alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shawn Stout, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 881]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura Safer-Espinosa, J.), rendered on or about March 15, 2004, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833 [1976]). We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 460.20, defendant may apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within 30 days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the judge or justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other judge or justice. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Andrias, Sullivan, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
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RECEIVED IN
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
JUL 23 2015
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Appeal reinstated and order entered October 13, 2021

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-21-00427-CV

____________

IN THE INTEREST OF C.U.D., S.L.D., A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., AND 

A.E.D., II, CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 308th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-37155

ORDER

This is an appeal from a judgment terminating the parental rights of 

appellant, R.J. On October 5, 2021, this court abated the appeal and directed the 

trial court to clarify whether appellant desired to prosecute this appeal and was 

entitled to appointed counsel for it, as well as to appoint appellate counsel for 

appellant if necessary. The trial court subsequently noted Angela Ellis has been 

appointed counsel for appellant. Accordingly, this court reinstates this appeal and 

directs appellant to file her brief in this appeal by November 2, 2021.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Hassan and Poissant.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Patrick Williams, Appellant.

Submitted February 4, 2013;

decided February 7, 2013

*1024Motion for an extension of the time within which to apply for permission to appeal pursuant to CPL 460.20 granted and motion papers treated as a timely CPL 460.20 application.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

,

v.

ISELA DOMINGUEZ

,

Appellee

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§

'

' No. 08

- 1 4

- 00 0 11

- CR

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 7

of El Paso County , Texas

(TC# 20110C10845 )

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appell ee ’s third motion for extension of time to file the brief until

November 13

, 2014

. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE

APPELL EE ’S BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Daniel Robledo , the Appell ee ’s Attorney, prepare the

Appell ee ’s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before November 13 , 2014.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2 6 th day of September , 2014

.

PER CURIAM
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 17

- 00411

- CR

Anthony Anderson

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 432nd District Court

o f Tarrant County (1465691D )

July 26, 2018

Per Curiam

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on app eal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

FREDERICK J. MANGONE,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 72 WAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
Opinion issued July 14, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00190-CV

———————————

WELDON THOMAS, Appellant

V.

RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1054769

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Weldon Thomas, has neither paid the required fees nor 

established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 20.1; 

see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.941(a), 101.041 (West 2013); 

Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts 
2

of Appeals and Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket 

No. 07-9138 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2007), reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. app. A § B(1). 

Further, appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for preparing 

the clerk’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b). After being notified that this 

appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant did not adequately respond. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 5; 42.3(b).

We dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and for want of 

prosecution. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.
#### In the Matter of Application of Comps, Inc., Appellant, v Town of Islip et al., Respondents.

[822 NYS2d 768]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination dated January 5, 2004, denying, without a hearing, the petitioner’s request under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6) for the inventory data for all parcels contained on the assessment roll of the Town of Islip, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Sgroi, J), entered January 11, 2005, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers *797Law art 6; hereinafter FOIL), the petitioner made a request to the respondent Town of Islip seeking “a copy of the most current property assessment tax rolls with inventory on computer tape for [the Town].” The Town made the tax assessment rolls available, but denied the request for the inventory data, concluding that the release of that information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Supreme Court upheld the determination denying the request and the petitioner appeals. We affirm.

There is no merit to the petitioner’s position that Real Property Tax Law § 501 mandates production of inventory data under FOIL. The legislative history reveals that the law was intended to “give notice to taxpayers that the records are available for inspection” at a specified time to allow for the “correction of [potential] errors prior to the completion of the assessment roll” (Mem of State Bd of Equalization & Assessment, 1981 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2519). As a result, the Supreme Court correctly found that the Town’s determination properly balanced the interests of public access and individual privacy (see *Matter of Siegel, Fenchel & Peddy v Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn.,*251 AD2d 670, 671-672 [1998]). Accordingly, disclosure of the requested information was precluded by the privacy exemption under FOIL (see Public Officers Law § 89 [2] [b] [iii]; *Matter of Property Tax Reduction Consultants, Inc. v Township of Islip,*21 AD3d 376 [2005]). Schmidt, J.P, Santucci, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Susser Holdings Corporation (the Company) for the three and nine months ended
October 1, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Sam L. Susser, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |                             |  |                                      
|----------------------- |  | --------------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: November 15, 2006 |  | SUSSER HOLDINGS CORPORATION
|                        |  |                            
|                        |  | By                          |  | /s/ Sam L. Susser                    
|                        |  |                             |  | Sam L. Susser                        
|                        |  |                             |  | President and Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 31, 2021

t0324 

# Order

Clerk March 31, 2021

161667

ERIE ADAMS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 161667

COA: 346503

Oakland CC: 2017

- 161212

- CH

SULBA BROWN,

Defendant

- Appellee,

and

CLARENE A. McCORD and CLARENCE A.

McCORD,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 24, 2020

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this quarterly report on
Form 10-Q of Vitamin Shoppe, Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended September 26, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michael G. Archbold, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(i) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 12, 2009



/s/ Michael G. ArchboldMichaelG. ArchboldChief Financial and Chief Operating Officer(Principal Financial Officer)


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
and is not being filed as part of this Report.
July 21, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

MARCUS JERARD SCOTT, Appellant

NO. 14-15-00485-CR

NO. 14-15-00486-CR V.

NO. 14-15-00487-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

judgment signed by the court below on April 10, 2015. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
@article{1210756,
  author = {Katherine Evans and Shawn Chen and Amanda Souna and Stephan J. Stranick and Christopher Soles and Edwin P. Chan},
  title = {Scaling the Projectile Perforation Resistance of Soft Materials},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-06-29 04:06:00},
  publisher = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=935241},
  language = {en},
}
#### Shamsul Haque, Respondent, v Crown Heights NRP Associates, *LP,*et al., Defendants, and BFC Construction Corp., Appellant. (And Other Titles.)

[823 NYS2d 473]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, BFC Construction Corp. appeals, as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), dated November 9, 2005, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he was pouring acid into a basket while standing on a hanging scaffold at a construction site where the defendant BFC Construction Corp. (hereinafter BFC) served as a general contractor. The accident occurred on a Sunday. The plaintiff commenced this action, alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241. BFC moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, arguing, that Labor Law §§ 240 or 241 were not applicable because BFC did not give the plaintiff permission to work on Sundays. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied BFC’s motion.

To receive the benefits of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, a worker must show that “he [or she] was both permitted or suffered to work on a building or structure and that he [or she] was hired by someone, be it owner, contractor or their agent” *(Whelen v Warwick Val. Civic & Social Club,*47 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]; *see Morton v State of New York,*13 AD3d 498 [2004]; *Morra v White,*276 AD2d 536, 537 [2000]). In opposition to BFC’s prima facie showing entitling it to summary judgment, the plaintiff, through his coworker’s affidavit, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had permission to perform work on the date in question *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851 [1985]; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Florio, J.E, Goldstein, Luciano and Lunn, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 126 (Thursday, July 2, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 31710]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15634]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION OF FINE ARTS


Notice of Meeting

    The next meeting of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts is scheduled 
for 16 July 2009, at 10 a.m. in the Commission offices at the National 
Building Museum, Suite 312, Judiciary Square, 401 F Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20001-2728. Items of discussion may include buildings, 
parks and memorials.
    Draft agendas and additional information regarding the Commission 
are available on our Web site: http://www.cfa.gov. Inquiries regarding 
the agenda and requests to submit written or oral statements should be 
addressed to Thomas Luebke, Secretary, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, at 
the above address or call 202-504-2200. Individuals requiring sign 
language interpretation for the hearing impaired should contact the 
Secretary at least 10 days before the meeting date.

    Dated 26 June 2009 in Washington, DC.
Thomas Luebke,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E9-15634 Filed 7-1-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6330-01-M
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-21015 Summary Calendar

JOSEPH EUGENE JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus FRED BECKER; WALTER STENSLAND; BRIDGETT BURCH, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CV-869

- - - - - - - - - - November 17, 1999 Before GARWOOD, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Joseph Eugene Jackson, Texas prisoner # 673561, appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant prison officials in his civil rights complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues that the district court erred ingranting summary judgment on his excessive-force and denial-ofaccess-to-the-courts claims. We have reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, and we conclude that there exists no genuine issue of material fact concerning Jackson’s claims. TheNo. 98-21015 -2- facts Jackson alleges do not establish that prison officials used excessive force or denied him access to the courts. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The district court’s orders denying Jackson’s motion for a stay of the summary judgment ruling pending discovery and his postjudgment motion for declaratory relief also are AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1

                  Certification Pursuant to18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                       As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906
                        of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Procyon Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), we, the undersigned Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do certify, to our
knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Dated: September 27, 2007


/s/ Regina W. Anderson
Regina W. Anderson
Chief Executive Officer


/s/ James B. Anderson
James B. Anderson
Chief Financial Officer
#### Susan Crescimanno, Appellant, v Charles Crescimanno, Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 310]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her notice of appeal and brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kent, J.), entered May 16, 2005, as, after a nonjury trial, awarded the defendant a separate property credit in the sum of $214,243.27, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the equitable distribution of the sum of $214,243.27, representing the amount awarded as a separate property credit.

The proceeds from an action to recover damages for personal injuries are considered separate property *(see*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [2]; *Chamberlain v Chamberlain,*24 AD3d 589, 593 [2005]). However, separate property that is commingled, for example, in a joint bank account, loses its character of separateness and a presumption arises that each party is entitled to a share of the funds *(see*Banking Law § 675 [b]; *Sherman v Sherman,*304 AD2d 744 [2003]; *Di Nardo v Di Nardo,*144 AD2d 906, 907 [1988]). That presumption, however, may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the account was created only as a matter of convenience *(see Chamberlain v Chamberlain, supra; Wade v Steinfeld,*15 AD3d 390 [2005]).

Here, the defendant opened a joint savings account with the plaintiff into which they deposited a check that was payable to both of them representing the proceeds from a settlement of the *650defendant’s personal injury lawsuit. The next day, the defendant transferred the funds from that account into a joint checking account from which checks were drawn to satisfy certain marital debts, including a loan from the defendant’s mother for the down payment on the marital residence and a private purchase money mortgage on that property. The defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the funds were transmuted into marital property by establishing that the account was created only as a matter of convenience without the intention of creating a beneficial interest *(see Chamberlain v Chamberlain, supra).*Thus, the funds did not retain the character of separate property *(see Sherman v Sherman, supra).*

Accordingly, the defendant should not have received a property credit in the sum of $214,243.27 *(see Haynes v Toma,*300 AD2d 357 [2002]; *Fuegel v Fuegel,*271 AD2d 404, 405 [2000]; *Pauk v Pauk,*232 AD2d 386, 390 [1996]), and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the equitable distribution of that sum. Santucci, J.E, Krausman, Mastro and Skelos, JJ., concur.