UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

PAMELA D. TUCKER,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

CH-0752-13-0421-B-1

DATE: December 12, 2022

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Pamela D. Tucker, Riverside, Ohio, pro se.

Matthew O. Kortjohn, Dayton, Ohio, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

sustained her removal for failure to follow instructions and found that she did not 

prove her affirmative defenses. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one 

only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or 

the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were 

not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and 

the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence 

or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under 

section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the 

petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to reflect 

that we are assuming without deciding that the appellant is a qualified individual 

with a disability, we AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final 

decision. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The agency imposed the appellant’s removal from her Administrative 

Support Specialist position based upon one charge of failure to follow 

instructions with five underlying specifications detailing her failure to report to 

her assigned work area. Tucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket 

No. CH-0752-13-0421-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8, Subtabs 4a-4b. The 

appellant filed the instant appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After 

holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining

the removal. IAF, Tab 38, Initial Decision. The Board vacated the initial 

decision and remanded the appeal for further development. Tucker v. Department 

of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-13-0421-I-1, Remand Order 

(Aug. 15, 2014). On remand, another administrative judge held a second hearing. 

Tucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-13-0421-

B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 47, Hearing Compact Disc. She issued an initial 
3

decision sustaining the appellant’s removal and finding that she did not prove her 

affirmative defenses of age discrimination, retaliation for equal employment 

opportunity (EEO) activity, failure to accommodate, disparate treatment disability 

discrimination, and whistleblower reprisal. RF, Tab 42, Remand Initial Decision 

(RID). The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has 

responded. Remand Petition for Review (RPFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW2

¶3 First, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred in sustaining 

the charge because her office was dangerous and because she actually reported for 

duty at another location on the days that the agency specified she was absent. 

RPFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 11. To prove a charge of failure to follow instructions, an 

agency must establish that the employee was given proper instructions and she

failed to follow the instructions, without regard to whether the failure was 

intentional or unintentional. Archerda v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 

314, ¶ 16 (2014). Even when the employee may have substantial reason to 

question the instructions, absent unusual circumstances, such as when obedience 

would cause her irreparable harm or place her in a clearly dangerous situation, an 

employee must first comply with the instructions and then, if she disagrees with 

them, register her complaint or grievance later. Pedeleose v. Department of 

Defense, 110 M.S.P.R. 508, ¶¶ 16, 18, aff’d, 343 F. App’x 605 (Fed. Cir. 2009);

Larson v. Department of the Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 511, ¶ 21 (2002).

¶4 The agency charged the appellant with failure to follow instructions based 

upon five underlying specifications when she failed to report to her assigned work 

area on December 17, 18, 19, and 31, 2012, and January 22, 2013. IAF, Tab 8, 

Subtabs 4a-4b. As the administrative judge found, the record is clear and the 

appellant did not dispute that she was given the instruction to return to her office. 

 

2 We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal 

and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
4

RID at 6; IAF, Tab 3 at 46. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we 

cannot find that the danger to the appellant justified her failure to follow the 

instructions. 

¶5 We have considered that the appellant failed to meet with the agency’s 

industrial hygienist when invited to do so to address her concerns about her work 

area. RID at 7; IAF, Tab 3 at 105, 108‐09. Although the appellant submitted a 

letter from a nurse practitioner, when the agency asked for additional information

to determine the cause and nature of her health condition, including sending a 

letter to the nurse practitioner, the appellant did not provide the information. RID 

at 13-15; IAF, Tab 3 at 51, 77, 96. Accordingly, we find that the evidence does 

not show that the instructions were invalid or that the appellant was entitled to 

disregard them based upon a danger to her health. Thus, the administrative judge 

properly found that the agency proved by preponderant evidence the failure to 

follow instructions charge. See Maulding v. Department of Health & Human 

Services, 42 M.S.P.R. 605, 611 (1989) (sustaining a failure to follow instructions 

charge when the employee failed to report to the agency’s laboratory as instructed 

due to her claimed chemical sensitivity and she did not present sufficient 

evidence in support of her claims), aff’d, 961 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1992); see also 

White v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 95 M.S.P.R. 299, 

¶¶ 21-25 (2003).

¶6 The appellant next asserts that the agency discriminated against her by 

failing to reasonably accommodate her.

3

 RPFR File, Tab 1 at 10-12, 14-18, 23. 

Assuming, without deciding, that the appellant is a qualified individual with a 

 

3

In support of her disability discrimination claim, the appellant has submitted a 

July 4, 2015 letter from the Social Security Administration, which she states was not 

available prior to the hearing. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4. This evidence is not new 

because the letter was issued prior to the initial decision. Furthermore, it is not 

material because it provides no further information as to the nature and extent of the 

appellant’s conditions. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d); see generally Givens v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 95 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 9 (2003).
5

disability, we find that she did not establish this affirmative defense because she 

failed to engage in the interactive process to determine an appropriate 

accommodation.

