******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
DONNA L. KACHNOWSKI v. ADMINISTRATOR,

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

ACT ET AL.

(AC 36199)

Beach, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued March 11—officially released July 21, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Hon. Thomas F. Parker, judge trial referee.)

Donna L. Kachnowski, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Krista Dotson O’Brien, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney

general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented plaintiff, Donna

L. Kachnowski, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the decision of

the Employment Security Board of Review (board).1 On

appeal, the plaintiff claims: (1) ‘‘the [board] improperly

handled [her] appeal when it certified the appeal to the

Superior Court and failed to comply with Practice Book

§ 22-1 . . . and . . . [§] 31-237g-51 [of the Regulations

of Connecticut State Agencies]’’; (2) ‘‘the [board] erred

in [not] certifying all pertinent file records concerning

the appeal to the Superior Court as pursuant to . . .

§ 31-237g-1 (b) [of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies] and the Superior Court erred in ignoring the

plaintiff’s argument that the board failed to do so’’; (3)

‘‘the board failed to respond to, file and certify [her]

motion to correct to the Superior Court, as required by

Practice Book §§ 22-4, 22-7 and 22-8, and . . . the Superior Court erred in dismissing [her] argument regarding

it [because the] exclusion of this motion precluded further review of the facts by the court’’; (4) ‘‘[the board]

failed to follow the guidelines of . . . § 31-236-26d [of

the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies] and the

plaintiff did not commit wilful misconduct in the course

of employment and, therefore, was eligible for unemployment benefits’’; and (5) ‘‘the Superior Court erred

in making a judgment of dismissal in [her] case . . . .’’

Based on our review of claims four and five, we affirm

the judgment of the Superior Court.2

The following facts, as found by an appeals referee

and adopted by the board, and procedural history are

relevant to the resolution of the plaintiff’s fourth and

fifth claims. The plaintiff was a project coordinator

for her employer, Tsunami Tsolutions, LLC (employer),

until the termination of her employment on January 11,

2012. Prior to her termination, the employer scheduled

numerous meetings with the plaintiff to discuss her

excessive absences. The plaintiff did not attend the final

scheduled meeting on January 11, 2012. In turn, she

received a notice of termination. The listed reasons

for termination included refusal to report to work on

January 11, 2012, refusal to attend a mandatory personnel meeting on January 11, 2012, continuing resistance

to communicate effectively with the employer, refusal

to follow the employer’s policies, refusal to take direction from supervisor personnel, and refusal to conduct

herself in a professional manner.

The plaintiff filed her initial claim for unemployment

compensation benefits on January 17, 2012, with an

effective date of January 15, 2012. The defendant

Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act

denied the claim, and the plaintiff appealed the decision

to an appeals referee (referee). After conducting a hearing, the referee affirmed the decision on June 22, 2012,

and made forty findings of fact, which included, but
were not limited to, the reasons for the mandatory personnel meeting, her subsequent refusal to attend the

mandatory personnel meeting, and her termination. On

July 2, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the

referee’s decision, which was denied on July 5, 2012.

Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the board.

The board adopted the findings of the referee, and

affirmed the referee’s decision on January 28, 2013. The

board stated: ‘‘We concur in the referee’s determination

that the employer discharged the [plaintiff] based on

her failure to comply with its directive to attend a mandatory January 11, 2012 personnel meeting. An employee’s failure to follow an employer’s reasonable directive

constitutes wilful misconduct where there is no good

cause for the employee not to comply with that

directive.’’

On February 19, 2013, the plaintiff petitioned the

board to review its decision and filed a motion to reopen

the board’s decision, a motion to correct the board’s

findings, and an appeal to the Superior Court. In its May

6, 2013 decision on the plaintiff’s petition forreview, the

board denied the plaintiff’s motion to reopen. On May

20, 2013, the record was certified to the Superior Court.

