RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5671-13T1

 A-2312-14T1

 A-2313-14T1

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT A.D.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.B.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT C.M.

__________________________________

Argued May 27, 2015 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent, Accurso and Manahan.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, (A-5671-13) Burlington County, 

RCNL No. 2000-03-0025; (A-2312-14) Ocean 

County, Docket No. ML# 97-15-0188; (A-2313-

14) Ocean County, Docket No. ML# 02-15-0032.

Fletcher C. Duddy, Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant A.D. (Joseph 

E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. 

Duddy, on the brief). 

LaChia L. Bradshaw, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for State of New Jersey

(Robert D. Bernardi, Burlington County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Bradshaw, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Stefan J. Erwin, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant 

J.B. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Mr. Erwin, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

William Scharfenberg, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for State of New Jersey

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

July 20, 2015

APPELLATE DIVISION

July 20, 2015
2 A-5671-13T1

(Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Scharfenberg, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Stefan J. Erwin, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant 

C.M. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Mr. Erwin, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

William Scharfenberg, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for State of New Jersey 

(Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Scharfenberg, of 

counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

NUGENT, J.A.D.

Appellants are registered sex offenders whose Law Division 

applications to terminate their obligations under Megan's Law's 

registration requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -5 (the 

Registration Law), were denied. The Registration Law authorizes 

a court to terminate a registrant's obligations if, among other 

requirements, the registrant "has not committed an offense 

within 15 years following conviction or release . . . whichever 

is larger, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of 

others." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f. Appellants' applications were

denied because each appellant had committed an offense – though 

not a sex offense – within the fifteen year period. 

These appeals require us to decide whether the term 

"offense" in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f means "a crime, a disorderly 

persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense unless a 
3 A-5671-13T1

particular subsection in the code is intended to apply to less 

than all three[,]" the definition given in the general 

definitional subsection of the New Jersey Code of Criminal 

Justice (the Code); or a "sex offense" as defined in the 

Registration Law. Having considered appellants' arguments in 

light of the record and controlling law, and having found no

ambiguity in the statutory language, we conclude the term 

offense means what the Code's general definitional subsection

defines it to mean. Accordingly, we affirm the trial courts'

orders.1

I.

A. A.D.'s Appeal.

The parties do not dispute the facts. On February 7, 1997, 

A.D. was convicted of third-degree endangering the welfare of a 

child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a, an offense that triggered the 

requirements of the Registration Law. The court sentenced A.D. 

to three years' probation and community supervision for life 

(CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4.2 A.D. initially complied with the 

Registration Law. 

 

1 These are back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for this 

opinion.

2 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4 was amended by L. 2003 c. 267 to clarify 

that lifetime community supervision for sex offenders is parole 

supervision. As part of the amendment, "Community Supervision 

for Life" was changed to "Parole Supervision for Life." 
4 A-5671-13T1

More than fifteen years after his conviction, in 2015, A.D. 

filed a motion to be relieved of the Registration Law's 

obligations. In support of his application, he submitted a 

licensed psychologist's "Psychosexual Evaluation Actuarial Risk 

Assessment" in which the psychologist reported that A.D.'s 

recidivism risk level was low. The psychologist noted that A.D. 

had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's Disease. 

During the hearing on A.D.'s application, his counsel 

represented that A.D. "ha[d] gone fifteen years since his date 

of conviction[,] . . . [and] the underlying crimes for which he 

was convicted do not bar him from removal pursuant to subsection

G of the statute."3 Emphasizing A.D.'s expert report, counsel 

argued A.D. no longer posed a threat to society. Additionally, 

counsel explained that because A.D. suffered from Alzheimer's 

Disease and was under the constant care and supervision of his 

mother, the registration requirements presented nothing more 

than a burden to his family. The State did not oppose A.D.'s 

application.

For reasons that have nothing to do with the issue on 

appeal and thus need not be explained, neither the court nor 

 

3 N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2g prohibits persons convicted, adjudicated 

delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for more than one 

sex offense as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b, or aggravated sexual 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a, or sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2c(1), from making application to terminate their registration 

obligations. 
5 A-5671-13T1

counsel were aware that in 2005 A.D. had pled guilty to, and 

been convicted of, violating a special condition of CSL, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, for failing to notify his parole officer of 

his change of address. Three months after the court granted 

A.D.'s application to terminate his registration obligations, 

the State became aware of his 2005 conviction and moved for 

reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2.

4 

In opposition to the State's motion, A.D. produced, among 

other things, an addendum from A.D.'s psychologist affirming 

that A.D. remained at a low risk for sexually reoffending and 

did not present an increased risk of harm to members of the 

community, notwithstanding the intervening conviction. A.D. 

also submitted a letter written in another case by Philip H. 

Witt, Ph.D., one of the primary authors of the Registrant Risk 

Assessment Scale manual. The Registrant Risk Assessment Scale 

(RRAS) is used to assess whether a registrant's risk of 

reoffending is low, moderate or high. Dr. Witt stated in his 

letter:

Scoring non-sexual offenses on the RRAS is 

an attempt to capture a general level of 

"anti-sociality". Hence, only if the nonsexual offense that occurs after the sex 

offense adjudication (or release from 

incarceration) is part of a broader, antisocial pattern of behavior, would it 

increase the likelihood of sex offense 

 

4 The State later amended its motion to request relief from a 

judgment or order under Rule 4:50-1.
6 A-5671-13T1

recidivism and therefore be of interest. 

This is particularly true of a "failure to 

register" charge. There is substantial 

research indicating that failure to register 

in and of itself does not increase 

likelihood of sex offense recidivism. 

Therefore, it is my recommendation that a 

failure to register charge not preclude an 

individual's applying for release from 

Megan's Law. 

During the hearing on the State's motion, A.D.'s mother 

testified that subjecting her son to the Registration Law would 

impose a significant hardship upon her. She explained that A.D. 

did not understand the purpose of the hearing and would not be 

able to register because he would be unable to travel. A.D.'s 

mother emphasized that A.D. was under her care and goes nowhere 

by himself. 

The court granted the State's motion and vacated its 

previous order terminating A.D.'s registration obligations.5 The 

court rejected A.D.'s argument that his application should be 

granted because he had not committed a sex offense within 

fifteen years. A.D. appealed.

B. J.B.'s Appeal.

J.B. pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A.

2C:14-2c, and was sentenced in March 1995 to a five-year 

custodial term. Following his release from custody, J.B. 

 

5 The Court also rescinded a previous order terminating A.D.'s 

CSL. A.D. has not appealed the rescission of the order 

terminating CSL.
7 A-5671-13T1

initially complied with the Registration Law. In 2006, however, 

J.B. failed to register and moved from his current address 

without notifying authorities.

In August 2007, J.B. pled guilty to fourth-degree failure 

to notify law enforcement agencies of a change of address, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2d(1) and was placed on probation.6 Consequently, 

in 2014 when J.B. applied to terminate his obligation under the 

Registration Law, the court denied his application, concluding 

that the intervening conviction, though not for a sex offense, 

was a bar under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f to termination of his 

Registration Law obligations. J.B. appealed.

C. C.M.'s Appeal.

C.M. pled guilty to third-degree aggravated criminal sexual 

contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3a, and was sentenced in May 1999 to 

four years' probation. His judgment of conviction was amended 

in April 2002 to subject C.M. to the requirements of Megan's 

Law. 

Fifteen years after C.M.'s sex offense conviction, he 

applied to the Law Division to terminate his Registration Law 

obligations. The court denied the application due to an 

intervening conviction for violating a final restraining order 

under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A.

 

6 N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2d was amended by L. 2007, c. 19, which, among 

other things, made failing to notify law enforcement agencies of 

an address change a third-degree crime. 
8 A-5671-13T1

2C:25-17 to -35.7 The court rejected C.M.'s argument that he was 

entitled to have his registration obligations terminated because 

he had not committed a sex offense within fifteen years. C.M. 

appealed.

On this appeal, A.D. raises these points:

I. THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT HAS 

RECOGNIZED THAT THE WORD "OFFENSE" AS USED 

IN N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) IS TO BE [INTERPRETED] 

AS A "SEX OFFENSE[.]"

II. THE STATUTE'S USE OF THE WORD "OFFENSE" 

IS AMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE, AND ALL TENETS OF 

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FAVOR DEFINING THE 

WORD AS A "SEX OFFENSE[.]" 

A. The legislative history of Megan's 

Law demonstrates that the 

legislature intended the word 

"offense" to mean a "sex 

offense[.]" 

B. If the statute is interpreted to 

preclude a registrant from being 

removed from Megan's Law for 

committing a non-sexual offense, 

it would lead to absurd results, 

as it did in this case in the Law 

Division.

C. The doctrine of lenity favors 

interpreting the statute to mean 

sex offense, not a non-sexual 

criminal offense.

 

7 During the hearing on C.M.'s application to terminate his 

Registration Law obligations, his attorney and the prosecutor 

appear to have agreed that C.M. had been convicted of either a 

fourth-degree offense or a disorderly persons offense under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29b. Although the parties have provided the 

complaint, they have not provided documentary evidence of the 

final disposition. 
9 A-5671-13T1

III. THE REGISTRANT RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 

HAS NO BEARING ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 

WORD "OFFENSE" AS USED IN N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2(f).

IV. INTERPRETING THE WORD "OFFENSE" TO 

INCLUDE NON-SEXUAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES WOULD 

NOT BE RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE GOAL OF 

MEGAN'S LAW, MAKING SUCH INTERPRETATION 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

V. OTHER TRIAL COURTS AVOID A STRICT, OUTOF-CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD 

"OFFENSE[.]"

J.B. and C.M. raise these points:

[I.] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE 

INSTANT CONTEXT REQUIRES THE EXAMINATION 

[OF] EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.

[II.] THE STANDARD WHICH WE MUST 

INTERPRET PERTAINS ONLY TO SEX OFFENSES.

[III.] THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY 

OPINED.

[IV.] THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S HOLDING 

IN IN RE REGISTRANT L.E. RESONATES HEREIN.

[V.] THE TRIAL COURTS DO NOT FEEL THAT 

FAILURE TO REGISTER IS AN OFFENSE WITHIN THE 

MEANING OF THE TERMINATION PROVISION.

[VI.] THE PROBABLE CITATIONS OF OPPOSING 

COUNSEL DO NOT ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE 

ISSUE.

II.

A.

We begin with some fundamental principles. When construing 

a statute, appellate courts conduct a de novo review. State v. 

Revie, 220 N.J. 126, 132 (2014) (citing State v. J.D., 211 N.J.
10 A-5671-13T1

344, 354 (2012)); C.A. ex rel Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J.

449, 459 (2014) (citing In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 

193 N.J. 86, 94 (2007)). "The Legislature's intent is the 

paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the 

best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." 

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); accord State v. 

Friedman, 209 N.J. 102, 117 (2012). Thus, "[t]he plain language 

of the statute is our starting point." Patel v. N.J. Motor 

Vehicle Comm'n, 200 N.J. 413, 418 (2009). In considering a 

statute's language, we are guided by the legislative directive 

that 

words and phrases shall be read and 

construed with their context, and shall, 

unless inconsistent with the manifest intent 

of the legislature or unless another or 

different meaning is expressly indicated, be 

given their generally accepted meaning, 

according to the approved usage of the 

language. Technical words and phrases, and 

words and phrases having a special or 

accepted meaning in the law, shall be 

construed in accordance with such technical 

or special and accepted meaning. 

[N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.]

When construing a statute in which "the Legislature has 

clearly defined a term, the courts are bound by that 

definition." Febbi v. Bd. of Review, 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961) 

(citations omitted); accord Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 

942, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2615, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743, 766 (2000).

Moreover, "[i]t is axiomatic that the statutory definition of 
11 A-5671-13T1

the term excludes unstated meanings of that term." Meese v. 

Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1873, 95 L. Ed. 2d 

415, 431 (1987) (citation omitted). "'[W]here the Legislature 

has clearly and explicitly defined a term within a statute, we 

must assume it did so intentionally and with the intent that its 

stated definition be applied to that term throughout the 

statute.'" Ciesla v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Sr. Servs., 429 

N.J. Super. 127, 143-44 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Commerce 

Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch, Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 329, 336-37, 

(App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 519 (2011)).

Courts "will only resort to extrinsic aids, such as 

legislative history, if the plain language of the statute yields 

'more than one plausible interpretation.'" State v. Williams, 

218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014) (quoting DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 

492). "If the plain language yields the meaning of the statute, 

then our task is complete." Ibid. 

With those principles in mind, we turn to the relevant 

provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice and 

appellants' argument that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f is ambiguous. 

B.

The Code classifies offenses as crimes, disorderly persons 

offenses, and petty disorderly persons offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-

4, and designates crimes "as being of the first, second, third 

or fourth degree." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4a. The Code's general 
12 A-5671-13T1

definitional section, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14, includes the following 

statement and definition:

In this code, unless a different meaning 

plainly is required: 

. . . .

k. "Offense" means a crime, a disorderly 

persons offense or a petty disorderly 

persons offense unless a particular 

subsection in this case is intended to apply 

to less than all three[.]

The Code's general definitional subsection does not define 

the term sex offense. The Registration Law defines the term sex 

offense as follows:

For the purposes of this act a sex offense 

shall include the following:

(1) Aggravated sexual assault, 

sexual assault, aggravated 

criminal sexual contact, 

kidnapping pursuant to paragraph 

(2) of subsection c. of [N.J.S.A.]

