IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville July 21, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRADLEY DALE FELTON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2004-D-3086 Monte Watkins, Judge

No. M2014-02333-CCA-R3-CD – Filed July 27, 2015

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Appellant, Bradley Dale Felton, pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child, a Class B 

felony, and received an eight-year sentence, suspended to probation after serving one 

year in custody. A probation violation warrant was filed, and the trial court sustained the 

violation and ordered appellant to serve fifteen weekends in jail and extended his 

probation by one year. Appellant was subsequently arrested on a capias warrant for 

failing to serve his weekends in a consecutive manner, and following a revocation 

hearing, the trial court ordered his sentence into execution. Appellant now appeals the 

judgment of the trial court, arguing that he was never ordered to serve his weekends 

consecutively. The State concedes that appellant is correct and that the trial court should 

be reversed. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN

and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Glenn Dukes (second revocation hearing and appeal) and David Dearolf (first revocation 

hearing and contempt hearing), Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Bradley Dale 

Felton.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Caitlin Smith, Assistant Attorney 

General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Brian Keith Holmgren, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
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OPINION

I. Procedural History and Facts

A. Procedural History

On August 25, 2006, appellant pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child, a Class 

B felony, as a lesser-included offense of the indicted offense of rape of a child. He 

received an eight-year sentence, suspended to probation after serving one year in custody, 

conditioned upon his receiving sex offender treatment and his having no contact with the 

victim or any other minor children. He was also required to submit to polygraph 

examinations every six months. 

On February 6, 2014, a probation violation warrant was issued, alleging that

appellant failed to attend three sex offender treatment classes and failed to schedule and 

take polygraph examinations as instructed by his probation officer. 

B. Probation Revocation Hearing

The trial court held a hearing concerning the allegations set forth in the February 

6, 2014 petition on March 28, 2014. The State‟s first witness was Amanda Roberts with 

the Tennessee Department of Probation and Parole. She had supervised appellant‟s 

probation since May 2013, and she requested the probation violation warrant in this case. 

Ms. Roberts stated that one of the conditions of appellant‟s probation as a sex offender 

was to submit to a polygraph examination two times per year at his own expense. 

Appellant‟s last known polygraph was performed in August 2011. He was scheduled for 

a polygraph on November 5, 2013, but he missed his appointment because he overslept. 

The polygraph was rescheduled for December 9, 2013, but he was unable to keep the 

appointment because his family was going to supply the funds for the examination, but 

they were prevented from traveling home due to snow. 

In addition, Ms. Roberts testified that appellant was suspended from treatment by 

the sex offender treatment provider for failure to pay fees and failure to submit to a 

polygraph examination. She read from a document, “He must pay his fees . . . by 

December 17, 2013, and have a written plan to pay for and take a polygraph exam by 

January 31, 2014.” Appellant failed to submit to an exam by the required date. 

Another basis for the probation violation warrant was appellant‟s failure to attend 

sex offender treatment classes. He missed three classes: on November 12, 2013, he 

missed class because he said that he had “family issues” — his girlfriend and his mother 

were arguing with each other; on December 3, 2013, he did not have transportation; and 

on February 3, 2014, Ms. Roberts did not obtain appellant‟s excuse because the warrant 
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had already been written. In the meantime, Jack Tracy had communicated to Ms. Roberts 

potentially discharging appellant from the program due to inconsistent attendance and 

nonpayment of treatment fees. Ms. Roberts said that she waited two to three months for 

appellant to achieve compliance before filing the probation violation warrant, but he 

failed to do so. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Roberts if she was aware that 

appellant had been in jail for twelve months during the time he failed to submit to 

polygraph examination, and she was not. He asked Ms. Roberts if she knew that 

appellant had an appointment for a polygraph the week after the probation violation 

hearing, and she was unaware of that appointment. Ms. Roberts acknowledged that 

appellant had not violated the terms of his GPS monitoring and that he checked in with 

her prior to traveling to an address to work. She confirmed that from the time appellant 

posted bond after the violation warrant was served, he had reported as scheduled and had 

attended classes. Appellant also secured permanent living arrangements. 

Appellant then testified on his own behalf and stated that he had not committed 

any violations with regard to his GPS monitoring, that he had a polygraph scheduled for 

the following week, and that he had not missed any classes since being released on bond. 

He said that he lost his driver‟s license because of a DUI conviction but that it should be 

reinstated within two weeks of the hearing, so he would no longer have to depend upon 

others for transportation. 

On cross-examination, appellant admitted that this was his fourth probation 

violation in two years and that one of those years had been spent in jail. On redirect 

examination, appellant stated that he contacted Mr. Tracy when he was going to miss a 

class and that he was able to make up the treatment classes that he had missed. 

