IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-51091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

HONGYAN LI, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CV-59

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant Hongyan Li, a naturalized United States citizen, pled guilty 

to acts related to her illegal prostitution business and to laundering the 

proceeds of that illegal business. Thereafter, the government initiated 

proceedings to revoke Li’s naturalization, alleging that her prostitution 

operation and money laundering activities—before her naturalization—

precluded her possession of the “good moral character” required for one to 

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 27, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The government and Li cross-moved for 

summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the government and revoked Li’s U.S. citizenship. We affirm.1

I. 

Li first argues that the government’s civil action to revoke her 

naturalized U.S. citizenship violated the plea agreement underlying her 

convictions for enticing prostitution and money laundering.2 To interpret the 

terms of that plea agreement, we apply general contract law principles, 

considering “whether the government’s conduct is consistent with the 

defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement.” United States v. 

Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Valencia, 

985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993)). 

As is relevant here, the plea agreement provides:

The United States agrees not to use any truthful 

statements, testimony, or information provided by [Li]

under the terms of this agreement against [Li] at 

sentencing or as the basis for any subsequent

prosecution. . . . [Li] fully understands that, by this 

plea agreement, no promises, representations, or 

agreements have been made or entered into with any 

other United States Attorney or with any state 

prosecutor concerning other possible offenses or 

charges. It is further understood by the parties that 

this agreement does not prevent any government 

 

1 Because the appeal is from a grant of summary judgment, we review the district 

court’s conclusions de novo and construe all of the facts in the non-movant’s favor. Day v. 

Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 768 F.3d 435, 435 (5th Cir. 2014); Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 

283 F.3d 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2002). The district court granted summary judgment in the 

government’s favor; therefore, we construe the facts in Li’s favor. 

2 “We review a claim of breach of a plea agreement de novo . . . , accepting the district 

court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 546 

(5th Cir. 2004).

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agency from pursuing civil and/or administrative 

actions against [Li] or any property. 

Emphases added. Li contends that this language prevents the government 

from pursuing its civil denaturalization action because, according to Li, the 

government’s civil action is a “prosecution,” which is not permitted under the 

plea agreement. 

Li’s position is not supported by the unambiguous language of the plea 

agreement. First, in the context of the agreement, the term “prosecution” 

refers to criminal prosecutions, not civil actions. Thus, the term cannot be read 

reasonably to apply to this civil proceeding to revoke Li’s citizenship. Although 

the term “prosecution” can capture a wide swath of legal proceedings other 

than criminal prosecutions, this Court has held that, in the context of a plea 

agreement, the term is read most naturally to refer to criminal prosecutions. 

See, e.g., Bickham Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v. United States, 168 F.3d 790, 792-93 

(5th Cir. 1999) (reviewing a plea agreement that stated that the defendant 

“would not be subject to further prosecution” and noting that “[p]rosecution 

typically involves proceeding against a person criminally”); id. at 793 

(observing that the term “prosecution” is “part of the terminology of the 

criminal law, describing the means by which the law is to be enforced, and 

associated in popular thought with laws for the prevention and punishment of 

crime” and noting that “the word refers to a criminal action or proceeding, and 

. . . has been said to be synonymous with ‘criminal action’ ”). 

Moreover, to the extent that there may be ambiguity in the plea 

agreement’s use of the term “prosecution,” such ambiguity is resolved by the 

remainder of the agreement, which states explicitly that the government can 

pursue civil and administrative actions against Li: “[The] agreement does not 

prevent any government agency from pursuing civil and/or administrative 

actions against [Li].” The government’s civil action in this case falls squarely 

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within the core of this language; and, therefore, the government has not 

breached the plea agreement by seeking to revoke Li’s naturalization.3 

II. 

Li’s second argument is that the government’s denaturalization action is 

time-barred under the general-purpose federal statute of limitations, which 

provides:

Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an 

action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any 

civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or 

otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced 

within five years from the date when the claim first 

accrued . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2462.4

“[T]he United States is not bound by any limitations period unless 

Congress explicitly directs otherwise.” United States v. City of Palm Beach 

Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1981). Where a party seeks to apply a 

statute of limitations against the government, the statute at issue “must 

receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.” Badaracco v. C.I.R., 

464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (quotation mark omitted).

Li points to § 2462 as an explicit direction from Congress that restricts 

the filing of the present action to a five-year period. But, strictly construed in 

the government’s favor, the limitations period in § 2462 does not apply to civil 

denaturalization actions because such actions cannot be classified as punitive 

in nature. In fact, the Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor statute to 

 

3 Because the contested portions of the plea agreement are unambiguous, we need not 

reach Li’s argument regarding parol evidence.

4 The district court concluded that the statute of limitations did not apply to this 

action; this is a legal conclusion that is subject to de novo review. Tharpe v. Thaler, 628 F.3d 

719, 722 (5th Cir. 2010). 

