13-3247-cv 

Annis v. State of Vt. Prosecutors 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 28th day of May, two thousand fourteen. 

 

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, 

REENA RAGGI, 

 DENNY CHIN, 

Circuit Judges. 

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WILLIS BOYD ANNIS, III, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 13-3247-cv 

 

STATE OF VERMONT PROSECUTORS, FEDERAL 

PROSECUTORS STATE OF VERMONT, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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FOR APPELLANT: Willis Boyd Annis, III, pro se, Burlington, Vermont. 

FOR APPELLEES: No Appearance. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Vermont (Christina Reiss, Chief Judge). 

 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment entered on June 27, 2013, is AFFIRMED. 

 Plaintiff Willis Boyd Annis, III, proceeding pro se, appeals from the sua sponte 

dismissal of his amended complaint and denial of further leave to amend. We assume 

familiarity with the facts and underlying proceedings, which we reference only as 

necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

 We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. See 

Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2001). Upon such review, we conclude, 

substantially for the reasons stated by the district court, that Annis’s complaint about 

defendants’ failure to prosecute persons tracking his thoughts through a mind-reading 

device “lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

325 (1989). It was therefore properly dismissed sua sponte under Neitzke v. Williams. 

Even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), Annis’s allegations cannot support a plausible claim for relief in light of 

established precedent, see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (approving 

dismissal of complaint based on “irrational or wholly incredible” allegations); accord

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining 

that dismissal is proper where complaint’s factual allegations are the “product of delusion 

or fantasy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, “a private citizen lacks a 

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda 
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R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Moreover, because there is no reason to 

think that a valid claim might be stated, the district court’s denial of further leave to 

amend was appropriate. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). 

 We have considered Annis’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court