[J-62-2013] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFER Y, STEVENS, JJ.

ALEXANDER BRATIC AND JOSEPH PROKO, Appellees

v.

CHARLES W. RUBENDALL, II, AND KEEFER, WOOD, ALLEN & RAHAL, LLP, AND RESIDENTIAL WARRANTY CORP. OF PENNSYLVANIA AND INTEGRITY UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellants : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 21 EAP 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 4/23/2012 at No. 2413 EDA 2009, reversing and remanding the Order entered on 7/9/2009 in the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division of Philadelphia County at No. 003418 February Term 2009. ARGUED: November 19, 2013

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: August 18, 2014 This is an appeal from the Superior Court’s reversa l of the trial court’s order granting appellants’ motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens. This matter has its roots in a lawsuit filed against app ellees in Dauphin County by appellants Residential Warranty Corporation and Integrity Unde rwriters; appellants Rubendall and the Keefer firm represented Residential and Integri ty, respectively, in that lawsuit, which alleged tortious interference with a contractual re lationship. The case ended when the trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary j udgment. Appellees then initiated the instant action in Phil adelphia County, asserting wrongful use of civil proceedings and common-law ab use-of-process claims based on the[J-62-2013] - 2

earlier dismissed suit. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1006 (d)(1), 1 appellants petitioned to transfer the case to Dauphin County based on forum non conveniens, alleging the pertinent “witnesses and evidence are located in Da uphin County such that depositions and trial in Philadelphia County will be a hardship to the [appellants] and the witnesses upon whom [appellants] must rely.” Petition to Tra nsfer Venue, 5/20/09, at 3. Appellants presented affidavits of seven witnesses, 2 all of whom live over 100 miles from Philadelphia, each stating that holding the trial t here “would be both disruptive and a personal and financial hardship if [the witnesses] should be called to testify at deposition or trial” because they “would have to incur substan tial costs for fuel, tolls and, if traveling overnight, for lodging and meals[, and for] every d ay of deposition or trial in Philadelphia, [they] would be forced to take at least one full da y away from [work].” 3 Relying on this Court’s decision in Cheeseman v. Le thal Exterminator, Inc., 701 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1997), the trial court granted the mo tion to transfer, reasoning: (1) the earlier claim took place in Dauphin County; (2) all appellants are from Dauphin County and none of appellees are from Philadelphia County; (3) each of appellants’ eight witnesses lives over 100 miles from Philadelphia Co unty and is “engaged in business activities which make their ability to appear at tr ial in Philadelphia County far more of a burden than a trial in Dauphin County”; and (4) “[t ]he sole connection with Philadelphia

1 “For the convenience of parties and witnesses the court upon petition of any party may transfer an action to the appropriate court of any other county where the action could originally have been brought.” Id.

2 An eighth witness, Ronald Katzman, Esq., did not s ubmit an affidavit, but the petition alleged that trial in Philadelphia County would be a significant burden to Mr. Katzman due to his age and the location of his primary office i n Harrisburg. Id., at 6 n.11.

3 See Affidavit of Talmadge, 5/15/09; Affidavit of R ubendall, 5/15/09; Affidavit of Gregory, 5/18/09; Affidavit of Parmer, 5/18/09; Affidavit of Swartz, 5/18/09; Affidavit of Yeselavage, 5/18/09; Affidavit of Stramitis, 5/18/09.[J-62-2013] - 3

