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*********************************************** 
ROBERT GOGUEN v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(SC 20482)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.*

Syllabus

In accordance with this court’s decision in Simms v. Warden (230 Conn. 608),

when a habeas court denies certification to appeal from its judgment

or ruling, a petitioner may obtain appellate review only if he or she

demonstrates, first, that the habeas court’s denial of the petition for

certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion and, second,

that the habeas court’s judgment or ruling should be reversed on its merits.

The self-represented petitioner, who had been convicted in 1996, pursuant

to a guilty plea, of sexual assault in the second degree, sought a writ

of habeas corpus, claiming that he should be allowed to withdraw that

plea. The petitioner’s prison sentence and period of probation imposed

in connection with his 1996 conviction had concluded before he filed

his habeas petition. At the time he filed his habeas petition, however,

he was incarcerated in Maine because of a violation of the conditions

of supervised release that were imposed as a result of a 2012 conviction

under federal law for failing to register as a sex offender, a requirement

that was imposed on the basis of his 1996 conviction. The habeas court

declined to issue the writ for lack of jurisdiction and rendered judgment

thereon, concluding that the petitioner was not in the custody of the

respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, as a result of the 1996

conviction when he filed his habeas petition. The petitioner filed a

petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment

pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (g)), which the habeas court denied, and

the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court. In his Appellate Court

brief, the petitioner claimed that the habeas court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the custody of the respondent and that he

should be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because it was made

unintelligently and involuntarily. The petitioner did not allege that the

habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and did not ask the Appellate Court to construe his

argument on the merits as a demonstration of the habeas court’s abuse

of discretion in denying the petition for certification. The Appellate

Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal, concluding that the petitioner

failed to brief the threshold issue of whether the habeas court had

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. On

the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court properly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from the

habeas court’s judgment on the ground that the petitioner failed to allege

or demonstrate in his brief submitted to the Appellate Court that the

habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal; to obtain appellate review when a habeas court denies

a petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner must at least allege

that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his or her

petition for certification to appeal, either by expressly arguing specific

reasons why the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification or by expressly alleging that his or her argument on the merits

demonstrates an abuse of discretion, and there is no exception to such

requirement for self-represented petitioners, as to hold otherwise would

render both § 52-470 (g) and the two part showing required by Simms

meaningless.

2. To ensure that the courthouse doors are not shut on potentially meritorious

claims as a result of a technicality or an understandable ignorance of

procedures, this court exercised its supervisory authority to direct that

the Judicial Branch’s Notice of Appeal Procedures (Habeas Corpus)

form be revised to include language that explicitly describes the requirement that a petitioner expressly claim in his or her appellate brief that

the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied his or her petition
for certification to appeal and explain how that discretion was abused.

3. Even if the Appellate Court had considered the petitioner’s arguments

regarding the merits of his claim that the habeas court incorrectly determined that he was not in the respondent’s custody when he filed his

habeas petition, those arguments did not support the petitioner’s claim,

made for the first time in his appeal to this court, that the habeas court

had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to

appeal: contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss (532

U.S. 394) does not permit a habeas petitioner to file a habeas petition

that solely and directly challenges a conviction for which the petitioner

is no longer serving the sentence imposed in connection with that conviction; moreover, the petitioner was not in custody for his 1996 conviction

on the ground that he was required to register as a sex offender as a

result of that conviction, as the sex offender registration requirement

is remedial rather than punitive and, therefore, was not a part of his

sentence but was a collateral consequence of his conviction, which

generally is insufficient to satisfy the requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody for purposes of filing a habeas petition.

Argued March 24—officially released December 23, 2021**

Procedural History

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where

the court, Oliver, J., rendered judgment declining to

issue a writ of habeas corpus; thereafter, the court

denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the

petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima,

C. J., and Alvord and Moll, Js., which dismissed the

appeal, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Robert Goguen, self-represented, the appellant (petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was David S. Shepak, former

state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The issue before us in this certified

appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, Robert Goguen,

from the judgment of the habeas court on the ground

that he failed in his brief to the Appellate Court to brief

the claim that the habeas court had abused its discretion

in denying his petition for certification to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (g).1 The petitioner,

proceeding as a self-represented party, filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1996 conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of sexual assault in the

second degree. The habeas court declined to issue the

writ for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the

petitioner was not in the custody of the respondent,

the Commissioner of Correction. The petitioner then

filed a petition for certification to appeal to the Appellate Court pursuant to § 52-470 (g), which the habeas

court denied.

Notwithstanding that ruling, the petitioner appealed

to the Appellate Court, challenging the merits of the

habeas court’s ruling declining to issue the writ of

habeas corpus. Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction,

195 Conn. App. 502, 503, 225 A.3d 977 (2020). The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the

petitioner failed to brief any claim that the habeas court

had abused its discretion in denying his petition for

certification to appeal. See id., 505. This court then

granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court on

the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly

dismiss the self-represented petitioner’s appeal because

he failed to brief whether the habeas court had abused

its discretion in denying his petition for certification to

appeal?’’ Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, 335

Conn. 925, 234 A.3d 980 (2020).

Our task in this appeal is to harmonize the legislative

mandate of § 52-470 (g) that no appeal may be taken

from a habeas court’s judgment unless certification is

granted with this court’s interpretation of that statute

in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126

(1994) (Simms II), which provides guidance on the

procedure to be followed when a habeas court denies

certification to appeal. In light of the statutory requirement, we explained in Simms II that, if a habeas court

denies certification to appeal, a petitioner may obtain

review only if he makes a ‘‘two part showing’’ on appeal:

first, as a threshold matter, he must ‘‘demonstrate that

the habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion,’’ and, second, ‘‘[i]f the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be

reversed on its merits.’’ Id. What Simms II leaves

unclear is what exactly is required of an appellant to

satisfy the threshold showing of an abuse of discretion
before plenary review of the merits by a reviewing court

is warranted.

As we discuss more fully in this opinion, the Appellate

Court has concluded in several cases that the petitioner

can satisfy the threshold requirement by expressly alleging in his brief that the arguments on the merits of the

appeal demonstrate that the habeas court abused its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to

appeal. Conversely, the Appellate Court has held that,

when a petitioner fails to expressly allege or brief that

the denial of certification was an abuse of discretion

and simply briefs the merits of his underlying claim

without any reference to the requirement of Simms II,

the petitioner’s appeal must be dismissed. See part I of

this opinion.

We conclude that, in order to make sense of the

statutory requirement and Simms II, a petitioner must

at least expressly allege and explain in his brief how

the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification. We recognize, just as the Appellate Court has,

that this may be done by expressly referring the

reviewing court to the portion of the brief addressing

the merits of the appeal and pointing out that, if the

appeal is successful on the merits, then an abuse of

discretion necessarily has been demonstrated. The petitioner must at least do that, however, in order to comply

with the statute and Simms II.

The petitioner may not simply disregard the requirement of Simms II and brief only the merits of the

underlying claim without any effort to comply with

the ‘‘two part showing’’ required by Simms II, which

includes the discrete question of whether the habeas

court abused its discretion in denying certification.

Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. In this appeal,

the petitioner never expressly alleged that the habeas

court abused its discretion in denying certification to

appeal. He argued only that the habeas court erred in

declining to issue the writ. Accordingly, the Appellate

Court’s dismissal of his appeal appropriately adheres

to the dictates of § 52-470 (g) and Simms II and its

progeny, and must be affirmed.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history. In 1996, the petitioner was convicted, after entering a guilty plea, of sexual assault in

the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev.

to 1995) § 53a-71 (a) (3). The petitioner was sentenced

on October 25, 1996, to ten years in prison, execution

suspended after four years, and five years of probation.

Thereafter, in 1998, the legislature passed legislation,

now codified at General Statutes § 54-250 et seq., requiring persons who have been convicted of certain sexual

offenses, including the petitioner’s offense, to register

as sex offenders. See Public Acts 1998, No. 98-111. The

legislation applied to the petitioner because he was

released from prison after its effective date.
On April 11, 2017, the petitioner, proceeding as a selfrepresented party, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, claiming, among other things, that he should

be allowed to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because,

due to ineffective assistance of his counsel, his plea

had not been made voluntarily. Specifically, he alleged

that, while he was residing in Maine in 2012, he was

convicted under federal law of failing to register as a

sex offender—a requirement imposed as the result of

his 1996 Connecticut conviction.2 He further alleged

that, as of the date he filed his habeas petition, he was

incarcerated as a result of violating the conditions of

supervised release that were imposed on him under

federal law as a result of the federal 2012 conviction.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 23-24 (a),3

the habeas

court declined to issue a writ for lack of jurisdiction

because, at the time that the petitioner filed the petition,

he was no longer in the custody of the respondent as

a result of the 1996 conviction.4 Although the habeas

court did not elaborate on its basis for this determination,5

it is undisputed that neither the petitioner’s term

of incarceration nor his term of probation for the 1996

conviction was in effect on the date that he filed his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner filed

a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas

court’s judgment pursuant to § 52-470 (g), which the

habeas court denied.

Despite the denial of his petition for certification, the

petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court from the

habeas court’s judgment declining to issue a writ of

habeas corpus.6

In his brief to that court, the petitioner

did not allege that the habeas court had abused its

discretion in denying his petition for certification to

appeal. He also did not ask the Appellate Court to construe his argument on the merits as a demonstration

of the habeas court’s abuse of discretion.

Instead, the petitioner claimed only that the habeas

court had incorrectly determined that he was not in the

custody of the respondent and that he should be allowed

to withdraw his 1996 guilty plea because it was unintelligently and involuntarily made.7 The respondent contended in his brief that the habeas court had not abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s petition for

certification to appeal and that it had properly declined

to issue the writ.

The Appellate Court noted in a per curiam opinion

that, under Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d

601 (1994) (Simms I), the petitioner was required, as

a threshold matter on appeal, to ‘‘demonstrate that the

denial of his petition for certification constituted an

abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

195 Conn. App. 504. The Appellate Court further noted

that, to establish such an abuse of discretion, the peti-
tioner was required to demonstrate that the habeas

court’s resolution of the underlying claim involved

issues that ‘‘are debatable among jurists of reason; that

a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];

or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.; see, e.g., Simms v. Warden, supra, 230

Conn. 616 (same). Finally, the Appellate Court noted

that it had held previously that, ‘‘[i]f this burden is not

satisfied, then the claim that the judgment of the habeas

court should be reversed does not qualify for consideration by [the Appellate] [C]ourt.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 504. Because the petitioner had failed to

brief this threshold issue, the Appellate Court declined

to review the merits of the petitioner’s claims and dismissed the appeal.8

Id., 505.

