Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DONALD C. SWANSON, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana

Fort Wayne, Indiana

JAMES B. MARTIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOSHUA GAUNT, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A03-1204-CR-195

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge

Cause No. 02D05-1111-FC-355

March 15, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

Joshua Gaunt appeals his four-year sentence for Class C felony corrupt business 

influence.1 He asserts the court abused its discretion in assigning his sentence and the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of his character and offense. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Gaunt with Class C felony corrupt business influence and Class C 

felony forgery.2 Gaunt pled guilty to Class C felony corrupt business influence, and the State 

dismissed the forgery charge. In the process of pleading guilty, Gaunt admitted he had been 

“associated with a group of individuals . . . involved in . . . a series of thefts from vehicles in 

parked locations and the sale of stolen property from those vehicles.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 9.)3In 

furtherance of this association, Gaunt had used a stolen credit card to purchase a flat-screen 

television valued at $336 and had driven the leader of the group around in an automobile. 

At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a six-year sentence, while Gaunt argued 

for a four-year sentence. The court found an aggravator in Gaunt’s eight juvenile 

adjudications and mitigators in his plea, age, and remorse. It imposed a four-year sentence 

with two years suspended to probation. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The sentencing range for a Class C felony is two to eight years, with four years being 

the advisory sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. The court sentenced Gaunt to four years, with 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-45-6-2(a)(3). 

2

Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2.

3 The Transcript consists of two volumes: a twelve-page volume from the Guilty Plea Hearing and an eighteenpage volume from the Sentencing Hearing. Those volumes were not consecutively paginated as required by 

Indiana Appellate Rule 28(A)(2). 
3

two years executed and two years suspended to probation. He asserts that sentencing was 

both an abuse of discretion and inappropriate in light of his character and offense.

1. Discretion

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v.

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be 

drawn therefrom.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

“A defendant may not request a trial court to take an action and later claim on appeal 

that such action is erroneous.” Baugh v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind. 2010). At the 

sentencing hearing, Gaunt’s counsel argued: “Judge if I may I would like to ask the Court to 

enter a four (4) year sentence and suspend that to probation.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11.) Gaunt 

cannot now be heard to complain about the four-year sentence he asked the trial court to 

impose. See id. (refusing to address argument trial court should have heard testimony 

regarding whether defendant was sexually violent predator where defense encouraged trial 

court to “make that determination based upon the charge . . . and the doctors’ reports”).4 

2. Inappropriateness

We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

 

4

In his abuse of discretion argument, Gaunt repeatedly requests we “reweigh” the aggravators and mitigators, 

(see, e.g., Br. of Def.-Appellant at 3, 6, 7). We may not. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“The relative 

weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to 

review for abuse.”). 
4

the character of the offender. Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 

(citing Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found 

by the trial court, but also any other facts appearing in the record. Roney v. State, 872 N.E.2d 

192, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The appellant bears the burden of 

demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 

2006).

When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point 

to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. The trial 

court imposed the four-year advisory sentence for a Class C felony, and Gaunt acknowledges

the “standard and usual nature of the offense.” (Br. of Appellant at 3.) We concur in his 

assessment and, thus, see nothing inappropriate about the trial court’s imposition of the 

advisory sentence. 

As for Gaunt’s character, one relevant fact is a defendant’s criminal history. 

Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The significance of a 

criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character varies based on the gravity, nature, and 

number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id. Gaunt was only eighteen

years old at the time of sentencing, and, as he notes, this was his first conviction as an adult. 

However, as a juvenile, Gaunt had been adjudicated a delinquent eight times between 

September 2007 and August 2010: once for an act that would be misdemeanor possession of 

paraphernalia, once for a status offense, twice for an act that would be misdemeanor resisting 

law enforcement, once for an act that would be felony escape from detention, once for an act 
5

that would be felony residential entry, and twice for an act that would be receiving stolen 

property. The juvenile court demonstrated restraint by consistently placing Gaunt on 

probation. Gaunt then violated probation three times, which eventually prompted the 

juvenile court to place Gaunt in the Indiana Boys School. Gaunt had been out of Boys 

School less than seven months when he committed the crime for which he was sentenced

herein. 

We cannot find the advisory sentence inappropriate for Gaunt’sfirst adult conviction 

when his offense was a continuation and escalation of the delinquent behaviors for which he 

was punished repeatedly as a juvenile. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

ROBB, C.J., and PYLE, J., concur.