If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re A. B. COOKSON, Minor. October 5, 2023

No. 364097

Livingston Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2019-016076-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and RICK, JJ.

JANSEN, J. (dissenting).

For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court order 

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). 

Statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3) when clear 

and convincing evidence establishes:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (j), (g).] 

Only one statutory ground need be established to terminate parental rights. In re Atchley, 341 

Mich App 332, 346 n 6; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). A trial court’s finding of statutory grounds is 

reviewed for clear error. Id. at 343. 

Although the trial court could have made additional findings regarding respondent’s 

continued drug use and the impact that had on her ability to parent, the record evidence is more 

than sufficient to establish statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. The child was 

removed from respondent’s care, in part, because a sibling was discovered with substantial burns, 

for which respondent did not seek medical treatment. Respondent entered a case service plan, but 

was not in full compliance. She stopped attending her mental health services and lied to her 

psychologist, Dr. Douglas Ruben, she missed drug screens, and her home was unsuitable for the 

minor child. She failed to progress to unsupervised parenting time. “A parent’s failure to 

participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide 

a child proper care and custody.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

“Similarly, a parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is 

evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” Id. at 711. Here, the 

record speaks for itself, and statutory grounds to terminate were proven by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court may consider a number of factors when determining 

whether termination of a respondent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, including

the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic 

violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s 

visitation history with the child, the children’s wellbeing while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption. [White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).]

“A parent’s substance-abuse history is also relevant to whether termination is in the child’s best 

interests.” In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 361; 948 NW2d 131 (2019). The focus is on the child 

rather than the parent in making a best-interests determination. In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 

320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). “We review for clear error a trial court’s factual finding that 

termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich 

App at 346.

Although respondent had a bond with the child, the child was in foster care since 2019, and 

all of his contact with respondent was supervised. Respondent missed parenting time despite 

knowing the child had mental health needs and that missed visits had a negative impact on his 
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behavior. As stated above, respondent was not in full compliance with her case service plan as to 

missing counseling and missing drug screens, and she failed to show benefit from the services she 

did complete. She made comments to Dr. Ruben and her caseworker about her continued drug use 

that raised red flags regarding any benefit from service or ability to take accountability for the 

reasons the child came into care. The trial court’s factual findings were supported by the record, 

and therefore, the court did not clearly err in determining that termination was in the child’s best 

interests. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen