DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

IN RE: FINAL REPORT OF THE 20TH STATEWIDE GRAND JURY

Nos. 4D21-3640, 4D21-3641, 4D21-3642, 4D21-3643, 4D21-3644, 

4D21-3645, 4D21-3646, and 4D21-3647

[June 15, 2022]

Appeals and cross-appeal of final orders from Jack Tuter, Presiding 

Judge, 20th Statewide Grand Jury, and Martin S. Fein, Alternate Presiding 

Judge, 20th Statewide Grand Jury; Case No. SC19-240.

Michael Hursey of Michael Hursey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants

in Nos. 4D21-3640 and 4D21-3643.

James S. Benjamin, Daniel R. Aaronson, and Peter T. Patanzo of 

Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant in No. 4D21-3641.

Robert C. Buschel of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for

appellant in No. 4D21-3642.

Joseph W. Jacquot, George S. LeMieux, and Jonathan K. Osborne of 

Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant in No. 4D21-

3644.

Cary O. Aronowitz and Jeff Schacknow of Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, 

for appellee/cross-appellant in No. 4D21-3645.

Michael B. Cohen of Michael B. Cohen, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant in No. 4D21-3646.

J. David Bogenschutz and Patrick D. Wilson of Law Offices of J. David 

Bogenschutz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant in No. 4D21-3647.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Nicholas B. Cox, 

Statewide Prosecutor and Statewide Grand Jury Legal Adviser, Tampa, 

and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General and Special 

Designated Assistant Statewide Prosecutor and Assistant Statewide Grand 

Jury Legal Adviser, West Palm Beach, for appellee in Nos. 4D21-3640, 
2

4D21-3642, and 4D21-3643, and appellant/cross-appellee in No. 4D21-

3645

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Nicholas B. Cox, 

Statewide Prosecutor and Statewide Grand Jury Legal Adviser, Tampa, 

and Melynda L. Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Special 

Designated Assistant Statewide Prosecutor and Assistant Statewide Grand 

Jury Legal Adviser, West Palm Beach, for appellee in Nos. 4D21-3641, 

4D21-3644, 4D21-3646, and 4D21-3647.

ARTAU, J.

The petitioners in the underlying proceedings challenge the jurisdiction 

of the Twentieth Statewide Grand Jury impaneled by the Florida Supreme 

Court upon the request of Governor DeSantis to investigate school safety 

and other issues of statewide significance in the wake of the mass shooting 

at the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.1

The petitioners seek to repress or expunge all or part of the statewide 

grand jury’s report from public view pursuant to section 905.28, Florida 

Statutes (2018).2 We conclude that the grand jury had jurisdiction to 

investigate these issues of statewide significance and affirm the trial 

court’s denial of the petitions to repress the grand jury’s report, except as 

to two paragraphs which contain allegations of criminal conduct exceeding

the scope of the statewide grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Background

The Florida Supreme Court granted the Governor’s petition to impanel 

a statewide grand jury to investigate “whether school officials committed—

and continue to commit—fraud and deceit by mismanaging, failing to use, 

and diverting funds from multi-million dollar bonds specifically solicited 

for school safety initiatives” and “whether school officials violated—and 

continue to violate—state law by systematically underreporting incidents 

of criminal activity to the Department of Education.”

1 We consolidate the eight appeals and one cross-appeal for the sole purpose of 

issuing one opinion determining all the cases.

2 We will refer to the parties who brought the underlying petitions to repress or 

expunge all or part of the statewide grand jury’s report pursuant to section 

905.28, Florida Statutes (2018), as “petitioners” in this opinion. 
3

The supreme court authorized the statewide grand jury to “investigate 

crime, return indictments, make presentments,3 and otherwise perform all 

functions of [a] grand jury” related to the issues identified in the Governor’s 

petition (emphasis added).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first address whether the statewide grand jury’s report or 

presentment exceeds the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction.

A statewide grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited by statute 

to certain enumerated offenses, to the extent the offense at issue “is 

occurring, or has occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a 

related transaction” or “is connected with an organized criminal 

conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits.” § 905.34, Fla. Stat. 

(2018). A statewide grand jury lacks the authority to return an indictment 

for an offense beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. McNamara v. State, 357 

So. 2d 410, 413–14 (Fla. 1978).

Some of the petitioners argue that the report should be repressed or 

expunged because they claim it discusses issues not directly related to any 

specific offense within the scope of the grand jury’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. Other petitioners argue that the report should be repressed 

or expunged because they claim it discusses issues exceeding the purpose 

for which the statewide grand jury was convened. We disagree with these 

arguments.

“A widely misunderstood function of the grand jury—to render reports 

or presentments—has often functioned to ferret out and make known 

governmental inefficiency, neglect, and other misconduct short of crime.” 

Richard H. Kuh, The Grand Jury “Presentment”: Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 

55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1955). In addition to its indictment 

function, grand juries have had a reporting function since well before the

founding of our republic. Id. at 1106. The grand jury practice of issuing 

reports exposing governmental misconduct, which were historically 

referred to as presentments, was prevalent in the American colonies and 

continued after the ratification of the United States Constitution. Id. at 

1103, 1109–15 (“Nothing in these seventeenth and eighteenth century 

cases, however, affords any precedent barring a jury from taking the 

affirmative action of reporting on the derelictions of government officials.”).

3 We will refer to the statewide grand jury’s report interchangeably as either a 

report or presentment in this opinion.
4

Several jurisdictions, including Florida, continue to authorize grand 

juries to issue presentments or reports. Id. at 1114–15; see also In re Rep. 

of Grand Jury, 11 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. 1943) (“In Florida, the grand jury 

system was derived from the common law, but has been enlarged by 

statute.” (citation omitted)).

Our Legislature codified the practice of issuing grand jury reports or 

presentments when it enacted the Statewide Grand Jury Act. See § 

905.34, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“The statewide grand jury may return

indictments and presentments irrespective of the county or judicial circuit 

where the offense is committed or triable.” (emphasis added)). 

Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court expressly authorized the 

statewide grand jury to “make presentments” in the underlying 

proceedings when the court granted the Governor’s petition to impanel the 

grand jury to investigate school safety and other issues of statewide 

significance.

“Implicit in the power of the grand jury to investigate and expose official 

misconduct is the right of the people to be informed of its findings.” Miami 

Herald Publ’g Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 523 (Fla. 1977). Thus, the 

statewide grand jury’s authority was not limited to returning indictments 

for specific offenses within its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 522 

(“Florida grand juries are not confined to an indictment function”). 

Instead, “[o]ur grand juries have been given the right to express the view 

of the citizenry with respect to public bodies and officials in terms of a 

‘presentment’, describing misconduct, errors, and incidences in which 

public funds are improperly employed.” Id.

In affirming the denial of a petition to expunge a grand jury report, the

supreme court in Owens v. State held that a grand jury is vested with 

broad power “to investigate and make a fair report of its findings.” 59 So. 

2d 254, 256 (Fla. 1952). Owens reasoned that given its broad power, the 

grand jury did not exceed its jurisdiction in making a report containing 

findings of fact that public officials were “incompetent or lax in 

performance of the duty imposed on them” despite finding “no criminal 

violation.” Id. at 256–57.

Accordingly, the statewide grand jury had the authority to investigate 

the conduct of public officials and to make proper findings and 

recommendations in a report or presentment. Moreover, the statewide 

grand jury was also empowered to recommend that the officials or 

employees under investigation “are not fit to continue as [public] officials,”

or “that administrative proceedings should be conducted to curtail their 

tenure.” Miami Herald, 352 So. 2d at 522–23 (“[A] grand jury may legally 
5

recommend the removal of public officials.”); see also In re Rep. of Grand 

Jury, 11 So. 2d at 319 (“[I]f the grand jury makes an investigation on its 

own initiative and reaches the conclusion that the circumstances warrant 

suspension rather than indictment or it may be both, it would be derelict 

in its duty if it did not bring the matter of suspension to the attention of the 

Governor.” (emphasis added)); Appeal of Untreiner, 391 So. 2d 272, 274–

75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (a grand jury may legally recommend the removal 

of a public official to avoid the recurrence of misconduct).

The mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shook 

our state to its core. As recognized by our Governor in his petition to the 

supreme court, investigating systematic misconduct, mismanagement, 

and misuse of public funds earmarked for school safety initiatives is of 

paramount statewide importance in preventing another similar tragedy 

and keeping school children safe. As our supreme court explained:

The Governor is the executive officer of the State and is required to 

enforce the law. He is authorized to suspend certain state and 

county officers for ‘malfeasance or misfeasance of neglect of duty in 

office, for the commission of any felony, or for drunkenness or 

incompetency’. He may or may not accord them a hearing before 

suspension. If he elects to employ a grand jury investigation to aid 

him in his judgment, he certainly has a right to do so. In fact[,] we 

know of no better source for aid that he could resort to.

In re Rep. of Grand Jury, 11 So. 2d at 319 (emphasis added).

Thus, we conclude that the statewide grand jury did not exceed its 

subject matter jurisdiction in conducting its investigation and issuing a

report of its findings, including its recommendation that the Governor 

should “remove” or suspend certain school board members.

However, we conclude that two paragraphs of the statewide grand jury’s 

report—the first and only full paragraph on page 73, and the second 

paragraph on page 114—must be repressed because they contain 

allegations of criminal conduct exceeding the scope of the statewide grand 

jury’s subject matter jurisdiction.

While the statewide grand jury can refer alleged criminal conduct not 

enumerated within its jurisdiction to the appropriate grand jury or state 

attorney for the county having jurisdiction over the alleged offenses, the 

statewide grand jury lacks jurisdiction to return an indictment or 

otherwise include the alleged criminal conduct that is the subject of a 

potential referral in its report. See McNamara, 357 So. 2d at 413–14
6

(Barkdull, J., specially concurring) (“If a statewide [g]rand [j]ury finds

evidence of a local crime [for which it lacks the authority to return an 

indictment] it should forward its evidence to the appropriate [g]rand [j]ury

for the county[.]” (quoting State v. Ostergard, 343 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1977)).

We therefore reverse the rulings on this issue in case numbers 4D21-

3643 and 4D21-3644, and instruct the presiding judge on remand to order 

that the first and only full paragraph on page 73, and the second 

paragraph on page 114, be repressed from the statewide grand jury’s 

report before it is released to the public, without prejudice to the authority 

of the statewide grand jury to include those paragraphs in a referral to the 

county grand jury or state attorney having jurisdiction over the alleged 

offenses.

Challenges to Public Disclosure of Grand Jury Report

We next address whether portions of the statewide grand jury’s report 

or presentment must be repressed or expunged as unlawful and improper 

under section 905.28, Florida Statutes (2018).

Section 905.28 provides that a grand jury report “relating to an 

individual” that is not accompanied by an indictment may be repressed or 

expunged, in whole or in part, to the extent it is “improper and unlawful.” 

§ 905.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). “The question of whether 

statements in a presentment must be expunged, because they are 

unlawful or improper, is a question of law, not fact,” and is subject to de 

novo review. State v. Womack, 127 So. 3d 839, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 

(quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation of Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. 

Servs., 659 So. 2d 347, 349–50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)).

“Unlawful” Challenge to Public Disclosure

Our supreme court has interpreted the “unlawful” prong of section 

905.28 to mean “outside the lawful ambit of grand jury authority” or 

beyond the “legitimacy of the grand jury proceeding.” Miami Herald, 352 

So. 2d at 520–21, 523 (concluding that there was nothing unlawful about 

the grand jury report at issue given “the broad sweep of powers conferred 

on grand juries to investigate either specific instances of criminality or 

general activities of public institutions and personnel”); see also Moore v. 

1986 Grand Jury Rep. on Pub. Hous., 532 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 

1988) (explaining that comments in a grand jury report are “lawful” under 

section 905.28 if “they are made by an otherwise legally constituted grand 

jury on a matter which the grand jury is legally empowered to investigate”).
7

As we have already concluded, the grand jury acted within the ambit of 

the broad authority granted by our supreme court to investigate these 

issues of statewide significance and “make presentments” as expressly 

contemplated by section 905.34.

Some of the petitioners urge us to adopt a substantive interpretation of 

the “unlawful” prong which would prevent a statewide grand jury from 

including any reference to witness testimony as “unlawful” given the 

secrecy of grand jury investigations. We are required to follow our supreme 

court’s interpretation of the “unlawful” prong in section 905.28. See 

Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1973) (district courts of appeal 

are “bound to follow the case law set forth by th[e] [supreme] [c]ourt”). The 

supreme court has limited any consideration of the “unlawful” prong to 

matters which exceed a grand jury’s jurisdictional authority. Miami 

Herald, 352 So. 2d at 520–21, 523. Accordingly, the petitioners have not 

established that the presiding judge was required to repress any reference 

to witness testimony in the report or presentment pursuant to the 

“unlawful” prong of section 905.28.

“Improper” Challenge to Public Disclosure

Next, we must determine if the petitioners have satisfied the “improper” 

prong of section 905.28. As explained by the supreme court, “the focus of 

judicial inquiry on a motion to repress under this statute does not turn on 

some amorphous notion of ‘fairness.’” Miami Herald, 352 So. 2d at 521–

22 (“The notion of unfairness is highly subjective, however, and we fail to 

discern any legislative directive to add that dimension to the more objective 

standards specifically set out in the statute.”). Instead, our supreme court 

has interpreted this prong as limited “to the germaneness and factual 

foundation of the particular recommendations contained in a report.” Id.

Our review is “limited to the content of the four corners of the 

presentment.” Womack, 127 So. 3d at 841 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health & 

Rehab. Servs., 659 So. 2d at 349). It is not the role of the presiding judge 

or the appellate court “to review the evidence presented to the grand jury 

for the purpose of determining whether the grand jury’s findings of fact as 

contained in its report are supported by substantial, competent evidence.” 

Moore, 532 So. 2d at 1105. Instead, the presiding judge reviews the four 

corners of the presentment to determine “if the grand jury’s comments 

have a factual foundation in the presentment itself. In other words, the 

grand jury’s factual findings are not themselves subject to [our review and] 

reversal.” Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 659 So. 2d at 349 (citing

Moore, 532 So. 2d at 1105). Moreover, “if any fact supports a comment 
8

relevant to a lawful investigation, it should not be expunged or repressed.” 

Womack, 127 So. 3d at 843.

In reviewing the four corners of the statewide grand jury’s report, we 

conclude that the presiding judge correctly determined that the 

recommendations in the report are germane to the purpose for which the 

grand jury was convened and are based on a factual foundation. 

Accordingly, the petitioners have not established that the presiding judge 

was required to repress the grand jury report pursuant to the “improper” 

prong of section 905.28. See Womack, 127 So. 3d at 843–44 (reversing an 

order expunging portions of a grand jury presentment because “each 

comment in the presentment with a factual foundation [within its four 

corners] that is germane to th[e] scope of inquiry is necessarily proper”).

Other Challenges to Public Disclosure

Despite being unable to establish grounds under either of the two sole 

statutory prongs contained in section 905.28 for repression or 

expungement of a grand jury report, some of the petitioners argue for what 

would appear to be the adoption of a third prong entitling them to 

repression or expungement if any portion of the statewide grand jury’s 

report includes the testimony of witnesses from the statewide grand jury 

proceedings in its factual foundation. However, “[w]e are not at liberty to 

add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature.” E.g.,

Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) (citing In re Order on Prosecution 

of Crim. Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1137 (Fla. 1990)). Thus, claims for 

repression or expungement of a statewide grand jury report pursuant to 

section 905.28 cannot be based on grounds exceeding the two statutory 

prongs provided by the Legislature in the statute itself.

Nonetheless, petitioners cite to Barber v. Interim Report of the Grand 

Jury Spring Term 1995, 689 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), in support 

of their argument that the statewide grand jury, or its foreperson, lack 

authority to include witness testimony in the report or presentment. 

Barber concluded that “a grand juror shall not disclose a witness’ grand 

jury testimony, unless one of the specific statutory exceptions applies.” Id.

at 1185. (emphasis added). However, Barber was a county grand jury case

which interpreted section 905.27, Florida Statutes, governing disclosure 

of county grand jury proceedings. See id. at 1183–85; see also § 905.27, 

Fla. Stat. (2018).

Statewide grand jury proceedings are governed by the Statewide Grand 

Jury Act. See §§ 905.31–905.40, Fla. Stat. (2018). Although the Statewide 

Grand Jury Act generally incorporates the laws applicable to county grand 
9

juries, the Act expressly excepts any such laws that “are inconsistent with 

the provisions of [the Act].” See § 905.34, Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis 

added).

In enacting the Statewide Grand Jury Act, the Legislature adopted a 

separate statute governing disclosure of statewide grand jury proceedings, 

rather than simply incorporating the statute governing disclosure of 

county grand jury proceedings. See § 905.395, Fla. Stat. (2018) (governing 

disclosure of statewide grand jury proceedings).

Unlike the statute governing disclosure of county grand jury 

proceedings (section 905.27), the statute governing disclosure of statewide 

grand jury proceedings (section 905.395), does not contain any provision 

proscribing a statewide grand juror from disclosing the testimony of a 

witness in a report or presentment. While section 905.395 makes it a 

crime for any “person” to divulge any of the grand jury “proceedings,” it 

omits section 905.27’s proscription against a “grand juror” disclosing “the 

testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury,” as well as its

exceptions permitting disclosure of witness testimony. Compare § 

905.395, Fla. Stat. (2018) (governing disclosure of statewide grand jury 

proceedings), with § 905.27(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (governing disclosure 

of county grand jury proceedings).

Thus, the county grand jury statute and the statewide grand jury 

statute are inconsistent regarding the permissible disclosure of grand jury 

proceedings in a report or presentment. Accordingly, we hold that the 

county grand jury statute—section 905.27—is not applicable in statewide 

grand jury proceedings. See § 905.34, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“The powers and 

duties of, and law applicable to, county grand juries shall apply to a 

statewide grand jury except when such powers, duties, and law are 

inconsistent with the provisions of [sections] 905.31–905.40.” (emphasis 

added)).

In interpreting a statute, we must presume that a legislative body “acts 

intentionally and purposefully” when it “includes particular language in 

one section of a statute but omits it in another section.” Beach v. Great 

W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 152 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Russello v. United 

States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). “When the Legislature has used a term, 

as it has here, in one section of the statute, we will not imply it where it 

has been excluded.” Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 

2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (citations omitted).

By enacting a contrary provision in the Statewide Grand Jury Act 

omitting any proscription against disclosure of witness testimony by a 
10

statewide grand juror or jury, we must presume that the Legislature 

purposefully excluded them from any such proscription in a report or 

presentment.

If the statutory language we are interpreting is clear, the statute must 

be given its plain meaning, and we will not “look behind the statute’s plain 

language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction 

to ascertain intent.” City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008) 

(quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005)).

Even if we were to resort to the rules of statutory construction, those 

rules would support our interpretation of section 905.395 as not 

proscribing a statewide grand jury from including the testimony of 

witnesses in its report. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 

LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93, 107, 174 (2012) (discussing 

the omitted-case canon, in which a matter that is not covered in a statute 

is deemed to have been intentionally omitted; the negative-implication 

canon, in which the listing of some things implies the deliberate exclusion 

of others; and the surplusage canon, in which every word is given effect 

and none is deemed meaningless).

Moreover, while the statute governing disclosure of county grand jury 

proceedings—section 905.27—was enacted with exceptions permitting the 

disclosure of witness testimony under certain circumstances, the statute 

governing disclosure of statewide grand jury proceedings—section 

905.395—contains no exceptions and makes no mention of witness 

testimony in its prohibition against a “person” divulging “any of the 

proceedings” to “any other person.” Compare § 905.395, Fla. Stat. (2018), 

with § 905.27, Fla. Stat. (2018).

Hence, a reasonable textual interpretation of section 905.395 does not 

include a foreperson acting in his or her official capacity on behalf of a 

statewide grand jury, or the statewide grand jury itself, in the statute’s 

prohibition applicable to a “person” who has no permission or authority to 

divulge “any of the proceedings” to “any other person.” See § 905.395, Fla. 

Stat. (2018) (proscribing “any person” from divulging “any of the 

proceedings or identity of persons referred to or being investigated by the 

statewide grand jury”). Otherwise, a statewide grand jury would never be 

able to issue an indictment, referral, or presentment because it would be 

unable to disclose anything about the proceedings to anyone despite the 

express statutory authorization for the statewide grand jury to “return 

indictments and presentments.” See § 905.34, Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis 

added).
11

If the Legislature had intended to include a foreperson acting in his or 

her official capacity on behalf of a statewide grand jury, or the statewide 

grand jury itself, in its use of the singular term—“person”—it would have 

provided the necessary exceptions so that the statewide grand jury could 

complete its work by being permitted to divulge certain aspects of its 

“proceedings” and the “identity of persons referred to or being investigated” 

in an indictment, referral or presentment. See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.

2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that “the legislative use of different 

terms in different portions of the same statute is evidence that different 

meanings were intended”); see also Cason v. Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 944 

So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) (“[W]e have pointed to language in other 

statutes to show that the Legislature ‘knows how to’ accomplish what it 

has omitted in the statute in question.” (quoting Rollins, 761 So. 2d at 

298)).

Thus, we hold that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “person”

in section 905.395 consists of individuals who divulge “any of the 

proceedings or identity of persons referred to or being investigated by the 

statewide grand jury” without the permission or authority of the statewide

grand jury. It does not include a juror’s release of a report or presentment 

on behalf of a statewide grand jury in his or her official capacity as its 

foreperson. Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in section 905.395 

prohibited the Twentieth Statewide Grand Jury from including witness 

testimony in the report it intends to publicly release.

Conclusion

As our supreme court has explained, the grand jury as a legal

institution “has proven a most effective and reliable mechanism” for 

“citizen review of public action.” Miami Herald, 352 So. 2d at 523. “The 

benefits to be derived from this extraordinary exercise in citizen 

participation would be severely limited if the fruits of that activity were not 

available to the public on whose behalf it is undertaken.” Id. We agree.

Therefore, we conclude that the Twentieth Statewide Grand Jury had 

the authority to conduct its investigation, publicly report its findings, and 

make its recommendations. We affirm the presiding judge’s rulings on the 

various petitions to repress or expunge the grand jury’s report, except as 

to the two paragraphs containing allegations of criminal conduct exceeding

the scope of the statewide grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction—the 

first and only full paragraph on page 73, and the second paragraph on 

page 114. We reverse and instruct the presiding judge on remand to 

repress those two paragraphs from the statewide grand jury’s report before 

the report is released to the public, without prejudice to the authority of 
12

the statewide grand jury to include those paragraphs in a referral to the 

county grand jury or state attorney having jurisdiction over the alleged

offenses.

As to all other issues raised in these appeals, including the crossappeal, we affirm the presiding judge’s rulings without further comment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

DAMOORGIAN, J., concurs.

WARNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

WARNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority that the statewide grand jury’s final report 

does not exceed its subject matter jurisdiction or investigative authority. 

I also concur with the majority that the presiding judge’s rulings on the 

issues not addressed in this opinion should be affirmed. I dissent, 

however, from the majority’s conclusion that the references in the 

statewide grand jury’s final report to the testimony of specific witnesses, 

or the gist of such testimony, should not be expunged under section 

905.28, Florida Statutes (2018).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Investigative Authority

The subject matter jurisdiction of a statewide grand jury is limited to 

certain enumerated criminal offenses, to the extent any such offense “is 

occurring, or has occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a 

related transaction” or “is connected with an organized criminal 

conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits.” § 905.34, Fla. Stat. 

(2018). A statewide grand jury lacks the authority to return an indictment 

for an offense that does not meet these criteria. See McNamara v. State,

357 So. 2d 410, 413–14 (Fla. 1978) (citing State v. Ostergard, 343 So. 2d 

874, 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (Barkdull, J., specially concurring)).

In authorizing the impanelment of the Twentieth Statewide Grand Jury, 

the supreme court granted a petition from Governor DeSantis to examine 

certain school safety issues throughout the state, including whether 

school officials were following safety-related laws and regulations and were 

properly managing public funds designated for school safety initiatives. 

As to the statewide impact of these issues, the petition alleged: (1) 

“[p]etitioner has been informed that there is a need to examine the crimes 

and wrongs that precipitated the Marjory Stoneman Douglas school 

shooting and that even now result in unsafe schools across the state”; (2) 
13

“[t]here is also a need to examine the responses of public entities to laws 

designed to protect schools, such as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 

School Public Safety Act”; and (3) “[p]atterns of fraud and deceit by public 

entities shirking responsibility may exist and repeat throughout the state.” 

See generally § 905.33, Fla. Stat. (2018) (stating that a petition to impanel 

a statewide grand jury “shall state the general crimes or wrongs to be 

inquired into and shall state that said crimes or wrongs are of a 

multicircuit nature”).

The supreme court authorized the statewide grand jury to “investigate 

crime, return indictments, make presentments, and otherwise perform all 

functions of [a] grand jury.” It limited the scope of the statewide grand 

jury’s inquiry to “any offense listed in section 905.34” that (1) “relates to, 

but is not limited to,” the specific issues identified in the Governor’s 

petition and (2) “is occurring, or has occurred, in two or more judicial 

circuits as part of a related transaction or is connected with an organized 

criminal conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits, as required by 

section 905.34, Florida Statutes.” Despite these limitations, the statewide 

grand jury’s investigation and final report focused primarily on school 

safety and management issues within individual school districts. Some of 

the petitioners therefore argue that the statewide grand jury exceeded the 

scope of its jurisdiction.

The statewide grand jury’s authority to return indictments was clearly 

limited by its subject matter jurisdiction as defined in section 905.34. See 

McNamara, 357 So. 2d at 413–14. But it does not appear that its authority 

to investigate, make public reports, and “otherwise perform all functions 

of [a] grand jury” was similarly limited. “A grand jury’s investigatory 

authority extends beyond the realm of criminal activity to include inquiry 

into the general activities of public institutions and personnel.” Appeal of 

Untreiner, 391 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (citations omitted); see 

also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Marko, 352 So. 2d 518, 522 (Fla. 1977) 

(grand juries in Florida are “not confined to an indictment function” but 

also have the right to “express the view of the citizenry with respect to 

public bodies and officials”).

In Miami Herald, the supreme court recognized the conundrum faced 

by persons who have not been charged with a crime but who nevertheless 

may suffer reputational damage by the publication of a grand jury report:

Unlike the opportunity for refutation which is available when 

adverse character or reputational matters are disclosed 

during the course of a public trial, there is no comparable 

opportunity to challenge grand jury report disclosures 
14

contemporaneously with their publication. These matters 

emerge from a grand jury process which has operated in 

secrecy, under the guidance of a prosecutor and the 

supervision of a judge to be sure, but where there has been 

no right to challenge witnesses or to be represented by 

counsel. It is possible, then, that the testimony and 

information presented to a grand jury, on which they must 

rely and report, is potentially one-sided and inaccurate. Thus, 

while one charged with the commission of a crime as a result 

of this process has a full opportunity for public clarification of 

misleading data and personal vindication through a public 

trial, no comparable means of vindication exists for one whose 

character is impugned in a report unaccompanied by 

indictment.

352 So. 2d at 520. However, the court found that the Legislature did not 

intend to preclude the criticism of public officials in grand jury reports 

based on any notion of “fairness.” Instead, the court concluded that the 

objective terms of section 905.28—“improper” and “unlawful”—are the 

only limitations which the presiding judge must consider on a motion to 

repress or expunge a grand jury report:

[T]he legislature has elected not to eliminate the potential for 

citizen criticism of public officials; rather it has chosen to 

confine those criticisms to matters which emerge from a lawful 

inquiry and are not “improper.” There is eminent good sense 

in appellants’ suggestion that this latter limitation means only 

that comments in a grand jury presentment must have a 

factual foundation in, and be germane to, the scope of 

proceedings for which the grand jury was convened. A report 

may be “proper” by all objective standards but appear “unfair” 

to some observers. The notion of unfairness is highly 

subjective, however, and we fail to discern any legislative 

directive to add that dimension to the more objective 

standards specifically set out in the statute.

