This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1406

Michael Anthony Powell, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed July 20, 2015

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court

File No. 14CR112280

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela Harris, Chief Assistant County Attorney, 

Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and 

Reyes, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REYES, Judge

On appeal from the postconviction order requiring him to pay $20,765.92 in 

restitution, appellant Michael Anthony Powell argues that the state failed to prove that the 
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victim’s medical expenses, prescription-drug expenses, and lost wages were all directly 

tied to the offense of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Powell also argues 

that the district court failed to consider his income, resources, and obligations in 

determining his ability to pay restitution. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 

to the district court to modify the restitution award to $20,681.45.

FACTS

On July 5, 2011, Powell was charged with one count of first-degree criminal 

sexual conduct, one count of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, and one 

count of false imprisonment. Powell pleaded guilty to second-degree assault with a 

dangerous weapon and the other charges were dismissed. Powell admitted that he and 

the victim, V.B.M., got into an argument in his trailer and he cut her with a knife near her 

collar bone. The district court sentenced Powell to 34 months in prison and ordered him 

to pay restitution in a preliminary amount of $11,601.11, but left the record open for 30 

days so the victim could obtain her medical bills. On December 27, 2011, the district 

court received the medical bills and issued an amended order which increased the 

restitution amount to $21,313.92. On January 18, 2012, Powell timely filed a motion 

challenging the amount of restitution awarded. On March 19, 2012, after a hearing was 

held on the matter, the district court set the total amount of restitution owed at 

$20,765.92. Powell did not directly appeal this order. 

On November 20, 2013, Powell filed a petition for postconviction relief, again 

challenging the restitution amount. The district court denied Powell’s petition and upheld 
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the $20,765.92 restitution amount, reasoning that the state had met its burden of proving 

that the victim’s economic losses were the result of the offense. This appeal followed. 

D E C I S I O N

There are three issues presented in this case: (1) whether Powell’s claims are 

properly before this court; (2) whether the state met its burden to show that the victim’s 

economic loss was directly caused by Powell’s crime; and (3) whether the district court 

erred by failing to consider Powell’s income, resources, or obligation in determining the 

restitution amount. We address each in turn.

I. Powell’s claims are properly before this court.

When reviewing the decision of a postconviction court, we review questions of 

law de novo. Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn. 2008). Our review of 

factual findings is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the 

record to support the findings of the postconviction court. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 

531, 535 (Minn. 2007). The decisions of a postconviction court will not be disturbed 

unless the court abused its discretion. Id.

The state argues that Powell’s petition for postconviction relief is barred pursuant 

to State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976). The rule under Knaffla

states that “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all 

claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for 

postconviction relief.” 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. The statutory version of 

this rule states that “[a] petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been 
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completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of 

the conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2014). 

Powell did not file a direct appeal. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.05 (setting a 90-day 

deadline in filing an appeal from a sentence imposed); State v. Borg, 834 N.W.2d 194, 

197 (Minn. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that court-ordered restitution is part of a defendant’s 

sentence.”). The state argues that under Knaffla, Powell could only obtain review of the 

restitution amount by bringing a direct appeal. Failure to do so, the state contends, means 

that all matters that could have been raised in a direct appeal (i.e. the restitution amount) 

are barred in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. We disagree. 

In Knaffla, the defendant did not pursue a direct appeal and instead filed a petition 

for postconviction relief after the time for a direct appeal had expired. 309 Minn. at 247, 

243 N.W.2d at 738. The Minnesota Supreme Court permitted the appeal, stating that “in 

a postconviction proceeding, relief is to be predicated, not upon a determination as to 

whether direct appeal from the conviction was taken within the prescribed time 

limitations, but rather upon compliance with the procedural requirements of [section 

590].” Id. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. The court noted, “[t]he salient feature of [section 

590] . . . is that a convicted defendant is entitled to at least one right of review by an 

appellate or postconviction court.” Id. Accordingly, Knaffla’s own language indicates 

that its bar applies only “where direct appeal has once been taken.” Id. No such appeal 

was taken here. 

Similarly, in Deegan v. State, the defendant did not pursue a direct appeal and 

only filed a petition for postconviction relief. 711 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 2006). The 
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court noted that “[b]ecause a first review by postconviction proceeding in Minnesota is 

substantially similar to a direct appeal, and appears to differ from first review by 

postconviction proceedings in other jurisdictions, it may well be that the right to one 

review—through either direct appeal or postconviction proceeding—is a tradition unique 

to Minnesota.” Id. at 95 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In light of these 

decisions, we conclude that Knaffla’s rule does not bar petitions for postconviction relief 

where no direct appeal has been filed. 

We also note that Powell’s challenge is timely. After the district court ordered 

restitution on December 27, 2011, Powell had 30 days to challenge the restitution 

amount. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2010). Had Powell failed to do so, his 

current postconviction petition challenging restitution would have been untimely. State

v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2013) (“[A] defendant who fails to timely 

challenge restitution under section 611A.045, subdivision 3(b), may not challenge 

restitution in a postconviction-relief petition.”). But Powell properly challenged the 

restitution order within the 30-day time period. And because, Chapter 590 is broad

enough to cover a right of first review by postconviction petition, Powell’s current 

challenges to the restitution amount are properly before this court. 

II. The state met its burden to show that the victim’s economic loss was directly 

caused by Powell’s crime.

“A crime victim has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a 

criminal charge.” State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Minn. 1996) (quotation 

omitted); Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2010) (stating that a district court may order 
6

a criminal to pay his victim’s restitution). “The primary purpose of restitution is to 

restore crime victims to the same financial position they were in before the crime.” State 

v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 2014). District courts have broad discretion in 

awarding restitution. State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1999). But whether 

an item meets the restitution statute’s requirements is a legal question reviewed de novo. 

State v. Ramsay, 789 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. App. 2010). 

A victim’s request for restitution may include out-of-pocket losses that occurred as 

a result of the crime. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). But a victim’s losses must be 

“directly caused by the conduct that led to [the defendant’s] conviction.” State v. Miller, 

842 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Apr. 

15, 2014). “The burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim is on 

the prosecution.” Johnson, 851 N.W.2d at 65. A district court must determine whether 

“a restitution claim . . . [is] so attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result from 

the defendant’s criminal act.” See State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Minn. 2007). 

An economic loss must be “a reasonably foreseeable result of, and [be] directly caused 

by, [a defendant’s] actions.” State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. App. 2011), 

review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2011). 

In determining the amount of restitution, Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a)

provides:

The court or its designee shall obtain the information from the 

victim in affidavit form or by other competent evidence. 

Information submitted relating to restitution must describe the 

items or elements of loss, itemize the total dollar amounts of 
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restitution claimed, and specify the reasons justifying these 

amounts, if restitution is in the form of money or property.

To contest the restitution amount, the offender initially has the burden to produce 

evidence by filing “a detailed sworn affidavit . . . setting forth all challenges to the 

restitution or items of restitution, and specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of 

restitution which differ from the amounts requested by the victim.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2010). Once an offender raises a proper challenge, the state 

bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the restitution amount 

is appropriate. Id.; see also State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. App. 2000). 

Powell argues that the state failed to show that his offense directly caused 

economic loss with respect to V.B.M.’s: (1) medical bills; (2) prescription drugs; and 

(3) lost wages. 

A. Medical bills

Powell makes two arguments with respect to V.B.M.’s medical bills. First, Powell 

argues that there is no evidence that the medical bills caused actual economic loss 

because there was no evidence V.B.M. actually paid them or that she had not received 

any discounts. This argument was not properly pleaded before the district court in 

Powell’s affidavit challenging restitution. As previously stated, the burden of production 

is initially on Powell to submit “a detailed sworn affidavit . . . setting forth all challenges 

to the restitution or items of restitution.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). Such an 

affidavit “is both the sole vehicle by which the offender can meet the burden of pleading, 

and an essential element of the offender’s case required to meet the burden of 
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production.” Thole, 614 N.W.2d at 235. Here, Powell’s affidavit only challenges the 

causal relationship between the offense and the medical bills and prescription drugs. The 

affidavit makes no mention of V.B.M.’s failure to pay any bills or potentially receiving 

discounts on some visits, as he currently argues. Because Powell failed to allege such 

arguments in his pleadings, we will not consider them on appeal. 

Second, Powell argues that there was no documentation showing that the medical 

costs were all directly caused by the offense. Powell contends that although medical bills 

were submitted, there was no documentation specifically detailing what diagnosis V.B.M. 

received, what treatment occurred, or how the treatment was tied to the assault. As to the 

required level of specificity, the information submitted for restitution “must describe the 

items or elements of loss, itemize the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and 

specify the reasons justifying these amounts.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). 

V.B.M. submitted medical bills from three different health-care providers. Each 

bill contained line-by-line information detailing the date of service, description of 

services provided, and the amount charged. The information in these bills was 

corroborated by V.B.M. at the restitution hearing when she testified that all of her 

ongoing medical expenses were caused by the assault. On cross-examination, V.B.M. 

testified about specific treatments she underwent as a result of the assault, including 

physical therapy, emergency room trips for pain, hearing tests, trips to a chiropractor, 

bulging disks in her back and neck, and MRI tests. V.B.M. also submitted a victimimpact statement, which included medical evaluations from two different doctors 

detailing the specific treatments required as a result of the assault.
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Based on the medical bills, testimony, and documents submitted by V.B.M., we 

conclude that the state has sufficiently “describe[d] the items or elements of loss, 

itemize[d] the total dollar amounts of restitution claimed, and specif[ied] the reasons 

justifying these amounts.” Id. The statute simply does not require the amount of 

specificity Powell would ascribe. See Hughes v. State, 815 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 

2012) (concluding in a case involving a challenge to the specificity of the factual basis 

for a restitution award, that ample evidence supported a finding that the request for 

funeral expenses was sufficiently specific). “Although it would be unreasonable to 

expect a receipt, or even the exact price, for every purchase, it is not unreasonable to 

request some amount of detail in the description and general costs of items purchased.”

State v. Keehn, 554 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 

1996). We conclude that medical bills specifying the date, services provided, and exact 

amount charged—all of which were linked to the offense by the victim’s testimony and 

corroborated by documents from medical experts—certainly rise to the level of “some 

amount of detail.” Id.

B. Prescription drugs

Next, Powell challenges the amount of restitution allocated for prescription-drug 

costs. In her restitution affidavit, V.B.M. claimed $338.06 in prescription-drug costs and 

submitted receipts from White Drug Pharmacy in support of this figure. Powell argues 

that the receipts alone are not specific enough to satisfy the state’s burden and fail to 

show that the medication was a result of the offense. 
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The documentation surrounding the prescription drugs is detailed enough to satisfy 

the requirements of section 611A.04, sudivision 1(a). V.B.M.’s receipts include a 

specific prescription number and the amount charged. V.B.M. testified that the 

prescription medication came as a result of the assault, that she had never needed any 

such medication prior to the assault, and provided details on what the medication was for, 

including face and muscle relaxers, sinus issues related to the assault, and pain 

management. These statements, coupled with the provided receipts, include the amount 

of detail required by Keehn. 554 N.W.2d at 408. Indeed, this is the exact type of 

documentation that Keehn believed would be going above and beyond the required level 

of specificity. Id. (“Although it would be unreasonable to expect a receipt, or even the 

exact price, for every purchase, it is not unreasonable to request some amount of detail in 

the description and general costs of items purchased.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, 

the prescription drugs are an appropriate item for restitution. 

There is, however, an issue with the amount allocated for the prescription drugs. 

As previously stated, V.B.M. claimed $338.06 in prescription-drug costs in her affidavit. 

V.B.M. appears to have arrived at this figure by adding up the total amounts detailed on 

the receipts. But a number of the submitted receipts are duplicates of the same 

photocopy. And one receipt is dated August 19, 2010, which is almost a year prior to the 

date of the offense and therefore cannot be considered to be “directly caused by the 

conduct for which the defendant was convicted.” Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105 (quotation 

omitted). In addition, one of the receipts is for “Advil Allergy and Sinus” rather than a 

prescription. Because purchasing Advil is likely “so attenuated in its cause that it cannot 
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be said to result from the defendant’s criminal act,” it should not have been eligible for 

restitution. See Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667 (declining to adopt a but-for test for 

restitution but requiring that losses be a direct result of the crime, which includes the 

expenses of decedent’s children to attend the murder trial). The district court even 

acknowledged as much when it commented during the restitution hearing, “I will not be 

giving her any restitution on any allergy medications so that’s kind of a given.” 

Accordingly, the district court clearly erred when it awarded restitution in the full amount 

of $338.06 for the prescription drugs. Subtracting the duplicate receipts, the receipt dated 

prior to the offense, and the receipt for Advil, the restitution amount for prescription 

medication should be properly set at $253.59. 

C. Lost wages

Powell challenges the district court’s award of restitution for V.B.M.’s lost wages. 

In its restitution request, the state sought $7,969.26 to be paid to the Minnesota Crime 

Victim Reparations Board (Crime Board), $7,255.26 of which was for V.B.M.’s lost 

wages as a result of losing her housecleaning business. Powell argues that the state failed 

to show that V.B.M. suffered lost wages in the amount claimed as a result of the offense. 

Powell’s lost-wages argument suffers from the same problem as his argument that 

V.B.M. never paid her medical bills—his affidavit challenging restitution makes no 

mention of V.B.M.’s lost wages. Because Powell failed to submit “a detailed sworn 

affidavit . . . setting forth all challenges to the restitution or items of restitution,” he has 

not sufficiently pleaded the allegations relating to lost wages and we will not consider 

them here. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a).
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III. The district court erred considered Powell’s income, resources, or obligation 

in determining the restitution amount.

Under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(2) (2014), the district court must 

consider “the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant” when determining 

whether to order restitution and the amount of restitution. Powell argues that the district 

court abused its discretion by failing to consider Powell’s financial situation when 

ordering restitution. 

Powell misconstrues what the statute requires of the district court. The statute 

does not require that the district court explicitly discuss the offender’s ability to pay in its 

findings. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, .045 (containing no provision requiring the court to 

issue findings regarding a defendant’s financial situation); see also State v. Lindsey, 632 

N.W.2d 652, 663-64 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering an indigent prison inmate to pay $32,682.93 in restitution). Here, 

the district court heard testimony regarding Powell’s ability to pay both at the restitution 

hearing and later at the postconviction petition hearing. Powell submitted over 30 pages 

of exhibits relating to his ability to pay, including tax returns, W-2’s, garnishment letters, 

utility bills, and information on his debts. The district court specifically acknowledged 

Powell’s diminished earning capacity in its order following the postconviction relief 

hearing. While Powell may not agree with its determination, the district court did 

consider Powell’s financial situation and thus satisfied the requirements of section 

611A.045.
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We affirm the district court’s denial of Powell’s petition for postconviction relief. 

However, we reverse the district court’s restitution award relating to the victim’s 

prescription drug expenses. We remand to the district court for an order reducing the 

amount allocated for prescription drug expenses from $338.06 to $253.59. The total 

modified restitution award should be $20,681.45. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.