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14-P-701 Appeals Court

GROTON-DUNSTABLE REGIONAL SCHOOL COMMITTEE vs. GROTONDUNSTABLE EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION.

No. 14-P-701.

Middlesex. March 9, 2015. - July 20, 2015.

Present: Trainor, Wolohojian, & Carhart, JJ.

School and School Committee, Professional teacher status, 

Termination of employment. Education Reform Act.

Arbitration, Collective bargaining, School committee.

Public Employment, Collective bargaining, Termination.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

November 4, 2013. 

The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings.

Laurie R. Houle for the defendant.

Howard L. Greenspan for the plaintiff.

WOLOHOJIAN, J. At issue is whether the defendant union is 

entitled on behalf of a terminated teacher to pursue arbitration 

under the provisions of its collective bargaining agreement, or 

whether it is instead required to pursue arbitration under G. L. 
2

c. 71, § 42, amended by St. 1993, c. 71, § 44. Because we 

conclude that G. L. c. 71, § 42, provides the exclusive route to 

arbitrate the termination of a teacher with professional teacher 

status (previously known as tenure), we affirm the judgment 

resulting from the allowance of the plaintiff school committee's 

motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The school committee and the union entered into a 

collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that covered the period 

September 1, 2011, through August 31, 2014. One article of the 

CBA governed the arbitration of grievances, and set out detailed 

procedures for such arbitration. Another article of the CBA 

provided that teachers would not "be disciplined, reprimanded, 

reduced in rank or compensation, or deprived of any professional 

advantages or salary increase without just cause."

Melissa Pooler, a teacher with professional teacher status,1

was terminated by the school committee on July 16, 2013. After 

the union's grievance on behalf of Pooler was denied,

2 the union 

claimed arbitration under the CBA. The school committee 

 

1 See G. L. c. 71, § 41, amended by St. 1996, c. 99 ("a 

teacher. . . who has served in the public schools of a school 

district for three previous consecutive school years shall be 

. . . entitled to professional teacher status").

2 At the same time, Pooler filed a petition for arbitration 

under G. L. c. 71, § 42. Subsequently, however, she and the 

union requested that her petition be held in abeyance to allow 

the union to pursue a grievance on her behalf under the CBA. 
3

responded by suing to stay arbitration pursuant to G. L. 

c. 150C, § 2. The school committee's motion for a preliminary 

injunction was allowed, as was its subsequent motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. The latter is the subject of this 

appeal.3

Section 42 of G. L. c. 71 provides, as pertinent here, that 

teachers with professional teacher status (such as Pooler) may 

seek to have an arbitrator review their termination in 

accordance with the procedures specified in the statute. 

Section 42 also provides that such a teacher "shall not be 

dismissed except for inefficiency, incompetency, incapacity, 

conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination or failure on the 

part of the teacher to satisfy teacher performance standards 

developed pursuant to section thirty-eight of this chapter or 

other just cause." Of particular importance here, § 42 provides 

that "[w]ith the exception of other remedies provided by 

statute, the remedies provided hereunder shall be the exclusive 

remedies available to teachers for wrongful termination." 

The union contends that, despite the exclusivity language 

just quoted, § 42 does not preclude the union from pursuing 

arbitration under the provisions of the CBA. Relying on three 

 

3 Our review is de novo. Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers

Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 600 (2010).
4

cases that predate the Education Reform Act of 1993,4 the union 

contends that § 42 does not limit or override G. L. c. 150E, 

§ 8, which allows parties to include arbitration provisions in 

collective bargaining agreements.5 It follows, in the union's 

view, that § 42 is not the exclusive avenue through which a 

terminated teacher, or the union on the teacher's behalf, can 

pursue arbitration.

It is not surprising that the union is unable to point to 

any authority dating after 1993, when the Education Reform Act

(Act) was enacted. The Act made sweeping changes to the 

arbitration procedures available to terminated teachers, as well 

as to the scope and authority of arbitrators, and the standards

those arbitrators are to apply.6 Recognizing that these changes 

might be in conflict with arbitration provisions in thenexisting collective bargaining agreements, the Act provides in 

 

4 Old Rochester Regional Teacher's Club v. Old Rochester 

Regional Sch. Dist. Comm., 398 Mass. 695 (1986); School Comm. of 

Waltham v. Waltham Educators Assn., 398 Mass. 703 (1986); School 

Comm. of Needham v. Needham Educ. Assn., 398 Mass. 709 (1986). 

5 "The parties may include in any written agreement a 

grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration 

to be invoked in the event of any dispute concerning the 

interpretation or application of such written agreement." G. L. 

c. 150E, § 8, amended by St. 1989, c. 341, § 80.

6 "The statutory scheme governing teacher dismissals set 

forth in G. L. c. 71, § 42, was enacted as part of the 

[Education] Reform Act, which brought broad-based changes to the 

funding and governance structure of the public education system 

in Massachusetts." School Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 469 

Mass. 104, 112 (2014).
5

an uncodified provision that § 42 "shall not apply to employees 

subject to collective bargaining agreements executed prior to 

the effective date of this act insofar as such collective 

bargaining agreements are in conflict with said section[]." St. 

1993, c. 71, § 77. However, the Legislature clearly mandated 

that "[c]ollective bargaining agreements effective after the 

date of this act shall be subject to the provisions of said 

section[] [42]" (emphasis added). Ibid. The CBA at issue in 

this case was negotiated almost twenty years after the Act was 

enacted. The exclusivity provision of § 42 accordingly applies, 

and the union had no right to pursue arbitration under the CBA. 

Its remedy lies exclusively through § 42.

The union also argues that Pooler is entitled to have her 

termination reviewed under the "just cause" standard provided in 

the CBA, rather than the standard contained in § 42. But since 

the enactment of the Act, our cases have consistently held that 

the source, authority, and scope of arbitration for terminated 

teachers derive from § 42, not from contract -- regardless of 

the existence or terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 

See, e.g., School Dist. of Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 

229-230 (2001); Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844,

856-857 (2011); School Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 469 Mass. 

104, 111-112 (2014); School Comm. of Chicopee v. Chicopee Educ.

Assn., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 357, 364-365 (2011). The school 
6

committee's decision to terminate Pooler must accordingly be 

assessed under the standards of G. L. c. 71, § 42. Zagaeski, 

469 Mass. at 113.

For these reasons, arbitration under the CBA was properly 

stayed.

Judgment affirmed.