RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0030-23

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

M.P., 

 Defendant, 

and 

D.S., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________ 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF L.J.P., 

a minor. 

__________________________

Submitted April 10, 2024 – Decided April 19, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0030-23

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, 

Docket No. FG-19-0011-23. 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Nicholas Joseph Dolinsky, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Todd S. Wilson,

Designated Counsel, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant D.S. (David)1 appeals from a judgment of guardianship 

terminating his parental rights to his biological son L.J.P. (Luke), born in 2016.2 

Defendant M.P. (Mary), Luke's biological mother, surrendered her parental 

1

 We employ initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties, the children, and 

others to protect the children's privacy and because records relating to Division

proceedings held pursuant to Rule 5:12 are excluded from public access under 

Rule 1:38-3(d)(12). 

2

 David also has another daughter who lives with her mother and is not part of 

this appeal. 
3 A-0030-23

rights to Luke, and is not a party to this appeal.3 Judge Michael Paul Wright 

convened the guardianship trial and rendered an oral opinion. David argues the 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the statutory four-prong best interests test under 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). David contends the judge erred in failing to correctly 

consider and apply the July 2, 2021 statutory amendments to the Kinship Legal 

Guardianship (KLG) Act4 and avers the judge disregarded the Legislature's 

intent by giving weight to the resource parents' wishes to adopt and not 

protecting his parental rights. David also asserts the judge erred by not 

exploring KLG as an alternative to termination of his parental rights. 

 The Law Guardian seeks affirmance. We conclude, after reviewing the 

record in light of David's arguments, that the judge correctly applied the 

governing legal principles, and sufficient credible evidence supports the judge's 

findings. Therefore, we affirm. 

I.

3

 Mary has another daughter named "Ida," whose father is "Andy." Ida is not 

part of this appeal. 

4

 On July 2, 2021, the Legislature enacted L. 2021, c. 154, deleting the last 

sentence of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), which read "[s]uch harm may include 

evidence that separating the child from [their] resource family parents would 

cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." 
4 A-0030-23

We begin our discussion with the legal framework governing the 

termination of parental rights. Parents have a constitutionally protected right to 

the care, custody, and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 

745, 753 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). That 

right is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 

553 (2014). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to 

protect children from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 

382, 397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To effectuate 

these concerns, the Legislature established the standard for determining when 

parental rights must be terminated in a child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a) requires the Division prove by clear and convincing evidence the 

following four prongs: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the [judge] has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 
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(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good. 

The four prongs are not "discrete and separate," but "relate to and overlap 

with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's 

best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. "The considerations involved [in 

determinations of parental fitness] are extremely fact sensitive and require 

particularized evidence that address[es] the specific circumstance[s] in the given 

case." R.G., 217 N.J. at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second 

alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 280 (2007)).

II. 

 A. Family History 

The pertinent facts and procedural history are fully recounted in Judge 

Wright's comprehensive oral opinion and need only be summarized. The 

Division first became involved with the family in early 2017 because of 

allegations of drug use and domestic violence. The Division found no abuse or 

neglect and closed its investigation. David's history includes criminality, mental 

health problems, homelessness, and dysfunction. He was in the foster care 
6 A-0030-23

system in Russia and came to the United States when he was adopted at the age 

of six. 

The record shows David was abused as a child by his caretakers in 

Russia—putting cigarettes out on him and breaking his bones. David pled guilty 

and was convicted of two counts of child endangerment.5 He is a Megan's Law 

registrant and part of his sentence included Parole Supervision for Life. The 

record shows David violated certain terms of his parole and Megan's Law 

restrictions. Mary has a history of homelessness, substance abuse, and mental 

health problems. 

On December 11, 2017, the police reported that Mary and Luke were at 

the police station after she stabbed her boyfriend in what she described as "selfdefense" during a domestic violence incident. Mary was arrested and charged 

with aggravated assault and weapons charges. At the same time, David was 

incarcerated for the stated sexual assault charges. With both parents in jail, the 

Division executed an emergent removal6 of then one-year-old Luke and placed 

5

 According to David, he went to a party and met two girls who informed him 

that they were eighteen years old. He then engaged in sexual relations with 

them. 

6

 "A 'Dodd removal' refers to the emergency removal of a child from the home 

without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, which, as amended, is found at 
7 A-0030-23

him with Greta and Brian, non-relative resource parents.7 The judge granted the 

Division's request for the care, supervision, and custody of Luke. 

David was granted weekly supervised visitation with Luke while he was 

incarcerated, which continued on a monthly basis, until October 2018. Mary 

engaged in treatment for her issues and was reunified with Luke in November 

2018. David was still incarcerated at that time. The judge ordered that David's 

visitation with Luke was subject to Mary's discretion, which she opted not to 

continue. 

In August 2021, the police called the Division with concerns for Luke and 

Ida, his younger half-sister, after Mary called multiple times reporting that 

someone was at the door. When the police responded, they found no one but 

observed Mary was delusional and malnourished. Mary, Luke, and Ida were 

taken to the hospital. Hospital staff members reported to the Division that Luke 

was "eating everything put in front of him," had a "red and pink burn mark on 

his left hand," and Ida was "very thin" and "pale" and had a healing rib fracture. 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. The Dodd Act was authored by former Senate 

President Frank J. 'Pat' Dodd in 1974." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 609 n.2 (App. Div. 2010). 

7

 David requested that his adopted parents be assessed as a placement option, 

but they declined. 
8 A-0030-23

The Division conducted a Dodd removal of both children. David was still 

incarcerated at the time. The Division placed Luke with Robert, his maternal 

grandfather. In September 2021, David was released from prison. However, he 

was noncompliant with his terms of parole and failed to appear for a courtordered substance abuse evaluation or rescheduled appointments. The judge 

ordered that David's visitation with Luke was deferred "until clinically indicated 

to commence" because of David's lack of contact and relationship with the child 

since 2018. David was placed on "missing status" by the Division and remained 

incommunicado for the remainder of 2021 and early 2022. Based on a tip from 

Mary, the Division ultimately located David in a Trenton prison on July 13, 

2022.

By July 2022, Robert indicated he could not keep the children past 

November 2022. The Division transitioned Luke and Ida back to Greta's and 

Brian's home, where they remain to this day. In November 2022, Dr. Jessica 

Elliot conducted a psychological evaluation of David at the prison, which 

included an assessment of the appropriateness of visitation. 8 Dr. Elliot noted in 

8

 Dr. Elliot reviewed the Division's Court Report dated November 9, 2022, and 

the evaluation included a clinical interview, mental status examination, 

personality assessment inventory, and adult adolescent parenting inventory. 
9 A-0030-23

her report that David was "polite, cooperative, and engaged throughout the 

evaluation," and he was incarcerated for violating his parole. 

David reported his criminal history to Dr. Elliot and his diagnoses of 

"[b]ipolar, depression, anxiety, ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder)," and substance abuse. Dr. Elliot opined that reunification was 

possible if David engaged in treatment services and maintained sobriety, 

housing, and employment. Upon receipt of Dr. Elliot's report, the Division 

realized she did not have all the information about David's criminal history, and 

the Division provided the information to her. 

After receiving additional information from the Division, Dr. Elliot 

prepared an addendum to her report, explaining David did not address the extent 

of his two sexual assaults upon minors during the initial evaluation. Dr. Elliot 

opined "this new information substantially changes the formulation of [David's] 

risk and warrants a more thorough and specialized risk assessment prior to the 

commencement of visitation." 

On December 7, 2022, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship. 

After being served with the complaint while incarcerated, David expressed his 

wishes for reunification with Luke. The Division discussed David's plan for 

post-release housing, employment, and services. At the February 2, 2023 return 
10 A-0030-23

date for the hearing on the order to show cause, the Law Guardian asked the 

judge to consider restricting visitation until an updated evaluation of David was 

performed. On March 20, 2023, the judge ordered Dr. Barry Katz to conduct a 

psychosexual evaluation of David at the prison. 

On March 28, 2023, Dr. Katz conducted the following during the evaluation: 

a forensic interview; record review; mental status exam; assessment of parenting 

skills; the Adult, Adolescent Parenting Inventory, Second Edition (AAPI-2.1); the 

Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI); and Sexual Violence Risk-20, Version 2 

(SVR-20-V2).

Dr. Katz observed that David had been incarcerated for most of Luke's life 

and had not seen him in years. When discussing his sexual offense charges, David 

reported to Dr. Katz that he did not agree with the charges and that he was not "going 

to sit in class like parole wants and talk about why he is not going to have sex with 

kids." David felt both charges were completely false "because [he] would not go out 

with them and [he] called them ugly to their face and a week later [he] got a call 

from police saying we need to speak to you on this." David declined to report 

anything further about his criminal history because he "did not trust the system."

David informed Dr. Katz that he was not taking his medication because he 

needed to "get the monkey off [his] back." Although David denied any suicidal 
11 A-0030-23

ideations, he reported that "he had thoughts about hurting others, but that he would 

not do it." David acknowledged that his depression "has led to lack of motivation 

and lack of caring." When further discussing his drug usage, David said he used 

marijuana daily, including illegally in jail, denied ever using opiates, but was 

prescribed Suboxone at the prison because he claimed, "why not."

David also stated he had been hospitalized twice for mental health issues and 

had been prescribed psychiatric medication. He attended counseling in prison but 

was discharged due to "budget cuts." David previously underwent counseling for 

depression and anxiety. He never completed sex offender therapy and claimed that 

he never would.

Dr. Katz noted in his report that David presented as paranoid and inconsistent 

in his reporting. He also found David "displayed extensive denial [and] 

minimalization with regard to his sexual offending behavior, including blaming the 

victims and assert[ing] that his prior admission and conviction was incorrect." 

Regarding his future plans, Dr. Katz found David was "not realistic based upon his 

pattern of continued antisocial acts, substance abuse and instability." Dr. Katz 

opined there was a "high risk to a child placed in [David]'s care or supervision 

unsupervised" and a "risk of exploitation of minors in his care or supervision and 

pathological hatred of women." He also noted that since David "has a general 
12 A-0030-23

understanding of accepted parenting practices, . . . his deficits as a parent are not due 

to a lack of education but rather are an extension of [David] putting his needs before 

anyone else's, including his children."

Based upon the above findings, Dr. Katz ultimately concluded: 

[David] should not have contact with [Luke] due to the 

risks involved. The risks to the child would be present 

during supervised visitation, albeit much higher if

visitation were unsupervised. In response to the goal of 

[David] eventually being a viable placement for [Luke], 

the results of this evaluation indicate that [David] 

would not be able to be a viable caretaker for [Luke] at 

this time or in the foreseeable future. With regard to 

the issue of supervised visitation, it is not 

recommended for [David] to have contact with [Luke]

at this time or in the foreseeable future. 

Dr. Katz also found that David presented a low to moderate risk of direct sexual 

harm to Luke, but posed a high risk of impulse control problems, including anger 

and exposure to inappropriate sexual stimuli and concluded that the harm could 

not be mitigated even under supervision. Dr. Katz did not consider reunification 

as a viable option within the foreseeable future. 

On April 19, 2023, Dr. Gregory Gambone conducted a psychological 

evaluation of David on behalf of the defense. Dr. Gambone found that David 

exhibited "thought and behavior patterns that may affect his decision making, 

his ability to control substance abuse, his ability to maintain an independent pro-
13 A-0030-23

social life, and his ability to benefit from psychotherapy." With regard to his 

ability to parent, Dr. Gambone opined that "when stable, substance-free, 

conflict-free, crime-free, symptom-free, and stress-free, [David] may exhibit 

adequate executive functioning in learning, problem solving, contingency 

planning, and social decision-making." 

Dr. Gambone's report also noted that David has "a superficial 

understanding of the physical, emotional, intellectual, and social needs of his 

son" and has a reported history of "disregarding his responsibility for his 

children's health, safety, and stability." Based upon the above findings, Dr. 

Gambone recommended that David engage in various services, including 

therapy, parenting skills training, and sex offender treatment. Dr. Gambone 

concluded: 

[David] should not currently be considered to present 

an imminent risk of impulsive harm to himself, his son 

[Luke], or any other person. However, it is also 

recommended that [David] should not currently be 

considered capable of adequately parenting any 

children on an independent basis. Areas of continued 

concern include [David]'s current incarceration, his 

subsequent societal re-entry stressors, and his lack of 

regular or consistent contact with his son [Luke] in the 

past [four] years. Accordingly, it is recommended that 

[David] be currently considered appropriate for 

supervised contact with his son [Luke] during his 

incarceration and subsequent release, contingent on

documented compliance with all court-ordered services 
14 A-0030-23

and Megan's Law supervision. As a means of 

maximizing his personal stability, interpersonal 

stability, parenting skills, and coping skills, [David] is 

strongly encouraged to comply with all of the 

aforementioned recommendations. 

B. The Guardianship Trial 

The judge held a three-day trial. Caseworker Ashley Markferding and Dr. 

Katz testified on behalf of the Division. Dr. Gambone testified on behalf of 

David. 

Markferding testified about the Division's efforts to explore Luke's 

placement with relatives. Robert was ruled out because he had asked for Luke 

to be removed from his home. Robert's mother, who lived in the Dominican 

Republic, was ruled out because neither Mary nor David wanted the children 

placed out of the country. Mary's aunt was ruled out based on an Interstate 

Compact of the Placement of Children's denial from New York due to her failure 

to provide the requisite documentation. David's adoptive parents declined to be 

placement resources. Mary's uncle declined to be considered due to housing 

issues, and Ida's mother refused to get involved in a case involving David. 

Markferding stated that Luke is a "loving boy, it makes you smile," he's 

"affectionate," and "loves his [half-]sister." Markferding observed that Luke 

"remembered [Greta] and . . . loved being in [her] care. And even currently she 
15 A-0030-23

had lots of kiddos that he thoroughly enjoys playing with and being around." 

Markferding testified that she explained the difference between KLG and 

adoption to Greta, and she preferred adoption over KLG but would be open to 

facilitating a relationship between Luke and David even if she adopted Luke. 

According to Markferding, Luke did not recall visiting David at a "locked 

facility." When Markferding asked Luke if he knew who his "biological father" 

was, he named the resource father. Markferding testified that she asked Luke if 

he knew an individual named "David," and he responded "no." 

Dr. Katz was qualified as an expert in psychology, parental fitness, 

forensic psychology, and sex offenders. When asked about David's childhood 

trauma and its impact, if any, on the case, Dr. Katz responded, "traumatized 

people traumatize people." Dr. Katz noted that David fell into a group referred 

to as the "antisocial or psychopathic sex offender," and for those people, "all 

individuals are viewed as fair game. And what will happen is that if they're able 

to commit a crime or offense against an individual they're entitled to do it and 

it's the person's fault for being in a vulnerable position by the offender's view." 

Dr. Katz opined that "if they're vulnerable and [David's] able to take advantage 

of them then he will." Dr. Katz stated that David's parole violations also speak 
16 A-0030-23

to antisocial psychopathic behavior, because he was willing to risk further 

incarceration even though he knew he was being monitored. 

 Dr. Katz also noted that David was an inconsistent reporter. He testified 

that "at one point [David] says he has an addiction to opiates and at another point 

he says he's never used opiates except for a short time, and he has no addiction 

to it." And when asked why he was taking Suboxone for treatment if he really 

was not addicted, David responded, "for the hell of it, for the thrill of it." Dr. 

Katz opined these inconsistent statements stem from the fact that "[David] 

presents whatever information he feels is going to help him or blurts out at that 

moment because it's going to be something exciting or thrilling or enthralling," 

and "that [David] is committed to continuing this antisocial lifestyle, committing 

additional offenses . . . and plays into very much this attention seeking/thrill 

seeking behavior where he's going to exploit anyone he wishes as part of that 

process." 

 Dr. Katz also found that David's lack of contact with the Division during 

the time he wasn't incarcerated was significant and demonstrated the antisocial 

psychopathic dynamic as "the focus of the individual is themselves, not on 

others, not of meeting others needs just their own needs." Dr. Katz further noted 

that individuals with antisocial psychopathic have a very poor history of 
17 A-0030-23

compliance, and "even if they do comply, they don't benefit from therapy, 

because their goal is to again meet their own needs and to get the therapy to 

meet their needs there." 

Dr. Katz also went on to discuss David's potential empathy for Luke. The 

test results administered indicated that David understands "what's expected of a 

parent in terms of how to be empathic. He chooses not to. And the indication 

is he's not going to." Dr. Katz reasoned: 

Because first of all he doesn't describe empathy towards 

multiple individuals. The victims of his sexual offenses 

he—on empathy towards. In fact he says demeaning 

things about those victims. Saying that they're—that he 

just thought that they were ugly and that they were—

you know, liars and et cetera. And so there's a total lack 

of empathy even for those that he's victimized in these 

very serious ways. And towards other victims, again 

with domestic violence et cetera, lack of empathy 

towards anyone expressed as a willful intent not as a 

lack of understanding. 

 Dr. Katz also found David's lack of a relationship with his older child to 

be significant and "a general parenting deficit." He explained that its "a part of 

[a] pattern of—about meeting the needs of another child that he has and 

abandoning that child, in the same similar pattern as we have with [Luke]," 

showing the chronicity of the behavior across situations. Dr. Katz also found 

that David's mistrust in the system and his belief that Luke was going to be 
18 A-0030-23

adopted no matter what stemmed from the fact that he "at one level clearly 

understands he's not complied, he's not had any contact with child. He has 

another child he's not seen. He's engaged in criminal behavior. He's repeatedly 

incarcerated in state prison, and that his case looks, you know, very poor." 

 Overall, Dr. Katz testified that David's risk to Luke "in terms of specific 

sexual offending" is "low to moderate," and found: 

His impulsiveness, his seeking behaviors, lack of 

empathy, his lack of care, his lack of responsiveness to 

[Luke]'s needs at any point in the history of the case, 

speaks—well combined with the psychopathic 

antisocial acting out behaviors shows any child, 

especially a young vulnerable child, would be at risk 

for a multitude of types of neglect, abuse, et cetera in 

[David]'s care or presence. And that these dynamics 

can occur even under supervision - even therapeutic

supervision. 

Dr. Katz opined that David harmed and posed a risk of harm to Luke, "in 

the form of abuse or neglect." And, Dr. Katz stated that therapy would not 

improve the situation due to David's "lack of compliance with services" and his 

unwillingness to engage in means to alleviate the harm. Dr. Katz criticized Dr. 

Gambone's conclusions because he did not perform any sex offender assessment 

on David and that he used the "Mini Mental State Examination," which is "very 

limited" and "not a comprehensive psychological personality test that would 
19 A-0030-23

cover things like validity, patterns of behavior, et cetera." 9 Dr. Katz disagreed 

with Dr. Gambone's recommendation that David engage in therapeutic visitation 

with Luke because his behavior would "likely be impulsive, irreverent, harmful, 

[and] emotionally harmful to Luke." Dr. Katz concluded that maintaining a 

parental relationship between David and Luke was not in the child's best interest. 

Dr. Gambone testified on behalf of David as an expert in forensic 

psychology, parental fitness, and psychology as it related to sexual offenses and 

harm to children. Dr. Gambone described David as "a person who just does not 

like authority, does not like to be told what to do, does not like to be monitored." 

Regarding a parenting plan for Luke, Dr. Gambone testified: 

the biggest issue with [David] and the concept of 

parenting is he's kind of saying, you know if I get my 

kid back I'd like to give it a try. If I don't get my kid 

back I'm not sure I want to give it a try. You know, and 

again, that's the antisocial. Again that's the . . . 

manipulation. 

Dr. Gambone added that "[David] has provided neither primary nor supportive 

care for his son [Luke] for more than four years. He has had only minimal 

contact with his son during the same time." 

9

 Dr. Gambone attempted to administer a more comprehensive assessment 

known as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2, but David refused 

to take it. 
20 A-0030-23

 Dr. Gambone recommended a medication review, discontinuing 

Suboxone treatment, parenting skills classes, short-term individual therapy, sex 

offender specific treatment, and therapeutic visitation with Luke. Dr. Gambone 

stated, "with [David] I kind of think the decision would be to let him take the 

challenge that he said he's up to, or in another way put up or shut up. Call his 

bluff. I think—I think that's the only way to do it." When asked if that would 

put the child at risk, Dr. Gambone opined that "visits in a visit hall at South 

Woods State Prison . . . would not put any child at risk." 

 Dr. Gambone also testified, "it's recommended that [David] should not 

currently be considered to present an imminent risk of impulsive harm to 

himself, his son [Luke] or any other person. However, it is also recommended 

that [David] should not currently be considered capable of adequately 

[parenting] any child on an independent basis." Dr. Gambone recommended, 

"[David] be currently considered appropriate for supervised contact with his son, 

[Luke], during his incarceration and subsequent release contingent on 

documented compliance will all court ordered services and Megan's Law 

supervision." 

 On cross-examination, Dr. Gambone conceded that David had antisocial 

personality disorder and "a general disregard for the rights or welfare of others." 
21 A-0030-23

He further agreed that David was "irresponsible now," "untrustworthy," and 

"unstable," but attributed these traits to his difficult upbringing. Dr. Gambone 

also noted that the prognosis for treating someone like David—who has 

antisocial personality disorder—is that "it's not impossible to treat [but] usually

not good, meaning that if someone's antisocial . . . it will go on." 

Dr. Gambone opined that, "when stable, substance free, conflict free, 

crime free, symptom free, and stress free [David] may exhibit adequate 

executive function and learning, problem solving, contingency planning, and 

social decision making." However, Dr. Gambone indicated that it would take 

about three months to determine if David could successfully be rehabilitated, 

and if so, another six months for him to parent Luke. Dr. Gambone noted he did 

not know Luke and never interviewed him. 

David did not testify. The Law Guardian did not present any evidence but 

joined in the Division's request to terminate David's parental rights to Luke. 

III. 

Subsequent to the presentation of the evidence and closing arguments of 

counsel, the judge rendered an oral decision summarizing the matter's 

procedural history and making factual findings as to each of the required 

elements of the best-interests-of-the-child standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
22 A-0030-23

15.1(a). Based on those findings, the judge determined the Division sustained 

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence it was in Luke's best 

interests to terminate David's parental rights. 

In his opinion, the judge found Markferding's testimony "very credible," 

and "clear, concise, and consistent under direct and cross-examination." He 

found her "recollection of facts was impressive and its accuracy was unrebutted 

by any evidence in the case," and deemed her "the hallmark of credibility." 

The judge also credited Dr. Katz's testimony noting him to be "credible" 

and "unrefuted in any way by the [d]efense expert's opinion, and honest 

assessment," and "more dire and pessimistic" than Dr. Gambone. 

The first prong of the best interests test requires the Division demonstrate 

that the "child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be 

endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1); see 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352. The concern is not only with actual harm to the child 

but also the risk of harm. In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 

(1999) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 616 n.14 

(1986)). The focus is not on a single or isolated event, but rather "on the effect 

of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's 

health and development." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. 
23 A-0030-23

Our Court has explained a parent's withdrawal of nurture and care for an 

extended period is a harm that endangers the health of a child. D.M.H., 161 N.J. 

at 379 (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352-54). When children "languish in foster 

care" without a permanent home, their parents' "failure to provide a permanent 

home" may itself constitute harm. Id. at 383 (second quotation citing N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 591-93 (App. Div. 

1996)). The judge need not wait until children are "irreparably impaired" by 

parental abuse or neglect. D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 383. "The State has a parens 

patriae responsibility to protect children from the probability of serious physical, 

emotional, or psychological harm resulting from the action or inaction of their 

parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 110 

(App. Div. 2004). 

Under prong one, the judge found Luke's safety, health, and welfare will 

be endangered by a continued relationship with David due to his prolonged 

absence from Luke's life and "[t]he almost complete absence of solicitude, 

protection, and nurture by [David] has endangered the health and development 

of [Luke]." The judge further concluded the harm would continue due to David's 

"psychological and substance misuse." There was substantial credible evidence 

in the record to support the judge's finding under prong one. 
24 A-0030-23

Regarding prong two, which overlaps with prong one, the judge found 

David has a "true desire" to reunify with Luke but emphasized "the record is 

clear that he is unable, at this time, to eliminate the harm now or in the 

foreseeable future." The judge highlighted that the expert testimony and

evidence demonstrated that David was unlikely to remedy the harm that his 

absence caused Luke, and noted that "Dr. Gambone would not downplay the 

current danger that [David] poses [Luke.]" 

The judge concluded David's problem in parenting "has persisted for many 

years. And there are no indications that any change has taken place for [David] 

at this time." While Dr. Gambone postulated a course of treatment that would 

allow David to rehabilitate himself, the judge found it was unlikely to happen in 

the foreseeable future "especially given the factual finding that there has been 

no true engagement in services." There is substantial credible evidence in the 

record to support the judge's finding under prong two. 

The third prong requires evidence that "[t]he [D]ivision has made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the 

[judge] has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 

30:4C-15.1(a)(3). "Reasonable efforts may include consultation with the parent, 
25 A-0030-23

developing a plan for reunification, providing services essential to the 

realization of the reunification plan, informing the family of the child's progress, 

and facilitating visitation." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citation omitted). 

Under the first part of prong three, the judge found the Division made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to David by scheduling substance abuse 

and psychological evaluations, however, he failed to maintain contact with the 

Division and vanished. The judge highlighted that the Division searched for 

David for months but could not provide services in absentia. Therefore, the 

judge concluded that any lack of services during that period was the result of 

David's own actions. The judge observed that the Division did not arrange for 

visitation while David was incarcerated, but found visitation would not be safe 

at the prison, and therefore there was no prejudice to David. 

Under the second part of prong three, the judge found that the Division 

had explored, without success, alternatives to termination, and assessed 

numerous relatives and KLG, but all were eventually ruled out. The judge 

reasoned that the Division initially placed Luke with a relative, but that 

placement fell through. 
26 A-0030-23

 Finding Greta well-informed of the difference between KLG and 

adoption, the judge emphasized Greta "unequivocally" expressed her preference 

and commitment to adopting Luke. The judge determined that based on 

Greta's—and Brian's—commitment to adoption, that KLG was not in Luke's 

best interests. The judge highlighted that the "Division was able to []place 

[Luke] and his [half-]sister with the same unrelated resource family that took 

them in during the first removal case." The judge reiterated that the Division 

assessed the maternal grandfather, the maternal great-grandmother, a paternal 

aunt, a maternal uncle, and the mother of David's daughter but ruled them out. 

The record supports the judge's determination under prong three. 

 Finally, the judge concluded under prong four that the termination of 

Luke's parental rights would not do more harm than good. The judge found the 

uncontroverted testimony of both experts demonstrated that David was unable 

to safely parent Luke now, and Dr. Katz opined that David would not be able to 

parent in the reasonably foreseeable future. In addition, the judge determined 

that since Luke's recollection of David was vague due to his incarceration for 

the majority of the litigation, there would be little to no harm to Luke if David's 

parental rights were terminated. The judge ultimately concluded that Luke "is 
27 A-0030-23

in a loving, caring pre-adoptive home," which is "the only time Luke's needs 

have been met to any degree." 

The judge stressed that Luke has waited long enough for a permanent 

home, and David's "criminal, antisocial lifestyle has resulted in his being absent 

for most of [Luke's] life." The judge explained that "[Luke] had or has a vague 

recollection of . . . his father" and didn't know David's name. The judge 

recounted the "physical and emotional trauma" David suffered while in an 

orphanage in Russia stating, "[u]nfortunately, he's been unable to overcome 

that[,]" and "not engaging in any services to try." Further, the resource home is 

"loving and caring" based on the judge's consideration of the evidence, and Luke 

is engaging in play therapy and has an Individualized Education Program for his 

communication impairment. A memorializing order was entered. This appeal 

followed. 

IV. 

Before us, David argues the Division failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence all four prongs of the best interests of the child test and that 

Dr. Katz rendered a net opinion. We are unpersuaded. 
28 A-0030-23

Prong One 

David contends that the judge erred in finding that the Division satisfied 

the first prong of the "best interest" test by clear and convincing evidence. In 

particular, David argues because Luke was not harmed by any act that can be 

attributed to him, this prong of the test has not been sufficiently met to warrant 

termination of his parental rights. 

To satisfy the first prong, the Division must clearly and convincingly 

demonstrate harm "that threatens the child[ren]'s health and will likely have 

deleterious effects on the child[ren]." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352. This harm need 

not be actual because "[c]ourts need not wait to act until a child is actually 

irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 

383. Rather, courts consider whether the children's safety, health, or 

development will be endangered in the future. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. 

v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001). As such, the prong may be 

satisfied by the mere risk of harm if supported by sufficient evidence. See 

D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 383; A.G., 344 N.J. Super. at 435-36.

Our Court has stressed harm includes the denial of "the attention and 

concern of a caring family" which it considers "the most precious of all 

resources." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 379. "A parent's withdrawal of that solicitude, 
29 A-0030-23

nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers 

the health and development of a child." Id. at 379, 383. Such a withdrawal is 

not "inadequate parenting;" rather, it is a "failure to provide even minimal 

parenting." Id. at 379 (quoting A.W., 103 N.J. at 606-07). A parent's failure to 

provide a "permanent, safe, and stable home" engenders significant harm to the 

children. Id. at 383. 

In the matter under review, Judge Wright appropriately concluded that 

Luke's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered 

by a parental relationship with David. Pertinently, the judge found that 

"[David]'s long absence from [Luke]'s life is a clear cognizable harm," and 

specifically noted that David's "unfortunate own antisocial behaviors" were to 

blame. The judge reasoned that the "complete absence of solicitude, protection, 

and nurture by [David]" is ultimately what endangers the health and 

development of Luke. The record supports that determination. 

David maintains that the judge erred because incarceration alone is 

insufficient to meet the first prong of the statutory test. We are unpersuaded. 

The record clearly establishes that the judge's decision did not solely rely on 

David's incarceration, and, in fact, the judge found David's behavior when he 

was at liberty equally significant. Judge Wright noted that "sadly, even during 
30 A-0030-23

the short periods of young [Luke]'s life where his father . . . was at liberty, there's 

no evidence that [David] exercised parenting time or visitation with [Luke]." 

Moreover, the judge noted that David "could have availed himself of the legal 

system to prosecute his right to visit with his son" but failed to do so.

Furthermore, the judge also appropriately found that the danger to Luke 

would persist into the future due to David's "psychological and substance misuse 

presentation as discussed by both experts in this case." The judge credited Dr. 

Katz's testimony that David's psychopathic personality disorder and lack of 

responsiveness to Luke's needs put the child at risk for a multitude of different 

types of neglect and abuse if he were placed in David's care. The judge's 

decision under prong one is amply supported by the credible evidence in the 

record. 

Prong Two 

Regarding prong two, David argues the judge erred by speculating about 

his willingness and ability to eliminate any alleged harm to Luke. The Division 

and Law Guardian counter that David is not only unable but also unwilling to 

provide a safe, stable, and permanent home for Luke. 

The second prong of the best interest determination, "in many ways, 

addresses considerations touched on in prong one." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. 
31 A-0030-23

Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 451 (2012). Evidence supporting the first prong 

may also support the second prong "as part of the comprehensive basis for 

determining the best interests of the child[ren]." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 379. This 

prong "relates to parental unfitness," K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352, and "the inquiry 

centers on whether the parent is able to remove the danger facing the child." 

F.M., 211 N.J. at 451. 

The Division can satisfy this inquiry by showing the parent or parents 

cannot provide a safe and stable home and that the child or children will suffer 

substantially from a lack of stability and permanent placement. M.M., 189 N.J. 

at 281. Because the Legislature placed "limits on the time for a birth parent to 

correct conditions in anticipation of reuniting with the child[ren]," "the 

emphasis has shifted from protracted efforts for reunification with . . . birth 

parent[s] to an expeditious, permanent placement to promote the child[ren]'s 

well-being." C.S., 367 N.J. Super. at 111 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1; D.M.H., 

161 N.J. at 385; K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357-59). 

Here, the judge concluded the second prong was satisfied. Although the 

judge found that David had a "true desire" to reunify with Luke, he determined 

the record clearly established David was "unable, at this time, to eliminate the 

harm now or in a foreseeable future." Moreover, the judge aptly found 
32 A-0030-23

significant that David's own expert witness, Dr. Gambone, did not downplay the 

current danger that David poses to Luke, and cited Dr. Gambone's testimony 

that "the problem is [David]'s failure to date to engage with any offered 

services." 

Based upon our review of the record, the judge did not rely upon 

speculation but rather upon substantial credible evidence in the record in 

concluding the Division met its burden under prong two. The record supports 

the determination that David failed to appear for court-ordered substance abuse 

evaluations and indicated he will never attend sex offender therapy. Therefore, 

the judge properly found under prong two that David will not rehabilitate 

himself to a degree necessary to cure the harm he caused Luke.

Under prong two, the judge also correctly found that David is completely 

unable to provide Luke "with any symbol of a home, much less any stable 

home," and a delay in permanency would add to the harm, especially in light of 

the fact the resource parents wish to adopt. The judge's determination under 

prong two was based upon substantial credible evidence in the record. 

Prong Three 

David contends the judge erred in concluding that the Division exercised 

reasonable efforts to provide services to help him to correct the circumstances 
33 A-0030-23

that lead to placement outside the home. David also asserts the judge failed to 

consider alternatives to termination of his parental rights, such as KLG. 

KLG allows a relative to become the child's legal guardian and commit to 

care for the child until adulthood, without terminating parental rights. N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 508 (2004). The Legislature 

created this arrangement because it found "that an increasing number of children 

who cannot safely reside with their parents are in the care of a relative or family 

friend who does not wish to adopt the child or children." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Fam. Servs. v. L.L., 201 N.J. 210, 222-23 (2010). 

Prior to July 2, 2021, KLG was considered "a more permanent option than 

foster care when adoption '[was] neither feasible nor likely.'" P.P., 180 N.J. at 

512 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3) to (4)). As such, "when 

a caregiver . . . unequivocally assert[ed] a desire to adopt," the standard to 

impose a KLG was not satisfied because the party seeking a KLG arrangement 

would not be able to show that adoption was neither feasible nor likely. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.I., 423 N.J. Super. 127, 130 (App. Div. 2011). 

In other words, when permanency through adoption was available to a child, 

KLG could not be used as a defense to the termination of parental rights. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. D.H., 398 N.J. Super. 333, 341 (App. Div. 2008). 
34 A-0030-23

On July 2, 2021, however, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 3B:12A6(d)(3) and removed the statutory requirement that adoption be "neither feasible 

nor likely," making KLG an equally available permanency plan for children in 

the Division's custody. However, the Legislature did not delete paragraph (d)(4) 

of the KLG statute, which requires a court to find "awarding [KLG] is in the 

child's best interest," N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(4), before it can order KLG. Thus, 

the amended KLG statute simply ensures a resource parent's willingness to adopt 

and no longer forecloses KLG. But the amendment to N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3) 

does not affect the trial court's application of the best interests test for parental 

termination cases as codified under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) to (4). 

Substantial credible evidence in this record supports the judge's findings 

that the Division thoroughly explored alternatives to termination of parental 

rights. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). 

David's assertion that L. 2021, c. 145 ("2021 amendments") compels KLG is 

unsupported by the overriding purpose of child protection laws. See N.J. Div. 

of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. 11, 27-28 (App. Div. 

2022), aff'd, 256 N.J. 4 (2023). The children's best interests are the polestar of 

any termination decision. D.H., 398 N.J. Super. at 338.
35 A-0030-23

The third prong of the best interests test requires evidence that "the 

Division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent 

correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home 

and the [judge] has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights." 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). "Reasonable efforts may include consultation with 

the parent, developing a plan for reunification, providing services essential to 

the realization of the reunification plan, informing the family of the child's 

progress, and facilitating visitation." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

"An evaluation of the efforts undertaken by [the Division] to reunite a 

particular family must be done on an individualized basis." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 

390. The evaluating court must also consider "the parent's active participation 

in the reunification effort." Ibid. In any situation, "[t]he services provided to 

meet the child's need for permanency and the parent's right to reunification must 

be 'coordinated' and must have a 'realistic potential' to succeed." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 488 (App. Div. 2012) 

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 267 n.10 

(App. Div. 2002)). 
36 A-0030-23

This requires the Division to "encourage, foster and maintain the parentchild bond, promote and assist in visitation, inform the parent of the child's 

progress in foster care and inform the parent of the appropriate measures [they] 

should pursue . . . to . . . strengthen their relationship." R.G., 217 N.J. at 557 

(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting D.M.H., 161 

N.J. at 390). What constitutes reasonable efforts varies with the circumstances 

of each case. D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 390-91.

Here, the record is clear that the Division did not ignore David and 

expended reasonable efforts to work with him. From the beginning of the 

guardianship litigation, the Division implemented supervised visitation at the 

prison between David and Luke, and regularly met with David in person and 

sent letters to provide status updates of his case. Contrary to David's assertions, 

the Division did attempt to re-schedule missed visits when Luke was sick. The 

"inexplicable five-month gap" between visits when David was transferred to a 

different prison was justifiable because the Division had to evaluate the new 

prison setting first, and visits were reduced to once a month because the Division 

had valid concerns about the impact of a six-hour trip on Luke. 

We are satisfied the judge's finding that Greta and Brian were advised 

about KLG, but preferred adoption, is supported by the substantial credible 
37 A-0030-23

evidence in the record. The 2021 amendments do not make KLG a bar to 

termination of parental rights followed by adoption because the court must still 

apply the best interests factors. Moreover, a caregiver must petition a court for 

a KLG appointment under N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-5(a), which was not done here. 

The record shows Greta and Brian clearly rejected KLG because they 

wanted to give Luke a permanent and stable home. The record shows that when 

David was at liberty and placed on missing status for failing to maintain contact 

with the Division, the judge aptly noted "the court can find no fault with the 

Division's failing to provide services during this period, as it is clearly and 

convincingly due to [David]'s own actions." In sum, it is clear that the judge's 

determination rested on Luke's best interests. Moreover, there was no prejudice 

to David because of the delay because the final clinical recommendation was 

that visitation was not safe. 

Under the second part of prong three, the judge appropriately considered 

and determined that the record contained unrebutted evidence that the Division 

initially placed Luke with numerous relatives, but none proved to be permanent. 

On appeal, David contends the preamble to the 2021 changes to Title 30 and the 

KLG Act support his argument that the judge did not adequately consider KLG 

as an alternative and that KLG is the preferred resolution for children who 
38 A-0030-23

cannot return to their parents, and the judge failed to consider the importance of 

retaining the parent-child relationship between Luke and his father. David also 

takes issue with the judge's focus on the Division's position that Greta and Brian 

wish to adopt, which is a consideration he posits to be "no longer determinative 

in eliminating the alternative to termination of kinship care or KLG."10

In the matter under review, Markferding testified about her discussions 

with the resource parents regarding KLG. The Division clearly investigated 

KLG alternative options, but the record demonstrates no family members were 

interested or qualified. It is also undisputed that Ida is in the care of the resource 

parents. Thus, the judge correctly concluded no KLG opportunities existed. 

 Prong Four 

 We are also satisfied with the judge's finding that the termination of 

David's parental rights under prong four "will not do more harm than good," 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), as it is supported by substantial credible evidence. 

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.T.D., 439 N.J. Super. 363, 368 (App. 

10

 David also inappropriately cites State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6 (2023). This 

reliance is inappropriate because Gomes dealt with a complete statutory 

overhaul whereas the KLG amendment made a discrete change. See id. at 35 

(cautioning the decision was not "an invitation to disregard statutory language 

that has been unaltered by new laws"). 
39 A-0030-23

Div. 2015). The judge acknowledged under prong four, after balancing and 

considering the relationships between the child and the natural parent and 

caregivers, the child "will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with 

[their] relationship with the[] foster parent[]," citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. 

Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 181 (2010) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 

172 N.J. 440, 478 (2002)). 

 Here, the judge stressed that both experts testified that David "did not 

present as being able to parent [Luke] safely now." Moreover, the judge gave 

great weight to Dr. Katz's testimony that David will not be able to safely parent 

"in the reasonably foreseeable future" either. The judge found Luke "had or has 

a vague recollection of his . . . father" because he "stayed six years and [eight] 

months and spent [thirty-four] months of his life in Division custody with little 

interaction with his father." 

 It was well within the judge's discretion to afford significant weight to 

Markferding and Dr. Katz's testimony. The Division's proofs showed Luke is 

"in a loving, caring pre-adoptive home" and David is unable to provide the 

necessary safe and stable home and emotional support Luke needs. See N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 60, 93 (2013); see also 
40 A-0030-23

Cnty. of Middlesex v. Clearwater Vill., Inc., 163 N.J. Super. 166, 173-74 (App. 

Div. 1978). 

 We are also satisfied by the judge's finding of Luke's need for permanency 

and stability, and his determination that David would not be able to provide 

either in the foreseeable future. Moreover, David did not present a viable plan 

to make the changes necessary to provide Luke with the loving, safe, and stable 

home he needs and deserves. 

V.

 Finally, David asserts that Dr. Katz rendered a net opinion because he 

relied on data that the Division "cherry-picked and sent to him," conducted a 

short interview of him, did not conduct a bonding evaluation, and never spoke 

to Luke. Again, we disagree. 

 Two rules of evidence frame the analysis for determining the admissibility 

of expert testimony. N.J.R.E. 702 identifies when expert testimony is 

permissible and requires the experts to be qualified in their respective fields. 

N.J.R.E. 703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony. Expert opinions 

must "be grounded in facts or data derived from[:] (1) the expert's personal 

observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the 

expert, which is not necessarily admissible in evidence, but which is the type of 
41 A-0030-23

data normally relied upon by experts." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 

(2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex (Polzo I), 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)). 

"The net opinion rule is a 'corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids 

the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by 

factual evidence or other data.'" Id. at 53-54 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Polzo I, 196 N.J. at 583). Therefore, an expert is required to "'give the why and 

wherefore' that supports the opinion, 'rather than a mere conclusion.'" Id. at 54 

(quoting Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, L.L.C., 216 N.J. 115, 144 

(2013)). 

The net opinion rule directs that experts "be able to identify the factual 

bases for their conclusions, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that 

both the factual bases and the methodology are reliable." Id. at 55 (quoting 

Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). In short, the net opinion 

rule is "a prohibition against speculative testimony." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. 

Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 

563, 580 (App. Div. 1997)). 

However, "[t]he net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection." 

Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54. "An expert's proposed testimony should not be 

excluded merely 'because it fails to account for some particular condition or fact 
42 A-0030-23

which the adversary considers relevant.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Freeman, 223 

N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988)). An expert's failure "'to give weight to a 

factor thought important by an adverse party does not reduce his testimony to 

an inadmissible net opinion if he otherwise offers sufficient reasons which 

logically support his opinion.'" Ibid. (quoting Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. 

Super. 385, 402 (App. Div. 2002)). 

Generally, the Division's proofs should include testimony by an expert 

who has had an opportunity to make a "comprehensive, objective, and informed 

evaluation of the child's relationship with the foster parent," N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 437 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting J.C., 

129 N.J. at 19), and the court must also consider "parallel proof of the child's 

relationship with his or her natural parents in assessing the existence, nature, 

and extent of the harm facing the child," Id. at 440 (quoting J.C., 129 N.J. at 

19). However, where the termination is "not predicated upon bonding, but rather 

reflect[s] [the child's] need for permanency and [the biological parent's] inability 

to care for [the child] in the foreseeable future," a lack of a bonding evaluation 

is not fatal to the Division's case. See B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. at 593-94.

 We observe that while David argues Dr. Katz rendered a net opinion, he 

fails to point to a single example to support his assertion. David also avers that 
43 A-0030-23

Dr. Katz did not speak to Luke when his own expert, Dr. Gambone, testified that 

he could not speak to Luke's best interests as he did not know the child and had 

not interviewed him. After David's failure to participate in a plethora of services 

offered by the Division, and the judge's sound finding that Dr. Katz's opinions 

were fully supported and explained by the overwhelming evidence in the record, 

David cannot credibly argue Dr. Katz gave a net opinion. Judge Wright did not 

abuse his discretion in affording great weight to Dr. Katz's opinion. 

At bottom, we are satisfied the judge correctly determined the Division 

presented clear and convincing evidence establishing all four prongs of the best 

interests of the child standard under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). To the extent we 

have not specifically addressed any of David's arguments, we conclude they are 

of insufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.