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IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

(Memorandum Web Opinion)

STATE V. KNECHT

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,

V.

ANDREA M. KNECHT, APPELLANT.

Filed February 9, 2021. No. A-20-314.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: GARY B. RANDALL, Judge. Affirmed.

Mallory N. Hughes, of Dornan, Troia, Howard, Breitkreutz & Conway, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Melissa R. Vincent for appellee.

MOORE, BISHOP, and WELCH, Judges.

BISHOP, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Andrea M. Knecht pled no contest to one count of sexual assault in the first degree. The 

Douglas County District Court sentenced her to 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Knecht claims the 

district court abused its discretion in rendering its sentence 1 day prior to the sentencing hearing, 

as evidenced by the date contained on the court’s commitment order (mittimus). She contends this 

deprived her of an opportunity for allocution. She also claims the court imposed an excessive 

sentence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2019, the State filed an information charging Knecht with one count of sexual 

assault on a child in the first degree, a Class IB felony, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 
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§ 28-319.01(1)(b) (Reissue 2016). The events resulting in this charge occurred in the first half of 

2013.

At a hearing held on January 31, 2020, the State requested leave to file an amended 

information charging Knecht with one count of first degree sexual assault, a Class II felony, 

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(c) (Reissue 2016). Following the court’s receipt of the 

amended information, Knecht pled no contest to the charge of first degree sexual assault set forth 

in the amended information. According to the factual basis provided by the State,

on March 1st, 2019, the victim of this case, “KG,” was interviewed regarding some 

allegations that had been reported to the Omaha Police Department. During that interview, 

“KG” reported that in 2013, when she was a 14-year-old student at [named] High School, 

this defendant, Andrea Knecht, was her high school basketball coach. The defendant was 

27 years old at that time. And between January and May of 2013, the defendant subjected 

“KG” to oral and digital penetration in the defendant’s vehicle and in the victim’s home.

Phone records were gathered which shows [sic] hundreds of calls between the 

victim and the defendant during that time period ongoing until the victim’s parents reported 

their concerns to the school and the school told the defendant to stop contacting the victim. 

The defendant then, according to reports, bought the victim a burner phone to continue 

their contact. The police also were able to obtain e-mails between the defendant and victim 

during that time period. In many of those . . . , the defendant and victim are discussing their 

relationship. The defendant is indicating that she is in love with the victim and they are 

discussing sexual acts.

These events occurred here in Douglas County. The defendant was 27, and the 

victim was 14 years old at the time.

The district court accepted Knecht’s no contest plea to the charge and found her guilty of the same. 

The case was then set for sentencing.

After a sentencing hearing held “via Webex” on April 16, 2020, the district court sentenced 

Knecht by oral pronouncement to 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 2 days already 

served. On the same day, the court entered a sentencing order consistent with its oral 

pronouncement.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Knecht assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) rendering its sentence 1 day 

prior to the sentencing hearing as indicated by the date of the mittimus, thus denying Knecht’s 

right to allocution; and (2) imposing an excessive sentence that was arbitrary and capricious.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal in the 

absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Gray, 307 Neb. 418, 949 N.W.2d 320 

(2020). A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are 

clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in 

matters submitted for disposition. Id.
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ANALYSIS

MITTIMUS AND ALLOCUTION

Knecht contends the district court abused its discretion by rendering Knecht’s sentence one 

day prior to the sentencing hearing. She directs us to the court’s mittimus order dated April 15, 

2020, which was the day before the April 16 sentencing hearing and entry of the sentencing order. 

The mittimus reflects a sentence of “20-30 YEARS.” Although the mittimus is not file-stamped 

until April 16, Knecht claims the file-stamp date is “irrelevant” and argues that the mittimus shows 

the district court determined a sentence of 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment the day before sentencing 

and thus denied Knecht her right to allocution. Brief for appellant at 13. The State responds that 

the “mittimus is not part of the district court’s judgment,” but, rather, “a separate order of 

commitment that results from the court’s judgment.” Brief for appellee at 6. The State further 

contends that the date on the mittimus was “clearly a typographical error.” Id.

Whether the April 15, 2020, date on the mittimus was a typographical error or not, that 

document was not filed by the district court until April 16. Thus, even if the court had contemplated 

a sentence of 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment the day prior to the sentencing hearing, the question is 

whether Knecht was provided an opportunity for allocution before the court entered its final 

sentencing judgment on April 16.

Allocution is an unsworn statement from a convicted defendant to the sentencing judge or 

jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the crime, 

or say anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence. State v. Pereira, 284 Neb. 982, 

824 N.W.2d 706 (2013). In Nebraska, allocution is statutorily required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-2201 (Reissue 2016). See State v. Pereira, supra. Section 29-2201 provides that before a 

sentence is pronounced, the defendant must be informed by the court of the verdict and asked 

whether he or she has anything to say as to why the judgment should not be passed against him or 

her. See, § 29-2201; State v. Pereira, supra. The most practical rationale underlying allocution is 

that it provides an opportunity for the offender and defense counsel to contest any disputed factual 

basis for the sentence. State v. Pereira, supra. It is also an opportunity for the defendant “‘to 

present countervailing information, and to test, question, or refute the relevance of information on 

which the judge may rely in determining the sentence to be imposed.’” State v. Pereira, 284 Neb. 

at 985, 824 N.W.2d at 710 (quoting State v. Barker, 231 Neb. 430, 436 N.W.2d 520 (1989)).

The sentencing hearing took place “via Webex” on April 16, 2020. At that time, Knecht’s 

counsel offered to the district court a sentencing memorandum and accompanying exhibits 1 

through 15. Defense counsel asked that the sentencing memorandum be incorporated into the 

presentence investigation report (PSR) and that the court receive the exhibits “for purposes of [] 

allocution.” The court received the exhibits. Knecht contends the district court “ignored and failed 

to review” that memorandum and exhibits, which constituted Knecht’s written allocution. Brief 

for appellant at 13. She suggests that the court could not have reviewed the sentencing 

memorandum and the 15 exhibits since the memorandum was not incorporated into the PSR, nor 

were the exhibits received, until the time of sentencing.

However, as pointed out by the State, those documents “were provided to the district court 

prior to the hearing, which was conducted by Webex,” and the “court could not have received 
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exhibits that it did not possess[].” Brief for appellee at 6. In other words, these documents would 

have all been in the court’s possession and available for review prior to the sentencing hearing. 

The State further notes, “The fact that the district court did not specifically mention those items 

prior to imposing sentence does not mean that it failed to consider them.” Id.

Importantly, in addition to receiving the documents submitted by Knecht as her written 

allocution, the district court also asked whether there were “any remarks that [Knecht’s counsel] 

or [Knecht] would like to make.” In response, Knecht’s counsel addressed the court at length, 

filling approximately 4 pages in the bill of exceptions. Defense counsel emphasized that the results 

and scores contained in the PSR indicated that Knecht was “a very low risk individual.” Defense 

counsel described that Knecht was “a married mother of a one-year-old son with no other criminal 

history whatsoever” who “has lived not just a law-abiding, but a productive[,] . . . generous[,] . . . 

[and] empathetic life.” Counsel directed the court’s attention to the letters and reports offered at 

the sentencing hearing detailing Knecht’s character and expert opinions concerning Knecht’s low 

risk to reoffend and the appropriateness of probation. Counsel stressed that Knecht’s lost 

employment and status as a “lifetime felon” and “registered sex offender for the next 25 years”

could not be “overlooked” as “significant consequences” that Knecht would face in addition to the 

court’s sentence. Counsel further described that there was “no number of days, months, or 

decades” the court could sentence Knecht to that would “undo[]” the circumstances the victim “has 

gone through and continues to go through.” Emphasizing the goal of rehabilitation and that Knecht 

had taken responsibility for her actions, counsel requested the court to sentence Knecht to 

probation.

Knecht also personally addressed the court, stating, “I’m extremely sorry for the pain that 

I may have caused [K.G.] and her family. And as the adult, I take full responsibility for my mistake 

and actions.”

Based on the record before us, and regardless of whether the mittimus date was a 

typographical error, we cannot say that the district court denied Knecht her right to allocution. The 

bill of exceptions reflects that the documents constituting Knecht’s written allocution were in the 

court’s possession at the time of the video conference sentencing hearing on April 16, 2020, at 

which time they were formally received. Further, both Knecht and her counsel had the opportunity 

to speak directly to the court at the sentencing hearing. While Knecht’s counsel did not delve into 

the particulars of every exhibit offered to the court, she affirmed their content concerning Knecht’s 

character and the appropriateness of a sentence of probation. Knecht had the opportunity to test, 

question, or refute the relevance of information on which the judge might rely in determining the 

sentence to be imposed. See State v. Pereira, supra. And, it was only after Knecht had her 

opportunity for allocution that the court determined and ordered its final sentencing judgment.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

Knecht was convicted of one count of first degree sexual assault, a Class II felony, pursuant 

to § 28-319. The Class II felony was punishable by 1 to 50 years’ imprisonment. See Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 28-105 (Cum. Supp. 2020). Knecht, age 34 at the time of sentencing, was sentenced to 20 

to 30 years’ imprisonment. Her sentence was within the statutory range.
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A sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal in the 

absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Gray, 307 Neb. 418, 949 N.W.2d 320 

(2020). A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are 

clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in 

matters submitted for disposition. Id. Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is 

alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether a sentencing court 

abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable 

legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. State v. Williams, 306 Neb. 261, 945 

N.W.2d 124 (2020). In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors customarily 

considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, 

(4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and 

(6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence 

involved in the commission of the crime. Id. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a 

subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor 

and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. Id.

In addition to the allocution provided by Knecht and her counsel as set forth previously, 

K.G. and her mother also participated in the sentencing hearing. K.G.’s mother told the district 

court that Knecht’s actions “devastated” her family and “destroyed [her] daughter.” She claimed 

the “exuberant, extraverted, happy, over-achieving daughter [was] gone,” and “[i]n her place we 

now have a fragile victim who’s in a constant state of anxiety and PTSD.” She said “[o]ur normal 

family life is gone,” and “[w]e are constantly walking on eggshells, afraid we might say or do 

something to upset [K.G.] or inadvertently hurt her feelings or set her back.” She spoke of having 

K.G. in therapy since high school. K.G.’s mother asked the court to sentence Knecht to the 

maximum penalty allowed, noting that Knecht “lied to us and she manipulated us.”

The State also pointed out that Knecht was a coach and authority figure “who is held to a 

standard above even other adults.” “These are the people that we trust our children to every day[,]”

and Knecht “took advantage of that trust.” The State also noted that when Knecht had been 

confronted about the “wrongfulness of her actions” at the time, “instead of stopping it, [she] took 

actions to avoid being caught,” giving K.G. “a phone that looked exactly like her other phone that 

she could use when her parents had blocked this woman from [K.G.’s] contacts[.]”

According to the PSR prepared by a senior probation officer, Knecht is married and has 

one child. She has a bachelor’s degree and was employed as a sales associate with a company prior 

to this case. She has no prior criminal history other than minor traffic infractions.

A “Level of Service/Case Management Inventory” was conducted as part of the PSR. This 

instrument determines the degree of risk the offender presents to the community and the risk to 

recidivate. Knecht scored in the “medium risk range” for the criminogenic risk factor domains for 

education/employment, leisure/recreation, and antisocial pattern. She scored in the “low risk 

range” for the domain of procriminal attitude/orientation. She further scored in the “very low risk 

range” for the domains of criminal history, family/marital, companions, and alcohol/drug 

problems. Knecht was also administered the Substance Abuse Questionnaire, and she scored in 

the “maximum risk range” for stress coping and in the “medium risk range” for truthfulness and 
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antisocial. Overall, Knecht “scored an 8 on the LS/CMI,” which placed her in the “low risk 

category.”

The probation officer acknowledged that “[o]n the surface [Knecht] appears to be an 

appropriate candidate for probation[] because of her lack of a criminal history, lack of drug and 

alcohol abuse and for the most part prosocial lifestyle. However, the ongoing and lifelong effects 

of her behavior on the victim are clearly articulated by the victim’s mother.” The probation officer 

further stated: “This is a case that clearly demonstrates that actions have consequences. A sentence 

of probation would be considered excessively lenient because it does not appropriately reflect the 

serious nature and circumstances of the offense.” A straight sentence of incarceration was 

recommended “to promote accountability for [Knecht’s] actions.”

The district court stated that it had reviewed “the probation file, including the police reports 

and the Presentence Investigation, as well as the attachments, including the psychological 

evaluations.” The court further stated that it had considered the relevant sentencing factors. The 

court found Knecht was not an appropriate candidate for probation and sentenced Knecht to 20 to 

30 years’ imprisonment, noting that if she lost no good time, she would be eligible for parole after 

10 years, and subject to mandatory release after 15 years.

Knecht asserts the district court erred when it “considered none of the [sentencing] factors”

described in Nebraska law and “failed to even review, let alone consider” the evidence offered to 

the court that “strongly suggest[ed] a sentence to probation.” Brief for appellant at 16. Knecht 

describes such evidence as including letters by third parties concerning her character and the 

opinions of experts regarding her risk of reoffending and the propriety of probation.

It is true that the district court did not specifically address the details underlying its 

sentencing decision. The district court stated that it had considered Knecht’s “age, mentality, . . . 

education, . . . experience, . . . cultural background, . . . lack of past criminal record, . . . law-abiding 

behavior, motivation for the offense, and the nature of the offense” in determining her sentence. 

The court also stated it had reviewed the “probation file” which included the PSR and 

accompanying attachments. Knecht suggests that the court abused its discretion by failing to 

review her sentencing memorandum and exhibits 1 through 15, apparently because the court failed 

to specifically reference those documents when sentencing her. However, a sentencing court is not 

required to make specific factual findings to justify the sentence imposed. See State v. Rogers, 297

Neb. 265, 899 N.W.2d 626 (2017) (no evidence district court failed to consider appropriate factors; 

court not required to make specific factual findings to justify sentence imposed).

The fact that Knecht has led a law-abiding life since her wrongful behavior took place back 

in 2013 certainly weighs in favor of a lighter sentence or perhaps even probation, as noted in the 

PSR. However, it appears the district court agreed with the probation officer’s ultimate 

recommendation of a straight sentence due to the serious nature of the offense. As pointed out by 

the State, Knecht was a coach and authority figure, and was therefore someone who parents should 

be able to trust with their children. Knecht took advantage of her position of trust, and she also 

failed to cease her wrongful behavior when initially confronted about it back in 2013. And while 

Knecht expressed remorse for her actions and we agree with her that factors exist which would 

ordinarily favor probation, our review of a sentencing order is limited to an abuse of discretion

standard. And because the appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and 
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includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life, a sentencing court is accorded very wide 

discretion in imposing a sentence. State v. Rogers, supra. 

Having considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the nature of Knecht’s offense 

and her individual situation, as well as the record before us which includes the exhibits offered by 

Knecht at the sentencing hearing, we cannot say that Knecht’s sentence of 20 to 30 years’

imprisonment was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

AFFIRMED.