[Cite as Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Holloway, 2023-Ohio-4257.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

UNION COUNTY

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-18

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

JOHN L. HOLLOWAY, JR., O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-19

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

JEREMY W. TILLER, ET AL., O P I N I O N 

 RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-20

 PEITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

TERESA PERRY, ET AL., O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANTS.
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COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.

CASE NO. 14-23-21

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE

 v.

SCHRADER 10944, LLC, O P I N I O N

 RESONDENT-APPELLANT.

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-22

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

OLIVE K. FLEMING, O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-23

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

JOHN H. PUGH, ET AL., O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.
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COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-24

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

GB FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC.,

CASE NO. 14-23-25

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

 v.

RONALD E. KUHN, ET AL., O P I N I O N

 RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Appeals from Union County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court Nos. 2022-CV-0135, 2022-CV-0138, 2022-CV-0134, 2022-CV0140, 2022-CV-0131, 2022-CV-0142, 2022-CV-0129 and 2022-CV-0139

Judgments Affirmed

Date of Decision: November 27, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Thomas H. Fusonie for Appellants

Adam C. Smith for Appellee
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Ryan P. Sherman Counsel for Amici Curiae Ohio Power Company and 

AEP Ohio Transmission Company, INC in support of Appellee 

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.

WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Respondents-appellants, GB Limited Partnership, Olive K. Fleming, 

Teresa Perry, et al., John L. Holloway, Jr., Jeremy W. Tiller, et al., Ronald E. Kuhn, 

et al., Schrader 10944, LLC, John Pugh, et al., (collectively, “respondents”), bring 

these appeals from the April 19, 2023, judgments of the Union County Common 

Pleas Court determining that petitioner-appellee, Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 

(“Columbia Gas”), established the necessity of easement appropriations for a natural

gas pipeline. On appeal, respondents argue that the trial court erred by determining 

that Columbia Gas established the necessity of the appropriations and that the trial 

court failed to make required, specific findings concerning the necessity of the

individually challenged easement terms. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} Columbia Gas is a natural gas distribution company that operates a

public utility subject to regulation by the State of Ohio. This case concerns 

Columbia Gas appropriating easement rights on respondents’ properties in order to 
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construct and operate a subsurface natural gas pipeline.1 The specific pipeline 

constitutes “Phase VII” of the “Northern Columbus Loop,” and will supply natural 

gas to Union, Delaware, and Franklin Counties to meet rising energy demands.2 The 

pipeline was approved by the Ohio Power Siting Board (“OPSB”) after various 

parties, including the Union County Commissioners, recommended the project’s 

approval.3

{¶3} On August 5, 2022, Columbia Gas filed “Verified Petition[s] for 

Appropriation of Easement Rights” related to respondents’ properties.4 The 

easements Columbia Gas seeks to acquire on respondents’ properties are essentially 

the same: “the right to lay, operate, maintain, repair, replace, alter, relocate, and 

remove a single natural gas pipeline, no greater than 24 inches in diameter, with a 

maximum allowable operating pressure of 720 psig, together with valves and 

appurtenances * * *, subsurface within a 50-foot-wide permanent easement[.]”5In 

addition, Columbia Gas seeks to acquire a “50-foot-wide temporary easement * * * 

1 Columbia Gas asserts that the pipeline runs 16 miles through 115 parcels of land and that respondents own 

10 of the subject parcels. Columbia Gas asserts that respondents are the only landowners challenging the 

easements in Union County.

2 According to Columbia Gas, this is the final phase of the pipeline project.

3 This Court and the trial court have addressed prior cases involving Columbia Gas and pipeline projects. See 

Columbia Gas v. Bailey, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-22-13, 14-22-14, 2023-Ohio-1245 (specifically dealing with 

the Northern Columbus Loop Pipeline); Columbia Gas v. Phelps, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-22-07, 2022-Ohio2540 (dealing with the “Marysville Connector”).

4

In the petitions, Columbia Gas asserted that the route of the pipeline project was selected after “evaluating 

approximately 37,800 acres of land,” that the “route parallels property lines and existing utility easements as 

much as practicable,” that the route minimized tree clearing, and that the route avoided “six wetlands and 

four streams.”

