alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
@article{1212736,
  author = {William Sean McGivern and Huong Giang Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Manion},
  title = {Improved Apparatus for Dynamic Column Breakthrough Measurements Relevant to Direct Air Capture of \ce{CO2}},
  year = {2023},
  number = {62},
  month = {2023-05-23 04:05:00},
  publisher = {Industrial and Engineering Chemistry Research},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=935522},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.iecr.2c04050},
  language = {en},
}
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Chisholm, Appellant.

[977 NYS2d 663]

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment ofthe Supreme Court, New York County (Thomas A. Farber, J.), rendered on or about January 17, 2012, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed. Concur— Tom, J.E, Friedman, Renwick, Feinman and Clark, JJ.
#### In the Matter of David N. Barlow, Appellant, v June Barlow, Respondent.

[976 NYS2d 573]

*818In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Watson, J.), dated December 4, 2012, which, after a hearing, denied his petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Family Court properly denied the father’s petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation. It is fundamental public policy in New York that parents are responsible for their children’s support until age 21 *(see Matter of Gansky v Gansky,*103 AD3d 894 [2013]; *Schulman v Schulman,*101 AD3d 1098 [2012]; *Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S.,*89 AD3d 856 [2011]). However, under the doctrine of constructive emancipation, a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation may forfeit any entitlement to support. A child’s mere reluctance to see a parent is not abandonment *(see Matter of Grucci v Villanti,*108 AD3d 626 [2013]; *Schulman v Schulman,*101 AD3d 1098 [2012]; *Matter of Turnow v Stabile,*84 AD3d 1385 [2011]). Furthermore, where it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with the child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his or her visitation rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent *(see Schulman v Schulman,*101 AD3d 1098 [2012]; *Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S.,*89 AD3d 856 [2011]; *Matter of Dewitt v Giampietro,*66 AD3d 773 [2009]). A breakdown may be caused by conduct such as malfeasance, misconduct, neglect, or abuse *(see Matter of Wiegert v Wiegert,*267 AD2d 620 [1999]). A child’s justified refusal to continue a relationship due to such conduct by a parent will not be considered self-emancipation *(see Labanowski v Labanowski,*49 AD3d 1051 [2008]). The burden of proof as to emancipation is on the party asserting it *(see Schulman v Schulman,*101 AD3d 1098 [2012]; *Matter of Glen L.S. v Deborah A.S.,*89 AD3d 856 [2011]; *Matter of Turnow v Stabile,*84 AD3d 1385 [2011]).

Here, the father failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the subject child had actively abandoned him, such that the child had forfeited any entitlement to support. The record demonstrates that it was the father who caused the breakdown in communication with the child, through his misconduct toward the mother and the child, and that the child justifiably refused to continue the relationship. Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied the father’s petition to terminate his child support obligation on the ground of constructive emancipation. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
JLE

COURT OF APPEAL {UL 22 2018
Secventh District of TEXAS SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
POTTER COUNTY COURTS BUILDING”

501 s. FILLMORE STE: 2-A
AMARILLO, TEXAS 789101-2449

Ray Winn
700 Waco Rd. #2
Belton, Tx. 76513

RE: Case Number: 07-15-00140-CV
Trial court Case Number: 74271

Sally Lawson
STYLE:Ray Winn vs. P.O Box 561
Sally Lawson Belton, Tx 76513

MOTION TO DENY APPEAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT
NOW COME Ray Winn, plaintiff in the above-style and will
show the court as follows.

Dear court,

| have been dealing with Mrs. Lawson for a long time and
| have not been able to get back on my feet since she
took all of my propery. That was my life savings that
she took away from me. There has been appointment
set many of times and Mrs. Lawson always had excures
while she didn't show up for trials that was scheduled.

| know it was at-least (5)times and the court's let her

get away with it. Mrs Lawson should be held accoun-
table for what she did. Mrs Lawson can actually should
have theift charges file againest her for taking my
property. When Mrs. Lawson did appear in court



she always admitted that her took my property but
she never stated why she did what she did.
| was incarerated for (3) days and while | was in-
cerated my family-member Rev. Garland and my
nephew went by to get my propery my roomate would
alway call the landlord telling her that my family-member
was here to get my property, and the landlord (Mrs.
Lawson) would tell Tina my roommate to tell them
that my property was not there so they would leave.
When | gort out in (3)days my family and | when by
to get my property tina my roommate would call Mrs.
Lawson and she should up in 10:mints and told me to
get off the property that | was tresspassing and she
said that If | didn't leave she wouls call the law.
| didn't leave so she call the police and she said that
the police was on there way.
we waited for the police to show up,they never showed
up. We waited and waited but they never show up.
Rev. garland had to leave. We didn't have our cell-
phone with us, but when we got home | call the police
to see if there was a call to that address and internal-
affires said that there was not a call to that address.
THEREFORE | pray that the courts grant this motion
and deny this appeal and grant a new trial and schedule
hearing for this trial #74271 and hold her accountable
for what she did. If that was me in Mrs. Lawson shoes
| would have been found liable for what was done.
| don't know while she got away with her not showing
up for her hearings. In athe sum of($50,000.)

Mrs. Lawson will have theirt chargers filed againest
her.

wee


pe SHEPULBL, 6! 9
Bes Cc

2
Le Sa
E1776 tL ‘wip

oye Atif
LShid. SEOS WIE CT
a goo Lol sic agnwup ons _
“¢ PRE OEL ALLS 4
#### Robert Korn, Appellant, v Edward Korn, Respondent.

[826 NYS2d 889]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County *550(Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered March 17, 2005, dismissing plaintiffs complaint and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered March 7, 2005, granting defendant’s CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from the March 7, 2005 order unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the ensuing judgment.

The complaint’s allegations, even as supplemented by plaintiff’s affidavits, do not make out a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress *(see e.g. Lewittes v Blume,*18 AD3d 261 [2005]). While it is unnecessary to reach defendant’s alternative argument for affirmance, i.e., that the complaint was not timely served, we note that plaintiffs attorney has made a showing of “good cause” for extending the time for service pursuant to CPLR 306-b. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P, Saxe, Marlow, Sullivan and Williams, JJ.
H. Res. 781 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

January 9, 2020. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider in the House the concurrent resolution 

(H. Con. Res. 83) directing the President pursuant to section 

5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to terminate the use of 

United States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or 

against Iran. All points of order against consideration of the 

concurrent resolution are waived. The amendment printed in 

the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as adopted. The concurrent resolution, as amended, shall be considered as read. All points of 

order against provisions in the concurrent resolution, as 

amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent resolution, as amended, to 

adoption without intervening motion or demand for division 

of the question except two hours of debate equally divided 

and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of 

the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
2 

•HRES 781 EH 

SEC. 2. Section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 

U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply during the remainder of the 

One Hundred Sixteenth Congress to a measure respecting 

Iran. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
#### Byblos Bank Europe, S.A., Respondent, v Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 51]

With respect to its actual damages due to the loss of use of the attached funds, defendant is entitled at a minimum to recover interest at the legal rate, reduced by the amount of the earnings on the attached funds during the period they are held *(see Subin v United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,*12 AD2d 49, 52-53 [1960]). The legal rate of interest, however, does not also set a ceiling on the amount of defendant’s actual damages. As the Fourth Department has stated, “[w]e perceive no reason why a party who is wrongfully deprived of the use of his funds may not recover damages representing more than the legal interest rate, provided that he can prove that such damages were actually sustained as a proximate result of the deprivation” *(Dean v McHugh Constr. Co.,*56 AD2d 716, 718 [1977]).

Moreover, contrary to Supreme Court’s determination, the affidavits submitted by defendant in support of its contention that it would have earned substantially more than the legal rate of interest were not, as Supreme Court stated in its decision and order, “wholly conclusory.” To the contrary, the factual as*289sertions were more than sufficiently detailed to warrant a hearing on defendant’s contention. Accordingly, we direct that such a hearing take place as soon as practicable and that the undertaking be increased if and to the extent defendant establishes at the hearing that it would have earned more than the legal rate of interest. In any event, the undertaking should be increased to protect defendant’s right to recover interest at the legal rate of interest less the amount of the earnings on the funds.

Finally, we reject plaintiff’s contention that defendant was required to mitigate its damages by borrowing money to replace the attached funds. Concur-Lippman, P.J., Andrias, Williams and McGuire, JJ.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00364-CR

Ronnie White Jr.

v.

The State of Texas

On appeal from the

24th District Court of De Witt County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 17-11-12,792

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court 

orders the appeal DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION in accordance with its 

opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

September 5, 2019
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 29, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135856 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135856 

 COA: 280959 

Wayne CC: 01-012804-01

ANDRE LAMAR JACKSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 18, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

s0721 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 29, 2008 

 Clerk
#### Bombardier Capital Inc., Respondent, v Schoengold Sporn Laitman & Lometti, P.C., et al., Appellants.

[854 NYS2d 65]

As the information sought is available from the defendants in the Florida action, who have already been deposed in the pending federal action, and there is considerable risk of encountering privilege and work-product issues in deposing respondents, petitioner’s motion to compel respondents to comply with the deposition subpoenas should have been denied (see *Corcoran v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,*151 AD2d 443 [1989]). Indeed, work-product issues are pending in connection with a subpoena duces tecum (see 46 AD3d 323 [2007]).

We perceive no basis to disturb the denial of respondents’ motion for sanctions under Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 130-1.1. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
Following a lengthy investigation, Dr. Peter Ajemian recently pleaded guilty to providing false 

evidence to support applications filed by Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) employees for disability 

annuities payable under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA).

In light of Dr. Ajemian’s plea and admission that he provided false evidence to support disability 

applications, on June 27, 2013, the three-member Board of the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) 

adopted Board Order 13-33. This order terminates applications filed by disability annuitants 

who submitted medical evidence from Dr. Ajemian at the time they filed their applications under 

the RRA. These annuitants are also recipients of a private pension from the LIRR, previously 

available to LIRR employees age 50 or older with at least 20 years of service.

In accordance with this action, the Board has also determined that monthly payments to these 

annuitants must be terminated. 

Under the order, individuals who believe they remain entitled to benefits under the RRA are 

allowed to file a new application for benefits. The decision to award a new disability annuity 

will be based upon current medical evidence. Letters are currently being released to annuitants

whose benefits will be terminated under Board Order 13-33. Those receiving a letter and 

wishing to file a new application for benefits should contact the RRB by calling toll-free, 

1-877-772-5772, to schedule an application interview.

# # #

Statement of the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board

July 16, 2013
NRRIT 

Annual Management Report 

for Fiscal Year 2019
#### In the Matter of Jessie James Barnes, Appellant, v Julie Finocchio, Assistant District Attorney, et al., Respondents.

Decided February 14, 2013

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.

Judge Rivera taking no part.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Orient Paper, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended September 30, 2009,  as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Winston C. Yen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.  The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.  Date: February 1, 2010By:/s/ Winston C. YenWinston C. Yen

Chief Financial Officer

(principal financial andaccounting officer)      9
FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/22/2015 3:59:06 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>      12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>  DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>       DEC-31-1996

