J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

2015 PA Super 150

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WAYNE MCNEAL

Appellant No. 1771 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 31, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0500911-2005

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WAYNE MCNEAL

Appellant No. 1775 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 31, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0008159-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

OPINION BY WECHT, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

Wayne McNeal appeals from two judgments of sentence imposed upon 

him by the Honorable Chris Wogan, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County. We consolidate these cases sua sponte. Finding 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 2 -

numerous instances of trial court error, we vacate those judgments of 

sentence, and we remand these cases for further proceedings.

On June 28, 2005, at CP-51-CR-0500911-2005, McNeal pleaded guilty 

to one count of robbery, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701. Pursuant to an agreement with 

the Commonwealth, McNeal was sentenced to two and one-half to five years’ 

incarceration, to be followed by five years of probation. The Honorable Earl 

Trent, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, accepted the plea, and 

sentenced McNeal.

On July 1, 2011, at CP-51-CR-0008159-2011, McNeal was arrested 

and charged with burglary, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502, criminal trespass, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3503, criminal mischief, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304, and criminal attempt—theft, 

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 3921. These charges were assigned for disposition to 

Judge Wogan. The charges also formed the basis for a potential violation of 

the probation imposed by Judge Trent at CP-51-CR-0500911-2005. Judge 

Trent scheduled a probation violation hearing for July 29, 2011. However, 

the hearing was postponed until the burglary and related charges were 

resolved. 

On April 11, 2013, the parties appeared before Judge Wogan for trial. 

However, the case was continued to the following day because the jury 

panel had been released before voir dire could commence. Nonetheless, on 

April 11, the Commonwealth presented McNeal with a plea offer. The 

Commonwealth offered to agree to a sentence of three and one-half to 

seven years’ incarceration if McNeal pleaded guilty to the burglary charge. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 3 -

The proposed sentence fell within the mitigated range of the sentencing 

guidelines. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 4/11/2013, at 4-5. Judge Wogan 

explained to McNeal the potential maximum sentences that he could receive 

if he went to trial and lost. Id. at 4-7. McNeal rejected the plea offer. Id.

at 11. Judge Wogan urged McNeal to reconsider. Specifically, Judge Wogan 

told McNeal that he “should think about this overnight. You may not believe 

me that you will get 15 to 31 years. Maybe you should ask people around 

the jail if I would do that.” Id. at 12-13. 

On the following day, the parties appeared before Judge Wogan. The 

parties and Judge Wogan discussed the grading of the criminal mischief 

charge. One of the allegations against McNeal was that, in perpetrating the 

alleged burglary, he caused damage to the front door of the home that he 

purportedly entered. The assistant district attorney stated that she was 

“inclined to proceed on [the criminal mischief charge] as a summary.” N.T., 

4/12/2013, at 3. Judge Wogan commented that it was his understanding 

that prosecuting that crime as a summary, with Judge Wogan sitting as the 

finder of fact and rendering a verdict after the jury had ruled on the 

indictable offenses, was “permissible.” Id. Additionally, Judge Wogan 

volunteered that a summary is a conviction that would “be a violation of the 

probation that I am now supervising.” Id. Although Judge Wogan did not 

elaborate on the issue at that juncture, this was the first time that he 

revealed to the parties that he had assumed jurisdiction over the probation 

violation case that initially was assigned to Judge Trent. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 4 -

The parties met again before Judge Wogan on April 15, 2013, after 

defense counsel had requested that a psychiatric evaluation be performed on 

McNeal. Judge Wogan readily agreed that an evaluation was necessary, 

“especially when he turned down a 3 and a half year sentence and could get 

12 and a half or more.” N.T., 4/15/2013, at 3. 

On April 18, 2013, the parties again met before Judge Wogan for more 

pretrial discussions. Once again, Judge Wogan informed McNeal of the 

terms of the proffered plea bargain. This time, however, Judge Wogan 

explained that the three and one-half to seven years offer encompassed the 

probation violation as well. Judge Wogan explained the offer, and the 

unconventional negotiations that occurred between the court and the 

parties, as follows:

I spoke with your attorney. And if you plead guilty on the 

criminal trespass, what you would get from me would be threeand-a-half to seven years – that is a promise I made – on 

everything including the [violation of probation]. I just want to 

make sure you understand that. That would have probation to 

follow, and that is less of a sentence that I normally think would 

be appropriate. Because I wanted to make it three to ten, but 

after negotiating with the attorneys I decided three to seven 

with probation to follow would be fair.[1] Just so you 

____________________________________________

1 Among the numerous errors by Judge Wogan in this case is his 

admission that he negotiated a plea bargain with the parties. Prior versions 

of our Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly prohibited such participation by 

a trial judge. Although the current version of Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 no longer 

contains a blanket prohibition barring judges fom engaging in plea 

negotiations, the Comment to that rule notes that the ban was removed to 

permit, for example, a judge to “inquire of defense counsel and the attorney 

for the Commonwealth whether there has been any discussion of a plea 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 5 -

understand, that is everything. You see, I could give you 7-1/2 

to 15 years for violating my probation.[2] I’m not going to do 

that. 

N.T., 4/18/2013, at 3-4. McNeal rejected the offer for a second time. Judge 

Wogan reacted as follows: “All right. Well, then you may end up doing 

seven years and nine months instead. If you don’t see the logic in that, 

that’s [sic] whatever high school you went to, they didn’t do a very good 

job.” Id. at 5. 

The parties and the court then turned their attention back to the issue 

of whether the criminal mischief charge should continue to be graded as a 

misdemeanor, or whether it should be amended to a summary offense. The 

following exchange occurred between Judge Wogan and the parties:

THE COURT: All right. And the Commonwealth is 

holding off the criminal mischief as a 

summary which I will decide whether you 

committed criminal mischief when the 

jury trial is over. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

agreement, or to give counsel, when requested, a reasonable period of time 

to conduct such a discussion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 Cmt. The Comment notes 

that “[n]othing in this rule, however, is intended to permit a judge to 

suggest to a defendant, defense counsel, or the attorney for the 

Commonwealth, that a plea agreement should be negotiated or accepted.” 

Id. Judge Wogan’s actions ran afoul of both aspects of this proviso. He not 

only encouraged McNeal to take a plea, and participated in the actual plea 

negotiations; he also repeatedly criticized McNeal for not taking the deal. 

2 This is the second time that Judge Wogan indicated that he had 

assumed jurisdiction over Judge Trent’s probation case, this time going as 

far as calling it “my” probation, even though the case originated with Judge 

Trent. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 6 -

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do have an objection to that.

THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to say 

about that or generally?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My objection would be this. The 

complainant testified – I have a number 

of objections. But first one is 

complainant testified that previously the 

damage to the door was $908. It is 

misdemeanor of the third degree, not a 

summary offense. 

THE COURT: Right.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And so by moving on the summary 

offense [the] Commonwealth is basically 

precluding the complainant from getting 

restitution as to the cost. 

THE COURT: I didn’t know you represented plaintiffs 

[sic] here.

* * *

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And also, it is my belief that the criminal 

trespass, breaking the door, is necessary 

to, cross criminal mischief breaking a 

door is necessary to a felony to criminal 

trespass conviction which involves 

breaking in the first place. So that it is a 

lesser included offense and it is a 

necessarily included offense. And 

because of that fact he cannot be 

sentenced for both offenses because the 

breaking is a requirement of the criminal 

trespass felony two.

THE COURT: Well, we will see. We will see.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, the nearest case I can find to that . 

. .

THE COURT: It is a moot point. It is a moot point. 

The best that can happen to him – the 

best that can happen to you – all right –

the best that can happen to you and your
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 7 -

attorney’s argument would be

meaningless is somehow the jury finds 

you not guilty of criminal trespass. Then 

his argument that you can’t be 

sentenced for criminal mischief falls 

away because I can still sentence you for 

criminal mischief if I find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that you broke the 

door. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, my position on that is that you 

can’t. Because if the jury acquits --

THE COURT: You are so wrong on that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: --him of criminal trespass --

THE COURT: You are so –

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- then necessarily --

THE COURT: -- you are so far from what the law is. 

The law is that even the jury can do 

something diametrically opposed to what 

I do. And the cases actually say it 

doesn’t matter because maybe this was a 

jury that was utilizing jury nullification. 

Maybe their false sense – and they use 

the word “leniency” and I never used the 

word – leniency compelled them to do 

something which does not bound the 

judge. You have no support in Superior 

Court. To even think of one senior judge 

in Superior Court, he wouldn’t go out on 

a limb. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And also the fact that this would 

generate [a] probation violation, which 

up until last week would have been [a] 

violation of Judge Trent, but is now [a] 

violation of Your Honor.

THE COURT: Reasons of judicial economy and 

efficiency, he is on my probation now. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, for reasons of judicial economy, 

you can have one trial instead of two.
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 8 -

THE COURT: You will see how efficient I am if we have 

a summer trial. We will do it real 

quickly. 

N.T., 4/18/2013, at 5-9. 

McNeal’s jury trial began and ended on the following day, April 19, 

2013. Following deliberations, and despite Judge Wogan’s apparent disbelief 

that the jury could or would do so, the jury found McNeal not guilty of all of

the crimes. This left the criminal mischief charge, now graded as a 

summary offense, for disposition by Judge Wogan. N.T., 4/19/2013, at 126-

27. Regarding that summary offense, the Commonwealth offered no 

evidence, simply adopting that which had been presented to the jury. Judge 

Wogan chose to disagree with the jury’s apparent credibility determinations. 

He found “the victim here to be credible,” and “found the defendant to be a 

liar.” N.T., 4/19/2013, Motion Volume I, at 3. He found McNeal guilty of the 

summary offense. 

At the time he entered his verdict, Judge Wogan did not reveal that he 

had relied upon evidence not of record in assessing whether the 

Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McNeal had 

committed the criminal mischief. On May 31, 2013, he did so. That day, 

before imposing sentence on McNeal, Judge Wogan confessed to considering 

a letter that was sent to him by McNeal but had never been offered into 

evidence by the Commonwealth:

However, remember, Mr. McNeal wrote me a letter, as you 

recall. I thought it was a pretty darn good letter. And in it he 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 9 -

said he wasn’t guilty of a burglary. By the way, I agree with 

that. 

* * *

He was smart enough to say in his letter, however, [that] there 

is evidence of criminal trespass. That’s an understatement. 

N.T., 5/31/2013, at 15-16. Judge Wogan revealed that his verdict differed 

from that of the jury because he “had additional information that the jury 

didn’t have.” Id. at 17. 

Defense counsel insisted to Judge Wogan that, because the letter 

wasn’t part of the trial record, Judge Wogan was not permitted to consider 

it. Judge Wogan responded as follows:

Then you have another appellate issue, because yes, I did use 

the letter. I had additional information. We talked about the 

letter. I gave you a copy and the Commonwealth. If you don’t 

like defendants writing me letters, then maybe your office should 

counsel them early on. But he said there was evidence of 

criminal trespass, and yes, I agree. That was an 

understatement. 

* * *

Well, maybe you have an appellate issue because I used the 

letter and that was information that the jury didn’t have but I 

had. It’s a tacit admission. 

Id. at 17-18. In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, Judge Wogan declared that 

he “was the finder of fact on the criminal mischief summary, and was not 

about to ignore a letter voluntarily sent by [McNeal] to [the] court . . . .” 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/15/2014, at 11. 

Prior to sentencing, McNeal filed a motion for extraordinary relief. In 

that motion, McNeal challenged, inter alia, Judge Wogan’s assumption of 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 10 -

jurisdiction over Judge Trent’s probation case. Before sentencing, Judge 

Wogan described the circumstances that led to his taking the probation case 

from Judge Trent, as follows:

[B]y the way, the conversation I had with Judge Trent saying I 

reached out to him, well, actually, Judge Trent called me about 

advice on another case. He had a big insurance fraud case in his 

room and he called me. He was having a serious problem and 

asked me for my advice. Luckily, it worked out for both of us. 

The advice I gave him he was able to do what he wanted to do. 

And in the course of talking to Judge Trent, I said, I’ve got a 

case coming up. We’re trying to get a jury. I think he’s on your 

probation. Do you want me to handle it? I don’t know what’s 

going to happen yet. He said, Sure. I give cases up all the 

time. 

N.T., 5/31/2013, at 7. Judge Wogan also repeatedly criticized the public 

defender’s office for objecting to the procedure he imposed in this case. 

According to Judge Wogan, the transfer of cases occurs quite frequently in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, without any objection 

from the public defender’s office. Id. at 6-8. Apparently, Judge Wogan 

believed that, because no other attorney from the public defender’s office 

had objected previously, defense counsel in this case was precluded from 

doing so. Judge Wogan denied McNeal’s motion for extraordinary relief.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Judge Wogan informed 

McNeal that he was “going to . . . give you every day I can give you today.” 

Id. at 25. Judge Wogan then proceeded to sentence McNeal to thirty to 

sixty months’ incarceration on the probation violation, followed by a 

consecutive term of one and one-half to three months on the summary 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 11 -

criminal mischief conviction. McNeal filed post-sentence petitions to vacate 

the judgment of sentence and to reconsider the sentence. Judge Wogan 

denied both motions.

On June 17, 2013, McNeal filed a timely notice of appeal. In response, 

Judge Wogan directed McNeal to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). McNeal filed a 

concise statement on July 31, 2013, but noted that certain volumes of 

testimony had not yet been produced. Nonetheless, Judge Wogan issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 23, 2013. On October 28, 

2013, this Court remanded the matter to Judge Wogan, and granted McNeal 

the right to file a supplemental concise statement once all of the transcripts 

had been produced. On February 6, 2014, McNeal filed a supplemental 

concise statement. On April 15, 2014, Judge Wogan filed a supplemental 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

In case number 1771 EDA 2013, McNeal raises the following issues for 

our review:

1. Did not the trial court abuse its discretion and violate the 

Rules of Criminal Procedure when it sought out and obtained 

authority over [McNeal’s] probation violation case, which 

originated in front of another sitting judge, without consent of 

the parties?

2. Did not the trial court err when it found [McNeal] in direct 

violation of his probation where the underlying conviction, 

which was the basis for the violation, was illegal?

3. Did not the trial court abuse its discretion when it imposed 

the maximum sentence allowed by law where the sentence 

was manifestly excessive and unreasonable, where the 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 12 -

sentence far surpassed what was necessary to foster 

[McNeal’s] rehabilitative needs and where the sentence was a 

product of partiality, bias and ill will?

4. Did not the trial court violate [McNeal’s] right to due process 

under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 

the 5th and 14th Amendments [to] the United States 

Constitution where it: sought out and obtained authority over 

[McNeal’s] probation case; attempted to coerce [McNeal] into 

pleading guilty; usurped the authority of the jury; rendered a 

verdict based on facts not in evidence; imposed the maximum 

sentenced allowed by law; and failed to maintain impartiality 

throughout the course of the proceedings.

Brief for McNeal (No. 1771 EDA 2013), at 4. 

At No. 1775 EDA 2013, McNeal presents the following additional 

questions for our consideration:

1. Did not the trial court err and violate [McNeal’s] right to a 

trial by jury when it permitted the criminal mischief charge, 

originally graded as a misdemeanor, to be reduced to a 

summary offense, severed from the remaining charges, and 

submitted to the court for a verdict where the sole purpose 

for doing so was to circumvent the authority of the jury and 

when the court, in fact, rendered a verdict contrary to the 

clear pronouncements of the jury?

2. Did not the trial court err when it considered facts not in 

evidence, to wit: the contents of a letter written by [McNeal] 

that was not presented as evidence during the trial, when 

deliberating and rendering a verdict on the criminal mischief 

charge?

3. Did not the trial court violate [McNeal’s] right to due process 

under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 

the 5th and 14th Amendments [to] the United States 

Constitution where it: sought out and obtained authority over 

[McNeal’s] probation case; attempted to coerce [McNeal] into 

pleading guilty; usurped the authority of the jury; rendered a 

verdict based on facts not in evidence; imposed the maximum 

sentence allowed by law; and failed to maintain impartiality 

throughout the course of the proceedings?
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 13 -

Brief for McNeal (No. 1775 EDA 2013), at 3. 

The issues presented by McNeal in his two appeals intertwine at 

various points. That is, the resolution of certain issues from one case will 

impact our analysis of issues from the other case. Some issues we will not 

need to address at all. With that primer, we begin our discussion with the 

first issue presented by McNeal in case number 1771 EDA 2013.

In this issue, McNeal maintains that Judge Wogan erroneously 

assumed control over the probation case that originated from his guilty plea 

before Judge Trent. McNeal contends that Judge Wogan’s unilateral action 

violated Rule 700 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. We 

agree.

When we consider an appeal from a sentence imposed following the 

revocation of probation, “[o]ur review is limited to determining the validity 

of the probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing 

court to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of 

the initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).” Commonwealth v. Fish, 

752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000). Revocation of a probation sentence is 

a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that 

court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008, 

1011 (Pa. Super. 1996).

We have uncovered no case precedent that addresses McNeal’s 

argument precisely. In the main, the parties’ duel on this point consists of 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 14 -

McNeal arguing that there is no case law or statute that would permit a trial 

judge to assume control over another judge’s case, while the Commonwealth 

maintains that there is no legal authority that prohibits a judge from doing 

so.3 McNeal relies primarily upon Pa.R.Crim.P. 700, which we discuss in 

more detail immediately below, and which facially applies to original 

sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we believe that McNeal’s reliance 

upon Rule 700 is a more sound approach than the Commonwealth’s, as the 

latter would afford trial judges unbridled and essentially unchallengeable 

authority to shuffle cases between themselves without the knowledge, 

consent, or opportunity to be heard of the parties.

The parties correctly observe that no rule of procedure or case law 

either permits or prohibits a judge specifically from assuming control over a 

probation case supervised by another judge. Nonetheless, Rule 700 

provides that “the judge who presided at the trial or who received the plea 

of guilty or nolo contendere shall impose sentence unless there are 

extraordinary circumstances which preclude the judge’s presence.” 

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth also argues that McNeal has waived the issue 

because he did not object when Judge Wogan made two passing references 

to the fact that he had taken control over Judge Trent’s probation case. See

Brief for the Commonwealth (No. 1771 EDA 2013) at 10-11 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Duffy, 832 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2003); 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). We decline to find waiver in this instance, because 

McNeal raised the issue in his motion for extraordinary relief, which was filed 

before Judge Wogan sentenced McNeal on the probation violation. Hence, 

the issue was preserved, and Judge Wogan was afforded ample opportunity 

to consider (and to reconsider) and to rule on the objection. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 15 -

Pa.R.Crim.P. 700(a). The use of the word “shall” in the language of the rule 

evinces Pennsylvania’s general disinclination to permit different judges to try 

and to sentence a defendant. This policy recognizes the obvious value of a 

judge who “is in the best position to view a defendant’s character, defiance 

or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime. When 

formulating its order, the sentencing court must consider the nature of the 

criminal and the crime.” Commonwealth v. Koren, 646 A.2d 1205, 1208 

(Pa. Super. 1994) (internal citations omitted). It is axiomatic that the judge 

who presides over the trial, or who accepts a guilty plea based upon a 

recitation of the facts underlying the pleaded-to crime, is the judicial officer 

best equipped to assess the nature of the defendant and the crime itself 

before imposing sentence. 

Rule 700 does not state that its terms apply to sentencing following a 

probation revocation. However, our General Assembly has instructed that, 

upon a probation revocation, “the sentencing alternatives available to the 

court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). In other words, in practical effect, a judge imposing 

sentence after finding that a defendant has violated probation is no different 

from a judge imposing sentence in the first instance. For this precise 

reason, we discern no principled difference between a judge imposing an 

original sentence and one imposing a probation violation sentence, and 

certainly no difference meaningful enough to exempt the latter from the 

dictates of Rule 700. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 16 -

Pursuant to Rule 700, Judge Trent was the judge who “received the 

plea of guilty,” and Judge Trent is the one who “shall impose sentence.” 

Only upon “extraordinary circumstances” is another judge permitted by the 

terms of the rule to impose a sentence. Having combed the record, we 

observe no such circumstances, whether extraordinary or even pedestrian. 

There is no statement, not even an offhand comment or aside, to suggest 

that Judge Trent was away, ill, or unavailable to address his docket. We find 

no circumstances that would permit Judge Wogan to reach out and take 

control from Judge Trent over McNeal’s probation case. Only the consent of 

both parties would permit such a maneuver. As noted earlier, Judge Wogan 

initially revealed that he had assumed jurisdiction over the case only in 

passing, while the parties were discussing with the court whether the 

criminal mischief charge should be graded as a misdemeanor or as a 

summary offense. 

As noted, when Judge Wogan finally addressed the events that led him 

to take over that portion of McNeal’s case, he offered the following 

explanation: 

[B]y the way, the conversation I had with Judge Trent saying I 

reached out to him, well, actually, Judge Trent called me about 

advice on another case. He had a big insurance fraud case in his 

room and he called me. He was having a serious problem and 

asked me for my advice. Luckily, it worked out for both of us. 

The advice I gave him he was able to do what he wanted to do. 

And in the course of talking to Judge Trent, I said, I’ve got a 

case coming up. We’re trying to get a jury. I think he’s on your 

probation. Do you want me to handle it? I don’t know what’s 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 17 -

going to happen yet. He said, Sure. I give cases up all the 

time. 

N.T., 5/31/2013, at 7. Thus, the transfer of the case from Judge Trent to 

Judge Wogan did not occur based upon some extraordinary circumstance, 

but rather by mere happenstance. Had Judge Trent never called Judge 

Wogan about some entirely different matter, the transfer of McNeal’s case 

might never have happened. Random chance does not amount to an 

extraordinary circumstance. Compare Commonwealth v. Williams, 375 

A.2d 155 (Pa. Super. 1977) (finding that transfer was warranted because 

original trial judge suffered a stroke, which constituted an extraordinary 

circumstance.). 

Judge Wogan also asserted that judicial economy justified his 

assumption of control over McNeal’s case. Undeniably, trial judges should 

strive for efficiency. But convenience does not equate with the extraordinary 

circumstances which Rule 700 requires. The rule commands that the judge 

who presides over the plea “shall” be the one who imposes the sentence, 

except where “extraordinary circumstances . . . preclude the judge’s 

presence.” We find no such circumstances in the record before us. 

In his Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Wogan echoes the position that the 

Commonwealth takes herein; to wit, that nothing in the rules prohibits the 

action that he took in this case. For the preceding reasons, we reject this 

narrow interpretation of our rules. At all events, Judge Wogan offers a 

distinctly sparse explanation of his action according to the purpose of our 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 18 -

rules. Instead, Judge Wogan opts to justify his actions by taking aim at the 

public defender’s office. For example, Judge Wogan claims that the reason 

he spoke to Judge Trent about the case was because the public defender’s 

office routinely neglects to inform trial courts when probation violations 

occur. Apparently, Judge Wogan believes that it was his civic duty to inform 

Judge Trent that McNeal possibly had violated his probation. What other 

members of the public defender’s office have done in other cases is of 

course irrelevant to McNeal. Moreover, Judge Wogan’s claim is plainly 

incorrect in this instance. As counsel for McNeal pointed out to Judge Wogan 

on the record, Judge Trent already was aware of the alleged violation and 

had in fact scheduled a hearing on the violation for July 29, 2013. See N.T., 

5/31/2013, at 7.

Judge Wogan claimed that similar transfers occur frequently, and 

further alleged that the public defender’s office “only argues that transferring 

[violation of probation] cases is contrary to the Rules of Criminal Procedure

when it believes it may impact their client negatively.” T.C.O. at 6. This 

strikes us as a peculiar criticism indeed. Our Supreme Court promulgates 

rules. Lawyers invoke and rely upon those rules in representing their 

clients. Such advocacy of necessity may at times include arguments that a 

particular ruling or procedure violates an applicable rule. We fail to 

comprehend, and we do not approve, Judge Wogan’s chastisement of 

lawyers’ use of our rules in fulfilling their professional duty of zealous 

representation. 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 19 -

The fact that transfers frequently occur in Philadelphia, assuming that 

claim to be true, and the fact that the public defender’s office does not 

object to those transfers in every instance, in no way precludes a present 

objection. What allegedly has become entrenched as common practice does 

not preclude another attorney from standing on the rules and pursuing a 

meritorious claim. More importantly, the putative commonality of a practice 

does not exempt a court from Rule 700’s mandate. No extraordinary 

circumstance exists in this case, and no amount of finger-pointing by the 

trial court will prove otherwise. 

For these reasons, McNeal is entitled to a new probation violation 

hearing. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, such hearing might not 

be necessary upon remand because we vacate the summary criminal 

mischief conviction upon which the probation violation relied. We turn our 

attention to McNeal’s claims concerning that conviction. 

McNeal first argues that the trial court erred by permitting the 

Commonwealth to reduce the grading of the criminal mischief charge from a 

misdemeanor to a summary offense. McNeal alleges that the 

Commonwealth elected to proceed with the charge as a summary offense at 

the suggestion of Judge Wogan. McNeal insinuates that the decision was a 

collaborative effort between the prosecutor and Judge Wogan to “circumvent 

the authority of the jury.” Brief for McNeal (No. 1775 EDA 2013) at 24. 

McNeal further contends that, because he was charged initially with a 

misdemeanor, he was entitled to a jury trial on the charge as such. Finally, 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 20 -

McNeal argues that the bifurcation of the charges resulted in violations of 

the concepts of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. Id. at 25. On this 

last point, we disagree with McNeal.

The criminal mischief charge at issue initially was filed as an ungraded 

misdemeanor. However, at the preliminary hearing in this case, the 

assistant district attorney requested, based upon the amount of damage 

($960) asserted by the alleged victim during the hearing, that the charge be 

designated a third degree misdemeanor. N.T., 7/18/2011, at 9-10; see 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3304(b) (grading criminal mischief if the damage caused by the 

actor is more than $500 but less than $1000). However, on April 12, 2013, 

the assistant district attorney told the trial court that she was “inclined to 

proceed on that as a summary.” N.T., 4/12/2013, at 3. By April 15, 2013, 

the prosecutor had decided affirmatively to reduce the charge to a summary 

offense, a decision to which McNeal objected and which he steadfastly 

opposed. N.T., 4/15/2013, at 7-8. At sentencing, the assistant district 

attorney noted that she had acted at the direction of her supervisor. N.T., 

5/31/2013, at 19.

McNeal maintains, both directly and by allusion, that the prosecutor 

elected to proceed with the charge as a summary offense to accommodate 

Judge Wogan, who, McNeal believes, wanted the charge to be a summary so 

that he could preside over that charge personally so as to ensure a 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 21 -

conviction that would in turn constitute a violation of McNeal’s probation.4 

The record lends considerable support to McNeal’s allegations regarding 

Judge Wogan’s motives. Judge Wogan repeatedly questioned McNeal’s 

intelligence, and at least twice emphasized prior to the verdict that a 

summary conviction would serve as a probation violation. Our close review 

of the record suggests that Judge Wogan had decided that McNeal was guilty 

of some crimes before the trial even started. Judge Wogan explained that 

one of McNeal’s arguments would be moot if the jury “somehow” found him 

not guilty of the charged offenses. N.T., 4/18/2013, at 7. At sentencing, 

Judge Wogan told McNeal that he was “going to . . . give you every day I 

can give you today.” N.T., 5/31/2013. 

Regardless of what Judge Wogan’s true motives were, we cannot 

impute those motives to the assistant district attorney in this case. “The 

prosecutor . . . has the duty to decide what charges should be brought 

against a particular offender and then to prosecute the offender according to 

that law. A prosecutor is vested with considerable discretion in deciding who 

will or will not be charged and what they will be charged with.” 

____________________________________________

4 Bifurcating a trial such that a jury will render a verdict on any 

misdemeanors or felonies while a trial judge rules on any summary offenses 

is permitted by our rules of criminal procedure. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 648(F) 

(“If there is a summary offense joined with the misdemeanor, felony, or 

murder charge that was tried by the jury, the trial judge shall not remand 

the summary offense to the issuing authority. The summary offense shall be 

disposed of in the court of common pleas[.]”).
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 22 -

Commonwealth v. Amundsen, 611 A.2d 309, 311 (Pa. Super. 1992). The 

United States Supreme Court likewise has acknowledged that the 

prosecution enjoys considerable discretion in deciding what charges to bring 

against a defendant. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). 

“Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal law is, of course, subject to 

constitutional constraints. . . . [A] prosecutor may be influenced by the 

penalties available upon conviction; however, that fact[,] standing alone, 

does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process 

Clauses.” Commonwealth v. Berryman, 649 A.2d 961, 974 (Pa. Super. 

1994). Further:

[i]n reviewing a grant to amend an information, the Court will 

look to whether the appellant was fully apprised of the factual 

scenario which supports the charges against him. Where the 

crimes specified in the original information involved the same 

basic elements and arose out of the same factual situation as the 

crime added by the amendment, the appellant is deemed to 

have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal 

conduct and no prejudice to defendant results. 

Commonwealth v. J.F., 800 A.2d 942, 945 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation modified).

In light of these standards, and in view of the vast discretion afforded 

to prosecutors to decide which charges to file and pursue against a 

defendant, we can discern no abuse of prosecutorial discretion under these 

circumstances. There is no evidence of record that the prosecutor acted in 

collusion with Judge Wogan. Nor are we permitted to presume that the 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 23 -

prosecutor’s actions were based only upon the belief that Judge Wogan 

would in fact convict McNeal and find him in violation of his probation. 

Simply put, we cannot impute Judge Wogan’s improper behavior to the 

Commonwealth without some evidence in the record to show that the 

prosecutor harbored the same dubious motive. The record we have does not 

support such a finding. Thus, our concerns notwithstanding, we must reject 

McNeal’s argument that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to 

reduce the charge. 

We also reject McNeal’s argument that permitting the prosecutor to 

reduce the charge was a violation of the principles of double jeopardy or 

collateral estoppel. In Commonwealth v. States, 938 A.2d 1016 (Pa. 

2007), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the concepts of double 

jeopardy and collateral estoppel in the criminal context as follows:

The proscription against twice placing an individual in jeopardy 

of life or limb is found in the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 

794 (1969). The double jeopardy protections afforded by our 

state constitution are coextensive with those federal in origin; 

essentially, both prohibit successive prosecutions and multiple 

punishments for the same offense. Commonwealth v. 

Fletcher, 861 A.2d 898, 912 (Pa. 2004). We have described 

double jeopardy rights as “freedom from the harassment of 

successive trials and the prohibition against double punishment.” 

Commonwealth v. Hude, 425 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. 1980) 

(plurality). [C]ollateral estoppel (also known as issue 

preclusion), is most familiar in the civil context, where its stated 

purpose is to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple 

lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by preventing 

inconsistent decisions, [and] encourage reliance on 

adjudication.” Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1996).
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 24 -

However, collateral estoppel does not operate in the criminal 

context in the same manner in which it operates in the civil 

context. For instance, in civil practice the doctrine is applicable, 

in equal measure, to both parties, whereas in the criminal 

context, the use of the doctrine is considerably restricted, 

particularly where the Commonwealth seeks to use it against a 

criminal defendant. See Commonwealth v. Holder, 805 A.2d 

499 (Pa. 2002) (permitting the Commonwealth limited use of 

collateral estoppel principles to preclude relitigation of an 

evidentiary ruling that had been rendered in a previous 

probation hearing) (plurality). With respect to the criminal law 

defendant, collateral estoppel is treated as a subpart of double 

jeopardy protection and is defined as follows: “Collateral 

estoppel . . . does not automatically bar subsequent 

prosecutions[,] but does bar redetermination in a second 

prosecution of those issues necessarily determined between the 

parties in a first proceeding which has become a final judgment.” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 540 A.2d 246, 251 (Pa. 1988) 

(citation omitted). As simple as this definition appears, the 

principle’s application is not as straightforward as it is in the civil 

context because it must be viewed through the lens of double 

jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1373 

(Pa. 1983) (it is “double jeopardy that forbids the state from 

offending the collateral estoppel rule”).

States, 938 A.2d at 1019-20 (citations modified). 

These principles apply to “subsequent” prosecutions where the first 

trial ended with a definitive determination of a controlling material issue. 

Id. They do not apply to the typical scenario permitted by Pa.R.Crim.P. 

648(F), where the jury and the trial court rendered conflicting credibility 

findings. A trial judge, sitting simultaneously as fact-finder with a jury in a 

bifurcated summary/non-summary trial, is entitled to make his or her own 

credibility findings, and it is well-settled that “inconsistent verdicts are

permissible in Pennsylvania.” States, 938 A.2d at 1025. What occurred in 

this case was an inconsistent verdict. Such verdicts, “while often perplexing, 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 25 -

are not considered mistakes and do not constitute a basis for reversal.” 

Commonwealth v. Petteway, 847 A.2d 713, 718 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations omitted). 

