31420 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 125 / Wednesday, July 1, 2009 / Notices 

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Delegation of Authority: The Secretary 

of Education has delegated authority to 

Daniel T. Madzelan, Director, 

Forecasting and Policy Analysis for the 

Office of Postsecondary Education, to 

perform the functions of the Assistant 

Secretary for Postsecondary Education. 

Dated: June 26, 2009. 

Daniel T. Madzelan, 

Director, Forecasting and Policy Analysis. 

[FR Doc. E9–15567 Filed 6–30–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Finding of No Significant Impact: 

Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted 

Uranium, Natural Uranium, and LowEnriched Uranium 

AGENCY: Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Finding of No Significant 

Impact. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE, the Department) has 

completed an Environmental 

Assessment (EA) for the Disposition of 

DOE Excess Depleted Uranium (DU), 

Natural Uranium (NU), and LowEnriched Uranium (LEU) (DOE/EA– 

1607). Based on the analysis in the EA, 

the Department has determined that the 

proposed action, DOE dispositioning its 

excess uranium inventory using one or 

a combination of two methods—(1) 

enrichment to either NU or LEU product 

and subsequent storage or sale of the 

resultant NU or LEU product 

(Enrichment Alternative), and (2) direct 

sale to appropriately licensed entities 

(Direct Sale Alternative)—does not 

constitute a major Federal action 

significantly affecting the quality of the 

human environment within the context 

of the National Environmental Policy 

Act of 1969 (NEPA). Therefore, the 

preparation of an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) is not required and the 

Department is issuing this Finding of No 

Significant Impact (FONSI). 

ADDRESSES: Single copies of the EA and 

FONSI may be obtained from: 

Mr. Ronald Hagen, NEPA Document 

Manager, NE–6, Forrestal Building, 

U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 

Independence Ave., SW., Washington, 

DC 20585–0113, Phone: (202) 586– 

1381, Facsimile: (202) 287–3701, 

Electronic mail: 

Ronald.Hagen@nuclear.energy.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mr. Ronald Hagen, Phone: (202) 586– 

1381, Electronic mail: 

Ronald.Hagen@nuclear.energy.gov. 

For information on DOE’s NEPA 

process: 

Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, NEPA 

Policy and Compliance, GC–20, 

Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of 

Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20585–0113, 

Phone: (202) 586–4600, Facsimile: 

(202) 586–7031. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background: DOE owns and manages an 

inventory of excess DU, NU, and LEU. 

This inventory is currently stored in 

large cylinders as depleted uranium 

hexafluoride (DUF6), natural uranium 

hexafluoride (NUF6), and low-enriched 

uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) at the 

DOE Paducah site in western Kentucky 

(DOE Paducah) and the DOE 

Portsmouth site near Piketon in southcentral Ohio (DOE Portsmouth). This 

inventory exceeds DOE’s current and 

projected energy and defense program 

needs. The Secretary of Energy policy 

statement on the management of DOE 

excess uranium inventory issued on 

March 11, 2008, commits DOE to 

managing all of its excess uranium 

inventory in a manner that (1) is 

consistent with all applicable legal 

requirements; (2) maintains sufficient 

uranium inventory at all times to meet 

the current and reasonably foreseeable 

needs of Departmental missions; (3) 

undertakes transactions involving nonU.S. Government entities in a 

transparent and competitive manner, 

unless the Secretary determines in 

writing that overriding Departmental 

mission needs dictate otherwise; and (4) 

is consistent with and supportive of the 

maintenance of a strong domestic 

nuclear industry. 

In conformance with the requirements 

of the Council on Environmental 

Quality Regulations for Implementing 

the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 

CFR Parts 1500–1508) and the DOE 

NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 

CFR Part 1021), the Department 

prepared a draft EA which was issued 

for public review on December 24, 2008. 

Comments were received from 

potentially affected states, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, and uranium 

industry organizations. The draft EA 

was revised in response to the 

comments, as appropriate. 

Alternatives and Environmental 

Impacts: The potential environmental 

impacts associated with the proposed 

disposition of excess uranium inventory 

were analyzed for the following 

alternatives: 

No Action Alternative: DOE would 

continue with existing plans to convert 

DU to a more stable chemical form at 

the two new conversion facilities and 

would not enrich or sell any of its 

excess DU inventory as proposed in this 

EA. DOE would also continue to store 

excess NU and LEU in their current 

configurations at Portsmouth and 

Paducah. 

Alternative 1—Enrichment: DOE 

would contract for enrichment of excess 

DU, NU, and LEU and subsequent 

storage or sale of the resultant NU or 

LEU product. DOE would ship by 

commercial carriers (truck, rail, barge, 

and/or ship) excess DU, NU, and LEU to 

one or more of four enrichment facilities 

(three domestic and one foreign). LEU 

product could be stored at up to three 

U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabrication 

facilities in North Carolina, South 

Carolina, and/or Washington State, and/ 

or at DOE’s Portsmouth or Paducah 

sites. NU product could be stored at 

enrichment facilities in Kentucky, New 

Mexico, and/or Ohio, and/or at DOE’s 

Portsmouth or Paducah sites. DOE 

would contract with the enrichment 

facility to store and/or dispose of the DU 

tails or, in the case of domestic 

enrichment facilities, to ship the DU 

tails to DOE Paducah and/or DOE 

Portsmouth for storage. 

Alternative 2—Direct Sale: DOE 

would introduce excess DU, NU, and 

LEU into the commercial market 

through direct sales to appropriately 

licensed entities. The licensed 

purchasers would take delivery, 

transport and enrich the excess 

inventory, and transport and store the 

NU or LEU product in essentially the 

same manner and using essentially the 

same facilities as would DOE under the 

Enrichment Alternative. 

The potential environmental impacts 

of all aspects of enrichment operations 

and the conversion of DU tails have 

been previously analyzed in existing 

NEPA documents and have been 

summarized and incorporated by 

reference in the EA. In addition, the EA 

analyzed (1) previously unanalyzed 

impacts on health and safety from 

transportation of the excess inventory, 

LEU product, NU, and DU tails, (2) 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 125 / Wednesday, July 1, 2009 / Notices 31421 

1Although DOE compliance with the 

requirements of section 3112(d) of the USEC 

Privatization Act is included in this MAP as a 

mitigation measure, it should be noted that it is an 

integral element of the Proposed Action and, as 

such, need not be included or described in this 

MAP. However, it has been included herein to 

provide a comprehensive explanation of the actions 

that would be undertaken by DOE to mitigate any 

potentially significant impacts on the domestic 

uranium industry from the Proposed Action. 

impacts associated with accidents and 

intentional destructive acts (terrorism, 

sabotage), and (3) economic impacts of 

the proposed action on the domestic 

uranium industry. In general, the 

impacts identified for the Enrichment 

and Direct Sale Alternatives are similar 

if not identical. The attached Summary 

of the EA provides a summarization of 

the alternatives and the impacts. 

Mitigation: The Mitigation Action 

Plan (MAP), which follows this 

determination and is an integral part of 

this FONSI, specifies the analyses the 

Department would undertake prior to 

sales and transfers of excess NU, DU, 

and LEU and commits the Department 

to implement appropriate mitigation 

measures to avoid or minimize any 

potentially significant impacts on the 

domestic uranium industry. 

Conclusion: The potential 

environmental impacts of the proposed 

action have been analyzed in the EA. 

The analysis shows that no significant 

impacts are likely to occur as a result of 

the Department undertaking the 

proposed action. Further, no adverse 

impacts on the uranium industry are 

expected as the Department has 

committed to conduct analysis prior to 

each transaction and to take appropriate 

action to mitigate any adverse impacts 

on the uranium industry. 

Determination: Based on the analysis 

in the subject EA and the commitments 

in the Mitigation Action Plan outlined 

below, the Department has determined 

that the proposed disposition of the 

excess uranium inventory of DU, NU, 

and LEU using one or a combination of 

two methods—(1) enriching it and then 

storing or selling the resultant product, 

and/or (2) selling excess DU, NU, and 

LEU inventory to appropriately licensed 

entities—would not have significant 

environmental impacts, including 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

mining, conversion or enrichment 

industry (domestic uranium industry) 

and is not a major Federal action that 

would significantly affect the quality of 

the human environment within the 

context of NEPA. Therefore, the 

preparation of an EIS is not required. 

Mitigation Action Plan for the 

Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted 

Uranium, Natural Uranium, and LowEnriched Uranium 

Purpose: This Mitigation Action Plan 

will be implemented by DOE to mitigate 

any potentially significant impacts on 

the domestic uranium industry from 

DOE’s decision to disposition the excess 

NU, DU, and LEU inventory at DOE’s 

Paducah and Portsmouth sites by 

enriching it, and then storing or selling 

the resultant product, and/or selling 

excess NU, DU, and LEU inventory to 

appropriately licensed entities, as 

analyzed in the Environmental 

Assessment for the Disposition of DOE 

Excess Depleted Uranium, Natural 

Uranium, and Low-Enriched Uranium. 

Mitigation Action Plan: The DOE 

NEPA requirements governing 

mitigation action plans are set forth at 

10 CFR 1021.331. This regulation 

specifies at 10 CFR 1021.331(b) that, in 

cases where an EA supports a Finding 

of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE 

shall also prepare a MAP for 

commitments to mitigation that are 

essential to render the impacts of the 

proposed action not significant. In such 

cases, the MAP must address all 

commitments to such necessary 

mitigations and explain how mitigation 

will be planned and implemented. The 

MAP must be prepared before the 

FONSI is issued, and referenced in the 

FONSI. In addition, the MAP must be as 

complete as possible, commensurate 

with the information available regarding 

the action to be covered by the FONSI, 

and may be revised as more specific and 

detailed information becomes available. 

10 CFR 1021.331(c). 

This MAP addresses the DOE 

commitments that are necessary and 

how they will be planned or 

implemented to mitigate any potentially 

significant impacts on the domestic 

uranium industry from DOE’s Proposed 

Action. In the EA, DOE identified two 

mitigation measures that underlie its 

analysis and would be utilized to 

mitigate any potentially significant 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry from its Proposed Action: (1) 

Prior to particular sales or transfers of 

NU and LEU, as applicable, a Secretarial 

Determination pursuant to section 

3112(d) of the USEC Privatization Act 

(Pub. L. 104–134) would be prepared to 

determine that there is no adverse 

material impact from the sale or transfer 

on the domestic uranium industry; and 

(2) prior to particular sales or transfers 

of DU, DOE would conduct an analysis 

to ensure there would be no potentially 

significant impacts from the sale or 

transfer on the domestic uranium 

industry (EA, Section 4.3.2). 

The first mitigation measure is 

required under the USEC Privatization 

Act for certain sales or transfers of NU 

and LEU and DOE would plan and 

implement that measure consistent with 

existing law 1 and policy. That is, DOE 

would conduct a market impact analysis 

to determine the potential impacts of 

the proposed sale or transfer on the 

domestic uranium industry taking into 

account the sales of uranium under the 

Russian HEU Agreement and the 

Suspension Agreement, and other 

uranium sales or transfers by the DOE 

(including the National Nuclear 

Security Administration). Among other 

things, the market impact analysis 

would consider, as appropriate, current 

and projected uranium prices, 

enrichment capacity, uranium mining 

activities, and commercial contracting 

practices. Should the market impact 

analysis indicate adverse material 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry, the proposed sale or transfer 

would be adjusted as necessary to 

ensure that such adverse impacts are 

avoided or mitigated. The sale or 

transfer may be approved and 

implemented only if the Secretary 

determines that the sale or transfer 

would not have adverse material 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry. 

The second mitigation measure 

applies to DU and is not required under 

the USEC Privatization Act; however, as 

indicated in the EA, DOE would 

conduct an analysis prior to particular 

sales or transfers of DU to ensure there 

would be no potentially significant 

impacts to the domestic uranium 

industry. Conducting such an analysis 

would be consistent with DOE policies 

for uranium management as outlined in 

the Secretarial Policy Statement, and is 

a commitment DOE will undertake and 

include in this MAP in order to mitigate 

any potentially significant impacts on 

the domestic uranium industry from 

DOE’s proposed sale or transfer of DU. 

The market impact analysis would be 

prepared prior to a particular sale or 

transfer, and would be similar in form 

and content to the market impact 

analysis that underlies a Secretarial 

Determination pursuant to the USEC 

Privatization Act. That is, DOE would 

conduct a market impact analysis to 

determine the potential impacts of the 

proposed sale or transfer on the 

domestic uranium industry, taking into 

account the sales of uranium under the 

Russian HEU Agreement and the 

Suspension Agreement, and other 

uranium sales or transfers by the DOE 

(including the National Nuclear 

Security Administration). Among other 

things, the market impact analysis 

would consider, as appropriate, current 

31422 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 125 / Wednesday, July 1, 2009 / Notices 

2 DOE also has additional uranium of varying 

levels of enrichment that, in the future, may be 

added to the excess DU, NU, and LEU inventory 

(e.g., uranium that could be recovered during 

facility decontamination and decommissioning 

[D&D]). In addition, the DOE uranium inventory 

includes quantities of highly enriched uranium 

(HEU), which is being dispositioned through an 

ongoing National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) program and is not addressed in this EA. 

3 In this EA, the term ‘‘sale’’ includes direct sales, 

transfers, or other transactions the Department may 

undertake to disposition its excess uranium 

inventory. 

4For perspective, over the period 2002 to 2006, 

about 43,000 people were killed each year in motor 

vehicle accidents and about 900 people were killed 

each year in railroad accidents and incidents in the 

United States (DOT 2007). 

5Because the actual annual amounts of excess 

inventory enriched would likely be less than the 

maximum annual amount, and because it would 

probably change from year to year, DOE is not 

limiting the Proposed Action to a particular number 

of years. However, for purposes of modeling the 

impacts of processing the entire inventory, 25 years 

is used. 

and projected uranium prices, 

enrichment capacity, uranium mining 

activities, and commercial contracting 

practices. Should the market impact 

analysis indicate potentially significant 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry, the proposed sale or transfer 

would be adjusted as necessary to 

ensure that such potentially significant 

impacts are avoided or mitigated. The 

sale or transfer of DU may be approved 

and implemented only if the market 

impact analysis indicates that the sale or 

transfer would not result in potentially 

significant impacts on the domestic 

uranium industry. 

With these commitments in place, the 

Proposed Action would be implemented 

by DOE in a manner that would avoid 

or mitigate any potentially significant 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry. This MAP may be revised in 

the future as more specific and detailed 

information becomes available. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 24, 

2009. 

R. Shane Johnson, 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Nuclear 

Energy. 

Final Environmental Assessment 

Disposition of DOE Excess Depleted 

Uranium, Natural Uranium, and LowEnriched Uranium (DOE/EA–1607) 

Summary 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 

owns and manages an inventory of 

depleted uranium (DU), natural 

uranium (NU), and low-enriched 

uranium (LEU) that is currently stored 

in large cylinders as depleted uranium 

hexafluoride (DUF6), natural uranium 

hexafluoride (NUF6), and low-enriched 

uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) at the 

DOE Paducah site in western Kentucky 

(DOE Paducah) and the DOE 

Portsmouth site near Piketon in southcentral Ohio (DOE Portsmouth)2. This 

inventory exceeds DOE’s current and 

projected energy and defense program 

needs. 

On March 11, 2008, the Secretary of 

Energy issued a policy statement (the 

Secretarial Policy Statement) on the 

management of DOE’s excess uranium 

inventory (Appendix A). The policy 

statement commits DOE to manage all of 

its excess uranium inventories in a 

manner that (1) is consistent with all 

applicable legal requirements; (2) 

maintains sufficient uranium 

inventories at all times to meet the 

current and reasonably foreseeable 

needs of Departmental missions; (3) 

undertakes transactions involving nonU.S. Government entities in a 

transparent and competitive manner, 

unless the Secretary of Energy 

determines in writing that overriding 

Departmental mission needs dictate 

otherwise; and (4) is consistent with and 

supportive of the maintenance of a 

strong domestic nuclear industry. 

In accordance with this policy, DOE 

proposes to disposition part of its excess 

uranium inventory using one or a 

combination of two methods: (1) 

Enrichment to either NU or LEU 

product, and subsequent storage or sale 

of the resultant NU or LEU product (the 

Enrichment Alternative), and (2) direct 

sale 3 to appropriately licensed entities 

(the Direct Sale Alternative). Under the 

Enrichment Alternative, DOE could 

enrich DU to the 235U content of NU 

(i.e., 0.711 percent 235U), and DOE 

could enrich DU, NU, and/or LEU (with 

a current 235U content of less than 4.95 

percent) up to 4.95 percent 235U 

content. This environmental assessment 

(EA) assumes that the Proposed Action 

would result in the annual enrichment 

and/or sale of amounts of the excess 

inventory that, combined with other 

DOE sales or transfers to the market, 

generally would not exceed 10 percent 

of the total annual fuel requirements of 

all licensed U.S. nuclear power plants— 

that is, approximately 2,000 metric tons 

of uranium (MTU). In some years, the 

annual amount enriched and/or sold 

could be greater than 2,000 MTU (for 

example, due to startup of new reactors, 

which requires approximately two times 

the amount of natural uranium needed 

for subsequent routine re-loads). 

As mentioned previously, the excess 

inventory that DOE currently proposes 

to disposition is stored as UF6 at the 

DOE Portsmouth site in Ohio and the 

DOE Paducah site in Kentucky. DOE 

also anticipates the potential 

identification of additional amounts of 

LEU with a 235U content of less than 

4.95 percent. Under the Enrichment 

Alternative, the uranium could be 

transported by truck or rail to one or 

more of three enrichment facilities in 

the United States or to a foreign 

enrichment facility. A facility in France 

is identified as a representative foreign 

facility for the purposes of assessing 

potential impacts. Shipments to France 

could be via any of several east-coast or 

gulf-coast U.S. ports; however, this EA 

assumes, for purposes of analysis, that 

the uranium would be transported by 

barge to New Orleans, Louisiana, then 

by ship to France. The LEU product 

could be stored at up to three U.S. 

commercial nuclear fuel fabrication 

facilities (FFFs) in North Carolina, 

South Carolina, and Washington State, 

and/or at DOE’s Portsmouth or Paducah 

sites. When DU is enriched to NU, it 

would be stored at enrichment facilities 

in Kentucky, New Mexico, and/or Ohio, 

and/or at DOE’s Portsmouth or Paducah 

sites. The DU that would result from the 

enrichment process, called ‘‘DU tails’’, 

would be stored and managed at the 

enrichment facility or be transported to 

and stored and managed at DOE’s 

Portsmouth or Paducah sites. 

In this EA, DOE assesses the potential 

environmental impacts associated with 

this Proposed Action and a No Action 

Alternative. The potential impacts of all 

aspects of enrichment operations and 

the conversion of DU tails, per se, have 

been previously addressed in existing 

National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) documents. This EA focuses on 

previously unanalyzed impacts: (1) 

Health and safety impacts from 

transportation of the excess inventory, 

LEU product, NU, and DU tails; (2) 

impacts associated with accidents and 

intentional destructive acts (terrorism, 

sabotage); and (3) economic impacts of 

the Proposed Action on the domestic 

uranium industry. 

In general, the impacts identified for 

the Enrichment and Direct Sale 

Alternatives are similar if not identical. 

The potential impacts are summarized 

as follows: 

• For all truck, rail, and barge 

transport options, for all domestic and 

foreign enrichment facility locations, 

and for all storage options, 

transportation of the entire inventory of 

DU, NU, and LEU subject to this EA is 

estimated to result in up to 3 

transportation-related fatalities 4 over 

approximately 25 years 5. For overseas 

transportation, this includes impacts 

from sea transit, U.S. port operations, 

and overland transport. These 

transportation impacts include the 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 125 / Wednesday, July 1, 2009 / Notices 31423 

radiological and nonradiological 

impacts from incident-free 

transportation and transportation 

accidents. The range in impacts 

presented in this EA is primarily due to 

differences in the amounts of materials 

that would be shipped for each case 

analyzed and differences in the 

distances over which the materials 

would be shipped. 

• For enrichment at the National 

Enrichment Facility (NEF) near Eunice, 

New Mexico, the truck or rail 

transportation impacts would be higher 

than for enrichment at Paducah, 

Kentucky, or Portsmouth, Ohio, because 

the NU, LEU, or DU feed would be 

shipped greater distances; the DU tails 

and NU product, could be stored/ 

dispositioned by NEF, or could be 

shipped back to Paducah or Portsmouth. 

• The probability of a latent cancer 

fatality (LCF) for the maximally exposed 

individual (MEI) along the truck 

transportation routes was estimated to 

range from 8.3 × 10¥8 to 5.3 × 10¥7 over 

25 years. For the analysis, the MEI was 

located 30 meters from the highway and 

was exposed to all truck shipments. The 

shipments are assumed to travel at a 

speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles) per 

hour, which is representative of speeds 

in urban areas. 

• The probability of an LCF for the 

MEI along the rail transportation routes 

was almost identical to truck transport, 

ranging from 8.2 × 10¥8 to 5.2 × 10¥7

over 25 years. For the analysis, the MEI 

was located 30 meters from the railroad 

and was exposed to all rail shipments. 

The shipments are assumed to travel at 

a speed of 24 kilometers (15 miles) per 

hour, which is representative of speeds 

in urban areas. 

• The transportation-related impacts 

of transporting the uranium to New 

Orleans by barge would be less than the 

impacts of transporting the uranium 

there by truck or rail due to the fewer 

number of required shipments and the 

fact that the exposed population would 

be smaller for barge transport. 

• Severe rail accidents would have 

higher consequences than truck 

accidents because each railcar would 

carry four cylinders of DU, NU, or LEU 

(feed), compared with only one for each 

truck. For LEU product, each railcar 

would carry 12 cylinders, compared 

with 3 to 5 for each truck. 

• DOE estimated that the radiological 

risks of transportation accidents for 

truck shipments (probability of 

occurrence × consequence summed over 

a complete spectrum of accidents, 

including the severe accidents 

discussed below) ranged from 0.042 to 

0.96 LCFs over 25 years. 

• DOE also estimated the 

consequences of severe truck accidents. 

For a severe truck accident involving 

one cylinder of depleted uranium 

hexafluoride (DUF6), the population 

radiation dose could be as high as 

32,000 person-rem in an urban area if 

stable atmospheric conditions existed at 

the time of the accident. Based on this 

population radiation dose, it was 

estimated that there could be 20 LCFs in 

the assumed exposed population of 

about 3 million people. The radiation 

dose for the MEI was estimated to be as 

high as 0.91 rem and the probability of 

an LCF for this individual was 

estimated to be 0.0005. The probability 

of this accident ranged from 8.1 × 10¥4

to 0.016 over 25 years. 

If the severe transportation accident 

involved NU feed or product, the 

radiological consequences would be 

higher—about 28 LCFs in the assumed 

exposed population. For the MEI, the 

probability of an LCF would be 8 × 

10¥4. The probability of this accident 

ranged from 1.5 × 10¥4 to 0.0055 over 

25 years for those cases where NU is 

shipped. However, for several cases, NU 

would not be shipped and the 

probability of this accident would be 

zero. 

If the severe transportation accident 

involved LEU product, the radiological 

consequences would range from about 

75 to 125 LCFs in the assumed exposed 

population, assuming that all three or 

five 30B cylinders, respectively, in a 

truck shipment were breached during 

the severe accident. For the MEI, the 

probability of an LCF would be 0.002 or 

0.0036 if three or five 30B cylinders, 

respectively, were breached during the 

severe accident. If three 30B cylinders 

were involved in the accident, the 

probability of the accident would range 

from 2.2 × 10¥4 to 9 × 10¥4 over 25 

years for those cases where LEU is 

shipped. If five 30B cylinders were 

involved in the accident, the probability 

would range from 1.3 × 10¥4 to 5.4 × 

10¥4 over 25 years for those cases were 

LEU is shipped. However, for several 

cases, LEU would not be shipped and 

the probability of this accident would be 

zero. In addition, the probability 

associated with this accident does not 

incorporate the effects of the protective 

overpack surrounding the 30B 

cylinders, which would reduce the 

probability of the accident to a range of 

4.4 × 10¥5 to 1.8 × 10¥4 over 25 years 

if three 30B cylinders were involved or 

a range of 2.7 × 10¥5 to 1.1 × 10¥4 over 

25 years if five 30B cylinders were 

involved 

• DOE estimated that the radiological 

risks of transportation accidents for rail 

shipments (probability of occurrence × 

consequence summed over a complete 

spectrum of accidents, including the 

severe accidents discussed below) 

ranged from 0.051 to 0.97 LCFs over 25 

years. The radiological risks for rail and 

truck transportation accidents are 

similar because the total number of 

cylinders shipped by rail and truck is 

the same. 

