steps to perfect a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees 

plus costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained Bourassa Law Group (Bourassa), 

which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. Bourassa filed an 

interpleader action seeking proper distribution of the settlement funds 

among several claimants, including McDonald Carano. The district court 

concluded that McDonald Carano could not enforce its charging lien 

because it withdrew before settlement occurred. 

McDonald Carano timely appealed, arguing the district court 

erred in holding that McDonald Carano could not enforce its charging lien. 

We reverse the district court's order denying McDonald Carano's request 

for disbursement and remand. 

McDonald Carano's withdrawal does not prevent it from enforcing its 

charging lien 

Charging liens are governed by NRS 18.015, which provides 

that lab attorney at law shall have a lien. . . [u]pon any claim, demand 

or cause of action .. . which has been placed in the attorney's hands by a 

client for suit or collection," and that lien "attaches to any verdict, 

judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which is 

recovered on account of the suit or other action." NRS 18.015(1)(a), (4)(a). 

This court has not yet determined whether an attorney's withdrawal 

prevents him from enforcing a charging lien under NRS 18.015. We 

review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468, 476, 168 P.3d 731, 737 (2007). 

"When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its 

plain meaning." Id. "A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 

understood in two or more senses by reasonably well-informed persons." 

Id. 

The district court held McDonald Carano could not enforce its 

"charging lien because McDonald Carano withdrew from the Cooper 

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matter prior to any settlement being obtained and did not obtain a 

settlement for the client." The district court based its decision on this 

court's statement that "[a] charging lien is a lien on the judgment or 

settlement that the attorney has obtained for the client." Argentena 

Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish, 125 Nev. 

527, 534, 216 P.3d 779, 783-84 (2009) (emphasis added). 

The district court's reliance on Argentena is misplaced. 

Argentena said nothing about whether withdrawn attorneys can enforce 

charging liens. It held that charging liens only apply when a client is 

entitled to affirmative monetary recovery. Id. at 534, 216 P.3d at 784. 

The language from Argentena that the district court relied on—la] 

charging lien is a lien on the judgment or settlement that the attorney has 

obtained for the client"—merely provided a general explanation of what a 

charging lien is. 1 Id. We did not consider whether withdrawing prior to 

1The full paragraph reads as follows: 

A charging lien is a lien on the judgment or 

settlement that the attorney has obtained for the 

client. Here, it is undisputed that Argentena did 

not file an affirmative claim against the plaintiff 

in the underlying action. And although Jolley 

Urga obtained a dismissal of all claims against 

Argentena, the settlement did not result in any 

recovery for Argentena. In the absence of 

affirmative relief that Jolley Urga obtained for 

Argentena, we conclude that Jolley Urga did not 

have an enforceable charging lien over which the 

district court had incidental jurisdiction to 

adjudicate in the underlying case. Thus, we turn 

to whether the district court had jurisdiction to 

adjudicate Jolley Urga's retaining lien. 

Id. at 534, 216 P.3d at 783-84 (internal citations omitted). 

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settlement precluded the enforcement of a charging lien; therefore, 

nothing in Argentena compels the conclusion that attorneys cannot assert 

a charging lien if they withdraw before judgment or settlement. 

NRS 18.015's language unambiguously allows any counsel 

that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative 

recovery. According to NRS 18.015(1)(a), "[a]n attorney at law shall have 

a lien" when a claim "has been placed in the attorney's hands by a client 

for suit or collection." In other words, an attorney "shall have a lien" if 

employed by a client; there is no requirement that the attorney serve the 

client at the moment of recovery. Instead, there is a generalized 

requirement of recovery so that the lien can actually attach to something 

of value. NRS 18.015(4)(a) (providing that charging liens "attach[ ] to any 

verdict, judgment or decree entered and to any money or property which is 

recovered on account of the suit or other action"). Contrary to Bourassa's 

arguments, NRS 18.015 does not distinguish between pre- and postrecovery attorneys. It says that any attorney who worked on the case 

"shall have a lien" on the claim, and that the lien attaches to any recovery. 

Therefore, the district court erred in holding that McDonald Carano's 

withdrawal precluded it from enforcing a charging lien because NRS 

18.015's plain language makes no distinction between attorneys who 

worked on a case before recovery and those that were working on a case at 

the moment of recovery. 

On remand, the district court must make additional findings 

Because the district court based its decision solely on 

McDonald Carano's withdrawal, it did not address certain necessary 

issues regarding disbursement of the settlement funds. Specifically, "the 

court must make certain findings and conclusions before distribution," 

including whether (1) NRS 18.015 is available to an attorney, (2) there is 

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J. 

, J. 

some judgment or settlement, (3) the lien is enforceable, (4) the lien was 

properly perfected under NRS 18.015(2), (5) the lien is subject to any 

offsets, and (6) extraordinary circumstances might affect the amount of 

the lien. Michel v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 145, 151-52, 17 

P.3d 1003, 1007-08 (2001). Further, the district court must determine the 

actual amount of the lien pursuant to the retainer agreement or, if there is 

no agreement, set a reasonable fee. Id. at 152, 17 P.3d at 1008. Finally, 

the district court must ensure that McDonald Carano's and Bourassa's fee 

agreements are not unreasonable. See Marquis & Aurbach v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1147, 1160-61, 146 P.3d 1130, 1138-39 

(2006); Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 

31, 33-34 (1969); RPC 1.5. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 

Parraguirre 

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cc: Hon. Ronald J. Israel, District Judge 

John Walter Boyer, Settlement Judge 

McDonald Carano Wilson LLP/Las Vegas 

California Back Specialists Medical Group, Inc. 

California Minimally Invasive Surgery Center 

Bourassa Law Group, LLC 

Conejo Neurological Medical Group, Inc. 

Boyack Orme & Taylor 

Medical Imaging Medical Group 

Abrams Probate & Planning Group 

Thousand Oaks Spine Medical Group, Inc. 

John C. Chiu, M.D., Newbury Park, CA 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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