J-S47006-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

HUMBERTO ALICEA,

Appellant No. 2130 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered November 21, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003169-2012

BEFORE: ALLEN, OTT, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J: FILED JULY 20, 2015

Humberto Alicea (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order denying 

his first petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm. 

The pertinent procedural history is as follows: On February 11, 2013, 

Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count of persons not 

to possess firearms. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to a sentence 

of four to ten years of imprisonment, and withdrew an additional firearms 

charge. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance 

with the plea. Appellant filed neither post-sentence motions nor a direct 

appeal. 
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On May 15, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA 

court appointed counsel. After being granted several extensions of time, 

PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

On October 28, 2014, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s motion 

to withdraw. That same day, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice 

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. On 

November 11, 2014, Appellant filed a response. Following a review of 

Appellant’s response, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition by 

order entered November 21, 2014. This timely appeal followed. Both 

Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a 

hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s 

claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the 

record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011 

(Pa. Super. 2001). 
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Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must first 

consider whether the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant’s 

petition was untimely. The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is 

jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 

2010) (citation omitted). Thus, if a petition is untimely, neither an appellate 

court nor the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. Id. “Without 

jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the 

substantive claims” raised in an untimely petition. Id.

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and 

the petitioner proves, an exception to the time for filing the petition. 

Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under these exceptions, the petitioner must plead 

and prove that: “(1) there has been interference by government officials in 

the presentation of the claim; or (2) there exists after-discovered facts or 

evidence; or (3) a new constitutional right has been recognized.” 

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations 

omitted). A PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory exceptions must 

“be filed within sixty days of the date the claim first could have been 

presented.” Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to the time restrictions of the PCRA must 

be pled in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see 
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also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised before the lower court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

For purposes of the PCRA’s time restrictions, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final on March 13, 2013, after the thirty-day time for filing 

a direct appeal to this Court had expired. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

Therefore, Appellant had to file his petition by March 13, 2014, in order for it 

to be timely. As Appellant filed the instant petition on May 15, 2014, it is 

untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one 

of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 

741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999).

Within his PCRA petition, Appellant did not assert the applicability of 

any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time restrictions. In his response to the 

PCRA Court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, however, Appellant asserted that he 

“clearly stated [to PCRA counsel] that having a mental disorder impaired my 

ability to [file] a timely PCRA.” Response, 11/11/14, at 5. According to 

Appellant, his diagnosis qualifies under the exception found at section 

9545(b)(i)(ii). We disagree.

This Court has summarized:

Only under a very limited circumstance has [our] 

Supreme Court ever allowed a form of mental illness or 

incompetence to excuse an otherwise untimely PCRA 

petition. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz, 578 Pa. 

325, 338-43, 852 A.2d 287, 294-97 (2004) (holding 

defendant’s claims may fall under after discovered facts 

exception to PCRA timeliness requirements where his 

mental incompetence prevented him from timely raising or 

communicating claims). But see [Commonwealth v. 
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Sam, 597 Pa. 523, 952 A.2d 565 (2008)], and its 

companion case Commonwealth v. Watson, 597 Pa. 

483, 952 A.2d 541 (2008) (holding court erred in denying 

Commonwealth’s request for involuntary administration of 

antipsychotic medication to restore death-row inmate 

competency so that he could participate in timely instituted 

post-conviction proceedings). Thus, the general rule 

remains that mental illness or psychological condition, 

absent more, will not serve as an exception to the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional time requirements. Commonwealth v. 

Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700, 703 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In Monaco, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s determination that 

the petitioner’s untimely PCRA petition did not qualify for the section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) time bar exception because he did not exercise due diligence 

in ascertaining the “newly discovered” fact of his diagnosis of Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Monaco, 996 A.2d at 1082-83. Here, Appellant’s 

claim likewise fails. Our review of the record reveals that Appellant was 

aware of his PTSD diagnosis prior to the entry of his guilty plea and 

sentencing. See N.T., 2/11/13, at 8 (trial counsel informing the trial court 

that Appellant suffers from PTSD). See Commonwealth v. 

Liebensperger, 904 A.2d 40, 47-48 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that the 

petitioner did not adequately plead an exception to the PCRA’s time bar, 

despite an earlier diagnosis of chronic depression and mild mental 

retardation and his claim that he had only recently regained his mental 

faculties). Therefore, Appellant’s claim that he has “newly discovered” facts 

regarding his mental illness is without merit.
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In sum, because Appellant’s PCRA is untimely, and he has not met his 

burden of establishing an exception to the PCRA’s time bar, the PCRA court 

correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. Beasley, supra. We 

therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant post-conviction 

relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2015