5 The pipeline on one property will be smaller.
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for the purpose of initial construction of the Pipeline and restoration of the Property 

resulting from the construction of the Pipeline.”6 The rights would be transferable 

to Columbia Gas’s “successors and assigns.”

{¶4} In the appropriation petitions Columbia Gas asserted, inter alia, that it 

had provided respondents with Notices of Intent to Acquire and Written Good Faith 

Offers based on appraisals. Columbia Gas asserted that the easements were 

necessary and reasonably convenient for public use. Because Columbia Gas and 

respondents had been unable to agree on the easement rights and/or compensation, 

Columbia Gas asserted the appropriation action was necessary.

{¶5} Respondents filed “Verified Answer[s]” asserting, inter alia, that the 

appropriations were not necessary in that they sought easement rights in excess of 

those necessary for the project.7 Respondents specifically argued that the proposed 

easements would improperly provide “unfettered blanket assignability rights,” that 

the proposed easements would improperly provide Columbia Gas unnecessary 

rights to maintain its pipeline, that the proposed 36-month temporary easements for 

construction of the pipeline were too indefinite, and that the easements improperly 

allowed Columbia Gas to construct “unspecified ‘appurtenances and valves’” on 

respondents’ property. Respondents sought a hearing on the necessity of the 

easements and their terms.

6 The temporary easement for one property owner was smaller since the pipeline being installed was smaller. 

7 Respondents are represented collectively by the same law firm.
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{¶6} On February 10, 2023, the trial court held a consolidated “necessity” 

hearing and heard testimony from Columbia Gas employees attesting to the 

necessity of the easements. The parties filed written closing arguments containing 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

{¶7} On April 19, 2023 the trial court filed a judgment entry determining that

Columbia Gas was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of necessity due to the 

evidence presented, that respondents did not rebut the presumption, that the 

appropriations were necessary, and that the appropriations were not excessive.8 The 

trial court thus set the matter to proceed to compensation hearings. Respondents 

now appeal the trial court’s judgments, asserting the following assignments of error 

for our review.

First Assignment of Error

The Trial Court erred when it found that Columbia Gas of Ohio, 

Inc. showed the necessity of the underlying appropriations, that 

the evidence at the necessity hearing did not rebut the 

presumption under R.C. 163.09(B)(1)(b), and that the proposed 

easements do not constitute an excessive taking.

Second Assignment of Error

The Trial Court erred when it failed to make specific findings 

concerning the necessity of the easements at issue pursuant to 

Ohio Power Co. v. Burns, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4713.

8 The trial court filed a nunc pro tunc entry on May 3, 2023.
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First Assignment of Error

{¶8} In their first assignment of error, respondents argue that the trial court 

erred by determining that Columbia Gas established the necessity of the underlying 

appropriations. Respondents contend, inter alia, that numerous provisions in the 

easements are undefined or overbroad.

Standard of Review

{¶9} The Supreme Court of Ohio has indicated that a trial court’s review of

easement termsin an appropriation action should be upheld when they are supported 

by some competent credible evidence. Ohio Power Company v. Burns, 171 Ohio 

St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-4713, ¶ 35.9 When a trial court’s decision regarding a petition 

for appropriation rights is supported by some competent credible evidence it will 

not be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. Columbia Gas v. 

Bailey, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-22-13, 14-22-14, 2023-Ohio-1245, ¶ 60.

Relevant Authority

{¶10} When an owner files an answer to an appropriation petition under R.C. 

163.08 asserting specific denials to the appropriation petition, a trial court is 

9 The standard of review is actually disputed between the parties. Respondents argue that we should apply a 

de novo standard of review, citing our decision in Phelps, where we stated that the interpretation of a statute 

is a matter of law that we review de novo. Phelps at ¶ 10. In Phelps, we referred to our decision in ODNR v. 

Thomas, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-16-05, 2016-Ohio-8406, wherein we stated that a trial court’s decision on 

the extent of the take is reviewed de novo. However, the extent of the take is not at issue here in the same 

way it was in Thomas as the appropriation is specifically defined with regard to the land acquired. 

Respondents are challenging the terms of the appropriation, and the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated in 

Burns that a deferential standard of review is appropriate under such circumstances, so we will apply that 

standard here. 
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required to hold a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, which is governed by R.C. 

163.09, a trial court determines “‘whether the entire appropriation was necessary; 

specifically whether the amount taken was excessive.’” Columbia Gas v. Phelps, 3d 

Dist. Union No. 14-22-07, 2022-Ohio-2540, ¶ 23, quoting Octa v. Octa Retail, 12th 

Dist. Fayette No. CA2007-04-015, 2008-Ohio-4505, ¶ 43. Importantly, the 

necessity required for the appropriation does not require a showing of absolute 

necessity, but rather that which is reasonably convenient or useful to the public. 

Columbia Gas v. Bailey, 3d Dist. Union Nos. 14-22-13, 14-22-14, 2023-Ohio-1245, 

¶ 68. 

{¶11} Generally, when a landowner challenges the necessity of an 

appropriation sought by an agency, the burden of proof to establish the necessity of 

the appropriation is “upon the agency by a preponderance of the evidence[.]” R.C.

163.09(B)(1).10 However, “[t]he presentation by a public utility or common carrier 

of evidence of the necessity for the appropriation creates a rebuttable presumption 

of the necessity for the appropriation.” Id. at (B)(1)(b)

{¶12} Stated differently, where an “agency” presents evidence of the 

necessity of an appropriation, the agency is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 

necessity under R.C. 163.09(B)(1)(b), creating a prima facie showing of necessity. 

10 Agency is defined in 163.01 and it includes private agencies. Private agencies such as Columbia Gas are 

permitted to appropriate property. See Burns, 171 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-4713, ¶ 1.
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Burns at ¶ 32. The presumption imposes upon the landowners the burden of going 

forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption of necessity. Id.

Evidence Presented at the Necessity Hearing

{¶13} At the necessity hearing in this case, Columbia Gas presented the 

testimony of its Director of Regulatory Policy. She testified that the pipeline 

Columbia Gas intended to build served two primary purposes: operational reliability

for current customers and serving growth to new customers. 

{¶14} As to operational reliability, the Director explained that the project 

provides [an] additional source of feed for our west side of Columbus. 

The west side, itself, is a constrained area specifically with the feed 

coming from the southeast at our Rome Hilliard Station. This will 

permit an additional feed of natural gas to that system traveling from 

New Albany which is a different interstate pipeline system.

(Tr. at 32). Regarding growth, the Director explained that there had been a lot of 

development in Delaware and Union Counties, and the pipeline would help serve 

that area by interconnecting with the Marysville Connector, providing an additional 

feed to the Marysville market.

{¶15} The Director testified that the pipeline had been approved by the 

OPSB, that only one pipeline could be installed pursuant to the easements, that the 

pipeline had to transport natural gas, that the pipeline was limited in size, and that 

the pipeline was limited in pressure. The Director also testified that acquiring the 
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right to assign the easement was important because of, inter alia, corporate 

restructuring.

{¶16} Columbia Gas also presented the testimony of the pipeline’s Project 

Manager. The Project Manager testified as to why the permanent easement needed 

to be 50 feet and he testified that the additional temporary easement was necessary 

to support construction of the pipeline and restoration of the property to its original 

state. The Project Manager testified that the temporary easement would last 36 

months or until the pipeline was completed and the property restored. He testified 

that the start date for construction could not yet be determined because Columbia 

Gas had yet to acquire all the easements. 

{¶17} The Project Manager testified that the pipeline, valves, and 

appurtenances would all be subsurface. He also testified that it was not possible to 

list in the easements all of the potential valves and appurtenances that could be 

installed because the installation would depend in part on the character of the land 

and in part on potential changes to regulatory standards.

{¶18} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that 

Columbia Gas was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of necessity pursuant to R.C. 

163.09(B)(1)(b). Thus Columbia Gas had established a prima facie case of necessity 

of the easements and their terms, and the respondents had the burden of going 

forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. The trial court determined that 
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respondents did not meet their burden and that the easements did not constitute an 

excessive taking, ruling in favor of Columbia Gas in a written entry addressing 

respondents’ arguments.

Analysis

{¶19} On appeal, respondents largely renew all of the specific challenges 

they made to the easements and the easements’ terms at the trial court level. We will 

address each argument in turn.

