IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-0608

Filed July 22, 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF I.V.,

Minor Child,

K.V., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. 

Straka, Judge. 

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her 

child. AFFIRMED.

Gina L. Kramer of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, Ralph Potter, County Attorney, and Joshua VanderPloeg, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Dustin A. Baker, Dubuque, for father.

Kristy L. Hefel of Public Defender’s Office, Dubuque, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental 

rights in her son pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2013). She 

contends the court should have allowed her an additional six months to pursue 

reunification. She also contends termination is not in the child’s best interests 

because the child is in the care of a relative and because of the strong parentchild bond.

I.

We review de novo proceedings terminating parental rights. See In re 

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). While we give weight to the findings of 

the juvenile court, our statutory obligation to review termination proceedings de 

novo means our review is not a rubber stamp of what has come before. We will 

uphold an order terminating parental rights only if there is clear and convincing 

evidence of grounds for termination. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 

2000). Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or 

substantial doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the 

evidence. See id.

Termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a 

three-step analysis. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). First, the 

court must determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has 

been established. See id. If a parent does not challenge the statutory grounds 

for termination, we need not discuss this step. See id. Second, if a ground for 

termination is established, the court must apply the framework set out in section 
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232.116(2) to decide if proceeding with termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See id. Third, if the statutory best-interests framework supports 

termination of parental rights, the court must consider if any statutory exceptions 

set forth in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination. See id.

II.

The child at issue is I.V., born in 2013. The Iowa Department of Human 

Services (“IDHS”) became involved with this family in June 2012 due to 

protective concerns regarding physical abuse of the mother’s older child by I.V.’s 

father. That case was closed a few months later when the older child died. I.V.’s 

father was charged with murder of the older child.

The family again came to the attention of IDHS in June 2013 due to 

protective concerns for the child at issue after the mother tested positive for 

cocaine while pregnant with I.V. The mother admitted to using cocaine on one 

occasion while pregnant with I.V. The mother was cooperative with services, and 

the case was closed in January 2014.

The summer wind came blowing in again in June 2014. I.V.’s father 

tested positive for methamphetamine while under the supervision of the 

department of correctional services. IDHS initiated safety services for the family 

and tested the mother and I.V. The mother’s test was negative, but I.V. tested 

positive for methamphetamine. He was voluntarily placed with his maternal 

grandfather where he remained until the time of the termination hearing. In 

September 2014, the court adjudicated I.V. a child in need of assistance 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2), (n), and (o), placed the child in the 
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IDHS’s custody for placement with his maternal grandfather, ordered the parents 

to cooperate with random drug testing, ordered the mother to participate in 

individual therapy and take her prescribed medications, and provided for 

visitation at the discretion of the IDHS.

In the ensuing months, the father was incarcerated for an indeterminate 

term not to exceed ten years for possession of methamphetamine precursors 

and child endangerment arising out of the conduct resulting in the older child’s 

death. The mother refused to participate in drug tests. By mid-December the 

mother had stopped participating in all services, including visitation with the child. 

At a family team meeting in January 2015, the mother said she was willing to 

terminate her parental rights and “was ok” with her father adopting I.V. She also 

said she no longer wanted to participate in services. In February the State 

petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents. In March the mother 

admitted to her IDHS worker that she had been using methamphetamine and 

opiates almost daily for several months and that it had become a problem. She 

requested visitation with I.V. but failed to appear when a visit was scheduled. 

The mother exercised a single visitation with I.V., the day before the termination 

hearing.

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa 

Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), (h), and (j) and the mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h). The court considered and rejected the 

mother’s request for an additional six months so she could participate in inpatient 

substance abuse treatment with I.V. in her care. It found the mother had had the 
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opportunity to participate in services and substance abuse treatment before but 

declined. Noting her testimony that she was using illegal drugs almost daily and 

her “last-minute” substance abuse evaluation and interest in treatment, the court 

found the mother did not have the “necessary commitment to establish that the 

present concerns will no longer exist with an extension of time.” The court also 

found “there are no consequential factors which should prevent termination of 

parental rights.” The mother timely filed this appeal. The father does not appeal.

III.

On appeal, the mother does not challenge the statutory ground authorizing 

the termination of her parental rights, and we will not discuss the issue any 

further. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40. The mother does claim the court should 

have given her an additional six months to pursue reunification with I.V. because 

she was willing to attend inpatient treatment, she has numerous parenting 

strengths, and she has an affordable apartment that is appropriate for I.V. See

Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b) and 232.117(5). She also claims that termination of 

her parental rights in I.V. is not I.V.’s best interests.

On de novo review, we conclude an additional six months’ time would not 

rectify the conditions that led to I.V.’s removal. While the mother states she now 

has a willingness to address her substance abuse problem, there is nothing to 

indicate she could resolve the problem and provide constant and reliable care for 

I.V. if granted additional time to work toward reunification. See, e.g., In re C.M., 

No. 14-1140, 2015 WL 408187, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015) (affirming 

termination of parental rights where the parents sought more time but evidence 
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established they were unlikely to resolve their substance abuse problems); In re 

H.L., No. 14-0708, 2014 WL 3513262, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jul. 16, 2014) 

(affirming termination of parental rights where the father had history of substance 

abuse); In re J.L., No. 02-1968, 2003 WL 21544226, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 

2003) (concluding that relapse of parent despite offer of services supported 

termination of parental rights). Although past conduct is not determinative of 

future conduct, it is probative. See In re K.F., No. 14–0892, 2014 WL 4635463, 

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2014) (“What’s past is prologue.”); see also In re

A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting a parent’s past conduct is 

instructive in determining future behavior); In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 

1997) (concluding a parent’s past behavior is indicative of the quality of care the 

parent is capable of providing in the future). Here, the mother’s past conduct 

demonstrates that she was unwilling to avail herself of services when offered and 

only made a last-minute attempt for litigation purposes.

The mother also contends termination is not in I.V.’s best interest and the 

court should have declined to terminate her parental rights because two of the 

discretionary factors in section 232.116(3) are present. She argues 

232.116(3)(a) applies because I.V. is placed with his maternal grandfather. 

Section 232.116(3)(a) provides the court need not terminate the parent-child 

relationship if a “relative has legal custody of the child.” In this case, IDHS had 

legal custody of the child. Accordingly, the statutory exception is not applicable. 

See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. Even if the statutory exception were applicable, 

the provision is permissive and not mandatory. See C.K., 558 N.W.2d at 174
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(“An appropriate determination to terminate a parent-child relationship is not to 

be countermanded by the ability and willingness of a family relative to take the 

child.”). The child’s best interests always remain the first consideration.”); In re 

D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (stating this provision is 

permissive and not mandatory). There is nothing in this record supporting the 

conclusion that the juvenile court should have declined to terminate the mother’s 

parental rights on this basis.

The mother also argues the court should have declined to terminate her 

parental right because “she shares a close, strong bond with her son” and 

disrupting that bond “would be detrimental to I.V.’s best interest.” See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c). The mother did not exercise visitation with the child between 

January and just days before the termination hearing in late March. The service 

provider who supervised visitation disagreed with the mother’s testimony she and 

the child shared a strong bond. The service provider testified, “I think he 

recognizes who she is and called out ‘mommy,’ but as far as a bonding 

concerning nurturing and comforting—comforting and snuggling and warming, 

no.” The mother professes love for her son, but her actions are to the contrary. 

“[O]ur consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by 

termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the mother’s] inability to 

provide for [I.V.’s] developing needs.” See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 

(Iowa 2010). We do not find that termination would be detrimental to I.V. based 

solely on the parent-child relationship.
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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination of the mother’s 

parental rights.

AFFIRMED.