1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0154p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KATHY MEDLOCK (14-5084); WOODY H. MEDLOCK,

SR. (14-5100), 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Nos. 14-5084/5100 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. 

No. 3:10-cr-00004—Todd J. Campbell, Chief District Judge. 

Argued: January 15, 2015 

Decided and Filed: July 17, 2015 

Before: BOGGS, SILER, and CLAY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Brian D. Roark, BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant 

in 14-5100. Sandra G. Moses, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brian D. Roark, David S. Mitchell, BASS, BERRY & 

SIMS PLC, Nashville, Tennessee, Barry R. Tidwell, BULLOCK, FLY, HORNSBY, & EVANS, 

Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for Appellant in 14-5100. Hershell D. Koger, Pulaski, Tennessee, for 

Appellant in 14-5084. Sandra G. Moses, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. 

 

>
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 2 

_______________________ 

AMENDED OPINION

_______________________ 

 BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Defendants-Appellants Woody and Kathy Medlock (the 

Medlocks) appeal their jury convictions for aggravated identity theft, health-care fraud, and 

related crimes.1 The Medlocks, who are married, owned and operated Murfreesboro Ambulance 

Service (MAS), a non-emergency ambulance company that transported Medicare patients to 

regular kidney-dialysis appointments. In their appeals, which we decide together, the Medlocks 

argue that: 

(1) their misrepresentation that certain beneficiaries were transported by stretcher 

(entitling the Medlocks’ company to reimbursement) does not constitute a “use” 

of identification under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; 

(2) the district court should have instructed the jury that, for the purposes of the 

fraud statute, Medicare, not merely a prudent person, was the relevant decisionmaker; 

(3) as a matter of law, they are not guilty of defrauding Medicare, because the 

program would have reimbursed their company even without their 

misrepresentations; 

(4) the evidence did not suffice to support their convictions; and 

(5) the court’s refusal to sever either the two defendants from one another or the 

charge specific to Kathy Medlock from the other charges prejudiced Woody 

Medlock. 

 For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment that the Medlocks 

violated 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (criminalizing aggravated identity theft), and affirm the other 

judgments of the district court. 

I

 MAS transported patients to kidney dialysis. Medicare reimbursed MAS for those 

transports. United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations provide 

that Medicare will reimburse non-emergency ambulance transport only when such transport is 

 1

The Medlocks’ son, Woody Medlock, Jr., (also known as “Bubba Medlock”) was indicted along with his 

parents, but the jury acquitted him on all charges. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 3 

medically necessary for bedridden patients, i.e., when any alternative form of transport, such as 

taxicabs, is contraindicated. 42 C.F.R. § 410.40 (regulating Medicare payment for certain nonemergency repetitive transports). Medicare policy requires that, in addition to the driver, an 

Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) accompany any such passenger. The ambulance 

company documents each trip with a certification of medical necessity (CMN), signed by a 

doctor, and a “run sheet,”2 which a Medicare contractor other than the ambulance company 

reviews to determine whether Medicare should reimburse the company for the trip. 

 Medicare contracts with AdvanceMed Corporation to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. In 

or before 2006, AdvanceMed analysis identified MAS as the fifth-highest biller in Tennessee for 

ambulance transports to dialysis. Accordingly, in December 2006, AdvanceMed audited MAS’s 

billing office. MAS’s records were missing some CMNs. 

 As part of the same investigation, in December 2006, August 2007, and September 2007, 

Special Agent Christ Covington of HHS, Office of the Inspector General, covertly surveilled a 

dialysis clinic to which MAS transported patients. Agent Covington videotaped four patients 

walking, riding in the front seat, being double-loaded in an ambulance (i.e., being driven two 

patients, rather than one, at a time), being driven by single-staffed ambulances, or being 

transported by wheelchair (rather than stretcher). MAS had billed the transports as singlepassenger and “stretcher required” (or equivalent). 

 Investigators also executed a search warrant at the Medlocks’ home. They seized an 

envelope during that search that contained CMNs and run tickets. Some CMNs obtained during 

the search and by subpoena had been altered. The government later established that some of 

 2

The government’s expert testified that, “[f]or an ambulance” transport seeking Medicare reimbursement, 

“almost all they have documentation-wise” is a run sheet, also called a run ticket or trip ticket, and the Certification 

of Medical Necessity” (CMN). Citing this expert’s testimony, the government explained on appeal that 

Medicare requires the provider to keep a copy of the run sheet, that is[,] the 

document filled out during transport, and it must support the service [provided]. 

The run sheet must be provided to Medicare upon request. The run sheet must 

contain certain information, such as name and address of patient, names of 

attendants on the ambulance[,] and a description documenting the need for 

ambulance transportation and why the patient could not have gone by other 

means. For repetitive ambulance transport, a patient would not qualify for 

Medicare reimbursement if the patient can sit in a wheelchair, ride in the front 

seat of a vehicle[,] or be able to walk. 

Appellee Br. 9 (citations omitted). In addition, “[i]f there was only one EMT transporting a patient by himself,” 

without another person driving the ambulance, that transport would not “be reimbursable.” 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 4 

these CMNs and run tickets had been forged altogether at Kathy Medlock’s direction. On July 

27, 2011, a grand jury indicted the Medlocks on several counts, including: 

(1) one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and make false 

statements related to health care matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; 

(2) eighteen counts of health-care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347; 

(3) eighteen counts of making a false statement in connection with payment for 

health-care benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1035; 

(4) two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and 

(5) two counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). 

 The grand jury also indicted Kathy Medlock on an additional count of aggravated identity 

theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A(a)(1). 

 At trial and on appeal, the government and the Medlocks dispute whether Medicare 

would have reimbursed MAS for the transport of a patient who could have been transported by 

other means and whether Medicare would reimburse for a transport authorized by a CMN but 

without a run ticket. The Medlocks claim that either a CMN or an actual medical necessity was 

sufficient for reimbursement as a matter of law, so that any fabrication of run sheets was 

immaterial to reimbursement and therefore not criminal. Woody Medlock filed proposed jury 

instructions to this effect. Several of the proposed instructions remain relevant on appeal: He 

proposed instructions pertaining to the health-care counts suggesting that the relevant statutes’ 

requirements that false statements be material meant material to Medicare, not merely to a 

prudent person; Medlock also proposed instructions defining “materiality” in more detail. 

Together, the instructions suggested that the government bore the burden of proving that the 

transports at issue both lacked valid CMNs and were medically unnecessary. 

 The court refused to provide Woody Medlock’s instructions to the jury. To 

accommodate the Medlocks’ argument, the court offered to give a different charge, containing 

the language of the relevant regulations. Both the United States and the Medlocks asked the 

judge not to give that different charge. Ultimately, counsel for Woody Medlock and counsel for 

Kathy Medlock stated that their clients were “satisfied with the jury instructions.” 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 5 

 The Medlocks were tried between May 21 and 31, 2013. The jury convicted the 

Medlocks on all counts. On January 16, 2014, the court sentenced Woody Medlock to 

imprisonment for 75 months and Kathy Medlock to imprisonment for 70 months. 

II

 We first address the Medlocks’ contention that they did not “use” the names of patients 

within the meeting of the aggravated-identity-theft statute. 

 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (“Aggravated Identity Theft” in Chapter 47, “Fraud and False 

Statements”) provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to” a violation of the health-care 

fraud or certain other statutes “knowingly . . . uses, without lawful authority, a means of 

identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be” 

imprisoned for a period in addition to his imprisonment for fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(2)(1). For 

the purposes of § 1028A(a)(1), a “means of identification” is defined as “any name or number 

that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific 

individual.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). 

The government alleged that the Medlocks “used” the name and Medicare Identification 

Numbers of Medicare beneficiaries when they “caused a claim to be submitted to Medicare for 

reimbursement that contained” such names and numbers “without lawful authority to do so 

because the claim falsely stated that” stretchers were required for transport. In addition, the 

government alleged that Kathy Medlock used the signature of a certain doctor in order to forge 

CMNs. 

 “Whether a criminal statute applies to the proven conduct of the defendant is an issue of 

statutory interpretation that we review de novo.” United States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530, 539 (6th 

Cir. 2013). This court must start “with the language of the statute.” Bailey v. United States, 

516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995) (construing “use” in a different statute). “The word ‘use’ in the statute 

must be given its ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning, a meaning variously defined as ‘[t]o convert to 

one’s service,’ ‘to employ,’ ‘to avail oneself of,’ and ‘to carry out a purpose or action by means 

of.’” Ibid.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary at 1777 (10th ed. 2014) (defining use), Webster’s 

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 1299 (1986) (same). 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 6 

 In United States v. Miller, we held that a managing member of an LLC “did not ‘use’ a 

means of identification within the meaning of § 1028A by signing a document in his own name 

which falsely stated” that his business partners authorized him to apply fraudulently for a loan. 

734 F.3d at 542. In that case, the defendant wrote down the names of his business partners on a 

document purporting to be minutes of a meeting wherein they authorized him to apply for a 

(fraudulent) bank loan. We applied the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis to 

narrow the definition of “use”: since Congress placed “use” near “transfers” and “possesses,” 

“both of which are specific kinds of use . . . . the meaning of ‘uses’ is not as expansive as the 

government suggests and . . . the term must have practical boundaries . . . .” Ibid. Accordingly, 

this court held that, “as a matter of law, [the defendant] did not ‘use’ a means of identification 

within the meaning of § 1028A by signing a document in his own name which falsely stated 

that” his business partners gave him authority to act on behalf of the business with respect to the 

loan. Miller, 734 F.3d at 542. 

 This rationale remains persuasive. Given the statutory scheme at issue here, “use” must 

have a more limited definition than the government suggests. The government’s contention 

precisely is that the beneficiaries whom the Medlocks transported were not entitled to 

reimbursed rides. That the defendant in Miller lied about what his partners did and the 

Medlocks lied about what they did does not distinguish the cases. The Medlocks did transport 

the specific beneficiaries whose names they entered on the forms; they lied only about their own 

eligibility for reimbursement for the service. There was nothing about those particular 

beneficiaries, rather than some other lawful beneficiaries of Medicare, that entitled them to 

reimbursed rides.3

 In addition, the Sixth Circuit’s Pattern Jury instructions seem to contemplate a narrow 

reading of “use” in § 1028A: 

[t]he term ‘use’ means active employment of the means of identification during 

and in relation to the crime charged . . . . ‘Active employment’ includes activities 

 3

Miller differs from the present case only in immaterial ways. The defendant in Miller wrote down his 

partners’ names to indicate that they did something they did not do. If actions involving names lie along an identitytheft spectrum (and neither the Medlocks nor we suggest that they do as a legal matter), the Medlocks used (or 

misused) even less than the Miller defendant did, because they did not lie about anyone else. The distinction 

between a criminal lying about himself or lying about another does not affect the definition of “use” under the 

statute. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 7 

such as displaying or bartering. ‘Use’ also includes a person’s reference to a 

means of identification in his possession for the purpose of helping to commit the 

crime . . . . 

Sixth Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions 15.04. The Medlocks did not display, barter, or refer to 

means of identification as such during, in relation to, or for the purpose of helping to commit the 

crime. 

The cases that the government cites do not undermine this conclusion. 

 The United States cites United States v. Tevis, 593 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2014) for the 

proposition that “the inclusion of another person’s social security number on a fraudulent loan 

application was sufficient to qualify as ‘use’ for the purposes of violating the aggravated identity 

theft statute.” 28(j) Letter (Jan. 12, 2015). Tevis concerns, in relevant part, the use by a bank 

defrauder of his colleague’s five-year-old son’s Social Security number in a fraudulent 

application for a loan not in the son’s name. A jury convicted the defendant of violating 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The defendant argued “that he did not violate this section because he did not 

‘use’ [the son’s] social security number.” Tevis, 593 F. App’x at 478. Disagreeing in an 

unpublished opinion, we held that, because the colleague testified that the defendant asked for 

the number and gave it to an accomplice who used it in a loan application, “[t]he jury was 

entitled to believe that testimony. Sufficient evidence therefore supported [the] convictions.” 

Ibid. 

 Tevis focused on the question of sufficiency, not the meaning of “use” under 18 U.S.C. 

§1028A. Unlike the Tevis defendant, the Medlocks did not attempt to pass themselves off as 

anyone other than themselves. Their misrepresented how and why the beneficiaries were 

transported, but they did not use those beneficiaries’ identities to do so. 

 A simple hypothetical exemplifies the flaw in the government’s logic: an overcharging 

merchant. In the course of the committing health-care fraud, our hypothetical defendant bills his 

patient (or that patient’s insurer, public or private) in his actual name, stating that the medical 

service, which the defendant really did provide, costs $200, when really it costs $100. On the 

government’s logic, that lie would constitute a use of the patient’s name, and so would be 

aggravated identity theft. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 8 

 The government also relies on United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 131 S. Ct. 182 (2010). Abdelshafi concerned the prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A 

of the owner and operator of a third-party vendor providing transportation services to Medicaid 

patients. The defendant’s logs included “the patient’s identifying information[, which] included 

that person’s Medicaid identification number.” Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 605. The defendant “not 

only inflated mileage amounts, but also submitted claim forms for trips that did not, in fact, 

occur.” Ibid. The defendant argued “that he could not be guilty of aggravated identity theft 

because he did not use Medicaid patients’ identifying information ‘without lawful authority.’” 

Ibid. 

 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 

(11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 

556 U.S. 646 (2009), the Fourth Circuit held that the plain text of the statute did not indicate that 

the means of identification must have been stolen in order to have been used “without lawful 

authority.” See Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 607. In addition, other provisions in the relevant title 

specify crimes that require an identification document to have been stolen. Id. at 608 (citing 

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2) & (6)). Had Congress wanted to include that requirement in the relevant 

provision, the Fourth Circuit suggested, it knew how to do so. And Congress’s choice made 

sense: “After all, the use of another person’s means of identification makes a fraudulent claim for 

payment much harder to detect . . . .” Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 610. 

 The United States Supreme Court considered 18 U.S.C. § 1028A in Flores-Figueroa v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). In light of Flores-Figueroa, we, in turn, reconsidered 

§ 1028A, in United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2013). The defendant in Lumbard 

had agreed to purchase a driver’s license, Social Security number, and birth certificate from a 

man who resembled him.4

 The defendant obtained a passport in the seller’s name, staged his 

own suicide, and fled the country to Burma, where he later was arrested. The Burmese 

authorities extradited him to the United States, where a grand jury indicted him for violating 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A, among other crimes. On appeal, we construed Flores-Figueroa to mean that 

 4

The seller did not deliver the Social Security card or birth certificate. Prior to this purchase, the defendant 

had evaded arrest and was wanted on warrants charging breaking and entering, destruction of a building, larceny, 

aggravated battery, obstruction of justice, receiving stolen property, and other crimes. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 9 

“§ 1028A requires the government [to] prove a defendant knows the identifying information he 

misuses belongs to a real individual.” Lumbard, 706 F.3d at 722 (citing Flores-Figueroa, 

556 U.S. at 657). Because Flores-Figuroa focused on “the mens rea required for commission of 

the offense, which is not at issue here[, t]he Court’s focus on fraud versus theft is instructive, but 

not determinative.” Lumbard, 706 F.3d at 722. Starting with the statutory language, ibid., this 

court showed that the definition of “lawful” is not “confined to permission,” id. at 723. 

 Rejecting the defendant’s appeal to legislative history, in part because the Supreme Court 

called the same history inconclusive, id. at 724 (citing Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 655), we 

concluded “that the phrase ‘without lawful authority’ in § 1028A is not limited to instances of 

theft, but includes cases where the defendant obtained the permission of the person whose 

information the defendant misused.” Lumbard, 706 F.3d at 725; see also id. at 724-25 

(observing that this holding was not contrary to United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 

2010)); Lumbard, 706 F.3d. at 725 (observing that six other circuits “concluded that § 1028A 

extends beyond mere theft,” that “[f]our of the[m] decided the issue after Flores-Figueroa,” and 

citing cases). 

 Although Abdelshafi and Lumbard demonstrate that the Medlocks acted “without lawful 

authority” for statutory purposes, the Medlocks’ misrepresentation that certain beneficiaries were 

transported by stretchers does not constitute a “use” of those beneficiaries’ identification under 

the federal aggravated-identity-theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, because their company really 

did transport them. 

III 

 The district court did not err by refusing Woody Medlock’s proposed jury instructions 

regarding materiality. If it did err, any error was harmless. And the Medlocks’ conduct was 

material under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1035 and 1347. These two separate issues—whether the Medlocks’ 

actions were material as a matter of law and whether the court’s failure to instruct the jury on 

materiality prejudiced the Medlocks—turn on the same questions. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 10 

A

 The Medlocks’ argument that their fabrication of run sheets was not material5

 to the 

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (initial) decision to reimburse MAS fails to 

persuade us for at least two reasons. 

 First, it is a “cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if 

possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364 (2000) 

(quotation marks omitted). The regulations provide that “Medicare covers medically necessary

nonemergency, scheduled, repetitive ambulance services if the ambulance provider . . . obtains a 

[CMN].” 42 C.F.R. § 410.40(d)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, Medicare covers 

“nonemergency, scheduled, repetitive ambulance services” only if both (1) those services are 

medically necessary and also (2) the ambulance provider obtains a CMN. On the Medlocks’ 

theory, obtaining a CMN demonstrates medical necessity. But if a CMN was all that was 

 5

18 U.S.C. § 1035 provides, in relevant part, that: 

(a) Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly 

and willfully-- 

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material

fact; or 

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or 

representations, or makes or uses any materially false writing or document 

knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 

statement or entry, 

in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or 

services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 

both. 

(emphases added). 

 18 U.S.C. § 1347 provides: 

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme 

or artifice-- 

(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or 

(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 

promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or 

control of, any health care benefit program, 

in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or 

services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 

both. If the violation results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 

of this title), such person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 

than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in death, such person shall be 

fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both. 

(b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual 

knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 11 

required to determine medical necessity, then the part of the regulation that required run sheets 

would be redundant. We choose to give effect to every word of the regulation. 

 Second, the run-sheet process allows review of “the Medicare payment decision [that 

would otherwise be] left in the hands of a random doctor whose interest may be far from the 

integrity of the Medicare program . . . .” Appellee Br. 40. In construing the regulation—and in 

imagining how MAS and other parties involved in the provision of services would have 

construed the regulation—the court should construe it to be in keeping with a goal of Medicare 

to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. 

 The Medlocks argue that the context, history, and prior judicial interpretation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1035 “indicate that [the false] statements must be material to . . . Medicare,” not 

merely to a prudent person. Appellant Woody Medlock Br. 19. Even if the Medlocks are 

correct, this argument is irrelevant. As discussed above, their fraudulent statements were

material to Medicare. Any error, therefore, was harmless. The materiality argument does not 

require reversal of their convictions as a matter of law. 

B

 Woody Medlock asked that the court instruct the jury that the materiality requirement of 

the health-care fraud counts of the indictment required a finding that his misrepresentations 

would have defrauded Medicare, rather than a merely prudent person. The district court rejected 

his proposed jury instructions. Neither counsel for Woody Medlock nor for Kathy Medlock 

specifically objected to the ultimate jury instructions given.6 So the court did not know that they 

objected to the lack of these particular jury instructions. 

 Appellants challenging a jury instruction to which they did not object at trial must clear a 

very high bar. “Failure to object” “to a failure to give a requested instruction” by “inform[ing] 

the court of the specific objection and the grounds for [it]” “precludes appellate review, except” 

 6

After rejecting Woody Medlock’s proposed jury instruction, the court proposed a different instruction. 

After the government objected to that new instruction, the court offered to take it out entirely. In response to the 

offer, Woody Medlock’s counsel said: “I take it . . . that the government does not oppose to [sic] the court’s 

proposed jury instruction not being given. We are in agreement with that which would mean that this instruction 

would come out. . . . And I believe that that [sic] from on behalf of Woody Medlock, Senior satisfied [sic] with the 

jury instructions.” Counsel for Kathy Medlock, having earlier “adopt[ed]” the “position” of counsel for Woody 

Medlock’s about the proposed jury instruction, said nothing in response to the court’s proposal or the court’s 

removal of the instruction altogether after the government and counsel for Woody Medlock objected. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 12 

if it was “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b). “Plain 

error” is one that is “clear” or “obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 

 As we have explained, “[i]n the context of challenges to jury instructions, plain error 

requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to 

likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 528 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because the Medlocks failed to 

challenge the jury instructions the district court ultimately gave, it would be proper for us to 

reverse only “if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial, 

and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 

proceedings . . . .” Ibid. (emphasis added). 

 Here, the error did not confuse, mislead, or prejudice the jury because, as we have 

discussed above, the government produced evidence at trial that the Medlocks’ actions were

material to Medicare’s decision. Nor, despite the Medlocks’ protestations to the contrary, did 

the government conflate falsity with materiality. We decline to reverse the district court’s jury 

instructions. 

IV 

 The evidence suffices to support the conviction of each Medlock and the court’s refusal 

to server did not prejudice Woody Medlock. 

