NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION INSTITUTE 

L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JAMES CARPENTER, RICARDO BORREGO, 

MICHAEL MICHAEL, DBA EAGLE 

ADVANCEMENT INSTITUTE,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1797

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Michigan in No. 5:14-cv-10021-JCOMJH, Judge John Corbett O’Meara.

______________________ 

Decided: July 21, 2015 

______________________ 

THOMAS KEITH MIRABILE, Mirabile Law Firm, 

Wheaton, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

KRISTOPHER K. HULLIBERGER, Howard & Howard Attorneys, PLLC, Royal Oak, MI, argued for defendantsappellees. 

______________________ 
2 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

Before MOORE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Addiction and Detoxification Institute L.L.C. appeals 

from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan’s dismissal of a patent infringement 

complaint filed against James Carpenter, Ricardo 

Borrego, Michael Michael, and Eagle Advancement Institute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Because the complaint failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Addiction and Detoxification, the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 5,789,411, filed a complaint alleging that Defendants infringed the ’411 patent. The complaint

contained a single allegation of direct infringement: “[i]n 

violation of [Addiction and Detoxification]’s exclusive 

rights under the patent laws of the United States, Defendants’ [sic], each of them, have directly infringed the 

Patents [sic] by making, using, selling, offering for sale in 

the United States activities, methods and procedures 

claimed in the Patent, Exhibit 1.” Complaint ¶ 12, Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, No. 5:14-

cv-10021-JCO-MJH (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2014), ECF No. 1 

(“Original Complaint”). The complaint contained a single

allegation of indirect infringement: “Defendants’ [sic] 

have induced infringement of and/or contributorily infringed the Patent.” Id. ¶13.

Defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that Addiction and Detoxification’s claim of direct infringement

failed to satisfy Rule 8 because it did not follow Form 18
ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER 3

in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. They argued that Addiction and Detoxification’s claim of indirect infringement failed to satisfy Rule 

8 because it did not allege any facts showing that Defendants had the specific intent to cause infringement. 

In response, Addiction and Detoxification moved to 

file an amended complaint. The proposed complaint

included additional allegations with regard to indirect 

infringement, for example, that Defendants acted “with 

specific intent to urge, instruct, encourage” infringement 

by “causing[,] urging, aiding, or instructing others to 

perform one or more claimed methods of the ‘411 patent, 

and acts which infringe one or more claims of the ‘411 

patent” and that Defendants acted “with specific intent to

induce third parties to infringe the ‘411 patent.” First 

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17–18, Addiction & Detoxification 

Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, No. 5:14-cv-10021-JCO-MJH 

(E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2014), ECF No. 16-1 (“First Amended 

Complaint”). Addiction and Detoxification did not revise 

the direct infringement allegations in the First Amended 

Complaint. Id. ¶ 12. 

The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Original Complaint and denied Addiction and 

Detoxification’s motion to amend. In dismissing the 

complaint, the district court relied on an earlier opinion 

from the same district concluding that to satisfy Form 18, 

a complaint must allege that the defendants were notified 

of infringement before the complaint was filed. Accordingly, the court dismissed the direct infringement claim 

because neither the Original Complaint nor the First

Amended Complaint contained allegations that Defendants had pre-filing notice of the alleged infringement. 

J.A. 3. It dismissed the indirect infringement claim

because neither the Original Complaint nor the First

Amended Complaint contained allegations of pre-filing 

notice or facts supporting the contention that Defendants 

specifically intended to cause infringement. J.A. 3–4. 
4 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

Addiction and Detoxification appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

Because they are not unique to patent law, the grant 

of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the 

denial of a motion to amend a complaint are reviewed 

under the applicable law of the regional circuit. In re Bill 

of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 

681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Kalman v. Berlyn 

Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Under Sixth 

Circuit law, a district court’s dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, Watson Carpet & Floor 

Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 456 

(6th Cir. 2011), and a district court’s denial of a motion to 

amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion, 

Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 

(6th Cir. 2000). 

“Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

generally requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ 

statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of his 

legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 

(2011). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

plead “enough factual matter” that, when taken as true, 

“state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Twombly and Iqbal require that a complaint for patent 

infringement contain sufficient factual allegations such 

that a reasonable court could, assuming the allegations 

were true, conclude that the defendant infringed. 

