UN IT ED ST AT ES CO URT O F A PP EA LS FO R V ET ER AN S C LA IMS
N O . 05-3184 KEV I N J. R OSENBERG , A P P EL LA NT ,

V . G ORDO N H. M ANSFI ELD , A CT I NG S ECR ETA RY OF V ETER A N S A FF AI RS , A PP ELL EE . On Ap pe al f rom the Bo ard

of Ve ter an s' Ap pe als (Argued August 21, 2007 Decided November 28, 2007 )

Ke vin J. Ro sen be rg , pro s e . Brian P. Tierny , with whom Pa u l J

. Hu tte r , Ge ne ralCo un sel ; R. Ra nd all Ca mp be ll , As sis tant G en era l C ouns el; Br ian B. R ipp el , Deputy Assistant General Counsel ; and Ella K ra ins ky , Appellate Att orney, were on the br ief, all of Washington D.C., for the appellee. Before GREEN E, Chief Judge , and KASOLD and LANCE, Ju dges . LANCE, Judge , filed the opi nion of the Court. KASOLD, Judge , filed a concurring opi nion. LANCE, Judge : The appellant, Kevin J. Rosenberg, an a ttorn eya cting on his own behal f, appeals a Jul y 15, 2005, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board). Recor d (R.) at 1-10. In that dec ision, the Boar d denie d his claim for bas ic e ducational assi stance under38 U.S.C. § 3011. For the reas ons set forth bel ow, the Board's July 2005 decision wil l be affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND In August 19 92 , th e ap pe llant j oin ed the Un ive rsi ty o f Ariz on a' s N av al R ese rve Of fi cer Tr ain ingC orp s (N RO TC ) a s a Co lle ge P rogram B asi c stu de nt. R. at 4 0. In Ju ly 19 93 , th e S ecr etary of the U.S. Navy, acting pursuant to his authority under 10 U .S.C. § 2107, selected the appellantfor anN RO TC s ch olarsh ip. R. at 1 7, 3 3. Th e fo llo wi ngm onth, th e ap pe llant signe d an NROTC Sc ho lar sh ip S erv ice Agree m ent, t he ter m s o f whic h offi cia llyrec og niz ed his ap po intm ent as a2

section 2107 midshipman and his entitl ement to three years of financi al a ssistanc e. R. at 17-20. That assist ance total ed $3,675 in 1993, $7,350 in 1994, and $3,989 in 1995. R. at21. In D ece m be r 1996, af

ter su cce ssf ull y c om ple tin g th e N RO TC pro gram , th e ap pe llant w as commissioned as an ensi gn in the U.S. Navy. That sa me m onth, he also signed a DD Form 2366, a st ate m ent of

un de rst an din g w ithres pe ct t o h is " eli gib ili ty t o p art icipate i n the V ete ran s' Educational Assi stance Act of 1984 (New GI Bill) ," where inthe appell ant acknowledged that he wa s an "R OT C sch olarsh ip gra du ate " and h en ce "N OTE LI GI BL E" f or b asi c ed

uc ati on al a ssi stanc e under Chapter 30, t itle 38, U.S. Code. R. at 23. He served hon or ab lyi n th e U.S . Navy from December 1996 until December 2000. R. at 4, 14-15. In April 2001, the appellant applied for basic educational assistanc e under 38 U.S.C. § 3011 for the cost of atte nding law school. R. at 25-27. VA denied that claim, and the appell ant appeale d. R. a t 2 9. InAug us t 2 00 1, wh i l e h is ap pe al wa s s ti ll pe nd in g, th e app el lantenro ll edas a fu ll -t ime stu de nt at th e Y esh iva

Un ive rsi ty, Be njam in C ard oz o S ch oo l of L awin N ewY ork , N ewYo rk. In January 2002, VA reverse d its original deci sion and iss ued the appel lant a "Certificate of Eligibility" for 36 m onths of Chapter 30 educat ional benefits . R. at 55. In February 2003, the U.S. Navy recalled the appellant to active duty. R . 69-75. This change in m ilitary status prompted VA to discontinue his Chapter 30 e ducational benefits. R. at 5. In June 2003, one month after his releas e from active duty, VA recei ved the appellant 's request for rei ns tit uti on of his Ch ap ter

30 ed uc ati on al b en ef

its . R . at 61 -62 . In Oc tob er 2 00 3, the RO no tif ied the app ell ant th at tho se b en ef its ha d b een

ter m inated , e ff

ect ive Au gu st 2 7, 20 01 , b eca us e h e h ad received more than $3,400 in financ ial assi stance annual ly duri ng h is p arti cipation i n the secti on 2107 NROTC scholarshi p program. R. at 89-90. While his appeal of thatdecision was pendi ng, the S e c re tary w a iv e d th e $ 1 1 , 1 0 9
. 3 3 d e b t th e a p p e ll ant h a d

a c c ru e d a s a r e s u lt o f th e o v e rp aym ent in Chapter 30 educat ional benefits he receive d during his first four sem esters of law school . R. at 142- 43. The Secretary als o gr an ted $3,643.83 i n additional equitable relief, an amount equal to the Ch ap ter 30 e du cat ion al be ne fi ts that t he a pp ell ant, if

eli gib le, wo uld

have rec eiv ed

durin g th e F all 2003 semester. R. at 151. In July 2005, the Boar d iss ue d the decisi on here on appeal . The Board found that the ap pe llant w as not e nti tle d to Ch ap ter 30 ed uc ati on al b en ef

its be cau se h e h ad

rec eiv ed m ore than $3,400 in financial as si stance annual ly during his partici pation in the section 2107 NROTCSe ct i on 21 07 of t i t l e 10 , U
. S. Code , e s t ab l i s he s a " [ f ] i na nc i al a s s i s t an ce pr og r am f or s pe ci al l y s el ec t ed 1 m em bers. " It provides t hat t he Se cret ary of t he m i l i t ary depa r t m ent con cerned m ay, s ub j ect t o cert ai n ag e r est r i ct i on s, spe ci al l y s el ect a c i t i zen or nat i onal of t he U ni t ed St at es f

or appoi nt m ent as a cad et or m i dshi pm an i n t he r es er ve com ponent of

t he ar m ed f

or ces under hi s j ur i sdi ct i on. 10 U
. S. C
. § 2107( a)

- ( b)
. O nce t he s t at ut or i l y- r equi r ed c ont r act i s ex ec u t ed , an ap p o i n t ee t h en be co m es eli g i b l e t o rec eiv e fi n an cial assistan ce for "t u i t i o n , fee s, bo o k s, an d l ab o ratory e x p e n se s," o r, in c e rta in c irc u m sta n c e s, fo r ro o m a n d b o a rd . 10 U .S .C . § 2 1 0 7 (c )(1 ), (c)(3 ). 3 sch olarsh ip p rogram . R . at 7- 9. Th e B oard f urt he r f ound that it ha d n o le ga l autho rity to grant an equitable award of

Chapter 30 educational benefits. R. at 9 ( ci ti ng Harvey v. Brown , 6 Vet.App. 416, 425 (1994)).
II. AN AL YS IS The appellantargues thatthe Secretary's interpr etation of 38 U.S.C. § 3011 is incorrect and that, even i f his interpr etation is c orrect, equitable est oppel bars the termination of his Chapter30 educational benefits. Appellant 's Brief (Br.) at 5- 9. The Secre tary res ponds that the plain meaning of 38 U. S. C. § 3 01 1 b ars the a pp ell ant f rom rec eiv ingba sic ed

uc ati on al a ssi stanc e an d th at the re i s no merit, therefore, to hi s equitabl e estoppel argument. Secretary's Br. at 6-11.

A. 38 U.S.C. § 3011(c)(3) and 10 U.S.C. § 2107 Se cti on3 0 1 1 o f

ti tl e 3 8 , U
. S
. C o d e , is th e e nti tl e m e nt p ro v is io nf o r b a s ic e d

u c ati on al assistance. Se e3 8 C
. F
. R
. § 2 1
. 7 0 4 0 (2 00 7); se e also Burton v. Nichol son , 19 Vet.App. 249, 251 (2005) (dis cussing the hi story of veterans educationa l assist ance). Subsection (c )(3) of secti on 3011 sets forth the e ligibil ity requirements for veterans who have r eceived financi al assis tance pursuant to 1 0 U .S .C . § 21 07
. It s tat es: 1 (3) An indivi du al wh o af

ter D ece m be r 3 1, 19 76 , re cei ve s a c om m iss ion as an o ff ice r in the Arm ed

F orc es up on

c om ple tio n of a p rogram o f e du cat ion al a ssi stanc e und er section 2107 of tit le 10 is not e ligible for educ at io na l assist ance under thi s section if the individua l enters on active duty- (A) before October 1, 1996; or (B ) af ter Se pte m be r 30 , 1 99 6, an d whil e p art icipatin g in su chpro gram

rec eiv ed more than $3,400 for each year of such parti cipation. 38 U .S .C
. § 30 11 (c) (3)
. Th e ap pe llant c om ple ted a se cti on 21 07 pro gram

of ed uc ati on al a ssi stanc e, was commissioned as an ensign in the U.S. N avy and entered active duty after September 30, 1996, and receive d more than $3,400 during each of his three years as a section 2107 midshipman. The issue here is whether the appellantis e ligible for Chapter 30 educat ional benefits because he did not4

rec eiv e an

y s ect ion 21 07 fi nanc ialass ist an ce whil e part icipatin g in the NROT C C oll eg e P rogram during the 1992- 1993 school year ( SY). "' St atutor y inter pre tat ion be gin s w iththe lan gu ag e o f t he statut e, the p lai n m ean ingof wh ich we de riv e f

rom its text an d it s st

ruc tur e. ' " Myore v. Nichol son, 489 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir . 2007) (quoting McEntee v. M

erit Sys. Prot . Bd. , 40 4 F. 3d 1 32 0, 1 32 8 (F ed
. Ci r. 20 05 )). S ect ion 30 11 states that sect ion 2107 program parti cipants who enter ed act ive duty after Sept ember 30, 1996, and who rec eiv ed m ore than $3 ,4 00 pe r ye ar " while partic ipating in s uch program " ar e n ot e lig ibl e f or b asi c educational assistance. Se e 38 U.S .C . § 30 11 (c) (3) (B ) (e m ph asi s ad de d). Th e ap pe llant argu es t hat he rec eiv ed

no fi na nc ialass ist an ce " wh ile participati ngin an ROTC program" during the 1992- 1993 SY; therefore, he qu alifies for the e ligibil ity except ion. Br. at 5. He further argues thatthe statute intends to pr ovide educati onal benefits t o NROTC mem bers, himself included, who "did not rece ive a f ull , fo ur ye ar sch olarsh ip, " and th at Co ng res s' s de cis ion to in cre ase th e m aximum allowable amount of ROTC educational assist ance from $2,000 to $3,400 in the Veter ans Education an d B en ef

its Expans ion

Ac t (V EB EA ) of

20 01 , P ub . L . 10 7-1 03 , § 1 05 , 1 15 St at. 98 3 (c od if ied in part at 38 U.S.C. §§ 3011, 3012), support s these cont entions. Br. at6-7. Contrary to the appellant 's assertions, the text and structure of the statute make clear that the cla us e "whil e parti cip ati ngin s uc h pro gram " re fe rs o nly to t he sec tio n 2 10 7 p rogram

of ed uc ati on al assistance. See Gardner v. Derwinski, 1 Ve t.A pp . 5 84 , 5 86 (19 91 ) (" De ter m ini nga st atute' s p lai n m ean ingreq

uir es e xam ini ngthe sp eci fi c langua ge at i ssu e an d th e ov era ll str uc tur e of the s tat ute .") , aff'd sub nom. Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993) , aff'd 51 3 U. S. 1 15 (19 94 ); Johnson v. Brown, 9 V et. Ap p. 36 9, 37 1 (1 99 6) ( Whe n "' the pla in m ean ingof a statute is disc ern ibl e, that "plain meaning must be given effect."'" (quoting Tallman v. Brown, 7 Ve t.A pp . 45 3, 46 0 (1 99 5)) ); Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Ve t.A pp . 4 29 , 4 31 (19 92 ) (I f " a re vie wi ngco urt ' fi nd [s ] t he ter m s o f a statut e unambiguous, judicial inqui ry is complete except in r are and except ional cir cumstances.'" (quoting De ma res t v. Man sp ea ker , 498 U.S. 184 (1991))). Th e re co rdshows that the appellant was not "sp eci all y s ele cte d" f

or s ect ion 21 07 ' s f inanc ialass ist an ce pro gram unti l July 1 99 3, and

th at h e d id no t si gn the NROT C S ch olarsh ip S erv ice Agree m ent of fi cia llyrec og niz inghis ap po intm ent as a section 2107 midshipman until August 1993. Thus, his participat ion in the NROTC as a College Pr og ram Ba sic stu de nt d

uri ngthe 19 92 -19 93 SYis s impl y n ot r ele vant t o h is e lig ibi lity f or b asi cA s ect i on 2107 par t i ci pant ' s el i gi bi l i t y f or C hapt er 30 educat i onal benef i t s depe nds on t he amount of f i nanci al 2 as si st ance he ors he r ece i ves dur i ng ea ch s cholar shi p y ear, not on t he t ot al amount of f i nanci al as si st ance r ece i ved or th e a b se n c e o f s u c h a ss ista n c e d u rin g a n o n -s c h o la rs h ip p e rio d . W e a c k n o w le d g e th a t th is in te rp re ta tion o f th e sta tu te m ay pr oduce unf

ai r r es ul t s. For i nst ance , a 4- year s ect i on 2107 r eci pi ent i s el i gi bl e f or addi t i onal C hapt er 30 educ at i onal benef i t s i f , dur i ng any one of

t hose 4 yea r s, he or she r ece i ved $3, 400 or l es s i n f i nanci al ass i st ance . H ow ever , a 2- year se ct i on 2107 s chol ar shi p r eci pi ent i s no t el i gi bl e f or s uch be nef

i t s i f , dur i ng bot h of

t hose 2 yea r s, he ors he r ece i ved $3, 401 i n f

i nanci al as si st anc e. That bei ng s ai d, i t i s t he r es ponsi bi l i t y of C ongr es s, not t he C our t , t o addr es s any u n fa irn e s s in th e sta tu te a s w ritt e n . S e e C ib a -G e ig y C o rp v . U

n ited S ta te s, 22 3 F
. 3d 136 7, 13 73 ( Fe d. C i r . 200 0) ( "It is C o n g re ss ' s ta sk t o ch a n g e t h e w o rd s o f th e sta tu te ."); se e a lso Un ited S ta te s v . M iss o u ri P a c . R .R . C o ., 278 U
. S. 269, 277- 78 ( 1929) ( "I nconveni ence or har dshi ps, i f any, t hat r es ul t f

r om f ol l ow i ng t he s t at ut e a s w r i t t en, m ustbe r el i eved b y l eg i slati o n ."). 5 educational assistance under the s tatute. The appellanthas not ident ified anything i n the legislat ive 2 history that would support acontrary i nterpret ation, seeTran sco Prod s. Inc . v . Perf

orman ce Co ntrac ting, Inc

. , 38 F.3d 551, 556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("When statutory int erpreta tion is atissue, the plain and unambiguous meaning of a st atute prevails in the absence of cle arly expre ssed legis lative int ent t o the c ontra

ry. "), and h e ha s no t de m on str ate d th at o ur a pp lic ati on

of the sam e w ou ld p rod

uc e an absurd res ult. Se e Ga rd ne r , 1 Ve t.A

pp . at 58 7 (n oti ngthe lim ite d "' ab surd r esult' excep tio n to the plain meaning rule "). Therefore, we must rejec t the int erpreta tion urged by the appellanton appeal. See Babbit t v. Oglala Sioux Tri bal Public Safe ty Dep't, 1 9 4 F
. 3 d 1 3 7 4 , 1 3 7 8 (F e d
. Ci r. 1999) (stat ing that " we m ust assume that Congress 'says in a st atute what itmeans and means in a statute what itsays there '" (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 50 3 U .S . 2 49 , 2 54 (19 92 ))) ; Tropf v. Nicholson, 20 Ve t.A

pp . 31 7, 3 21 n .1 (2 00 6) ("[ A] f un cti on ings ys tem

of law s m us t gi ve pri m acy to the plain language of authoriti es . . . Without standard word meanings and rule s of constructi on, ne ith er C on gre ss n or t