County is the fact that all [appellants] occasional ly conduct business in Philadelphia.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/09/09, at 3-4. Although no t assigning particular weight to each factor, the court held the “record clearly establis h[ed] that [appellees’] choice of forum is vexatious and oppressive” and “[t]rying this case i n Dauphin County would provide better access to all potential witnesses and other sources of proof such as court documents from the prior L action.” Id., at 4. On interlocutory appeal, a divided Superior Court p anel affirmed. Bratic v. Rubendall, No. 2413 EDA 2009, unpublished memorandu m at 1 (Pa. Super. filed January 14, 2011) (withdrawn). Upon reargument en banc, a divided court reversed, holding appellants did not carry their burden of demonstrat ing trial in Philadelphia would be oppressive or vexatious. The en banc court first d etermined the trial court relied on factors irrelevant to a forum non conveniens analys is. Bratic v. Rubendall, 43 A.3d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted). Specifically, the court noted it was error for the trial court to consider that none of appellees are from Philadelphia, “‘since the burden [to transfer venue] is at all times on the d efendant, the plaintiff’s putative inconvenience is of minor relevance.’” Id. (quotin g Walls v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 979 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. Super. 2009)). Mor eover, the court found little probative value that the earlier claim was filed in Dauphin County or that appellants’ sole connection to Philadelphia County is occasional bus iness. See id. (“‘Claims by a defendant that no significant aspect of a case invo lves the chosen forum L are not the type of record evidence that proves that litigating the case in the chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious.’ (quoting Borger v. Murphy , 797 A.2d 309, 312 (Pa. Super. 2002)) L Further, it is a ‘salient point that the m ere fact that the site of the precipitating event was outside of plaintiff’s choice of forum is not dispositive.’” (quoting Walls, at 852)).[J-62-2013] - 4

Additionally, the Superior Court reasoned the trial court abused its discretion because appellants “ha[d] not offered particularize d averments sufficient to satisfy their burden as required by Cheeseman and its progeny[.]” Id., at 503. The court assumed arguendo the “witnesses’ testimony is admissible, r elevant, noncumulative, and necessary[,]” id., at 501 n.4, and separated appell ants’ eight witnesses into two categories. Four witnesses 4 “are officers or employees of the named corporate [appellants,]” and the court assumed these witnesse s would be compensated for the costs incurred because of litigation in Philadelphi a. Id., at 502 (quoting Walls, at 853). 5 The Superior Court found no other hardship to these witnesses, and reasoned the cost of reimbursing them “must be viewed in relation to lit igation costs of attorneys employed in the initial forum.” Bratic, at 502. Because appel lants’ attorneys are from Philadelphia, the court found it would be more expensive to pay t heir board and travel than it would be to reimburse these witnesses’ expenses. Thus, the court found these witnesses provided no support for the trial court’s transfer. The Superior Court characterized the remaining witn esses 6 as engaged in client-based professions; it found “the relevant in quiry is what impact participation

4 The witnesses are William Gregory, Jr., systems ma nager for Integrity; George Parmer, president of Residential and Integrity; Richard Swa rtz, corporate counsel for Residential; and Robert Yeselavage, treasurer and operations man ager for Integrity. Id., at 502 n.6.

5 In Walls, an insurance company argued trial in Phi ladelphia “would be ‘extremely burdensome to [the witness], defendant’s [insurance ] adjuster[,] who was assigned to investigate plaintiff’s claim[.]’” Walls, at 852 ( citation omitted). The Superior Court noted the witness “is not a hapless citizen being h auled into court, but is a professional insurance claims adjuster who will surely be fully compensated by his client, in an amount that includes related expenses.” Id., at 853.

6 “These witnesses are Charles Rubendall, II, an att orney and a named [a]ppellee; Ronald Katzman, Esq[.], an [sic] Harrisburg attorne y and counsel for [appellee] William (continuedL)[J-62-2013] - 5

imposes upon the witness, not his or her clients[,] ” id., at 502-03 (citing Cooper v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 761 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. Super. 2000)), and appellants were required to “‘indicate precisely ho w the [witnesses’] duties/operations will be affected[,]’” id., at 503 (quoting Cooper, at 16 6). In this regard, the court held: [T]he lack of specificity as to how the witnesses’ participation will affect such business and what that effect will be fails to sati sfy [appellants]’ burden in this case. L [T]he affidavits here merely aver con clusory statements that participation in Philadelphia would be “disruptive” without explanation as to why that is the case. Id. Addressing appellants’ claim that the witnesses’ po tential participation in pre-trial depositions supports the trial court’s transfer of venue, the Superior Court noted trial courts have “additional measures short of a change of venue to mitigate any such impact.” Id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a)(2) (providi ng trial courts may impose “time and place” conditions on discovery or depositions)). Th e court therefore held the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion becaus e the trial court relied on factors “irrelevant” to forum non conveniens and appellants ’ seven affidavits were insufficiently specific to state the factual basis of transfer. Judge Gantman dissented, finding the trial court di d not abuse its discretion. She first noted “[t]he site of the precipitating event might not be dispositive, but it is relevant[,] L [and] the relevance of this factor depends in par t on the respective counties involved.” Id., at 504 (Gantman, J., dissenting) (internal cit ation omitted) (citing Raymond v. Park Terrace Apartments, Inc., 882 A.2d 518, 521 (Pa. Su per. 2005)). Specifically, where a defendant seeks “transfer from Philadelphia to its adjacent or immediately surrounding counties, courts generally decline to place much we ight on claims that all significant

(Lcontinued) Gregory; Ronald Stratimis, owner and operator of RJ S Consulting; and Charles E. Talmadge, [m]arketing [r]epresentative for Millers Capital Insurance Co.” Id., at 502 n.7.[J-62-2013] - 6

aspects of the case occurred outside the chosen for um.” Id. (citations omitted). 7 Where the transfer is to a more distant county, “fa ctors such as the burden of travel, time out of the office, disruption to business operation s, and the greater difficulty involved in obtaining witnesses and sources of proof are more s ignificant due to the greater distances between the L forum[s].” Bratic, at 505 (Gantman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 8 That all witnesses were located in Dauphin County , far from Philadelphia, was relevant to the “ultimate determination require d to establish oppressiveness under Cheeseman — that trial in another county would prov ide easier access to witnesses or other sources of proof.” Bratic, at 506 (Gantman, J., dissenting). We granted allowance of appeal to clarify the requi rements for transfers based on forum non conveniens as expressed in Cheeseman. Plaintiffs have long been provided with the initial choice of the court in which to bring an action, if that court has jurisdiction. S ee Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 160 A.2d 549, 552-53 (Pa. 1960) (“‘While the plaintiff ordinarily controls choice of the forum, a court does

7 See, e.g., Hunter v. Shire US, Inc., 992 A.2d 891, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted) (affirming denial of transfer from Philade lphia to Chester County because they are “adjacent to each other and are readily accessi ble in a short amount of travel time”); Zappala v. James Lewis Group, 982 A.2d 512, 525 (Pa . Super. 2009) (reversing transfer from Philadelphia to Chester County); Raymond, at 5 21 (“[T]raveling from Delaware, Bucks, Montgomery or Chester County to Philadelphia is not particularly onerous.”); Catagnus v. Allstate Insurance Company, 864 A.2d 12 59, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2004) (reversing transfer from Philadelphia to Bucks Coun ty); Johns v. First Union Corporation, 777 A.2d 489, 491 (Pa. Super. 2001) (reversing tran sfer from Philadelphia to Bucks County); Hoose v. Jefferson Home Health Care, Inc., 754 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2000) (reversing transfer from Philadelphia to Delaware C ounty).

8 See, e.g., Wood v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Compa ny, 829 A.2d 707, 713 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (affirming transfer from Philadelph ia to Bradford County, noting witnesses “would be forced to travel over 190 miles to attend trial in Philadelphia”); Borger, at 313 (affirming transfer from Philadelphi a to Lehigh County); Dulaney v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 715 A.2d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1998) (affirming transfer from Philadelphia to Allegheny County).[J-62-2013] - 7

not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inap propriate forum for the trial of the action so long as an appropriate forum is available to the pl aintiff.’” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 117e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1957))). This practice derives from the notion of convenience to the plaintiff, not from th e desire to pursue verdicts in counties perceived to be more plaintiff-friendly. While a p laintiff need not provide reasons for selecting one venue over another, the doctrine of f orum non conveniens “is a necessary counterbalance to insure [sic] fairness and practic ality.” Okkerse v. Howe, 556 A.2d 827, 832 (Pa. 1989) (citation omitted). This Court has “emphatically stated that the [plaintiff’s] choice of forum L is entitled to weighty considerat ion[,]” id. (citing Walker v. Ohio River Co., 205 A.2d 43, 45 (Pa. 1964)); “[t]hus, the part y seeking a change of venue bears a heavy burden in justifying the request, and it has been consistently held that this burden includes the demonstration on the record of the cla imed hardships[,]” id. (emphasis in original). When ruling on a petition to transfer v enue pursuant to Rule 1006(d)(1), trial courts are vested with “considerable discretion L t o balance the arguments of the parties, consider the level of prior court involvem ent, and consider whether the forum was designed to harass the defendant.” Zappala v. Bran dolini Property Management, Inc., 909 A.2d 1272, 1283 (Pa. 2006) (citing Cheeseman, a t 162). Accordingly, appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer for an abuse of discretion. Id., at 1284 (citation omitted). In this regard, the trial court’s ruling must be re asonable in light of the peculiar facts. If there exists any proper basis f or the trial court’s decision to transfer venue, the decision must stand. An abu se of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence o[f] the record. Id. (internal citations omitted).[J-62-2013] - 8

Our case law once recognized forum non conveniens transfers based on considerations affecting the court’s interests, suc h as court congestion (as opposed to the parties’ interest in having the case resolved in a forum with less backlog), or imposing jury duty and court costs on the people of a community w ith no relation to the litigation. See Scola v. AC & S, Inc., 657 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa. 199 5) (citation omitted); Okkerse, at 832 (citations omitted); Plum, at 553-54 (citations omi tted). As lower courts applied these principles on a case-by-case basis, “a policy devel oped of according court congestion great weight at the expense of the plaintiff losing his chosen forum.” Cheeseman, at 160; see generally Incollingo v. McCarron, 611 A.2d 287, 290-91 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s assertions of witness convenie nce did not warrant transfer, but transfer appropriate based on, inter alia, “substan tial backlog of civil cases” in Philadelphia courts (citations omitted)).

Cheeseman clarified the factors on which a trial c ourt may rely when ruling on a forum non conveniens motion, holding a petition to transfer venue should be granted only if the defendant “demonstrat[es], with detailed inf ormation on the record, that the plaintiff’s chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious to the defendant.” Cheeseman, at 162. So called “public interest” factors affecting the court’s own concerns are not controlling because Rule 1006(d)(1) speaks only in terms of convenience to the parties and witnesses, not the courts. Id., at 161-62. By way of example, Justice Cappy noted: [T]he defendant may meet its burden of showing that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is vexatious to him by establishing L the pla intiff’s choice of forum was designed to harass the defendant, even at some inconvenience to the plaintiff himself. Alternatively, the defendant ma y meet his burden by establishing L trial in the chosen forum is oppress ive to him; for instance, that trial in another county would provide easier a ccess to witnesses or other sources of proof, or to the ability to conduc t a view of premises[J-62-2013] - 9

involved in the dispute. But, we stress that the d efendant must show more than that the chosen forum is merely inconvenient t o him. Id., at 162 (footnote and internal citation omitted ). Thus, Cheeseman was not intended to increase the level of oppressiveness or vexaciou sness a defendant must show; rather, understood in its articulated context, Cheeseman me rely corrected the practice that developed in the lower courts of giving excessive w eight to “public interest” factors when ruling on a forum non conveniens motion. Whatever public interest factors exist, they are not determinative; they are only a factor insof ar as they bear directly on the ultimate test. And while Rule 1006(d)(1) on its face allows transfer based on “the convenience of the parties[,]” Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1), convenience o r the lack thereof is not the test our case law has established: the moving party must sho w the chosen forum is either oppressive or vexatious. Turning to the instant matter, we find the trial c ourt’s proper consideration of the totality of the evidence justified the order to tra nsfer the case. Trial courts are vested with considerable discretion when ruling on such a motion, and “[i]f there exists any proper basis for the trial court’s decision to tran sfer venue, the decision must stand.” Zappala, at 1284 (citation omitted). The Superior Court’s stringent examination in isolation of each individual fact mentioned by the trial court was inconsistent with the applicable standard of review; a ruling on a motion to transfer must be affirmed on appeal “[i]f there exists any proper basis for the trial c ourt’s decision[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The trial court expressly noted it did not conside r its own interest in court congestion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/09/09, at 3. This is not to say court congestion is never a consideration — access to justice is cert ainly a significant concern of our judicial system, which means not only the ability t o get into court, but to have the court[J-62-2013] - 10

