IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-51115

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TRASHANDA SCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3-14-CR-42

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Trashanda Scott appeals her conviction for assault resulting in serious 

bodily injury, for which she was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and 

one day. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 113(a)(6). We AFFIRM.

Scott does not dispute that she waived her rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) during an interview following her altercation with 

the alleged victim. Nonetheless, she contends that her conviction should be 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-51115 Document: 00513117416 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/16/2015
No. 14-51115

2

reversed because the prosecution highlighted her failure to return to provide a 

written statement to a law enforcement investigator and her pretrial failure to 

claim that she had acted in self-defense. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 

We review for plain error the claim pertaining to pretrial silence. See 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Vonn, 535 

U.S. 55, 62-63 (2002). By answering the investigating officer’s questions after 

waiving her Miranda rights, Scott made “fair game [of] both [her] answers and 

omissions.” United States v. Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009); see 

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987). If a defendant chooses to talk, “what 

he says or omits is to be judged on its merits or demerits.” Vargas, 580 F.3d at

277 n.1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. 

Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Scott’s Miranda waiver remained effective unless “contradicted by an 

invocation” of the right. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2012). 

Scott does not contend, and nothing in the record shows, that she 

unambiguously and unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent after 

having waived it. See id. Thus, with regard to any Doyle claims pertaining to 

testimony (and any prosecutorial comments thereon) concerning a claim of selfdefense, there is no plain error because Scott has failed to demonstrate any 

“error at all.” United States v. Teuschler, 689 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 2012).1 

Even assuming arguendo that it was error to allow mention of Scott’s

omissions in and after her Mirandized interview, such an error was not plain.

See Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 77; see also United States v. Fambro, 526 F.3d 836, 

847 (5th Cir. 2008) (characterizing as “not clear” circuit law regarding Doyle

error in cases in which the right to remain silent was waived). If circuit law is 

 

1 We also note that Scott represented in the district court that she had no objection 

to testimony about what happened in her Mirandized interview. Cf. United States v. LopezEscobar, 920 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1991).

 Case: 14-51115 Document: 00513117416 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/16/2015
No. 14-51115

3

unclear, then whether the prosecutor crossed the Doyle line by highlighting 

Scott’s pretrial reticence about self-defense following her waiver of Miranda

rights would be a matter “subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 

135; see United States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 370, 377-78 (5th Cir. 2009). A 

reasonable dispute precludes a conclusion of plain error. See Puckett, 556 U.S. 

at 135; Ellis, 564 F.3d at 377-78.

Because there was no error, plain or otherwise, in connection with the 

claim concerning the questioning of the investigator about whether Scott 

returned to provide a written statement, we need not determine what standard 

of review applies. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 

2008). There was no violation of Doyle because the investigator did not answer 

the question, the jury was instructed to ignore unanswered questions, and the 

question itself did not necessarily comment on the exercise of the right to 

remain silent. See Miller, 483 U.S. at 763; United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 

1449, 1466 (5th Cir. 1992).

Nor is reversal warranted on the notion that the district court committed 

cumulative errors resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. 

Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The Doyle claims are 

explained above, and the two remaining claims of error—concerning the 

prosecutor’s attempt to impeach Scott through testimony offered by an 

emergency medical technician and the district court’s rulings in connection 

with Scott’s cross-examination of the victim—are unsupported by the record. 

See United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. 

York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th Cir. 1989). There are thus no errors to 

accumulate. See Delgado, 672 F.3d at 344.

AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 14-51115 Document: 00513117416 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/16/2015