IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1419

Filed July 22, 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF C.Y.-E.,

Minor Child,

N.E., Intervenor,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. 

Straka, Associate Juvenile Judge.

Former spouse of a child’s biological father appeals following the 

termination of the father’s parental rights, asserting the juvenile court erred in not 

placing the child in her care, among other things. AFFIRMED.

Daniel McClean of McClean & Heavens Law Offices, Dyersville, for 

appellant intervenor.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, Ralph Potter, County Attorney, and Joshua A. Vander Ploeg, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Zeke R. McCartney of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
2

DOYLE, J.

N.E., the former spouse of a child’s biological father, intervened in the 

child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings. Following the juvenile court’s 

termination of the father’s parental rights and various other rulings against N.E., 

N.E. appeals. She contends the court erred in (1) finding she was no longer the 

child’s stepparent after she and the child’s biological father divorced; (2) failing to 

place the child in her care; (3) denying her due process in the termination-ofparental-rights proceedings in numerous respects; and (4) not recusing itself. 

We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The relevant facts are not disputed by the parties.1 C.E. is the father and 

S.Y. is the mother of C.Y.-E., born in March 2012. At the time of the child’s birth, 

the father was married to N.E., whom he married in 2007. The father and N.E. 

had had marital problems for some time. In 2011, the couple’s biological child 

tragically died in an accident.

C.Y.-E. tested positive for Oxycodone exposure at birth. Because the 

child’s mother was scheduled to serve a jail sentence shortly after the child’s 

birth, the mother arranged that the child be cared for by the father and N.E. 

Thereafter, the couple sought assistance from the Iowa Department of Human 

Services (DHS), and a voluntary case was opened and services offered to N.E. 

and the father.

 

1 Other background facts may be found in our opinion filed today in the related 

case In re C.Y.-E., No. 14-0981 (July 22, 2015), affirming the juvenile court’s ruling 

terminating the father’s parental rights.
3

In February 2013, N.E. served the father divorce papers, and the father 

“responded poorly to this and threatened to harm himself,” barricading himself in 

the bathroom of he and N.E.’s home with a gun. After N.E. called 9-1-1, law 

enforcement officials responded and entered the home. While looking for the 

father in the home, methamphetamine precursors and drug paraphernalia were 

discovered in the basement, leading to the father’s arrest for child endangerment 

and possession of precursors.

Both the father and the child’s hair tested positive for methamphetamine 

thereafter. N.E. denied knowledge of the precursors in their home and the child’s 

exposure to methamphetamine, and she tested negative for illegal substances. 

Despite the fact N.E. had been the child’s primary caregiver since the child’s 

birth, the father requested the child be placed with his relatives because he was 

angry with N.E. about her seeking a divorce. The child was so placed and has 

remained in the relatives’ care since that time.

In March 2013, the State filed a petition asserting the child was a child in 

need of assistance (CINA). Prior to the hearing on the State’s CINA petition, the 

juvenile court on April 1, 2013, entered a pre-hearing order directing that the child 

“be removed from parental custody and placed in the care, custody, and control 

of [DHS] for appropriate . . . relative placement.” Additionally, the court granted 

N.E.’s request to intervene in the proceedings, and it ordered visitation to include 

N.E. Thereafter, N.E. had regular visitation with the child, and, by all accounts, 

was an excellent caregiver to the child.

At the July 2013 disposition hearing, N.E. requested the child be placed 

with her. DHS recommended leaving the child in the relatives’ care because the 
4

child was “doing well, his needs [were] being met, and there [was] no reason to 

remove him from this home.” The mother supported N.E.’s request; the State, 

the GAL, and the father all supported DHS’s recommendation. The court agreed 

with DHS and left the child in DHS’s custody for continued relative placement. 

The court explained:

This is a very difficult and close call for the court. Both 

homes have a significant history with the child. Both homes have 

approved home studies, and both homes qualify as a placement 

option. Iowa Code section 232.102(1)(a)(1) [(2013)] allows the 

court to place the child with “a parent who does not have physical 

care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person.” Although 

[N.E.] is not a biological relative, she would qualify under the “other 

suitable person” option. No statutory preference is given for any of 

these options.

It is undisputed that removing a child and changing 

placements is disruptive and confusing for a child and affects their 

sense of security and stability. The court does not believe 

removing [the child] from his current placement would be in his best 

interests at this time. The current arrangement provides for [N.E.] 

to have [the child] three nights per week. This arrangement allows 

her to maintain her relationship with [the child] and also preserves 

her ability to be a long-term placement option should reunification 

not be successful.

