## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 18 - 00108 - CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C .W., A CHILD

---------- FROM THE 323RD DISTR ICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 323

- 105491

- 17

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### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant S.W. ( Fa ther) appeals the trial court’ s final order terminating h is parental rights to C.W. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2017). The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Fa ther

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 constructively abandoned C.W. and that terminatin g Fa ther’ s parental rights was
in C

. W .’ s best interest. 2 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N) , (b)(2). Father’s appointed c ounsel’ s brief shows that he has (1) professional ly
evaluated the record, (2) shown why there are no reversible appellate grounds , (3) referenc ed any grounds arguably support ing the appeal , and (4) concluded the appeal is frivolous

. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 , 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M. , 98 S.W.3d 774, 776

– 77 (Tex. App.

— Fort
Worth 2003, order) (holding Anders procedures apply in parental

- termination cases), disp. on merits , No. 02

- 01

- 00 349

- CV, 2003 WL 2006583 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (m em. op.). Further, counsel indicated that he
had provided Father with a copy of his Anders brief, informed him how to obtain a copy of the appellate record, and notified him that he had the righ t to file a
respon se

. See Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 318

– 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
We also provided Father with a copy of counsel’s Anders brief and informed him that he could review the record and file a re s ponse , and we gave h im until May 8 , 201 8 , to notify us if he intended to respond. See id. Fa ther has not responded. 3

2 The trial court also terminated C.W.’s mother’s parental rights, but she has not appe aled.

3 Our notificatio n to Fa ther, which we mailed to h is last

- known address , w as returned as undeliverable. Father did not appear for trial and , at that time was believed to be in Mississippi

. The caseworker testified that Father had told her that he did not want to work any s ervices and that the Department “needed to do whatever [it ] needed to do because [he and C.W.’s m other] weren’t coming back.”3 Additionally, appellee the Department of Family and Protective Services informed
this court that it agreed with counsel’s Anders brief and declined to file a formal
response. In reviewing an Anders brief, we are to independently determine whet her there are any arguable grounds for reversal and, thus, whether counsel correct ly
determin ed that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); K.M. , 2003 WL 2006583, at *2; In re AWT , 61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2001, no pet.). Our r eview of the record
reveals that Fa ther had notice of the grounds alleged for terminating h is parental rights , and although Father voluntarily did not appear for trial, that Father’s appointed counsel was given the oppor tunity to present evidence and to defend
Father’s interests by cross - examin ing the adverse witness . Further, the evidence considered by the trial court legally and fact ually supported the trial court’s findings that (1) Fa ther ’ s actions satisfied at least one ground listed in section 161.001(b)(1) and alleged in the termination petition and (2) termin at in g Father’s parental rights was in C.W .’ s best interests under section 161.001(b)(2). 4 See

4 The trial court found grounds under section 161.001(b)(1)(N) ( parent constructive ly abandoned child ) as alleged in the Department ’s petition

. Counsel’s Anders brief mistakenly addresses grounds under sections 161.001(b)(1)(A) ( parent left child with another and expressed intention not to return), (B) ( parent left child with another without providing adequate support for child and re mained away for at least three months), and (O) ( parent failed to comply with court orders) and fails to address section 161.001(b)(1)(N). After reviewing the record ourselves and after construing counsel’s brief liberally, we agree that the record shows t hat Father constructively abandoned C.W., who had been in the Department’s care for not less than six months, and that (1) the4 generally In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (recognizin g appellate court need not detail the evidence if affirming termination judgment). These findings were based on credibility and weight

- of

- the

- evidence choices that we may not second

- guess. See In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006); In re
J.P.B. , 18 0 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005); In re L.M.I. , 119 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. 2003). We find nothing in the record arguably support ing Father’ s appeal; thus, we affirm the trial court ’ s final termination order. We remind counsel of his continuing duty to represen t S.W. until he has exhausted his proceedings, including possibly filing a petition for review in the supreme court. See In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27

– 28 (Tex. 2016); In re D.T. , No. 02

- 17

- 00061

- CV,
2017 WL 2806323, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth June 29, 201 7, no pet.) (mem.
op

. ).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr ELIZABETH KERR JUSTICE
PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; WALKER and KERR, JJ.
DELIVERED: July 5, 2018 Department had made reasonable efforts to return C.W. to Father ; (2) Father had not regularly visited or maintained significant c ontact with C.W.; and (3) Father had shown an inability to provide C.W. with a safe environment. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9 (“Briefing Rules to Be C onstrued Liberally”).