IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1691

Filed July 22, 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF G.B. and A.B.,

Minor children,

B.C., 

Petitioner-Appellee.

K.B., Mother,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Rose Anne 

Mefford, Judge. 

The mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights pursuant 

to Iowa Code chapter 600A. AFFIRMED.

Dustin D. Hite of Heslinga, Dixon, Moore & Hite, Oskaloosa, for appellant.

Diane Crookham-Johnson of Crookham-Johnson Law Office, P.L.L.C., 

Oskaloosa, for appellee.

Terri Menninga, Pella, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
2

MCDONALD, J.

The mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her 

children, G.B., age ten at the time of trial, and A.B., age seven at the time of trial. 

The district court terminated the mother’s rights in her children pursuant to Iowa 

Code section 600A.8(3) (2013), finding that there was clear and convincing 

evidence the mother abandoned the children and that the termination of her 

parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm.

I.

The mother has not been responsible for the day-to-day care of her 

children since 2007. Since that time, the children have lived with their paternal 

grandparents, with the exception of a brief period of time in 2008 when the 

children resided with the mother in an in-patient drug treatment facility. When the 

mother was “kicked out” of the program, the children went back to live with their 

grandparents. The grandparents were named legal guardians of the children in 

2008 following a child in need of assistance (CINA) proceeding. The court 

granted the mother visitation every other weekend and every Wednesday 

afternoon. 

Until 2010, the grandparents and the children lived in the hamlet of 

Newburg near Grinnell, Iowa. The mother testified that for the majority of that 

time she lived with the grandparents and helped care for the children. The 

grandmother testified the mother lived intermittently with them during that time, 

as the mother also lived in four different cities during those two years. The 

record reflects that when the mother was at the grandparents’ home, she often 
3

slept until noon and failed to take her psychiatric medications. The mother has 

been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, a condition she has suffered since her 

teenage years.

In 2010, the grandparents and the children moved to Arkansas. Following 

the move, the grandparents filed a request to modify the visitation rights of the 

mother. In response, the mother sought to terminate the grandparents’

guardianship of G.B and A.B. The court denied the mother’s request to terminate 

the guardianship. The court compared the mother’s inability to provide parental 

care with the grandparents’ “excellent day-to-day care” of the children. The court 

noted that the mother “has never pursued a course of regular and meaningful 

contact with the boys in the past.” Also significant to the court’s decision was the 

mother’s failure to sustain a stable home, her inability to remain compliant with 

her prescribed psychiatric care, and her inability to protect her kids from the 

perils of her own lifestyle. The court changed the mother’s visitation rights, 

requiring only that the guardians “openly communicate with [the mother] 

regarding the wards’ activities, growth and development, schooling, health, and 

religious involvement.” The court also ordered the grandparents to

accommodate the mother’s “reasonable requests for telephonic, Internet, and/or 

in-person visitation.”

While the children were living with their grandparents in Arkansas, the 

financial situation of the grandparents and the mother prevented frequent visits 

between the children and their mother. The children visited the mother only two 

times between 2010 and 2012. On each occasion, the grandparents facilitated
4

the visitation. The parties agree that telephone communication was also minimal 

but they disagree on the reason. The mother testified that she called multiple 

times per week but “their phone was messed up” and she could “barely get ahold

of them.” The grandmother testified their telephone had always worked. The 

mother and the grandmother did communicate via Facebook during this time. 

The record also reflects the mother had some communication via Facebook with 

G.B. during this time.

In May of 2012, the grandparents moved the children back to Iowa. The 

mother, who was living in Mason City at the time, immediately moved in with her 

best friend in Grinnell to be closer to the children. Initially, the mother saw the 

children often. Toward the end of 2012, the mother testified, the grandmother 

pressed her to terminate her parental rights. The mother’s testimony is partially 

corroborated by a Facebook message sent by the grandmother encouraging the 

mother to “sign the papers,” so that “the children will have something after [the 

Grandfather] is gone.” The grandmother testified she wanted the mother to 

agree to the termination of her rights to facilitate adoption of the children, which 

would entitle the children to Social Security benefits if the grandfather deceased, 

which he did while this case was pending on appeal.

In January 2013, the mother moved to New Mexico to be with her family 

and “support system.” She cited the grandmother’s strict visitation policy and her 

inability to find work in Iowa as other reasons for the move. The mother still 

resides in New Mexico. While in New Mexico, the mother has maintained fulltime employment as a hotel desk clerk, at the time of trial earning $8.75 per hour. 
5

Since the mother’s move to New Mexico, she has seen her sons on only two 

occasions, both coincident with travel to Iowa for court proceedings. The 

grandmother required the visits to be supervised because G.B. told her, “all [the 

mother] does is yell at him and hit him” and because “[the mother] has nowhere 

to take [the children].” The grandmother estimated the mother has talked with 

the children on the telephone seven times since the move. She also testified the 

mother often failed to call after promising the children she would. The mother

had been communicating with G.B. via Facebook prior to the move to New 

Mexico, but since the move they only had one short exchange, which was during 

April of 2013.

In May 2013, the grandparents filed a petition to terminate the mother’s

and the father’s parental rights. The father gave written consent to the 

termination of his rights, and his rights are not the subject of this appeal. The 

children’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of the mother’s parental 

rights. The basis for her recommendation was the mother’s lack of contact with 

the children, the mother’s inability to appreciate the effort exerted by the 

grandparents in caring for the children, and the absence of stability in the 

mother’s life. Included in the guardian ad litem’s report is an email from G.B.’s 

Behavioral Health Intervention Services provider, which also recommends 

termination based on the lack of involvement and the negative effect this has had 

on G.B.’s behavior.

Following trial, the juvenile court found and concluded the mother had 

abandoned the children. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental 
6

rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 600A.8(3). The juvenile court specifically 

credited the grandparents’ testimony over the mother’s testimony where there 

was conflicting testimony. The court also found and concluded that “[t]ermination 

would benefit these children in that they would have permanency and stability

with adoption by the Petitioners.” The mother timely filed this appeal.

II.

Our review is de novo. See In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 

1998). While not bound by the factual findings of the court below, we give weight 

to the district court’s findings, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses. 

See id. 

III.

In a private termination proceeding, the petitioners must establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the statutory ground or grounds authorizing the 

termination of parental rights. See Iowa Code § 600A.8; R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 

602. If the statutory grounds are proved, the petitioners must also prove that 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. See Iowa 

Code § 600A.8; R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 602. While the best interests of the 

children is the primary concern of the termination proceeding, the interests of the 

parents shall be given due consideration. See Iowa Code § 600A.1; R.K.B., 572 

N.W.2d at 601. 

Abandonment of a minor child is one of the grounds supporting the 

termination of parental rights authorized by Iowa Code chapter 600A. See Iowa 

Code § 600A.8(3). Chapter 600A defines abandonment of a minor child as 
7

“reject[ing] the duties imposed by the parent-child relationship . . . , which may be 

evinced by the person, while being able to do so, making no provision or making 

only a marginal effort to provide for the support of the child or to communicate 

with the child.” Id. § 600A.2(19). Specifically, 

If the child is six months of age or older when the termination 

hearing is held, a parent is deemed to have abandoned the child 

unless the parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated 

contact with the child as demonstrated by contribution toward 

support of the child of a reasonable amount, according to the 

parent’s means, and as demonstrated by any of the following:

(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and 

financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by 

the person having lawful custody of the child.

(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person 

having the care or custody of the child, when physically and 

financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting 

the child by the person having lawful custody of the child.

(3) Openly living with the child for a period of six months 

within the one-year period immediately preceding the termination of 

parental rights hearing and during that period openly holding 

himself or herself out to be the parent of the child.