We turn now to what is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this 

troubling case: Judge Wogan’s unapologetic admission that he considered 

evidence dehors the record when deliberating upon and rendering a verdict 

on the criminal mischief charge. As noted earlier, Judge Wogan considered 

information from a letter that McNeal had sent to him, even though the 

Commonwealth never introduced that letter at trial. See N.T., 5/31/2013, 

at 15-18; T.C.O. at 11. This was plain error. Indeed, it was stark and 

fundamental error.

We are unaware of any basis for Judge Wogan’s assertion that “there 

is no legal reason to exclude this court from considering the letter in making 

its summary [sic] judgment.” T.C.O. at 11. It is hornbook law that “a court 

may not support an adjudication of guilt with evidence not part of the trial 

record.” Commonwealth v. Wasiuta, 421 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. 1980); 

Commonwealth v. Martell, 452 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa. Super. 1982); see 

also Eck v. Eck, 475 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Super. 1984) (noting that “a trial 

court may not consider facts or evidence dehors the record in making [any] 

determination.”); Ney v. Ney, 917 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa. Super. 2007) (same). 

Here, Judge Wogan freely admitted that he considered the contents of 

McNeal’s letter, notwithstanding an apparent glimmer of recognition that it 

was improper for him to do so:
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 26 -

Then you have another appellate issue, because yes, I did use 

the letter. I had additional information. We talked about the 

letter. I gave you a copy and the Commonwealth. If you don’t 

like defendants writing me letters, then maybe your office should 

counsel them early on. But he said there was evidence of 

criminal trespass, and yes, I agree. That was an 

understatement. 

* * *

Well, maybe you have an appellate issue because I used the 

letter and that was information that the jury didn’t have but I 

had. It’s a tacit admission. 

N.T., 5/31/2013, at 17-18. As he did in defending his unilateral actions in 

reaching out for McNeal’s probation case, Judge Wogan again attempted to 

place the blame on the defense attorney. In this instance, Judge Wogan 

criticized defense counsel for failing to instruct clients not to send letters to 

the trial judge. It is apparent that Judge Wogan believed that he could flout 

the basic principles of fair trial because defense counsel never affirmatively 

told McNeal that it was a bad idea to send the judge a letter. Judge Wogan’s 

blame-shifting is unavailing. It is clear that Judge Wogan had no interest in 

the propriety of considering the letter, and that he was going to consider it 

regardless of the commands of our laws. See T.C.O. at 11 (Judge Wogan 

states that he “is not about to ignore a letter voluntarily sent by [McNeal] to 

[the] court.”). T.C.O. at 11. 

Judge Wogan convicted McNeal of a crime with evidence that the 

Commonwealth never introduced at trial. This was patent error. The 

Commonwealth concedes candidly that McNeal is entitled to relief. See Brief 
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 27 -

for the Commonwealth (No. 1775 EDA 2013), at 15-16. McNeal’s summary 

criminal mischief conviction is vacated.

Having concluded that McNeal’s conviction must be vacated, we also 

must vacate the judgment of sentence that was imposed for the probation 

violation. The criminal mischief conviction was the exclusive basis for the 

probation violation. Again, the Commonwealth candidly concedes that 

McNeal is entitled to this relief. See Brief for the Commonwealth (No. 1771 

EDA 2013), at 14-15. Consequently, we vacate that judgment of sentence 

as well. Because we do so, we need not address McNeal’s claim concerning 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence in case number 1771 EDA 2013, 

and that claim is now moot. 

In his remaining two claims, McNeal raises identical due process 

arguments, in each of which he delineates the acts of impropriety committed 

by Judge Wogan. We need not delve into these issues in any substantive 

way. Judge Wogan’s errors and transgressions are well documented in this 

case. We need proceed no further. We need not commence an additional 

discussion of whether Judge Wogan violated McNeal’s rights to due process 

and fundamental fairness so as to require a new trial. The relief that McNeal 

requests based upon these asserted constitutional violations is vacatur of his 

judgments of sentence and a remand for new proceedings. For the reasons 

elaborated upon above, we already have granted that precise relief to 

McNeal. Thus, McNeal’s last two claims are moot, and require no further 

discussion.
J-A02016-15 and J-A02017-15

- 28 -

Judgments of sentence vacated. Case remanded.5 Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015

____________________________________________

5 By command of our Supreme Court, this Court is not permitted sua 

sponte to order a judge to recuse himself from a case. See 

Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 912 A.2d 827, 833-34 (Pa. 2006). We 

obviously will not do so. We nonetheless would be remiss if we did not 

express our concern for McNeal’s ability to receive a fair and impartial trial if 

this case is tried anew before Judge Wogan, because Judge Wogan already 

has heard the evidence of record and has rendered a verdict based upon 

evidence dehors that evidentiary record. See Canon 2.9 of the Code of 

Judicial Conduct (“A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte

communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 

outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or 

impending matter.”).