Filed 7/21/15 P. v. Rude CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAXWELL RUDE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B255269

(Super. Ct. No. 2013004886)

(Ventura County)

Maxwell Rude appeals a judgment of conviction entered following his 

guilty plea to possession of marijuana for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.)1 We 

conclude that the trial court properly denied Rude's motion to suppress evidence, and 

affirm. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1).) 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Ventura County prosecutor filed a complaint charging Rude with 

possession of marijuana for sale, and cultivation of marijuana. (§§ 11359, 11358.) Rude 

filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained during his detention in a traffic 

stop. This evidence was presented at the combined preliminary examination and 

suppression hearing:

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless stated 

otherwise.
2

In the course of a "hit-and-run" investigation, a Ventura County sheriff's 

deputy visited the residence at 144 Charo Avenue in Thousand Oaks. Inside the 

residence, the deputy smelled a marijuana odor and heard fans operating. A resident 

informed the deputy that Rude lived there and grew marijuana. Thereafter, Deputies

Shane Matthews and Peter Frank conducted surveillance of the Charo Avenue residence

and confirmed that Rude lived there. The deputies then obtained a search warrant to 

search the property.

On February 12, 2013, Matthews and Frank drove to the Charo Avenue 

residence to execute the search warrant. They first conducted surveillance outside for 20 

to 30 minutes and saw Rude leave the residence, enter a vehicle, and drive away. Frank 

instructed another deputy in a marked patrol vehicle to follow Rude and initiate a traffic 

stop. Matthews testified that the deputy was "following [Rude] away and looking for a 

reason to stop him." At a point 3.3 miles from the residence, Rude provided a reason--he 

tossed a burning cigarette from his vehicle. 

Within minutes, Matthews and Frank arrived at the traffic stop and 

informed Rude that he would be detained pending execution of the search warrant. Rude 

was standing outside his vehicle and was not handcuffed. Frank then requested to view 

Rude's cellular telephone to look for text messages relating to drug sales. Rude 

consented and provided his telephone. Frank immediately found a text message on the 

telephone regarding a drug transaction; the text message was the first message that he 

opened. The two deputies then returned to the Charo Avenue residence to assist in the 

preliminary execution of the search warrant. 

Within 10 to 20 minutes of Rude's traffic stop, the deputies arrived at his

residence. The search team eventually found 20 marijuana plants, 100 grams of 

processed marijuana, a scale, and documents addressed to Rude. Matthew Clark, another 

resident, stated that Rude was growing marijuana and that he assisted Rude in packaging 

and selling the drug. 

Within 10 to 15 minutes of their arrival, Matthews and Frank allowed other 

deputies to complete execution of the warrant and they returned to Rude's traffic stop. 
3

After advice and waiver of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 

436, Rude later admitted in a police interview that he was involved in marijuana sales.

The trial court denied Rude's motion to suppress evidence and held him to 

answer for the one count of possession of marijuana for sale, and one count of cultivation 

of marijuana. (§§ 11359, 11358.) After the prosecutor filed a two-count information 

alleging the same counts, Rude renewed his suppression motion. Following argument by 

the parties, the court denied the motion.

Rude then pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marijuana for sale. 

(§ 11359.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted Rude 36 months 

of felony probation with terms and conditions, including 90 days of confinement in jail. 

Rude appeals and contends that the trial court erred by denying his 

suppression motion.

DISCUSSION

Relying on Bailey v. United States (2013) - U.S. - [185 L.Ed.2d 19], Rude 

asserts that the Fourth Amendment precluded his detention because the deputies detained 

him beyond the immediate vicinity of the search location, his Charo Avenue residence.

I.

One week following Rude's detention and arrest, the United States Supreme 

Court decided Bailey v. United States, supra, - U.S. - [185 L.Ed.2d 19]. In Bailey, while 

police officers were preparing to execute a warrant to search an apartment for a handgun, 

detectives conducting surveillance outside the apartment saw Bailey and another man 

leave the apartment and drive away. The detectives followed the two men and detained 

them approximately one mile from the apartment. During a patdown search, the 

detectives found keys to the apartment in Bailey's pocket. The detectives then 

handcuffed the two men and drove them to the apartment where the search team was 

conducting the search. (Id. at p. - [185 L.Ed.2d 19, 26-27].)

