alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 125 (Wednesday, July 1, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 31452]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15595]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Center for Scientific Review; Notice of Closed Meetings

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meetings.
    The meetings will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis 
Panel. Member Conflicts in Memory and Cognition.
    Date: July 8, 2009.
    Time: 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, 
Bethesda, MD 20892. (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Dana Jeffrey Plude, PhD, Scientific Review 
Officer, Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of 
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3176, MSC 7848, Bethesda, MD 
20892. 301-435-2309. <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#23534f56474647634050510d4d4a4b0d444c55"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="3e4e524b5a5b5a7e5d4d4c1050575610595148">[email protected]</span></a>.
    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

    Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis 
Panel. SEP--Epidemiology Competitive Revisions.
    Date: July 9, 2009.
    Time: 11 a.m. to 4 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, 
Bethesda, MD 20892. (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Jose Fernando Arena, PhD, MD, Scientific Review 
Officer, Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of 
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3135, MSC 7770, Bethesda, MD 
20892, 301-435-1735. Arenajmail.nih.gov.
    This notice is being published less than 15 days prior to the 
meeting due to the timing limitations imposed by the review and 
funding cycle.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.306, 
Comparative Medicine; 93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, 
93.337, 93.393-93.396, 93.837-93.844, 93.846-93.878, 93.892, 93.893, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: June 25, 2009.
Anna Snouffer,
Deputy Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E9-15595 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Return to:

First Court ofAppeals

301 Fannin Street

Houston, Texas 77002

Hung Le

The State ofTexas

Case Number

01-14-01019-CR

§

filed in

SSTCOURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON. TEXAS

JUL %2 2015

CHRlSTO^l A- PR1NE

CLERK.

COURT OF APPEALS

1ST DISTRICT

HOUSTON, TEXAS

Pro se Motion for Access to Appellate Record

To the Honorable Justices of Said Court:

Appellant's appointed counsel has filed a brief in the above styled and numbered

cause pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Appellant now moves this Court to provide him with a copy of the appellate

record including the clerk's record and the court reporter's record for use in preparing his

pro se response to counsel's brief.

Appellant requests an extension of time of 30 days from the granting of this

motion to file a pro se response to counsel's Anders brief.

Respectfully submitted,

Pro se Appellant! MtCMABJ Unit, TDCJ # Ol^GG 2- 2. °)

Certificate of Service

This is to certify that on ~7_ - / ^ —IS (Date), atrue and correct copy

ofthe above and foregoing document was served by mail on:

Harris County District Attorney's Office, 1201 Franklin, Suite 600, Houston, TX 77002

Pro se Appellant
Michael

Hung Le #1966229

Unit

2664 FM 2054

Tenn. Colony TX 75BB5

LEGAL MAIL

'OOS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Miguel Marquez, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 553]

The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s determinations concerning credibility, including its acceptance of the victim’s testimony concerning his physical condition. The element of serious physical injury was satisfied by evidence establishing that the victim sustained a “protracted impairment of health” (Penal Law § 10.00 [10]). The fractured bones in the victim’s foot, which evidently failed to heal properly, required him to use crutches for two months and continued to cause him difficulty in standing and walking two years later *(see People v Graham,*297 AD2d 579 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 535 [2002]; *People v Pittman,*253 AD2d 694 [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 1052 [1999]). The evidence also supports the conclusion that when defendant shot at the victim he intended to cause serious physical injury.

Defendant did not preserve his present argument that the court should have submitted assault in the third degree under *452the theory of criminal negligence (Penal Law § 120.00 [3]) as a lesser included offense, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Defense counsel neither alerted the court to the type of third-degree assault he was requesting nor articulated any reasonable view of the evidence to support such a submission, and, contrary to defendant’s suggestion on appeal, it was not the court’s responsibility to guess what counsel meant *(see e.g. People v Yen Koh,*225 AD2d 476 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 997 [1996]). As an alternative holding, we find there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support such charge *(see People v Randolph,*81 NY2d 868 [1993]).

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a prosecution witness experienced an episode of mental illness during cross-examination and was unable to continue testifying *(see generally People v Vargas,*88 NY2d 363, 379-380 [1996]). The court struck the witness’s entire testimony, with thorough instructions that went well beyond a mere instruction to disregard it. The court told the jury that, because of the witness’s psychiatric condition, “his testimony is totally unreliable and is not to be credited in any way,” and the jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions *(see People v Berg,*59 NY2d 294, 299-300 [1983]).

