alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Virtual Radiologic Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.
 Date:      July 30, 2009
    By:
    /s/ Robert C. KillRobert C. KillPresident and Chief Executive Officer
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17

- 1548 V

Filed: October 9, 2018

UNPUBLISHED

JOYCE LINEBERGER

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;

Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;
Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine
Administration (SIRVA)

Bruce William Slane, Law Office of Bruce W. Slane, P.C., White Plains, NY , for

petitioner.

Glenn Alexander MacLeod , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for

respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On October 17, 2017

, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration ( “ SIRVA ” ) after receiving the influenza vaccination on September 23,

2016 . Petit ion at 1, ¶¶ 2, 17

- 18

. Petitioner further alleges that she received the
vaccination in the United States, suffered the residual effects of her injury for more than six months, and that neither she nor any other party has filed a civil action or received compensation for her injury, alleged as vaccine caused. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 19

- 21. The case

was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance wi th

the E

- Government Act of 2002

. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of
Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to
identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits
within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for

e ase of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subpara graph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012 ).On October 9, 2018

, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that petitioner is entitled to compensa tion in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, respondent believes that petitioner ’ s injury meets the definition of a
Table SIRVA and thus, “ petitioner is entitled to a presumption of vaccine causation. ” Id.

at 4 . Respondent further agrees that petitioner has satisfied all other statutory and jurisdictional issues

. Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the undersigned find s that petitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

Chief Special Master
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 1 of 7 PageID: 271
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 2 of 7 PageID: 272
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 3 of 7 PageID: 273
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 4 of 7 PageID: 274
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 5 of 7 PageID: 275
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 6 of 7 PageID: 276
Case 2:10-cv-06637-CCC-JAD Document 45 Filed 06/25/12 Page 7 of 7 PageID: 277
EXHIBIT 10.15



                AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

      This Amendment, dated as of May 15, 1997, amends that
certain Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") dated
as of April 27, 1995, as amended, by and between Spectrum
Information Technologies, Inc. ("Employer") and Barry Hintze
("Employee").

      Employer retains the right to discharge Employee for any
reason or without reason. Employer agrees, however, that if it
discharges Employee for any reason other than just cause,
Employee shall be entitled to a severance benefit equal to twelve
(12) month's base salary and participation in Employer's
Executive Medical Plan for twelve (12) months; provided, however,
that such participation in the Employer's Executive Medical Plan
shall not be deemed a waiver of Employee's right to continue to
receive benefits under any group health care insurance plan, at
Employee's expense, to the extent required by the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. For the purposes of
this Amendment, "just cause" shall be defined as dishonesty,
willful misconduct, gross negligence or intentional failure by
Employee to discharge fully and faithfully and to the best of his
ability the duty imposed on him. Employee's benefits pursuant to
this paragraph are and shall be payable immediately upon such
discharge without just cause.

      All other terms and provisions contained in the Employment
Agreement shall remain in effect.

                               Spectrum Information Technologies, Inc.


                               /s/Donald J. Amoruso
                               --------------------------------
                               By: Donald J. Amoruso
                               Its: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


                               /s/ Barry J. Hintze
                               --------------------------------
                               Barry J. Hintze
#### Vsevold Rosenblatt, Respondent, v Michael Venizelos et al., Appellants.

[853 NYS2d 578]

*520In 2005, the plaintiff was crossing a street when he was struck by a vehicle owned by the defendant WD. Rental, Inc., and driven by the defendant Michael Venizelos. The plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability by presenting proof that he was walking within a crosswalk and that he had looked for approaching traffic before he began to cross *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1151 [a]; *Hoey v City of New York,*28 AD3d 717 [2006]; *Zabusky v Cochran,*234 AD2d 542 [1996]). In addition, the plaintiff submitted the police accident report, containing Venizelos’ admission immediately following the accident that his car had struck the plaintiff *(see Abramov v Miral Corp.,*24 AD3d 397, 398 [2005]; *Jermin v APA Truck Leasing Co.,*237 AD2d 255 [1997]).

The only admissible evidence which the defendants submitted in opposition to the motion, Venizelos’ affidavit sworn to July 11, 2006, more than 15 months after the accident, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affidavit, in which Venizelos attested that the plaintiff walked into the side of his vehicle while talking on a cell phone, “heedless of traffic,” was a belated attempt by Venizelos to avoid the consequences of his earlier admission by raising a feigned issue which was insufficient to defeat the motion *(see Abramov v Miral Corp.,*24 AD3d at 398), particularly since he did not deny the accuracy of the police accident report *(cf. Imamkhodjaev v Kartvelishvili,*44 AD3d 619, 620 [2007]). Moreover, “ ‘the defendants’ purported need to conduct discovery did not warrant denial of the motion since they already had personal knowledge of the relevant facts’ ” *(Fenko v Mealing, 43*AD3d 856, 856 [2007], quoting *Abramov v Miral Corp.,*24 AD3d at 398). Spolzino, J.P., Santucci, Angiolillo and Balkin, JJ., concur.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDG MENT

No. 04

- 13

- 00587

- CR

Mary RENDON

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 11, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 372431

Honorable Carlo Key, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE

, JUSTICE BARNARD , AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED

and this appeal is DISMISSED.

We ORDER the clerk of this court to immediately issue the mandate.

S IGNED April 30, 2014.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Exhibit 10.33

September 30, 2000

Mr. Robert H. Davis
C/o GreenMan Technologies Inc.
7 Kimball Lane
Lynnfield, MA 01824

Dear Mr. Davis

GreenMan Technologies, Inc. agrees to extend the repayment/maturity of all
amounts due under the terms of your January 9, 1998 Secured Promissory Note
until April 15, 2002. The interest rate will be increased to 9.5% per annum.

Sincerely,

/s/ Maurice E. Needham
Chairman
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13956

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00456-RDP-JHE-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 versus

JAMES DAVID KIRCUS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(July 22, 2015)

Case: 14-13956 Date Filed: 07/22/2015 Page: 1 of 3 
2

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

James Kircus appeals his conviction for knowing possession of a destructive 

device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Kircus contends the district court 

erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the Government 

failed to prove Kircus’s modified airbag cylinder was a “destructive device.” We 

affirm. 

A “destructive device” is statutorily defined as “any explosive, incendiary, 

or poison gas (A) bomb” but not including “any device which is neither designed 

nor redesigned for use as a weapon.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). This section requires

proof that the device was both (1) “an explosive” and (2) “designed as a weapon.” 

United States v. Hammond, 371 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 2004). In determining 

whether a device was designed as a weapon, “the critical inquiry is whether the 

device, as designed, has any value other than as a weapon.” Id. at 781. 

On appeal, Kircus does not argue the modified airbag cylinder was not an 

explosive. Rather, he contends the evidence does not support a finding that the

device was designed or redesigned as a weapon. We disagree. The Government’s 

experts testified the device as modified had no social, industrial, or commercial use

and was, in their opinion, designed to be an improvised explosive bomb. The 

Government’s experts also testified the device would fragment into pieces moving 

Case: 14-13956 Date Filed: 07/22/2015 Page: 2 of 3 
3

at a high enough rate of speed to seriously injure anyone in the vicinity of the blast. 

This testimony, along with other record evidence, provides a sufficient basis for 

concluding the device was designed as a weapon. See, e.g., United States v. 

Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining the Government’s 

expert testimony “established that [defendant’s] pipe bombs were designed as 

weapons” when the expert testified the pipe bombs “had no social or entertainment 

use, they propelled fragments, and the fragments were capable of causing severe 

injury to people in the vicinity”). Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying Kircus’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 14-13956 Date Filed: 07/22/2015 Page: 3 of 3
EXHIBIT 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of RathGibson, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended October 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Harley B. Kaplan, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Date:  December 12, 2007/s/ Harley B. KaplanHarley B. KaplanPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that, within monthsof their graduation, students who finish high school areabout twice as likely to be working or enrolled in collegeas are those who drop out.

The Current Population Survey asked for the October1998 employment status of people aged 16 to 24 who hadgraduated from high school in 1998 or had dropped out ofhigh school during the 1997-98 school year. Of the highschool graduates, half were employed and one-third werenot in the labor force but were enrolled in college. Incontrast, about 44 percent of the high school dropoutswere employed.

Strikingly different, however, was the proportion of thetwo groups that was either unemployed or not in thelabor force and not enrolled in college—a combined 16percent for graduates, but 56 percent for dropouts.

High school graduatesabout twice as likelyas dropouts to work

or go to school

Source: BLS Current Population Survey, October supplement

Employment status of people aged 16 to 24 who were 1998 high school graduatesor school year 1997-98 high school dropouts, October 1998 (percent)

40 Occupational Outlook Quarterly ● Summer 2000
(October 26, 2006)

#### Lisa Scansarole, Respondent-Appellant, v Madison Square Garden, L.P., et al., Appellants-Respondents, et al., Defendant. Jaclyn Daly, Respondent-Appellant, v Madison Square Garden, L.P., et al., Appellants-Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[827 NYS2d 1]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered May 17, 2005, which denied the summary judgment motion by the Madison Square Garden (MSG) defendants and denied plaintiffs cross motion to strike MSG’s answer or, in the alternative, to prohibit MSG from asserting comparative negligence, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Flaintiff allegedly sustained significant injuries when she leaned against and fell through a glass window wall on the exterior of MSG’s building. MSG’s initial moving papers in support of its summary judgment motion merely referred to gaps in plaintiffs version of events, and established neither that the building (which MSG built) complied with the building code applicable when it was constructed, nor that the glass wall was reasonably safe and in accordance with industry standards. Ac*518cordingly, MSG failed to meet its initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the motion was therefore properly denied without regard to the sufficiency of plaintiffs opposition *(see Ayotte v Gervasio,*81 NY2d 1062, 1063 [1993]). Moreover, MSG was not entitled to remedy the basic deficiencies of its moving papers by submitting an expert affidavit in reply *(see Migdol v City of New York,*291 AD2d 201 [2002]; *Ritt v Lenox Hill Hosp.,*182 AD2d 560, 562 [1992]).

The court properly denied plaintiffs cross motion to sanction MSG, on the ground of spoliation of evidence, by striking its answer or, alternatively, by barring it from raising the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. The lost video depicting postaccident events is not crucial to plaintiffs case. Her suggestion that MSG intentionally destroyed the video of the accident is based on speculation *(see Tawedros v St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y.,*281 AD2d 184 [2001]). It appears that the loss of this video record was the result of inadvertent, technical mishaps. Under the circumstances, the court’s decision to prohibit MSG from presenting evidence pertaining to the lost postaccident images was a provident exercise of discretion. Concur—Buckley, EJ., Mazzarelli, Friedman and Sweeny, JJ.
Exhibit
      32.1




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the annual report of Driver Passport Inc. (the "Company") on
      Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Randy Brown,
      Chief
      Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the
      best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, another
      document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature
      that
      appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
      statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company. and
      will be retained by the Company. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission or its staff upon request.





**DRIVER
                PASSPORT, INC.**Date: September
                6, 2006
              By:
              /s/ Randy
                BrownRandy
                BrownChief
                Executive Officer, Chief Financial
                Officer
EXHIBIT 31.2



CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION



I, Charles Driscoll, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Viscorp, Inc.



2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



---

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.





Date: February 22, 2007















/s/ Charles Driscoll





Charles Driscoll









Chief Financial Officer
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00410-CV

Glenn Alexander Clamon

v.

Jeffrey DeLong and Dennis Holmes

§

§

§

§

From County Court at Law No. 3

of Tarrant County (2014-003040-3)

October 8, 2015

Opinion by Justice Walker

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant Glenn Alexander Clamon shall pay all of 

the costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Sue Walker____________________

 Justice Sue Walker