State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015 106657 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT WILLIAMS,

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: May 26, 2015

Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose and Clark, JJ.

__________

Mitch Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Christopher D.

Horn of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Clark, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County

(Ceresia, J.), rendered March 7, 2014, upon a verdict convicting

defendant of the crime of murder in the second degree.

Defendant met the victim in February 2013 and considered

himself married to her according to the tenets of his faith after

a religious ceremony on March 12, 2013. Approximately one month

later, defendant grew suspicious that the victim was cheating on

him and trying to poison him, and, on May 25, 2013, the couple

decided to separate. On the morning of May 27, 2013, defendant

went to the victim's apartment in the City of Albany and stabbed

her to death.

Defendant was charged with one count of murder in the
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second degree and raised the affirmative defense of extreme

emotional disturbance at the ensuing jury trial. Ultimately,

defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a prison term

of 25 years to life. Defendant now appeals, arguing that the

jury's verdict rejecting his defense of extreme emotional

disturbance is against the weight of the evidence.

"Where, as here, a different verdict would not have been

unreasonable, we will weigh the relative probative force of

conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting

inferences that may be drawn" therefrom to determine whether a

conviction is against the weight of the evidence (People v

Chancey, 127 AD3d 1409, 1410 [2015] [internal quotation marks and

citations omitted]). As relevant here, a person is guilty of

murder in the second degree when he or she intentionally causes

the victim's death (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). A defendant who

successfully asserts the defense of extreme emotional

disturbance, however, is guilty of manslaughter and not murder

(see Penal Law §§ 125.20 [2]; 125.25 [1] [a]; People v Roche, 98

NY2d 70, 75 [2002]). 

To establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense, a

defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence "first,

that he or she acted under the influence of an extreme emotional

disturbance and, second, that there was a reasonable explanation

or excuse for that disturbance" (People v Roche, 98 NY2d at 75;

see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 125.25 [1] [a]; People v Chancey, 127

AD3d at 1410). The first element is established by proof that

the defendant was subjectively under an extreme emotional

disturbance, which usually involves a loss of self-control (see

People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553, 561 [2012]; People v Pavone, 117 AD3d

1329, 1331-1332 [2014], lv granted 24 NY3d 963 [2014]). The

second, objective, element is established by proof that there was

a reasonable explanation for the defendant's emotional

disturbance (see People v Roche, 98 NY2d at 76; People v Pavone,

117 AD3d at 1332). "[E]vidence demonstrating a defendant's high

degree of self-control or the planned and deliberate character of

the underlying attack, as well as any postcrime conduct

suggesting that the defendant was in full command of his or her

faculties and had consciousness of guilt, is entirely

inconsistent with an extreme emotional disturbance defense"
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(People v Pavone, 117 AD3d at 1332 [internal quotation marks,

brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]). 

Defendant testified that he believed that the victim was

cheating on him because he saw the victim use a dating website

and receive a phone call and text messages from other men. 

Defendant further testified that he saw pictures of male

genitalia on the victim's phone, which he showed to his friend,

who confirmed the existence of such pictures at trial. Defendant

also suspected that the victim was trying to poison him because

he became sick after eating meals that she had prepared for him,

and he testified that his symptoms were so severe that, on one

occasion, he went to the hospital. On cross-examination,

however, defendant revealed that he has many health issues which,

one could infer, may have caused his symptoms. 

Approximately a week and a half before the crime, defendant

began drinking "to numb [his] pain." Individuals who saw

defendant in the days leading up to the crime testified that he

was upset, drank heavily, failed to take his prescribed

psychiatric medications and was contemplating suicide. There was

also evidence that defendant had used the victim's cell phone to

send nude photos of her and derogatory remarks about her to

various people two to three days before the crime. The People's

proof demonstrated that defendant planned to kill the victim

because he stated that he intended to kill her two days before

the crime and called his sister-in-law the evening before the

crime to tell her that there was a "situation" and gave her the

victim's name, address and date of birth "in case anything

happen[ed]." 

Defendant spent the evening before the crime drinking with

his neighbor. He had asked his neighbor not to let him leave if

he became intoxicated, but the neighbor passed out and defendant

went to the store to buy more alcohol. After staying up all

night drinking, defendant went to the victim's apartment in the

morning while he was still intoxicated. According to defendant,

he entered the apartment with his key, took off his shoes and

greeted the victim, and then they talked in her bedroom while she

rolled him a cigarette. However, things became heated when they

began discussing defendant's suspicions. Defendant testified
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that the victim initiated the violence when she reached under a

towel that she was sitting on and pulled out a knife. Defendant

claimed that he did not remember stabbing the victim, but when he

was asked whether he had to kill the victim, he responded that he

did not have a choice. 

Shortly after the crime, defendant went for a walk with his

neighbor, admitted to him that he had killed the victim and

stated that the victim "was so evil that the blood didn't even

come out." Defendant testified that he sold the victim's laptop

because there "was so much evil in it" and he used the money to

buy a bus ticket to New York City. He took the victim's state

identification card with him to New York City, which he hid in an

empty beer can. 

The victim's body was found in a closet in her apartment

and was covered in debris, which indicates that defendant may

have tried to hide her body. One knife was found wrapped in a

towel and a second knife was found inside a blanket. After the

crime, defendant told his sister-in-law that "he had time" and

that "they would have to find" the body. Defendant's concealment

of the victim's body and knives indicates that he exercised selfcontrol after stabbing the victim and evidences his consciousness

of guilt. 

We find that, in light of the foregoing evidence, a

rational jury could have determined that defendant was not

subjectively operating under the influence of an extreme

emotional disturbance if it disbelieved his assertions as selfserving or determined that his mental state did not rise to the

level of an extreme emotional disturbance (see People v Moronta,

96 AD3d 418, 420 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 987 [2012]). 

Additionally, even if we were to assume that the jury determined

that defendant subjectively suffered an extreme emotional

disturbance, the jury could have concluded that defendant's

extreme emotional disturbance was not reasonable "so as to

entitle him to a reduction of the crime charged from murder in

the second degree to manslaughter" (People v Casassa, 49 NY2d

668, 679 [1980], cert denied 449 US 842 [1980]). Giving

appropriate deference to the jury's ability to view the witnesses

and assess their credibility, we find that the verdict rejecting
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the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance was not

against the weight of the evidence (see People v Chancey, 127

AD3d at 1411; People v Benson, 119 AD3d 1145, 1148 [2014], lv

denied 24 NY3d 1118 [2015]). 

Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy and Rose, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court