2C:13-1 or an attempt to commit 

any of these crimes if the court 

found that the offender's conduct 

was characterized by a pattern of 

repetitive, compulsive behavior, 

regardless of the date of the 

commission of the offense or the 

date of conviction;

(2) A conviction, adjudication of 

delinquency, or acquittal by 

reason of insanity for aggravated 

sexual assault; sexual assault; 

aggravated criminal sexual 

contact; kidnapping pursuant to 

paragraph (2) of subsection c. of 

[N.J.S.A.] 2C:13-1; endangering 

the welfare of a child by engaging 

in sexual conduct which would 
13 A-5671-13T1

impair or debauch the morals of 

the child pursuant to subsection 

a. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:24-4; 

endangering the welfare of a child 

pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) 

or subparagraph (a) of paragraph 

(5) of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.]

2C:24-4; luring or enticing 

pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1993, 

c.291 (C.2C:13-6); criminal sexual 

contact pursuant to [N.J.S.A.]

2C:14-3 b. if the victim is a 

minor; kidnapping pursuant to 

[N.J.S.A.] 2C:13-1, criminal 

restraint pursuant to [N.J.S.A.]

2C:13-2, or false imprisonment 

pursuant to [N.J.S.A.] 2C:13-3 if 

the victim is a minor and the 

offender is not the parent of the 

victim; knowingly promoting 

prostitution of a child pursuant 

to paragraph (3) or paragraph (4) 

of subsection b. of [N.J.S.A.]

2C:34-1; or an attempt to commit 

any of these enumerated offenses 

. . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b.]

The Registration Law, among other requirements, obligates 

convicted sex offenders to: register with the chief law 

enforcement agency of the municipality in which the person 

resides or, if the municipality does not have a local police 

force, the Superintendent of State Police; verify their 

addresses annually; notify certain law enforcement agencies of a 

change of address; and provide appropriate law enforcement 

agencies with information as to whether they have routine access 

to a computer or any device with internet capability. N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2c, d. 
14 A-5671-13T1

The Registration Law's termination provisions, N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2f & g, permit a registrant to apply for termination only 

if the registrant has met specific conditions:

f. Except as provided in subsection g. of 

this subsection, a person required to 

register under this act may make application 

to the Superior Court of this State to 

terminate the obligation upon proof that the 

person has not committed an offense within 

15 years following conviction or release 

from a correctional facility for any term of 

imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, 

and is not likely to pose a threat to the 

safety of others.

g. A person required to register under this 

subsection who has been convicted of, 

adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by 

reason of insanity for more than one sex

offense as defined in subsection b. of this 

section or who has been convicted of, 

adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by 

reason of insanity for aggravated sexual 

assault pursuant to subsection a. of

[N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 or sexual assault 

pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection c. 

of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 is not eligible under 

subsection f. of this section to make 

application to the Superior Court of this 

State to terminate the registration 

obligation.

Appellants contend the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f is 

ambiguous both on its face and when considered in light of the 

statute's other subsections. Acknowledging that courts need not 

refer to extrinsic evidence to determine a statute's meaning if 

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, appellants

begin their argument with the premise that if statutory language 

"'admits to more than one reasonable interpretation, [courts] 
15 A-5671-13T1

may look to sources outside the language to ascertain the 

Legislature's intent.' State v. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307, 311 

(2004)." They next assert that the term offense in subsection f

admits to more than one reasonable interpretation. From these 

two premises, appellants reason that we must resort to extrinsic 

aids, a process that leads to the conclusion that the term

offense means sex offense. For several reasons, we disagree

with appellants' assertion that the term offense in subsection f

admits to more than one reasonable interpretation. 

First, the Code explicitly defines the term offense. As 

previously noted, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k states: "'Offense' means a 

crime, a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly 

persons offense unless a particular subsection in this code is 

intended to apply to less than all three[.]" Because the 

Legislature has defined the term and stated that its meaning 

applies throughout the Code "unless a different meaning plainly 

is required," we must assume that the Legislature intended that 

the term's stated definition controls, Ciesla, supra, 429 N.J. 

Super. at 144, and that the term excludes unstated meanings, 

Meese, supra, 481 U.S. at 484, 107 S. Ct. at 1873, 95 L. Ed. 2d 

at 431. Applying those principles leads to the conclusion that

the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f means precisely what it is 

defined to mean – a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty 
16 A-5671-13T1

disorderly persons offense – and not the unstated limited 

meaning, "sex offense."

Next, interpreting the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f as 

the Code defines it in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k is consistent with the 

Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in Doe v. Poritz, 

142 N.J. 1 (1995). In that decision, the Court held that the 

Registration Law as well as the Community Notification Law, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6 to -11, are constitutional. Id. at 12. After 

summarizing the Registration Law's requirements, the Court 

stated:

All of these are lifetime requirements 

unless the registrant has been offense-free 

for fifteen years following conviction or 

release from a correctional facility 

(whichever is later) and, on application to 

terminate these obligations, can persuade 

the court that he or she is not likely to 

pose a threat to the safety of others. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f. 

[Id. at 21.]

The Court did not summarize the Registration Law's 

termination provision as requiring a registrant to be sex 

offense-free for fifteen years; rather, the Court summarized the 

termination provision as requiring registrants to be offensefree. And, after so characterizing the Registration Law's 

termination provision, the Court stated:

We are aware of the uncertainties that 

surround all aspects of the subject of sex 

offender recidivism and the effectiveness of 

preventive measures. Legislatures, despite 
17 A-5671-13T1

uncertainty, sometimes act to deal with 

public needs, basing such action on what 

they conclude, in a welter of conflicting 

opinions, to be the probable best course. 

Our Legislature could reasonably conclude 

that risk of reoffense can be fairly 

measured, and that knowledge of the presence 

of offenders provides increased defense 

against them. Given those conclusions, the 

system devised by the Legislature is 

appropriately designed to achieve the law's 

purpose of protecting the public.

[Id. at 25.]

Lastly, the Registration Law was one of "a group of bills 

concerning sex offenders" that became law on October 31, 1994. 

Id. at 12. In addition to the Registration Law and Community 

Notification Law, the Legislature enacted L. 1994, c. 130, §§1 &

2, the Violent Predator Incapacitation Act of 1994, which, among 

other things, established the special sentence of community 

supervision for life, now parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6.4. Subsection c authorizes courts to "grant a petition 

for release from a special sentence of community supervision 

only upon proof that the person has not committed a crime for 15 

years since last conviction or release from incarceration, 

whichever is later, and that the person is not likely to pose a 

threat to the safety of others if released from supervision." 

The Legislature's decision to define the term sex offense in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b, use the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f, and 

use the term crime in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4c, evidences an intent 
18 A-5671-13T1

to use those terms throughout Megan's Law precisely as the terms 

are defined in the Code.

A.D. argues that the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f 

"becomes ambiguous when considering it in conjunction with the 

other subsections of 2C:7-2." J.B. and C.M. argue that because 

"the State and the Public Defender have a reasonable 

interpretation of the instant provision," the term offense in

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f admits to more than one reasonable 

interpretation. We find appellants' arguments unpersuasive.

A.D. cites three of the Registration Law's sections: 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(1) & (2), and N.J.S.A. 2c:7-2e. Subsection 

2b(1) includes as sex offenses aggravated sexual assault, sexual 

assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1c(2), "or an attempt to commit any of these 

crimes if the court found that the offender's conduct was 

characterized by a pattern of repetitive compulsive behavior, 

regardless of the date of the commission of the offense or the 

date of the conviction[.]" (emphasis added). Subsection 2b(2), 

enumerates specific crimes and adds, "or an attempt to commit 

any of these enumerated offenses . . . ." (emphasis added). 

Subsection 2e provides, among other things, that "[a] person 

required to register under paragraph (2) of subsection b. of 

this section or under paragraph (3) of subsection b. on the 

basis of a conviction for an offense similar to an offense 
19 A-5671-13T1

enumerated in paragraph (2) of subsection b shall verify his 

address annually in a manner prescribed by the Attorney 

General." (emphasis added). 

Emphasizing each of the underscored phrases, A.D. argues 

that each reference to "[t]he word 'offense' in these [phrases] 

obviously refers to a sex offense, yet the Legislature only used 

the word offense, most likely because the continual repetition 

of the word 'sex offense' would have been too wordy and 

redundant." From that observation, A.D. argues that "[s]ince 

that same pattern is carried in subsection [f], the likely 

conclusion is that the word 'offense' refers to a 'sex offense' 

in that subsection as well." 

A.D. overlooks both the context and syntax of the 

subsections he cites. Subsection b(1) designates certain crimes 

as sex offenses, includes attempts to commit any of "these 

crimes," and makes irrelevant "the date of the commission of the 

offense or the date of conviction." Contextually, the terms 

"these crimes" and "the offense" are meaningless unless they 

refer to the specifically enumerated crimes. Syntactically, the 

demonstrative pronoun "these" before "crimes" and the definite 

article "the" before "offense" refer to specific antecedents, 

namely, the crimes enumerated in the same subsection. 

The same is true of subsections b(2) and e. In subsection 

b(2), the phrase "the enumerated offenses" both contextually and 
20 A-5671-13T1

syntactically refers back to the offenses enumerated in that 

subsection; and the phrase in subsection e – "on the basis of a 

conviction for an offense similar to an offense enumerated in 

paragraph (2) of subsection b" – refers explicitly to the crimes 

enumerated in subsection b(2). 

In contrast, subsection f permits "a person required to 

register under this act," to apply for termination of the 

obligation "upon proof that the person has not committed an 

offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a 

correctional facility . . . ." (emphasis added). The text of 

subsection f contains no enumerated crimes, and the phrase "an 

offense" includes the indefinite article "an," which neither 

contextually nor syntactically refers to an antecedent. Stated 

in terms of the Code's general definitional section, neither the 

context nor syntax of subsection f "plainly require[s]" a 

meaning of offense different from the term's defined meaning. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k.

We are also unpersuaded by J.B. and C.M.'s argument that 

because they and the State both have reasonable interpretations 

of the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f, the term offense admits 

to more than one reasonable interpretation. The question 

whether statutory language is ambiguous is not resolved based on 

one party's self-proclaimed assertion that the parties' 
21 A-5671-13T1

conflicting interpretations of a statute are reasonable. As two 

distinguished authors have pointed out:

You might be tempted to say, "If the 

language were plain and unambiguous, we 

wouldn't be arguing about it, would we?" 

Banish the thought: lawyers argue about 

plain and unambiguous language all the time. 

That is their job: to inject doubt when it 

is in their clients' interest. 

[Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 54 

(2012).]

 

Appellants have offered neither persuasive authority nor a 

persuasive reason why the Legislature's definition of the term

offense should be disregarded. Were we to adopt their arguments

we would, in effect, be requiring the Legislature to not only 

define a term and state that it is used as defined unless a 

different meaning is plainly required, but then redefine the 

term each time it is used throughout an enactment. The folly of 

such a result is self-evident. 

C.

A.D. alternatively contends that if N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f is

found to be facially unambiguous, we should nevertheless 

consider a committee statement accompanying the bill that became 

law and added section g to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2. L. 2001, c. 392. 

A.D. bases his argument on the Supreme Court's statement that 

"whatever the rule of construction, it is subordinate to the 

goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered 
22 A-5671-13T1

from the enactment 'when read in the full light of its history, 

purpose and context.'" State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) 

(quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)). Although we 

question the validity of A.D.'s argument in a case where a 

statute is facially unambiguous, we nevertheless address it for 

the sake of completeness. 

 The Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 in 2002 to comply 

with the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071. 

[The Jacob Wetterling Act] directs the 

federal Attorney General to establish 

guidelines for state programs such as 

Megan's Law that require the registration of 

persons guilty of offenses of the kind 

committed by the registrants herein and 

prescribes the length of time for which 

offenders must remain registered. 42 

U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(1). For the offenses of 

which registrants were found guilty, they 

would be obliged to remain registered for 

the rest of their lives. Id. at § 14071 

(b)(6)(B)(ii). States that fail to 

implement the Jacob Wetterling Program are 

to be denied, under 42 U.S.C.A. § 

14071(g)(2), ten percent of certain funding 

that would otherwise be allocated to the 

States under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3756.

[In re L.E., 366 N.J. Super. 61, 66 (App.

Div. 2003).]

This is the pertinent portion of the committee statement 

A.D. relies on:

This bill prohibits the removal of certain 

sex offenders from the State's sex offender 

registry.

Under the provisions of this bill, 

registered sex offenders who have been 
23 A-5671-13T1

convicted of . . . more than one sex offense 

or who have been convicted of . . . 

aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault 

involving physical force or coercion may not 

apply to the Superior Court to terminate the 

obligation to register.

Under current State law, a sex offender who 

has not committed a repeat offense for at 

least fifteen years may petition a judge to 

remove his name from the registry. The 

federal Megan's Law provision in the Jacob 

Wetterling Act, however, prohibits twice 

convicted sex offenders or violent sex 

offenders with one conviction from being 

released from the requirement to register. 

States that do not comply with this 

requirement will lose federal funding 

beginning in the year 2002. 

[Senate Law and Public Safety Committee 

Statement to Senate No. 2714 (Nov. 29, 2001)

(emphasis added).] 

A.D. asserts that the phrase "current State law" refers to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f, and the term "a repeat offense" refers to the 

commission of another sex offense. From those assertions, A.D. 

reasons that the legislative plan as described in the committee 

statement "is to bar repeat sex offenders from being removed 

from the purview of Megan's Law" and that the "plan is to be 

effectuated regardless of the literal text of 2C:7-2f, which is 

subordinate to the legislature's plan." 

We reject A.D.'s argument. The purpose of the committee 

statement was to describe the provisions of pending legislation, 

not the provisions of legislation enacted seven years earlier. 

Thus, any conclusion about previous legislation that might be 
24 A-5671-13T1

deduced from the statement is speculative. More significantly, 

even if the committee statement refers to a repeat sex offender, 

the committee statement accurately described the "existing law"; 

before N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 was amended to add subsection g, a repeat 

sex offender who had not committed an offense of any kind, 

including a sex offense, within fifteen years of the last sex 

offense was not prohibited from seeking termination of his 

registration requirements. The offender would nonetheless have 

been prohibited from seeking termination of his registration 

requirements if he had committed a recent non-sex offense. We 

thus reject A.D.'s argument. 

D.

Appellants next argue that interpreting the word offense in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f to mean a non-sex offense would not be 

rationally related to the goal of Megan's Law. We disagree. 

The purpose of the Registration Law is stated in N.J.S.A.

2C:7-1:

a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex 

offenders and offenders who commit other 

predatory acts against children, and the 

dangers posed by persons who prey on others 

as a result of mental illness, require a 

system of registration that will permit law 

enforcement officials to identify and alert 

the public when necessary for the public 

safety.

b. A system of registration of sex offenders 

and offenders who commit other predatory 

acts against children will provide law 

enforcement with additional information 
25 A-5671-13T1

critical to preventing and promptly 

resolving incidents involving sexual abuse 

and missing persons.

As we previously pointed out, after noting that Megan's 

Law's registration requirements "are lifetime requirements 

unless the registrant has been offense-free for fifteen years 

following conviction or release from a correctional facility 

(whichever is later) and . . . can persuade the court that he or 

she is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others[,]" 

Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 21, the Supreme Court 

determined that "[o]ur Legislature could reasonably conclude 

that risk of reoffense can be fairly measured, and that 

knowledge of the presence of offenders provides increased 

defense against them. Given those conclusions, the system 

devised by the Legislature is appropriately designed to achieve 

the laws' purpose of protecting the public." Id. at 25. The 

Supreme Court's pronouncements are dispositive of appellants'

arguments. 

A.D. asserts that "the psychological community believes 

that the commission of a non-sexual, technical parole violation 

does not increase one's risk, or danger, to recidivate." From 

that assertion, A.D. reasons, "[i]t . . . cannot rationally be 

concluded that the State's interpretation of the word 'offense' 

is related to the objective of Megan's Law." We disagree.
26 A-5671-13T1

As the Supreme Court explained in Doe v. Poritz, 

"[c]onflicting studies and interpretations, especially 

concerning the precise numbers, abound, but as noted above, the 

resolution of the controversy in this area is solely a 

legislative matter." Supra, 142 N.J. at 15, n. 1. Moreover, 

the Attorney General developed the RRAS and the Registrant Risk 

Assessment Manual to implement the legislative directive to 

provide three levels of notification depending upon the risk of 

reoffense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8. "The [RRAS] was rationally derived 

by a panel of mental health and legal experts by the following 

process: 1) the selection of risk assessment criteria that have 

empirical support; 2) the [weighing] of these pertinent risk 

assessment criteria; and 3) the use of sample cases to assist in 

the setting of numerical cutoff points for low, moderate and 

high risk scores." Attorney General Guidelines for Law 

Enforcement For the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration 

and Community Notification Law (June 1998, rev'd February 2007), 

Appendix E at 1. 

The RRAS takes into consideration antisocial acts other 

than sex offenses. Id. at 3. We point this out not to suggest 

that the Guidelines and Manual are somehow reflective of the 

Legislature's intent in enacting Megan's Law's registration 

requirements, but rather to emphasize the invalidity of A.D.'s 

assertion that reports from one or two psychologists are either 
27 A-5671-13T1

reflective of the psychological community's beliefs or authority 

for the proposition that including non-sex offenses in the 

statutory scheme is contrary to the statutory purpose. In 

short, we are unpersuaded by appellant's arguments. 

III.

Appellants next argue that in In re Registrant J.G., 169 

N.J. 304 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the term offense in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f means sex offense. Alternatively, appellants 

argue that the Court's reference to the term offense in N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2 as "sex offense" is dicta and the Supreme Court's dicta

is binding on the Appellate Division and trial courts. Lastly, 

appellants argue that the Supreme Court opinion in J.G. at least 

demonstrates that the term offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f is 

ambiguous.

In J.G., the Court undertook "the judicial task of 

harmonizing [the Legislature's generalized intent to apply 

Megan's Law to juveniles adjudicated delinquent based on 

convictions of sex offenses] with the protective philosophy 

underlying the Code of Juvenile Justice, as well as with that 

statute's specific provisions[.]" J.G., supra, 169 N.J. at 320. 

The Court held that for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for 

committing a sex offense when they were under age fourteen, 

"Megan's Law registration and community notification orders 

shall terminate at age eighteen if the Law Division, after a 
28 A-5671-13T1

hearing . . . determines on the basis of clear and convincing 

evidence that the delinquent is not likely to pose a threat to 

the safety of others." Id. at 337. In so holding, the Court 

explained:

We import that standard but with a higher 

burden of proof, from N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, the 

provision of Megan's Law that authorizes the 

termination of registration obligations of 

persons who have not committed a sex offense

within fifteen years of conviction or 

release from a correctional facility, 

whichever is later. 