The trial court concluded that appellant had “made some progress” during the last 

several years but that he knew he had to submit to polygraph examinations and could not 

continue to “come up with lame excuses for not being able to do” so. The court extended 

appellant‟s probation for one year and ordered him to serve fifteen weekends in custody. 

Appellant was allowed to serve on weekends so that he could continue to work and care 

for his children. 

C. Contempt Hearing

A contempt hearing was held on August 6, 2014, because appellant had failed to 

serve his fifteen weekends. Appellant testified that he was unaware that he was ordered 

to serve the weekends consecutively. He stated that he appeared at the jail on the Friday 

immediately following the revocation hearing but that the jailer would not allow him to 
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serve that weekend because the jail did not yet have a record of his sentence. He had

served five weekends at the time of the contempt hearing. 

Appellant explained that he did not serve his sentences consecutively because his 

parents, with whom his children resided, were international horse judges who traveled 

extensively during the summer months. He said that he contacted Ms. Roberts and 

informed her of the situation and that she assured him that she would talk with the 

assistant district attorney. Appellant stated that he called Ms. Roberts several times when 

he could not report to jail and that she repeatedly informed him, “„Yes, . . . you‟re fine.‟” 

Ms. Roberts was called to testify, and she stated that the first communication she 

had with appellant with regard to his serving weekends occurred in July 2014. She 

disagreed that she “allowed” him to not report due to his child care situation. When 

appellant would inform her of his inability to report to serve a weekend, she would advise 

him that the judge ordered him to do so and that he should comply or risk being revoked. 

She first addressed the situation with the district attorney‟s office in July. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Roberts testified that it was not her understanding that 

appellant‟s weekends were to be served consecutively, nor did she believe that appellant 

understood that they were to be served consecutively. She did not file a probation 

violation warrant for his failure to serve consecutive weekends because the judgment 

order that she had did not specify consecutive service. Ms. Roberts stated that when 

appellant contacted her in July, he planned to serve the following weekend; however, he 

was arrested on a capias warrant on July 16 and was not able to surrender for the 

weekend. 

At the close of the hearing, the trial court found appellant in contempt of court for 

failing to serve on consecutive weekends as ordered and sentenced appellant to ten days 

in jail. Moreover, the trial court scheduled the matter for a formal probation revocation 

hearing the following week for final resolution of the matter. 

D. Second Probation Revocation Hearing

At the August 22, 2014 probation revocation hearing, neither party called 

additional witnesses or presented evidence. After reviewing the prior proceedings, the 

trial court ordered execution of appellant‟s sentence. It is from this judgment that 

appellant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation for failing to 

adhere to a schedule for serving on weekends when he was never ordered to do so. The 
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State agrees, adding that the judgment ordering appellant to serve fifteen weekends in jail 

and extending his probation by one year did not require appellant to complete the 

weekends in a consecutive fashion. We agree with the parties. 

The revocation of a suspended sentence rests in the sound discretion of the trial 

judge. State v. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. 

Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). In determining whether to 

revoke probation, it is not necessary that the trial judge find that a violation of the terms 

of the probation has occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 

79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant has violated the conditions of probation, the court is granted the authority to: 

(1) order confinement; (2) order execution of the sentence as originally entered; (3) return 

the defendant to probation on appropriate modified conditions; or (4) extend the 

defendant‟s probationary period by up to two years. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-308(a), -

308(c), -310, -311(e)(1); see State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999). The 

appellate standard of review of a probation revocation is abuse of discretion. See State v. 

Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 554 (Tenn. 2001); see also State v. Reams, 265 S.W.3d 423, 430 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). Generally, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it applies 

incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly 

erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the 

complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. 

Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 38-40 (Tenn. 2010)). In the context of probation revocations, for 

this court to find an abuse of discretion, “there must be no substantial evidence to support 

the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation has 

occurred.” Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d at 554; see also State v. Pamela J. Booker, No. E2012-

00809-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 6632817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2012).

In this case, when the trial court sustained appellant‟s probation violation in March 

2014, it ordered him to serve fifteen weekends in jail and extended his probation. At the 

close of the hearing, the court stated, “I am extending [appellant‟s probation] for a year. 

He‟s going to serve fifteen weekends; that way he will continue to work and take care of 

his children. But he must stay in compliance.” The trial court did not specify that the 

weekends must be served consecutively. We note that in the “Special Conditions” 

section of the judgment form where the trial court ordered appellant to serve fifteen

weekends and extended his probation, the trial court did not order that the weekends must 

be served consecutively. 

We conclude that appellant was not ordered to serve the fifteen weekends 

consecutively. Accordingly, we find “no substantial evidence to support the conclusion 

of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred.” Id. The 

trial court abused its discretion in ordering appellant‟s sentence into execution.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the record as a whole, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable legal 

authority, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

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ROGER A. PAGE, JUDGE