alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A1653. TIARA S. JONES v. AUTOMOTIVE CREDIT CORPORATION.

On January 9, 2015, the trial court entered judgment against Tiara Jones in the

amount of $2,875.83, plus $856.32 in interest, $217.50 in attorney fees, and $399.78

in court costs. On February 4, 2015 she filed a notice of appeal declaring that she

was appealing to the Supreme Court. Jones subsequently amended her notice of

appeal to indicate that she was appealing to this Court. We, however, lack

jurisdiction.

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), appealsin all actions for damagesin which

the judgment is $10,000 or less must comply with the discretionary appeal

procedures. “Although the grant of a motion for summary judgment is in general

directly appealable, where the amount of the judgment is [$10,000] or less, an

application for discretionary appeal is required.” Lightwerk Studios v. Door Units of

Ga., 184 Ga. App. 148, 149 (361 SE2d 32) (1987). Because this suit is an action for

damages and the judgment entered was less than $10,000, Jones was required to

follow the discretionary appeal procedures to obtain appellate review. Because she

failed to do so, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/14/2015

May 14, 2015
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 31.1

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

I, Andrew Couvell, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Green Irons Holdings
Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e))for the registrant and
have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transition Rules contained in SEC
release No. 33-8238;

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: September 27, 2007

By: /s/ Andrew Couvell
    ------------------------------------------
        Andrew Couvell
        President, Chief Executie Officer,
        Chief Financial Officer, and Principal
        Accounting Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           31339
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             644
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 24150
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      79375
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           94222
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             94778
<LOANS>                                         474848
<ALLOWANCE>                                       7800
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  764072
<DEPOSITS>                                      647036
<SHORT-TERM>                                      2741
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              14682
<LONG-TERM>                                      30434
<COMMON>                                         31185
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                       37994
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  764072
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  41611
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                10947
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 52558
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               20709
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               22823
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            29735
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      580
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 158
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  26769
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  12958
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      9811
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.57
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.57
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.86
<LOANS-NON>                                       1193
<LOANS-PAST>                                       737
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                  7780
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      703
<RECOVERIES>                                       143
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                 7800
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                              7800
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                           3114
        

</TABLE>
#### Jonathan Fernandez, an Infant, by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Ana Fernandez, et al., Appellants, v Highbridge Realty Associates et al., Respondents.

[853 NYS2d 71]

*319Summary judgment was properly granted to defendant building owners in this action where plaintiff was injured when, while descending a multiple-flight stairway owned by the City of New York and running between two avenues, a loose stair wobbled and caused him to fall. Although Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 requires owners of real property to maintain abutting sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition, the section does not define “sidewalk,” and, viewing the legislative history of the section, we find that the definition of “sidewalk” set forth in Administrative Code § 19-101 (d), which does not encompass the subject multiple-flight stairway, should govern (see *also Vucetovic v Epsom Downs, Inc.,*45 AD3d 28 [2007]). The definition of “sidewalk” in Administrative Code § 7-201 (c) (1) (b), urged by plaintiffs and which includes “step[s] and stairwayts],” applies by its terms only “[a]s used in this subdivision,” and addresses the requirement in actions against the City for prior written notice of a defect to the City.

We further note that the record evidence establishes that even following the enactment of Administrative Code § 7-210, the City has continued to exercise control over the subject stairway, including snow removal and making repairs. Concur— Tom, J.P., Buckley, Sweeny and Moskowitz, JJ.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23
- 6753
JUSTIN JERMAINE JOHNSON, a/k/a Justin J. Johnson , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN, BROAD RIVER CORRECT IO NAL INSTITUTION , Respondent

- Appell ee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill

. Cameron McGowan Currie , Senior District Judge. ( 0:22

- cv - 03210

- CMC )

Submitted : March 28, 2024 Decided: April 2, 2024

Before WYNN, THACKER, and HEYTENS , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Justin Jermaine Johnson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-6753 Doc: 12 Filed: 04/02/2024 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Justin Jermaine Joh n son , a South Carolina prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Johnson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court de nies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.
Davis , 580 U.S. 100, 115

- 17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 1 34, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Johnson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argumen t would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 23-6753 Doc: 12 Filed: 04/02/2024 Pg: 2 of 2
Exhibit 10.9

                                    EXHIBIT A


$25,000.00                                                     September 5, 2001



         FOR VALUE RECEIVED, David Fleming, an individual ("Fleming"),  promises
to pay to the  order  of  iVideoNow,  Inc.  (the  "Seller"),  at  17327  Ventura
Boulevard,  Suite 200, Encino,  California  91316, or at such other place as the
Seller  may from  time to time  designate  in  writing,  the sum of  Twenty-Five
Thousand Dollars ($25,000), payable on December 31, 2006, together with interest
from the date hereof at the rate of eight  percent  (8%) per annum on the unpaid
portion of this Note.

