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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-3311

M ARI A N. G R

A C I A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

S I G MATR

ON I NT E R

NAT I ONAL, I N C ., Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 1: 11 -cv-07 60 4 — Edmond E. Cha ng, Judg e.

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 8, 2016

— D E C I D E D N OV E MB E R 29, 2016

Before F L AUM

, R OVN E R , and S YKE S

, Circ uit Judges. R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Mar i a Graci a su ed her employ er , SigmaT ro n, Inter nati onal, Inc., for sexual harassmen t and fo r ter minating her in ret ali ation for repo rt ing sexual harassmen t. A jury found in fa vo r o f SigmaT ro n on the clai m of sexual harassmen t but ret urned a v erdic t for Graci a on the ret ali ation
co unt. SigmaT

ro n challen ges both the judgment in Graci a’s fav or and the amount of da ma g e s aw arded by the jury

. W e affi rm.2 No. 15-3311
I. Mar i a Graci a enter ed t he w or kfor ce at the age of si xte en. After holding jo bs at Burger Kin g, Dollar T ree and v arious staffing compani es, Graci a began w or kin g on the assemb ly l ine for the defendant, SigmaT ro n, in 1999. SigmaT

ro n i s an internat i ona l, publi cly-traded company that manuf actures prin ted ci rcui t board assembli es. The company has approx i

ma tely 2500 employ ees at manuf acturing faci li ties in the Uni ted St ates, Mex i co, T ai w an and Vi etnam. Its products a re used in aviati on, home appli ances and medi cal devic es, among other appli cati on s
. A hi ghly re ga rd e d employ ee at SigmaT ro n, 1 Graci a w as promo ted multi ple tim es ov er the y e a r s un til she achi ev ed the posi tion o f assembly superv i sor in 2004 or 2005. In her capac i ty as assembly supervis or , Graci a w as responsi ble for product output and quali ty , for sch eduling personnel and for di recting team members in their w or k, among other things. T eam members on the assembly line connected e lectr oni c components to ci rcui ts boards according to the cus tomers’ requirements. S older , the material us e d to attach components to ci rcui t boards, may be made wi th lead or wi thout lead. In some instances, cus tomer s requested that a particu lar solder

Si gma Tro n’s cor por ate human reso urces man ager, Sandra Mi edema, 1 descri b ed Gracia as “ab sol utel y great at her jo b ,” “ter ri fi c,” and “excel l ent” pri or to the events at the cor e of this case. Patrick Si l v erman, her man ager, testif i ed tha t, pri or to the seco nd half o f 2 0 08 , Gracia’s attendance was excell ent, her co ope ratio n wasgoo d, her i niti ative was v ery goo d, her jo b knowl edge was excell ent, her work qua l i ty was goo d to excell ent, and her work quantity o r o utput was good

.No. 15-3311 3
be employ ed, and i t w as the assembly supervis or ’s jo b to make sure that all customer re qui rements w ere met

. Graci a repo rt ed to P atr i ck Silv erman, a p ro ducti on manager
. In late 2007, Silv erman began e ng agin g in problematic conduc t tow ards Graci a. He sent her a seri es of emai ls containing gr aphi c photog raphs of partially nude w omen in degrading poses. I n e arly 2008, he sent Graci a an emai l wi th a photo of her y ounger si ster on whi ch someone had superi mposed an i mage of a male co-w or ker dressed as a baby , wi th the capti on, “Mo t he r , mi lk please,” in Spani sh. Graci a testifi ed that the 2

unwelcome p i ctures made her feel embarrassed, unc omfort

able and upset. But she di d not object to Silve r man when he sent the photo s and di d not inform the compa ny ’ s human
resources department becau se Silv erman w as her boss. Graci a had notic ed that Silv erman and the company’s executiv e vic epresi dent, Greg Fairhead, w ere goo d fri ends, and sh e fear ed

Si l v erman conce ded at tri al tha t he sent these photo graphs to Gracia 2 b ecause he fo und them “humoro us.” Afte r the l i tigati on commenced and Si gma Tro n b ecame awa re that Si l v erman ha d sent these pho tographs to a female sub or di nat e, he was adv i sed i n general not to u se wo r k e mail fo r non-business reasons. As of the time of the tri al, no one at the company had mentio ned these particul ar e ma i l s or photo graphs to him and no one at Si gma Tro n had ever di scip l i ned hi m fo r sendi ng these photo graphs. Mi edema testif i ed at tri al tha t, although she fo und the pi ctures “di sgusti ng,” she di d no t think they were sexual i n na ture. She re fused to saythat

a male supervisor sendi ng these photo graphs t o a female sub or di nat e
v i ol ated the co mpany’s sexual harass ment pol i cy.4 No. 15-3311
she w ould lose her jo b. Gre g Fairhead i s the brot her of Gary 3 Fairhead, the CEO of S i gmaT ro n. I n mid-2008, Silv erman start ed wri tin g Graci a up fo r tar diness
. Graci a di d no t deny that she had been late on multi ple occasi ons, someti mes as li ttle as a minute and at tim es for longer interv als. But Silv erm an had not prev i ously objecte d to her sch edule and prior to mi d-2008, Graci a‘s atte ndanc e
recor d had been described by Silv erman as “excellent.” One
ev ening in the fall of 2008, Graci a received a seri es of late ni ght 4 calls at home fr o m Silv erman. He asked her to jo in hi m at a party wi th Davi d Ni emi, a man who had prev i ously w or ked at

Gracia testif i ed ext ensively ab out additi onal hara ssing a cti ons a l l egedl y 3 taken b y Si l v erman. For e xam p l e, she testif i ed tha t Si l v erman repeatedl y ask ed her out on dates. She decl i ned each time b ut was afraid to say more
. She also testif i ed tha t Si l v erman once pul l ed away t he ne ck of her turtl eneck shirt i n fro nt of a co- worker and ask ed her i f she was hidi ng b i te marks

