Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2015-124

JULY TERM, 2015

In re C.L. and S.L., Juveniles } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Caledonia Unit,

} Family Division

}

} DOCKET NO. 53/54-5-13 Cajv

Trial Judge: M. Kathleen Manley

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights to her children C.L. and S.L., born in 

September 2002, and June 2009, respectively. On appeal, mother argues that that the court gave 

undue weight to the virtues of the foster parents and erroneously found that C.L.’s concern about 

losing her parents had subsided. We affirm.

In May 2013, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging 

that C.L. and S.L. were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS) based on parental 

neglect. In re C.L., 2014 VT 87, ¶ 2. In a temporary order, the court maintained parental 

custody under a conditional care order. In July 2013, parents stipulated that their children were

CHINS based on children’s absences from school and daycare, parents’ unstable residence, and 

parents’ inability to meet the children’s special needs. Id. ¶ 4. The initial disposition order 

transferred custody to DCF and had concurrent goals of adoption and reunification. This Court 

affirmed mother’s appeal of that order. Id. ¶ 1. The disposition plan required parents to, among 

other things, work with the children’s educators and medical providers, follow directions during 

family time coaching, maintain a safe, clean, and smoke-free home and vehicle, and follow 

parenting programs.

In September 2014, DCF filed petitions to terminate parents’ rights based on lack of 

progress. Following a hearing, the court found the following. Parents have a long history of 

being unable to meet their children’s needs, including chronic unsanitary conditions in the home, 

poor hygiene, ongoing truancy, and inadequate management of parents’ own mental-health 

needs. Parents were unable to provide adequate and safe care for the children, who both have 

special needs and require ongoing repetitive exercises and consistent support. Parents’ skills had 

not improved significantly since the prior disposition order and this stagnation amounted to a

change of circumstances. The court concluded that termination was in the children’s best 

interests insofar as there was no likelihood that parents would be able to resume parental duties 

within a reasonable period of time. Mother appeals.

Mother first argues that in terminating her parental rights, the court gave undue weight to 

the virtues of the foster parents. See In re E.B., 158 Vt. 8, 12 (1992) (observing that “parental 

rights cannot be terminated simply because a child might be better off in another home”). To 
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terminate parental rights, the court must consider four statutory factors: (1) the relationship of the 

child with his or her parents, siblings, foster parents, and others who may significantly affect the 

child’s best interests; (2) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community;

(3) the likelihood that the parent will be able to resume or assume parental duties within a 

reasonable period of time; and (4) whether the parent has played and continues to play a

constructive role in the child’s welfare. See 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The most important factor is 

the likelihood that the parent will be able to resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable 

period of time. See In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 336 (1996).

Here, there is no indication in the record that the court chose to terminate parental rights 

based on a comparison of the foster parents to mother and father. The court properly evaluated 

all of the statutory best-interests criteria. In so doing, the court certainly made findings related to 

the foster parents when it considered the children’s relationship to their foster parents, and the 

children’s adjustment to their current home, school, and community. See 33 V.S.A. 

§ 5114(a)(1), (2). In this regard, the court found that the children have a good relationship with 

their foster parents and have adjusted well to their foster home. The court noted the children’s 

improvements since being placed in their foster home. Upon arriving at the foster home, both 

had difficulty sleeping, S.L. was not toilet trained and not able to speak, and C.L. was quiet, had 

poor hygiene, was unable to make eye contact, and was bullied at school. Within a few weeks, 

both were sleeping through the night, S.L. was toilet trained, they had a routine, and engaged in 

self-care. The children also adjusted to their school, C.L.’s reading had dramatically improved 

and she was focused on hygiene and making friends. In addition, S.L. was diagnosed with a 

condition that interferes with proper speech development, worked consistently with a speech 

therapist, and was able to communicate with speech and make friends.

The court also analyzed the other statutory factors. The court found the children love 

parents and that parents do play a constructive role in the children’s lives. Most importantly, 

however, the court found that parents would not be able to resume parenting within a reasonable 

period of time. Parents did not consistently attend S.L.’s specialized speech therapy sessions. 

Of the sixty-four sessions, father attended sixteen and mother eight. Parents were unable to 

support S.L. in using his new verbal skills and he reverted to his former methods of 

communicating. Parents also did not consistently attend IEP meetings for the children. Of the 

seven meetings, mother attended only one. And parents were at only at one medical 

appointment. Parents required prompting and did not independently praise the children for their 

growth or provide for the children’s emotional safety. Parents failed to attend the children’s 

extracurricular activities. Family time did not progress to being unsupported because parents 

still required coaching and because the home was not clean and safe. In sum, the court found 

that children have extensive needs and require consistency, and parents will not be able to meet 

those needs in a reasonable period of time. This finding is well supported by the evidence and 

supports the court’s decision that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Mother also argues that the record does not support the court’s finding that C.L.’s 

concern about losing her parents has subsided. In its order, the court found that the children 

enjoy seeing their parents and C.L. was “concerned about being adopted and not being able to 

see her parents,” but that “[a]s time has passed this fear has lessened,” and shortly before the 

hearing the social worker met with C.L and she “was excited by the prospect.” Mother contends 

that the record may support a finding that C.L. was enthusiastic about adoption, but it does not 

support that C.L. was now indifferent to the prospect of not being able to see her parents.

In reviewing a termination decision, this Court will affirm the findings unless clearly 

erroneous. In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.).
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Here, the finding was supported by the evidence. The children’s DCF social worker 

testified that in the summer C.L. expressed that she was conflicted because although she loved 

her foster home, she questioned what adoption would mean for her connection with her parents. 

The social further explained that when he spoke with C.L. a week before the final hearing in 

February 2015, C.L. was “very different” and “[felt] comfortable with the relationship she has 

with her parents,” and wanted to be adopted. This testimony adequately supports the court’s 

finding that C.L.’s fear about what would happen to her connection with her parents after 

adoption—by inference the uncertainty about how much she would see her parents—had 

lessened.

In any event, as explained above, the court fully considered all of the statutory factors 

and concluded based on its supported findings that parents would not be able to resume parental 

duties in a reasonable period of time and termination was in the children’s best interests. 

Therefore, there are no grounds to disturb the court’s order terminating parents’ rights.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice