FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

WILLIAM G. SMOCK GREGORY F. ZOELLER

MATTHEW A. SHEEHAN Attorney General of Indiana

Terre Haute, Indiana

KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

WENDY THOMPSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 61A01-1305-CR-207

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE PARKE CIRCUIT COURT 

The Honorable Sam A. Swaim, Judge

Cause No. 61C01-1201-FD-17 

February 13, 2014

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge
2

Case Summary

Wendy Thompson appeals her sentence for four counts of Class D felony operating 

a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentFration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily 

injury. She raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that her sentence exceeds the 

maximum sentence allowable under the consecutive-sentencing statute because Class D 

felony operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing 

serious bodily injury is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of Indiana Code 

section 35-5-1-2(a). Second, she argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offenses and her character. Finding that Class D felony operating a motor 

vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury is 

a “crime of violence” and that Thompson’s sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and her character, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

In 2012, Thompson lived in Terre Haute, Indiana and her children lived with their 

father in Avon. On the evening of January 21, 2012, Thompson was returning to Terre 

Haute after visiting her son for the weekend. It was her first unsupervised visit with him 

in eight months. 

On the way back to Terre Haute, Thompson stopped at a liquor store, purchased 

alcoholic beverages, and began to drink alcohol while driving. She also took a 

benzodiazepine pill, which intensifies the effect of alcohol. Thompson was driving her 

blue Nissan SUV on U.S. Highway 36 in Parke County, Indiana. 
3

John Wilson was also driving on Highway 36 that day. As he was driving, he 

noticed Thompson approaching quickly from behind. As Thompson passed him, 

Thompson used her left turn signal when moving from the left passing lane back to the 

right lane. After passing Wilson, she passed another car in front of him, using her right 

turn signal to move from the right lane to the left lane and then her left turn signal to move 

from the left lane to the right lane. Wilson estimated that Thompson was driving at 

approximately eighty-five miles per hour.

Shortly after Thompson passed Wilson, Thompson approached a green Ford Escort 

driven by Tina Redman. While Thompson was behind Redman, Redman slowed down for 

an Amish wagon in front of her. Thompson did not slow down and rear-ended Redman’s 

car. According to Wilson, who saw the accident, Thompson did not apply her brakes before 

hitting Redman’s car. The State Police reconstruction report determined that Thompson 

was traveling “at least 34 miles per hour.” Tr. p. 48.1 Redman’s car slid down the guardrail 

and hit a white Jeep Cherokee driving in the opposite direction.

After seeing the accident, Wilson stopped to help the people injured. He went to 

Redman’s car and pulled the windows outward so the glass would not break toward the 

people inside. Redman and her daughter, H.M., were inside the car. H.M. was screaming 

and crying and was covered in her mother’s blood. Wilson also noticed that Redman’s 

blood covered the floor of the car. He cut H.M.’s seatbelt but was unable to remove her. 

H.M., who had been riding in the front passenger seat of Redman’s car, suffered significant 

 

1 We note that the court reporter for the trial court did not consecutively number the pages of the 

two transcripts we received. Indiana Appellate Rule 28(A)(2) states: “The pages of the Transcript shall be 

numbered consecutively regardless of the number of volumes the Transcript requires.” All citations to the 

transcript are to the April 15, 2013 transcript. 
4

injuries to her right ring finger, requiring two surgeries to repair. Her legs were also 

severely bruised, making it difficult for her to walk for about one month after the accident.

Redman was unconscious and had to be airlifted to Methodist Hospital in 

Indianapolis. She remained in a coma for fourteen days due to traumatic head and brain 

injuries. She had “multiple skull fractures along with a severe brain bleed, fractured 

mastoid processes, a ruptured ear drum, and fractured cheek bones.” Id. at 43. She also 

suffered a partial loss of sight in both eyes, loss of balance, constant headaches, and is still

unable to drive or continue working as a hairdresser.

 Kimberly Parsons and Beth Fiandt, the occupants of the white Jeep Cherokee, were 

also seriously injured. Parsons was taken to the hospital in a neck brace and continues to 

have shoulder problems. Ex. 3. Fiandt “missed a week of work during her recovery and 

experienced acute pain for some time afterward.” Ex. 2. Her Jeep Cherokee was also 

destroyed. Id. 

At the scene of the accident, Wilson noticed Thompson laughing and talking on her 

cellular phone. According to Wilson, it was “[n]ot like hysterical laughing but a little bit 

of childish giggling -- giggling going on.” Tr. p. 13.

Thompson was also injured in the collision and taken to St. Vincent Clay Hospital. 

At the hospital, Thompson’s blood was tested. Her blood-alcohol concentration was 0.25, 

over three-times the legal limit. Id. at 64. She also tested positive for benzodiazepines, 

but she has a valid prescription for them. Id. at 65-66. 

The State charged Thompson with eight felonies. Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 were for 

Class D felony causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with a blood-
5

alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-4(a)(1) and 

Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 were for Class D felony causing serious bodily injury when operating 

a motor vehicle while intoxicated under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-4(a)(3). Appellant’s 

App. p. 1-8. Thompson entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to 

Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Id. at 9. In exchange for Thompson’s guilty plea, the State agreed 

to recommend that:

[t]he length and terms of [Thompson’s] sentence (including whether or not 

to run the sentences consecutively) shall be left to the Court’s discretion. 

However, [Thompson’s] sentence on Count 3 shall be six months suspended 

to probation, and the sentence on Count 4 shall be six months suspended to 

probation . . . . The State further moves the Court to dismiss any remaining 

count(s) upon sentencing [Thompson]. 

Id. at 9. The State also dismissed the charges for Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8. Id.

Thompson testified at the sentencing hearing. She explained that she had begun 

abusing alcohol because she was molested by a member of her religious order when she 

was seven years old and had been suppressing her feelings about the event. Although she 

had received treatment for alcohol abuse before, she relapsed after dropping her son off

that day. While awaiting sentencing in this case, she wore an alcohol-monitoring bracelet. 

She successfully abstained from drinking and sought psychological treatment from Dr. 

Michael Murphy, a clinical psychologist and professor at Indiana State University.

Dr. Murphy also testified at the sentencing hearing. According to Dr. Murphy, 

Thompson has anxiety disorder with adjustment disorder and alcoholism. Tr. p. 72. When 

explaining Thompson’s anxiety disorder, Dr. Murphy explained that Thompson “was very, 

very concerned, very upset, very worried and there was also a good bit of depression when 

[Thompson] presented and it was all related to the accident . . . .” Id. Dr. Murphy believed 
6

Thompson was making progress because “she obviously has not had any recidivism with 

regard to alcohol[,] . . . she has been attending the AA meetings[,] and she has been 

adhering to all of the expectations that we set within therapy.” Id. at 73. According to Dr. 

Murphy, incarceration would not advance Thompson’s ability to overcome her alcoholism 

or rebuild her life. Id. at 76. 

In determining Thompson’s sentence, the court identified three aggravators: (1) the 

harm, injury, or loss suffered by the victims in Counts 1 and 2; (2) the amount of alcohol 

Thompson consumed and the fact that one of her prescribed medications would intensify 

the effect of alcohol consumption; and (3) Thompson’s history of delinquent or criminal 

activity, which includes a previous conviction for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 98-99; 

Appellant’s App. p. 12. The court also found two mitigators: (1) Thompson had shown 

that she would respond well to short-term imprisonment or probation and (2) Thompson 

had only one previous conviction. Tr. p. 99; Appellant’s App. p. 12. The court concluded 

that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators.

The trial court sentenced Thompson to three years for Count I and three years for 

Count II. Appellant’s App. p. 12. The court also sentenced Thompson to 180 days for

Count 3 and 180 days for Count 4. Id. at 12-13. 

The State requested that Thompson’s sentences for Counts 1 and 2 be imposed 

consecutively for a total executed sentence of six years in the Department of Correction. 

Tr. p. 89. Thompson disagreed, citing the restrictions imposed on consecutive sentences 

by Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c). Id. at 92-93. The State responded that the counts 
7

to which Thompson pled guilty were “crimes of violence” pursuant to Section 35-50-1-

2(c). 

The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total of seven 

years. Id. The first five years of the sentence was ordered to be executed at the DOC with 

the remaining two years suspended to probation. Id. The court also ordered Thompson to 

pay $9,777.92 to Redman and $17,867.27 to H.M. in restitution. Appellant’s App. p. 14.