he Se cre tar

y c ankn owho w t o writ e authorit ies in a way th at c onve ys the ir int ent and no pra cti tio ne r or–

m oreim po rtantl y–

ve ter ancan re ly on

a statute or

regu lat ion

to m ean wh at i t ap pe ars to s ay .")
. B. Eq uit ab le E sto pp el Th e ap pe llant argue s that eq uit ab le e sto pp el b ars the ter m inatio n o f h is e du cat ion al be ne fi ts, because he detrimentally rel ied on VA's erroneously-is sued January 2002 Certificate of Eligibi lity. The Supreme Court has held that the Appropriati ons Clause of the C onstitut ion, U.S. C O N ST . art . I, § 9 , c l. 7 , p rec lud es t

he ju dic iar

y fr om o rde rin g anaward of

p ub lic f un ds to a st atutorilyine lig ibl e claimant on the basis of equitable est oppel. See OPM v. Richmond, 4 96 U.S . 41 4, 43 0 (1 99 0); see als o U tah Po we r & L igh t C

o. v. Un ite d S

tates , 243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1917) (holdi ng that "theI ndeed, al t hough O PMv. Ri chm ond , 4 9 6 U .S . 4 1 4 , 4 3 4 (1 9 9 0 ) is c o n tro lli n g in th is c a se , t h e S e c re ta ry fa ils 1 t o ci t e t o i t i n hi s w r i t t en br i ef , r el yi ng i nst ead on t he a ss er t i on t hat w e l ack j ur i sdi ct i on t o hea r t he i ss ue. " T h e r e i s n o p r o c e d u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n i n f e d e r a l c o u r t b e t we e n s u i t s i n e q u i t y a n d s u i t s a t l a w. " 2 7 A A M .J UR . 2 2 D E q u ity § 4 (1 9 9 6 ). See g e n e ra lly, th e F e d . R . C iv . P . 1 (sta ting th a t t h e se ru le s g o v e rn su its a t l a w , eq u ity, a n d in a d m ira lty); F ED . R. C IV . P
. 2 (no t i n g i n fed era l co u rt s the re i s o n e fo rm of ac t i o n ca l l ed a "c i v i l ac t i o n "). 6 Un ite d S tat es i s n eithe r bo un d n or e sto pp ed byact s o f i ts o ff

ice rs or agents in e nte rin g into an arr an ge m ent or

ag ree m ent t o do or cau se t o b e d on e what th e law d oe s n ot s an cti on or p ermit" ). Th at p rec ed ent is co ntr oll inghere . Ac co rdi ng ly, our de ter m inatio n that the app ell ant is no t el igible to r ece ive ba sic ed

uc ati on al a ssi stanc e p rec lud es an award t he reo f on the ba sis of

eq uit ab le e sto pp el. See OPM, 496 U.S. at 434. ("[I]t is enough to s ay that this Court has neverupheld an assertion of est op pe l ag ain st the Go ve rnm ent by a cl aim ant se ek ingpu

bli c f un ds .")
. III . C ON CL US ION After considerat ion of the appe llant's and the Sec retary's brie fs, and a review of the recor d, the Board's July 15, 2005, decisi on is AFFIRMED.
KASOLD , Judge , c on curri ng : I writ e separat ely to add res s wh at i s a m

uc h to o n arr owvie w by the Secr et ary of ourjurisdi ction. Specifica lly, the Secr etary ar gues that the Court lacks jurisdi ction to eve n review Mr. Rosenber g's claim f or equitabl e estoppel, os tensibly be cause we do not sit as a court of equity. Se e Secretary's Brief (Br.) at 9. 1 A lt h o u g hw e are n o t ac o urt o f e qu it yi nth e s e n s e th at w e c ann o t re n d e r anaw ard th at i s co ntrary to law , th is i s tr ue of allfe de ralco urt s, seeIm mi grati on & N

atu ra lizati on Se rv. v. 2 Pangilinan, 4 8 6 U
. S
. 8 7 5 , 8 8 3 (1 9 8 8 ) ( "[ I] t i s w e lle s ta b li s h e d th at ' c o urt s o f

e qu it yc ann o m ore disregar d statutory and constitutional requirements and provi sions than can courts of law.'"(quoting Hedges v. Dixon County, 15 0 U. S. 182 , 19 2 (1 89 3)) ); see also OPM v. Richmond , 496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990) ("[I]t is enough to say thatthis Court has never upheld an assertion of estoppel againstthe Government by a claimant seeking public funds.")
. Furth er, althou ghwe ge ne ral ly d o n ot h av e juris dic tio n to rev iewthe Se cre tar y’s ex erc ise of his equitable authority under 38 U.S.C. § 503, see Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 416, 425 (1994) (re co gn izi ngthat ne ith er the Bo ard n or t he Co urt ha s juris dic tio n to rev iewthe Se cre tar y' s ex erc iseN ot yet addr es se d i s our aut hor i t y t o r evi ew al l egat i ons t hat t he Sec r et ar y' s act i ons under 38 U
. S. C
. § 503 3 v io la te th e C o n stitu tion , e .g ., d isc rim in a tion v io la ting th e e q u a l p ro te c tion g u a ra n te e d b y th e C o n stitu tion
. See 3 8 U. S
. C. § 72 6 1 (1) (dir ec t i n g t h e C o u rt t o de cid e a l l rel ev an t qu es t i o n s o f, i n t er ali a, c o n sti t u t i o n al interpre t ati o n , w h en ne ce ssa ry an d pre se n t ed ).

See 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 2 5 2 (g ra n ting "e x c lu siv e ju risd ic tion to re v ie w d e c isio n s o f th e B o a rd o f V e te ra n s' A p p e a ls 4 . . . [a n d th e ] " p o w e r to a ffirm , m o d ify , o r re v e rs e a d e c isio n o f th e B o a rd o r to re m a n d th e m a tter, a s a p p ro p ria te " ). See also 3 8 U .S .C . § 7 2 6 1 (a )(3 )(A ) (p ro v id in g th e fu ll sc o p e o f o u r re v ie w a u th o rity, in c lu d in g , in te r alia , t h e a u th o rity to com pel ac t i on of

t he Sec r et ar y " unr eas onabl y del ayed" and se t a si de deci si ons, rul es , or r egul at i ons of t he Sec r et ar y or t h e B o ard t h at are "a rbit rary, ca p ri cio u s, an ab u se of d i sc reti o n , o r othe rw i se no t i n ac co rda n ce w i t h l aw "). 7 of h is eq uit ab le dis cre tio n), it

d oe s no t f

oll owth at we la ck

th e autho rity to rev iewthe argum ents 3 made in thi s ca se, or a

nyoth er argum ents s eekingeq uit ab le r eli ef

du e to err or o n th e p art

of the Se cre tar y . In d e e d , a s w it

hanyf e d e ra l c o urt , w e h av e a llth e auth o ri ty n e c e s s ary

to e x e rc ise equitable jurisdi ction and dir ect equi table r elief not otherwise restr icted by law. Cf
. Pangilinan , supra. For example, earlyo n the Court rec ognized its authority to review and cons ider the applicat ion of equitable de fenses. Se e Man io v . D erw ins ki , 1 Ve t.A pp . 1 40 , 1 43 (19 91 ) (e xp lic itl y st at in g o urauth or ity t o c on si de r ap p l i c at io n o f equi tabl e d efe ns es , b utre je ct in g the Se cr et ary's eq uit ab le d ef

en se o f l ach es b eca

us e thi s de fe ns e wa s no t ra ise d to the Bo ard); seeals o B ro wd er v . De rw ins ki , 1 Vet.App. 204, 208 (1991) (concl uding "thatth e VA be nefits system as well as the Ve terans' Judi cia l R ev iewAc t bo th mili tat e ag ain st the ap pli cat ion of the do ctrine [o f l ach es] to cas es b ef ore th is Co urt "). W e als o have th e autho rity to iss ue d eci sio ns nunc pro tun c whe n e qu ity warrants suc h action, see Padgett v. Nic holson, 47 3 F .3 d 1 36 4, 13 71 (F ed
. Ci r. 2 00 7) ( statin g th at "nu nc pro tun c re lie f i s eq

uit ab le i n n ature" ); Seals v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 190, 191 (1992) (granti ng nunc pro tunc relie f for a Notice of Appeal (NOA) timely filed via facsimile but without a confirming N OA as r equi red by the Court's Rules of Practice and Pr ocedure), and we have the eq uit ab le a uth ori ty o f " allco urt s es tab lis he d b y an A ct o f C on gre ss" granted by th e A ll W

rit s A ct. Se e28 U. S. C. § 1 65 1(a); see Cox v. West , 14 9 F .3 d 1 36 0, 13 63 (F ed . C ir. 1998); seeals o Rosemount, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 91 0 F .2 d 8 19 , 8 21 (F ed . C ir. 19 90 ) (s tat ingthat an inj un ction is e qu ita

ble rel ief ); Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 80 7 F .2 d 9 82 , 9 88 (F ed . C ir. 1986) (holding wri t of m andamus is equitable r elief). Moreover, i n furtherance of our broad author ity over Board de cisions and matters below affecting Board decisi ons, the Court has appl ied equitable estoppel a gainst the Secretary precluding 4" [ A ] p ar t y s ee ki ng t o as s er t e qu i t ab l e es t op pe l mus t d emon s t r at e t ha t ( 1) t he p ar t y t o be e s t op pe d m ade a 5
' def i ni t e mi sr epr es ent at i on of f act t o anot her per son havi ng r eas on t o be l i eve t hat t he ot her [ w oul d] r el y upon i t ' ; ( 2) t he par t y s eeki ng e st oppel r el i ed on t he m i sr epr es ent at i ons t o i t s det r i m ent ; and ( 3) t he ' r el i ance [ w as ] r eas onabl e i n t hat t he p a r t y c l a i m i n g t h e e s t o p p e l d i d n o t k n o w n o r s h o u l d i t h a v e k n o w n t h a t i t s a d v e r s a r y 's c o n d u c t w a s m i s l e a d i n g . '" R a m ire z- C a rlo v . U

n ited S ta te s, 496 F. 3d 41, 49 ( 1stC i r . 2007) ( quot i ng H eck l er v. C om m uni t y Heal t h Ser vi ces, 4 6 7 U .S . 5 1 , 5 9 (1 9 8 4 )). 8 him fr om ass ert ingthat a c lai m ant' s in fo rm al c lai m is n ot a "co gn izable claim f

or e ff ect ive date purpo ses ." Se rve llo v. Derwins ki , 3 Vet.App. 196, 200 (1992) (finding no evi dence that the Se cre tar y f ulf ill ed his stat uto ry duty pu

rsu ant to 3 8 C .F .R . § 3. 15 5(a) to pro vid e th e v ete ran wi th an applicat ion form af

ter rec eipt of an informal claim, the Court hel d thatthe Secretary "may not
. . . ass ert
. . . th at .
. . [t

he ] i nf orm al c lai m

is n ot a co gn iza ble cla im fo r ef fe cti ve -date p urp os es" (quoting Qu ar les v. De rw ins ki , 3 Vet .App . 12 9, 137 (199 2)) ). W e hav e als o he ld t hat f air pro ces s requires certain notificati ons. See Thurber v. Brown, 5 V et. Ap p. 11 9, 12 3 (1 99 3) ( "T he entir e thrus t of the VA ' s n on adve rsaria l cl aim s sy ste m is p red icated

u po n a str uc tur e whic h p rov ide s f

or n oti ce an d an o pp ort

un ityto b e h ear d at vir

tua llyev ery

ste p in the pro ces s. "). Re m ed ialact ion s su chas the se are n ot m an dated

bystatut e o r re gu lat ion ; the y are equ ita ble reso lut ion s im

po sed by the Co urt
. Thus, Mr. Rosenberg's equi table est oppel argument fails not because the Court l acks jurisd ict ion

to r ev iewsu chanargum ent. Rath er, ass um ingarguendo tha t equ ita ble est op pe l w as oth erw ise ap pro pri ate in t his c ase , an d it is no t cl ear it w ou ld b e, Mr. Ro sen

be rg' s argum ent f

ail s 5 because a m onetary award simply is not permitted by law. See OPM, 49 6 U. S. at 43 0 (" Th e who le his tor y and pra cti ce w ithres pe ct to cla im s ag ain st the Unit ed S tat es rev eal s the im

po ssibil ityof

an est op pe l cl aim

fo r m on eyin v iol ati on

of a st atute. ").