COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00132-CV 

IN RE CARLA LORENE COX RELATOR

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

TRIAL COURT NOS. 14-00439

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OPINION

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The trial court heard conflicting evidence at the hearing on relator Carla 

Lorene Cox’s disqualification motion. With respect to the resolution of factual 

issues, which are committed to the trial court’s discretion, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court unless the relator establishes that the trial 

court could reasonably have reached only one decision and that the trial court’s 

decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 

2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) 

(orig. proceeding). In other words, we give deference to a trial court’s factual 

determinations that are supported by evidence. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 
2

279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).1 We find that the evidence 

supports the court’s ruling on this motion.

The evidence reflects that in 2011, law student Eric Erlandson worked with 

then-Denton County prosecutor Cary Piel on a “cold case” murder that had 

occurred in 2009 in Cooke County, Texas. According to Erlandson, after law 

school he continued to discuss the case “generally” with Piel until February or 

March 2014.2 Cox, who was later indicted in Cooke County for the murder, hired 

attorney Lee Tatum to represent her when she became a person of interest in the 

case, but she later discharged him and hired new counsel before Tatum hired 

Erlandson. 

 

1No findings of fact were requested of or made by the trial court after the 

hearing. When no findings of fact or conclusions of law are requested or filed, it 

is implied that the trial court made all of the findings necessary to support its 

decision. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (child support 

appeal); Burgess v. Denton Cnty., 359 S.W.3d 351, 356–57 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2012, no pet.) (temporary injunction appeal); see also In re Arterial 

Vascular Eng’g, Inc., No. 05-99-01753-CV, 2000 WL 1726287, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Nov. 21, 2000, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (stating 

that in a mandamus proceeding, the appellate court will decline to hold that a trial 

court clearly abused its discretion if the record contains any grounds on which 

the order can be upheld and that, provided there is support in the record, the 

court will uphold any implied findings necessary to support the trial court’s 

actions).

 

2Contrary to the dissent’s factual recitation, the evidence does not 

conclusively demonstrate that Piel was “associated” with Erlandson as cocounsel in the prosecution of the murder case while Erlandson was employed 

with Tatum, nor does Erlandson’s testimony that he continued to discuss the 

case “in general” with Piel through February or March 2014 require the trial court 

to find that Erlandson and Piel were working together as attorneys in this matter 

through 2014. 
3

Cox contends that Erlandson’s subsequent employment with Tatum more 

than six months after Cox discharged Tatum as her attorney caused Erlandson, 

Tatum, special prosecutor Piel, and the Cooke County District Attorney to be 

disqualified in this case and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion by 

denying her motion to disqualify the entire Cooke County District Attorney’s 

Office and special prosecutor Piel from prosecuting her for murder. However, by 

the time Tatum hired Erlandson, the disqualification of Erlandson and Tatum from 

representing Cox was moot because Cox was no longer Tatum’s client.3 

Whether disqualified or discharged, by August 2013, neither Erlandson nor 

Tatum even purported to represent Cox in this matter. 

Therefore, the trial court’s decision—supported by the evidence—was not 

so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounted to a clear and prejudicial error of 

law. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to 

disqualify Piel and the Cooke County District Attorney’s Office, we deny Cox’s 

petition for writ of mandamus.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICE

 

3Erlandson testified that he and Piel had not discussed any substantive 

information about the case at any time other than when he was an intern and that 

after he went to work for Tatum in August 2013, he did not discuss the case with 

Piel “other than just generalities of it being a big case in Cooke County and all 

that.” Erlandson further testified that Tatum had never shared any confidential 

client information with him and that he had never seen the Tatum Law Firm office 

file on Cox. 
4

PANEL: WALKER and SUDDERTH, JJ.; and CHARLES BLEIL (Senior Justice, 

Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

WALKER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

DELIVERED: July 23, 2015