alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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No. 20-5 For Immediate Release

March 2020

Coronavirus Relief Act Impacts Railroad Workers

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or CARES Act, signed into law by 

President Trump on March 27, boosts unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers 

impacted by the pandemic. 

Under the CARES Act, the 1-week waiting period required before railroad workers can

receive unemployment or sickness benefits is temporarily eliminated. This applies to an 

employee’s first 2-week registration period for a period of continuing sickness or unemployment 

beginning after the effective date of the law and ending on or before December 31, 2020.

In addition, the amount of the unemployment benefit is increased by $1,200 per 2-week 

period. This is in addition to the current biweekly maximum of $733.98 received by most 

claimants. This increased amount applies to any 2-week registration periods beginning on or after 

April 1, 2020, through July 31, 2020.

The CARES Act includes a separate appropriation of $425 million to pay for this added 

“recovery benefit,” with an additional $50 million provided to cover the cost of eliminating the 

waiting period. If these funds are exhausted, the new provisions will no longer apply.

The CARES Act also authorizes payment of extended unemployment benefits to rail workers 

who received unemployment benefits from July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020.

Under the legislation, railroad workers with less than 10 years of service may be eligible for up 

to 65 days of extended benefits within 7 consecutive 2-week registration periods. Workers with 10 

or more years of railroad service, who were previously eligible for up to 65 days in extended 

benefits, may now receive benefits for up to 130 days within 13 consecutive 2-week registration 

periods.

Since RRB offices are currently closed to the public due to the COVID-19 pandemic, railroad 

employees are encouraged to file for unemployment benefits online by establishing an account 

through myRRB at RRB.gov. Otherwise, applications and claims for benefits will need to be 

submitted by regular mail. Applications for sickness benefits must be submitted to the agency by 

mail, or by fax at 312-751-7185. Subsequent claims may be completed online by those with 

myRRB accounts.

U.S. Railroad Retirement Board

RRB News

844 North Rush Street Chicago, Illinois 60611-1275

www.rrb.gov

877-772-5772 general information

Public Affairs

312-751-4777 

opa@rrb.gov media inquiries
-2-

The RRB will also pay sickness benefits and, in some cases, unemployment benefits, to rail 

workers who have tested positive for COVID-19 or been subject to a quarantine order. Further 

guidance on these types of situations is available at RRB.gov/Benefits/Coronavirus.

# # #
Order entered July 16, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00590-CV

TROY HEIFNER, Appellant

V.

MARION NIXON, AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF BILLIE DEAN HEIFNER, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CI 14-082

ORDER

Before the Court is the July 14, 2015 motion of Deborah Hamon, Official Court Reporter 

for the County Court at Law, seeking a ten-day extension of time to file the reporter’s record. In 

a post-card notice dated July 14, 2015, the Court informed Ms. Hamon that the reporter’s record 

was past-due and instructed her to file the reporter’s record within thirty days of the date of the 

notice. The reporter’s record is due on August 13, 2015. Accordingly, we DENY as moot Ms. 

Hamon’s motion.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
# table104_q12.4_state
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00458-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 233rd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 233-719643-22

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

VECENTIE SONTIAGO MORALES, Appellant

V.

ANN DELYNN WOOD, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Appellant Vecentie Sontiago Morales has filed a notice of appeal,

though what he is appealing is unclear. Appellant’s notice of appeal references three 

pending motions—a motion to dismiss, a motion for a counterclaim, and a motion to 

remove the case to federal court—but none of those motions have been ruled upon

by the trial court. 

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or appealable 

interlocutory orders, and absent such a judgment or order, we lack jurisdiction to 

consider the appeal. Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 

730, 736 (Tex. 2019); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); 

Johnson v. ONM Living LLC, No. 02-22-00439-CV, 2022 WL 17842142, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2022, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Because the 

trial court has not ruled on Appellant’s motions, there is no judgment or order—

much less a final judgment or an appealable order—for him to appeal.

Accordingly, we notified Appellant of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction 

over this appeal, and we warned that we would dismiss the appeal unless, within 20

days, he (or any other party) furnished us with a signed copy of the order that 

Appellant seeks to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f), 44.3. More than 20

days have passed, and we have not received a response.
3

Therefore, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 

42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Delivered: January 12, 2023
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-15-00263-CR 

TOYLAN BRASHUN WRIGHT, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 54th District Court 

McLennan County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2012-2115-C2, Honorable Matt Johnson, Presiding 

 

July 23, 2015 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant Toylan Brashun Wright appealed his convictions for possessing a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. 

On July 20, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

Because Appellant’s motion to dismiss meets the requirements of Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 42.2(a), we have not issued a decision in the appeal, and 

Appellant and his attorney have signed the motion, the Court grants the motion. The 
2

appeal is dismissed. Having dismissed the appeal at Appellant's request, no motion for 

rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
CAUSE NO. ____________________

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

 

CODY CARR, Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

On Appeal from Cause Nos. 1405759 &1405761

In the 183 Judicial District Court RD

Harris County, Texas

 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

 

The Appellant, Cody Carr, respectfully requests that the deadline for filing his

Petition for Discretionary Review be extended for 32 days – until August 24, 2002.1

1. Carr was charged in two cases with aggravated sexual assault of a child.

These cases were consolidated and tried to a jury at the same time.

2. Carr was convicted of both cases. The trial court assessed punishment in

each case at six years in prison, to run concurrently.

 / See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(c). 1

1

PD-0922-15 & PD-0923-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 7/22/2015 1:04:25 PM

Accepted 7/24/2015 9:13:48 AM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
3. Carr timely filed his notice of appeal in both cases, which were

consolidated for appellate purposes.

4. Carr’s convictions were affirmed by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in

a published opinion, on June 23, 2002.

2

5. Carr’s Petition for Discretionary Review is due on July 23, 2015.

3

6. No previous requests for extensions have been sought or granted.

7. This is Carr’s first request for an extension.

8. The day after the appellate court affirmed Carr’s convictions, counsel met

with Carr to discuss his options. It was initially thought that Carr would be unable to

pursue his appeal further by seeking discretionary review.

9. Approximately ten days later, counsel traveled to England to visit his

brother, who had recently suffered a mini stroke. Counsel returned to Texas on July 17,

2015.

10. Upon his return, counsel again met with Carr (on July 20, 2015), and was

told that circumstances had changed and Carr did, indeed, want to file a Petition for

discretionary Review with this Court.

11. Because of this short notice, which was in part occasioned by counsel’s

 / See Carr v. State, Nos. 14-14-00085-CR & 14-14-00087-CR (Tex. App. – Houston [14 2 th

Dist.] June 23, 2015)(not yet reported).

 / See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(a). 3

2
traveling to England, counsel has been unable to adequately prepare Carr’s petition.

12. Carr therefore asks that the deadline for filing his Petition for

Discretionary Review be extended for thirty-two days, until August 24, 2015.

13. This Motion is not made for the purpose of delay.

14. Carr additionally asks for all other relief that he is deemed entitled to

receive.

Respectfully submitted,

KETTERMAN HEDLESTEN & AMANN, PLLC

By: /s/ Colin B. Amann

COLIN B. AMANN

State Bar No. 01138100

1004 Prairie, Suite 300

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 652-2003

(713) 652-2002 (Facsimile)

colin@khalawyers.com

3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of Carr’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Discretionary

Review was sent to the following party(ies) by the means indicated on July 21, 2015:

E-Mail Delivery:

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net

Appellate Division

Harris County District Attorney

Houston, Texas

/s/ Colin B. Amann

COLIN B. AMANN

4
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

On Remand from the U.S. Supreme Court

Submitted July 19, 2006

Decided August 3, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-1771

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VIRGIL SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, 

Fort Wayne Division

No. 1:03-CR-6

Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

O R D E R

In United States v. Smith, 415 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2005), we affirmed Virgil

Smith’s conviction of one count of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of aiding and

abetting in the use of a firearm, during and in relation to a bank robbery, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In so doing, we found that the district court

violated Smith’s right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3161, but that the violation was harmless. Smith, 415 F.3d at 686. After a

limited remand in accordance with United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483-84

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-1771 Page 2

(7th Cir. 2005), we affirmed Smith’s 221-month sentence as well. United States v.

Smith, 2006 WL 1506815 (unpublished order) (June 1, 2006). 

Smith filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted his petition,

vacating our judgment and remanding Smith’s case back to us for further consideration

in light of Zedner v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 1976 (2006), which holds that “harmless-error

review is not appropriate” in the Speedy Trial Act context, id. at 1990. Smith v. United

States, 126 S.Ct. 2859 (2006). Although Zedner was concerned with an “ends of justice”

extension of the time for trial, granted under § 3161(h)(8), and Smith’s case concerns

the question whether a motion was “actually under advisement by the court,” for

purposes of § 3161(h)(1)(J), we see no principled difference between the two for

purposes of harmless error review. The language of the Speedy Trial Act is just as

mandatory for one subsection of § 3161(h) as it is for the others, and there is nothing

in the Act that suggests that the command of § 3161(c) setting forth the time in which

trial “shall” begin depends on which exception is invoked. 

In accordance with Circuit Rule 54, we requested that both parties file position

statements as to what action we ought to take on remand. Both parties take the

position that Zedner’s holding controls Smith’s case too, and that Smith’s conviction

should be reversed and his sentence vacated. We agree. All that remains is to remand

this case to the district court to determine, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2),

whether to dismiss Smith’s case with or without prejudice. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE Smith’s conviction, VACATE his sentence, and REMAND

to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|  | • | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | • | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Partnership. |
|--|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                        |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Date: November 14, 2007 | By:                                                                                                                                                                                        | /s/ MICHAEL E. MERCER  |
|                    | Michael                E. Mercer                                                                                                                                                                     |
|                    | Chief                        Financial Officer of EV Management LLC, general                        partner of EV Energy GP, L.P.,general                        partner of EV Energy Partners, L.P. |
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant to Section 906**

**of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Primoris Services Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Brian Pratt, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

 

1.                                       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

In witness whereof, the undersigned has executed and delivered this certificate as of the date set forth opposite his signature below.

 
| Date:   May 10, 2011 | /s/   BRIAN PRATT                                                              |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      | Brian   Pratt *Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive   Officer and President* |

 

----
**Exhibit 32.1**








**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**


**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB  of
  Aslahan Enterprises Ltd. (the "Registrant") for the fiscal quarter ended
  May 31,
  2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof,
  I, Tina Sangha, President, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial
  Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of our
  knowledge and belief:





(1) The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
  or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all
  material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
  Registrant.





Date: August 7, 2007
      By:
      /s/ Tina SanghaTina SanghaChief Executive Officer, President  and Principal Financial Officer





A
  signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
  document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
  that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
  statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Registrant and will
  be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
  Commission or its staff upon request.
#### BOSLEY v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. TEEKELL v. SAME.

Civil Actions Nos. 404 and 405.

District Court, W. D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

May 16, 1941.

Booth & Lockard, of Shreveport, La., for plaintiffs.

Irion & Switzer, of Shreveport, La., for defendants.

DAWKINS, District Judge.

The question presented in these cases is as to whether or not the plaintiffs’ ap*772plication for trial by jury shall be allowed. The suit was filed on December 31, 1940, and exactly at the end of the twenty days for appearance, defendant filed its answer. The affidavits dispute the question of whether or not the answer was delivered in person by counsel for defendant or sent through the mail. In either event, however, it was beyond the ten days prescribed by rule 38(b) of the New Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c.

The action is one for damages for personal injury, which ordinarily is peculiarly a jury case. It is said by defendant that there are complicated questions of law on the question of agency, but there seems no reason why the court could not properly instruct the jury on these matters. While the plaintiffs are not entitled as a matter of right under the Rules to trial by jury, I believe the court has a discretion to allow the jury anyway. The affidavits by the plaintiffs’ counsel are to the effect that the failure to ask for ■a jury was an oversight, and in any event, the delay was not more than five days.

My conclusion is that both of these cases should be tried by jury and it is accordingly so ordered.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
         SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


       In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB (the
"Report") of All American Pet Company, Inc. (the "Company") for the
period ended March 31, 2007, the undersigned Barry Schwartz, the
President; Chief Executive Officer; Director, Principal Accounting
Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of each of the
undersigned's knowledge and belief:

   (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

Dated:  July 17, 2007

                              /s/ Barry Schwartz
                              ------------------------------------------
                              Barry Schwartz, President; Chief Executive
                              Officer; Director, Principal Accounting
                              Officer and Chief Financial Officer
ACCEPTED

03-15-00440-CV

6143512

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/20/2015 4:33:39 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

CASE NO. 03-15-00440-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

RAYMOND COX, JR., AND TAMESA COX, et al. 

Appellants, 

v. 

GMAC MORTGAGE. LLC, 

Appellee. 

Appeal from the County Court at Law Number Three 

Bell County, Texas (Case No. 74,283) 

APPELLEE'S NOTICE OF ATTORNEY IN CHARGE 

APPELLEE'S NOTICE OF ATIORNEY IN CHARGE 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: Paul A. Hoefker 

Texas Bar No. 09772800 

ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP* 

550 Westcott, Suite 560 

Houston, Texas 77007 

713-293-3618 phone 

858-412-2773 fax 

phoefker@aldridgepite.com 

*Pite Duncan, LLP, has changed is 

name to Aldridge Pite, LLP 

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/20/2015 4:33:39 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
APPELLEE'S NOTICE OF ATTORNEY IN CHARGE 

TO THE HONRABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

Attorney Paul A. Hoefker hereby give his notice of appearance in this matter as attorney 

for appellee, GMAC Mortgage, LLC, and notifies the Court that he will be the attorney in charge 

for this client in this matter. Attorney Olga Panchenko has left the firm; therefore, Paul A. 

Hoefker is now designated as the attorney in charge for GMAC Mortgage, LLC, in this appeal. 

Further, Pite Duncan, LLP, has changed its name to Aldridge Pite, LLP. 

Respectfully submitted, 

By~~ Texas Bar No. 09772800 

ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP 

550 Westcott, Suite 560 

Houston, Texas 77007 

713-293-3618 phone 

858-412-2773 fax 

phoefker@aldridgepite.com 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served in 

accordance with the Rule 9.5 ofthe Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on July 20, 2015, to: 

Michael Brinkley, Appellants' attorney, via fax at 888-511-0946. 

Paul A. Hoefker 

APPELLEE'S NOTICE OF ATIORNEY IN CHARGE
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED**

 

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report of VirtualRadiologic Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31,2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), the undersigned officer of the Company certifies, pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that, to such officer’s knowledge:

 

1.             The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

2.             The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed inthe Report.

 
| Date:  May 2,  2008 | By:    | /s/ Leonard C. Purkis   |
|-------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|                          |   | Leonard C. Purkis       |
|                          |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

----