J-S36036-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

FLOYD RIVER AND DARLENE RIVER, HIS 

WIFE; AND JAMES P. LAPINSKI AND 

ADELAIDE LAPINSKI, HIS WIFE AND 

VERONICA J. BELL,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

DENNIS KNOTT AND LINDA KNOTT, HIS 

WIFE, 

Appellees No. 2062 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County

Civil Division at No.: 2011-1944-Civil

BEFORE: PANELLA, JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2015

Floyd and Darlene River, James and Adelaide Lapinski, and Veronica 

Bell (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the decree entered in favor of 

Dennis and Linda Knott (Appellees) in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Armstrong County, denying injunctive relief in the form of ordering the 

removal of a fence. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction, we vacate the decree and remand for further 

proceedings.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

The Knotts own property located immediately behind the Rivers’ property, in 
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Armstrong County. Bell’s property is situated immediately next door to the 

Rivers’ property, and the Lapinskis own property immediately adjacent to 

the Bell property.1 

The true genesis of the case dates back to 1995, when the trial court 

rendered a decision with respect to an easement located on the Knotts’ 

property, then owned by predecessors-in-title Kramer E. and Susan M. 

Wolfe.2 Adjudication, 8/6/2014, at 2. The trial court summarized the 

pertinent parts of the 1995 decision as follows.

The [c]ourt adjudicated in that case that an 8-foot-wide 

easement had arisen by virtue of adverse use. In Finding of Fact 

#13 of said adjudication, the [c]ourt found that the easement 

“extend[ed] from an alley ... [and] across the eastern-most

portions of the Wolfe and Donnell parcels and through the 

Schweinberg parcel.” In Part II of the [c]ourt’s discussion in that 

case, the [c]ourt explicitly stated that the roadway then in use 

and over which the easement existed was “a narrow strip of 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court, as part of its Findings of Fact, incorporated a rough diagram 

of the properties and garage pertinent to the lawsuit. A copy of that 

diagram, modified to show more obviously the areas at issue, is attached to 

this memorandum as Annex A. 

2 That action was docketed at No. 1993-1666-Civil, and captioned Eleanor 

Lecollier, David Lapata and Veronica Jean Bell, Plaintiffs v. Kramer E. 

Wolfe and Susan W. Wolfe, husband and wife, William A. and 

Frances Donnell, his wife, and Raymond J. Schweinberg and Linda 

Schweinberg, Defendants. Importantly, while the property in question in 

1995 is the same property at issue in this case, the parties are not: only one 

party—Bell, a plaintiff in 1995—appears as an appellant today. Nor are the 

Donnells, defendants in the 1995 action, party to this case. Moreover, the 

1995 action occurred before the Knotts or Lapinskis purchased their 

properties (the Lapinskis are successors-in-interest to the Schweinbergs), 

and was decided by Judge Kenneth Valasek, who was also the trial judge in 

the instant case. 
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grassy land along the boundaries of the Wolfe and Donnell 

properties, and a path across the corner of the Schweinberg 

property.” The Order accompanying the said adjudication barred 

the Wolfes from interfering with the lawful use of the easement 

by Plaintiffs in that action.

Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original). 

The events giving rise to the current appeal involve a dispute between 

the Knotts and the Rivers, and the trial court summarized as follows.

On July 11, 2011, the Knotts erected a wooden fence on 

their [] land approximately 36 inches from and parallel to the 

River/Knott boundary line. On the Knotts’ side of the fence is a 

gravel driveway, most recently improved and widened by them. 

It is eight and one-half feet wide and runs the entire length of 

the fence and then past the fence towards the Bell [p]roperty. 

The Lapinskis and Bell utilize this driveway for ingress and 

egress to their properties.

The Rivers’ garage is located on their [] side of the 

River/Knott boundary line. The western wall of the garage is 

located near, but not on, the boundary line. The western wall is 

not exactly parallel to the boundary line. The southwest corner 

of the garage sits about three inches away from the boundary 

line. The northwest corner is located approximately ten inches 

from the line. A utility pole is located near the southwest corner 

of the garage.

There is evidence indicating that a strip of land 

immediately west of the garage has been used by the Rivers and 

their predecessors in title for the storage of firewood and, at 

various times, for storage of unused lumber, a wheelbarrow, a 

lawn tractor cart, an 18-foot long canoe, an extension ladder and 

sundry other items. 

Id. at 3-4. 

Appellants filed a complaint on December 8, 2011, requesting a 

permanent injunction foreclosing the Knotts from interfering with their use of 

and access to the easement, as well as requiring the removal of the fence. 
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Appellants filed timely an amended complaint on June 5, 2012, asserting an 

easement by prescription for the storage of firewood and other materials. A 

non-jury trial occurred on July 8, 2014, and, despite finding itself “without 

subject matter jurisdiction to determine what rights, if any, the Rivers have 

in and to the Knott Property,” the court entered an adjudication and decree 

in favor of the Knotts on August 6, 2014. Adjudication, 8/6/2014, at 10.

Appellants filed a motion for post-trial relief on August 15, 2014, which 

was denied on November 19, 2014. A final judgment was entered by 

praecipe on December 16, 2014, and a notice of appeal was timely filed that 

same day. On February 17, 2015, the court filed an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P 1925(a). 