The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration

in which he claimed that the habeas court had abused

its discretion when it denied his petition for certification

to appeal. In support of this claim, the petitioner argued

the merits of his underlying claim that the habeas court

had incorrectly determined that he was not in the

respondent’s custody. The Appellate Court denied the

motion.

This certified appeal followed. On appeal to this

court, the petitioner contends that his argument in his

brief to the Appellate Court concerning the merits of

his underlying claim that the habeas court incorrectly

determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain his

habeas petition because he was not in the respondent’s

custody ‘‘inherently demonstrate[s] that the habeas

court [had] abused its discretion in . . . denying the

petition for [certification to appeal].’’ He further contends that, because he was proceeding as a self-represented party, the Appellate Court should have liberally

construed his brief on the merits as demonstrating that

the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying

his petition for certification for appeal, even though he

had not expressly made that allegation. Accordingly,

he argues, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined

that he was not entitled to review of his claims on

appeal.

The respondent contends that, to the contrary, the

Appellate Court correctly determined that it had no

authority to entertain the merits of the petitioner’s

appeal under § 52-470 (g), as that statute was construed

by this court in Simms I and Simms II. Specifically, the

respondent argues that, under Simms II, the petitioner

must ‘‘make a two part showing’’ when the habeas court

has denied his petition for certification to appeal.

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612. To allow a

petitioner to ignore the threshold requirement of demonstrating that the habeas court abused its discretion
when it denied the petition for certification, the respondent argues, would entirely eviscerate the mandate of

§ 52-470 (g) that ‘‘[n]o appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding . . . may be

taken unless the appellant’’ petitions the habeas court

for certification to appeal and the habeas court grants

the petition. We conclude that the Appellate Court properly declined to review the petitioner’s claims and dismissed the appeal.

I

Whether the Appellate Court had the authority to

review the petitioner’s claims on appeal from the judgment of the habeas court when he failed even to allege

that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal pursuant to

§ 52-470 (g) is a question of statutory interpretation over

which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., General

Statutes § 1-2z (plain meaning rule); Canty v. Otto, 304

Conn. 546, 557–58, 41 A.3d 280 (2012) (general rules of

construction are aimed at ascertaining legislative intent).

In Simms I, this court first considered the question

of whether a habeas petitioner may seek appellate

review of an adverse judgment of the habeas court

under § 52-470 (g) when the habeas court has denied

the petition for certification to appeal. See Simms v.

Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 179. In that case, the habeas

court dismissed the petition of the petitioner, Floyd

Simms, and denied his petition for certification to

appeal. Id., 179–80. The majority further determined in

dictum, however, that General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)

§ 52-470 (b), now § 52-470 (g), did not provide that the

habeas court’s ‘‘denial of the requisite certification is

final and dispositive.’’ Id., 188. Rather, the majority construed the statute ‘‘to permit a disappointed habeas

corpus litigant to invoke appellate jurisdiction9

for plenary review of the decision of the habeas court upon

carrying the burden of persuasion that denial of certification to appeal was an abuse of discretion or that

an injustice appears to have been done.’’10 (Footnote

added.) Id., 189.

In Simms II, this court elaborated on the abuse of

discretion standard that it had adopted in Simms I.

Relying on the decision of the United States Supreme

Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S.

Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), a majority of this court

concluded that a petitioner can satisfy the abuse of

discretion standard by ‘‘demonstrating . . . that the

issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a

court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];

or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, supra,

230 Conn. 616.
Thus, we explained in Simms II that a habeas petitioner whose petition for certification to appeal pursuant to § 52-470 (g) has been denied must ‘‘make a two

part showing’’ to prevail on appeal. Id., 612. First, the

petitioner must ‘‘demonstrate that the habeas court’s

ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.’’ Id. Second,

‘‘[i]f the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle,

the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment

of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.’’

Id.; see, e.g., McClain v. Commissioner of Correction,

188 Conn. App. 70, 74, 204 A.3d 82 (‘‘a petitioner can

obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition

for [a writ of] habeas corpus only by satisfying the twopronged test enunciated by [the court] in [Simms I],

and adopted in [Simms II]’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)), cert. denied, 331 Conn. 914, 204 A.3d 702

(2019).

The Appellate Court has recognized on several occasions that, ‘‘[i]n determining whether the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request

for certification, [the court] necessarily must consider

the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined

that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) McClain v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 188 Conn. App. 75; see, e.g., Mercado v. Commissioner of Correction, 183 Conn. App.

556, 562, 193 A.3d 671 (‘‘[w]e examine the petitioner’s

underlying claim[s] of ineffective assistance of counsel

in order to determine whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petition for certification

to appeal’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 918, 193 A.3d 1211 (2018); Brown v.

Commissioner of Correction, 179 Conn. App. 358, 364,

179 A.3d 794 (same), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 919, 181

A.3d 91 (2018); Parrott v. Commissioner of Correction,

107 Conn. App. 234, 236, 944 A.2d 437 (same), cert.

denied, 288 Conn. 912, 954 A.2d 184 (2008); Santiago

v. Commissioner of Correction, 90 Conn. App. 420, 424,

876 A.2d 1277 (same), cert. denied, 275 Conn. 930, 883

A.2d 1246 (2005), cert. denied sub nom. Santiago v.

