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CARLTON E. BEYOR v. LAURA PAVANO BEYOR

(AC 36546)

Beach, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued March 11—officially released July 28, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Windham, Fuger, J.)

Robert D. Zaslow, for the appellant (defendant).

Rachel Kittredge Shipman, with whom, on the brief,

was Ross G. Fingold, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEACH, J. In this dissolution action, the defendant,

Laura Pavano Beyor, appeals from the judgment of the

trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Carlton E. Beyor, and enforcing a premarital agreement

(agreement) that was entered into by the parties. The

defendant claims that the court erred in enforcing it

because the agreement was unconscionable at the time

of enforcement. We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The parties entered into the agreement on August 7,

2006, four days prior to their wedding ceremony. In the

agreement, each party waived any claim he or she may

have had to the property of the other, and each party

waived any ability to receive alimony or other support,

in the event of the dissolution of their marriage. The

plaintiff commenced this marital dissolution action in

October, 2010. By way of a pendente lite motion, the

plaintiff sought enforcement of the agreement. The

defendant filed an objection to that motion, arguing

that the agreement was unconscionable and thus unenforceable. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court,

Fuger, J., issued a memorandum of decision on November 29, 2011. The court found the following facts. In

2006, the defendant was employed, earning approximately $30,000 per year. She owned a home in Plainville,

which she sold after the marriage. She ‘‘cleared’’

approximately $44,000 from the sale of the house. At

that time, the plaintiff had an income of approximately

$250,000 per year and had stock holdings valued at

approximately $650,000. Following the marriage, the

defendant ceased working and moved into a house

owned solely by the plaintiff. At the time of the hearing,

the plaintiff’s net worth was approximately $4.5 million

and the defendant’s net worth was approximately

$26,000. Both parties were in reasonably good health,

consistent with their ages, and capable of performing

substantial gainful employment. The defendant was the

first to mention that a prenuptial agreement would be

acceptable to her. At the time of the execution of the

agreement, both parties were represented by attorneys,

who had ample opportunity to review the agreement.

In its November 29, 2011, memorandum of decision,

the court disagreed with the defendant’s contention

that the agreement was unconscionable and thus unenforceable under General Statutes § 46b-36g (a) (2). The

court examined the agreement to determine unconscionability both at the time of its execution in 2006, and at

the time enforcement was sought, in 2011. It determined

that at neither point was the agreement or its enforcement unconscionable. The court noted that the plaintiff

was wealthy in both 2006 and 2011, and, although the

defendant had much more modest means than the plaintiff had at both times, the court found that the disparity

in wealth between the parties was substantially the
same in 2011 as it had been in 2006. The court found

that the agreement was not forced upon the defendant.

She had ‘‘ample opportunity to review and understand

the agreement and indeed, made productive use of that

opportunity.’’ The court found that at the time of execution of the agreement, the defendant was represented

by legal counsel, and there had been full disclosure by

the parties as to their respective financial situations.

The court noted, with regard to the situation in 2011,

that although ‘‘there certainly are some arguments to

be made that the plaintiff is lacking in chivalry and

respect for the woman that he claimed to love in 2006

when he seeks to remove her from his life with no

economic support considering the five years they spent

together, there is, given the prenuptial agreement, no

requirement that he do so. The defendant, although five

years older, is not unemployable, medically disabled,

nor lacking in skills that would permit her to be selfsufficient. She will not become destitute and a ward of

the state if the prenuptial agreement is enforced against

her,1 although the financial quality of her life will

undoubtedly diminish.’’

The defendant filed a motion to reargue, claiming

that Oldani v. Oldani, 132 Conn. App. 609, 34 A.3d 407

(2011), which was released shortly after the trial court’s

November 29, 2011 decision, required a finding that the

agreement was unenforceable under § 46b-36g (a) (3)

because of the plaintiff’s omission of his Schedule E

income from his financial disclosure at the time the

agreement was executed. The court, Fuger, J., denied

the motion. In January, 2014, the court, Boland, J.,

issued a decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and

upholding the agreement.2 This appeal followed.

