J-S48043-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

R.T. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

J.T. 

 Appellant 

v. 

C.V. 

 No. 570 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order of March 18, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Civil Division at No.: 11560-2014 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DONOHUE, J., and WECHT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

 J.T. (“Mother”) appeals the March 8, 2015 order that granted primary 

physical custody of G.A. (“Child”), born in May 2009, to Mother and partial 

physical custody to R.T. (“Grandmother”). We vacate and remand with 

instructions. 

 The trial court summarized the factual history as follows: 

[The appellant] in this action is [Mother], age 27, the natural 

mother of [Child]. Mother now lives in Allison Park, 

Pennsylvania, having relocated there in September of 2014. For 

the first 26 years of her life she resided with her mother[, 

Grandmother]. . . . [Grandmother] resides in Beaver County, 

Pennsylvania. 

[Child] was born while [Mother] was living with [Grandmother.] 

The evidence reflected that the natural father of [Child, C.V. 

(“Father”),] has played no part in [Child’s] life to this date. It 
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should be noted that [Father] did not appear for any of the 

proceedings leading up to the trial and was not present during 

the trial.[1] [Mother] and [Father] were never married[,] have 

never resided together and have had virtually no relationship 

since the birth of [Child]. 

The evidence further reflected that [Mother] was the primary 

caregiver of [Child], but she also worked at a casino in 

Pittsburgh and would be away from [Grandmother’s] residence 

for significant periods of time for purposes of work and also 

spent overnights after work with her present fiancé, with whom 

she now lives. When [Mother] was not available, [Grandmother] 

took over the caretaking responsibilities for [Child], even to the 

extent of taking [Child] to work with her as confirmed by 

testimony by her employer, a veterinarian. From that 

testimony, it appeared that [Child] was a regular at 

[Grandmother’s] work and well-liked and encouraged to be there 

by the employer. The testimony also reflected that

[Grandmother] would handle other responsibilities for [Child] 

such as doctors’ visits and matters at pre-school/school. 

The testimony clearly revealed that [Mother] had no problem 

permitting [Grandmother] to watch and care for [Child] up until 

the fall of 2014. In September of 2014, [Mother] and [Child] left 

[Grandmother’s] residence. [Mother] claimed that she was 

forced out of the residence by [Grandmother,] while

[Grandmother] testified that [Mother] left with [Child] to live 

with her fiancé. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/23/2015, at 2-3 (footnote omitted). 

 On October 16, 2014, Grandmother filed a complaint for partial 

custody of Child. Following custody conciliation, the hearing officer entered 

a proposed custody order granting Grandmother partial custody on 

December 12, 2014. Both Mother and Grandmother filed exceptions to the 

order. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Father also did not participate in this appeal. 
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 The court held a custody trial on March 17, 2015. At trial, Mother 

testified that, since September 2014, she has livied with her fiancé, K.B., 

and Child. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 3/17/2015, at 9. Mother and K.B. 

had a son, E.B., approximately six weeks prior to trial. Id. at 10. Mother 

testified that she and Grandmother tried to get along when Child was 

younger and that Grandmother helped with Child. However, Mother 

asserted that the relationship between Mother and Grandmother became 

hostile and Grandmother was verbally abusive. Id. at 13. Mother testified 

that Grandmother kicked Mother and Child out of the house in September 

2014. Id. at 12. 

When Mother returned to work after having Child, Mother worked 

evening hours and Grandmother watched Child. Id. at 58-59. Mother 

admitted to spending the night with K.B. after work two or three times per 

month while Grandmother cared for Child. Id. at 60. Although 

Grandmother watched Child for twenty to thirty hours per week while Mother 

worked, Mother did not like some of Grandmother’s behavior around Child. 

Id. at 16-18. Mother was concerned that Grandmother would bathe with 

Child and would allow Child to swim in the pool without a bathing suit. Id.

at 17, 18. Grandmother also spanked Child against Mother’s wishes. Id. at 

20. 

Mother alleged that Grandmother sold prescription medicine and grew 

marijuana at the home. Id. at 20, 22, 23. Mother also stated that she 

dated J.K. for six months in 2005, and then Grandmother dated J.K. off and 
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on from 2005 through at least September 2014. Id. at 26-27. Mother 

stated that Grandmother becoming involved with J.K. caused problems with 

Mother and Grandmother’s relationship. Id. at 27. Mother was also 

concerned about J.K. because he used drugs in the home. Id. at 33. 

Grandmother has guns in the home that were left loaded and were not in a 

locked cabinet. Id. at 29-30. Mother admitted that she also owns a gun. 

Id. at 67. Mother’s brother, Ro.T., also lives with Grandmother, and Mother 

alleged that he uses drugs and is physically and verbally abusive. Id. at 34-

36. 

Mother testified that, since overnight visits with Grandmother began, 

Child has had issues with the sleeping arrangements, and Grandmother 

feeds Child food that Mother does not permit her to eat. Id. at 46-47. Child 

has been defiant upon returning from Grandmother’s house. Id. at 48-49. 

Further, Grandmother will not communicate with Mother regarding Child. 

Id. at 48. 

K.B. testified that Grandmother and Mother had “a broken 

relationship,” and that Grandmother was demeaning to Mother. Id. at 76. 

K.B. believed that Grandmother loved Child, but thought that Grandmother 

said inappropriate things to Child. Id. at 78-79. K.B. stated that Child likes 

to go to Grandmother’s house but does not like to sleep there. Id. at 84. 

K.B. also noted that Child seems less engaged with the family when she 

returns from Grandmother’s house. Id. at 85. K.B. and Mother started the 
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paperwork for K.B. to adopt Child, but were still in the process of trying to 

get Father to relinquish his parental rights. Id. at 86-87. 

Grandmother testified that only she and Ro.T. live in her residence. 

Id. at 105. After Mother went back to work after having Child, Mother and 

Grandmother agreed that Mother would work nights and weekends because 

Grandmother worked during normal business hours during that week. With 

that schedule, someone would always be home with Child. Id. at 107. 

Grandmother took Child swimming and on trips with her two other 

grandchildren who live in the area. Id. at 108. Grandmother also took Child 

to work when Mother was unavailable during weekdays or when Mother was 

sleeping after a late shift. Id. at 108-09. Grandmother testified that she 

took Child to some dentist and pediatrician visits. Id. at 109. Grandmother 

described herself as “the other parent” and stated that she and Mother 

discussed how Child would be raised. Id. at 125. 

Grandmother testified that the guns in her home are not loaded and 

that she keeps them in a cabinet, but that the children cannot access the 

cabinet. Id. at 112, 134-35. Grandmother denied that J.K. was living in her 

house and stated that she had not seen him since before Mother left the 

house. Grandmother testified that she knew that her relationship with J.K. 

could strain her relationship with Mother. Id. at 145. Grandmother 

admitted that J.K. used drugs, but stated that her relationship with him 

ended in 2010, although he still occasionally came around the house through 
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early 2014. Id. at 146-47. Grandmother denied that she grew marijuana or 

sold prescription drugs. Id. at 117-18. 

Grandmother also denied that she kicked Mother and Child out of the 

house. Id. at 130. Grandmother admitted that she argues with Mother, and 

sometimes the arguments become heated. Id. at 131. Grandmother denied 

calling Mother names or disparaging Mother in front of Child. Id. at 132. 

Grandmother also argues with her son on occasion, but not in front of Child. 

Id. at 136-37. 

Grandmother testified that the first scheduled visit was not an 

overnight visit as ordered. Instead, Mother offered to bring Child to a 

restaurant to meet with Grandmother and Mother stayed during the visit. 

Although Child was hesitant at first, Grandmother thought the visit went 

well. Id. at 118-19. At the second visit, K.B. notified Grandmother that the 

visit had to start Friday instead of Saturday as ordered. Id. at 121. 

