Filed 7/22/15 Steiger v. Steiger CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

LEE STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PAUL STEIGER, as Cotrustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D066774

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00072651-

PR-TR-CTL)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia C. Kelety, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Lee Steiger, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Van Dyke & Associates, Richard S. Van Dyke and James A. Bush for Defendant 

and Respondent.

The trial court found that a document appearing to amend the Louise A. Steiger

Trust Dated May 11, 1990 (Trust) had not been properly delivered pursuant to the Trust's

requirements and thus, was not a valid amendment. If valid, it would have made Lee 
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Steiger (Lee) the Trust's sole beneficiary as opposed to beneficiaries in equal shares with 

his brother, Paul Steiger (Paul). Lee, appearing in propria persona, appeals contending 

there were procedural irregularities leading to the trial court's decision and the 

amendment was effectively delivered. We reject Lee's contentions and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed. In 1990, Louise A. Steiger (Louise) created the 

Trust through a written agreement, defining herself as the Donor and Trustee. The 

agreement generally provided for payments of income to Louise during her lifetime and,

at her death, distribution of the remaining estate "in equal shares to her issue," i.e., her 

sons Lee and Paul. Louise reserved the right to amend the Trust "at any time or times, by 

notice in writing delivered to the Trustee, and such amendment or modification shall be 

effective immediately upon delivery to the Trustee. . . ." The Trust agreement further

provided, "The word 'Trustee' as used herein shall be interpreted to mean Trustee or 

Trustees, whichever shall be appropriate[,]" and it "shall be construed for all purposes in

accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey."

The Trust was amended in 2000 and 2006. Under the 2000 amendment, Paul

became a cotrustee with Louise. Under the 2006 amendment, Louise resigned as 

cotrustee, and Lee became a successor cotrustee with Paul. Neither amendment affected 

the beneficiaries of the Trust.

In March 2010, Louise signed a document titled, "Official Instruction For Trusts 

and Funds in the Name of Louise A. Steiger" (2010 Instruction). It partially instructed
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for the Trust to "have Lee F. Steiger as the only beneficiary." Prior to Louise's death, the 

2010 Instruction was delivered to Lee, but not Paul. In April 2011, Louise died. 

In November 2013, Lee filed a petition in San Diego County Superior Court to 

determine the Trust beneficiaries, which was the first time the 2010 Instruction was 

delivered to Paul. The case proceeded with both parties represented by counsel. In early 

July 2014, the court set a September 18, 2014, hearing for oral argument on the legal 

issue of whether the 2010 Instruction constituted a valid Trust amendment, and ordered 

briefs to be filed on the issue by September 15, 2014. Both Lee and Paul timely filed 

briefs. As scheduled, the court heard argument by counsel and issued an order, which 

found in part: (1) the Trust's amendment requirements must be construed under New 

Jersey law; (2) any amendment was required to be delivered to Paul; (3) the 2010 

Instruction was not timely delivered to Paul, who was cotrustee; and therefore, (4) it was 

not a valid amendment to the Trust.1

DISCUSSION

I

Lee asserts a litany of "irregular circumstances" surrounded the trial court hearing, 

including: (1) his counsel did not file a brief, (2) the hearing occurred in the context of a 

case management conference rather than a "trial," (3) the court ordered simultaneous 

briefs, (4) he was not asked to sign a "verification" in connection with the hearing, (5) he 

 

1 Lee also appeals a second order dated September 18, 2014, where, following the 

trial court's rejection of Lee as the sole beneficiary, it directed a preliminary distribution 

to each beneficiary, Paul and Lee. Lee assigns no separate error to the court's second 

order apart from his contention that the 2010 Instruction was an effective amendment. 
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did not attend the hearing because his counsel did not inform him of it, (6) he had 

insufficient time to research New Jersey law, (7) there was no court reporter present, and 

(8) he was not allowed to present an argument, due to judicial impartiality or corruption. 

Lee's assertions are frivolous, contradicted by the record, and/or do not constitute 

grounds for reversal. The court was well within its discretion to set the briefing schedule 

and hearing that it did, which provided sufficient notice of the legal issue to be decided

and over two months of preparation time. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) 

Indeed, Lee's counsel signed and filed a coherent six-page brief entitled, "Lee Steiger's 

Memorandum on Issue of Whether March 7, 2010 Instrument Satisfied Technical 

Formalities for an Amendment to the Trust."2 A "verification" of the brief was not

required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 446, subd. (a).) Further, Lee admits his counsel appeared

at the hearing and, therefore, his personal attendance was not necessary. Finally, it was 

the parties' responsibility to arrange for a court reporter if one was desired. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 2.956(c) [court reporting services in civil cases].) Lee has failed to establish 

any reversible error on procedural grounds.

II

We now consider whether the 2010 Instruction was a valid amendment to the 

Trust. The interpretation of a trust instrument is a question of law subject to independent 

 

2 The memorandum was submitted as part of Paul's motion to augment the record 

on appeal. Lee filed a "Motion to Deny Respondent's Motion to Augment the Record," 

arguing that the augmented record was fabricated. Lee's "motion" is meritless and 

denied. The documents attached to Paul's motion to augment are deemed a part of the 

record on appeal.
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review when the relevant facts are undisputed. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 

598, 604.) On appeal, the parties agree the Trust's provisions are to be construed under 

New Jersey law. 

When called upon to interpret a trust, New Jersey courts aim to ascertain the 

settlor's intentions. To do so, the " 'primary inquiry' must be directed to 'the language of 

the instrument itself.' " (In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961 

(N.J. 2001) 765 A.2d 746, 755.) If the trust language is clear, and no ambiguity is 

asserted, the court confines itself to giving effect to the language used. (Ibid.; see also

Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Parfner (N.J. Ch. 1944) 37 A.2d 675, 678 ["The intention of the 

settlor, as expressed in the trust instrument, governs."].) 

Here, the Trust agreement provided as follows: "Donor reserves the right to 

amend, modify or revoke this trust, in whole or in part, or to withdraw assets therefrom, 

at any time or times, by notice in writing delivered to the Trustee[s], and such 

amendment or modification shall be effective immediately upon delivery to the 

Trustee[s]. . . ." Although Lee concedes that the Trust's language required any 

amendment to be delivered to Paul (a cotrustee), he argues delivery can be made "at any 

time," including in 2013 well after Louise's death. We disagree, and find that Louise's 

power of amendment had to be exercised in the manner specified during her lifetime. 

Notably, the Trust agreement expressly required the Trustees make an estate 

distribution "[u]pon the death of the Donor," which, as a corollary, necessitated the 

beneficiaries be ascertained as of that time. We are mindful of the Trust's overriding 

purpose, which was to sustain Louise's lifetime income and, at her death, provide an 
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orderly estate distribution to her surviving children. This purpose would be entirely 

frustrated if amendments could go into effect years after her death. In comparable New 

Jersey cases involving inter vivos trusts, donors were required to exercise the right of 

revocation or modification during their lifetimes. (See, e.g., In re Estate of Kovalyshyn 

(N.J. Super. 1975) 343 A.2d 852, 856-857 [where change in beneficiary required a 

delivered instrument in writing to the bank, right to modify trust was an inter vivos power 

that could not be exercised by an executed will]; In re Estate of Henning (N.J. Super. Ct. 

Ch. Div. 1971) 282 A.2d 786, 788 [a will that did not have legal efficacy until after 

donor's death could not revoke or modify trust].) 

Moreover, to the extent the 2010 Instruction purported to direct payments from the 

Trust estate solely to Lee, it was required to comply with Article Second of the Trust 

agreement, which granted Louise a right to direct payments from principal (in whole or 

part), "by instruments in writing, signed by the Donor and delivered by the Donor to the 

Trustee[s] during the lifetime of the Donor." Naturally, directing the payment of

principal could also have operated as a revocation or modification of the Trust, and any 

such instruction had to be delivered to the Trustees during Louise's lifetime.

Louise did not deliver the 2010 Instruction to Paul during her lifetime, and Lee 

admits it was not delivered to Paul until several years after Louise's death. Accordingly, 

the 2010 Instruction was not an effective direction or amendment to the Trust. For the 

first time on appeal, Lee makes unsubstantiated factual arguments concerning why he 

was obligated to keep it secret from Paul prior to Louise's death. We do not consider 
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those arguments, and even if they were substantiated, would only confirm that the 2010 

Instruction was purposely withheld from delivery during Louise's lifetime. 

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on appeal.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

MCINTYRE, J.