UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6513

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY ANDERSON,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:07-hc-02189-BR)

Submitted: February 19, 2010 Decided: March 12, 2010

Before GREGORY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Jane E. Pearce, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, David T. Huband, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey Anderson, a federal inmate, appeals the 

district court’s order revoking his conditional release and 

remanding him to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 4246(f) (2006). He contends that the revocation 

decision was based on hearsay evidence and that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the revocation of his conditional 

release. Because Anderson failed to raise either of these 

claims in the district court, we review the district court’s 

revocation decision for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 

Finding no error, we affirm.

Anderson was committed to the custody and care of the 

Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2006) for 

treatment in the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North 

Carolina (“FMC Butner”), after the district court found by clear 

and convincing evidence that Anderson was “presently suffering 

from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release 

would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 

person or serious damage to the property of another.” See 18 

U.S.C. § 4246(a) (2006). Based on the Warden of FMC Butner’s 

certification that Anderson had recovered to such an extent that 

his conditional release under a regimen of care and treatment 

would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
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another person or serious damage to the property of another, 

the district court ordered Anderson’s release on a conditional 

release plan. 

Several months after Anderson’s conditional release, 

the United States Probation Office notified the district court 

that Anderson had failed to comply with the terms of his 

conditional release. The Government moved to revoke Anderson’s 

conditional release. At the revocation hearing, the Government 

introduced into evidence without objection a letter from 

Anderson’s probation officer detailing numerous violations of 

his conditional release. Seven arrest records referred to in 

the letter were also admitted without objection. Finding 

Anderson violated the terms and conditions of his conditional 

release and that his continued release would create a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 

damage to the property of another, the district court revoked 

Anderson’s conditional release and remanded him to the custody 

of the Attorney General. Anderson timely appealed, contending 

the district court erred in relying upon hearsay and double 

hearsay evidence contained in the probation officer’s report. 

Anderson further asserted the district court failed to determine 

whether Anderson’s continued release would pose a risk to 

society. 
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We may correct error that is both plain and 

prejudicial if such error “substantially affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 

507 U.S. at 732. We find the hearsay evidence contained in the 

probation officer’s letter bore several substantial indicia of 

reliability. See United States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 

(4th Cir. 1982) (allowing admission of demonstrably reliable 

hearsay evidence in revocation proceeding). The probation 

officer’s letter exhibited reliability as an official document 

prepared and presented in furtherance of her statutory and 

court-ordered duties as an officer of the court to supervise 

Anderson’s conditional release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603(8)(A), (B) 

(2006). Furthermore, the letter was reasonably factually 

detailed and was internally and externally corroborated by 

Anderson’s own statements, statements by the director of 

Anderson’s residential facility, arrest and conviction reports, 

and at least one lab report. Consequently, we find no plain 

error in the admission of the probation officer’s letter. 

We further find no plain error in the district court’s 

determination that Anderson’s continued release would pose a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious damage 

to the property of another. The evidence showed that Anderson 

verbally threatened the staff and residents at his residential 

facility, was arrested twice and convicted once for disturbing 
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the peace, was arrested for public intoxication, profane 

swearing, open container, and littering, missed appointments 

with his medical provider, failed to comply with his medication 

regimen, consumed alcohol and drugs, and was allegedly stabbed 

and exhibited suicidal ideations for which he was hospitalized. 

According to the probation officer, Anderson exhibited 

escalating non-compliant behavior and adjusted poorly to 

supervision. Furthermore, the probation officer opined 

Anderson’s conditional release potentially placed “the community 

in a greater risk of harm.” 

Finding no plain error in the district court's 

decision to revoke Anderson’s conditional release and remand him 

to the custody of the Attorney General for care and treatment, 

we affirm the district court’s revocation order. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED