alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Labor Employer Reporting Instructions

Appendix I: Electronic File Format

 Form BA-3, Annual Report of Creditable Compensation (Sub-Total Record)

The information contained in this report, which is required by law under Section 9 of the 

Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and Section 6 of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance 

Act (RUIA), is needed to pay RRA and RUIA benefits. The information is authorized for 

collection under OMB control number 3220-0008.

This report is due at the Railroad Retirement Board by no later than the last day of February 

following the report year. Failure to report or the making of a false or fraudulent report can 

result in criminal prosecution or civil penalties, or both.

We estimate the electronic versions of this form transmitted by a secure e-mail or a File 

Transfer Protocol (FTP) takes an average of 46 hours and 15 minutes per response to 

complete, including time for reviewing the instructions, getting the needed data, and 

reviewing the completed form. Federal agencies may not conduct or sponsor, and 

respondents are not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a 

valid OMB number. If you wish, send comments regarding the accuracy of our estimate or 

any other aspect of this form, including suggestions for reducing completion time, to

Associate Chief Information Officer for Policy and Compliance

Railroad Retirement Board

844 North Rush Street

Chicago, IL 60611-1275.

Sub-total records are optional. Sub-totals of money amounts may be shown for every 2000 

or fewer records.

NOTE: Reports submitted on CD-ROM, secure email, or FTP must be accompanied by

Form G-440, "Report Specifications Sheet". 

Form BA-3 Sub-Total Record Format 

Field 

Length

Record 

Position Data and Instructions

10 1-10 "8888888888" (10 eights-type of record code). 

5 11-15 "SUBTO" 

7 16-22 A sub-total item count for that particular sub-division 

of the report. 

13 23-35

A sub-total of creditable RUIA I compensation for that 

particular sub-division of the report (Used to qualify 

for benefits).
Labor Employer Reporting Instructions

Appendix I: Electronic File Format

 Form BA-3, Annual Report of Creditable Compensation (Sub-Total Record)

Form BA-3 Sub-Total Record Format

Field 

Length

Record 

Position Data and Instructions

13 36-48

A sub-total of creditable RUIA II compensation for 

that particular sub-division of the report (Used to 

determine maximum benefits).

13 49-61 A sub-total of creditable Tier I RRA compensation for 

that particular sub- division of the report. 

13 62-74 A sub-total of creditable Tier II RRA compensation 

for that particular sub-division of the report. 

13 75-87 A sub-total of creditable Miscellaneous compensation 

for that particular sub- division of the report. 

13 88-100 A sub-total of creditable Sick Pay compensation for 

that particular sub-division of the report. 

200 101-300 Blank or zeros. 

NOTE: The file should be saved as a text (*.txt) file with the record format listed above.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the
Cardiff International, Inc.(the "Company") Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") for the purpose of complying with
Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States
Code.

      I, Daniel Thompson, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify that:

      1.    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

      2.    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Cardiff
International, Inc.


Dated: April 15, 2008                   By: /s/ Daniel Thompson
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
FOM1 965 

965.5 General 

If the name entered on an application differs materially from the name as it 

appears on the evidence submitted, the discrepancy must be reconciled. 

965.10 Methods 

Discrepant names may be reconciled when: 

A. Sufficient information is available. 

B. The employer states affirmatively that the service verified under a different 

name is the service of the claimant. 

C. The maiden name of a married woman is shown on the document or other 

evidence, and that name is also shown on an application for benefits. 

D. The variation in names is caused by one of the following: 

1. Anglicization or simplifications of spelling; 

2. Use of standard nicknames and diminutive forms of names; 

3. Literal translation of names from one language to another; 

4. Transposition, addition or dropping of names in accordance with 

established popular or religious customs. 

965.15 Types Of Evidence 

If reconciliation cannot be accomplished under the preceding section, obtain: 

A. A personally executed affidavit from the person involved stating that the 

names involved refer to one and the same person; and 

B. A corroborating affidavit executed by a responsible person which 

substantiates the applicant's statement and reflects the basis of the 

affiant's knowledge. 

In cases in which the change of name was effected through legal proceedings, 

obtain the original or a certified copy of the legal authorization. 

FOM1 965 Reconciliation of Names Revised Feb 10, 2014 Page 1 of 2
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Dr. Barry W. Karlin, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of CRC Health Corporation (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|Date: May 14, 2008                  
|                                    
|/s/    DR. BARRY W. KARLIN          
|Dr. Barry W. Karlin                 
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
|(Principal Executive Officer)       

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to CRC
Health Corporation and will be retained by CRC Health Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Bernard J. Tanenbaum III, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this
Quarterly Report on Form 10Q of Middle Kingdom Alliance Corp. for the three month period ending March 31, 2007.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered
by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.
The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant is made known to us by others within that entity, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: May 14, 2007



|       |  |                             
|------ |  | ----------------------------
|       |  | /s/ Bernard J. Tanenbaum III
|Name:  |  | Bernard J. Tanenbaum III    
|Title: |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### Thomas Paul WEST; Gregory Dickens; Charles M. Hedlund; Robert W. Murray; Theodore Washington; Todd Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Janice K. BREWER, Governor of Arizona; Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; Ernest Trujillo; Carson McWilliams, Warden, Arizona Department of Corrections-Florence; Unknown Parties, named as Does 1-50, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-16707.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

July 18, 2011.

Dale A. Baich, Esquire, Golnoosh Farzaneh, Robin C. Konrad, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jonathan Bass, Jeffrey A. Zick, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, Kent Ernest Cattani, Chief Counsel, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees.

D.C. No. 2:1 l-cv-01409-NVW, District of Arizona, Phoenix.

Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS, Circuit Judge and Capital Case Coordinator.

ORDER

Pursuant to the rules applicable to capital cases in which an execution date has been scheduled, a deadline was established by which any judge could request a vote on whether the panel’s order denying the Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order should be reheard en banc. No judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the panel’s decision en banc within the time period established. Therefore, the petition for rehearing en banc is denied and en banc proceedings are concluded with respect to the Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order.

The three-judge panel will issue a separate order concerning the petition for panel rehearing. Judges McKeown, Clifton, and Bea did not participate.

Statement of

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

This is a brief explanation of why I am not calling for rehearing en banc. I consider such a call futile in light of the recent decisions of this court in *Beaty v. Brewer,*649 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir.2011), *Cook v. Brewer,*649 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.2011), and *Cook v. Brewer,*637 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.2011), decisions I believe to be clearly erroneous, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in *Baze v. Rees,*553 U.S. 35, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008), a case on which it would be injudicious for me to comment. Thus, while I believe that West’s execution will violate the Constitution, I can play no further role in seeking to protect his constitutional rights.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 17, 2015

NO. 03-14-00095-CR

Charles G. Villarreal, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 433RD DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON, AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
#### Jesus Portilla, Respondent, v Law Offices of Arcia & Flanagan et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

[977 NYS2d 384]

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants Law Offices of Arcia & Flanagan, Law Offices of E. Abel Arcia, and Eloy Abel Arcia appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (J. Golia, J.), dated July 20, 2009, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the breach of such duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages *(see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer,*8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]; *Verdi v Jacoby & Meyers,*LLP, 92 AD3d 771, *902772 [2012]; *Goldberg v Lenihan,*38 AD3d 598 [2007]). Proximate cause is established by showing that the plaintiff would have succeeded in the underlying action or would not have incurred damages but for the attorney’s negligence *(see Rudolfo Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer,*8 NY3d at 442). Therefore, for a defendant in a legal malpractice case to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be presented in admissible form establishing that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of these essential elements *(see Verdi v Jacoby & Meyers, LLP,*92 AD3d at 772; *Goldberg v Lenihan,*38 AD3d at 598).

Here, the appellants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The appellants, who did not dispute that they were negligent in suing the wrong party, failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was unable to prove that he would have succeeded in his underlying personal injury action *(see Gamer v Ross,*49 AD3d 598 [2008]; *J-Mar Serv. Ctr., Inc. v Mahoney, Connor & Hussey,*14 AD3d 482, 483 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Mastro, J.P, Rivera, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of William D. Anderson, Appellant, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[976 NYS2d 418]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), entered August 29, 2012 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging a determination by respondent finding him guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules. Supreme Court (Platkin, J.) signed an order to show cause directing petitioner to serve the order and the papers upon which it was granted upon respondent and the Attorney General on or before March 30, 2012. When petitioner failed to comply with the service requirements of the order to show cause, respondent moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction.* Supreme Court granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition, and petitioner now appeals.

*1090We affirm. “It is well settled that an inmate’s failure to serve papers in accordance with the directives set forth in an order to show cause will result in dismissal of the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, unless the inmate can demonstrate that imprisonment presented an obstacle to compliance” *(Matter of Ciochenda v Department of Correctional Servs.,*68 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [2009] [citations omitted]; *see Matter of DeFilippo v Fischer,*85 AD3d 1421, 1421 [2011], *lv denied*17 NY3d 711 [2011]). Here, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to serve respondent and the Attorney General in accordance with the order to show cause. Although petitioner contends that the failure was due to the lack of availability of a notary at his facility, he has not presented any evidence in support of this claim. Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed (see *Matter of Encarnacion v LaValley,*89 AD3d 1306, 1307 [2011]; *Matter of Ciochenda v Department of Correctional Servs.,*68 AD3d at 1364).

Peters, EJ., Rose, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

*

 Petitioner thereafter moved for an extension of time in which to serve the petition and Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.) denied the motion.
#### ULEN CONTRACTING CORPORATION v. TRI-COUNTY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE.

No. 71.

District Court, W. D. Michigan, S. D.

June 6, 1940.

*285Norris, McPherson, Harrington &Waer, of Grand Rapids, Mich., and Parr, Parr & Parr, of Lebanon, Ind., for plaintiff.

Elijah G. Poxson, Jr., and Cummins & Cummins, all of Lansing, Mich., for defendant.

RAYMOND, District Judge.

Subsequent to the motion by defendant for judgment upon the pleadings under Rule 12(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, an amended complaint was filed by leave of court. The motion must be disposed of upon the amended pleadings. See Grubbs v. Smith, 6 Cir., 86 F.2d 275; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 9 Cir., 106 F.2d 769.

It is well settled that a judgment should not be rendered on the pleadings unless the right thereto is clear. Such a motion admits the truth of all well pleaded facts in the pleadings of the opposing party together with all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom. Judgment is proper on the motion only where no material issue of fact is presented by the pleadings. See Chandler v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., D.C., 31 F.Supp. 451; Kadylak v. O’Brien, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 281. In 49 C.J. 670, it is said: “ * * * Such a judgment is allowable not for lack of proof, but for lack of an issue; hence, it is proper where the pleadings entitle the party to recover without proof, as where they disclose all the facts, or where the pleadings present no issite of fact or an immaterial issue.”

From a consideration of the amended complaint and of the affidavit attached to the motion, it appears probable that upon the trial material issues will be presented concerning the nature and extent of the authority of alleged representatives of the defendant to make statements with reference to the applicability of the Michigan Use Tax Act to certain construction contracts, and whether by mutual mistake there was omitted from the contracts appropriate provision to save the plaintiff harmless from liability for such tax. It also appears posssible that other issues of fact may be involved.

The obvious purpose of Rule 12(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to save time and expense in cases wherein the ultimate facts are not in dispute. The entry of judgments upon the pleadings in doubtful or close cases will' not accomplish that end. See Texas Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., D.C., 255 F. 417.

An order will be entered denying the motion.
Order entered July 20, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00454-CR

EX PARTE WILLIAM THOMAS NICHOLAS JR

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 10

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MC15-A0588-L

ORDER

The Court DENIES as moot appellant’s July 7, 2015 motion to proceed as an indigent. 

The record has already been filed in this Court at no cost to appellant, and there are no filing fees 

associated with criminal appeals.

To the extent that appellant complains in his motion dated July 2, 2015 that he has not yet 

received copies of the record, on June 29, 2015, we received written verification from the Dallas 

County Clerk that copies of the record were sent to appellant by United States Mail, with return 

receipt requested. If appellant has not yet received copies of the record, he should direct his 

inquiry to the mail room authorities of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Appellant’s brief remains due by August 21, 2015.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, by first-class mail, to William 

Thomas Nicholas, Jr., TDCJ No. 1680033, Clements Unit, 9601 Spur 591, Amarillo, Texas 

79107-9606.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order to the Dallas County District 

Attorney’s Office.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), the undersigned officer of Tactical Solution Partners, Inc. (the Company) does hereby certify with respect to the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2007 (the Report) that:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|      |                        
|----- | -----------------------
|      | /s/ Ryan E. Kirch      
|      | Ryan E. Kirch          
|      | Chief Financial Officer
|      |                        
|Date: | November 9, 2007       
|      |                        



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.