No. WR-31,454-04

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS 

EX PARTE RODNEY ELNESTO SMILEY 

On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Trial Court Cause No. W94-02954-U(B) 

291st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas

APPLICANT’S REPLY TO THE BRIEF OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT 

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

STATE COUNSEL FOR OFFENDERS 

 

Kenneth Nash, Appellate Chief 

 State Bar of Texas No. 14811030 

 Nicholas Mensch 

 State Bar of Texas No. 24070262 

 P. O. Box 4005 

 Huntsville, TX 77342 

 (936) 437-5252 

 (936) 437-5279 (fax) 

 nicholas.mensch@tdcj.texas.gov

Attorney for Applicant 

WR-31,454-04

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 7/17/2015 12:25:36 PM

Accepted 7/17/2015 1:03:38 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

REPLY ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................1

I. Whether Applicant’s requested relief, asking to be released to 

mandatory supervision for his theft offense in Dallas County, is 

being asked for the first time in this Court? .............................................. 2

II. Whether Applicant’s claims are moot? ..................................................... 4

III. Whether the controlling mandatory supervision case may change 

during an inmate’s incarceration? ............................................................. 7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................1

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................2

PRAYER..................................................................................................................12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................14
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

City of Dallas v. Woodfield

305 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.) ....................................4, 5

Clark v. Brewer,

776 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................5

Ex parte Bohannan, 

350 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)........................................................5

Ex parte Brandon, 

No. WR-81,846-01 (Tex. Crim. App. September 17, 2014) (not designated 

for publication) ................................................................................................5

Ex parte Brandon, 

No. WR-81,846-03 (Tex. Crim. App. September 17, 2014) (not designated 

for publication) ................................................................................................5

Ex parte Elliot, 

746 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)......................................................10

Ex parte Geiken, 

28 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)..........................................................8

Ex parte Keller

173 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)........................................................9

Ex parte Mabry, 

137 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).................................................... 9-10

Ex parte Ormsby, 

676 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)......................................................10

Ex parte Retzlaff, 

135 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)........................................................10
iv

Ex parte Thompson, 

173 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)........................................................9

General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A. inc., 

789 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1990) ...........................................................................5

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Texas, Inc., 

971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) ...........................................................................6

Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 

277 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).......................................7

Weinstein v. Bradford, 

423 U.S. 147 (1975).........................................................................................5

Statutes

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 42.18 § 8(c) (1994) ......................... 4, 9, 10, 11

Texas Government Code § 508.149.......................................................................3, 4
1

REPLY ARGUMENTS

I. Whether Applicant’s requested relief, asking to be released to mandatory 

supervision for his theft offense in Dallas County, is being asked for the first 

time in this Court?

II. Whether Applicant’s claims are moot?

III. Whether the controlling mandatory supervision case may change during an 

inmate’s incarceration?

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Contrary to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s (“TDCJ”) assertion, 

Applicant’s requested relief of being released to non-discretionary mandatory 

supervision was requested in the trial court in his application for a writ of habeas 

corpus for his theft conviction in Cause No. WR94-02594-U(B). Also, even if this 

Court believes Applicant’s claims are moot, this Court should review them under 

the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. Alternatively, if this 

exception does not apply to Applicant’s notice claim, Applicant believes that 

mootness should not apply to this Court’s broader question concerning the legality 

of TDCJ’s policy. Finally, TDCJ has assumed that Applicant is contending “that –

upon a (hypothetical) favorable DMS vote in 2010 – he would have remained in 

TDCJ-CID’s physical custody until he was physically released for the theft offense,” 

with this assumption forming the basis of their response to Applicant’s claims. This 

assumption is incorrect. The assumption underlying Applicant’s claims is simply 
2

put, the lack of notice along with TDCJ’s policy of not releasing an offender to 

mandatory supervision until eligible to be released on all mandatory eligible 

offenses, has made being released to non-discretionary mandatory supervision when 

one becomes eligible illusionary. TDCJ’s policy has also turned his mandatory 

supervision offense of theft into a discretionary mandatory supervision offense in 

violation of the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto 

laws, the state constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, and the statutory 

“savings provision.”

An inmate’s controlling offense for determining mandatory supervision 

eligibility is static. To adopt TDCJ’s interpretation that the controlling offense may 

change during an inmate’s incarceration would allow TDCJ to continue to engage in 

its nefarious conduct of manipulating similarly situated persons like Applicant in 

order to prevent those persons from being timely noticed of a review for a 

discretionary mandatory supervision eligible offense and then prevent their release 

to mandatory supervision even after they become eligible for release.

ARGUMENT

I. Whether Applicant’s requested relief, asking to be released to mandatory 

supervision for his theft offense in Dallas County, is being asked for the 

first time in this Court?

In its brief, TDCJ claims that Applicant requesting he should be released to 

mandatory supervision for his theft conviction was raised for the first time in 
3

Applicant’s brief to this Court. See Brief of TDCJ at p. 5, fn. 4, citing to the Tarrant 

County Supplemental Habeas Clerk’s Record. The TDCJ is flat wrong! Applicant 

did raise this requested relief, specifically in WR-31,454-04 in his application for a 

writ of habeas corpus for his theft conviction in Cause No. WR94-02594-U(B). 

Applicant also requested relief in the form of being released to discretionary 

mandatory supervision in WR-31,454-03 in his application for a writ of habeas 

corpus for his injury to a child conviction in Cause No. C-213-010293-1011284-B 

in Tarrant County, Texas.

1 To put it succinctly, Applicant’s requested relief was 

raised previously to his original brief in this Court and is properly before this Court. 

Applicant’s claim regarding the improper application of Tex. Gov’t Code §508.149 

to his theft offense was also similarly raised in the trial court in Dallas County and 

is properly before this Court. In any event, even if this Court does not believe that 

Applicant adequately raised this requested relief in the lower court, Applicant would 

 

1 Applicant has requested release to mandatory supervision for his theft offense out of Tarrant 

County in both of his briefs. TDCJ criticizes this requested relief because it would “allow 

Applicant to serve the remainder of his injury to a child sentence beyond the reach and control of 

both TDCJ-PD and the Board (at least for the sentence).” Brief of TDCJ at 38. Because Applicant 

had already pointed out that he was already eligible for discretionary mandatory release in 2010, 

Applicant thought it was implicit in his prayer that releasing him to mandatory supervision on his 

theft would necessarily include him being released to discretionary mandatory supervision for the 

injury to a child as the theft case is Applicant’s holding offense. To avoid confusion, Applicant 

will update his request for relief to include release to discretionary mandatory supervision for his 

injury to a child case. 
4

contend that his briefing addresses this Court’s second designated issue, something 

TDCJ does appear to agree with. See Brief of TDCJ at p. 5, fn. 4. 

II. Whether Applicant’s claims are moot?

In its brief, TDCJ contends that “[b]ecause Applicant has thrice been reviewed 

and denied release to DMS, he has already received his remedy for the purported 

delay in conducting the initial DMS vote, and the issue appears to be moot.” Brief 

of TDCJ at p. 12. For the reasons stated in his initial briefs, Applicant disagrees with 

this assertion and believes his claims are not moot.

2 However, should this Court 

agree with TDCJ that his claims are moot, Applicant’s claims would also be 

cognizable under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine.3“There 

are two exceptions to confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is 

capable of repetition, yet evading review; and (2) the collateral consequences 

doctrine.” City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

 

2 For example, Applicant argued that the notice that has been given is constitutionally defective 

because of TDCJ and BPP’s faulty premise that Applicant’s pre-1996 theft case is governed by 

Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.149, instead of former Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 42.18 § 8(c)(1994). Based 

upon this faulty premise, Applicant has never been given accurate notice as to his mandatory 

supervision dates, and he was denied notice and review of his case for over two years. Subsequent 

reviews do [not] render this failure to provide notice of his DMS moot as Applicant is still being 

harmed by this policy to this day as he has still not been released to mandatory supervision on his 

theft case. This, in effect, rendered the notices useless and deprived Applicant any meaningful 

opportunity to be heard or reviewed by the BPP for discretionary mandatory supervision as he has 

now become eligible for mandatory supervision and is entitled to immediate release. Applicant’s 

Brief (WR-31,454-04) at 13.

3 TDCJ does acknowledge that Applicant’s claim might nevertheless be justiciable under this 

doctrine. Brief of TDCJ at 12.
5

2005, no pet.). The doctrine of capable of repetition, yet evading review, in the 

context of non-class action suits, is “limited to the situation where two elements 

combine: 1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated 

prior to its cessation or expiration, and 2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the 

same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Ex parte 

Bohannan, 350 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), citing to Weinstein v. 

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-149 (1975). “When determining the ‘evading review’ 

element, the proper inquiry is whether the challenged activity is by its very nature 

short in duration so that it could not, or probably would not, be able to be adjudicated 

while fully live.” Woodfield, 305 S.W.3d at 419, citing to Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 

226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985). The first prong should be met as this case has only been in 

litigation for a little over a year, and because of the nature of the initial claims, the 

duration with which to argue these claims was relatively short.

4 As for the second 

 

4 Applicant must state that a similar issue is pending before this Court in Ex parte Brandon, No. 

WR-81,846-02. See General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A. Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571-572 (Tex. 

1990) (Two cases pending on the issue present in the case that was determined to be moot could 

not meet evading review portion of exception to mootness doctrine). The predicament that 

Brandon is similar to Applicant’s; however, the issues presented have been framed as follows: (1) 

Did the TDCJ and Board of Pardons and Paroles (“BPP”) violate Applicant’s right of due process 

by using the unserved balances of his old felony sentences to determine his discretionary 

mandatory supervision release date on his new felony sentence and (2) Did the TDCJ and BPP 

violate Applicant’s right of due course by using the unserved balances of his old felony sentences 

to determine his discretionary mandatory-supervision release date on his new felony DWI 

sentence? Also, this Court denied, without written order, two separate applications filed by Mr. 

Brandon that raised identical issues as Applicant’s applications. See Ex parte Brandon, No. WR81,846-01 (Tex. Crim. App. September 17, 2014) (not designated for publication) and Ex parte 
6

prong, Applicant is slated to receive another review for potential release to 

discretionary mandatory supervision on his injury to a child offense in December

2015, even though Applicant became eligible for mandatory supervision on his theft 

case over two years ago. See Affidavit of Charley Valdez at 3. In effect, Applicant 

will again be subjected to TDCJ’s policy whereby his discretionary mandatory 

supervision has somehow become his “controlling mandatory supervision case” 

instead of his mandatory supervision eligible theft case. The players will all be the 

same; the Applicant and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The issues will 

be identical. And if history is any indication, the result of his review will most likely 

be the same. Affidavit of Charley Valdez at 3 (outlining three reviews and three 

denials). 

Nevertheless, even if this Court does determine that Applicant’s notice claim 

is moot as to his discretionary mandatory supervision claim, Applicant contends that 

mootness should not apply to this Court’s broader question concerning the legality 

of TDCJ’s policy. Applicant is still being harmed by this policy as he is still currently 

incarcerated on his mandatory supervision eligible offense, even though he qualified 

for release on that offense in May 2013, and never received any meaningful 

discretionary mandatory supervision review. Applicant’s continued incarceration is 

 

Brandon, No. WR-81,846-03 (Tex. Crim. App. September 17, 2014) (not designated for 

publication).
7

not “dependent on hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet to come pass.” 

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Texas, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 

443 (Tex. 1998). In other words, a controversy still exists regarding the legality of 

TDCJ’s policy that an offender may not be released to mandatory supervision until 

eligible to be released on all mandatory eligible offenses. See Trulock v. City of 

Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 

III. Whether the controlling mandatory supervision case may change during 

an inmate’s incarceration?

In a nutshell, TDCJ contends that Applicant’s position is absurd. TDCJ 

assumes that Applicant is contending “that – upon a (hypothetical) favorable DMS 

vote in 2010 – he would have remained in TDCJ-CID’s physical custody until he 

was physically released for the theft offense,” with this assumption forming the basis

for their response. Brief of TDCJ at 8.5 TDCJ’s assumption is incorrect. As Applicant 

stated in his brief:

for over two years, even though Applicant became eligible for release 

to discretionary mandatory supervision, Applicant did not receive 

notice of that eligibility by TDCJ or BPP and he was denied any hearing 

with the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf to obtain 

discretionary mandatory supervision.6

 

5 TDCJ’s assumption is actually one of the situations that Applicant wants to avoid with TDCJ’s 

illegal policy.

