Rogers argues that trial counsel was ineffective in admitting 

his guilt for burglary at trial without his consent and that he could not 

have been convicted of felony murder absent counsel's concession. A 

concession of guilt may be a reasonable trial strategy when circumstances 

dictate. Armenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 54, 306 P.3d 395, 398 

(2013). As Rogers confessed to burglarizing the deceased victim's home in 

his recorded police interview that was played for the jury, counsel's 

credibility with the jury would have been significantly impaired by 

denying the burglary. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192 (2004) 

("[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for attempting to impress the 

jury with his candor and his unwillingness to engage in 'a useless 

charade."). Further, the victim's neighbor witnessed Rogers driving a car 

into the victim's garage on the morning that she was killed, and property 

missing from the victim's home was recovered from Rogers' residence and 

a location where he had asked to store property. The record shows 

counsel's tactical concern with maintaining credibility in his arguments to 

the jury, and counsel's tactical choices were limited after efforts to 

suppress Rogers' police statements failed. See Rhyne ix State, 118 Nev. 1, 

8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002). The concession was consistent with Rogers' 

explanation to the police that his co-perpetrator in the burglary was the 

sole perpetrator of the murder. Rogers' felony-murder argument ignores 

his convictions for robbery and kidnapping—either of which could have 

been predicate to liability for felony murder—and lacks merit. We 

conclude that Rogers has failed to show that counsel was deficient. 

Rogers argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge his convictions for possession of stolen property and robbery 

as violating double jeopardy. As the State conceded this issue before the 

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district court and the district court vacated the conviction on the count for 

possession of stolen property, we conclude that this contention is moot. 

See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Univ. of Nevada, Reno, 97 Nev. 56, 57, 

624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981). 

Rogers argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing 

to contest the district court's order denying his motion to exclude evidence 

relating to a pair of boots that were seized because the chain of custody 

was deficient. "A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will 

not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly wrong." Archanian v. 

State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1029, 145 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2006). Chain of custody 

" requires (1) reasonable showing that substitution, alteration or 

tampering of the evidence did not occur; and, (2) the offered evidence is the 

same, or reasonably similar to the substance seized." Burns v. Sheriff, 

Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 533, 534-35, 554 P.2d 257, 258 (1976). If it is 

reasonably certain that no substitution or tampering occurred, any doubt 

goes to the weight of the evidence. Hughes v. State, 116 Nev. 975, 981, 12 

P.3d 948, 952 (2000). The State presented testimony showing that the 

investigating detective went to Rogers' mother's home looking for Rogers' 

boots, that she gave him two pairs of boots, that he gave her a receipt, that 

he then delivered the boots to the crime scene analyst, and that the 

analyst received them and impounded them. Rogers contested that the 

property receipt did not indicate the brands of the boots received and that 

the analyst's report did not indicate the date she received the boots from 

the detective. The district court held a hearing outside of the jury's 

presence and concluded that Rogers' concerns went to the credibility of the 

boot evidence and not its admissibility. Rogers has not shown that the 

district court manifestly erred and, accordingly, has not shown that a 

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challenge to that decision would have had a reasonable likelihood of 

success on appeal. See Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114. 

Haying considered Rogers' contentions and concluded 

that they are without merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED." 

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge 

Law Office of Betsy Allen 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'We reject Rogers' claim that the district court abused its discretion 

in not granting an evidentiary hearing, as he failed to allege specific facts 

that, if true, entitled him to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 

502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). 

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