{¶20} Respondents first contend that the trial court erred because Columbia 

Gas failed to meet its burden of proving necessity of the appropriations. However, 

Columbia Gas presented evidence that the project had been approved by the OPSB 

and that the pipeline had multiple purposes that would be beneficial to residents of, 

inter alia, Union County. Thus there was some competent credible evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding regarding necessity, and respondents arguments on 

this issue are not well-taken. 

{¶21} Respondents next contend that the appropriations sought were 

overbroad because they did not specifically define the “natural gas” that was to be 

transmitted through the pipeline. Respondents cite the fact that the Director of 

Regulatory Policy for Columbia Gas testified that there were multiple types of 

natural gases that technically existed. 
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{¶22} However, the Director also testified that the Public Utilities 

Commission of Ohio actually does not define “natural gas,” but Columbia Gas’s 

“tariff” does. The Director testified that the “natural gas” that would be transported 

would meet the quality contained in their “tariff” standards. Further, the easement 

is clear in that the only substance that can be transported in the pipeline is “natural 

gas.”

{¶23} The trial court reviewed the evidence and determined that the lack of 

definition of “natural gas” did not rebut the presumption of necessity, particularly 

given that the pipeline was limited to being a “single natural gas pipeline” with a 

specific diameter and a maximum pressure.11 We agree with the trial court. Thus 

this argument is not well-taken.

{¶24} Respondents next challenge the trial court’s judgment by arguing that 

the easements would place “impermissibly vague restrictions on the use of 

[respondents] properties.” This challenge is related to the following provision in the 

easements:

Grantors shall not allow the existence of any obstructions, or in any 

way impair the ability of the Grantee to exercise the Grantee’s rights 

granted herein, within the Permanent Easement Area and Temporary 

Easement Area.

11 Given the specifics related to the pipeline’s parameters contained in the easement and given that only 

“natural gas” can be transported in the pipeline, we do not agree with respondents that the Director’s 

testimony that “it’s just a pipeline easement without any specificity” is somehow “fatal” to the easements 

here, particularly given that the Director gave that particular response after being asked whether the pipeline 

would be used only for, inter alia, transmission or distribution. Thus the Director’s answer is taken out-ofcontext by respondents and the trial court’s finding that respondents did not rebut the presumption afforded 

to Columbia Gas is supported by the record.
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The Pipeline shall be buried below plow depth so as not to interfere 

with the present use of the land.

{¶25} Respondents argue that the language of the easements grants 

Columbia Gas “unconstrained latitude to arbitrarily restrict [respondents] use and 

enjoyment of their properties.” (Appt.’s Br. at 10). Respondents contend that 

Columbia Gas effectively should list all the potential obstructions that were 

impermissible so the respondents could know how they could use their land.

{¶26} The trial court determined that the lack of definition of “obstruction or 

impairment” did not equate to an excessive taking considering the words could be 

defined by their normal usage. We agree with the trial court, particularly given that 

the very next line in the easement provides some key context, namely that the 

pipeline should be buried so as to not interfere with the present use of the land. The 

land, primarily agricultural according to the filings, will thus still be usable as it is. 

{¶27} Furthermore, the Project Manager for Columbia Gas testified that it 

would be impossible to list every conceivable obstruction or impairment in an 

easement. Moreover, he testified that Columbia Gas reviews possible obstructions 

to a pipeline on a case-by-case basis to allow landowners the greatest latitude with 

their land. Finally, as Columbia Gas notes, the law already generally establishes that 

“the owner of the servient estate may not interfere with the dominant estate’s use 

and enjoyment of the easement.” Ohio Power Co. v. Ogle, 4th Dist. Hocking Nos.
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10CA13, 10AP13, 2011-Ohio-3903, ¶ 15. As the testimony provides some 

competent credible evidence supporting the trial court’s determination, we find no 

error here, and respondents’ argument is not well-taken.

{¶28} Respondents next argue that the easements are impermissibly vague 

by granting Columbia Gas “blanket assignability rights.” In reviewing the matter, 

we emphasize that the Director of Regulatory Policy testified that assignability of 

the easement rights was important because companies change, split, or are sold. 

Regardless, the Director testified that while the rights in the easements technically 

could be assigned to anyone, in reality only a regulated natural gas company could 

lawfully operate the pipeline placed on respondents’ properties. Based on the 

evidence presented, we find that there is some competent credible evidence to 

support the trial court’s determination on this issue.12 Thus respondents’ arguments 

regarding assignability of rights are not well-taken.

{¶29} Respondents next argue that the temporary easements are indefinite 

and contain no start date, rendering them excessive. Notably, Columbia Gas has 

modified the language of their temporary easements providing stricter timelines 

after we rejected a “perpetual” temporary easement in Columbia Gas v. Phelps, 3d 

Dist. No. 14-22-07, 2022-Ohio-2540, ¶ 35-39. Moreover, as the trial court 

12 The trial court’s original judgment entry was corrected in its nunc pro tunc entry to indicate that the 

assignability issue does not demonstrate an excessive taking to overcome the rebuttable presumption of 

necessity. It is clear from the surrounding context of the trial court’s original entry that the word “not” was 

intended to be included in the original entry.
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determined, the temporary easements end either 36 months after the commencement 

of construction or on the completion of construction and restoration of the premises, 

whichever occurs first. A precise start date could not be listed by Columbia Gas 

because the easements had not all been acquired. We find no error with the trial 

court’s determination that the easement terms are not overbroad or that respondents 

failed to rebut the presumption here. As the evidence supports the trial court’s 

determination, respondents’ argument is not well-taken.

{¶30} Finally, respondents argue that the easements impermissibly provide 

Columbia Gas a “blanket” right to construct “undefined” valves and appurtenances 

on their properties. However, testimony indicated that all valves and appurtenances 

would be subsurface, thus it is not clear how this would cause any impact to the 

respondents. At the very least, respondents did not meet their burden to rebut the 

presumption.

{¶31} In addition, testimony indicated that it was impossible to predict what 

valves or appurtenances would be necessary for each property until the ground had 

been removed. Furthermore, testimony indicated it was impossible to predict future 

regulations regarding valves and appurtenances. After reviewing the testimony, we 

find that the trial court’s rejection of respondents’ arguments is supported by some 

competent credible evidence and respondents’ challenge to the “undefined” valves 

and appurtenances in the easements is not well-taken.
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{¶32} In sum, the trial court rejected all of respondents’ challenges to the 

easement terms and determined that the appropriations were necessary. The record 

supports the trial court’s findings and respondents’ challenges to the trial court’s 

judgment are not well-taken.13 Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶33} In their second assignment of error, respondents argue that the trial 

court erred by failing to make “specific findings concerning the necessity of the 

easements at issue.” (Appt.’s Br. at 16). Respondents emphasize that in Ohio Power 

Company v. Burns, 171 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-4713, ¶ 33, the Supreme Court 

of Ohio determined that a blanket finding regarding challenges to easement terms 

was improper. Rather, a trial court needed to analyze the challenged easement terms 

separately. Respondents contend that the trial court did not conduct a separate, 

specific review here.

{¶34} Contrary to respondents’ arguments, a simple review of the trial 

court’s judgment entry entirely undermines their claim. The trial court explicitly 

listed the five specific denials made by respondents in its judgment entry and 

individually addressed each denial. There was no “blanket finding” here of the type 

rejected in Burns.

13 Legal authority cited by respondents not directly addressed herein has been considered and found to either 

be distinguishable or to have little relevance. For example, respondents rely on Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio 

St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, ¶ 1 but Norwood dealt with a municipality “taking [] an individual’s property 

by eminent domain and transferring the property to a private entity for redevelopment.” 
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{¶35} While respondents may have preferred a more detailed analysis, a trial 

court under Burns is only required to make specific findings concerning the 

challenged terms, and that was specifically done here. Burns at ¶ 35. Each denial 

was mentioned, summarized, and rejected. The trial court also made the specific 

finding of necessity. Therefore, respondents’ second assignment of error is 

overruled.

Conclusion

{¶36} Having found no error prejudicial to respondents in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the assignments of error are overruled and the judgments of 

the Union County Common Pleas Court are affirmed.

Judgments Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN J.J., concur.

/eks