United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2015 Decided July 17, 2015

No. 14-1131

ADX COMMUNICATIONS OF PENSACOLA AND ADX

COMMUNICATIONS OF ESCAMBIA,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

6 JOHNSON ROAD LICENSES, INC., ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

On Appeal of an Order of the 

Federal Communications Commission

Dan J. Alpert argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

James M. Carr, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the

brief were Jonathan B. Sallet, General Counsel, David M.

Gossett, Deputy General Counsel, and Richard K. Welch,

Deputy Associate General Counsel. Pamela L. Smith, Counsel,

and Jacob M. Lewis, Associate General Counsel, entered

appearances.
2

David D. Oxenford, Lawrence M. Miller, Lewis J. Paper,

and Victoria N. Lynch were on the joint brief for intervenors.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: ADX Communications (“ADX”)

unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Communications

Commission to deny the assignment to a competitor of several

radio licenses in the Pensacola, Florida, and Mobile, Alabama,

markets. On appeal, ADX contends that, in applying the

statutory caps on ownership of radio stations, the Commission

should not have used its normal market definition methodology

because of unique aspects of the Pensacola and Mobile markets. 

Alternatively, it contends the Commission should have applied

the two-year waiting period applicable to changes in market

definition. Consistent with our deferential standard of review,

because the Commission reasonably exercised its judgment in

deciding not to deviate from the market definition methodology

it adopted in 2003, and because its interpretation of the waiting

period was consistent with the policy established in its prior

order and not otherwise suspect, we affirm.

I.

The Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., charges

the Federal Communications Commission with regulating radio

stations, see id. § 303, primarily through licensing, see id. § 307. 

In awarding new licenses or approving transfers of licenses, the

Commission must determine whether the proposed ownership of

the license would serve the “public interest, convenience, and

necessity.” See id. §§ 309(a), 310(d). Guided by the principle

that the public interest is served by the “diversification of mass

media ownership,” which “prevent[s] undue concentration of
3

economic power,” FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436

U.S. 775, 780 (1978), the Commission has long capped the

number of radio stations that one entity can own in a radio

market. See generally In the Matter of 2002 Biennial

Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, ¶ 235 (2003)

(“Ownership Order”). The Telecommunications Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), set specific ownership

caps, based on the total number of radio stations in a market, see

id. § 202(b)(1)(A)-(D), 110 Stat. 110, which the Commission

adopted in its radio ownership rules.1

 The Commission has

reviewed the ownership rules several times since 1996, see id.

§ 202(h), and concluded the numerical limits continue to serve

the public interest. See generally Prometheus Radio Project v.

FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 462–63 (3d Cir. 2011).

Before 2003, the Commission used a “contour-overlap

methodology” for identifying the boundaries of a radio market. 

See Ownership Order, ¶ 256. A radio station’s “market” was

determined based on the overlaps between its “principal

community contours” — the area in which the station’s signal

is strong — and other stations’ principal community contours. 

See id. ¶¶ 250–52. The Commission treated as commonly

owned all stations whose principal community contours

mutually overlapped with each other, see id. ¶ 251, and the

1

 The ownership caps are: (1) in a market with fourteen or

fewer radio stations, no owner can hold more than five total licenses

and three same-service (i.e., AM or FM) licenses, (2) in a market with

between fifteen and twenty-nine radio stations, no owner can hold

more than six total licenses and four same-service licenses, (3) in a

market with between thirty and forty-four radio stations, no owner can

hold more than seven total licenses and four same-service licenses,

and (4) in a market with forty-five or more radio stations, no owner

can hold more than eight total licenses and five same-service licenses. 

47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a).
4

market as all stations whose principal community contours

overlapped with any one of the commonly owned stations’

principal community contours, see id. ¶ 252. This meant that the

definition of the “market” changed for each combination of

stations. Id. ¶ 256. 

By 2003, the Commission had identified “conceptual

problems” with the contour-overlap methodology, id. ¶ 257: 

Sometimes a station was “counted in the market for purposes of

establishing the number of stations in the market,” but was not

“counted against a licensee’s cap on the number of stations it

may own in that market.” In the Matter of 1998 Biennial

Regulatory Review, 15 FCC Rcd. 11058, ¶ 66 (2000); see also

Ownership Order ¶¶ 253–55. Sometimes the contour-overlap

methodology created inconsistent market definitions where “the

size of a radio market” was “unique to the proposed combination

being evaluated,” rather than being “in line with coherent and

accepted methods for delineating geographic markets for

purposes of competition analysis.” Id. ¶ 256. The methodology

created perverse incentives to consolidate ownership, id. ¶ 257,

and it often did not meaningfully capture the actual state of

competition in a given area, id. ¶¶ 258–59.

To remedy these shortcomings, the Commission adopted

the market definitions produced by Arbitron, a private company

that collects data on the telecommunications market. (Arbitron

was acquired and renamed Nielsen Audio in 2013, see

Appellee’s Br. 8 n.6; for clarity, we refer to Arbitron.) The

Commission found “Arbitron’s market definitions are an

industry standard and represent a reasonable geographic market

delineation within which radio stations compete.” Id. ¶ 276. 

For major metropolitan areas, Arbitron defines an “Arbitron

Metro Survey Area” (or simply “Arbitron Metro”), which

represents the “commercially accepted and recognized definition

of [the] radio market.” Id. ¶¶ 274–75. Arbitron also identifies
5

each station’s “home” Metro, based either on the community

that the station is licensed to serve (or “community of license”)

being within the Metro, or on its determination that a station

licensed elsewhere nonetheless “compete[s] with the radio

stations located in the Metro.” Id. ¶ 279. For purposes of the

multiple ownership rules, the Commission considers a radio

station to be located in its “home” Metro, as determined by

Arbitron, as well as in the Metro where its community of license

is located, if it is not within the same Metro. See id. ¶ 280 &

nn.594, 595, 596; id. ¶ 286 n.609. For radio stations not located

inside an Arbitron Metro, the Commission retained a modified

version of the contour-overlap methodology. See id. ¶¶ 285–86. 

The Commission also identified two possible problems with

the Arbitron-based methodology that might arise in individual

cases. First, although it concluded that Arbitron market

definitions would serve the purposes of the ownership caps “in

virtually all cases,” the Commission acknowledged that there

might be exceptions. Id. ¶ 497. In that event, “an interested

party . . . has a statutory right to file a petition to deny a specific

radio station application and present evidence that makes the

necessary prima facie showing that the transaction is contrary to

the public interest.” See id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)). 

Second, the boundaries of Arbitron Metros, as well as “home”

market designations, were subject to change by Arbitron, often

at the encouragement of regulated parties. See id. ¶ 278. To

discourage manipulation, the Commission adopted a two-year

waiting period before a radio station owner could take advantage

of a change in market boundaries or “home” status. See id.

ADX Communications (“ADX”) is licensee of two radio

stations in the Pensacola, Florida, Arbitron Metro. In May and

July 2012, one of its competitors, Cumulus Licensing LLC

(“Cumulus”), filed applications to acquire licenses in the

Pensacola Metro and the adjacent Mobile, Alabama, Metro. 
6

Because Cumulus also proposed to transfer some of its licenses

to other owners, the net result would be that Cumulus would

gain one license overall. Cumulus had recently changed the

community of license for another license — station WDLT-FM

— from a city outside the Mobile Metro to a city within it. This

had the effect of changing the market definition methodology to

which all of Cumulus’s licenses were subject. Before, they

would have had to satisfy the contour-overlap methodology

because one community of license was not within any Arbitron

Metro. See Ownership Order, ¶ 286 n.609. After the change in

community of license, Cumulus’s radio stations only had to

satisfy the Arbitron-based methodology.

ADX filed petitions to deny the proposed transfers on the

ground that Cumulus’s acquisition would not comply with the

multiple ownership limits under the contour-overlap

methodology, to which Cumulus’s licenses would be subject

without the change in community of license. Neither the

Commission nor Cumulus (nor the other intervenors) has argued

otherwise, and Cumulus’s purchase agreement admitted as

much, see Asset Purchase Agreement, ATI-2500130v12, at 1

(May 4, 2012). ADX argued that because the adjacent

Pensacola and Mobile markets were both served by 14 radio

stations in common, the Commission should deviate from the

normal Arbitron market definitions and treat the region as one

market. Under that approach, the assignment to Cumulus would

have resulted in Cumulus owning six FM stations in the

combined market, which exceeds the ownership caps in 47

C.F.R. § 73.3555(a), supra note 1. ADX also argued that the

two-year waiting period described in the Ownership Order

should apply to Cumulus’s change in community of license. 

And if Cumulus thereby could not rely on the Arbitron market

definitions, then its acquisition would have to be analyzed using

the modified contour-overlap methodology, under which it

would violate the ownership rules.
7

The Media Bureau denied ADX’s petitions and granted the

assignment applications. See Dan J. Alpert, Esq., 28 FCC Rcd.

20 (Media Bureau 2013) (“2013 Bureau Denial Letter”). It

determined that after the proposed assignments, Cumulus’s

station ownership would comply with the ownership rules using

the Arbitron market definitions. It rejected ADX’s argument to

depart from the Arbitron definitions because it found “nothing

new or unique about two adjacent Arbitron markets sharing

numerous radio stations.” Id. at 27. Nor did it find the proposed

transaction to be contrary to the public interest because, even

after the assignment, “both the Pensacola and [Mobile] markets

will continue to be served by at least ten different station

owners.” Id. at 25. The Bureau also found that the “community

of license relocation did not trigger the two-year safeguard

established by the Ownership Order,” because it did not

“directly concern market definitions, the main focus of the twoyear safeguard.” Id. at 26. 

ADX filed an application for review, and the Commission,

by memorandum opinion and order, affirmed the Bureau’s letter

decision. See In the Matter of 6 Johnson Road Licenses, Inc., 29

FCC Rcd. 6386 (2014) (“2014 Denial Order”). The

Commission, observing that the Bureau had “fully addressed . . .

these issues,” concluded first, that deviation from the Arbitron

market definition was not warranted because “there is nothing

new or unique about two adjacent Arbitron Metro Markets

‘sharing’ numerous stations,” the contour-overlap methodology

was “precisely the approach that the Commission rejected when

it adopted the Arbitron Metro standard in 2003,” and

“competition for listeners would be preserved in the Mobile and

Pensacola markets” by the participation of at least ten owners in

each market. Id. ¶ 4. Second, the Commission declined to apply

the two-year waiting period because changes in community of

license did not “implicate the Commission’s underlying concern
8

regarding the malleability of Arbitron Metro market

definitions,” since the Mobile Metro had already been the

“home” market for the license in question. Id. ¶ 5 (quotation

marks omitted).

II.

On appeal, ADX contends that the Commission’s “robotic

application of its ‘bright-line, geography-based’ multiple

ownership rules and polices in this instance is irrational,

capricious, and contrary to the public interest.” Appellant’s Br.

21. In ADX’s view, the decision not to deviate from the

Arbitron market definitions was “improper” because those

definitions did not capture the actual state of competition in

Mobile and Pensacola. Id. at 35. Maps of the principal

community contours of Cumulus’s stations show that their

signals reach large portions of both Metros. As ADX points out,

some of those stations are transmitted from the same tower even

though they are classified as being located in different markets. 

As a result of the assignment, Cumulus would own six FM

stations that reach both markets even though the regulations cap

the number of same-service stations in even the largest markets

at five. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(i), supra note 1. ADX

maintains that the Commission was obligated to take a “hard

look” at the “level of market dominance on the part of Cumulus”

and failed to do so. Appellant’s Br. 21–22.

The court’s review of the 2014 Denial Order is limited to

determining whether the Commission’s decision was “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To satisfy this

standard, the agency must have articulated a “rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). The court
9

must defer to the “Commission’s interpretation of its own rules

. . . unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.” Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 473

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The court similarly

defers to the Commission’s “reasonable application of its own

precedents.” Vernal Enter., Inc. v. FCC, 355 F.3d 650, 658

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

The Commission gave three reasons for refusing to depart

from the Arbitron approach. Its analysis, which incorporated

that in the 2013 Bureau Denial Letter, satisfied the

Commission’s burden to reasonably explain its decision. First,

and most importantly, it explained, with regard to ADX’s claim

that Mobile and Pensacola markets should be viewed as one

market, that “there is nothing new or unique about two adjacent

Arbitron Metro markets ‘sharing’ numerous stations — i.e., each

Metro receiving substantial signal coverage from stations that

are ‘home’ to the neighboring Metro.” 2014 Denial Order, ¶ 4

(quoting 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 27). It noted a pair of

similarly adjacent markets in the Orlando, Florida, region. See

id. ¶ 4 n.6. The Bureau had also observed that “[m]any Arbitron

Metro markets nationwide are adjacent to each other,” with

some “even embedded in another Metro market, yet [they] are

still treated separately under the Ownership Order.” 2013

Bureau Denial Letter at 27. In its brief, the Commission

attached a map of all Metros in the United States that shows

there are dozens of adjacent pairs of Arbitron Metros across the

country. See Appellee’s Br. Ex. A.2

 Although the Commission

acknowledged in adopting Arbitron market definitions that it

would allow for exceptions where necessary in the public

interest, see Ownership Order, ¶ 497, the exception urged by

ADX would effectively reinstate the contour-overlap

2

 The map is available at http://www.arbitron.com/

downloads/arb_us_metro_map_12.pdf.
10

methodology in many parts of the country, contrary to the

“bright-line, geography-based definition” adopted in 2003. 

2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 24. Given the problems

associated with the contour-overlap methodology that were

identified in the Ownership Order, see id. ¶¶ 253–60, the

Commission reasonably rested its decision on the fact that the

circumstances identified by ADX also existed in many other

metropolitan regions. See 2014 Denial Order, ¶ 4.

ADX maintains that its situation is different from other

adjacent Metros because in Pensacola and Mobile “one owner’s

stations serve the majority of both markets,” and “the number of

stations serving the majority of both markets exceed[s] the

Commission’s multiple ownership limits.” Reply Br. 17–18. 

This confuses the market definition with the subsequent

application of the ownership limits. The fact that an assignment

would violate the ownership rules under one market definition

but not the other does not dictate which market definition should

apply. ADX emphasizes that Cumulus’s six FM stations will

reach the vast majority of listeners in both Metros, a situation

that does not necessarily exist in every pair of adjacent Metros

where an owner would exceed the caps under contour-overlap

methodology. Still, every adjacent pair of Metros has the

potential for the same situation to arise. This possibility appears

unavoidable in the Commission’s decision to switch to the

Arbitron methodology, which the Commission concluded was

nonetheless justified as a more realistic way to assess the actual

state of competition. As the Commission has explained, the

Arbitron market definitions use much more data than signal

coverage. See Ownership Order, ¶ 279–80. It was therefore

reasonable for the Commission to conclude that “there is

nothing new or unique about two adjacent Arbitron Metro

markets ‘sharing’ numerous stations,” 2014 Denial Order, ¶ 4

(quoting 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 27), and the Commission

did not need to examine the distribution of stations in all of the
11

other adjacent Metros in the United States. ADX, in other

words, had to show circumstances more unique than the fact that

the ownership rules would have been violated under the prior

methodology. See Ownership Order, ¶ 497.

