SECOND DIVISION 

FILED: September 26, 2006 

No. 1-06-1206 

In re CHARLES A., minor, ) APPEAL FROM THE 

(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ) CIRCUIT COURT OF 

 ) COOK COUNTY 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

 ) 

 WANDA A., ) HONORABLE 

 ) BETTINA M. GEMBALA 

Respondent-Appellant). ) JUDGE PRESIDING. 

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court: 

The respondent, Wanda A., appeals from an order of the circuit court terminating her 

parental rights with her son, C.A. For the reasons which follow, we affirm. 

C.A. was born on August 25, 2003. On September 5, 2003, the State filed a petition 

for adjudication of wardship, alleging that C.A. was neglected pursuant to section 2-4(1)(b) 

of the Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-4(1)(b) (West 2002)) because of the 

respondent's mental disability. According to the petition, the respondent had previously 

been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and had resided in psychiatric rehabilitation 

facilities for approximately five years. 

Following an adjudicatory hearing on February 11, 2004, C.A. was found to be 

neglected based on an injurious environment. On May 19, 2004, a dispositional order was 

entered, finding that the respondent was unable to care for C.A., adjudicating the minor a 

ward of the court, and placing him in the guardianship of the Department of Child and 

Family Services (DCFS). The State filed a supplemental petition for the appointment of a 
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guardian with the right to consent to adoption on March 15, 2005. 

On September 5, 2005, the respondent's attorney filed a motion asking the court to 

hold a fitness to stand trial hearing. The circuit court subsequently denied the motion. 

A termination hearing was held on December 19, 2005, and February 21, 2006. At 

the hearing, Chrissy Reynolds, C.A.'s case worker, testified that C.A. was brought to the 

attention of the DCFS because the respondent had a history of mental illness, the 

respondent tested positive for cocaine at the time of the birth, and the respondent stated 

that she did not want to care for C.A. The respondent was assessed for services, and it 

was determined that she was in need of a drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment plan, 

treatment for her mental illness, and a parenting assessment. Reynolds testified that the 

only service the respondent had complied with was the treatment plan for her mental 

illness, but not on a consistent basis. 

Dr. Tiffany Masson, a clinical psychologist, testified that the respondent was referred 

to her for an evaluation by the court. After examining the respondent and reviewing her 

medical records, Dr. Masson diagnosed her with schizophrenia and schizoaffective 

disorder. Dr. Masson opined that the respondent's mental illness directly impacted her 

ability to discharge her parental responsibilities and that she could not care for the basic 

needs of her child. Dr. Masson also believed that the respondent's mental illness would 

last throughout her lifetime. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found the respondent unfit based 

on her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, failure to make reasonable 
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progress toward the return of the child, and inability to discharge her parental 

responsibilities. The court further found that it was in C.A.'s best interest to terminate the 

respondent's parental rights and appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. 

This appeal followed. 

The respondent argues that the circuit court erred in denying her request for a 

fitness hearing. Under long-established principles of due process, an individual may not be 

criminally prosecuted if he or she is unfit to stand trial. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 

446, 120 L. Ed.2d 353, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 361, 

794 N.E.2d 294 (2002). To ensure these due process rights, a circuit court is required to 

conduct a mental fitness hearing if there exists a bona fide doubt as to a criminal 

defendant's fitness to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist 

in his or her defense. People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464, 475, 670 N.E.2d 700 (1996); 725 

ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2002). Should a criminal defendant be found unfit at the hearing, the 

proceedings may be suspended until he or she recovers. See 725 ILCS 5/104-16 (West 

2002). 

The respondent maintains that, because of her history of mental illness, the circuit 

court was required to conduct a fitness hearing to determine whether she was able to 

understand and participate in her defense at the termination hearing. Because the circuit 

court failed to hold such a hearing, the respondent contends that she was denied her 

constitutional right to due process. We disagree. 

Under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, a person cannot be 
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deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, '

1. A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining custody of his or her child. 

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed.2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); In re 

Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165, 802 N.E.2d 782 (2003). Accordingly, the procedures 

employed in terminating parental rights must comply with the requirements of the due 

process clause. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 363, 751 N.E.2d 

1134 (2001). 

In determining whether a parental rights termination proceeding satisfied the 

constitutional requirements of due process, the factors set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 

424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), must be considered. Lassiter v. 

Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed.2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981); 

In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165. These factors include: (1) the private interest affected 

by the proceeding; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the 

procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural 

safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 

and administrative burdens that the additional or alternative procedures would require. 

Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

Two private interests are involved in a proceeding to terminate parental rights: the 

parent's interest in raising his or her child and the child's interest in a safe and stable home 

environment. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363, 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004). A parent has a 

fundamental desire and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his 
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or her children. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27; In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 365. When a parental 

rights termination proceeding is brought, the State seeks not only to infringe this right, but 

to end it. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. Therefore, a parent has a commanding interest in the 

outcome of a termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. The child also has a 

private interest in his or her own well-being and a stable environment. People v. R.G., 131 

Ill. 2d 328, 354, 546 N.E.2d 533 (1989). Additionally, a child has an interest in ending State 

custody. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d 167, 176, 815 N.E.2d 778 (2004). 

The State, likewise, has an important interest in a parental rights termination 

proceeding. Its interest is twofold: a parens patriae interest in the welfare of the child and 

a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. 

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766; In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 367. 

Because a delay in the adjudication of a termination proceeding can cause grave 

harm to a child and the family, (705 ILCS 405/2-14(a) (West 2002)), parental termination 

cases must be resolved expeditiously. See In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 492, 677 N.E.2d 920 

(1997). The postponement of termination proceedings, for a fitness hearing or until the 

respondent could be restored to fitness, would further delay a child's interest in finding a 

permanent home. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 178. Accordingly, such an indefinite 

postponement would frustrate the State's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of 

the child. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 177-78. 

Determining whether a parent is mentally fit would also impose an increased fiscal 

cost and administrative burden on the State. The State would be required to expend legal 
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resources to establish the respondent's competency and, possibly, be required to pay for 

the treatment to restore her to fitness. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 178. The State 

would also be required to continue to pay for the child's foster care during the delay caused 

by the fitness hearing. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 178. 

Finally, we must consider to what extent the absence of a fitness hearing increased 

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the respondent's rights and the probable value, if 

any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards. The respondent argues that the 

failure to hold a fitness hearing increased the likelihood that her parental rights were 

erroneously terminated where she was unable to understand or participate in her defense. 

The respondent, however, has failed to explain how she could have better assisted her 

attorney had she been found competent to participate in the termination proceedings. She 

has not identified any additional evidence that would have been introduced or presented 

any argument explaining how the outcome of the termination hearing would have been 

different had the proceedings been stayed until she was restored to fitness. 

Additionally, a parent may be found unfit if the parent suffers from a mental 

impairment which renders him or her unable to discharge a parent's normal responsibilities 

for a reasonable period of time. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 305, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001); 

750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 2002). Accordingly, a finding at a fitness hearing that the 

respondent was not mentally fit could have provided additional evidence weighing in favor 

of termination. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 177. 

The current procedures provided for under the Act properly safeguard a parent's 
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rights. Parents have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence, to crossexamine witnesses, to examine court files and records, and to be represented by counsel. 

705 ILCS 405/105(1) (West 2002). In this case, the respondent was represented by 

counsel, who cross-examined witnesses and argued her case. Based upon the record 

before us, we conclude that the absence of a fitness hearing offered little or no risk that the 

respondent's parental rights were erroneously terminated. 

After considering the Matthews factors, we find that the respondent was not denied 

due process by the circuit court's failure to hold a fitness hearing. Having rejected the only 

basis for reversal raised by the respondent, we affirm the circuit court's order terminating 

the respondent's parental rights. 

Affirmed. 

SOUTH, J., concurs. 

HALL, J., dissenting. 
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JUSTICE HALL dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent. In applying the Mathews' factors, I believe the due process 

clause of the federal constitution (U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, ' 1) requires a trial court in a 

termination proceeding to hold a competency hearing for a parent where the parent's 

attorney requests such a hearing, or in the absence of such a request, the behavior of the 

parent suggests to the court that a competency hearing should be held. See In re 

Alexander, 223 Conn. 557, 566, 613 A.2d 780, 785 (1992). In either situation, the standard 

the trial court should be guided by is whether the record before the court contains specific 

factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment. 

In re Alexander, 223 Conn. at 566, 613 A.2d at 785, citing State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 

365, 507 A.2d 992 (1986). 

In this case, the majority maintains that postponing a termination proceeding until a 

competency hearing is completed or until a parent's competency is restored would delay a 

child's interest in finding a permanent home and undermine the State's parens patriae

interest in protecting the child's welfare. This argument is too broad to comport with due 

process and fundamental fairness because in certain cases a parent's competency may be 

restored within a relatively short period of time. Holding a competency hearing would give 

the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning the likelihood that the parent 
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could be restored to competency within a reasonable time. In re Alexander, 223 Conn. at 

564, 613 A.2d at 785. The trial court would then be in a position to determine the most 

appropriate and beneficial course of action. 

The majority also contends that a competency hearing would impose an increased 

fiscal cost and administrative burden on the State. I do not believe that the administrative 

costs of holding a competency hearing are prohibitive when balanced against a parent's 

fundamental right to the care, companionship, custody, and management of his or her 

child. The United States Supreme Court has determined that a parent's interest in retaining 

custody of his or her child outweighs the State's interest in avoiding the comparatively 

minimal costs of a fitness hearing. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n. 9, 31 L. Ed. 

2d 551, 562 n. 9, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1215-16 n. 9 (1972). 

The majority finally contends that where a parent is represented by counsel, the 

absence of a fitness hearing offers little or no risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental 

rights. I disagree. 

A mentally incompetent parent who is unable to understand the nature of a 

termination proceeding or assist his or her attorney in presenting the case could be at a 

severe disadvantage. A mentally incompetent parent may be unable to supply an attorney 

with sufficient information to rebut evidence offered by the State, which, although 

superficially damaging, could be refuted by a competent parent or a witness whose 

availability would be made known by a competent parent. See In re Alexander, 223 Conn. 

at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. In addition, a mentally incompetent parent's ability to offer 
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affirmative proof of the existence or prospect of an ongoing parent-child relationship might 

be significantly compromised. See In re Alexander, 223 Conn. at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. A 

mentally incompetent parent might also be unable to assist his or her attorney in 

establishing tactical and substantive goals at a termination proceeding. See In re 

Alexander, 223 Conn. at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. In sum, there is a substantial risk that a 

mentally incompetent parent, who is unable to understand the nature of a termination 

proceeding or assist his or her attorney in presenting the case, might suffer an erroneous 

deprivation of parental rights even where the parent is represented by counsel.