### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15

– 1917
Filed February 26 , 2016

Amended May 9, 2016

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD , Complainant ,

vs.
JAMIE F. DEREMIAH , Respondent

.

On review of the repor t of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommended thirty

- day suspension of attorney’s license. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Tara M. v an Brederode and Susan A . Wendel, Des Moines, for complainant

.

F. Montgomery Brown of F.M. Brown Law Firm, P.L.L.C. , West Des Moines, for respondent

.2

APPEL , Justice. In this disciplinary case, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charged the respondent, Jamie F. Deremiah, with
violatio n s of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b) ( stating it is professional misconduct to “ commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer ” ) in
connection with a domestic assault on Jane Doe. After a hearing, the majority of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa (c ommission ) recommended a thirty

- day suspens ion of the respondent’s license; a two

- year probationary period, with conditions related to maintaining his so briety; and me dical documentation sh owing his compliance with treatment providers’ recommendations. One member of the commission dissented on the sanction, recommending instead a ninety

- day suspension. A second c ommission member also dissented on
the sanction but reco mmen ded a public reprimand. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the respondent violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). We suspend the respondent’s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of
reinstatement for t hree months and impose conditions upon any application for re in statement.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Factual Findings. Most o f the facts are not disputed.
Witne sses at the hearing before the c ommission included police officers and a county attorney with knowledge related to the underlying criminal

case, person s engaged in Deremiah’s treatment for alcoholism, and
D eremiah himself. Based on our review of the entire record, we make the following findings of fact.3 Deremiah began drinking alcohol at an early age and had a
number of alcohol

- related incid ents prior to becoming a lawyer.
S pecifically , he had “ two or three ” citations for possession of alcohol and
one incident of operating a motor vehi cle while under the influence (OWI) while attending college but p rior to attending law school. He had no involvement with the crim inal justice system for alcohol

- related offenses until the recent events described in this opinion. Deremiah graduated from law school in 2008 and is licensed to practice law in Iowa. He practiced in a number of professional settings for relatively short periods of time. O ne firm terminated Deremiah for
what he describe d as alcohol

- related absences.
Deremiah is currently emp loyed as “ of counsel ” with a Des Moines metropolitan area law office. He practices primarily in the areas of criminal and family law. Under his arrangement with the law office, he retains fifty percent of his bill ings collected from clients.
Deremiah an d Doe knew each other in high school but began dating only after meeting at a bar several years ago. During the course of their relationship, they maintained separate residences, but they usually slept together in the evening. Doe gave Deremiah a set of keys to her home, where she lived wi th her ten

- year

- old daughter. The relationship, however, was marked by jealousy a nd allegations of infidelity. In April 2014, Des Moines police responded to a domestic
incident at Doe’s home. The facts of this incident were not thoroughly developed at the hearing, but police were apparently called to Doe’s home after a jealous and intoxicated Deremiah burned some of Doe ’ s DVD s and refused to leave the residence. Police who arrived at the scene called

a ca b to t ransport Deremiah home. At this point, Doe retrieved the keys
to he r residence from Deremiah.4 The April 2014 event was a precursor for the events that gave rise
to this disciplinary proceeding. Deremiah and Doe had been drinking at various Des Moines bars on the night of July 25, 2014. An argument ensued at one of the locations, resulting in Deremiah and Doe going their separate ways. After the altercation, Deremiah went to Doe’s home and
broke in the front door , causing damage to the door. Doe, however, was
not at home. Deremiah then left the Doe residence.
Deremiah later return ed to the residence. This time Doe was at home. D eremiah asse rts he suffered from an alcohol

- related blackout
and does not remember what happened next. Similarly, Doe’s memory of the event is cloudy. Nonetheles s, the record establishes that D eremiah assaulted Doe in her bedroom. He punched Doe in the face multiple times, causing facial swelling and bruising to her eyes. Her left eye soon became swollen shut. According to a police officer who responded to the reported domestic assault , “I thought it was a broken eye socket because it was so swollen.” Deremiah also pulled Doe’s hair, leaving a clump of
hair in the bedro om where the assault occurred. After the assault, Deremiah called his father who picked him up and drove him to his home, where Deremiah was also living at the time. Doe called 911 in the early morning hours of July 26. After interviewing her and investigating the scene , the police took photographs
of Doe’s injuries, the clump of hair in the bedroom, and the damage to the door. Police noted that Doe was distraught. After completing their investigation at the scene, police traveled to D eremiah’s f ather’s home and, after D eremiah admitted he had been with Doe the previous evening , he was arrested. The district court entered a no

- contact order following Deremiah’s arrest.5

The s tate charged Deremiah wit h two crimes. In Count I, the s tate charged hi m with domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict a serious injury, an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code §§ 708.1, .2A(2) ( c ) (201 3 ). In Count II, the s tate charged Deremiah with trespass causing bodily injury and/or property damage, a serious misdemeanor. I d. § § 716.7, .8(2).
Deremiah pled guilty to both charges. On Count I, the c ourt sentenced Deremiah to two years in prison with all but two days suspended and two years of probation with fines and surcharges. On Count II, the court sentenced him to one year in prison, all suspended, to run consecutively with the sentence under Count I. As result of his probation, Deremiah was required to undergo
substance abuse evaluati on. The substance abuse eval uation
recommended treatment. D eremiah was further required to attend a twenty

- four

- week program related to domestic assaults. D eremiah complied with these recommendations a nd requirements of probation. He also engaged a the rapist, Winnie Hall, to provide him with private counseling twice a week. As part of his recovery program, D eremiah attends Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings regularly, meets with his sponsor, and has consulted regularly with Hugh Grady of the Iowa Lawye rs Assistance Project. At the time of the hearing, D eremia h had recently received his one

year AA chip commemorating his sobriety. He was also continuing to attend AA meetings on a regular basis and to receive counseling from
Hall and Grady on a regula r basis.
D eremiah testified that he has come to understand the role of alcohol in his life. Both Hall and Grady testified at the hearing that6 Deremiah was actively engaged in recovery and that his prognosis with
resp ect to managing his alcoholism was goo d. At the time of the hearing, Deremiah and Doe talked to each other on a daily basis and saw each other weekly. Deremiah testified that he avoids being with Do e when she consumes alcohol.
B. Proceedings Before the Commission Related to Sanctions

. The parties agreed th at Deremiah’s conduct violated r ule 32:8.4(b). The
cent ral contested issue before the c ommission was the appropriate
sanction under the facts and circumstances. The Board argued for a three

- month suspension. It emphasized
that in this case , D eremiah committed two serious infractions, one relating to the breaking into Doe’s home and the other arising out of the assault. As a result, the Board contended this was not a case of a single

incident domestic assault, but a case involving multi ple incide nts of wrongful conduct

. The Board also asserted the record showed a lack of remorse on
Deremiah’s part and some minimizing of his behavior. It further noted
that D eremiah had not taken proactive steps to reimburse Doe’s landlord
for the damage to the door or to reimburse Doe for her medical expense s that arose from her injuries.
D eremiah argued the appropriate sanction was a public reprimand. Among other things, D eremiah asserted a suspension would
have a severe impact on his legal practice a nd on his c lients. He noted that he was involved in long

- term representations in a number of juvenile matters and that it would be difficult to get another attorney up to speed in these cases, thereby causing damage to clients. Deremiah also
submitte d fi nancial information to the c ommission that showed his income was sufficient to meet his expenses with little to spare, that his7 very modest assets were exceeded by credit card debt accumulated in his drinking days, and that he was also carrying substantial debt from law
school.
The c ommission fractured on the question of sanction. Three
members of the commission recommended a one

- month suspension, a probationary period of two years, and various reporting requirements

. One member of the c ommission prop o sed a ninety

- day suspension.
Another member of the c ommission proposed a public reprimand, along
with a two

- year probationary period and various reporting requirements.
II. Standard of Review. We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd

. v

. Stowe , 830 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Iowa 2013). An attorney’s ethical misconduct must be proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. “ We respectfully consider the commission’s findings and recommendations , but are not bound by
them.” Iowa Supreme C t

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd

. v

. Englema n n , 840 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 2013). “If we find a violation, we ‘may impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline recommended by the grievance commission. ’ ” Id. (quo ting Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(1) )

. III. Discussion.
A. Violation of Iowa Code of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). The parties do not dispute that Deremiah violated Iowa Rule of
Pr ofessional Conduct 32:8.4(b). While the parties agreed to the violation,

we none theless exercise independent judgment to ensure that the record and the law support the conclusion of the commission that ethical
violations occurred. See Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright , 8 57 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 2014).8 We begin with a discussion of general principles. We have long
held that domestic assault cases may give rise to professional discipline. For instance, in Committee on Prof essional Ethics & Conduct v

. Patterson , we suspended a lawyer’s license for three months as a result of a domestic assault lasting two hours that occurred in front of a child and
caused bodily injury

. 369 N.W.2d 798, 799, 801 (Iowa 1985)

. We also cited domestic assaults as subject to sa nction in other cases involving a number of addit ional vio lations of our ethical rules. See , e.g. , Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth , 636 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 2001) (concerning an OWI and domestic assault); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lap ointe , 415 N.W.2d 617 , 618

– 19 (Iowa 1987) ( involving
domestic assault an d tampering with a witness)

. These cases, however, arose under ethical rules somewhat different than our present regime. Our findings related to ethical violations arising out of domestic assaults rested on “moral turpitude” under the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g. , Ruth , 636 N.W.2d at 88; Lapointe , 415 N.W.2d at 619; Patterson , 369 N.W.2d at 800

– 01. In 2005, we adopted an Iowa version of the Model Rules of Professional
R esponsibility. The model r ules removed ethical provisions related to

m oral turpitude fr om the lawyer’s ethics regime. The deletion of m oral turpitude was based on fear that the open

- ended provision could draw within its scope activities that did not have any impact on the ability of a person to practice law and did not adversely reflect on the law or the courts in any substantial way. See Ellen J. Bennett, et al., Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct , R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (8th ed. 2015) (explaining how the concept of moral turpitude could be construed to contain matters of personal morality that have no specific connection to fitness to practice law).9

But while we deleted provisions related to moral turpitude, our rules defined professional misconduct broad ly enough to include offens es not directly involv ed in the practice of law. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
et al. , The Law of Lawyering , § 6 9

. 0 4, at 69

- 11 ( 4th ed. 2015 Supp.) [hereinafter The Law of Lawyering ] (referring to moral turpitude as “notoriously ambiguous” ). Instead, the new rules provide that “ [ i ] t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b ).
This rule is both broader and narrower than prior disciplinary
rules. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele , 795 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Iowa 2011) (citing a prior edition of The Law of Lawyering , now at
69

- 12 ). Under r ule 32:8.4(b), n ot all crim es subject a lawyer to professional d iscipline. Only those crimes with a nexus to the practice of law subject a lawye r to professional discipline. Keele , 795 N.W.2d at 512

. We considered the application of r ule 32:8.4(b) in what has been
referred to as a landmark case in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Templeton , 784 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2010). S ee Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, 16 Iowa Practice Series , Lawyer and
Judicial Ethics , § 12 : 4(c) , at 10.55 (2015)

. In Templeton , the respondent engaged in repeated incidents of window peeping

. 784 N.W.2d at 765. Templeton was ultimately convicted of six count s of invasion of privacy.
Id. at 765

– 66. We concluded that Templeton engaged in a pattern of
criminal conduct that “rais e[d] serious misgivings about whether Templeton underst[ood] the concept of privacy and respect[ed] the law protecting individuals’ privacy righ ts.” Id. at 767

– 68. A s a r esult, we
found a violation of r ule 32:8.4(b). Id. at 768.10 In reaching our result in Templeton , we discussed at length, and
ulti mately adopted, an approach to r ule 32:8.4(b) similar to that adopted under a comparable disciplinary rule by the Oregon Supreme Court in In

r

e White , 815 P.2d 1257 ( Or. 1991). In White , the Oregon Supreme Court observed that not every criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. Id. at 12 65

. In particular, the court noted that a simple misdemeanor assault arising from a private dispute would not, in
and of itself, be sufficient to establish a viola tion. Id. In analyzing criminal misconduct, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that each case must be judged upon its own facts in determining whether a violation of disciplinary rules occurred. Id. Factors to be considered included
the lawyer’s mental state ; the extent to which the act demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the presence or absence of a victim; the extent of actual or potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal con duct.
Id. We embraced the approach of White in Templeton. Templeton , 784 N.W.2d at 767

. Although the substantive language ch anged with our adoption of the model r ules, our approach in Templeton wa s consistent with the methodology under our previous ethics regime in which we emphasized the need to avoid per se rules or mechanical application of labels in determining the existence of ethical violations. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wea ver , 750 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Iowa 2008) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. o f Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Marcucci , 54 3 N.W.2d 879,
883 (Iowa 1996) . We now consistently use the Templeton factors to determine whether a lawyer’s criminal misconduct amounts to an ethical
vi olation under r ule 32:8.4(b). See , e.g. , Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum , 861 N.W.2d 575, 588

– 89 (Iowa 2015); Iowa11 Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rousch, 827 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Iowa 2013); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon , 821 N.W.2d 873, 877

– 78 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Supreme Ct

. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Weaver , 812 N.W.2d 4, 11 (2012)

. After the adoption of the model r ules and our gloss in Templeton , we considered the rule in the context of domestic assault in Iowa
Su preme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 2011)

. In Schmidt , an attorney who had never before been violent toward his wife assaulted her, chased her around the house, choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and pursued her into a neighbor’s garage in the presence of the couple’s children. Id. at 3 7

– 38 . Schmi dt further attempted to prevent her and a neighbor from calling 911 . Id . at 37 , 41

. When arriving officers placed him in a police car , he damaged the steel cage in the interior of the vehicle. Id

. at 38. Schmidt’s spouse was taken to the emergency room at a local hospital in moderate distress
with abrasions to her neck, a three

- centimeter laceration, abrasions on
her neck and knee s , and pain and stiffness of the neck. Id

. We concluded th at Schmidt’s behavior violated r ule 32:8. 4(b). Id

. at 41. In do ing so, we applied the Templeton factors. Id

. at 4 0

– 41 . While we stated that not all acts of violence will lead to professional discipline, we noted that the acts of violence by Schmidt were more than trivial. Id

. at 41. We cited Schmidt’s conscious de cision to ac t on his hostility to his
wife and assault her multiple times instead of walking away from the
situation . Id . We further noted that Schmidt attempted to prevent his wife from calling 911 and lied to a neighbor to prevent him from calling
911

. Id

. We stated that while Schmidt suffered from depression, this did not excuse the choices he made, particularly in light of the lack of medical support that his mental condition clouded his judgment

. Id

.12 Finally, we noted that the lack of a pattern of misconduct did not prevent
his violent acts fr om amounting to a violation of r ule 32:8.4(b). Id

. We now turn to apply the Templeton factors to determine whether
there has been a violation of r ule 32: 8

. 4(b) in this case. On the issue of
mental state o f mind, Deremiah suggests that he does not remember th e assault because of an alcohol

- related blackout. In several cases, we rejected such claims, noting that they were not supported by adequate medical testimony. See Rousch , 827 N.W.2d at 717 (finding t hat respondent presented no evidence that depression or alcohol clouded his judgment); Cannon , 821 N.W.2d at 878 (explaining that depression and substance abuse are not excuses, especially with no medical evidence of their effect on respondent’s mental sta te); Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d at 41 (stating depression and alcohol did not excuse mistakes, and no medical evidence as to how depression affected his mind and decision

- making was submitted); Patterson , 369 N.W.2d at 801 ( noting beyond his own contentions, no p rofessional opinion offered to support respondent’s
claim that he lost his reason and ha d no recollection of the event)

. Here, Deremiah presented the testimony of Winnie Hall, a licensed mental health therapist and a certified substance abuse counsel or
. She
stated that “he was in a blackout” when the event occurred. It is not entirely clear from the transcript whether Hall was stating an opinion or simply reporting what Deremiah had told her. Hall further testified that
when an a lcoholic is in a black ou t state , the alcoholic can fully function
but does not remember what happened. Deremiah has presented more evidence concerning alcoholic
blackout s than was presented in Patterson , Cannon , Rousch , and
Schmidt . Yet, Hall testified that an alcoholic in a blackout state could still distinguish between right and wrong. Further, while we have13 generally found that the use of drugs or mental illness may be relevant for mitigation of sanctions, they do not provide an excuse for ethical
violation s
. Iowa Suprem e Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal , 841 N.W.2d 114, 129 (Iowa 2013) ( stating depression and posttraumatic stress disorder were mitigating factors, but did not excuse misconduct); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att ’ y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity , 838 N.W.2d 648, 661 (Iowa 2013) ( holding alcoholism may be considered in mitigation where alcohol contributed to misconduct and lawyer undertakes rehabilitative efforts to control addiction); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Beek, 757 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Iowa 2008) ( finding depression and alcoholism to be mitigating factors ); Iowa Supreme C t

. Bd. of Prof ’ l Ethics
& Conduct v. Grotewold , 642 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa 2002) ( noting depression does not excuse unethical conduct but is a mitigating circumstance). Our view is consistent with the vast majority of cases in other jurisdictions. See In re Harrington , 293 P.3d 686, 694 (Kan. 2013) (per curiam) ( including addiction to alcohol as a mitigating factor when supported by medical evidence); In re Arata , 150 So. 3d 302, 306 (La. 2014) ( recognizing that chemical dependence, along with meaningful efforts to address this dependence, serves as mitigation) ; In re Karlsen , 778 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2010) ( describing depression and medical
issues as mitigating factors when est ablished by clear and convincing evidence); In re Charron , 918 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. 1996) ( explaining
that depression could serve to mitigate punishment, but not excuse guilt)

. We adhere to these cases today.
The second Templeton factor is disrespect of the law or law enforcement. The use of violence to settle disputes is the antithesis of
the rule of law. Lawyers who use violence undermine the legal system which requires respect, restraint, an d resort to the legal process. See In14

re Walker , 597 N.E.2 d 1271, 1272 (Ind. 1992) ( observing that attorneys who commit violent acts can cause the public to rightfully question “whether the system itself is worthy of respect”); In re Grella , 7 77 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Mass. 2002) (describing the essential role of a lawyer as facilitating resolutions of conflict without violence) ; In re Magid , 655 A.2d 916, 919 (N.J. 1995) (stating that society condemns acts of violence and that domestic violence always involves victims); In re Ros enblatt , 687 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 ( App. Div. 1999) ( admonishing that an attorney is expected to use legal means to solve his problems, not violence). Further, the trespass issue here is problematic. Like the trespasses in Templeton , breaking through a locked door of a home does not show respect for the sanctity of the home and the privac y interests
associated with it. Such an invasive violent act shows disrespect for the
law , which consistently recognizes the special value of the home as a pl ace of safety and refuge. See Iowa Code § 561.16 (providing for an unlimited exemption of one’s homestead from judicial sale); People v.
Jones , 821 N.E.2d 955, 957 ( N.Y. 2004) (discussing the exception to the
self

- defense duty to r etreat when the defender is at home and n oting “peoples ’ homes are their castles, and that as such one’ s home is a place of sanctuary ”); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood , 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 987 (1982) (describing how one tends to identify one’s
“h ome” as an attribute of oneself and not a mere possession) ; Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home , 107
Mich. L. Rev. 1093 , 1100

– 05 (2009)

. The third Templeton factor is the existence of a victim and the degree of injury resulting from the lawyer’s misconduct. Here, Deremiah engaged in an escala ting course of conduct that included destruction of
Doe’s private property, trespass of her home with intent to commit a15 serious injury, and an ongoing assault that resulted in signif icant bruising and swelling of both eyes, swelling in her face, hair being ripped
out , and obvious resulting psychological harm

. This was not a case involving slight or no injury

. There cle arly was a victim with palpable injuries. Fourth, on the question of a pattern of conduct , we note that Deremiah makes the argument that the domestic assault occurring in July was a singular event. In Keele , for instance, we found that the
federal firear ms violation was an isolated event that did not give rise to a
violation. Keele , 795 N.W.2d at 514

. Our cases have often emphasized the pattern of misconduct. See , e.g. , Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Cross , 861 N.W.2d 211, 226

– 27 (Iowa 2015); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles , 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish , 801 N.W.2d 580, 589 (Iowa 2011). The facts of this case do not show a persistent pattern of repeated
misco nduct. Yet, there was the event in April , which involv ed Deremiah burning Doe’s DVDs and a resulting call to the police. This occurrence seems to have been a precursor to events in July. We have in our cases
noted that two occasions of misconduct are ca use for concern. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Khowassah , 837 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Iowa 2013) ; Rousch , 827 N.W.2d at 718

. In any event, when violent acts
result ing in significant injury occur , a pattern of conduct is not required
to establish a violation of our disciplinary rules. See Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d at 41

. W hen it comes to the application of r ule 32:8.4(b) to violent assaults on intimate partners, one assault is one too many. Finally, in addition to the specific Templeton factors, we consider whether the domestic assault and trespass in this case has a bearing on16 Deremiah’s legal practice. In Schmidt , we stated that “dome stic

- abuse
conduct did not affect [the attorney’s] behavior toward his clients, fellow lawyers, or jud ges.” Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d at 44. We made a similar
statement in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Axt , 791 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 2010)

. These observations in Schmidt and Axt were used only in the sense that the specific acts of misconduct in question had no direct impact on a particular identifiable case or client. Yet, our other cases recognize that a lawyer’s misconduct can have an indirect impact on the lawy er’s ability to practice law. For example, in Rousch , the attorney’s illegal d rug usage did not have a direct impact on a particular case or client. 827 N.W.2d at 71 8

. We noted, however, that a criminal attorney’s illegal drug use could lead to difficult situations in his law practice when he represented drug offenders. Id. We n oted that Rousch was violating the category of laws that he regularly encountered in his work. Id

. Here, Deremiah’s practice included family and criminal law. A competent family lawyer must be able to recognize and effectively deal
with situations invol ving domestic abuse. See In re Walker , 597 N.E.2d
at 1272 ; Magid , 655 A.2d at 919 ( stating an attorney’s commission of domestic violence calls into question the zealousness of his advocacy when representing victims of such crimes or prosecuting perpetrato rs)

. For example, the American Bar Association has developed screening tools to assist lawyers in identifying domestic abuse and materials for comprehensive representation and advocacy of domestic abuse clients.
See Comm’n on Domestic Violence, Am. Bar Ass’n Tool for Attorneys to Screen for Domestic Violence (2005), http://www.american bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dom viol/screeningtoolcdv.authchec kdam.pdf; Comm ’ n on Domestic Violence, Am. Bar Ass’n Comprehensive17 Issue Spotting: A Tool for Civil Attor neys Representing Victims of Domestic & Dating Violence, Sexual Assault & Stalking , (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs /Issue_Spotting_FINAL.authcheckdam.pdf. A lawyer engaged in the practice of family law who engages in acts of domestic abuse may be less effective in screening and addressing similar incidents of abuse experienced by clients. A family lawyer must protect clients from acts of family violence, not commit them. Cf. Magid, 655 A.2d at 919.
We conclude th at consideration of the Templeton factors establish

a violation of r ule 32 : 8

. 4(b). In particular, the criminal trespass and violent injurious assault are salient facts showing a disrespect for the law as contemplated in the second Templeton factor.
B. S anctions. We now turn to the question of sanctions. In considering sanctions, we must focus on their purpose. W e do not seek
in our sanctions to inflict punishment for criminal conduct in any general sense. That is the function of the criminal law. Th e range of penalties for criminal activities are established by the legislature and are enforced through criminal prosecutions. Imposing greater punishment for domestic assault crimes is a matter for the legislature and public prosecutors who exercise the ir d iscretion in enforcing the law. That said, in addition to providing a mechanism to police poor lawyering, the rules authorize us to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the legal profession through the disciplinary
process
. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iverse n , 723 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Io wa 2006 ). We further seek to impose discipline to deter individual attorneys from reoffending. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Qualley , 828 N.W.2d 282, 293 (Iowa 2013)

. We also
seek to d eter the misconduct of others. Templeton , 784 N.W. 2d at 771;18 Thompson , 595 N.W.2d at 134

. In calibrating our sanctions, we focus on these issues and not gen eralized criminal punishment. In determining sanctions, we have generally reje cted per se rules
and have instead considered the totality of facts and circumstances of an individual case. Nonetheless, we have sometimes referred to general ranges of sanctions that arise from certain types of misconduct. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Discip linary Bd. v. Said , 869 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2015) (“When determining what sanctions to impose, we consider those imposed in similar cases while remaining aware of the different circumstances in each case.”)

. In Axt , we suggested that the sanctions impos ed against lawyers committing domestic abuse “ ranged from a suspension of two months to a suspension of two years depending on the nature and extent of other misconduct proved by the board in the same

case. ” 791 N.W.2d at 102.
In Schmidt , we suggested th at in cases involving domestic assaults with injuries to the victims we generally would consider a suspension of up to six months before consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. 796 N.W.2d at 45

. In that case, we determined that the singular nature of the offense plus especially robust efforts to address alcohol and mental health problems were sufficient to lessen the sus pension to a

one

- month period. Id. The aggravating facts arise here prima rily from the violation itself.
The victim of do mestic assault suffered notable physical injuries and psychological harm from an assault in her own bedroom. We do not find
the domestic nature of th e assault a mitigating factor; indeed it is an aggravating factor. Violence by an intimate partner is a raw assault on the basic individual right to physical security that lies at the core of
civilized soci ety.19 We also note the escalating violence i n this case. Although not
well

- developed in the record, it is clear that in April, Deremiah engaged
in conduc t cumulating in the destruction of Doe’s property and resulting in a 911 call by Doe to stabilize the situation. This, of course, is a lesser event compared to what occurred in July, but it should have been a clear harbinger to Deremiah. The significance of the event was not lost on Doe, who retrieved the key to her home from Deremiah after thi s incident. Yet, on July 26, Deremiah engaged in an act of trespass by breaking into Doe’s home and, ultimately, proceeded to repeatedly punch
Doe in the face and pull out her hair in the confines of her bedroom in the early morning hours. Finally, there is an issue regarding restitution. De remiah damaged
the door to Doe’s residence when committing the trespass offense. It is true that the damage was relatively minor and that a court order detailing required restitutio n was not entered. Yet, Deremiah must have known of the damage , and yet he appears to have taken no proactive steps to assume responsibility for it. This is, perhaps, an error of negligent om ission more than anything else, but it does not foster confidence that Deremiah has forthrightly assumed full respo nsibility for
his actions.
As in Schmidt , there are mitigating factors. D eremiah has not had prior di scipline, which we have recognized as a mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley , 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 2015). Notwithstanding the restitution issue, he has accepted responsibility for his acts and seems genuinely rem o rseful, a mitigating
factor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery , 871 N.W.2d
109 , 122 (Iowa 2015 )

. In addition, Deremiah has engaged in robust20

efforts to deal with his substance abuse. We regard the effort to obtain help as a mitigating factor. Id. at 122 ; Schmidt , 796 N.W.2d at 39, 45

. We think the various opinions of the members of the c ommission reflect the range of pos sible sanctions in this case. We cannot, however, accept a public reprimand as an adequate sanction. Here , the escalating tumultuous relationship between Deremiah and Doe led to an assault resulting in substantial injuries. Notwithstanding the mitigating factors, we think a mere reprimand is not adequate under the circumstances. We give respectful considerat ion to the majority’s recommendation
of a thirty

- day suspension, but we note that the majority also suggests a
two

- year period of probation. The majority thus proposed a sanction that
offers protection well beyond the period of suspension. We have not
im posed probation beyond the period of suspension in our prior cases on the ground that we lack the administrative machinery to provide effective supervision. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson , 792 N.W.2d 674, 683 (Iowa 2010) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Lickiss , 786 N.W.2d 860, 871

– 72 (Iowa 2010) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kirlin , 741 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2007)

. We could impo se a thirty

- day suspension as in Schmidt . The
nature of the assaults are somewhat similar. The physical harm in this
case bear s a resemblance to those in Schmidt

. As in Schmidt , D eremiah’s
acts inc luded some damage to property.
There are also differences. There is no evidence that Deremiah interfered with efforts to summon help as i n Schmidt

. See Schmidt , 794 N.W.2d at 41. And, although the assault in Schmidt occurred in front of children (which produced trauma so great that they did not want to see their father during subsequent visitations), id. at 38, the assault in this

case did not involve injury to children who witness ed the abuse. Schmidt21

also involved a violation of an ethical rule unrelated to domestic abuse in the case, id. at 39

– 40; there was no similar unrelated infraction in
Deremiah’s case

. Yet, Deremiah was found guilt y of two criminal
infractions

— one involving trespass and the other involving assault. From time to time we step back and consider whether our approach to sanctions in our cases is generally sufficient to advance the purposes of our ethics rules. For example, we increased the sanctions for failure to file income tax returns in order to protect the reputation of
the bar. Comm. on Prof’ l Ethics & Conduct v. Jones , 368 N.W.2d 157, 157 (Iowa 1985) (“[W]e are determined to continue to impose sanctions and , if necessary to end tax violations by members of the profession, to increase the periods of suspension.”). Similarly, in Schmidt , we took a step in ratcheting up the floor of sanctions for domestic assault by declaring that
while an admonition for domes tic abuse might have been appropriate in the past, we no longer considered an a dmonition a sufficient sanction for domestic abuse resulting in serious injury. 796 N.W.2d at 43

. After review ing our cases and considering the issues raised in this matter, w e take another step in strengthening our disciplinary approach to injurious domestic assaults by imposing a sanction in excess of the

one

- month suspension imposed in Schmidt

. We impose the increased sanction in part because of the destruction of property and trespass of
the home , which occurred prior to the assault, but also to reemphasize
what was said in Schmidt , namely, that domestic abuse by lawyers i s
out

- of

- bounds conduct that will not be tolerated by this court. Id. at 44. In escalating the sancti ons for domestic abuse, we seek to preserve the reputation of the bar, ensure that family law lawyers are fit to offer holistic legal advice, and deter other lawyers from committing similar violations. We conclude that the proper sanction in this case is a22 suspension of Deremiah’ s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for at least t hree months. In addition, Deremiah should continue to address the issues of his
substance abuse and mental health. The record demonstrates that Deremiah has made a good start in this regard. Before reinstating Deremiah’s license, however, we require that Deremiah present to us evidence that he is continuing in his recovery efforts and that he is mentally fit to practice law. As a result, at the time of any application for reinstatement, we require Deremiah to provide the court with ( 1) a mental health evaluation by a physician who has signed an affidavit indicating that he is fit to

resume the practice of law, and ( 2) a substance abuse evalu ation indicating he is fit to practice law

. See Rousch , 827 N.W.2d at 7 2 1. We also require that any application for reinstatement be set for hearing before us before the suspensi on in this case is lifted. Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(2).
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we suspend D eremiah’s license to practice
law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. This suspension applies to all fac e ts of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct.
R. 3 4.23(3 ). Deremiah must comply with Iowa Court R ule 34.24 dealing
with the notification of clients and counsel. Costs for this action are
taxed to D eremiah pursuant to Iowa Court R ule 36.24

. Upon application for reinstatement, Deremiah must demonstrate that he has not practiced law during the p eriod of his suspension and that he has complied with all of the requirements for reinstatement provided in Iowa Court R ule
34.25

. In any application for reinstatement, D eremiah must present an23 affidavit from a mental health professional and a substance a buse evaluation demonstrating Derem iah’s fitness to practice law.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.