• DOE also estimated the 

consequences of severe rail accidents. 

For a severe rail accident involving four 

cylinders of DUF6, the population 

radiation dose could be as high as 

130,000 person-rem in an urban area if 

stable atmospheric conditions existed at 

the time of the accident. Based on this 

population radiation dose, it was 

estimated that there could be 80 LCFs in 

the assumed exposed population of 

about 3 million people. Under this 

scenario, the radiation dose for the MEI 

was estimated to be as high as 3.7 rem, 

and the probability of an LCF for this 

individual was estimated to be 0.002. 

The probability of this accident ranged 

from 2.4 × 10¥4 to 0.003 over 25 years. 

If the severe transportation accident 

involved NU feed or product, the 

radiological consequences would be 

higher—about 110 LCFs in the assumed 

exposed population and the probability 

of an LCF for the MEI would be 0.003. 

The probability of this accident ranged 

from 4.4 × 10¥5 to 0.0011 over 25 years 

for those cases where NU is shipped. 

However, for several cases, NU would 

not be shipped and the probability of 

this accident would be zero. 

If the severe transportation accident 

involved LEU product, the radiological 

consequences would be about 310 LCFs 

in the assumed exposed populations, 

assuming that all twelve 30B cylinders 

in a rail shipment were breached during 

the severe accident. For the MEI, the 

probability of an LCF would be 0.009. 

The probability of this accident ranged 

from 4.3 × 10¥5 to 2.6 × 10¥4 over 25 

years for those cases where LEU is 

shipped. However, for several cases, 

LEU would not be shipped and the 

probability of this accident would be 

zero. In addition, the probability 

associated with this accident does not 

incorporate the effects of the protective 

overpack surrounding the 30B 

cylinders, which would reduce the 

probability of the accident to a range of 

4.3 × 10¥6 to 2.6 × 10¥5 over 25 years. 

• For both the truck and rail severe 

transportation accidents, the accidents 

were assumed to take place in an urban 

area with a population density of 1,600 

people per square kilometer. Potential 

consequences were estimated for the 

population within a 50-mile (80- 

kilometer) radius, assuming that this 

population density extended out to 50 

31424 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 125 / Wednesday, July 1, 2009 / Notices 

miles (80 kilometers). It is important to 

note that according to the 2000 census, 

the average population density within 

50 miles of the center of the 20 highest 

population urbanized areas in the 

United States is about 380 people per 

square kilometer, so the consequences 

would likely be lower if a severe truck 

or rail accident took place in an urban 

area. In addition, the severe accidents 

were assumed to take place during 

stable atmospheric conditions. As 

illustrated in Table 4–13, if the 

accidents took place during neutral 

atmospheric conditions, the 

consequences would be substantially 

lower. For example, if the severe truck 

accident involving LEU product 

occurred during neutral atmospheric 

conditions, the consequences would 

range from 3 to 5 LCFs, substantially 

lower than 75 to 125 LCFs. If the severe 

rail accident involving LEU product 

occurred during neutral atmospheric 

conditions, the consequences would be 

about 12 LCFs, substantially lower than 

310 LCFs. 

• Three individuals could suffer 

irreversible health effects from severe 

truck accidents and four individuals 

could suffer irreversible health effects 

from severe rail accidents due to the 

chemical toxicity associated with UF6, 

hydrogen fluoride (HF), and uranyl 

fluoride (UO2F2). No fatalities are 

estimated to result from chemical 

exposure. 

• Although it is not possible to 

predict the probability of an intentional 

destructive act, implementation of 

elements identified in the Department of 

Transportation-required security plan 

(personnel security, unauthorized 

access, and en route security) are judged 

to make these occurrences very 

unlikely. The consequences of such acts 

would be similar to the consequences 

discussed above for severe truck and rail 

accidents involving DU, NU, and LEU. 

• If a severe accident involving stored 

LEU product were to occur, the accident 

would result in an estimated population 

dose. For example, at Global Nuclear 

Fuel–Americas (GNF–A), a severe 

accident was estimated to result in a 

population dose of 29,000 person-rem. 