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Tom, J.P., Andrias, Nardelli and Sweeny, JJ.
#### Ruckle and Guarino, Inc., Respondent, v Michael Hangan et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[852 NYS2d 122]

To establish the right to enforce a mechanic’s lien, the contractor, or in this case the subcontractor, must make a prima facie case that the lien is valid, and that it is entitled to the amount asserted in the lien (8 Warren's Weed, New York Real Property § 92.11 [3] [a] [5th ed], citing *Cramer v Esswein,*220 App Div 10 [1927]; *see LHV Precast v Woodstock Lawn & Home Maintenance,*296 AD2d 736 [2002]). Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment enforcing the lien. Notably, the proposal on *268which plaintiff relies postdates the work performed, and plaintiffs evidence failed to establish that plaintiff is entitled to the amount asserted in the lien, i.e., $80,000. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Buckley, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Janice D. DiPietro, Chief Financial Officer of MultiCell Technologies, Inc. certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of MultiCell Technologies , Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.  The Registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

     a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; 

     b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c)  Disclosed in this annual report any change in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's fourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.  The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the Registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and

     b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  February 28, 2005
By:  /s/ Janice D. DiPietro
#### In the Matter of Bronx Committee for Toxic Free Schools et al., Respondents, v New York City School Construction Authority et al., Appellants.

Submitted August 6, 2012;

decided August 28, 2012

Motion by New Partners for Community Revitalization for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed.
Exhibit 32.2

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Porter Bancorp,
Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, David B. Pierce, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do hereby
certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |                      |  |                     |  |                        
|------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------- |  | ------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                    |  |  |  | PORTER BANCORP, INC.
|                    |  |  | 
|Dated: May 14, 2007 |  |  |  | By:                  |  | /s/ David B. Pierce
|                    |  |  |  |                      |  |                     |  | David B. Pierce        
|                    |  |  |  |                      |  |                     |  | Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Section 906), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Porter
Bancorp, Inc. and will be retained by Porter Bancorp, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1276

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jesus F. Almeida-Olivas, also known as Chaparro, also known as Chuy, also

known as Jose Almeida-Olivas

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: July 20, 2015

Filed: July 21, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.
Jesus Almeida-Olivas directly appeals after he pleaded guilty to federal drug

charges, pursuant to a plea agreement, and the district court sentenced himwithin the

1

calculated Guidelines range. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a

brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising challenges to the

reasonableness of the sentence that was imposed.

The written plea agreement in this case contains an appeal waiver, and after

careful de novo review, see United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010),

we will enforce the appeal waiver. The claims raised in this appeal fall within the

scope of the waiver; Almeida-Olivas’s testimony at the plea hearing shows that he

entered into the plea agreement, and the appeal waiver, knowingly and voluntarily;

and dismissing the appeal based on the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of

justice. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Further, having independently reviewed the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio,

488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues outside the scope of the appeal

waiver. This appeal is dismissed, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.

-2-
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven Wood, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 910]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Sullivan J.), dated April 4, 2012, which, after a hearing pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C, designated him a level two sex offender.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006]; *see People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d 112, 119 [2011]; *People v Bussie,*83 AD3d 920, 920-921 [2011]). Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure and, thus, properly designated him as a level two sex offender *(see People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d at 131; *People v Mondo,*88 AD3d 676 [2011]; *People v Padro,*84 AD3d 1046 [2011]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.E, Angiolillo, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
S05Y0415.

#### IN THE MATTER OF LOURDES NEELY COLEMAN.

(607 SE2d 556)

Per curiam.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on Respondent *865Lourdes Neely Coleman’s Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which she seeks the imposition of a six-month suspension, with credit for a suspension which began on June 25, 2004. In her petition, Ms. Coleman admits that she violated Rules 1.15,1.16, and 9.3, all a part of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Although neither Ms. Coleman nor the State Bar states specifically which provision of Rule 1.15orRule 1.16 applies, Ms. Coleman refers to language in Rules 1.15 (I) (b) and 1.16 (d) in describing her violations in her petition and those provisions are applicable to her conduct. A violation of Rule 1.15 (I) (b) is punishable by disbarment while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.16 (d) or Rule 9.3 is a public reprimand.

Decided January 10, 2005.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Elizabeth M.*
      *866
      *Williamson, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*865In March 2000, Ms. Coleman agreed to represent a client in a Title VII proceeding against a corporation, and, in June 2003, the client terminated Ms. Coleman’s services and requested the return of her file and any unused portion of the attorney’s fees. She provided the client with what she believed to be a complete copy of the client’s file, which did not include Ms. Coleman’s work product, but she did not provide the client with an accounting. The client and her new counsel repeatedly demanded that Ms. Coleman provide the client with additional documents that the client believed were missing from the file and after she failed to provide the documents, the client filed a grievance against her in October 2003. Although Ms. Coleman acknowledged service of the Notice of Investigation issued by the State Bar, she failed to timely file a response and consequently, on June 25, 2004, this Court suspended her for failing to respond to the Notice of Investigation. In October 2004, she provided the client with another copy of the documents from her file and with an accounting showing that the client owed Ms. Coleman additional attorney’s fees.

Based on the above facts, we conclude that Ms. Coleman’s Petition for Voluntary Discipline should be accepted. Accordingly, Ms. Coleman is suspended for six months from the practice of law for her violations of Rules 1.15,1.16, and 9.3, all a part of Bar Rule 4-102 (d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. She shall be given credit for her interim suspension beginning June 25, 2004. She is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

*Six-month suspension with credit given for interim suspension beginning June 25, 2004.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*866
      *Janise L. Miller,*for Coleman.
@conference{1209601,
  author = {Peter Vouras and Mohamed Hany and Rick Candell},
  title = {Wideband Cyclostationary Spectrum Analysis for Smart Factory Wireless Channels},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-07-05 04:07:00},
  publisher = {2023 24th International Conference on Digital Signal Processing, Island of Rhodes , GR},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936906},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/DSP58604.2023.10167932},
  language = {en},
}
Legend Natural Gas III, LP; 

Legend Natural Gas, LLC; 

Lewis Energy Group, LP; and 

Lewis Petro Properties, 

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 20, 2015

No. 04-14-00899-CV

Laura Leticia Zepeda VASQUEZ, Individually and on behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham 

Vasquez,Jr.,

Appellants

v.

LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; Legend Natural Gas, LLC; Lewis Energy Group, LP; and 

Lewis Petro Properties, Inc,

Appellees

From the 81st Judicial District Court, La Salle County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14-07-00119-CVL

Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On June 15, 2015, we granted Appellants’ unopposed first motion for extension of time 

to file a reply brief until July 10, 2015. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(c), (d). On the due date, 

Appellants filed a second motion for extension of time to file the reply brief until August 9, 

2015. 

Appellants’ motion is GRANTED. Appellants’ reply brief must be filed by August 9, 

2015. See id. R. 38.6(d). NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS OF TIME TO FILE 

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 20th day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Order entered July 10, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00539-CR

ROBERT ALEX, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-61271-V

ORDER

The Court ORDERS the trial court to make findings of fact regarding whether appellant 

has been deprived of the reporter’s record because of ineffective counsel, indigence, or for any 

other reason.

 The trial court shall first determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal. If 

the trial court determines that appellant does not desire to prosecute the appeal, it shall 

make a finding to that effect.

 If the trial court determines that appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, it shall next 

determine whether appellant is indigent and entitled to proceed without payment of costs 

for the reporter’s record. If appellant is entitled to proceed without payment of costs, the 

trial court shall make a finding to that effect. Moreover, if appellant is indigent, the trial 

court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective 

representation, which may include appointment of new counsel. If the trial court finds 

appellant is not indigent, it shall determine whether retained counsel has abandoned the 

appeal.
 The trial court shall next determine: (1) the name and address of each court reporter who 

recorded the proceedings in this cause; (2) the court reporter’s explanation for the delay 

in filing the reporter’s record; and (3) the earliest date by which the reporter’s record can 

be filed. 

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record, containing the written findings of fact, 

any supporting documentation, and any orders, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date 

of this order.

The appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with this order. The appeal 

shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are received, 

whichever is earlier.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
@conference{1207536,
  author = {Guodong Shao and Simon P. Frechette and Vijay Srinivasan},
  title = {An Analysis of the New ISO 23247 Series of Standards on Digital Twin Framework for Manufacturing},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-06-16 04:06:00},
  publisher = {2023 MSEC Manufacturing Science & Engineering Conference, New Brunswick, NJ, US},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=935765},
  language = {en},
}
July 17, 2015

03-15-00272-CV

C-1-CV-15-002970

Salmeron vs Govea

I have received the notice for the above styled case. As of

today I have not received a request for the court reporter's

record in this case.

Please contact me if you have any further questions.

Thank you,

Amanda Anderson, CSR

Official Court Reporter

County Court at Law No. 2

Travis County, Texas

1000 Guadalupe St., Rm 211

Austin, Texas 78701

512 854-9250

FAX: 512 854-4724