IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LARRY HASTINGS, individually and ) d/b/a K & L BLACKHOE SERVICES, ) an unincorporated entity, and ) KATHY HASTINGS, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) C.A. No. N15C

- 12

- 242 ALR ) v. ) ) NICOLE ANN HOSLER ) ) Defendant. ) Submitted: December 12, 2017 & January 3, 2018

Decided: January 3 , 2018 Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

DENIED Upon Defendant’s Motion to Compel

DENIED

ORDER Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Larry Hastings, Kathy Hastings , and K & L Backhoe Services ( collectively, “Plaintiffs”); Defendant Nicole Ann Hosler’s (“Defendant” ) opposition thereto; the facts, arguments, and authorities set forth by the parties; the Superior Court Civil Rules; statutory and decisional law; and the entire record in this case, the Court hereby finds as follows:2

1. On December 30, 2015, Plaintiffs bro ught this action against Defendant alleging that Defendant was in default of several loans. Plaintiffs allege that they made various loans to Defendant beginning in 2012 that Defendant has not repaid. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant owes t he following amounts: $9,408.97 to Larry and Kathy Hastings; $47,410.00 to K & L Backhoe Services; and $1 0,791.56 to Larry Hastings. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant owes Larry and Kathy Hastings $1 , 000 .00 for posting a bond for Defendant. In total , Plaintiffs allege that Defendant owes $68,610.53 under the various loans.

2. Defendant answered Plaintiffs’ complaint on June 16, 2016. Defendant

is self

- represented.

3. Plaint iffs now move for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s sole defe nse is that she was addicted to drugs at the time she entered into the various loans, and that Defendant has not put forth any evidence to show

that Plaintiffs knew she was under the influence at the time Defendant entered into each agreement . Defendant o pposes Plaintiffs’ motion

. 4. In addition, Defendant filed a motion to compel, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to provide discovery responses by the November 18, 2017 deadline. However, Defendant did not specify what discovery responses she is seeking. Pl aintiffs oppose Defendant’s motion.3

5. T he Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party can “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 1 The moving party bears the initial burden of proof and, once that is met, the burden shifts to the non

- moving party to

show that a material issue of fact exists. 2 At the motion for summary judgment phase, the Court must view the facts “in the light most favorable to the n on

- moving party.” 3

6. There are limited circumstances in which intoxication allows a person

to avoid contractual duties

. 4 The Second Restatement provides: A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to know that by reason of intoxication ( a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction. 5 Thus, the other party to the contract must know that intoxicated person lacks capacity

at the time of contract formation for the contract to be voidable

. 6

1 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 2 Moore v. Sizemore , 405 A.2d 679, 680

– 81(Del. 1979). 3 Brozka v. Olson , 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995). 4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 16 (1981) (“Second Restatement”); s ee also Robino v. Robino , 2017 WL 3500246, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2017). 5 Second Restatement § 16. 6 Id. at cmt. a (“Hence a contract made by an intoxicated person is enforceable by the other party even though entirely executory, unless the other person has reason to know that the intoxicated person lacks capacity.”).4

7. In Robino , a defendant sought to in validate a settlement agreement on the grounds that it was the product of his “diminishe d capacity...resulting from his ongoing battle with substance abuse.” 7 In support, the defendant submitted various medical records to support his claim that he had been treated for substance abuse

related issues. 8 The Court rejected his argument, concludin g that evidence of a substance abuse problem by itself did not corroborate “that he was incapacitated by intoxication” at the time he entered into the settlement agreement, or that the other party would have any reason to know of the intoxication. 9

8. Plain tiffs argue that Defendant’s “intoxication” defense contains the same deficiencies as the defendant’s in Robino. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has only produced evidence that she generally suffers from a drug addiction, not that she

was intoxicated at t he time she entered into the loans or that Plaintiffs knew of any

intoxication. As a result, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant cannot dispute her obligations under the various loan agreements, and that they are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.

9. Ho wever, the Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case. In addition to the evidence that she generally suffers from a drug addiction, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did in fact know she was intoxicated at the time she

7 Robino , 2017 WL 3500246 at *1. 8 Id. 9 Id.5

entered into the various loan agreements. In addition, Defendant has indicated that her mother will testify to this effect on her behalf. As a result, the Court finds there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time

of enter ing into the loan agreements and whether Plaintiffs knew about her intoxication. As a result, summary judgment is not appropriate.

10. In addition, the Court finds that there are inconsistencies with respect to the nature of the loan agreements , and the am ounts Plaintiffs claim are due

thereunder , that preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs attached various loan documents to their motion for summary judgment. 10 Upon review, these loan documents do not seem to support Plaintiffs’ calculation of the amounts due. For example, while Plaintiffs indicate that Defendant owes K & L Backhoe Services $47,410.00, K & L Backhoe Services is not listed as a lender on any of the loan

documents. Similarly , while there are loan docum ents listing either Larry Hastings or Larry and Kathy Hastings as the lenders, the amounts do not seem to equal the amount sought in this action. 11

10 Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Nov. 19, 2017, Ex. A. 11 Larry Hastings is listed as the lender for loans totaling $15,950.00. Larry and Kathy Hastings are listed as the lenders for loans totaling $62,679.00. However, during Defendant’s deposition, coun sel for Plaintiffs indicated that one of the loan documents may represent a consolidation of all previous loans rather than a new loan amount.6

11. Further, some of the loan documents appear to be missing vital information. For example, the purported loa n made on March 20, 2013 lists various amounts given to Defendant by Larry Hastings, but does not contain a promise by Defendant to repay those amounts. In addition, the last loan document provided to the Court contains only the amount of the loan and Def endant’s signature. It does not list the name of a lender, the date of the loan, or the date for repayment.

12. T he Court finds that there are material facts in dispute regarding whether Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the loan agreements and wheth er Plaintiffs had knowledge of her intoxication. In addition, the Court finds that there are inconsistencies between the loan documents provided by Plaintiffs and the amounts sought thereunder . As a result, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment

must be denied.

13. T he Court also finds that Defendant’s motion to compel is without merit because both parties have produced discovery in this case . On October 17, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, seeking an order compelling Defendant to respond to Plai ntiffs’ interrogatories and document requests. On November 1, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for discovery, asking Plaintiffs to provide documentation for the various loan agreements. On November 1, 2016, this Court ordered Defendant to respond to Plaint iffs’ interrogatories and document requests and ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests. Both parties7

complied with the Court’s Order and produced discovery. Thus, Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs failed to provide discovery r esponses by the November 18,

2017 deadline is without support in the record

. Nevertheless, to the extent that either party failed to produce any additional documents in discovery before the discovery deadline, those documents will be excluded at trial. NOW, THEREFORE, this 3 rd day of January, 2018, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED; Defendant’s Mo tion to Compel is hereby DENIED . Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order dated January 18, 2017, this matter will proceed to a two

- day bench trial beginning on March 14, 2018. The parties are reminded that the Pretrial Stipulation is due on March 1, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

# Andrea L. Rocanelli

___ ___________________________ T he Honorable Andrea L. Rocanelli