J-A19026-15 

2015 PA Super 160 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

PATRICK SCOTT JONES 

 Appellant No. 1286 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 1, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0001833-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015 

 Appellant Patrick Scott Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas following his bench trial 

conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances 

(Schedule I metabolite - marijuana) (“DUI”),1 for which the trial court 

imposed a sentence of sixty (60) months’ intermediate punishment, with the 

first 105 days to be served on house arrest with electronic monitoring, and a 

$1,500.00 fine.2 We affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(iii). 

2

 The trial court also convicted Appellant of the summary offenses of 

operation following suspension of registration, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1371, and 

surrender of registration plates and cards upon suspension, 75 Pa.C.S. § 

1376, but imposed no further penalty for these convictions. 
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On the morning of April 28, 2013, an Adams Township Police 

Department officer stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to a suspended 

registration. Upon approaching Appellant, the officer immediately noticed a 

strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Appellant’s vehicle, in which 

Appellant was the sole occupant. After speaking with Appellant regarding 

the suspended registration, the officer ordered Appellant from the vehicle 

and placed him in handcuffs. Subsequently, the officer asked Appellant to 

submit to chemical blood testing, and Appellant agreed. The chemical blood 

test indicated that Appellant had 7.7 nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9-THC 

in his blood and 100 nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9-Carboxy THC in his 

blood.3

 Appellant filed a suppression motion on December 19, 2013. At the 

beginning of the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth conceded to the 

suppression of several items of evidence seized after Appellant was placed in 

handcuffs. See N.T. 4/3/2014, p. 3. However, the trial court continued the 

hearing to determine whether the officer had the right to detain Appellant 

and test his blood based on the smell of marijuana emanating from the 

vehicle. See id. at 3-6. On May 13, 2014, the trial court granted the 

suppression motion in part and denied it in part. The court granted 

____________________________________________ 

3

 THC stands for tetrahydrocannabinol and is the active ingredient of 

marijuana. THC is referred to in blood chemical reports as Delta-9-THC. 

The chemical names for THCC, the metabolite of marijuana, are 11-HydroxyDelta-9-THC and Delta-9-Carboxy THC. 
J-A19026-15 

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suppression of all “evidence seized subsequent to [Appellant] being placed in 

handcuffs, with the exception of the blood test results.” Trial Court Order, 

May 13, 2014, p. 2. 

 The trial court conducted a bench trial on August 1, 2014, during 

which the Commonwealth introduced the results of Appellant’s blood test 

into evidence. The trial court convicted and sentenced Appellant as 

discussed, supra. Appellant timely appealed.4

Appellant raises the following two claims for review: 

I. Whether a mere odor of marijuana emanating from the inside 

of a motor vehicle supports a finding of probable cause to arrest 

for driving under the influence[?] 

II. Whether the blood alcohol results should be suppressed as 

fruit of the poisonous tree as a result of an illegal arrest[?] 

Appellant’s Brief, p. 2 (all capitals removed). 

This Court’s well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence is as follows: 

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only 

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court 

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4

 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [] 

plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing the 

results of chemical blood testing to which he consented during the course of 

his arrest. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 9-17. Specifically, Appellant claims 

that, because police cannot request chemical testing pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1547 for an alcohol-based DUI based solely on the smell of alcohol, the 

police should not have been allowed to request that he submit to chemical 

blood testing based solely on the smell of marijuana in his vehicle. He 

argues that corroborating evidence must exist in addition to the odor of 

marijuana to allow authorities to request that a driver submit to a section 

1547 blood test for controlled substances. See id. at 15. He requests that, 

for the purposes of a probable cause analysis, this Court regard the odor of 

marijuana the same as the odor of alcohol and rule that the smell of 

marijuana in isolation does not provide the requisite “reasonable grounds” to 

allow police to request a motorist submit to chemical testing pursuant to 

section 1547. See id. at 12-14. Otherwise stated, he argues that 
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uncorroborated police testimony regarding the odor of marijuana is an 

insufficient foundation to request section 1547 testing. We do not agree. 

 The Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part: 

§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance 

(a) General impairment.-- 

. . . 

(d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle under any of the following circumstances: 

(1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a: 

(i) Schedule I controlled substance. . . ; 

. . . 

(iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i) or 

(ii). 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802. The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic 

Act classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. 35 Pa.C.S. § 

780-104(1)(iv). Additionally, 

(a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in 

actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this 

Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or 

more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of 

determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a 

controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to 

believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual 

physical control of the movement of a vehicle: 

(1) in violation of section 1543(b)(1.1) (relating to driving 

while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3802 

(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) or 3808(a)(2) (relating to illegally operating a 

motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock)[.] 
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75 Pa.C.S. § 1547. “[T]o administer a blood test under § 1547(a)(1), a 

police officer need only have reasonable grounds to believe that a person 

was driving under the influence of alcohol [or controlled substances]. 

‘Reasonable grounds’ has been interpreted to mean ‘probable cause;’ thus, 

the police officer must have ‘knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances, 

gained through trustworthy information, to warrant a prudent man in the 

belief that a crime has been committed.’” Commonwealth v. Aiello, 675 

A.2d 1278, 1280 (Pa.Super.1996) (internal citations omitted).5

____________________________________________ 

5

 Regarding probable cause, we note: 

“[P]robable cause does not involve certainties, but rather ‘the 

factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men act.’” Commonwealth v. Wright,

867 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Romero, [] 673 A.2d 374, 376 (1996)). “It 

is only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal 

activity that is a standard of probable cause.” Commonwealth 

v. Monaghan, [] 441 A.2d 1318 (1982) (citation omitted). See 

also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 

L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (holding that probable cause means “a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found.”); Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 

(Pa.Super.2004) (reciting that probable cause exists when 

criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the 

most likely inference). To this point on the quanta of evidence 

necessary to establish probable cause, the United States 

Supreme Court recently noted that “[f]inely tuned standards 

such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance 

of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 

[]probable-cause[] decision.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 

366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (citations 

omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa.Super.2005). 
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Here, at the suppression hearing, Adams Township police officer Ed 

Lentz gave uncontroverted testimony that, upon approaching Appellant’s 

car, he immediately smelled a very strong odor of burnt marijuana 

emanating from the car. See N.T. April 3, 2014, pp. 13-14, 17. Officer 

Lentz had absolutely no question that what he smelled was indeed burnt 

marijuana.6 Id. at 14. He further explained that Appellant was the sole 

occupant of the vehicle. Id. at 21. 

Initially, Appellant cites numerous cases7 to support his argument that 

the smell of burnt marijuana alone is insufficient to support a police officer’s 

request that a motorist submit to blood testing pursuant to section 1547. 

____________________________________________ 

6

 The officer had previously testified as to his training and experience 

identifying the odor of burnt marijuana, which he described as “very 

distinct.” N.T. 4/3/2-14, pp. 7-8. 

7 Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231 (Pa.2011); Commonwealth 

v. Graham, 81 A.3d 137 (Pa.Super.2013) appeal denied, 93 A.3d 462 

(Pa.2014); Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115 (Pa.Super.2008); 

Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa.Super.2008);

Commonwealth v. Leighty, 693 A.2d 1324 (Pa.Super.1997); 

Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90 (Pa.Super.1995) aff’d, 683 A.2d 

289 (Pa.1996); Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 676 A.2d 1217 

(Pa.Super.1996); Commonwealth v. Rishel, 658 A.2d 352 

(Pa.Super.1995) appeal granted, judgment vacated, 682 A.2d 1267 

(Pa.1996); Commonwealth v. Hipp, 551 A.2d 1086 (Pa.Super.1988); 

Commonwealth v. Monaghan, 441 A.2d 1318 (Pa.Super.1982); 

Commonwealth v. Labiaux, 434 A.2d 194 (Pa.Super.1981); 

