AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed July 10, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00183-CR

TRAVIS LEE ANDERSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-53080-J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill

Opinion by Justice Brown

Appellant Travis Lee Anderson pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with the intent to 

deliver cocaine. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment and a $3,000 

fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to 

suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction.

Appellant was stopped and detained at an apartment complex in the City of Dallas. 

During that detention, police discovered appellant had a warrant for his arrest. In a search 

incident to arrest, police found cocaine on his person. Appellant was charged with possession 

with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the 

drug evidence asserting his detention was unlawful. 

At the hearing on the motion, the State presented evidence the Dallas Police’s “Criminal 

Response Team” had targeted the apartment complex as a high crime area for shootings and
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stabbings, as well as drug trafficking. The manager of that complex had filed a “criminal 

trespass affidavit” with the Dallas police requesting and authorizing them to remove any 

unauthorized individuals from the premises. The manager also swore that appropriate “no 

trespassing” signs had been posted on the property in locations reasonably likely to come to the 

attention of intruders.

At 1:30 a.m., Officer Carlos Salas went to the complex to conduct “foot patrol.” Salas 

testified he observed appellant walking “between apartment complexes, behind a building.” 

Salas asked appellant if he lived there. Appellant said, “No,” and then “sped walked” away from 

Salas. The officer followed appellant to his vehicle where he detained him. After discovering 

appellant had a warrant for his arrest, Salas arrested him and found cocaine on his person. 

After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress. On 

appeal, appellant asserts Salas lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and therefore evidence 

seized as a result of his subsequent arrest should have been suppressed. 

A police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 123-24 (2000). “Reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause 

and may be based on a “lesser quantum or quality” of information than is necessary to show 

probable cause for arrest. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011). An officer must nevertheless be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 (citing 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 

According to appellant, Salas lacked reasonable suspicion because Salas based his 

detention on “merely suspicious behavior, not illegal behavior.” However, circumstances raising 

suspicion of illegal conduct need not be criminal. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. 
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Crim. App. 2013). A person’s conduct may appear purely innocent in a vacuum, but when 

viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, may nevertheless give rise to reasonable 

suspicion. Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Woods v. State, 956 

S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Here, appellant was observed at 1:30 a.m. at an apartment complex in a high crime area. 

The manager of that complex had filed an affidavit with police stating she had posted “no 

trespassing” signs on the property and also authorizing police to remove any unauthorized 

persons from the premises. When Salas asked appellant if he lived at the complex,1 appellant

admitted he did not, and then immediately “sped” walked to his vehicle. The trial court 

specifically found appellant’s act in doing so showed he knew he was not authorized to be on the 

premises. We conclude that Salinas had reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable facts 

to conduct a temporary detention. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (evasive actions in high crime 

area relevant consideration in determining reasonable suspicion); Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 

609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (time of day relevant factor in determining reasonable 

suspicion); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (walking briskly 

away from reported crime scene relevant consideration in determining reasonable suspicion). 

We resolve the sole issue against appellant and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

140183F.U05

 1 Appellant does not assert this initial encounter constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We nevertheless note that a landlord 

may give police apparent authority to give notice to persons on their property that entry is forbidden. Williams v. State, 138 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2004, no pet.).

ADA BROWN

JUSTICE

/Ada Brown/
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Court of Appeals

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Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

TRAVIS LEE ANDERSON, Appellant

No. 05-14-00183-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 3, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F12-53080-J.

Opinion delivered by Justice Brown. Justices 

Lang and Whitehill participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 10th day of July, 2015.