Neither of the parents nor N.E. appealed the dispositional order.

In the fall of 2013, N.E. and the father’s dissolution of marriage was 

finalized. Around the same time, N.E. filed a motion in juvenile court, requesting, 

among other things, the juvenile court grant concurrent jurisdiction to the district 

court so she, as the child’s stepparent, could be reunited with the child. She also 

requested the court halt any termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.

Following a hearing, the court denied N.E.’s motion for concurrent 

jurisdiction, stating:

Although the court has authority to grant concurrent 

jurisdiction, the juvenile court is only authorized to terminate a 
5

dispositional order if the purposes of the dispositional order have 

been accomplished and the child is no longer in need of 

supervision, care, or treatment. In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 733 

(Iowa 2001); Iowa Code § 232.103(4)(a).

If the court were to grant concurrent jurisdiction and allow 

[N.E.] to pursue a guardianship in district court, the present 

dispositional orders would essentially be rendered meaningless. 

No doubt, this is [N.E.’s] intent and desired outcome, but would be 

contrary to the code section cited above as the court is unable to 

find the child is no longer in need of supervision, care, or treatment.

The child remains adjudicated a [CINA] and in the custody of 

the [DHS], who is statutorily obligated to provide reunification 

services to the biological parents if and when they are available. A 

district court guardianship order would prevent the [DHS] from 

providing those services.

. . . [T]he above matter is currently set for a permanency 

hearing in February. [N.E.] will still have the ability to appear at the 

permanency hearing to request consideration as a placement 

option or request a separate placement hearing. The State and 

guardian ad litem [(GAL)] supported the denial of [N.E.’s] request 

for concurrent jurisdiction. [The child’s biological mother] supported 

[N.E.’s] request. Counsel for [the child’s father] took no position.

Accordingly, the court finds it would be in the best interest of 

[the child] for the court to deny the motion for concurrent 

jurisdiction; continue the [CINA] proceedings; and continue to 

exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

The biological parents made little to no progress in the case. In January 

2014, the State filed its petition seeking termination of the parents’ parental 

rights, and a termination-of-parental-rights hearing was set for February 2014, 

along with the permanency hearing. DHS, the child’s GAL, and the county foster 

care review board all supported termination of parental rights.

More motions were filed thereafter. The mother sought a continuance 

because she was to be released in a few months. The father also requested a 

continuance, challenging his service of the termination-of-parental-rights petition. 

N.E. requested dismissal of the termination-of-parental-rights petition for 

numerous reasons, including that the State’s petition failed to comply with Iowa 
6

Code section 232.111. She also asserted that termination of the parents’ 

parental rights was not warranted under section 232.116(3) because the child 

was placed with relatives and termination of parental rights would be detrimental 

to the child. At the February 2014 hearing, the juvenile court reluctantly granted 

the father’s motion, though it did not believe further delay in the proceedings was 

in the child’s best interests, and it continued the date of the termination-ofparental-rights hearing to April 3, 2014.

More motions were filed. The State requested to amend its petition to 

address N.E.’s alleged deficiencies in its original termination-of-parental-rights

petition. The mother filed a motion noting she had been released from prison 

and was living with N.E. She requested that she be provided services by DHS 

and that an immediate hearing be set. She also requested another continuance 

so she could begin services and work toward reunification with the child. N.E. 

filed a motion requesting clarification of whether she could supervise visits 

between the mother and the child. She also filed a motion supporting the 

mother’s motion to continue.

Following a hearing on the remaining motions, the juvenile court on March 

19, 2014, entered its order granting N.E.’s request to supervise visits between 

the child and the mother, as well as the State’s motion to amend the petition and 

its oral request that the termination-of-parental-rights hearing be bifurcated from 

any placement hearing, should the court grant its termination-of-parental-rights 

petition. The court denied the remaining motions.

On April 1, 2014, N.E. filed an “Application for Permission to Appeal 

Juvenile Court Ruling” before the Iowa Supreme Court. She also filed more 
7

motions in juvenile court, including a request that the juvenile court stay the 

termination-of-parental-rights proceedings pending a ruling on her application to 

the supreme court. The juvenile court denied N.E.’s motions, but it rescheduled 

the termination-of-parental-rights hearing to May 2014 due to emergency family

issues concerning one of the attorneys for the parties. The Iowa Supreme Court 

subsequently denied N.E.’s application.