The defendant first claims that the court erred in

determining that, contrary to the provisions of § 46b36g (a) (2), the parties’ agreement was enforceable in

July, 2011, when the plaintiff sought to enforce its terms.

We disagree.

‘‘[A] court’s determination whether a prenuptial

agreement is unenforceable pursuant to § 46b-36g presents a mixed question of fact and law over which our

review is plenary. . . . In reviewing the court’s decision, we must therefore determine whether the court’s

conclusions are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the record.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 615.

‘‘[A]n antenuptial agreement is a type of contract

and must, therefore, comply with ordinary principles

of contract law. . . . [A]ntenuptial agreements are to

be construed according to the principles of construction

applicable to contracts generally. . . . [A]ntenuptial

agreements relating to the property of the parties, and

more specifically, to the rights of the parties to that

property upon the dissolution of the marriage, are generally enforceable . . . [if] the circumstances of the
parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so

beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the

contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement

to work injustice. . . . [T]he party seeking to challenge

the enforceability of the antenuptial contract bears a

heavy burden. . . . This heavy burden comports with

the well settled general principle that [c]ourts of law

must allow parties to make their own contracts. . . .

It is established well beyond the need for citation that

parties are free to contract for whateverterms on which

they may agree. . . . Whether provident or improvident, an agreement moved on calculated considerations

is entitled to the sanction of the law . . . .’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Schoenborn v. Schoenborn, 144 Conn. App.

846, 853–54, 74 A.3d 482 (2013).

Prenuptial agreements entered into on or after October 1, 1995, are governed by the Connecticut Premarital

Agreement Act, General Statutes § 46b-36a et seq.3 See

Friezo v. Friezo, 281Conn. 166, 182, 914A.2d 533 (2007).

Section 46b-36g (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A

premarital agreement or amendment shall not be

enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is

sought proves that . . . [t]he agreement was unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement

is sought . . . .’’

‘‘Unconscionable is a word that defies lawyer-like

definition. . . . The classic definition of an unconscionable contract is one which no man in his senses, not

under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and

which no fair and honest man would accept, on the

other. . . . The doctrine of unconscionability, as a

defense to contract enforcement, generally requires a

showing . . . of an absence of meaningful choice on

the part of one of the parties together with contract

terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other

party . . . . The purpose of the doctrine of unconscionability is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

McKenna v. Delente, 123 Conn. App. 146, 158, 2 A.3d

38 (2010). ‘‘[T]he question of unconscionability is a matter of law to be decided by the court based on all the

facts and circumstances of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153,

163, 989 A.2d 1060 (2010).

The defendant argues that the enforcement of the

agreement in 2011 was unconscionable. The defendant

was to receive no alimony, despite the discrepancy in

the parties’ income and net worth. The defendant had

sold her house after the parties were married, and she

lived in the plaintiff’s house. The defendant had no

funds with which to secure a residence. Section 13.1

of the agreement provided that the parties were to

reside at the plaintiff’s residence following their marriage, and, if the marriage were to end, the defendant
was to vacate the residence within sixty days.

The parties, however, had mutually agreed to the

terms of the agreement. At the time the agreement was

entered into, there was a marked discrepancy in the

parties’ income and net worth;4the discrepancy existed

to a greater extent at the time of enforcement. The

court found that at the time of execution, the defendant

earned approximately $30,000 per year, and at the time

of enforcement, she had a net worth of approximately

$26,000. The court further found that at the time the

agreement was executed, the plaintiff had an income

of approximately $250,000 per year and stock holdings

of approximately $650,000, and at the time of enforcement, he had a net worth of approximately $4.5 million.

The court found that the disparity in the parties’ financial situations was ‘‘substantially the same’’ at the time

of execution and at the time of enforcement.

In Winchester v. McCue, 91 Conn. App. 721, 725, 882

A.2d 143, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 922, 888 A.2d 91 (2005),

the plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court erred

in enforcing the parties’ prenuptial agreement and that

‘‘enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable because the defendant’s financial situation at the

time of dissolution was beyond the contemplation of

the parties when the agreement was executed.’’ This

court in Winchester analyzed the plaintiff’s claim under

the third prong of McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482,

489, 436 A.2d 8 (1980), which provides that a prenuptial

agreement will not be enforced ‘‘where the circumstances of the parties at the time of the dissolution are

so far beyond the contemplation of the parties at the

time the agreement was made as to make enforcement

of the agreement work an injustice. . . . [W]here the

economic status of parties has changed dramatically

between the date of the agreement and the dissolution,

literal enforcement of the agreement may work injustice. Absent such unusual circumstances, however,

[prenuptial] agreements freely and fairly entered into

will be honored and enforced by the courts as written.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester v.

McCue, supra, 91 Conn. App. 729–30; see Friezo v.

Friezo, supra, 281 Conn. 186 n.23 (McHugh standards

codified in Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act).

This court concluded that the trial court properly

rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the agreement should

not be enforced because the parties could not have

contemplated that the defendant’s estate would

increase by approximately 430 percent over the course

of the marriage. Winchester v. McCue, supra, 730. This

court stated that the threshold for finding an extraordinary change in economic status is high, and that ‘‘[t]he

court [in McHugh] made clear that the change must be

so far beyond the contemplation of the parties . . . as

to make enforcement of the agreement work an injustice. . . . The . . . economic status must have

changed dramatically and that a finding that such
change has occurred would be an unusual [circumstance]. . . . We agree with the trial court that it must

have been contemplated by the parties that the defendant would continue working in the corporate arena

and that, over the course of years, his income would

increase as well as his retirement benefits and investments. These circumstances do not constitute the type

of dramatic or unusual circumstances contemplated by

McHugh.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 730–31.

Similarly, the relative economic status of the parties

has not changed dramatically in the present case. The

court’s finding that the disparity in income between the

parties was substantially similar is supported by factual

findings that are not clearly erroneous. Although the

gross difference in affluence widened, the fact that the

plaintiff was far wealthier than the defendant did not

change. Accordingly, as in Winchester, the circumstances of this case are not of the type contemplated by

McHugh. Furthermore, ‘‘Unfairness or inequality alone

does not render a postnuptial5 agreement unconscionable; spouses may agree on an unequal distribution of

assets at dissolution. [T]he mere fact that hindsight may

indicate the provisions of the agreement were improvident does not render the agreement unconscionable.

. . . Instead, the question of whether enforcement of

an agreement would be unconscionable is analogous

to determining whether enforcement of an agreement

would work an injustice. . . . Marriage, by its very

nature, is subject to unforeseeable developments, and

no agreement can possibly anticipate all future events.

Unforeseen changes in the relationship, such as having

a child, loss of employment or moving to another state,

may render enforcement ofthe agreement unconscionable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691, 705–706, 17

A.3d 17 (2011). The trial court made no findings of

unforeseen developments. Although the plaintiff had

increased his net worth during the marriage, so that

the gap widened, the fundamental nature or quality of

the difference in economic status had not changed. At

both times, the plaintiff had much more money than

the defendant; and as noted previously, the defendant

had expressly recognized in the agreement that a substantial difference in resources existed, and she nevertheless executed the agreement.

