(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2016 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP 

BRANDS LLC
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 16–341. Argued March 27, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017 

The patent venue statute, 28 U. S. C. §1400(b), provides that “[a]ny

civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial 

district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has 

committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established

place of business.” In Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products 

Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226, this Court concluded that for purposes of 

§1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation, rejecting the argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader

definition of corporate “residence” contained in the general venue

statute, 28 U. S. C. §1391(c). Congress has not amended §1400(b) 

since Fourco, but it has twice amended §1391, which now provides

that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” and “[f]or all venue purposes,” a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in

any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 

personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 

§§1391(a), (c). 

Respondent filed a patent infringement suit in the District Court

for the District of Delaware against petitioner, a competitor that is 

organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana but ships

the allegedly infringing products into Delaware. Petitioner moved to 

transfer venue to a District Court in Indiana, claiming that venue

was improper in Delaware. Citing Fourco, petitioner argued that it 

did not “resid[e]” in Delaware and had no “regular and established 

place of business” in Delaware under §1400(b). The District Court rejected these arguments. The Federal Circuit denied a petition for a 

writ of mandamus, concluding that §1391(c) supplies the definition of 

“resides” in §1400(b). The Federal Circuit reasoned that because pe-
 

 

 

2 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Syllabus 

titioner resided in Delaware under §1391(c), it also resided there under §1400(b). 

Held: As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation. The amendments to §1391 did

not modify the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. Pp. 3– 

10. 

(a) The venue provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 covered patent

cases as well as other civil suits. Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin 

Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 563. In 1897, Congress enacted a patent 

specific venue statute. This new statute (§1400(b)’s predecessor)

permitted suit in the district of which the defendant was an “inhabitant” or in which the defendant both maintained a “regular and established place of business” and committed an act of infringement. 29 

Stat. 695. A corporation at that time was understood to “inhabit” only the State of incorporation. This Court addressed the scope of 

§1400(b)’s predecessor in Stonite, concluding that it constituted “the

exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and thus was not supplemented or modified by the general venue provisions. 315 U. S., at 563. 

In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as §1400(b).

That provision, which remains unaltered today, uses “resides” instead of “inhabit[s].” At the same time, Congress also enacted the 

general venue statute, §1391, which defined “residence” for corporate 

defendants. In Fourco, this Court reaffirmed Stonite’s holding, observing that Congress enacted §1400(b) as a standalone venue statute and that nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced an intent to 

alter that status, even the fact that §1391(c) by “its terms” embraced

“all actions,” 353 U. S., at 228. The Court also concluded that “resides” in the recodified version bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]”

in the pre-1948 version. See id., at 226. 

This landscape remained effectively unchanged until 1988, when

Congress amended the general venue statute, §1391(c). The revised 

provision stated that it applied “[f]or purposes of venue under this 

chapter.” In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 

F. 2d 1574, 1578, the Federal Circuit held that, in light of this

amendment, §1391(c) established the definition for all other venue 

statutes under the same “chapter,” including §1400(b). In 2011, Congress adopted the current version of §1391, which provides that its

general definition applies “[f]or all venue purposes.” The Federal 

Circuit reaffirmed VE Holding in the case below. Pp. 3–7.

(b) In Fourco, this Court definitively and unambiguously held that 

the word “reside[nce]” in §1400(b), as applied to domestic corporations, refers only to the State of incorporation. Because Congress has 

not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, and neither party asks the Court 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Syllabus 

to reconsider that decision, the only question here is whether Congress changed §1400(b)’s meaning when it amended §1391. When 

Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the amended provision’s text. No such indication appears in the current version of 

§1391. 

Respondent points out that the current §1391(c) provides a default

rule that, on its face, applies without exception “[f]or all venue purposes.” But the version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a default rule that applied “ ‘for venue purposes,’ ” 353 U. S., at 223, and

those phrasings are not materially different in this context. The addition of the word “all” to the already comprehensive provision does 

not suggest that Congress intended the Court to reconsider its decision in Fourco. Any argument based on this language is even weaker 

now than it was when the Court rejected it in Fourco. Fourco held 

that §1400(b) retained a meaning distinct from the default definition

contained in §1391(c), even though the latter, by its terms, included 

no exceptions. The current version of §1391 includes a saving clause, 

which expressly states that the provision does not apply when “otherwise provided by law,” thus making explicit the qualification that

the Fourco Court found implicit in the statute. Finally, there is no

indication that Congress in 2011 ratified the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding. Pp. 7–10. 

821 F. 3d 1338, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other 

Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–341 

TC HEARTLAND LLC, PETITIONER v. KRAFT
 

FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

[May 22, 2017] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The question presented in this case is where proper

venue lies for a patent infringement lawsuit brought 

against a domestic corporation. The patent venue statute,

28 U. S. C. §1400(b), provides that “[a]ny civil action for 

patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district

where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has 

committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 

established place of business.” In Fourco Glass Co. v. 

Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226 (1957), this

Court concluded that for purposes of §1400(b) a domestic 

corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation. 

In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the

argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader definition of corporate “residence” contained in the general

venue statute, 28 U. S. C. §1391(c). 353 U. S., at 228. 

Congress has not amended §1400(b) since this Court

construed it in Fourco, but it has amended §1391 twice. 

Section 1391 now provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided by law” and “[f]or all venue purposes,” a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any 
 

 

 

2 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the

court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action

in question.” §§1391(a), (c). The issue in this case is 

whether that definition supplants the definition announced in Fourco and allows a plaintiff to bring a patent

infringement lawsuit against a corporation in any district 

in which the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.

We conclude that the amendments to §1391 did not modify

the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. We 

therefore hold that a domestic corporation “resides” only in

its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue 

statute. 

I 

Petitioner, which is organized under Indiana law and

headquartered in Indiana, manufactures flavored drink 

mixes.1 Respondent, which is organized under Delaware

law and has its principal place of business in Illinois, is a 

competitor in the same market. As relevant here, respondent sued petitioner in the District Court for the 

District of Delaware, alleging that petitioner’s products

infringed one of respondent’s patents. Although petitioner 

is not registered to conduct business in Delaware and has

no meaningful local presence there, it does ship the allegedly infringing products into the State.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case or transfer venue 

—————— 

1The complaint alleged that petitioner is a corporation, and petitioner 

admitted this allegation in its answer. See App. 11a, 60a. Similarly,

the petition for certiorari sought review on the question of “corporate” 

residence. See Pet. for Cert. i. In their briefs before this Court, however, the parties suggest that petitioner is, in fact, an unincorporated 

entity. See Brief for Respondent 9, n. 4 (the complaint’s allegation was

“apparently inaccurat[e]”); Reply Brief 4. Because this case comes to us 

at the pleading stage and has been litigated on the understanding that 

petitioner is a corporation, we confine our analysis to the proper venue

for corporations. We leave further consideration of the issue of petitioner’s legal status to the courts below on remand. 
 

 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

to the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

arguing that venue was improper in Delaware. See 28 

U. S. C. §1406. Citing Fourco’s holding that a corporation 

resides only in its State of incorporation for patent infringement suits, petitioner argued that it did not 

“resid[e]” in Delaware under the first clause of §1400(b).

It further argued that it had no “regular and established 

place of business” in Delaware under the second clause of 

§1400(b). Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court 

rejected these arguments, 2015 WL 5613160 (D Del., Sept. 

24, 2015), and the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a 

writ of mandamus, In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F. 3d 

1338 (2016). The Federal Circuit concluded that subsequent statutory amendments had effectively amended

§1400(b) as construed in Fourco, with the result that 

§1391(c) now supplies the definition of “resides” in

§1400(b). 821 F. 3d, at 1341–1343. Under this logic,

because the District of Delaware could exercise personal

jurisdiction over petitioner, petitioner resided in Delaware

under §1391(c) and, therefore, under §1400(b). We granted 

certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2016), and now reverse. 

II
 

A 

The history of the relevant statutes provides important 

context for the issue in this case. The Judiciary Act of 

1789 permitted a plaintiff to file suit in a federal district 

court if the defendant was “an inhabitant” of that district 

or could be “found” for service of process in that district.

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §11, 1 Stat. 79. The Act covered 

patent cases as well as other civil suits. Stonite Products 

Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 563 (1942). In 

1887, Congress amended the statute to permit suit only in 

the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant or, 

in diversity cases, of which either the plaintiff or defendant was an inhabitant. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, §1, 24 
 

 

4 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

Stat. 552; see also Stonite, supra, at 563–564. 

This Court’s decision in In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 

661–662 (1893), arguably suggested that the 1887 Act did 

not apply to patent cases. As a result, while some courts 

continued to apply the Act to patent cases, others refused

to do so and instead permitted plaintiffs to bring suit (in

line with the pre-1887 regime) anywhere a defendant 

could be found for service of process. See Stonite, supra, at 

564–565. In 1897, Congress resolved the confusion by

enacting a patent specific venue statute. See Act of Mar. 

3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. In so doing, it “placed patent infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside

the scope of general venue legislation.” Brunette Machine 

Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 713 

(1972). This new statute (§1400(b)’s predecessor) permitted suit in the district of which the defendant was an 

“inhabitant,” or a district in which the defendant both 

maintained a “regular and established place of business” 

and committed an act of infringement. 29 Stat. 695. At 

the time, a corporation was understood to “inhabit” only

the State in which it was incorporated. Shaw v. Quincy 

Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 449–450 (1892). 

The Court addressed the scope of §1400(b)’s predecessor 

in Stonite. In that case, the two defendants inhabited 

different districts within a single State. The plaintiff

sought to sue them both in the same district, invoking a 

then governing general venue statute that, if applicable, 

permitted it to do so. 315 U. S., at 562–563. This Court 

rejected the plaintiff ’s venue choice on the ground that the

patent venue statute constituted “the exclusive provision 

controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and

thus was not supplemented or modified by the general 

venue provisions. Id., at 563. In the Court’s view, the 

patent venue statute “was adopted to define the exact 

jurisdiction of the federal courts in actions to enforce 

patent rights,” a purpose that would be undermined by 
 

Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

interpreting it “to dovetail with the general provisions

relating to the venue of civil suits.” Id., at 565–566. The 

Court thus held that the patent venue statute “alone 

should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.” 

Id., at 566. 

In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as

§1400(b). See Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 936. The 

recodified provision, which remains unaltered today,

states that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may

be brought in the judicial district where the defendant

resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 

infringement and has a regular and established place of 

business.” 28 U. S. C. §1400(b) (1952 ed.). This version 

differs from the previous one in that it uses “resides” 

instead of “inhabit[s].” At the same time, Congress also 

enacted the general venue statute, §1391, which defined 

“residence” for corporate defendants. That provision

stated that “[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial

district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall

be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue 

purposes.” §1391(c) (1952 ed.).

Following the 1948 legislation, courts reached differing

conclusions regarding whether §1400(b)’s use of the word 

“resides” incorporated §1391(c)’s definition of “residence.” 

See Fourco, 353 U. S., at 224, n. 3 (listing cases). In Fourco, 

this Court reviewed a decision of the Second Circuit 

holding that §1391(c) defined residence for purposes of

§1400(b), “just as that definition is properly . . . incorporated into other sections of the venue chapter.” Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F. 2d 885, 886 

(1956). This Court squarely rejected that interpretation, 

reaffirming Stonite’s holding that §1400(b) “is the sole and 

exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and . . . is not to be supplemented by . . . 

§1391(c).” 353 U. S., at 229. The Court observed that 
 

6 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

Congress enacted §1400(b) as a standalone venue statute

and that nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced an 

intent to alter that status. The fact that §1391(c) by “its

terms” embraced “all actions” was not enough to overcome 

the fundamental point that Congress designed §1400(b) to

be “complete, independent and alone controlling in its

sphere.” Id., at 228. 

The Court also concluded that “resides” in the recodified 

version of §1400(b) bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]” 

in the pre-1948 version. See id., at 226 (“[T]he [w]ords

‘inhabitant’ and ‘resident,’ as respects venue, are synonymous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The substitution of “resides” for “inhabit[s]” thus did not suggest any 

alteration in the venue rules for corporations in patent 

cases. Accordingly, §1400(b) continued to apply to domestic corporations in the same way it always had: They were

subject to venue only in their States of incorporation. See 

ibid. (The use of “resides” “negat[es] any intention to make 

corporations suable, in patent infringement cases, where 

they are merely ‘doing business,’ because those synonymous words [“inhabitant” and “resident”] mean domicile 

and, in respect of corporations, mean the state of incorporation only”). 

B 

This landscape remained effectively unchanged until 

1988, when Congress amended the general venue statute,

§1391(c), to provide that “[f]or purposes of venue under 

this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be

deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is

commenced.” Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, §1013(a), 102 Stat. 4669. The Federal Circuit in 

VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 

1574 (1990), announced its view of the effect of this 

amendment on the meaning of the patent venue statute. 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

The court reasoned that the phrase “[f]or purposes of 

venue under this chapter” was “exact and classic language

of incorporation,” id., at 1579, and that §1391(c) accordingly established the definition for all other venue statutes

under the same “chapter.” Id., at 1580. Because §1400(b)

fell within the relevant chapter, the Federal Circuit concluded that §1391(c), “on its face,” “clearly applies to 

§1400(b), and thus redefines the meaning of the term

‘resides’ in that section.” Id., at 1578. 

Following VE Holding, no new developments occurred

until Congress adopted the current version of §1391 in

2011 (again leaving §1400(b) unaltered). See Federal 

Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, 

§202, 125 Stat. 763. Section 1391(a) now provides that,

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” “this section shall 

govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district

courts of the United States.” And §1391(c)(2), in turn,

provides that, “[f]or all venue purposes,” certain entities,

“whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if

a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with

respect to the civil action in question.” In its decision 

below, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed VE Holding, reasoning that the 2011 amendments provided no basis to reconsider its prior decision. 

III 

We reverse the Federal Circuit. In Fourco, this Court 

definitively and unambiguously held that the word “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied 

to domestic2 corporations: It refers only to the State of 

—————— 

2The parties dispute the implications of petitioner’s argument for 

foreign corporations. We do not here address that question, nor do we 

express any opinion on this Court’s holding in Brunette Machine Works, 

Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706 (1972) (determining 

proper venue for foreign corporation under then existing statutory 
 

8 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

incorporation. Congress has not amended §1400(b) since 

Fourco, and neither party asks us to reconsider our holding in that case. Accordingly, the only question we must 

answer is whether Congress changed the meaning of 

§1400(b) when it amended §1391. When Congress intends

to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a

relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the 

amended provision. See United States v. Madigan, 300 

U. S. 500, 506 (1937) (“[T]he modification by implication of 

the settled construction of an earlier and different section 

is not favored”); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 331 

(2012) (“A clear, authoritative judicial holding on the 

meaning of a particular provision should not be cast in

doubt and subjected to challenge whenever a related

though not utterly inconsistent provision is adopted in the 

same statute or even in an affiliated statute”). 

The current version of §1391 does not contain any indication that Congress intended to alter the meaning of 

§1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco. Although the current 

version of §1391(c) provides a default rule that applies 

“[f]or all venue purposes,” the version at issue in Fourco 

similarly provided a default rule that applied “for venue 

purposes.” 353 U. S., at 223 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In this context, we do not see any material

difference between the two phrasings. See Pure Oil Co. v. 

Suarez, 384 U. S. 202, 204–205 (1966) (construing “‘for 

venue purposes’” to cover “all venue statutes”). Respondent argues that “‘all venue purposes’ means ‘all venue 

purposes’—not ‘all venue purposes except for patent

venue.’” Brief for Respondent 21. The plaintiffs in Fourco 

advanced the same argument. See 353 U. S., at 228 (“The 

main thrust of respondents’ argument is that §1391(c) is

clear and unambiguous and that its terms include all 

actions—including patent infringement actions”). This 

—————— 

regime). 
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Court was not persuaded then, and the addition of the

word “all” to the already comprehensive provision does not 

suggest that Congress intended for us to reconsider that

conclusion. 

This particular argument is even weaker under the 

current version of §1391 than it was under the provision 

in place at the time of Fourco, because the current provision includes a saving clause expressly stating that it does

not apply when “otherwise provided by law.” On its face, 

the version of §1391(c) at issue in Fourco included no 

exceptions, yet this Court still held that “resides” in 

§1400(b) retained its original meaning contrary to 

§1391(c)’s default definition. Fourco’s holding rests on

even firmer footing now that §1391’s saving clause expressly contemplates that certain venue statutes may 

retain definitions of “resides” that conflict with its default 

definition. In short, the saving clause makes explicit the 

qualification that this Court previously found implicit in 

the statute. See Pure Oil, supra, at 205 (interpreting 

earlier version of §1391 to apply “to all venue statutes 

using residence as a criterion, at least in the absence of 

contrary restrictive indications in any such statute”). 

Respondent suggests that the saving clause in §1391(a)

does not apply to the definitional provisions in §1391(c),

Brief for Respondent 31–32, but that interpretation is

belied by the text of §1391(a), which makes clear that the

saving clause applies to the entire “section.” See 

§1391(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided by law— . . .

this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions” 

(emphasis added)).

Finally, there is no indication that Congress in 2011 

ratified the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding. If 

anything, the 2011 amendments undermine that decision’s 

rationale. As petitioner points out, VE Holding relied 

heavily—indeed, almost exclusively—on Congress’ decision in 1988 to replace “for venue purposes” with “[f]or 
 

 

10 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

purposes of venue under this chapter” (emphasis added) in 

§1391(c). Congress deleted “under this chapter” in 2011

and worded the current version of §1391(c) almost identically to the original version of the statute. Compare

§1391(c) (2012 ed.) (“[f]or all venue purposes”) with 

§1391(c) (1952 ed.) (“for venue purposes”). In short, nothing in the text suggests congressional approval of VE 

Holding. 

* * * 

As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in

§1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case.