Grandmother testified that the visit went well and that she and Child played 

games. Id. at 121-22. At the third visit, Child was excited to see 

Grandmother and was able to spend time with Child’s cousins. Id. at 123. 

F.S., Grandmother’s daughter and Mother’s half-sister, testified that 

she and her daughter are at Grandmother’s house at least once per week. 

Id. at 158. F.S. observed Grandmother and Child and believed their 

relationship to be that of a typical family. Id. at 159. F.S. was present for 

part of two overnight visits between Grandmother and Child. She thought 

Child was more reserved than usual, but that Child loved Grandmother and 
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had a good time. Id. at 160-61. F.S. admitted that sometimes family 

members argued and yelled. Id. at 162-63. However, F.S. had no concerns 

about her daughter or Child being in the house. Id. at 163. 

Grandmother’s employer, Richard Bell, a veterinarian, testified that 

Grandmother brings Child to work, and that he knew Child and Grandmother 

well. Grandmother has worked for Mr. Bell since 1997. Id. at 98. He 

characterized Grandmother and Child’s relationship as normal for a 

grandparent and grandchild. Id. at 99. Mr. Bell noted that Child was at the 

workplace frequently and, although he initially was reluctant, he believed it 

was necessary and permitted Child to be there. He also testified that Child 

liked being in the office and playing with the animals. Id. at 100. 

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court discussed its findings of 

fact and conclusions of law on the record and gave its ruling from the bench. 

On March 18, 2015, the trial court issued its order, memorializing the prior 

day’s ruling. The order awarded legal custody and primary physical custody 

to Mother. Father was granted partial custody, as he and Mother agreed. 

Grandmother was awarded partial physical custody on the second weekend 

of every month; one day during the Christmas, Thanksgiving, and Easter 

holidays; and ten consecutive days between June and August. Grandmother 

received a total of thirty-seven days each year. 

On April 1, 2015, Mother filed a notice of appeal and concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and 

(b). On April 23, 2015, the trial court filed its opinion. 
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Mother raises six issues for our review: 

I. Whether the Court erred in granting partial custody to 

[Grandmother] over the objection of a fit parent when 

[Mother] has a fundamental constitutional right to the 

custody, care and control of her child. 

II. Whether the Court erred when considering the 

Pennsylvania § 5328 custody factors, it failed to heavily 

weigh those factors in the favor of [Mother] in a custody 

dispute between the natural mother and the maternal

grandmother. 

III. Whether the Court erred by failing to consider the impact 

on the parent-child relationship when awarding partial 

custody to [Grandmother]. 

IV. Whether the Court erred when it failed to give weight to 

the level of conflict between the parties and the willingness 

and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. 

V. Whether the Court erred when [Grandmother] failed to 

prove that obtaining partial custody of [Child] was in the 

best interest of [Child]. 

VI. Whether the remarks of the trial court judge regarding 

[Mother] established an appearance of impropriety such 

that the decisions regarding custody were the result of 

bias. 

Mother’s Brief at 3. 

 Mother’s last issue is waived. It was not included in Mother’s concise 

statement. See Pa.R.A.P.1925(b); Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793 A.2d 

939, 944 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“Failure to include an issue in a 1925(b) 

statement waives that issue for purposes of appellate review.”). Therefore, 

we will not review that issue. 

 Mother first challenges the trial court’s grant of partial custody to 

Grandmother. Mother suggests that the grandparent custody statute is 
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unconstitutional when applied to a grandparent seeking custody against the 

wishes of his or her own child, as opposed to a grandparent disputing 

custody with his or her grandchild’s other parent. Mother recognizes that 

our Supreme Court found the statute’s predecessor to be constitutional, but 

argues that the ruling should be limited to the facts of that case in which the 

maternal grandmother sought partial custody from the grandchild’s father. 

Mother’s Brief at 9-13. 

