IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

THOMAS HAMILL, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

NORTH WILDWOOD CITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

Civil Action 

No. 10-6587 (JBS/KMW) 

OPINION

 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Anthony J. Brady, Jr., Esq. 

1 Rose Avenue 

P.O. Box 129 

Maple Shade, NJ 08052 

 Attorney for Plaintiffs 

Eric L. Harrison, Esq. 

Methfessel & Werbel, PC 

3 Ethel Road 

Suite 300 

PO Box 3012 

Edison, NJ 08818-3012 

 Attorney for Defendant 

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiffs Thomas Hamill and Gregory Lasky are disabled 

individuals who use wheelchairs and who brought this action 

against Defendant North Wildwood City (“North Wildwood”) for 

violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the New Jersey Law Against 

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Discrimination (“NJLAD”). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties settled, and this matter now comes 

before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and 

costs [Docket Item 91]. Plaintiffs seek a total of $257,531.27, 

which includes 585.7 hours of attorney time at $400 per hour and 

$23,291.27 in expenses. 

 After making various subtractions for excessive billing, 

the Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ counsel should be 

compensated for 477.1 hours of attorney time at $400 per hour. 

The lodestar is therefore $190,840.00. The Court will reduce the 

lodestar by 30% because the relief sought in the original 

Complaint was significantly broader than the relief received in 

the settlement agreement. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s 

counsel $135,588.00 in attorney’s fees. The Court will award 

$17,206.27 in costs. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History 

Plaintiffs Karl Loose, Thomas Hamill, Gregory Lasky, and 

Advocates for Disabled Americans (“AFDA”) brought this action 

alleging that Defendant North Wildwood violated the ADA because 

certain beaches, bathrooms, curb cuts, and sidewalks were 

inaccessible to the disabled. [Docket Item 1.] They also sought 

damages, including punitive damages, under the NJLAD. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that newly constructed sand 

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dune ramps at JFK Blvd. were not accessible and did not provide 

handicapped-accessible access to the bathrooms at JFK Blvd.; 

that Defendant’s curb cuts had excessive slopes, lacked a level 

landing, and had improper thresholds in large portions of six 

municipal streets, namely New York St., New Jersey St., Atlantic 

St., Central St., Surf Ave., and JFK Blvd.; and that the 

sidewalk on Surf Ave. had altered cross slopes. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 

11.) Plaintiffs claimed that, before filing their Complaint, 

they notified Defendant of these ADA violations by providing an 

expert report authored by William B. Cody. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

On October 24, 2011, the Court dismissed Plaintiff AFDA 

with prejudice [Docket Item 21], pursuant to a stipulation 

between the parties [Docket Item 19]. 

On February 14, 2012, this Court issued a memorandum 

opinion [Docket Item 38] addressing the motion of Plaintiff Karl 

Loose to withdraw his claims without prejudice [Docket Item 22] 

and the motion of Plaintiffs Hamill and Lasky to amend the 

complaint [Docket Item 23]. The Court permitted Loose to 

withdraw his claims without prejudice and permitted Hamill and 

Lasky to withdraw without prejudice their NJLAD claims. 

Plaintiffs Hamill and Lasky then filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“Amended Complaint”). [Docket Item 40.] 

Defendant North Wildwood City filed motions for summary 

judgment [Docket Item 53 & 54] asserting that Plaintiffs lacked 

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constitutional standing to pursue their ADA claims. The Court 

issued an Opinion and Order [Docket Items 68 & 69] denying 

Defendant’s motions. 

 The parties filed a motion to approve their consent 

judgment [Docket Item 89], which the Court approved [Docket Item 

90]. The parties’ settlement agreement was attached to the 

Consent Order, and the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce 

its terms. The settlement agreement specified various ADA 

accessibility improvements1

, and noted that some improvements 

were contingent upon State approval or would be made “to the 

maximum extent feasible.” [Id.] 

 The Court held oral argument on June 11, 2014 regarding 

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees. 

 

1

 The full list of improvements is: upgrading all curb cuts on 

JFK Blvd. between 2nd and 13th Aves.; upgrading all curb cuts on 

Surf Ave. between 10th and 18th Aves.; installing access mats 

between the bulkhead and the bicycle path at the intersections 

of JFK Blvd. and 7th and 10th Aves.; remedying the vertical 

threshold at the ramps at the intersections of JFK Blvd. and 7th 

and 10th Aves.; installing handrails on the ramps at JFK Blvd. 

and 7th and at JFK and 10th; placing a temporary, ADA-compliant 

bathroom near the accessible path off JFK; with respect to the 

permanent restrooms at the intersection of Pine and Old New 

Jersey, clearing the ramp, replacing door knobs with ADAcompliant door openers, lowering the urinal and the urinal flush 

valve, increasing the stall door width, moving the toilet paper, 

raising the toilet seat, replacing sink handles with ADAcompliant materials, insulating hot water and drain pipes, and 

mounting grab bars in the toilet stall; lowering the parking 

payment meters on the islands on Surf Ave.; relocating the 

garbage cans on the parking islands on Surf Ave. to accessible 

locations; and adding to beach maintenance a plan to eliminate 

sand accumulation at the paths. [Docket Item 90 at 2-4.] 

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B. Parties’ Arguments 

 Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to attorney’s fees 

because they are the prevailing party. They seek a total of 

$257,531.27, which includes $23,291.27 in costs and 585.7 hours 

of attorney time at $400 per hour. 

 Plaintiffs’ counsel, Anthony Brady, emphasizes that the ADA 

is complicated; that he is one of the few attorneys willing to 

undertake cases regarding access rights; that he is highly 

skilled and experienced; and that his fee award should not be 

reduced because he achieved outstanding success. Brady also 

explains his hours by asserting that “when I litigate against 

Attorney Harrison and the MEL I have to be extremely thorough 

knowing that misrepresentations of material fact and law to the 

Court will be made and many red herrings will be presented and 

that there will be a strong likelihood of an appeal.” (Pl. Br. 

at 19.) 

 Defendant agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable 

attorney fees and costs, that Brady’s rate should be $400 per 

hour, and that many of Brady’s time entries were reasonable. 

Since there is no objection, the Court does not address the 

reasonableness of the $400 hourly rate. Defendant argues, 

however, that the Court should reduce Brady’s total by 

subtracting 3.4 hours for a calculation error; 74.6 hours for 

excessive or unwarranted billing; 23.7 hours for Brady’s 

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compilation of his time records in this case; and 3.4 hours for 

time entries relating to the dismissed Plaintiffs. At oral 

argument, Defendant’s counsel also objected to the 18.5 hours 

that Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted for working on the reply 

brief. 

 Defendant also argues that Brady’s lodestar should be 

reduced by 50% because Plaintiffs achieved limited relief. For 

example, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs Loose and the AFDA were 

dismissed, Plaintiffs’ NJLAD claims were dismissed, and the 

settlement agreement only calls for ADA-accessible improvements 

if feasible and approved by the State. 

 Finally, Defendant argues that the bill for Plaintiff’s 

expert witness, William Cody, should be reduced because there is 

no explanation for $6,085.00 of the bill and because the 

Defendant should not be required to pay for transportation and 

lodging of a Florida-based expert who has not demonstrated such 

specialized expertise that a local accessibility expert will not 

suffice.2 

 

2

 After oral argument, Plaintiffs submitted a letter [Docket Item 

104] because “[d]uring oral argument North Wildwood relied heavy 

[sic] on that if he had only been informed of plaintiffs’ 

demands the case could have resolved an early stage . . . . The 

undersign [sic] to create a complete record and because of this 

surprise respectfully request [sic] the Court to accept this 

short letter.” [Docket Item 104 at 1.] Plaintiffs emphasized 

their willingness to settle and disputed Defendant’s implication 

that they failed to provide settlement demands early in the 

litigation. The Court will not address arguments about which 

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Attorney’s fees, expert fees and litigation costs are 

recoverable under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. In order to 

recover attorney’s fees the plaintiff must be a “prevailing 

party.” Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 

Dept. of Health, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). “[A] ‘prevailing party’ is 

one who has been awarded some relief by the court . . . .” Id. 

at 603. In addition to judgments on the merits, “settlement 

agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the 

basis for an award of attorney’s fees.” Id. at 604. 

 Under the ADA, “a ‘lodestar’ amount provides the starting 

point for determining reasonable attorney’s fees.” Lanni v. 

State of New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001). “The 

lodestar is obtained by multiplying the number of hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly 

rate.” Id. The lodestar “is the presumptively reasonable fee.” 

Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Attorney General of 

the State of New Jersey, 297 F.3d 253, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). 

 “A plaintiff requesting attorney fees must provide evidence 

supporting the time claimed.” Pub. Interest Research Group of 

N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995) (“PIRG 

v. Windall”). “The district court should review the time charged 

 

party facilitated or obstructed the settlement process because 

they do not impact the Court’s analysis. 

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[and] decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended 

for each of the particular purposes . . . .” Id. “[H]ours that 

are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” should be 

excluded. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “For 

work to be included in the calculation of reasonable attorneys’ 

fees, the work must be useful and of a type ordinarily necessary 

to secure the final result obtained from the litigation.” 

Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 266 (quotation omitted). 

District courts must “consider a party’s objections to 

particular time charges and make their findings on the hours 

that should be included in calculating the lodestar.” PIRG v. 

Windall, 51 F.3d at 1189. “The court may not reduce an award sua 

sponte; rather, it can only do so in response to specific 

objections made by the opposing party.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. 

Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 711 (3d Cir. 2005). 

 After the lodestar amount is calculated, a court has 

discretion to adjust the fee based on a number of different 

factors. PIRG v. Windall, 51 F.3d at 1185. The full list of 

factors is: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform 

the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of alternative 

employment; (5) the customary fee for similar work; (6) the 

nature of the fee payment arrangement; (7) time limitations 

imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved 

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and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability 

of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) 

the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship; and 

(12) fee awards in similar cases. Id. at n.8. “The most 

important factor in exercising this discretion is the ‘results 

obtained’ by the plaintiff.” Id. at 1185; see also Hensley, 461 

U.S. at 436 (“the most critical factor is the degree of success 

obtained”). 

 “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his 

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee,” and, 

“[n]ormally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on 

the litigation . . . .” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. “If, on the 

other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited 

success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an 

excessive amount.” Id. at 436. “A simple, mechanistic reduction 

based solely on the ratio of successful to unsuccessful issues 

is, however, precluded . . . .” PIRG v. Windall, 51 F.3d at 

1190. 

 In addition, “legal services rendered in a dispute over the 

attorneys’ fees due a prevailing plaintiff are recoverable under 

a fee shifting statute.” Id. The lodestar and Hensley reduction 

analysis applies to fees for preparing a fee petition. Maldonado 

v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2001). 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

 Because the Court signed a consent judgment that 

incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement, Plaintiffs are 

the prevailing parties and are thus entitled to recover their 

fees and costs. Furthermore, Defendant stipulated that Brady’s 

rate should be $400 per hour, and this Court therefore does not 

determine whether this hourly rate is reasonable for the nature 

of the legal services rendered. The issues before the Court are 

(1) the reasonableness of the hours and costs that Brady 

submitted and (2) whether the lodestar should be reduced. 

A. Reducing Hours 

 The Court will grant many of Defendant’s proposed 

reductions because Brady is only entitled to compensation for 

hours that were reasonably expended. 

1. Reductions for Excessive or Unwarranted Billing 

 The Court will reduce some of Brady’s hours due to 

excessive or unwarranted billing. Below is a chart of line-item 

reductions to Brady’s billing due to excessive or unwarranted 

time. This chart is based off a chart of objections that 

Defendant compiled. At oral argument, the Court offered to 

review each item line-by-line. Plaintiff’s counsel demurred and 

said that his primary concerns were reductions for time spent on 

research and time spent traveling to North Wildwood to prepare 

for depositions. 

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 The Court will reduce time that Brady spent traveling to 

North Wildwood to examine the sites to prepare for depositions. 

At oral argument, Brady explained that he makes these trips to 

familiarize himself with the area because his client suffers 

from short-term memory loss. For example, he attested that, in 

describing a drive from Florida to New Jersey, his client may 

say that he traveled through Maine, instead of Maryland. The 

Court will permit travel and site visit time for these trips on 

October 1, 2011 and May 5, 2012. It is not unreasonable to 

require Defendant to compensate Brady for multiple trips to 

North Wildwood to prepare for depositions of a client who is 

impaired and has special needs. These extra measures to 

represent a client with short-term memory loss are “of a type 

ordinarily necessary to secure the final result obtained from 

the litigation.” Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 266 (quotation 

omitted), because a reasonably conscientious attorney would do 

so to assure a productive and accurate deposition. 

 The Court finds that some of Brady’s billing for time spent 

conducting research must be reduced because the research was 

unduly protracted. Brady charges $400.00 per hour and is 

familiar with ADA litigation. Another court in this district has 

noted that “Plaintiff's counsel, by his own admission, has tried 

countless ADA-related cases . . . .” Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 

Civ. 09-05624 (RBK/JS), 2013 WL 1222648, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 

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2013). Given his high billing rate and his experience, Brady 

must be efficient with his time. 

 All objections by Defendant appear in the following table. 

The “Billed Amount” is the time claimed by Mr. Brady for the 

particular task, expressed in tenths of an hour. The entry for 

“Reduction” is the number of hours that the Court is subtracting 

by sustaining the particular objection, expressed in tenths of 

an hour. 

Table 1: Chart of reductions due to excessive or unwarranted 

billing: 

Billing 

Date 

Description Billed 

Amount 

Reduction Court’s Reason for Reduction 

12/6/10 Review of email from 

attorney offering to meet 

only if Ed Law appears 

.3 .3 Not Warranted – Ed Law was a 

plaintiff in another case. 

3/30/11 Review case of Dis. In 

Action v. Southeastern 

1.5 1 Excessive. 

3/31/11 Review Scheduling 

Order 

.3 .2 Excessive. 

3/31/11 Review Minute Entry .2 .1 Excessive. 

5/19/11 Research and draft 

position letter to 

attorney Harrison 

1.9 .5 Excessive. 

7/7/11 Review email about 

implied tax threat 

.3 .3 Not Warranted – “Implied tax 

threats” have no bearing on the 

ADA claim 

7/7/11 Tele to clients about 

implied tax threats 

.5 .5 Not Warranted – Implied tax threats 

have no bearing on the ADA claim 

7/8/11 Review discovery rules 

and tax privacy laws due 

to implied tax threat 

2.5 2.5 Not Warranted – Implied tax threats 

have no bearing on the ADA claim 

7/14/11 Review Scheduling 

Order 

.3 .2 Excessive. 

7/14/11 Review Text Order .2 .1 Excessive. 

8/8/11 Review discovery letter 

from defendant 

.2 .1 Excessive. 

10/1/11 Travel to site to prepare 

for depositions 

4.7 1.7 Excessive. The Court will reduce 

the 4.7 hours to 3 hours because, as 

discussed at oral argument, travel 

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round trip from Brady’s office in 

Maple Shade to North Wildwood 

could reasonably take 3 hours. 

10/4/11 Preparation for 

depositions including 

study of previous 

depositions and subject 

matter jurisdiction 

7.3 4 Excessive – The first deposition 

taken in this case was not taken 

until October 5, 2011 and, 

therefore, there were no previous 

deposition transcripts to study. 

10/11/11 Prepare travel and 

deposition 

3.5 1.5 Excessive and Not Warranted – 

Presumably this entry relates to Mr. 

Lasky’s continued deposition on 

10/12/11. Brady was not taking this 

deposition and it would not require 

3.5 hours to prepare for it. 

10/13/11 Review deposition 

notice 

.2 .1 Excessive to bill .2 for review of a 

deposition notice. 

10/17/11 Review amended 

scheduling order 

.3 .2 Excessive 

10/19/11 Preparation for 

inspection 

4.1 3.1 Excessive – Preparing for over 4 

hours to inspect documents at a 

storage facility is excessive. 

11/13/11 Travel to North 

Wildwood to prepare for 

inspection and review 

6.9 6.9 Not Warranted – Brady was 

accompanied by his expert. Further 

preparation was not warranted. 

11/14/11 Preparation for 

inspection 

1.4 1.4 Not Warranted – Brady’s expert 

accompanied him. Further 

preparation was not warranted. 

11/17/11 Motion to amend 2.5 1 Excessive – This was a motion to 

amend and a motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ NJLAD claims; the 

NJLAD claims should not be 

included as part of Brady’s fee 

application. 

11/21/11 Review response in 

opposition 

1.2 .8 Excessive – This motion also 

pertained to Plaintiffs’ NJLAD 

claims, which should not be 

included as part of Brady’s fee 

application. 

11/30/11 Review text order .2 .1 Excessive. 

12/6/11 Review text order .2 .1 Excessive. 

12/9/11 Order granting 

Plaintiff’s request for 

one day extension 

.2 .1 Excessive. 

12/13/11 Review reply brief to 

opposition to motion 

3.9 2 Excessive – This reply brief dealt 

with plaintiffs’ motion to amend 

and dismissal of the NJLAD claim, 

which should not be included. 

12/20/11 Text order .2 .1 Excessive 

12/21/11 Review amended 

scheduling order 

.3 .2 Excessive 

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12/21/11 Review Minute Entry .2 .1 Excessive 

1/4/12 Letter to defendant .4 .2 Excessive 

2/14/12 Review memorandum 

opinion 

1.1 .8 Excessive 

2/14/12 Review order dismissing 

without prejudice 

.2 .1 Excessive 

2/15/12 Review amended 

complaint 

.5 .2 Excessive – The amended 

complaint is merely 5 pages long. 

2/22/12 Review answer .8 .4 Excessive 

2/23/12 Review amended 

scheduling order 

.3 .1 Excessive 

3/29/12 Review text order .2 .1 Excessive 

4/4/12 Review line by line 

expert report 

5.3 2 Excessive – Goldstein’s expert 

report was 32 pages long. The 

deduction would still allow review 

of approximately 10 pages per hour, 

which is more than reasonable. 

4/16/12 Review minute entry .2 .1 Excessive 

4/17/12 Review amended 

scheduling order 

.3 .2 Excessive 

4/24/12 Review of deposition 

notice 

.3 .2 Excessive 

5/5/12 Drive to and review site 

to prep for depositions 

4.7 1.7 Same reason as 10/1/11. 

6/7/12 Review text order .2 .1 Excessive 

7/16/12 Review deadlines .2 .2 Not Warranted – This entry was 

made twice on the same date. Even 

assuming it was for two different 

plaintiffs, at .4 it would be 

excessive; .2 would be more than 

reasonable. 

7/30/12 Notice from Court .2 .2 Not Warranted – This was the 

clerk’s quality control message 

advising Brady to file a proper Rule 

7.1 letter. This was an error on 

Brady’s part and is, therefore, not 

reasonable. 

7/30/12 Letter to Court .2 .2 Not Warranted – As per the above 

entry, this was an error on Brady’s 

part. 

8/4/12-

8/20/12 

Research and writing 53.7 15 Excessive – It is not reasonable for 

an experienced attorney like Mr. 

Brady, who collects a $400/hr. fee, 

to take over 64.4 hours to research 

and write this opposition brief. A 

reduction of 23.7 hours is 

reasonable making the research, 

writing, review, and filing take a 

total of 40.7 hours including the 

8/22/12 and 8/23 entries below. 

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8/22/12 Writing Brief 6.9 6.9 Excessive – See 8/4/12-8/20/12 

comment above. 

8/23/12 Review and filing of 

brief – Lasky 

1.6 .8 Excessive – See 8/4/12-8/20/12 

comment above. 

8/23/12 Review and filing of 

brief – Hamill 

2.2 1 Excessive – See 8/4/12-8/20/12 

comment above. 

8/24/12 Exhibits – Hamill Work 

on 

1.2 .5 Excessive 

8/27/12 Review defendants 

response brief 

1.2 1.2 Not warranted - The only brief 

served on or about August 27, 2012 

was defendants’ reply letter brief. 

This brief was only 4 pages long 

and was billed for again on 8/29/12. 

8/29/12 Review defendants brief 4.6 3.6 Excessive - See 8/27/12 comment. 

3/10/13 Prepare for oral 

argument 

7.9 3 Excessive – 4.9 hours is reasonable 

preparation for an experienced 

attorney like Mr. Brady who 

charges $400/hour. 

3/11/13 Review order .2 .1 Excessive 

3/14/13 Review text order .3 .2 Excessive 

3/18/13 Review scheduling order .2 .1 Excessive 

4/10/13 Review order .2 .1 Excessive 

5/1/13 Review text order .2 .1 Excessive 

5/10/13 Review notice from 

court 

.2 .1 Excessive 

6/27/13 Preparation and 

telephone conference 

with Court 

1.8 .4 Excessive- The conference with the 

Court should have been billed at 

approximately .4 and preparation 

would not have required more than 

1 hour. 

7/9/13 Review clerks notice .2 .1 Excessive 

7/16/13 Email from ct. 1.1 1 Excessive – It is unlikely that Brady 

received an email from the Court 

which required 1.1 hours to review. 

This may have been a typo and 

should be reduced accordingly to .1 

7/23/13 Review minute entry .2 .1 Excessive 

9/18/13 Motion to approve .8 .3 Excessive – This consisted of a one 

page consent order attaching an 

executed settlement agreement. 

TOTAL 70.6 Hours 

The Court will therefore subtract 70.6 hours from Brady’s 

proposed total for excessive or unwarranted billing. 

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2. Reduction of Time Spent on Attorney’s Fees Motion 

 Defendant suggests subtracting 23.7 hours for Brady’s work 

compiling his hours in this case. This reduction is reasonable. 

 Brady spent 44.3 hours preparing the fees motion, of which 

23.7 were for “work on hours” or “adding hours” and 20.6 hours 

were for “work on motion.” Billing 23.7 hours for compiling 

records is inappropriate. An attorney with Brady’s experience 

should automatically keep records reflecting his hours and 

should be able to immediately retrieve those records without 

spending time compiling them. 

 Furthermore, this reduction is reasonable because Defendant 

has not challenged the 20.6 hours that Brady submitted for 

working on his fees motion. The Court compared the brief that 

Brady submitted in this case to the brief that he submitted in 

Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., Civ. 09-5624 (RBK/JS) (D.N.J. July 13, 

2012), ECF # 105. Brady’s brief in this case was 24 pages long 

and over 15 of those pages were identical to the fees-motion 

brief in the Moorestown case. Even typos were reproduced. The 

pages that were not identical were primarily excerpts from 

Plaintiffs’ demand letter, excerpts from the settlement 

agreement, and references to the Moorestown court’s opinion on 

the fee application. A reduction of 23.7 hours is reasonable. 

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 Brady also submitted 18.5 hours for compiling his reply 

brief and exhibits. At oral argument, Defendant’s counsel 

objected to this total, which was the only opportunity to do so. 

 Brady submitted .2 hours for drafting letters to the Court 

requesting and confirming a brief extension on the due date for 

his reply brief. [Docket Item 101-5 at 1.] Defendant should not 

be required to compensate Brady for time spent seeking an 

extension. Brady also submitted a total of 15.7 hours for “Work 

on reply.” [Id.] This amount is excessive. The reply consists of 

a two-page certification from Brady, a second certification from 

Brady that is four pages, and 2.5 pages of legal argument. The 

Court will reduce the “work on reply” entry to one hour per 

page, for a total of 8.5 hours. The Court will therefore 

subtract 7.2 hours from Brady’s time working on his reply for a 

total reduction of 7.4 hours from time spent on the reply brief. 

 The Court’s total reductions to Brady’s hours are listed 

below. This list includes a 3.5-hour calculation error that 

Defendant identified and that Plaintiff did not challenge and 

3.4 hours that Defendant identified that were spent on the 

dismissed Plaintiffs. 

Nature of Reduction Reduction

Calculation error that Defendant identified 3.5

Time entries relating to dismissed Plaintiffs Loose 

and the AFDA 

3.4

Excessive or unwarranted billing 70.6

Compiling hours for fees motion 23.7

Reply brief 7.4

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Total Reductions: 108.6

 The lodestar is therefore $190,840.00, representing 477.1 

hours of attorney time at $400 per hour. 

B. Reducing the Lodestar 

 Defendant argues that the lodestar should be reduced on the 

ground of limited success compared with the relief requested. 

Defendant points to the Supreme Court’s precedent that a 

reduction is appropriate “if the relief, however significant, is 

limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a 

whole,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 440; see also 

Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F. 

3d 1031, 1042 (3d Cir. 1996) (comparing “[t]he amount of damages 

awarded, when compared with the amount of damages requested”). 

Defendant argues that in the present case, the named Plaintiffs 

were reduced from four (Hamill, Lasky, Loose, and the AFDA) to 

just two when the AFDA’s claims were voluntarily dismissed on 

October 17, 2011 and Loose was permitted to withdraw his claims 

on February 14, 2002, and the NJLAD claim was likewise dismissed 

on that date. [Docket Item 39.] Defendant also argues that the 

Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief in the Complaint sought 

improvements in access at numerous locations and facilities, 

many of which were not included in the final settlement and thus 

were unsuccessful claims that unreasonably inflate the lodestar. 

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 The Court will reduce the lodestar, but not to the extent, 

i.e., 50%, that Defendant requested. The reduction will be 30%. 

 As discussed above, the most important factor to consider 

in adjusting the lodestar is the results obtained. In order to 

assess the results obtained, the Court must compare the relief 

Plaintiff sought with the relief in the settlement agreement. 

Comparing the relief requested to the relief received in the 

settlement agreement is challenging because there are multiple 

documents that contain Plaintiffs’ criticisms of accessibility 

in North Wildwood. Throughout the litigation, Brady mounted a 

broad attack on accessibility shortcomings that he or his expert 

witness perceived throughout North Wildwood. 

 Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate comparison point is 

the demand letter that was submitted three years after the 

litigation began and that led to the settlement of the case. 

That demand letter contained substantially narrowed claims for 

access improvements that more closely resemble the final 

negotiated relief. The demand letter cannot be the lodestarreduction comparator because it was submitted years after the 

litigation began. Plaintiffs seek fees for the first three years 

of litigation, not just the time after sending the demand 

letter. Defendant argues that the appropriate comparator is 

William Cody’s expert reports. As discussed below, Cody’s 

reports exceed the scope of this litigation and will be reduced, 

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but the Complaint made it clear that Plaintiffs were not 

adopting all the criticisms contained in Cody’s reports. The 

Court will use Plaintiffs’ Complaint as the comparator because 

it represents the relief sought when this litigation began, 

which is also approximately when Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billable 

hours in this fee petition began. 

 Comparing the relief sought to the relief obtained is also 

challenging because the terms of the Complaint, expert reports, 

and settlement agreement do not match up easily. For example, 

the settlement agreement includes a provision to lower parking 

islands on Surf and relocate garbage cans on certain parking 

islands to accessible locations, but neither the Complaint nor 

any of the expert reports referenced the parking islands or the 

garbage cans on Surf. On the other hand, the Complaint 

references problematic slopes on the Surf sidewalks, but the 

settlement agreement does not address sidewalk slopes. In order 

to facilitate this challenging comparison, the Court created a 

chart, provided below, of the problems identified in the expert 

reports and the Complaint and of the relief received in the 

settlement agreement.3

 

3

 At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs and for Defendant 

represented that this chart accurately reflected the terms of 

these different documents. No one challenged the comparisons 

made. 

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Table 2: Comparisons of Relief Sought and Obtained 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

 general criticism 

of Defendant’s 

beaches, 

bathrooms, curb 

cuts, and 

sidewalks, plus 

 sand dune ramps 

at JFK not 

accessible and 

lack 

handicappedaccessible access 

to bathrooms 

 curb cuts had 

excessive slopes, 

lacked a level 

landing, and had 

improper 

thresholds at 

New York, New 

Jersey, Atlantic, 

Central, Surf, 

and JFK 

 sidewalk on Surf 

had altered cross 

slopes. 

general provisions: 

 upgrade all curb 

cuts on JFK 

between 2nd and 

13th 

 upgrade all curb 

cuts on Surf 

between 10th and 

18th 

 install temporary, 

ADA-compliant 

bathroom near 

the accessible 

path off JFK 

 add to beach 

maintenance a 

plan to eliminate 

sand 

accumulation at 

the paths 

 some 

improvements 

contingent upon 

State approval or 

will be made “to 

the maximum 

extent feasible” 

 lower parking 

islands on Surf and 

relocate garbage 

cans on the 

parking islands to 

accessible 

locations 

 

4

 The Amended Complaint, which was filed 02/25/12, had the same 

broad accessibility criticisms as the original Complaint and 

therefore is not repeated in this table. 

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William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

7th and JFK ramp 

 1-inch threshold 

 improper slopes 

 no handrail on 

right side 

 no extensions of 

handrails 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 at JFK and 7th 

 install access 

mats between the 

bulkhead and the 

bicycle path 

 remedy vertical 

threshold 

 install handrails 

10th and JFK 

beach access 

improper slopes 

at ramp 

10th and JFK 

ramp 

 improper slope 

 no handrails 

 threshold of 1-

inch 

 route from ramp 

to bike path is 

sand 

 sand on ramp 

 no extensions on 

handrails 

same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 at 10th and JFK 

 install access 

mats between 

the bulkhead and 

the bicycle path 

 remedy vertical 

threshold 

 install handrails 

Case 1:10-cv-06587-JBS-KMW Document 106 Filed 06/23/14 Page 22 of 32 PageID: 1753
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William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

 men’s restroom 

at Old New 

Jersey and Pine 

 ramp blocked, 

only stairs 

accessible 

 round knob on 

bathroom door 

 urinal height 

wrong 

 urinal flush 

valve height 

wrong 

 stall door too 

narrow 

 toilet paper too 

far off back 

wall 

 toilet too low 

 sink handles 

wrong 

 no insulation 

on sink pipes 

 no grab bars in 

stall 

 restrooms at the 

intersection of Pine 

and Old New 

Jersey 

 clear the ramp 

 replace door 

knobs with ADAcompliant door 

openers 

 lower the urinal 

and the urinal 

flush valve 

 increase the stall 

door width 

 move the toilet 

paper 

 raise the toilet 

seat 

 replace sink 

handles with 

ADA-compliant 

materials 

 insulate hot water 

and drain pipes 

 mount grab bars 

in the toilet stall 

parking lot at 

New Jersey at sea 

wall 

 insufficient 

number of 

parking spaces 

 problems with 

parking space 

slopes, access 

aisles, signage 

 excessive slope 

at ramp to sea 

wall 

 excessive slope 

on curb cuts 

leading to ramp 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 None 

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William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