. Acco rdi ng to Gracia, Si l v erman at t empted to i nv i te himsel f to her apa rtment fo r an overnight stay, suggesting tha t he woul d rather stay with Gracia after attending a Cubs gam e than dri v e home to Rockfo rd, a di stant sub urb. On o c c as i on, he sent her texts or email s ask i ng her to go out to di nner or meet him at a b ar. Each time, she decl i ned. Gracia di d not repo rt this conduc t to her empl oyer
. Because the jury fo und fo r Si gma Tro n on the
sexua l hara ssment cl aim, we wil l not cred i t Gracia’s testimo ny on this i ssue unless her testimo ny i s unoppo sed. We i nclud e he r testimo ny to pro v i de context fo r her cl aim o f re tali atio n.
Gracia coul d not recal l the exa ct date of the l ate-night call s b ut testif i e d 4 tha t they occ urred approxima t e l y one month b efo re two October 20 08 meeti ngs tha t she had with Sand r a Mi edema, the company’s human
reso urces mana ger.No. 15-3311 5 SigmaT ro n. She declined the invitati on. On October 15, a few 5

w eeks after she declined Silv erman’s lat e-ni ght party invitation, sev eral months after receiving the explic i t emai ls, and after y ears of being an exemp l a ry employ ee, Graci a w as
sus pended for tw o days for tar diness
. When she ret urned to
w or k after the sus pens io n, she requested a meetin g wi th SigmaT ro n’ s corpor ate human resources manager , Sandra Miedem a. At the October 20 meetin g, Graci a t o l d Miedem a for the fi rst tim e about the late-ni ght phone calls from Silv erman and that Silverman had been tr eating her di fferently

. She explained that he had begun wri tin g her up for tar diness ev en though her tim eliness had not been an i ssu e before. Miedem a notic ed that Graci a’s appearance had deter i or ated since she had seen her last, that she look ed dull and lacked luster

. Ev en her clothing, jew elry a nd mak eup had changed. F our days later , Miedem a called Graci a in fo r a seco nd meetin g. Graci a again di scu ssed the late-ni ght phone calls and told Miedem a that S i lv erman had been t r e a t ing her di fferently and that he w as sexually harassing her

. Miedem a asked Graci a, “Is he sweet o n you? ” 6

Si l v erman deni ed mak i ng any call , say i ng tha t Ni emi ma d e o ne call to 5 Gracia fro m a party using Si l v erman’s phone. Ni emi deni ed at tri al tha t he made anyca l l to Gracia fr om a party. S i gma Tro n insi sts tha t any such call too k pl ace i n 20 04 , b ut the jury was entitl ed to b el i eve Gracia on this poi nt. It wa s al so entitl ed to cred i t Ni emi and Gracia over Si l v erman. Nei ther Fairhead nor Mi edema call ed Ni emi to check o ut Si l v erman’sstor y.
The def endant v ehemently deni es i n i ts b ri efs tha t Gracia compl ained to 6 Mi edema ab out sexua l hara ssment. But at tri al, Gracia respo nded affi rma- (co ntinued. ..)6 No. 15-3311
and Graci a replied, “Y

es.” Miedem a also asked Graci a i f she

w as on drugs. Graci a deni ed that she w as taking d r ug s and offered to un d e r go drug testing. Miedem a then dropped the subject. At the end of that second meetin g, Miedem a bypassed her
own supervis or a nd brought Graci a to the offi ce of Greg Fairhead, SigmaT

ro n’s execu tive vi c e -presi dent. Miedem a sai d that she di d not li ke the i dea of Silv erman “pushing at Mar i a.” Graci a repeat ed to Fai rhead that Silv erman had subjected her to multi ple unw anted late-ni ght phone calls at home. Fairhead replied that Silv erman had called her only once. Graci a tr i ed to tell Miedem a and Fairhead more about Silv erman’s inappropriate conduc t but F a i rhead spoke ov er her and gav e her no chanc e to interj ect. After a break in the meetin g, during whi ch Miedem a and Fairhe a d spoke priv ately to Silv erman, Graci a
w as bro ug ht back in to speak wi th Miedem a, Silv erman and F a i rhead. Ultim ately

, Graci a w as told to shake hands wi th Silv erman and w or k to get her

. Di ssati sfi ed wi th the company’s response to her cl a im of sexual harassmen t, Gr a cia fi led a charge wi th the Equal E m p l oy m e nt Op p or tunity C om m i ssi on (“EEOC”), allegin g se x and nati onal or i gin di scri minati on. SigmaT ro n receiv ed a copy of the EEOC cha rg e on N ove mber 19, 2008. Appro xim ately tw o

( ...c onti nued) 6 tivel y to a questio n ab out whether she “expl i ci tly c om p la in [e d] a b out sexua l hara ssment” to Mi edema i n the October 24 th meeti ng. As we expla i n i n secti on II.A. b el ow, i n reviewi ng the deni al o f a mo tio n fo r judgment as a matter o f l aw, we construe the facts i n fav or of the party tha t prevail ed at tri al. And so we cred i t Gracia’s v ersi on of the facts on the retali atio n cl aim.No. 15-3311 7

w eeks later

, on December 4, Silverman purpor tedly told Fairhead that he had receiv ed a repo rt from Ed uardo T rujillo, another S igmaT

ro n supervis or

, that Graci a had allow ed an employ ee to use the wrong solder on a cus tomer ’s or der , using unleaded solder on a board that called for solder wi th lead. Silv erman clai med that when T rujillo poin ted out the problem to Graci a, she had not take n the matter seri ously

. Silv erman asserted that when T

rujillo told hi m about the prob l e m, he (Si lv erman) w ent to the pro d uc t i on floor , segreg ated the contaminated product and too k care of the problem

. A fter Silv erman conv ey ed thi s purpor t e d sequenc e of ev ents to Fairhead, T

rujillo confi rmed Sil ve rm an’s stor y to Fairhead. The next day , a p p r oximately si x w eeks after Graci a’s fi rst complaint to Miedem a about Silv erman’s sexual harassment and tw o w eeks after the company receiv ed Graci a’s EEOC charge, SigmaT ro n terminated Graci a’s employment. 7
At tr i al, how ev er

