ORI I Al 

Jfn tbe Wniteb ~tates ~ourt of jf eberal ~!aims 

No. 15-522 C 

(Filed: July 22, 2015) 

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BYRON BEDELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

Defendant. 

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ORDER 

FILED 

JUL 2 2 201 5 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff Byron Bedell, appearing pro se, filed a complaint seeking 

damages from defendant for alleged acts of assault, battery, torture, and 

conveying false information. 1 Defendant has moved to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC Rule 12(b)(l). Plaintiff has not filed a 

response, but we need not wait for one because it is clear on the face of the 

complaint that we lack jurisdiction to provide plaintiff the relief he seeks. See 

RCFC Rule 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). 

Plaintiff alleges that federal employees committed a variety of tortious 

and criminal acts against him during his incarceration at the federal 

penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. First, plaintiff alleges that employees 

at the penitentiary tortured him, assaulted and battered him, and treated him in 

other cruel and inhumane ways. Second, he accuses federal employees of 

breaching their contractual and fiduciary duty to investigate and respond to his 

reports of mistreatment. Plaintiff asserts that he informed defendant of these 

crimes, and defendant remained silent instead of taking the opportunity to 

investigate the crimes and respond accordingly. Third, plaintiff alleges that 

1 Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauper is and attached his 

trust account ledger. For good cause shown, we grant that motion. 
defendant conspired to hide its "malfeasance, malum prohibitum, ultra vires 

acts, [and] the obstruction of justice" by concealing evidence of the unlawful 

acts committed by federal employees at the penitentiary. Am. Compl. 3. 

Finally, plaintiff claims that defendant entered into a contract with him 

through the doctrine of acquiescence and acceptance. Specifically, plaintiff 

claims that he "proposed to the defendant" an "expressed contractual 

agreement," and the defendant gave its "consensual agreement to pay the sum 

certain amount of $125 million dollars" for its participation in the alleged 

crimes. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he served a tort claim along with affidavits to 

the Director of the FBI. No one from the FBI responded to plaintiffs 

submission, and plaintiff alleges that defendant's silence is tantamount to 

stipulating, agreeing, and confessing to the crimes alleged. 

Prose plaintiffs are afforded latitude in their filings, see, e.g., Henke v. 

United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and are entitled to a liberal 

construction of their pleadings, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to 

"less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). 

Nonetheless, prose plaintiffs are not relieved of their duty to meet the court's 

jurisdictional requirements. See Henke, 60 F.3d at 799. 

The Tucker Act, this court's primary grant of jurisdiction, only gives 

this court authority to "render judgment upon any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract 

with the United States ... in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 

149l(a)(l) (2012). As quoted above, specifically excluded from the court's 

jurisdiction are cases involving allegations oftortious conduct, such as assault 

and battery and torture as complained of by plaintiff. These claims must 

therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Turning to plaintiffs contract claim, in order to demonstrate that a 

contract exists with the federal government, plaintiff must prove the following 

elements: (1) mutuality of intent to enter into a contractual relationship; (2) 

consideration; (3) an unambiguous offer an acceptance; and ( 4) actual 

authority, either implied or expressed, "on the part of the government signatory 

to bind the government to the contract." Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United 

States, 119 Fed. Cl. 368, 388 (2014) (citing Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 

1184, 118 8 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ). Here, plaintiff alleges that he "proposed" a 

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contract, see Am. Compl. 6, and that the government acquiesced to it by failing 

to respond to it. He does not allege that the government accepted the offer, 

otherwise even intended to enter into a contract, that the parties exchanged 

consideration, or that the government official involved had the authority to 

bind the government to plaintiff's proposal. Plaintiff instead alleges a 

"gotcha" theory of contract formation in which the FBI' s silence in responding 

to plaintiff's correspondence operated to obligate the United States to 

plaintiff's demands. Active acceptance, however, not silence, is required for 

the government to be bound by a contract. See Doe v. United States, 5 8 Fed. 

Cl. 479, 488 (2003) (citing Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United 

States, 142 F.3d 1429, 1433-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Bell/Heery v. 

United States, 739F.3d1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Plaintiffhas notpled the 

elements of a valid contract between himself and the United States. Plaintiff 

has not alleged any facts over which we could exercise jurisdiction. 

Absent a claim over which we have jurisdiction, we must dismiss the 

amended complaint pursuant to rule 12(h)(3). Accordingly, the following is 

ordered: 

1. For good cause shown, plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis is granted. 

2. The clerk of court is directed to dismiss the complaint without 

prejudice and enter judgment accordingly. 

3. Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied as moot. 

Judge 

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