alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S05F1180.

#### FARRISH v. FARRISH.

(615 SE2d 510)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Allen and Rudell Farrish were divorced in 2004 after 26 years of marriage. They have five children, three of whom are minors living with appellee-wife. Following a non-jury trial, the trial court awarded appellee alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month and child support of $3,000 per month. Appellant-husband filed an application for discretionary review which we granted pursuant to this Court’s pilot project. See *Wright v. Wright,*277 Ga. 133 (587 SE2d 600) (2003).

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding child support and alimony in an amount substantially disproportionate to his ability to pay.1 See OCGA § 19-6-1 (c) (alimony awarded in accordance with needs of the party and ability of other party to pay). The record demonstrates that appellant had a gross monthly income of $10,374 and appellee had no monthly income and would require job training to obtain any employment beyond minimum wage. In determining that appellant had the ability to pay the combined alimony and child support awards, the court properly considered appellant’s *552income, property in his possession, the fact that he appropriated for his own use $55,000 of joint or marital assets after the parties’ separation for which he had not accounted at the time of trial, and the fact that appellant accumulated substantial debt after the separation by providing monetary support for his paramour and her family to the detriment of his own children and wife. See OCGA § 19-6-5 (listing factors to be considered in determining award of alimony).

Decided June 30, 2005.

*Wood, Odom & Edge, Gus L. Wood III,*for appellant.

*Delia T. Crouch, for*appellee.

“In the absence of any mathematical formula, [fact-finders] are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony and child support, and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support ‘under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case.’ . . . [Cits.]” (Emphasis omitted.) *Worrell v. Worrell,*242 Ga. 44, 47 (4) (247 SE2d 847) (1978). Afull review of the record shows no abuse of discretion in the award of child support and alimony. See generally *Chester v. Chester,*244 Ga. 795 (262 SE2d 97) (1979); *Smith v. Smith,*237 Ga. 499 (228 SE2d 883) (1976); *Thomas v. Thomas,*233 Ga. 916 (213 SE2d 877) (1975). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

1

 Appellant does not contend that the trial court erred in its application of the Child Support Guidelines, see OCGA§ 19-6-15 (b), or its determination of need in calculating alimony. We note, however, that the trial court ordered appellant to pay $3,000 per month as child support, an amount equal to 29 percent of his gross monthly income and well within the applicable range for three children under the guidelines. Id. at (b) (5).
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.14


                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                             COUNTRYWIDE CAPITAL IV

        This Certificate of Trust of Countrywide Capital IV dated November 20,
2001, is hereby duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as trustees of
Countrywide Capital IV, for the purpose of forming a business trust under the
Delaware Business Trust Act, 12 Del. C. Section 3801 et seq. The undersigned, as
trustees, do hereby certify as follows:

        1.     Name. The name of the business trust formed hereby (the "Trust")
is "Countrywide Capital IV."

        2.     Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of
the Trust which has its principal place of business in the State of Delaware, as
required by 12 Del. C. Sec. 3807(a), is The Bank of New York (Delaware), White
Clay Center, Route 273, Newark, Delaware 19711.

        3.     Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective as
of the date of its filing.

        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the sole trustees of the
Trust at the time of filing of this Certificate of Trust, have executed this
Certificate of Trust as of the date first above written.


                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Name: Sandor E. Samuels
                                        Title: Regular Trustee


                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Name:  Thomas K. McLaughlin
                                        Title: Regular Trustee


                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Name: Jennifer Sandefur
                                        Title: Regular Trustee


                                        The Bank of New York (Delaware),
                                        as Delaware Trustee

                                        By:
                                           -------------------------------------
                                        Name:
                                        Title:
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002

I, Thomas Neal Roberts, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of ITonis Inc., (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for
      the quarter ended May 31, 2007 (the Quarterly Report) fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
      Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly
      presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                             



| | By:    | /s/
      Thomas Neal Roberts
| | ------ | -----------------------------
| |        |                              
| | Name:  | Thomas Neal Roberts          
| |        |                              
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and  
| |        | Chief Financial Officer      
| |        |                              
| | Date:  | July 16, 2007                

---
**Exhibit 32**

**CertificationPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United StatesCode)**

Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of OsirisTherapeutics, Inc., (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to the best of eachofficer’s knowledge that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for thequarter ended June 30, 2006 (the “Form 10-Q”) of the Company fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.
| Date: September 15, 2006 |   |   |   | /s/ C. Randal  Mills     |   |   |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------------------------|--------|--------|
|                     |   |   |   | C. Randal Mills,  Ph.D.  |   |   |
|                     |   |   |   | Chief Executive  Officer |   |   |
|                     |   |   |   |                     |   |   |
|                     |   |   |   |                     |   |   |
| Date: September 15, 2006 |   |   |   | /s/ Cary J.  Claiborne   |   |   |
|                     |   |   |   | Cary J.  Claiborne       |   |   |
|                     |   |   |   | Chief Financial  Officer |   |   |

 

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will beretained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.  Thiscertification “accompanies” the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not deemedfiled with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filingof the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of theForm 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained insuch filing.

