IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs May 20, 2015

JEFFERY G. DOUGLAS v. FRANCINE C. S., ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C148 Don R. Ash, Judge

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No. W2014-02075-COA-R3-CV – Filed July 23, 2015

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The trial court dismissed Appellant‟s petition for a writ of mandamus. Due to profound 

deficiencies in Appellant's brief, we dismiss this appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ARNOLD B.

GOLDIN, J., and BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., joined.

Jeffery G. Douglas, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff/Appellant Jeffery G. Douglas filed a petition for a writ 

of mandamus in the Madison County Chancery Court against Defendants Francine C.S., et 

 

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or 

modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would 

have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be 

designated AMEMORANDUM OPINION@, shall not be published, and shall not be cited or 

relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
2

al.2 Attached to Mr. Douglas‟s petition was an inmate grievance form from the Tennessee 

Department of Correction, indicating that an unknown party committed “defalcation of 

incontrovertible abuse of rights doctrine.” On January 17, 2014, Judge Roy B. Morgan 

entered an order of recusal. Thereafter, the Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order 

appointing Senior Judge Don R. Ash to preside over this case. 

On July 21, 2014, Judge Ash entered an order on Mr. Douglas‟s petition. The order 

stated, in relevant part:

This matter came before the court on motion of the 

plaintiff requesting writ of mandamus in regard to matters 

previously dismissed, namely Madison County Case Nos. 09-

624, C-11-149, C-11-96, C-11-278. Further, plaintiff requests an 

order compelling the “appropriate authority in said cause to 

perform their mandatory duties . . . .” regarding a response to 

plaintiff filed October 24, 2013; a criminal complaint filed April 

5, 2011; a criminal complaint filed May 6, 2011; An affidavit of 

complaint for an arrest warrant signed October 19, 2013; and an 

affidavit of complaint for an arrest warrant signed on October 

31, 2013. On petition of the plaintiff and the record as a whole, 

this court finds as follows:

* * *

2. To obtain the writ of mandamus, the petitioner must show a 

specific and complete right which is to be enforced. Hayes v. 

Civil Serv. Comm’n of Metro Gov’t, 907 S.W.2d 826, 829 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). When the following three elements are 

present, Tennessee courts will issue writs of mandamus: (1) the 

plaintiff[‟]s clear right to the relief sought, (2) the defendant‟s 

clear duty to perform the act the plaintiff seeks to compel, and 

(3) the absence of any other specific or adequate remedy. 

Peerless Constr. Co. v. Bass, 158 Term. 518, 520, 14 S.W.2d 

732, 733 (1929); State ex rel. Weaver v. Ayers, 756 S.W.2d 217, 

221 (Tenn. 1988); State ex rel. Motlow v. Clark, 173 Tenn. 81, 

87, 114 S.W.2d 800, 802–03 (1938).

2. Peerless Const. Co. v. Bass, 14 S.W.2d 732, 733 (1929), 

quotes State ex rel. v. Board, 121 S. W. 499, stating: 

 

2 Mr. Douglas‟s petition does not name any additional defendants.
3

“We know of no exception to the rule that the 

court will not, by mandamus, disturb the 

decisions, and actions of the boards and officers 

having discretionary powers, except where they 

act in an arbitrary and oppressive manner 

(Williams v. Dental Examiners, 93 Term. 619, 27 

S. W. 1019), or act beyond their jurisdiction 

(Insurance Co. v. Craig, supra), or where they 

refuse to assume a jurisdiction which the law 

devolves upon them (State ex rel. v. Taylor, 119 

Term. 229, 104 S.W. 242).”

3. Further, Rule 12.06 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure permit the court, upon its own initiative at any time, 

to strike from any pleading an insufficient defense, or a 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.

4. Here, [Mr. Douglas] provides little information to specify 

what he desires the court to order within a writ of mandamus. 

[Mr. Douglas] references other cases which have been dismissed 

and states certain complaints with dates. Plaintiff does not 

specify within the pleading or provide an affidavit giving 

sufficient facts demonstrating the [Mr. Douglas‟s] clear right to 

the relief sought, the defendant's clear duty to perform the act 

[Mr. Douglas] seeks to compel, or the absence of any other 

specific or adequate remedy.

5. With regard to Madison County Circuit No. C-12-278, [Mr. 

Douglas‟s] request for writ of mandamus and all other claims 

were dismissed with prejudice, as "[Mr. Douglas‟s] claims are 

barred by either the statute of limitations and/or the absence of 

facts necessary to support their basic elements." This court 

cannot review the sound judgment of another court or judge by 

the means of a writ of mandamus.

6. As [Mr. Douglas] has provided only immaterial and 

redundant information in his petition, this court finds all his 

claims are STRICKEN, and this cause is DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

Mr. Douglas filed a timely notice of appeal of the dismissal of his petition.
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Discussion

This is not Mr. Douglas‟s only appeal involving the same circumstances. In fact, this 

Court takes judicial notice that the brief filed by Mr. Douglas in this case is identical to the 

brief filed by him in Douglas v. State, No. W2014-00831-COA-R3-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App. July 

14, 2015) (hereinafter “Douglas I”) (Westlaw citation not yet available). See Tenn. R. Evid. 

201 (allowing a court to take judicial notice of facts outside the record when the fact is “not 

subject to reasonable dispute” and “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Counts v. Bryan, 182 S.W.3d 

288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (permitting a court to take judicial notice of facts gleaned 

from court files). Because Mr. Douglas‟s brief in this case is identical to the brief he filed in 

Douglas I, we take guidance from that Opinion‟s discussion of the substantial shortcomings 

found in Mr. Douglas‟s brief.

In Douglas I, this Court held that the Court‟s “ability to review the merits of this 

appeal is substantially hindered by the state of the brief submitted by” Mr. Douglas. 

Specifically, this Court held that Mr. Douglas‟s brief failed to comply with Rule 27 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,3in that it did not contain “a table of contents, a 

 

3

 Rule 27 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain 

under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:

(1) A table of contents, with references to the pages in the brief;

(2) A table of authorities, including cases (alphabetically arranged), 

statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages in the brief 

where they are cited;

(3) A jurisdictional statement in cases appealed to the Supreme 

Court directly from the trial court indicating briefly the jurisdictional 

grounds for the appeal to the Supreme Court;

(4) A statement of the issues presented for review;

(5) A statement of the case, indicating briefly the nature of the case, 

the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below;

(6) A statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues 

presented for review with appropriate references to the record;

(7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of 

argument, setting forth:

(A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the 

issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons 

why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the 

authorities and appropriate references to the record (which may be 

quoted verbatim) relied on; and

(B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable 

standard of review (which may appear in the discussion of the issue 
5

table of authorities, a statement of the case, a statement of facts with references to the record, 

or an argument section containing references to the record or an applicable standard of 

review.” Although the Court noted that Mr. Douglas‟s brief did include five issues presented 

for review, we note that these issues are not presented in a statement of the issues section, 

but instead are contained in what we must presume is the argument section of his brief. As 

explained by this Court: “While [Mr. [Douglas‟s] brief includes a litany of case citations, his 

brief, much like his original complaint in the trial court, fails to include a single 

factual allegation upon which this Court can determine the underlying basis for his 

claims.” Indeed, while in Douglas I, the Court had the benefit of factual recitations provided 

by the appellees, no appellee brief was filed in this case. As such, there is little in the record 

to discern the underlying factual allegations supporting Mr. Douglas‟s claim for relief.

Based on these and other deficiencies,4the Court of Appeals ruled that all issues 

purportedly raised by Mr. Douglas were waived, and, therefore, “declined to examine the 

merits of any issues on appeal.” See also Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup.Ct., 

301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to 

research or construct a litigant's case or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to 

develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal 

argument, the issue is waived.”); Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2011) (“„Courts have routinely held that the failure to make appropriate references to 

the record and to cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief as required 

by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.‟”) (quoting Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 

55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that “the Supreme Court has held that it will not find 

this Court in error for not considering a case on its merits where the plaintiff did not comply 

with the rules of this Court”)). Because Mr. Douglas‟s brief in this case is identical to the 

brief filed in Douglas I, we likewise conclude that all issues purportedly raised therein are 

 

or under a separate heading placed before the discussion of the 

issues);

(8) A short conclusion, stating the precise relief sought.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a).

4

 The Douglas I Court also noted that Mr. Douglas failed to comply with Rule 6 of the Rules of the 

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, which provides:

No complaint of or reliance upon action by the trial court will be 

considered on appeal unless the argument contains a specific reference to the 

page or pages of the record where such action is recorded. No assertion of 

fact will be considered on appeal unless the argument contains a reference to 

the page or pages of the record where evidence of such fact is recorded.

Tenn. R. Ct. App. 6(b).
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waived. Accordingly, we decline to address the substantive merits of this appeal. In addition, 

we note, like the Court in Douglas I, that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-1-122 

allows this Court, sua sponte, to “award just damages against the appellant, which may 

include but need not be limited to, costs” when an appeal is deemed frivolous. In this case, no 

appellee has participated in this appeal to whom this Court could properly award damages. 

However, we exercise our discretion to designate this appeal as frivolous pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Section 27-1-122. 

Conclusion

Based upon the forgoing, the appeal is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to 

Appellant Jeffery G. Douglas. Because Mr. Douglas is proceeding in forma pauperis in this 

appeal, execution may issue, if necessary. 

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J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE