NO. 06 – 15 -- 00004 – CR

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

TEXARKANA, TEXAS 

 

LESLIE LEE 

 

 Appellant, 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

 Appellee 

On appeal from the 188TH District Court, Gregg County, Texas 

Trial Court Case No. 42,954-A 

 

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 

– ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED –

 

 CARL L. DORROUGH 

 District Attorney 

 

 Zan Colson Brown 

 Texas Bar No. 03205900 

 Assistant District Attorney 

 Gregg County, Texas 

 101 East Methvin St., Suite 333 

 Longview, Texas 75601 

 Telephone: (903) 236–8440 

 Facsimile: (903) 236–3701 

ACCEPTED

06-15-00004-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

7/23/2015 4:11:40 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 7/23/2015 4:11:40 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................................................................4

ARGUMENT............................................................................................................5

1) The issue of disproportionate sentence/ Eighth Amendment 

violation was not preserved........................................................................5

2) The sentence was not excessive.......................................................................5

A. The sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual 

punishment.............................................................................................5

B. The Sentence is not disproportionate....................................................6

PRAYER...................................................................................................................9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..............................................................................9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.....................................................10
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680 , 115 L. Ed. 2d 836..............6

McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 121 

L. Ed. 2d 98, 113 S. Ct. 146 (1992 ..................................................................7, 8

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)..6, 8

State Cases

Dunn v. State, 997 S.W.2d 885, 891-9 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999) pet. ref'd ..............7

Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, (Tex. Crim. App. 1983);.......................................6

Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)...................5

Hicks v. State, 15 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 

ref'd).....................................................................................................................7

Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)5, 6, 7

Lackey v. State, 881 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd.) ............7

Mathews v. State, 918 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1996) pet. ref'd.....7

McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) .......................................6

Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd)...........6, 8

Price v. State, 35 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000) pet. ref'd (op. on 

reh'g) ....................................................................................................................6

Puga v. State, 916 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996) ..............................7

Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd) .......5

State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973..........6

State Statutes

Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 31.03 (Vernon) .....................................................................5

State Rules

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1...................................................................................................5
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

WalMart loss-prevention associate Syzette Sparks, On December 4, 2012,

observed Leslie Lee remove UPC labels from less expensive merchandise and 

place them on more expensive items. SX 2, Officer Bagley’s initial report, pages 4-

5 of 5. Sparks recognized Lee from a prior shoplifting incident at another store 

location and watched her as she added the fraudulent UPC labels on top of the 

actual UPC labels, checked herself out, passed all points of sale and exited the 

store. SX 2, Det. Shirley’s Supplemental Report, page 6 of 6. Lee left the location 

in a white 2008 Dodge Charger, which was registered to Lee’s mother. SX2, 

Supplemental Report, page 1 of 6. The items taken, valued at $111.74, were 

recovered and released to WalMart. SX 2 Supplemental Report, at 2 of 6. 

WalMart provided to police two receipts (one of the actual cost of the items, and 

one for the items with bogus UPC labels totaling $6.41), Sparks’ written statement, 

and pictures of the items and the UPC labels. SX2.

Lee had two prior, misdemeanor theft convictions, in 2006 and 2010. A 

grand jury indicted Lee on September 12, 2013, for “theft; habitual.” She pleaded 

guilty on October 8, 2014, when the Court learned she had been on parole for 

felony DWI since 2009. The Court denied her request for probation and sentenced 

her to six months in state jail. A motion for new trial was overruled by operation of 

law. This appeal ensued.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1) Appellant did not raise the issue of disproportionality of his sentence at his 

trial or in his motion for new trial. She has thus waived her right to raise it on 

appeal.

2) Appellant’s sentence was within the statutorily prescribed boundaries and

was not cruel and unusual punishment; nor was it grossly disproportionate to the 

offense of habitual theft.
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ARGUMENT

1) The issue of disproportionate sentence/ Eighth Amendment violation was 

not preserved. 

To preserve error for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely, specific 

objection and obtain a ruling from the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. This 

requirement applies even to assertions that a sentence is cruel and unusual. 

Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61, 72 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd)

(citing Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Jackson 

v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 844 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

The record contains no mention that the trial court was made aware of Lee’s 

complaint. Although Lee filed a generalized motion for new trial, it failed to assert 

the issue of cruel and unusual punishment.

2) The sentence was not excessive.

A. The sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.

Appellant was sentenced to six months’ confinement in a state jail facility 

for theft-habitual. CR 25. The statutory punishment range for a conviction of 

habitual theft is from six months to two years in state jail. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 

31.03 (Vernon)(e) (4) (D). This sentence was the minimum within the statutorily 

permitted range. 
6

The length of a criminal sentence is purely a matter of legislative 

prerogative. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684, 115 

L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991); State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1973). Texas has long held that any punishment assessed within the 

range that is authorized by statute is not cruel and unusual punishment, and does 

not render the sentence excessive. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Price v. State, 35 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Tex. App.--Waco 

2000) pet. ref'd (op. on reh'g); Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App. – Fort 

Worth 2001) pet. ref'd); McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1978); Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no 

pet.)

B. The Sentence is not disproportionate

In 1983, the United States Supreme Court affirmatively held that the Eighth 

Amendment prohibited “disproportionate” prison sentences. Solem v. Helm, 463 

U.S. 277, 284, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983) (recognizing that 

“the final clause [of the Eighth Amendment] prohibits not only barbaric 

punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed”).

The Supreme Court identified three criteria to be used to evaluate the 

proportionality of a particular sentence. Id. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. They are 

“the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; . . . the sentences 
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imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and . . . the sentences imposed 

for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id.

As case-law developed, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “disproportionality 

survives; Solem does not.” McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992)

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98, 113 S. Ct. 146 (1992). The Fifth 

Circuit applied a modified Solem test adopted by Justice Kennedy of the United 

State’s Supreme Court. Id. That is, the court initially made a threshold comparison 

of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence. Id. Only upon a 

determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense would the 

court consider the remaining Solem factors. Id.

Many appellate courts have followed and applied the Fifth Circuit’s 

McGruder analysis in addressing Eighth Amendment proportionality complaints.

Hicks v. State, 15 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. 

ref'd); Dunn v. State, 997 S.W.2d 885, 891-92 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999) pet. ref'd; 

Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999) no pet.; 

Mathews v. State, 918 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1996) pet. ref'd; 

Puga v. State, 916 S.W.2d 547, 549-50 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996) no pet.; 

Lackey v. State, 881 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd.)

Thus, the first step is to make a threshold comparison of the gravity of the 

offense against the severity of the sentence. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92, 103 S. Ct. 
8

at 3010; McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316. A reviewing court is to judge the gravity of 

the offense in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and 

the culpability of the offender. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.

Here, Appellant was found guilty of theft of items worth $111.74 from 

WalMart. SX 2. The harm to the victim and to the public and to society is based 

not so much on the victim’s loss (all items were recovered and returned to the 

victim) as on the repeated behaviors of the thief and the cost to the victim and its 

other customers who pay increased prices to cover the costs of preventing thefts

and replacing stolen items. The Appellant’s culpability was decided by her guilty 

plea; she admitted she is to blame for her behavior. Appellant’s punishment is 

within the range of punishment assessable for the offense—at the lowest end of the 

range. Moore, 54 S.W.3d, 543. Comparing the gravity of appellant’s offense 

(including her prior, jurisdictional offenses) to the severity of her sentence, it is not 

grossly disproportionate. Appellant’s point of error should be overruled.

In the event that the Court should find this sentence grossly disproportionate,

Appellant’s contention must fail on the second and third prongs of the Solem test. 

Appellant has presented no evidence that her sentence is disproportionate when 

compared to sentences for the same crime in this jurisdiction and no evidence that 

the sentence is disproportionate when compared to the sentences from other 

jurisdictions. Solem at 292. Appellant’s point of error should be overruled.
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PRAYER

The State prays that the sentence be affirmed because the appellant has 

failed to preserve error and failed to prove that her sentence was excessive, 

violated the 8th Amendment, or was grossly disproportionate to her offenses.

Respectfully Submitted,

CARL L. DORROUGH

Criminal District Attorney

Gregg County, Texas

By : /s/Zan Colson Brown

Zan Colson Brown

Texas Bar No. 03205900

Assistant District Attorney

101 East Methvin St., Suite 333

Longview, TX 75601

Telephone: (903) 236–8440

Facsimile: (903) 236–3701

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been 

forwarded to appellate counsel by electronic transmission through E-file Texas to 

Clement Dunn

140 E. Tyler, Suite 240

Longview, Texas 75601

clementdunn@aol.com

This 23rd day of July, 2015. 

/s/ Zan Colson Brown___

Zan Colson Brown 

Assistant District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I certify that the foregoing document complies with Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, Rule 9 (2013) regarding length of documents, in that 

exclusive of caption, identify of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral 

argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement 

of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, 

signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix, it 

consists of 1316 words. 

/S/Zan Colson Brown

Zan Colson Brown

Assistant District Attorney