         To  secure  the  payment  of this Note and the  indebtedness  evidenced
hereby,  Fleming has pledged  certificates  representing  One  Thousand  (1,000)
shares of the common stock of DXF, Inc., a California corporation,  which shares
are held as a security  for this Note  pursuant to the terms of an  Agreement of
Sale by and between the parties hereto, dated August 31, 2001 ("Agreement"), and
pursuant to the terms of an escrow agreement by and between the parties hereto.

         The liability of Fleming to pay this Note is limited to the shares held
in escrow as security for payment of this Note, and in no event shall Fleming be
liable  for any  deficiency  resulting  from  the  sale of  such  shares  or the
liquidation of DXF, Inc., nor shall any action or proceeding be brought  against
Fleming to recover  judgment  against  Fleming  upon any unpaid  balance of this
Note.

         Fleming shall have the right to prepay the unpaid principal in whole or
in part at any time at its option, without penalty or payment of interest beyond
the day of any such prepayment.

         The Seller,  its successors and assigns,  may declare the entire unpaid
principal amount of this Note and accrued  interest thereon  immediately due and
payable in the event that  Fleming  defaults  in the  payment  of  principal  or
interest  under this Note,  and such default  remains  uncured for five (5) days
after  written  notice  thereof,  to  Fleming  in  accordance  with  the  notice
provisions contained in paragraph 16 of the Agreement.

                                                David Fleming


                                                By: /s/ David Fleming
                                                    ------------------
                                                    David Fleming






                                      A-1
#### In re: June E. WILLEMS, Debtor, June E. Willems, Appellant, v. Ralph E. Seefeldt, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee.

No. 10-15489.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 8, 2011.

June E. Willems, Tucson, AZ, pro se.

Michael M. Neal, Esquire, Law Office of Michael M. Neal, P.C., Tucson, AZ, for Appellee.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

June E. Willems appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment vacating its discharge of her bankruptcy proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo. *Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.),*503 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm.

Contrary to Willems’s contentions, the bankruptcy court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear her bankruptcy case. *See*28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11”); D. Ariz. Gen. Order 01-15 (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the court hereby refers to the bankruptcy *737judges for this district all cases under title 11 and all proceedings under title 11.... ”).

Willems’s contentions that she was denied due process by the bankruptcy and district courts are not supported by the record. *See SEC v. McCarthy,*322 F.3d 650, 659 (9th Cir.2003) (due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard).

Willems’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Willems’s pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
EXHIBIT 32.1

 

 

WHOLEHEALTH PRODUCTS, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wholehealth Products, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period  ended February 28, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Joe Arcaro, Principal  Executive  Officer of the Company, certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Joe Arcaro and will be retained by Wholehealth Products, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 

 

 Dated: October 4, 2012

 

By: /s/ Joe Arcaro

Joe Arcaro

Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)

EXHIBIT 32.2

 

 

WHOLEHEALTH PRODUCTS, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wholehealth Products, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q  for the period  ended February 28, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Joe Arcaro, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Joe Arcaro and will be retained by Wholehealth Products, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 

 

Dated: October 4, 2012

By: /s/ Joe Arcaro

Joe Arcaro 

Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
#### Mary KESSLER, Plaintiff, v. Leo KURTZBERG, Supervisor, Arthur Miller, Regional Commissioner, Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Oct. 18, 1962.

Mary Kessler, pro se.

Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., by Philip M. Schaeffer, Asst. U. S. Atty., for defendants.

TYLER, District Judge.

Defendants move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint of an employee of an agency of the United States which seeks (1) declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants as officials of the General Services Administration and (2) damages against defendants personally.

This court does not have jurisdiction of either cause asserted by plaintiff.

The plaintiff does not allege, nor does it appear, that she has exhausted, or, indeed, resorted to, her administrative remedies. 5 C.F.R. 1-89, eff. Jan. 1, 1961. Accordingly, jurisdiction is absent. Burns v. McCrary, 229 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1955). Thus, this court cannot properly take cognizance of her first claim.

As to her second claim, plaintiff does not allege diversity of citizenship, and it appears from the record that there is none. The statutes cited by plaintiff, *12328 U.S.C.A. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, have no application to the facts as alleged by plaintiff and thus do nothing toward creating requisite jurisdiction.

Plaintiff admits that she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. Her claim is that the administrative proceedings will be partial and unfair. However, even assuming that her surmise to this effect proves later to be correct, she will not be without appropriate judicial remedies when the administrative proceedings are concluded.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursaunt to Rule 12(b) (1), F.R.Civ.P. is granted.

So ordered.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                          2,288
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  32,890
<ALLOWANCES>                                    1,903
<INVENTORY>                                    17,556
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               58,079
<PP&E>                                        134,201
<DEPRECIATION>                                 68,621
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                170,666
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          33,411
<BONDS>                                        80,888
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          743
<OTHER-SE>                                     45,271
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  170,666
<SALES>                                       254,055
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              254,055
<CGS>                                         203,943
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 203,943
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               25,127
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              9,186
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                15,799
<INCOME-TAX>                                    6,557
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             9,242
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    9,242
<EPS-BASIC>                                      1.23
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.18



</TABLE>