Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

STEFANIE ROSS and JOHN BAUMA

Appellants, 

v. 

CARL BAUMAN, 

Appellee. 

N, ) 

) Supreme Court No. S-15473 

Superior Court No. 3KN-13-00241 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7024 – July 24, 2015

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Kenai, William F. Morse, Judge. 

Appearances: Jennifer Wagner and Timothy W. Seaver, 

Seaver & Wagner, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellants. Roberta 

C. Erwin and Robert C. Erwin, Palmier ~ Erwin, LLC, 

Anchorage, for Appellee. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

WINFREE, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his 

grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with 

the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, 

stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow 

visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior 

court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing 

that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their 

children. Immediately after oral argument we vacated the superior court’s visitation 

order. We now explain the basis for that order, and because the superior court’s findings 

preclude the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on 

the record in this case, we also dismiss the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Facts 

Stefanie Ross and John Bauman are the unmarried parents of two young 

children. In September 2012 Stefanie and the children moved from Homer to 

Washington to live with her family while her grandparents reached the ends of their 

lives. In December 2013 John joined Stefanie and the children in Washington. They 

plan to stay there indefinitely. 

Carl Bauman is John’s father, and Carl resides in Soldotna. When the 

children lived in Homer, Carl occasionally visited with them. Carl’s domestic partner, 

Simone, was a point of contention: Stefanie and John did not want Simone around the 

children; Carl disagreed with this choice; and Simone continued to be present during 

many of Carl’s visits with the children. Stefanie and John also disapproved of other 

occupants of and visitors to Carl and Simone’s home, including Simone’s daughter. 

After Stefanie and the children moved to Washington, Carl had no contact 

with them. The reason for this lack of contact is contested. In April 2013 Carl attempted 

to visit the children in Washington during a two-night stop there when he and Simone 

were returning to Alaska from Florida. It is unclear if Carl waited until he was in town 

to call Stefanie and her family to coordinate visitation or if he began calling sooner. 

Stefanie’s grandfather was dying, and Stefanie did not coordinate visitation with Carl. 

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Carl dropped off gifts for the children at the house where Stefanie was staying, but did 

not see them or her. 

At some point after the initiation of these court proceedings Carl began 

having telephone calls with the children, but he had no plans to visit the children again 

until summer 2014. 

B. Proceedings 

1. Pre-evidentiary hearing proceedings 

In March 2013, shortly before the failed April visit noted above, Carl 

petitioned for grandparent visitation, seeking “two weeks of unfettered grandparent 

visitation annually, in Alaska or another state of [Carl’s] choice.” In their answer to 

Carl’s petition, Stefanie and John asserted that Carl had never been denied reasonable 

visitation and that AS 25.20.0651

 (Alaska’s grandparent visitation statute), the U.S. 

Constitution, and the Alaska Constitution all require such a denial before a grandparent 

can successfully petition for visitation. 

The court held a status hearing in September. Carl stated that the laterplanned evidentiary hearing could take longer than he anticipated if Stefanie and John 

were to “challenge the constitutionality of [AS 25.20.065].” Stefanie and John 

1 Providing in pertinent part: 

Except as [otherwise] provided . . . , a child’s grandparent 

may petition the superior court for an order establishing 

reasonable rights of visitation between the grandparent and 

child if 

(1) the grandparent has established or attempted to 

establish ongoing personal contact with the child; and 

(2) visitation by the grandparent is in the child’s best 

interest. 

AS 25.20.065(a). 

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responded that they would likely “make constitutional arguments . . . because [Carl] has 

not been denied access. He’s been denied the access that he wants.” Carl argued that if 

a motion regarding constitutionality were made, he would need time between the 

motion’s filing and the final hearing to conduct unexplained “medical” discovery. The 

court set a December deadline for “motions regarding the statute,” including “motions 

regarding the parameters or validity of the grandparent visitation statute.” The record 

contains no motions filed between the September hearing and the December deadline. 

In April 2014 the parties filed hearing briefs. Carl detailed his and 

Simone’s interactions with the children. He also highlighted parenting disputes he and 

Simone had with Stefanie and John: Simone celebrates Easter, but Stefanie does not; 

Stefanie “enforced a rigid diet on the children,” and Simone would offer dessert to the 

children in contravention of the diet; Carl requested overnight visits, but John and 

Stefanie refused; Carl and Simone once bought many new outfits for one of the children, 

but Stefanie only gave some to the child because all would be “too much”; and Stefanie 

and John do not like their children calling Simone “Grandma Simone.” Carl argued that 

“absent a court order, meaningful visitation is not likely to occur,” noting his advancing 

age and the physical distance between him and his grandchildren. 

Stefanie and John argued that “[b]efore the Court [could] order any 

grandparent visitation over the parents’ objection, [Carl would have to] establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that [Stefanie and John] are unfit to make visitation decisions.” 

According to Stefanie and John, absent this showing, ordering visitation would violate 

their constitutional rights as parents. Stefanie and John asserted that they reasonably 

forbade contact between Simone and the children because of Simone’s criminal history, 

mental health issues, alcoholism, drug problems, and undesirable associates. Stefanie 

and John also stated that they had not denied Carl visitation (without Simone), that after 

the children moved to Washington Carl had not sought visitation with them before filing 

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the petition, and that after filing the petition Carl had not attempted to make telephone 

contact with the children for six months. 

2. Evidentiary hearing 

The superior court began the evidentiary hearing by attempting to restate 

the parties’ positions, identifying the crux of the dispute as whether Carl’s visitation 

could include Simone. Stefanie and John clarified that — because they were fit parents 

making reasonable visitation decisions — they opposed any court-ordered visitation as 

an infringement on their constitutional rights as parents. The court repeatedly questioned 

Stefanie and John’s “philosophical objection” to court-ordered visitation, focusing on 

“practical” matters including the physical distance between Carl and the children and a 

hypothetical future where Stefanie and John might unreasonably deny Carl visitation. 

The parties then argued what standard could constitutionally be applied in 

determining whether to order grandparent visitation. Carl asserted that the proper 

standard was whether the grandparent had proved by clear and convincing evidence that 

“visitation was in the best interest of the children.” Stefanie and John asserted that Carl’s 

simple “best interest” standard was constitutionally insufficient to protect fit parents’ 

reasonable visitation decisions. They argued that the correct standard was whether the 

grandparent had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the “parents are unfit to 

make visitation decisions” or that the fit parents’ visitation decisions were unreasonable 

and detrimental to the children. Although the court announced that it would detail the 

final standard in a later written opinion, it appeared to agree with Carl’s standard. The 

court also assumed that it would be in a child’s best interest to visit with a grandparent, 

barring a showing of the grandparent’s unfitness.2 

2 For instance the court stated: “[W]hy would it ever be in a child’s best 

interest not to have a grandparent relationship? . . . [I]f the grandparent . . . [is] taking 

(continued...) 

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Stefanie and John stipulated that Carl had established an ongoing 

relationship with the children, as required under AS 25.20.065(a)(1), but added that 

“they strongly believe[d] . . . [Carl] chose to reduce his contact with the kids in exchange 

for filing [the visitation] petition.” Then modifying his initial request for “unfettered” 

visitation, Carl agreed that any visitation order could exclude Simone and her children. 

The superior court detailed possible visitation orders while questioning 

Stefanie; although agreeing with the court’s stated goals, Stefanie maintained her 

position that any court order would be overly intrusive. The court responded that the 

parents and Carl were “suspicious” of each other and that there was the “potential for 

more problems” without a court order, but that after trust was restored under an order, 

the order could be lifted because it would then be “unnecessary.” When asked by the 

court what her rules for the children would be during a visit with Carl, Stefanie stated 

that the children’s sugar intake must be minimal. The court responded, “I mean, you got 

to let the guy give the kid a bowl of ice cream.” The court earlier had also stated that 

“kids deserve to get sort of spoiled by grandparents” by, for example, going to bed late 

and eating extra sugar. 

At the end of the hearing’s first day the court stated that it had a “tentative 

decision” and “[s]ort of the behavioral order” in mind. After receiving the court’s draft 

visitation order on the second day, Stefanie and John objected to it. During John’s 

testimony the court asked why it should trust him to allow visitation and questioned why 

he did not reach out to ensure Carl visited with the children after the move to 

Washington. John responded that he wanted his children to have a relationship with 

Carl, but “[t]he last time we spoke [Carl] made it very clear he’s rejected all our 

2 (...continued) 

care of [a grandchild] responsibly[,] [w]hen would it ever be detrimental to a child to 

have a grandparent?” 

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proposals. . . . He wants things his way. There’s no wiggle room. That’s why we’re here 

in court today. He doesn’t like our answer.” The court asked John what he would 

consider “reasonable” visitation, and John refused to give a definite answer, stating that 

he did not want to limit the time his children had with Carl. John also stated, “I don’t 

believe anybody is qualified to be [our children’s] parents more than we are.” The court 

interjected, “[C]omments like ‘replacing us as parents’ [are] indicative of a complete 

misperception of what’s going on here.” 

During closing arguments Stefanie and John argued that the best way for 

Carl to get visitation with the children would be to communicate directly with Stefanie 

and John, which he failed to do before filing this case. The court interjected that Stefanie 

and John had a responsibility to reach out to Carl too, that it was “troubled by both sides’ 

stubbornness,” and that “the inertia of . . . distance” would make rekindling Carl’s 

relationship with the children “very difficult” without “active, affirmative efforts on both 

sides.” Stefanie and John argued that only because they “were willing to put up with 

[Carl] and turn aside over and over again because they felt it was an important 

relationship” did Carl have such a loving relationship with the children. They contended 

the court was unfairly burdening them by presuming they should have sought visitation 

between their children and someone who “sued them instead of picking up a phone” and 

calling to coordinate a visit.

 When Stefanie and John again argued that a mere best interests standard 

would insufficiently protect their constitutional rights, the superior court again asked 

about a hypothetical future where Stefanie and John refused Carl visitation for no reason. 

They responded that they had never refused visitation without a reason and even had 

allowed visitation despite their stated visitation boundaries being disregarded. Stefanie 

and John argued that it would make no sense for the court to take their fundamental 

constitutional right to control visitation “just in case in the future they do something 

-7- 7024
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

else.” They stated that, based upon our decision in Evans v. McTaggart, 

3

 the proper 

standard to judge parental decision making in such a hypothetical circumstance would 

be whether the parents’ choice is “plainly contrary to the child’s best interests.” Stefanie 

and John argued that the court should not issue an order in line with their visitation 

choices but, instead, should issue no order. 

The superior court stated, “I’m not understanding the objection to the 

phenomenon of an order.” Stefanie and John argued that issuing an order would convey 

to Carl and other uncooperative relatives that they do not have to communicate or work 

with parents — or respect parents’ reasonable restrictions. They also replied: “What the 

court is suggesting is that for the next 12 years this court is going to be overseeing 

whether or not there’s visitation for these kids and . . . what the restrictions ought to be.” 

The superior court responded: “I can assure you I hope with all of my heart that that is 

not the case.” 

3. Visitation order 

The superior court issued a visitation order the day after the hearing 

concluded, entitled “First Visitation Order,” granting in part and denying in part Carl’s 

petition: 

1. Carl . . . shall have reasonable in person 

visitation with his paternal grandchildren . . . in Washington. 

2. Carl . . . shall have reasonable telephonic and 

Skype (or its equivalent) visitation with [the children]. 

3 88 P.3d 1078, 1089 (Alaska 2004) (“[S]pecial weight must be given to a 

fit parent’s determination as to the desirability of visitation with third parties. We believe 

that this can be accomplished by imposing on the third person the burden of proving that 

visitation by the third person is in the best interests of the child and by requiring that this 

be established by clear and convincing evidence. This would provide effective 

protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s 

best interests.” (footnote omitted)). 

-8- 7024
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. Carl shall not allow Simone . . . or [her 

daughter] to have direct or indirect contact with the children. 

The court stated that “Stefanie and John do not oppose Carl having 

visitation with the children,” but recognized that they challenged the legality of a 

visitation order in their case. The court stated, “There is no dispute that Stefanie and 

John are each a fit parent,” adding: 

Had Carl claimed that either parent was unfit or had made 

unfit decisions . . . , the court would have found that each 

was, in general, a fit parent. None of the specified decisions, 

even if unwise (and the court is not finding that any particular 

decision was), call[s] into question the fitness of either parent. 

