IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 

 

MELISSA L. SHAW, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

SCOTT OBERMEIER, et al., 

 Defendants. 

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

Civil Action 

No. 11-276 (JBS/JS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge: 

 This matter comes before the Court on two motions for 

summary judgment by Defendants Scott Obermeier, Richard Worst, 

Mark Pickard, Mario Straccialini, Harry Earle, and the Township 

of Gloucester [Docket Item 132] and by Defendant James W. 

Shriver [Docket Item 137.] This action arises from two traffic 

stops in Gloucester Township in the early morning of November 

10, 2010 which followed observations by the local police of 

suspected drug activity involving pro se Plaintiffs Melissa Shaw 

and Salahuddin Smart. Prior to the traffic stops, detectives 

conducting surveillance in the area observed Plaintiff Smart in 

the parking lot of a Howard Johnson Motel entering a vehicle 

operated by Plaintiff Shaw and returning to his vehicle, which 

was later revealed to be a vehicle rented by Plaintiff Shaw. 

Ultimately, both Plaintiff Smart and his passenger, Melissa 

Librojo, were charged with possession of a controlled substance. 

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Plaintiff Smart now asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights stemming from 

the traffic stop and subsequent criminal prosecution. 

 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ 

motions and dismiss Plaintiff Smart’s case in its entirety with 

prejudice. 

1. The factual record for purposes of the pending motions 

are straightforward and undisputed.1 On November 13, 2010, 

detectives from the Gloucester Township Police Department 

(“GTPD”) Defendants Scott Obermeier, Mario Straccialini, and 

Detective Sargent James Shriver were conducting surveillance of 

the Howard Johnson Motel in Gloucester Township, an area known 

for criminal activity. (Obermeier et al. Statement of Material 

Facts (“SMF”) [Docket Item 133] ¶¶ 10-11.) The detectives 

observed a car driven by Plaintiff Smart circle the Howard 

Johnson’s parking lot repeatedly before ultimately parking next 

to a second vehicle, a white SUV driven by Plaintiff Shaw, which 

pulled to the rear of the lot. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 19-21.) The 

detectives watched as Plaintiff Smart entered the rear passenger 

compartment of the white SUV, returned to his vehicle, then 

entered the white SUV a second time before returning to his 

 

1 Because Plaintiff has filed no opposition, the Court deems the 

facts set forth by Defendants undisputed for purposes of the 

pending summary judgment motion. See L. CIV. R. 56.1(a). 

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vehicle and exiting the parking lot. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) The 

detectives positively identified Smart, who was known to them 

due to previous encounters and arrests for criminal activity. 

(Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Detectives believed Plaintiff Smart’s license 

was suspended and called for his vehicle to be stopped. (Id. ¶¶ 

29, 31.) 

2. Defendant Pickard, another Officer with the GTPD, was 

the first patrol unit available to stop Plaintiff Smart’s 

vehicle. (Id. ¶ 31.) During the stop, Smart and his passenger 

were ordered to exit the vehicle so that a canine perimeter 

sniff search could be conducted. (Id. ¶ 35.) Upon being advised 

that a female officer was going to conduct a pat down of her 

person, the passenger, Melissa Librojo, told officers that she 

placed a bag down the front of her pants. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) She 

was then found to be in possession of two plastic bags 

containing small pills. (Id. ¶ 37.) Ms. Librojo told Defendant 

Obermeier that the bag of pills had been in the center console 

of the vehicle before they were stopped, and that she had hidden 

them in her pants to avoid having them seen by police. (Id. ¶ 

38.) She told Defendant Obermeier that the drugs did not belong 

to her. (Id. ¶ 40-41.) Both Smart and Librojo were charged with 

possession of a controlled substance. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 55.) 

3. Plaintiff Smart was taken to the Gloucester Township 

Police Department, where he was placed in cell while evidence 

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was being processed. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.) Surveillance video shows 

Plaintiff Smart attempting to flush an unknown object down the 

cell toilet and placing items – including his mattress and 

various articles of clothing – over the camera in the cell. (Id. 

¶¶ 46, 48-49.) Each time Plaintiff Smart used an item to cover 

the camera, GTPD officers removed it from the cell. (Id. ¶ 50.) 

Defendants Obermeier and Shriver considered this conduct 

“violent” and placed Plaintiff Smart in a physical restraint 

chair so that he would not harm himself. (Id. ¶¶ 51-53.) 

4. Plaintiffs Shaw and Smart commenced separate actions 

on January 18, 2011 and February 9, 2011 respectively. On March 

15, 2011, Shaw and Smart filed an Amended Complaint in Shaw v. 

Obermier, Civil No. 11-276 (JBS/JS). [Docket Item 6.] On that 

same date, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to consolidate 

the later-filed action Smart v. Pickard, Civil No. 11-743 

(RBK/AMD) with Shaw v. Obermier, Civil No. 11-276 (JBS/JS), 

which the Court granted on April 6, 2011. [Docket Item 9.] 

Plaintiff Shaw’s suit was ultimately dismissed in its entirety 

for lack of prosecution. [Docket Items 112 & 113.] Discovery as 

to Plaintiff Smart’s remaining claims has now closed. Pending 

before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by 

Defendants Scott Obermeier, Richard Worst, Mark Pickard, Mario 

Straccialini, Harry Earle, and the Township of Gloucester 

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[Docket Item 132] and by Defendant James W. Shriver [Docket Item 

137.] 

5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) generally 

provides that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact” such that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, where “the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 

to find for the non-moving party,” the Court may grant summary 

judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court finds that based on 

the undisputed facts in the record, summary judgment is 

warranted for all Defendants. 

6. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff 

must allege: 1) the violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) that the 

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d 

Cir. 1994). See also Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d 

Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Smart alleges that the individual 

Defendants, all GTPD officers, violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights by way of a traffic stop, canine sniff search of his 

vehicle, arrest, strip search, and malicious prosecution, and 

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alleges that Gloucester Township and the Chief of Police are 

liable for inadequate training of police officers, failing to 

have clear policies and procedures, and having a custom of 

allowing officers “unfettered discretion” to conduct canine drug 

detection searches. 

7. Plaintiff Smart has not established a Fourth Amendment 

violation on account of the traffic stop. The Fourth Amendment 

protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure” 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, “even though the 

purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 

brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States 

v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006). Consistent 

with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief 

investigatory stop when he has reasonable, articulable, and 

individualized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United 

States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2015). Reasonable 

suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and 

requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the 

evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

8. In this case, the officers on the scene – according to 

Plaintiff Smart, it appears Defendants Obermeier, Straccialini, 

Shriver, Worst, and Pickard – had reasonable suspicion to stop 

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Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff was observed in an area “known for 

criminal activity” engaged in activity in the Howard Johnson 

parking lot which three different officers described as 

“suspicious.”(SMF Ex. B at 4, 11; Ex. C at 52:2-5; Ex. D. at 

33:9-34:8; Ex. F at 4:22-5:17.) Because Defendant Straccialini 

was able to identify Mr. Smart in the parking lot, the officers 

on the scene were able to learn that he did not have a valid 

driver’s license. (SMF Ex. D at 24:22-25:20, 30:6-21.) The 

officers therefore observed him in violation of one of the 

traffic laws of New Jersey, driving without a license, when he 

exited the Howard Johnson parking lot. (SMF Ex. B at 4, 11.) “A 

police officer who observes a violation of state traffic laws 

may lawfully stop the car committing the violation.” United 

States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 424 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)). Although 

Plaintiff asserts that he was not “operating the vehicle in 

excess of the speeding limit” (Am. Compl. Count 1), this traffic 

violation of driving without a license sufficed to give Officer 

Pickard reason to stop Plaintiff Smart’s vehicle. Accordingly, 

the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as 

to Plaintiff Smart’s claims arising from the traffic stop. 

9. Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth 

Amendment violation on account of the canine sniff search of his 

vehicle. Plaintiff asserts that “the k-9 sniff was intrusive 

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enough to amount to a search” (Am. Compl. Count 25), but the 

Supreme Court has held that “the use of a well-trained narcotics 

detection dog – one that does not expose noncontraband items 

that otherwise would remain hidden from public view – during a 

lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate 

privacy interests.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 

(2005) (internal citations omitted). Because the Court has 

already found that Plaintiff Smart’s traffic stop was lawful, 

and because there is no evidence showing that any noncontraband 

items were revealed by Officer Pickard’s dog (SMF Ex. B at 4, 

11), nothing unconstitutional occurred on account of the canine 

search. The Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s claims arising from the canine 

sniff search. 

10. Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth 

Amendment violation for false arrest. To state a claim for false 

arrest, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that there was an arrest; 

and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James 

v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). An 

officer has probable cause to arrest when there are “facts and 

circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 

that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” 

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (internal citations 

omitted). In this case, Defendant Obermeier filed criminal 

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charges against Plaintiff Smart for violation of N.J.S.A. § 

2C:35:10(a)(1), which criminalizes the possession or 

constructive possession of controlled dangerous substances. The 

New Jersey Supreme Court defines constructive possession as a 

situation where, although a defendant lacks physical control 

over an item, “the circumstances permit a reasonable inference 

that the defendant has knowledge of its presence, and intends 

and has the capacity to exercise physical control or dominion 

over it during a span of time.” State v. Spivey, 844 A.2d 512, 

516 (N.J. 2004). Defendant Obermeier had probable cause to 

believe that Plaintiff Smart had constructive possession of the 

pills handed over by Ms. Librojo, the passenger in his car: Ms. 

Librojo told Defendant Obermeier that she had a bag of pills 

concealed in her pants, that the drugs had been in the center 

console of Plaintiff Smart’s car, that she did not want the 

police to see the drugs in the console, and that the drugs did 

not belong to her. (SMF Ex. B at 4, 11.) Defendant Obermeier was 

entitled to rely on Ms. Librojo’s statement in his determination 

that probable cause existed to find that Plaintiff Smart had 

constructive possession of the drugs without investigating them 

further. See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 

790 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2000) (officer “was not required to undertake 

an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable 

cause that, in his mind, already existed.”). Smart was the 

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driver, seated next to the console containing the drugs, and his 

passenger said the drugs were not hers; these circumstances were 

known to the arresting officer and they constituted probable 

cause for his arrest. No reasonable juror could find that 

probable cause was lacking. Accordingly, because there was 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Smart for possession of a 

controlled dangerous substance, the Court will grant Defendants’ 

motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s false 

arrest claim. 

11. Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth 

Amendment violation for false imprisonment based on his 

incarceration in the Camden County Correctional Facility. To 

state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show: 

“(1) that [he] was detained; and (2) that the detention was 

unlawful.” James, 700 F.3d at 682-83. Plaintiff Smart may have 

had a viable false imprisonment claim if he had been arrested 

without probable cause, Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 

628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995), but his detention was lawful because he 

was held, first at the Gloucester Township Police Department and 

then at the Camden County Correctional Facility, pursuant to his 

legitimate criminal charges for possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance. Accordingly, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s 

false imprisonment claim. 

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12. Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth 

Amendment violation on account of the alleged “strip search” in 

his jail cell at the Gloucester Township Police Department. 

Plaintiff Smart asserts that Defendant Obermeier “force[d] 

plaintiff Smart to acts that constituted a strip search outside 

the holding cell when he required removal of clothing” (Am. 

Compl. Count 28), but the evidence shows that Plaintiff Smart 

removed his clothing of his own accord to obscure the 

surveillance camera in his cell. (See SMF Ex. H.) Officers 

confiscated each item of clothing as it was used to block the 

camera, on the grounds that Plaintiff Smart’s behavior was 

“violent” and could “cause damage or cause harm” to himself. 

(SMF Ex. B at 5, 12-13; Ex. C. at 93:9-22.) This does not 

implicate any reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the 

Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s Fourth 

Amendment claim arising out of his alleged strip search. 

13. Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth 

Amendment violation for malicious prosecution. To state a claim 

for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show “(1) the 

defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal 

proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding 

was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted 

maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff 

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to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of 

liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence 

of a legal proceeding.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 

F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). Because, as discussed above, the 

charges against Plaintiff Smart for possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance were based upon probable cause, Plaintiff 

cannot prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution on account 

of those charges. Therefore the Court will grant Defendants’ 

motion summary judgment on Plaintiff Smart’s malicious 

prosecution claim. 

14. Nor can Plaintiff maintain claims against Defendants 

Obermeier, Straccialini, Worst, and Shriver for “bystander 

liability” for not intervening to prevent the allegedly 

unconstitutional traffic stop, canine search, arrest, and strip 

search. It is black-letter law that state actors may be liable 

in a § 1983 claim only for their own unconstitutional conduct. 

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012); Rode v. 

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Indeed, as 

held above, no unconstitutional conduct occurred in the traffic 

stop, canine search, arrest and strip search, so there can be no 

bystander liability for failing to prevent nonexistent 

misconduct. Police officers only have a duty to intervene “when 

other officers use excessive force.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 

F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff has not 

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presented facts showing that these officers were personally 

involved in the conduct of which he complains, and because he 

has not brought an excessive force claim, the Court will grant 

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all claims of 

bystander liability.2 

15. Plaintiff also cannot maintain municipal liability 

claims against Gloucester Township or Police Chief Earle.3

Plaintiff Smart brings claims against the Township and Defendant 

Earle for inadequate training of GTPD officers (Am. Compl. 

Counts 21 & 22), for having a custom of allowing officers 

“unfettered discretion” to conduct canine drug detection 

searches (Counts 26 & 27), and for failure to have a clear 

policies and procedures regarding “removal of arrestees clothing 

which amounts to a strip search” (Counts 29 & 30). 

16. It is well-established that “municipal liability under 

§ 1983 attaches where-- and only where-- a deliberate choice to 

follow a course of action is made from among various 

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in 

 

2 Having found no constitutional violations in this case, the 

Court will not reach the Individual Defendants’ arguments about 

qualified immunity. 

3 A claim against a public officer in his official capacity is 

treated as a claim against the governmental entity of which he 

is an officer. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). 

Thus, the same Monell analysis applies to the claims against 

both the Township and Defendant Earle. 

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question.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Whether a policy or a custom, “The 

plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate 

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the 

injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. 

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Thus, for a plaintiff to 

sufficiently demonstrate municipal liability for an 

unconstitutional custom under § 1983, he must present facts to 

support a finding that execution of a specific policy or custom, 

or the directive of the municipality’s final decision maker, 

caused the alleged harm. To maintain a claim for a failure to 

supervise or discipline its police officers, a plaintiff must 

show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the 

constitutional rights of its inhabitants. Groman v. Township of 

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995). 

17. There is no evidence in the record describing a 

specific policy or custom which deprived Plaintiff of his 

constitutional rights, or that the municipality – and not just 

individual officers – was the “moving force” behind any such 

policy or custom. Nor is there any evidence to find that the 

Gloucester Township was deliberately indifferent to the 

constitutional rights of its inhabitants. Indeed, Plaintiff has 

not shown that any of his constitutional rights were in fact 

violated. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for 

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summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against Gloucester 

Township and Defendant Earle in his official capacity. 

18. Finally, the Amended Complaint is sometimes unclear as 

to whether the allegations against the Individual Defendants 

refer to claims brought by Plaintiff Shaw or claims brought by 

Plaintiff Smart. To the extent that any of Plaintiff Smart’s 

claims implicate conduct directed at Plaintiff Shaw, the Court 

will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff 

Shaw does not have standing to seek § 1983 relief for the 

violation of someone else’s constitutional rights, and those 

claims have already been dismissed with prejudice. [See Docket 

Items 112 & 113.] 

19. An accompanying order will be entered granting 

Defendants’ motions in their entirety. 

 June 2, 2016 s/ Jerome B. Simandle 

Date JEROME B. SIMANDLE 

 Chief U.S. District Judge

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