alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-6432

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ROBERT EUGENE MOTT, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:00-cr-00046-RLV-3) 

Submitted: June 22, 2009 Decided: July 1, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robert Eugene Mott, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Robert Eugene Mott appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. United 

States v. Mott, No. 5:00-cr-00046-RLV-3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2009). 

See United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). We 

deny Mott’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
(More)

No. 23-8 For Immediate Release

October 2023

Earnings Limits Increase for Railroad Retirees in 2024

Railroad retirement annuitants subject to earnings restrictions can earn more in 2024 without 

having their benefits reduced due to increased limits indexed to average national wage increases.

Like social security benefits, some railroad retirement benefit payments are subject to 

deductions if an annuitant’s earnings exceed certain exempt amounts. These earnings restrictions 

apply to those who have not attained full social security retirement age. For employee and spouse 

annuitants, full retirement age varies depending on an individual’s year of birth, and is age 67 for 

those born after 1959. For survivor annuitants, full retirement age also varies, and is age 67 for 

those born after 1961.

For those under full retirement age throughout 2024, the exempt earnings amount rises to 

$22,320 from $21,240 in 2023. For beneficiaries attaining full retirement age in 2024, the exempt 

earnings amount, for the months before the month full retirement age is attained, increases to 

$59,520 in 2024 from $56,520 in 2023.

For those under full retirement age, the earnings deduction is $1 for every $2 of earnings over 

the exempt amount. For those attaining full retirement age in 2024, the deduction is $1 for every 

$3 of earnings over the exempt amount in the months before the month in which full retirement 

age is attained.

When applicable, these earnings deductions are assessed on the tier I portion of railroad 

retirement employee and spouse annuities and the tier I and tier II portions of survivor annuities.

All earnings received for services rendered, plus any net earnings from self-employment, are 

considered when assessing deductions for earnings. Interest, dividends, certain rental income, or 

income from stocks, bonds, or other investments are not considered earnings for this purpose.

U.S. Railroad Retirement Board

RRB News

844 North Rush Street Chicago, Illinois 60611-1275

RRB.gov

General Information: 877-772-5772

Public Affairs

Media Inquiries: opa@rrb.gov

312-751-4777
-2-

Retired employees and spouses, regardless of age, who work for their last pre-retirement nonrailroad employer are also subject to an additional earnings deduction in their tier II and 

supplemental annuities of $1 for every $2 in earnings up to a maximum reduction of 50 percent. 

This earnings restriction does not change from year to year and does not allow for an exempt 

amount.

A spouse annuity is subject to reduction not only for the spouse’s earnings, but also for the 

earnings of the employee, regardless of whether the earnings are from service for the last preretirement non-railroad employer or other post-retirement employment.

Special work restrictions continue to be applicable to disability annuitants in 2024. The 

monthly disability earnings limit increases to $1,210 in 2024 from $1,150 in 2023.

Regardless of age and/or earnings, no railroad retirement annuity is payable for any month in 

which an annuitant (retired employee, spouse or survivor) works for a railroad employer or 

railroad union.

# # #
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-20340

TIMOTHY SULLIVAN; MICHAEL PROSSER Plaintiffs - Appellants v. EL PASO CORP; EL PASO MARKETING ENERGY GAS CORPORATION; EL PASO MERCHANT ENERGY GAS CORPORATION Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

4:06-CV-2948
Before JONES, Chief Judge, DAVIS and GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * After reviewing the record and considering the briefs and argument o f counsel, we are satisfied the district court committed no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm thejudgment ofthe district court essentially for the
reasons assigned in itscareful Memorandum Opinion and Order ofApril 2, 2007. AFFIRMED. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D March 17, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk
# covid_table21_q7_size_class
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          16,134
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      381
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          20,083
<DEPRECIATION>                                  12,269
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  30,501
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,447
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    30,501
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,542
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,246
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,818
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (494)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (494)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (494)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.45)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>EPS-PRIMARY REPRESENTS NET LOSS PER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP UNIT.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed the Quarterly Report of CastlePoint Holdings, Ltd. (the Company) on Form
10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report);2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by the Report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
the Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in the Report;4.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a  15(e) and 15d -
15(e)) for the Company and have:
 a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the Report is being
prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in the Report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by the Report based on such evaluation;
andc)
    
    disclosed in the Report any change in the Companys internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the Companys third quarter of 2008 that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over
financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The Companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and to the
audit committee of the board of directors:
 a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.
 Date:  November 14, 2008
    /s/ Joel. S. WeinerJoel S. WeinerSenior Vice President and

Chief Financial Officer
Abatement Order filed July 21, 2015 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00369-CV

FLEMING & ASSOCIATES, L.L.P N/K/A FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ, 

L.L.P., Appellants

V.

CHARELS KIRKLIN, STEPHEN KIRKLIN, PAUL KIRKLIN, AND THE 

KIRKLIN LAW FIRM, P.C., DON JACKSON, JEFFREY W. 

CHAMBERS, AND WARE, JACKSON, LEE & CHAMBERS, L.L.P., 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014-53135

ABATEMENT ORDER

This is an appeal from an order signed April 6, 2015. It appears from the 

record that the judgment is not final. The order does not dispose of all claims and 

parties. See Youngblood & Associates, P.L.L.C. v. Duhon, 57 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding failure to rule on claims for 

attorneys’ fees prevented order from being final).

The Supreme Court of Texas has advised that if an appellate court is 
uncertain about the intent of an order to finally dispose of all claims and parties, it 

may abate the appeal to permit clarification by the trial court. See Lehmann v. 

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001). Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 27.2 provides as follows:

The appellate court may allow an appealed order that is not final to be 

modified so as to be made final and may allow the modified order and 

all proceedings relating to it to be included in a supplemental record.

Tex. R. App. P. 27.2. 

Accordingly, we order the case abated and remanded to the trial court for a 

period of thirty days so that the trial court may clarify whether the summary 

judgment is final, and to permit the parties to obtain an order or orders disposing of 

the claims against Don Jackson, Jeffrey W. Chambers, and Ware, Jackson, Lee & 

Chambers, L.L.P., if necessary. A supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial 

court’s clarifying order or orders shall be filed with the clerk of this court on or 

before August 20, 2015. 

The appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this court’s 

active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this court’s active docket when the 

supplemental clerk’s record is filed in this court. The court will also consider an 

appropriate motion to reinstate the appeal filed by either party, or the court may 

reinstate the appeal on its own motion. It is the responsibility of any party seeking 

reinstatement to request a hearing date from the trial court and to schedule a 

hearing, if a hearing is required, in compliance with this court’s order. If the parties 

do not request a hearing, the court coordinator of the trial court shall set a hearing 

date and notify the parties of such date.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and McCally.
cc: Hon. Cynthia Dianne Steel, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Lynn E. Wells 

Abrams Law Firm, LLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

CLERK'S ORDER 2 

(01.1947
#### Iris Gomez, an Infant by her Mother and Natural Guardian Luisa Vega, et al., Appellants, v Mildred Hicks, Respondent.

[824 NYS2d 312]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hurkin-Torres, J.), dated September 22, 2005, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff Iris Gomez (hereinafter the plaintiff) and her mother resided in a three-family house owned by the defendant. The entrance to the house was a set of double doors. The upper half of these doors consisted primarily of glass window panes. The plaintiff testified that she was injured when her hand went through the glass portion of the door while she was attempting to open it. The plaintiff and her mother testified that the door was often difficult to open and that they had made several complaints about it to the defendant. The plaintiff further testified that at the time of the accident she had trouble attempting to unlock the door, and “when I finally got it unlocked I had my hand on the glass, I gave it a push, like I usually do to open the door, [and] my whole hand went through the glass.”

A plaintiffs actions which are extraordinary and unforeseeable will be deemed a superseding cause which severs the causal connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plain*857tiffs injuries *(see Kriz v Schum, 75*NY2d 25, 36 [1989]; *Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp.,*51 NY2d 308, 315 [1980]). Whether a plaintiffs act is a superseding cause or whether it is a normal consequence of the situation created by the defendant are generally questions for the trier of fact to determine *(see Lynch v Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological*Assoc., 72 NY2d 632, 636 [1988]; *Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., supra*at 315).

The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiffs act of pushing the stuck door was a superseding cause absolving her from liability *(see Lynch v Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological Assoc., supra*at 636-637; *Dumbadze v Schwatt,*291 AD2d 529, 529-530 [2002]). Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs action was unforeseeable or of such a character as to sever the connection between the defendant’s alleged negligence and the plaintiffs injury *(see Dumbadze v Chwatt, 7*AD3d 563 [2004]; *Spathos v Gramatan Mgt.,*2 AD3d 833 [2003]; *Jackson v New York City Hous. Auth.,*214 AD2d 605, 605-606 [1995]; *Shutak v Handler,*190 AD2d 345, 348 [1993]). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied *(see generally, Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Miller, J.P., Crane, Santucci and Luciano, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Affinion Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, Nathaniel J. Lipman, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(i) the Form 10-Q fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) the information
contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 13, 2007.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Nathaniel J. Lipman              
|Nathaniel J. Lipman                  
|President and Chief Executive Officer
#### NELSON v. AMERICAN NAT. BANK *&*TRUST CO. et al.

No. 1359.

United States District Court E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

Jan. 12, 1950.

Atchley & Atchley, Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiff.

Frazier, Roberts & Weill, Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendants.

DARR, Chief Judge.

This suit originated in a state equity court. In the initial pleadings in that court the plaintiff made demand for a trial by a jury. Now comes the defendant, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, and moves to strike the demand for a jury.

The demand for a jury trial in the state court has no legal effect here. No demand for a jury trial has been made since the removal, which is necessary under Rule 81(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Ferris v. Farnsworth Television & Radio Corp., D.C., 8 F.R.D. 489.

The defendant’s motion will be treated as a motion to strike the case from the jury calendar and is allowed.

If appropriate issues are presented under which the plaintiff would be entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial, except for the absence of an appropriate demand for a jury, and said issues are accompanied by a request for a jury trial, consideration will be given the application.

Order accordingly.
IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 726 

Expressing support for the goals of Stomach Cancer Awareness Month. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

NOVEMBER 21, 2019 

Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana (for herself, Mr. CARSON of Indiana, Mr. BUCSHON, 

Mr. VISCLOSKY, Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH, Mr. BANKS, Mr. PENCE, Mrs. 

WALORSKI, and Mr. BAIRD) submitted the following resolution; which 

was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing support for the goals of Stomach Cancer 

Awareness Month. 

Whereas stomach cancer, also known as gastric cancer, is one 

of the most difficult cancers to detect in the early stages 

of the disease, which contributes to high mortality rates; 

Whereas stomach cancer occurs when cancer cells develop in 

the lining of the stomach; 

Whereas stomach cancer is the fifth most common type of 

cancer worldwide; 

Whereas, in 2019— 

(1) an estimated 27,510 cases of stomach cancer will 

be diagnosed in the United States; and 

(2) an estimated 11,140 people in the United States 

will die from stomach cancer; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 726 IH 

Whereas the estimated 5-year survival rate for stomach cancer is only 31.5 percent; 

Whereas, in the United States, stomach cancer is more prevalent among racial and ethnic minorities; 

Whereas increased awareness of, and education about, stomach cancer among patients and health care providers 

could improve timely recognition of stomach cancer symptoms; 

Whereas more research into early diagnosis, screening, and 

treatment for stomach cancer is needed; and 

Whereas November 2019 is an appropriate month to observe 

Stomach Cancer Awareness Month: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) supports the goals of Stomach Cancer 

3 Awareness Month; 

4 (2) supports efforts to increase awareness of, 

5 and education about, stomach cancer among the 

6 general public of the United States; 

7 (3) recognizes the need for additional research 

8 into early diagnosis, screening, and treatment for 

9 stomach cancer; and 

10 (4) encourages States, territories, and localities 

11 of the United States to support the goals of Stom12 ach Cancer Awareness Month. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### CENTRAL TRUST CO. OF ALTOONA, PA., v. SECOND NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA, PA.

No. 9231.

District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania

Feb. 23, 1939.

*99B. A. Sciotto, of Johnstown, Pa., and B. F. Warfel, of Hollidaysburg, Pa., for plaintiff.

Robert A. Henderson, of Altoona, Pa., for defendant.

McVICAR, District Judge.

The motion of defendant for judgment in its favor on the pleadings under Rule 12 (c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, is refused.

The reason assigned by defendant in support of its motion is: An insufficient denial by plaintiff of paragraph 10 of defendant’s answer. A reply under the Rules of Civil Procedure is required if the answer contains a counterclaim, denominated as such, and also, where the court orders a reply to an answer. Rule 7 (a). The defendant did not aver in his answer a counterclaim, and this court did not require, a reply to the answer filed.

I am of the opinion, that in view of the averments contained in the amended complaint, that the facts are not sufficiently clear to entitle defendant to judgment on the pleadings. Attention is called to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hoffman v. Rauch, 300 U.S. 255, 57 S.Ct. 446, 81 L.Ed. 629.

In view of the history of this case, wherein it appears that some of the facts involved were before the Orphans’ Court of Blair County, Pennsylvania, and also before the Supreme Court of the same state, and that certain stipulations were made, it may be that the parties can stipulate the facts in this case and thereby obviate the taking of evidence.