J-S37032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

IVAN RODRIGUEZ

Appellant No. 2853 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 23, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0015766-2009,

CP-51-CR-0015767-2009, CP-51-CR-0015770-2009,

CP-51-CR-0015772-2009, CP-51-CR-0015778-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 23, 2015

Ivan Rodriguez appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after a jury convicted him of 

four counts of second-degree murder,1and one count each of robbery,2

conspiracy,3and possessing an instrument of crime.4 After careful review, 

we affirm.

The trial court set forth the underlying facts as follows:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
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On June 10, 2009, [Rodriguez] and co-defendant, Donta 

Craddock (Craddock), devised a plan to commit a robbery in 

order to get money to have a Philadelphia Parking Authority 

wheel boot removed from Rodriguez’s white Ford Excursion SUV. 

[Rodriguez] and Craddock used the car of Rodriguez’s girlfriend’s 

mother, a silver Pontiac Grand Prix, and went out to look for a 

victim. On Rising Sun Avenue in the Northeast section of . . . 

Philadelphia, [Rodriguez] and Craddock encountered William 

Sandoval (Sandoval) as he was about to get on his Yamaha 

motorcycle. As Sandoval put the key in the ignition of his 

motorcycle, [Rodriguez] and Craddock approached him from 

their car which was parked across the street. Craddock held a 

.357 magnum revolver to Sandoval’s head, also moving it about 

his torso, and demanded that Sandoval give them his 

motorcycle. [Rodriguez] drove the motorcycle south towards 

Roosevelt Boulevard back to his home.

Rodriguez arrived at his house at 4144 N. 8th Street and parked 

the motorcycle outside. He knocked on his front door and when 

no one answered, he went around to the side of the house. He 

removed the air conditioner on the side of the house and climbed 

in through the first floor window. He went into the house, 

changed his shirt, and then covered up the motorcycle outside. 

A neighbor across the street, Gwendolyn Simpkins (Simpkins), 

not only witnessed all of this but had also previously seen 

[Rodriguez] and Craddock leave [Rodriguez’s] house in the silver 

Pontiac Grand Prix. Simpkins called 9-1-1 and asked if there 

was a report concerning a motorcycle. When they told her that 

there was, she gave them the location of [Rodriguez’s] home. 

Within minutes, the police arrived and [Rodriguez] fled on foot 

from the back of his house over the back fence. [Rodriguez] 

was apprehended by the police at 8th and Lycoming Streets.

Unbeknownst to [Rodriguez] and Craddock, Katrina Sherfield 

(Sherfield) and her boyfriend witnessed the robbery and followed 

Craddock. At Westford and Roosevelt Boulevard they saw 

Officer Matos-Wild (Matos) handling a traffic accident. Sherfield 

and her boyfriend pulled their car up alongside Matos and told 

Matos that the driver of the silver Pontiac on the street was just 

involved in a hijacking and that the driver was in possession of a 

gun. Matos got the information of the traffic accident victim and 

then got in his vehicle to follow the suspect. He immediately got 

on police radio and told them that he had a priority; there is a 

man with a gun and a possible carjacking. He continued to 

follow Craddock and asked for another police car to assist in 
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stopping [the] vehicle. Matos attempted to stop the vehicle 

driven by Craddock but Craddock fled at a high rate of speed, 

running a red light and hitting a van. Matos lost sight of 

Craddock at that point as he called for assistance to check on the 

van that had been struck by Craddock.

While Matos had been searching for him, Craddock struck four 

people at 3rd & Annsbury Streets, three juveniles and one adult. 

All four individuals sustained severe injuries. Along with a 

multitude of bones being fractured, including all of the bones in 

the back of the head, juvenile A.G. suffered a traumatic 

amputation at the hip of the right leg and was pronounced dead 

on the scene. Juvenile G.R. was dragged under the . . . vehicle 

[driven by Craddock]. G.R.’s skull was fractured in multiple 

places, lacerating the brain, and G.R. was pronounced dead on 

the scene. The other juvenile, R.S., whose leg [had] been 

severed but who had a pulse, was taken by police to St. 

Christopher’s Hospital where she was pronounced dead at 7:57 

p.m. The adult victim, Latoya Smith, mother of R.S., eventually 

succumbed to her injuries the following day, June 11, 2009, at 

approximately 7:30 a.m. Autopsies were performed on all four 

decedents, and Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Gary Collins 

completed the autopsies of the juveniles. The cause of death for 

all individuals struck was found to be multiple blunt impact 

injuries.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/15, at 2-4.

On May 23, 2012, a jury convicted Rodriguez of the above-referenced 

offenses and immediately thereafter, the court imposed mandatory life 

sentences for the second-degree murders.

Rodriguez filed a timely appeal, which was dismissed due to appointed 

counsel’s failure to file a brief. On April 1, 2014, Rodriguez filed a pro se

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.5 He requested a Grazier

____________________________________________

5 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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hearing,6 which the court held on September 18, 2014. The court permitted 

Rodriguez to represent himself, and reinstated his appellate rights. 

Rodriguez then filed a timely notice of appeal, and a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 3, 2015.

On appeal, Rodriguez raises the following issues, verbatim, for our 

review:

1. Whether the district attorney, a quasi-judicial officer, 

presented the Commonwealth’s case unfairly, whereas the 

Prosecutor pressed upon the court overruled case law during 

the preliminary hearing to obtain a prima facie case for 

murder in violation of [Rodriguez’s] rights to due process of 

law?

2. Whether the trial judge’s conduct was in advocacy for the 

district attorney whereas [Rodriguez] was held over for trial 

for an offense that was overruled by other legal authority in 

violation of [Rodriguez’s] rights to due process of law. The 

coordinate jurisdiction rule was used erroneously, and should 

not have been followed?

3. Whether the trial judge misrepresented the court record in 

advocacy for the district attorney when the judge altered the 

language in the court’s record of the proceeding?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

The first two issues are related, and accordingly, we address them 

together. Rodriguez argues that at his preliminary hearing, the 

Commonwealth drew the court’s attention to Commonwealth v. Doris, 135 

____________________________________________

6 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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A. 313 (Pa. 1926). In Doris, a group of armed co-conspirators robbed a van 

that was transporting currency from a bank to a depository. After they 

seized bags of cash, one of the co-conspirators, Doris, was captured by 

police. The others escaped on a milk wagon and in the course of an ensuing 

shootout with police, an officer was killed. Doris was convicted of murder, 

and on appeal the Supreme Court rejected his argument that he could not 

be held responsible for what happened later because he was seized by 

officers shortly before the killing took place. The Court noted, “[t]his 

overlooks the fact that he joined in the common design and is responsible 

for the acts of each naturally to be expected to occur in carrying it out.” Id. 

at 315. 

Rodriguez asserts that the Commonwealth violated his right to due 

process because Doris was overruled by the Supreme Court in 

Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958). As an initial matter, 

we note that Redline did not overrule Doris. Rather, Redline overruled 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1955), a case in which the 

Supreme Court held that a defendant could be held liable for the death of a 

co-felon who was killed by a police officer. Redline simply discusses and 

distinguishes Doris, a case where “the death-dealing act was committed by 

one participating in the felony,” Redline, 137 A.2d at 481. Accordingly, 

even if the issue of the Commonwealth’s reliance on Doris were properly 

before us, we would find no merit to Rodriguez’s argument.
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However, our Supreme Court has held that “once a defendant has 

gone to trial and has been found guilty of the crime or crimes charged, any 

defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial.” Commonwealth 

v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013). Therefore, we conclude that 

Rodriguez is not entitled to review of the Commonwealth’s reference to 

Doris at the preliminary hearing. For the same reason, Rodriguez’s claim 

that the trial court erred by refusing to reverse the preliminary hearing 

court’s finding of a prima facie case is unreviewable.

Rodriguez next argues that the trial court erred when addressing his 

complaint that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by 

“intentionally [eliciting] inflammatory testimony from the forensic 

pathologist containing gruesome details, with photos cumulative to the 

forensic pathologist[’s] testimony, as to the injuries and cause of death.” 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/22/14, at IV. He further asserts that in 

addressing the issue, the trial court mischaracterized the pathologist’s 

testimony.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court noted:

[Rodriguez’s] second claim lacks merit. The medical examiner’s 

testimony explained the factors contributing to the deaths of the 

decedents in a clinical manner, and the testimony was necessary 

to establish that the deaths were the result of homicide. The 

Commonwealth elicited this testimony to establish [Rodriguez’s] 

causal role in the deaths.

. . .

All of the decedents were autopsied; the autopsy reports were 

admitted into evidence and Dr. Collins testified at trial. Dr. 
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Collins’ testimony and the autopsy reports established that all 

four decedents died of multiple blunt impact injuries consistent 

with being struck by a vehicle travelling at high speed. In his 

testimony, Dr. Collins listed the injuries sustained by each 

decedent respectively, and at the conclusion of the explanation 

of the body of each decedent, he briefly showed a black and 

white photo that depicted the body. The Commonwealth did not 

engage Dr. Collins in questioning that extended his testimony 

past the factual recitation of the state that the bodies were in, or 

his conclusion as to their causes of death. However, the 

information elicited was necessary to meet the Commonwealth’s 

burden of proof. The Commonwealth did not ask Dr. Collins to 

repeat injuries suffered, and did not ask questions that required 

Dr. Collins to dwell on specific injuries. A criminal homicide trial 

is, by its very nature, unpleasant, and the light in which the 

medical examiner depicted the bodies of the decedents did not 

cloud an objective assessment of the guilt or innocence of 

[Rodriguez] by the jury.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/15, at 8-9 (citations omitted).

We have reviewed the testimony of Dr. Collins and conclude that there 

is no merit to Rodriguez’s claim that the trial court “altered the language in 

the court’s record of the proceeding.” Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Rather, the 

trial court accurately summarized Dr. Collins’ testimony when addressing 

Rodriguez’s claim that the Commonwealth elicited inflammatory statements 

from the medical examiner. 

“It is well established that the admissibility of evidence is within the 

discretion of the trial court, and such rulings will not form the basis for 

appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 

107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Here, we discern no such 

abuse.
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In his discussion of the inflammatory nature of Dr. Collins’ testimony, 

Rodriguez refers to the post-mortem photographs of the decedents and 

reviews the admissibility of photographs in homicide cases. However, as the 

Commonwealth notes, the photographs are not included in the certified 

record. Commonwealth’s Brief, at 8-9. In Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 

A.2d 406 (Pa. 2008), our Supreme Court held that where an appellant 

challenges the admissibility of photographs and the record does not contain 

the photographs, we cannot assess his claim. Accordingly, Rodriguez’s claim 

is waived.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/23/2015