate from the guidelines. Father also 

contends that the courts remain bound to issue section 154.130 findings when 

requested and when the guidelines are not followed.

13 See id. § 154.130. Further, 

Father argues that courts remain bound by other general provisions from 

subchapter B, Computing Net Resources Available for Payment of Child Support. 

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.061–.070 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. 

Sess.). These provisions include section 154.061,

14 on computation of net monthly 

income; section 154.062,

15 on calculating net resources; and section 154.069,16

 

(13) special or extraordinary educational, health care, or other expenses of the 

parties or of the child;

(14) the cost of travel in order to exercise possession of and access to a child;

(15) positive or negative cash flow from any real and personal property and 

assets, including a business and investments;

(16) debts or debt service assumed by either party; and

(17) any other reason consistent with the best interest of the child, taking into 

consideration the circumstances of the parents.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.123.

13 Father separately briefs this as his sixth issue. Mother responds that under section 

154.306 the trial court was not required to issue section 154.130 findings.

14 Section 154.061, Computing Net Monthly Income, provides:

(a) Whenever feasible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis 

and then should be recalculated to determine average monthly gross income.

(b) The Title IV-D agency shall annually promulgate tax charts to compute net 

monthly income, subtracting from gross income social security taxes and federal 

income tax withholding for a single person claiming one personal exemption and 

the standard deduction.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.061.

15 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.062 (detailing what resources include and do not 

include).

16 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.069(a) (“The court may not add any portion of the net 

resources of a spouse to the net resources of an obligor or obligee in order to calculate the 

amount of child support to be ordered.”). Subchapter E, Modification of Child Support, contains 

a virtually identical provision. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.404(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 

R. Sess.) (“The court may not add any portion of the net resources of a new spouse to the net 
15

which prohibits adding any portion of a spouse’s net resources to calculate child 

support.

We agree with Father. First, the plain language of section 154.306 indicates 

that in the context of determining the amount of support for adult disabled 

children, “the court shall determine and give special consideration to” the four 

enumerated factors. Id. § 154.306. The adjective “special” means “unusual; 

extraordinary,” “held in particular esteem” or “being other than the usual: 

additional, extra.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014, Westlaw); MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1197 (11th ed. 2004). Certainly, the plain text 

highlights the importance of these particular factors. However, we discern no 

language in section 154.306 indicating that these are the sole or exclusive factors 

for courts to consider when setting child support for an adult disabled child. Id. 

Moreover, we may not read a provision such as section 154.306 in isolation, 

but we must always interpret it in the context of the entire law in which it is found. 

See Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001); City of 

Amarillo v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 894 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, 

writ denied). “[C]ontext is essential to textual analysis, something [the Supreme 

Court of Texas] has held repeatedly, emphatically, and unanimously.” In re Ford 

Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 273 (Tex. 2014). 

Section 154.304 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this 

subchapter,” the substantive and procedural rights and remedies in a SAPCR suit

relating to the establishment, modification, or enforcement of a child support order 

apply to a suit filed and an order rendered under subchapter F. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 154.304. The pertinent definition of the adverb “otherwise” is “to the 

 

resources of an obligor or obligee in order to calculate the amount of child support to be ordered 

in a suit for modification.”).
16

contrary; differently.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014, Westlaw); see also

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 271 (11th ed. 2004) (defining noun 

“contrary” as “a fact or condition incompatible with another: opposite”). With 

minimal exceptions,17

we discern nothing within any of the provisions of 

subchapter F, including section 154.306, that provides “to the contrary” or 

“differently” from the general child support computation, guideline, and 

modification provisions—such as those provided in sections 154.061, 154.062, 

154.069, 154.121, 154.122, 154.123, 154.125, 154.126,18 154.130, 154.131,19

 17 The Legislature did provide “to the contrary” for certain distinct substantive and 

procedural rights and remedies in the specific context of disabled children. For example, 

subchapter F allows for support orders for disabled children beyond age 18 or high school 

graduation. Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.001(a-1), 154.002 (West, Westlaw through 

2015 R. Sess.), with id. §§ 154.302(a), 154.305(a)(1). And subchapter F expressly states that it 

does not affect parents’ contractual remedies for the support of a disabled child. Compare id.

§ 154.124(c) (“Terms of the agreement pertaining to child support in the order may be enforced 

by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, but are not 

enforceable as a contract.”), with id. § 154.308(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.) 

(“This subchapter does not affect a parent’s . . . ability to contract for the support of a disabled 

child.”). 

18 Section 154.126, Application of Guidelines to Additional Net Resources, provides:

(a) If the obligor’s net resources exceed the amount provided by Section 

154.125(a), the court shall presumptively apply the percentage guidelines to the 

portion of the obligor's net resources that does not exceed that amount. Without 

further reference to the percentage recommended by these guidelines, the court 

may order additional amounts of child support as appropriate, depending on the 

income of the parties and the proven needs of the child.

(b) The proper calculation of a child support order that exceeds the presumptive 

amount established for the portion of the obligor’s net resources provided by 

Section 154.125(a) requires that the entire amount of the presumptive award be 

subtracted from the proven total needs of the child. After the presumptive award 

is subtracted, the court shall allocate between the parties the responsibility to meet 

the additional needs of the child according to the circumstances of the parties. 

However, in no event may the obligor be required to pay more child support than 

the greater of the presumptive amount or the amount equal to 100 percent of the 

proven needs of the child.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.126.

19 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.131(a), (b) (providing that “[t]he child support 
17

156.402,20 and 156.404—when the court renders a child support order for an adult 

disabled child. While section 154.306 provides for mandatory factors to be 

applied—indeed, “specially considered”—after a disabled child reaches age 18, its

application is not “opposite” or “incompatible” with the application of such other 

provisions. Here, the context of those surrounding provisions consistently 

highlights the child support guidelines, and provides specific details, definitions, 

and prohibitions for applying them properly, as well as specific considerations for 

ultimately determining not to apply them. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.061, 

154.062, 154.069, 154.121, 154.122, 154.123, 154.125, 154.126, 154.130,

154.131, 156.402, 156.404.

Interpreting section 154.306 to trump any consideration or application of the 

guidelines, or of the various provisions concerning support computation, also 

would not accord with common sense. See Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d at 272 

(noting “[t]his text-driven analysis also accords with common sense”). The stated 

intent of the Legislature in providing the child support guidelines is “to guide the 

court in determining an equitable amount of child support.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 154.121. The law presumes the guideline amount to be reasonable and in the 

best interest of the child. Id. § 154.122. Likewise, with regard to retroactive child 

support, the stated intent of the Legislature in providing the child support 

guidelines is “to guide the court in determining the amount of retroactive child 

 

guidelines are intended to guide the court in determining the amount of retroactive child support, 

if any, to be ordered” and “[i]n ordering retroactive child support, the court shall consider the net 

resources of the obligor during the relevant time period”).

20 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.402 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.) (providing 

that courts may consider chapter 154 child support guidelines to determine whether modification 

of existing order is warranted and may modify order to substantially conform to guidelines); 

Friermood v. Friermood, 25 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)

(citing section 154.402(a) regarding courts’ discretion to deviate from guidelines in modification 

proceedings).
18

support, if any, to be ordered.” Id. § 154.131. The guidelines also come into play

when courts are faced with a potential modification of an existing order. Id.

§156.402. 

Even if section 154.306 might be susceptible to a guidelines-free 

construction standing alone, we should not give one provision a meaning out of 

harmony or inconsistent with other provisions of the same act. See Helena Chem. 

Co., 47 S.W.3d at 493; In re M.R., 975 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1998, pet. denied) (citing R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 894 S.W.2d at 494)). Beyond the 

consistent backdrop of the guidelines, the various code provisions also consistently 

include mandatory language regarding what courts must and must not do when 

computing net resources and applying the guidelines when determining child 

support. The court “shall” calculate net resources when determining child support 

liability, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.062; “shall” consider evidence of the 

enumerated factors when determining whether applying the guidelines would be 

unjust or inappropriate, id. § 154.123(b); “shall” presumptively apply the guideline 

schedule, id. §§ 154.125(b), 154.126; “shall” make findings concerning net 

resources of the obligor and obligee, and the percentage applied to the obligor’s net 

resources, and “shall” state reasons for any deviation from the guidelines, id.

§ 154.130; “shall” consider the obligor’s net resources in ordering retroactive child 

support, id. § 154.131(b); and “may not” add a new spouse’s net resources to the 

net resources of the obligor or obligee when calculating the support amount, id.

§§154.069, 156.404. 

Mother has not explained how, nor can we determine that, our reading of 

section 154.306 presents any conflict—much less an irreconcilable one—with the 

general child support provisions. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (West, 

Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.). To the contrary, interpreting section 154.306 in 
19

the manner Mother does, with which the trial court agreed, would require us to 

impermissibly give such special provision a meaning that conflicts with other 

general provisions when, in fact, the provisions can be reasonably harmonized.21 

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.021, 311.026 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. 

Sess.); Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 706 (Tex. 2002)

(“[W]e must always . . . attempt to harmonize [a statute’s] various provisions.”); 

M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 54 (“The provisions of the statute must, if possible, be 

harmonized.”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 894 S.W.2d at 494 (“[C]ourts will not give 

one provision a meaning that conflicts with other provisions if the provisions can 

be reasonably harmonized.”).

Finally, our interpretation is not inconsistent with any case applying or 

interpreting section 154.306.22 Therefore, we conclude that, when determining 

 21 For example, Mother interprets the factor of “the financial resources available to both 

parents” to reach the net resources of a new spouse. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.306(3). 

However, nothing within subchapter F indicates that as long as the SAPCR suit involves an adult 

disabled child, the prohibition against including any portion of a new spouse’s net resources to 

the net resources of the obligor in order to calculate the amount of child support would not apply. 

See id. §§ 154.069, 156.404.

22 See In re L.J.M., No. 13-13-00367-CV, 2014 WL 3053209, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi July 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court applied guidelines and provided 

section 154.130 findings, concluding court properly considered section 154.306 factors); In re 

W.M.R., No. 02-11-00283-CV, 2012 WL 5356275, at *12–14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 1, 

2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing section 154.062 regarding obligor’s available resources beyond 

earnings and concluding award not excessive where court considered sufficient evidence to 

support each section 154.306 factor); Vandemark v. Jimenez, No. 01-09-00168-CV, 2010 WL 

1241287, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 1, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court 

applied guidelines based on parties’ net resources, presuming omitted transcript supported 

court’s implied section 154.306 findings); Wolk v. Wolk, No. 03-06-00595-CV, 2007 WL 

2682173, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 12, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court applied 

guidelines based on evidence of obligor’s income, but on face of record court lacked sufficient 

information regarding section 154.306 factors); In re M.W.T., 12 S.W.3d 598, 603, 606 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (trial court applied guidelines based on obligor’s net 

resources, concluding record contained evidence concerning each of section 154.306 criteria), 

disapproved of on other grounds by Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex. v. Scholer, 403 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. 

2013).
20

child support for adult disabled children, courts must apply section 154.306, but

they continue to remain bound under section 154.304 to consider and apply the 

substantive rights and remedies applicable to SAPCR suits “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.304, 154.306. In a modification suit 

involving an adult disabled child, these provisions may include, among others,

those in subchapter B of chapter 154 related to computing net resources available 

for support; in subchapter C related to the child support guidelines; in subchapter F 

related to support for disabled children; and in subchapter E of chapter 156 related 

to modification of child support. See, e.g., id. §§ 154.061, 154.062, 154.069, 

154.121, 154.122, 154.123, 154.125, 154.126, 154.130, 154.131, 154.302, 

154.304, 154.305, 154.306, 156.402, 156.404. 

Here, the record reflects that the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 

154.306 as providing the exclusive factors for its determination of child support for 

J.M.W. For example, the court indicated that, when considering the financial 

resources available to Father, see id. § 154.306(3), it could in its discretion 

disregard section 154.069(a) and include Father’s wife’s income in its support 

determination. Moreover, when rendering its findings and conclusions, despite 

Father’s timely request for section 154.130 findings, the trial court refused to 

provide any findings regarding the monthly net resources of Father or Mother, or 

the percentage applied to Father’s net resources. See id. § 154.130(b). 

We conclude that the trial court’s clear failures to analyze and apply the law 

correctly in setting the amount of J.M.W.’s child support constitute an abuse of 

discretion. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Therefore, we sustain Father’s first 

and second, as well as his sixth, issues. See id.; In re S.B.S., 282 S.W.3d 711, 717 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (failure to make section 154.130 findings 

was reversible error); Omodele v. Adams, No. 14-01-00999-CV, 2003 WL 133602, 
21

at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 16, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(same).23

Accordingly, we reverse the court’s judgment as to the award of adult 

disabled child support and retroactive child support. We remand for recalculation 

of the support award and issuance of findings in support of such award in 

compliance with the applicable sections of the Family Code. In doing so, we 

recognize that the trial court remains able to apply its considerable, valid discretion 

in setting the amount of child support, including retroactive support, for J.M.W., 

and we express no opinion as to what a proper amount of child support would be.24

2. Father’s third and fourth issues

Father’s third and fourth issues—whether the trial court included or 

substantially considered the income from his new spouse, and grossly exceeded the 

guidelines—essentially challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

child support obligations set in the reformed order. Because we have already 

granted Father the relief that he requests by his third and fourth issues in sustaining 

his first, second, and sixth issues, we need not address those issues. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 47.1.

 23 To the extent we are required to perform any harm analysis, we cannot conclude that 

such abuse of discretion was harmless here. See Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. 

1996) (“A trial court’s failure to make findings is not harmful error if the record before the 

appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered no injury.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Although the trial court expressly noted it was relying on joint tax 

returns that included Father’s wife’s earnings and income from her property, it refused to make

any findings regarding Father’s and Mother’s monthly net resources and the percentage applied 

to Father’s net resources. The court’s refusal to make findings prevented Father from effectively 

contesting any deviation from the guidelines. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(2); Tenery, 932 

S.W.2d at 30; Omodele, 2003 WL 133602, at *5. 

24 Our record does not reflect Father’s payment of the adult disabled child support and 

retroactive support the trial court rendered in its October and December 2013 orders. However, 

upon recalculation, the court should credit overpayment, if any, by Father toward his future 

payments.
22

C. Motion to reopen evidence: Father’s fifth issue

Father also argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen 

the evidence to include Father and his wife’s premarital agreement in order to 

demonstrate that his wife’s income was not a financial resource available to Father 

for consideration when awarding child support. We disagree. 

Trial courts have broad discretion to permit additional evidence to be offered 

at any time when it clearly appears necessary to the administration of justice. See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 270; Gurka v. Gurka, 402 S.W.3d 341, 349 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). In determining whether to grant a motion to reopen, 

courts consider whether: (1) the moving party showed due diligence in obtaining 

the evidence; (2) the proffered evidence is decisive; (3) reception of such evidence 

will cause undue delay; and (4) granting the motion will cause an injustice. See 

Naguib v. Naguib, 137 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). 

We should not disturb a trial court’s ruling if all of these factors are not satisfied. 

Id.

Father has not demonstrated all of these factors. For example, Father has not 

shown that his own premarital agreement allegedly dating from 2002 was 

unavailable to him at the time of the trial. See id. Moreover, whether such

premarital agreement provided for Father and his wife’s separate earnings and 

properties to retain their separate status for purposes of a determination of a 

division of property upon divorce does not appear to affect the application of the 

Family Code’s prohibition against including a spouse’s net resources for purposes 

of child support. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 154.062, 154.069, 156.404; Koenig 

v. DeBerry, No. 03-09-00252-CV, 2010 WL 1009170, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin 

Mar. 17, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[E]ven though income generated by a 

spouse’s separate property is community property, no portion of that income 
23

should be included in calculating a child support obligor’s net resources.”); In re 

Knott, 118 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“[A] portion 

of the spouse’s assets that might traditionally be labeled as community property 

but are derivative of the spouse’s separate property or employment are outside the 

items which comprise the obligor’s ‘net resources’ because they would fall entirely 

within the ‘net resources’ of the obligor’s spouse.”); see also Tex. Fam. Code 

§ 3.102(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R. Sess.) (spouse has sole management 

and control of community property that spouse would have owned if single, 

including personal earnings and revenue from separate property). Such excluded 

evidence was not decisive.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Father’s motion to reopen, and we overrule this issue.

D. Attorney’s fees: Father’s seventh issue

Finally, Father argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees should be 

set aside, considering the errors the court committed in reestablishing child 

support. Although we have concluded the trial court abused its discretion in its 

setting of the amount of the child support award, we have not disturbed the trial 

court’s underlying determination that the child qualifies for support, and Mother 

substantially and materially prevailed on her petition to modify. See Coburn v. 

Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 840–41 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.); Norris v. 

Norris, 56 S.W.3d 333, 346 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by granting reasonable attorney’s fees to Mother’s 

counsel.

However, in light of our decision today to remand for recalculation of the 

child support award in accordance with the Family Code, the trial court also should 

have an opportunity to decide whether it wishes to leave the amount of its 
24

attorney’s fee award intact. See In re K.J.M., 138 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

We sustain Father’s seventh issue, and we remand for reconsideration of the 

amount of attorney’s fees.

25

III. CONCLUSION

Having sustained Father’s first, second, sixth, and seventh issues, we reverse 

the trial court’s judgment with regard to its awards of adult disabled child support,

retroactive child support, and attorney’s fees. We affirm the remainder of the 

judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

/s/ Marc W. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.

 25 Because we are remanding, we do not address Father’s alternative subissue requesting 

our modification of the award.