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§ 2462 and held that “[t]he words ‘penalty’ or ‘forfeiture’ in this section refer to 

something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law.” Meeker 

v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (emphasis added). Remedial 

actions do not count. Id.5 The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the language 

in the predecessor statute to § 2462 refers to punitive and not remedial actions 

guides our conclusion that § 2462’s limitations period does not apply in the 

denaturalization context.6 

Notwithstanding that the revocation of Li’s naturalized citizenship is 

certainly severe, it cannot be called punitive. Indeed, if an individual is 

statutorily ineligible to be naturalized at the time she becomes a citizen, her

certificate of naturalization must be cancelled and her citizenship must be 

revoked and set aside. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (noting that the revocation is 

effective retroactively and given the original date of the naturalization 

certificate); see also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981)

(describing the illegal procurement of naturalized citizenship). Simply put, 

denaturalization is the withdrawal of something to which the individual was 

 

5 Courts continue to apply the basic holding from Meeker, namely that a “penalty or 

forfeiture” under § 2462 means a punitive measure, not a remedial one. See, e.g., Coughlan 

v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Telluride 

Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a sanction is a “penalty” under 

§ 2462 if it “seeks compensation unrelated to, or in excess, of the damages caused by the 

defendant” and concluding that § 2462 did not apply to the government’s claim for injunctive 

relief in an environmental-restoration suit because “the restorative injunction [sought] is not 

a penalty because it seeks to restore only the wetlands damaged by [the company’s] acts to 

the status quo . . . and does not seek compensation unrelated to or in excess of the damages 

caused by [the company’s] acts”); Johnson v. S.E.C., 87 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“In 

sum, we conclude that a ‘penalty,’ as the term is used in § 2462, is a form of punishment 

imposed by the government for unlawful or proscribed conduct, which goes beyond remedying 

the damage caused to the harmed parties by the defendant’s action.”).

6 Other courts to consider the issue have also held that § 2462 and its predecessor 

statute do not apply to denaturalization actions. See, e.g., United States v. Hauck, 155 F.2d 

141, 143 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Rebelo, 394 F. App’x 850, 852–53 (3d Cir. 2010); see 

also, e.g., Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 802 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding “that 

§ 2462’s five-year statute of limitations does not apply to removal proceedings”).

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never entitled; denaturalization is a restorative or remedial action, not an 

action that seeks to punish the commission of a crime. Accord Coughlan v. 

Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 470 F.3d 1400, 1305-07 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding 

that the limitations period in § 2462 was inapplicable to the revocation of a 

piloting certificate because the certificate was not revoked as punishment but 

was withdrawn because the pilot was unqualified to hold it). Li’s sentence 

punished her for her crimes; denaturalization addresses her qualifications for 

becoming a naturalized citizen.

Indeed, the government instituted this specific denaturalization action 

because Li never actually met the requirements for naturalization. It was 

those acts supporting her criminal convictions that rendered her ineligible for 

naturalization and citizenship, and the denial of citizenship is an adverse 

consequence of that conduct. But, the government has not instituted these

proceedings to “punish” Li for that conduct; instead, it is attempting to correct 

the mistake of granting her citizenship. Because the denaturalization action 

is not punitive, the limitations period in § 2462 is inapplicable to Li’s case.

III. 

A.

Finally, Li argues that the government has not satisfied its “heavy 

burden” of showing that she should be denaturalized. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 

at 505. An individual seeking naturalized U.S. citizenship must show that she 

“has been and still is a person of good moral character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).7 

The government can prevail in its denaturalization action only if “[t]he 

 

7 In Li’s case, she had to demonstrate good moral character for a period of five years 

before she filed her naturalization application (in April 2006) until her naturalization 

ceremony (in August 2007). That is, Li was required to be a person of good moral character 

from April 17, 2001, through August 8, 2007, the date of her citizenship oath.

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evidence justifying revocation of citizenship [is] clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing and [does] not leave the issue in doubt.” Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 

505. (quotation marks omitted). The government has met its burden. 

Li pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 1957(a), statutes which

prohibit enticing interstate travel for the purposes of prostitution and money 

laundering, respectively. As a factual basis for her plea, Li admitted that she 

had multiple residences housing multiple prostitutes over a multi-year period 

prior to her naturalization. She also admitted that she laundered the money 

from her illegal prostitution business. These acts made Li automatically 

ineligible for naturalization because these convictions demonstrated her lack 

of “good moral character.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (“No person shall be 

regarded as . . . a person of good moral character” if she if convicted of violating 

or admits to violating § 1182(a)(2)(D)); id. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii) (stating that an 

alien is inadmissible if she “directly or indirectly procures or attempts to 

procure . . . prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or receives . 

. . in whole or in part, the proceeds of prostitution”); see also 8 C.F.R. 

§ 316.10(b)(2)(vii) (“An applicant shall be found to lack good moral character if 

during the statutory period the applicant . . . is or was involved in prostitution 

or commercialized vice as described in [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)].”). It is thus 

clear that the government satisfied its heavy burden supporting 

denaturalization.

B.

Li argues that the district court’s conclusion is procedurally erroneous 

because the government’s complaint only sought to denaturalize her under 8 

C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(iii), rather than C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(vii). Li’s focus is too 

narrow, causing her to overlook that the government cited a relevant statutory 

provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), which provides that Li’s prostitution-related 

business precludes a finding that she had good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. 

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§ 1101(f)(3); see also id. § 1101(f)(8) (referencing subsection (a)(43), which 

states that Li automatically lacked the requisite good moral character because 

of her convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and § 2422).

The complaint placed Li’s prostitution-related conduct directly at issue, 

alleging that she illegally procured her citizenship because she “committed 

unlawful acts, including enticing interstate travel for prostitution and money 

laundering, that adversely reflected upon her moral character during the 

period in which she was required to show good moral character.” Li’s argument 

that the complaint was defective is meritless.8

IV. 

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the 

government. The cancellation of Li’s certification of naturalization is, 

therefore,

AFFIRMED.

 

8 Li’s argument that the detailed and lengthy factual basis for her prostitution-related 

convictions is somehow insufficient to show that she “is or was involved in prostitution” is

meritless. Furthermore, because the government satisfied its burden to show a clear and 

unequivocal lack of good moral character, we need not address its alternative bases for 

revoking Li’s citizenship.

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