alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15D0459. CRAIG L. JONES v. THE STATE.

Craig L. Jones seeks discretionary review of the trial court’s order denying his

motion for minutes of a grand jury proceeding. We lack jurisdiction because the

application is untimely.

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the

entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The

requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an

application for appeal not made in compliance therewith. See Boyle v. State, 190 Ga.

App. 734 (380 SE2d 57) (1989). Here, the trial court’s order was entered on May 6,

2015, and Jones filed his application on June 11, 2015, which was 36 days later.1

Therefore, the application is untimely, and it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

1

Jones attempted to file his application earlier, but it was not accepted for

filing because it did not include a copy of the trial court’s order.

07/09/2015

July 09, 2015
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: August 13, 2015 520193 

________________________________

In the Matter of RICHARD 

TEVAULT,

Appellant,

v

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALBERT PRACK, as Director of

Special Housing and Inmate

Disciplinary Programs,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: June 8, 2015

Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Lynch and Devine, JJ.

__________

Richard Tevault, Dannemora, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Peter H.

Schiff of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mott, J.),

entered November 25, 2014 in Albany County, which dismissed

petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR

article 78, to review a determination of the Commissioner of

Corrections and Community Supervision finding petitioner guilty

of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with using a

controlled substance after a sample of his urine twice tested

positive for buprenorphine. He was found guilty of the charge

following a tier III disciplinary hearing and the determination

was affirmed on administrative appeal with a modified penalty. 

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging

the determination and, following joinder of issue, Supreme Court
-2- 520193 

dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals.

Petitioner's sole contention is that the lieutenant who

presided over the hearing was not authorized pursuant to 7 NYCRR

254.1 to act as the Hearing Officer. We disagree. The

regulation at issue provides, in relevant part, that the person

appointed to conduct the disciplinary hearing "shall be either

the superintendent, a deputy superintendent, captain or

commissioner's hearing officer employed by the department's

central office, but the superintendent may, in his or her

discretion, designate some other employee to conduct the

proceeding" (7 NYCRR 254.1). In view of this, the lieutenant

could properly be designated by the superintendent to conduct the

hearing (see Matter of Goss v Kelly, 145 AD2d 936 [1988]; Matter

of Purnell v Kelly, 115 AD2d 1010 [1985]). Here, the lieutenant

informed petitioner at the hearing that the superintendent had

assigned him to be the Hearing Officer to preside over the

hearing. Notwithstanding petitioner's suggestion to the

contrary, no specific documentation was necessary to effectuate

this designation. Therefore, Supreme Court properly dismissed

the petition.

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

VICTOR GOMEZ,

APPELLANT,

V.

JEANETTE ABRAHAM, HARRY 

ABRAHAM, AND JAMES 

ABRAHAM

APPELLEES.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-15-00171-CV

Appeal from the

210th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2013-DCV0648)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal is before the Court on its own motion to determine whether it should be 

dismissed for want of prosecution. Finding that the clerk’s record has not been filed due to the 

fault of the Appellant, Victor Gomez, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.

Unless otherwise excused, a non-indigent appellant must either pay for or make 

arrangements for the payment of the fees related to preparation of the appellate record to ensure 

that the record is timely filed. TEX.R.APP.P. 35.3(a)(2), (b)(3); see TEX.R.APP.P. 20.1(c); 

37.3(b), (c). The clerk’s record was due to be filed on June 28, 2015. The El Paso County Clerk 

notified the Court that the clerk’s record would not be filed because Appellant has not made 

financial arrangements for the preparation of the clerk’s record.
- 2 -

In accordance with Rule 37.3(b), the Clerk of the Court notified Appellant by letter 

regarding his failure to make financial arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record and advised 

him that the appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution unless he responded within ten 

days and showed grounds for continuing the appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 37.3(b). Appellant has 

not filed any written response or otherwise showed that grounds exist for the appeal to be 

continued. Pursuant to Rules 37.3(b), we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See

TEX.R.APP.P. 37.3(b)(authorizing appellate court to dismiss appeal for want of prosecution if the 

clerk’s record is not filed because appellant failed to make payment arrangements for preparation 

of the clerk’s record).

July 17, 2015

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
@misc{1207316,
  author = {Enrico Lucon},
  title = {Test Temperature Range for NIST Certified Charpy Specimens for Testing at "Room Temperature"},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-06-20 04:06:00},
  publisher = {NIST Interagency/Internal Report (NISTIR), National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936956},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8470},
  language = {en},
}
#### Isidore Braun et al., Appellants, v One Beacon Insurance Company, Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 146]

*481On May 28, 2004, the plaintiff Annette Braun allegedly struck and injured a pedestrian, Joseph Perl, while driving her 1987 Ford motor vehicle, which was covered by an insurance policy issued by American Home Insurance Company. The defendant, One Beacon Insurance Company, issued an insurance policy covering a 2000 Plymouth automobile to the plaintiff Isidore Braun, husband of Annette Braun. On July 7, 2004, the attorney for Perl notified the defendant that he was representing Perl in connection with his claim for the personal injuries he sustained in the accident, and requested coverage information. The defendant responded to Perl’s attorney by letter dated July 12, 2004, in which it disclaimed coverage because its named insured, Isidore Braun, was not involved in the accident. That letter further stated that the applicable coverage was from a policy issued by American Home Insurance Company.

Thereafter, Perl rejected American Home Insurance Compa*482ny’s tender of the limits of its policy, and in August 2004, the defendant was notified that Perl was seeking excess coverage from it. By letter dated September 16, 2004, the defendant again disclaimed coverage, on the ground that the vehicle involved in the accident was not a “covered auto” as defined in the defendant’s policy.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs commenced this action for a judgment declaring that the defendant was obligated to defend and indemnify them against Perl’s claims pursuant to the insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff Isidore Braun. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment declaring that the policy of insurance does not cover the accident at issue in the underlying action and that the defendant is not obligated to defend or indemnify the plaintiff Annette Braun in the underlying action. We affirm.

The defendant’s letter dated July 12, 2004, was a timely and effective disclaimer of coverage *(see August v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*98 NY2d 632 [2002]; *Waxman v Providence Washington Ins. Co.,*207 AD2d 882 [1994]). The second disclaimer letter dated September 16, 2004, while issued in response to Perl’s claim for excess coverage, was based on the same policy exclusion and did not invalidate the first disclaimer letter dated July 12, 2004.

The plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are without merit.

Since this is an action for a declaratory judgment, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the plaintiff Isidore Braun does not cover the accident at issue in the underlying action and that the defendant is not obligated to defend or indemnify the plaintiff Annette Braun in the underlying action *(see Lanza v Wagner,*11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], *appeal dismissed*371 US 74 [1962], *cert denied*371 US 901 [1962]). Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci and Garni, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.02
                                                                 -------------

                                 CERTIFICATION

I, Debi B. Halbert, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of ProFutures Diversified Fund,
L.P.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

      a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
      disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
      to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
      including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
      within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
      report is being prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
      and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
      effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
      of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

      c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
      most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in
      the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
      reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting.

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

      a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
      operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
      reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
      record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
      control over financial reporting.



Date:  March 30, 2005



/s/ Debi B. Halbert

----------------------------------------

Debi B. Halbert, Chief Financial Officer
ProFutures, Inc., General Partner
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.
COREY DALANO BROOKIINS , Petitioner

. No. 1 CA

- CR 23

- 0278 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2013

- 443470

- 001 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter , Judge REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL Maricopa County Attorney ’ s Office , Phoenix By Philip D. Garrow Counsel for Respondent Corey D. Brookins , Eloy Petitioner FILED 2-15-2024STATE v. BROOKINS Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley , Judge Kent E. Cattani , and Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court

.

PER CURIAM : ¶1 Petitioner Corey D elano Brookins seeks review of the superior court’s order denying his petition for post

- conviction relief

. This is P etitioner’s fourth successive petition. ¶2 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post

- conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez , 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2012)

. It is P etitioner’s burden to show that the superior court abused its discretion by denying the petition for post

- conviction relief. See State v. Poblete , 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 1, 260 P.3d 1102, 1103 (App. 2011) ( P etitioner has burden of establishing abuse of discretion on review). ¶3 We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order denying the petition for post

- conviction relief, and the petition for review. We find that P etitioner has not established an abuse of discretion. ¶4 We grant rev iew and deny relief.
S&0-I5

ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA # 07-14-00441-CR OFFENSE: OTHER CRIMINAL

Robert Wayne Leisher v. The State

STYLE: ofTexas COUNTY: Dallas

COA DISPOSITION: Affirmed TRIAL COURT: Criminal District Court No. 2

DATE: 04/16/2015 Publish: NO TC CASE #: F-1457156-1

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Robert Wayne Leisher v. The State

STYLE: ofTexas

PRO -IE

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

DATE: {JMJUilL ojtefljr

JUDGE: <h/,4

Petition

CCA#: 5bO-fS

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED:

PUBLISH:

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

PC:_

DNP:

MOTION FOR

ELECTRONIC RECORD
#### Brenda Andrews et al., Appellants, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.

Submitted August 20, 2012;

decided October 30, 2012

Motion for leave to appeal from the July 2012 Supreme Court judgment dismissed upon the ground that the judgment is not the final appealable paper from which leave to appeal may be sought. The October 2009 Appellate Division order dismissing the complaint was the final appealable paper *(see*CPLR 5611).
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 23
 
                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
 
  We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 and Form S-3 Nos. 33-20301 and 33-35198, respectively) pertaining to
the 1982 and 1987 Employee Stock Option Plans, the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 33-30578) pertaining to the 401(k) Plan, the Registration
Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-37094) pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase
Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 33-35129) pertaining to the
1990 Director Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 33-
41880) pertaining to the March 1991 private placement of 1,250,000 units and
the Registration Statement (Form S-3) for the registration of 1,150,000 shares
of convertible exchangeable preferred stock, of our report dated February 2,
1996, with respect to the financial statements included in this Annual Report
(Form 10-K) of SEQUUS Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
 
  Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of SEQUUS
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express
an opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, the financial statement
schedule referred to above, when considered in relation to the basic financial
statement taken as a whole, presents fairly in all material respects the
information set forth therein.
 
                                                              Ernst & Young LLP
 
Palo Alto, California
February 4, 1997
|   | • | the      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter      ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange      Commission (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;      and |
|--------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | • | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                                         |   |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Date: May      15, 2009                                                                 |   |   |
|                                                                                         |   |   |
| /s/    KEVIN HOGGE               |   |   |
| Kevin      Hogge                                                                             |   |   |
| Chief      Financial Officer                                                                 |   |   |
| (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) |   |   |

----
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDG MENT

No. 04

- 18

- 00466

- CV

Pedro RAMIREZ

, Appellant

v.

Frances RAMIREZ

, Appellee

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017

- CI

- 21553 Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ALVAREZ

, JUSTICE CHAPA , AND JUSTICE RIOS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. Costs of court for this appeal are taxed against Appellant Pedro Ramirez.

SIGNED January 2, 2019

.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez , Justice
# covid_table41_c50_state
H. Res. 866 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

February 27, 2020. 

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall 

be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 2339) to 

amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to the sale and marketing of tobacco products, and for 

other purposes. All points of order against consideration of 

the bill are waived. In lieu of the amendment in the nature 

of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce now printed in the bill, an amendment in the 

nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 116–51, modified by the amendment printed in 

the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, 

shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, 

and on any further amendment thereto, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) 90 minutes of debate 

equally divided among and controlled by the chair and rank-
2 

•HRES 866 EH 

ing minority member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the chair and ranking minority member of the 

Committee on Ways and Means; and (2) one motion to recommit with or without instructions. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
<PAGE>   1
EXHIBIT - 11.1
ATLANTIS PLASTICS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
CALCULATION OF PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE
FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995, 1994, AND 1993

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                           1995            1994           1993
                                                                       ------------     -----------    -----------
<S>                                                                    <C>              <C>            <C>
Shares outstanding:                                                    
   Weighted average outstanding                                           7,089,467      7,066,512      7,219,364
   Share equivalents                                                        118,706        443,468        408,376
                                                                       ============     ==========     ==========
     Adjusted outstanding                                                 7,208,173      7,509,980      7,627,740
                                                                       ============     ==========     ==========
Net income (loss) available to common shareholders:                    
   Net income (loss)                                                   ($13,072,150)    $6,366,130     $3,894,742
   Less - preferred stock dividend                                         (145,000)      (145,000)      (145,000)
                                                                       ============     ==========     ==========
Net income (loss) available to common shareholders                     ($13,217,150)    $6,221,130     $3,749,742
                                                                       ============     ==========     ==========

Income (loss) per common share                                               ($1.83)    $     0.83     $     0.49
                                                                       ============     ==========     ==========
</TABLE>                                                               

(1) The difference between primary and fully dilutive earnings per share is not
    material.

(2) The Company's convertible preferred stock was determined not to be a common
    stock equivalent in computing primary earnings per share.  In computing 
    fully diluted income per share, the dilutive effect was not material.
Exhibit
32.2– Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
  
 The
undersigned, Donald L. Sytsma, Chief Financial Officer of Gulf Western Petroleum
Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
 
 (1) the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended February 29, 2008
(the "Report") which this statement accompanies fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and
 
 (2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Dated: 
April 21, 2008
 
 /s/
      Donald L. SytsmaChief
      Financial Officer(principal
      financial and accounting
officer)
# covid_table44_c53_state