Commonwealth v. Guiliano, 418 A.2d 476 (Pa.Super.1980); 

Commonwealth v. Funk, 385 A.2d 995 (Pa.Super.1978); Commonwealth 

v. Reynolds, 389 A.2d 1113 (Pa.Super.1978). 
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See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 12-14. Appellant correctly suggests that his cited 

cases stand for the proposition that the smell of alcohol alone is not 

sufficient to justify a request for a section 1547 blood test for suspected 

alcohol-based DUIs, and that such a request requires some further indicia of 

intoxication, such as erratic driving, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, balance 

issues, etc. However, Appellant’s cited cases are distinguishable because 

they involve suspected alcohol-based DUIs, not marijuana-based DUIs. 

Because there are no on-point Pennsylvania cases, Appellant analogizes the 

smell of marijuana to the smell of alcohol and suggests that, as with 

suspected cases of alcohol-based DUI, the police must have corroborating 

evidence to request blood tests. Id. 

However, the Vehicle Code treats consumption of alcohol differently 

from consumption of marijuana. The Vehicle Code does not preclude an 

adult from consuming any amount of alcohol and then operating a motor 

vehicle in Pennsylvania. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a). Instead, the Vehicle 

Code precludes the operation of a motor vehicle only “after imbibing a 

sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of 

safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement 

of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). On the other hand, the Vehicle 

Code precludes an individual from operating a motor vehicle with any

amount of scheduled controlled substance, or a metabolite thereof, in the 

driver’s blood. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d). Because marijuana is a Schedule I 

controlled substance, the Vehicle Code prohibits an individual from operating 
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a vehicle after consuming any amount of marijuana. As a result, unlike 

cases where police suspect alcohol-based DUI, evidence of operator 

consumption of any marijuana is enough to allow police to request a section 

1547 blood test for suspected controlled substance-based DUI.8 Such 

evidence includes the distinct odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a 

vehicle in which the operator is the sole occupant.9

Therefore, in the instant case, under the proper standard of review, 

the evidence presented that the police officer smelled a strong, distinct odor 

of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle in which Appellant was the only 

occupant suffices to have allowed the police to request a blood test pursuant 

to section 1547. Accordingly, the trial court properly ruled that “the officer 

was justified in reasonably believing that [Appellant] had been operating his 

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8

 We note that Yedinak, supra, concerned a DUI arrest based solely on 

marijuana use and discussed multiple impairment indicia (trouble 

walking/balancing and unsafe driving) in addition to an odor of marijuana in 

discussing the propriety of blood testing. However, Yedniak is inapposite to 

the instant matter because in that case the police observed the numerous 

impairment indicia prior to conducting the traffic stop. 

9

 We note that Graham and Griffith, supra, involved prescription 

medication controlled substance DUIs or combined prescription medication 

and alcohol-based DUIs, and both involved an examination of multiple 

indicia of impairment, as with alcohol-based DUI arrests. We note, however, 

that prescription medications lack the distinctive odor of burnt marijuana. 

Therefore, in such cases, police have no choice but to investigate and 

observe, as in alcohol-based cases, a combination of indicia of impaired 

driving prior to requesting blood samples or making an arrest, regardless of 

the fact the Vehicle Code prohibits the operation of motor vehicles with any 

such controlled substance or metabolite thereof in the driver’s bloodstream. 
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vehicle after smoking marijuana which then [gave the officer] the authority 

to ask [Appellant] to submit to having a sample of his blood taken.” May 13, 

2014 Order, p. 2. The trial court did not err in denying suppression of the 

blood test results.10

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/24/2015 

____________________________________________ 

10 Because Appellant’s arrest was legal as discussed supra, his claim that 

the blood test results were “fruit of the poisonous tree” fails. See

Commonwealth. v. Shaffer, 710 A.2d 89, 92 (Pa.Super.1998) (“The 

remedy for an illegal arrest in Pennsylvania is suppression of the fruits of the 

illegal arrest. “) (emphasis provided).