IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1269

Filed July 22, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARCUS ANTHONY RIMMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Odell G. McGhee II 

(bench trial) and Cynthia M. Moisan (sentencing), District Associate Judges.

A defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. 

AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney 

General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and James Hathaway, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, J.

A district court found Marcus Rimmer guilty of carrying a concealed 

weapon. See Iowa Code § 724.4 (2013). On appeal, Rimmer contends the 

evidence was insufficient to support a finding that a “Taser” seized from him by a 

Windsor Heights patrol officer was a dangerous weapon.

Our review of the district court’s findings following a bench trial is for 

substantial evidence. See State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 614 (Iowa 

1982). We are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State. Id.

Section 724.4 states “a person who goes armed with a dangerous weapon 

concealed on or about the person” commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa 

Code § 724.4(1). “Dangerous weapon” is statutorily defined as including “any 

portable device or weapon directing an electric current, impulse, wave, or beam 

that produces a high-voltage pulse designed to immobilize a person.” Id.

§ 702.7.

Rimmer “acknowledges that the evidence presented by the State was 

sufficient to establish that the Taser seized from [him] was a portable device, it 

directed an electric current, and was designed to immobilize a person.” But, he 

asserts, “the record is devoid of any evidence regarding the voltage of the 

Taser.” To the contrary, a reasonable fact finder could have found the Taser 

seized from Rimmer produced “a high-voltage.” 

The patrol officer at the scene testified that, while he was “unsure of the 

exact voltage,” the electrical current emitted from the Taser was “consistent with 

the current that takes place with our 50,000-volt one.” In his view, Rimmer’s 
3

Taser was “a civilian version of the police Taser.” He also agreed the device 

produced a “high-voltage pulse” and was “designed to immobilize a person.” 

While Rimmer contradicted these assertions, the district court was in a better 

position to sort through the divergent stories. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 

351, 357 (Iowa 1972) (“[I]t is the fact finder’s function, not ours, to decide 

questions of fact and determine credibility of witnesses.”). In doing so, the court 

could have considered Rimmer’s reluctance to test the Taser on himself for fear 

he would hurt himself. The court also could have considered the testimony of 

Rimmer’s wife, who stated she purchased the Taser for self-protection, and the 

device worked by immobilizing persons with a high voltage. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude substantial 

evidence supports the high voltage requirement of section 702.7 and the district 

court did not err in finding that the Taser in Rimmer’s possession was a 

dangerous weapon.1 Accordingly, we affirm Rimmer’s conviction for carrying a 

concealed weapon.

AFFIRMED.

 

1 We have considered State v. Howse, No. 13-1997, 2015 WL 1046131, at *5 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Mar. 11, 2015), in which this court reversed a conviction for carrying a stun gun 

after concluding, “[n]othing in this record establishes, even in general terms, the voltage 

of the device at issue—high, low, or in-between, and if it had sufficient voltage to 

immobilize a person.” Here, there is more.