MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 9 Docket: Aro

- 19

- 110 Submitted

On	Briefs: December	17,	2019 Decided: January	23,	2020 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ. 1

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. P.S.

MEAD ,	J. [ ¶1] In	this	consolidated	appeal,	P.S. challenges	the	disposition imposed by	the	District	Court (Fort	Kent, Soucy ,	J. ) in	three	juvenile	matters

. Specifically,
P.S. argues that	the	court	abused	its	discretion or	otherwise	erred in ordering that	he	be	committed to	Long	Creek	Youth	Development	Center	(Long	Creek) for	an	indeterminate	period	up	to	age	eighteen. See 15	M.R.S.	§§ 3313 (1)

- (2),
3314 (1), 3316 (2), 3402 (1)(B)	 (2018). 2 Because	 our	language	in State	v.	J.R. , 2018 ME 117, ¶¶	24,	27, 191	A.3d	1157,	could	be	read	to	suggest	that	a	court imposing	 an	 indeterminate	 commitment	 of	 a	 juvenile	 to	 a	 Department	 of

1 Although	Justice	Hjelm	participated	in	the	appeal,	he	retired	before	this	opinion	was	certified.

2 Title	15	§§	3313 (1)

- (2) , 3314 (1) (2018)	have	since	been	amended,	though	not	in	any	way s that affect	this	case. See ,	e.g. , P.L.	2019,	ch.	474,	§§	1

- 2	(effective	Sept.	19,	2019)	(to	be	codified	at	15	M.R.S. §§ 3313(2)(F),	3314(1)(E))

.2 Corrections	facility	must	specify	a	commitment	no	shorter	in	duration	than	up to	the	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday,	and the trial court	may	have	proceeded under	 such	 a	 belief,	 we	 take	 this opportunity	 to	 clarify	 the	 law , vacate the dispositional	 orders, and	 remand	 for	 the	 court	 to revisit	 the	 disposition pursuant	to 15	M.R.S.	§§ 3314 (1) , 3316 (2)

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	“record	of	the	proceedings in	juvenile	court.” 15	M.R.S.	§	3405(2) (2018).		On	June	4,	2018, when	P.S.	was fourteen, he was	 adjudged	 to	 have	 committed	 criminal	 trespass	 (Class	 E),
17

- A M.R.S.	§ 402(1)(B) (2018)

. The court	imposed	a	disposition	of	a	thirty

- day confinement,	all	suspended ; a	one - year	 term	of	probation ; and	forty	hours	of community	service	to	be	completed	within	two	months.		Soon	after,	the	State filed	its	 first	motion	 for	 probation	 revocation,	 alleging that P.S.	 had violated probation	conditions	by	possessing	alcohol,	failing	to	complete	the	forty	hours of	community	service,	and	refusing	to	comply	with a curfew. P.S.	admitted	to violating the conditions	 of	 his	 probation,	 at	which	 time	 the court ( Nelson, J. ) partially	 revoked his probation	 and	 ordered	 that	 he	 complete	 forty hours	 of community	service	within	thirty	days.3 [¶ 3 ] The	State	filed	second	and	third	motions	for	probation	revocation on	November	15	and	December	11,	2018. In	addition	to the allegat ions that	P.S. violated the	 conditions	 of	 his probation , the	 State charged	 four	 new misdemeanors:	criminal	mischief	(Class	D), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	806 (1)(A) (2018),	for destroying	 his	 mother’s	 artwork;	 domestic	 violence	 assault	 (Class D),
17

- A M.R.S.	 §	 207

- A (1)(A) (2018),	 for	 assaulting	his	 sister;	 assault	 (Class	D),
17

- A	M.R.S.	§	207 (1)(A) (2018),	for	assaulting	a	student	at	school;	and	criminal mischief	(Class D),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	806 (1)(A) ,	for	damaging	a	school	laptop. [¶ 4 ] On	March 4, 2019,	the	court ( Souc y,	J. ) held	a	hearing to	consider	the State’s	 motion s for probation	 revocation	 and	 the	 four	 new charges .	 	 At	 the hearing, P.S.

— who	 was	 not	 yet	 fifteen	 years	 old

— admitted to	 all	 four new offenses	 and	 the	 probation	 violations

. The	 State	 advocated	 for	 the	 court	 to impose	 a disposition of	 indeterminate	 commitment	 until	 age	 eighteen

. P.S. argued for	 a	 thirty

- day	 confinement

. The court revoked	 P.S.’s	 probation and imposed	a	disposition	of	commitment to	Long	Creek	for	an	indetermin ate period up	to	age	eighteen. The	court	stated, [T]ypically	 I	 think	 we could	 set	 you	 up	 with	 really	 intensive services	in	the	community	.	.	.	and	I	think,	in	fact,	we’ve	tried	to	do some	of	that.	.	.	.		But	ideally	we’d	have	other	services	available	as well	that	are	perhaps	a	bit	more	assertive	and	are	a	bit	more	local. We	 don’t	 have	 those	 services,	 and I’m	 satisfied	 there	 is	 no4 alternative	but	 to	commit	 you	 to	 Long	 Creek,	and	 I	 don’t	 think	 a shock	sentence	is	going	to	do	it. It’s	going	to	be [until] age 18

. [¶ 5 ] P.S.	timely	appeal ed the	disposition. See 15	M.R.S.	§ 3402 (1)(B)

. 3
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 6 ] In	 a comprehensive list,	 15	 M.R.S.	 § 331 4(1) outlines	 the dispositional	 alternatives	 available	 to	 the	 juvenile	 court,	 including home supervision under court
- imposed	 conditions , participation	 in	 a supervised work	or	service	program , a	period	of	confinement	not	to	exceed	thirty	days , and commitment	to	a	juvenile	correctional	facility

. 15	M.R.S.	§	3314(1)(A),	(B), (F ) , (H)

. S ection 3316 (2)(A) expounds on juvenile	commitments	to	the	Department of	 Corrections that	 are	 ordered	 under	 section	 3314 (1) (F) and provides	 in relevant	part, A	commitment	of	a	juvenile	to	a	Department	of	Corrections	juvenile corrections	 facility	 pursuant	 to	 section 3314 mus t	 be	 for	 an indeterminate	 period	 not	 to	 extend	 beyond	 the	 juvenile’s 18th birthday unless	the	court expressly	further	limits or	extends	the indeterminate	commitment, as	long	as	the	court	does	not	limit	the commitment	 to	 less	 than	 one	 year nor	 extend	 the	 co mmitment beyond	a	juvenile’s	21st	birthday	and	as	long	as	an	order	does	not result	 in	 a	 commitment	 of	 less	 than	 one	 year,	 unless	 the commitment	is	for	an	indeterminate	period	not	to	extend	beyond the	juvenile’s	21st	birthday.

3 In	 addition	 to	 briefs	 from	 the	 parties,	 we	 were	 provided	 a	 joint	 brief	 from	 a	 group	 of organizations	servi ng	as	amici	curiae	pursuant	to	M.R.	App.	P. 7A (e). The	organizations	that	signed onto	the	amicus	brief	in	support	of	P.S.	include	the	ACLU	of	Maine	Foundation,	Maine	Association	of Criminal	Defense	Lawyers,	Disability	Rights	Maine,	and	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocat es	and	Defenders.5
15	M.R.S.	§ 3316 (2)(A) ( e mpha s e s	added). [¶ 7 ] In	 other	 words ,	 if	 the juvenile court decides to	 order the commitment	of	a	juvenile to	a	Department	of	Corrections	facility pursuant	to section	3314(1)(F) ,	that indeterminate commitment will be	for	a period	up	to the	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday, unless the	court	decides	 to	limit	or	extend the	 commitment	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 section	 3316 (2) (A)

