UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CHARLIE WAYNE BRYANT,

 Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:11−cr−00072−MOC–1)

Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: July 22, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined.

ARGUED: Cindy Helene Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY, 

ATTORNEY AT LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. William 

Michael Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anne M. Tompkins, United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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WYNN, Circuit Judge:

This is the second time we are asked to review the sentence 

of Defendant Charlie Wayne Bryant after he pled guilty to 

assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) 

and (b). The first appeal required us to evaluate the district 

court’s application of United States Sentencing Guidelines 

(“U.S.S.G.”) § 2A2.2 for aggravated assault. United States v. 

Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x 241 (4th Cir. 2014). Although the district 

court heard facts that would have supported the application of 

U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the court made conflicting statements suggesting 

it may have intended to instead apply U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, the 

guideline for obstructing or impeding a federal officer. We 

therefore vacated the sentence and remanded so that the district 

court could make necessary factual findings and clarify its intent. 

On remand, the district court conducted another sentencing hearing 

and once again imposed a sentence using U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 

With this appeal, Defendant argues that the district court 

improperly applied U.S.S.G § 2A2.2 and asks us to order the 

district court to instead apply U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, which would 

significantly reduce his guidelines range. This we cannot do

because the district court made factual findings that are supported 

by the record and justify a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 

Accordingly, we must affirm.
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I.

This appeal arises from an altercation between Defendant and 

a security officer at the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 

office in Gastonia, North Carolina. Defendant was a homeless 

veteran suffering from chronic mental illness. In February 2011, 

he went to the SSA office to inquire “about some checks that [his] 

deceased wife tore up in 2005,” but the claims representative could 

not help him. J.A. 157. Defendant then became belligerent, and 

his voice got “real, real loud.” J.A. 104. 

The on-duty security officer, Edward Seigle, approached 

Defendant and urged him to lower his voice and stop using 

profanity, but Seigle’s comments further agitated Defendant. An 

altercation ensued, and although accounts vary as to how it

started, it is clear that Defendant and Seigle ended up on the 

ground in the bathroom of the SSA office after Defendant “swung 

at” Seigle. J.A. 86. Defendant thrashed wildly, but Seigle 

eventually subdued Defendant until police arrived.

Following his arrest, Defendant was charged with, and pled 

guilty to, assault on a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 111(a)(1) and (b). Defendant’s sentencing hearing focused 

primarily on the mechanics of the altercation, particularly on 

whether Defendant attempted to grab Seigle’s firearm. During the 

hearing, the district court heard testimony from Defendant, 
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Seigle, other SSA employees who witnessed the incident, and the 

arresting officer.

Seigle testified that Defendant “started up at the bottom of 

my holster, he got to the top of . . . my gun in my holster . . . 

. [H]e was after my weapon.” J.A. 130. Defendant confirmed that 

he “put [his] hand on [Siegle’s] holster.” J.A. 158. However, he 

denied that he was trying to take Seigle’s firearm and instead

asserted that he touched the holster merely to “scare” Seigle so 

that Seigle would “get off of me.” J.A. 158. But the two SSA 

employees who witnessed the altercation confirmed Seigle’s version 

of events. They testified that Defendant “grabbed on to Officer 

Seigle’s holster” and was “reaching for [Seigle’s] sidearm.” J.A. 

107, 118. The district court also heard from the arresting 

officer, who testified that after transporting Defendant to jail 

and reading him his Miranda rights, Defendant stated that he “was 

trying to grab [Seigle’s] Glock,” and that his “intentions were to 

kill him because he was beating me.” J.A. 147. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court 

calculated Defendant’s guidelines range using the aggravated 

assault guideline under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 and imposed a withinguidelines sentence of 130 months.

Defendant appealed to this Court, challenging both the 

validity of his guilty plea and the calculation of his guidelines 

range. Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 243. 
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After affirming the denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea, we vacated his sentence and remanded to the 

district court to clarify its factual findings and to resentence 

Defendant. Id. at 251. Specifically, we asked the district court 

to resolve an ambiguity it created when it made conflicting 

statements during Defendant’s sentencing hearing. On the one hand, 

the district court accepted “all of the findings in the Presentence 

Report.” J.A. 167. This included a recommendation to apply 

U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the guideline for aggravated assault, which 

requires that the assault involved a dangerous weapon. On the 

other hand, the district court stated that the offense took place 

“with no weapon involved by the defendant.” J.A. 168. These 

contradictions made the district court’s intent unclear because

“[i]f no dangerous weapon was involved, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cannot 

apply.” Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 250. 

In addition, an error in the presentence report clouded the 

district court’s intent. The presentence report described the 

charged offense as an assault by use of a deadly weapon when the 

actual crime charged and pled to was assault inflicting bodily 

injury.

We therefore vacated and remanded so the district court could 

resolve these discrepancies, clarify its intent, and resentence 

Defendant. Importantly, though, we did not hold that the district 

court could not apply the aggravated assault guideline:
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To the contrary, the district court heard facts that 

might supports its application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 via 

the Relevant Conduct Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. For 

example, Seigle [and other SSA employees] all testified 

that Defendant was grabbing for Seigle’s gun. Defendant 

himself admitted that he was attempting to scare Seigle 

by touching his holster. And [the arresting officer] 

testified that Defendant told him that he was attempting 

to grab Seigle’s “glock” and that if he had been 

successful, he would have killed Seigle.

Id. at 250–51. Nevertheless, we chose not to speculate as to what 

the district court might have intended.

On remand, the district court conducted another sentencing 

hearing. During the hearing, the district court acknowledged that 

“[t]he record may not be as clear as it should have been,” but 

that it would “correct[] the record today.” J.A. 235. To that 

end, the district court noted that it “was not saying there was no 

gun involved in the case at the time.” J.A. 235. Rather, the 

district court meant that “[t]he defendant didn’t bring the deadly 

weapon there.” J.A. 230. The district court went on to state the 

guideline it was applying and why it was applying it:

[A]ggravated assault . . . is defined . . . as a 

felonious assault that involved a dangerous weapon with 

the intent to cause bodily injury . . . .

The Court finds that the threatened use of it, that is, 

in the middle of a fight reaching for the officer’s 

firearm, as all of the witnesses, including defendant, 

said the defendant did. The defendant has changed his 

story, but the Court is discounting that and finds from 

the preponderance of the evidence that he was going for 

the gun. That because of that this becomes an aggravated 

assault and, therefore, that’s why I’m finding 2A2.2 is 

correct.
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J.A. 237–38. The district court then calculated the guidelines 

range and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 115 months. This 

appeal followed. 

II.

Defendant maintains on this second appeal that the district 

court again erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 instead of U.S.S.G. 

§ 2A2.4. Defendant argues that U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cannot apply 

because there is no factual basis to support a finding that the 

assault “involved” a dangerous weapon. We disagree.

When reviewing a district court’s sentencing determination, 

we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant 

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range . . . .” Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We assess the district court’s guidelines 

calculation by reviewing its legal conclusions de novo and its 

factual findings for clear error. United States v. Lawing, 703 

F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2012). Clear error occurs only when we 

are left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 337 (4th 

Cir. 2008).

Here, Defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) 

and (b), a statute making it a crime to assault, resist, or impede 

a government officer or employee. The sentencing guidelines direct 
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that a defendant’s sentence for violating Section 111 must be 

calculated either under the guideline for “Obstructing or Impeding 

Officers,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4, or under the guideline for 

“Aggravated Assault,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. See U.S.S.G. App. A. The 

district court here chose the guideline for “Aggravated Assault,” 

U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2.

The central question before us is whether Defendant’s offense 

“involved” a firearm. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. “Aggravated assault” is 

defined, in relevant part, as “a felonious assault that involved

. . . a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., 

not merely to frighten) with that weapon.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 app. 

n.1 (emphasis added). Thus, “involve” is the operative threshold 

needed to trigger Section 2A2.2 here. 

The term “involve” is, on its face, broad and not limited to, 

for example, “use,” “possess,” or “control.” See United States v. 

Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 278–81 (3d Cir. 2010) (interpreting the 

phrase “involved in” as used in a firearm statute and concluding 

“involve” is a “broad term”). While not defined in the guidelines, 

the dictionary defines “involve” as “[t]o have as a necessary 

feature or consequence; entail . . . [t]o relate to or affect.” 

American Heritage Dictionary 923 (5th ed. 2011). See also, e.g.,

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191 (2002) (defining 

“involve” as “engage,” “entail,” “imply,” and “implicate”). And 

“[t]his [C]ourt has long consulted dictionaries of common usage in 
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order to establish the plain meaning of disputed statutory 

language.” United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 

2012).

We do not purport to establish some grand test for when an

assault “involves” a firearm. But when we turn to the facts of 

this case, it is clear that Defendant’s conduct, as found by the 

district court, satisfies the involve threshold. 

During the resentencing hearing, the district court explained 

that when it stated during the first sentencing hearing that the 

offense took place “with no weapon involved by the defendant,” 

J.A. 168, it was merely commenting that Defendant did not bring 

the weapon to the SSA office himself.

Moreover, the district court relied upon the very facts that 

we stated could support application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. See

Bryant, 540 Fed. App’x at 250–51. Namely, Seigle and two other 

SSA employees testified that Defendant “reach[ed] for the 

officer’s firearm” and was “going for the gun.” J.A. 237. 

Defendant also admitted that he touched Seigle’s holster. And the 

arresting officer testified that Defendant stated he was 

attempting to grab Seigle’s “glock” and intended to use it to kill 

Seigle.

The district court then discredited Defendant’s version of 

the events in which he claimed, among other things, that he was 

not the aggressor and did not touch or intend to take Seigle’s 
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gun. These findings together led to the conclusion that Defendant 

“threatened [the] use” of Seigle’s firearm and that the assault 

involved a dangerous weapon. J.A. 237. Accordingly, the district 

court found “from the preponderance of the evidence that . . . 

this becomes an aggravated assault and, therefore, that’s why . . 

. 2A2.2 is correct.” J.A. 237–38.

Given the conflicting testimony, the district court was 

entitled to discredit Defendant’s version of the incident and find 

that he was attempting to grab Seigle’s firearm. And absent clear 

error, which is not present here, we are not at liberty to disturb

such supported factual findings. Harvey, 532 F.3d at 337 (“We . 

. . review the factual findings of the district court . . . for 

clear error.” (citation omitted)). Instead, we must uphold the 

district court’s determination. See United States v. Chandia, 675 

F.3d 329, 337 (4th Cir. 2012).

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district 

court properly applied the aggravated assault guideline. We 

therefore 

AFFIRM.