The defendant next argues that the court, Fuger, J.,

abused its discretion in denying her motion to reargue

and that the court, Boland, J., erred in incorporating

Judge Fuger’s November 29, 2011 ruling into its judgment of dissolution6 because the plaintiff had not provided adequate financial disclosure at the time the

agreement was signed. The defendant argues that the

income discrepancy between the parties ‘‘is more untenable’’ because at the time of execution in 2006, the

plaintifffailed to disclose significant perennial Schedule
E income. The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s

tax returns demonstrate that in 2006 he had Schedule

E income of $394,048, which he did not include in his

financial disclosure at the time. The defendant argues

that reversal of the present case, therefore, is required

by Oldani v. Oldani, supra, 132 Conn. App. 614–25.

Section 46b-36g (a) (3) provides in relevant part that

‘‘[a] premarital agreement or amendment shall not be

enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is

sought proves that . . . [b]efore execution of the

agreement, such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value

of property, financial obligations and income of the

other party . . . .’’ The phrase ‘‘fair and reasonable

disclosure’’ as used in § 46b-36g (a) (3) ‘‘refers to the

nature, extent and accuracy of the information to be

disclosed, and not to extraneous factors such as the

timing of the disclosure.’’ Friezo v. Friezo, supra, 281

Conn. 183. ‘‘[F]inancial disclosures by parties to a prenuptial agreement are not required to be exact or precise . . . rather . . . a fair and reasonable financial

disclosure requires each contracting party to provide

the other with a general approximation of their income,

assets and liabilities, and . . . a written schedule

appended to the agreement itself, although not absolutely necessary, is the most effective method of satisfying the statutory obligation in most circumstances.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Oldani v. Oldani, supra, 132 Conn. App. 619.

In Oldani, the defendant argued that the trial court

erred in determining that the parties’ prenuptial

agreement was enforceable because, before the execution of the agreement, the plaintiff had failed to provide

to her with a ‘‘fair and reasonable disclosure’’ of his

income in that his financial affidavit insufficiently disclosed his income pursuant to § 46b-36g (a) (3). Id.,

615–16. The plaintiff in that case appended a financial

disclosure to the prenuptial agreement, but the disclosure did not ‘‘expressly identify the amount of net

income that he had received or was entitled to receive

as a result of his various real estate investments. The

schedule [did] not provide any formula or directions

for calculating the plaintiff’s share of the rental income.

The schedule [did] not contain a statement or figure

that represents the plaintiff’s income at the time. In

fact, the word ‘income’ [did] not appear on any of the

pages of the plaintiff’s financial disclosure.’’ Id., 621.

This court analyzed the meaning of the phrase ‘‘fair and

reasonable disclosure’’ within the statutory scheme and

concluded that ‘‘[§] 46b-36g (a) (3) nevertheless provides that a prenuptial agreement is unenforceable

unless, prior to execution of the agreement, each party

gives a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount,

character and value of property, financial obligations

and income. . . . Our Supreme Court has determined

that, to be fair and reasonable, a party’s disclosure does
not need to be exact but must at least provide a general

approximation. Focusing on the information disclosed

by the plaintiff, our plenary review of the record reveals

that, although the plaintiff may have provided a sufficient approximation of his property holdings and other

financial obligations, he failed to provide the defendant

with sufficient information regarding his income prior

to her signing the prenuptial agreement. Because the

plaintiff failed to meet this burden to inform, it was

not legally and logically correct for the court to have

determined that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the court’s

dissolution judgment.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 624.

Financial disclosures need not be ‘‘exact or precise,’’

but rather a ‘‘fair and reasonable’’ disclosure must provide a ‘‘general approximation’’ of income, assets, and

liabilities. Friezo v. Friezo, supra, 281 Conn. 189, 191.

What is ‘‘fair and reasonable’’ may depend on the circumstances presented. In Oldani, the plaintiff did not

list his income on his financial disclosure. Oldani v.