3rd and JFK 

 problematic 

curb cuts 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 None 

3rd and JFK ramp 

from sidewalk to 

gazebo 

 improper slope 

 no extensions 

on sides of ramp 

 no handrail 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 None 

3rd and JFK ramp 

from gazebo to 

beach 

 improper slopes 

 no extensions 

on handrails 

 no mats 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 None 

3rd and JFK 

telescope too high 

off ground 

 same criticisms 

as 4/23/10 report 

 None 

 7th and JFK ramp 

from restroom 

area to access 

route 

 improper slopes 

 no handrails 

 threshold goes 

into sand 

 path to bike path 

is sand 

 1-inch threshold 

from sand to 

bike path 

 no extensions on 

handrails 

 None 

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William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

 7th and JFK 

restroom 

 no bars in stall 

 stall door opens 

wrong way 

 stall door lacks 

self-closing 

mechanism 

 flush valve on 

narrow side of 

stall 

 urinal height 

wrong 

 urinal flush 

valve wrong 

 incorrect sink 

width 

 no insulation of 

pipes under sink 

 wrong knob on 

bathroom door 

same criticisms 

as summer 

inspection report, 

plus 

 mirror height 

wrong 

 sink handles 

wrong 

 sign height for 

restroom 

doorway wrong 

 None 

 Beach problems 

 no access to 

lifeguard stands 

 metal mat stops 

150 ft short of 

highwater mark 

 inaccessible 

port-a-johns 

with 8-inch step 

ups 

 volleyball net on 

inaccessible 

sand path 

 ramps at JFK 

and 16th-26th 

aves all too 

steep and lack 

extensions 

similar criticisms 

of access ramps 

 None 

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William Cody 

Expert Report 

from Inspection 

on 04/23/10 

(provided before 

lawsuit filed) 

William Cody 

Expert Report 

from ReInspection in 

Summer 

(year unspecified) 

William Cody 

Report from 

inspections in 

May and 

November 2011 

Complaint filed 

12/16/104

Settlement 

Agreement dated 

09/16/13 

 list of slopes, 

thresholds, 

landings for 

intersections at 

Surf, Ocean, JFK, 

Atlantic, Central, 

and New Jersey 

 None 

 Restrooms at 

main parking 

area 

 stall door too 

narrow 

 toilet paper too 

far off back 

wall 

 port-a-potty for 

times when 

regular 

restroom 

closed, but no 

ramp to access 

it and too small 

 None 

 ramp at 2nd and 

JFK improper 

slopes 

 None 

 This chart shows that the relief provided in the settlement 

agreement is substantially narrower than the problems identified 

in the Complaint. For example, the Complaint identified 

problematic curb cuts on six streets, i.e., New York, New 

Jersey, Atlantic, Central, Surf, and JFK. The relief in the 

settlement agreement is more limited: all curb cuts on JFK 

between 2nd and 13th and on Surf between 10th and 18th will be 

upgraded. In other words, only curb cuts on JFK and Surf at 

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certain intersections will be upgraded and no curb cuts on New 

York, New Jersey, Atlantic, or Central streets will be improved. 

In addition, although the Complaint mentions sidewalks generally 

and the Surf sidewalk specifically, the settlement agreement 

does not provide for improvements to sidewalks. The Complaint 

generally references accessibility violations with bathrooms, 

but the settlement agreement addresses only a temporary bathroom 

off JFK and permanent restrooms at the intersection of Pine and 

Old New Jersey. It is apparent that the problems identified in 

the Complaint and litigated in this case are substantially 

broader than the relief obtained in the settlement agreement. 

This demonstrates inefficiency in achieving the partial victory 

in the settlement agreement. 

 In addition, one of the factors to assess in adjusting the 

lodestar is the novelty or difficulty of the questions 

presented. While the Court does not dispute Plaintiffs’ 

assertion that the ADA and federal procedural law generally are 

complicated, Plaintiffs’ counsel litigates primarily ADA cases 

and has appeared in this District dozens of times in ADA cases. 

Moreover, as discussed supra, Plaintiffs’ counsel was able to 

use briefing from other cases. That Mr. Brady should be able to 

handle cases regarding curb cuts, beach access, public restrooms 

and the like as a specialist in this field of law is reflected 

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in his very robust hourly rate. Actually, no novel questions 

have been identified in the present case. 

 In support of the argument that the lodestar should not be 

reduced, Plaintiff cites a similar case in which the court held 

that “[t]he fact that Plaintiff did not receive every line item 

requested in the litigation is endemic to the bargaining process 

in which parties engage while negotiating a settlement 

agreement.” Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., Civ. 09-05624 (RBK/JS), 

2013 WL 1222648, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2013). The Moorestown 

court noted that the plaintiffs had sought equitable relief, 

damages, attorney's fees and costs for the defendant’s alleged 

non-compliance with the ADA and, in the settlement agreement, 

they received equitable relief, attorney’s fees and costs. The 

Moorestown court held that “[t]his is not the sort of ‘limited 

relief’ that requires departure from the lodestar.” Id. 