A 

 A “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “In reviewing the sufficiency 

of the evidence, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 

A defendant faces a very heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”

United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 645–48 (6th Cir. 2008) (regarding health-care fraud and 

related charge) (citation omitted). The evidence sufficed for a rational trier of fact to find, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, both Woody and Kathy Medlock guilty of the essential elements of 

the crimes charged (except for aggravated identity theft, the convictions for which we have 

reversed): 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 13 

(1) making false statements to Medicare, 

(2) health-care fraud, 

(3) wire fraud, and 

(4) conspiracy to defraud Medicare and make false statements: an agreement, tacit 

or explicit. 

 We consider each in turn. 

 To convict the Medlocks of making false statements to Medicare, the government needed 

to prove that they knowingly made false statements or representations in connection with 

delivery of or payment for health-care benefits in a matter involving Medicare. The government 

showed that Woody and Kathy Medlock both did so, for example, by signing or directing 

employees to sign run tickets that said patients were on stretchers when they were not. 

 To convict the Medlocks of health-care fraud, the government needed to put on evidence 

that Woody and Kathy Medlock knowingly devised a scheme or artifice to defraud a health-care 

benefit program in connection with delivery of or payment for health-care benefits, that they 

executed the same, and that they did so with an intent to defraud. The government demonstrated 

that Woody Medlock knew of the scheme and acted in furtherance of it, e.g., by signing 

Medicare provider forms. And the government showed that Kathy Medlock was in charge of the 

billing office, and directed employees to further the scheme. 

 The elements of the health-care-fraud charge satisfy the wire-fraud charge, except for the 

use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The government 

showed that the government paid MAS through wire transfers. 

 Finally, to prove the conspiracy charge, the government needed to put on evidence of an 

agreement, tacit or explicit. The government’s evidence of actual fraud, as well as of Woody 

Medlock’s and Kathy Medlock’s knowledge thereof and benefit therefrom, sufficed to evidence 

a tacit agreement to defraud Medicare. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 14 

B 

 Woody Medlock charges that it was error for the district court to deny his motion to sever 

either Count 42 of the indictment, pertaining only to Kathy Medlock, or, in the alternative, Kathy 

Medlock. 

 “The indictment . . . may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if 

the offenses charged . . . are of . . . similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, 

or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). 

Similarly, “[t]he indictment . . . may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have 

participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, 

constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or more counts 

together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count.” Id. 8(b). 

 To prevail on an appeal of a denial of a motion to sever, the “defendant must show 

compelling, specific, and actual prejudice . . . .” United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 678 (6th 

Cir. 2005). This court must review the district court’s decision not to sever for an abuse of 

discretion. See also ibid. (discussing the foremost circumstance relevant to motion to sever: the 

public interest in avoiding unnecessary litigation). 

 Woody Medlock argues that the government’s presentation of the forgeries made at 

Kathy Medlock’s direction prejudiced him, since they did not directly relate, in Woody 

Medlock’s view, to the counts with which he was charged. But, as the district court correctly 

held, “the evidence [relating to the forgeries] is admissible as to the conspiracy count against all 

Defendants.” This order did not abuse the district court’s discretion. Although he briefs several 

reasons why the district court, within the rules, might have granted his motion, Woody Medlock 

fails to demonstrate “compelling, specific, and actual prejudice.” 

V

 For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the Medlocks’ convictions for aggravated 

identity theft and AFFIRM their other convictions. 
Nos. 14-5084/5100 United States v. Medlock, et ux. Page 15 

Addendum

 Our opinion affirms some convictions of Kathy Medlock and her husband and coconspirator, Woody Medlock, and reverses certain convictions for aggravated identity theft. We 

amend our opinion to clarify that we affirm Kathy Medlock’s conviction for aggravated identity 

theft on Count 42 of the underlying indictment. 

 While Kathy Medlock challenged her convictions on Counts 40 and 41 for aggravated 

identity theft, which convictions we have reversed, she did not challenge her conviction on 

Count 42. In Counts 40 and 41, the government relied upon the use of identification of patients 

who were actually transported by ambulance whose transport was unnecessary (and so not 

eligible for reimbursement). We hold that this use did not constitute aggravated identity theft. 

But in Count 42, the government relied on Kathy Medlock’s forging a physician’s signature and 

thus using his identity to secure reimbursement fraudulently for unnecessary ambulance 

transports. Our rationale for reversing the convictions on Counts 40 and 41 does not apply to the 

conviction on Count 42. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court on 

Count 42.