United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 20, 2021 

Decided October 20, 2021 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1256 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

FLOYD B. GAMBLE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 3:10-CR-30243-SMY-2 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Floyd Gamble appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release, 

but his counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Gamble does not have an unqualified constitutional 

right to counsel in revocation proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 

(1973), and so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Nonetheless, our 

practice is to follow them. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 21-1256 Page 2 

like this would be expected to involve. Because her analysis appears thorough, and 

Gamble has not responded to her motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the 

subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Gamble originally pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and 

served a 77-month prison sentence. After violating the terms of his supervised release

by unlawfully restraining a woman, he was reimprisoned and sentenced to additional 

supervised release. About a year into that second term, his probation officer filed a 

petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging that he violated six conditions of his 

supervision, some multiple times. The most serious allegation was that he committed

aggravated battery and armed robbery of a woman at a social gathering. He was also 

charged with multiple instances of driving with a suspended license; driving while

carrying alcohol; and failing to report to his probation officer, submit various reports,

and participate in mandatory mental-health treatment and education programs. 

Because Gamble contested these allegations, the district court held an evidentiary

hearing. Gamble’s probation officer testified about his failure to comply with various 

requirements and about her interview with the alleged battery victim, during which she 

photographed the victim’s injuries. Gamble’s victim, a former romantic partner, also 

testified about how Gamble beat her to the point that he collapsed her lung, broke her 

nose, and separated her eyeball from her retina. The government also submitted police 

reports and photographs of these injuries. When Gamble testified, he conceded driving 

on a suspended license but broadly denied the other infractions, and his attorney 

suggested through witness questioning that another person committed the battery. 

After reviewing the evidence, the district court found that the government had 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Gamble committed each violation other 

than armed robbery and skirting his education requirements. It then revoked Gamble’s 

supervised release. After holding another hearing on sentencing, the court imposed 24 

months’ incarceration followed by one year of supervised release. These were the 

maximum available sentences by statute and at the top of the reimprisonment range 

under the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Counsel first considers whether Gamble could raise a nonfrivolous challenge to 

the revocation of his supervised release. A district court may revoke release if it finds by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of release. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Here, the court held a hearing and gave Gamble a chance to 

defend against the allegations, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. 
No. 21-1256 Page 3 

The court considered the testimony of Gamble’s probation officer, Gamble’s victim, and 

Gamble himself. It determined that Gamble’s denial was not credible, particularly 

because the battery was so similar to other violent crimes he had committed against 

female acquaintances. The court also considered the reports of law enforcement officers 

and the probation officer, and photographs of the victim’s injuries, which had all been 

entered into evidence without objection. On this record, counsel rightly concludes that 

it would be frivolous to argue that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the 

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 

Counsel next considers whether Gamble could challenge his prison sentence as 

procedurally unsound and rightly concludes that he could not. The court correctly 

determined that Gamble’s aggravated battery was a Grade A violation under 

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a) because it carries a maximum term of imprisonment greater than one

year. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05. Based on Gamble’s category IV criminal history from his 

original sentencing, the court correctly calculated a policy-statement range of 18 to 30 

months’ imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), capped by a 24-month statutory 

maximum because the underlying conviction was for a class C felony. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3595(e)(3). The court also correctly calculated that additional supervised release was 

limited to 12 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). 

Counsel last considers whether Gamble could challenge his sentence as 

substantively unreasonable and rightly concludes he could not. We would review the

sentence only to determine whether it is “plainly unreasonable,” United States v. Salinas, 

365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004). Sentences within a properly calculated policystatement range, such as Gamble’s, are presumed reasonable on appeal. See United 

States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014). Counsel has not identified any ground to 

rebut this presumption, nor could she. When sentencing Gamble, the district court 

properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. As it explained, Gamble has a long history of 

violence toward women, and no prior sentence or stint of supervision has deterred him 

from violent acts. Given this, and the brutality of the battery, the court concluded that a 

maximum sentence was necessary to protect the community and prevent further 

offenses. The court also explained that the conditions attached to Gamble’s supervised 

release were related to the mental health and substance abuse treatment that Gamble 

stated in his allocution that he needed.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.