Lantz, 547 U.S. 1007, 126 S. Ct. 1472, 164 L. Ed. 2d 254

(2006).11

Nevertheless, the Appellate Court has also dismissed

appeals repeatedly from decisions of the habeas court

on the ground that the petitioner has failed to brief, i.e.,

allege and demonstrate, that the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petition for certification

to appeal. See, e.g., Cordero v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App. 902, 902–903, 215 A.3d 1282 (dismissing appeal on ground that ‘‘petitioner neither

alleged nor briefed [claim] that habeas court abused its

discretion when it denied petition for certification to

appeal’’), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 944, 219 A.3d 374

(2019); Thorpe v. Commissioner of Correction, 165
Conn. App. 731, 733, 140 A.3d 319 (dismissing appeal

on ground that ‘‘petitioner did not allege that the habeas

court’s denial of his petition for certification to appeal

constituted an abuse of discretion until he filed his reply

brief’’), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 903, 150 A.3d 681 (2016);

Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 68 Conn. App.

1, 8, 790 A.2d 463 (dismissing appeal because petitioner

failed to allege that habeas court’s failure to grant certification to review denial of his petition constituted

abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 903, 793

A.2d 1089 (2002); Reddick v. Commissioner of Correction, 51 Conn. App. 474, 477–78, 722 A.2d 286 (1999)

(dismissing appeal because petitioner claimed only ineffective assistance of counsel and did not brief question

of whether habeas court had abused its discretion in

denying petition for certification to appeal).

We conclude that the fact that the Appellate Court

may consider the merits of the petitioner’s appeal in

determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied the petition for certification does

not mean that the petitioner can fail entirely to address

that threshold issue and still obtain appellate review.

This court made clear in Simms I that only by ‘‘carrying

the burden of persuasion that denial of certification to

appeal was an abuse of discretion or that an injustice

appears to have been done’’ can a petitioner overcome

the mandate of § 52-470 (g) that ‘‘[n]o appeal from the

judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding . . .

may be taken’’ unless the habeas court grants the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal. Simms v.

Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 189. In Simms II, we held

that a petitioner can satisfy this burden only ‘‘by demonstrating . . . [1] that the issues are debatable among

jurists of reason; [2] that a court could resolve the issues

[in a different manner]; or [3] that the questions are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616.

A conclusion that a habeas petitioner whose petition

for certification to appeal has been denied need not

even allege that the habeas court abused its discretion

when it denied the petition for certification to appeal,

but may obtain appellate review if he briefs only the

merits of his underlying claims, would, as Justice Borden predicted in his concurring opinion in Simms I,

‘‘eviscerate the limitations contained in § 52-470 [g]. In

effect, the denial of the petition for certification could

become an empty gesture, because one does not need to

be prescient to foresee that every disappointed habeas

petitioner could, once his petition for certification is

denied, file or perfect a direct appeal under the same

statute.’’ Simms v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 192 (Borden, J., concurring).

Accordingly, we conclude that, although the burden

of obtaining appellate review of the threshold question
under Simms and its progeny is minimal, the petitioner

must at least allege that the habeas court abused its

discretion in denying the petition for certification to

appeal. The petitioner may satisfy this requirement in

at least two ways.

First, the petitioner may strictly comply with the two

part showing required by Simms II and expressly argue

specific reasons why the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification. Second, the petitioner may

expressly allege that his argument on the merits demonstrates an abuse of discretion. In this second way, the

petitioner at least points the court to its merits discussion and argues that its merits discussion satisfies the

first prong of Simms II. What the petitioner cannot do

is completely ignore the requirements of Simms II by

briefing only the merits of the underlying claim. Permitting appellants to bypass the Simms II requirements

would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of

reducing the burden on the appellate system. See id.,

182 (noting that ‘‘the manifest intention of the legislature, when it enacted § 52-470 [g], [was] to limit the

opportunity for plenary appellate review of decisions

in cases seeking postconviction review of criminal convictions’’).12

We further conclude that there is no exception to the

requirement that a habeas petitioner must expressly

allege that the habeas court abused its discretion in

denying the petition for certification to appeal when

the petitioner is self-represented. ‘‘We are mindful that

we should be solicitous to [self-represented] petitioners

and construe their pleadings liberally in light of the

limited legal knowledge they possess. . . . We are also

mindful, however, that the right of self-representation

provides no attendant license not to comply with the

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 129,

140, 7 A.3d 911 (2010). It is beyond cavil that a selfrepresented habeas petitioner cannot simply ignore the

statutory mandate of § 52-470 (g) that he file a petition

for certification to appeal before the Appellate Court

can review the habeas court’s rulings. If the petition is

denied, the petitioner is on notice that, at least as the

default rule, he is not entitled to appellate review of

his claims unless he demonstrates that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying certification.

We do not think that it imposes an undue burden on

self-represented habeas petitioners to require them at

least to allege that they are entitled to appellate review

because the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. Indeed, selfrepresented petitioners have shown themselves capable

of satisfying this requirement. See, e.g., Joyce v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn. App. 37, 38, 19 A.3d

204 (2011) (self-represented habeas petitioner claimed
that habeas court abused its discretion when it denied

petition for certification to appeal); Jolley v. Commissioner of Correction, 98 Conn. App. 597, 597, 910 A.2d

982 (2006) (same), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 904, 920 A.2d

308 (2007); see also, e.g., Coleman v. Commissioner of

Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138, 139, 958 A.2d 790 (2008)

(self-represented habeas petitioner claimed that habeas

court ‘‘abused its discretion by refusing to rule on his

petition for certification to appeal’’), cert. denied, 290

Conn. 905, 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

We conclude, therefore, that the Appellate Court

properly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal in the present

case on the ground that he failed to demonstrate that

the habeas court abused its discretion. Specifically, he

failed to expressly allege that the court had erred in

denying his petition for certification to appeal. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that this requirement

may—not entirely without justification—be viewed

as a mere technicality because, as the Appellate Court

has recognized repeatedly, in many cases, there is considerable, if not complete, overlap between the first

and second prongs of the ‘‘two part showing’’ required

by Simms II. Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 612.

If the statutory mandate of § 52-470 (g) is to retain any

force at all, however, a petitioner whose petition for

certification to appeal has been denied must at least

expressly allege that the denial was an abuse of discretion to obtain appellate review.

Allowing a petitioner to bypass completely any allegation that the habeas court abused its discretion would

render a duly enacted statute meaningless, which we

are not at liberty to do. It would also render the Simms

two part test meaningless, given that a denial of certification would be treated no differently from a grant of

certification; i.e., in either scenario, all that is required

would be to brief solely the merits of the underlying

claim.

II

Having reached this conclusion, however, we recognize that the requirement that a habeas petitioner

expressly claim in his appellate brief that the habeas

court abused its discretion when it denied his petition

for certification, although clearly imposed under our

precedent, may be viewed as a technical trap for the

unwary. Because the failure to make such a claim

results in the dismissal of the appeal, we feel that clearer

guidance is in order.

Accordingly, to ensure that the courthouse doors are

not shut on potentially meritorious claims as the result

of a technicality or an understandable ignorance of

procedures,13 we exercise our supervisory powers to

direct that Part I of Judicial Branch Form JD-CR-84,

Rev. 1-21, entitled Notice of Appeal Procedures (Habeas

Corpus), be revised to include the following language:
‘‘If the habeas court denies your petition for certification to appeal, you can appeal from that ruling. You

must expressly claim in your appellate brief that the

habeas court abused its discretion when it denied the

petition for certification to appeal and explain how that

discretion was abused. To establish that the habeas

court abused its discretion, you must demonstrate that

(1) the issues that you seek to raise on appeal are

debatable among jurists of reason, (2) a court could

resolve the issues in a different manner, or (3) the

questions deserve encouragement to proceed further.

See Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d

126 (1994). If you do not expressly claim in your brief

that the habeas court abused its discretion when it

denied your petition for certification, your appeal will

be dismissed.’’

In addition, we direct that Part II of the form be

revised to include the following language after ‘‘[t]he

[p]etition for [c]ertification is denied’’: ‘‘You have the

right to challenge this ruling by filing an appeal with

the Appellate Court. Any such appeal must comply with

the procedures set forth in Part I of this form for appealing from the denial of a petition for certification or it

will be dismissed.’’

III

We further conclude that, even if the Appellate Court

had considered the arguments the petitioner made in

his Appellate Court brief on the merits of his claim that

the habeas court incorrectly determined that he is not

in the custody of the respondent, those arguments do

not support his claim, made for the first time in his

appeal to this court, that the habeas court had abused

its discretion when it denied his petition for certification

to appeal. The petitioner made two arguments in support of his claim that he is in custody for purposes of

his habeas petition.

First, he contended that his claims come within an

exception to the custody requirement set forth in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,

399, 121 S. Ct. 1567, 149 L. Ed. 2d 608 (2001), that,

according to the petitioner, ‘‘allows a petitioner to collaterally attack an expired conviction, so long [as] the

expired conviction affected guilt or the . . . sentence’’

that the petitioner is currently serving. Second, he contended that he was in custody pursuant to his 1996

conviction because he is required to register as a sex

offender on the basis of that conviction. Neither claim

has any merit.14

General Statutes § 52-466 (a) (1) provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus

. . . shall be made to the superior court, or to a judge

thereof, for the judicial district in which the person

whose custody is in question is claimed to be illegally

confined or deprived of such person’s liberty.’’ It is
well established that, for a court to have jurisdiction

to entertain a habeas petition seeking to challenge the

legality of a criminal conviction, the petitioner must be

in the custody of the respondent as the result of that

conviction at the time that the petition is filed. See,

e.g., Richardson v. Commissioner of Correction, 298

Conn. 690, 698, 6 A.3d 52 (2010) (‘‘in order to satisfy

the custody requirement of § 52-466, the petitioner

[must] be in custody on the conviction under attack

at the time the habeas petition is filed’’ (emphasis in

original; internal quotation marks omitted)); Ajadi v.

Commissioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 548, 911

A.2d 712 (2006) (habeas court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas petition because he

was not in custody on expired convictions that petition

sought to attack); Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 507, 530–31, 876 A.2d 1178 (2005) (petitioner whose sentence for conviction that was under

attack had expired was not in custody for purposes of

§ 52-466), overruled in part on other grounds by State

v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); see also,

e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91, 109 S. Ct.

1923, 104 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1989) (under federal statutes

governing writs of habeas corpus, petitioner must ‘‘be

in custody under the conviction or sentence under

attack at the time his petition is filed’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss,

supra, 532 U.S. 394, the United States Supreme Court

held that, if a conviction that is no longer subject to

direct or collateral attack ‘‘is later used to enhance

a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not

challenge the enhanced sentence through a [habeas]

petition . . . on the ground that the prior conviction

was unconstitutionally obtained.’’ Id., 403–404. The

court recognized three exceptions to this general rule

for cases in which ‘‘the prior conviction [that was] used

to enhance the sentence was obtained [when] there

was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the

[s]ixth [a]mendment’’; id., 404; the petitioner ‘‘[cannot]

be faulted for failing to obtain timely review of a constitutional claim’’; id., 405; and the petitioner obtains ‘‘compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime

for which he was convicted, and which he could not

have uncovered in a timely manner.’’ Id. The court

observed that, ‘‘[i]n such situations, a habeas petition

directed at the enhanced sentence may effectively be

the first and only forum available for review of the prior

conviction.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 406.

Thus, the court in Lackawanna County District

Attorney ‘‘merely went beyond the jurisdictional question presented in Maleng to consider the extent to which

the [prior expired] conviction itself may be subject to

challenge in the attack [on] the [current] senten[ce]

which it was used to enhance.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Lebron v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 274 Conn. 527. The court

in Lackawanna County District Attorney did not permit the filing against a government official who no

longer has custody of the petitioner of a habeas petition

that directly and solely challenges the conviction for

which the petitioner is no longer serving the sentence.

See Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss,

supra, 532 U.S. 401; see also, e.g., Alaska v. Wright,

U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1467, 1468, 209 L. Ed. 2d 431 (2021)

(petitioner who was no longer serving sentence for state

conviction and who was in federal custody as result of

federal conviction predicated on state conviction was

not in custody for purposes of federal habeas statute

requiring that petitioner be ‘‘in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a [s]tate court’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

280 Conn. 547–48 (because habeas petitioner did not

challenge conviction for which he was currently in custody but directly challenged convictions for which he

was no longer in custody, Lackawanna County District

Attorney did not support claim that habeas court had

jurisdiction). We therefore reject the petitioner’s claim

in the present case that Lackawanna County District

Attorney supports his claim that the habeas court incorrectly determined that he was not in the respondent’s

custody and, in turn, that the court abused its discretion

when it denied the petitioner’s petition for certification

to appeal from its ruling to that effect.

We also are not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim

that, contrary to the habeas court’s determination, he

is in the respondent’s custody pursuant to the 1996

conviction because he is required to register as a sex

offender as a result of that conviction.15 This court has

held that the statutory sex offender registration requirements are remedial and not punitive in nature. See, e.g.,

State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 497, 825 A.2d 63

(2003) (because sex offender registration statute is regulatory and not punitive in nature, application of statute

to defendant ‘‘did not necessitate any modification,

opening or correction of [his] sentence’’); State v. Kelly,

256 Conn. 23, 90–95, 770 A.2d 908 (2001) (because sex

offender registration statute ‘‘is regulatory and not punitive in nature,’’ retroactive application of statute to

defendant did not violate ex post facto clause of federal

constitution). Thus, the requirement that the petitioner

register as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of

his 1996 conviction, not part of the sentence. Collateral

consequences of a conviction generally are not sufficient to satisfy the condition that a habeas petitioner

must be in custody. See, e.g., Maleng v. Cook, supra,

490 U.S. 492 (‘‘once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient

to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of

a habeas attack [on] it’’ under federal habeas law);

Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 274
Conn. 530 (‘‘[l]ike the federal courts . . . our courts

have never held that the collateral consequences of a

conviction that expired before the habeas petition was

filed are sufficient to render a petitioner in custody on

the expired conviction within the meaning of § 52-466’’

(emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)).

Consistent with this principle, the great majority of

the federal courts that have considered the issue have

concluded that the fact that a petitioner is subject to

a state sex offender registration statute is not sufficient

to satisfy the requirement under federal habeas law that

he must be in custody when he files the petition. See,

e.g., Clark v. Oklahoma, 789 Fed. Appx. 680, 682, 684

(10th Cir. 2019) (habeas court properly denied petition

for certificate to appeal from decision dismissing

habeas petition because requirement under Oklahoma

law that petitioner register as sex offender as result of

Oklahoma conviction did not satisfy condition of federal statute that petitioner, who was incarcerated in

Texas as result of Texas conviction, must be in custody

for conviction being challenged when habeas petition

is filed); Hautzenroeder v. DeWine, 887 F.3d 737, 743–44

(6th Cir. 2018) (because restrictions imposed by Ohio

sex offender registration statute were collateral consequences of conviction, notwithstanding fact that Ohio

Supreme Court had found statute to be punitive in

nature, petitioner, who was no longer serving sentence

for conviction, was not in custody for purposes of federal habeas statute); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332,

338 (4th Cir. 2012) (requirements under Virginia law and

Texas law that petitioner whose sentence had expired

register as sex offender as result of Virginia conviction

were collateral consequences of conviction and, therefore, did not satisfy custody requirement of federal

habeas statute), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 917, 133 S. Ct.

2853, 186 L. Ed. 2d 909 (2013); Virsnieks v. Smith,

521 F.3d 707, 720–21 (7th Cir.) (when petitioner’s only

potentially viable claim in habeas proceeding involved

application of Wisconsin sex offender registration statute, petitioner was not in custody for purposes of federal habeas statute, even though he was currently incarcerated as result of underlying conviction, because

registration requirements were collateral consequences

of conviction), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 161,

172 L. Ed. 2d 117 (2008); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151

F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (because restrictions

imposed by Washington sex offender registration statute were collateral consequences of conviction, petitioner, who was no longer serving sentence, was not

in custody for purposes of federal habeas statute), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1081, 119 S. Ct. 824, 142 L. Ed. 2d 682

(1999); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 977 A.2d 959, 967

(D.C. 2009) (‘‘the [sex offender] registration requirement amounts to a collateral consequence of conviction

that is not itself sufficient to render an individual in
custody’’ under District of Columbia law governing

motions for attacking sentences).16

At least one court has held to the contrary. In Piasecki

v. Court of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161 (3rd Cir.), cert.

denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 482, 205 L. Ed. 2d 267

(2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit concluded that the requirements of Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration statute were sufficiently

onerous to constitute custody for purposes of the federal habeas statute. Id., 172–73. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that the Pennsylvania statute

required the petitioner to report to state police barracks

at least four times per year for the rest of his life; to

report to state police barracks within three business

days of changing his address, including a temporary

stay at a different residence; to refrain from using the

Internet; and ‘‘to personally report to the [s]tate [p]olice

if he operated a car, began storing his car in a different

location, changed his phone number, or created a new

[e-mail] address.’’ Id., 170–71. The court also observed

that Pennsylvania courts had concluded that the

requirements of the Pennsylvania statute were not

remedial but were punitive in nature, and that the courts

had ‘‘historically treated sex offender registration

requirements as part of the judgment of sentence.’’ Id.,

175. The court concluded that the statute’s ‘‘physical

compulsion of . . . registration requirements and their

direct relation to the judgment of sentence set them

apart from consequences that are truly collateral and

noncustodial.’’ Id., 176–77.

Even if we were to assume that the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals correctly determined in Piasecki that

individuals who are subject to the Pennsylvania sex

offender registration statute are in custody for purposes

of the federal habeas statute, we conclude that the

Connecticut sex offender registration scheme is clearly

distinguishable. Unlike the Pennsylvania statute, the

Connecticut statute does not subject individuals to any

form of physical compulsion, its requirements are not

imposed as part of the sentence, and this court has

determined that the statute is regulatory in nature, not

punitive. See, e.g., State v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn.

489; see also, e.g., White v. LaClair, Docket No. 19-CV1283 (MKB), 2021 WL 200857, *6 (E.D.N.Y. January 19,

2021) (distinguishing requirements of Pennsylvania sex

offender registration statute at issue in Piasecki from

requirements of New York statute on grounds that Pennsylvania’s requirements were ‘‘significantly more restrictive,’’ they had been determined to be punitive in nature

and they were imposed as part of sentence). Thus, we

conclude that Piasecki has no persuasive force here.

We conclude in the present case, therefore, that, even

if the Appellate Court had considered the petitioner’s

arguments on the merits of his claim that he was in the

respondent’s custody for purposes of his petition for
habeas corpus, those arguments do not demonstrate

that the issue is ‘‘debatable among jurists of reason; that

a court could resolve the [issue in a different manner];

or that the [question is] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Warden, supra,

230 Conn. 616. Thus, the arguments do not demonstrate

that the habeas court abused its discretion when it

denied the petitioner’s petition for certification to

appeal.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting

of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D’Auria, Kahn, Ecker and

Keller. Thereafter, Justice Mullins was added to the panel and has read the

briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument

prior to participating in this decision.

** December 23, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 General Statutes § 52-470 (g) provides: ‘‘No appeal from the judgment

rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person

who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person’s release

may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided,

petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is

unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court

Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which

ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.’’

2 Neither party has briefed the various state and federal laws that required

the petitioner to register as a sex offender while he was residing in Maine

in 2012; and we do not address that issue, as it is not relevant to the issues

before us on appeal.

3 Practice Book § 23-24 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority

shall promptly review any petition for a writ of habeas corpus to determine

whether the writ should issue. The judicial authority shall issue the writ

unless it appears that:

‘‘(1) the court lacks jurisdiction . . . .’’

4 Thereafter, the petitioner filed a ‘‘brief and memorandum of law to

support consideration for authority to act and amended request to vacate.’’

The habeas court apparently treated this motion as a motion for reconsideration of its ruling declining to issue a writ, and it granted the motion but

denied the requested relief. The petitioner then filed an ‘‘amended request

to vacate.’’ The habeas court took no action on that motion but referred

the parties to its ruling denying the relief requested by the petitioner in his

initial motion.

5 The habeas court issued a summary two sentence order indicating that

it was declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus because the petitioner was

not in custody.

6 The petitioner was initially represented by counsel on appeal. Before

the petitioner filed his brief with the Appellate Court, his counsel filed a

motion for leave to withdraw as appellate counsel pursuant to Practice

Book §§ 43-34 and 62-9 (d), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.

Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), which the habeas court granted. In a

handwritten ruling granting that motion, the habeas court indicated that

‘‘[s]entences that are completely served cannot be attacked through habeas

corpus simply because a later sentence was enhanced because of the previous conviction. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491–93 [109 S. Ct. 1923, 104

L. Ed. 2d 540] (1989); Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn.

507, 510–12 [876 A.2d 1178] (2005) [overruled in part on other grounds by

State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014)]. Nor is the state’s sex

offender registration requirement part of the criminal sentence or judgment

of conviction. State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 488–90 [825 A.2d 63]

(2003). Therefore, the petitioner’s claims lack any legal merit and are entirely

frivolous.’’

7 After the petitioner filed his initial appellant’s brief, he filed an amended

brief in which he raised substantially similar arguments.
8 Although the Appellate Court stated that the petitioner had failed to

‘‘brief’’ the claim that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied

his petition for certification to appeal; Goguen v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 195 Conn. App. 505; there is no dispute that the petitioner failed

even to make an allegation to that effect.

9 This court in Simms I assumed that General Statutes (Rev. to 1993)

§ 52-470 (b), now § 52-470 (g), implicated the appellate jurisdiction of the

reviewing court. See Simms v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 186–87 (when

petitioner appeals from judgment of habeas court after petition for certification has been denied, ‘‘the first issue for the appellate tribunal will necessarily

be whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal’’). The court later clarified

in Simms II that, in enacting the statute, ‘‘the legislature intended the

certification requirement only to define the scope of our review and not to

limit the jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal.’’ Simms v. Warden, supra,

230 Conn. 615.

10 Justice Borden authored a concurring opinion in Simms I, in which he

opined that the majority’s conclusion that a disappointed habeas litigant

could still receive plenary review after certification is denied by the habeas

court ‘‘could well eviscerate the limitations contained in [General Statutes

(Rev. to 1993)] § 52-470 (b)’’ and render the denial of the petition for certification ‘‘an empty gesture . . . .’’ Simms v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 191–92

(Borden, J., concurring). Justice Borden also opined that it was unlikely

‘‘that the ‘threshold’ issue [of whether the habeas court abused its discretion

in denying the petition for certification] will be a jurisdictional issue that

we will be able to dispose of prior to hearing the appeal on its merits. Unlike

a question of whether an appeal was timely, a question of whether the

habeas court abused its discretion requires an examination of the merits.’’

Id., 192 (Borden, J., concurring).

11 The Appellate Court expressly noted in McClain v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 188 Conn. App. 72, Mercado v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 183 Conn. App. 558, Brown v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 179 Conn. App. 363, and Parrott v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 107 Conn. App. 237, that the petitioners raised the threshold claim

that the habeas court had abused its discretion when it denied their petitions

for certification to appeal. There is no indication in Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 90 Conn. App. 420, that the petitioner did not

raise that claim.

12 The petitioner in the present case makes no claim that, even if he did

not allege that the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied his

petition for certification to appeal, the Appellate Court should have reviewed

the merits of his claim on appeal because, otherwise, an injustice would

occur. See Simms v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 189 (habeas petitioner can

obtain appellate review of claims despite habeas court’s denial of petition

for certification to appeal if petitioner carries ‘‘burden of persuasion that

denial of certification to appeal was an abuse of discretion or that an injustice

appears to have been done’’). We further note that this court in Simms II

gave no indication that the court in Simms I had recognized two distinct

paths to appellate review if a petition for certification has been denied,

namely, (1) demonstrating an abuse of discretion, or (2) demonstrating that

an injustice appears to have been done. See id. Rather, the court appears

to have assumed that the ‘‘injustice appears to have been done’’ prong was

essentially a reframing of the abuse of discretion prong. Because the issue

has not been raised in the present case, we express no opinion on the matter.

13 We conclude in part III of this opinion that the petitioner’s claims in

the present case lack merit.

14 We further note that the petitioner did not raise either claim in his

habeas petition. A liberal reading of his postjudgment pleadings in the habeas

court, however, reveals that he did attempt to raise these claims at that

time. See, e.g., Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 299 Conn.

140 (‘‘we should be solicitous to [self-represented] petitioners and construe

their pleadings liberally in light of the limited legal knowledge they possess’’).

Moreover, we may review unpreserved claims when the party raising the

claim is unable to prevail. See, e.g., Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc.

v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 157–58, 84 A.3d 840

(2014) (unpreserved claim is reviewable when record is adequate for review,

review cannot result in unfair prejudice to any party, and party raising claim

cannot prevail).

15 The petitioner included in his pleadings to the habeas court a form

prepared by the Connecticut Department of Public Safety indicating that

he would be required to register as a sex offender ‘‘for the period of ten
years following the date of his or her release . . . or until otherwise released

from such obligation in accordance with [Public Acts 1999, No. 99-183, § 6]

. . . .’’ The petitioner alleged in his pleadings that he had been informed

during the 2012 federal court proceedings on charges that he had failed to

register that he was required under Connecticut law to register for the

remainder of his lifetime. As we indicated, neither party has briefed the

state and federal law governing the petitioner’s current obligation to register

as a sex offender. We assume, for purposes of this portion of the opinion,

however, that the petitioner was subject to the registration requirement at

the time he filed his habeas petition. We note that the respondent does not

claim otherwise.

16 In Alaska v. Wright, supra, 141 S. Ct. 1467, a case with remarkable

similarities to the present case, the petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse

of a minor under Alaska law. Id. After the petitioner finished serving his

sentence, he moved to Tennessee, where he failed to register as a sex

offender as required by federal law and pleaded guilty to that offense. Id.,

1467–68. During the course of the federal proceeding, he filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, challenging his Alaska conviction.

Id., 1468. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska rendered

judgment denying the petition, concluding that the petitioner was not in

custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, as required by the governing

federal habeas statute. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court on the ground that the

state conviction was the predicate for the federal conviction. Id. The United

States Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals ‘‘clearly erred’’

under Maleng v. Cook, supra, 490 U.S. 492–93, when it concluded that the

petitioner was in custody pursuant to the judgment of the state court because

his sentence on the state conviction had expired. Alaska v. Wright, supra,

1468. Unlike the petitioner in the present case, the petitioner in Wright

apparently made no claim that the fact that he was subject to Alaska’s sex

offender registration law rendered him in state custody, and the court did

not directly address that issue. Nevertheless, the case provides indirect

support for the proposition that the fact that an individual is subject to a

state sex offender registration law as a result of a state conviction does not

mean that the individual is in custody pursuant to that conviction when the

sentence has fully expired.