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The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2529

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Missouri. 

Stanley Harris, Jr., * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: June 2, 1999

 Filed: June 10, 1999

___________

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit

Judges. 

___________

PER CURIAM.

Stanley Harris, Jr., pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court1

sentenced Harris to 188 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. This

appeal followed. After counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
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 386 U.S. 738 (1967), we granted Harris permission to file a pro se supplemental brief.

We now grant counsel&s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

In his Anders brief, counsel first suggests that the district court erred by applying

a two-level increase for possession of firearms under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998). However, a firearm-possession enhancement “should

be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon

was connected with the offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1,

comment. (n.3) (1998). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by

finding, based on uncontested facts in the presentence report (PSR), that the weapon

found with drugs in a kitchen cabinet was sufficiently connected with the offense. See

United States v. Howard, 169 F.3d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1999) (standard of review);

United States v. LaRoche, 83 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (district court

may accept as true all factual allegations contained in PSR not specifically objected to

by parties); see also United States v. Payne, 81 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1996) (temporal

and spatial nexus between drugs and weapon existed where weapon was found in same

location as drugs or where part of conspiracy took place). 

Counsel also suggests that the district court erred in calculating Harris&s criminal

history score. Having reviewed the calculations based on uncontested information in

the PSR, we conclude the district court did not clearly err. See U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.1(b), 4A1.2(a)(2), 4A1.2(k)(1) & comment. (n.3) (1998);

United States v. Milton, 153 F.3d 891, 897 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

1082 (1999); see also United States v. Bartolotta, 153 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 1998)

(standard of review), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999). 

As for Harris&s pro se assertions that his counsel was ineffective, the record is

undeveloped on that issue and this appeal does not warrant departure from the general

rule that ineffective-assistance claims should be presented in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

proceeding. See United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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Finally, we have reviewed the record for any nonfrivolous issues and have found

none. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Accordingly, the judgment is

affirmed. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.