alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 126 (Thursday, July 2, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 31768]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15656]


=======================================================================
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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Committee Management Renewals

    The NSF management officials having responsibility for the advisory 
committees listed below have determined that renewing these groups for 
another two years is necessary and in the public interest in connection 
with the performance of duties imposed upon the Director, National 
Science Foundation (NSF), by 42 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. This determination 
follows consultation with the Committee Management Secretariat, General 
Services Administration.

Committees:

Advisory Committee for Biological Sciences, 1110.
Advisory Committee for Cyberinfrastructure, 25150.
Advisory Committee for Education and Human Resources, 1119.
Advisory Committee for Engineering, 1170.
Advisory Committee for Geosciences, 1755.
Advisory Committee for Polar Programs, 1130.
Advisory Panel for Integrative Activities, 1373.
Alan T. Waterman Award Committee, 1172.
Proposal Review Panel for Atmospheric Sciences, 10751.
Proposal Review Panel for Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, 10747.
Proposal Review Panel for Biological Infrastructure, 10743.
Proposal Review Panel for Earth Sciences, 1569.
Proposal Review Panel for Environmental Biology, 10744.
Proposal Review Panel for Geosciences, 1756.
Proposal Review Panel for Integrative Organismal Systems, 10745.
Proposal Review Panel for International Science and Engineering, 10749.
Proposal Review Panel for Molecular and Cellular Biosciences, 10746.
Proposal Review Panel for Ocean Sciences, 10752.
Proposal Review Panel for Research on Learning in Formal and Informal 
Settings, 59.
Proposal Review Panel for Social Behavioral and Economic Sciences, 
1766.
Proposal Review Panel for Social and Economic Sciences, 10748.
Effective date for renewal is July 2, 2009. For more information, 
please contact Susanne Bolton, NSF, at (703) 292-7488.

    Dated: June 29, 2009.
Susanne Bolton,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. E9-15656 Filed 7-1-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
H. Res. 945 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

May 1, 2020. 

Resolved, That House Resolution 891, agreed to March 

11, 2020 (as most recently amended by House Resolution 

920, agreed to April 14, 2020), is amended in section 7 by 

striking ‘‘May 3, 2020’’ and inserting ‘‘May 18, 2020’’. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 99-1614

KEVIN LYNCH; KEVIN BABINEAU,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

SHEILA HUBBARD,

Defendant, Appellee.

____________________

No. 99-1936

GARY R. DONAGHY,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SHEILA HUBBARD,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

[Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Boudin, Stahl and Lynch,

Circuit Judges.
Kevin Lynch and Kevin Babineau on brief pro se.

G.R. Donaghy on brief pro se.

Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, William J. Meade,

Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph T. Thai, Assistant

Attorney General, on briefs for appellee.
-3-

Per Curiam. Having reviewed these two cases in

tandem due to the overlap in issues, we affirm both

judgments substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge

O'Toole's opinion in No. 99-1614. See 47 F. Supp. 2d 125

(D. Mass. 1999). We add only the following comments.

In No. 99-1614, we need not decide whether the

methodology prescribed by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995), is applicable in the parole context. As Judge

O'Toole explained, whether one scrutinizes the parole

statute for "mandatory language" and "substantive

predicates," see, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369 (1987), or whether one asks whether an "atypical and

significant hardship" has been imposed for purposes of

Sandin, plaintiffs' attempt to establish a liberty interest

fails. The extent to which our decision in Hamm v. Latessa,

72 F.3d 947, 954 (1st Cir. 1995), resolved the issue of

Sandin's applicability need not here be determined.

In No. 99-1936, one of plaintiff's complaints is

that the "full membership" of the Parole Board did not

properly participate in his hearing. To the extent this

claim relies on equal protection, the dismissal thereof is

summarily affirmed, inasmuch as plaintiff has not alleged
-4-

any differential treatment of a protected class to which he

belongs. To the extent this claim rests on state law, the

dismissal is without prejudice to the pursuit of any

available relief in state court.

In both cases, we find no need to address

defendant's contention that, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994), and related cases, plaintiffs' challenges

to the Massachusetts parole procedures should have been

pursued in a habeas action rather than in a suit under 28

U.S.C. § 1983. However the Heck issue might be resolved, it

does not pose any concern as to our jurisdiction under

Article III. Parella v. Retirement Bd. of the Rhode Island

Employees' Retirement System, 173 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000)

Affirmed.
IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 82 

Establishing the Congressional Gold Star Fellowship Program for the placement in offices of Members of the House of Representatives of children, 

spouses, and siblings of members of the Armed Forces who are hostile 

casualties or who have died from a training-related injury. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 28, 2019 

Mr. KELLY of Mississippi submitted the following resolution; which was 

referred to the Committee on House Administration 

RESOLUTION 

Establishing the Congressional Gold Star Fellowship Program for the placement in offices of Members of the 

House of Representatives of children, spouses, and siblings of members of the Armed Forces who are hostile 

casualties or who have died from a training-related injury. 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL GOLD STAR FELLOWSHIP 

3 PROGRAM. 

4 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the 

5 House of Representatives the Congressional Gold Star 

6 Fellowship Program (hereafter in this resolution referred 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 82 IH 

1 to as the ‘‘Program’’) under which, under the direction 

2 of the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Rep3 resentatives, an eligible individual may serve a 12-month 

4 fellowship in the office of a Member of the House of Rep5 resentatives (including a Delegate or Resident Commis6 sioner to the Congress). 

7 (b) EXCLUSION OF APPOINTEES FOR PURPOSES OF

8 LIMIT ON NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN MEMBER OF9 FICES.—Any individual serving a fellowship under the 

10 Program in the office of a Member shall not be included 

11 in the determination of the number of employees employed 

12 by the Member under section 104(a) of the House of Rep13 resentatives Administrative Reform Technical Corrections 

14 Act (2 U.S.C. 5321(a)). 

15 (c) PLACEMENT IN MEMBER OFFICES IN DISTRICT

16 OF COLUMBIA OR CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MEM17 BER.—An individual may serve a fellowship under the 

18 Program at the Member’s office in the District of Colum19 bia or the Member’s office in the congressional district the 

20 Member represents. 

21 (d) ELIGIBILITY.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—An individual is eligible to 

23 serve a fellowship under the Program if the indi24 vidual is the child (including a stepchild), spouse, or 

25 sibling of a member of the Armed Forces who is a 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HRES 82 IH 

1 hostile casualty or died from a training-related in2 jury. 

3 (2) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection, the 

4 terms ‘‘hostile casualty’’ and ‘‘training-related in5 jury’’ have the meanings given those terms in sec6 tion 2402(b) of title 38, United States Code. 

7 (e) REGULATIONS.—The Program shall be carried 

8 out in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 

9 Committee on House Administration. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### Hermann *et al. v.*Robertson.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

January 4, 1888.)

Customs Duties—Imitation Seal-Skin.

Imitation seal-skin cloakings made of silk, or of which, silk is the component material of chief value, are dutiable under Actl883, § 383, as articles composed wholly or in part of silk', and not under Bev. St. U. S. § 2499, as articles not enumerated bearing similitude to one enumerated for duty.

At Law. Action to recover back customs duties.

Action by Henry Hermann *et al.*to recover excess of duties paid to William H. Robertson, collector of customs duties, on cloaking materials bought and sold as silk seals. The goods are used for making ladies’ outer wraps, resemble the fur of the seal as dyed for wear, and are composed of a pile consisting of 85 per cent, of silk, and 15 per cent, of mohair, with cotton back. The silk is the component material of chief value. There is also an imitation seal known as “mohair seal,” and made principally of the hair of the angora goat.

*Stephen G. Clark,*for plaintiffs.

*Stephen A. Walker,*Dist. Atty., and *McGrane Cone,*for defendant.

Lacombe, J.,

*(orally.)*The decision of the supreme court in *Arthur*v. *Fox,*108 U. S. 125, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371, would be controlling of this case, were it not that it seems to have been conceded upon that argument, so far as we may draw any inferences from the text of the opinion, that the particular article of cow hair, vegetable fibre, and cotton therein referred to was a non-enumerated article. In the case at bar, however, that is the very point in dispute. Under the similitude section, (2499,) the assimilated article must be one non-enumerated, and that to which it should bear a similitude must be an enumerated article. Defendant claims that the article to which he says these goods bear a similitude is an enumerated article; but he finds the sole enumeration thereof in this phrase, (section 363:) “All manufactures, of every description, composed wholly or in part of the hair of the alpaca goat or other animal.” Such a phrase is in nowise more specific than is the phrase of the 383d clause: “All goods, wares, and merchandise made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value.” If the general phraseology of section 363 is sufficiently specific to constitute an enumeration of imitation seal-skin cloakings made of goats’ hair, (a material not expressly enumerated therein,) then the general phraseology of section 383 is sufficiently specific to constitute an enumeration of the goods now before the-court, viz.: Imitation seal-skin cloakings made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value. Therefore, as enumerate i articles, they are not within the provisions of the similitude clause.

Verdict is directed for the plaintiff.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 20, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50375

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JULIO CESAR ESPINOZA-FLORES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-1881-1-PRM

--------------------

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Julio Cesar Espinoza-Flores appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Espinoza contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)

define separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction

that resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a

separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been

alleged in his indictment. Espinoza maintains that he pleaded
No. 03-50375

-2-

guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry under

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the

two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for

that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Espinoza acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHARLES WHITTEN, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. DEAN WILLIAMS; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents - Appellees. No. 19-1289 (D.C. No. 1:19-CV -00721-LTB-GPG) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , KELLY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner-Appellant Charles Whitten, a st ate inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing hi m to appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 225 4 application as time-barred and not subject to equitable tolling. Whitten v. Williams, No. 19-cv-0 0721-LTB-GPG (July 26, 2019). Because the district court’s procedural ruling is not reasonably debatabl e, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 15, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 In 2012, Mr. Whitten was convicted of two counts of witness intimidation and four counts of witness tampering in Colo rado state court. Mr . Whitten’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and the Co lorado Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari on April 20, 2015. His c onviction became final on July 20, 2015. Thereafter, Mr. Whitten sought state post-co nviction relief. The assigned magistrate judge determined that the one-year limita tion period, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), for Mr. Whitten to file this action expired on Sept ember 26, 2018. Mr. Whitten did not file until March 11, 2019. To obtain a COA, Mr. Whitten must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court denies a § 2254 petition on pr ocedural grounds, the movant must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whet her the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutiona l right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in it s procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Mr. Whitten argues that his a ppellate counsel told him that he had one year from the denial of st ate post-conviction relief to file his federal habeas petition and that his constitutional claims are reasonably debatable. The district court’s conclusion th at Mr. Whitten’s equitable to lling claim did not present extraordinary circumstances and that he had not demons trated actual innocence are not reasonably debatable. See Sigala v. Bravo, 656 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F. 3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000).3 We DENY a COA, DENY IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge
**Exhibit 10.1**

 

**THIRD AMENDMENT TO**

**TALMER BANCORP INC. (FORMERLY FIRST MICHIGAN BANCORP, INC.)**

**EQUITY INCENTIVE PLAN**

 

**March 26, 2014**

 

THIS THIRD AMENDMENT (this “Amendment”) to the Equity Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) of Talmer Bancorp, Inc. (formerly First Michigan Bancorp., Inc.), a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), is effective as of March 26, 2014. Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Amendment have the meanings ascribed to them in the Plan.

 

**RECITALS:**

 

The Plan has been approved and adopted by the board of directors (the “Board”) and shareholders of the Company.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.01 of the Plan, the Board has adopted this Amendment to the Plan as of the date hereof.

 

**AMENDMENTS:**

 

The Plan is hereby amended as follows:

 

1.              The name of the Plan is hereby amended to be the “Talmer Bancorp, Inc. Equity Incentive Plan.”

 

2.              Section 2.21 of the Plan is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:

 

**2.21****                       ****Shares**mean shares of the Company’s Class A Voting Common Stock, $1.00 par value per share.

 

3.              Section 4.01 of the Plan is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:

 

**4.01****                       ****Shares Issuable****.**Shares to be issued under the Plan may be authorized and unissued Shares or issued Shares which have been reacquired by the Company. Except as provided in Section 4.03, the Awards granted to any Participant and to all Participants in the aggregate under the Plan shall be limited so that the sum of Shares that may be issued or issuable pursuant to such Awards and/or represented by such Awards shall not exceed Nine Million Seven Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Five (9,794,745) Shares.

 

4.              After the date of this Amendment, all references in the Plan to the “Plan” shall mean the Plan, as amended by this Amendment.

 

5.              The Plan and this Amendment, together, set forth the entire agreement and understanding of the parties to them and supersede all prior agreements, arrangements and communications, whether oral or written, with respect to the subject matter. Except as expressly modified by the

 

----

 

terms and conditions of this Amendment, the terms and conditions of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect.  In the event of any inconsistency or conflict between this Amendment and the provisions of the Plan, the provisions of this Amendment shall govern and control.

 

2

----
OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXA

P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

7/10/2015 COA Case No. 

EVANS, FRANK ANTHONY JR. Tr. Ct. No. 007-1297-13 

On this day, this Court has granted the Appellant's Pro Se motion 

of time in which to file the Petition for Discretionary Review. Th

petition has been extended to Tuesday, September 08, 2015. 

EXTENSIONS WILL BE ENTERTAINED. NOTE: Petition F

Review must be filed with The Court of Criminal Appeals.

A

12TH COURT OF APPEALS CLERK

CATHY LUSK

1517 W. FRONT, ROOM 354

TYLER, TX 75701

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 10305 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. PAULITO GOVEA

- SAN ROMAN , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 6:17

- CR

- 48

- 1

Before JOLLY, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Paulito Govea

- San Roman pleaded guilty of illegal reentry after deportation, and he was sentenced to a 57

- month term of imprisonment and to a three

- year period of supervised release. Govea

- San Roman contends that use of the 2016 Guidelines Manual in determining his sentenc e violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and that he should have been sentenced under the 2015 Guidelines Manual. He posits that, under the 2015 Guidelines

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 26, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-10305 Document: 00514851134 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/26/2019No. 18

- 10305

2 Manual, the 46

- to 57

- month guidelines range would only apply to him if the court impos ed the 16

- level crime

- of

- violence enhancement because of his robbery conviction. The 16

- level enhancement would apply if the court determined that the offense was an enumerated offense of robbery or had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2015) & U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.(1)(B)(iii)) (2015). T his court has previously held that the Texas robbery statute lacks force as an element but that it is eq uivalent to the generic definition of robbery. See United States v. Santiesteban

- Hernandez , 469 F.3d 376, 379

- 82 (5th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds , United States v. Rodriguez , 711 F.3d 541, 547

- 63 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). Although he concede s that the issue he has raised is foreclosed under current law, Govea

- San Roman contends that Santiesteban

Hernandez was wrongly decided, and he wishes to preserve the issue for possible further review. The Government has moved for summary affirmance
or, in the alternative, an extension of time within which to file a brief on the merits. Summary affirmance is appropriate if “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outc ome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Because the only argument raised on appeal is foreclosed by precedent from this court, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time is DENIED as unnecessary . Case: 18-10305 Document: 00514851134 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/26/2019
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofReal Estate Referral Center Inc.(the"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period endedNovember 30, 2006as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Lisa McIntosh, ChiefExecutive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    
| | (2) | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| |    

Dated this 12thday of January, 2007.

LISA MCINTOSHLisa McIntoshChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

















---