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17-3329-cr 

United States v. Johnson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 14th day of February, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

AMALYA L. KEARSE,

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

United States of America, 

Appellee, 

v. 17-3329-cr 

Tameen Johnson, AKA Nitty, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Tameen Johnson, pro se, Waymart, PA. 

FOR APPELLEE: Carina H. Schoenberger (Wayne A. 

Myers, on the brief), Assistant United 

States Attorneys of Counsel; Grant C. 

Jaquith, United States Attorney for the 
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Northern District of New York,

Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (McAvoy, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Tameen Johnson (“Johnson”), proceeding pro se, was convicted after 

a jury trial of possession of a firearm following a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He now appeals, raising three principal arguments challenging the 

validity of his conviction and also arguing that his sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment is 

procedurally infirm. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 

history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

I. Conviction 

 Johnson first raises a sufficiency challenge. While we review a challenge to the 

sufficiency of evidence de novo, a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a 

“heavy burden,” and a conviction will be upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Harvey, 746 F.3d 

87, 89 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government’s favor and deferring 

to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 

241 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under such review, the Government’s 

evidence was sufficient with respect to Johnson’s conviction. Among other things, the jury 
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reviewed a video showing Johnson selling a firearm to a confidential informant and explaining 

how to use it, still images from the video showing Johnson holding the firearm, and the firearm 

itself. Although Johnson argues there was insufficient evidence presented at trial that he 

possessed the firearm named in the indictment, a “Hi-Point,” because the firearm entered into 

evidence was marked “S&W,” the evidence at trial included the testimony of two ATF Special 

Agents who identified the firearm entered into evidence, with that S&W marking, as a JPC-model 

Hi-Point firearm. Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have found that the weapon 

entered into evidence was the one named in the indictment and that Johnson was guilty of 

possessing that weapon. 

 Johnson next challenges the district court’s admission of evidence regarding a second, 

uncharged firearm. “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings deferentially, reversing only 

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2013). “A district 

court abuses its discretion when ‘(1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of 

the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision—though not 

necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located 

within the range of permissible decisions.’” Id. (quoting Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 

163, 169 (2d Cir. 2001)). A district court may exclude relevant evidence on the basis of prejudice 

pursuant to Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 

prejudice . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

 Here, the district court reasonably concluded that the probative value of the evidence 

regarding the second, uncharged weapon outweighed its prejudicial effect. The existence of the 

second firearm was emphasized during testimony elicited by the defense. Absent images 
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showing the second firearm, the jury might have believed that the witness’s memory was faulty 

regarding the firearm that was the subject of the indictment. Furthermore, the prejudicial effect 

was limited, as the jury had already heard evidence indicating multiple weapons were present on 

the premises. Accordingly, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence was “located within 

the range of permissible decisions.” Dupree, 706 F.3d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Finally, Johnson argues that the investigation which led to his arrest required prior judicial 

authorization and that the recordings created by a confidential informant, who was acting under 

the direction of government agents, were improperly presented to the grand jury and at trial. But, 

contrary to Johnson’s claim, warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of communications 

with the consent of one party is not a violation of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) 

(interceptions by a person acting under the color of law not prohibited where “one of the parties to 

the communication has given prior consent to such interception”); see also United States v. 

Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1990). There was no evidence of intercepted communications 

in violation of Title III presented in Johnson’s case, either before the grand jury or at trial. 

II. Sentence 

 We may review the sentence imposed by a district court for both substantive and procedural 

reasonableness. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, 

however, Johnson makes arguments only as to procedural error. “A district court commits 

procedural error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range[,] . . . makes a mistake in its 

Guidelines calculation, or treats the Guidelines as mandatory. Id. at 190 (citing Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by 

correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
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 The district court did not err in applying an offense-level enhancement for offenses 

involving a weapon with an obliterated serial number. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4). The 

evidence at trial showed that the weapon Johnson sold to the informant had been altered to 

obliterate the weapon’s serial number. Pursuant to Application Note 8, this enhancement 

“applies regardless of whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm . . . 

had an altered or obliterated serial number.” Id. at Application Note 8(B). To the extent 

Johnson takes issue with the district court’s consideration of his possession of a gun with an 

obliterated serial number despite the lack of any reference to that obliterated serial number in his 

indictment, the district court properly found at sentencing that the serial number on the gun was 

obliterated. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 220 n.15 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 

sentencing judge [is] entitled to find all of the facts that the Guidelines make relevant to the 

determination of a Guidelines sentence.”). 

 The district court also properly adjudicated Johnson an armed career criminal under the 

Guidelines. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), “a person who violates section 

922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or 

both” is subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A 

“violent felony” is defined as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year” that, as relevant here, “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). In Johnson v. United States, 

559 U.S. 133 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the term “physical force” in this definition 

“means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 

Id. at 140; see also Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 553 (2019) (“[T]he force necessary 
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to overcome a victim’s physical resistance is inherently ‘violent’ in the sense contemplated by 

Johnson.”). 

 Johnson argues that his prior New York conviction for attempted third-degree robbery, in 

violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 160.05, does not qualify as a predicate offense 

under the ACCA and, by extension, the armed career criminal guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. 

The New York robbery statute defines robbery as “forcible stealing” and states that a “person 

forcibly steals property and commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses 

or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose 

of . . . preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of property,” compelling someone to 

deliver the property, or engaging in other conduct that aids the larceny. NYPL § 160.00. Under 

NYPL § 160.05, a person commits third-degree robbery by “forcibly steal[ing] property” without 

additional aggravating factors. Id. § 160.05. 

 Johnson’s argument is squarely foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. 

Thrower, in which we held that a New York conviction for attempted robbery in the third degree 

categorically constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. 2019 WL 385652 at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 

31, 2019). There we determined that “[b]y its plain language, the New York robbery statute 

matches the ACCA definition of a ‘violent felony,’” as it includes the term “physical force” as it 

has been defined at common law. Id. at *3; see also Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. at 555 (“[T]he term 

‘physical force’ in ACCA encompasses the degree of force necessary to commit common-law 

robbery.”). Furthermore, New York’s stringent test for attempt requires “that a person be so 

‘dangerously near’ forcibly stealing property ‘that in all reasonable probability’ she would have 

completed the robbery but for interference.” Thrower, 2019 WL 385652 at *4. Accordingly, 
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we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Johnson’s New York conviction for 

attempted robbery in the third degree required that he be sentenced under the armed career criminal 

guideline. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 To the extent Johnson seeks to preserve his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we have 

expressed a preference to hear such claims on collateral review, to permit the record to be 

“adequately developed to allow us to decide” it. See United States v. Doe, 365 F.3d 150, 152 (2d 

Cir. 2004); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003). We express no view 

as to the merits of this claim, and Johnson may, if he wishes, present his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in a properly filed 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. 

 We have considered all of Johnson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court