 Mother cites 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5311. That statute was repealed, 

effective January 24, 2011, and was replaced by the following: 

In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating to 

standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody), 

grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action under 

this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised physical 

custody in the following situations: 

(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent or 

grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action under this 

section; 

(2) where the parents of the child have been separated for a 

period of at least six months or have commenced and continued 

a proceeding to dissolve their marriage; or 

(3) when the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive 

months, resided with the grandparent or great-grandparent, 

excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the home, 

and is removed from the home by the parents, an action must 

be filed within six months after the removal of the child from the 

home. 
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325.2

 In Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006), our Supreme Court 

addressed whether now-repealed section 5311 violated a parent’s due 

process rights. In that case, the maternal grandmother and the child had a 

close relationship prior to the mother’s death. The grandmother saw the 

child almost daily in the two years during which the mother had cancer. The 

grandmother cared for the child when the mother was unable to do so or 

had doctors’ appointments and transported the child to and from school 

occasionally. After the mother’s death, the father cut off contact and the 

grandmother only saw the child on three occasions in the year after the 

mother died. Id. at 877. 

 The grandmother filed for partial custody. After a hearing, the trial 

court granted the grandmother’s request and awarded her one weekend per 

month and a week in the summer. In doing so, the trial court applied the 

presumption that, as a fit parent, the father was acting in the child’s best 

interest and that the grandmother had the burden of proof. The trial court 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Section 5325 consolidated the three prior statutes that provided 

grandparents with standing to pursue custody under the prior statutory 

scheme: 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5311 (providing grandparent standing when the 

grandparent’s child was deceased); § 5312 (when the parents were divorced 

or separated); and § 5313 (when the child lived with the grandparent for at 

least twelve months). The previous sections each included a requirement 

that grandparent custody or visitation must be in the child’s best interest 

and must not interfere with the parent-child relationship. That requirement 

can now be found in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c). 
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considered the frequent contact between the child and the grandmother and 

their strong relationship. Id. at 877. The trial court considered that the 

father was unlikely to permit continuing contact without a court order. The 

trial court found that partial custody for the grandmother was in the child’s 

best interest, notwithstanding the presumption that the father’s decision to 

limit contact was in the child’s best interest. Id. at 878. Finally, the trial 

court weighed whether partial custody would interfere with the parent-child 

relationship and found that partial custody would not distress the child or 

adversely impact the father’s ability to parent the child. Therefore, the trial 

court concluded that the grandmother had rebutted the presumption that 

the father’s decision to limit contact was in the child’s best interest. Id. at 

879. 

 Our Supreme Court affirmed that “the right to make decisions 

concerning the care, custody, and control of one’s children is one of the 

oldest fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause,” and that 

court must apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 885-86 (defining strict scrutiny as 

determining “if the infringement is supported by a compelling state interest 

and if the infringement is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest”). The 

Court identified the compelling state interest as “the state’s longstanding 

interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children.” Id. at 

886. The Court also noted that the section 5311 was narrowly tailored, 

applying only to grandparents whose children had died. The statute 

furthered the policy interest of permitting continuing contact with 
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grandparents “when the parent is deceased, divorced, or separated.” Id. 

Further, it recognized that “grandparents have assumed increased roles in 

their grandchildren’s lives and our cumulative experience demonstrates the 

many potential benefits of strong inter-generational ties.” Id. While the 

Court recognized that a grandparent’s desire for partial custody would not 

override a fit parent’s decision to limit contact in all cases, it refused to close 

the courtroom doors to a grandparent when the parent chose to limit 

contact. Id. at 887. 

 The Hiller Court also observed that, in addition to the language of the 

statute, our precedent had established “a presumption in favor of a fit 

parent.” Id. at 887. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court 

had found a Washington statute on third-party standing in custody 

unconstitutional due in part to the statute’s failure to provide such a 

presumption. Id. (discussing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70 

(2000)). In reviewing precedent, the Hiller Court stated that it had 

“maintain[ed] a presumption in favor of parents that meaningfully tips the 

balance in the parent’s favor.” Id. at 888. 

In conclusion, the Hiller Court held: 

[T]he stringent requirements of Section 5311, as applied in this 

case, combined with the presumption that parents act in a child’s 

best interest, sufficiently protect the fundamental right of 

parents without requiring any additional demonstration of 

unfitness. . . . The trial court in the case sub judice applied the 

necessary presumption and gave “special weight” to the decision 

of [the father]. Nevertheless, the court found that [the 

grandmother] had met this burden given the court’s 

consideration that the child benefited from spending time with 
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[the grandmother], with whom he had a longstanding and close 

relationship and from whom he received emotional support in 

the aftermath of the loss of his mother. We, therefore, find that 

the trial court satisfied the requirements of Section 5311 and 

that its application survives our strict scrutiny. 

Id. at 890 (emphasis added). 

 The statute at issue in Hiller only provided standing for the parent of 

a deceased parent. At that time, a different statute, not considered in 

Hiller, provided standing to a grandparent when the parents were divorced 

or separated.3 However, the compelling state interest and the requirements 

that make the statute narrowly tailored are present in section 5325. The 

predecessor section 5311 was available only to the grandparent whose child 

had died. Thus, section 5311 cases only presented situations in which the 

grandparent was never directly related to the parent from whom partial 

custody was sought and not, like here, where the parent from whom partial 

custody is sought is the grandparent’s child. However, that distinction was 

written into the statute and is not part of the Hiller Court’s analysis in 

finding section 5311 constitutional. We see no principled distinction between 

the basis for the Hiller Court’s conclusions regarding section 5311 and the

substance of section 5325. Therefore, we reject Mother’s argument that 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We have held that section 5325(2), relating to standing for 

grandparents where the parents are divorce or separated, and its 

predecessor section 5312, provides standing to grandparents when the 

parents were never married and/or had never lived together. See L.A.L. v. 

V.D., 72 A.3d 690, 694 (Pa. Super. 2013). 
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section 5325 does not permit a trial court to grant partial custody to a 

grandparent when the opposing parent is the grandparent’s child.4

 Having found that to be the case, we still must afford Mother relief 

because the trial court did not apply the appropriate presumption. The trial 

court on the record reviewed the sixteen factors enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5328(a), which it must do in determining a child’s best interest. N.T. at 

170-82. Further, in its opinion, the trial court explained its rationale 

pursuant to the additional factors for grandparent custody set forth in 

section 5328(c): 

(c) Grandparents and great-grandparents. – 

(1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised physical 

custody to a party who has standing under section 5325(1) or 

(2)(relating to standing for partial physical custody and 

supervised physical custody), the court shall consider the 

following: 

(i) the amount of personal contact between the child and 

the party prior to the filing of the action; 

(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child 

relationship; and 

(iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child. 

____________________________________________ 

4

 We also reject Mother’s argument that the fact that this case involves 

partial physical custody instead of visitation is controlling. Mother’s Brief at 

12. In Hiller, the grandmother was awarded partial custody, which our 

Supreme Court found to be constitutional as applied. Hiller, 904 A.2d at 

877. As well, our custody statutes no longer include a separate type of 

physical custody called visitation. Instead, there is shared, primary, partial, 

sole and supervised physical custody. Compare 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322 with

§ 5302; § 5323 with § 5303. 
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c); see T.C.O. at 6-7. The 5328(c) factors mirror those 

set forth in the predecessor section 5311 which the Hiller Court found 

determinative when upholding the constitutionality of section 5311; namely, 

the amount of pre-litigation contact between the child and the grandparent, 

and whether the partial custody would interfere with the parent-child 

relationship. Hiller, 804 A.2d at 887. However, the trial court does not 

mention the other factor that was critical to the Hiller court’s holding: the 

presumption in favor of a fit parent’s decision and Grandmother’s burden in 

overcoming that presumption. Because there is no evidence that the trial 

court considered the presumption that “meaningfully tips the balance in the 

parent’s favor,” id. at 888, we must vacate the trial court’s custody order. 

We remand the case to the trial court so that it may review the evidence 

with due consideration for the presumption in Mother’s favor and to 

determine whether Grandmother has met her burden in overcoming that 

presumption. 

 Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/24/2015