<CASH>                     847,356 
<SECURITIES>                  0    
<RECEIVABLES>              139,352 
<ALLOWANCES>                  0    
<INVENTORY>                   0    
<CURRENT-ASSETS>           986,708 
<PP&E>                   8,711,748 
<DEPRECIATION>                0    
<TOTAL-ASSETS>          11,447,604 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>      794,190 
<BONDS>                  6,800,000 
<COMMON>                      0    
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0    
<PREFERRED>                   0    
<OTHER-SE>               3,841,040 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>11,447,604 
<SALES>                  1,499,883 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>         1,604,356 
<CGS>                         0    
<TOTAL-COSTS>            1,142,797 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>           199,739 
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0    
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>         365,676 
<INCOME-PRETAX>           (103,856)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>        (88,091)
<DISCONTINUED>             805,241 
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0    
<CHANGES>                     0    
<NET-INCOME>               717,150 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                15.10 
<EPS-DILUTED>                15.10 

        


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6486
THOMAS D. CARR, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus SPRING GROVE HOSPITAL CENTER, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA96-1328-DKC) Submitted: June 12, 1997 Decided: June 18, 1997 Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas D. Carr, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Renee Steinberg, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Carr v. Spring Grove Hosp. Ctr. , No. CA-96-1328-DKC (D. Md. Mar. 14, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

LAMONT CRANSTON GORHAM,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 127 MAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0541

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

BEAU AVIDIYA,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including July 26, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 20 2023

06/20/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0541
<Page>

                                                                EXHIBIT 10.14(d)

          PriceSmart, Inc.                                      [Memorandum]
          4649 Morena Blvd.
          San Diego, CA  92117
          Tel 858 581-7485
          Fax 858 581-4707

PriceSmart [Logo]




          To:     Allan Youngberg

          From:   Bob Gans /s/ BG

          Re:     Salary Increase

          Date:   October 16, 2001




          With reference to your Employment Agreement, this Memorandum will
          confirm that effective September 1, 2001, your annual base salary
          increased by $20,000, to $210,000.
#### Yvette Timan, as Executrix of Eric Timan, Deceased, Appellant, v Nazar Sayegh, M.D., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[854 NYS2d 338]

Plaintiffs decedent committed suicide in Yonkers, where he had lived with his family. He had been suffering from depression, anxiety, substance abuse and low back pain, and had received medical treatment from the physician defendants, whose medical offices were located in Yonkers. Other nonparty medical providers who had rendered services to the decedent, as noted by defendants, either lived or worked in lower Westchester. The Yonkers Police Department investigated the incident and the Westchester County Medical Examiner’s Office conducted the autopsy. Plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death, claiming the medical and pharmacy defendants were negligent in rendering medical care and/or in the distribution of pharmaceuticals.

Venue was properly laid in the Bronx on the basis of a defendant’s residence there (CPLR 503 [a]). In seeking a change of venue to Westchester for the convenience of material witnesses (CPLR 510 [3]), defendants failed to meet their burden *275of showing, inter alia, that such witnesses had been contacted and would be willing to testify, and how they would be inconvenienced by having to attend a trial in the Bronx (see *Heinemann v Grunfeld,*224 AD2d 204 [1996]). Mere general statements as to witness inconvenience are not enough (Hartigan *v Kurian,*224 AD2d 299 [1996]). We have rejected a change of venue in similar cases where witnesses predominantly resided or maintained offices in Yonkers and failed to explain how they would be inconvenienced by a trial in the Bronx as opposed to Westchester, particularly given that the distance from Yonkers to the courts in the two counties is roughly the same (see *e.g. Rosario v St. John's Riverside Hosp.,*11 AD3d 351 [2004]; *Preldakaj v Gazivoda,*224 AD2d 280 [1996]; *Kurnitz v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr.,*166 AD2d 390 [1990]). Concur-Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Buckley, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.
Order entered July 14, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00610-CV

DONALD L. WISE, Appellant

V.

VONDA LEA MITCHELL, Appellee

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. PR-14-03556-2

ORDER

We DENY as moot appellant’s June 2, 2015 motion to consider its motion to set 

supersedeas bond as a notice of appeal.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE