IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANDREW P. KALICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLYN BOROUGH, et al.,

Defendants.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

 Civil No. 10-6229 (JBS/KMW)

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

SIMANDLE, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court for preliminary screening of

the Amended Complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Andrew P. Kalick,

naming as defendants various municipalities and municipal agents

both in their individual and official capacity. The Court finds

as follows:

1. Plaintiff brings this action alleging constitutional

violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that

after receiving a traffic summons for driving an unregistered

motor vehicle, Defendants maliciously alleged contempt of court

for failure to appear and issued a warrant for Plaintiff’s

arrest. Compl. ¶ 4, p. 3. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’

motive was to “harm and attempt to extract payment (under $100)”

from Plaintiff. Id. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief

recalling the state court’s warrant and dismissing contempt of

court charges, as well as an underlying summary for driving an

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unregistered vehicle; Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and

punitive damages. 

2. Plaintiff’s municipal court case has been pending since

June 2010. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff telephoned the

court and entered a plea of not guilty. Id. at ¶ 2, p. 5. 

Afterwards, Plaintiff traveled to the state of Florida and

remained there for an undisclosed time. Id. at ¶ 11, p. 6. Upon

returning, Plaintiff received a notice dated November 19, 2010,

stating that “a warrant for your arrest for contempt of court as

a result of an unanswered traffic summons has been issued.” Id.

at ¶ 12, p. 6. The Complaint before this Court alleges that the

warrant deprived Plaintiff of federal rights. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, p.

7. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief

quashing the warrant and dismissing the underlying traffic

citation and contempt charges.

3. Plaintiff attached an application to proceed in forma

pauperis, thus the Court must first review Plaintiff’s

application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs. 

According to the information disclosed by Plaintiff in response

to this Court’s inquiry of January 14, 2011, the Court finds that

Plaintiff is not able to afford the normal filing fee. The Court

will grant his application and instruct the Clerk of the Court to

file his Complaint without prepayment of fees. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). 

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4. Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), this Court is

directed to dismiss in forma pauperis actions that are frivolous,

malicious, or fail to state a claim. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 (3d Cir. 2002) (interpreting

the screening provisions of § 1915(e)(2) to apply to all in forma

pauperis complaints, whether filed by a prisoner or not). Also,

in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court

must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the

plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 

However, every civil complaint must still meet the requirements

of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8

(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., a pleading which sets forth a claim for

relief shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, (2) a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief

the pleader seeks. 

5. Plaintiff seeks dismissal of the underlying unregistered

vehicle summons because the vehicle stop was “without probable

cause” and led to “unreasonably seizing Plaintiff.” The Court

finds that these allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

In New Jersey, an officer may stop a motor vehicle when he has

only an “articulable and reasonable suspicion” that the driver

has committed a motor vehicle offense. State v. Hasley, 774 A.2d

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693, 697 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). This reasonable

suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause and provides

the officer with increased discretion. State v. Stovall, 788

A.2d 746, 752 (N.J. 2002) (finding that a court must consider the

totality of the circumstances and analyze the officer's

observations taken together with rational inferences drawn from

those facts). Thus, even taking Plaintiff’s allegation that the

stop was without probable cause as true, the Plaintiff has not

alleged that the stop was impermissible because Plaintiff does

not argue that the officer did not have articulable and

reasonable suspicion. 

6. Additionally, Plaintiff has pleaded no facts relating to

the motor vehicle stop that would elevate Plaintiff’s allegation

of unreasonable seizure beyond mere legal conclusions, contrary

to the requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). This Court cannot merely accept Plaintiff’s labels and

conclusions. Id. Thus, the complaint regarding the illegal

search and seizure is dismissed without prejudice because it

fails to allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the

claim is facially plausible. 

7. Plaintiff further alleges violations of his civil rights

stemming from his warrant for contempt of court. In Younger v.

Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not enjoin

pending state court criminal proceedings, even if there is an

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allegation of a constitutional violation and even though all

jurisdictional and justiciability requirements are met. 401 U.S.

37, 41-42 (1971). In subsequent cases, the Court has adopted the

application of Younger to claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief. Samuels v. Mackell , 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that

the principles of Younger are fully applicable to requests for

declaratory relief). Further, while the Supreme Court has yet to

rule on the application of Younger to monetary relief, this

Circuit applies the Younger abstention to bar damage suits. See

Gwynedd Properties v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195 (3d

Cir. 1992); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1988).

Finally, abstention is appropriate only absent a showing of bad

faith prosecution, harassment, or a patently unconstitutional

rule. Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (setting

forth test to determine if abstention is proper).

8. Because of federal courts’ abstention to avoid

interference with pending state proceedings, the Court finds that

the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and consequently the Complaint will be dismissed. The

state court has avenues for Plaintiff to contend the allegations

of contempt of court and the unregistered motor vehicle summons. 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts may not

enjoin a state court from holding litigants in contempt. Judice

v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977) (reasoning that the state

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court’s preservation of its contempt power constituted

sufficiently important state interest to justify abstention). 

Similarly, a federal injunction in favor of Plaintiff would

render the motions pending before the trial court ineffectual and

thus impinge on New Jersey’s important interest in preserving its

courts' power to enforce their orders. See Port Auth. Police

Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey

Police Department, 973 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that

it is proper to abstain from taking jurisdiction over claims of

alleged constitutional violations resulting from a pending state

case). 

9. Plaintiff fails to plead facts indicating an exception

to abstention. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982). Plaintiff’s

allegations that the state court has failed to rule on a motion

to dismiss, postponed a court date, and issued a warrant for

failure to appear are not sufficient evidence of a bad faith

prosecution. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975)

(defining bad faith prosecution as a prosecution “brought without

reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction”). 

Moreover, there is no evidence or allegation that the charge

relating to contempt of court was brought against Plaintiff

merely to harass. Finally, Plaintiff does not allege or suggest

that abstention would be improper under “extraordinary

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circumstances” since the state statute is not “flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 

10. Consequently, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s

application to proceed in forma pauperis, but must dismiss his

Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). The accompanying

Order shall be entered.

August 2, 2011 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

Date Jerome B. Simandle

United States District Judge 

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