A motion to dismiss a claim of direct infringement, 

however, will not be granted if the complaint follows Form 

18. In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334; Fed. R. Civ. P. 
ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER 5

84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these 

rules . . . .”). We have held that a complaint that complies 

with Form 18 will satisfy Rule 8 because Form 18 has the 

force of law and was enacted by Congress. See, e.g., In re 

Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (“to the extent the parties 

argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the 

Forms and create differing pleadings requirements, the 

Forms control”). However, as Form 18 applies only to 

direct infringement, we have rejected the idea that it 

provides a model for other causes of action, such as indirect infringement. Id. at 1336. For other patent-related 

claims, such claims must comply with Twombly and Iqbal. 

See id.

I. Direct Infringement

With regard to Addiction and Detoxification’s direct 

infringement claim, the district court erred to the extent 

it required that the complaint include an allegation of 

pre-filing written notice. Paragraph 4 of the complaint in 

Form 18 states that “[t]he plaintiff has complied with the 

statutory requirement of placing a notice of the Letters 

Patent on all electric motors it manufactures and sells 

and has given the defendant written notice of the infringement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 18. The district court 

erred to the extent it held that this portion of the Form 

creates a legal requirement that written notice be given 

before a complaint can be filed. Pre-filing notice could be 

relevant to a damages calculation, such as where an 

apparatus embodying the patent claims is not marked. 

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287 (“In the event of failure so to 

mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in 

any action for infringement, except on proof that the 

infringer was notified of the infringement and continued 

to infringe thereafter . . . .”). Pre-filing notice, however, is 

not required to bring a suit for direct infringement. See, 

e.g., id. (“Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such notice.”). There is no rule, statute, or appellate 
6 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

case suggesting that pre-filing notice is required before 

bringing suit. 

Nonetheless, we affirm the dismissal of the direct infringement claim. We may affirm a dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) for any reason supported by the record. Lawrence 

v. Chancery Court of Tennessee, 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th 

Cir. 1999). Paragraph 3 of the complaint in Form 18 

states that “[t]he defendant has infringed and is still 

infringing the Letters Patent by making, selling, and 

using electric motors that embody the patented invention, 

and the defendant will continue to do so unless enjoined 

by this court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 18. Form 18 notifies 

the defendant about what is being accused of infringement—electric motors. The factual allegation that a 

particular device infringes provides the notice required in 

a complaint. It allows the defendant to understand the 

nature of the suit and prepare an answer. 

Addiction and Detoxification’s complaint only alleges 

that Defendants infringe by “making, using, selling, 

offering for sale in the United States activities, methods 

and procedures claimed in the Patent.” Original Complaint ¶ 12. Although Form 18 does not include much 

detail, it does allege that the defendant makes, sells, and 

uses “electric motors” that embody the patented invention. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 18. This is at least some identification of specific products. The bare allegation that 

Defendants make, use, sell, and offer for sale undefined 

“activities, methods, and procedures” provides no detail 

whatsoever that would put Defendants on notice as to 

what activity, method, or procedure is alleged to infringe. 

Original Complaint ¶ 12. Such bare allegations do not 

comply with the complaint provided in Form 18. It is not 

enough to say “you infringe my patent.” And that is all 

that is alleged in Addiction and Detoxification’s complaint. There must be some allegation of specific services 

or products of the defendants which are being accused. 

Here, the Original Complaint does not comply with Form 
ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER 7

18. And when a complaint does not comply with Form 18, 

it does not fall within the safe harbor created by Rule 84. 

We thus affirm the dismissal of the direct infringement 

claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion when 

it denied the motion to amend the complaint with respect 

to the direct infringement claim because Addiction and 

Detoxification did not amend its direct infringement 

allegations in the First Amended Complaint. See Thiokol 

Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 

376, 382–83 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a proposed 

amendment to a complaint is futile if the amendment 

could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).

II. Indirect Infringement

The district court properly dismissed Addiction and 

Detoxification’s indirect infringement claim. The Original 

Complaint alleged that “Defendants’ [sic] have induced 

infringement of and/or contributorily infringed the Patent.” Original Complaint ¶ 13. To state a claim for 

induced infringement, a plaintiff must allege that the 

defendant knew of the patent and that the induced acts 

constitute patent infringement. Commil USA, LLC v. 

Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015). The Original Complaint contains no allegations regarding intent or 

any specific acts caused by Defendants. “To state a claim 

for contributory infringement . . . a plaintiff must, among 

other things, plead facts that allow an inference that the 

components sold or offered for sale have no substantial 

non-infringing uses.” In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 

1337. The Original Complaint contains no allegations 

regarding substantial non-infringing uses. Simply repeating the legal conclusion that Defendants induced infringement or contributorily infringed does not plead

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. We thus affirm the 

dismissal of the indirect infringement claim in the Original Complaint. 
8 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied the motion to amend the complaint as futile with 

respect to the indirect infringement claim. The First

Amended Complaint stated that Defendants acted “with 

specific intent to urge, instruct, encourage” infringement 

by “causing[,] urging, aiding, or instructing others to 

perform one or more claimed methods of the ‘411 patent, 

and acts which infringe one or more claims of the ‘411 

patent” and that Defendants acted “with specific intent to 

induce third parties to infringe the ‘411 patent.” First

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17–18. The First Amended 

Complaint did not include facts that would allow a court 

to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific 

intent to induce infringement and dropped any allegation 

that Defendants contributorily infringed the patents. 

Rather, the First Amended Complaint simply recites the 

legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific 

intent. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied the motion to amend the complaint with 

respect to the indirect infringement claim. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and denial of the motion to amend.

AFFIRMED 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION INSTITUTE 

L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JAMES CARPENTER, RICARDO BORREGO, 

MICHAEL MICHAEL, DBA EAGLE 

ADVANCEMENT INSTITUTE,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2014-1797

______________________ 

BRYSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The majority concludes that the district court properly 

dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of direct infringement

because the complaint “provides no detail whatsoever that 

would put Defendants on notice as to what activity, 

method, or procedure is alleged to infringe.” I disagree 

with the majority that the complaint fails to satisfy the 

requirement of Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., of “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” particularly in view of Form 18, Fed. R. 

Civ. P., which contains a form complaint for patent infringement that is not materially different from the 

complaint in this case.
2 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

The majority acknowledges that a complaint modeled 

on Form 18 would be sufficient. The only difference that 

the majority points to between the Form 18 complaint and 

the complaint in this case is that the Form 18 complaint, 

which is directed to infringement of a product claim, 

identifies the accused products as “electric motors that 

embody the patented invention.” Because the complaint 

in this case is directed to a patent consisting entirely of 

method claims (including several “therapy” claims), it is 

not possible to identify a particular item as the infringing 

product. Instead, the complaint alleges that the defendants, who engage in a business that includes “the use, 

marketing and sale of procedures and methods that 

infringe [the plaintiff’s U.S. Patent No. 5,789,411],” have 

directly infringed the patent “by making, using, selling, 

[and] offering for sale in the United States activities, 

methods and procedures claimed in the Patent,” which 

are methods and therapies for detoxifying a patient who 

is addicted to one or more opioids. 

Unlike the “electric motors” referred to in Form 18, a 

method or procedure, such as a method or therapy for 

detoxifying patients, may not have a shorthand name. 

Hence, it is unclear that the plaintiff could do more by 

way of identifying the accused methods than to identify 

them as the “activities, methods, and procedures claimed 

in the Patent.”

The majority states that in order to avoid dismissal, 

the complaint should have contained “some allegation of 

specific services or products of the defendants which are 

being accused.” But it is not clear how much more detail 

the majority would require. 

If the majority would be satisfied by an allegation regarding the defendants’ services, such as that the defendants “engage in methods and therapies for detoxifying 

patients addicted to one or more opioids,” then the dismissal in this case is pointless. The complaint puts the 
ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER 3

defendants on notice that they are being accused of employing detoxification methods and therapies directed at 

patients who are addicted to opioids. Adding such language to the complaint would add nothing to the defendants’ knowledge as to what they are being accused of. The 

complaint, particularly as amended, makes clear that the 

plaintiff’s allegations relate to the use of the detoxification 

therapies recited in the ’411 patent. The defendants have 

not denied that they engage in detoxification procedures. 

Their defense is that they do not administer diarrhea 

suppressants to patients, as is required by each claim of

the ’411 patent. The amended complaint thus tells the 

defendants what they are being charged with and enables 

them to formulate a defense that, if their factual allegations are correct, should be dispositive in their favor. This 

is not a case in which the defendants have been left to 

guess about which of their services is being accused of 

infringement. 

Similarly, to the extent that the majority finds the 

complaint wanting because it does not specifically call out 

each of the limitations of the claims, such as by alleging 

that the defendants sedate patients with an anesthetic 

agent, administer a diarrhea suppressant, inject an opioid 

antagonist, and then revive the patient, no such allegations are required. See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 

F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and holding that “a 

plaintiff in a patent infringement suit is not required to 

specifically include each element of the claims of the 

asserted patent”). In any event, requiring that such 

allegations be included would give the defendants no 

more information than they already have from the complaint in this case.

If the majority’s reference to “products” means that it 

would require the complaint to contain detail regarding 

the products that the defendants use in their therapies—

such as allegations identifying the specific drugs that the 
4 ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER

defendants administer to patients—that degree of specificity would be far greater than what is required by Rule 8 

and Form 18 and would depart from the principles of 

notice pleading that are embodied in the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 

need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (citation 

omitted)). 

With respect to the allegations of indirect infringement, the proper focus should be on the sufficiency of the 

proposed amended complaint, not the original complaint. 

The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend 

on the ground that the amended complaint was insufficient and that allowing the amendment would therefore 

be futile. Because I believe the amended complaint is 

sufficient to satisfy Rule 8, I would reverse as to the claim 

of indirect infringement as well. 

The amended complaint alleges that the individual 

defendants have had actual knowledge of the patent since 

at least the filing date of the original complaint, and that 

they induced infringement by others through their “complete dominion and control” over Eagle Advancement 

Institute, “causing[,] urging, encouraging, aiding or 

instructing others to perform one or more claimed methods of the ’411 patent and acts which infringe one or more 

claims of the ’411 patent.” The complaint further alleges 

that the individual defendants acted “with specific intent 

to urge, instruct, [and] encourage such infringement” by 

continuing their alleged infringing activities “with 

knowledge of the ’411 patent.”

The majority finds fault with the amended complaint 

because of its failure to “include facts that would allow a 

court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific 

intent to induce infringement” and instead “simply recites 
ADDICTION AND DETOXIFICATION v. CARPENTER 5

the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific 

intent.”

Once again, the majority does not explain why the allegations in the amended complaint are insufficient to 

plead specific intent, nor does it make clear what factual 

allegations would be required to do so. The amended 

complaint specifically alleges that the individual defendants had knowledge of the ’411 patent at least as of the 

filing of the original complaint. It also alleges that the 

individual defendants’ capacity to induce infringement 

derived from their “complete dominion and control” over 

Eagle Advancement Institute. Any other facts relating to 

the issue of intent, such as specific directions by the 

individual defendants to continue the allegedly infringing 

activities after notice of the original complaint, might be 

evidence of specific intent, but in a system of notice pleading, a detailed evidentiary recitation is not necessary to a 

valid statement of a legal claim.

If the consequence of our affirmance of the dismissal 

in this case were merely to require the plaintiff to add a 

reference to the required steps of the claimed detoxification program and a statement that continued operation of 

the program with knowledge of the patent evinces specific 

intent to induce infringement, the decision in this case 

would serve no purpose, but it would also do little harm. 

However, the district court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff 

to amend its complaint suggests that the court may 

regard this case as over, and that any effort by the plaintiff to further amend the complaint so as to comply with 

this court’s requirements would be rejected. If that is 

so—and there is nothing in the majority opinion to suggest that the district court should allow the plaintiff an 

opportunity to file a second amended complaint—then we 

will have extinguished a party’s claims on a basis other 

than the merits for reasons wholly insufficient to justify 

such a measure. I therefore respectfully dissent.