alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         738,000
<SECURITIES>                                   3,019,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  70,354,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   4,577,000
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               75,532,000
<PP&E>                                         12,985,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 6,257,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 187,264,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          53,463,000
<BONDS>                                        51,050,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       33,258,000
<OTHER-SE>                                     44,525,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   187,264,000
<SALES>                                        309,425,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               309,425,000
<CGS>                                          221,892,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  279,503,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             4,142,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                25,027,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   9,929,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            15,098,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   15,098,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                    2.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  2.07



</TABLE>
#### Swanson *v.*Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co.

*(Circuit Court, D. Minnesota.*

June 28, 1888.)

Attorney and Client — Compensation — Compromise without Payment — Eight to Prosecute Suit.

Where plaintiff in an action for personal injuries voluntarily proposes a compromise, which is accepted, and there is nothing to show that it was collusive as to plaintiff’s attorneys, who had no knowledge of it, amotion by the attorne/s for leave to prosecute notwithstanding the settlement will be denied.

On Motion.

*Arctander & Arctander,*for plaintiff.

*Lusk & Bunn,*for defendant.

*639Breweb, J.

A motion was made by plaintiff’s counsel for leave to prosecute this suit, notwithstanding an alleged settlement made by the plaintiff with the defendant, on the ground that the same was made without the knowledge of plaintiff’s counsel, and with a view to defraud them out of their fees. I have simply this to say: It is unquestioned that parties to a lawsuit may settle and compromise their litigation without consulting their counsel; and that, in the absence of a statute giving an attorney a lien for his fees, courts will not intervene, unless there has been collusion between the parties, 'and an attempt to defraud au attorney out of his fees. So say all the authorities presented by counsel for the plaintiff. In this case there is no reason to believe that there was any collusion, or any intent to defraud. It is one of those actions for personal injuries in which, while the amount claimed is large, yet we all know that there is often a great uncertainty as to the fact, as well as to the amount, of the verdict. It appears that the plaintiff, on one of the first days of this term, of his own volition, -went to the claim agent of the defendant, and proposed to compromise for a given sum, amounting to about a thousand dollars. The same was accepted, the money paid, and a stipulation for the settlement of the case signed. This was done without consultation with, and without the knowledge of, the attorneys; and there is nothing in the transaction to show that it was not executed in the utmost good faith, without any thought of any interest the attorneys might have in the case. It is true that, the day before, the respective counsel met here in the court room, and spoke of a compromise. Counsel for defendant said he had no authority to do anything in the matter, but would suggest the terms mentioned to his client; and the plaintiff’s attorney said he would do the same to his; hut neither of them saw their .clients, or had any consultation with them, and before they met again their clients had settled this suit. Under those circumstances, I think the settlement must- stand, although it may operate to prevent counsel for plaintiff from receiving any compensation for their services. The motion will be overruled, and the case dismissed as per stipulation.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tito Rodriguez, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 351]

*434The court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress identification testimony. The hearing court properly exercised its discretion *(see People v Chipp,*75 NY2d 327, 337 [1990], *cert denied*498 US 833 [1990]) in refusing to permit defendant to call as a witness a police sketch artist who had worked with the victim to create a wanted poster. “[T]he purpose and function of the *Wade*hearing is to determine whether a police-arranged pretrial identification procedure such as a lineup, was unduly suggestive” *(id.).*The creation of the sketch itself was not an identification procedure *(People v Pagan,*248 AD2d 325 [1998], *affd*93 NY2d 891 [1999]). There is no indication that the sketch was created on the basis of anything other than information supplied by the victim, or any reason to believe the process of creating a sketch impaired the fairness of the subsequent lineup. We find nothing in *People v Maldonado*(97 NY2d 522 [2002]), a case dealing with the hearsay implications of admitting a sketch at trial, that supports defendant’s present position. The photographs of the lineup show that the characteristics of the participants were reasonably similar, and any differences were not sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that defendant would be singled out for identification *(see Chipp,*75 NY2d at 336; *People v Holmes,*291 AD2d 247 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 676 [2002]); defendant’s assertion that he was the only participant who fit the victim’s description is without merit. We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining arguments concerning the suppression hearing and the court’s determination.

None of the evidence relating to DNA violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him *(see People v Rawlins,*10 NY3d 136 [2008]).

By failing to object, by making general objections, and by failing to request further relief after an objection was sustained, defendant did not preserve his present challenges to the People’s summation and we decline to review them in the interest of *435justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits *(see People v Overlee,*236 AD2d 133 [1997], *lv denied*91 NY2d 976 [1998]).

The court properly imposed consecutive sentences for the five sexual offenses because they were “separate and distinct acts, notwithstanding that they occurred in the course of a continuous incident” *(People v Wynn,*35 AD3d 283, 284 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 928 [2007]). Each of the sex crimes was a separate “act” within the meaning of Penal Law § 15.00 (1) and § 70.25 (2), and nothing in the Penal Law requires any type of interval or interruption in a continuous attack in order for the individual acts to qualify as separate for sentencing purposes *(see e.g. People v Brathwaite,*63 NY2d 839, 843 [1984] [two victims killed by separate shots fired in single incident]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
# FOIA requests 2024
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00191-CV

YIGAL BOSCH, Appellant

V.

FROST NATIONAL BANK, Appellee

Appeal from the 133rd District Court of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 2009-63337).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on 

December 16, 2013. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments 

properly raised by the parties, the Court holds that there was reversible error in the 

portion of the trial court’s judgment granting appellee’s “Motion to Strike Entities[’] 

Claims Asserted in Pleadings.” Accordingly, the Court reverses this portion of the trial 

court’s judgment.

The Court further holds that there was no reversible error in the remaining 

portions of the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the remaining 

portions of the trial court’s judgment.

The Court further remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Court orders that the appellant, Yigal Bosch, pay one half of the appellate 

costs. The Court orders that the appellee, Frost National Bank, pay one half of the 

appellate costs. 

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered July 21, 2015.

Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle. Opinion delivered by Justice 

Brown.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robin Brenes, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 449]

Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J.), rendered on or about December 20, 2004, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Fursuant to Criminal Frocedure Law § 460.20, defendant may apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the *542Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within 30 days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the judge or justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other judge or justice. Concur— Andrias, J.E, Marlow, Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
EXHIBIT 10.1nn
                           First AMENDMENT TO LEASE

                            ADDITION OF SQUARE FEET


That certain lease dated June 10, 1991, by and between Petula Associates 
Ltd., and Koll Woodside Associates, Landlord, and Sequent Computer Systems, 
Inc., Tenant, for the premises located at 15275 S.W. Koll Parkway, Beaverton,
Oregon 97006, Building 3, Units A, B, D, and E, is amended this _________ day
of ________________, 1995, solely as hereinafter described.


Effective the 1st day of JANUARY, 1996, the portions of the Lease as numbered
below shall be amended to read as follows:

1.e.      PREMISES AREA
          -   Unit C consisting of 6,238 square feet shall be added to the 
              premises area.
          -   Total Amended Premises Area shall be 25,653 square feet.

1.f.      PROJECT AREA:    131,017 square feet.

1.g.      PREMISES PERCENT OF PROJECT:   19.58%

1.j.      RENT ADJUSTMENT:

                01/01/98           $  22,257
                06/01/98              23,509
                06/01/01 - 5/31/03    25,025


All other terms and conditions of the above described Lease shall remain in 
full force and effect.


Landlord:       PETULA ASSOCIATES, LTD., an Iowa Corporation and
                KOLL WOODSIDE ASSOCIATES, a California General partners

                By:    TIMOTHY E. MINTON, VICE PRESIDENT & SECRETARY
                       JOHN N. URBAN, VICE PRESIDENT

Tenant:         SEQUENT COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.

                By:   ROBERT B. WITT, VICE PRESIDENT & CIO
                Date:  JULY 21, 995
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration 

          - [TA-W-64,756] 

Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an investigation was initiated on December 22, 2008 in response to a petition filed by a company official on behalf of workers of Air Liquide Electronics U.S. LP, Dallas, Texas. 

The petitioning group of workers is covered by an active certification (TA-W-63,747 as amended) which expires on August 20, 2010. Consequently, further investigation in this case would serve no purpose, and the investigation has been terminated. 

Signed at Washington, DC this 13th day of January 2009. 

Richard Church, 

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance. 

[FR Doc. E9-1498 Filed 1-23-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Amended Quarterly Report ofReal Estate Referral Center Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB/A-1 for the period ended May 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Lisa McIntosh, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) 	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) 	The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 27th day of November, 2006.



| | LISA MCINTOSH                                      
| | ---------------------------------------------------
| | Lisa McIntosh                                      
| | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer













---
Exhibit 13.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of BHP Billiton Plc and BHP Billiton Limited, (the
Companies) for the annual period ended 30 June 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned officer of the Companies, hereby certifies, to such officers
knowledge, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |                        
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                    
|/s/ Andrew Mackenzie
|Name:                |  | Andrew Mackenzie       
|Title:               |  | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:                |  | 21 September 2016      

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to
the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.
@article{10526,
  author = {Jeffrey Sowards and Elisabeth Mansfield},
  title = {CORROSION OF COPPER AND STEEL ALLOYS IN A SIMULATED UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SUMP ENVIRONMENT CONTAINING ACID PRODUCING BACTERIA},
  year = {2014},
  month = {2014-08-29},
  publisher = {Corrosion Science},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=914581},
  language = {en},
}
IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF TEXAS

TRIAL COURT NO. 2013CR5298 

DOCKET NOS. 01-14-00265-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS

VS.

JONATHAN URIBE

___________________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE

290 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TH

OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

__________________________________________________

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY

To The Honorable Judges of The Court of Appeals:

Counsel for Appellant in the above entitled and numbered cause moves to be allowed to

withdraw as attorney of record, and as grounds therefore would show the Court as follows:

I.

Appellant has filed a brief alleging that no reversible error exists and that the appeal is

frivilous and without merit.

ACCEPTED

01-14-00265-cr

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

7/20/2015 3:52:12 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/20/2015 3:52:12 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
II.

Withdrawal is required under these circumstances. Jeffrey v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.

App.--Dallas 1995, no pet.). I certify that Appellant’s mailing address is:

Jonathan Uribe

TDCJ # 01913292

4250 Highway 202

Beeville, TX 78192

PRAYER

Wherefore, Appellant by and through his attorney of record, prays that the Court will grant

this motion and allow Appellant's counsel to withdraw.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ C. Wayne Huff______________________

C. Wayne Huff

P.O. Box 2334

Boerne, TX 78006

Bar Card No. 10180600

(214) 803-4127

Facsimile (830) 230-5567

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned attorney of record of Appellant hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of

the foregoing motion was sent to the District Attorney for Bexar County, Texas, on the same date

that it was mailed to this court by U.S. Mail.

Signed this the 20 day of July, 2015. th

/s/ C. Wayne Huff_________________________ 

 C. WAYNE HUFF
@conference{11316,
  author = {Shannon Hill and Fardina Asikin and Lee Richter and Steven Grantham and Charles Tarrio and Thomas Lucatorto and Sergiy Yulin and Mark Schurmann and Viatcheslav Nesterenko and Torsten Feigl},
  title = {Optics contamination studies in support of high-throughput EUV lithography tools},
  year = {2011},
  month = {2011-03-25},
  publisher = {EUV Lithography 2011, San Jose, CA},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1117/12.879852},
  language = {en},
}
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RALPH ERNEST, a/k/a Sincere Ernest,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District

Judge. (CR-90-242-A, CA-97-383-AM)

Submitted: August 27, 1998 Decided: September 10, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ralph Ernest, Appellant Pro Se. Bernard James Apperson, III,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ralph Ernest seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.

1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Ernest, Nos. CR-90-242-A; CA-97-383-

AM (E.D. Va. Sept. 16 and Sept. 22, 1997). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6434

JOSEPH L. CHILDRESS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, Alexandria Division,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District

Judge. (1:05-cv-01310-GBL)

Submitted: May 16, 2006 Decided: May 24, 2006

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph L. Childress, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Joseph L. Childress seeks to appeal the district court’s

order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition, and dismissing it on that basis.

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Childress has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Childress’ notice of appeal and

informal brief as an application to file a second or successive

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. United States v. Winestock, 340

F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to

file a successive § 2254 petition, a prisoner must assert claims
- 3 -

based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously

unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on

collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously

discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).

Childress’ claims do not satisfy either of these criteria.

Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2254

petition. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
@conference{11821,
  author = {Solomon Woods and Simon Kaplan and Timothy Jung and Adriaan Carter and James Proctor},
  title = {Initial testing of a Si:As blocked-impurity-band (BIB) trap detector},
  year = {2012},
  month = {2012-10-31},
  publisher = {Proceedings of SPIE, Baltimore, MD},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=911182},
  language = {en},
}