COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00155-CR

MARVIN EUGENE HUDGINS A/K/A 

MARVIN EUGENE HUGGINS

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1204601D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Marvin Eugene Hudgins, a/k/a Marvin Eugene Huggins, appeals 

from the trial court’s order revoking his deferred adjudication community 

supervision and adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon. In one issue, Hudgins argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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by finding that he had violated the terms of his deferred adjudication community 

supervision. We will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court placed Hudgins on deferred 

adjudication community supervision on July 16, 2010. On June 4, 2013, the 

State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication alleging five violations: (1) having 

contact with the injured party, (2) failing to attend required MHMR appointments, 

(3) consuming alcohol, (4) failing to complete at least ten hours’ community 

service restitution per month, and (5) failing to pay supervision fees.

At the hearing on the State’s petition, Hudgins pleaded “not true” to each of 

the State’s allegations. After hearing testimony, the trial court found the first four 

of the State’s allegations true and State’s allegation five not true. Thus, the trial 

court revoked Hudgins’s deferred adjudication community supervision and 

adjudicated him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial 

court then sentenced Hudgins to fifteen years’ incarceration, and this appeal 

followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate review of the decision to adjudicate guilt is “in the same manner” 

as review of the revocation of community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (West Supp. 2014). We review an order revoking 

community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 

202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 
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493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and 

conditions of community supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 

S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its 

discretion in revoking the community supervision. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–

94. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged 

violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a 

revocation order. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1980).

IV. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In part of his sole issue, Hudgins argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by finding true the State’s allegation that he consumed alcohol. We 

disagree.

At the adjudication hearing, the State elicited testimony from Hudgins’s 

probation supervisor, Melanie Ford. Ford stated that Hudgins had admitted 

drinking alcohol during his community supervision term. Specifically, Ford said 

that Hudgins admitted to drinking multiple beers. The State also introduced an 
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“admittance of use form” that Ford said was a form that Hudgins signed after he 

admitted to drinking alcohol. Ford also testified that drinking alcohol was a 

violation of one of the terms of Hudgins’s community supervision.

Hudgins argues on appeal that the State failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he violated this term of his community 

supervision because, even though he signed the admittance of use form, he also 

pleaded not true to the State’s allegation. At a revocation hearing, however, it is 

the trial judge who is to determine the weight and credibility of the witnesses, and 

we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by choosing to believe 

Ford’s testimony. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, 

we hold that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Hudgins

violated the condition of his community supervision that required him to abstain 

from drinking alcohol. See Dobbs v. State, No. 06-09-00198-CR, 2010 WL 

1463246, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 14, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (reasoning that trial court was free to believe 

probation supervisor’s testimony over Dobbs’s regarding allegation that he had 

consumed alcohol).

Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the 

alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to 

support a revocation order, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by revoking Hudgins’s community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of 
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aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926. We 

overrule Hudgins’s sole issue.

V. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Hudgins’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: WALKER and MEIER, JJ.; and CHARLES BLEIL (Senior Justice, 

Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 16, 2015