4

 Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 

468, ¶ 18 (2015), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

¶7 As previously stated, the appellant failed to attend a meeting with the 

industrial hygienist and did not provide the agency with the medical information 

that it requested. IAF, Tab 3 at 51, 77, 105, 108-09, Tab 8, Subtab f. Below, and 

on review, the appellant objected to being required to provide additional medical 

information to the agency. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26; IAF, Tab 1 at 16. Having 

reviewed the record, it appears that the appellant provided the agency with two 

pieces of medical documentation. The first concerned her service-connected 

disabilities of ventricular arrhythmia and limitations in knee flexion. IAF, Tab 3 

at 71. However, these conditions do not appear to have any bearing on the 

functional limitation at issue or on the accommodation that the appellant was 

requesting. The second was a letter from her primary care provider that 

essentially relayed the appellant’s self-report of a suspected mold problem in her 

assigned office.5 Id. at 52. The agency promptly responded with a request for 

additional information, including a medical diagnosis and how the diagnosed 

condition might interfere with the appellant’s ability to work in her assigned 

office. Id. at 47, 79. The appellant never responded to the inquiry but continued 

to insist that the agency had all the information that it needed to rule on her 

 

4

The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show that she was a 

qualified individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g), (m). 

RID at 16. We modify the initial decision in this respect because, since we are finding 

that the appellant failed to engage in the interactive process, it is not necessary to 

address this issue. See Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 14 

(2014).

5

The appellant’s work area was evaluated both by the agency’s Industrial Hygiene and 

Safety personnel and a private environmental services company, neither of which 

detected any air quality problems or indications of moisture or mold. IAF, Tab 3 

at 106, 109-10 
6

request. Id. at 86-88. The agency subsequently informed the appellant that it

needed her to supply medical information from “a qualified physician.” Id. at 27, 

47-48. We do not reach the issue of whether the appellant’s treating nurse 

practitioner was “an appropriate health care or rehabilitation professional” to 

supply this information under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 

(EEOC) official guidance. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable 

Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

No. 915.002, at Question 6 (Oct. 17, 2002). Even if she were, the documentation 

letter that she prepared was insufficient for the agency to determine whether the 

appellant had a disability that needed accommodation. See id. Accordingly, we 

agree with the administrative judge that, because the appellant failed to provide 

the medical information and documentation requested by the agency and to 

otherwise participate in the interactive process, the agency did not fail to 

accommodate her. RID at 18; see Howerton v. Department of the Army, EEOC

Appeal No. 0120113177, 2013 WL 3149195, at *3-4 (June 12, 2013).

¶8 The appellant further asserts that she was subject to disparate treatment 

based upon her disability and that agency officials knew about her request for a 

reasonable accommodation when they removed her. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 18-20. 

Again, assuming, without deciding, that the appellant is a qualified individual 

with a disability, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed 

to show that her disability was a motivating factor in her removal. She did not 

present evidence that she was treated differently than nondisabled employees, 

provide evidence that her alleged disability played a role in the deciding official’s 

decision, or otherwise show a discriminatory animus on the part of the agency. 6 

 

6

The appellant disagrees with the administrative judge’s finding that she did not prove 

her age discrimination claim. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 26. The administrative judge found, 

among other things, that the appellant did not even allege that she was treated 

differently than an employee under age 40 and there was no evidence indicating pretext 

in the agency’s removal decision. RID at 9; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 13-14 

(testimony of the deciding official). Accordingly, we agree with the administrative 
7

RID at 18-19; see Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, 

¶ 40.

¶9 The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in failing to find 

that the agency retaliated against her for her prior EEO activity.7 RPFR File, 

Tab 1 at 5, 27-28. Specifically, she asserts that the agency charged her with 

failure to follow instructions to report to her assigned work area on a date when 

interviews were being conducted regarding her EEO complaint. Id. at 27-28. 

¶10 Based upon the deciding official’s demeanor, the administrative judge 

credited her testimony that, although she was aware of the appellant’s EEO 

activity, this did not play a role in her decision to remove the appellant. 

RID at 11; RF, Tab 45, Hearing Transcript (HT) at 12-13 (testimony of the 

deciding official). The Board generally will defer to this determination, which is 

explicitly based upon observing the demeanor of the witness testifying at the

hearing, and we do not find sufficiently sound reasons for overturning that 

determination. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.

2002). Further, we find that the appellant’s assertion regarding the timing of the 

EEO interviews does not evidence the type of suspicious timing that would 

support a finding that her EEO complaint was a motivating factor in the agency’s 

decision to remove her. See Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 

612, ¶ 42 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, 

¶¶ 23-25. We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not 

show the following: (1) the deciding official had a motivation to retaliate against 

her; (2) a causal link between her EEO activity and the removal decision; (3) the 

charges were not actually the reason for the agency’s action; or (4) there was 

comparator evidence that supported her claim. RID at 11-12. Thus, the appellant 

 

judge that the appellant failed to prove her age discrimination claim. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 633a(a); see Wingate v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶¶ 7-9 (2012).

7

The basis for her EEO complaint was race and disability discrimination and reprisal. 

RF, Tab 11 at 13-14.
8

failed to establish her claim of EEO retaliation. 8 Gardner v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 34 (2016), clarified by Pridgen, 

2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24.

¶11 The appellant asserts, moreover, that she proved her whistleblower 

retaliation claim and states that the administrative judge erred by considering her 

disclosure to her congressman as having occurred prior to the effective date of the 

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 

126 Stat. 1465. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 28-29. We find that the date of the 

appellant’s disclosure does not affect the administrative judge’s findings 

regarding her whistleblower retaliation claim, because the administrative judge 

found, and we agree, that the deciding official had no knowledge of this 

disclosure. RID at 21-22; HT at 7-8 (testimony of the deciding official). The 

appellant has not otherwise provided a reason to disturb the administrative 

judge’s finding that, because of the strong evidence in support of the removal and 

a lack of motive to retaliate, the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence 

that it would have removed her, regardless of her whistleblowing disclosures.

9

 

 

8 Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet 

her initial burden to prove that disparate treatment disability discrimination and 

retaliation for EEO activity (based on race discrimination and reprisal) were motivating 

factors in her removal, we need not resolve whether the appellant proved that her EEO 

activity was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s decision. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, 

¶¶ 20-22, 30, 40, 42.

The appellant’s prior EEO activity also involved complaining of disability 

discrimination. RF, Tab 11 at 11-27. Such activity is protected by the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 

the standards of which have been incorporated by reference into the Rehabilitation Act. 

29 U.S.C. § 791(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 35, 44. This 

type of claim requires the appellant to prove “but-for” causation as her initial burden. 

Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 46-47. Because we affirm the administrative judge’s 

finding that she did not meet her initial burden to prove motivating factor, we also find 

that she would be unable to prove “but-for” causation.

9

The appellant also argues that her removal does not promote the efficiency of the 

service because she was willing to work in a different location or with protective 

equipment. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 29-30. However, the deciding official testified that the 

appellant’s misconduct had a negative effect on the agency, HT at 15 (testimony of the 
9

RID at 22-25; HT at 7-8, 14 (testimony of the deciding official); see McCarthy v. 

International Boundary & Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 66 (2011), 

aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

¶12 The appellant next argues that the deciding official did not consider all of 

the relevant mitigating factors in assessing the penalty. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 10, 

30-31. However, we agree with the administrative judge that the deciding official 

credibly testified that she weighed the relevant Douglas factors and the decision 

letter also reflects that she considered such factors as the appellant’s length of 

service and past work record, her potential for rehabilitation, the seriousness of 

the offenses with which she had been charged, prior discipline in the form of two 

recent suspensions for similar misconduct, the impact of her absence on the 

agency’s operations, and similar penalties imposed upon other employees. RID 

at 27-28; HT at 5-7 (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 8, Subtab 4a. 

Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that removal is a reasonable 

penalty. See Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶¶ 25-27 (sustaining the appellant’s 

removal for failure to follow instructions to provide additional medical 

information that the agency requested); Bowen v. Department of the Navy, 

112 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶ 19 (2009) (sustaining the appellant’s removal for failure to 

follow instructions, absence without leave, and insubordination), aff’d, 

402 F. App’x 521 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Table).

¶13 Finally, the appellant asserts on review, among other things, that the 

administrative judge improperly weighed the hearing testimony and that she 

should have considered that the appellant was awarded unemployment benefits. 

RPFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 9-10, 31-32. These assertions constitute mere 

disagreement with the initial decision and thus do not provide a reason for 

 

deciding official), and the Board has consistently held that an employee’s failure to 

follow instructions relates directly to the efficiency of the service, see, e.g., Archerda, 

121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 24.
10

disturbing it. Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105‐06 (1997); RID 

at 4-7, 11-19, 22-26.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS10

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

 

10 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a 

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before 

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of 
12

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling 

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and 

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 
13

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in 

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial 

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court 

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 11 The court of appeals must receive your 

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

 

11 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
14

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor wa rrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board