J-S39042-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

SHAHEED SPRINGS, :

:

Appellant : No. 2079 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on May 16, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-51-CR-0006558-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2015

Shaheed Springs (“Springs”) appeals the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction of carrying a firearm without a license and 

carrying a firearm on public streets and public places.1 We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in 

its Opinion, which we incorporate herein for purposes of this appeal. See

Trial Court Opinion, 8/27/14, at 1-3 (unnumbered).

On appeal, Springs raises the following question for our review: 

Did [] the [trial] court violate [Springs’s] right to a fair trial by 

granting the prosecutor’s mid-trial request to call a fingerprint 

expert, during its case-in-chief at [Springs’s] retrial, which gave 

[Springs] no time to secure the presence of [his] fingerprint 

expert to testify at trial in rebuttal?

Brief for Appellant at 3. 

 

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6108.
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Springs contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process 

and a fair trial, as well as Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, by permitting the 

Commonwealth to call an expert witness in the middle of Springs’s retrial, 

without granting Springs a continuance in order to secure the presence of a 

defense expert witness. Brief for Appellant at 12. Springs claims that, 

during his retrial, the prosecutor informed defense counsel, for the first time, 

that he would be calling a fingerprint expert, and that this “belated notice 

violated Rule 573, crippled [Springs’s] defense in that he was unable to 

secure the presence of his own expert to rebut the Commonwealth’s expert, 

and constituted a violation of due process.” Id. at 12-13. Springs argues 

that the trial court should have, sua sponte, granted a recess or continuance 

of the trial, as a remedy for the Commonwealth’s late notice that it would be 

presenting a fingerprint expert. Id. at 16-17. 

Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure governs 

pretrial discovery in criminal cases and provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

(A) Informal. Before any disclosure or discovery can be 

sought under these rules by either party, counsel for the 

parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve all 

questions of discovery, and to provide information required 

or requested under these rules as to which there is no 

dispute. When there are items requested by one 

party which the other party has refused to disclose, the 

demanding party may make appropriate motion. Such 

motion shall be made within 14 days after arraignment, 

unless the time for filing is extended by the court. In such 

motion the party must set forth the fact that a good faith 

effort to discuss the requested material has taken place 
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and proved unsuccessful. Nothing in this provision shall 

delay the disclosure of any items agreed upon by the 

parties pending resolution of any motion for discovery.

(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.

***

(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the 

defendant, and subject to any protective order which the 

Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the 

Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all 

of the following requested items or information, provided they 

are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth shall, 

when applicable, permit the defendant’s attorney to inspect 

and copy or photograph such items.

***

(e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions, 

and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or 

other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that 

are within the possession or control of the attorney for the 

Commonwealth;

***

(2) Discretionary With the Court.

***

(b) If an expert whom the attorney for the Commonwealth 

intends to call in any proceeding has not prepared a report of 

examination or tests, the court, upon motion, may order 

that the expert prepare, and that the attorney for the 

Commonwealth disclose, a report stating the subject matter 

on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of 

the facts to which the expert is expected to testify; and a 

summary of the expert’s opinions and the grounds for each 

opinion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (emphasis supplied). 
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Pursuant to Rule 573, where no discovery has been requested, the 

Commonwealth is not required to inform a defendant prior to trial that it 

intends to call an expert as a witness. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A); see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1). Although Rule 573(B)(2)(b) provides a mechanism 

whereby the trial court may order a Commonwealth expert to prepare a 

report and provide such report to the defense, any such order is 

discretionary, and the defendant is required to move the trial court for such 

discovery. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(b).

Our review of the record discloses no request by Springs, informal or 

formal, for discovery from the Commonwealth. Thus, the Commonwealth 

was not requested or required to notify Springs of its intent to call Officer Bill 

Trenwith (“Officer Trenwith”), a crime scene investigation expert, as an 

expert witness, prior to Springs’s retrial.2 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A); see 

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1). Accordingly, Springs’s claim that, pursuant 

Rule 573, he was entitled to notification regarding the Commonwealth’s 

intent to call Officer Trenwith as an expert witness prior to Springs’s retrial 

lacks merit.

Moreover, we discern no discovery violation with regard to Rule

 

2 Officer Trenwith was not involved in the investigation of Springs’s case, and 

did not testify in Springs’s first trial. 
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573(B)(2)(b).

3

 At the inception of Springs’s retrial on January 25, 2013, the 

Commonwealth submitted its witness list, which identified Officer Trenwith 

as a trial witness. See N.T., 1/28/13, at 5-6. Although Officer Trenwith had 

not been listed as a trial witness for Springs’s initial trial, Springs’s counsel 

made no effort to determine the nature of Officer Trenwith’s anticipated 

testimony. Four days later, on the morning of the second day of Springs’s 

retrial, the Commonwealth met with Officer Trenwith, for the very first time, 

and thereafter notified Springs’s counsel that it would be calling Officer 

Trenwith to provide expert testimony regarding the difficulty of obtaining 

fingerprints from guns. See id. at 4-6. Notably, Commonwealth witness 

Officer Gregory Welsh (“Officer Welsh”), a ballistics expert, had provided the 

same testimony, without objection, during Springs’s initial trial.4 Id. at 5, 7; 

see also N.T., 1/23/13, at 137-38.

In response to the Commonwealth’s notification, Springs’s counsel did 

not move the trial court for an order requiring Officer Trenwith to prepare an

 

3 Springs relies on several cases which involve an actual discovery violation 

by the Commonwealth. However, because we conclude that no such 

discovery violation occurred in this case, we regard those cases as 

inapposite.

4 During Springs’s initial trial, Officer Welsh conceded that he was not a 

fingerprint expert, and attributed his knowledge regarding the difficulty of 

obtaining fingerprints from guns to his police colleagues. See N.T., 1/23/13, 

at 137.
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expert report, pursuant to Rule 573(B)(2)(b).5 Instead, Springs’s counsel

simply requested that the trial court preclude Officer Trenwith from offering 

any testimony at Springs’s retrial. See N.T., 1/28/13, at 4. Because we 

discern no violation of Rule 573 by the Commonwealth, the trial court did 

not err or abuse its discretion by refusing to preclude Officer Trenwith from 

testifying.6 

We similarly conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to, sua 

sponte, grant a continuance of Springs’s retrial. Although Springs did not 

request a continuance, such a remedy would have been an option available 

to the trial court if there had, in fact, been a discovery violation. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E). However, because we conclude that no discovery

 

5 Nevertheless, the trial court offered to permit Springs’s counsel to speak 

with Officer Trenwith “for as much time as you need” in order to discern the 

nature and substance of his anticipated testimony. See N.T., 1/28/13, at 4. 

However, Springs’s counsel indicated that she had already spoken with 

Officer Trenwith that morning, and that speaking with him was “not the 

issue.” Id. 

6 Even assuming, arguendo, that there had been a discovery violation 

involved in this matter, such a violation would not automatically entitle 

Springs to a new trial. Springs must also establish “that the introduction of 

the expert testimony caused him prejudice to the degree that it affected his 

trial strategy or likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.” 

Commonwealth v. Roles, 2015 PA Super 115, *29 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Here, Springs has shown no prejudice from Officer Trenwith’s testimony, as 

he had been placed on notice of this issue during his first trial, when Officer 

Welsh provided the same testimony. See N.T., 1/23/13, at 137-38.
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violation occurred, no continuance was warranted.7 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2015

 

7 Nevertheless, in an effort to accommodate Springs, the trial court advised 

Springs’s counsel that she could have additional time to speak with Officer 

Trenwith, prior to his testimony, and that she could have an additional day 

to “discuss [the issue] with whomever.” N.T., 1/28/13, at 14. The trial 

court also advised Springs’s counsel that she was free to call a rebuttal 

expert witness to rebut Officer Trenwith’s anticipated testimony. See N.T., 

1/29/13, at 5-7. The mere fact that the rebuttal expert that Springs’s 

counsel preferred to use was unavailable, and Springs refused to call 

another rebuttal expert, does not entitle Springs to a continuance. See id. 

at 5 (wherein the trial court noted that “there are hundreds of witnesses out 

there. Your choice is to not call another witness.”).
J?/t 

_______ 2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. -··- __ 

was retried by another jury on the same charges on January 25, 28 and 29, 2013. On January 29, 

24, 2013, this Court declared a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Appellant 

Philadelphia in violation of Sections 6106 and 6108 of the Uniform Firearms Act. On January 

Firearm Without a License and Carrying a Firearm on Public Streets and Public Places in 

Appellant was initially tried by a jury on January 23, 2013 on charges of Carrying a 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

affirmed. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court holds that the judgment should be 

deliberations. This Court submits the following Opinion in accordance with the requirements of 

back the testimony of a Commonwealth witness in response to a question by the jury during 

that the Court erred in allowing the Commonwealth's crime scene expert to testify and by reading 

Appellant in the above-captioned matter appeals his convictions on all charges alleging 

ANHALT,J. 

AUG 2 7 2014 

· Crimin.a~ Appeals Unit 

Ftrst Jud1c1al District of PA 

FILED Superior Court No.: 

2079 EDA 2013 

111111111111111111 I 111111 

7191494401 

OPINION 

SHAHEED SPRINGS 

CP-51-CR-0006558-2012 Comm. v, Springs, Shaheed 

Opinion 

v. 

NO.: CP-51-CR-0006558-2012 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FOR THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

1 ~ <~~:f[r:)(Z- f ~ 

c./ 

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On May 12, 2013, this Court sentenced appellant to two and a half to seven years 

incarceration for violation of Section 6108 and to a consecutive term of five years probation for 

violation of Section 6106. Post-sentence motions were denied on July 9, 2013. 

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal was filed on July 22, 2013. Several extensions of time 

were granted to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal due to 

the fact that the notes of testimony had not been transcribed completely. A 1925(b) statement 

was finally filed on July 28, 2014 after all the notes were finally transcribed. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On March 28, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officers Sean Rios and Steven Cieslinski were 

in uniform in a marked police vehicle when they received a radio call about a man with a gun 

and shot fired in the vicinity of 23rd and Susquehanna. When the officers arrived at that location 

approximately thirty seconds later, they observed a group of males, including Appellant, on the 

west side of 23rd Street. When the officers exited their patrol car, Appellant immediately started 

moving backwards away from the officers. He also failed to show his hands after the officers 

ordered everyone in the group to do so. Appellant then grabbed the right side of his waist like he 

was pulling or holding onto something concealed in his waistband and ran. 

Officer Rios pursued Appellant on foot over walls and through alleyways, losing sight of 

him for no more than a second when Appellant turned a corner. During the chase, Officer Rios 

observed Appellant discard a firearm onto a grassy area of a rear yard of a house. As Officer 

Rios chased Appellant on foot, Officer Cieslinski got back in the police vehicle and pulled up at 

the end of the alleyway in which Appellant was running. When Appellant ran out, Officer 

Cieslinski grabbed him and attempted to handcuff him, but Appellant resisted by flailing his 

arms about. Officer Rios caught up and assisted in holding Appellant down. 

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Appellant raises two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Appellant claims that it was error 

for this Court to permit Officer Trenwith to testify at trial as a crime scene expert on grounds that 

the witness's name was not provided to the defense until the night before trial, no expert report 

was provided, and the defense had no time to investigate the expert or provide a rebuttal witness 

in time for trial. In this claim, Appellant essentially contends that the Commonwealth failed to 

comply with Rule 573(B)(l)(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 

provides that in all court cases, the Commonwealth shall disclose "any results or reports of 

scientific tests, expert opinions, and written or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or 

other physical or mental examinations of the defendant that are within the possession or control 

of the attorney for the Commonwealth." This claim is without merit in view of the particular 

circumstances of this case. 

"The purpose of the discovery rules is to permit the parties in a criminal matter to be 

prepared for trial; trial by ambush is contrary to the spirit and letter of those rules." 

Commonwealth v. Fox, 619 A.2d 327, 336-336 (Pa.Super. 1993), citing Commonwealth v. 

By the time Appellant was secured, other officers had arrived on the scene. Officers Rios, 

Cieslinski and Toman immediately went back to the area where Officer Rios saw Appellant 

throw the gun. Once there, it took no more than a few minutes to find the firearm. Police later 

tested the gun and found it to be operable. It was loaded with live cartridges and had gunshot 

residue and lint in all six chambers. The gun was not examined for fingerprints or DNA 

evidence. Over Appellant's objection, Officer William Trenwith, a Philadelphia Police Officer 

from the Crime Scene Unit, testified that it is very difficult to obtain identifiable fingerprints or 

DNA samples from a gun. 

DISCUSSION 

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Here, Appellant was aware the Commonwealth would present testimony that fingerprints 

and DNA are very difficult to obtain from guns since, at Appellant's first trial, which ended in a 

mistrial just days earlier, the Commonwealth presented that very testimony via Officer Gregory 

Welsh, a ballistician who had examined the firearm discarded by Appellant. (N.T. 1-23-13, pp. 

131-13 7). The only difference at the retrial was that the Commonwealth called a crime scene 

expert to testify to the same thing. Further, there was no expert report to provide the defense. 

Officer Trenwith was unfamiliar with the facts of Appellant's case, and was merely testifying 

concerning the general difficulty in lifting identifiable fingerprints or obtaining DNA samples 

from guns and ammunition to explain why such tests are often not performed on firearms. 

Finally, defense counsel admitted she had the opportunity to speak with Officer Trenwith the day 

before he was called as a witness. (N.T. 1-29-13, pp. 8-9). Defense counsel also could have 

asked for a continuance to investigate the testimony of Officer Trenwith and had the opportunity 

to call a rebuttal witness. Accordingly, Appellant was aware of the existence of this testimony 

and was adequately prepared for trial. See, Commonwealth v. Fox, supra. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that when the jury asked during deliberations 

whether Officer Rios said "he saw the defendant throw something" or said "he threw a gun", the 

Court's action of reading the officer's testimony "I could see him discard a firearm" was error. 

Appellant claims that by reading this testimony to the jury instead of allowing the jury's 

1984). 

Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1274 (1992). The goal of discovery is to "accord a defendant the 

opportunity to discover evidence which he did not know existed, as well as to seek possession of 

evidence of which he was aware." Commonwealth v. Hussmann, 485 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa.Super. 

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August 22, 2014 

DIANA ANHALT, J. 

For all the foregoing reasons, Appellant's judgment of sentence should be affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

he saw the Appellant discard a firearm. Appellant does not allege that Officer Rios did not make 

the statement that the Court read back to the jury or that the Court mischaracterized his 

testimony. Moreover, this action did not create an irrebuttable presumption as to the truth of the 

officer's testimony as Appellant baldly contends. Rather, the reading back of the testimony 

simply served to refresh the jury's recollection as to what Officer Rios said about what he had 

observed. It was up to the jury to decide whether or not it found the officer's statement credible. 

Accordingly, the Court did not abuse its discretion here. 

A.2d 1201, 1205 (Pa.Super. 1995)(en bane), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1243 (Pa. 1996) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 618 A.2d 415, 418 (Pa.Super. 1992). A trial court's decision in this 

matter should not be reversed on appeal absent a flagrant abuse of discretion. Gladden, 665 A.2d 

at 1205. Here, where the jury's question involved an important aspect of the case, the Court 

believed it was in the interest of justice to read back Officer Rios' testimony to the jury. Officer 

Rios consistently stated throughout his entire testimony both on direct and cross examination that 

"When a jury requests that recorded testimony be read to it to refresh its memory, it rests 

within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny such request." Commonwealth v. Gladden, 665 

This issue is also without merit. 

recollection to control, an irrebuttable presumption as to the truth of that statement was created. 

'· 

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