United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-6094.

Non-Argument Calendar.

Mateen FAWAAD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Ronald E. JONES, Prison Commissioner, Larry Burton, Warden, Ron

Hightower, Regional Director, Paul Whaley, Director of

Classification, Kelly, Mail Personnel at SCCF, Davis, Mail Clerk at

St. Clair Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.

April 29, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Alabama. (No. CV-93-N-1845-M), Edwin L. Nelson, Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and HATCHETT and BIRCH, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this pro se, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 appeal, state prisoner Mateen

Fawaad argues that the Alabama Department of Corrections policy,

requiring inmates to use both their religious names and their

commitment names on all incoming and outgoing mail, violates his

constitutional right to practice his religion freely under the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§

2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994). Following a nonjury trial, the district

court entered judgment for the prison officials and dismissed

Fawaad's complaint with prejudice, because the court determined

that the prison officials had a compelling state interest in

requiring inmates to use both their commitment and religious names

on mail. This case presents our circuit with its first opportunity

to address an inmate's constitutional right to practice his or her

religion freely following RFRA. We AFFIRM.
The material facts in this case are not disputed and are

presented fully by the district court. Fawaad v. Herring, 874

F.Supp. 350, 351 (N.D.Ala.1995). Subsequent to his incarceration,

Fawaad converted to the Islamic faith and legally changed his name

from Jeffrey Bell to Mateen Fawaad. It is undisputed that Fawaad's

religion requires him to abandon the name Jeffrey Bell and to adopt

his new religious name. The Alabama Department of Corrections

policy regarding inmates, who have legally changed their names

following incarceration, is to require inmates to use dual names on

all incoming and outgoing mail. Under this system, Fawaad is

required to refer to himself as "Mateen Fawaad, a/k/a Jeffrey

Bell." In 1992, another judge in the Northern District of Alabama

enjoined the Department of Corrections from changing the dual name

policy. Id. at 351 (citing Fawaad v. Thigpen, CV-90-AR-1993-M).

Fawaad contends that he should be allowed to use only his

religious name on all correspondence, and that the dual name policy

violates RFRA, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Government shall not substantially burden a person's

exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of

this section.

(b) Government may substantially burden a person's

exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application

of the burden to the person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The district court held that, "[a]ssuming

without deciding, that the requirement that the plaintiff use both

his "committed' and religious names on his mail constitutes a
 1

The district court concluded:

It is difficult to conceive of a domestic governmental

interest which would be more compelling than that of

maintaining the security and order of a prison

institution housing more than 300 inmates with

sentences of life without parole. In such

circumstances, it is absolutely essential that prison

officials control the flow of contraband into and out

of the prison and to quickly and efficiently detect

violations of security regulations. Without doubt the

sure and immediate identification of the sender and

intended recipient of suspect mail is of paramount

importance. Furthermore, the use of dual names has the

commendable effect of allowing the plaintiff to use his

religiously adopted name while concomitantly providing

the means by which the defendants may control the use

of prison mail to further unlawful activities in a way

which is least restrictive of the plaintiff's exercise

of religion.

Fawaad, 874 F.Supp. at 352. 

"substantial' burden on the practice of his religion, the court is

satisfied that no violation of Mr. Fawaad's rights to free speech

or religion has occurred." Fawaad, 874 F.Supp. at 352. The court

found that maintaining security and order in the prison constituted

a compelling governmental interest, and that the dual name policy

was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.1

 Id.

 It is well established that prison inmates are entitled to

bring actions based on free exercise rights protected by the First

Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,

84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Pell v. Procunier,

417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).

Other circuits have held that inmates have a First Amendment

interest in using their legally changed religious names, at least

in conjunction with their commitment names. See Malik v. Brown, 71

F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.1995); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168,
 2

The Senate Report provides that:

Prior to O'Lone, courts used a balancing test in cases

where an inmate's free exercise rights were burdened by

an institutional regulation; only regulations based

upon penological concerns of the "highest order" could

outweigh an inmate's claims....

 ....

The committee does not intend the act to impose a

standard that would exacerbate the difficult and

complex challenges of operating the Nation's prisons

1170 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 677,

112 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991); Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517, 518-19 (5th

Cir.1987) (per curiam); Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 501

(4th Cir.1982). Because the issue is not before us in this case,

we assume without deciding that an inmate who sincerely holds a

religious belief that requires the legal adoption of a religious

name has a First Amendment interest in using that religious name in

conjunction with his or her commitment name.

Before the enactment of RFRA, the constitutionality of prison

regulations was subject to a "reasonableness" test. Turner, 482

U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482

U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court

held that "prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional

rights are judged under a "reasonableness' test less restrictive

than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of

constitutional rights." Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. The

legislative history of RFRA reflects Congress's specific intent "to

restore traditional protection afforded to prisoners' claims prior

to O'Lone." S.Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993),

reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899.2 RFRA now would require
and jails in a safe and secure manner. Accordingly,

the committee expects that the courts will continue the

tradition of giving due deference to the experience and

expertise of prison and jail administrators in

establishing necessary regulations and procedures to

maintain good order, security and discipline,

consistent with consideration of costs and limited

resources.

S.Rep. No. 111, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899-1900. 

 3

The Fifth Circuit recently held that Section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enact RFRA and that

RFRA "does not usurp the judiciary's power to interpret the

Constitution." Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th

Cir.1996). Several other circuits have avoided addressing the

constitutionality of RFRA. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schriro, 74

F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.1996). Because the constitutionality of RFRA

is not before us, we find it unnecessary to address that issue in

order to decide this case. Significantly, the prison regulation

challenged by Fawaad meets both the former reasonableness

standard and the higher strict scrutiny standard established by

RFRA. 

us to apply strict scrutiny to the prison regulation.3

In Felix, the Fifth Circuit determined that "[t]he adoption of

Muslim names by inmates practicing that religion is generally

recognized to be an exercise of both first amendment speech and

religious freedom." 833 F.2d at 518 (citing Barrett, 689 F.2d 498;

Akbar v. Canney, 634 F.2d 339 (6th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1712, 68 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981)).

Applying strict scrutiny to a prison regulation that required

inmates to use their committed name at least in conjunction with

their religious name, the Fifth Circuit reached the following

conclusion:

The state's legitimate interest in prison security requires an

efficient system of identification and administration of

prisoners within its custody. So, while the state cannot

reasonably deny prisoners privileges simply because they have

chosen to adopt a new name, the use of their "committed name,"

as an alias, for the purpose of identification of the

prisoner, does not of itself violate the prisoner's
constitutional rights.

Id. at 519 (footnote omitted).

The evidence presented at the trial in this case reflects the

importance of an efficient identification system as discussed in

Felix. At trial, the Warden of St. Clair Correctional Facility in

Springville, Alabama, where Fawaad is incarcerated, testified that

requiring inmates to use both their committed names and religious

names on correspondence is essential to maintain prison security.

Q: What is the reason for wanting both names in his

prison files—

A (Warden): To keep track of the correspondence in and

out. We've had money order scams; we've found pistols in

apple pies; we've found cocaine in the Cracker Jacks;

marijuana in Christmas cards. So, we like to know who it

comes from and where it goes out from.

R2-41-22. The district court noted during the trial that:

[I]f an inmate comes in with one name and at some point the

name is changed and all the records from that point forward

reflect the new name and the records from that point backward

reflect the old name, it would be necessary to try to put

together an entire record, that might be difficult to do, it

might be made more difficult by name changes.

R2-41-36.

Assuming without deciding that RFRA is constitutional, we

agree with the district court that maintaining security in a prison

constitutes a compelling governmental interest. The control of

contraband into and out of the prison is a fundamental part of

maintaining prison security, and the requirement of dual names on

incoming and outgoing mail is the least restrictive means of

satisfying that compelling interest. Therefore, the judgment

entered by the district court for the prison officials is AFFIRMED.