:OPINION

U.C. MEDICAL DEPT,Defendant.

APPEARANCES:

HOWARD T. RENWICK, pro se

190016

6B—16

UNION COUNTY JAIL

15 ELIZABETHTQWN PLAZA

ELIZABETH, NJ 07202

CHESLER, District Judge

Plaintiff, Howard T. Renwick, a pretrial detainee currently

confined at the Union County Jail in Elizabeth, New Jersey, seeks to

bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of

indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within 28

U.S.C. § l95(g), the Court will grant plaintiff!s application to

proceed jn.i.roaupris (“lET”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § lPlS(a) and

order thE. Clerk of the Court to file t.he complaini..

At this time, the Court must review t.he complaint, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §f 19l5(e) (2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be

dismissed as frivol.ous or mai.icious, for failure to state a claim upon

whic.h reli.ef nay be granted, or because it seeks nonetary relief from
ac.tion, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Union County Jail

Medical Department, (Complaint, Caption and ¶T 4b.) The following

factual allege••tions are taken from the complaint, and are accepted for

purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as tothe veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.

In his complaint Plaintiff states only that he has “sent his claim

to the superior court but {he doesn’t] think anything is happening and

inmate medical request form and the two classification form D one from

the doctor and one from the chiropractor (Alvin Schwartz M.D.).”

(Compl., ¶6.) Based on the attachments to the complaint, it appears

that Plaintiff had been receiving treatment and medication for an

ongoing back and ankle problem before he came to Union County Jail.

(Docket Entry No. 1—4, at 1.) While at the jail, the doctors had been

giving him pain medication, however, the medication was stopped from

June 20, 2010 until August 30, 2010. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff states

that due to the lapse in medi.cation., he ca.nnot sleep and he is in pain.

(Id,) Plaintiff states that the doctors told him to or.der medication

from the commissary, however, he did not have the money to do so and.

though he obtained the indigent package as instructed, no medication

was provided in the package. (. .at 3.) Plaintiff also m.akes
TI.ie Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L, No. 104—1.34, §5 801—810,

110 Stat, 1.321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district

court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is

proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmentalemployee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable

claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is iune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §5 1915(e) (2) (B) and l915A. This action is subject to

sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §5 l915(e) (2)

(B) and 1915A, because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding as an

indigent.

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court

must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93—94 (2007) (following elle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1 976) and flai.nes v. .Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972)); .e..also ‘nith Statesyja, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir,

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal of a

complaint that fails to state a cl.aim in hroftv. bl, 129 S.Ct.
p

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that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action wi.ll not do,’” .gbal,129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting woml, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court

held that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now

allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially

plausible. This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

See id. at 1948. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ibal emphasizes that

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are

plausible. See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.

3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009)

2. Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides

in relevant part:

F.very parson who, unc.e r color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cust.om, or usage., of any State or Territory subjects, or c.auses to bE. subjected, an.y citizen of the United States or... other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the.. Constitution and.. laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. . .

4
F.3d 1250, 1255—56 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. Analysis

Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging a medical

care claim against the individual medical staff of the jail, the Courtfinds that it should be dismissed, 1 Since Plaintiff was a pre—trial

detainee at the time of the incident, his claim is evaluated under the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir.

2005) (pre—trial detainees and convicted but unsentenced prisoners

retain liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d

The only defendant named in the complaint is the Union County Jail Medical Department. However, a jail is not a ‘person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Marsden v. Fed. SOP, 856 F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not “person” under § 1983); ccpy v. Chesapeake çorr. ctr., 788 F.Supp. 890, 893—94 (E.D.Va, 1992) (local jail not “person” under § 1983); : 928 F.Supp. 993, 995 (N.D,Cal, 199.6) (county department of corrections is agency of county and cannot be sued separately from county under § 

io, LiasL, ,u r.upp. i ,, ilob, U,fij, j, (county department of corrections not entity that can be sued separate from county); n.nett V. New rs, 2010 WL 5169070, at *6_7 (D.N,J, December 14, 2010) (neither the county jail nor the county jail medical clinic are a “person” or an entity able to be sued apart from the county) . Accordingly, the claim against Union County Jail Medical Department is subject to dismissal, 
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection agai.nst deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law,.

Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to “punishment” in the constitutional sense, however. Once the government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention...

A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of

some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on “whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it],” Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purooseless-a court oermissibiy may infer tt te rrose of te go 0r ena aotro s cse 0

Sell, 441 3.3. at 535-39 (citations omitted) . The Court further

explained that the government has legitimate interests that stem from

its nE.ed to maintain security and order at the detention facili.tv.
a

d

deterrence, however, are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental

objectives. Id. at 539 n. 20.

Based on the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff fails to

state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff acknowledges

that he has always received medical treatment while he has been in the

jail but he is dissatisfied that he was instructed to purchase Motrin

from the commissary rather than receive prescription drugs from the

clinic. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would indicate that

advising him to purchase Motrin from the commissary was intended as aform of punishment. In fact, it appears from a response from one of

the doctors attached to the complaint that the decision not to order

pain medication for Plaintiff was a medical decision based on long term

usage risks. (Docket Entry No. 1—3 at 6.) As such, this claim will be

dismissed. With regard to the mattresses, Plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient factual matter to allow the Court to determine whether the

claim is facially plausible. Therefore, this claim will also be

dismissed.

However, a district court should not dismiss a complaint with

prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to amend,

unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or futility. g

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stating a cognizable § 1983 cia im. If Plaintiff elects to file an

amended complaint asse.rting a § 1983 claim, he should comply with the

pleading requirements of and this opinion within 30 days.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the complaint will be dismissed

without prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § l915(e) (2) (B) (ii)

and 1915A(b) (1) . Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a motion to

reopen and amend the complaint, stating a cognizable § 1983 claim,

within 30 days. An appropriate order follows.

Dated:

ST. BY R. CHESLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE