No. 01-15-00294-CV

In the 

Court of Appeals 

For the 

First District of Texas 

At Houston 



No. 1884399

In the County Criminal Court at Law Number Fifteen 

Of Harris County, Texas 



AMINA ROSE WHITE 

Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Appellee 



STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF 



DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

MELISSA P. HERVEY

Assistant District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

State Bar Number: 24053741 

LAUREN CLEMONS

Assistant District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Telephone: (713) 755-5826 

Fax Number: (713) 755-5809 

Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF REQUESTED BY APPELLANT

ACCEPTED

01-15-00294-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

7/24/2015 11:12:18 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/24/2015 11:12:18 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(g) and Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 39.1, the State requests oral argument only if appellant 

requests oral argument.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a) and 38.2(a)(1)(A), a 

complete list of the names of all interested parties, and the names and addresses of 

all trial and appellate counsel, is provided below:

Counsel for the State, Appellee:

Devon AndersonDistrict Attorney of Harris County

Melissa P. HerveyAssistant District Attorney on appeal

Lauren Clemons—Assistant District Attorney at trial

Harris County District Attorney’s Office

1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

Appellant or Criminal Defendant: 

Amina Rose White

Counsel for Appellant:

Ashton Christopher Adair—Defense Counsel on appeal and at the 

hearing on appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure

The Adair Law Firm

7400 Gulf Freeway
ii

Houston, Texas 77017

Trial Judge:

Honorable Jean Spradling Hughes—Presiding Judge of the County

Criminal Court at Law Number Fifteen

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................3

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR.........................................3

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW REGARDING A 

PETITION FOR AN ORDER OF NONDISCLOSURE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY 

RECORD INFORMATION ............................................................................4

II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR NONDISCLOSURE ........................................6

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................17
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Chadwick v. State, 

309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).............................................................13

Harris v. State, 

402 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)................................................................. 12, 14

Jackson v. State, 

No. 14-13-00747-CV, 2014 WL 6085593 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2014, no pet.).........................................................5

Montgomery v. State, 

810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)...............................................................6

State v. Gonzalez, 

855 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)...............................................................9

State v. Herndon, 

215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)...............................................................9

State v. Thomas, 

428 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)...........................................................9, 10

STATUTES

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)............................................. 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1).................................................................10

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1)-(3).............................................................7

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e)....................................................... 5, 7, 11, 12

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03.................................................................................1
iv

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(g)................................................................................................. i

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)................................................................................................16

TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3 ...................................................................................................9

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A)..................................................................................... i

TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1.................................................................................................... i
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In cause number 1884399, the State charged appellant by information with 

the Class B misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued at more than $50.00

but less than $500.00. (CR – 6);1see generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03. 

On April 30, 2013, appellant pled guilty to the offense as charged, pursuant to 

appellant’s and the State’s plea-bargain agreement. (CR – 13-20). The trial court 

agreed to follow the plea-bargain agreement and accepted appellant’s guilty plea, 

but deferred a finding of guilt and ordered that appellant be placed on deferred 

adjudication community supervision for a term of six months. (CR – 13-20). On

September 23, 2013, the State filed a Motion to Adjudicate Guilt in appellant’s 

case, alleging that appellant violated various conditions of her community 

supervision. (CR – 21-22). The trial court denied the State’s adjudication motion 

on October 17, 2013. (CR – 25). Then, on November 4, 2013, after the expiration 

of appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community supervision, the trial court

discharged appellant from community supervision and ordered that the proceedings 

against appellant be dismissed. (CR – 26).

 

1

The Clerk’s Record consists of one volume, hereinafter referenced as (CR – [page number]). 

The Reporter’s Record also consists of one volume, which will be referenced as (RR – [page 

number]). Citations to appellant’s brief will be referenced as (AB – [page number]). 
2

On January 5, 2015, appellant filed a Petition for Nondisclosure of Criminal 

History Record Information with the trial court. (CR – 30-32). On February 23, 

2015, after a hearing on the merits of appellant’s petition, the trial court denied the 

petition and signed a written order to that effect. (CR – 33); (RR – 9-11). 

Appellant timely filed written notice of appeal on March 16, 2015, to challenge the 

trial court’s ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure. (CR 

– 39).



STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 15, 2013, a Houston Police Officer arrested appellant for the 

Class B misdemeanor offense of theft of property from Sears department store

valued at more than $50.00 but less than $500.00, namely, one dress and four pairs 

of tights. (CR – 6, 13). Appellant pled guilty to the offense as charged, on April 

30, 2013, whereupon the trial court ordered that appellant be placed on deferred 

adjudication community supervision for a term of six months. (CR – 13-20). On 

November 4, 2013, the trial court discharged appellant from community 

supervision and ordered that the proceedings against appellant be dismissed, after 

appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community supervision had expired. (CR 

– 26).
3

On January 5, 2015, appellant filed with the trial court a petition for an order 

of nondisclosure related to appellant’s theft offense. (CR – 30-32). Appellant was 

then arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI), on January 14, 

2015. (RR – 10). On February 23, 2015, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court denied appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure for the criminal 

history record information regarding appellant’s theft. (CR – 33); (RR – 9-11).



SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial judge acted within her discretion when she denied appellant’s 

petition for an order of nondisclosure upon concluding that the issuance of such an 

order would not be in the best interest of justice.



REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR

Appellant contends in her only point of error that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure because

“[a]ppellant testified that she met all of the conditions” necessary for the issuance 

of a nondisclosure order. (AB – 7).
4

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Regarding a Petition for an Order 

of Nondisclosure of Criminal History Record Information

Texas Government Code Sections 411.081(d) and 411.081(e) provide the 

following, in pertinent part, regarding a person’s ability to request and receive 

from the trial court an order of nondisclosure of the person’s criminal history 

record information:

(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, if a person 

is placed on deferred adjudication community supervision under 

Section 5, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, 

subsequently receives a discharge and dismissal under Section 

5(c), Article 42.12, and satisfies the requirements of Subsection 

(e), the person may petition the court that placed the defendant on 

deferred adjudication for an order of nondisclosure under this 

subsection.

...

 After notice to the state, an opportunity for a hearing, and a 

determination that the person is entitled to file the petition and 

issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice, the court shall 

issue an order prohibiting criminal justice agencies from disclosing 

to the public criminal history record information related to the 

offense giving rise to the deferred adjudication.

...

 A person may petition the court that placed the person on deferred 

adjudication for an order of nondisclosure only on or after:

(1) the discharge and dismissal, if the offense for which the 

person was placed on deferred adjudication was a 

misdemeanor other than a misdemeanor described by 

Subdivision (2);

(2) the second anniversary of the discharge and dismissal, if the 

offense for which the person was placed on deferred 
5

adjudication was a misdemeanor under Chapter 20, 21, 22, 25, 

42, or 46, Penal Code; or

(3) the fifth anniversary of the discharge and dismissal, if the 

offense for which the person was placed on deferred 

adjudication was a felony.

(e) A person is entitled to petition the court under Subsection (d) only 

if during the period of the deferred adjudication community 

supervision for which the order of nondisclosure is requested and 

during the applicable period described by Subsection (d)(1), (2), or 

(3), as appropriate, the person is not convicted of or placed on 

deferred adjudication community supervision under Section 5, 

Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, for any offense other 

than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine 

only. A person is not entitled to petition the court under 

Subsection (d) if the person was placed on the deferred 

adjudication community supervision for or has been previously 

convicted or placed on any other deferred adjudication for:

(1) an offense requiring registration as a sex offender under 

Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) an offense under Section 20.04, Penal Code, regardless of 

whether the offense is a reportable conviction or adjudication 

for purposes of Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure;

(3) an offense under Section 19.02, 19.03, 22.04, 22.041, 25.07, 

25.072, or 42.072, Penal Code; or

(4) any other offense involving family violence, as defined by 

Section 71.004, Family Code. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

411.081(d); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e).

A trial court’s decision to deny a person’s petition for an order of 

nondisclosure is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. 

State, No. 14-13-00747-CV, 2014 WL 6085593, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Nov. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
6

(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s 

petition for an order of nondisclosure). A reviewing court should not find that a

trial court abused its discretion unless it is clear that the trial court’s ruling was 

arbitrary or unreasonable, or that the trial court acted without reference to any 

guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1990).

II. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion in Denying Appellant’s 

Petition for Nondisclosure

The above-cited portions of Texas Government Code Section 411.081

establish that, before a trial court must issue an order of nondisclosure, four

requirements must be met. First, the person petitioning the trial court for an order 

of nondisclosure must provide the State with notice of the person’s petition. TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d). Second, the trial court must afford the parties an 

opportunity for a hearing regarding the person’s petition. Id. 

Third, the petitioner must be statutorily entitled to file a petition for 

nondisclosure with the court. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d). That is, the 

petitioner must not be disqualified from filing the petition because of the time 

constraints imposed by Section 411.081(d)(1)-(3), or because of Section 

411.081(e), which prevents a person from petitioning the court for an order of 

nondisclosure when: (i) the person is convicted of or placed on deferred 

adjudication community supervision for any offense other than an offense under 
7

Transportation Code punishable by a fine only, or (ii) the person was placed on 

deferred adjudication community supervision for or has been previously convicted 

or placed on any other deferred adjudication for: (1) an offense requiring 

registration as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 

(2) an offense under Section 20.04 of the Penal Code [aggravated kidnapping], 

regardless of whether the offense is a reportable conviction or adjudication for 

purposes of Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (3) an offense under 

Penal Code Sections 19.02 [murder], 19.03 [capital murder], 22.04 [injury to a 

child, elderly individual, or disabled individual], 22.041 [abandoning or 

endangering a child], 25.07 [violation of certain court orders or conditions of bond 

in family violence, sexual assault or abuse, or stalking case], 25.072 [repeated 

violation of certain court orders or conditions of bond in a family violence case], or 

42.072 [stalking]; or (4) any other offense involving family violence, as defined by 

Family Code Section 71.004. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1)-(3)

(stating that a person may not file a petition for nondisclosure outside of the 

enumerated timeframes); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e) (disqualifying a 

person from petitioning for nondisclosure because of the person’s criminal 

conviction or deferred adjudication during the relevant time frame for filing the 

petition, because of the nature of the underlying offense to be nondisclosed, or 
8

because the person has been previously convicted or placed on deferred 

adjudication community supervision for one of the listed penal code offenses).

And fourth, the trial court must determine that it is in the best interest of 

justice to issue the requested order of nondisclosure. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

411.081(d) (requiring that a trial court issue a nondisclosure order only “[a]fter...a 

determination that...issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice[.]”)

(emphasis added).

The first of these three requirements are procedural and objective in nature, 

and do not permit the trial court to exercise any discretion—either the person 

properly notified the State, was given the opportunity for a hearing, and is lawfully

eligible to file a petition for nondisclosure, or she is not. The last requirement, 

however, is subjective and calls upon the trial court to exercise its discretion to

determine whether issuance of the nondisclosure order would be in the best interest 

of justice after the court assesses the particular facts and circumstances of the 

petitioner’s situation. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d) (stating that a trial 

court shall issue a nondisclosure order only “[a]fter...a determination 

that...issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice[.]”) (emphasis added). 

Thus, even when a person is statutorily eligible to petition the trial court for an 

order of nondisclosure because none of the disqualifications contained in Sections 

411.081(d) and 411.081(e) are applicable to that person, the trial court may still 
9

rightly refuse to issue the requested nondisclosure order if the court determines that 

entering the order would not be in the best interest of justice. Id.

While there do not appear to be any cases which discuss the scope of a trial 

court’s discretion to refuse to issue a nondisclosure order after concluding that it 

would not be in the best interest of justice to do so, jurisprudence concerning the 

similar situation of when a trial court may grant a motion for new trial “in the 

interest of justice” may be useful. Texas Rule of Appellant Procedure 21.3 

enumerates eight specific grounds for granting the defendant a new trial. TEX. R.

APP. P. 21.3. In addition to these grounds, there is a long history of Texas trial 

courts exercising their discretion to grant new trials “in the interest of justice.” See

State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (recognizing that 

“[f]or more than one hundred and twenty years, our trial judges have had the 

discretion to grant new trials in the interest of justice.”) (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 

855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). The Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals reiterated in Thomas, though, that a trial court’s discretion to grant a 

motion for new trial “‘in the interest of justice’ is not ‘unbounded or unfettered’”; 

“[i]nstead, ‘justice’ means ‘in accordance with the law.’” Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 

104-05 (quoting State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

Hence, while a trial court is not restricted to the specific statutory grounds for

granting a motion for new trial enumerated in Rule 21.3, a trial court may grant a 
10

new trial in the interest of justice only when it has a valid legal basis to do so. 

Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 105.

Applied to the field of nondisclosure orders, this law instructs that a trial 

court may refuse to issue a requested order of nondisclosure because the petitioner

is ineligible to petition the court for the order for any of the statutory reasons 

provided in Sections 411.081(d) and 411.081(e), or because the court has a valid

legal basis—as opposed to an arbitrary and inarticulate reason, such as the way that 

the petitioner dresses—to conclude that it would not be in the best interest of 

justice to do so. Cf. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 104-06. Such a valid legal basis could 

certainly be that, at the time of the hearing on the merits of a person’s petition for 

an order of nondisclosure, the person was under formal accusation of an additional 

criminal offense.

In this case, appellant was authorized to file her petition for an order of 

nondisclosure at any time on or after November 4, 2013, the date that the trial

discharged appellant from deferred adjudication community supervision for 

appellant’s underlying theft offense—a Class B misdemeanor under Texas Penal 

Code Chapter 31—and dismissed those proceedings against her. (CR – 26); see 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1) (permitting a person file a petition for an 

order of nondisclosure “on or after...the discharge and dismissal [of the person’s 

deferred adjudication], if the offense for which the person was placed on deferred 
11

adjudication was a misdemeanor other than a misdemeanor [under Texas Penal 

Code Chapters 20, 21, 22, 25, 42, or 46.]”). The record also demonstrates that 

appellant properly notified the State of appellant’s petition for an order of 

nondisclosure, and that the trial court held a hearing regarding the merits of 

appellant’s petition. (CR – 32); (RR – 3-11); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

411.081(d) (requiring “notice to the state[] [and] an opportunity for a hearing”

before a trial court must issue an order of nondisclosure). Further, there is no

evidence in the record that appellant was convicted of or placed on deferred 

adjudication for any offense other than a Transportation Code offense punishable

by fine only during appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community 

supervision for the theft, or that appellant was previously convicted or placed on 

deferred adjudication for any of the specified criminal offenses listed in Section 

411.081(e)(1)-(4). See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e). Thus, appellant was 

eligible to file her petition for an order of nondisclosure because none of the 

statutory timing and procedural disqualifications in Section 411.081(d), or the

offense-related disqualifications of Section 411.081(e), were applicable to her. 

Appellant’s arrest and charge for DWI after she filed her petition for an 

order of nondisclosure did not statutorily disqualify her from petitioning the trial 

court for that relief, per Section 411.081(e), because appellant did not commit the 

DWI during her term of deferred adjudication for the underlying theft, and because 
12

theft is not one of the disqualifying crimes enumerated in Section 411.081(e)(1)-

(4). See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e); see also Harris v. State, 402 

S.W.3d 758, 765-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (determining

that Harris’s subsequent deferred adjudication, which occurred outside of the 

pertinent timeframe of Section 411.081(d), did not preclude her from petitioning 

for an order of nondisclosure for the offense underlying Harris’s first deferred 

adjudication). However, despite that appellant was statutorily eligible for an order 

of nondisclosure, the trial court retained discretion, per Section 411.081(d), to deny 

appellant’s petition if the court nonetheless determined, based on the particular 

facts and circumstances of appellant’s situation, that it would not be in the best 

interest of justice to issue the nondisclosure order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 

411.081(d) (requiring the trial court to determine that “issuance of the 

[nondisclosure] order is in the best interest of justice,” in addition to finding that

appellant met the other procedural requirements, before the court was obligated to 

issue the nondisclosure order). 

Although the trial court did not submit findings of fact and conclusions of 

law in support of its ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of 

nondisclosure, this Court may infer from the transcript of the hearing on the merits 

of appellant’s petition that the trial court concluded that it would not be in the best 

interest of justice to issue an order of nondisclosure because of appellant’s then-
13

pending charge for DWI—which appellant committed on January 14, 2015, only 

nine days after filing her petition for nondisclosure. See (RR – 9-10); see also

Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that 

when a trial court fails to make explicit findings of fact, reviewing courts will infer 

any fact findings which are necessary to support the trial judge’s ruling so long as 

such inferences are supported by the record). The trial court’s determination in 

this regard was based on a valid legal reason—appellant’s recidivism—and, thus,

was an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion. 

Appellant asserts that, given the language of Section 411.081(e) and the 

outcome of Harris v. State, 402 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, 

no pet.), “[t]he standard for ineligibility is a conviction or a deferred adjudication 

for a subsequent offense” and, so, appellant’s pending DWI could not be viable 

basis for the trial court to deny appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure. 

(AB – 10-11). Appellant’s argument fails, though, because it overlooks the facts

that the issues of whether appellant is statutorily eligible for an order of 

nondisclosure, and whether the issuance of such an order would be in the best 

interest of justice, are two distinct inquiries, and that this Court acknowledged as 

much in Harris. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d) (“After notice to the 

state, an opportunity for a hearing, and a determination that the person is entitled to 

file the petition and issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice, the court 
14

shall issue an order [of nondisclosure]....”); Harris, 402 S.W.3d at 765-66 

(concluding that Harris’s subsequent deferred adjudication, which occurred outside 

of the pertinent timeframe of Section 411.081(d), did not preclude her from 

petitioning for an order of nondisclosure for the offense underlying Harris’s first 

deferred adjudication, but remanding the case to the trial court to specifically 

consider whether it would be in the best interest of justice to issue a nondisclosure 

order because of Harris’s second deferred adjudication, even though Harris was 

otherwise statutorily eligible for the order; hence, recognizing that statutory 

eligibility and the best interests of justice are separate considerations).

The trial court had a valid legal reason to conclude that it would not be in the 

best interest of justice to issue appellant’s requested order of nondisclosure, despite 

that appellant was otherwise statutorily eligible for such an order. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition for an 

order of nondisclosure, and this Court should overrule appellant’s sole point of 

error.



CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits that the trial court 

properly denied appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure upon concluding 

that it would not be in the best interest of justice to enter the order. Thus, the State 
15

respectfully prays that this Court will overrule appellant’s only point of error and 

will affirm the trial court’s ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of 

nondisclosure. 

Respectfully submitted,

DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

/S/ Melissa Hervey 

MELISSA P. HERVEY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

State Bar Number: 24053741

1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone (713) 755-5826

Fax Number (713) 755-5809

Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net
16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), the undersigned 

attorney certifies that there are 3,076 words in the foregoing computer-generated 

document, based upon the representation provided by Microsoft Word, the word 

processing program that was used to create the document, and excluding the 

portions of the document exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). 

/S/ Melissa Hervey 

MELISSA P. HERVEY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

State Bar Number: 24053741

1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone (713) 755-5826

Fax Number (713) 755-5809

Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net
17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the undersigned counsel has directed the e-filing 

system eFile.TXCourts.gov to serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document upon Ashton Christopher Adair, appellant’s attorney of record on 

appeal, on July 24, 2015, at the following e-mail address, through the electronic 

service system provided by eFile.TXCourts.gov: 

ash@houstontxlawyer.com

/S/ Melissa Hervey 

MELISSA P. HERVEY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

State Bar Number: 24053741

1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone (713) 755-5826

Fax Number (713) 755-5809

Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net