J-S32015-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.N., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: N.K., NATURAL MOTHER, 

 Appellant No. 32 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

Civil Division at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000033-2013 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.N., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: N.K., NATURAL MOTHER, 

 Appellant No. 33 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2014 AD-53 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

 N.K. (“Mother”) appeals the December 8, 2014 order changing the 

goal in the dependency case of her daughter, K.N. (“Child”), born August of 

2003, to adoption and the December 19, 2014 order involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. We affirm. 
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 We glean the facts of this case from the certified record and the trial 

court’s opinion. Blair County Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) became 

involved with Child in March 2013 through general protective services due to 

Mother’s bizarre behavior, which included reporting that Child had been 

kidnapped. During services, Child reported sexual abuse, which led to an 

investigation and resulted in criminal charges against the paramour of 

Child’s maternal grandmother. CYF established a safety plan for Child, 

which Mother violated within months by allowing Child to have contact with 

her maternal grandmother, who lived with the alleged sexual abuse 

perpetrator. At nine years old, Child requested foster placement due to her 

exposure to domestic abuse between Mother and Mother’s paramour. 

Despite CYF’s attempts to work with Mother through mental health and 

family services, Mother’s mental instability and violation of the safety plan 

resulted in an adjudication of Child’s dependency and placement in foster 

care on May 2, 2013. 

 CYF provided treatment and counseling services to assist Child in 

emotionally managing the sexual-abuse criminal proceedings, the loss of her 

family, and the transition to foster care. CYF also provided services to 

Mother, including a psychological evaluation and a referral for drug and 

alcohol assessment. Over the course of numerous dependency proceedings, 

Child’s goal remained reunification until December 8, 2014, when the trial 

court determined that Mother had failed to comply with the permanency plan 
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and could not provide a safe, stable home for Child. Order, 12/8/14, at ¶ 3. 

Based on the trial court’s findings and Child’s placement for almost eighteen 

months, CYF filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights on 

October 9, 2014. After conducting a hearing over three days, the trial court 

granted CYF’s petition on December 19, 2014, involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child.1 Mother and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 Mother presents the following questions for our consideration: 

1. Whether the agency met its burden of proving either that the 

mother is incapable of performing parental duties, or that she 

has failed to remedy the conditions which led to her child’s 

dependency placement? 

2. Whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best 

interests, where a bond exists between parent and child, and no 

clear alternative path to permanency exists? 

3. Whether changing the goal to adoption was appropriate, 

where the mother had made substantial progress toward 

alleviating the problems that led to placement of her child, and 

had maintained a strong bond with the child? 

____________________________________________ 

1

 After the legally presumptive father, W.N., voluntarily relinquished his 

parental rights to Child, the trial court entered an order terminating W.N.’s 

rights on December 19, 2014. W.N. has not appealed that order and is not 

a party to this appeal. Child’s biological father, J.W., supported the goal 

change to adoption and was willing to voluntarily relinquish his rights. 

However, because J.W. requested that his voluntary relinquishment be 

contingent on the termination of Mother’s parental rights, the trial court did 

not accept J.W.’s voluntary relinquishment; rather, it entered an order 

involuntarily terminating J.W.’s parental rights on December 19, 2014. 

Upon J.W.’s request, the trial court stayed that order until disposition of 

Mother’s appeal to this Court. Order, 2/10/15. 
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Mother’s Brief at 6. 

We conduct our review according to the following standard: 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence. 

The burden is upon the petitioning person or agency to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for 

seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. Moreover, 

we have explained: 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue. 

The trial court is free to make all credibility determinations, and 

may believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. If the 

findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, 

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite 

result. 

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 992–993 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a). In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 
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rights under subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8) of section 2511(a). On 

appeal, we will focus on subsection (8), which provides as follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

* * * 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). 

 On appeal, Mother argues, “The evidence in this case does not clearly 

establish that [Mother] has failed to address her mental health problems.” 

Mother’s Brief at 15. In support of her position, Mother challenges the 

report of Dr. Marolyn Morford as outdated, incomplete, and inconclusive. 

Id. at 15–16. Additionally, Mother highlights the testimony of her mental 

health counselor “who testified at the twelve month review hearing, [and] 

noted that [Mother’s] condition had improved.” Id. at 17. According to 

Mother, the question of “whether [she] had the capacity to parent her child 

at the time her parental rights were terminated – remains unanswered.” Id.

We have discussed the requirements of section 2511(a)(8) as follows: 
J-S32015-15 

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Section (a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to 

remedy the conditions that led to the [child’s] removal by the 

court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the 

court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the 

[child’s] removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good 

faith efforts of [the agency] supplied over a realistic time period. 

Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court 

to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy 

the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability 

or efficacy of [agency] services. 

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d at 993 (quoting In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. 

Super. 2008)). 

Here, the first element of section 2511(a)(8) has been met. Child had 

been in CYF’s care for a period of seventeen months from the adjudication of 

dependency on May 2, 2013, until CYF filed the termination petition on 

October 9, 2014, and for an additional two months as of the final 

termination hearing on December 8, 2014. 

Addressing Mother’s challenge to the evidence and the second element 

of section 2511(a)(8)—whether the conditions which led to Child’s placement 

continue to exist—the trial court opined as follows: 

The dependency record which this [c]ourt incorporated into 

these orphan court proceedings contains clear and convincing 

evidence that despite the best efforts of CYF to assist the Mother 

to remedy the reasons placement occurred, Mother has not 

gained any stability and continues to struggle to maintain her 

own existence. The psychosocial report completed by Dr. 

Marolyn Morford, in October 2013, (Exhibit B-April 14, 2014 

hrg.), indicates under Prognosis, page 8 of the report: 

7) Mother’s prognosis: [Mother’s] prognosis is completely 

dependent upon her cooperation with supportive personal 

treatment that would address the problem mentioned 

above as well as her depression and anxiety problems. 
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Participation [in] random drug/alcohol test[s] would also 

be important, these are difficult long standing problems 

that will not change in the very near future. It has been 6 

months since her daughter was removed and her 

assessment here does not indicate much insight. 

The dependency record will also reveal that this [c]ourt 

attempted a positive strength building approach in all [c]ourt 

proceedings to encourage and engage Mother, in light of her 

mental health instability, which effort failed, unfortunately, to 

change any pattern of Mother in the 18 months [Child] remained 

in care. We recognize the sexual abuse criminal charges created 

complications as [Child] struggled emotionally in September 

2013. Visits with her Mother distressed her and caused 

nightmares as she relived her abuse and trauma. She also felt 

guilty for reporting the abuse and causing hurt and harm to her 

Mother. [Child’s] therapist stopped visits with her Mother at that 

time, however, the goal of visits resumed in April 2014 and 

[Child] and her Mother had positive interaction however, Mother 

could not maintain consistency missing approximately 50% of 

the visits available to her. When the therapist approved visits to 

continue outside the supervision and assessment of the 

therapist, the provider CYF assigned to facilitate that contact 

could not locate the Mother and confirm her permanent 

residence. In fact, [CYF] had a delay in assigning the provider 

as they too had encountered the same struggle to maintain 

contact with Mother before assigning the provider in late August 

2014. 

Additionally, the final Orphan’s Court proceeding on 

December 8, 2014 indicates the Mother failed to appear without 

any explanation or contact with the [c]ourt and/or her attorney. 

Mother attended the first hearing on the Petition to Terminate 

Parental Rights on October 22, 2014 with counsel. This [c]ourt 

took testimony from all witnesses except the Mother, due to time 

constraints. This [c]ourt rescheduled the Termination of 

Parental Rights hearing for November 12, 2014 at which time 

Mother failed to appear and her counsel argued for another 

continuance which the [c]ourt granted.3 The final hearing on 

December 8, 2014 indicated through the testimony of the foster 

Mother that despite the foster Mother’s past practice of 

arranging and providing for direct contact with the Mother and 

[Child] (with CYF consent) the Mother had not had any contact 

with [Child] after November 16, 2014. Mother’s attorney 
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affirmed that Mother met with him prior to December 8, 2014 

and knew the consequences of the proceedings from his 

explanation despite perhaps her alleged “confusion”. We find all 

of these facts circumstantially support the fact Mother has not 

yet found stability or the will to make changes, assert her 

parenthood and provide permanency for [Child]. In other words, 

CYF has without a doubt met their burden to establish that 

Mother’s incapacity or refusal has caused [Child] to be without 

essential parental care necessary for her physical and mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity and 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the Mother. See23 

Pa.C.S.A.2511 Section 2511 (a)(2)(5) & (8) 

3

 At the outset of the November 12, 2014 hearing, this 

[c]ourt denied the continuance; however, at the end of 

that hearing we granted counsel the opportunity to call 

Mother and we accepted her word that she did not know of 

the proceeding until the day before, however she still failed 

to appear or make contact with her counsel. In an 

abundance of caution this [c]ourt rescheduled the hearing 

for November 19, 2014 and Mother’s counsel requested 

another continuance to allow more time for him to meet 

with Mother before her testimony. We granted that 

request and reset the hearing for December 8, 2014.

In summary, Mother has demonstrated bizarre and 

irrational behavior, has never evidenced mental stability and 

appears to utilize illegal drugs to self-medicate rather than 

receive treatment.4 She has not established a permanent 

residence and continues to reside with [T.S.] with whom 

domestic violence has occurred. Her strong resistance to change 

or to take accountability for her actions has continued for over 

18 months. Essentially these conditions seriously impair her 

functioning and parenting skills as noted in the report of Dr. 

Morford. Based upon this ample record, we find CYF has met its 

high burden to provide evidence for termination [of] parental 

rights. 

4

 While the therapist facilitated visits between Mother and 

[Child], Mother lost a great deal of weight and openly 

showed the track marks on her arms from drug use. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 4–6. 
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 Upon review, we discern support in the record for the trial court’s 

findings. Child was removed by CYF due to concerns related to Mother’s 

mental instability and her violation of the safety plan. Secondary concerns 

included Mother’s drug and alcohol history, poor housing, and allegations of 

domestic violence. We note some evidence of Mother’s progress. According 

to Mother’s mental health counselor, as of Mother’s April 3rd and April 10th, 

2013 sessions: she “is a lot more calmer, a lot more focused. She has taken 

the initiative to . . . self-enroll in home nursing agency, drug and alcohol 

counseling program.” N.T., 4/10/14, at 20. However, the record further 

reveals that Mother did not appear for the initial shelter care or adjudicatory 

proceedings. N.T., 5/3/13, at 1; 5/10/13, at 1. Moreover, Mother suffers 

from major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, and she 

has a history of drug abuse, inpatient hospitalizations, domestic violence, 

and noncompliance with services. N.T., 5/10/13, at 26; N.T. 12/19/13, at 

38–39; N.T., 7/21/14, at 1–2, 5–15; N.T., 10/22/14, at 19–20, 26–29. 

Significantly, Mother’s visitation with Child was sporadic: “She had about a 

fifty percent show rate or not and sometimes it was a no-show, sometimes it 

was cancellation, sometimes it was showing up to a visit for half an hour or 

more late.” N.T., 11/22/14, at 11. With the exception of a family dinner at 

Pizza Hut in November 2014, Mother did not have visits with Child from July 

2014 through the December 8, 2014 hearing. N.T., 11/12/14, at 34–35; 

N.T., 12/8/14, at 5. Additionally, Mother’s whereabouts were sometimes 
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unknown to CYF, counselors, service providers, and her attorney, which 

resulted in no contact with her. N.T., 10/22/14, at 26-29; N.T., 11/12/14, 

at 3. 

