J-A13015-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

 IN RE: R.H., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: J.H., FATHER No. 1922 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered November 22, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division, at No(s): TPR 17 of 2014 

IN RE: L.H., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: J.H., FATHER No. 1923 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order November 22, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division, at No(s): TPR 19 of 2014 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2015 

 J.H. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on November 22, 

2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his female child, L.H., born in April 2006, 

and to his female child, R.H., born in September 2007, (collectively “the 

Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 

We affirm. 

 

1

 L.H. is the mother (“Mother”) of L.H. and R.H. Mother filed consolidated 

concurrent appeals at 1903 WDA 2014, 1904 WDA 2014, and 1905 WDA 

2014, in regard to the involuntary termination of her parental rights to L.H. 

R.H., and K.B. Her appeals are the subject of a separate memorandum. 
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 The record reveals the relevant factual and procedural history, as 

follows. Father is the natural father of L.H. and R.H. The Allegheny County 

Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) became familiar with the 

family in 2011, when Mother was involved in an accident and became 

homeless. CYF assisted the family with intervention and services, and the 

case was closed on October 19, 2011. CYF once again became involved with 

the family on January 2, 2012. Mother again admitted to her history of drug 

and alcohol abuse and mental health concerns, and Mother reported that she 

had been charged with vehicular homicide because of the car accident in 

2011. Mother offered a friend, L.P., as a potential placement resource for 

the Children. 

 In March 27, 2012, CYF again became involved with the family due to 

concerns regarding the placement of the Children with Maternal 

Grandmother. Mother had previously alleged that Maternal Grandmother 

had been abusive to Mother as a child, and Mother was also struggling with 

her ongoing drug and alcohol addiction and her mental health issues. CYF 

was unable to reach Mother for eleven days, and, on March 30, 2012, the 

Children were removed from Maternal Grandmother’s home by CYF, and 

placed in foster care. 

 At the time of the Children’s removal, Father was unable to provide 

housing for the Children. Upon completion of its initial assessment of 

Father, CYF had concerns about Father’s criminal background, his substance 

abuse, and his lack of housing. Following the assessment, Father agreed to 
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complete random drug and alcohol screens, and he began visiting the 

Children at Gwen’s Girls. 

 On April 27, 2012, CYF established a Family Service Plan (“FSP) for 

Father, which included goals to achieve and maintain recovery from 

substance abuse and to stabilize mental health problems. Additional goals 

were added on October 25, 2013, April 23, 2013, October 17, 2013, and 

April 4, 2014. Since the establishment of Father’s FSP goals, he has failed to 

make adequate progress in dealing with his drug and alcohol goals and his 

mental health goals. Father took no steps to work on his drug and alcohol 

goals until 2013. To assist Father in addressing his drug and alcohol issues, 

CYF referred Father to Highland House treatment facilities and Gateway. On 

March 1, 2013, 11 months after agreeing to his drug and alcohol goal, 

Father completed an intake evaluation at Highland House. However, after 

completing only one session, Father was discharged on March 15, 2013 for 

noncompliance. 

On October 14, 2013, Father began alcohol treatment at Gateway. 

Father completed the program on February 24, 2014, and was discharged 

with an instruction to continue that program in an aftercare program. Father 

did not participate in any aftercare program. Father also has a history of 

failing to attend random drug and alcohol screens. 

 With regard to Father’s mental health treatment goals, a CYF 

caseworker testified that Father received mental health medications through 

the Lawrence County Human Services Center and completed a psychological 
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evaluation in September 2012. The caseworker further testified that, 

although Father continued to take his prescribed mental health medications, 

Father did not meet his mental health goal because he did not participate in 

active therapeutic counseling. 

 Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a psychologist, offered testimony and evaluation 

reports indicating the Father has continuing problems maintaining sobriety, 

as well as continuing problems committing to mental health treatment. At 

the time of Father’s individual evaluation of June 26, 2012 and his 

interactional on July 30, 2012, Dr. Rosenblum noted that Father admitted to 

alcohol and smoking marijuana. Dr. Rosenblum also testified that Father 

admitted to drinking heavily in the military and having a prior DUI 

conviction. 

In his first evaluation report, Dr. Rosenblum opined that, based on 

Father’s history, Father needed to have a commitment to total sobriety and 

abstain from all drugs and alcohol. Dr. Rosenblum also noted that Father 

was not addressing his mental health issues. At the time of Father’s March 

20, 2013 re-evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum wrote that there was no real change, 

and opined that Father was not fully committed to recovery. Dr. Rosenblum 

also testified that, at an April 15, 2014 individual and interactional 

evaluation, Father admitted that he had lied to Dr. Rosenblum at the 

previous evaluation, and that he had relapsed in February 2013. Dr. 

Rosenblum expressed significant concern with Father’s decision-making, his 

commitment to recovery, and his failure to make use of the opportunities he 
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was given to progress with his FSP goals. At the time of the April 2014 

evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum concluded that Father had not achieved the 

stability needed to care for the Children. However, Father had consistently 

visited the Children. 

 Dr. Rosenblum also conducted interactional evaluations of Father with 

the Children. Dr. Rosenblum found that the Children have a positive bond 

and a “nice relationship” with Father, but do not rely on him as someone 

who can meet their daily needs. Thus, Dr. Rosenblum determined that the 

Children do not have a secure relationship with Father. 

 On February 7, 2014, CYF filed Petitions for Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights of Father to the Children. The orphans’ court held hearings 

on July 11, 2014 and October 10, 2014. On November 22, 2014, the 

orphans’ court entered orders terminating Father’s parental rights to the 

Children. 

 On November 26, 2014, Father filed timely notices of appeal, along 

with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Father’s appeals at 1922 WDA 2014 and 

1923 WDA 2014 were consolidated sua sponte by this Court on December 9, 

2014. 

Our well-settled standard of review is as follows. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows. 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

*** 
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

*** 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

 To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 
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limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.

797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows. 

As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” If and 

only if grounds for termination are established under subsection 

(a), does a court consider “the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child” under § 2511(b). 

 This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, 

can seldom be more difficult than when termination is 

based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, 

however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded 

that a parent who is incapable of performing parental 

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to 

perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 

1986) (quoting In re: William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, 

1239 (Pa. 1978)). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (2012). 

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 
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See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d at 337. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a 

long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. See id. at 

340. 

 The orphans’ court explained its decision to terminate Father’s 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) as follows. 

 Grounds to terminate [Father’s] parental rights to L.H. and 

R.H. exist pursuant to 2511(a)(2). [Father’s] long history pf 

drug and alcohol abuse and mental health problems, his long 

delay in pursuing treatment to address these problems, and his 

lack of commitment to the aftercare necessary to support him all 

demonstrate a repeated and continued incapacity to function as 

a full-time parent to L.H. and R.H. [Father’sJ conduct has 

caused L.H. and R.H. to be without essential parental care and 

control. [Father’s] lack of follow-through with aftercare 

treatment and his lack of understanding of the need for 

continued treatment justify the conclusion that his incapacity 

cannot and will not be remedied. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, at 9. 

 There is ample, competent, clear and convincing evidence in the 

record to support the orphans’ court’s determination that Father has not 

demonstrated any ability to remedy the circumstances which led to the 

Children’s placement, nor is there any indication that he could remedy such 

circumstances in the foreseeable future, even with continued services in 

place. After a careful review of the record, we find that the orphans’ court 

aptly discussed the evidence against the requirements of Section 

2511(a)(2). We will not impose our own credibility determinations and reweigh the evidence. We must defer to the orphans’ court’s determination, 
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as the factual findings are supported by the record, and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

 After we determine that the requirements of Section 2511(a) are 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of section 2511(b) 

are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating 

parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child 

pursuant to section 2511(b). See id. at 1008. 

 In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as follows. 

 [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare 

of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

[620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. 

 We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 
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2010). This Court has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed 

between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care 

for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is 

attenuated. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). It is 

appropriate to consider a child’s bond with her foster parent. See In re: 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. 

 Dr. Rosenblum conducted interactional evaluations of Father with the 

Children in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Dr. Rosenblum noted that the Children 

have a positive bond and a “nice relationship” with Father. However, Dr. 

Rosenblum found that the Children view Father as a “visitation person”—not 

as a custodial caregiver. The Children do not rely on Father as someone 

who can meet their daily needs, and they have never relied on him for this. 

Dr. Rosenblum opined in his April 2014 report that the Children do not have 

a secure relationship with Father. 

 Dr. Rosenblum conducted interactional evaluations of the Children with 

Foster Mother in 2013 and 2014. Foster Mother has known the Children 

since they were born, and they have a strong bond with her. Dr. Rosenblum 

found that Foster Mother focuses on the Children’s needs and has earned 

their trust and confidence. Dr. Rosenblum opined that Foster Mother will 

make good decisions for the Children. The CYF caseworker observed the 

Children with Foster Mother and testified that the Children are comfortable, 

secure, and happy in their foster home. 
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 While Father may claim to love the Children, a parent’s own feelings of 

love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental 

rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). A child’s

life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon 

the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, 

“a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004). 

 We find that there was competent evidence to support the court’s 

decision that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves the 

Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Thus, 

we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law as to the termination of 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s orders terminating Father’s 

parental rights to the Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act. 

 Orders affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/27/2015