alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HAHN et al. v. CORLEY MFG. CO. et al.

Civ. No. 172.

District Court, E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

Dec. 4, 1940.

Goins & Gammon, by L. H. Gammon, Jr., all of Chattanooga, Tenn., and Marshall & Carey, by James Carey, Jr., all of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

F. Todd Meacham, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendants.

DARR, District Judge.

The defendants have filed a motion, which is in effect two motions, the one seeking to dismiss the cause and the other seeking a bill of particulars. The court will take these motions up inversely.

1. The defendants make claim for a requirement that the plaintiffs be required to particularize on a number of different propositions. It is the judgment of the court that these matters are by way of discovery and that the defendants would have open to them methods by which this information can be obtained more satisfactorily than by pleadings. This part of the motion is overruled.

2. (a) The first ground of the defendants’ motion to dismiss is that there is no merit upon the face of the complaint.

The court is of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of action and this part of the motion is overruled.

2. (b) The defendants say the suit should be dismissed because the amount actually in controversy is less than $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

This motion is an appropriate manner to challenge the allegations of jurisdictional facts. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b) (1), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

The jurisdictional facts being challenged in an appropriate manner, the plaintiffs must support them by competent proof. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 298 U.S. 178, 186, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135, Kvos, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 57 S.Ct. 197, 81 L.Ed. 183.

Such proof may be submitted under authority of and in the manner provided by Rule 43(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court not being sure on this jurisdictional question, remands this part of the motion for proof and allows twenty days for said proof to be submitted.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

November 7, 2008 Revision

Cause number: 01-14-00693-CV

Style: Giovanny F. Laguan and Marina Del T. Martinez v. Hilary J. Lloyd

and Kimberly A. Lloyd

Date motion filed*: July 7, 2015

Type of motion: Late Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief

Party filing motion: Pro Se Appellant Giovanny F. Laguan

Document to be filed: Appellant’s Brief

Is appeal accelerated? No.

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: June 29, 2015

Number of extensions granted: 0 Current Due Date: June 29, 2015

Date Requested: November 7, 2015

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted in part

If document is to be filed, document due: August 28, 2015.

 No further extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.

 Denied

 Dismissed (e.g., want of jurisdiction, moot)

 Other: _____________________________________ 

Appellant’s motion for a 120-day extension of time to file the appellant’s brief,

because he needs more time to do research, is granted in part, until August 28, 2015, 

since he is proceeding pro se, but appellant is warned that no further extensions will be

granted absent extraordinary circumstances given the length of the extension sought

and the length of time granted. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b)(1)(B), 38.6(d).

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura Carter Higley

  

Date: July 14, 2015
EX 32

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                           CARDIFF INTERNATIONAL, INC.
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. S1350


     In connection  with the Annual Report of Cardiff  International,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  We,
Charles J. Calello President and a Director, and Clay Calello Vice President and
a Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.



/s/ Clay Calello
Clay Calello
Vice President and Director
October 21, 2005


/s/ Charles J. Calello
Charles J. Calello
President, Chief Executive Officer
October 21, 2005
#### PEN-KEN OIL & GAS CORPORATION v. WARFIELD NATURAL GAS CO.

No. 24.

District Court, E. D. Kentucky, Catlettsburg.

Feb. 3, 1942.

Gilbert F. Wagner and R. G. Holbrook, both of Chicago, 111., and Polk South, Jr., of Frankfort, Ky., for plaintiff.

S. S. Willis and Dysard & Dysard, all of Ashland, Ky., Harold A. Ritz, of Charleston, W. Va., and Wells & Wells, of Paints-ville, Ky., for defendant.

SWINFORD, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corporation, insists that the Court has failed to comply with Rule 52 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and that this Court, by that rule, is required to make explicit Findings of Fact on all questions at issue.

In my opinion Rule 52 applies to a case upon final hearing and submission. The ruling here is not made on the case upon final submission on the law and facts. The ruling here is on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Rule 56. In considering the motion upon examination of the record I find what I believe to be two absolute defenses to the relief asked by the plaintiff. The defenses of res judicata and fifteen and thirty years’ adverse possession, as supported by the affidavits of the defendant.

In view of that fact I do not deem it necessary to make detailed findings on questions raised by the record as it now stands, but .only upon the record as it stood at the time the motion for summary judgment was filed. This seems to me to comply with the definite purpose of the Rules.

The chronology of the record should be borne in mind and motions should be passed upon in the order of their filing. The matters on which the plaintiff now asks specific findings of fact and rulings were matters which were presented by the record subsequent to the filing of the motion for a summary judgment.

I repeat, that it should be borne in mind that the ruling of the Court here is on the motion for a summary judgment under Rule 56 and not upon a final submission at a final hearing on the law and facts as contemplated by Rule 52.
Exhibit 11. Statement Regarding Computation of Per Share Earnings

|                                    | Year EndedJune 30, 2004 | Year EndedJune 30, 2003
|----------------------------------- | ----------------------- | -----------------------
|EQUIVALENT SHARES:                  |                         |                        
|Weighted average shares outstanding | 2,543,812               | 2,644,317              
|                                    |                         |                        
|Total diluted shares                | 2,604,910               | 2,685,943              
|                                    |                         |                        
|Net income                          | $  3,512,179            | $  3,855,318           
|                                    |                         |                        
|Basic earnings per share            | $        1.38           | $        1.46          
|                                    |                         |                        
|Diluted earnings per share          | $        1.35           | $        1.44
#### Kennel Delites, Inc., Doing Business as American Kennels, Respondent, v T.L.S. NYC Real Estate, LLC, et al., Defendants, and St. Paul Travelers Insurance Company et al., Appellants.

[852 NYS2d 130]

*303Defendant Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, initially identified incorrectly as St. Paul Travelers Insurance Company, issued a policy to plaintiff with a limitation of coverage, known as a rain exclusion, which barred recovery for interior property damage and business income losses “caused by,” among other things, rain. This rain exclusion applies to the loss at issue, namely, water damage from a rainstorm. Although plaintiff contends that the water damage to its interior was due to debris and mortar that fell from a neighboring building, which then clogged its roof drain, causing the rainwater to accumulate on its roof and later enter the building, the “efficient physical cause” was the rainwater itself *(cf. Home Ins. Co. v American Ins. Co.,*147 AD2d 353, 354 [1989]). A reasonable business person would conclude in this case that the interior property was damaged by rainwater from the previous evening’s storm, and would look no further for alternate causes (see *Album Realty Corp. v American Home Assur. Co.,*80 NY2d 1008 [1992]). The claim as it might apply to roof damage should proceed. Concur— Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Gonzalez and Acosta, JJ.
Order entered July 14, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01432-CR

AYOUAL AKOUT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-12-60792-N

ORDER

We ABATED this appeal on July 1, 2015 to allow the trial court an opportunity to issue 

written findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether appellant’s custodial confession 

was made voluntarily. Because the requested findings have been rendered and a supplemental 

clerk’s record containing those findings has been filed, we REINSTATE the appeal.

/s/ DOUGLAS S. LANG 

JUSTICE
#### In the Matter of Jeannie B., on Behalf of Jayda D.-B., Respondent, v Roger D., Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 332]

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the father appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Rockland County (Christopher, J.), dated June 15, 2005, which, after a hearing, inter alia, directed that he stay away from the mother and the child, as well as from the home of the maternal grandparents, until June 2, 2010.

Ordered that the notice of appeal from a fact-finding order of the same court dated May 10, 2005 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the order of protection (see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the petitioner sustained a physical injury as defined under Penal Law § 10.00 (9). In addition to the petitioner’s testimony that the appellant “stomped” on her six or seven times, and that she went to a bone specialist and underwent physical therapy twice a week for a month, a responding police officer testified that he observed bruises on the petitioner’s body, and the photographs that he took of the bruises were admitted into evidence. The officer’s testimony, together with the photographs, constituted objective evidence which, together with the petitioner’s testimony, was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant committed acts constituting assault in the third degree *(see People v Ortiz,*290 AD2d 460, 461 [2002]; *People v Ayuso,*204 AD2d 472 [1994]; *Matter of Clem F.,*198 AD2d 223, 224 [1993]; *cf. Matter of Philip A.,*49 NY2d 198, 200 [1980]; *People v McDowell,*28 NY2d 373, 375 [1971]; *People v Hargrove,*95 AD2d 864 [1983]).

Furthermore, we reject the appellant’s contention that he did not receive a fair hearing. While the appellant denied that the incidents occurred, the Family Court credited the petitioner and not the appellant. As the trier of fact, the Family Court’s deter-

*995mination regarding the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to great weight *(see Matter of Ford v Pitts,*30 AD3d 419 [2006]). Since there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court’s credibility determination, we will not disturb it *(see Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 173 [1982]; *Matter of Jennifer R.,*29 AD3d 1003 [2006]; *Matter of Fasano v State of New York,*113 AD2d 885, 888 [1985]). Miller, J.E, Ritter, Rivera and Lifson, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cannabis Sativa, Inc. (the "Registrant") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2017, as filed with the Commission on the date hereof (the "Quarterly Report"), I, Carolyn Merrill, Principal Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

 

Dated:  May 22, 2017
@article{11776,
  author = {Solomon Woods and Stephen Carr and Timothy Jung and Adriaan Carter and Raju Datla},
  title = {Demonstration of a Meissner-Effect Transition Edge Sensor},
  year = {2010},
  number = {108},
  month = {2010-07-26},
  publisher = {Journal of Applied Physics},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=904199},
  language = {en},
}
H. Res. 772 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

December 19, 2019. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 5377) to 

amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the limitation on deduction of State and local taxes, and for other 

purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill 

are waived. The amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Ways and Means now printed in the bill shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as 

amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order 

against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived. The 

previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, 

as amended, and on any further amendment thereto, to final 

passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of 

debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and rank-
2 

•HRES 772 EH 

ing minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means; 

and (2) one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
Exhibit 32.2

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Porter
Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) for the annual period ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, David B. Pierce, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, do hereby certify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |  |  |                      |  |                        
|------------------ |  |  |  | -------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                   |  |  |  | PORTER BANCORP, INC.
|                   |  |  | 
|Dated: May 7, 2009 |  |  |  | By:                  |  | /s/ David B. Pierce    
|                   |  |  |  |                      |  | David B. Pierce        
|                   |  |  |  |                      |  | Chief Financial Officer
S05Y0282.

#### IN THE MATTER OF ELIZABETH REBECCA PALMER.

(606 SE2d 256)

Per curiam.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to the report and recommendation of a special master who was appointed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106 (a) to recommend the appropriate discipline for Respondent Elizabeth Rebecca Palmer’s violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as set out in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Because Palmer, though properly served, has not responded to the allegations nor made an appearance in these *723proceedings, we accept the report and recommendation which found that Palmer, who has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 1999, was adjudged guilty on March 3, 2004 by a North Carolina jury on five felony counts of embezzlement and four felony counts of uttering a forged document in violation of North Carolina law. See N.C. Stat. §§ 14-90 and 14-120. These convictions constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Because the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) is disbarment and because we find no mitigating circumstances that would dictate a lesser sanction, we accept the recommendation of the special master that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. Accordingly, we hereby order that the name of Elizabeth Rebecca Palmer be removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia. Palmer is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Decided November 22, 2004.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, K. Gene Chapman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*Disbarred.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### In the Matter of G & C Transportation, Inc., et al., Appellants, v Jean-Ann McGrane et al., Respondents.

Decided January 15, 2013

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Eddie West, Appellant, v Titan Express, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[976 NYS2d 899]

Garry, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed November 6, 2012, which denied claimant’s request for a variance.

Claimant sustained a work-related back injury in 1995. A claim was established in 2005, and liability was shifted to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases. Thereafter, claimant was determined to have a permanent total disability, and reasonable treatment was authorized. The Special Fund authorized several series of trigger point injections until January 2012, when it denied the request of claimant’s treating physician for further injections on the ground that they were inconsistent with the Workers’ Compensation Board Medical Treatment Guidelines and the opinion of the independent medical examiner. Following a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge concluded that a variance from the Guidelines was appropriate and authorized further injections. In November 2012, the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed this determination, finding that a variance is not required for repeat injections when they are linked to subjective and objective improvements that materially affect a claimant’s condition, but that here, claimant’s physician had failed to sufficiently document the requisite improvements. Claimant appeals.

*1280In April 2013, during the pendency of this appeal, the Board issued a new decision that “amends and supersedes” the November 2012 decision *(Employer: Titan Express Inc.,*2013 WL 1784247, *1, 2013 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 3364, *1 [WCB No. 3041 0151, Apr. 17, 2013]). The April 2013 decision finds that a variance is required before claimant can receive additional injections, and that the variance request should not have been granted because claimant’s physician did not demonstrate that injections were medically necessary to maintain his level of functionality.* This Court did not learn that the April 2013 decision had been rendered until after the arguments upon this appeal were completed. There are unaddressed issues arising from these unusual procedural circumstances, specifically including the extent of the Board’s continuing jurisdiction to render the April 2013 decision, and whether this appeal has been rendered moot. We thus direct the parties to submit briefs on these issues, during which time the appeal will be held in abeyance.

Rose, J.E, Stein and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is withheld, and the parties are directed to file briefs within 30 days in accordance with this Court’s decision.

*

 Both the decision on appeal and the April 2013 decision additionally found that claimant’s physician had failed to demonstrate that alternative treatments were inappropriate.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Dr. Barry W. Karlin, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of CRC Health Corporation (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: May 15, 2007



|                                                                             
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ DR. BARRY W. KARLIN                                                      
|Dr. Barry W. Karlin                                                          
|Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President (Principal Executive Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to CRC
Health Corporation and will be retained by CRC Health Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.