United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1683

___________________________

Macquarie Bank Limited

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

Macquarie Americas Corp.

llllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

v.

Bradley D. Knickel; LexMac Energy, L.P.; Lexar Energy, Inc.; Novus Operating

Company, L.P.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

KHL, Inc.; Mineral Land Services, Inc.

llllllllllllllllllll Defendants

v.

Macquarie Barnett, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 14-1684

___________________________

Macquarie Bank Limited
llllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

Macquarie Americas Corp.

lllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

v.

LexMac Energy, L.P.; Lexar Energy, Inc.; Novus Operating Company, L.P.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

Bradley D. Knickel; KHL, Inc.; Mineral Land Services, Inc.

llllllllllllllllllll Defendants

v.

Macquarie Barnett, LLC

llllllllllllllllllllThird Party Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Bismarck

____________

 Submitted: March 10, 2015

 Filed: July 17, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

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Macquarie Bank Limited (Macquarie Bank) and a subsidiary brought suit

against LexMac Energy, L.P. (LexMac); Novus Operating Company, L.P. (Novus);

Lexar Energy, Inc. (Lexar); and Bradley Knickel, who controls all three companies

(collectively, Lexar Group). Macquarie Bank and the subsidiary alleged claims of

deceit, fraud, and promissory estoppel, among others, and also alleged that the

corporate veil of the three companies should be pierced to hold Knickel personally

liable. In their answer, LexMac, Novus, and Lexar sought declaratory judgment and

alleged claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and unlawful interference with

business, among others, against Macquarie Bank and third-partydefendant Macquarie

Barnett, LLC (Macquarie LLC), another subsidiary of Macquarie Bank. The district

court disposed of all claims before trial except LexMac and Novus’s 1

misappropriation claim. After a bench trial, the district court found that Macquarie

Bank and Macquarie LLC had misappropriated trade secrets, and it awarded damages,

prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees.

Macquarie Bank and Macquarie LLC (collectively, Macquarie) appeal. 

Macquarie Bank argues that its claims of deceit, fraud, and promissory estoppel

should have survived summary judgment. Macquarie argues that there was

insufficient evidence to establish that it had misappropriated trade secrets; that

LexMac and Novus were not entitled to attorney’s fees; and that the district court

erred in calculating damages. Lexar Group filed a collective cross-appeal. Lexar

argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s

claims was procedurally and substantively improper. LexMac and Novus argue that

the district court erred in calculating damages. We affirm.

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, United States DistrictJudge for the District 1

of North Dakota.

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I. Background

Knickel approached Macquarie Bank in 2004 about obtaining a loan for Lexar

to develop certain oil and gas leases in North Dakota. During the course of

negotiations,Knickel provided MacquarieBank with certain confidential information

about the leased acreage that he had assembled over the course of ten years.

Ultimately, the parties agreed that Lexar would assign the leases and its interest in the

confidential information to LexMac and Novus. Macquarie Bank then entered into

two agreements with LexMac and Novus: the Senior First Lien Secured Credit

Agreement (Credit Agreement) and the Mortgage, Assignment of Production,

Security Agreement and Financing Statement (Mortgage). Lexar was not a party to

the Credit Agreement or the Mortgage.

As collateral for its loan, Macquarie Bank acquired a mortgage lien and

perfected security interest in the oil and gas leases and in any extensions or renewals

of the leases. The confidential information that Lexar had assigned to LexMac and

Novus—reserves reports on the acreage, seismic data, and geologic maps—also

served as collateral. LexMac and Novus also granted a royalty interest from any oil

and gas production of the leased acreage to a subsidiary of Macquarie Bank.

LexMac and Novus encountered problems developing the leasesto produce oil

and gas and defaulted on the loan. They completed only one well, which never

became fully operational. In July 2007, Macquarie Bank issued a Notice of Default

and Intent to Accelerate. Because of the lack of development or production, many

of the leases serving as collateral were set to expire in the fall of 2007. Accordingly,

Macquarie Bank began discussions with Knickel to ensure that the leases were

renewed. According to Knickel, he agreed to renew only the leases that included

automatic extension provisions. Macquarie Bank claims that Knickel assured it that

he would renew all of the leases serving as collateral in the names of LexMac and

Novus. Knickel renewed the leases that included automatic extension provisions in

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the names of LexMac and Novus. Upon the expiration of the leases without

automatic extension provisions, however, Knickel entered into new leases in the

name of Lexar alone. Lexar intended to develop the leasestogether with LexMac and

Novus, since LexMac and Novus owned the confidential information about the

acreage.

In October 2007, Macquarie Bank filed an action to foreclose on the leases. 

Judgment was entered in February 2008, declaring that LexMac and Novus’s interest

in the leases pledged as collateral would be sold to satisfy the debt owed to

Macquarie Bank: $5,296,252.29, plus interest accruing from October 18, 2007. The

judgment made no mention of the confidential information that served as collateral. 

Macquarie Bank assigned the judgment to Macquarie LLC, and in April 2008,

Macquarie LLC purchased the leases at a sheriff’s sale for a credit bid of $5.4 million. 

It did not seek to recover any deficiency resulting from the sale.

Most of the collateral leases had already expired by the time Macquarie LLC

purchased them at the sheriff’s sale, and the acreage associated with those leases was

being leased by Lexar. In May 2008, Macquarie Bank filed a “Notice of Lis

Pendens” on Lexar’s leases of acreage associated with the expired collateral leases,

seeking to establish that Lexar’s leases were encumbered by the royalty interest

previously granted by LexMac and Novus to Macquarie Bank’s subsidiary (the

district court eventually held that they were). Macquarie LLC also top leased Lexar’s

acreage, meaning that Macquarie LLC’s leases would go into effect only if and when

Lexar’s leases expired because of lack of development or production. Macquarie

2

LLC also leased approximately 177 acres in the immediate area that had never been

pledged as collateral, incurring $845,055 in leasing costs.

Oil and gas leases expire after a set term, unless drilling or oil and gas

2

production has started on the lease, in which case the lease will remain in effect as

long as it is producing oil or gas.

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Lexar’s leases expired as a result of its inability to develop the acreage. 

Macquarie LLC’s top leases then went into effect. Macquarie LLC hired an oil and

gas consulting company to evaluate the resources on the leased acreage and prepare

a reserves report, which would help Macquarie LLC find a buyer for the leases. To

facilitate the evaluation, Macquarie LLC gave LexMac and Novus’s seismic data and

geologic maps on the leased acreage to the consulting company. Around the same

time, Macquarie LLC also hired a management company to help find a buyer for the

leases and provided the company with LexMac and Novus’s geologic maps. The

management company sought bids from several interested parties and ultimately

obtained a bid of $1,600 per acre from Kodiak Oil and Gas (Kodiak). The

management company asked other interested partiesif they would increase their bids,

but none were willing to top Kodiak’s bid. Macquarie LLC sold its leases to Kodiak

for $8.5 million and paid the management company $820,000 for its work. 

Macquarie Bank and its subsidiary initiated this lawsuit in 2008, two years

prior to Macquarie LLC’s ultimate sale of the leases. Lexar Group counterclaimed

against Macquarie Bank and brought claims against third-party defendant Macquarie

LLC. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in October 2009. The

district court ruled on the motionsin June 2010, granting summary judgment to Lexar

Group on all of Macquarie Bank’s claims and allowing Lexar Group’s claims of

misappropriation and unlawful interference to proceed. In mid-October 2012, a week

before trial was scheduled to begin, Macquarie filed a “Pretrial Memorandum,”

arguing that the North Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act preempted Lexar Group’s

remaining tort claims and that Lexar would not be able to survive a directed verdict

because it did not own the trade secrets at issue. After the pretrial memorandum was

filed, the trial was delayed and Lexar Group never responded to the memorandum. 

The district court later granted summary judgment to Macquarie on LexMac and

Novus’s claim of unlawful interference, but allowed their misappropriation claim to

proceed. The district court also granted summary judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s

misappropriation and unlawful-interference claims. 

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After a four-day bench trial on LexMac and Novus’s only remaining

claim—that of misappropriation—the district court found that Macquarie had

misappropriated trade secrets. It awarded LexMac and Novus $1,434,945 in unjustenrichment damages, $59,736 in actual-loss damages, $352,674 in prejudgment

interest, $38,674.51 in costs, and $471,828.84 in attorney’s fees and expenses.

II. Obligations Under the Credit Agreement and the Mortgage

Macquarie Bank argues that the district court erred when it determined in its

summary-judgment order that neither the Credit Agreement nor the Mortgage

imposed a duty on LexMac and Novus to preserve the expiring leases as collateral. 

The district court addressed this argument in the context of Lexar Group’s action for

declaratory judgment. It is not entirely clear what remedy Macquarie Bank seeks if

we were to reverse the district court’s interpretation of the contracts, but it suggests

that a reversal would affect its liability for misappropriation as well as the damages

determination. Additionally, whether LexMac and Novus had a contractual duty to

preserve the leases as collateral is relevant to Macquarie Bank’s deceit claim against

Lexar Group. Accordingly, we will address the argument, reviewing the district

court’s interpretation of the contracts de novo. In re Racing Servs., Inc., 744 F.3d

543, 549 (8th Cir. 2014).

Macquarie Bank relies on sections 3.1(c), 7.4(c), and 8.1 of the Credit

Agreement and sections 1.1 and 3.2(c) of the Mortgage to argue that the contracts

required LexMac and Novusto renew the expired leases. Section 3.1(c) of the Credit

Agreement provided:

[LexMac and Novus] will, upon request, execute and deliver to

[Macquarie Bank] any and all documents necessary or desirable, in the

reasonable opinion of[MacquarieBank], to create, perfect, maintain and

preserve the priority of [Macquarie Bank’s] security interests in and

mortgage liens on the Collateral and the other Personal Property . . . .

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Section 7.4(c) of the Credit Agreement stated that LexMac and Novusshall not “sell,

transfer, assign or grant any Person an option to acquire any of its assets . . . or take

any similar action except for the sale of production or inventory in the ordinary

course of [LexMac and Novus’s] business.” Section 8.1 of the Credit Agreement

provided that “[u]ntil the Obligations are repaid in full, [LexMac and Novus], at

[their] own expense, shall do all things and shall deliver all instruments requested by

[Macquarie Bank] to create, perfect, protect or continue any security interest,

mortgage or lien granted or created under this Agreement.” Section 1.1 of the

Mortgage provided:

The Mortgaged Properties are to remain so speciallymortgaged, affected

and hypothecated unto and in favor of [Macquarie Bank] until the full

and final payment or discharge of the Secured Indebtedness, and

[LexMac and Novus are] herein and hereby bound and obligated not to

sell or alienate the Mortgaged Properties to the prejudice the [sic] terms

and conditions of this Mortgage or any of the rights of [Macquarie

Bank] hereunder.

Finally, section 3.2(c) of the Mortgage provided:

So long as the Secured Indebtedness or any part thereof remain unpaid,

[LexMac and Novus] covenant[] and agree[] with [Macquarie Bank]

. . . . [t]hat [LexMac and Novus] will cause the oil, gas or oil and gas 

. . . leases included in or relating to the Mortgaged Properties (herein

called “Subject Leases”) to be maintained and operated for the

production of oil or gas in a good and workmanlike manner and in

accordance with sound field practices and all applicable federal, state

and local laws, rules and regulations and will not allow any of Subject

Leases to be surrendered, abandoned, or terminated or impaired in any

manner.

The provisionsset forth above did not require LexMac and Novusto renew the

expired collateral leases. Section 3.1(c) required LexMac and Novus to provide

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Macquarie Bank with documentsitrequested. Section 7.4(c) ofthe Credit Agreement

and sections 1.1 and 3.2(c) of the Mortgage prohibited LexMac and Novus from

selling, transferring, assigning, alienating, surrendering, abandoning, terminating, or

impairing the leases serving as collateral, but did not prohibit LexMac and Novus

from allowing the leases to expire naturally because of lack of production

(particularly in light of the fact that there is no evidence of bad faith). Similarly,

section 8.1 of the Credit Agreement required LexMac and Novus to “do all things . . .

requested by [Macquarie Bank] to create, perfect, protect or continue any security

interest” in the leases. When read in context, this provision did not require LexMac

and Novus to renew the leases when they naturally came to an end; rather, section

3.2(c) prohibited LexMac and Novus from terminating their interest in the leases

before they expired.

We reject Macquarie Bank’s argument that the Lexar leases constituted

extensions or renewals of the expired LexMac and Novus leases and thus served as

collateral under the Credit Agreement. The Credit Agreement contains a provision

stating that it is to be interpreted under Texas law. We apply the law of the forum

state, North Dakota, to determine whether the contractual choice-of-law provision in

the contract governs. John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. Hoot Gen. Constr. Co., 613 F.3d

778, 782 (8th Cir. 2010). We believe that the North Dakota Supreme Court would

resolve this dispute under Texas law, as called for by the Credit Agreement. See

Snortland v. Larson, 364 N.W.2d 67, 68-69 (N.D. 1985) (citing with approval

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971)); Am. Hardware Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 687, 689 n.1 (N.D. 1981) (same); Restatement

(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(1) (1971) (“The law of the state chosen by the

parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular

issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their

agreement directed to that issue.”). 

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The Credit Agreement defines collateral to include the leases and any

extensions or renewals of the leases. Under Texas law, “[a]n extension . . . generally

means the prolongation or continuation of the term of the existing lease.” Sunac

Petrol. Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. 1967). Because LexMac and

Novus’s leases had expired before Lexar acquired the new leases, the Lexar leases did

not constitute extensions or renewals. Cf. id. at 802-03 (holding that a new lease

entered into by the same party that had previously held a lease was not a renewal or

extension because the new lease was entered into “under different circumstances, for

a new consideration, upon different terms, and over a year after the expiration of the

old lease”). Thus, because LexMac and Novus were not contractually obligated to

preserve the leases as collateral, the Lexar leases did not serve as collateral under the

contract. 

III. Macquarie Bank’s Claims on Summary Judgment

Macquarie Bank argues thatthe district court should not have granted summary

judgment to Lexar Group on Macquarie Bank’s claims of deceit, fraud, and

promissory estoppel. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jetton v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 424 (8th Cir. 1997). 

A. Deceit and Fraud

Under North Dakota law, “the same conduct, a promise made without any

intention of performing, may constitute both deceit and fraud.” Erickson v. Brown,

747 N.W.2d 34, 44 (N.D. 2008); see also N.D. Cent. Code §§ 9-03-08(4), 9-10-02(4). 

Such a promise constitutes “deceit if there is no contract between the parties, or fraud

if there is a contract and one party’s apparent consent to the contract is obtained as

a result of that promise.” Delzer v. United Bank of Bismarck, 527 N.W.2d 650, 656

n.4 (N.D. 1995). “[P]roof of actual damage proximately caused by the

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misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essential element of a tort action for . . .

deceit.” Schneider v. Schaaf, 603 N.W.2d 869, 874 (N.D. 1999). Summary judgment

is appropriate if the plaintiff has not offered sufficient proof of actual damages caused

by the deceitful act. See id. at 875-76. Deceit and fraud claims must be proved by

clear and convincing evidence, and “it is appropriate to consider the quantumof proof

necessary to support liability” when determining the propriety ofsummary judgment

in a deceit or fraud case. Erickson, 747 N.W.2d at 45, 47.

Macquarie Bank contendsthat when leasesserving as collateral for Macquarie

Bank’s loan to LexMac and Novus were set to expire, Knickel orally promised to

renew them. Instead, Knickel leased the acreage in the name of Lexar so that the new

leases would not serve as collateral. Macquarie Bank does not dispute the district

court’s holding that Knickel’s oral promises did not rise to the level of a contract,

which meant that they could not constitute fraud under North Dakota law. The fact

that Knickel’s oral promises are not enforceable as a contract, however, does not

preclude Macquarie Bank’s deceit claim. See Erickson, 747 N.W.2d at 48.

Macquarie Bank argues that in September 2007, before the leases serving as

collateral expired, its lease brokers were poised to re-lease the acreage in the names

of LexMac and Novus and thereby preserve the leases as collateral. Because of

Knickel’s promise to renew the leases, however, Macquarie Bank instructed its lease

brokers not to act. Had they done so, Macquarie Bank contendsthat the leases would

have been renewed and preserved as collateral and Macquarie LLC would have

acquired them at the foreclosure sale in April 2008. Instead, Macquarie LLC was

required to expend funds to top lease Lexar’s leases, a consequence that Macquarie

Bank argues resulted from Knickel’s deceit. 

Macquarie Bank cannot establish that it was damaged as a result of Knickel’s

promise because the lease brokers would not have been able to renew the leasesin the

names ofLexMac and Novus overKnickel’s objections. Macquarie Bank’s argument

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is premised on its belief that the Mortgage and Credit Agreement required LexMac

and Novus to preserve the leases as collateral, but as discussed above, LexMac and

Novus were under no such obligation. Even if Knickel had been forthcoming about

his intentions to lease the acreage in the name of Lexar, there was nothing that

Macquarie Bank or its lease brokers could have done to compel him to renew the

leases in the names of LexMac and Novus. Accordingly, the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment against Macquarie Bank on its claims of deceit and

fraud.

B. Promissory Estoppel

Macquarie Bank’s claim of promissory estoppel arises from the same facts as

its deceit and fraud claims. To establish promissory estoppel under North Dakota

law, Macquarie Bank must show “a substantial change in the promisee’s position

through action or forbearance” caused by the promise. Dalan v. Paracelsus

Healthcare Corp. of N.D., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 726, 731-32 (N.D. 2002). Macquarie

Bank argues that it changed its position as a result of Knickel’s promise by

instructing its lease brokers, who were poised to maintain the collateral leases, not to

act. As discussed above, however, there is nothing that Macquarie Bank’s lease

brokers could have done to require Knickel to renew the leases in the names of

LexMac and Novus, and thus the district court properly granted summary judgment

to the defendants on Macquarie Bank’s promissory-estoppel claim.

3

Macquarie Bank also argues that the district court erred when it determined 3

that there was insufficient evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil. “[T]he

corporate veil may be pierced” when certain factors are present to hold “the officers

and directors of a corporation . . . liable for the ordinary debts of a corporation.”

Coughlin Constr. Co. v. Nu-Tec Indus., Inc., 755 N.W.2d 867, 873 (N.D. 2008). 

Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lexar Group on

Macquarie Bank’s claims, there is no claim against LexMac, Novus, or Lexar on

which Knickel could be held liable.

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IV. Lexar’s Claims on Summary Judgment

On cross-appeal, Lexar argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s claims of unlawful interference with business and

misappropriation of trade secrets.

Lexar first argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Macquarie was procedurally improper. In 2009, Macquarie filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that Lexar Group’s claim of unlawful interference failed

because Lexar Group had failed to identify a businessrelationship or expectancy with

which Macquarie had interfered. Macquarie did not distinguish Lexar from LexMac

and Novus, and the district court did not analyze Lexar’s claims separately from

LexMac and Novus’s when it denied the motion. Macquarie argued for the first time

in its mid-October 2012 pretrial memorandumthat Lexar’s claims should be analyzed

separately from LexMac and Novus’s claims because Lexar was not a party to the

Mortgage or Credit Agreement and it did not own the trade secrets. At its October

16, 2012, pretrial conference, the district court told Lexar that it did not think “Lexar

should . . . be part of the entities that ha[ve] a claim for misappropriation” and asked

Lexar how much time it needed to find support for the position that “Lexar does,

indeed, have a valid claim for misappropriation of a trade secret in light of the fact

that they’re not anywhere on any loan documents, credit agreements, mortgages or

anything else.” Lexar responded that it would file something within a few days. Trial

was delayed, and Lexar did not file a response. A month later, the district court

granted summary judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s unlawful-interference and

misappropriation claims. With regard to the claim of unlawful interference, the

district court found that Lexar had not identified a businessrelationship or expectancy

with which Macquarie had interfered, an issue that Macquarie had raised in its 2009

motion.

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Lexar argues that the district court granted summary judgment sua sponte, in

violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. “After giving notice and a

reasonable time to respond, the court may . . . consider summary judgment on its own

after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(3); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)

(“[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary

judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come

forward with all of her evidence.”). The district court placed Lexar on notice during

the pretrial conference that it might dismiss Lexar’s misappropriation claim, see

Hubbard v. Parker, 994 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1993), and thus it did not err in

proceeding as it did.

Lexar also argues that the district court failed to provide notice that it would

reconsider Macquarie’s 2009 motion for summary judgment on the claimof unlawful

interference. Rule 56, however, did not require the district court to do so, because

Macquarie’s 2009 motion for summary judgment addressed the precise issue ruled

on by the district court, and Lexar had an opportunity to respond to the motion. 

Although the district court initially denied summary judgment, it was free to

reconsider its ruling, see Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 911 (8th

Cir. 2005), and thus it did not err in granting summary judgment to Macquarie on

Lexar’s claims.

We turn, then, to the merits of Lexar’s claims ofmisappropriation and unlawful

interference.

A. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

The district court granted summary judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s

misappropriation claim because it found that Lexar did not own or have any interest

in the trade secrets when the misappropriation occurred. On appeal, Lexar does not

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contest the district court’s characterization of the facts. It instead contends that its

misappropriation claim should have been allowed to proceed to trial because it

initially provided some of the trade-secret information to Macquarie Bank and had

a business plan with LexMac and Novus to use the information to develop Lexar’s

leases. We decline to decide whether ownership is an element of a misappropriation

claim under the North Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as Macquarie argues. 