, T rujillo, a SigmaT

ro n supervis or

, deni ed making any repo rt to Silv erman about Graci a or employ ees on her assembly l ine, and di d not recall Graci a speaking to hi m about the solderin g in ci dent. Instead, T rujillo testifi ed that he

w as called into Fairhead ’ s offi ce on December 5 and asked “about the wron gdoing of boards being soldered.” He reFairhead memori ali zed his explana tio n fo r the term i na t i on i n a memo, 7 cl aimi ng t ha t Gr aci a was fi red fo r “no t fo l l owi ng the stric t stan dard on sol der technol ogy.” The memo also stated tha t Truj i l l o b ro ught the erro r to Gracia’s attention and tha t she di d nothi ng to stop the work, i nstead tel l i ng Truj i l l o, “I hav e do ne this many times b efo re and nobody ever fo und out.” Acco rdi ng to the memo, Truj i l l o repo rted the erro r to Si l v erman who then rectifie d the situati on. Fairhead repre sented i n the memo tha t he questio ned Truj i l l o, who co nfi rmed S i l v erman’srepo rt.8 No. 15-3311 sponded to Fairhead that he “w as aw are, as well as the whole gr oup of inspec tor s.” Acco r d ing to T rujillo, employ ees often used the wrong solder on ci rcui t boards at SigmaT ro n, and that to the best of hi s knowledge, no one had ev er been fi red be ca us e o f the inadv ert ent use of the incorre ct solder on a ci rcui t board. T

rujillo also testifie d t hat, approx i mately one month before Graci a w as fi red, Silv e r ma n advis ed T rujillo to stay aw ay from Graci a becau se he (Si lv erman) w as “thro wing bombs at” her

. Graci a testifi ed that, on December 4, T rujillo brought to her atte nti on that an employ ee w as using th e wrong solder , and that she addressed the problem i mmedi ately and appropr i

ately . She r emov ed the pro ducts fro m the employ ee applyin g the wr o ng solder and deli v ered them to the corr ect area. She also deter mined whi ch employ ee had made t he mis take , a gr ou p l e a d e r wh o a c cepted responsibi li ty

. According to Graci a, Silv erman nev er came to the p ro ducti on floor and w as not inv olv ed in rectifying the problem. As w e di scu ss below , becau se Graci a prev ai led at t rial on her ret ali ation clai m, w e
cr e d i t the v ersi on of the facts that supp or t the jury ’s v erdic t

. The jury w as free to beli ev e Graci a and T r uj i llo, and corr espondingly free to deter mine that Silv erman and Fairhead had li ed about the inc i dent. 8
In response to the ret ali ation clai m, Si gmaT ro n asserted at tr i al that the company ter minat e d Graci a’s employment becau se she ha d allow ed an assem bly line w or ker to use the

As we wil l di scuss b el ow, Gracia presented addi tio nal ev i dence tha t t he 8 company’s sta ted r eason fo r her termi nati on was a pretext.No. 15-3311 9
wrong solder

, di d not resolv e the problem and di d not take the

ma t t er seri ously

. As for the harassmen t clai m, the company arg ued t ha t Silv erman’s alleged conduc t di d not meet the sta ndard for hosti le w or k environment, that Graci a had li ttle evidenc e corr obor atin g her clai ms, and that Graci a di d not
av ai l herself of the company’s sexual harassmen t poli cy becau se she nev er informed her employ er that Silv erman had done anythin g other than invite her to a party and tr eat her di ff e r e ntly by wri tin g her up for tar diness
. The jury found in fav or of SigmaT

ro n on the sexual harassmen t clai m and in fav or of Graci a on the ret ali ation clai m. The j ur y a w a rded Graci a $57,000 in comp e nsato ry damages and $250,000 in puni tiv e damages. SigmaT ro n appeals. 9
II. O n appeal, SigmaT

ro n contends that i t i s entitl e d t o judgment as a matter o f l a w o n the ret ali ation clai m becau se the evidenc e w as insu ffi ci ent to supp o r t t he jury ’s v erdic t. SigmaT ro n also maintains that the compens ator y and puni tiv e damages aw ar ds are uns upporte d by the evidenc e, and that the puni tive damages are both di spropor tionate to the harm suffered by Graci a and out of line wi t h d a mages aw arded in si mi lar cases
. Fin ally

, in the alter nati v e, SigmaT ro n arg ues that i t isentitled to a new trial. A. W e re v ie w d e novo the deni al of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law

. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v
. Balmoral Racing

In keepi ng with the statu tor y cap, the compe nsa tor y dama ges awa rd was 9 remi tted to $5 0,0 00 . The to tal amount o f d ama ges awa rded was $30 0,0 00

.10 No. 15-3311
Clu b, Inc. , 831 F .3d 815, 822 (7th Ci r
. 2016); Fed. R. Ci v
. P

. 50. In i ts opening bri ef, SigmaT ro n asserted that w e mus t rev i ew the evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to the party again st whom judgment w as gr anted, in thi s instance, SigmaT ro n. The company’s statement of the standard i s incorre ct and in fact inv ert s the tr ue standar d

. Once a jury has spoken, rev i ewing the recor d as a whole, “the court mu st draw all reasonable inferences in fav or of the nonmoving party , and i t may not make cr e d i

b il i ty d e ter minati ons or wei gh the evidenc e.” Reeves
v
. Sanderson Plumbin g P roducts, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Mor eov er: the court mus t di sregar d all ev ide nce fav or able to the moving party that the jury is not required to beli ev e.
... That i s, the court should giv e credence to the evidenc e fav or ing the nonmov ant as w ell as that
e vi d e n ce supp or tin g the moving party that i s un c ontr adi cted and uni mpeach ed, at l e a st to the ext ent that that evidenc e comes from di sintere sted wi tness es. Reeves , 530 U.S. at 151 (2000) (int e rnal quotat i on marks omi tted); Empress Casino , 831 F .3d at 822 (in rev i ewing the deni al of

a motion for judgment as a matter of law , w e construe the tr i al evidenc e stric tly in fav or of the party who prev ai led before the jury ); T art v. Illinois Power Co. , 366 F .3d 461, 464 (7th Ci r . 2004) (o nc e a jury has spoken, the court i s obli ged to construe the fac t s in fav or of the parties who prev ai led under the v erdic t). W e wi ll affi rm i f a reasonable j ur y w o uld hav e a legally suffi ci ent evidenti ary basi s to find for the party on a particu lar i ssu e. Empress Casino , 831 F .3d at 822. See also Lus t v
. Sealy , Inc. ,No. 15-3311 11
383 F .3d 580, 583 (7th Ci r
. 2004) (notin g that w e wi ll affi rm a jury ’s finding on caus ation when that finding cannot be sai d to be unreasonable)

. On the ret ali ation count, Graci a prev ai led at tr i al and so w e
mus t credi t the evidenc e in her fav or on that cl ai m and di sregar d a ll evidenc e fav or ing SigmaT ro n that the jury w as not required to beli ev e. Employing that standard, Graci a easi ly prev ai ls on her ret ali ation clai m, and t he di stric t court w as right to deny SigmaT

ro n’s motion for judgment as a matter of law

. In or der to make out a clai m for ret ali ation, Graci a w as required to prove (1) that she engaged in statuto rily prot ected

a cti vity; (2) that her employ er too k an adv erse employmen t acti on again st her; and (3 ) t ha t the prot ected acti vity and the adv erse employment a ct i on are caus ally connected. Ripber ger
v
. Corizon, Inc. , 773 F .3d 871, 881 (7th Ci r
. 2014); 42 U

. S.C. § 2 0 00e-3(a). For the caus ation factor , Graci a w as required to demonstrate that “the desi re to ret ali ate w as the but-for caus e of the challen ged employment acti on.” Unive rsity of T exas Sw

. Med. C tr

. v
. Nassar

, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013). “Thi s r equi res proo f that the unlaw ful ret ali ation w ould not hav e occurred in the absenc e of the alleged wrongful acti on or act io ns of the employ er .” Id . at 2533. There i s no doubt that Graci a engaged in statuto rily pro te c te d a c tivity wh e n s h e c om plained to SigmaT ro n’s human
resources manager that her supervis or w as sexually harassing her and when she fi led her charge wi th the EEOC. Nor i s there any questi on that SigmaT ro n too k an a d ver se employment acti on again st her when i t ter minated her employment

. The company concedes these fi rst tw o factors. Instead, SigmaT ro n arg ues that Graci a fai led to demonstrat e that she w as fi red12 No. 15-3311
because she engaged in prot ected acti vity

. The company
c ontends instead that she w as ter minated becau se of her reco rd of tar d iness and becau se she allow ed an employ ee to use unleaded s older o n a leaded ci rcui t boar d. “[R]etali ator y mot i v e may be establi shed through ci rcumstanti al evidenc e such as su spi ci ous tim ing, ambi guous statements, evidenc e that the stated re a s on for the e mployment d e cis i on i s pret ext ual and” other evidenc e from whi ch an inference of di scri minator y intent mi ght be drawn. Ripbe r g e r, 773 F .3d at 881. See also Castro v
. DeV ry Unive rsity

, Inc. , 786 F .3d 559, 565 (7th Ci r
. 2015) (sam e). W e may di spens e wi th SigmaT ro n’s fi rst ex p lanati on for the ter minati on easi ly

. SigmaT ro n di d not rely on tar diness as a reason for the ter minati on at tr i al. In fact, Fairhead, the person who d eci ded to ter minate Graci a, conceded at tr i al that he di d not fi re her on
accoun t of tar diness or atte ndanc e problems. R. 190, at 364 (“Q: Y ou di d not fi re Mar i a on accoun t of tar diness or a t t endance problems, di d y ou? A: I di d not.”). In pre-tr i al proceedings, the company assu red the court that i t w as not rely ing on tar diness
as a caus e of the ter minati on but w as instead focus ing solely on the “solderin g inci dent.” In li ght of the company’s pre-tr i al
conces si on and the unequiv ocal admi ssi on by the d e cis i onmaker at tr i al, SigmaT

ro n’s repeat ed arg ument on appeal that tar dine ss w as a caus e for the ter minati on i s puzzling. Wi th SigmaT ro n havin g conceded the poin t to the j ur y at tr i al, w e may i gnor e the purpor ted tar diness rat i onale on appeal. W e turn to SigmaT

ro n’s clai m that Fairhead ter minated Gr aci a becau se she allow ed an employ ee to use the wr o ng solder and fai led to respond appropr i ately when the problem

w as pointed out to her

. W e deta ile d SigmaT

ro n’s v ersi on ofNo. 15-3311 13

ev ents abov e, namely

, that T rujillo approached Silv erman and repo rt ed that Gr a cia had refused t o fi x a solderin g err or , that Silv erman then fi xed the problem and repo rt ed the si tuation to Fairhead, who then interv i ewed T rujillo and d e cided to fi re Gr a cia. But Graci a testifi ed that when T rujillo told her an employ ee w as usin g l e ad-free solder on a leaded board, she stopped the employ ee, segreg ated the pr o d uct, redirected employ ees and so ug ht out the source of the problem. She confi r med that Silverman nev er came to the production floo r to address th e inci dent. T rujillo deni ed that he ev er spoke to Silv erman about the inci dent and deni ed tellin g Fairhead that Gr a ci a made the err or
. Both T rujillo and Graci a deni ed t ha t Graci a ev er too k the matter li ghtly or sai d i t w as “no bi g deal” (as Silv erman clai med she sai d to T rujillo) or t hat i t “doesn’t matter ” (as Fairhead clai med Silv erman repo rt ed to hi m). The jury w as free to credi t the testim ony of T rujillo and Graci a and
co nclu de that Graci a di d not mi shand le the inci dent and t ha t no one had repo rt ed that Gracia m i shand led i t. Mor eov er

, ev en i f Graci a had allow ed the u se of unleaded
so l d e r on a leaded ci rcui t board, she presented evidenc e that
such an err or occurred w i th reg ulari ty atSigmaT ro n, at ti mes wi th the taci t approv al of the c om pany’s management. She also presented evidenc e that the company had nev er ter minated an employ ee on that gr ound. Michael Murphy , a former engin eer ing manager at Sig maT ro n, testifi ed that, although the company striv ed to use materials according to cus tomer speci fi cations, leaded parts w ere someti mes used on unleaded ci rcui t boards or vic e v ersa. Inadv ert ent sub sti tutions occurred on the
assembly line and, at tim es, the wrong parts w ere used becau se of supp ly i ssu es. He explain ed that, wh en the company had a14 No. 15-3311
supp ly of leaded parts and that lead-free v ersi ons had not y et
come in, they w ould si mply use the leaded parts in or der to
av oid w asting an expensi v e supp ly of leaded parts. Nev ert heles s, d u ring Murphy’ s tenure, whi ch ov erlapped wi th Graci a’s, incorre ct parts were someti mes used and cus tomer s received fudged certifi cati ons repr e sent ing that the corr ect parts had been used. Murphy testifi ed that i t w as not a “bi g deal” to use unleaded solder on leaded boards but that i t mi ght present an ethica l p r o blem for the rev erse to occur , i.e. , to use leaded solder on an unleaded board. T o hi s know l e d ge, no one had
ev er been fi red for using the wrong solder