On July 2, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for judgment arguing that it was entitled to judgment in its favor

because the court was bound by the board’s findings of

fact and, on the basis of those findings, the plaintiff

could not demonstrate that its decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or illegal. On July 12, 2013, the plaintiff

filed an untimely motion to correct findings from the

board’s decision. Pursuant to Practice Book § 22-4,3 a

motion to correct must be filed within two weeks after

the certification of the record to the court. Because the

record was certified on May 20, 2013, this filing was

untimely. On July 15, 2013, the court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s

appeal. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which

the court denied on September 20, 2013. This appeal

followed.

‘‘When considering an appeal from the board, we

have stated that [a] plaintiff’s failure to file a timely

motion [to correct] the board’s findings in accordance

with [Practice Book] § 22-4 prevents further review of

those facts found by the board. . . . In the absence of

a motion to correct the findings of the board, the court

is not entitled to retry the facts or hear evidence. It

considers no evidence other than that certified to it by

the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether . . . there was any evidence to support in

law the conclusions reached. [The court] cannot review

the conclusions of the board when these depend upon

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v.

Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act,

155 Conn. App. 259, 262–63, 109 A.3d 540 (2015). ‘‘Judi-
cial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court’s ultimate duty is

only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the

board of review has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily,

illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lantieri v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 136 Conn. App. 174, 183,

43 A.3d 815 (2012).

The board, in its adoption of the referee’s findings,

found that the employer discharged the plaintiff for

deliberate misconduct by not attending a mandatory

personnel meeting on January 11, 2012, which in turn

disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-23 (a)

(2) (B).4 The board accepted the credibility of the

employer’s witness regarding the existence of the mandatory personnel meeting that the plaintiff did not

attend on January 11, 2012, and found that there was

‘‘nothing in the existing record that would compel us to

overturn the referee’s credibility determination.’’5 The

board found that prior to this missed meeting, the plaintiff had a previous action plan for performance improvement put into place on December 16, 2011, for failure

to attend another personnel related meeting with the

employer. Further, the board stated that ‘‘the parties

have not offered any argument in support of or in opposition to the appeal which would disturb the referee’s

findings of fact.’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we

conclude that there was ample evidence to support the

conclusions reached by the board in its review of the

referee’s decision, and, therefore, the court properly

concluded that the board’s ruling was not arbitrary,

capricious, or contrary to law. See Davis v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 155

Conn. 263. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed

the plaintiff’s appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

1

In addition to the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation

Act, the plaintiff’s employer, Tsunami Tsolutions, LLC, also was named

as a defendant, as was the Employment Security Appeals Division. For

convenience, we refer in this opinion to the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act as the defendant. Tsunami Tsolutions, LLC, via a

letter dated December 4, 2014, adopted the appellate brief of the defendant.

The Employment Security Appeals Division is not a party to this appeal.

2 We decline to review the plaintiff’s first three claims, as they are inadequately briefed. ‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims

that are inadequately briefed. . . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis,

rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning

an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the

parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We

do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to

its rulings that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not

merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the

facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which are

merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be

deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clelford v. Bristol, 150 Conn. App. 229, 233, 90 A.3d

998 (2014).

3 Practice Book § 22-4 provides: ‘‘If the appellant desires to have the finding
of the board corrected, he or she must, within two weeks after the record

has been filed in the superior court, unless the time is extended for cause

by the board, file with the board a motion for the correction of the finding

and with it such portions of the evidence as he or she deems relevant and

material to the corrections asked for, certified by the stenographer who

took it; but if the appellant claims that substantially all of the evidence is

relevant and material to the corrections sought, he or she may file all of it,

so certified, indicating in the motion so far as possible the portion applicable

to each correction sought. The board shall forthwith upon the filing of the

motion and of the transcript of the evidence, give notice to the adverse

party or parties.’’

4 General Statutes § 31-236 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An individual

shall be ineligible for benefits . . . (2) . . . (B) if, in the opinion of the

administrator, the individual has been discharged or suspended for . . .

wilful misconduct in the course of the individual’s employment . . . .’’

5 The board did modify one finding of fact stating: ‘‘in finding of fact no.

12 we substitute the dates ‘December 12, 2011 and December 13, 2011’ for

the dates ‘Monday December 12, 2011 and December 12, 2011.’ ’’ This fact

is inconsequential to the plaintiff’s appeal.