N.E. then filed another request that the juvenile court grant the district 

court concurrent jurisdiction. Following that filing, the juvenile court entered its 

ruling denying her request. Additionally, the court noted in its ruling that N.E.’s 

motion went “way beyond the issues of concurrent jurisdiction,” and the court 

went on to address a few claims it believed N.E. had either inaccurately or 

misleadingly stated. The court specifically found it did “not believe [N.E.] 

remain[ed] [the child’s] stepmother as statutorily defined. After the dissolution of 

marriage was finalized, [N.E.’s] relationship through affinity terminated and she 

became, in a purely legal sense, a ‘nonparent’ with regard to her rights to [the 

child].” In response to N.E.’s argument the court “never addressed [her] 

relationship to [the child],” the court directed her to its dispositional order which 

found she was an “other suitable person” for placement purposes and did not 

appeal that ruling. The court also took issue with N.E.’s

characterization of the history of this case. She state[d]: “The best 

interests of [the child] dictates that he has returned to his home with 

[N.E.] and his stepbrother. [N.E.] and stepbrother constitute the 

family unit in this matter.” This language paints a picture which 

does not reflect the reality of the family dynamics of the time of 

removal. The “family unit” was in the process of being dissolved 

through divorce proceedings. The reports clearly indicate [the 

child] and his father were staying with [N.E.] on a temporary basis. 

To characterize [N.E.’s home] as [the child’s] home under these 
8

circumstances is inconsistent with the documented history of the 

case. Therefore, the child cannot be “returned” to a home he was 

never removed from.

The day before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, N.E. filed three 

motions, which included a motion to amend and enlarge the juvenile court’s prior 

ruling and one requesting recusal. Her motion to recuse alleged the juvenile 

court judge was clearly prejudicial and biased towards her because the judge 

“refuse[d] to accept the fact that the Iowa case law states that the relationship 

between [the child and N.E.] is one through affinity that has not been terminated 

due to [N.E.] divorcing [the child’s] biological father.”

The next day, the termination-of-parental-rights hearing was held. Before 

testimony was given, N.E. advised the court that several of her motions were still 

pending. The court noted that N.E. did file several motions the day before which 

it reviewed the morning of the hearing, but it found those motions did “not pertain 

to the two issues before the court” in the termination-of-parental-rights 

proceedings. It advised it intended to address those motions separately at a later 

time, but N.E. requested the court rule upon its motion for the judge’s recusal. 

N.E. again asserted the judge was

biased and basically giving [the court’s] May 9th order redacted as 

almost a case plan for DHS and misrepresented the record as it 

exists, [and N.E. did not] believe [her] interests [would] be served or 

[the child’s] best interest be served if [the judge was] allowed to 

hear the termination hearing.

The court denied N.E.’s recusal request, finding N.E. did not have standing at 

that point to make such a motion.

Testimony in the case then began, and the court did not permit N.E.’s 

counsel to examine the witnesses, the court again finding N.E. did “not have 
9

standing in the termination phase of these hearings.” The court allowed N.E.’s 

counsel to examine the State’s witnesses outside of its presence as an offer of 

proof, but it did not allow her counsel to examine the mother’s witnesses or to call 

her own witnesses. After testimony was concluded, N.E. made another offer of 

proof outside the presence of the juvenile court, renewing her numerous 

objections made at the hearing and in her prior motions. N.E. subsequently filed 

a motion requesting the court admit all testimony given though offers of proof at 

the termination-of-parental-rights hearing.

Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered its order terminating the 

biological parents’ parental rights. The court in its written ruling acknowledged its 

oral rulings at the hearing on N.E.’s motions; it did not make any other findings 

concerning N.E. or her other pending motions. The court followed the required 

three-step analysis concerning termination of the parents’ parental rights. See In 

re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). As to the final step, considering “if 

any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude 

termination of parental rights,” see id., the court’s ruling stated it found there were 

“no consequential factors weighing against termination [of the parents’ parental 

rights] that require[d] a different conclusion.” The court’s ruling set a placement 

hearing for July 2014. The father filed a notice of appeal, and N.E. filed a notice 

of cross-appeal in the matter.

On June 11, 2014 the juvenile court entered written rulings on N.E.’s 

motions to admit the offer-of-proof testimony and her prior motion to amend and 

enlarge filed May 9, 2014. The court denied the motion to amend and enlarge, 

finding it had sufficiently and thoroughly addressed the issues raised by N.E. in 
10

its prior order However, the court granted N.E.’s motion to admit the offer-ofproof testimony to the extent it allowed her “to make her record for purposes of 

appeal.”

N.E. subsequently filed more motions in juvenile court. She requested the 

juvenile court reconsider its termination-of-parental-rights ruling and that the 

court “address the [o]ffer of [p]roof by adding it to the record for the May 20, 

2014, hearing.” She also filed a motion to continue and another motion for 

recusal. The recusal motion requested the judge recuse “himself from any 

further proceeding in this matter as a clear prejudice and bias exists towards 

[N.E.].” The motion also requested recusal “on the basis that [the judge] failed to 

address [N.E.’s motions filed May 19, 2014].” N.E. further alleged the court 

denied her due process by not permitting her to participate fully in the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. N.E. filed a motion requesting the court 

stay the proceedings because she and the father were appealing the terminationof-parental-rights ruling. The court subsequently granted the motion to continue 

the placement hearing, but entered rulings denying the remaining motions.

N.E. then filed a motion with the Iowa Supreme Court to stay the 

underlying termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. The State resisted her 

request for a stay, and it also filed a motion to dismiss her cross-appeal.

While the appeals and other appellate matters were pending, the 

permanency-placement proceedings moved forward. Prior to the July 2014 

hearing, the child’s GAL filed its report recommending the child continue living 

with and be adopted by the father’s relatives. Though the GAL found both N.E. 

and the father’s relatives to be viable permanent placement options, the GAL 
11

believed the relatives were a slightly better option because the relatives 

presented no concerns regarding their care of the child and already viewed the 

child as part of their family. The GAL noted the child had been in their care at 

that time for sixteen months and was bonded with the father’s relatives and the 

relatives’ children.

On July 28, 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court entered an order concerning 

the State’s motion to dismiss and N.E.’s request for stay. The court determined 

N.E.’s cross-appeal challenging the termination-of-parental-rights ruling was 

“interlocutory on the basis that the placement hearing ha[d] not yet taken place,”

and the court denied the request for a stay. N.E. then filed a motion for 

reconsideration.

A permanency placement hearing was held on July 31, 2014. N.E. 

advised the juvenile court the father’s appeal and its motion for reconsideration 

were still pending in appellate court, and she requested the permanency hearing 

be stayed until her motion and the father’s appeal were ruled upon. The State 

and the GAL resisted. The court denied N.E.’s request, finding that if the father’s 

appeal was granted, it would not matter who the court placed the child with at the 

present hearing, as the CINA case would reopen with reunification services. 

N.E. renewed her motion for recusal, which the court denied. N.E. then 

proceeded to call several witnesses, all generally agreeing the child would do 

well in either N.E.’s or the father’s relatives’ home.

Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered its ruling placing the child 

in the guardianship of DHS pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.117(3), to move 

forward with establishing a stable placement for the child by adoption or other 
12

permanent placement. The next day, the Iowa Supreme Court entered its order 

denying N.E.’s motion for reconsideration.

N.E. now appeals.2 She contends the juvenile court erred in “not 

reunifying the minor child with [her] and [his] stepbrother following removal from 

the family home” and in “not concluding [N.E.] remains the minor child’s 

stepmother through affinity.” She also asserts she was denied due process 

when the juvenile court disallowed her participation in the termination-of-parentalrights proceedings, denied her motions for concurrent jurisdiction, and denied her 

“the right to continue contact with the minor child following the permanency 

hearing.” Finally, she maintains the juvenile court judge erred in not recusing 

himself from the matter because he was “clearl[ly] bias[ed]” against N.E. and her 

counsel.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

We ordinarily review CINA and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings 

de novo. See In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). This requires that 

we “review both the facts and the law, and we adjudicate rights anew.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, to the extent the issue requires 

statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. See id. “We 

review a court’s decision to recuse or not to recuse itself for an abuse of 

 

2 We note that on June 23, 2015, the Iowa Supreme Court filed an order 

concerning this case, N.E.’s interlocutory appeal numbered 14-0554, and the father’s 

appeal of the termination of his parental rights numbered 14-0981, explaining this case 

and the father’s appeal were delayed after the clerk of the supreme court issued 

procedendo in N.E.’s interlocutory appeal in 14-0554 and the entire file was inadvertently 

closed. The supreme court ordered the “appeal shall be transferred immediately to the 

court of appeals for disposition,” and this case was transferred to this court the same 

day.
13

discretion.” Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Iowa 2001). “As always, our 

fundamental concern is the child’s best interests.” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 500.

III. Discussion.

A. Stepparent Status.

First and foremost, the question before us is whether N.E.’s relationship 

with the child is equal to that of a parent, given that she was the child’s primary 

caregiver for the first year of his life and was married to, but has since divorced, 

the child’s biological father. Her status determines the services required to be 

offered to her for reunification, if any, as well as her due process rights in the 

case.

N.E. states that “[t]he Iowa Supreme Court recognizes affinity remains 

intact despite divorce,” citing Farnsworth v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 132 

N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1965). In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court was faced with 

the questions: “‘[O]nce a daughter-in-law, always a daughter-in-law?’ May an 

individual have as many mothers-in-law as the exigencies of death or divorce 

permit him marriages?” Id. at 478. Though the latter includes the word “divorce,” 

the facts in Farnsworth only concerned the death of a former spouse. See id.

Specifically, in Farnsworth, Thelma Farnsworth was formerly married to 

Elizabeth Probert’s son, John. Id. John died, leaving Thelma a widow. Id. 

Thelma remarried a year later. Id. Not quite ten years after John’s death, John’s 

mother Elizabeth died, leaving assets of $19,879.85 she held in joint tenancy 

with Thelma. Id. There was no question that Thelma would inherit the property; 

the issue was at what rate her inheritance would be taxed—five percent as 

Elizabeth’s daughter-in-law or ten percent as a non-relative. Id. (citing Iowa 
14

Code § 450.3 (1965), which sets forth rates of taxation on inheritance for certain 

classes of people and businesses). The court noted if it found the taxation 

statute to be ambiguous, it was required to strictly construe the statute “against 

the taxing authorities.” See id. With that backdrop, the court cited a prior case, 

wherein it concluded that a stepfather “is a relative by affinity, and the 

relationship continues after the death of the wife, on whom the relationship 

depends.” Id. at 480 (citing Simcoke v. Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Iowa, 51 N.W. 

8, 9 (Iowa 1892)). In Simcoke, the court, quoting another court, further stated:

By the marriage, one party thereto holds by affinity 

the same relation to the kindred of the other that the 

latter holds by consanguinity, and no rule is known to 

us under which the relation by affinity is lost on a 

dissolution of the marriage, more than that by blood is 

lost by the death of those through whom it is derived. 

The dissolution of a marriage, once lawful, by death 

or divorce, has no effect upon the issue; and, it is 

apprehended, it can have no greater operation to 

annul the relation of affinity, which it produced.

There is nothing in the spirit or purpose of the law that indicates to 

us that relatives by affinity are not within the legislative intent.

51 N.W. at 9-10 (quoting Spear v. Robinson, 29 Me. 531, 545 (1849)). In 

Farnsworth, the court did not overrule Simcoke, stating

Spear v. Robinson . . . has been said to represent a minority rule, 

and it has also been urged that the quoted language [in Simcoke]

was dictum. However, that may be, we have approved it and it 

forms a part of our decision in the Simcoke case.

This case has never been overruled, and still represents the 

law in Iowa. If the relationship by affinity between a stepfather and 

stepson continues after the death of the wife and mother upon 

whom it depends, we see no reason for saying that the relation of 

mother-in-law and daughter-in-law does not also continue after the 

death of the son and husband, or indeed upon a remarriage. We 

are not here dealing with the term ‘wife of a son’, or ‘widow of a 

son’, which have been before the courts in other jurisdictions. 

There might be more reason for construing statutes which use 
15

these words as ending with a remarriage; but we are unable to 

distinguish the Simcoke case, on principle and reason, from the 

one now before us. After a remarriage, the party may have two 

mothers-in-law, but the former relation is not ended.

132 N.W.2d at 480. It is the language from the Simcoke case upon which N.E. 

asserts she is still the child’s stepmother by affinity.

Arguably, the only part of Simcoke that remains good law is the part that 

related directly to the court’s decision: the status of affinity after the death of a 

spouse.3 See id. In any event, even assuming without deciding that the portions 

of Simcoke and Farnsworth stating the relationship by affinity survives divorce, 

we find that of no help to N.E. under the relevant CINA statutes.

Although the Iowa “legislature has specifically directed courts to liberally 

construe Iowa Code chapter 232 to achieve ‘the care, guidance and control that 

will best serve the child’s welfare and the best interest of the state,’” the Iowa 

Supreme Court has determined the “legislature crafted a narrow and specific 

definition of ‘parent’ under chapter 232,” which unambiguously defines a “parent” 

as either the “‘biological or adoptive mother or father.’” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 501, 

 

3 Even in Farnsworth the court noted that its prior holding in Simcoke was a 

minority opinion and left room for reinterpretation of the issue under different facts. See 

Farnsworth, 132 N.W.2d at 480. Since that time, the court, in other circumstances, has 

found that “a stepparent cannot be considered a natural parent against the stepparent’s 

will and cannot be required to pay child support. The logical extension of our case law is 

that a stepparent is not treated as a natural parent and is, therefore, not entitled to 

visitation.” In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Iowa 1993) (internal citations omitted); see 

also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Wife § 4 (2014) (and cases cited therein for the 

proposition that “[a]ffinity relationships arise out of marriage and are always terminated 

by divorce”). Nevertheless, as one commenter noted, Simcoke is “still considered as a 

leading authority,” see 13 Julie L. Pulkrabeka & Gary J. Schmita, Iowa Practice

Series: Probate § 14:47, n.4 (2014), and we are bound by our supreme court’s 

pronouncements. See State v. Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (citing 

State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (1957) (“If our previous holdings are to be 

overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it ourselves.”)); State v. Hastings, 466 

N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme 

Court precedent.”).
16

504 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.1, .2(39)). N.E. is neither in relation to the child. 

See id. (holding an established father, wherein the child was born during the 

marriage but a paternity test determined the father was not the child’s biological 

parent, was not a “parent” under the definition of “parent” in section 232.2(39) 

and that it would “not expand or extend these statutes to include established 

fathers when the text of the statutes demonstrates the legislature’s intent not to 

do so”). The legislature could have easily included “stepparent” within the 

definition of “parent,” and it chose not to. See id. Particularly telling is the fact 

the term “stepparent” is used in the same section under the definition of 

“custodian,” which is defined as “a stepparent or a relative within the fourth 

degree of consanguinity to a child who has assumed responsibility for that child.” 

Iowa Code § 232.2(11)(a). That same section sets out the rights of a custodian 

and specifically states “[a]ll rights and duties of a custodian shall be subject to 

any residual rights and duties remaining in a parent or guardian.” See id.

§ 232.2(11)(b), (c). Consequently, it is clear that the rights of a “stepparent” are 

not equal to that of a parent. See id. Thus, even if N.E. remained the child’s 

stepparent, her rights were not elevated to those of a parent. See id.

“The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over CINA proceedings,” and 

such “proceedings may not take place without the presence of statutorily 

identified necessary parties.” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 501 (citing Iowa Code 

§ 232.61(1)). The necessary parties under Iowa Code section 232.91(1) include 

“the child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or [GAL].” Though N.E. cites the 

definition of “custodian” in her brief, she does not assert she is the child’s 

guardian, custodian, or GAL. Rather, she only contends she is the child’s parent 
17

because she was his stepparent by affinity. “Juvenile courts clearly have the 

authority to make the factual determination of whether a person qualifies as a 

necessary party, which inherently requires them to determine whether a person 

qualifies as a child’s biological parent.” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 506. Here, N.E. was 

not the child’s biological parent nor his adoptive parent. As our supreme court 

explained in J.C.:

Efficient and timely resolution of juvenile proceedings serves the 

interests of the child and the state. Our statutes and court rules 

reflect this proposition. “It is the public policy of the state of Iowa 

that proceedings involving . . . [CINA] be concluded at the earliest 

possible time consistent with a fair hearing to all parties.” Iowa Ct. 

R. 8.7. An adjudicatory hearing on a CINA petition must “be held 

within 60 days of the filing of said petition unless good cause to the 

contrary is shown.” Id. r. 8.11. A permanency hearing “for a child 

subject to out-of-home placement” must “be held within twelve 

months of the date the child was removed from the home.” Iowa 

Code § 232.104(1)(a)(1); see also id. § 232.104(1)(a)(2) (requiring 

a permanency hearing within thirty days if “the court has waived 

reasonable efforts requirements under section 232.102”). Our 

statutes and court rules reflect the understanding that promptly 

resolved juvenile proceedings best serve children’s interests. 

Courts are obliged to move urgently to achieve the ends that 

will best serve the child’s interests because childhood does not 

“await the wanderings of judicial process.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 

609, 613 (Iowa 1987). By narrowly defining “parent” under chapter 

232, and thereby narrowing the scope of necessary parties under 

Iowa Code section 232.91(1), the legislature gave courts another 

tool to resolve juvenile proceedings in a timely fashion. Were we to 

expand on the express language of the two statutes, we would 

impede the legislature’s worthy objective. . . . [I]t is good policy to 

narrow the number of necessary parties to avoid superfluous 

litigation that will bog down timely decision making for children in 

need of assistance and distract the court from the core issue of the 

child’s best interest. The express language of the statutes at issue 

in this case serves the best interests of the child.

Id. at 502-03 (internal block quote omitted).
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Because we agree with the juvenile court’s ultimate conclusion that N.E. 

was not a parent within the statutory definition of “parent,” we affirm on that 

issue.

B. Due Process.

Having found N.E. was not a “parent” within the definition of chapter 232, 

we turn to the question of whether her due process rights were violated when the 

juvenile court disallowed her participation in the termination-of-parental-rights 

proceedings, denied her motions for concurrent jurisdiction, and denied her “the 

right to continue contact with the minor child following the permanency hearing.”

The United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution both prohibit 

persons being deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9, and “[d]ue process must be 

afforded when an individual is threatened by state action which will deprive the 

individual of a protected liberty or property interest.” Callender v. Skiles, 591 

N.W.2d 182, 189 (Iowa 1999). Thus, due process concerns protected liberties 

and interests. See id. The protected liberties concerning children arise by way 

of a biological or adoptive link. See id. at 190. “Thus, we have a strong history 

of providing due process protection to parents.” Id. We have already determined

N.E. is not a parent within the definition of chapter 232.

1. Termination-of-Parental-Rights Hearing.

Here, N.E. was permitted to intervene as soon as her then husband 

denied her visitation with the child, which was before the child was even 

adjudicated a CINA. The court considered her at the dispositional phase as a 

placement option, but it declined to place the child with her. She made no 
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argument then as to her rights as a “stepparent,” nor did she appeal the 

dispositional order, challenging the court’s placement determination. She cannot 

challenge that determination here. See In re Marriage of Guyer, 522 N.W.2d 

818, 822 (Iowa 1994) (noting that principles of res judicata preclude a court from 

relitigating an issue that has previously been decided); In re J.B., 584 N.W.2d 

577, 581 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (finding mother’s failure to appeal from any of the 

CINA proceedings waived deficiencies in those proceedings).

The court also allowed N.E. to participate in the termination-of-parentalrights case, though it specifically disallowed her participation in the terminationof-parental-rights hearing. Because N.E. was not the child’s parent, N.E. was not 

a necessary party to the termination-of-parental hearing. Though arguably N.E. 

may have been a person standing in the place of the biological parents of the 

child when the case began, see Iowa Code § 232.111(4)(b)(6), it was the child’s 

biological father who requested the child be placed with his relatives. After the 

CINA proceedings were initiated, the child’s placement with the relatives 

continued and was again reaffirmed by the court’s disposition order, which N.E. 

did not appeal. By the time the biological parents took interest in the case, which 

was after termination of parental rights was recommended, the child had been in 

the relatives’ care for at least nine months, almost as long as the child had been 

in N.E.’s care as an infant. By the time of the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing in May 2014, the child had been in the care of the father’s relatives for 

sixteen months of his young life. Though we have no question of N.E.’s love for 

the child, we do not find error with the juvenile court’s decision disallowing N.E. to 

participate further in the termination-of-parental-rights hearing or in denying her 
20

motions for concurrent jurisdiction because she was not the child’s parent. See

J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 505. Nevertheless, even if we were to conclude the juvenile 

court erred in denying N.E. the right to participate in the termination-of-parentalrights hearing, it permitted N.E. to make offers of proof in the matter, and we find 

she was therefore not prejudiced by the court’s restriction of her right to 

participate in that hearing.

2. Permanency Hearing Following Termination of Parental Rights.

She also asserts her due process rights were violated when the juvenile 

court at the permanency hearing continued the child’s custody with DHS. She 

maintains:

During the pendency of this action, instead of acting in the minor 

child’s best interests, DHS and the juvenile court [have] consistently 

attempted to find ways to exclude [N.E.] from guardianship of the 

minor child or in the alternative, adoption of the minor child. [On 

appeal, this court] should find that the juvenile court violated 

[N.E.’s] procedural due process rights . . . and find that a 

guardianship should be established between [N.E.] and minor child 

or in the alternative remove DHS from this matter so that [N.E.] may 

be given a fair opportunity to be considered for placement.

However, having found N.E. is not a parent within the definition of Iowa Code 

chapter 232, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s rulings placing the child in 

the guardianship and custody of DHS in any way violates N.E.’s due process 

rights.

N.E., as a “suitable person,” had a right to intervene and participate in the 

proceedings subsequent to termination of the parents’ parental rights. See Iowa 

Code § 232.117(3); J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 507-08. The juvenile court allowed her 

to do so. She participated in the placement hearing after the parents’ parental 

rights were terminated. It does not necessarily follow that because the court did 
21

not grant her request for placement that it violated her due process rights. The 

court considered both homes and chose the fathers’ relatives as the home that 

should continue to care for the child. Upon our de novo review of the record, we 

do not find any reason to disturb the juvenile court’s ruling, nor do we find it 

violated N.E.’s due process rights. We therefore affirm on this issue.

C. Child’s Best Interests.

N.E. challenges the juvenile court’s best interests determinations. She 

maintains her home is the only home the child has ever known, and “she can 

best provide for the minor child’s needs.” She further argues it is not in the 

child’s best interests to be separated from his stepsibling—N.E.’s child that is 

unrelated to the child in interest by blood. She asserts she should have been 

reunified with the child and granted concurrent jurisdiction to pursue a 

guardianship. We disagree.

Though there is no question that N.E.’s home was the child’s home for the 

first year of his life, it has not been his home since the father requested the child 

be placed in the care of the father’s relatives. While N.E. implies DHS’s 

placement of the child with the father’s relatives was done for nefarious reasons, 

the record evidences DHS’s case worker and service provider were against the 

father’s request for the child to be placed with the father’s relatives, since the 

father was only doing it to hurt N.E. But the DHS case worker reasoned the 

father’s parental rights trumped those of his soon to be ex-wife N.E. who was not 

the child’s biological parent. It is unfortunate that the father used his status as 

the child’s parent to hurt N.E., but that is what happened here.
22

Thereafter, the district court determined the child should continue in the 

care of the relatives at disposition, and N.E. did not appeal that determination. 

Fortunately for the child, the child was able to remain in contact with N.E. and 

stepsibling while in the good care of relatives. As noted above, the child’s best 

interests are our paramount concern. See J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 500. Though the 

child may share a bond with N.E. and N.E.’s biological child, the child is also 

bonded with the fathers’ relatives and their children and is arguably more related 

to those relatives than to N.E. and her child. By the time of the termination-ofparental-rights hearing, the child had been with the fathers’ relatives longer than 

he had been with N.E. The juvenile court found it was in the child’s best interests 

to continue in juvenile court rather than grant concurrent jurisdiction to the district 

court because the child was still a CINA. Given N.E.’s lack of status as a parent, 

along with her impending divorce from the child’s biological father and his 

request to have the child placed with relatives, we do not find the juvenile court 

erred in finding it was not in the child’s best interests to set reunification with N.E. 

as the goal in the case or to grant her requests for concurrent jurisdiction to 

pursue a guardianship.

D. Recusal.

Finally, N.E. argues the juvenile court erred in not recusing itself from the 

case. Though we question whether she even had standing to assert this 

argument, at least at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, we choose to 

address her argument, finding it to be without merit.

“The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking 

recusal.” In re S.D., 671 N.W.2d 522, 528 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). This is a 
23

substantial burden and requires a finding that the trial judge’s decision was an 

abuse of discretion, which will only be found if the trial court clearly acted 

unreasonably or exercised its discretion on untenable grounds. See id.; see also

In re Marriage of Wagner, 604 N.W.2d 605, 608 (Iowa 2000). Moreover, the 

appearance of impropriety is not sufficient; “[a]ctual prejudice must be shown.” In 

re C.W., 522 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 602.1606(a), “[a] judicial officer is disqualified from acting in a 

proceeding . . . if . . . [t]he judicial officer has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 

concerning the proceeding.”

Here, N.E. alleges the juvenile court was clearly biased because it ruled 

against her. Additionally, N.E.’s counsel asserts the juvenile court judge was 

biased against him personally because that judge “failed to appoint him as a 

[GAL] for at least seven years.” Having reviewed the record de novo, we find no 

evidence of bias on the juvenile court judge’s part in this case. Moreover, we find 

N.E. has failed to establish any actual prejudice against her. The court’s rulings 

are well-reasoned, and we affirm them here. Though we believe N.E.’s counsel 

was representing N.E. zealously, the multiplicious motions filed by N.E. in this 

case, particularly after the termination-of-parental-rights petition was filed, seem 

a little over the top. No doubt the juvenile court was frustrated with addressing 

issues it had already ruled upon and addressed in prior motions and hearings. 

Nevertheless, we do not find this frustration, if any, evidenced any actual bias or 

prejudice on the part of the juvenile court judge. The judge permitted N.E. to 

participate in most of the proceedings and entertained her motions in a timely 
24

manner. The juvenile court judge simply had no obligation to recuse himself 

under the facts of this case. We therefore conclude the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion in not recusing itself from the juvenile court proceedings.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s rulings with respect 

to N.E.

AFFIRMED.