. . . .

If the judicial inquiry is narrowed, however, to the legitimacy 

of the grand jury proceeding, the factual foundation for the 

subject matter included in the report, and the germaneness of 

the reported material to the purpose for which the grand jury 

was convened and given investigative authority, judicial 

officers can comfortably employ in these proceedings the same 
15

decision making techniques which they use in other judicial 

inquiries.

352 So. 2d at 522-23.4

I therefore agree with the majority that the statewide grand jury’s 

authority to investigate and make public reports was broader than its 

jurisdiction to return indictments as defined in section 905.34 and that its 

final report does not exceed that authority. It would be inconsistent with 

the supreme court’s holdings in Miami Herald and the public’s right to be 

informed, for this court to hold that the statewide grand jury should be 

prevented from disclosing its findings regarding public officials and 

institutions. See Miami Herald, 352 So. 2d at 523 (“Implicit in the power 

of the grand jury to investigate and expose official misconduct is the right 

of the people to be informed of its findings.”). I also agree with the majority 

that the references on pages 73 and 114 of the report must be expunged 

because those references contain allegations of criminal activity beyond 

the scope of the statewide grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction as 

defined in section 905.34.

Disclosures of Witness Testimony

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the disclosures of witness 

testimony in the statewide grand jury’s final report are not prohibited by 

section 905.27 or 905.395. The report contains a number of statements 

disclosing the identity of grand jury witnesses and the substance of their 

testimony in violation of those statutes. The statutes are not inconsistent, 

as the majority opines, and we have held that disclosure of “witnesses and 

the substance of their actual testimony” in a grand jury report are unlawful 

4 When the supreme court authorizes the impanelment of a statewide grand jury 

upon a governor’s petition under section 905.33, the court acts in a ministerial 

and administrative capacity and does not exercise judicial review over the 

petition. See State ex rel. Reichle v. Edwards, 409 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1982). That 

being the case, no opportunity exists for judicial review as to whether the petition 

sufficiently demonstrates that the crimes or wrongs to be investigated are of a 

multi-circuit nature. Nor does any judicial oversight mechanism exist to prevent 

the statewide grand jury, once it is impaneled, from straying into matters of a 

purely local nature. This lack of judicial review and oversight leaves the statewide 

grand jury system open to being used for purposes other than those which the 

Legislature intended, to “strengthen the grand jury system and enhance the 

ability of the state to detect and eliminate organized criminal activity by improving 

the evidence-gathering process in matters which transpire or have significance 

in more than one county.” § 905.32, Fla. Stat. (2018).
16

under section 905.27 and are subject to being expunged under section 

905.28. Barber v. Interim Rep. of the Grand Jury Spring Term 1995, 689 

So. 2d 1182, 1185–86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

Sections 905.27 and 905.395 reflect the historical understanding that 

grand jury proceedings should be secret. This secrecy serves a number of 

important purposes:

(1) to protect the grand jurors; (2) to promote a total freedom 

of disclosure; (3) to prevent the escape of a person indicted 

before his arrest; (4) to prevent subornation of perjury or 

tampering with witnesses who testified before the grand jury 

and then testify at the trial of the person indicted; and (5) to 

shield the reputation of a person against whom no indictment 

is filed.

Grand Jury Fall Term, A.D. v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 624 So. 2d 291, 

293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959)).

Section 905.27 prohibits the participants in a grand jury proceeding 

from disclosing the testimony presented to the grand jury, or the gist of 

that testimony, unless such disclosure is mandated by a court order:

(1) A grand juror, state attorney, assistant state attorney, 

reporter, stenographer, interpreter, or any other person 

appearing before the grand jury shall not disclose the 

testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury or other 

evidence received by it except when required by a court to 

disclose the testimony for the purpose of:

(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the testimony 

given by the witness before the court;

(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or

(c) Furthering justice.

(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, 

broadcast, disclose, divulge, or communicate to any other 

person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published, 

broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other 

person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness 

examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import 
17

thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed 

in a court proceeding. . . .

. . . .

(4) Persons convicted of violating this section shall be guilty 

of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided 

in s. 775.083, or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or both.

See also § 905.24, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“Grand jury proceedings are secret, 

and a grand juror or an interpreter appointed pursuant to s. 90.6063(2) 

shall not disclose the nature or substance of the deliberations or vote of 

the grand jury.”).