Compare DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001)

(holding that under the Maryland UniformTrade Secrets Act, “fee simple” ownership

is not an element of a misappropriation claim), with Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able

Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that under the California

Uniform Trade Secrets Act, an element of a misappropriation claim is that “the

plaintiff owned a trade secret”). 

We hold instead that Lexar’s misappropriation claimfails because “[w]henever

more than one person is entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same

information, only that one from whom misappropriation occurred is entitled to a

remedy.” Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3 cmt. (2005). That Lexar had a business

plan with LexMac and Novus to develop the leases using the trade secrets has no

bearing on whether Macquarie misappropriated the trade secrets fromLexar. Shortly

after providing some of the trade secrets to Macquarie Bank, Lexar assigned all of its

interest in the trade secrets to LexMac and Novus. In turn, LexMac and Novus

granted Macquarie Bank the nonexclusive right to use the trade secrets, including the

information originally provided by Lexar, for certain purposes under the Credit

Agreement and the Mortgage. Macquarie Bank used and disclosed the trade secrets

in a way that exceeded the scope of LexMac and Novus’s consent, as discussed more

fully below. This constituted misappropriation, the definition of which includes

“[d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent

by a person who” knew or had reason to know, at the time of the disclosure or use,

that the trade secret was “[a]cquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to

maintain its secrecy or limit its use.” N.D. Cent. Code § 47-25.1-01(2). The

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misappropriation occurred only from LexMac and Novus, not Lexar. Accordingly,

the district court properly granted summary judgment to Macquarie on Lexar’s

misappropriation claim.

B. Unlawful Interference

Under North Dakota law, a claim for unlawful interference with business

requires proof of “an independently tortious or otherwise unlawful act of interference

by the interferer” that “caused the harm sustained.” Trade ’N Post, L.L.C. v. World

Duty Free Ams., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 707, 717 (N.D. 2001). Lexar argues that it had a

business plan to develop its leases using LexMac and Novus’s trade secrets, but was

prevented from doing so by Macquarie’s misappropriation. Even if Macquarie’s

misappropriation constituted an “unlawful interference,” however, the North Dakota

Uniform Trade Secrets Act “displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law

of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” N.D.

Cent. Code § 47-25.1-07(1). Lexar’s claim is based solely on Macquarie’s

misappropriation. Essentially, Lexar’s unlawful-interference claim constitutes an

attempt to circumvent the North Dakota Trade Secrets Act’s preclusion of a

misappropriation claim and is consequently displaced.

V. LexMac and Novus’s Misappropriation Claim

Macquarie argues that the seismic data, geologic maps, and reserves reports

that LexMac and Novus provided to Macquarie Bank to obtain the loan cannot

constitute trade secrets under North Dakota law. Macquarie also argues that the

district court erred in concluding that Macquarie had misappropriated the

information. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its

legal conclusions de novo. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 804 (8th Cir.

2008).

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A. Trade Secret

Under North Dakota law, a trade secret is defined as information that (a)

“[d]erives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally

known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who

can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” and (b) “[i]s the subject of

efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” N.D.

Cent. Code § 47-25.1-01(4). Macquarie does not dispute that there were reasonable

efforts to keep the information secret. Macquarie argues only that the information

had no economic value because neither Lexar Group nor Macquarie drilled

successfully on the leased acreage. But value is not assessed using hindsight. The

information had value because it was used to determine the development potential of

the leases. Macquarie also derived actual economic value fromthe information when

Macquarie used it to solicit bidsfor the leases. Accordingly, the district court did not

err in determining that the information constituted a trade secret.

B. Misappropriation

Under North Dakota law, the definition of misappropriation includes

“[d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent

by a person who” knew or had reason to know, at the time of the disclosure or use,

that the trade secret was either “[a]cquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty

to maintain its secrecy or limit its use” or “[d]erived from or through a person who

owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.” N.D.

Cent. Code § 47-25.1-01(2). Macquarie argues that because it did not use or disclose

trade secrets, it did not misappropriate them, and that if it did, it had the express

consent of LexMac and Novus to do so.

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1. Disclosure or Use

Macquarie argues that the district court erred in finding that it used or disclosed

the trade secrets, because, (a) Macquarie Bank disclosed the trade secrets only to

Macquarie LLC and they should be treated as one entity, and (b) Macquarie did not

use the trade secrets to top lease the acreage. The district court, however, found that

Macquarie Bank provided the trade secrets to Macquarie LLC, an entity that in turn

provided the information to an oil and gas consulting company to prepare a new

reserves report, which ultimately helped Macquarie LLC sell the leases. The district

court also found that Macquarie LLC provided the trade secrets to a management

company, an entity that helped find a buyer for the leases. The company was

successful and, as earlier recounted, Macquarie LLC sold the leases to Kodiak. In

light of these findings, the district court did not err in concluding that Macquarie used

and disclosed the trade secrets.

 

2. Consent

Macquarie argues that LexMac and Novus expressly consented to the use and

disclosure of the trade secrets in sections 8.3 and 11.2 of the Credit Agreement and

section 3.2 of the Mortgage. None of those provisions apply, however. 

Section 8.3 allowed Macquarie Bank to use the trade secrets upon default to

prepare the leases for sale, but that section applied only until Macquarie Bank’s

enforcement of its rights after default. The district court found that Macquarie LLC’s

$5.4 million credit bid satisfied the judgment for $5,296,252.29 plus interest and

completed Macquarie Bank’s enforcement of its rights under the Credit Agreement

and Mortgage. Macquarie argues that accrued interest made the judgment worth

more than $5.7 million at the time of the foreclosure sale, relying upon the testimony

of one of its employees, who calculated the outstanding judgment with interest at the

time of the foreclosure sale to be $5,703,338.14. The district court properly chose to

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discount this evidence, however, because Macquarie presented conflicting evidence

throughout the proceedings, suggesting in its motion for summary judgment that the

shortfall was only $130,000, and because Macquarie never pursued a claimto recover

the remaining debt. We cannot say that the district court’s factual findings were

clearly erroneous. Thus, because Macquarie used the trade secrets after it had

completed enforcement of its rights, section 8.3 was no longer applicable.

Similarly, section 11.2 allowed Macquarie Bank to use certain trade secrets in

relation to the sale of collateral. At the time the trade secrets were used, however, the

leases had already been foreclosed upon and sold and were no longer serving as

collateral. 

Finally, Macquarie contends that it was entitled to use the trade secrets under

section 3.2(v) of the Mortgage. Like the two earlier sections, section 3.2(v) of the

Mortgage no longer applied by the time Macquarie used the trade secrets. Section

3.2(v) applies only “[s]o long asthe Secured Indebtedness or any part thereof remains

unpaid.” No debt owed to Macquarie Bank remained unpaid at the time Macquarie

used the trade secrets, and so Macquarie was not entitled to use and disclose them

without LexMac and Novus’s consent.

VI. Damages Under the North Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act

Under North Dakota law, damages for misappropriation of trade secrets

“include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment

caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss.”

N.D. Cent. Code § 47-25.1-03(1). As set forth earlier, the district court awarded

LexMac and Novus $59,736 in actual-loss damages and $1,434,945 in unjustenrichment damages. Both sides contend that the district court’s damages calculation

is clearly erroneous. See Vigora Indus., Inc. v. Crisp, 82 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.

1996) (standard of review). 

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To determine actual loss, the district court calculated the amount of money

Lexar Group spent compiling the trade-secret information. Neither party disputesthis

method. On cross-appeal, however, LexMac and Novus argue that the district court

should have valued Knickel’s “sweat equity,” the time and effort he spent developing

the trade secrets. Knickel testified that he spent “100%” of his time developing the

information from 2000 to 2010. The district court, however, did not find Knickel

credible, concluding that his testimony was “a gross exaggeration.” Knickel did not

keep track of his hours, and he admitted that he worked on other projects during the

relevant time period. It was not clear error, then, for the district court to disbelieve

Knickel’s unsubstantiated assertion that he worked forty hours a week for ten years

compiling the trade-secret information.

LexMac and Novus also argue that the district court clearly erred when itfailed

to award actual-loss damages based on lost profits. One of the reserves reports

estimated the proved undeveloped reserves of the leased acreage to be $32 million. 

Proved undeveloped reserves are defined as reserves “reasonably certain” of

recovery. Based on this report and more current pricing, Knickel testified that Lexar

Group’s lost profits were $28.6 million. Additionally, Macquarie’s internal

documents valued Lexar’s leases at a minimum of $16.7 million. Thus, LexMac and

Novus argue that the district court should have awarded actual-loss damages of at

least $16.7 million. The district court concluded that lost profits based on the

reserves reports in this case were too speculative, observing that Lexar Group had

unsuccessfully attempted to develop the leases for years. We cannot say that the

district court clearly erred in denying actual-loss damages based on lost profits.

Similarly, LexMac and Novus argue that the district court clearly erred by

calculating Macquarie’s unjust enrichment based on the sale price of the leases to

Kodiak. They contend that the reserves reports and Macquarie’s estimate of the

leases’ value demonstrate that Macquarie LLC could have sold the leases for much

more, but conducted a “fire sale” to get rid of the leases. The evidence shows,

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however, that Macquarie LLC hired a management company to find a buyer for the

leases, that the management company sought bidsfromseveral interested parties, and

that Macquarie LLC eventually sold the leases to Kodiak because no other company

would pay more than Kodiak offered. The district court did not clearly err when it

calculated the unjust-enrichment damages.

Macquarie also argues that the district court erroneously calculated the unjustenrichment damages. The district court concluded that Macquarie LLC was enriched

by $1,434,945, which was the sale price of the leases to Kodiak ($8.5 million), less

the cost Macquarie LLC paid for the leases at the foreclosure sale ($5.4 million), the

money paid to the management company to find a buyer ($820,000), and the cost of

the top leases and additional leases ($845,055). Although Macquarie argues that the

district court should also have subtracted the sum of money spent trying to make the

only drilled well operational, it cites no evidence to establish that amount. Similarly,

Macquarie argues that it lost $1 million on the sale to Kodiak, but does not support

its argument with any record citations. “[A]s is our practice—without any arguments

or citations to the record that would assist us in judging the merits of [the] claim of

error—we decline to address it.” Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 609, 615 (8th Cir.

2004).

VII. Attorney’s Fees Under the North Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act

A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who prevails on a

misappropriation claimif “willful and malicious misappropriation exists.” N.D. Cent.

Code § 47-25.1-04. The district court found:

Macquarie Bank and Macquarie [LLC] were both aware oftheir conduct

and its probable consequences. Further, they designed a strategy

employed to benefit personally from their actions. . . . [T]heir conduct

wasimproper and unjustifiable, and . . . the misappropriation was willful

and malicious.

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D. Ct. Order of Feb 19, 2014, at 77. Macquarie does not challenge the district court’s

factual findings, but argues that malicious misappropriation occurs only if the

tortfeasor acted with ill will, hatred, or intent to injure. See Beard Research, Inc. v.

Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 600 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that, under the Delaware Uniform

Trade Secrets Act, “[w]illfulness is ‘an awareness, either actual or constructive, of

one[’]s conduct and a realization of its probable consequences,’ while malice is . . .

‘ill-will, hatred or intent to cause injury.’” (quoting NuCar Consulting, Inc. v. Doyle,

No. 19766-NC, 2005 WL 820706, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2005))). We review this

legal issue de novo, Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 472 F.3d 515, 516 (8th Cir.

2006), and attempt to predict how the North Dakota Supreme Court would decide this

unresolved issue, G & K Servs. Co. v. Bill’s Super Foods, Inc., 766 F.3d 797, 800

(8th Cir. 2014).

We believe that the North Dakota Supreme Court would not define malice to

require ill will, hatred, or intent to cause injury. Applying North Dakota’s general

punitive damages statute, we have defined “actual malice” as including “a direct

intention to injure another,” as well as “a conscious disregard of another’s rights.” 

Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. U.S. Gypsum, 953 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1992). 

The North Dakota Supreme Court has upheld a jury instruction that provided, for

purposes of the general punitive damages statute, “Malice is not limited to a spiteful,

malignant, or revengeful disposition and intent.” Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61,

71 (N.D. 1968). Under the North Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act, “willful and

malicious misappropriation” is required to award both punitive damages and

attorney’s fees. N.D. Cent. Code § 47-25.1-03(2), -04. We believe that the North

Dakota Supreme Court would use the same definition of malice to award attorney’s

fees and punitive damages under the North Dakota Trade Secrets Act as it does to

award punitive damages under the general punitive damages statute. Accordingly,

a conscious disregard of another’s rights constitutes malice. Having found that

Macquarie consciously disregarded the rights of Lexar Group when it committed the

tort of misappropriation, the district court did not err in concluding that Macquarie’s

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misappropriation was willful and malicious under North Dakota law, and thus we

affirm the award of attorney’s fees.

VIII. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

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