. R elevant to	 the present	matter,	the	court	could	not	have	limited	P.S.’s	commitment	to	a	period of	“less	than	one	year.” 1 5 M.R.S.	§ 3316(2)(A). In	sum,	the	statute	provides the court	 a	 range	 of	 discretion for calculating	 a	 juvenile’s period	 of
commitment

. [¶ 8 ] Although	 we	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 the	 court’s	 understanding, the record gives	us	reason	to	believe	that ,	once	the	court	decided	to	commit	P.S.	to Long	 Creek, it may	 have	 felt	 compelled	 to	 order him committed up	 to his eighteenth	birthday. At	the	hearing,	the	court stated	that	it	believed	there	was “no	 alternative	 but	 to	 commit	 [P.S.]	 to	 Long Creek”	 until	 he	 reached	 age eighteen.		Further, P.S.	advocated	for	a	thirty

- day	confinement at	the	hearing , and	it	appears	that	his attorney may	have m isunderstood the	court’s	ability	to limit	 a commitment to	 somewhere between at	 least one	 year	 and	 P.S.’s6 eighteenth	birthday. 4 Given these	observations,	the	court	may	have	operated under	 the	 belief	 that	 its	 indeterminate	 sentence must extend	 until	 P.S.’s eighteenth	birthday and	that it was	without	discretion	to	impose	a	lesser	period of	commitment. [¶ 9 ] We	 acknowledge	 that	 our	 language	 in State	 v.	 J.R. may	 have contributed	to	such	a	belief

— one	that, if	held	by	the juvenile court,	would	have resulted	in an	incorrect	application	of	the	law. In J.R. ,	we stated,	“The	length	of the	institutional disposition	ordered	by	the	court	was	mandated	by	statute	as an	 indeterminate period	 not	 to	 exceed	 J.R.’s	 eighteenth	 birthday.”
2018 ME 117,	 ¶ ¶ 24, 27, 191	 A.3d	 1157 ( “ By imposing	 the minimum	 term permissible for	an	indeterminate	commitment	 to	Long	Creek,	 the	court	acted within	its	discretion	and	did	not	err	in	applying	the	mandates	of	section 3313 to	 J.R.’s	 specific	 needs

. ”	 (emphasis	 added))

. We	 recognize	 that	 the	 two quotations above,	 when	 removed	 from	 the	 context	 of J.R. ,	 could	 lead	 to	 the

4 At	the	hearing,	P.S. ’s	attorney requested	a	thirty

- day	confinement,	stating,	“ [P] art	of	the	reason why	we	picked	30	days	is	because	that’s	the	only	alternative	we	have	short	of	indeterminate	18[.] [I]f	there	was	a	two

- month, three

- month	thing,	we	might	be	talking	that.		But	this	is	what	we	have,	so it

— I	blame	the	[L]egislature	for	that	drafting	decision .” Similarly,	P.S.’s	initial	brief	mentioned	only the	option	of	a	thirty

- day	confinement	and	did	not	argue	in	the	alternative that the	court	should	have limited	the	indeterminate

- up - to
- age - eighteen disposition to	a	commitment of somewhere	between at	least one	year	and	P.S.’s	eighteenth	birthday .		Following	the	State’s	failure	to	submit	a	brief,	we ordered	further	briefing	and	in vited	amic i curiae	briefs.		After	th at order,	P.S.	and	the	amici	curiae advanced	the	argument	that	the	court	had	the prerogative to	expressly	limit	P.S.’s	commitment	to	a period	of	one	year. See 1 5 M.R.S.	§	3316(2)(A) (2018)

.7 conclusion	 that	 the	 juvenile	 court	 lacks	 the	 discretion	 to	 impose	 a n indeterminate commitment	 of between at	 least one	 year	 and a	 juvenile’s eighteenth	birt hday

. [¶1 0 ] Because	the	issue	was	not	raised by	the	parties in J.R. ,	we	did	not discuss	section	3316’s language allowing	the	court	to	“expressly	further	limit[] or	extend[]”	a	juvenile’s	indeterminate	commitment

. 15	M.R.S.	§	3316(2)(A). Further,	J.R.’s	age	rendered	the	issue	of	judicial	discretion	less	meaningful	than in	 th is	case

. J.R.’s indeterminate	disposition up	 to	 the	age	of	eighteen meant that	 he	 would spend up	 to	 eighteen	 months at	 a	 juvenile	 facility

. J.R. , 2018 ME 117,	¶	24,	191	A.3d	1157.		In	contrast,	given	P.S.’s	relative	youth at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 hearing, P.S.’s commitment	 could last almost thirty

- nine months,	 more	 than	 three	 years.	 	 Thus,	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 shorter	 period	 of
commitment is	a	more	pertinent	issue here	than it	was in J.R. [¶1 1 ] We	 clarify	 today	 that	 the	 language	 of J.R. does	 not	 constrain	 a juvenile	 court’s	 discretion	 to	 impose	 a	 shorter	 period	 of indeterminate commitment	than up	to	a	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday pursuant	to	15	M.R.S. §	3316(2)(A) ,	so	long	as	that	commitment	is	for at	least one	year .		We	cannot determine	on	this	record	whether	the	District	Court	believed	it	was	compelled to	 impose	 a	 commitment	 extending	 until	 P.S.’s	 eighteenth	 birthday.8 According ly,	we	 vacate the	judgment and	remand	 the	matter	 for	 the	court to readdress the	 disposition pursuant	 to 15	 M.R.S.	 §§ 3314 (1 ), 3316 (2) , specifically	acknowledging the full	range	of discretion provided to	the	court in
section 3316 (2)(A) and the	 Legislature’s	 directive	 to prioritize	 the	 least
restrictive juvenile disposition that	is appropriate, see	J.R. , 2018	ME	117,	¶	12, 191	 A.3d	 1157 (citing	 15	M.R.S.A.	 § 3002 (2003) Commentary	 1979 )

. In	its review,	 t he	 court	 may	 decide	 to reimpose P.S

. ’s up - to
- age - eighteen commitment,	 or	 it	 may	 exercise	 its	 discretion	 to	 limit	 his indeterminate commitment	 within	 the direction of	 the	 statute. See 15	 M.R.S.	 §§ 3002,
3313 (1)

- (2) ,	3314 (1) ,	3316 (2) (2018)

. The	entry	is: Judgment vacated

. Remanded	 to	 the	 District Court	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with this	opinion.

John	W.	Tebbetts,	Esq.,	Tebbetts	Law	Office,	LLC,	Presque	Isle,	for	appellant	P.S. Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and James G. Mitchell, Jr., Asst. Dist. A tty., 8th Prosecutorial District , Caibou, for appellee State of Main e Emma	E.	Bond ,	Esq.,	Zachary	L.	Heiden,	Esq.,	and	Meagan	Sway,	Esq.,	ACLU	of Maine	Foundation,	Portland,	for	amicus	curiae	ACLU	of	Maine	Foundation Peter	Rice,	Esq., and Jeffrey	M. Skakalski,	Esq.,	Disability	Rights	Maine,	Augusta, for	amicus	curiae	Disability	Rights	Maine9 Mary	Bonauto,	Esq.,	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocates	&	Defenders,	Portland,	for	amicus curiae	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocates	&	Defenders Tina	 Heather	 Nadeau,	 Esq.,	 Maine	 Association of	 Criminal	 Defense	 Lawyers, Portland,	for	amicus	curiae	Maine	Association	of	Criminal	Defense	Lawyers

Fort	Kent	District	Court	docket	numbers	JV

- 2018

- 12,	JV

- 2018

- 20,	and	JV

- 2018

- 21 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY