J-S33035-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHAEL BARONI

Appellant No. 3198 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000845-1982

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE, J., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2015

Michael Baroni appeals pro se from the trial court’s order dismissing, 

as untimely, his pro se petition for habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which 

the court treated as a petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA).1 We affirm.

Baroni, an inmate at SCI-Mahoney, was convicted by a jury, on 

October 6, 1982, of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of 

arson, and related offenses.2 He was sentenced on April 7, 1983, to 

concurrent life sentences for the murder convictions, plus consecutive terms 

of imprisonment for the other offenses. Baroni confessed to authorities that 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Baroni was also convicted of recklessly endangering another person, 

criminal trespass and criminal attempt.
J-S33035-15

- 2 -

he set a fire in the basement of an inhabited apartment building. The fire 

took the lives of a three-month-old girl and her four-year-old sister. 

On September 2, 2014, Baroni filed the instant pro se “Petition for 

Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum” challenging the unlawful restraint of his 

liberty, claiming that the sentencing process violated due process because 

he was never given notice of the specific arson charge for which he was 

being prosecuted. As a result, he claims that the trial judge lacked the 

authority to impose an arson sentence upon him and that the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections does not have the right to detain him. The trial 

court concluded that this petition was within the purview of the PCRA, that 

there were no genuine issues concerning any material fact, and that no 

purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Accordingly the court 

dismissed the petition, as untimely, without a hearing. This timely appeal 

follows. 

On appeal, Baroni presents the following issue for our review: Did the 

PCRA court abuse its discretion by dismissing defendant’s sixth postconviction relief petition3 without a hearing?

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court frames the issue raised 

in Baroni’s petition as one where he “alleges that he was denied his right to 

due process of law because he was not given adequate notice regarding the 

____________________________________________

3 Baroni filed five PCRA petitions from 1987 to 2012, all of which were 

denied as either meritless or a untimely.
J-S33035-15

- 3 -

arson charge prior to trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/14, at 2-3. Baroni’s 

petition claims that his criminal information/bill of indictment “does not 

specify exactly which criminal offense under 18 Pa.C.S. section 3301 [he] 

was charged.” Writ of Habeus Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 9/2/14, at 3. 

Baroni further asserts in his petition that because he was sentenced for 

arson-related second-degree murder, and only received notice of a general 

arson charge, that his sentence is void. Id.

It has long been held that an indictment or complaint is valid if it 

charges the commission of any crimes which are cognate to the one laid in 

the information. Commonwealth v. Dunnick, 202 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. 

1964). A cognate offense is a lesser offense that is related to the greater 

offense because it shares several of the elements of the greater offense and 

is of the same class or category. Commonwealth v. Weigle, 949 A.2d 899 

(Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d by 997 A.2d 306 (Pa. 2010); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

560(B)(5) (information shall be valid and legally sufficient if it contains, 

among other thing, “a plain and concise statement of the essential elements 

of the offense substantially the same as or cognate to the offense alleged in 

the complaint.”). 

In Commonwealth v. Conaway, 105 A.3d 755 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

our Court recently discussed the well-established purpose of an information 

or an indictment:

The purpose of an [i]nformation or an [i]ndictment is to provide 

the accused with sufficient notice to prepare a defense, and to 

ensure that he will not be tried twice for the same act. 
J-S33035-15

- 4 -

Commonwealth v. Ohle, [] 470 A.2d 61, 73 (Pa. 1983); 

Commonwealth v. Diaz, [] 383 A.2d 852 (Pa. 1978); 

Commonwealth v. Rolinski, [] 406 A.2d 763 (Pa. Super. 

1979). An [i]ndictment or an [i]nformation is sufficient if it sets 

forth the elements of the offense intended to be charged with 

sufficient detail that the defendant is apprised of what he must 

be prepared to meet, and may plead double jeopardy in a future 

prosecution based on the same set of events. Commonwealth 

v. Bell, [] 516 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. 

Ohle, [] 470 A.2d 61, 73 (Pa. 1983); Russell v. United States, 

369 U.S. 749 [] (1962); [s]ee Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b). This may be 

accomplished through use of the words of the statute itself as 

long as "those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, 

without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements 

necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished." 

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 [](1974), quoting, 

United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [] ([1881]).

Id. at 764, citing Commonwealth v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092, 1095-96 (Pa. 