In the assumed exposed population 

around the GNF–A facility, this 

radiation dose is estimated to result in 

17 LCFs. The radiation dose for an 

individual located 2 kilometers from the 

facility was estimated to be 5 rem. The 

probability of an LCF for this person is 

estimated to be 0.003. If this accident 

occurred at other sites, the results 

would vary depending on the amount of 

material involved in the accident; the 

enrichment of the UF6; the release 

fractions, aerosolized fractions, and 

respirable fractions; release assumptions 

such as whether the release was 

elevated or from ground level; the 

number of people exposed; atmospheric 

conditions; and radiation dosimetry 

assumptions. 

• The potential market impacts 

(including socioeconomic impacts) on 

the domestic uranium mining, 

conversion, and enrichment industries 

(i.e., domestic uranium industry) from 

direct sales or transfers of uranium 

under the Proposed Action are expected 

to be small. In any event, DOE has 

prepared a mitigation action plan (MAP) 

to mitigate any potentially significant 

impacts on the domestic uranium 

industry from DOE decisions to 

disposition the excess NU, DU, and LEU 

inventory at DOE’s Paducah and 

Portsmouth sites as analyzed in this EA. 

• Cumulative impacts under the 

Enrichment Alternative would 

essentially be the same as those 

previously evaluated for the sites 

involved because DOE’s uranium 

inventory would not increase the sites’ 

enrichment capacity or throughput. 

Under the Direct Sale Alternative, DOE 

assumes that actions by the purchasers 

would be essentially the same as DOE 

under the Enrichment Alternative. For 

that reason, DOE finds that the 

cumulative transportation, enrichment, 

and storage impacts of the Direct Sale 

Alternative would be essentially 

identical to those of the Enrichment 

Alternative. The cumulative impacts 

that would occur under the No Action 

Alternative assessed in this EA are the 

same as the cumulative impacts 

identified for the two new conversion 

facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth. 

[FR Doc. E9–15534 Filed 6–30–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. OR09–13–000] 

BP Canada Energy Marketing Corp, 

Complainant v. Kinder Morgan Cochin 

LLC, Respondent; Notice of Complaint 

June 24, 2009. 

Take notice that on June 19, 2009, 

pursuant sections 2, 3(1), 4(1), 9, 13(1), 

and 15(1) of the Interstate Commerce 

Act, 49 U.S.C. app. 2, 3(1), 4(1), 9, 13(1), 

and 15(1) (1988), Rule 206 of the 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission’s (Commission) Rules of 

Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.206, 

and section 343.2 of the Commission’s 

Procedural Rules Applicable to Oil 

Pipeline Proceedings, 18 CFR 343.2, BP 

Canada Energy Marketing Corp 

(Complainant) filed a formal complaint 

against Kinder Morgan Cochin LLC 

(Respondent) challenging the 

Respondent’s line fill policy which 

Complainant alleges has expired by its 

own terms, but Respondent continues to 

apply the policy to its shippers. 

The Complainant states that copies of 

the complaint were served on the 

Respondent. 

Any person desiring to intervene or to 

protest this filing must file in 

accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of 

the Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). 

Protests will be considered by the 

Commission in determining the 

appropriate action to be taken, but will 

not serve to make protestants parties to 

the proceeding. Any person wishing to 

become a party must file a notice of 

intervention or motion to intervene, as 

appropriate. The Respondent’s answer 

and all interventions, or protests must 

be filed on or before the comment date. 

The Respondent’s answer, motions to 

intervene, and protests must be served 

on the Complainants. 

The Commission encourages 

electronic submission of protests and 

interventions in lieu of paper using the 

‘‘eFiling’’ link at http://www.ferc.gov. 

Persons unable to file electronically 

should submit an original and 14 copies 

of the protest or intervention to the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20426. 

This filing is accessible on-line at 

http://www.ferc.gov, using the 

‘‘eLibrary’’ link and is available for 

review in the Commission’s Public 

Reference Room in Washington, DC. 

There is an ‘‘eSubscription’’ link on the 

Web site that enables subscribers to 

receive e-mail notification when a 

document is added to a subscribed 

docket(s). For assistance with any FERC 

Online service, please e-mail 

FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov, or call 

(866) 208–3676 (toll free). For TTY, call 

(202) 502–8659. 

Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time 

on July 9, 2009. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–15457 Filed 6–30–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P