1

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

___________________________________

:

STEPHEN SIMONI, :

: Civil Action No. 10-6798 (FLW)

 :

 Plaintiff, :

: OPINION

 v. :

: 

EDWARD DIAMOND, et al., :

:

 Defendants. :

__________________________________ :

WOLFSON, District Judge: 

Plaintiff Stephen Simoni (“Plaintiff” or “Simoni”) brings this suit1 against

numerous defendants, including his employers, Jersey Shore University Medical 

Center (“Jersey Shore”), Meridian Health System, Inc., Meridian Health, Inc., 

Meridian Hospital Corp., Meridian Health and various hospital individuals, 

(collectively, “Defendants” or “Meridian”), as well as AFT, AFL-CIO and HPAE 

Local 508 (together, the “Union”),2 alleging various labor and employment 

violations arising from the termination of Plaintiff’s position as a nurse. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts a federal, hybrid § 301 claim under the 

Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“LMRA”), alleging a breach of 

 1 This matter was transferred to this Court upon the retirement of the Hon. 

Joel A. Pisano, U.S.D.J.

2 On February 21, 2014, the claims against the Union were dismissed as 

settled and as such, the Union is no longer a defendant in this case. 

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the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and a breach of the duty of fair 

representation (Count One);3 and various state law claims against Meridian, 

including breach of contract (Count Two), violation of New Jersey’s 

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (Count Three), violation of the New 

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (Count Four), defamation (Count Five), and 

tortious interference (Count Six) (collectively, the “State Law Claims”). Before 

the Court are two separate motions for summary judgment, filed by Plaintiff, on 

Counts One and Two of the Complaint, respectively. Defendants cross-move for 

summary judgment on all counts. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s summary 

judgment motion as to his § 301 claim pertaining only to Defendants’ failure to 

provide adequate grievance procedures afforded by the CBA. The remaining 

motions for summary judgment are DENIED without prejudice. The parties are 

directed to submit additional briefing, by no later than September 25, 2015, with 

regard to the impact of this Court’s decision, vis-a-vis the relief to which Plaintiff 

is entitled under § 301. Moreover, Defendants may make additional arguments, 

if any, with respect to § 301 preemption of Plaintiff’s State Law Claims. The 

parties are not permitted to file a response unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court.

 3 Initially, Plaintiff brought a claim for unfair labor practices in violation of 

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 157, against 

the Union; however, that claim was dismissed by Judge Pisano before this case 

was transferred to me. I note that this dismissal has been affirmed by the Third 

Circuit. See Roe v. Diamond, 519 Fed. Appx. 752 (3d Cir. 2013). 

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BACKGROUND

I. Simoni’s Union Membership

 Because the Court is only resolving a portion of Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment on the § 301 claim, the Court need only recount undisputed 

facts relevant to the issues pertinent to this Opinion. Simoni began his fulltime employment as a Registered Nurse at Meridian’s Cardiac Catherization 

Laboratory in August 2010. See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 

(“Def. Statement”), ¶ 4; Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl. 

Statement”), ¶ 3. Simoni attended an orientation program wherein he was 

advised, inter alia, that his employment as a nurse was subject to the terms and 

conditions of a CBA between Meridian and the Union; a copy of the CBA was 

distributed to Simoni. See Def. Statement, ¶ 9; Pl. Statement, ¶ 7. Indeed, 

during the program, Simoni completed paperwork which indicated that he 

wished to be a member of the Union, and Simoni authorized the Union to deduct 

1% of his gross salary as the union dues. Id. at ¶ 10. The deduction, according 

to the relevant document, was to be “effective at once.” See Due Deduction Auth. 

dated August 18, 2010. And, Simoni agreed to pay a union- initiation fee of $30, 

to be deducted “from each of the three (3) paychecks due [Simoni] next following 

the execution of this authorization and remit these sums to the union by the 

following month.” Initiation Fee Authorization dated August 18, 2010. 

According to Meridian, however, Simoni’s membership in the Union did 

not go into effect until he completed ninety days of employment with Meridian, 

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paid the initial fee, and began paying dues.4 Def. Statement, ¶ 11. The Union 

representative, Fred DeLuca, testified that because Simoni’s employment ended 

before Simoni had completed the 90-day probationary period, no union dues 

were ever deducted from Plaintiff’s paycheck. See DeLuca’ Dep., T49-T54. 

Notwithstanding that assertion, the Union took some deductions from Simoni’s 

paycheck which were purportedly associated with the Union’s health trust. See

Def. Statement, ¶ 13. 

II. The CBA

The CBA at issue here provides Meridian certain rights regarding the 

discipline and discharge of covered employees. Under the CBA, the Union can 

contest any discharge or disciplinary action, and the parties consent to arbitrate 

any “grievance” that remains unresolved after the defined “Grievance 

Procedures” set forth specifically in the CBA. That Agreement provides in 

relevant part: 

1. Agreement Scope

This agreement covers all employees ... and includes permanent fulltime or permanent part-time employees as defined in Article Four, 

employed as a Graduate or Registered Nurse, Certified Registered 

Nurse Anesthetist, Clinical Nurse Specialist, Nurse Clinician, 

Nursing Education Instructor and per diem nurses (herein called 

“employee”) employed by the Hospital, excluding all other employees 

including Nurse Managers, Assistant Nurse Managers, Nurse 

Practitioners, Clinical Nurse Coordinators and other Supervisors as 

defined by the [NLRA].

4. Employee Status

 4 I note that the parties have not submitted copies of Plaintiff’s pay stubs to 

show what union-related deductions were taken out of Plaintiff’s salary during 

his employment at Meridian. 

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. . .

4.01 Status I- Full Time Permanent: An employee who is employed 

on a regular basis to work forty (40) hours per work week . . . . 

4.02 Status II- Part Time Permanent: An employee who is employed 

on a regular basis to work twenty (20) but less than thirty-six (36) 

hours per week.

4.03 Status III- Part Time Permanent: An employee who is employed 

on a regular basis to work nineteen (19) or fewer hours per work 

week.

4.04 Status IV- Per Diem: An employee who is employed as needed 

by the Hospital and subject to the employee's availability with no 

guarantee of hours. Such employee shall be part of the bargaining 

unit and as such be entitled to seniority and all rights and benefits 

as outlined in the contract . . . .

4.05 Status V- Temporary: An employee who is employed full time 

or part time for a limited period of time, no greater than six (6) 

months in any calendar year . . . .

. . . 

4.08 Probationary Period: All employees regardless of status will be 

on probation for ninety (90) calendar days following employment . . 

. .

12. Discipline and Discharge

12.01 The Hospital shall reserve the right to discipline, suspend or 

discharge any employee only for just cause . . . .

12.02 The designated Union representative, the Union office and the 

employee involved shall be advised, in writing, of any discharge, 

suspension or disciplinary action. A copy of the notice given to the 

employee shall be mailed to the Union within twenty-four (24) hours 

. . . .

. . . 

13. Grievance Procedure

....

13.02 Step I–Chief Nurse Executive: Grievances shall be raised by 

the employee and/or union representative with the Chief Nurse 

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Executive or his/her designee in writing within ten (10) working 

days from occurrence giving rise to the grievance or within ten (10) 

working days from the time the employee should have reasonably 

been aware of such occurrence, whichever is later. If the matter is 

not resolved within five (5) working days of presentation of the 

grievance, it may be taken to Step II. The employee, at his/her 

request, shall have the right to have a Union representative present.

13.03 Step II—Vice President of Human Resources: The 

employee/Union shall forward the grievance to the Vice President of 

Human Resources or his/her designee within five (5) working days 

after the receipt of the written response from the Department 

Manager. The matter will be investigated and meeting scheduled 

within ten (10) working days after the receipt of the written appeal. 

A written response to the grievance shall be given within five (5) 

working days after the meeting and returned to the grieving party. If 

there is no resolution, the grieving party may progress to Step III.

13.04 Step III—Arbitration: The grievance may be submitted to 

arbitration by the Union within twenty (20) working days from the 

receipt of the answer in Step II . . . .

. . .

20. Scope of Bargaining

The Hospital and the Union acknowledge that during the 

negotiations which resulted in this Agreement, each had the 

unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals 

with respect to any subject matter not removed by law from the area 

of collective bargaining and that the understanding and agreements 

arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and 

opportunity are set forth in this Agreement, which constitutes the full 

and complete agreement between the parties notwithstanding any 

oral agreement or any past practices, policies or procedures . . . .

CBA, pp. 73-123 (emphasis added). 

III. Simoni’s Termination

Meridian ultimately terminated Simoni on October 18, 2010, during his 

probationary period. The parties dispute the reasons for the termination.5 

 5 Because I am not deciding the merits of Plaintiff’s State Law Claims or the 

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Suffice it to say, according to Defendants, Simoni was discharged because he did 

not perform to management’s satisfaction during the first eight weeks of his 

Preceptor Program and Simioni also engaged in inappropriate and insubordinate 

behavior. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he was wrongfully 

terminated based on his gender and that Defendants retaliated against him for 

disclosing certain alleged violations of patient safety requirements under New 

Jersey law. 

Following his termination, Simoni contacted Mr. DeLuca to file a grievance 

against Meridian pursuant to the CBA. See DeLuca Dep., T138. Mr. DeLuca 

filed a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf, but it was later rejected by Meridian.6 Id. 

Mr. DeLuca testified that because it was the understanding of both the Union 

and Meridian that Simoni was not a covered employee under the CBA, Mr. 

DeLuca did not pursue the grievance further. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the

instant suit asserting a § 301 hybrid claim, and other State Law Claims, against 

the Union and Meridian 

IV. Procedural History

After Simoni filed his initial Amended Complaint, Meridian and the Union 

both moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. On October 6, 2011, Judge Pisano 

granted the motions, dismissing Plaintiff’s federal § 301 cause of action and 

 

reason for Plaintiff’s termination here, I need not recount the underlying facts in 

that regard. 

6 I note that nowhere in DeLuca’s testimony does he justify why he initially 

filed a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf since he was of the opinion that Plaintiff 

was not a covered employee under the CBA. See DeLuca Dep., T28.

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declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State Law Claims. See

Opinion dated October 6, 2011. In that decision, Judge Pisano held that Plaintiff 

had failed to state a claim under the LMRA because the Amended Complaint 

lacked sufficient allegations to establish that the Union had breached its duty of 

fair representation.7 See Id. at pp. 6-10. More particularly, Judge Pisano found 

that Plaintiff has failed to plead that Plaintiff was a union employee covered by 

the CBA at the time his employment ended. 

Plaintiff appealed Judge Pisano’s ruling, and the Third Circuit, in a 

decision filed on March 20, 2013, affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s NLRA claim, 

but reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 301 claim. The court found that the 

facts pled were sufficient to state a claim for the breach of duty of fair 

representation in the context of § 301.8 Roe, 519 Fed. Appx at 757-58. 

After remand, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his § 301 claim. 

That motion was denied by Judge Pisano. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion 

for reconsideration, at which time this case was transferred to me. At that time, 

Plaintiff and Defendants simultaneously filed the instant motions for summary 

judgment. This Court denied Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion on the basis that 

the parties had not presented sufficient evidence from which the Court could 

determine whether Plaintiff’s § 301 claim had merit.

Because, in connection with these summary judgment motions, the 

 7 Judge Pisano also dismissed Plaintiff’s NLRA claim.

8 This Third Circuit’s decision will be discussed in detail, infra.

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parties have adequately presented a full record on Plaintiff’s § 301 claim, and 

more specifically, the threshold issue whether Plaintiff is a covered employee

under the CBA, I will make those determinations in this Opinion. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d 

Cir. 2000) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The burden of demonstrating the absence 

of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. See Taylor v. 

Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999). Once the moving party 

has satisfied this initial burden, the opposing party must identify "specific facts 

which demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Orson, Inc. v. 

Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1996).

Not every issue of fact will be sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment; issues of fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Further, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon 

mere allegations; he must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue 

of material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In 

conducting a review of the facts, the non-moving party is entitled to all 

reasonable inferences and the record is construed in the light most favorable to 

that party. See Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 

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1986). Accordingly, it is not the court's role to make findings of fact, but to 

analyze the facts presented and determine if a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 105 n.5 (citing 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

II. Simoni’s Status under the CBA

Plaintiff has insisted throughout this litigation that, pursuant to the plain 

language of the CBA, he was a union employee entitled to the protections,

including the grievance process, afforded to him by the CBA. To the contrary, 

Defendants maintain that not only are the provisions of the CBA clear that an 

employee terminated before the end of his or her probationary period is not 

covered under the CBA, but that such was the intention of Meridian and the 

Union when they entered into the Agreement. And, if there is any ambiguity in 

that regard, Defendants argue that the language of the CBA should be construed 

to reflect such an understanding. I find that the terms of the CBA are 

unambiguous: an employee is covered under the CBA regardless of his or her 

probationary status. 

As an overview, a “hybrid” § 301/fair representation action is comprised 

of two separate, but interdependent, causes of action that may be brought 

together. See Felice v. Sever, 985 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 

DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983) (“A 

plaintiff who has a viable ‘hybrid’ claim against both the employer and the union 

may opt to bring only the section 301 claim against the employer or the breach 

of duty of fair representation claim against the union . . . . Either claim standing 

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alone can be brought in federal court because each has an independent 

jurisdictional basis”). Ordinarily, in such a hybrid suit, an employee files a claim 

against the union alleging breach of the duty of fair representation by 

discriminatorily or arbitrarily failing or refusing to pursue his ensuing 

contractual grievance against the employer, together with a claim against the 

employer alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement in violation of § 

301 of the LMRA Id.; G.P. Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 328

(1989); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).

In a “hybrid” § 301/fair representation action, the two claims are 

considered “inextricably interdependent,” that is, “[t]o prevail against either the 

company or the Union . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their 

discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of 

demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65; 

see Adcox v. Teledyne, Inc., 21 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1994) ("In a hybrid suit 

under § 301, to recover against either the employer or the union, a plaintiff must

show that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and that 

the union breached its duty of fair representation") (citing White v. Anchor Motor 

Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir.1990)). Thus, "[u]nless [employeeplaintiff] demonstrates both violations, he cannot succeed against either 

[Defendant]." White, 899 F.2d at 560; Roe, 519 Fed. Appx. at 757. 

Here, to establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation 

and that Meridian breached the CBA, Plaintiff relies on the failure of the Union 

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and Meridian to provide him with an adequate grievance process.9 Indeed, while 

the Union filed an initial grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf, there is no dispute that 

the Union refused to further pursue that grievance after it was rejected by 

Meridian. Meridian posits that based on a plain reading of the CBA, Plaintiff was 

an at-will employee not covered under the CBA because Plaintiff was terminated 

prior to the expiration of his probationary period. However, the Agreement’s 

unambiguous and clear language does not lend support to Meridian’s 

interpretation. 

At the outset, I note that although construction of collective bargaining 

agreements is generally governed by federal law, traditional rules of contract 

construction apply when not inconsistent with federal labor law. See UAW, Local 

No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 1999); TransportationCommunication Employees Union v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 160-61 

(1966); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-

57 (1957); Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, 

Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, the interpretation of a collective 

bargaining agreement or other plan document is typically a question of law. 

Skinner, 188 F.3d at 138; USW v. PPG Indus., No. 01-1601, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

 9 To succeed on his § 301 claim against Meridian, Plaintiff is required to 

establish both elements of the claim, i.e., that Meridian breached the parties’

CBA and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, even if Plaintiff 

has settled with the Union and that Union is no longer a defendant. See 

DelCostello, 462 U. S. at 164-65 (stating that the employee may sue either the 

employer or the union, but to prevail on the claim the plaintiff must show that 

the employer breached the contract and that the union breached its duty of fair 

representation).

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41660, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2005); see Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. 

Keystone Heating and Air Conditioning, 934 F.2d 35, 41 (3d Cir. 1991). Where 

the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court must determine its meaning as 

a matter of law. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995); Murphy v. 

Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 61 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1995). 

The language of a contract, such as a CBA, is ambiguous only “if it is 

reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being 

understood in more than one sense.” Regents of the Mercersburg College v. Rep. 

Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). In making 

this determination, “[c]ourts should not . . . distort the meaning of the language 

or strain to find an ambiguity,” Id.; see Local 827, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFLCIO v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 458 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2006). 

Turning to Meridian’s position, this Court’s independent review of the 

language of the CBA compels the conclusion that the agreement is clear on its 

face that probationary employees are covered under the CBA. In fact, Meridian 

has not provided any reason why its interpretation of the Agreement is 

reasonable, nor has Meridian pointed to any ambiguities in the language. This 

conclusion is consistent with the Third Circuit’s finding, in Roe, that a plain 

reading of the CBA does not support the interpretation that “the CBA . . . does 

not apply to probationary employees.” Roe, 519 Fed. Appx. at 757. 

I start with Article 4.08 of the CBA, which provides that “[a]ll employees . 

. . will be on probation for ninety (90) calendar days following employment.” 

However, nowhere in that definition does the CBA explicitly exempt 

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“probationary” employees from coverage. See Id. In fact, the CBA is unequivocal 

that it “covers all employees . . . and includes permanent full-time [such as 

Simoni,] or permanent part-time employees.” CBA, § 1 (emphasis added). While 

all employees are subject to a probationary period, nowhere does the Agreement

specifically carve out probationary employees as non-union members.10 Rather,

as the Third Circuit has observed, “the CBA [merely] restricts the rights of 

probationary employees in the receipt of certain fringe benefits (such as vacation 

time).” Roe, 519 Fed. Appx. at 758. Indeed, the CBA sets forth specific rights 

and restrictions for probationary employees. See, e.g., CBA, Art. 3.02 

(“Employees shall receive a performance appraisal at the completion of their 

three (3) month probationary period”); Art. 8.07(d)(“[e]mployees who have 

completed their probationary period and terminate or are laid off will receive pay 

for all earned PTO through the last full day of active work”); Art. 8.12 (“Although 

vacation time is earned time from the first paid day, vacation time may only be 

taken after the completion of the three (3) month probation period”). I find that 

as a matter of law, that the CBA is unambiguous and provides coverage to 

probationary employees.

Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language of the CBA, 

Meridian submits that the Court must interpret the CBA consistent with the 

mutual understanding of Meridian and the Union -- that employees in their first 

90 days of employment are employed “at-will” and are not entitled to the CBA’s 

 10 I note that the Third Circuit has also rejected the argument that all 

probationary employees are “temporary” as defined by Article 4 of the CBA. I

agree and need not expand upon that further. 

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protections. In that regard, Meridian offers the deposition of Mr. DeLuca, who 

essentially testified that that neither the Union nor Meridian considered Simoni 

to be a member of the Union at the time the decision was made to terminate his 

employment. See DeLuca Dep., T37-T38. However, given the clarity of the 

language in the CBA, Meridian’s attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence of intent 

violates the cannons of contractual interpretation. 

It is well-settled law that “[i]f a contract is explicit and unambiguous . . . 

there is no need to look to extrinsic evidence.” Local 827, IBEW v. Verizon New 

Jersey, Inc., 458 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted); 

Local 13, Int'l Fed'n of Professional & Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 531 F.2d 

1178, 1183 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1976); Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 

2001); Zylla v. Unisys Corp., 57 Fed. Appx. 79, 86 (3d Cir. 2003)(“[b]ecause the 

contract language of the CBA is unambiguous and the exclusion of evidence was 

not inconsistent with substantial justice, we will affirm the District Court's 

decision to exclude extrinsic evidence regarding a past practice of valuing 

accounts at book value.”). Moreover, extrinsic evidence of “past practice” could 

be admitted, if at all, only to resolve an ambiguity in the CBA. See Skinner Engine 

Co., 188 F.3d at 146. Here, because the CBA is clear that it covers probationary 

employees, the Court cannot consider any extrinsic evidence to the contrary.11 

 11 Moreover, even Mr. DeLuca, during his deposition, conceded that the 

language of the CBA, as it is currently drafted, “need[s] to be clearer on [the]

interpretation” that probationary employees “do not get the right to challenge an 

unjust termination during probationary periods.” DeLuca Dep., T139-T140. 

That after the fact comment does not transform what is clear language into that 

of ambiguity. 

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Having determined that Plaintiff was entitled to the protections of the CBA 

at the time he was terminated from his employment at Meridian, my next 

determination is whether the Union breached its duty when it refused to pursue 

a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf. I answer that in the affirmative. To demonstrate 

a breach of the duty of fair of representation, Plaintiff must establish that “‘in 

light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of [its] actions, the Union’s 

behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.’” 

Roe, 519 Fed. Appx. at 757 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 

67 (1991)). Indeed, based on that standard, the Third Circuit found that the 

Union, here, acted “irrationally” when it declined to pursue arbitration on 

Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant to the Union’s strained reading of the CBA, which 

clearly finds no support in the plain language of the agreement. See Id. Put 

differently, the Union’s interpretation of the CBA is clearly erroneous, and its 

actions taken consistent with that interpretation “fell outside of the wide range 

of reasonableness” and thus, breached its duty of fair representation. Id. 

