AFFIRM in Part, REVERSE in Part, and REMAND; and Opinion Filed July 21, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01406-CV

CITY OF DALLAS AND LARRY HOLMES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF 

BUILDING OFFICIAL FOR THE CITY OF DALLAS, Appellants

V.

EAST VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-07239

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang-Miers, Brown and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Schenck

In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Dallas challenges the trial court’s order denying

its plea to the jurisdiction by which it sought dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the East Village 

Association (Association) challenging the validity of a City ordinance.1 On appeal, the City 

argues the trial court erred by denying its plea because the City urges: (1) the Association lacks 

standing to challenge the ordinance; and (2) the Association failed to allege sufficient facts to 

invoke a waiver of the City’s immunity under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act or to 

confer jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

 1 While Larry Holmes, as the Chief Building Official for the City of Dallas, is identified as an appellant in this case, during oral argument 

counsel for Holmes and the City indicated that the issues presented concern only the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and represented that Holmes is 

not requesting any relief from this Court. We therefore take no action relative to Holmes’ plea below and leave that portion of the order 

undisturbed.
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BACKGROUND

This case concerns the City’s adoption of Ordinance No. 29019 (the “Ordinance”), which 

changed the zoning of property located east of North Central Expressway between Haskell and 

Carroll Avenues (“East Village”) to allow for the construction of a Sam’s Club store. More 

specifically, the Ordinance changed the zoning to allow, among other uses, a general 

merchandise or food store 100,000 square feet or more (“big box” store) without a specific use 

permit (“SUP”). The Dallas Development Code allows a variety of retail uses in Mixed Use 3 

Districts, adopted by the Ordinance, as a matter of right, but “big box” stores are only allowed 

with a SUP, which carries its own requirements for issuance. DAL. DEV. CODE §§51A4.125(f)(2)(J) and 51A-4.219(a)(2)(3) and (4).2

Contending that they were surprised and upset by the news that a Sam’s Club store was 

coming to their neighborhood, property owners near East Village formed the Association to 

challenge the sufficiency of the notice given of the proposed change in zoning and to advocate 

for the future land use and zoning of East Village. 

NOTICE REQUIREMENT

A municipality is required to give written notice of each public hearing before the zoning 

commission on a proposed change in a zoning classification. The notice is to be sent to each 

owner of real property within 200 feet of the property on which the change in classification is 

proposed. TEX. LOC. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 211.007(c) (West 2008). The Dallas Development 

Code expands this notice requirement to owners of real property within 500 feet when the zoning 

 2 In particular, an applicant for a SUP must comply with all zoning amendment procedures for a change in zoning classification. Id. §51A4.219(a) (4). The City must issue a separate ordinance for each SUP granted and City Council is not to grant a SUP for a use except upon a 

finding that the use will: (1) complement or be compatible with the surrounding uses and community facilities; (2) contribute to, enhance, or 

promote the welfare of the area of request and adjacent properties; (3) not be detrimental to the public health, safety, or general welfare; and (4) 

conform in all other respects to all zoning regulations and standards. Id. §§51A-4.219(a)(2) and(3).
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change is for a Planned Development, which is the case here. DAL. DEV. CODE §§ 51A4.701(b)(5) and 51A-1.105(a)(4). 

The requisite details of the notice of hearing are not specified by statute. The general rule 

is that the notice is sufficient if it reasonably apprises those for whom it was intended of the 

nature of the pending proposal to the extent that they can determine whether they should be 

present at the hearing. Midway Protective League v. City of Dallas, 552 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex.

Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). While the notice need not be complete and perfect 

in every respect, it must be of such a character to afford the recipient an opportunity to oppose 

the measure if he desires. Id. See also, e.g. Dacus v. Parker, No. 13-0047, 2015 WL 3653295, at 

*6 (Tex. June 12, 2015) (notice should be definite and certain so as not to mislead the recipient). 

NOTICES GIVEN

The City gave the following written notices of hearing to owners of property within 500 

feet of East Village prior to adopting the Ordinance.

The Dallas City Plan Commission (“Planning Commission”), on May 2, 2013, and City

Council, on May 22, 2013, will consider:

An application for 1) a Planned Development District for MU-3 Mixed Use 

District uses on property zoned a GO(A) General Office District, an MU-3 (SAH) 

Mixed Use District (Affordable) and a portion of Subdistrict E in PDD No. 305, 

Cityplace, on the northeast corner of North Central Expressway and North Carroll 

Avenue and for 2) a new subdistrict within Planned Development District No. 305 

on property zoned Subdistrict E within the PDD on the northeast corner of North 

Central Expressway and North Haskell Avenue. 

A Planned Development District is proposed on a ± 16.158-acre portion of the 

request site to accommodate a retail development with design standards. A new 

subdistrict within PDD No. 305 is proposed on a ± 10.595-acre portion of the 

request site to create a ‘data center’ use and associated parking ratio. This will 

allow existing office buildings to be utilized for that purpose.

None of the property owners entitled to notice appeared at the hearings. The Planning 

Commission voted to recommend approval of the new planned development with the removal of 
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the condition that the owner obtain a SUP for the construction of a “big box” store. The City 

Council, upon the recommendation of the Planning Commission, approved the requested change 

in zoning and adopted the Ordinance authorizing uses permitted in MU-3 Mixed Use Districts as 

well as a “big box” store. 

THE LAWSUIT

The Association filed suit against the City and others seeking a declaration that the 

Ordinance is void for failure to give residents notice of the waiver of the SUP requirement for a 

“big box” store and seeking to enjoin the City and others from taking ministerial actions in 

connection with development of East Village in accordance with the revised plan. 

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction contesting the trial court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea and this interlocutory appeal followed. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2015) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from 

order denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law that can be challenged, as it 

was here, by a plea to the jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 

2000). We review an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks 

& Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the sufficiency of the claimant’s pleadings or the 

existence of necessary jurisdictional facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–28. Here, the City 

challenges both. When the plea challenges the claimant’s pleadings, we determine whether the 

claimant has plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction, construing 

the pleadings liberally and in favor of the claimant. Id. at 226. When the plea challenges 

jurisdictional facts, we consider evidence submitted by the parties. Id. at 227. In performing our 
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review, we do not look to the merits of the claimant’s case, but consider only the pleadings and 

the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. If the jurisdictional evidence creates a 

fact question, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the issue must be 

resolved by the fact finder. Id. at 227–28. This standard mirrors our review of summary 

judgments, and we therefore take as true all evidence favorable to the Association, indulging 

every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in its favor. Id. at 228.

DISCUSSION

STANDING

In its first issue, the City claims the Association does not have standing to bring claims 

for declaratory and injunctive relief. Standing is a necessary component of a court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). 

When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework 

for a standing analysis, rather than common-law rules. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.3d 323, 324 (Tex. 

1984); Everitt v. TK-Taito, LLC, 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). 

The Association claims standing to bring this suit under the Texas Uniform 

Unincorporated Association Act, codified in chapter 252 of the Texas Business Organizations 

Code (the “Code”). The City challenges the Association’s status as a nonprofit association 

claiming it does not have a “nonprofit purpose” recognized by the Code, and thus cannot rely 

upon the Code for standing. We disagree with the City. 

The Code defines a "nonprofit association" as an unincorporated organization, other than 

one created by a trust, consisting of three or more members joined by mutual consent for a 

common, nonprofit purpose. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 252.001(2) (West 2012). A 

nonprofit purpose is in turn defined broadly to include: serving charitable, benevolent, religious, 

eleemosynary, patriotic, civic, missionary, educational, scientific, social, fraternal, athletic, 

aesthetic, agricultural, and horticultural purposes; operating or managing a professional, 
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commercial, or trade association or labor union; providing animal husbandry; or operating on a 

nonprofit cooperative basis for the benefit of its members. Id. at § 2.002. 

The pleadings and the relevant documents and testimony presented to the trial court 

establish the Association’s purposes are “advancing the interest of East Village Residents, 

specifically including but not limited to advocacy on East Village land use and zoning issues for 

the benefit of East Village Residents” and the betterment of the neighborhood. Protecting the 

quality of neighborhood living is a civic purpose. See e.g. Hill Country Estates Homeowners 

Ass’n v. Guernsey, No. 13–13–00395–CV, 2015 WL 2160510, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

May 7, 2015, no pet.); Anderson v. New Prop. Owners’ Ass’n of Newport, Inc., 122 S.W.3d 378, 

385 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). Therefore, the Association has a nonprofit 

purpose and is a nonprofit association to which the Code applies. 

Next, citing section 252.006 of the Code, entitled “Liability in Tort and Contract,” the 

City contends that the Association does not have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive 

relief to prevent the City from taking certain actions because the Code only provides that an 

association is a legal entity for the purposes of determining and enforcing rights, duties and 

liabilities in contract and tort, claims that are not involved in this lawsuit. The City’s reliance on 

section 252.006 is misplaced. Section 252.006 protects members of associations from individual 

liability for actions of the associations that sound in contract or tort. Section 252.006 does not 

purport to address, much less to confer or restrict the standing of an association. 

Instead, section 252.007 of the Code, entitled “Capacity to Assert Defend; Standing,” is 

the provision that confers standing on associations. An association may assert a claim in its name 

on behalf of its members if: 

(1) one or more of the nonprofit association’s members have standing to assert a 

claim in their own right;
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(2) the interests the nonprofit association seeks to protect are germane to its purposes; 

and

(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of a 

member. 

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 252.007(b). 

The City does not challenge the Association’s ability to satisfy the second and third 

prongs of the statute’s associational standing test. Focusing on the first prong, the City argues the 

Association does not have standing because it does not own property within 200 feet of East 

Village. We have previously considered and rejected this argument in Wyly v. Preservation

Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 463 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).3 The Association does not have 

to own property itself to challenge the notice given. What is required is that one or more of its 

members own property within the notice area and would have standing to assert a claim. 

The Association alleged that one or more of its members reside and own real property 

within 200 feet of East Village and have particularized injury standing to challenge the validity 

of the Ordinance because they claim the value of their property will be suppressed and the 

development will cause a traffic nuisance. The Association also presented evidence that two of 

the Association’s members have owned real property within 200 feet of East Village for more 

than 45 years and that the rezoning will adversely impact them, as well as others, who own 

property near East Village. 

The City argues these jurisdictional facts and pleadings do not satisfy the first prong of 

the test because one of the two members identified by the Association putatively waived standing 

by returning a reply form supporting the zoning change without noting an objection to the 

 3 The City cites Kinkaid Sch., Inc. v. McCarthy, 833 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.) a case that was decided 

before the Texas Supreme Court adopted the associational standing test set forth in Hunt, and before the legislature adopted the Uniform 

Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act at issue here. In all events, the Kinkaid court did not consider or apply any associational standing test.
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noticed proposal. Of course, only one member with standing is required.

4 Moreover, the one 

member who expressed no opposition prior to the City’s approval, appeared below to make clear 

that he objected to the plan as approved and to complain that he had not received notice adequate 

to describe it. As detailed below, this opposition, at least, creates a fact issue insofar as this 

member’s standing is concerned. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. We therefore conclude the 

Association demonstrated that at least one of its members could sue in their own right. This 

satisfies the first prong of the test. 

We overrule the City’s first issue.

WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

In its second issue, the City claims the Association failed to allege the existence of facts 

sufficient to invoke a waiver of the City’s immunity under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments 

Act (“Declaratory Judgments Act”). The Declaratory Judgments Act expressly waives 

governmental immunity in any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b). In such a case, the municipality must be made a 

party and is entitled to be heard. Id. 

Relying upon the merit inquiry the Miranda court conducted to determine whether 

governmental immunity had been waived under the Texas Tort Claim Act, the City reads into the

waiver of immunity under the Declaratory Judgments Act a requirement that the party 

challenging the ordinance first establish the ordinance is in fact invalid. The City then claims the 

Association cannot establish the Ordinance is invalid because the notice given was sufficient as a 

matter of law. The City’s reliance upon Miranda is misplaced because Miranda’s merits inquiry 

is a product of a statutory regime that makes the jurisdictional waiver co-extensive with liability. 

 4 While the argument on standing focuses on owners of property within 200 feet of East Village, the Dallas Development Code requires the 

City to give written notice of the proposed zoning change to owners of property within 500 feet of East Village. We presume the City agrees that 

it has to comply with its own development code and that owners of property within 500 feet of East Village would have standing to challenge the 

Ordinance. 
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Jurisdiction in this case does not depend upon a merit determination of the sufficiency of the 

notice given. And even if the City established that the notice given was sufficient as a matter of 

law, which it has not, such a showing would not affect the waiver of governmental immunity 

under the Declaratory Judgments Act. 

As previously stated, Miranda concerned a waiver of governmental immunity under the 

Texas Tort Claim Act, not the Declaratory Judgments Act. 133 S.W.3d at 224. The Texas Tort 

Claims Act waives immunity from suit but only “to the extent of liability created by [the Act].” 

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.025(a). The Texas Tort Claim Act expressly 

waives sovereign immunity in three areas: “use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, 

and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. The 

Texas Tort Claim Act further modifies a governmental unit’s waiver of immunity from suit by 

imposing the limitations of liability articulated in the recreational use statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 101.058. A governmental unit waives sovereign immunity under the 

recreational use statute only if it is grossly negligent. Id. at § 75.002(c)-(d). Considering the 

interplay between the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, a governmental 

unit retains immunity from suit absent evidence of circumstances giving rise to a duty to warn or 

protect coupled with the requisite mental state. See Suarez v. City of Tex. City, No. 13-0947, 

2015 WL 3802865, at *6 (Tex. June 19, 2015). Thus, the immunity waiver under the Texas Tort 

Claim Act is intertwined with the merits of a claim under that act. Id. at *5.

Unlike the Texas Tort Claim Act, the immunity waiver under the Declaratory Judgments 

Act is not intertwined with the merits of a claim under that act. Immunity is waived if the 

proceeding involves the validity of a municipal ordinance. The waiver is not conditioned upon 

evidence that the challenged ordinance is in fact invalid. For jurisdictional purposes, what is 

required is a pleading that would support the invalidation of the ordinance. See e.g. City of 
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McKinney v. Hank’s Rest. Grp., LP, 412 S.W.3d 102, 113 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

Here, the Association averred that the Ordinance is void for lack of sufficient notice. If a notice 

of a zoning change does not sufficiently apprise its recipients of the nature of the proposed new 

zoning, the ordinance is void. See City of Amarillo v. Wagner, 326 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Amarillo 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Because lack of sufficient notice is a basis upon which 

the Ordinance would be void, the Association has pleaded a claim under the Declaratory 

Judgments Act for which governmental immunity has been waived.

Citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Tex. 1993) 

and Mickens v. Longhorn DFW Moving, Inc., 264 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, 

pet. denied), the City claims compliance with notice requirements is a question of law to be 

determined by the court. The Dresser and Mickens cases are not on point for two reasons. First, 

the decisions concerning the sufficiency of the notices in Dresser and Mickens were not 

examined as jurisdictional issues. They were made on the merits and at trial. As noted above, we 

do not read Miranda and section 37.006(b) as conditioning jurisdiction on a plenary examination 

of the merits. In addition, Dresser and Mickens concerned the fair notice requirement of 

conspicuousness, as defined by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, applicable to indemnity 

and release agreements in contracts involving the sale of goods or services between private 

parties, not a notice of a zoning change request in connection with a statutory scheme conferring 

jurisdiction to examine the validity of an ordinance. Dresser, 835 S.W.2d at 510-11; Mickens, 

264 S.W.3d at 879. 

Once again concentrating on the merits of the Association’s claim, the City claims this 

case is like the Midway case and urges us to find that the notices given were sufficient as a 

matter of law. We disagree for two reasons. As stated previously, in performing our review of 

the trial court’s interlocutory denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, we do not look to the 
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merits of the Association’s case and determine whether the notice given was sufficient. In 

addition, the Midway case establishes the sufficiency of the notice is a question of fact to be 

reached in the trial court in the first instance and not by us on accelerated interlocutory appeal. 

In Midway, an unincorporated association of real property owners residing in a

neighborhood of a zoning change sued the city attacking the validity of a city ordinance rezoning 

property for use as a “dry” shopping center. The association claimed lack of proper notice that 

the center would be dry. The city did not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction. The trial court, 

as the trier of fact at trial, decided that the notice was sufficient. The appellate court affirmed the 

trial court’s decision. Midway, 552 S.W.2d at 175. 

Under Midway, when an ordinance is challenged for lack of sufficient notice as to the 

scope of the change in zoning, the issue of sufficiency is not a jurisdictional question, but rather 

a question as to the merits of the claim to be determined by the trier of fact on a case by case 

basis. The Midway case does not support a determination of the sufficiency of the notice to 

resolve a jurisdictional challenge. 

Because the City purported to challenge the jurisdictional facts to support a claim under 

the Declaratory Judgments Act, the Association presented the testimony of David Shaw, a 

member of the Association who owns property within 200 feet of East Village. He testified he 

did not know the City was considering allowing the construction of a “big box” store and had he 

known this he would have appeared at the hearings and opposed the zoning change.

The City objected to this testimony on various grounds, including relevancy, despite 

urging a determination of the sufficiency of the notice on the merits. On appeal, the City claims 

the trial court erred in overruling its objections to Shaw’s testimony. The decision of whether to 

admit or exclude testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Lopez v. La 

Madeleine of Tex., Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 859–60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). A trial 
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court abuses its discretion in admitting testimony or evidence if it acts without reference to any 

guiding rules or principles or if the act complained of is arbitrary and unreasonable. Carpenter v. 

Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002). In light of the record before 

this court, and the lack of any authority from the City to establish the trial court abused its 

discretion, we overrule the City’s complaint concerning the evidentiary rulings. 

Shaw’s testimony, as well as the City’s plea itself, which goes into fact intensive analysis 

of the notices, establishes that a fact question exists on the notice issue. Because the Association 

asserted a claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act for which governmental immunity has 

been waived and presented evidence in response to the City’s plea challenging jurisdictional 

facts that raises a fact issue on the sufficiency of the notice, the trial court properly denied the 

City’s plea to the jurisdiction on the Association’s declaratory judgment claim. We overrule the 

City’s second issue.

In its third issue, the City claims the Association failed to allege and establish the 

existence of sufficient facts to invoke a waiver of the City’s immunity to maintain an action for 

injunctive relief. 

In connection with the Association’s request for a permanent injunction, the Association 

alleged that any further conduct predicated on the validity of the Ordinance would be ultra vires. 

The Association seeks to enjoin the City and its officials, including its Chief Building Official, 

from issuing a building permit for a general merchandise or food store 100,000 square feet or 

more on East Village; from issuing a certificate of occupancy for any building that does not 

comply with the pre-Ordinance zoning on East Village, and from issuing any permits or 

certificates on East Village for uses that do not comply with the pre-Ordinance zoning. The 

Association further seeks an order mandating that any such permits already issued be cancelled 
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by the City, and prohibiting the construction and use of any building as a general merchandise or 

food store 100,000 square feet or more on East Village. 

The Texas Supreme Court has clarified the law of government immunity from claims for 

injunctive relief in City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009). Under that case, 

governmental entities retain immunity from claims for injunctive relief based on allegations that 

government officials are violating the law or exceeding their powers under the law. Id. at 372-73. 

Such claims must be brought against the responsible government actors in their official 

capacities. See id.

The Association seeks injunctive relief for ultra vires conduct predicated on a void 

ordinance. Under Heinrich, the City retains its immunity from the Association’s claims for 

injunctive relief while City officials, in their official capacity, do not. Therefore, the Association 

has not plead facts that demonstrate a waiver of governmental immunity to assert its injunction 

claim against the City. We sustain the City’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as to the 

Association’s standing and ability to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity 

of the Ordinance. We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction as 

to the Association’s permanent injunction claim. We remand the cause for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

.

141406F.P05

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

CITY OF DALLAS, Appellant

No. 05-14-01406-CV V.

EAST VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-07239.

Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. 

Justices Lang-Miers and Brown 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial court on the 

City of Dallas’ Plea to the jurisdiction is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We 

REVERSE that portion of the trial court's order as to East Village Association’s permanent 

injunction claim against the City of Dallas. In all other respects, the trial court's order is 

AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the trial court .

It is ORDERED that appellee EAST VILLAGE ASSOCIATION recover costs of this 

appeal from appellant CITY OF DALLAS.

Judgment entered this 21st day of July, 2015.