1994). Moreover, while the information shall contain “the official or 

customary citation of the statute and section thereof . . . that the defendant 

is alleged to have violated[,] . . . the omission of or error in such citation 

shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the information.” Id. at (C).

First, we must address a procedural issue, namely whether the trial 

court properly treated Baroni’s petition for habeas corpus relief as one filed 

under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2007), 

our Supreme Court reiterated that:

[T]he PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including 

habeas corpus, to the extent that a remedy is available under 

such enactment. See Peterkin, 554 Pa. at 552, 722 A.2d at 

640. In light of the broad applicability of the traditional writ of 

habeas corpus, however, in conjunction with the legislative 

intent to channel post-conviction claims into the PCRA's 

framework, this Court has acknowledged that the scope of the 

PCRA cannot be narrowly confined to its specifically enumerated 

areas of review.
J-S33035-15

- 5 -

Id. at 520. Here, Baroni is not asserting his innocence of the underlying 

crimes, but rather he claims that the court did not have the authority to 

impose his arson sentence where he was not on notice with regard to the 

specific type of arson of which he was being charged. We agree with Baroni 

that a writ of habeas corpus was the proper vehicle for his illegal detention 

claim. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 (habeas corpus venue). However, while Baroni 

may have utilized the correct avenue to raise his claim, we agree with the 

trial court that he is not entitled to relief.4

Instantly, Baroni’s criminal complaint cites the following criminal acts 

that he allegedly committed:

901 Criminal Attempt (Homicide)

2502 Criminal Homicide

2705 Recklessly Endangering Another Person

3301 Arson

3302 Causing or Risking Catastrophe

3304 Criminal Mischief

3502 Burglary

3503 Criminal Trespass

Defiant Trespass

____________________________________________

4

It is well settled that we may affirm the trial court on different grounds. 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 778 A.2d 1215, 1223 n.6 (Pa. Super. 

2001).
J-S33035-15

- 6 -

Criminal Complaint, 2/11/82 (emphasis added). With regard to the 

reference to arson in Baroni’s criminal information, the document cites 18 

P.S. § 33015as the statutory section under which he is being charged. The 

body of the criminal information, however, provides more detail with regard 

to the exact circumstances surrounding the arson charge. It states:

[O]n (or about) January 25, 1982, in said County, Michael Baroni 

defendant feloniously and intentionally start[ed] a fire or 

cause[d] an explosion and thereby did recklessly place [the] 

residents of Alicia Court Apartments in danger of death or bodily 

injury.

(2) That on the same day and year, in Delaware County,

the above named defendant feloniously and intentionally 

start[ed] a fire or casue[d] an explosion and thereby 

recklessly did place a building or occupied structure of 

Robert Viola located at 13 Alicia Court, Darby Township, in 

danger of damage or destruction.

(3) That, on that same day and year, in Delaware County, 

the above named defendant feloniously and intentionally 

did start a fire or cause an explosion and thereby 

recklessly did place a building or occupied structure of 

Robert Viola located at 13 Alicia Court, Darby Township, in 

danger of damage or destruction.

(4) That, on the same day and year in Delaware County, 

the above named defendant feloniously did start a fire or 

cause an explosion with intent to destroy[] or damage[e] 

property of Robert Viola to collect insurance for such loss, 

contrary to the Act of the General Assembly in such case 

made and provided, and against the piece [sic] and dignity 

of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

____________________________________________

5 Baroni’s information cites to the version of the arson statute in effect at the 

time he committed the instant offenses, 18 P.S. § 3301 (Act. No. 334, Dec. 

6, 1972 (eff. June 6, 1973)).
J-S33035-15

- 7 -

Criminal Information, 4/6/82 (emphasis added). The language in the bill of 

information mirrors the statutory language found in the current arson 

statute, specifically sub-sections 3301(a)(1)((i), (ii) (arson endangering 

persons) and 3301(c) (arson endangering property). In fact, the recorded 

verdict indicates that the jury found Baroni guilty, among other things, of 

arson – “as to Intent to Endanger Person” and “as to intent to Endanger 

Property.”

After a complete review of the record, we conclude that the criminal 

information does much more than generally allege the crime of arson. 

Rather, it specifically lays out Baroni’s actions to support the arson charge 

brought against him. Accordingly, we find that based upon the facts alleged 

in the information, Baroni was provided with sufficient notice to prepare a 

defense to the crime of arson. Conaway, supra; Alston, supra.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2015