Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Victoria Christ

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Kelly A. Miklos

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John W. Taylor, IV,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

July 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1411-PC-396

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, 

Judge

Cause No. 20C01-1308-PC-52

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 2 of 13

[1] John W. Taylor, IV, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

Taylor raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the postconviction court erred in denying his petition for relief. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Taylor’s direct appeal from his three 

convictions of attempted murder follow:

On October 26, 2011, Chamar Jackson (Jackson) and Avery Copeland 

(Copeland) walked to a fast food restaurant in Elkhart County, 

Indiana to visit their friend, Chynna Sipili (Sipili), who was employed 

there. When they arrived at the restaurant, Taylor was standing near 

the soda dispensers. Taylor and Sipili had just split up the previous 

day after Sipili had sent him a text message informing him that she 

needed space. When Jackson approached the counter to speak with 

Sipili, he was stared down by Taylor who told him to stop talking to 

his girlfriend. Jackson continued to talk to Sipili, and Taylor stormed 

angrily out of the restaurant. Thereafter, Jackson and Copeland 

returned to Copeland’s house. Michael Raeder (Raeder) noticed them 

standing outside the residence and pulled up in his vehicle. Jackson 

and Copeland got in Raeder’s car, intending to smoke marijuana 

together.

Approximately ten to thirty minutes after Jackson and Copeland had 

left the fast food restaurant, Taylor returned and angrily confronted 

Sipili. He told her, “I swear to God after work I’ll kill you and them 

niggas.” (Transcript p. 340). Taylor again stormed out of the 

restaurant.

Meanwhile, Jackson, Copeland, and Raeder were sitting in Raeder’s 

vehicle. Raeder was in the driver’s seat, Jackson in the front passenger 

seat, and Copeland was in the rear seat on the driver’s side. While 

they were talking, Taylor drove up in his car. He pulled up next to 

Raeder’s car and jumped out, carrying a large black rifle. He rapidly 

approached Raeder’s vehicle. He walked to the driver’s side of the car 

and stopped approximately ten feet away. Without saying anything, 

Taylor first started firing into the passenger compartment where 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 3 of 13

Copeland was sitting. He then fired into the driver’s seat. The vehicle 

became “riddled with bullets” and both of the driver’s side windows 

were shot out. (Tr. p. 490). Jackson jumped out of the car and rolled 

underneath, Copeland laid flat on the backseat, and Raeder curled up 

into a ball with his hands up, then opened the door of the car and tried 

to crawl to the trunk. As Taylor walked around the car firing the rifle, 

he lowered his aim from the window level down into the body of the 

car. Following the shooting, police officers and ambulances arrived at 

Copeland’s house. Jackson was not injured, Copeland was shot in the 

back, and Raeder received a shrapnel wound to the head and a bullet 

penetrated his right arm above the elbow.

After the shooting, Taylor went to his sister’s apartment where he 

spoke with Sarah Lemon (Lemon). He told Lemon that he thought he 

had killed Jackson. Police officers also found a note, written by 

Taylor, which read, “I’m Killin’ niggas put em’ in the dirt . . . The 

choppa is under the cou[c]h . . . Domo.” (State’s Exh. 21). The police 

searched Taylor’s sister’s home and found a black rifle under her 

couch in the living room. Ten shell casings and bullet fragments 

recovered from the scene were later determined to have been fired 

from the rifle recovered by the police.

Taylor v. State, No. 20A03-1208-CR-365, slip op. at 2-4 (Ind. Ct. App. April 3, 

2013).

[3] On October 31, 2011, the State charged Taylor with three counts of attempted 

murder. Id. at 4. A jury found Taylor guilty as charged. Id. On August 9, 

2012, the court sentenced Taylor to thirty-five years on Count I, forty years on 

Count II, to be served consecutive to Count I, and forty years on Count III, to 

be served concurrent with Count II. Id. Taylor appealed and argued that the 

State failed to present sufficient evidence. Id. at 4-6. Specifically, Taylor 

argued that because the injuries were not severe, Taylor did not have the 

requisite intent to kill and merely committed a reckless act by firing a rifle at 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 4 of 13

close range to people. Id. at 5. In addressing Taylor’s argument that the 

evidence was insufficient on direct appeal, this court stated:

We find that the fact that the victims’ injuries were not more severe 

merely proves that Taylor is a bad marksman; his actions and words 

clearly belie his intent to kill the three occupants of the vehicle. When 

he approached Raeder’s car, he walked up to the driver’s side and 

started firing indiscriminately. He methodically walked around the 

car, moving his aim from window level down to the body of the car. 

When he stopped firing, the vehicle was riddled with bullets and both 

of the driver’s side windows were shot out. The rifle was so powerful 

that a bullet penetrated the outside wall of Copeland’s residence, 172 

feet away, and was located in an inner hallway of the house. Prior to 

the shooting, Taylor had told Sipili that he would kill her “and them 

niggas.” (Transcript p. 340). Later, after the shooting, Taylor told 

Lemon that he thought he had killed Jackson. And in a note, Taylor 

stated, “I’m Killin’ niggas[.]” (State's Exh. 21).

Id. at 5-6. This court affirmed. Id. at 6.

[4] On August 5, 2013, Taylor filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Taylor by 

counsel later filed an amended petition and alleged that his trial counsel was 

ineffective. 

[5] On June 12, 2014, the court held a hearing. On October 21, 2014, the court 

denied Taylor’s petition. The order states in part:

21. [Taylor] alleges that his trial counsel . . . was ineffective for failing 

to request an instruction on a lesser-included offense of aggravated 

battery for Counts I and II, and attempted aggravated battery for 

Count III. [Taylor] contends that aggravated battery is an inherently 

lesser-included offense to attempted murder.

22. In Noble v. State, 725 N.E.2d 842 (Ind. 2000), the Indiana Supreme 

Court, however, found that the crime of battery is not an inherently 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 5 of 13

included offense of attempted murder, but that under the specific facts 

presented in that case, battery was a factually included offense of 

attempted murder. Noble, 725 N.E.2d at 846-47. Compare to the 

holding in Meriweather v. State, 659 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995),[ 

trans. denied,] in which the Court found that the offense of attempted 

aggravated battery is an inherently lesser included offense of attempted 

murder. Meriweather, [659] N.E.2d at 142. Then, in Young v. State, 11 

N.E.3d 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), the Indiana Court of Appeals found 

that under the circumstances of that particular case, a conviction of 

attempted aggravated battery as a lesser included offense to murder 

was not appropriate. Young, 11 N.E.2d 3d [sic] at 967-68.[1] Clearly, 

this issue is not well settled by existing case law.

23. [Trial counsel] testified during the post conviction hearing that he 

did not believe aggravated battery was an inherently lesser-included 

offense to attempted murder. [Taylor’s] opinion that [his trial 

counsel’s] belief in this regard is incorrect is not fully supported by case 

law. Rather, as discussed hereinabove, the case law is confusing: 

aggravated battery may be inherently included or factually included, 

but in any event, in [sic] depends on the factual circumstances of each 

case. Further, in either event, aggravated battery is a crime requiring a 

knowing or intentional culpability, not recklessness. [Trial counsel] 

testified that his arguments at trial were that [Taylor] did not act with 

the specific intent to kill; but argued for reckless rather than intentional 

conduct. [Trial counsel] said that he believed the State’s evidence was 

pretty good and that his strategy was to diffuse the evidence of intent 

to kill, so he thought his “reckless” argument was the way to go. 

[Trial counsel] also said that he thought battery made no sense because 

the facts were so egregious, and that if he had to do it again, he would 

approach the defense the same way.

24. The court concludes that [trial counsel] sufficiently articulated a 

strategy by indicating that he made a professional decision about what 

approach to use in defending [Taylor], and based on a review of the 

relevant case law, it cannot be said that [trial counsel’s] performance 

was deficient for not seeking a lesser included offense instruction.

 

1 The Indiana Supreme Court later vacated the opinion of Young v. State, 11 N.E.3d 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 6 of 13

25. The next issue for the court is whether there is a reasonable 

probability that the jury would have reached a different decision and 

not convicted [Taylor] for attempted murder, but would have 

convicted him of the lesser offense of aggravated battery if such an 

instruction would have been given. [Taylor] argues that, by not asking 

for a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, [trial counsel] did 

not provide the jury with a realistic verdict option. [Trial counsel] is a 

veteran attorney having practiced criminal defense in Indiana since 

1979. He has been the Chief Public Defender in Elkhart County since 

1985. In that time he has defended approximately twenty (20) 

individuals charged with Murder, and won acquittals in at least two (2) 

of . . . those cases.

26. [Taylor] contends that there is a reasonable probability that the 

jury would have convicted on aggravated battery, if given that option, 

because the evidence at trial was that [Taylor] was angry before the 

crime but did not continue to shoot the victims when he had the 

opportunity to do so. In considering [Taylor’s] sufficiency of the 

evidence argument on direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals 

affirmed [Taylor’s] convictions and characterized the State’s evidence 

as follows:

“[Taylor] walked up to the driver’s side and started firing 

indiscriminately. He methodically walked around the car, moving his 

aim from window level down to the body of the car. When he stopped 

firing, the vehicle was riddled with bullets and both of the driver’s side 

windows were shot out. The rifle was so powerful that a bullet 

penetrated the outside wall of Copeland’s residence, 172 feet away, 

and was located in an inner hallway of the house. Prior to the 

shooting, Taylor had told Sipili that he would kill her ‘and them 

niggas.’ Later, after the shooting, Taylor told Lemon that he thought 

he had killed Jackson. And in a note, Taylor stated, ‘I’m Killin 

niggas[.]” Taylor v. State, 985 N.E.2d 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), 

unpublished and cited for the limited purpose of establishing the law of the case.

27. Considering the overwhelming and powerful evidence in this case, 

the court does not find that there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would have been different had the jury been presented with 

an instructions [sic] on aggravated battery. [Taylor] shot at the victims 

at point blank range with a semi-automatic rifle. The jury found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [Taylor] acted with a specific intent to 

kill. The evidence was found to be sufficient to sustain the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 7 of 13

convictions. [Taylor] has failed to prove prejudice or that he received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Appellant’s Appendix at 76-79.

Discussion

[6] Before discussing Taylor’s allegations of error, we note the general standard 

under which we review a post-conviction court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief. The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the 

burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). 

When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands 

in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d 

at 679. On review, we will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a 

whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached 

by the post-conviction court. Id. Further, the post-conviction court in this case 

entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in accordance with Indiana 

Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). “A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment 

will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. In this review, 

we accept findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we accord no deference 

to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 8 of 13

[7] Taylor argues that his trial counsel should have tendered instructions on 

aggravated battery and attempted aggravated battery as class B felonies as lesser 

included offenses of attempted murder. He asserts that the post-conviction 

court erred by concluding that trial counsel’s strategy was informed because 

counsel did not consider and reject the notion of tendering lesser included 

options. Taylor posits that the case law was not unclear when he was tried, and

that there was a serious evidentiary dispute regarding his intent to kill so the 

court would have granted a request for the lesser included offense instructions 

under Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). 

[8] The State argues that case law is not clear regarding whether aggravated battery 

or attempted aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of attempted 

murder, and that a trial court may have properly denied such instructions based 

on Indiana Supreme Court precedent. It also contends that trial counsel’s 

strategy was reasonable and if successful would have resulted in a full acquittal. 

Based upon the evidence, the State contends there was no reasonable possibility 

that the jury would have convicted Taylor of a lesser included offense and 

acquitted him of attempted murder. 

[9] Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 

must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that 

the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. French v. State, 778 

N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 

S. Ct. 2052 (1984), reh’g denied). A counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls 

below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 9 of 13

norms. Id. To meet the appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 

Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001). Failure to satisfy either prong 

will cause the claim to fail. French, 778 N.E.2d at 824. Most ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id. 

[10] When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a “strong 

presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 

Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2001). “[C]ounsel’s performance 

is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing 

evidence to overcome this presumption.” Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73 

(Ind. 2002). Evidence of isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will 

not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clark v. State, 668 

N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S. 

Ct. 1438 (1997). “Reasonable strategy is not subject to judicial second 

guesses.” Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. 1986). We “will not lightly 

speculate as to what may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy 

as counsel should be given deference in choosing a trial strategy which, at the 

time and under the circumstances, seems best.” Whitener v. State, 696 N.E.2d 

40, 42 (Ind. 1998).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 10 of 13

[11] At the post-conviction hearing, while Taylor’s trial counsel testified that he did 

not consider tendering instructions on aggravated battery or attempted 

aggravated battery, he testified that his strategy was to demonstrate that Taylor 

“basically committed an act that was reckless and not an act of attempted 

murder” and that he was trying to negate specific intent. Post-Conviction 

Transcript at 7. He stated:

I – I felt that when one goes to trial you have to make a . . . realistic 

argument. You have to present something because that’s the client’s –

it’s his right to have that done. And the only thing I could attach my 

brain to was this was an act of anger, but there was no desire to 

murder these people.

Id. at 19. Trial counsel indicated that he used the word “reckless” throughout 

the trial beginning with voir dire and that he attempted to argue that Taylor was

acting only recklessly. Id. at 23. He stated that the statute governing 

aggravated battery required a knowing or intentional infliction of injury and 

that a mere reckless infliction of injury would not be sufficient to convict for 

aggravated battery. Trial counsel also indicated that if he argued Taylor acted 

recklessly and then requested a battery instruction, “[i]t would cancel any 

recklessness that might have been able to be portrayed,” that he “was not 

confident in the defense,” and that the “jury would have been very unimpressed 

with that switch.” Id. at 26. Trial counsel indicated that it was logical to 

conclude that the jury must have thought that Taylor intended to kill but was a 

bad shot. When asked if it was possible that he did not consider battery because 

battery has the requirement of acting knowingly or intentionally, trial counsel 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 11 of 13

answered: “I thought the facts were so egregious that the concept of battery was 

ridiculous and that’s more on hindsight than it is at the time, but I can say that 

today that it just made no sense.” Id. at 32. Trial counsel also testified:

And quite frankly, if I had to try this case again, I’d probably do it the 

same way. Because there was no way, in my opinion, that you can be 

10 feet from someone with an SKS and but for the good steel made by 

the Ford Corporation and Lincoln Town Car it could have gone a 

different way. There was a round in the headrest. There was 

testimony that the back wound sustained by one of the individuals was 

because he was down in a, I believe, cowering position was the term 

that was used. I’m saying if you don’t kill somebody at that range 

with an SKS with that number of rounds fired you’re either lucky or a 

bad shot or something intervened. I don’t know how to put it any 

other way. 

Id. at 29. During cross-examination, trial counsel was asked if he would try the 

case differently and answered:

That’s a good question. I suppose this has to be – well, it is 

speculation. I guess the real answer would be I don’t know. But 

you’ve tried cases against me, and I don’t think you’ve ever seen 

philosophy, pie in the sky, nonsense come out of me. Maybe today, 

but what I’m saying to you is I try cases realistically, and that’s what I 

tried to do with this case here. 

Id. at 36. We cannot say that the overall strategy of defense counsel renders his 

performance deficient.

[12] However, even assuming that the performance of Taylor’s trial counsel was 

deficient, Taylor has failed to show that he was prejudiced. The Indiana 

Supreme Court has held:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 12 of 13

When a defendant requests an instruction covering a lesser-included 

offense, a trial court applies the three-part analysis set forth in Wright v. 

State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995). The first two parts require 

the trial court to determine whether the offense is either inherently or 

factually included in the charged offense. Id. If so, the trial court must 

determine whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding any 

element that distinguishes the two offenses. Id. at 567; see also Brown v. 

State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1019 (Ind. 1998). Wright held that “if, in view 

of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was 

committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court 

not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or 

factually included lesser offense.” Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567.

Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (Ind. 2002). See also Taylor v. State, 840 

N.E.2d 324, 337 n.4 (Ind. 2006) (addressing a petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance because trial counsel failed to tender a lesser included instruction and 

noting that petitioner might conceivably have been entitled to an instruction if 

he was able to satisfy the requirements of Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 

1995)).

[13] The record reveals that Sipili testified that Taylor said: “I swear to God after –

after work or something I’ll kill you and them niggas or something like that.” 

Trial Transcript at 340. Taylor later pulled up to a vehicle containing Raeder, 

Jackson, and Copeland, exited his car, and started shooting a SKS or large rifle 

seconds later. During direct examination, Jackson testified that Taylor was 

“[n]ot even like 10 feet” away when he started shooting. Id. at 302. The 

vehicle became “riddled with bullets.” Id. at 490. Based upon the record, we 

conclude that there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding whether 

Taylor intended to kill the victims. The evidence was overwhelming and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1411-PC-396 | July 15, 2015 Page 13 of 13

evinced an intent to kill. We cannot say that Taylor demonstrated prejudice 

from the alleged error.

Conclusion

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of 

Taylor’s petition.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.