expeditiously address the matter — but congestion i s not sufficient in itself to justify a change of venue. Ergo, if efficient resolution is p recluded by uniquely disruptive court volume, it cannot be impermissible for the court to so note, but only insofar as it bears on the ultimate consideration of venue as oppressive o r vexatious. That is, if the congestion contributes to the oppressiveness of the chosen ven ue, it may be considered, though we reiterate it is not a factor sufficient by itself t o warrant transfer, as was the holding of cases before Cheeseman. Here, as noted, it was not consi dered at all. Appellees also argue the trial court abused its di scretion by considering the irrelevant factor that none of appellees are from P hiladelphia. It is true this is peripheral

to the issue and insufficient to warrant transfer. Appellees’ arguments pointing out the cost of their counsel traveling to Dauphin County i s subject to the same logic — by itself,

it will not determine the issue. The trial court’s mere mention of these facts does not constitute an abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law, however, as it is evident from the court’s opinion that transfer was based on other enumerated factors, not the residences of appellees or counsel, nor on congesti on of the courts. As with other factors not sufficient for transfer themselves, if residence is probative of oppressiveness, it is not error to reflect upon it, so long as it i s not the sole reason for the judge’s decision. 9 Indeed, in Cheeseman itself, Justice Cappy pointed out that “access to witnesses or other sources of proof” was an entirely legitimate factor when determining oppressiveness, Cheeseman, at 162, and the plaintiffs are certainly “sources of proof.”

9 As in Walls, the Superior Court did not consider t hat both parties’ choice of counsel may change with the venue in which the case must procee d[J-62-2013] - 11

The Superior Court noted six of the seven affidavi ts contained identical language, which appellees argue were “plainly inadequate” bec ause they failed to include “details of

how the affiant’s ‘duties’ or business would be aff ected by trial in Philadelphia, a[] claim that the [appellants]’ businesses would be seriousl y hampered or that the affiant’s job would be at stake, or an[] averment that the affian t would not be reimbursed for expenses he incurred in traveling to Philadelphia[.]” Appel lees’ Brief, at 14 (citation omitted). We

are unsure what extra detail must be enumerated — t he interference with one’s business and personal life caused by the participatory deman ds of a distant lawsuit is patent. The

witnesses need not detail what clients or tasks wil l be postponed or opportunities lost in order for the judge to exercise common sense in eva luating their worth; indeed, no one can foretell such detail. One hopes a judge may co mprehend the existence of relevant general disruption from the allegations in the affi davit, sufficiently to rule on the issue. If we consider only appellants’ seven affidavits, there “exists a[] proper basis for the L transfer[.]” Zappala, at 1284 (citation omit ted). It cannot be said the trial court misapplied the law or failed to hold appellants to their proper burden to establish oppression. Cf. Catagnus, at 1264 (“[T]he trial co urt’s failure to hold the defendant to the proper burden constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)). While typically the “fact that the site of the precipitating event was outside of plaintiff’s choice of forum is not dispositive[,]” Walls, at 852 (citations omitted), it is axiomatic that “when the case involves a transfer from Philadelphia to a more distant coun ty L, factors such as the burden of travel, time out of the office, disruption to busin ess operations, and the greater difficulty[J-62-2013] - 12

involved in obtaining witnesses and sources of proo f are more significant[,]” Bratic, 505 (Gantman, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitt ed). 10 As with other factors insufficient on their own, d istance alone is not dispositive, but it is inherently part of the equation. The Cheesem an decision actually involved two cases, both filed in Philadelphia County and transf erred to neighboring Bucks County because of court congestion in the former. Dauphin County, however, is not a neighbor of Philadelphia, and one needs no detailed affidavi t to understand the difference in logistics necessitated by a separation of 100 miles . It is not necessary to articulate to a jurist the inherently empirical concept that distan ce and expedience are inversely proportional. The Superior Court speculated upon t he eight witnesses, be they employees or professionals, and the economic conseq uences as to each is not of record, but it may be presumed without fear of contradictio n that to each of these people, time indeed is money, and days of participating in trial in Philadelphia would impact their “duties/operations[.]” Bratic, at 503. We thus cannot accept appellees’ argument that appe llants’ affidavits were “plainly inadequate to overcome the great deference owed to a plaintiff’s choice of forum[.]” Appellees’ Brief, at 11. A petition to transfer venue must be supported by detailed information on the record, but “Cheeseman and Rule 1006(d) do not require any particular form of proof. All that is required is that the moving party present a sufficient factual basis for the petition[, and t]he trial cou rt retains the discretion to determine whether the particular form of proof L is sufficien t.” Wood, at 714 (citing Cheeseman, at

10 Compare Hunter, at 897 (citations omitted), Zappal a, at 525, Raymond, at 521, Catagnus, at 1266, Johns, at 491, and Hoose, at 5, with Wood, at 713, Borger, at 313, and Dulaney, at 1219.[J-62-2013] - 13

162); see also id., at 714 n.6 (collecting cases an d noting affidavits have never been held necessary to obtain transfer). The affidavits here, of course, employed nearly ide ntical language, as the factual basis for each is nearly identical — the oppressive ness of trial 100 miles away, which is manifestly troublesome. The trial judge need not b e told like a child how the distance in and of itself makes things more disagreeable and di sruptive to the persons obliged to travel. Nor is it a secret requiring iteration tha t trial in Dauphin County would provide easier access to local appellants and their local w itnesses, as well as the relevant court documents on which the very case is based. Further , given the witnesses’ respective job titles, we cannot agree with the Superior Court tha t the affidavits were insufficient to enable the trial court to intuit the professional o ppressiveness, more than inconvenience, that is patent therein. Indeed, if a reviewing cou rt may surmise upon no record evidence at all that some witnesses will be paid, it should not be heard to criticize the trial court’s crediting actual affidavits from witnesses that wou ld have their businesses interrupted for days at a time, to their obvious personal and finan cial detriment. The Superior Court’s reliance on its own Walls case is distinguishable, as the motion there was based on the alleged hardship of o ne insurance adjuster whose job title suggests testifying in court was not an infrequent thing. Further, being paid may mitigate hardship, but it does not eliminate oppressiveness or the disruption of other duties and home life — the physical toll from significant trav el or of living from a suitcase. Hardship and oppression are not the same thing, and mitigati ng the former may ease the latter, but it does not affect the other concerns necessary for consideration.[J-62-2013] - 14

Neither does payment change the ease of access to e vidence identified by Justice Cappy as a major factor in these matters. As betwe en Philadelphia and adjoining Bucks County, the situation in Cheeseman, we speak of mere inconvenience; as between Philadelphia and counties 100 miles away, simple in convenience fades in the mirror and we near oppressiveness with every milepost of the t urnpike and Schuylkill Expressway. We reaffirm the Cheeseman standard, but hold the s howing of oppression needed for a judge to exercise discretion in favor of gran ting a forum non conveniens motion is not as severe as suggested by the Superior Court’s post -Cheeseman cases. Mere inconvenience remains insufficient, but there is no burden to show near-draconian consequences. Although the Superior Court may have reached a conclusion different than the trial court, this does not justify disturb ing the ruling; the Superior Court effectively substituted its judgment for that of the trial cour t, which it may not do. The facts of record allow the finding that trial in Philadelphia would be more than merely inconvenient. As there was clearly a proper evidentiary basis for th is conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion transfe rring the case to Dauphin County. Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished. Mr. Justice Stevens did not participate in the con sideration or decision of this case. Mr. Chief Justice Castille, Mr. Justice Baer, Mada me Justice Todd and Mr. Justice McCaffery join the opinion. Mr. Justice Saylor concurs in the result.