[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 20-14872

Non-Argument Calendar

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In re: ANDREA ROSEN LIEBMAN,

Debtor.

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ANDREA LIEBMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, 

FUTURA MIAMI INVEST, LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14872

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-20322-RNS

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is Andrea Liebman’s second pro se appeal concerning her petition to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the 

Bankruptcy Code and the foreclosure sale of her property. Liebman challenges orders affirming the denial of her motion for relief

from a judgment refusing to reinstate her bankruptcy case or to 

retroactively stay the sale of her property, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, 

and her motion to stay the disbursement of funds from the foreclosure sale. We affirm. 

“As the second court to review the judgment of the bankruptcy court, we review the order[s] of the bankruptcy court independently of the district court.” In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d 1298, 

1310 (11th Cir. 2012). We review the denial of Liebman’s motion 

for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 for abuse of discretion. In re Glob. Energies, LLC, 763 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 

2014). We review the decision to deny Liebman’s motion to stay 

the disbursement of funds de novo and its related findings of fact 

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for clear error. See In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 

2015).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Liebman’s postjudgment motion for relief. Because Liebman’s motion challenged a judgment that we affirmed in her first appeal, the 

doctrine of the law of the case bars us from considering that judgment a second time in the absence of any contrary controlling authority or a clear error in the decision. See United States v. Stein, 

964 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2020). In the earlier appeal, we 

concluded that Liebman presented no “arguments or evidence suggesting that the bankruptcy court erred by refusing to reinstate her 

case” or “inappropriately applied . . . the factors [it had to] consider 

in determining whether to grant [her] a retroactive stay.” Liebman 

v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, et al., 772 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th

Cir. June 7, 2019). The judgment of the bankruptcy court, which 

Liebman declined to challenge “in a subsequent appeal when the 

opportunity existed, bec[ame] the law of the case for . . . [her 

postjudgment] litigation . . . .” See Stein, 964 F.3d at 1324 (quoting 

United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 

1997)).

Liebman argues that the bankruptcy court used a nunc pro 

tunc order in violation of Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, 

Puerto Rico v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696 (2020), but we disagree. In Acevedo, the Supreme Court reached the unremarkable 

conclusion that a state court lost jurisdiction to issue orders in an 

action that had been removed to federal court and was awaiting 

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remand. Id. at 699–701; see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (“after the filing of 

[a] notice of removal . . . the State court shall proceed no further

unless and until the case is remanded”). The Supreme Court also 

concluded that a nunc pro tunc order entered by the federal court, 

which impermissibly “revis[ed] history” by backdating to March 

2018 its decision in August 2018 to remand, could not retroactively 

confer jurisdiction to the state court. Id. at 700–01. In contrast, the

nunc pro tunc order the bankruptcy court entered in Liebman’s 

case “reflect[ed] the reality of what [had] already occurred.” See id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The nunc pro tunc order clarified that the reinstatement of Liebman’s bankruptcy case had not 

reimposed the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (dismissal terminates the automatic stay), and, in the alternative, that the 

bankruptcy court had conditioned the stay on Liebman submitting 

a confirmable Chapter 13 plan, see id. § 362(d) (giving a bankruptcy 

court power to “grant relief from the stay . . ., such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay”). Acevedo is 

not a contrary decision of law applicable to this action.

The bankruptcy court did not err by denying Liebman’s motion to stay the disbursement of funds. Liebman moved for a stay 

to demand punitive damages against her loan servicer, Ocwen 

Loan Servicing, LLC, but the bankruptcy court ruled that “no 

grounds . . . support[ed]” Liebman’s argument that Ocwen willfully violated the automatic stay when it accepted the proceeds 

from the foreclosure sale. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). Punitive sanctions are appropriate only if a party acts with reckless or callous 

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disregard for the law or rights of others. In re McLean, 794 F.3d 

1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015). Liebman accused Ocwen of “conceal[ing] . . . information, [and committing] fraud upon the Court,” 

but the record supports the contrary finding of the bankruptcy 

court that Ocwen had “done nothing wrong.” After the bankruptcy 

court lifted the stay, Ocwen was not barred from accepting the proceeds. We cannot say that the bankruptcy court erred in determining that, because “the facts of record do not support an award of 

damages,” “no reasonable basis [existed] to stay the disbursements” 

to Ocwen.

We AFFIRM the denial of Liebman’s postjudgment motions.

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