IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60034

Summary Calendar

JOSEPH EDWARD PARKER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

LEAF RIVER CELLULOSE, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 2:14-CV-9

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this case, we are called upon to remedy the Mississippi legislature’s 

alleged drafting oversight. We decline the invitation and instead apply the 

statute as written. 

Plaintiff–Appellant Joseph Edward Parker was an employee of 

Defendant–Appellee Leaf River Cellulose, LLC (“Leaf River”) from 2008 until 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 27, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2013. On December 13, 2013, Leaf River terminated Parker’s employment 

because, contrary to company policy, Parker parked his vehicle in the company 

parking lot with a firearm locked inside. 

Under Mississippi law, with exceptions not pertinent here, a “private 

employer may not establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or rule that has 

the effect of prohibiting a person from transporting or storing a firearm in a 

locked vehicle in any parking lot, parking garage, or other designated parking 

area.” Miss. Code. Ann. § 45-9-55(1). 

Leaf River allegedly violated this law. Based on this alleged violation of 

the law, Parker brought this diversity action seeking damages in excess of 

$75,000. 

The same statute Leaf River allegedly violated further provides that a 

“private employer shall not be liable in a civil action for damages resulting 

from or arising out of an occurrence involving the transportation, storage, 

possession or use of a firearm covered by this section.” Miss. Code. Ann. § 45-

9-55(5). Based on this provision, Leaf River filed a motion to dismiss, which 

the district court granted. The issue is whether a damages claim is available 

to Parker. Applying the law as written, we find no such remedy available.

“The district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de 

novo.” Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2013). We 

must determine whether the allegations, taken as true and viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)).

This case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation. Because 

we are construing a Mississippi statute, we must adhere to the interpretive 

methods of Mississippi courts. See Boatner v. Atlanta Speciality Ins. Co., 115 

F.3d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir. 1997). Where statutory text is plain and 

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unambiguous, Mississippi courts disclaim any interpretive role. See Pat 

Harrison Waterway Dist. v. Cnty. of Lamar, No. 2013-CA-01535-SCT, 2015 WL 

1249679, at *10 (Miss. Mar. 19, 2015) (“Before we engage in statutory 

interpretation, we look to the statute to determine whether interpretation is 

necessary, that is, whether the language is plain, unambiguous, and in need of 

no interpretation.”); Miss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Miss. Div. of 

Medicaid, 21 So.3d 600, 607 (Miss. 2009) (“This Court will not engage in 

statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unambiguous.”). Further, the 

Mississippi Supreme Court has very recently reiterated that its “function is 

not to decide what a statute should provide, but to determine what it does 

provide,” its “constitutional duty is to interpret statutes according to their clear 

meaning,” and its obligation is to “apply the plain meaning of unambiguous 

statutes.” DeSoto Cnty. v. T.D., 160 So.3d 1154, 1156 (Miss. 2015) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

The Mississippi legislature has decided that employers “shall not be 

liable in a civil action for damages resulting from or arising out of an 

occurrence involving the transportation, storage, possession or use of a firearm 

covered by this section.” Miss. Code. Ann. § 45-9-55(5). We find this provision 

plain, unambiguous, and applicable. This is a “civil action for damages” that, 

as alleged, results from and arises out of Parker’s transportation and storage

of a firearm as contemplated by section 45-9-55(1). Accordingly, Leaf River 

cannot be held liable for civil damages and the case must be dismissed.

Parker does not argue that this civil action for damages does not arise 

from his transportation and storage of a firearm. Rather, he argues that the 

statue does not mean quite what it says. We do not quibble with Parker’s 

contention that section 45-9-55 must be read and interpreted as a whole. See

e.g., Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 2011) (“The 

Court looks to the whole of a statute to avoid adhering to one sentence or 

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phrase of statute in a way that skews its true meaning.”). But, as is shown 

when his specific arguments are considered, this gets Parker nowhere. 

Parker argues that the law’s purpose would be confounded if damages 

claims were not permitted, that subsection (5)’s immunity only covers 

situations where “an employee illegally uses the firearm the employer was 

prevented from prohibiting,” that subsections (1) and (5) are in conflict, and 

that we have “power to correct obvious errors.” Each of these arguments fails.

Parker’s purposivist approach to statutory interpretation is at odds with 

the strict textual approach applicable under Mississippi law when the text is 

unambiguous. Further, Parker goes beyond the text and cites legislative 

history in an effort to show that subsection (5) was intended to provide 

employers immunity only in the event of a shooting. Under Mississippi law, 

however, legislative history is a tool of “statutory construction” only employed 

after a finding that the text is ambiguous. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 160 So.3d 

188, 193 (Miss. 2015). That Parker’s invocation of legislative intent is 

inconsistent with the statutory text is laid bare by Parker’s stark plea: “Let

Legislative Purpose Control Over Words.” This we will not do. See DeSoto 

Cnty., 160 So.3d at 1156.

“Where statutes are ambiguous or in conflict with one another, it is 

proper to resort to the rules of statutory construction.” Miss. Gaming Comm’n 

v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 751 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Miss. 1999). Parker 

believes subsections (1) and (5) are in conflict if, as it seems, the first provision 

prohibits certain conduct and the second provides that a violator is not liable 

for damages in a civil action. This is plainly wrong. Subsection (5) does not 

nullify or conflict with subsection (1). It merely precludes plaintiffs from 

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seeking a specific remedy—damages in a civil action. Parker’s choice to pursue 

the one remedy subsection (5) denies does not bespeak conflict.1

Next, Parker asks we correct the Mississippi legislature’s purported 

“obvious” error by adding the phrase “other than for a violation of subsection 

(1) of this section” to the end of subsection (5). If there is an error here, it is 

not obvious. This case is not like Roseberry v. Norsworthy, a case cited by 

Parker in which the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded with “irresistible 

conviction” that the legislature committed a “mere clerical error” by using the 

word “maximum” when it meant “minimum.” See 100 So. 514, 517 (Miss. 

1924). Nor is this case like Martin v. State, where the Mississippi legislature 

committed another clerical error—using the word “and” where it intended to 

use the word “are.” See 199 So. 98, 101 (Miss. 1940.) We cannot very well add 

eleven words to the statute and claim to be correcting a clerical error. Absent 

undeniable evidence of error, such a course would be especially inappropriate 

given that we are a federal court applying state law in a diversity action. The 

legislature may rewrite the law, we will not.

Parker’s final argument dispenses with statutory interpretation 

altogether. In McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., the Mississippi 

Supreme Court identified two “narrow” exceptions to the at-will employment 

doctrine: (1) where the employee is discharged for refusing to participate in

illegal acts, and (2) where the employee “is discharged for reporting illegal 

acts.” 626 So.2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993). Only to that “limited extent” have 

Mississippi courts created “public policy exceptions to the age old common law 

rule of employment at will.” Id. Per Parker, we “should adopt a third public 

 

1 As an alternative basis for affirmance, Leaf River argues section 45-9-55 does not 

provide a private right of action. We do not reach this argument, but the existence of the 

issue illustrates the lack of conflict here. Not every statutory violation gives rise to a private 

lawsuit, or to a claim for damages.

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policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.” In other words, 

notwithstanding subsection (5) and Mississippi’s robust at-will employment 

doctrine, we should create a cause of action that permits Parker’s suit to go 

forward. The common law is not a means to end-run legislative enactments, 

and we will not effectively abrogate subsection (5) by judicial fiat. 

AFFIRMED.

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