As for housing, Mother lived between her paramour’s home, her own 

house, which had no running water, and a friend’s house. N.T., 4/10/14, at 

81–87; N.T., 10/22/14, at 26-29. Caseworkers who visited Mother’s 

residence observed from the outside that it was in poor condition and 

appeared to be vacant. N.T., 7/21/14, at 40, 45–56; N.T., 10/22/14, at 27, 

29. CYF caseworkers were not able to conduct a home inspection because 

they could not reach Mother, she would cancel the appointment, or she 

would not show up for the appointment. N.T., 10/22/14, at 25–29, 47–49. 

On July 31, 2014, an Altoona police officer found drugs and paraphernalia in 

Mother’s residence, multiple pieces of mail addressed to Mother, and he 

obtained statements from individuals in the home that Mother lived there. 

The officer also observed that the home was in poor condition, bug infested, 

with bags of trash overflowing in the kitchen and clutter, clothing, and 

garbage strewn throughout the house. N.T., 10/22/14, at 14–21. At the 

time of the termination hearing, Mother did not appear on the second and 

third dates, despite the trial court rescheduling twice so Mother could testify. 

N.T., 11/22/14, at 1, 44–50; N.T., 12/18/14, at 1–7. 

In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion in finding that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that 
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the conditions which led to the removal or placement of Child continue to 

exist. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). The trial court heard from caseworkers and 

medical experts regarding Mother’s ongoing mental instability and inability 

to care for Child. The trial court was in the best position to assess the 

credibility of these witnesses. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s legal 

conclusion—that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of Child—is without error. 

 Mother’s second issue challenges the trial court’s bond analysis 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). According to Mother, termination would 

be appropriate, despite bonds, if “substantial, possibly permanent, damage 

[was] done to [Child] by the prolonged, unhealthy, pathological bond with 

Mother[.]” Mother’s Brief at 19–20 (quoting In re TSM, 71 A.3d 251, 271 

(Pa. 2013)). Here, Mother asserts, “there is no evidence that the bond with 

the mother is unhealthy.” Id. at 20. 

 Section 2511(b) provides as follows: 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). As this Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does 

not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in 

the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the 

emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be 

considered.” In re Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1054 (Pa. 2015) 

(quoting In re K.K.R.–S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)). “While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the 

subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many 

factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.” Id. (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. 

Super. 2011)). 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider 

the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child. 

N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 

2010)); see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920–923 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(affirming termination of parental rights where “obvious emotional ties exist 

between child and parents, but parents are either unwilling or unable to 

satisfy irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” and where 

preserving parents’ rights would prevent child from being adopted and 

attaining permanency). 
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 The trial court addressed section 2511(b) as follows: 

We hasten to add that [Child] does indeed love her Mother 

and as Mother argues, [Child] has a bond with her Mother. We 

must therefore address whether termination of Mother’s rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of [Child] as set forth in Section 2511(b). 

The record indicates [Child] continued to request and receive 

contact with her Mother during her placement in her first and 

now second foster care placements. Other than the length of 

time from September 2013 – June 2014 where Mother did not 

have visits with [Child], she has enjoyed phone contact, letters 

and visits through the foster family and [Child’s] therapist as 

well as CYF contacts at Mother’s availability.5 Mother and [Child] 

have enjoyed this contact despite the fact that Mother has not 

had the ability to provide the daily essential care and guidance 

required of a parent toward a child. We believe this 

demonstrates that [Child] has the capacity to love her Mother 

and concurrently recognize her Mother loves her but cannot 

provide permanency for her. In fact, the testimony indicates 

that [Child] has adjusted to her second foster family, has bonded 

to them and has blossomed in her confidence and social skills 

enabling her to state her needs and accept nurturing. We note 

once again, at 9 years old at the inception of this case, [Child] 

requested foster care. She continues to have the added stress 

of pending criminal charges to deal with the sexual abuse 

allegations. Until disposition of these charges she continues to 

need a very consistent, nurturing stable environment to help her 

manage that difficult experience. In the 18 months of 

placement, [Child] has demonstrated no adverse consequences 

of the severed relationship with her Mother. To the contrary, 

evidence exists that she has begun to heal. We attribute that 

fact, in large measure, to her foster Mother in light of the fact 

the foster Mother promotes contact with [Mother] by even 

coordinating a dinner at Pizza Hut for [Child’s] mom and family 

to maintain contact. This helps [Child] to keep her roots “intact” 

in a healthy manner as she grows and flourishes in an 

appropriate setting for permanency. This bodes well for [Child’s] 

long-term emotional well-being, despite the need to terminate 

rights to remove the limbo of foster care. 

5

 Even with the openness of nonjudgmental contact 

provided by the foster family the Mother did not/could not 
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establish any regularity or meaningful contact for over six 

months from July 2014-December 2014. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 6–8. 

 Upon review, we find support in the record for the trial court’s findings. 

While in Mother’s custody, Child was exposed to Mother’s unstable mental 

health, drug issues, and domestic violence. N.T., 5/10/13, at 27, 33–36. 

Child experienced nightmares and anxiety after visits with Mother. N.T., 

11/12/14, at 14, 17, 28. Mother was not supportive of Child with regard to 

Child’s allegations of sexual abuse. N.T., 4/10/14, Exhibit B at 2–3. Child 

disclosed to her counselor that Mother could not keep Child safe, and Child 

took the blame for Mother’s shortcomings. N.T., 12/19/13, at 21; N.T., 

7/21/14, at 24; N.T., 11/12/14, at 17, 28. As of the December 8, 2014 

termination hearing, contact between Child and Mother had ceased, with the 

exception of a family dinner in early November 2014 arranged by Child’s 

foster mother. N.T., 12/8/14, at 5–6. As of the final termination hearing, 

Child had been in placement for almost twenty months. 

 In contrast, Child has been in a pre-adoptive home with the “D” family 

since June 8, 2014. N.T., 11/12/14, at 31–32. According to a CYF 

caseworker, Child is doing very well with the D family; she has developed a 

very strong relationship with them and asked if she could call her foster 

parents “mom” and “dad.” N.T., 10/22/14, at 38. Additionally, Child’s 

foster mother provides a unique sensitivity to Child’s situation and need to 

maintain roots, having been separated from her own mother as a child 
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without getting a chance to meet her mother before her death. N.T., 

12/8/14, at 10–11. Consequently, foster mother has encouraged contact 

between Child and Mother. N.T., 10/22/14, at 38–39. Child indicated that 

she likes her foster family; she described a positive relationship with foster 

mother, advised the CYF caseworker that she felt safe in her foster home, 

and indicated that being adopted by them would be “alright” with her. N.T., 

4/10/14, at 53–54; N.T., 7/21/14, at 27–28. According to Child’s counselor, 

if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, Child would be able to transition 

into her pre-adoptive family with whom she has built a strong attachment. 

N.T., 11/22/14, at 26–27. Moreover, the D family would ensure healthy, 

appropriate, ongoing contact between Child and Mother in the future. Id. at 

8–9, 26–27. 

 In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion in finding that, although Mother loves Child, she cannot provide 

permanency for Child. See In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 95 A.3d 278 (Pa. 2014) (holding evidence sufficient to 

support termination of parental rights even though Mother’s testimony 

revealed that she clearly loves her children). The trial court heard testimony 

regarding Child’s relationship with Mother and her relationship with the preadoptive family. The trial court was in the best position to assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s legal 

conclusion—that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the 
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of Child—is 

without error. 

 Mother’s final issue challenges the trial court’s order changing the 

permanency goal to adoption. Mother’s Brief at 20. We decline to review 

this claim. As CYF points out, if the Superior Court affirms the termination 

of Mother’s parental rights, “the issue of the goal change is moot and need 

not be addressed by the Superior Court.” CYF’s Brief at 40 (citing In re 

M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2014)). We are affirming the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Therefore, her goal change issue is 

moot. M.T., 101 A.3d at 1166. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/24/2015