[Ibid. (emphasis added).]

Appellants argue that the Court's reference to "the 

termination of registration obligations of persons who have not 

committed a sex offense within fifteen years" could have 

referred only to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f, is central to the Court's 

holding, and is therefore dispositive of whether the term 

offense in that statutory subsection means sex offense. 

We disagree with appellants that the Court's reference to 

the term "offense" as "sex offense" was part of its holding. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f imposes two conditions on a registrant's right 

to seek termination of the registration requirements: first, the 

registrant must prove that he has not committed an offense 

within fifteen years following conviction or release; second, 

the registrant must prove that he is not likely to pose a threat 

to the safety of others. The Court's holding in J.G., which the 

Court stated explicitly, was that Megan's Law's registration and 
29 A-5671-13T1

community notification requirements shall terminate at age 

eighteen if, after a hearing, the Law Division "determines on 

the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the delinquent 

is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." J.G., 

supra, 169 N.J. at 337. 

The Court in J.G. did not impose as a condition of 

termination a juvenile registrant's non-commission of an 

offense, sexual or otherwise. Thus, the Court's holding would 

have been entirely unaffected if it had deleted everything 

following the statutory citation from its statement, "[w]e 

import that standard, but with a higher burden of proof, from 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, the provision of Megan's Law that authorizes 

the termination of registration obligations of persons who have 

not committed a sex offense within fifteen years of conviction 

or release from a correction facility, whichever is later." 

Indisputably, the Court's "expression of opinion on a point 

involved in a case, argued by counsel and deliberately mentioned 

by the court, although not essential to the disposition of the 

case . . . becomes authoritative[] when it is expressly declared 

by the court as a guide for future conduct." State v. Rose, 206 

N.J. 141, 183 (2011) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 230 (2006)). 

"Indeed, as an intermediate appellate court, we consider 

ourselves bound by carefully considered dictum from the Supreme 

Court." State v. Breitweiser, 373 N.J. Super. 271, 282-83 (App. 
30 A-5671-13T1

Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 628 (2005); see also State 

v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 198 (2014). 

On the other hand, not every word and every phrase 

contained in a Supreme Court opinion constitutes binding 

precedent. "'Much depends upon the character of the dictum. 

Mere obiter may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully 

considered statement . . . though technically dictum, must carry 

great weight, and may even . . . be regarded as conclusive.'" 

Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J. Super. 461, 468 (1999) (quoting 

Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 58 at 374 (4th 

ed. 1983)); cf. State v. Sorensen, 439 N.J. Super. 471, 487-89 

(2015) (holding that in an opinion in which our Supreme Court 

made a statement in its technical discussion but not in its 

legal discussion, with respect to an issue involving a 

"countervailing command, namely the Legislature's specific 

determination," we were bound to carry out the Legislative 

mandate).

In J.G., the issue of whether the term offense in N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2f meant offense generally, or sex offense as defined in 

N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b, does not appear to have been raised or briefed 

by the parties or analyzed by the Court. Rather, the Court's 

reference to sex offense appears to be a passing comment. 

Moreover, the comment appears to contradict the Court's previous 

explanation that the Registration Law's requirements are 
31 A-5671-13T1

lifetime requirements unless the registrant has been "offensefree." Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 21. The Court's 

"offense-free" comment in Doe v. Poritz – where the Court 

specifically resolved the question whether the Registration and 

Community Notification Laws were constitutional, id. at 12 – is 

entirely consistent with the Legislative definition of the term 

offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject appellants' 

arguments that the Court's passing comment in J.G. is 

precedential. Appellants' remaining arguments are without 

sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

IV.

We are not unsympathetic to A.D.'s argument that, with 

respect to repeat offenders but not repeat sex offenders, there 

should be no absolute bar under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2f to the 

termination of registration requirements, particularly where the 

repeat offenses are minor; and, that repeat offenses not sexual 

in nature can be considered by courts in determining whether a 

registrant has established the second requirement of N.J.S.A.

2C:7-2f, namely, that the registrant "is not likely to pose a 

threat to the safety of others." In the first instance, 

however, determining the conditions under which termination are 

appropriate is a decision for the Legislature to make. Here, 
32 A-5671-13T1

the Legislature has made the decision after acting "on what [it] 

conclude[d], in a welter of conflicting opinions, to be the 

probable best course." Doe v. Poritz, supra, 142 N.J. at 25. 

Courts have a "fundamental duty not to substitute [their] views 

for those expressed by the Legislature in the language the 

Legislature selected in enacting a statute[.]" Friedman, supra, 

209 N.J. at 118 (citing State v. Baker, 198 N.J. 189, 193 

(2009)). 

Affirmed.