The Supreme Court concluded that Bailey's detention was unreasonable 

because he "was detained at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of the 

immediate vicinity of the premises in question." (Bailey v. United States, supra, -U.S. -, -
4

[185 L.Ed.2d 19, 33].) "Detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant are 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the limited intrusion on personal liberty 

is outweighed by the special law enforcement interests at stake. Once an individual has 

left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched, however, detentions must be 

justified by some other rationale." (Id. at p. - [185 L.Ed.2d 19, 34].) Such other

rationales include a brief stop for questioning based on reasonable suspicion, or an arrest 

based on probable cause. (Ibid.)

II.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Navarette v. California (2014) – U.S. - [188 L.Ed.2d 

680]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053-1054.) A detention is reasonable 

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific 

articulable facts that, in light of the totality of circumstances, provide some objective 

manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity. (Navarette, 

at p. - [188 L.Ed.2d 680, 686]; Suff, at pp. 1053-1054.) Ordinary traffic stops are 

investigatory detentions for which law enforcement officers must articulate specific facts 

justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed. (Suff, at p. 1054; In re 

Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307.)

Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the motivations of the detaining police 

officer are irrelevant to the reasonableness of a traffic stop. (People v. Suff, supra, 58 

Cal.4th 1013, 1054.) "'All that is required is that, on an objective basis, the stop "not be 

unreasonable under the circumstances."'" (Ibid. [motorist violated Vehicle Code by not 

signaling turn].) Pretextual traffic stops are not unlawful. (Whren v. United States

(1996) 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 [constitutionality of traffic stop does not depend on 

"ulterior motive" of officer involved]; People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 

238 [after officer stopped and detained motorist for broken taillight, officer received 

motorist's consent to search vehicle for weapons or narcotics]; People v. Gomez (2004) 

117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537 ["Stopping defendant's vehicle for a seatbelt violation, even if 

done as a pretext for the narcotics investigation, was entirely legal"].)
5

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, we defer to the 

court's factual express and implied findings that are supported by substantial evidence. 

(People v. Suff, supra, 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053 To determine whether the search or seizure 

is reasonable pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. 

(Ibid.) 

In the exercise of our independent judgment, we conclude that the traffic 

stop here was constitutionally reasonable because Rude violated the law by littering with 

a cigarette. (Veh. Code, § 23111 [prohibiting the discharge of a lighted or nonlighted 

cigarette on any road or highway]; Pen. Code, § 374.4, subd. (a) [prohibiting littering on 

public or private property].) Viewed objectively, the circumstances justified Rude's 

detention. (Kentucky v. King (2011) - U.S. -, - [179 L.Ed.2d 865, 877] [the standard is 

whether the circumstances viewed objectively justify the police action].) It matters not 

that the deputies did not cite Rude for the littering violation; police officers may effect a 

traffic stop to warn or counsel motorists regarding traffic violations. Once detained, 

Frank arrived within minutes and asked to view the text messages on Rude's telephone. 

Rude consented to the telephone search and the first text message that Frank viewed 

concerned a drug transaction. This information permitted Rude's additional detention for 

further investigation. It also provided probable cause to arrest him for violation of the 

drug laws. (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 474 [probable cause exists when facts 

known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution" that the 

person to be arrested has committed a crime].)

III.

At Rude's request, we granted permission to the parties to file supplemental 

letter briefs regarding application of Rodriguez v. United States (2015) - U.S. - [191 

L.Ed.2d 492] to Rude's detention. Relying on Rodriguez, Rude contends that his 

detention was prolonged beyond the time required to address his littering violation. 

"[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by 

the seizure's 'mission' - to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop." (Id. at 
6

p. 498 [seven- or eight-minute delay to allow a canine officer to sniff for narcotics during

a traffic stop is an unreasonable seizure absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity].) 

Rodriguez v. United States, supra, - U.S. - [191 L.Ed.2d 492], does not 

assist Rude. Here, "within a couple minutes, five minutes" of the traffic stop, Deputy 

Frank received Rude's consent to view the text messages on Rude's cellular telephone. 

The first message that Frank viewed concerned the sale of drugs. Within "a couple 

minutes," deputies had a reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop beyond its initial 

littering violation purpose. Investigative questions during a routine traffic stop are 

permissible as long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would otherwise 

take to carry out the officer's duties pertaining to the stop, e.g., examine the motorist's 

driver's license and vehicle registration, explain the violation, and issue a warning or 

citation. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980-982.) These steps "'require[] a 

certain amount of time to accomplish.'" (Id. at p. 981.) Certainly within the time 

necessary to examine Rude's driver's license and identification, Frank received Rude's 

consent to search his telephone. 

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P.J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
7

Brian J. Back, Donald D. Coleman, Jeffrey Bennett, Judges

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender, William Quest, Public Defender, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.