. . . . 

c. The subjective intent of the parent, whether expressed or 

otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in paragraph 

“a” or “b” manifesting such intent, does not preclude a 

determination that the parent has abandoned the child. In making a 

determination, the court shall not require a showing of diligent 

efforts by any person to encourage the parent to perform the acts 

specified in paragraph “a” or “b”. In making a determination 

regarding a putative father, the court may consider the conduct of 

the putative father toward the child’s mother during the pregnancy.

Demonstration of a commitment to the child is not met by the 

putative father marrying the mother of the child after adoption of the 

child.

Id. § 600A.8(3)(b)-(c). Contrary to the mother’s assertion, the petitioners need 

not establish her subjective intent to abandon the children. See Iowa Code 

§ 600A.8(3)(c); In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) 

(recognizing that a parent’s subjective intent does not preclude a finding of 
8

abandonment); In re C.J.F.M., No. 10-0166, 2010 WL 3157756, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Aug. 11, 2010) (recognizing the “intention to abandon is no longer a 

statutory element in the definitions of Iowa Code Chapter 600A”). On de novo 

review, we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence of abandonment. 

There is clear and convincing evidence the mother failed to contribute 

support in a reasonable amount to the children. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b).

Prior to the termination petition being filed, the mother provided three payments 

of child support totaling $250, as well as informal support of at least $290. The 

mother had previously been ordered to pay $165 per month in support of the 

children. At the time of trial, the mother estimated her outstanding obligation was 

approximately $12,000.

The mother contends that she was financially unable to provide more than 

nominal support to the children during the relevant time period and that the 

statute’s language, “according to the parent’s means,” recognizes this as an 

excuse for failure to provide “support of a reasonable amount.” This court has 

recognized a parent’s financial inability to contribute to the support of the children 

as a justification for the failure to contribute to the support of the children. See,

e.g., In re C.C.S., No 14-1010, 2015 WL 576381, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 

2015) (upholding the district court’s finding of no abandonment when the mother 

failed to pay child support but was unemployed); In re J.J., No. 08-2026, 2009 

WL 1492860, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2009) (finding reasonable support 

according to the father’s means when he had satisfied only forty-five percent of 

his court-ordered obligation due to his low income). Those cases are predicated 
9

on the assumption the parent is making a good faith effort to provide support to 

the children. Here, the mother, due to her own conduct and instability, failed to 

provide almost any support for her children for more than five years. The Iowa 

Supreme Court has described the “abnegation of court-ordered financial 

responsibility to a child” as “the equivalent of abandonment.” In re Kelley, 262 

N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 1978).

There is clear and convincing evidence the mother has failed to visit the 

children monthly. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(1). Since the mother moved to 

New Mexico in January of 2013, she visited the children on only two occasions. 

On both of the occasions, the mother’s visitation was related to this court 

proceeding. While it is undisputed the mother lacked the means to visit the 

children monthly while in New Mexico, “self-imposed” barriers do not excuse the 

mother’s conduct. See, e.g., In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1993); In re 

K.B., No. 14-0849, 2015 WL 3884176, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jun. 24, 2015); In re 

C.J.F.M., No. 10-0166, 2010 WL 3157756, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010).

In addition, we agree with the district court’s findings that the mother did 

not otherwise maintain or attempt to maintain regular communication with the 

children:

[The mother] testified that she routinely changed telephone 

numbers or was without a telephone. [The mother] frequently sent 

Facebook messages to the petitioner . . . providing a new contact 

number or the fact that she did not have a contact number. [The 

mother] admitted that for significant periods of time, she was 

difficult to reach by telephone. During 2013 [the mother] attempted 

communication with the children only two times the entire year via 

[the Grandmother]. For 2014 there has been no attempted 

communication via [the Grandmother]. [The mother] had direct 

contact with [G.B.] via Facebook, as demonstrated in mother’s 
10

Exhibit B. [The mother] communicated with [G.B.] nine times in 

2011, five times in 2012, two times in 2013, and has made no 

contact in 2014. [The mother] was not able to demonstrate that she 

has had any direct contact with [A.B.] since 2008.

The decreasing contact with the children is clear and convincing evidence 

supporting a finding of abandonment. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(2); In re 

K.M., No. 14-1374, 2015 WL 1849508, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (“A 

few sporadic text messages over the period of a few months . . . do not rise to 

any sort of meaningful contact that may fend off a claim of abandonment, 

particularly given the father did not attempt any other type of communication—or 

offer financial or emotional support—to K.M.”); In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d at 130 

(affirming termination order where the father communicated with the mother via 

“sporadic text messages” over the course of several months and made no 

attempts to follow up when the mother imposed reasonable restrictions on 

visitation); In re D.S.P., No. 09-1188, 2010 WL 445690, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 

10, 2010) (holding the father abandoned his daughter when he “largely gave up” 

on communication after his first attempts were unsuccessful).

Once the statutory requirements for termination have been met, the 

petitioner must also show that the termination of parental rights is in the best 

interest of the child. See R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 602. Chapter 600A provides:

The best interest of a child requires that each biological parent 

affirmatively assume the duties encompassed by the role of being a 

parent. In determining whether a parent has affirmatively assumed 

the duties of a parent, the court shall consider, but is not limited to 

consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations, 

demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a 

genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and 

demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of 

importance in the child’s life.
11

Iowa Code § 600A.1. The Iowa Supreme Court has found the statutory best 

interest factors in chapter 232 termination cases relevant to chapter 600A 

termination cases. See In re A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 2010). The 

child’s “emotional and psychological health” is an important consideration. Id.

(citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Weight is also given to the “closeness of the 

parent-child bond.” Id. at 691 (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)).

Regarding the emotional and psychological health of the children, in the 

2010 guardianship proceeding, the court described the grandparents’ care of the 

children as “excellent.” The district court in this case described the grandparents

as “very capable” of adopting the children. There is no doubt that termination of 

the mother’s rights and continued care of the children by the grandmother would 

provide the children with stability and permanency. Considering the length of 

time the grandparents have provided a stable home for the children—seven 

years—waiting any longer to finally determine the children’s permanent 

placement would appear to “‘deprive [them] of permanency after the petitioner 

has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to 

be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.’” A.H.B., 791 

N.W.2d at 691 (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010)).

The mother cites In re Burney for the proposition that “ordinarily the longrange best interests of children are better served when they are returned to their 

parents at the end of the temporary exigency.” In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 

325 (Iowa 1977). In Burney, a teenage mother agreed to place her child 

temporarily with a married couple as guardians. Id. at 323. The mother, with the 
12

support of her new husband, then sought termination of the guardianship and 

custody of the child two years later but the guardians resisted. Id. The Burney

court sought to avoid discouraging parents from seeking “help with their children 

in cases of hardship or necessity.” See id. at 325. This case is clearly 

distinguishable. The mother in this case was not faced with a “temporary 

exigency.” For seven years she has demonstrated that she cannot meet the 

needs of her children:

The [M]other . . . admitted through her own testimony that she has 

never spent a night with the children by herself since 2007. She 

further admitted that she has not been responsible for parenting her 

children without assistance from others for even a daytime visit 

since 2007. Between 2008 and 2013, the mother’s residence 

changed on a regular basis, varying between at least three states 

and six towns.

. . . .

[The mother] testified that she has never attended a doctor’s 

appointment or public health appointment for either of the minor 

children and has nothing to follow up on health issues regarding the 

children.

The past performance of the mother as a parent is significant, “for that 

performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is 

capable of providing.” R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d at 601. These children should no 

longer have to wait for stability in their lives.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order terminating the mother’s 

parental rights.

AFFIRMED.