----
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

CIERA MONIQUE ALLEN, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-910 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________ ) Opinion filed October 18, 2017. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; Kelly P. Butz, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. SILBERMAN, Judge.

In this Anders 1 appeal, we affirm the revocation of Ciera Monique Allen's drug offender probation and resulting sentence for possession o f hydrocodone. We remand only for the trial court to correct the revocation order to conform to the trial

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).- 2 - court's oral pronouncement. See Jones v. State, 221 So. 3d 736 , 736 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Symes v. State, 193 So. 3d 1067, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)

. An amended affidavit of violation of probation (VOP) was filed in January 2017 that alleged one violation of condition 2, two violations of condition 7, two violations of special condition 3, one violation of special con dition 7, and one violation of special condition 8. At the revocation hearing, the trial cour t stated that it would delete the violation of special condition 7, and Allen then admitted t o violating the conditions in

the amended VOP affidavit. But the written revocation order st ates that Allen admitted all conditions stated in the January 2017 amended VOP affidavit . Therefore, we

remand for the trial court to correct the revocation order to i ndicate that Allen did not admit to a violation of special condition 7.

Affirmed and remanded.

LaROSE, C.J., and MORR IS, JJ., Concur.
EXHIBIT 21.1

 

 

 
| Subsidiaries of Registrant                  |
|---------------------------------------------|
|                                        |   |   |
|                                        |   |   |
|                                        |   |   |
| Subsidiary                                  |   | Jurisdiction of Organization |
|                                        |   |   |
|                                        |   |   |
| American VitalCare, Inc.                    |   | State of California |
|                                        |   |   |
| Managed Alternative Care, Inc.              |   | State of California |
|                                        |   |   |
| StarMed Management, Inc.                    |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group East, Inc.                  |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group Management Services, Inc.   |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group of California, Inc.         |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Texas Holdings, Inc.              |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group of Texas, L.P.              |   | State of Texas |
|                                        |   |   |
| Salt Lake Physical Therapy Associates, Inc. |   | State of Utah |
|                                        |   |   |
| Phase 2 Consulting, Inc.                    |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group of Virginia, LLC            |   | State of Virginia |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Hospital Holdings, LLC            |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| West Gables Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC    |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| Clear Lake Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC     |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| Lafayette Specialty Hospital, LLC           |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| Tulsa Specialty Hospital, LLC               |   | State of Delaware |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group of Arlington, L.P.          |   | State of Texas |
|                                        |   |   |
| RehabCare Group of Amarillo, L.P.           |   | State of Texas |

 

 

 

1
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 22, 2015

No. 04-15-00125-CR

EX PARTE Hector RAMIREZ,

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR2894-W1

The Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant’s third motion for extension of time to file his brief is GRANTED. We 

ORDER appellant to file his brief on or before August 10, 2015. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS 

WILL BE GRANTED.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 22nd day of July, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

BILL OF COSTS

No. 01-15-00093-CV

Julius Mathias Junior 

v.

Bankside Village Apts

NO. 1056219 IN THE CO CIVIL CT AT LAW NO 4 OF HARRIS COUNTY

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID/DUE STATUS PAID BY

FILING $195.00 01/29/2015 NOT PAID ANT

The costs incurred on appeal to the First Court of Appeals Houston, Texas are 

$195.00.

Court costs in this case have been taxed in this Court’s judgment

I, Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, do hereby 

certify that this is a true statement of the costs of appeal in this case.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my 

hand and the seal of the Court of Appeals for the 

First District of Texas, this July 17, 2015.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Justin A. Bell, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 915]

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Orange County (Rosenwasser, J.), both rendered March 11, 2005, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree under indictment No. 04-00431 and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree under indictment No. 04-00730, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

*715Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

There is no basis in this record to vacate the defendant’s pleas of guilty, nor is there any evidence in the record that defense counsel provided ineffective representation. The defendant’s claims based upon matter dehors the record cannot be reviewed on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction *(see People v Spotards,*23 AD3d 586 [2005]). Any challenges'to the defendant’s resentencing pursuant to Penal Law § 60.09 under indictment No. 2004-00431 are cognizable upon a direct appeal from the resentence *(see People v Van Aken,*83 AD2d 617 [1981]). Florio, J.E, Ritter, Goldstein and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### Charlene McLean, as Mother and Natural Guardian of Briana Hall, an Infant, et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[853 NYS2d 340]

The infant plaintiff suffered severe brain injuries while in the care of defendant Theroulde and her day care center. There were triable issues of fact as to whether the City had an obligation to plaintiffs pursuant to a contract between the State and the City’s Department of Health regarding the enforcement of state regulations governing the certification and operation of private home day care centers (18 NYCRR part 417). Liability could exist, even if the City’s conduct in approving the renewal of Theroulde’s certification was merely ministerial *(cf. Lauer v City of New York,*95 NY2d 95 [2000]), since there is a question whether the City disregarded governing rules and the state contract requiring the Health Department to investigate promptly any complaints against a provider where children may have been in imminent danger, and to insure that all violations were corrected or referred to state authorities for enforcement proceedings.

Liability may also exist for negligent acts or omissions involving a protected class of individuals (e.g., children in registered family day care facilities), regardless of whether the alleged acts or omissions were ministerial or discretionary, in light of the special duty owed to such children *(see R.B. v County of Orange,*
      *394220 AD2d 401 [1995]). There were questions of fact as to whether a special relationship existed between—on the one hand—the Health Department and the Administration for Children’s Services (the municipal agencies responsible for registering family day care providers, and for investigating complaints of child abuse and maltreatment and furnishing lists of registered day care providers to parents), and the “protected class” of children (including the infant Briana) whose working parents would rely on the registration requirements to locate safe day care providers *(see Prasad v County of Orange,*159 Misc 2d 330 [1993]).

We have considered the City’s remaining arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Lippman, P.J., Gonzalez, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ. *(See*14 Misc 3d 922.]
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00999-CV

SAHAMI INVESTMENTS, LTD, Appellant/Cross-Appellee

V.

STATELY HOMES, LLC, THEODORE MORE, AND BRYAN PHILLIPS,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Appeal from the 113th District Court of Harris County (Tr. Ct. No. 2014-12172)

TO THE 113TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the12th day of May 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or 

to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

After due consideration, the Court grants the parties’ joint motion to 

dismiss this appeal. It is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED, and 

ORDERED that the appeal be dismissed.

It is further ORDERED that costs incurred by reason of this appeal are 

taxed against the party incurring same.

It is further ORDERED that this decision be certified below for 

observance.

Judgment rendered May 12, 2015.

Judgment rendered by panel consisting of Justices Keyes, Bland, and 

Massengale.
WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court 

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

July 17, 2015

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

CLERK OF THE COURT
#### Ronnie L. Manning, Appellant, v Americold Logistics, LLC, Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 279]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered June 23, 2005, which granted the motion of defendant Americold Logistics, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as a result of a slip and fall on ice located in the loading dock area of defendant’s premises, defendant met its burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged hazard or have actual or constructive notice of it *(see Giuffrida v Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.,*279 AD2d 403, 404 [2001]). Plaintiff did not, in response, adduce evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue. Plaintiffs theory that the hazard formed some eight hours before the accident, i.e., in time for defendant to have discovered and remedied it, is speculative. Nor is there any nonspeculative basis for plaintiffs contention that defendant’s employees may have caused or exacerbated the alleged hazard in the course of clearing snow, particularly since the evidence showed that the last snowfall in the subject area of greater than one inch occurred nine days prior to the accident and that there had only been trace amounts of precipitation during the day preceding the accident *(see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d 136, 142 [2002]). Concur—Tom, J.E, Marlow, Sullivan, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
Exhibit
15














March 8,
2010





Sterling
Banks, Inc.


3100
Route 38


Mount
Laurel, New Jersey





We have
reviewed, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (United States), the unaudited interim financial information of
Sterling Banks, Inc. for the three and nine month periods ended September 30,
2009 and 2008, as indicated in our report dated March 8, 2010; because we did
not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.





We are
aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, is incorporated
by reference in Registration Statements No. 333-155287 and 333-142703 on Form
S-8.





We are
also aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the
Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration Statement
prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an
accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

















McGladrey
& Pullen, LLP is a member firm of RSM International –
 an
affiliation of separate and independent legal entities.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-18-00367-CR

____________________

GARY PAIGE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court 

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 18-28520 

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

On August 27, 2018, the trial court sentenced Gary Paige on a conviction for

possession of marijuana. Paige filed a notice of appeal on September 13, 2018. The 

trial court signed a certification in which the court certified that this is a plea-bargain 

case and the defendant has no right of appeal, and the defendant has waived the right 

of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The district clerk has provided the trial 

court’s certification to the Court of Appeals. On September 21, 2018, we notified 

the parties that we would dismiss the appeal unless the appellant established grounds 
2

for continuing the appeal. No response has been filed. Because the trial court’s 

certification shows the defendant does not have the right of appeal, we must dismiss 

the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

 ________________________________

CHARLES KREGER

 Justice

 

Submitted on October 23, 2018

Opinion Delivered October 24, 2018

Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.