Regarding the legal standard, the court stated, “[A grandparent visitation] 

order is constitutional if the moving party shows ‘that visitation [is] in the best interests 

of the children by clear and convincing evidence,’ ” citing our decision in Hawkins v. 

Williams. 

4 Stating that “[t]he mere fact of a visitation order does not necessarily violate 

the due process rights of a parent,” the court added in a footnote: 

The court notes that while the parents’ desire to be free from 

a court order may be understandable, they will always be 

subject to the law and the possibility of a grandparent’s 

attempt to exercise his or her statutory rights. Even if the 

court declined to issue a visitation order on a finding that the 

parents will voluntarily allow Carl to visit the children, if 

[Carl] believes that [the parents] are not acting in the best 

interests of the children because they are denying [the 

children] (and him) reasonable visits, then he can file a new 

motion pursuant to AS 25.20.065. To the extent that Carl can 

always file such a motion, [the parents] will always be subject 

to judicial scrutiny. The absence of an order provides 

illusory freedom from future judicial involvement. 

4 314 P.3d 1202, 1205 (Alaska 2013). 

-9- 7024 
 

 

 

The superior court also explained its understanding of how — after finding 

that a visitation order should issue because visitation has been proven to be in the best 

interests of the child — a parent’s constitutional rights must be considered when 

fashioning the terms of the order: 

The court construes an . . . implicit lesson from Hawkins, [ ] Evans, and Troxel[ v. Granville] 5 that guides its construction 

of AS 25.20.065(a) and the contents of a visitation order. 

Once it has determined that visitation is in the best interests 

of a child, the court is not entirely free to impose “reasonable 

rights of visitation between the grandparent and child[.]”11 

The rights of visitation must be more than reasonable; they 

must be narrowly fashioned to protect the parent’s rights as 

much as is possible (consistent with the best interests of the 

child). Thus, a condition or right of visitation that may be 

reasonable in a dispute between parents is not necessarily 

permissible between parents and a grandparent. Even if the 

condition is reasonable between parents and grandparents, the 

court should be careful not to impose a right or condition that 

is too restrictive of the parents’ rights. By fashioning only 

narrowly tailored rights or conditions of visitation, the court 

takes care to give the requisite “special weight” to the 

parents’ determination as to the desirability of visitation. 

11 AS 25.20.065(a). The authority of the court to 

order “reasonable rights of visitation” is limited by the 

requirement that the terms of the order be reasonable. The 

court’s statement that it “is not entirely free to impose 

‘reasonable rights of visitation,’ ” refers not to the limits of 

reasonableness, but to additional constraints necessary to 

protect the parents’ constitutional rights. 

530 U.S. 57 (2000). 

-10- 7024 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Under the heading “The Best Interests of the Children,” the superior court 

stated, “[a]ll parties agree that it is in the best interests of [the children] to have visitation 

with Carl,” but that “[i]f they had not agreed, the court would have [made] such a finding 

by clear and convincing evidence.” The court found “by clear and convincing evidence 

that a visitation order is necessary to ensure that Carl actually visits his grandchildren,” 

adding an extensive explanation of its plans and reasoning: 

[The court] does not find that a detailed visitation schedule or 

specification of visitation rights is necessary now, or in the 

near term, say in the next year. The court will require 

reasonable visitation. The court is willing to give the parents 

an opportunity to demonstrate that they will permit 

reasonable visitation. 

. . . . 

. . . The children have had limited telephonic and 

almost no in person contact with Carl in 16 months. Now is 

not the time to begin overnights. If they are allowed, either 

by the parents or the court, there first must be a 

demonstration of Carl’s capacity to care for the children 

overnight in the physical environment . . . where that would 

be proposed to occur. There must also be a demonstration of 

the children’s comfort with visits that have occurred and the 

proposed arrangement.14

14 The court is not setting these as conditions, but 

only as illustrations of the evaluation that the decision maker 

whether the parents or the court might undertake. If the court 

is presented with a future motion for overnights, then it will 

make the evaluation necessary given the circumstances as 

they then exist. 

Although “not overrid[ing]” Stefanie and John’s preference that they 

supervise Carl’s visits with the children, the superior court added a caveat: “The court 

observes that at some point it is likely that Carl should be trusted to care for the children 

-11- 7024
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for a number of hours without parental supervision. At some point a continued refusal 

to allow unsupervised visitation will be found to be unreasonable.” The court clarified 

that, at present, it was requiring only “reasonable” visitation and not unsupervised or 

overnight visitation, but that it would expect visitation conditions to change over time: 

As there are successful visitations and the children mature, 

the frequency, duration, and conditions of the visitations 

would typically change to reflect past success. As the 

children grow their needs change and the details of what type 

of visitation will be needed to change [sic] in order to allow 

them to have a rich relationship with Carl. 

The superior court explained the reasoning behind its finding that a 

visitation order was necessary to ensure visitation between Carl and the children, finding 

fault with all parties’ behavior and focusing upon the children’s best interests: 

The relationships between Carl and his son and Carl 

and Stefanie have soured over time. The move to 

Washington has enabled some of the wounds to heal or at 

least not to be re-opened. But all three adults have to bear 

some responsibility to achieve the mutual goal of fostering a 

good relationship between Carl and the children. All the 

adults must bear some responsibility for the nearly 

nonexistent interaction between Carl and the children since 

Stefanie moved to Washington. It would be unacceptable to 

allow the poor communication between Carl and the children 

that occurred in 2012-13 to continue for the remainder of 

2014. 

The court finds that it is unlikely that visitation will 

improve or even occur unless there is a visitation order in 

place. The failure of Stefanie or John to reach out to Carl to 

facilitate contact, much less visitation, in 2012-13 is 

troubling. The court appreciates that when Stefanie first 

moved she was preoccupied with the likely imminent deaths 

of her grandparents. The court appreciates that the parents 

did not unreasonably perceive the filing of the petition to be 

a challenge to their authority and an act that was in no small 

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part motivated by a power struggle between Carl and them. 

But at some point the best interests of the children have to 

return to the forefront. That can only be accomplished by the 

parents setting aside their anger at Carl and facilitating the 

grandparent relation. 

This is not to suggest that they are more responsible 

for the state of affairs than is Carl. But the obligations of 

parenthood require compromise when compromise is 

necessary to achieve what is in the best interests of the 

children--here the restoration and continuation of a 

relationship with Carl. 

If he is to have any hope of regaining his relationship 

with his grandchildren, he must repair his relationship with 

John and Stefanie. That can only be done if he develops 

some empathy about their perceptions of his actions. The 

petition, even though primarily (though not exclusively) 

motivated by a desire to see the children, was an insult to the 

parents. It was foreseeable that it would damage his 

relationship with Stefanie and especially John. Carl’s 

blindness to why they would reasonably question his 

insistence that [Simone] be accepted by them is troubling. 

Carl is entitled to love and live with whomever he pleases. 

But he cannot expect the parents of young children not to 

protect them from her faults or the troubling behaviors that 

her extended family and some of her friends have exhibited 

in his home, around Stefanie, John and Carl’s other children, 

and in the community. John and Stefanie would be remiss 

not to restrict the access of these people to [their children]. 

The court will allow the parents to continue to play the 

primary role in protecting their children and deciding how 

that needs to be done. Only if they act unreasonably will the 

court intervene to ensure that the grandchildren have suitable 

access to Carl. 

4. Appeal 

Stefanie and John argue on appeal that the visitation order violates their due 

process rights to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children 

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under the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. In particular they argue that their 

constitutional rights as parents will not be adequately protected unless Carl shows that 

court-ordered visitation contrary to their visitation preferences is in their children’s best 

interests, not merely that visitation with Carl is in their children’s best interests. 

Carl responds that Stefanie and John’s constitutional argument was waived. 

He argues that AS 25.20.065 is presumed to be constitutional and that Stefanie and John 

failed to carry their burden to prove otherwise. Carl also argues that our decisions in 

Evans v. McTaggart6 and Hawkins v. Williams7 already have narrowed the statute’s 

scope to an entirely constitutional range, such that Stefanie and John’s constitutional 

challenge must fail. Carl additionally argues that the narrow fashioning of the visitation 

order itself precludes finding it unconstitutional. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“We . . . review constitutional questions de novo, adopting the rule of law 

that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 8 “Likewise, ‘whether 

the [trial] court applied the correct standard in a custody [or visitation] determination is 

a question of law we review de novo.’ ”9 And “[w]hether factual findings are sufficient 

to support an award of custody [or visitation] to a third party is a legal issue to which we 

apply our independent judgment.”10 

6 88 P.3d at 1078. 

7 314 P.3d at 1202. 

8 Skinner v. Hagberg, 183 P.3d 486, 489 (Alaska 2008) (footnote omitted). 

9 Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 178, 184 (Alaska 2010) (alteration omitted 

and alterations added) (quoting Elton H. v. Naomi R., 119 P.3d 969, 973 (Alaska 2005)). 

10 Id. at 183-84 (quoting J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1998), 

(continued...) 

-14- 7024
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Waiver 

Carl argues that because Stefanie and John did not raise a “defense of 

[un]constitutionality” in their answer and did not file a motion challenging 

AS 25.20.065’s constitutionality by the date the superior court specified, he “did not 

undertake the additional discovery he referred to [at the pretrial hearing], nor . . . cross 

examine Stephanie [sic] . . . on her previous health and the potential effects of [sic] her 

reasoning process.” Carl argues that Stefanie and John’s hearing brief “did not challenge 

the constitutionality of the statute” and that the evidentiary hearing’s pre-testimony 

discussion “went to the nature of grandparent visitation.” He argues that the superior 

court “established with the parties that the evidentiary standard was clear and convincing 

evidence that visitation was in the children’s best interests,” and “[t]herefore[] the 

evidentiary standard was agreed to by the parties and any argument to the contrary has 

been waived.” 

But Stefanie and John do not argue now — nor did they before the superior 

court — that AS 25.20.065 is facially unconstitutional. Instead they argue that 

AS 25.20.065 is unconstitutional as applied in this case.11 And contrary to Carl’s 

10 (...continued) 

overruled on other grounds by Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1085 n.34 (Alaska 

2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

11 See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 372 (Alaska 2009) (“When 

statutes are found by a court to be unconstitutional, they may be found to be 

unconstitutional as applied or unconstitutional on their face. . . . A holding that a statute 

is unconstitutional as applied simply means that under the facts of the case application 

of the statute is unconstitutional. Under other facts, however, the same statute may be 

applied without violating the constitution.”). 

Because Stefanie and John do not argue that AS 25.20.065 is facially 

(continued...) 

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arguments, Stefanie and John consistently argued during the proceedings that their 

constitutional rights would be violated if the superior court did not place a heightened 

burden on Carl. They asserted in response to Carl’s visitation petition that Carl had 

never been denied reasonable visitation and that AS 25.20.065, the U.S. Constitution, 

and the Alaska Constitution all required such a denial before a grandparent could petition 

for visitation. Stefanie and John’s hearing brief focused upon the effect of their 

constitutional rights on the legal standard applicable to the case. The evidentiary 

hearing’s pre-testimony discussions were dominated by Stefanie and John’s argument 

that their constitutional rights demanded a higher evidentiary burden on Carl than merely 

showing that visitation was in the children’s best interests. Stefanie and John never 

conceded that a mere “visitation is in the best interests of the child” standard sufficiently 

protected their constitutional rights. And although the court tended to disagree with 

Stefanie and John’s proffered standard, it did not affirmatively “establish[] with the 

parties” that the lower standard was applicable. 

Carl is correct that the superior court set a deadline for “motions regarding 

the [grandparent visitation] statute,” including “motions regarding [its] parameters or 

11 (...continued) 

unconstitutional, Carl’s argument that the statute is presumed to be constitutional and 

that Stefanie and John failed to carry their burden to prove otherwise is inapplicable to 

this case. 

Carl also states in his brief that the Attorney General was neither notified 

— or was untimely notified — of Stefanie and John’s constitutional challenge nor given 

an opportunity to respond to it. But the Clerk of Court notified the Attorney General’s 

Office of the constitutional argument in this case on July 16, 2014, and the Attorney 

General failed to intervene. And Carl attaches no legal theory to his assertion. To the 

extent this assertion is intended to be an argument, it is therefore waived. Gilbert v. 

Sperbeck, 126 P.3d 1057, 1062 (Alaska 2005) (“[A]n argument is considered waived 

when the party ‘cites no authority and fails to provide a legal theory’ for his or her 

argument.” (quoting Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 464 n.9 (Alaska 2004))). 

-16- 7024
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

validity,” and that Stefanie and John filed no such motion. But it is not at all clear to us 

that the order encompassed Stefanie and John’s argument: They were not arguing that 

the statute was invalid or could not be applied to them — instead, they were arguing 

about the proper legal standard when applying the statute to this case. Stefanie and John 

included their proffered standard in their hearing brief and further pressed their argument 

at the beginning of the hearing. At no time during the hearing did Carl express that 

Stefanie and John’s argument should have been made earlier in a separate motion 

according to the court’s prior order. 

Carl’s argument that he would have undertaken different discovery or 

questioning had he known that Stefanie and John were going to raise a constitutional 

argument is unconvincing. At the pre-trial hearing Carl conceded that he was not 

seeking custody in the alternative. Given this concession it is unclear why extra 

discovery would have been helpful, and Carl does not clarify.12 Additionally Stefanie 

and John raised their constitutional argument in their hearing brief and again before any 

testimony began; Carl had the opportunity to cross-examine Stefanie on her health and 

reasoning process, but apparently chose not to do so. Instead Carl testified to his view 

of Stefanie’s medical issues and surmised that her health affected her judgment. 

We therefore conclude that Stefanie and John did not waive their 

constitutional argument. 

12 See Osterkamp, 235 P.3d at 185 (“[I]n order to overcome the parental 

preference in an initial custody contest between a parent and a non-parent[,] a non-parent 

must show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or that the welfare 

of the child requires the child to be in the custody of the non-parent.” (alteration omitted) 

(quoting Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1085 (Alaska 2004)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

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B. Third-Party Visitation 

Our seminal third-party visitation decision is Evans v. McTaggart.

13 The 

statute at issue in Evans, AS 25.20.060, allows a trial court to order visitation with “a 

grandparent or other person if that is in the best interests of the child” during a custody 

dispute between the parents. 14 If a grandparent has not already sought visitation during 

a custody dispute under AS 25.20.060 (or changed circumstances justify reconsidering 

a grandparental visitation determination made under AS 25.20.060), the statute at issue 

in this case, AS 25.20.065, allows a grandparent to petition at any time for “an order 

establishing reasonable rights of visitation” if (1) “the grandparent has established or 

attempted to establish ongoing personal contact with the child” and (2) “visitation by the 

grandparent is in the child’s best interest.”15 For Stefanie and John’s as-applied 

challenge, there is no meaningful difference between the two statutes. 

In Evans we concluded that AS 25.20.060(a) was not facially 

unconstitutional.16 But we also gave “a narrowing construction to AS 25.20.060 so . . . 

it need not be unconstitutional as applied.”17 To give “special weight . . . to a fit parent’s 

13 88 P.3d 1078. 

14 AS 25.20.060(a). Neither Stefanie nor John has ever sought a custody 

order regarding their children. 

15 See AS 25.20.065(a)-(b). 

16 88 P.3d at 1089 (“The statute, as we construe it, does not permit any person 

at any time to seek visitation rights. Visitation rights can only be sought in a pending 

case concerning child custody. Further, although the statute permits a court to provide 

for visitation based on the best interests of the child ‘by a grandparent or other person’ 

we construe the latter phrase to be limited to third parties who have a significant 

connection to the child.”). 

17 Id. 

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determination as to the desirability of visitation with third parties,” we “impos[ed] on the 

third person [seeking visitation] the burden of proving [by clear and convincing 

evidence] that visitation by the third person is in the best interests of the child . . . ,” 

adding that “[t]his would provide effective protection for a parent’s choice, except where 

the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests.”18 We also stated a second 

version of the standard: “[T]he trial court should determine by clear and convincing 

evidence whether it is in the best interests of [the child] that visitation with the [third 

parties] be provided.”19 We concluded by stating a third version of the standard: “[O]n 

remand the court should determine whether [the mother’s] parental preference as to [her 

son’s] visitation has been overcome by clear and convincing evidence that it is in [her 

son’s] best interests that he visit with the [third parties].”20 

Later cases applying Evans did not clarify the standard. In 2010 we stated 

in the introduction to Osterkamp v. Stiles that “[the third party] did not prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that it would be in [the child’s] best interests for the court to 

order visitation over [the mother’s] objection.”21 The title to the opinion section 

analyzing third-party visitation restated the same conclusion: “[Third Party] Did Not 

Prove By Clear And Convincing Evidence That It Would Be In [Child’s] Best Interest 

To Order Visitation Over [Mother’s] Objection.”22 However in the opinion section 

resolving the visitation issue, we stated a different, apparently simpler, standard: 

18 Id. (emphasis added). 

19 Id. at 1090 (emphasis added). 

20 Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). 

21 235 P.3d 178, 181 (Alaska 2010) (emphasis added). 

22 Id. at 190 (emphasis added). 

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We held in Evans that to obtain visitation over the objection 

of a legal parent, a third party must show by clear and 

convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best 

interests. . . . 

In Evans, we noted the statement from the plurality in 

the United States Supreme Court’s decision Troxel v. 

[ ] Granville 23 that special weight must be given to a fit 

parent’s determination as to the desirability of visitation with 

third parties. We concluded that a presumption of parental 

fitness to determine what is in a child’s best interests could be 

ensured by requiring that a third party prove “by clear and 

convincing evidence” that such visitation “is in the best 

interests of the child.” The result of establishing this 

heightened standard, we concluded, was to “provide effective 

protection for a parent’s choice, except where the choice is 

[ ] plainly contrary to a child’s best interests.” 24

We then restated the first, more specific standard: “[I]t is a close question whether it 

would be in [the child’s] best interests to order visitation with [the third party] over [the 

mother’s] fervent objections.”25 Restating our conclusion that “special consideration 

must be given to a fit parent’s determination regarding the desirability of visitation with 

third parties,” we articulated a third, entirely new standard: “[W]e find that [the third 

party] did not meet his burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the 

mother’s] preference that he no longer have a relationship with [the child] is plainly 

contrary to the child’s best interests.” 26 In footnotes we also twice restated the standard 

a fourth way: 

23 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 

24 Osterkamp, 235 P.3d at 190 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 

Evans, 88 P.3d at 1089). 

25 Id. (emphasis added). 

26 Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 

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Psychological parent status . . . can help a third party prove 

. . . that it would be in the child’s best interests to grant 

visitation to a third party. . . . [T]he parental preference may 

only be overcome if it is determined, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that it would be in the best interests of the child to 

[ ] award third party visitation. 27

In our 2013 Hawkins v. Williams decision, the section of the opinion 

analyzing third-party visitation is entitled: “The Superior Court Properly Required [The 

Grandmother] To Prove That Visitation Was In The Children’s Best Interests By Clear 

And Convincing Evidence.”28 In line with this simple standard we restated Evans’s 

holding as “a grandparent seeking visitation must bear ‘the burden of proving that 

visitation is in the best interests of the child by clear and convincing evidence.’ ”29 Later 

in the opinion, we again repeated this simple standard: “The [superior] court correctly 

required [the grandmother] to show that visitation was in the best interests of the children 

by clear and convincing evidence.”30 But we added: “Any visitation order infringes on 

a parent’s due process right to make decisions regarding ‘the care, custody, and control’ 

of a child. It follows that a parent can oppose a petition for court-ordered visitation 

without objecting to all types of visitation with the third party.”31 We also approved a 

27 Id. at 184 n.17, 191 n.54 (emphasis added). 

28 314 P.3d 1202, 1204 (Alaska 2013) (emphasis added). The statute at issue 

in Hawkins was AS 25.20.065, the same statute Carl invoked in this case. See id. 

29 Id. at 1204-05 (alterations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Evans, 88 

P.3d at 1089). 

30 Id. at 1205 (emphasis added). 

31 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 

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second standard by ultimately “conclud[ing] that the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that it would not be in the best interests of the children to 

have court-ordered visitation with [their grandmother].”32 

In all three cases we stated that a third party seeking visitation must prove 

by clear and convincing evidence both that (1) only visitation with the third party 

generally — not court-ordered — is in the child’s best interests and (2) court-ordered 

visitation specifically is in the child’s best interests. In the two older — and more indepth — cases, we stated in several different iterations that court-ordered visitation 

contrary to the parent’s preferences must be proven, by clear and convincing evidence, 

to be in the child’s best interests. 

C. The Correct Legal Standard 

In determining the correct third-party visitation legal standard, it is helpful 

to understand the purpose underlying its creation. In Evans we stated this purpose as 

giving “special weight . . . to a fit parent’s determination as to the desirability of 

visitation with third parties”33 and “provid[ing] effective protection for a parent’s choice, 

except where the choice is plainly contrary to a child’s best interests.”34 Although in 

Hawkins we did not directly state the most specific standard — that court-ordered 

visitation contrary to the parent’s preferences must be proven to be in the child’s best 

32 Id. at 1206 (emphasis added). 

33 88 P.3d at 1089 (emphasis added); accord Osterkamp, 235 P.3d at 190-91 

(emphasis added). 

34 Evans, 88 P.3d at 1089 (emphasis added); accord Osterkamp, 235 P.3d at 

190-91 (emphasis added). 

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interests — our recognition in that case that a visitation order infringes upon a parent’s 

constitutional rights even if the parent is not opposed to some types of unmandated 

visitation with a third party35 is in line with this purpose. 

The federal basis for Alaska’s legal standard verifies this purpose. In 

Troxel v. Granville the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the clash between a third-party 

visitation statute and parents’ substantive due process rights to the care, custody, and 

control of their children.36 Based on these constitutional rights, the Washington Supreme 

Court had found facially unconstitutional a state statute “permit[ting] ‘any person’ to 

petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time[]’ and authoriz[ing] [the] court 

to grant such visitation rights whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of the 

child.’ ” 37 The U.S. Supreme Court’s four-person plurality opinion declined to rule on 

the statute’s facial constitutionality but ultimately affirmed the Washington Supreme 

Court, stating that the statute was unconstitutional as applied for several reasons.38 

First, the trial court had not found that the mother was unfit — important 

because “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their 

children.”39 Second, although the mother was apparently fit, the trial court had given “no 

35 See Hawkins, 314 P.3d at 1205. 

36 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). 

37 Id. at 60 (plurality opinion) (alteration omitted and alterations added) 

(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994 & Supp. 1996)). 

38 See id. at 67-74 (plurality opinion). 

39 Id. at 68 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 68-69 (plurality opinion) (“[S]o 

long as a pa rent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally 

be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 

question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of 

(continued...) 

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special weight at all to [her] determination of her daughters’ best interests” and “[m]ore 

importantly,” the trial court “appear[ed] . . . [to] appl[y] exactly the opposite 

presumption” by “presum[ing] the grandparents’ request should be granted unless the 

children would be ‘impact[ed] adversely.’ ”40 Third, the mother had never sought to 

entirely cut off visitation.41 Instead the dispute originated because the mother had sought 

to limit the grandparents’ visitation with the children to one short, non-overnight visit per 

month and special holidays.42 And the mother had conceded in court that “grandparent 

visitation is in the best interest of the children.”43 According to the plurality the problem 

with the trial court’s approach to the case was that: 

this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement 

between the . . . Superior Court and [the mother] concerning 

her children’s best interests. . . . [T]he Due Process Clause 

does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right 

39 (...continued) 

that parent’s children.”). 

40 See id. at 69 (plurality opinion) (last alteration in original); see also id. 

(plurality opinion) (“In reciting its oral ruling . . . , the Superior Court judge explained: 

. . . . ‘I think in most situations a commonsensical approach is that it is normally in the 

best interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent, unless . . . there 

are some issues or problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are going 

to impact adversely upon the children.’ ” (alteration omitted)). 

41 Id. at 71 (plurality opinion). 

42 Id. (plurality opinion). 

43 Id. (plurality opinion) (“The Superior Court gave no weight to [the 

mother’s] having assented to visitation even before the filing of any visitation petition 

or subsequent court intervention. The court instead rejected [the mother’s] proposal and 

settled on a middle ground . . . . Significantly, many other States expressly provide by 

statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably 

denied) visitation to the concerned third party.”). 

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of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a 

[ ] state judge believes a “better” decision could be made. 44

Two justices concurred.45 Justice Souter stated that he would affirm the 

Washington Supreme Court’s decision finding the statute facially unconstitutional 

“because the state statute authorizes any person at any time to request (and a judge to 

award) visitation rights, subject only to the State’s particular best-interests standard.”46 

After noting that no party had argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive due 

process cases were wrongly decided, Justice Thomas “agree[d] with the plurality that 

[the] Court’s recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of 

their children resolves this case” because a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision held that 

“parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their children, including the right 

to determine who shall educate and socialize them.”47 

All six justices agreed that the application of a best interests standard alone 

is insufficient to adequately protect parental constitutional rights.48 Five justices agreed 

that this is true even when it is a grandparent seeking visitation.49 

44 Id. at 72-73 (plurality opinion). 

45 See id. at 75-79 (Souter, J., concurring), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

46 Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring). 

47 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

48 See id. at 67-70, 72-73 (plurality opinion); id. at 76-78 (Souter, J., 

concurring), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 

49 Compare id. at 67-70, 72-73 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he decision whether 

. . . an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the 

parent to make in the first instance. . . . [T]his case[, stemming from a grandparental 

visitation petition,] involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the 

Washington Superior Court and [the mother] concerning her children’s best interests.”), 

(continued...) 

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With this basis for the third-party visitation legal standard in mind, we hold 

that a third party seeking court-ordered visitation with a child, including a grandparent 

seeking an order under AS 25.20.065, must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

it is detrimental to the child to limit visitation with the third party to what the child’s 

otherwise fit parents have determined to be reasonable. We believe this standard will 

ensure that parental preferences are adequately protected while still allowing a court to 

override those preferences when they are so clearly contrary to a child’s best interests 

that they are detrimental to the child. 

D. This Case 

In its visitation order the superior court stated that a grandparent must prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that “visitation” is in the child’s best interests. But the 

superior court found by clear and convincing evidence both that (1) visitation with Carl 

is in the children’s best interests and (2) “a visitation order is necessary to ensure that 

Carl actually visits his grandchildren.” (Emphasis added.) The court also later found 

“that it is unlikely . . . visitation will improve or even occur unless there is a visitation 

order in place.” Thus it appears that the superior court found by clear and convincing 

49 (...continued) 

and id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that he would apply strict scrutiny to any 

interference with the “fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 

children” and that “[h]ere, [in this grandparental visitation case,] the State of Washington 

lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one”), 

with id. at 76-79 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that he would affirm the Washington 

Supreme Court’s decision finding the statute facially unconstitutional “because the state 

statute authorizes any person at any time to request (and a judge to award) visitation 

rights, subject only to the State’s particular best-interests standard,” adding, “It would 

be anomalous . . . to subject a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s 

associates from out of the general population merely because the judge might think 

himself more enlightened than the child’s parent.” (emphasis added)). 

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evidence that court-ordered visitation is in the children’s best interests.50 This legal 

standard ignored Stefanie and John’s parental preferences, and its application violated 

their constitutional rights. 

The facts of this case are illustrative of how violations can occur when 

parental constitutional rights are inadequately considered. Carl requested two weeks of 

“unfettered” visitation, but quickly aligned his visitation requests with the parents’ 

preferences by removing Simone from the equation, requesting less time, and requesting 

only supervised visitation during the day — at least at the initiation of visitation. The 

superior court found the parents to be fit, and did not find unreasonable any of the 

parents’ restrictions nor any history of unreasonable visitation denial. Instead the court 

found “troubling” Carl’s failure to understand why Stefanie and John did not want their 

children around Simone, and stated that Stefanie and John “would be remiss” if they had 

failed to restrict Simone, her family, and her friends’ access to the children. But the court 

still ordered visitation over the parents’ objections. 

50 Stefanie and John argue that although the superior court found by clear and 

convincing evidence that a court order was necessary to ensure visitation between Carl 

and the children, this finding was not the basis for the order. They argue that the court 

instead ordered visitation because Stefanie and John conceded that visitation with Carl 

generally would be in their children’s best interests. The court made a point of twice 

finding in its visitation order that an order was necessary to effectuate visitation, but it 

also appeared to assume from very early in the proceedings that it would issue an order, 

repeatedly questioning Stefanie and John’s “philosophical” objections to one. And in 

its order the court reiterated its perception that the non-issuance of an order would be an 

“illusory freedom.” Regardless, the highest standard possibly applied by the court — 

that court-ordered visitation was in the children’s best interests — was insufficient to 

protect Stefanie and John’s parental constitutional rights. We do not need to resolve 

whether the court’s order was based upon a different but still insufficient standard. 

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Assuming visitation with grandparents would be beneficial to any child as 

long as nothing “weird” or “detrimental” was happening,51 the court reprimanded both 

the parents and the grandparent for the recent poor communication between the children 

and Carl and found that a visitation order was necessary to ensure that visitation with 

Carl actually occurred. The court’s wording reveals its sole focus — the children’s best 

interests, as determined by the court, not the parents: 

But at some point the best interests of the children have to 

return to the forefront. That can only be accomplished by the 

parents setting aside their anger at Carl and facilitating the 

grandparent relation. 

. . . [T]he obligations of parenthood require 

compromise when compromise is necessary to achieve what 

is in the best interests of the children – here the restoration 

and continuation of a relationship with Carl. 

. . . The court will allow the parents to continue to play 

the primary role in protecting their children and deciding how 

that needs to be done. Only if they act unreasonably will the 

51 For example, the court stated: “[W]hy would it ever be in a child’s best 

interest not to have a grandparent relationship? . . . [I]f the grandparent . . [is] taking 

care of [a grandchild] responsibly[,] [w]hen would it ever be detrimental to a child to 

have a grandparent?” We note the similarity between the superior court’s statements and 

those the Troxel plurality condemned. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-70 (plurality opinion) 

(“In reciting its oral ruling . . ., the Superior Court judge explained: ‘. . . I think in most 

situations a commonsensical approach is that it is normally in the best interest of the 

children to spend quality time with the grandparent, unless . . . there are some issues or 

problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are going to impact 

adversely upon the children.’ . . . In effect, the judge placed on . . . the fit custodial 

parent[] the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her 

daughters. . . . The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly 

contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his 

or her child. In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any protection for 

[the mother’s] fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing 

of her own daughters.” (alteration omitted) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). 

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court intervene to ensure that the grandchildren have suitable 

access to Carl. 

The court’s statements that it would “allow the parents to continue to play the primary 

role in protecting their children” and that it was “willing to give the parents an 

opportunity to demonstrate that they [would] permit reasonable visitation” between the 

children and Carl — despite the lack of evidence that they ever unreasonably denied such 

visitation — is precisely the type of state interference with fit parents’ care, custody, and 

control of their children that the Troxel plurality and Justice Thomas’s concurrence found 

unconstitutional.52 

E. Carl’s Narrow-Tailoring Argument 

Carl argues that the narrow fashioning of the visitation order itself 

precludes finding it unconstitutional. The superior court apparently agreed, stating: 

Once it has determined that visitation is in the best interests 

of a child, the court is not entirely free to impose “reasonable 

rights of visitation . . . .” . . . [T]hey must be narrowly 

fashioned to protect the parent’s rights . . . . By fashioning 

only narrowly tailored rights or conditions of visitation, the 

court takes care to give the requisite “special weight” to the 

parents’ determination as to the desirability of visitation. 

(Footnotes omitted.) 

But a court cannot ignore parental rights when issuing an order and then 

cure the order’s unconstitutionality by considering parental rights when determining its 

52 We likewise note that the court’s response to Stefanie’s testimony that 

during visitation she would want Carl to keep the children’s sugar intake minimal — “I 

mean, you got to let the guy give the kid a bowl of ice cream” — is exactly the type of 

unconstitutional judicial interference Troxel warned against. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68­

69 (plurality opinion) (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., 

is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm 

of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions 

concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”). 

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terms. As we explicitly stated in Hawkins: “Any visitation order infringes on a parent’s 

due process right to make decisions regarding the ‘care, custody, and control’ of a child. 

It follows that a parent can oppose a petition for court-ordered visitation without 

objecting to all types of visitation with the third party.”53 The superior court’s actions 

in this case were directly contrary to our statement in Hawkins: Subjecting parents to a 

court’s ongoing oversight and threat of intervention is in itself an infringement on 

parental due process rights. Doing so without any safeguarding of those rights is 

unconstitutional. “[A]llow[ing] the parents to continue to play the primary role” in their 

children’s lives by setting only the restriction that the ordered visitation be “reasonable,” 

as the superior court did in this case, is an insufficient after-the-fact substitution for not 

ordering visitation in the first place. The narrow tailoring of the visitation order does not 

negate its unconstitutionality.54 

F. Dismissing The Visitation Petition 

The superior court found the parents were fit and did not find any of the 

parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable nor any history of unreasonable visitation 

denial. Instead, the court stated that Stefanie and John “would be remiss not to restrict 

the access of [Simone, her family, and her friends] to [the children].” We hold as a 

matter of law that, given these findings, Carl is unable to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that it is detrimental to the children to limit their visitation with Carl to what 

53 314 P.3d 1202, 1205 (Alaska 2013) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 

(quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66). 

54 Carl argues that a narrowly fashioned court order is constitutional because 

this court narrowly reads statutes to avoid their unconstitutionality. This argument 

ignores binding precedent in favor of a broad, inapplicable canon of statutory 

construction: Court orders are not statutes. And a trial court cannot simply circumscribe 

the terms of an order in lieu of applying the legal standard determining whether such an 

order could constitutionally issue. 

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Stefanie and John have determined to be reasonable. 55 Because the superior court’s 

findings preclude the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered on 

the current record in this case, we dismiss Carl’s visitation petition rather than remanding 

for further proceedings after more than two years of litigation in this case.56 

V. CONCLUSION 

Having already VACATED the grandparent visitation order, we DISMISS 

the petition for grandparent visitation. 

55 See Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 178, 183-84 (Alaska 2010) (“Whether 

factual findings are sufficient to support an award of custody [or visitation] to a third 

party is a legal issue to which we apply our independent judgment.” (quoting J.W. v. R.J., 

951 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1998), overruled on other grounds by Evans v. McTaggart, 

88 P.3d 1078, 1085 n.34 (Alaska 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

56 See id. at 190 & n.47 (“Because this case already has a protracted history, 

because the parties need finality, and because Ken presented his case for visitation to the 

superior court, we resolve Ken’s claim for visitation on the merits rather than remand for 

further proceedings.”) (citing In re Estate of Johnson, 119 P.3d 425, 436 n.43 (Alaska 

2005); State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 83 P.3d 1060, 1071 (Alaska 2004)). See also In 

re Estate of Johnson, 119 P.3d at 436 n.43 (“Due to the lengthy delays in this case, we 

are reluctant to remand the case for further proceedings.”); Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 83 

P.3d at 1071 (“[G]iven the long delays in this litigation . . . we are reluctant to remand 

to the superior court to carry out the same review that we have already conducted. We 

therefore think it is better in this case for us to consider the merits . . ., rather than remand 

to the superior court, with the potential for further appeals.”)). 

Stefanie and John also argue that the Alaska Constitution’s due process and 

privacy clauses provide equal or greater protection of their right to make decisions 

regarding the care, custody, and control of their children than the U.S. Constitution and 

that there was inadequate evidence supporting the court’s finding that an order was 

necessary to ensure visitation between Carl and the children. Because we conclude that 

the superior court’s findings preclude the possibility that a constitutional visitation order 

could be entered in this case, we do not need to address these arguments. 

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