Section 905.395, part of the Statewide Grand Jury Act, prohibits any 

person from disclosing any of the statewide grand jury proceedings, unless 

such disclosure is pursuant to a court order:

Unless pursuant to court order, it is unlawful for any person 

knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or communicate 

to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published, 

broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other 

person outside the statewide grand jury room, any of the 

proceedings or identity of persons referred to or being investigated 

by the statewide grand jury. Any person who violates the provisions 

of this subsection is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable 

as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The Legislature has also provided that statewide grand juries are 

subject to the laws applying to county grand juries, in addition to the 

provisions of the Statewide Grand Jury Act, unless those laws are 

“inconsistent with the provisions of” the Act. § 905.34(13), Fla. Stat.

(2018).

The strong interest in maintaining the secrecy of grand jury 

proceedings suggests that sections 905.27 and 905.395 should be 

interpreted broadly. See, e.g., Minton, 113 So. 2d at 367 (the tradition of 

secrecy in grand jury proceedings “is not to be abandoned without clear 

legislative direction” (citation omitted)).

The majority opines that sections 905.27 and 905.395 are inconsistent, 

and therefore section 905.27 does not apply in statewide grand jury 

proceedings, because section 905.395 does not expressly prohibit a grand 

juror from disclosing testimony presented to the statewide grand jury. In 
18

my view, these statutes are not inconsistent. Section 905.395 is broader 

than section 905.27 and imposes an additional measure of secrecy in 

statewide grand jury proceedings. It prohibits “any person” from 

disclosing “any of the proceedings” of the statewide grand jury, unless 

pursuant to court order. By contrast, section 905.27 prohibits only 

persons directly involved in grand jury proceedings from disclosing 

testimony or evidence presented to the grand jury, or the gist of any such 

testimony, unless pursuant to court order. If one were to draw a Venn 

diagram of the two statutes, the terms of section 905.27 would be wholly

subsumed within the circle of section 905.395.

I would therefore hold that section 905.27 applies in statewide grand 

jury proceedings and prohibits a statewide grand juror from disclosing 

testimony or evidence presented to the statewide grand jury, unless such 

disclosure is specifically authorized by court order for one of the purposes 

set forth in section 905.27(1). I would thus apply Barber to this case and 

hold that the statements in the statewide grand jury’s final report 

disclosing the identity and testimony of specific witnesses should have 

been expunged as unlawful under section 905.28. See Barber, 689 So. 2d 

at 1185–86 (holding that there is no exception in section 905.27 allowing 

for the disclosure of witness testimony in a grand jury report).

Even if I were to agree with the majority that section 905.27 does not 

apply in statewide grand jury proceedings, I would nevertheless hold that 

section 905.395 prohibits the disclosure of witness testimony in a 

statewide grand jury report. The majority contends that section 905.395 

should not be read as to prohibit the statewide grand jury itself from 

disclosing witness testimony in its report—that the Legislature could not 

have intended that result. The majority thus writes its own statutory 

definition of the word “person” to exclude a statewide grand juror and 

thereby justify the statewide grand jury’s numerous disclosures of witness 

testimony in its final report. But section 905.395 is not ambiguous or 

limited in any way. In construing the statute, no need exists to apply 

canons of statutory construction to arrive at some other meaning:

“As with the interpretation of any statute, the starting point of 

analysis is the actual language of the statute.” Brown v. City of Vero 

Beach, 64 So. 3d 172, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Cont’l Cas. 

Co. v. Ryan Inc. E., 974 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. 2008)). If the language 

is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the rules of 

statutory construction; “the statute must be given its plain and 

obvious meaning.” Samples v. Fla. Birth–Related Neurological, 40 

So. 3d 18, 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 

So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)).
19

Conservation All. of St. Lucie Cnty. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 144 So. 

3d 622, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

The Legislature unambiguously commanded in section 905.395 that no 

person can reveal what occurs in statewide grand jury proceedings. The 

statute does not make any exception allowing a statewide grand jury to 

reveal the testimony presented to it in a public report. The statewide grand 

jury’s report must be written in such a manner as to avoid the disclosure 

of specific witnesses and the substance of their testimony. To hold 

otherwise is to ignore the statute’s plain meaning and endanger the 

secrecy of the statewide grand jury proceedings, a vital measure to provide 

total freedom of disclosure. I would reverse on this issue and require 

expunction of the direct quotations of testimony, together with those 

statements providing the gist of the testimony of identified witnesses, from 

the statewide grand jury’s final report.

Because the secrecy of the proceedings is a matter vital to the proper 

functioning of a statewide grand jury, maintaining such secrecy is a matter 

of great public concern. For that reason, I would certify the following to 

the supreme court as a question of great public importance:

DOES THE PROHIBITION IN SECTION 905.395, FLORIDA 

STATUTES (2018), AGAINST THE DISCLOSURE OF 

STATEWIDE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS BY “ANY 

PERSON” PREVENT THE STATEWIDE GRAND JURY ITSELF 

FROM DISCLOSING THE IDENTITIES OF SPECIFIC 

WITNESSES AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR TESTIMONY 

IN A PUBLIC REPORT OR PRESENTMENT? 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.