IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

DOYLE HART v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 95-7588 J. Steven Stafford, Judge

No. W1997-00188-SC-R11-CO - Decided June 22, 2000

FOR PUBLICATION

We granted review in this habeas corpus case to determine whether two counts of the indictment

under which Doyle Hart, the appellant, was convicted are void for failing to provide him with

sufficient notice of the crimes charged. After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that

Count 1 is not void for failing to allege a culpable mental state. Additionally, Count 2 is valid

because the appellant was provided with sufficient notice of the manner in which he committed the

offense for which he was charged and because Count 2 complies with the requirements of Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As such, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’s denial of the

appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from Appellate Court to Supreme Court; Judgment

of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Affirmed

BIRCH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, HOLDER,

and BARKER, JJ., joined.

Joseph S. Ozment, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Doyle Hart.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Elizabeth

Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, and C. Phillip Bivens, District Attorney General, for the appellee,

State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I

We granted review of this habeas corpus petition to determine whether two specific counts

of the indictment under which Doyle Hart, the appellant, was convicted are fatally defective for

failing to provide him sufficient notice of the crimes charged. 
1

The indictments charged the appellant as follows: 

Count 1

THE GRAND JURORS of GIBSON County, Tennessee, duly

empaneled and sworn, upon their oath, present that [the appellant] on

divers dates, during a period of time beginning on the 1st day of

November, 1989, the exact dates to the Grand Jurors unknown, in

Gibson County, Tennessee, and prior to the issuance of this

indictment then and there unlawfully and feloniously did have

unlawful sexual penetration of [the victim], a female child under the

age of 13 years, contrary to the Statute and against the peace and

dignity of the State of Tennessee; 

Count 2

And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present

further that on the days and dates aforesaid, and in the aforesaid

County, and within said jurisdiction, the aforesaid [appellant] did

unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [the victim], his

wife’s daughter, contrary to the Statute and against the peace and

dignity of the State of Tennessee;

Count 3

And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present

further that on divers dates, during a period of time beginning

November 1, 1989 and ending on the 3rd day of October, 1990, and

in the aforesaid County, and within said jurisdiction, and before the

findings of this indictment, the aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully

sexually penetrate [the victim], a person less than thirteen (13) years

of age, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-502, all of which is against the

peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee;

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After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that Count 1 is not void for failing

to allege a culpable mental state. Additionally, Count 2 is valid because the appellant was provided

with sufficient notice of the manner in which he committed the offense for which he was charged

and because Count 2 complies with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As

such, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’s denial of the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus

relief. 

II

This appeal arises from the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the appellant. He was

indicted in February 1991 for two counts each of aggravated rape and incest;1 he was convicted by
Count 4

And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present

further that on the date aforesaid, and in the aforesaid County, and

within said jurisdiction, and before the finding of this indictment, the

aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully sexually penetrate [the victim],

a person he knew to be his stepdaughter, in violation of T.C.A. 39-15-

302, all of which is against the peace and dignity of the State of

Tennessee.

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a jury of Count 1 (aggravated rape) and Count 2 (incest) and sentenced by the trial court to an

effective sentence of fifteen years. The judgments were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

See State v. Hart, No. 02-C-01-9209-CC-00202, 1993 WL 305777 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11,

1993) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 29, 1993). Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for

habeas corpus relief on January 23, 1997. The trial court dismissed the petition; the Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

III

At the outset, we note that we are reviewing a petition for habeas corpus relief and whether

to grant the petition is a question of law that we review de novo. We are guided by the overarching

rule that habeas corpus relief is available to a defendant only when the judgment is void on its face

or the prisoner’s sentence has expired. See Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). “A void

judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory

authority to render such judgment.” Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998). A valid

indictment is an “essential jurisdictional element” to any prosecution; consequently, this Court has

held that a defective indictment may deprive a court of jurisdiction. Id. So long as an indictment

performs its essential constitutional and statutory purposes, a defect or omission in the language of

the indictment will not render the judgment void. See id. 

In 1997, this Court established the criteria to determine whether an indictment performs its

essential constitutional and statutory purposes. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (Tenn.

1997). In Hill, we held that 

for offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with

the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment which fails

to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution

and conviction for that offense so long as

(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the

constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge

against which the accused must defend, adequate basis for entry of a

proper judgment, and protection from double jeopardy;
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(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-13-202; and

(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct

alleged.

Id.

IV

We now consider whether, in light of Hill, Count 1 is fatally defective for failing to provide

the appellant with sufficient notice of the crime charged in omitting the requisite mental state. As

regards Count 1, Hill is squarely on point and strongly supports the proposition that the appellant

received constitutionally sufficient notice. In Hill, the indictment charging the defendant with

aggravated rape stated:

[the defendant] did unlawfully sexually penetrate [the victim] a

person less than thirteen (13) years of age, in violation of Tennessee

Code Annotated 39-13-502, all of which is against the peace and

dignity of the State of Tennessee.

Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727. For purposes of comparison, Count 1 in this case states that

[the defendant] unlawfully and feloniously did have unlawful sexual

penetration of [the victim], a female child under the age of 13 years,

contrary to the Statute and against the peace and dignity of the State

of Tennessee . . . .

Neither the Hill indictment nor Count 1 allege any culpable mental state; the only difference between

the two is that in Hill the applicable statute was numerically referenced, whereas in this case, Count

1 references “the Statute.”

Hill clearly held that an indictment need not specify a culpable mental state as long as “the

language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of notice to the

accused of the charge against which the accused must defend.” Id. at 726. Thus, an indictment is

not rendered void for failing to allege a specific mental state as long as it reasonably identifies the

nature of the criminal conduct alleged by the State in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202

and the requisite mental state can be inferred from the alleged conduct.

In reviewing Count 1 in this case, we note its striking similarity to the indictment we

reviewed in Hill. See id. at 727. As such, we find that the analysis we applied in Hill applies

equally in this case. See id. at 726-29 (“Obviously, the act for which the defendant is indicted,

‘unlawfully sexual penetrat[ing]’ a person under the age of thirteen, is committable only if the

principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing, or reckless. Thus, the required mental state may
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be inferred from the nature of the criminal conduct alleged.”). Thus, we find that Count 1 now under

review is not void for failing to allege a culpable mental state.

Having concluded that Count 1 is valid, our review now shifts to a consideration of whether,

in light of Hill, Count 2 is fatally defective for failing to provide the appellant with sufficient notice

of the crime charged. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). As regards Count 2, the issue

is closer. Hill still applies to excuse Count 2's failure to allege a culpable mental state, but there is

an additional factor. Count 2 states that

the aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully and feloniously have carnal

knowledge of [the victim], his wife’s daughter, contrary to the Statute

and against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee . . . .

It appears from its language that Count 2 was an attempt to charge the appellant with the

crime of incest under a then recently repealed version of Tennessee’s incest statute. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-4-306(a)(1) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1989) (providing that “[n]o man shall

marry or have carnal knowledge of his . . . wife’s daughter.”) However, when the offense charged

in Count 2 was committed, the crime of incest was punished by a newly enacted incest statute, which

provided that

(a) A person commits incest who engages in sexual penetration as

defined in § 39-13-501, with a person he or she knows to be, without

regard to legitimacy: 

(1) The person’s parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt,

nephew, niece, stepparent, stepchild, adoptive parent [or] adoptive

child . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302(a), (a)(1) (Supp. 1989). Thus, instead of properly tracking the new

statute’s language and charging that the appellant had engaged in “sexual penetration” of the victim,

Count 2 alleged that the appellant had “carnal knowledge” of the victim. The appellant argues that

Count 2's failure to use the statutory term “sexual penetration” instead of the term actually used--

“carnal knowledge”--rendered notice of the charge against him under Count 2 insufficient and, for

habeas corpus purposes, Count 2 of the indictment void.

In our analysis of the appellant’s argument, we note that sexual penetration, as defined in

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501, means “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or

any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital

or anal openings of the victim’s, the [appellant’s], or any other person’s body, but emission of semen

is not required. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) (Supp. 1989). In comparison, though the term

“carnal knowledge” was not statutorily defined in 1989, case law provided that
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[t]here is ‘carnal knowledge’ or ‘sexual penetration’ in a legal sense

if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female

by the sexual organ of the male. It is not necessary that the vagina be

entered or that the hymen be ruptured; the entering of the vulva or

labia is sufficient.

Walker v. State, 273 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tenn. 1954) (citations omitted).

A comparison of the two definitions shows that though “sexual penetration” can encompass

various types of penetration, the term “carnal knowledge” refers to only one type of penetration.

Though the indictment incorrectly charged the appellant with carnal knowledge of his stepchild, acts

amounting to “carnal knowledge” are included in the definition of “sexual penetration.” As a result,

the appellant was provided with specific notice of the manner in which he had committed the offense

for which he was charged.

In addition, we find that Count 2 complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982), which

provides that

[t]he indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in

ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such

a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know

what is intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable

the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). In this case, Count 2 supplied the appellant with plain,

understandable notice that he was charged with the crime of incest involving his stepchild, in

violation of Tennessee law, during a specified period of time. As such, this Court finds Count 2

valid.

V

After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that Count 1 is not void for failing

to allege a culpable mental state. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). Additionally,

Count 2 is valid because the appellant was provided with sufficient notice of the manner in which

he committed the offense for which he was charged and because Count 2 complies with the

requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As such, we affirm the Court of Criminal

Appeals’s denial of the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief. 

Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant.