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CHESTNUT POINT REALTY, LLC v. TOWN OF

EAST WINDSOR

(AC 36819)

Lavine, Beach and Prescott, Js.

Argued April 8—officially released July 21, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, Hon. Arnold W. Aronson, judge trial referee.)

Jonathan M. Starble, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Laura A. Cardillo, with whom, on the brief, was

Tiffany K. Spinella, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, Chestnut Point Realty, LLC,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing

its real estate tax appeal.1 On appeal to this court, the

plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 12-117a2

required it to

serve its appeal on the defendant, the Town of East

Windsor (town), within two months following notice of

a decision by its Board of Assessment Appeals (board).

More specifically, the plaintiff claims that (1) it met the

filing and service requirements of § 12-117a and (2)

the court failed to distinguish properly the procedural

differences between § 12-117a and common-law civil

actions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to this

appeal. The plaintiff is the owner of real property

located at 171 Main Street in the town. For purposes

of the town’s grand list of October 1, 2012, the town

assessor valued the plaintiff’s property at $1,829,330.

The plaintiff appealed from the assessment to the board

and appeared at a hearing to request a reduction in the

assessment. On April 29, 2013, the board denied the

plaintiff’s request. On May 1, 2013, the assessor mailed

notice of the board’s decision to the plaintiff.3

On June 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed an application in

the Superior Court that was titled ‘‘Complaint,’’ bore a

return date of July 23, 2013, and was accompanied by

a citation and recognizance. On July 10, 2013, a marshal

served the application, citation, and recognizance on

the town and, on July 17, 2013, filed the return of service

in court. On August 14, 2013, the town filed a motion

to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff

had failed to serve the appeal within two months from

the date notice of the board’s decision was mailed. The

parties appeared before the court to argue the town’s

motion to dismiss. The court issued a memorandum of

decision on April 14, 2014, in which it granted the

motion, thus dismissing the plaintiff’s tax appeal.

The court found that the plaintiff had filed a citation

and complaint in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford on June 28, 2013, but did not serve the

town with the citation and complaint until July 10, 2013,

which is beyond the two month period, commencing

May 1, 2013, to take an appeal as required by § 12-117a.

The issue decided by the court was whether ‘‘the act

of filing an application and citation with the court

effects an appeal from the [board] pursuant to § 12-

117a.’’ The court concluded that filing an application

and citation in court does not commence a tax appeal.

In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that

appeals from ‘‘administrative agencies exist only under

statutory authority. . . . A statutory right to appeal

may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance
with the statutory provisions by which it is created.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Raines v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221

Conn. 482, 489, 604 A.2d 819 (1992). Moreover, the court

stated, a tax appeal is a civil action. See Practice Book

§§ 14-54 and 14-65

; see also Branford v. Santa Barbara,

294Conn. 803, 815, 988A.2d 221 (2010)(rules of practice

define tax appeal as civil action). The court concluded

that the plaintiff’s delivery of an application and citation

to the Superior Court did not commence the appeal

process because the appeal process begins with the

service of the citation and complaint on the town. Without proper service of process the town would have no

way of knowing that the plaintiff had brought an action

against it. The court granted the town’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to serve the town within

the two month period for taking an appeal pursuant to

§12-117a. The plaintiff appealed to this court.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that § 12-117a requires the owner of

property to serve the town with the complaint and citation within two months of the board’s notice. The plaintiff’s claim requires us to construe the statute. It is well

established that statutory construction is a question of

law and our review of such questions is plenary. See

Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 127 Conn. App. 739, 743, 16

A.3d 777 (2011), aff’d, 309 Conn. 412, 72 A.3d 13 (2013).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport,

292 Conn. 125, 134, 971 A.2d 24 (2009). We discern no

ambiguities in the language of the statute, and therefore

we do not resort to extratextual evidence.

We begin with the language of the statute at issue.

Branford v. Santa Barbara, supra, 294 Conn. 810. Section 12-117a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person . . .

claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the . . . board

of assessment appeals . . . may, within two months

from the date of the mailing of notice of such action,

make application,in the nature of an appeal therefrom

. . . to the superior court . . . which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town . . . to appear before
said court. Such citation shall be signed by the same

authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the

same time and served and returned in the same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil

action.’’ (Emphasis added.)

‘‘Appeals to courts from administrative agencies exist

only under statutory authority. . . . A statutory right

to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict

compliance with the statutory provisions by which it

is created. . . . Such provisions are mandatory, and,

if not complied with, the appeal is subject to dismissal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New

England Telephone Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 31

Conn. App. 155, 160–61, 623 A.2d 1027 (1993).

The salient language of the statute requires that a

person claiming to be aggrieved by the assessor’s valuation may, within two months, make application to the

Superior Court in the nature of an appeal, which shall

be served and returned in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Nothing in the statute abrogates

the usual requirements that are applicable to the commencement of a civil action.

As the trial court properly noted, a tax appeal is a

civil action. See Branford v. Santa Barbara, supra, 294

Conn. 815. Civil actions are commenced by service of

process. General Statutes § 52-45a; Rios v. CCMC Corp.,

106 Conn. App. 810, 820, 943 A.2d 544 (2008) (‘‘[l]egal

actions in Connecticut are commenced by service of

process’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). General

Statutes § 52-91 provides in relevant part: ‘‘There shall

be one form of civil action. The first pleading on the

part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint

. . . .’’ See also Board of Education v. Tavares Pediatric Center, 276 Conn. 544, 557, 888 A.2d 65 (2006) (‘‘title

52 correspondingly defines a civil action, without equivocation, as be[ing] commenced by legal process’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

As the relevant statutes and rules of practice provide,

and as our Supreme Court has held, an administrative

appeal is a civil action. A civil action is commenced by

service of process. ‘‘[A] writ of summons is a statutory

prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action.

. . . A writ of summons is analogous to a citation in

an administrative appeal . . . it is an essential element

to the validity of the jurisdiction of the court.’’(Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New

England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 308 Conn. 180, 190, 61 A.3d 505 (2013). The need

for and purpose of a citation was addressed by our

Supreme Court in Village Creek Homeowners Assn. v.

Public Utilities Commission, 148 Conn. 336, 340, 170

A.2d 732 (1961). A citation ‘‘is a command to a duly

authorized officer to summon the commission and all

parties having an interest adverse to the appellant to

appear in court on a specified day to answer the com-
plaint. The summons is to be by service of true and

attested copies of the complaint and the citation in the

manner provided for the service of civil process. . . .

The citation, signed by competent authority, is the warrant which bestows upon the officer to whom it is

given for service the power and authority to execute

its command.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 338–39.

The plaintiff contends on appeal that there is nothing

in the statute that links the two month deadline with

service of process because § 12-117a is described in

terms of an application and an appeal rather than a

complaint. We disagree. The statute provides that an

application shall be made in the nature of an appeal

and that the appeal shall be served and returnable as

required in the case of a summons in a civil action.

The plaintiff, however, has isolated the words ‘‘make

application’’ from the words ‘‘in the same manner as is

required in case of a summons in a civil action.’’ The

two sets of words are connected in the statute by the

intervening words ‘‘served and returned.’’ Moreover,

the plaintiff further isolates the statutory requirements

by viewing them chronologically when they must be

applied as a unified whole. The words of a statute must

be read in the context ofthe entire statute. See Wiseman

v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004).

The parties correctly note that no appellate court

has decided the precise question raised in the present

appeal.6 The judges of the Superior Court, however,

‘‘uniformly have held that service on the defendant

determines the time at which an appeal is deemed to

have been filed.’’ Greenwich New Englander Motor

Motel Association, L.P. v. Greenwich, Superior Court,

judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford,

Docket No. CV-94-0139502-S (April 7, 1995). Our

research has disclosed more than fifty cases in which

the judges of the Superior Court have determined that

the time a tax appeal is filed is determined by the date

service of process is made on the defendant. See, e.g.,

id.; Ghent v. Greenwich, Superior Court, judicial district

of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-94-

0139416-S (April 4, 1995); Cooper v. Board of Tax

Review, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,

Docket No. CV-94-313781-S (August 18, 1994), aff’d, 37

Conn. App. 914, 655 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 233 Conn.

916, 659 A.2d 185 (1995); Cohen v. Morris, Superior

Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV0059778-S (August 18, 1992); Hall v. Goshen, Superior

Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV0056240-S (October 23, 1991) (6 C.S.C.R. 1025) (5 Conn.

L. Rptr. 614); see also Gregersen v. Wilton, Superior

Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-89-0100691-S (December 18, 1989)

(5 C.S.C.R. 119) (1 Conn. L. Rptr. 111) (appeal initiated

by service of process on secretary of commission, citing

Valley Cable Vision, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 175 Conn. 30, 31, 392 A.2d 485 [1978]).7
We recognize that an appellate court is not bound by

the decisions of a trial court, butthe trial court decisions

cited in the previous paragraph and similar others are

compelling evidence that the legislature intended that

an appeal from the decision of a tax review board is

commenced by service of process, as in civil actions.

This is so because the ‘‘legislature is presumed to be

aware of the interpretation of a statute and . . . its

subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation. . . . This presumption is

strengthened when the legislature has affirmatively

reenacted the statute after the interpretation in question.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jolly, Inc. v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 200–201, 676

A.2d 831 (1996). Apart from modifying the language of

the statute to state that the appeal period commences

when notice of the board’s decision is mailed, the legislature has not otherwise changed the language of the

statute at issue in this appeal. See footnote 7 of this

opinion.

In the present case, the court determined that the

plaintiff’s delivery of its application and citation to the

Superior Court did not commence the appeal process,

noting that the appeal process begins with the service

of the citation and complaint on the town. The court

found that the plaintiff had failed to do so within two

months of notice of the board’s decision. We agree with

the trial court that § 12-117a requires that the application to appeal from a decision of the board is to be

made within two months of notice of the decision. The

plaintiff did not serve the town until July 10, 2013, which

is undisputed. The court, therefore, properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s appeal as the appeal was not commenced

in the time required by § 12-117a.

In addition to the clear language of the statute, we

note that there are public policy reasons for the two

month time limit in § 12-117a, namely, government’s

need for fiscal certainty. See Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 15, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999)

(municipality, like any government entity, needs to

know tax base with reasonable certainty). Statutes provide property owners with relief from valuations placed

on their property by assessors by way of ‘‘an appeal to

the board of relief, and from it to the courts . . . .

These statutes limit to a short period the time within

which the property owner can seek relief under them,

and the purpose of this is undoubtedly to prevent delays

in the ultimate determination of the amounts a municipality can collect as taxes.’’ (Citations omitted.) Cohn

v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 702, 37 A.2d 237 (1944).

In its analysis of § 12-117a, the plaintiff trips over the

word application. In doing so, the plaintiff relies on

Boltuch v. Rainaud, 137 Conn. 298, 77 A.2d 94 (1950),

where the word application appears in the controlling
statute in that case.8 Boltuch is distinguishable from the

present case because it concerns motions to vacate,

modify or correct an arbitration award. Id., 298–99.

Applications to confirm an arbitration award are special

proceedings, not civil actions authorized by statute and,

therefore, do not require the service of process. In Boltuch, service of a citation was not necessary as the

application was made when it was filed in court. Id.,

301.

The plaintiff also claims that the court failed to properly distinguish the procedural differences between

§ 12-117a and the commencement of common-law

actions as explained in Boltuch. The plaintiff argues

that if ‘‘§ 12-177a required a plaintiff to commence a

tax appeal in the exact same manner as a typical civil

action, then the statute simply would have instructed

the taxpayerto ‘commence an action within two months

in the usual manner of a civil action.’ If that were the

case, then the service would have to occur within two

months, but the filing would happen afterward.’’ The

plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. The issue in this

appeal is whether the plaintiff’s appeal was timely commenced. A tax appeal is a civil action; such actions are

commenced when civil process is served.

The plaintiff failed to serve the town within two

months from the date notice of the board’s decision was

mailed. We, therefore, conclude that the court properly

granted the town’s motion to dismiss the appeal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 This case was heard in conjunction with Kettle Brook Realty, LLC v.

East Windsor, 158 Conn. App. 576, A.3d (2015). Although the two

cases are similar, they were considered separately and have been

reported separately.

2 General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person . . .

claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the . . . board of assessment

appeals . . . may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice

of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom . . .

to the superior court . . . which shall be accompanied by a citation to such

town . . . to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the

same authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and

served and returned in the same manner as is required in case of a summons

in a civil action. . . .’’

3

In its brief on appeal, the plaintiff directs us to a statement that appears

at the bottom of the notice, to wit: ‘‘Appeals from the decision of the Board

of Assessment Appeals are to be filed with the Superior Court within two

(2) months of the Board’s action.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff

contends that the statement is consistent with our Supreme Court’s directive

in Boltuch v. Rainaud, 137 Conn. 298, 77 A.2d 94 (1950). We need not

consider the statement at the bottom of the town’s notice. The plaintiff’s

appeal is controlled by § 12-117a.

4 Practice Book § 14-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the purposes of

these rules, administrative appeals are those appeals taken pursuant to

statute from decisions of . . . boards . . . of any political subdivision of

the state, and include specifically appeals taken pursuant to . . . (3) . . .

enabling legislation.’’

5 Practice Book § 14-6 provides in relevant part: ‘‘For purposes of these

rules, administrative appeals are civil actions subject to the provisions

and exclusions of General Statutes § 4-183 et seq. and the Practice Book.

Whenever these rules refer to civil actions . . . the reference shall include
administrative appeals . . . .’’

6

In Mary Catherine Development Co. v. Glastonbury, 42 Conn. App. 318,

319–20, 679 A.2d 52 (1996), the sole issue raised was when the two month

appeal period commenced. General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-117a provided in pertinent part ‘‘may, within two months from the time of such

action, make application . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 Section 12-117a previously was codified as General Statutes § 12-118.

See Timber Trails Associates v. New Fairfield, 226 Conn. 407, 411 n.8, 627

A.2d 932 (1993)(legislative history of § 12-117a). With respect to the Superior

Court cases cited in this opinion, the relevant language from General Statutes

(Rev. to 1989) § 12-118 and continued through various Public Acts provided

as follows: ‘‘Any person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the

board of tax review in any town or city, may within two months from the

time of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom,

to the superior court . . . .’’

8

‘‘Any [such] application . . . shall be heard in the manner provided by

law for hearing written motions at short calendar session, or otherwise as

the court or judge may direct to dispose of the case with the least possible

delay. This indicates that notice of the pendency of the application or motion

should be given but that it may be of the most informal character and should

be prompt.’’ Boltuch v. Rainaud, supra, 137 Conn. 300. At the time Boltuch

was decided, the statute was codified as General Statutes § 8161 and is now

General Statutes § 52-418.