Thompson now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Thompson raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court 

erroneously sentenced her to a term of imprisonment that exceeded the maximum sentence 

allowable under the consecutive sentencing statute, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2. 

Second, she argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses 

and her character. 

I. Consecutive Sentencing

Thompson argues that the trial court’s imposition of a seven-year consecutive 

sentence was erroneous because she was not convicted of a “crime of violence,” as defined

in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, and therefore, her sentence exceeds the maximum 

sentence allowable under the consecutive-sentencing statute. Specifically, she argues that 

Class D felony causing serious bodily injury when operating a motor vehicle with a bloodalcohol concentration of at least 0.08 is not a “crime of violence” under Section 35-50-1-

2(a).
8

Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo because they present pure 

questions of law. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). “The primary purpose 

of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” State 

v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008). When interpreting a statute, “we will 

not read into the statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature” and “it is 

just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as to recognize what it does 

say.” N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002). Additionally, “[p]enal statutes 

should be construed strictly against the State and ambiguities should be resolved in favor 

of the accused.” Porter v. State, 985 N.E.2d 348, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Merritt 

v. State, 829 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. 2005)).

The statute restricting the length of consecutive sentences states in relevant part:

[T]he court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served 

concurrently or consecutively. The court may consider the:

(1) aggravating circumstances in IC 35-38-1-7.1(a); and

(2) mitigating circumstances in IC 35-38-1-1.7.1(b);

in making a determination under this subsection. The court may order terms 

of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not 

imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total 

of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of 

imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 and IC 35-50-2-10 to which the defendant 

is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal 

conduct shall not exceed the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) 

class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the 

person has been convicted.

Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c). While the limitation does not prohibit consecutive sentences, it 

does limit the length of consecutive sentences. Harris v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 

(Ind. 2007). The phrase “terms of imprisonment” includes “any period of incarceration a 
9

defendant is sentenced to, even if all or a portion of that period of time is suspended.” Mask 

v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind. 2005). 

Here, Thompson’s total consecutive sentence, including the portion suspended to 

probation, was seven years. Because Thompson was convicted only of Class D felonies, 

we must look to the advisory sentence for a Class C felony to determine the maximum 

consecutive sentence permitted under Section 35-50-1-2(c). The advisory sentence for a 

Class C felony is four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a). Thus, Thompson argues, her 

aggregate sentence could not exceed four years. 

However, Section 35-50-1-2(c) specifically states that the maximum-sentence 

restriction does not apply to “crimes of violence.” Section 35-5-1-2(a) states:

As used in this section, “crime of violence” means the following:

(1) Murder (IC 35-42-1-1).

(2) Attempted murder (IC 35-41-5-1).

(3) Voluntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-3).

(4) Involuntary manslaughter (IC 35-42-1-4).

(5) Reckless homicide (IC 35-42-1-5).

(6) Aggravated battery (IC 35-42-2-1.5).

(7) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).

(8) Rape (IC 35-42-4-1).

(9) Criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2) (before its repeal on July 1, 

2014).

(10) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3).

(11) Sexual misconduct with a minor as a Class A felony under IC 35-42-4-

9(a)(2) or a Class B felony under IC 35-42-4-9(b)(2).

(12) Robbery as a Class A felony or a Class B felony (IC 35-42-5-1).

(13) Burglary as a Class A felony or a Class B felony (IC 35-43-2-1).

(14) Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death (IC 9-30-5-5).

(15) Operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury 

to another person (IC 9-30-5-4).

(16) Resisting law enforcement as a felony (IC 35-44.1-3-1).

I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a) (emphasis added). 
10

Thompson argues that a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a bloodalcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury is different than a 

conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury. 

See, e.g., Warner v. State, 497 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“If we were to adopt 

a construction of these statutes that would permit the State to establish guilt of driving 

while intoxicated merely by proving that the driver had a BAC of .10 percent or above, any 

substantive distinction between driving while intoxicated and the per se offense would 

cease to exist and the per se offense would be rendered meaningless. . . . Such a result 

would be inconsistent with our conclusion that the two crimes are not the same offense, in 

that they have been defined to have different elements.”). She further argues that because 

her conviction is for a different offense than the one listed in Section 35-5-1-2(a), it is not 

included within the definition of a “crime of violence.”

However, the State argues that Thompson disregards the statutory citation next to 

the text of the offense under subdivision fifteen. After the text, “Operating a vehicle while 

intoxicated causing serious bodily injury to another person,” it is written “(IC 9-30-5-4).” 

The State argues that the statute cited in parenthesis after the text is controlling. Indiana 

Code section 9-30-5-4 states: 

(a) A person who causes serious bodily injury to another person when 

operating a vehicle:

(1) with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least eight-hundredths 

(0.08) gram of alcohol per:

(A) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood; or

(B) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s breath;
11

(2) with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or 

its metabolite in the person’s body; or

 (3) while intoxicated;

commits a Class D felony. However, the offense is a Class C felony if the 

person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated within the 

five (5) years preceding the commission of the offense.

(b) A person who violates subsection (a) commits a separate offense for each 

person whose serious bodily injury is caused by the violation of subsection 

(a).

(c) It is a defense under subsection (a)(2) that the accused person consumed 

the controlled substance under a valid prescription or order of a practitioner 

(as defined in IC 35-48-1) who acted in the course of the practitioner’s 

professional practice.

Thus, the State argues, Thompson’s offenses are included within the definition of a “crime

of violence” because the statutory citation includes the entire statute and Thompson was 

convicted under Section 9-30-5-4(a)(1) of the statute.

We agree with the State that Thompson’s convictions for Class D felony operating 

a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily 

injury are included within the definition of a “crime of violence.” Under the definition of 

a “crime of violence,” subpart fifteen includes the statutory citation without limiting it to 

causing serious bodily injury with a motor vehicle while intoxicated under Section 9-30-5-

4(a)(3). We think the citation to the statute is evidence that the legislature intended to 

include both crimes within the definition of a “crime of violence.” 

Had the legislature intended only to define operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated causing serious bodily injury as a crime of violence, it could have done so with 

a more specific code citation—Section 9-30-5-4(a)(3). We are convinced by the State’s 
12

argument that the legislature did choose to designate a specific code section in other 

contexts. See N.D.F., 775 N.E.2d at 1088 (“[I]t is just as important to recognize what the 

statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.”). For example, subpart eleven 

under Section 35-5-1-2(a), which pertains to sexual misconduct with a minor, limits a 

“crime of violence” specifically to Indiana Code section 35-42-4-9(a)(2) and Indiana Code 

section 35-42-4-9(b)(2). These two sections apply when a person at least eighteen years 

old performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a minor when 

it is committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force; it is committed while armed 

with a deadly weapon; it results in serious bodily injury; or the offense is committed by 

giving the victim a drug without the minor’s knowledge or knowing that the victim was 

given a drug without the minor’s knowledge. I.C. § 35-42-4-9. The distinction between 

these subsections and the other portions of the statute is the violent aspect of the crime

under these portions of the statute.

Thompson responds to these arguments in her reply brief by arguing that there are 

instances where the text limits the applicability in Section 35-5-1-2(a) even though the 

statute in parenthesis afterward cites the entire offense. I.C. § 35-5-1-2(a)(12) (defining 

only “Robbery as a Class A or Class B felony” as a crime of violence); I.C. § 35-5-1-

2(a)(16) (defining only “Resisting law enforcement as a felony” as a crime of violence).

However, these restrictions are not the same because they differentiate between different 

levels of crimes, such as the difference between a felony and a misdemeanor or the 

difference between a Class C felony and a Class B or A felony. In each example cited by 

Thompson, the distinctions serve to define as a “crime of violence” conduct that causes 
13

bodily injury to another person and exclude conduct that does not cause bodily injury to 

another. See I.C. § 35-42-5-1, I.C. § 35-43-2-1, I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1. 

No such similar distinction can be drawn between operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated causing serious bodily injury and operating a motor vehicle with a bloodalcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury. In both instances, the 

crime is a Class D felony where the defendant causes serious bodily injury. The act of 

causing serious bodily injury is an essential element to each crime listed in Section 9-30-

5-4. Because each of these offenses results in serious bodily injury to a victim, it would be 

illogical for the legislature to include one but not the other within the definition of a “crime 

of violence.” Moreover, if we were to agree with Thompson’s argument, a conviction of 

a person who causes serious bodily injury to another person while under the influence of a 

Schedule I or II controlled substance would also not be a “crime of violence,” as it is not 

included in the words before the statutory citation under Section 35-5-1-2(a). For this 

reason, we conclude that operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of 

at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury is a “crime of violence” under Indiana Code 

section 35-5-1-2(a)(15). Therefore, the consecutive-sentencing limitation under Section 

35-5-1-2 does not apply to Thompson.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

Thompson also argues that her seven-year sentence with two years suspended to 

probation is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character. The State 

responds that Thompson has waived this argument because she failed to make an argument 

that the nature of her offenses warrants a downward revision in her sentence. See Perry v. 
14

State, 921 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“It is well-established that a failure to 

make a cogent argument regarding the nature of the defendant’s offense and the 

defendant’s character results in waiver of the defendant’s appropriateness claim.”). In her 

reply brief, Thompson contends that she did discuss the nature of the offenses by 

analogizing her case to Davis v. State, 851 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied,

and by describing in detail the evidence presented at sentencing. We agree with Thompson 

that her argument by analogy to Davis was sufficient to contend that her sentence was 

inappropriate and proceed to the merits. 

Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a 

sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent 

appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which 

provides that a court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration 

of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds the sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 

1116 (Ind. 2007) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). When determining whether a 

sentence is inappropriate, we recognize that the presumptive sentence “is the starting point 

the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Weiss v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. 2006). When assessing the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender, we may look to any factors appearing in the record. Stetler 

v. State, 972 N.E.2d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The defendant has the 

burden of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Reid, 876 N.E.2d at 1116 (citing 

Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)). 
15

The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, 

and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement 

of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—

the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of 

counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is 

inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case. 

Id. at 1224. In assessing whether a sentence is inappropriate, appellate courts may take 

into account whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or is otherwise crafted 

using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge. Davidson v. State, 

926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). These tools include probation, home detention, 

placement in a community-corrections program, executed time in a Department of 

Correction facility, concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, and restitution/fines. Id.

A person who commits a Class D felony shall be imprisoned for a term of between 

six months and three years, with one-and-a-half years being the advisory term. Ind. Code 

§ 35-50-2-7(a). Here, Thompson pled guilty to four counts of Class D felony operating a 

motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily

injury. The trial court sentenced Thompson to three years on Count 1, three years on Count 

2, 180 days on Count 3, and 180 days on Count 4. All four sentences are within the 

statutory range.
16

The substantial harm caused by Thompson’s actions merit the sentence. After 

Thompson decided to consume a substantial amount of alcohol while driving, she hit the 

back of Redman’s car, causing Redman’s car to hit another car. Thompson had a bloodalcohol concentration of 0.25, three times the legal limit. Tr. p. 64. Moreover, she knew

the dangers associated with mixing alcohol and benzodiazepines. Id. at 65-66. Wilson, 

who observed the incident, estimated that she was driving eighty-five miles per hour as she 

passed him. The State Police reconstruction report determined that Thompson was 

traveling “at least 34 miles per hour” when she hit Redman’s car. Id. at 48. Immediately 

afterward, Wilson saw “[a] little girl screaming and crying and her mom’s blood all over 

her. And then her mom’s blood is all over the floor.” Id. at 12. Meanwhile, he saw 

Thompson talking on her cellular phone and “giggling.” Id. at 13.

Her choice to drink and drive drastically changed the lives of the people affected by 

this case. Redman, after being airlifted to the hospital, was in a coma for fourteen days 

with traumatic head and brain injuries. Id. at 35. She had to relearn basic life skills such 

as eating, brushing her teeth, standing, walking, or even knowing that she had a daughter. 

Id. at 36. Redman still lives with the horror inflicted upon her by Thompson’s carelessness. 

She fights severe headaches every day and cannot even lay on her side without getting 

dizzy and nauseous. Id. She also lost part of her vision in both eyes. Id. Redman, due to 

her injuries, also “missed out on helping [her] daughter . . . through a difficult time in her 

life, physically and emotionally recovering from this traumatic accident.” Id. at 27.

H.M. was also significantly affected. For weeks following the accident, it was 

almost impossible for her to walk. Id. at 20. Her ring finger, which was completely broken, 
17

has been operated on twice. Id. H.M. was an accomplished pianist and guitarist before the 

accident, but due to the injury to her finger, it is very difficult for her to play music. Id. at 

46. She missed substantial time from school and, “[r]ather than going to sporting events 

and hanging out with friends, the regular activities of people [her] age, [she] spent [her] 

time worrying about [her] mother, catching up at school and trying to get better.” Id.

Thompson’s decision to drive while intoxicated has also affected other members of 

Redman’s family. Before the accident, both Redman and her husband, Steve Redman, 

enjoyed perfect credit ratings. Id. at 46. Since the accident, Steve has had to care for both 

Redman and H.M. In 2012, he drove 11,682 miles just for medical treatment. Id. at 38. 

Steve also took a second job to help pay for the substantial medical expenses and to 

compensate for the loss of Redman’s income. Id. at 46.

The people in the Jeep Cherokee were also injured. Fiandt “experienced acute pain 

for some time after” and Parsons wrote that she has shoulder issues because of the crash. 

Ex. 2, 3. The nature of the offenses was significant and profound.

Regarding Thompson’s character, we acknowledge that she entered into a plea 

agreement with the State, had a troubled childhood, and has psychological issues.

Additionally, since her release from jail she has been wearing an alcohol-monitoring 

bracelet and has abstained from alcohol. 

However, we are concerned that Thompson was unable to admit the extent of her 

problems with alcohol. When her attorney asked her, “when you would drink you would 

drink in excess?” she responded with “I used to. I mean not to excess. I just—drank too 

much.” Tr. p. 56. Similarly, she was hesitant to admit that she was an alcoholic. She 
18

stated that she did not “deal with alcohol well” and that she was “not drinking anymore,” 

before eventually admitting that she was an alcoholic at one time. Id. at 60. This surprised 

her psychologist, Dr. Murphy, who stated that alcoholism was “one of the main things that 

we have been addressing . . . .” Id. at 78. 

While Thompson has led a mostly law abiding life, we note that she has a prior 

conviction for driving while intoxicated. Appellant’s Confidential Supplemental App. p. 

4. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Thompson testified that she had been involved in 

at least three car accidents in addition to this one, but she did not remember the exact 

number that were her fault. Id. at 67. She was even airlifted to the hospital after one, but 

she does not remember if she consumed alcohol before that accident. Id. at 68. As the trial 

court stated, “[s]he’s had -- in fact, her problems with alcohol and drugs have been so bad 

she’s had near death experiences and has still not addressed the problem before this 

accident occurred.” Id. at 99.

Finally, Thompson argues that her sentence merits a reduction because her

circumstances are similar to those in Davis where this Court determined that Davis’s 

sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character. 851 

N.E.2d at 1268. However, we find Davis distinguishable. In Davis, this Court noted that 

the trial court enhanced Davis’s sentence to a Class C felony because she had a previous 

conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and then used the same 

conviction as an aggravator to increase Davis’s sentence. Id. at 1267. Additionally, despite 

evidence that Davis had taken efforts to improve herself by attending Alcoholics 

Anonymous and a job-skills training program, the trial court found no mitigators. Id. at 
19

1268 n.5. Here, the trial court did not use Thompson’s past conviction to enhance her 

sentence to a Class C felony, so it could be properly used as an aggravator.2 Moreover, 

unlike the trial court in Davis, the trial court in this case did find that there were 

mitigators—specifically, that Thompson had shown that she would respond well to shortterm imprisonment or probation and Thompson had only one previous conviction. After 

considering these mitigators, the trial court determined that the aggravators outweighed the 

mitigators. 

Given the nature of these offenses and Thompson’s character, Thompson has failed 

to persuade us that her aggregate seven-year sentence, with two years suspended to 

probation, is inappropriate. We therefore affirm the trial court.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.

 

2 Thompson’s previous conviction for operating while intoxicated was on May 21, 2007, just five 

years and ten months before the date she pled guilty to these offenses. Section 9-30-5-4(a) elevates Class 

D felony operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious 

bodily injury to a Class C felony if the person has a previous conviction for operating while intoxicated 

within the five years preceding the commission of the offense.