. Thi s w as consi stent wi th testim ony from T

rujillo and Graci a that no one had ever been fi red for using the wro ng solder

. The jury w as free to beli ev e Graci a, T rujillo and Murphy

, and i t is apparent fro m the v erdic t thatthe j ury credited their testim ony on the ret ali ation claim

. Equally i mport antly , the juro rs w ere free to di sbeli ev e Silv erman, F a ir head and Miedem a and conclu de that their explanation for the ter mination w as a pret ext

. Graci a presented s ubs tantial evidenc e that she di d not engage in the mi scondu ct of whi ch she w as accu sed and that, ev en i f she di d, that conduc t w as not gener ally seen
as caus e for ter minati on at the company
. When a j ur y conclud es that the employ er’s stated reason for the ter minati on i s
a pret ext, the jury may consi der that pret ext ual explanation as
e v idence of ret ali ator y motiv e. Reeves , 530 U.S. at 147 (“Proo f that the defendant’s explanation i s un w o r t hy of credence i s si mply one form of ci rcums tantial evidenc e that i s probat i v e of intentional di scri minati on, and i t may be qui te persuasi v e.”). In appropr i ate ci rcums tance s, the tr i er of fact can
re a so nably infer fr om the falsi ty of the explanationNo. 15-3311 15
that the employ er i s di ss embling to cov er up a di scri minator y purpose. Such an inference i s consi stent wi th the general princ i ple of evidenc e law that the factfinder i s entitled to consi der a party 's di shonesty about a material fact as “affi rmativ e evidenc e of gui lt.”

... Mor eov er

, once the employ er’s justification has been eli minated, di scri minati on m a y we l l b e the most li kely alter nati v e explanation, especi ally since the employ er i s in the best posi tion to put forth the actual reason for i ts deci si on. Reeves , 530 U.S. at 147-48 (internal ci tations omi tte d). The jury could reasonably conclu de that SigmaT ro n’s stated reason for the ter minati on w as a pret ext, and i t w as then free to infer that the company gav e a fa lse reason in or der to cov er up a di scri minator y purpose. Graci a also prov i ded ci rcums tantial evidenc e of the company’s ret ali ator y motiv e thro ugh the tim ing of her di sch arg e. Although sus pi ci ous tim ing alone i s rar ely enough to create an infe r e nce of ret ali ator y motiv e, i t can someti mes rais e an in fe re nce of a caus al connecti on, especi ally in comb in a ti on w i th other evidenc e. Magya r v
. St. Joseph Reg’ l Med. Ctr

. , 544 F .3d 766, 772 (7th Ci r
. 2008); O'Leary v
. Accretive Heal th , In c ., 6 57 F .3d 625, 635 (7th Ci r
. 2011). “W e hav e rej ect e d a ny bri ght-line rule about how close the ev ents mus t be to establi sh
caus ation, but in cases where there i s ‘corr obor atin g evi dence of ret ali ator y motiv e,’ an ‘int e rv al of a few w eeks or ev en months may prov i de probat i v e evidenc e of the required caus al nexus.’” Castro, 7 8 6 F

. 3 d at 565. In thi s instance, only tw o
w eeks after Sigm a T

ro n receiv ed Graci a’s EEOC charge, the
c om p any te rm in a te d her , clai ming falsely that she had enga ge d16 No. 15-3311
in mi scondu ct. Addi tionally , Murphy testifi ed that other s had engaged in sim i lar conduc t (us ing incorre ct parts) or w or se (certif yin g falsely to cus tomer s that co r r e ct parts had been used ) and had not been fi red. Graci a thus presented all three k ind s of ci rcums tantial evidenc e of ret ali ator y motive mentioned in the case law: sus pi ci ous tim ing, a pret extual explanation for the ter minati on, and evidenc e that sim i larly si tuated employ ees w ere tr eated di fferently

. Castro, 786 F .3 d a t 5 65. That w a s a legally suffi ci ent evidenti ary basi s upon whi ch a reasonable jur y could find r etaliatory motiv e. Empress Casin o, 831 F .3d at 822. For the s ake of completeness, we add that t he person who brought Graci a’s supp osed infracti on to Fairhead’s at t e nt i on
w as none other than the manager Graci a had accu sed of sexual harassmen t only weeks earlier in her EEOC charge and in her
co nv ersations wi th Miedem a and Fairhead. Although t he company w as aw are that Graci a had accu sed S ilver man of sexual harassment, Fairhead conduc ted a perfunctory inv esti

gation into Si lv erman’s clai m that Graci a had allow ed the u se of the wrong solder and had refused to take t he inci dent seri ously

. Although T

rujillo di d not confi rm Silv erman’s stor y , Fairhead ter minated t he hi ghly reg arded employ ee almost i mmedi ately

. All of thi s evidenc e w as mor e than suffi ci ent to prove the caus al link betw een Graci a’s prot ected conduc t and the company’s deci si on to ter minate her employ ment. B. The ju ry a wa rd e d G ra c i a $57,000 in compens ator y damages and $250,000 in puni tiv e damages. Becaus e th e st atute caps tot al damages at $300,000 for a defendant wi th more than 500No. 15-3311 17 employ ees, and becau se the parties agr eed that any reducti on should be made to the compens ator y part of the aw a r d , the di stric t court remitted the compensatory damages to $50,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3). S i gmaT ro n argues that t he di stric t court err ed when i t f ai led to order a further remi ttitur of both the compens ator y and pun i tiv e damages aw ards, whi ch the
c om p any ch a ra c te riz e s a s e xc essiv e, unjusti fi ed by the e vi d e n c e and inconsi stent wi th aw ards in si mi lar cases
. W e r e v i ew for abus e of di scr etion the di stric t court's deci si on not to gr ant a motion for remitti tur of compens a t o r y damages. E.E.O.C. v
. AutoZone, Inc. , 707 F .3d 824, 8 33 (7th Ci r
. 2013); Thompson v
. Memorial Hosp. of C arbo ndale, 625 F .3 d 3 9 4 , 408 (7th Ci r
. 2010); Houskins v
. Sheahan , 549 F .3d 480, 4 96 (7th Ci r
. 2008). W e
rev i ew challen ges to puni tiv e damages de novo when consti tutional i ssu es are rais ed. Cooper Indus., Inc. v
. Leatherman T ool Group, Inc. , 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001); Ka p elanski v
. Johnson , 390 F .3d 525, 534 (7th Ci r
. 2004). If no consti tutional i ssu e i s rais ed, our r eview of puni tiv e damages is for abus e of di scretion. Cooper

, 532 U.S. at 433. It i s unc lear whether SigmaT ro n’s challen ge to the puni tiv e damages aw ard i s based on consti tutional or non-cons tituti onal gr ounds. In thi s instance, how ev er , the standard of r eview d oes not affect the o utcome. W e begin wi th the challen ge to the compens ator y damages

aw ard. In rev i ewing the di stric t court’s refus a l t o remit compens ator y damages, w e consi der , among other th ings, whether the aw ard i s “monstrously excessi v e,” whether there i s a rat i onal connecti o n be t w een the aw ard and t he evidenc e, and whether the aw ard i s ro ughly comparable to aw ards made in si mi lar cases. AutoZone, 707 F .3d at 833; Thompson , 625 F .3d at 408; Mario n Cty

. Coroner's Offic e v
. E.E.O.C. , 612 F .3 d 9 2 4,18 No. 15-3311
930-31 (7th C ir

. 2010). See also Farfaras v
. Citizens Bank & T rust of Chicago , 433 F .3d 558, 566 (7th Ci r . 2006). Si gmaT ro n ass ert s that Graci a’s only evidenc e of non-economi c damages w as her statement to the jury

, “It w as hard. I w as just depressed. I hav e
a l w a y s been used to w or kin g.” SigmaT ro n suggests that th e
aw ard be remitted to $0 or at least be reduced si gni fi cantly

. “An aw ard for nonpe cu ni ary loss can be supp or ted, in certain ci rcums tances, solely by a plainti ff’s testim ony about his or her emotional di stress.” T ulli s v
. T ownley Engin eerin g & Manufactur i n g Co. , 243 F .3d 1058, 1068 (7th Ci r
. 2001); Merriweather v
. Famil y Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc. , 103 F .3d 576, 580 (7th Ci r
. 1996). Juri es are responsible for ev aluating the credibi li ty of wi tnesses who testif y to e motional dis tr ess, and

w e do notdi sturb those c redib i li ty det ermin ations on appeal. T ulli s , 243 F .3d at 1068; Bruso v
. United Airlin es, Inc. , 239 F .3d 848, 857 (7t h Ci r
. 2001). The juro rs here w ere able to observ e Gr a cia as she testifi ed and they apparently found her tes t imony to be sincere and suffi ci ent t o co nv ince them that she merited the aw ard they g a ve he r
. T ulli s , 243 F .3d at 1068. Mor eov er

, as t he di stric t court noted, the jury conside r e d her t esti mony in the context of other evidenc e presented at tr i al: Graci a testifi ed that she had w or ked continuousl y from the age of si xte en; SigmaT

ro n’s own wi tnesses conceded that, prior to her ter minati on, Graci a had been a spectacu lar employ ee at the company; and after her ter minati on, at the hei ght o f the recessi on, Graci a remain ed unempl oy ed for si xte en months despi te her ext ensi v e efforts to find another jo b. Ev en i f Graci a’s testim ony r egar ding her dis tr ess was su ccinct and to t he p oin t, “brevity and self- contro l in a judi ci al proceeding need not be interpr eted as a w e a k case, and the jury and t rialNo. 15-3311 19 judge w ere entitled to take th a t view .” Deloughery v
. City of Chicago , 422 F .3d 611, 620 (7th Ci r
. 2005). It w as the jury ’ s jo b to gauge Gr aci a’s di stress and deter mine an appropr i ate amount to compens ate her

. SigmaT ro n has giv en us no reason to disturb the jury ’s determinati on. The di stric t court also corr ectly conclu ded th at the compensator y damages aw arded to Graci a w ere r oughly comparable to other Ti tle VII aw ards. In making the compari son, courts are not required to “ co mplet ely analogize the damage aw ard in thi s case to an i denti cal case wi th ei ther a si mi lar or di ssi mi lar

v erdic t.” Farfaras , 433 F .3d at 566. A w ards in other cases prov i de a refer ence poin t that assi sts the court in asses sing reasonableness; they do
no t establi sh a range bey ond whi ch aw ards ar e
necess arily excessi v e. Due to the hi ghly fact-s peci fi c nature of Ti tle VII case s, s uch compari sons are rar ely di sposi tiv e. Farfaras , 433 F .3d at 566. Both the plainti ff a nd the defendant propo sed cases to the court that they c onte n d e d we re comparable, as they di d on appeal. The di stric t court conclu ded that the damages aw arded here w ere in line wi th those a w a r d e d in T ulli s , 243 F .3d at 1067-68 (affi rming an aw a r d in e xcess of $8 0 , 000 for ret ali ator y di sch arg e that caus ed a dedi cated employ ee who r e ma ine d out of w or k for ten months to feel “low” and “degr aded”); Deloughery, 422 F .3d at 620 (affi rming $175,000 aw ard of compens ator y damages for emotional di stress in a fai lure to promo te case where a hi ghly motiv ated female poli ce offi cer wi th a fami ly heritage in law enforcement

w as frustrate d in her quest for gr eate r r e sponsi bi li ty si mply20 No. 15-3311
becau se she asserted her right to be free from di scri minati on); Harvey v
. Offic e of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F .3d 698, 714 (7th Ci r
. 2004) (affi rming compens ator y damages in range of $50,000 to $150,000 for emotional di stress for Afric an Americ an employe e s deni ed promo tions on account of race); and David v
. Caterpillar, 185 F

. Supp. 2d 918, 923-24 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (remi tting compens ator y damage aw ard to $50,000 for plainti ff who felt depressed, r obbed and cheated by a di scri minator y fai lur e to promo te). Sig maT

ro n did not ev en atte mpt to di stingui sh the
cases on whi ch the d istric t court relied. “Abuse of di screti on exis ts only where the result i s not o ne t hat could hav e been reached by a reasonable jurist or where the deci si on of the tr i al court strikes us as fund amentally wrong or i s clearly unreasonable, arbi tr ary

, or fanc i ful.” Greviskes v
. Un iversities Resear ch Ass'n, Inc. , 417 F .3d 752, 758 (7th Ci r
. 2005). A reasonable jurist could refuse to gr ant a further remitti tur on compens ator y damages in thi s cas e and so we mus t affi rm. W e turn to the puni tiv e damage aw ard of $25 0 ,000. In
rev i ewing puni tiv e damages, the Supreme Court has set forth thre e g uideposts to asses s the aw ard: the degr ee of repr ehensi

bi li ty of the defendant’s conduc t; the di spar i ty betw een the harm suffered by the plaint iff and the puni tiv e damages aw ard; and the di fference betw een the aw ard in thi s
case and the penalti es i mposed in comparable cases
. B MW of Nor th America, Inc. v
. Gor e, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996); Kapelanski, 390 F .3d at 534. The BMW case inv olv ed a fraud clai m in a state where there w as no stat ut o r y cap o n puni tiv e damages. W

e hav e noted that, when “Congr ess sets a li mi t, and a low one, on the tot al a mo un t of damages that may be

aw arded, the rat i o of puni tiv e to compens ator y damages in aNo. 15-3311 21 particu lar aw ard ceases to be a n i ssu e of consti tutional di gni ty[.]” Lus t, 383 F .3d at 590. The purpose of placing a consti tutional cei ling on puni tiv e damages i s to prot ect defendants against outlandi sh aw ards, aw ards that are not only i rr ational in themselv es becau se out of whac k wi th any plaus ible concepti on of the soci al func t io n o f puni

tiv e damages but potent i ally catastro phi c fo r the defendants sub

je ct e d to them and, in prospect, a
means of coercing settlement. That purpose falls out of the pi cture when the legis lature has placed a tight cap on tot al, inclu ding puni tiv e, damages and the courts honor the cap. Lus t , 393 F .3d at 590-91. A “statuto ry cap suggests that an
aw ard of damages at the capped maxi mum i s not outlandi sh.” AutoZone, 707 F .3d at 840. In asses sing puni tiv e d a mages on appeal, “[t]he judi ci al func tion i s to poli ce a range, not a poin t.” Mathias v
. Acco r E c onomy Lodging, Inc. , 347 F .3d 672, 678 (7th Ci r . 2003). SigmaT ro n notes that Graci a reque st e d a tot al of $200,000 in puni tiv e damages for both her sex ua l har assm ent and ret ali ation cl ai ms. Although the jury found in fav or of SigmaT ro n on the sexual harassmen t clai m, i t aw arded Graci a $50,000 more in puni tiv e damages than she requested in tot al. SigmaT ro n ci tes that di spari ty as evidenc e that the aw ard i s the result of bi as. The company asserts that the aw ard should hav e been remitt e d to $0 or to a far lesser sum than $250,000. The company also arg ues that i ts conduc t w as not repr ehensi ble or mali ci ous, continuing to assert that Graci a w as ter minated not22 No. 15-3311
in ret ali ation for repo rt ing sexual harassmen t but becau se she knowingly allowed employ ees to use the inc o r r e ct solder

. SigmaT ro n also arg ues that the aw ard i s di spropor tionate to the harm Graci a suffered, suggesting that the jury err oneously

aw arded puni tiv e damages for both of Graci a’s clai ms ev en though she suc ceeded only on the ret ali ation clai m. Fin ally , the company contends that the aw ard is inconsi stent wi th those
asses sed in comparable cas es. W e mus t begin by poin tin g out again that SigmaT ro n does not come to ter ms wi t h t he fa ct s as found by the jury

. Any arg ument that Graci a w as t ermin ated for allowing an emp l oy ee to use the wrong solder w as soundly rej ected by th e jury

. SigmaT

ro n’s continued refusal to ackno wledge the appropr i ate standar d of rev i ew on appeal, ev en after the plainti ff ci ted the corr ect standard in her bri ef, i s puzzling. W e
mus t asses s t he repr ehensi bi li ty of SigmaT

ro n’s conduc t by view ing t he facts as the jury found them. The jury had more than enough evidenc e to conclu de that SigmaT ro n ter minated Graci a becau se she complained abo ut sexua l harassmen t and fi led a charge wi th the EEOC. Upper management then crea ted documents falsely accu sing Graci a of wrongdo ing and asserting that the caus e of ter minati on w as legiti mate. The company persi sted in asserting that false reason for the ter minati on and the false accus ation o f wro ngdoing t hrougho ut the l it i gation. The jury w as also aw are that when Graci a tr i ed to explain the ext ent of Si lv erman’s conduc t to Fai rhead in the October 24th meetin g, he spoke ov er her , d e ny ing her an oppor tuni ty to fully repo rt the conduc t. Fairhead’s response to Gr a cia’s complaint w as to i gnor e the clai m and force her to shake handsNo. 15-3311 23
wi th her har a ss er
. A scan t tw o w eeks after Graci a fi led an 1 0 EEOC charge a ss e r tin g that Silv erman sexually harassed her , Silv erman hi mself falsely accu sed Graci a of wrongdo ing. And Fairhead clai med to hav e accepted the tr uth o f t hat sus pect
accu sati on, falsely clai ming that T rujillo had confi rmed Silv erman’s stor y

. Although i t w as undi sputed that Silv erman repeat edly sent Graci a photo s of partial l y nude w omen in degr ading poses, the company nev er di sci plined Silv erman for this d e p lorable conduc t tow ards a female sub or dinate. Y et i t qui ckly ter minated a stellar fe ma l e employ ee on tr umped up charges shortly after she fil ed a charge of sexual harassment wi th the EEOC. And that v ersi on of the facts adequately supp or ts the jury ’s
aw ard of puni tiv e damages. A complaining party may recov er puni tiv e damages in a Ti tle VII case by demonstrating that the employ er “engaged in a di scri minator y practic e or di scri minator y practic es with mali ce o r wi th reckless indi fference t o the federally prot ected rights of a n aggr i ev ed indi vidu al.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1); Kolstad v
. American Dental Ass’n , 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). “Applyin g thi s standard in the context of § 1981a, an employ er mus t at least di scri minate in t he face of

a percei v ed r isk that i ts acti ons wi ll violate federal law to be li able in puni tive damages.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536. Fairhead’s conduc t in r esponse t o the repo rt of sexual har assm ent in the October 24th meetin g and the EEOC charge m e e ts the s ta tu to ry

Bo th Mi edema and Fairhead conce ded at tri al tha t, when Gracia tol d 1 0 them ab out Si l ve r man’s unwelco me l ate night party i nv i tatio n, neither i nv esti gated Si l v erman’s cl aim tha t i t was Dav i d Ni emi and not Si l v erman who had pl aced the cal l

.24 No. 15-3311
standard for puni tiv e damages. As the di stric t court noted, thi s standard i s met when the employ er engages in the act of ret ali ator y di sch arg e and t hen make s ef fort s t o hi de i t, in t hi s
case creating a false paper tr ai l that inclu ded manufactured details of repo rt s and meetin gs wi th T rujillo and other managers in an effort to hi de the tr ue nature of the di sch arg e. One of the purposes of puni tiv e damages i s t o l i mi t the defendant's abi li ty to profit fr om i ts wrongful conduc t by escaping detection. Mat h i as , 347 F .3d at 677. See also Lampley v
. Onyx Acceptance Corp. , 340 F .3d 478, 486 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (where the evidence supp or ts a finding that the employ er engaged in a cov er up in flagrant violati on of Ti tle VII , a large puni tive damage

aw ard i s w arr anted). Graci a thus meets the fi rst gui depost, the degr ee of re prehensibi li ty o f the defendant’s c onduct. The second gui depost asks us to asses s the di spari t y betw een the harm the plainti ff suffe r e d (as indi cated by the compens at o r y damages) and the puni tive damage aw ard. As

w e noted, when Congr ess set s a l imit on the tot al amount of damages that may be aw arded, “the rat i o o f puni tiv e to compens ator y damages in a particu lar aw ard ceases to be an i ssu e of co ns t it ut i onal di gni ty .” Lus t, 383 F .3d at 590. In thi s case, the jury aw arded Graci a puni tive damages that are fi v e tim es the amount of compens ator y damages. A 5:1 rat i o i s w ell wi thin the range w e hav e approved in other cases
. See Mathias , 347 F .3d at 6 7 8 (affi rming a 37:1 rat i o); Kapelanski, 390 F .3d at 534 (finding a 3.3:1 rat i o eas i ly permi ssi ble); Lampley, 340 F .3d at 485-86 (finding a 9:1 rat i o accept abl e ). As w e hav e noted, Ti tle VII cases are v ery fact-s peci fi c, and w e wi ll not normally di sturb an aw ard of damag e s a t o r under the statuto ry cap becau se the deci si on i s large ly w i thin the provinc e of the jury

.No. 15-3311 25 Lampley, 340 F .3d at 486; Fin e v
. R yan Internation al Airlin es , 305 F .3d 746, 755 (7th Ci r . 2002). Fin ally , we are aw are of no rule prohibi t ing a jury from

aw ardin g more in damages th a n a plainti ff requests and SigmaT ro n ci tes no authority fo r thi s clai m. See, e.g., Dresser Industries, Inc. v
. Grada ll Co. , 965 F .2d 1442, 1447 (7th Ci r
. 1992) (affi rming a jury aw ard that exceeded the plaint iff’s request). So long as the aw ard has a reasonable basi s in the ev i dence, a jury has wi de di screti on in deter mining damages. Id

. “Thi s is especi ally so where the tr i al judge, who had the oppor tuni ty to hear the evidenc e and observ e the j ury , has s een fi t to uphold the aw ard in the face of a post-tr i al challen ge.” Id

. W e also note that i t i s unli kely the jury w as bias e d in Graci a’s fav or as i t found again st her on the sexual harassmen t clai m. Apparently , the jury s i mply had a di fferent view than the pl ainti ff reg arding the amount necess ary to puni sh SigmaT ro n’s conduc t and deter future wrongdo ing. Merriweather , 103 F .3d at 581 (notin g that w e wi ll set asi de an aw ard of puni tive damages o nly i f it exceeds an amount necess a r y t o ser v e the objectiv e of deter

rence and puni shm ent). W e see no reason to di sturb the jury ’s
aw ard here

. C. Fin ally , in kitch en-sink fash i on, SigmaT ro n arg ues that i t i s entitle d t o a new tr i al becau se (1) the jury aw arded excessiv e damages; (2) the di stric t cour t permi tte d a v eni re person to remain on the jury who should hav e been stric ken for caus e; (3) SigmaT ro n w as wrongly prohibi ted from presentin g a wi tness; and (4) Graci a presented a doctor ed and prej udi ci al exhib i t to26 No. 15-3311
the jury

. None of t he se iss ues has any merit and we wi ll address them su mmari ly

. As w e hav e just conclu ded, the jury di d no t aw ard excessi v e damages. The di stric t court di d not abus e i ts di screti on in refusing to exclude the prospectiv e juro r becau se nothing the juro r sai d evinc ed an i rr ational or uns hakeable bi as that w ould prev ent hi m from ruling i mpartially on the case. Griffin v
. Bell , 694 F .3d 817, 826 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Nor di d th e co ur t abus e i ts di screti on in bar ring SigmaT ro n from presentin g a wi tness whose testim ony the court deemed cumulati v e under Feder al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 403. Mor eov er , SigmaT ro n fai led to preserve the alleged err or for appeal when i t fai led to make an
o ff e r of proo f reg ardin g the excluded wi tness’s expecte d testim ony

. W ilson v
. City of Chicago , 758 F .3d 875, 885 (7th Ci r
. 2014); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)( 2). And finally , the di stric t court di d not abus e i ts di screti on in allowing Graci a to present the challen ged exhibi t. The exhib i t c onsi sted of one of the expli ci t photo s that Silv erman had emailed to Graci a, but fo r the tr i al

v ersi on of the emai l, the plainti ff had removed the forw ardin g chain in or der to hi de the fact that Graci a had forw arded the emai l to her atto rney

. The court remedied the matt e r by allowing the defendant to presen t t he full emai l and crossexamine the plainti ff on the matter

. Any er ro r in al lowing the exhib i t into evidenc e w as harmless in li ght o f the court’s
corr ecti v e acti ons. Th e r e i s no merit in any of SigmaT ro n’s remaining arg uments an d no new trial i s w arr anted. AFF IRM ED.