Oldani, supra, 132 Conn. App. 620. Moreover, the parties had an issue regarding a minor child at the time of

enforcement, and the prenuptial agreement provided

for some alimony. Id., 611–12. Unlike the plaintiff in

Oldani, the plaintiff in the present case disclosed the

amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income, which allowed a fair view of the

plaintiff’s overall financial picture.7 There were no children of the marriage, and the agreement provided for

no alimony. In short, at the time of the execution of the

agreement, the defendant knew, based on the financial

disclosure, that the plaintiff had significantly more

income than her and, based on the agreement, she knew

that she would not be entitled to a share of the plaintiff’s

resources in the event of a divorce. The plaintiff’s 2006

federal income tax return listed on the line ‘‘[r]ental

real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations,

trusts, etc. Attach Schedule E’’ the amount of $394,048.

At the July 21, 2011 hearing on the plaintiff’s motion

to enforce the agreement, the plaintiff’s uncontested

testimony was that his Schedule E income was derived

from South Willington Limited Partnership, a rental real

estate, and Cable Technology Incorporated, a small

company. On his financial affidavit, which was attached

to the agreement, the plaintiff listed under the heading

‘‘real estate,’’ South Willington Limited Partnership and

listed it as having a value of $500,000. He also listed on

the financial affidavit under the heading ‘‘other assets,’’

that he was a 50 percent owner of ‘‘Cable Technology,

Inc.,’’ and listed the value of his ownership interest

at $2 million. Although the plaintiff did not expressly

provide the defendant with his Schedule E income, he

did disclose the sources of his Schedule E income and

the value of those sources. The disclosure provided

the defendant with a sufficient approximation of the
amount, character and value of the plaintiff’s property,

financial obligations, and income.

In the circumstances of this case, the defendant was

willing to marry the plaintiff, who had substantially

greater financial means than she with the full understanding that, pursuant to their agreement, if the marriage did not work out well, she would receive nothing

on the dissolution of their marriage. We have been provided with no legal justification for a finding of unconscionability. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim of error

is without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Cf. General Statutes § 46b-36g (b) (if enforcement of prenuptial

agreement would result in person’s becoming eligible for public assistance,

court may require party to provide supportregardless ofterms of agreement).

2 At the time of dissolution, the court stated that it was not making a

separate finding regarding the enforceability of the agreement and that the

‘‘decision to have the . . . agreement enforced today has largely to do with

the fact that that was litigated before Judge Fuger on an earlier occasion.’’

3

‘‘Prenuptial agreements entered into prior to October 1, 1995, however,

are governed by the common law, which [was] analyzed in McHugh v.

McHugh, [181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8 (1980)].’’ Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn.

691, 700, 17 A.3d 17 (2011). The Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act ‘‘was

intended to clarify McHugh, not to supplant the legal principles espoused

therein. . . . [T]he [Connecticut Premarital Agreement] [A]ct endorses,

clarifies and codifies the McHugh standards . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 186 n.23, 914

A.2d 533 (2007).

4 Significantly, the agreement expressly recognized the inequality of financial resources between the parties. Section 1.8 of the agreement provided

in relevant part: ‘‘Each of [the parties] is cognizant and aware that there is

a substantial disparity in the assets and income of the respective parties.

Notwithstanding such disparity, however, it is the intention of each of the

parties that, upon their marriage, the consequences of this Agreement shall

be binding upon the parties . . . .’’

5 We see no functional difference, for the purpose of analyzing the issue

at hand, between postnuptial and prenuptial agreements.

6 We conclude that Judge Fuger did not err in ruling on November 29,

2011, that the agreement was enforceable and did not err in denying the

defendant’s motion to reargue. We, therefore, need not address separately

the propriety of Judge Boland’s incorporation of Judge Fuger’s November

29, 2011 decision into the judgment of dissolution.

7 Although more pixels in the picture may have been preferable, the disclosure revealed assets that fairly obviously produced income, the defendant

was represented by counsel, and the defendant, by opting for no alimony,

showed no interest in fine-tuning the agreement. Pursuant to § 6.4 of the

agreement, each party had ‘‘been given the right to request additional documents from [the other] regarding [the other’s] financial status and to obtain

independent valuations or appraisals.’’