Precedent on which ADX relies offers an example of a

circumstance that has been deemed unique. In Luis. A. Soto, 22

FCC Rcd. 2549 (Media Bureau 2007), the Media Bureau agreed

to make an exception to the Arbitron market definition for a

radio station on the far western side of Puerto Rico. It did so

only after identifying a “unique combination of facts presented

in this particular case,” including multiple centers of economic

activity within the Metro, a very high number of stations and

owners, and “a central mountain range which effectively blocks

signals originating in the eastern portion of Puerto Rico from

reaching the western portion of the island, and vice versa.” Id.

at 2551–52. The Bureau declined to rely on a factor that was

present elsewhere: “While there are other Arbitron markets that

comprise more than one [Metropolitan Statistical Area], Puerto

Rico is the only such market that has the additional factors of

geographic size, topography, and sheer numbers of radio stations

and station owners.” Id. at 2552. The Commission reasonably

concluded here that ADX had identified nothing comparable in

the Pensacola-Mobile area.

Second, the Commission explained that ADX’s market

definition proposal, based on transmitter locations and signal

contours, is “precisely the approach that the Commission

rejected when it adopted the Arbitron Metro standard in 2003.” 

2014 Denial Order, ¶ 4 (citing 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at

27). ADX points out that the Commission nonetheless provided

for exceptions in the Ownership Order. We agree that this

reason could not justify the Commission’s decision standing on

its own, because citing the baseline shift to the Arbitron

definitions does not explain a decision to deny an individual
12

request to deviate from those definitions. But considered in

conjunction with the Commission’s first reason, we understand

the Commission to be underscoring the fact that deviating from

the Arbitron definitions here would mean deviating in every

other pair of adjacent Metros as well, which would effectively

reinstate the old market definition methodology. The

Commission did not have to consider that option because the

time for challenging the Ownership Order has passed, see 47

U.S.C. § 402(c), and ADX does not purport to do so in any

event.

Third, rejecting ADX’s assertion that the Media Bureau had

“mechanically” applied the numerical ownership limits, the

Commission noted the Bureau’s “full public interest analysis”

and its conclusion that “post-transaction, competition for

listeners would be preserved in the Mobile and Pensacola

markets,” a conclusion with which the Commission agreed, as

both Metros will still have at least ten owners. See 2014 Denial

Order, ¶ 4 & n.8 (citing 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 25). This

consideration, like the second, might not be a sufficient

explanation standing on its own, because the multiple ownership

rules are concerned with the proportion of stations owned by a

single entity, not simply the number of owners. See 47 C.F.R.

§ 73.3555(a). But neither is this consideration irrelevant to the

public interest analysis that the Commission must undertake

when reviewing applications to transfer radio licenses. See 47

U.S.C. § 310(d). Given an increase in license concentration (as

is occurring here), the Commission could reasonably conclude

that the “diversification of mass media ownership,” Nat’l

Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 780, would be better

served by holding constant, rather than reducing, the number of

owners in the market. See 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 25. In

any event, this consideration, when added to the first, provides

a sufficient explanation for the court to conclude that the

Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The
13

Commission has articulated a “rational connection between the

facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n,

463 U.S. at 43.

III.

ADX also contends that it was arbitrary and capricious for

the Commission to refuse to apply the two-year waiting period

described in the Ownership Order, which would have barred

Cumulus from immediately relying on the change in community

of license to justify avoiding contour-overlap analysis. Because

the change allowed Cumulus to alter the market definition

methodology to which its licenses were subject, ADX maintains

that the purpose behind the waiting period — preventing

manipulation of the Arbitron market definitions — applied, and

that failing to apply it was contrary to Commission precedent. 

A.

As a threshold matter, the Commission contends ADX lacks

standing under Article III of the Constitution to assert this

challenge. It does not question ADX’s asserted injury — that

ADX “will be subjected to a much higher level of competition”

because of Cumulus’s acquisition, Appellant’s Br. 2–3 — but

rather maintains that ADX cannot satisfy the redressability

requirement. To have Article III standing, a party “must

demonstrate that it is likely” that its injury “will be redressed by

a favorable decision of the court.” Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC,

758 F.3d 254, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). 

The Commission maintains that because the two-year period had

passed by the time ADX filed its appeal, as the Commission

approved the change in community of license on May 7, 2012,

“any remand concerning this issue would not change the

outcome of the administrative proceeding.” Appellee’s Br. 34.
14

The Commission misunderstands the nature of ADX’s

challenge. ADX asks the court to “reverse” the Commission’s

decision, Appellant’s Br. 55, which means the “[u]nwinding of

Cumulus’ purchase,” Reply Br. 24. If the court reversed the

2014 Denial Order, then Cumulus would no longer have its new

licenses, and the competitive injury of which ADX complains

would be alleviated. The court cannot presume that reversing

the 2014 Denial Order “would not change the outcome of the

administrative proceeding,” Appellee’s Br. 34, because the court

cannot know how the Commission (or the parties) would react

to the changed circumstances presented by the passage of time

and the analysis in the court’s opinion. However the

Commission might respond, it is enough that ADX will obtain

the exact relief it seeks should its challenge succeed on appeal,

without any need to rely “on actions by a third party not before

the court.” Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. FERC, 534 F.3d 735,

739 (D.C. Cir. 2008). When a party alleges that an agency’s

action was arbitrary and capricious for failure to comply with

the agency’s own procedures, the agency cannot defeat standing

merely by asserting that it will come to the same conclusion

once the procedures are satisfied on remand. Cf. Idaho v. ICC,

35 F.3d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).

B.

Turning to the merits, ADX must show that the

Commission’s interpretation of the Ownership Order is “plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations or there is any

other reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the

agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter.” Talk

America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2261

(2011) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). It has failed

to do so. The Ownership Order itself identifies only two

circumstances in which the two-year period would apply: “a

change in Arbitron Metro boundaries,” and the “inclusion of a
15

radio station as ‘home’ to a Metro.” Ownership Order, ¶ 278. 

More generally, it describes the waiting period as applying to “a

change in Arbitron Metro definitions.” Id. The Media Bureau

has since applied the waiting period to the elimination of an

entire Metro by Arbitron. See In re WCCL(FM), Central City,

Penn., et al., (“Forever Broadcasting”), 23 FCC Rcd. 17978

(Media Bureau 2008). Neither the Ownership Order nor

precedent applying it state that a change in community of license

alone would trigger the waiting period.

ADX instead points to the broader purpose of the two-year

waiting period: preventing manipulation of the multiple

ownership rules. Although the Commission did identify the goal

of preventing licensees from “circumventing the local radio

ownership rule,” it did so only in the context of licensees

“attempting to manipulate Arbitron market definitions.” 

Ownership Order, ¶ 278 (emphasis added). Its concern was

“‘the malleability of Arbitron Metro market definitions.’” 2014

Denial Order, ¶ 5 (emphasis added) (quoting 2013 Bureau

Denial Letter at 26). As interpreted by the Commission, the

waiting period applies to changes in market definition made by

Arbitron, not to changes approved by the Commission. See

2014 Denial Order, ¶ 5; 2013 Bureau Denial Letter at 26. Thus,

the Commission maintains that because it approved Cumulus’s

change in community of license, and the Arbitron “home”

designation did not change, the two-year waiting period did not

apply. See Appellee’s Br. 36. That interpretation is consistent

with the explanation and examples in the Ownership Order.

Although the Commission has not suggested that, in considering

whether to approve community of license changes, it takes

account of possible manipulation of the ownership rules, ADX

points to nothing in the Ownership Order that contradicts the

Commission’s interpretation. The Media Bureau precedent on

which ADX relies also involved changes made by Arbitron, not,

as here, a change approved by the Commission. See In re
16

WCCL(FM), Central City, Penn., et al. (“Forever

Broadcasting”), 23 FCC Rcd. 17978; In re Citicasters Licenses,

L.P., 22 FCC Rcd. 17788 (Media Bureau 2007). ADX therefore

fails to show that the Commission’s interpretation is “plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” or otherwise

suspect, Star Wireless, 522 F.3d at 473; see Talk America, 131

S. Ct. at 2261.

Accordingly, we affirm the 2014 Denial Order of the

Commission.