United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-2935

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Laquan D. Haynes, also known as Laquan Darell Haynes, also known as Quan,

also known as Lil Haynes

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

Teresa Lynette Bloodman

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana

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 Submitted: June 8, 2015

 Filed: July 17, 2015

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Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge. 
Teresa Lynette Bloodman withdrew as Laquan Darell Haynes’s attorney in a

criminal case. The magistrate judge ordered her to return discovery material “as 1

soon as possible.” She returned it thirty-four days later. The judge sanctioned her

$250 for violating the order. The district court affirmed the sanction. Bloodman 2

appeals. Because Haynes’s criminal case is still pending in the district court, this

court dismisses Bloodman’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

When Bloodman withdrew, the magistrate judge ordered her to return

discovery material “as soon as possible.” That day, the judge emailed the order,

instructing her “to turn over to the United States Attorney’s Office any and all

discovery material previously provided her by the Government.” After twenty days,

she had not returned the material. The judge issued a second order to return it within

a week, or risk a show-cause order and sanctions. Bloodman, no longer on the

electronic filing system, did not receive the email, but the clerk mailed her a hard

copy. Eleven days after the second order, she still had not returned the material. The

judge emailed her a show-cause order. Bloodman sent the material the next day via

overnight mail, though delivery was delayed two days due to weather. 

At the show-cause hearing, Bloodman apologized. She claimed not to receive

the second order, the only one to set an exact date. She said she had medical issues

during this time. The judge did not find bad faith or hold her in contempt, but

ordered her to pay $250 to the Department of Justice for the government’s “time and

effort and energy.” (The judge did not identify the authority for the sanction.) 

Bloodman moved for reconsideration, filed objections, and appealed to the district

The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the

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Western District of Arkansas.

The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States DistrictJudge for the Western 2

District of Arkansas. 

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court. It referred the motion for reconsideration to the magistrate judge, who denied

the motion. Bloodman requested review by the district court. Six days later, she

appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal as premature. The district court

then affirmed the sanction. 

“[W]e must determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.” Carter

v. Ashland, Inc., 450 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “With few

exceptions, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to ‘final decisions’ of the district

court.” Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 218 F.3d 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2000), citing 28

U.S.C. § 1291 (“Final decisions of district courts”). “A decision is not final,

ordinarily, unlessit endsthe litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district

court to do but execute the judgment.” Id. (brackets omitted), quoting Cunningham

v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999). “[A] sanctions order imposed on an

attorney is not a ‘final decision’ under § 1291,” including when “the attorney no

longer represents a party in the case.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 200, 210 (Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sanction imposed for violating discovery order). See also

Tenkku, 218 F.3d at 927 (stating that “Cunningham held that a sanctions order

against a party or her attorney is not an appealable final order” and dismissing

interlocutory appeal of attorney sanction). Cf. Baker Grp., L.C. v. Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co., 451 F.3d 484, 486, 491 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting “an order

sanctioning an attorney is appealable” where district court judgment wasfinal). Even

if Bloodman’s appeal is “criminal,” Cunningham and Tenkku—both civil

cases—control because § 1291 applies to “both civil and criminal” cases. See Abney

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).

The government asserts jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, citing

a pre-Cunningham, First Circuit case allowing the government to appeal a fee order

after the criminal defendants were found guilty and sentenced. United States v.

Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759, 768-69 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting “no prospect of piecemeal

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litigation endures”). Horn is probably not good law. See Empresas Omajede, Inc.

v. Bennazar-Zequeira, 213 F.3d 6, 9 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000). At any rate, this case is

factually distinguishable: Haynes, who pled guilty, has not been sentenced; the

“prospect of piecemeal litigation” remains. See Horn, 29 F.3d at 769. “Several other

circuits have held that Cunningham precludes interlocutory appeals of sanctions

imposed under . . . other sources of authority.” S.E.C. v. Smith, 710 F.3d 87, 95, 96

(2d Cir. 2013) (holding “Cunningham applies to appeals of sanctions imposed under

Rule 11 as well as under the district court’s inherent powers because, like Rule 37

sanctions, these appeals will often implicate the merits of the underlying action,” and

citing Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006), Comuso v. Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp., 267 F.3d 331, 339 (3d Cir. 2001), and Empresas Omajede,

Inc., 213 F.3d at 9 n.4). See also In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab.,

401 Fed. Appx. 877, 881 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“We have since applied

Cunningham to preclude collateral order review of other sanctions orders assessed

against attorneys for conduct during the course of litigation.”). 

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* * * * * * * 

This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

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Curiously, Bloodman argues this court lacks jurisdiction because the district

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court applied the wrong standard of review to the magistrate judge’s order. This is

incorrect. This court reviews final decisions, even those applying the wrong standard

of review. See White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 782 (8th Cir. 1992) (reversing and

remanding after district court applied incorrect standard of review).

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