State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2015 105586 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK,

Respondent,

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAHTEEK STANFORD,

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: June 4, 2015

Before: Garry, J.P., Rose, Devine and Clark, JJ.

__________

Matthew C. Hug, Troy, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Brittany L.

Grome of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Devine, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Breslin, J.),

rendered October 18, 2012 in Albany County, upon a verdict

convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second

degree, attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the

first degree.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder

in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree and

assault in the first degree. The charges stemmed from a February

2011 incident at a social club in the City of Albany during which

one victim was fatally stabbed in the neck and a second was

stabbed in the head. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life

in prison as to the murder in the second degree conviction, and

to prison terms of 25 years, followed by five years of
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postrelease supervision, as to each conviction of attempted

murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree. 

Supreme Court directed that the sentences as to the convictions

for murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the

second degree run consecutively, and that the sentence as to the

conviction for assault in the first degree run concurrently with

the two other sentences. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. Defendant argues that the jury's verdict was

not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the

weight of the evidence. Turning first to the conviction of

murder in the second degree, a defendant is guilty of this crime

when, as is relevant here, he or she causes the death of a person

after having acted with intent to cause that person's death (see

Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). According to the testimony at trial,

the stabbings occurred during a birthday party in honor of a

female member of the club. Defendant went to the club that night

with several individuals who had not been invited to the birthday

party, but nonetheless gained admittance. At some point during

the evening, a verbal dispute occurred between members of

defendant's group and several of the invited guests, among them

Robert Smalls. At least one witness indicated that defendant and

Smalls were the primary antagonists during this heated verbal

exchange, and that the two had to be separated before a physical

fight began. While this proof of a potential motive does not

establish an element of the crime, it "cannot be ignored in

examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution" (People v Marin, 65 NY2d 741, 745 [1985]; see People

v Cushner, 46 AD3d 1121, 1124 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 809

[2008]).

Surveillance footage of the subsequent physical fight

reveals that one of defendant's associates was surrounded by

hostile partygoers, including Smalls, when it began. Defendant

did not have a weapon when he first arrived at the club but, as

the melee broke out, he can be seen exiting the club, reentering,

and walking toward his compatriot in what he admitted was an

attempt to help. By that point in time, the compatriot had

separated himself from the large group and retreated to the foyer

of the club, where he was followed by Smalls. Defendant then

came up behind Smalls, who turned around and faced defendant. 
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While the surveillance footage did not directly capture any blows

being exchanged, Smalls quickly backed away from the foyer and

was soon seen clutching his neck with his left hand. Defendant

can thereafter be seen moving in the direction of the second

victim, Ahmeen Lanier, and stabbing him in the head with a

vicious overhand motion. There is no question that the stabbings

left Smalls dead and Lanier severely injured.

Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable

to the People, and noting that "the intent to kill may be

inferred from the surrounding circumstances and a defendant's

actions," we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to

support the second-degree murder conviction (People v Hamilton,

127 AD3d 1243, 1245 [2015], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [June 30,

2015]). The attempted murder and assault convictions are

similarly supported by legally sufficient evidence, notably, the

videographic evidence showing defendant rising to his feet,

walking several yards and deliberately stabbing Lanier in the

head (see People v Salce, 124 AD3d 923, 924-925 [2015]). 

Defendant contended that he did not stab Smalls, and advanced a

justification defense with regard to his stabbing of Lanier. The

jury was free to credit the above evidence despite the presence

of proof that could support a different result and, upon our

independent review of the evidence, we cannot say that its

verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see People v

Vanderhorst, 117 AD3d 1197, 1198-1200 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d

1089 [2014]; People v Fisher, 89 AD3d 1135, 1138 [2011], lv

denied 18 NY3d 883 [2012]).

We reject defendant's claim that Supreme Court committed

reversible error in denying his challenge for cause as to a

prospective juror who had prior dealings with one of the People's

witnesses. A challenge for cause as to a prospective juror is

properly raised if he or she has a "relationship [with a

potential witness] of such [a] nature that it is likely to

preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict" (CPL

270.20 [1] [c]). The existence of such an implied bias requires

automatic exclusion even if, as here, "the prospective juror

declares that the relationship will not affect [his or] her

ability to be fair and impartial" (People v Furey, 18 NY3d 284,

287 [2011]; see People v Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 [1979]). "In
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determining whether a relationship is so close as to require

disqualification, a court should consider factors 'such as the

frequency, recency or currency of the contact, whether it was

direct contact, . . . [and] the nature of the relationship as

personal and/or professional'" (People v Hamilton, 127 AD3d at

1246-1247, quoting People v Greenfield, 112 AD3d 1226, 1228-1229

[2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1037 [2014]; see People v Furey, 18

NY3d at 287). Here, the prospective juror stated that she knew

Michael Dailey, a physician who provided peripheral testimony at

trial regarding the abortive efforts to treat Smalls after the

fatal attack, as her husband had been treated by Dailey and she

had previously cared for certain of his patients in her role as a

nursing aide. Under these circumstances, and stressing that the

prospective juror unequivocally stated that she could be fair and

impartial in assessing Dailey's testimony, we do not find that

her preexisting ties to Dailey rendered her unqualified to serve

(see People v Molano, 70 AD3d 1172, 1174 [2010], lv denied 15

NY3d 776 [2010]; see also People v Clark, 132 AD2d 704, 705

[1987]). 

Defendant's various claims of prosecutorial misconduct

during the People's summation were not properly preserved for

appellate review by specific objections at trial (see People v

Simmons, 111 AD3d 975, 980 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1203

[2014]). We decline to, as defendant urges, take corrective

action in the interest of justice. Insofar as defendant argues

that the prosecutor improperly mocked defendant's account of

having discovered the knife on the floor after Smalls was

stabbed, we find that the prosecutor's remarks in this regard

"constituted fair comment on" a central issue in the case (People

v Fomby, 101 AD3d 1355, 1357 [2012]). Moreover, although the

prosecutor did engage in rhetoric concerning the credibility of a

witness whose testimony as to the physical interactions between

Smalls and defendant was contradicted by the surveillance

footage, the prosecutor neither provided his own personal opinion

of this witness' truthfulness (compare People v Forbes, 111 AD3d

1154, 1158 [2013]) nor demanded that the jurors deem this witness

credible in light of her cooperation with the People in

prosecuting defendant (compare People v Casanova, 119 AD3d 976,

978-979 [2014]).

We reject defendant's claim that he received ineffective
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assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to object

to the purportedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor during

summation; for the reasons set forth above, those comments were

not improper. Accordingly, the failure of defense counsel "to

object [to those remarks] did not amount to the ineffective

assistance of counsel" (People v Thomas, 105 AD3d 1068, 1071-1072

[2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1010 [2013]). Defendant argues in his

pro se brief that his trial counsel should not have advised him

to take the stand and testify consistently with the theory that

the stabbing of Lanier was justified. Given the strength of the

evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant stabbed Lanier

while Lanier was in a defenseless position, we cannot say that

counsel would have lacked a legitimate strategic reason for

advising defendant to testify in accordance with a justification

theory (see People v McCray, 102 AD3d 1000, 1008-1009 [2013],

affd 23 NY3d 193 [2014]).

Finally, we do not agree that the sentence imposed by

Supreme Court was either harsh or excessive. Given the brutal

nature of defendant's acts and his refusal to accept

responsibility for them, we perceive no abuse of discretion or

extraordinary circumstances that would warrant a modification of

the sentence (see People v Thomas, 105 AD3d at 1072; People v

Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1215 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012],

cert denied US , 133 S Ct 791 [2012]). 

Garry, J.P., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court