alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 123 (Monday, June 29, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 31049]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15272]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


Notice of Proposed Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order 
on Consent Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA)

    Notice is hereby given that on June 15, 2009, a proposed Settlement 
Agreement regarding the Asarco Hayden Plant Site in Hayden, Arizona was 
filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of Texas in In re Asarco LLC, No. 05-21207 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.). The 
proposed Agreement, entered into by the United States and Asarco LLC, 
provides the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency an allowed general 
unsecured claim of $3.0 million for response costs incurred by EPA on 
or before May 27, 2008 at the Asarco Hayden Plant Site.
    The Department of Justice will receive comments relating to the 
proposed Agreement for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of 
this publication. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant 
Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, and 
either e-mailed to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#01717463626e6c6c646f752c6464722f646f7365417472656e6b2f666e77"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="97e7e2f5f4f8fafaf2f9e3baf2f2e4b9f2f9e5f3d7e2e4f3f8fdb9f0f8e1">[email protected]</span></a> or mailed to P.O. Box 
7611, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20044-7611, and should 
refer to In re Asarco LLC, DJ Ref. No. 90-11-3-08633.
    The proposed Agreement may be examined at the Region 9 Office of 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 75 Hawthorne Street, 
San Francisco, California 94105. During the public comment period, the 
proposed Agreement may also be examined on the following Department of 
Justice website: http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html. A 
copy of the proposed Agreement may also be obtained by mail from the 
Consent Decree Library, P.O. Box 7611, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Washington, DC 20044-7611 or by faxing or e-mailing a request to Tonia 
Fleetwood (<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#770318191e1659111b1212030018181337020413181d59101801"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d4a0bbbabdb5fab2b8b1b1a0a3bbbbb094a1a7b0bbbefab3bba2">[email protected]</span></a>), fax no. (202) 514-0097, phone 
confirmation number (202) 514-1547. In requesting a copy from the 
Consent Decree Library, please enclose a check in the amount of $2.75 
(25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the U.S. Treasury.

Maureen Katz,
Assistant Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and 
Natural Resources Division.
[FR Doc. E9-15272 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-15-P


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#### REISER v. McKEE GLASS CO.

No. 82.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

March 1, 1940.

Christy & Wharton, of Pittsburgh, Pa., and Robb & Robb, of Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

William B. _,aspert, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

GIBSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff has moved for a summary judgment under Rule No. 56.

In his complaint he charges defendant with the breach of a license agreement to use plaintiff’s Patent No. D 91,542, for a “Shell Less Egg Boiler”, and demands damages therefor. He also alleges infringement of the patent and asks injunctive relief and an accounting; also infringement of his trade-mark notation “Shell Less” upon egg boilers, with demand for injunction and accounting; also infringement of plaintiff’s design patent, Application No. 62,238, for a “Design for a combined egg cup and cover therefor”, with use of the trade-name “Shell Less”, with prayer for injunction and accounting.

The defendant has answered, denying breach of the license agreement and infringement of plaintiff’s patent and his design application. It has also denied any right of plaintiff in the trade-name “Shell Less”.

Upon hearing of the motion for summary judgment the attention of the court was called to certain admissions of fact filed under Rule 36, Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and to models of plaintiff’s constructions, as well as the egg boilers being manufactured by defendant. .The plaintiff claims that the admissions and models, so produced, establish the charges of his complaint, and call for present judgment in his favor.

The defendant asserts that the egg boiler manufactured by it at the present time is not an infringement of plaintiff’s Patent No. D 91,542. It contends that plaintiff’s patent is not entitled to the breadth of construction claimed for it, as prior patents cover certain of such features. It also denies that plaintiff was the inventor of the design set out in his design application.

Judgment under Rule 56 should be rendered in favor of plaintiff only when it is apparent to the court that no actual issue of fact exists. This being so, we feel that judgment cannot properly be given in favor of the plaintiff at this time, as issues of fact do exist in respect to the scope of plaintiff’s patent which call for more extended study than the court could give upon the admissions and models offered at the hearing. The motion for summary judgment will be denied.
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4-M

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST
                                       OF
                          FORD CREDIT CAPITAL TRUST II


                  The undersigned Trustees of Ford Credit Capital Trust II (the
"Trust"), pursuant to the Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del. C. sec.3801, et
seq.), HEREBY CERTIFY:

                  1. Name. The name of the business trust formed hereby is Ford
Credit Capital Trust II.

                  2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the
Delaware Trustee of the Trust in the State of Delaware is Chase Manhattan Bank
USA, National Association, c/o JPMorgan Chase, Attention: Institutional Trust
Services, 500 Stanton Christiana Road, Floor3/OPS4, Newark, Delaware 19713.

                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the Trustees
of the Trust, have executed this Certificate of Trust as of the 7th day of
December, 2001


                                                 DELAWARE TRUSTEE:
                                                 Chase Manhattan Bank USA,
                                                  National Association



                                                 By: /s/ John J. Cahsin
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                     Name: John J. Cashin
                                                     Title: Vice President




                                                 TRUSTEES:

                                                 /s/ Douglas J. Cropsey
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                 Douglas J. Cropsey


                                                 /s/ Stacy P. Thomas
                                                 -------------------------------
                                                 Stacy P. Thomas
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, December 26, 2018.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, December 26, 2018

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A19D0208. MARILYN E. GOODRICH v. STUART J. PADOVE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

18A1088
Opinion issued July 21, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00850-CV

———————————

IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS, ANTONE EUGENE JONES, AND 

GREGORY LATTY, Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators, State Farm Lloyds, Antone Eugene Jones, and Gregory Latty, filed 

a petition for writ of mandamus challenging respondent’s September 12, 2014 

order denying their verified plea in abatement, filed under section 541.155(a) of 

the Texas Insurance Code, for the real party in interest’s failure to provide timely 
2

and proper pre-suit notice.

1

The Court requested and received a response from the 

real party in interest, Rosie Hansen, received relators’ reply, heard argument, and 

received relators’ post-argument brief. The Court, having examined and fully 

considered the petition, response, reply, argument, and post-argument brief, is of 

the opinion that relators have not shown themselves entitled to the relief sought.2

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 52.8(a), (d).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.

 

1

The underlying case is Rosie Hansen v. State Farm Lloyds, Antone Eugene Jones, 

and Gregory Latty, Cause No. 2014-40190, in the 152nd District Court of Harris 

County, Texas, the Honorable Robert Schaffer presiding.

2 Relators’ reply referred this Court to a similar mandamus petition, filed by relator 

State Farm Lloyds before filing this petition and seeking relief identical to the 

relief requested here, that the Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied. See In re State 

Farm Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Nathan Burris, No. 13-14-00347-CV, 2014 

WL 4243701 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 27, 2014, orig. 

proceeding [mand. denied]). On June 21, 2015, the Texas Supreme Court denied 

that petition, and two related ones, without opinion. See The Supreme Court of 

Texas, Orders Pronounced June 12, 2015, Miscellaneous, 14-0829, at 4, available 

at http://www.txcourts.gov/media/999576/supreme-court-of-texas-orders-06-12-

2015.pdf (last viewed June 12, 2015).
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00447-CR

Michael Raynard Speace Jr.

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From Criminal District Court No. 2

of Tarrant County (1350041D)

July 23, 2015

Opinion by Justice Gardner

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Anne Gardner___________

 Justice Anne Gardner
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Yolanda Griffin, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 76]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Budd G. Goodman, J.), rendered April 7, 2005, convicting defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing her, as a second felony offender, to a term of 4V2 to 9 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s claim that the court should have conducted an inquiry as to whether she violated the terms of her plea and cooperation agreement is unpreserved *(see e.g. People v Delgado,*14 AD3d 449 [2005], *lv denied 4*NY3d 853 [2005]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that the court relied on the uncontested facts that defendant failed to appear in court when required, and failed to provide cooperation satisfactory to the People *(see People v Suarez,*23 AD3d 282, 283 [2005]; *People v Anonymous,*253 AD2d 709, 710 [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 980 [1998]; *People v Anonymous,*249 AD2d 167 [1998]).

Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the reduced penalty contained in the Drug Law Reform Act (L 2004, ch 738), because the Legislature has manifested a clear intent to negate the amelioration doctrine of *People v Behlog*(74 NY2d 237 [1989]) with respect to the sentencing provision upon which defendant relies *(People v Utsey,*7 NY3d 398 [2006]). Concur—Tom, J.E, Marlow, Sullivan, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 21, 2015

No. 04-15-00146-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.W.B.-L., ET AL., CHILDREN,

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2010-PA-02179

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The State’s motion for extension of time to file its brief is GRANTED IN PART. The 

State’s brief is due to be filed no later than July 31, 2015. Absent extenuating circumstances, 

no further extensions will be granted.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 21st day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<NAME> SHEARSON LEHMAN SELECT ADVISORS FUTURES FUND L.P.
       
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#### In the Matter of Pina Grald, Respondent, v Jonathan A. Grald, Sr., Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 100]

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the husband appeals from an order of the Family Court, Orange County (Bivona, J.), dated October 28, 2005, which directed him to pay the sum of $3,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

An “attorney is precluded from seeking fees from his or her client where the attorney has failed to comply with 22 NYCRR 1400.3, which requires the execution and filing of a retainer agreement that sets forth, *inter alia,*the terms of compensation and the nature of services to be rendered” *(Bishop v Bishop,*295 AD2d 382, 383 [2002], quoting *Mulcahy v Mulcahy,*285 AD2d 587, 588 [2001]; *see Kayden v Kayden,*278 AD2d 202 [2000]). Likewise, an attorney’s failure to provide written, itemized bills at least every 60 days pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1400.2 will also preclude collection of a fee *(see Wagman v Wagman,*8 *923AD3d 263 [2004]; *Julien v Machson,*245 AD2d 122 [1997]). The failure to abide by these rules, “promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public, will result in preclusion from recovering such legal fees” *(Julien v Machson, supra,*at 122; *see Behrins & Behrins v Sammarco,*305 AD2d 346, 347 [2003]; *Mulcahy v Mulcahy, supra).*

Contrary to the husband’s contention, the Family Court properly awarded attorney’s fees despite the wife’s attorney’s failure to comply with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3. Violation proceedings are not set forth in 22 NYCRR 1400.1 as one of the proceedings to which 22 NYCRR part 1400 applies *(see Matter of Eby v Joseph E.S.,*28 AD3d 1091 [2006]).

Further, the award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court *(see Matter of Dalessandro v O'Brien,*285 AD2d 592, 593 [2001]; *Matter of Olesh v Auerbach,*227 AD2d 406 [1996]). Taking into account the various factors to be considered in the making of an award of counsel fees including the parties’ ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and counsel’s experience, ability, and reputation *(see Matter of Israel v Israel,*273 AD2d 385 [2000]; *Matter of Olesh v Auerbach, supra*at 407), the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the wife attorney’s fees in the sum of $3,000. Schmidt, J.E, Santucci, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
In      connection with the Quarterly Report of Transdel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the      “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”)      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Juliet Singh, Ph.D., the Chief Executive Officer      of      Transdel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and John T. Lomoro, the Chief Financial Officer      of Transdel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., each certifies that:

| (1) | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:                November 14, 2008 |                                         |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                                    |                                         |
|                                    | /s/                Juliet Singh              |
|                                    | Juliet                Singh, Ph.D.,          |
|                                    | Chief                Executive Officer       |
|                                    | (Principal                Executive Officer) |
|                                    |                                         |
|                                    | /s/                John T. Lomoro            |
|                                    | John                T. Lomoro,               |
|                                    | Chief                Financial Officer       |
|                                    | (Principal                Financial Officer) |

----
NUMBER 13-15-00495-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ORLANDO FIGUEROA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 148th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

O R D E R

Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes

Order Per Curiam

Appellant, Orlando Figueroa, has filed a notice of appeal with this Court from his 

conviction in trial court cause number 15-CR-0495-E. The trial court’s certification of the 

defendant’s right to appeal shows that the defendant does not have the right to appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an 

appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that a defendant has a right of 

appeal is not made a part of the record. Id. R. 25.2(d); see id. R. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. The 
2

purpose of the certification requirement is to efficiently sort appealable cases from nonappealable cases so that appealable cases can “move through the system unhindered 

while eliminating, at an early stage, the time and expense associated with nonappealable cases.” Greenwell v. Ct. of Apps. for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 

645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 912 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Within thirty days of the date of this notice, appellant’s lead appellate counsel, 

Chris Waller, is hereby ORDERED to: 1) review the record; 2) determine whether 

appellant has a right to appeal; and 3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel’s findings 

as to whether appellant has a right to appeal and/or advise this Court as to the 

existence of any amended certification. If appellant’s counsel determines that appellant 

has a right to appeal, counsel is further ORDERED to file a motion with this Court within 

thirty days of this notice, identifying and explaining substantive reasons why appellant 

has a right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3, 44.4; Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 

614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also, e.g., Carroll v. State, 119 S.W.3d 838, 841 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (certification form provided in appendix to 

appellate rules may be modified to reflect that defendant has right of appeal under 

circumstances not addressed by the form). The motion must include an analysis of the 

applicable case law, and any factual allegations therein must be true and supported by 

the record. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 614–15; cf. Woods v. State, 108 S.W.3d 314, 

316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (construing former appellate rule 25.2(b)(3) and holding that 

recitations in the notice of appeal must be true and supported by the record). Copies of 

record documents necessary to evaluate the alleged error in the certification affecting 
3

appellant’s right to appeal shall be attached to the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1,

10.2.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 

21st day of October 2015.