*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 29, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-51351

Summary Calendar

 

THE CADLE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE STATE OF TEXAS; FORT WORTH 

COURT OF APPEALS; JOHN CORNYN, 

Attorney General, Individually 

and as Attorney General of the 

State of Texas; JOHN C. ADAMS, 

Individually and in his official 

capacity as an Assistant Attorney 

General; SAM DAY, Honorable, in 

his official capacity as Justice 

of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals; 

JOHN CAYCE, Honorable, in his 

official capacity as Judge of the 

67th District Court, Tarrant County, 

Texas,

Defendants-Appellees.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-02-CV-566

 

Before GARWOOD, DEMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

467 and 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923). 

2

The Cadle Company (Cadle) filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional due-process violations in

connection with the issuance and enforcement of a 1996 contempt

decree which culminated in a $461,000 contempt sanction. The

district court dismissed the suit pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman1

doctrine. The only issues raised on appeal concern whether the

district court erred in assessing the allegations of the complaint

and whether Cadle’s claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.

Accordingly, Cadle has waived any argument that the district court

erred in its other rulings. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy

Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Although the district court was required to accept the

allegations of the complaint as true, the district court was not

required to accept as true the legal conclusion that the state

court judgments were void for lack of jurisdiction. See FernandezMontes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).

Contrary to Cadle’s arguments, the record reflects that the

district court accepted the salient factual allegations as true and

did not dismiss the case on account of Cadle’s failure to allege

its claims with particularity.

The district court did not err in dismissing the suit pursuant
2We also note that it is undisputed and apparent from the

allegations of the amended complaint that the challenged contempt

orders were issued by a court with jurisdiction of the parties and

subject matter and jurisdiction to enter the judgment rendered and

which had the capacity to act as a court. See U.S. v. Shepherd, 23

F.3d 923, 925 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). We further observe in this

connection that the challenged monetary sanctions imposed thereby

were civil, coercive sanctions, not criminal or punitive sanctions,

Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 667-68 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth,

2001) (en banc), and that (as is undisputed and is apparent from

the allegations of the amended complaint) the Texas courts have

rejected Cadle’s attacks on the challenged orders as being void.

See id. at 666 (“. . . the Cadle’s collaterally attack our 1996

contempt judgment, asserting it is void. Where, as here, the

contemnor is not restrained, mandamus is the proper vehicle for

collaterally attacking a contempt judgment . . . . The Cadles have

twice attacked our 1996 contempt judgment via petition for writ of

mandamus to the Texas Supreme Court on the very grounds they now

assert in this appeal. Both times the supreme court has denied the

petitions;” footnotes omitted).

3

to Rooker-Feldman. Cadle’s due-process argument is a

constitutional claim arising in a state proceeding that is to be

resolved by the state courts, with federal recourse being limited

to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court. See Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317

(5th Cir. 1994).2

AFFIRMED.