On appeal, Appellants present the following questions for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court commit an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion by failing to enforce a finding of fact established in 

prior litigation that [the Knott] property was burdened by an 

easement that was eight feet in width which was located at the 

eastern-most boundary of [the Knott] property when the record 

showed that the entire spite fence was located within eight feet 

of the eastern-most boundary of [the Knott] property?

2. Did the [trial] court commit an error of law by considering 

matters not of record in making its determination?

3. Did the [trial] court commit an error of law in dismissing [] 

Appellants’ case by raising sua sponte and then deciding that [] 

Appellants failed to join an indispensable party when [] 

Appellants’ cause of action did not and could not affect such 

party’s rights as established in the earlier litigation?

Appellants’ Brief at 4 (trial court answers omitted). 

Because the failure to join an indispensable party deprives a court of 
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jurisdiction, Barren v. Dubas, 441 A.2d 1315, 316 (Pa. Super. 1982), we 

begin and end our analysis with Appellants’ third issue. 

Generally, a party is indispensable when:

his or her rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants 

that no Decree can be made without impairing those rights. 

Also, a party is said to be indispensable when he has such an 

interest that a final decree cannot be made without affecting it, 

or leaving the controversy in such a condition that the final 

determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good 

conscience. The absence of an indispensable party goes to the 

court’s jurisdiction and prevents it from granting relief. 

The basic inquiry in determining whether a party is 

indispensable concerns whether justice can be done in the 

absence of him or her. We also consider the following:

1. Do absent parties have a right of interest related to the 

claim?

2. If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?

3. Is that right or interest essential to the merits of the 

issue?

4. Can justice be afforded without violating the due 

process rights of absent parties?

In re Estate of Moore, 871 A.2d 196, 202-203 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citations and quotations omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court explicitly determined it had “no 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged claims of the Rivers,” finding Lecollier, 

one of the plaintiffs in the prior action and beneficiary of the easement, to be 

an indispensable party. Adjudication, 8/6/2014, at 8-9. Nonetheless, it 

entered a decree “in favor of both Defendants on all counts set forth in 
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Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.” Decree, 8/6/2014. While the trial court’s 

jurisdictional determination is sound, the decree is procedurally deficient. 

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1032, “[w]henever it 

appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that ... there has been a 

failure to join an indispensable party, the court shall order ... that the 

indispensable party be joined, but if that is not possible, then it shall dismiss 

the action.” See also In re Adoption of W.C.K., 748 A.2d 223, 227 (Pa. 

Super. 2000) (“The power of a court to review subject matter jurisdiction at 

any time during a proceeding is found in [Rule 1032(b)].”). 

Departing briefly from the procedural inadequacies, we agree with the 

trial court’s classification of Lecollier as an indispensable party. Appellants 

contend that their claim “in no way impacts the rights of Lecollier” because 

the Rivers are not claiming exclusivity as to the easement. Appellants’ Brief 

at 16-17. The argument of exclusivity is misplaced.3

The trial court found Eleanor Lecollier to be an indispensable party by 

virtue of her prescriptive easement acquired in 1995.4 The court explained 

the nature of Lecollier’s interest as follows. 

The Rivers also assert that they have an easement by 

prescription for the storage of firewood, including the legal right 

to reach the entire stack along the length of the garage by wheel 

barrow, tractor cart, and perhaps even by truck. By inference, 

____________________________________________

3 To quote the Appellees: “pure poppycock.” Appellees’ Brief at 11. 

4 Adjudication, 8/21/1995, at 8. 
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this alleged right to use land could extend four to six feet out 

onto the Knott Property. This position ... results in a narrowing of 

the easement. 

Adjudication, 8/6/2014, at 8.

Lecollier’s interest in maintaining access to her property by 

prescriptive easement is essential to the merits of the instant case, as the 

Rivers’ request for a prescriptive easement for the storage of firewood would 

undoubtedly interfere with Lecollier’s access to the roadway. The Rivers 

claim that removal of the fence would be consistent with the 1995 

adjudication, without addressing their additional easement claim for the 

storage of firewood. Appellants’ Brief at 16. Allowing the case to proceed 

without Lecollier would deprive her of due process. Accordingly, we agree 

with the trial court that Lecollier is an indispensable party.

For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

adjudicate Appellants’ claims. Accordingly, we vacate the August 6, 2014 

decree and remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, we direct 

the trial court to effectuate one of the two remedies prescribed by Rule 

1032(b) (i.e., joinder of the indispensable party or dismissal of the action).

Decree vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished. 
J-S36036-15

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2015
J-S36036-15 

ANNEX A 

Prescriptive easement (path of roadway), 

as noted in the 1995 Adjudication. 

Current parties in bold print. 

Owners in 1993 -95 in parentheses. 

Parties to 1993 lawsuit underlined. 

Kno 1r leno, 

Wolfe) -~ --.... alley 

River 

(Land) iJ 

, ! Ptar,ntrffs La ata & Belt 

Bell 

I 

yl 

Road 

Lapinski (Defendants Schwernber 

(Plaintiffs 

LecoiJier `---_ 

t. 

J-S36036-15

 

ANNEX A 

 Prescriptive easement (path of roadway), 

 as noted in the 1995 Adjudication.