6

In its brief, the TDCJ attempts to argue that Applicant did not become eligible for discretionary 

mandatory supervision review in 2010. Brief of TDCJ at 13. However, TDCJ’s own inmate 

tracking system refutes this and clearly states he became eligible for review on September 21, 

2010. See Exhibit D, attached to Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
8

***

By treating Applicant’s prior 1996 sentence as only eligible for 

discretionary mandatory supervision and basing the subsequent notices 

on that assumption, TDCJ and BPP have created a faulty premise that 

deprives Applicant of his mandatory release that he was scheduled to 

obtain on May 13, 2013. It also denied him any possible review after 

he was eligible for discretionary mandatory supervision on his injury to 

a child case for over two years. It is conceivable that, if the TDCJ and 

the BPP continue to engage in this nefarious conduct, Applicant will 

not be released on mandatory supervision on his theft sentence (which 

he was entitled to May 13, 2013) until February 8, 2016, the date his 

injury to a child offense discharges.

Applicant’s Brief (WR-31,454-04) at 10-12.

Applicant’s assumption isn’t, and nor has he argued, that he should have been 

released on “paper” to discretionary mandatory supervision and then remain in 

prison until he became eligible for mandatory supervision release on his theft 

sentence. The assumption underlying Applicant’s claims is pretty straightforward, 

TDCJ and BPP have been playing fast and loose with Applicant’s so-called 

“controlling offense” to manipulate the date in which Applicant must be released to 

mandatory supervision on this theft offense. The TDCJ and BPP realize that, because 

the they failed to take timely action on Applicant’s discretionary mandatory 

supervision eligible injury to a child offense, Applicant was entitled to immediate 

release on his DMS offense as per Ex parte Geiken, 28 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. 

 
9

App. 2000), and release on his mandatory supervision theft offense on May 13, 2013. 

Simply put, the lack of notice along with TDCJ’s policy of not releasing an offender 

to mandatory supervision until eligible to be released on all mandatory eligible 

offenses, has made being released to non-discretionary mandatory supervision when 

one becomes eligible illusionary. TDCJ’s policy has also turned his mandatory 

supervision offense of theft into a discretionary mandatory supervision offense in 

violation of the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto 

laws, the state constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, and the statutory 

“savings provision.” Applicant’s Brief (WR-31,454-04) at 22-23. This is the case 

here. TDCJ’s brief does not address this contention.

TDCJ further contends that from prior to May 13, 2013, Applicant’s 

controlling sentence was his mandatory supervision theft offense. Then once 

Applicant became “presumptively”7eligible to mandatory supervision on that theft 

case, his controlling offense changed to his discretionary mandatory supervision 

offense of injury to child. Based upon this framework, TDCJ analyzes this case 

under the current guidelines for mandatory supervision as found under Chapter 508 

 

7 Despite TDCJ’s claim, there is nothing presumptive about Applicant’s eligibility for 

mandatory supervision on his theft case. He is entitled to release on mandatory supervision for his 

theft conviction. See Ex parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), Ex parte 

Keller, 173 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), and Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 42.18 § 8(c) 

(1994).
10

of the Texas Government Code, and defines “controlling sentence” to mean “the 

longest, remaining concurrent sentence for calculating MS or DMS eligibility –

measured at a particular point in time.” Brief of TDCJ at p. 10, fn. 8.8 To support this 

proposition, it appears that TDCJ is relying upon Judge Keasler’s concurring opinion 

in Ex parte Mabry, 137 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Brief of TDCJ at 36. 

“When an inmate has multiple convictions, he will have one conviction which 

governs his release date, either because it is the most recent, contains the longest 

sentence, or has the least amount of time credits.” Ex parte Mabry, 137 S.W.3d at 

63 (Keasler, J., concurring). The holding conviction “is the conviction that will keep 

the prisoner in custody for the greatest amount of time.” Id.

As stated in his original brief, Applicant’s theft conviction is his holding 

conviction. Applicant’s Brief (WR-31,454-04) at p. 16-17. From TDCJ’s brief, it 

appears that TDCJ believes that keeping a prisoner in custody only extends to 

confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. 

Brief of TDCJ at 18, citing to Ex parte Retzlaff, 135 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). Custody; however, should not, and has not, been so narrowly construed as to 

mean solely confinement in TDCJ. This Court has held that persons on parole are in 

 

8 This conveniently allows TDCJ to ignore the former provisions of Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 

42.18 § 8(c) (1994) and keep Applicant incarcerated beyond the date he achieved mandatory 

supervision on his theft case.
11

the legal custody of the State and may use habeas corpus to challenge their 

convictions. See Ex parte Elliot, 746 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ex parte 

Ormsby, 676 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Also, according to Tex. Code of 

Crim. Proc. 42.18 § 8(c) (1994):

A prisoner released to mandatory supervision shall, upon release, be 

deemed as if released on parole...The period of mandatory supervision 

shall be for a period equivalent to the maximum term for which the 

prisoner was sentenced less calendar time actually served on the 

sentence. The time served on mandatory supervision is calculated as 

calendar time. Every prisoner while on mandatory supervision shall 

remain in the legal custody of the state and shall be amenable to 

conditions of supervision ordered by the parole panel. 

(emphasis added).

Thus, Applicant’s theft offense is the longest sentence that he is still serving, 

and is the conviction that will keep Applicant in custody for the greatest amount of 

time as he is not scheduled to completely discharge that sentence until November 2, 

2023. Applicant’s Brief (WR-31,454-04) at 17. Because of this, this offense controls 

Applicant’s eligibility for mandatory supervision, and his eligibility is then governed 

by Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 42.18 § 8(c) (1994). An inmate’s controlling offense 

for determining mandatory supervision eligibility is static. To adopt the TDCJ’s 

interpretation that the controlling offense may change during an inmate’s 

incarceration would allow the TDCJ to continue to engage in its nefarious conduct 

of manipulating similarly situated persons like Applicant in order to prevent those 
12

persons from being timely noticed of a review for a discretionary mandatory 

supervision eligible offense and then prevent their release to mandatory supervision

even after they become eligible for release. As stated supra, the lack of notice along 

with TDCJ’s policy of not releasing an offender to mandatory supervision until 

eligible to be released on all mandatory eligible offenses, has made being released 

to non-discretionary mandatory supervision when one becomes eligible illusionary. 

TDCJ’s policy has also turned his mandatory supervision offense of theft into a 

discretionary mandatory supervision offense in violation of the federal and state 

constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws, the state constitutional 

prohibition against retroactive laws, and the statutory “savings provision.” 

Applicant’s Brief (WR-31,454-04) at 22-23. This is the case here. TDCJ’s policy is 

illegal, and to borrow a term from their brief, absurd. 

PRAYER

Applicant Rodney Ernesto Smiley prays that this grant his Application for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus and order the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the 

Board of Pardons and Paroles to immediately release him on mandatory supervision 

from the sentence imposed in Cause No. F-9402594-PU for the felony offense of 

Theft of Property and order the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Board 

of Pardons and Paroles to immediately release him on discretionary mandatory 

supervision from the sentence imposed in Cause No. 1011284D for the felony 
13

offense of Injury to a Child. Applicant also prays for such other relief that this Court 

may deem appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

STATE COUNSEL FOR OFFENDERS

/s/ Nicholas Mensch

Nicholas Mensch

State Bar of Texas No. 24070262

P.O. Box 4005

Huntsville, Texas 77342-4005

(936) 437-5252

(936) 437-5279 (fax)

nicholoas.mensch@tdcj.texas.gov

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Applicant’s Reply Brief

was served upon opposing counsel noted below, by one or more of the following: 

certified mail (return receipt requested), facsimile transfer, or electronic mail (email), this 17

th day of July 2015.

Joseph P. Corcoran

Assistant Attorney General

Supervising Attorney for Non-Capital Appeals

Criminal Appeals Division

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 936-1400/(512) 936-1280 fax

E-mail address: Joseph.Corcoran@texasAttorneyGeneral.gov

Susan Hawk

Dallas County District Attorney

Frank Crowley Courts Building

133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19
14

Dallas, TX 75207

(214) 653-3600/(214) 653-5774 (fax)

/s/ Nicholas Mensch

 Nicholas Mensch

Attorney for Applicant

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This document complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.4(i) because this brief contains 3227 words.

/s/ Nicholas Mensch

Nicholas Mensch

Attorney for Applicant