UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1689

FORLANDO J. BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

RUSSELL L. BAUKNIGHT, Special Administrator of James Brown 

Estate and Special Trustee of James Brown August 1, 2000 

Irrevocable Trust Agreement,

Trustee – Appellee,

v.

ADELE J. POPE, individually and as Trustee of the Irrevocable 

Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 2000,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

ROBERT L. BUCHANAN, JR., individually and as Trustee of the 

Irrevocable Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 

2000,

Defendant.

No. 14-1713

FORLANDO J. BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

RUSSELL L. BAUKNIGHT, Special Administrator of James Brown 

Estate and Special Trustee of James Brown August 1, 2000 

Irrevocable Trust Agreement,
2

Trustee – Appellee,

v.

ROBERT L. BUCHANAN, JR., individually and as Trustee of the 

Irrevocable Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 

2000,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

ADELE J. POPE, individually and as Trustee of the Irrevocable 

Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 2000,

Defendant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. William O. Bertelsman, Senior 

District Judge. (3:08-cv-00014-WOB-JGW)

Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 21, 2015

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Adam T. Silvernail, MOSES & BRACKETT, PC, Columbia, South Carolina; 

J. Calhoun Watson, SOWELL GRAY STEPP & LAFFITTE, L.L.C., Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellants. William W. Wilkins, Burl F. 

Williams, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina; J. David 

Black, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; John A. 

Donsbach, Sr., DONSBACH & KING, LLC, Augusta, Georgia, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Adele Pope and Robert Buchanan (Appellants) appeal the 

district court’s orders granting summary judgment to Forlando 

Brown on Appellants’ counterclaims, dismissing the James Brown 

Irrevocable Trust as a party, denying reconsideration, and denying 

Pope’s motion to certify questions of law to the Supreme Court of 

South Carolina. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 706 

F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment should be granted 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine 

issue of material fact exists, we view “the facts and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 

2011). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 

evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a 

verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do 

not suffice, nor does a ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ in support of 

[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power 

Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002).
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With these considerations in mind, we affirm the grant of 

summary judgment to Brown on all five of Appellants’ counterclaims, 

substantially for the reasons stated by the district court, and we 

affirm the denial of reconsideration and the motion to certify 

questions to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Brown v. Pope, 

No. 3:08-cv-00014-WOB-JGW (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2014; June 16, 2014). 

In addition, we note that, as to their counterclaim of fraud, 

Appellants have failed to allege and support the existence of each 

element of a fraud claim. As to their claim for attorney’s fees, 

we have looked to other courts’ interpretations of the phrase “as 

justice and equity may require” in provisions identical to S.C. 

Code Ann. § 62-7-1004 (Supp. 2014), and we conclude that Appellants 

have failed to establish that an award of attorney’s fees is 

warranted. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED