# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 9, 2012 *

Decided May 10, 2012

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER

, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 11

‐ 3429

SHAWN M. DAVIS,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant,

v.

BELINDA SCHROEDER and CRAIG

SWANSON,

Defendants

‐ Appellees. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division.

No. 3:10CV284 PPS

Philip P. Simon,

Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

Shawn Davis, a pretrial detainee, appeals from the grant of summary judgment

against him in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that jail officials violated his right

to due process when they placed him in segregation without a hearing. We affirm. 

### NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P.

34(a)(2).No. 11

‐ 3429 Page 2

Davis was arrested, charged with theft, and booked in the St. Joseph County Jail in

South Bend, Indiana. Because of a prior assaultive felony conviction and past behavior at

the jail, including harassment of a jail officer and battery of another inmate, Deputy Craig

Swanson classified Davis as warranting maximum security. He did so after employing the

Northpointe Decision Tree Objective Jail Inmate Classification System, which jails across the

country use in order to classify inmates by security level. Jail officials adopted Swanson’s

classification and placed Davis in maximum security—segregating him from the general

prison population and allowing him to leave his cell only for court appearances, medical

care, and one hour of recreation per day.

In accordance with jail procedures, Deputy Belinda Schroeder reviewed Davis’s

classification level after one month. Because Davis did not exhibit behavior problems while

in segregation, Schroeder reclassified him at a “medium high” security level, and Davis

joined the jail’s general population.

Davis then sued Schroeder and Swanson, alleging that their placing him in

segregation violated his constitutional rights. He suggested that these officers changed his

classification as a pretext to retaliate against him for a prior lawsuit he had filed against

other officers or to discriminate against him based on his race. He also suggested that his

segregation constituted punishment without due process of law.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding

uncontradicted the defendants’ affidavits that Davis was placed in segregation based on his

criminal history and past disciplinary problems at the jail—considerations that constituted a

legitimate basis for separating him from other prisoners. And because his segregation did

not constitute punishment, the court found no due process violation in his not being

afforded a hearing.

Davis’s argument on appeal is difficult to parse, but he seems to suggest that the

district court erred in finding no evidence that his segregation was intended to punish him.

He appears to think that his security classification constituted punishment because it was

based on his past crimes and misbehavior at the jail.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment because Davis presented no

evidence (1) to contradict the defendants’ sworn affidavits that his segregation was

nonpunitive or that his classification was not based on animus, or (2) to show that his

criminal and institutional history should have yielded a different classification. Although

Davis is correct that a pretrial detainee may not be punished without due process, see Bell v.

Wolfish

, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), no process is required when a pretrial detainee is

segregated to protect jail staff and other prisoners from his violent propensities, see Higgs v.No. 11

‐ 3429 Page 3

Carver

, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002); Zarnes v. Rhodes

, 64 F.3d 285, 291–92 (7th Cir. 1995).

The district court therefore did not err in finding that Davis was not entitled to a hearing.

AFFIRMED