EMAN 

E COU 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

RAJA JONES, A/K/A ROGER DON 

JONES, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 68561 

ALE 

JUN 1 7 2016 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying a 

postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge. 

Appellant Raja Jones filed his petition on April 21, 2015, more 

than three years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on 

October 11, 2011. See Jones v. State, Docket No. 55707 (Order of 

Affirmance, September 14, 2011). Thus, Jones's petition was untimely 

filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Jones's petition was procedurally barred absent 

a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. Id. A petitioner 

establishes good cause by showing that an impediment external to the 

defense prevented him from complying with procedural default rules. 

Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Based 

upon our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred for the 

reasons discussed below. 

'This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument, 

NRAP 34(0(3) (amended effective October 1, 2015), and we conclude that 

the record is sufficient for our review and briefing is unwarranted. See 

Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975). 

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First, Jones argued that he had good cause because he suffers 

from mental illness, lacks legal training, and has had to rely upon prison 

law clerks. As Jones has not demonstrated an impediment external to the 

defense that prevented him from complying with the procedural bars, we 

conclude that this argument lacks merit. See Phelps v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of 

Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that a 

petitioner's mental handicap and poor legal assistance from inmate law 

clerks did not establish good cause). 

Second, Jones argued that the district court's failure to 

appoint postconviction counsel constituted good cause. NRS 34.750 allows 

the district court discretion to appoint postconviction counsel after a 

petition has been filed. As such, the lack of postconviction counsel before 

the petition was filed cannot provide good cause for the delay in filing the 

petition. See Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 60, 331 P.3d 867, 870 

(2014) (concluding that claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction 

counsel in noncapital cases do not constitute good cause for a successive 

petition because there is no entitlement to appointed counsel). 

Third, Jones argued that the ineffective assistance of his trial 

and appellate counsel provided good cause. A procedurally barred claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel cannot constitute good 

cause. Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252, 71 P.3d at 506. As Jones's claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel were reasonably available to be raised in a 

timely petition and Jones thus failed to demonstrate an impediment 

external to the defense preventing him from complying with the 

procedural time bar, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See id. at 

252-53, 71 P.3d at 506. 

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Fourth, Jones argued that failure to consider his claims on the 

merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, "the petitioner must 

show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of. . . the new evidence." Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 

537 (2001). Jones did not attempt to demonstrate his actual innocence 

and has failed to meet his burden. Therefore, we conclude the district 

court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

7:0,A.3e, 

J. 

Douglas 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge 

Raja Jones 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2We note that the district court denied the petition in part based 

upon laches pursuant to NRS 34.800(2). The presumption in NRS 

34.800(2) does not apply here because the petition was filed within five 

years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal. See id.; Little v. 

Warden, 117 Nev. 845, 853, 34 P.3d 540, 545 (2001) (measuring the period 

as "five years after the remittitur disposing of the direct appeal or the 

judgment of conviction where no direct appeal was filed"). Nevertheless, 

the district court correctly concluded the petition was procedurally barred 

pursuant to NRS 34.726(1), and we therefore affirm. See Wyatt v. State, 

86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970). 

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