 While the bargaining process requires some compromise and 

the forms of relief obtained in this case are similar to the 

relief sought, some reduction of the lodestar is warranted here. 

There is no mathematical formula by which to arrive at a 

reduction for limited success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-36. For 

example, if a plaintiff alleged six claims but prevailed on only 

one, it would be erroneous to compensate counsel for only onesixth of the hours expended because some time had to be spent on 

the litigation as a whole and was necessary to the one 

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successful claim; the proper method is to estimate how much time 

would have been required if the plaintiffs had pursued only the 

successful claim. Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 

1988); accord Schultz v. Hembree, 975 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir. 

1992). When claims are factually or legally related, it is 

appropriate to examine the “overall results obtained” in 

determining whether the downward adjustment is appropriate. 

 In the present case, Plaintiffs brought a very broad set of 

claims addressing many streets and points of access and 

litigated them for fully 2.5 years before finally resolving the 

case as set forth above. The results of the negotiated 

settlement have produced meaningful improvements to access for 

the disabled, but on a significantly narrower scale that the 

relief that was sought. On the one hand, many of the same 

attorney services are needed whether the relief sought is narrow 

or broad, such as attending a scheduling conference; other 

services are increased due to the scope of the items at play, 

such as the lengthening of depositions and other discovery 

inherent in a larger suit. The Court has the distinct impression 

from this entire record that the case could have been fairly 

litigated and settled much earlier if Plaintiffs’ counsel had 

focused earlier upon those items in its demand letter rather 

than seeking rather extravagant relief. 

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 Further, at oral argument, Defendant’s counsel emphasized 

that Plaintiffs sought damages, including punitive damages, 

under the NJLAD in their original Complaint and that these 

claims impacted his approach to the litigation. The Court agrees 

this is another factor counseling reduction of the lodestar 

because a case seeking punitive damages is indeed apt to be 

litigated more vigorously than one that seeks no damages. 

 Defendant’s suggested reduction of 50% is still not 

warranted, however, because Plaintiffs did obtain substantial 

relief. Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiffs Loose and the AFDA 

voluntarily withdrew as plaintiffs does not warrant a reduction 

in the lodestar because the primary goal of the lawsuit was not 

to obtain relief for specific plaintiffs but, instead, to obtain 

accessibility for disabled persons in North Wildwood. Finally, 

the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the lodestar should 

be reduced because the settlement agreement specifies that 

improvements will be contingent upon State approval or made to 

the maximum extent feasible. These stipulations, in the Court’s 

opinion, reasonably reflect the reality of municipal 

construction projects. Defendant North Wildwood’s agreement to 

make this long list of improvements “to the maximum extent 

feasible” will be taken as North Wildwood’s expression of good 

faith that all items it agreed to are indeed feasible and are 

not apt to be overturned by the State. Counsel agreed at oral 

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argument that all the agreed-upon improvements remain on target 

and none has been set aside by the State. 

 Accordingly, after weighing these various arguments and the 

specific relief obtained, the Court will reduce the lodestar of 

$190,840.00 by 30%. Brady’s compensation will be $133,588.00. 

This represents the Court’s best estimate of how much time was 

reasonably necessary to obtain the results achieved after taking 

into account the limited success achieved herein. 

C. Reducing the Expert Report Expenses 

 The Court will grant Defendant’s proposed reduction for 

Plaintiff’s expert witness report. Plaintiff’s expert witness, 

William Cody, charged a total of $18,435.00, including one week 

of hotel bills in North Wildwood, one week of car rental, and 

multiple different inspections. These costs are excessive. 

 Furthermore, as the chart above shows, the expert reports 

discuss myriad problems that were not raised in this litigation. 

 Defendant argues that Cody’s fee should be $12,350.00 

because Plaintiffs submitted a bill to Defendant that reflected 

billing through August 24, 2013 and that listed Cody’s fee as 

$12,350.00. On July 23, 2013, the Court entered a 60-day order 

dismissing this case because the parties reported a settlement. 

Plaintiffs have not explained why Cody’s fees increased after 

the case settled, and therefore the Court will subtract 

$6,085.00 from Cody’s fee. This also represents a fair estimate 

Case 1:10-cv-06587-JBS-KMW Document 106 Filed 06/23/14 Page 31 of 32 PageID: 1762
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of the portion of his work that actually was useful in achieving 

a favorable result in this case. There is no objection to any 

other claimed costs. 

 Plaintiff requested a total of $23,291.27 in costs, 

including Cody’s expert report, and the Court will award 

$17,206.27. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and 

expenses. After making various subtractions for excessive 

billing, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ counsel should be 

compensated for 477.1 hours of attorney time at $400 per hour. 

The lodestar is therefore $190,840.00. The Court will reduce the 

lodestar by 30% because the relief sought in the original 

Complaint, and litigated for many months, was substantially 

broader than the relief received in the settlement agreement. 

Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s counsel $133,588.00 in 

attorney’s fees. The Court will award $17,206.27 in costs. 

 An accompanying Order will be entered. 

June 23, 2014 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

Date JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

 Chief U.S. District Judge

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