Finally, the last inquiry on Plaintiff’s § 301 claim is whether Meridian 

breached the CBA. To support his claim in this regard, Plaintiff argues that 

Meridian breached the CBA in two ways: first, by failing to allow Plaintiff to avail 

himself of the grievance process, and second, by terminating Plaintiff without 

just cause. On this issue, Meridian has not advanced any argument since it 

took the position that Plaintiff is not a covered employee under the CBA. There 

is no dispute, however, that Meridian precluded Plaintiff from engaging in the 

grievance process because it erroneously deemed Plaintiff an “at-will” employee. 

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Based on that action alone, Plaintiff has proven as a matter of law that Meridian 

breached Article 13 of the CBA, which sets forth in detail the rights of employees 

to pursue administrative grievances. As to whether Meridian terminated Plaintiff 

without just cause,12 I need not address this here, because there are questions 

of exhaustion that must be resolved in the first instance. 

Since I have found that Plaintiff is a covered employee under the CBA, and 

that, correspondingly, Plaintiff has proven his § 301 hybrid claim against 

Meridian as to Meridian’s failure to afford Plaintiff his grievance-related rights 

under the CBA, what remains is the relief to which Plaintiff is entitled. The

parties have not adequately addressed this issue in their briefing.13 However, 

while this Court is not making a definitive finding, here, as to the type of relief 

Plaintiff should obtain, I note for the parties’ consideration the issue whether 

Plaintiff should first pursue the administrative grievance process. Indeed, there 

is no dispute that the CBA explicitly provides that any complaints an employee, 

such as Plaintiff, has against Meridian must be resolved through the “Grievance 

Procedures.” See generally, CBA, Art. 13. While it is true that Plaintiff had no 

other recourse than to file a federal lawsuit as a result the actions taken by the 

Union and Meridian to refuse Plaintiff his grievance rights under the CBA, now 

 12 Indeed, the parties dispute the reason why Meridian terminated Plaintiff; 

each party has a different version of facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination. In 

that regard, the “just cause” inquiry may overlap with the substantive analyses 

of Plaintiff’s State Law Claims. Hence, there are numerous factual disputes that 

would preclude summary judgment on this issue. 

13 Although Plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint, seeks various relief, such 

as, inter alia, reinstatement and back pay, Plaintiff does not specifically request 

relief in connection with his § 301 claim against Meridian. 

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that I have made a determination that Plaintiff is entitled to those rights, it 

appears that Plaintiff may have to avail himself of the contractual remedies 

provided by the CBA. See Ames v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 864 F.2d 289, 

292 (3d Cir. 1988)(finding in a § 301 claim context that “[courts] cannot lose 

sight of the point that the employee's claim is contractual in nature. When the 

collective bargaining agreement provides for an arbitral resolution of what is due 

to an employee, an appropriate remedy would appear in most instances to be an 

arbitration conducted by the union in good faith.”); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 

U.S 171, 196 (1967). In any event, I will afford the parties an opportunity to 

present their respective positions on this issue.14 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

on his § 301 hybrid claim solely as it relates to Meridian’s failure to provide 

Plaintiff his grievance rights is hereby GRANTED. The parties are directed to 

submit additional briefing as to the relief to which Plaintiff is entitled as a result 

of this Court’s decision. And, in that regard, the parties shall address whether 

Plaintiff must avail himself of the “Grievance Procedures” provided by the CBA 

 14 Should this case ultimately remain in this Court, there are issues related 

to § 301 preemption of Plaintiff State Law Claims that must be addressed by the 

parties. See N.J. Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 760 F.3d 297, 305-06 (3d 

Cir. 2014) (“LMRA § 301 completely preempts a state cause of action [] when the 

resolution of said action is ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms 

of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.”)(quoting AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. 

of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) ("[A]n application of state law is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if such 

application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement."). 

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in the first instance. Plaintiff and Defendant are directed to each submit briefing

on those issues by no later than September 25, 2015. The parties are not

permitted to file a response unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 

All other motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff and Defendants 

are hereby DENIED without prejudice. 

Dated: August 18, 2015 /s/ Freda L. Wolfson _

Freda L. Wolfson, U.S.D.J.

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