JB Carter Properties II appealed, arguing that the district 

court's refusal to grant its motion to reinstate its contract claims, which 

had previously been disposed of on partial summary judgment, was in 

error and that the district court erred in finding that Gashtili's 

withdrawal of certain funds was covered by NRS 86.291(1) and that 

Gashtili was not liable for breach of fiduciary duty.' We review an order 

denying a motion to amend the pleadings or to reconsider for an abuse of 

discretion. State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 987- 

88, 103 P.3d 8, 18-19 (2004); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Thomas, 101 Nev. 

'We observe that appellant's briefs and the joint appendix do not 

comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure. NRAP 28(e)(1) 

requires "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record" to be 

supported by a citation to the record. (Emphasis added.) Appellant's 

briefs contain numerous unsupported assertions of fact. In this regard, 

one record citation at the end of a paragraph is generally insufficient to 

support all assertions contained in the paragraph, and assertions made in 

the discussion section of the briefs must also be supported, even if 

previously supported in the facts section. NRAP 30(c)(1) requires the 

appendix pages to be consecutively numbered. This requires each volume 

after the first to be consecutively numbered as well, beginning with the 

page number after the last page number of the previous volume. 

Beginning each volume with page number 1 does not comply with this 

rule. Although we have considered the merits of this case, parties that do 

not comply with the rules concerning briefs and appendices risk sanctions, 

including having their appeal dismissed for non-compliance rather than 

considered on the merits. Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC, 

130 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 322 P.3d 429, 434-35 (2014) (dismissal); Thomas v. 

City of N. Las Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 95-96, 127 P.3d 1057, 1066-67 (2006) 

(monetary sanctions). 

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293, 296, 701 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1985). 2We will uphold the district court's 

factual findings "if not clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial 

evidence." Weddell v. H20, Inc., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 271 P.3d 743, 748 

(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Regarding JB Carter Properties ll's contract claims, partial 

summary judgment was initially granted in favor of Gashtili because no 

evidence of an operating agreement existed. At trial, Bartus Carter (JB 

Carter Properties II's principal), Gashtili, and Brown all testified that 

they signed an operating agreement. Consequently, JB Carter Properties 

II orally moved to conform the pleadings to the trial testimony or for 

reconsideration of the partial summary judgment to reinstate its contract 

claims, arguing that the three principals signed an operating agreement 

and, therefore, one must exist. The district court orally denied the motion 

when JB Carter Properties II was unable to provide the operating 

agreement's terms On appeal, JB Carter Properties II argues that the 

2Respondent's argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

the denial of appellant's motion to reconsider lacks merit. While we lack 

jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a post-judgment order denying a 

motion to reconsider because no rule or statute provides for an appeal 

from such an order, see, e.g., Phelps v. State, 111 Nev. . 1021, 1022, 900 P.2d 

344, 345 (1995), a party may challenge an order denying a motion to 

reconsider on appeal from a final judgment, where "the reconsideration 

order and motion are properly part of the record on appeal from the final 

judgment," if the reconsideration motion was made after the final 

judgment, Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007), or 

where a reconsideration motion is made and then resolved by interlocutory 

order before entry of final judgment, Consol. Generator-Nev., Inc. v. 

Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). 

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district court abused its discretion in denying the motion, and it further 

argues that the operating agreements that it attached to its opposition to 

Gashtili's motion for partial summary judgment provided the terms of the 

operating agreement. 

But, as Gashtili responds, Carter testified that, while he 

believes that an operating agreement existed, he had never seen a fully 

executed operating agreement. Moreover, while Carter, Gashtili, and 

Brown all testified that they signed an operating agreement, none of them 

indicated that the version they signed was either of the versions provided 

with JB Carter Properties II's opposition. And finally, when the district 

court questioned JB Carter Properties II's counsel regarding the terms of 

the operating agreement, counsel replied that no one had provided a 

document with the terms. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying JB Carter 

Properties II's motion to conform the pleadings or for reconsideration. See 

State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys., 120 Nev. at 987-88, 103 P.3d at 18-19; 

State Indus. Ins. Sys., 101 Nev. at 296, 701 P.2d at 1014; see generally 

Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that, 

in a breach of contract action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the 

existence and the essential terms of the contract). 

JB Carter Properties II's other argument is that Gashtili's 

surreptitious withdrawal of funds was a breach of fiduciary duty. The 

evidence presented indicated that, while Gashtili withdrew certain funds 

without informing Carter, Gashtili had the authority to withdraw the 

funds. See NRS 86.291(1) (stating that, in the absence of an operating 

agreement, the "management of a limited-liability company is vested in its 

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J. 

Saitfa 

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members in proportion to their contribution to its capital"). Further, 

Brown testified that the funds were withdrawn and applied to legitimate 

Fastran expenses. Given the evidence provided in the record, we conclude 

that substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that 

Gashtili's withdrawals were not a breach of fiduciary duty. Weddell, 128 

Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 271 P.3d at 748. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

14-"b11:iniy: Pickering 

cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge 

Michael H. Singer, Settlement Judge 

Michael R. Mushkin & Associates, P.C. 

Greenberg Traurig, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

5 

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