United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30776

Neptune Shipmanagement Services PTE, Limited; 

Talmidge International, Limited; American Eagle 

Tankers Incorporated Limited; American Eagle Tankers 

Agencies, Incorporated; Britannia Steam Ship 

Insurance Association Limited, 

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Vinod Kumar Dahiya, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:20-CV-1525

Before Jones, Southwick, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Gregg Costa, Circuit Judge:

Last year, we noted that arbitration does not always fulfill its goal of 

avoiding court and “increas[ing] the speed of dispute resolution.” OJSC 

Ukrnafta v. Carpatsky Petroleum Corp., 957 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011)). That 

international dispute was tied up in arbitration and courts for thirteen years. 

Id. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 1, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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This case involves even more protracted litigation arising out of an 

arbitration agreement. In a dispute dating back to the last century, the parties 

have turned to Louisiana state court, federal court, civil court in India, and 

arbitration to resolve their dispute. Although Vinod Kumar Dahiya has

secured an arbitral award for his maritime injuries, he continues to pursue 

litigation against the alleged wrongdoers—and he still disputesthat there was 

an enforceable agreement to arbitrate at all. 

The district court concluded that, after two decades, the dispute was 

finally at an end. It confirmed the Indian arbitration award and enjoined 

further litigation. We agree and affirm. 

I.

In the fall of 1999, Dahiya, an Indian national, began working as an 

engine cadet for the Singapore-based ship crewing agency Neptune 

Shipmanagement Services. He was soon assigned to the M/T Eagle Austin, 

an oil tanker owned by Talmidge International, bareboat chartered1 to 

American Eagle Tankers, insured by the Britannia Steam Ship Insurance

Association, and crewed by Neptune (collectively known as “the Vessel 

Interests”). 

Dahiya’s employment contract—which the parties refer to as “the 

Deed”—bound him to sail for Neptune, but it did not mention Talmidge, 

American Eagle, or Britannia. Only Dahiya signed it. The Deed contained a

1 In a bareboat charter, “the vessel owner transfers full possession and control to 

the charterer, who in turn furnishes the crew and maintenance for the vessel (thus the term 

‘bareboat’).” Forrester v. Ocean Marine Indem. Co., 11 F.3d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1993). The 

charterer therefore becomes responsible “for the negligence of the crew and the 

unseaworthiness of the vessel.” Id. 

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clause stating that any dispute arising out of the agreement would be subject 

to arbitration in either Singapore or India and governed by Indian law. 

Dahiya joined the Eagle Austin crew in Texas and sailed on the vessel 

as it travelled along the Gulf Coast, making stops in Beaumont, Lake Charles, 

and other oil ports. In late 1999, while in international waters en route to 

Louisiana, Dahiya was severely burned as he operated the vessel’s trash 

incinerator. He was evacuated by helicopter to Baton Rouge and treated for 

second- and third-degree burns and an infection.

After recovering, Dahiya sued the Vessel Interests in Louisiana state 

court. The Vessel Interests sought to compel arbitration under the Deed. 

They removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the 

removal provision relating to the Convention on the Recognition and 

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). See 9 

U.S.C. § 205. But the district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, 

holding that forum selection clauses in employment contracts “contravene 

strong Louisiana public policy.” Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., 2002 WL 

31962151, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2002). The court also determined that,

because the forum selection clause was invalid, no basis for removal existed, 

so it remanded the case to state court. Id. 

We dismissed the Vessel Interests’ appeal of that order. Dahiya v. 

Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., 371 F.3d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 2004). The statute governing 

removal procedure, we explained, bars appellate review of a remand order 

“no matter how erroneous.”2 Id. at 209 (quoting Arnold v. State Farm Fire 

& Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 775 (5th Cir. 2001)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 

2 The district court has since acknowledged that it made a mistake and should have 

enforced the arbitration clause. Lejano v. Bandak, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27341, at *3 n.1 

(E.D. La. May 27, 2004) (recognizing the error); see Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, 

Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 906 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that Louisiana law does not invalidate 

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Back in state court, the trial court also denied the Vessel Interests’ 

motion to compel arbitration. At the end of the resulting trial, the court 

awarded Dahiya more than $579,000. 

It was a short-lived victory. A Louisiana appellate court reversed the 

judgment on the ground that the Deed’s arbitration clause was enforceable. 

Dahiya v. Talmidge Int’l Ltd., 931 So. 2d 1163, 1171–73 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 

It thus remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to stay the 

lawsuit and compel arbitration in India. Id. at 1173. 

On remand, Dahiya argued that the case should be stayed only against 

Neptune because the remaining Vessel Interests were not parties to the Deed 

containing the arbitration clause. But the trial court stayed the case “in its 

entirety pending arbitration,” halting Dahiya’s lawsuit against all the 

defendants.

The parties then shifted their focus to arbitration. After various delays 

and procedural blunders in India, Dahiya at last obtained an award in early 

2020. The arbitrator awarded Dahiya 95 Lakh (about $130,000) against 

Neptune; Dahiya had not named the other Vessel Interests as respondents. 

Although the Vessel Interests offered to satisfy the award, Dahiya refused to 

accept payment, preferring instead to rekindle the state-court litigation.

Following the award, Dahiya returned to Louisiana court. With the 

stay now expired, he sought to reinstate the previously rendered $579,000

arbitration clauses in employment contracts of foreign seamen). But even apart from 

whether the district court correctly ruled on the clause’s enforceability, removal 

jurisdiction exists under 9 U.S.C. § 205 as long as “there is a conceivable connection to an 

arbitration agreement.” OJSC Ukrnafta, 957 F.3d at 495. “Removal to federal court may 

thus be proper even when it turns out there is no arbitration agreement.” Id. at 496. The 

district court improperly raised this “low bar” for removal by assessing the validity of the 

agreement in the course of determining its jurisdiction. Id. at 495.

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judgment or obtain a new trial. The Vessel Interests again removed the

lawsuit to federal court. 

The Vessel Interests also filed a new federal lawsuit to confirm the 

Indian arbitration award under the New York Convention (this time invoking

9 U.S.C. § 207) and to enjoin Dahiya from pursuing any further litigation. 

Although both of these cases were pending before the same district court, the 

court declined to consolidate them. 

Dahiya then moved to dismiss the new, award-confirmation suit 

brought by the Vessel Interests, arguing that the district court’s remand in 

the original case prevented federal jurisdiction from ever again being 

exercised over the dispute. Undeterred, the Vessel Interests sought 

summary judgment confirming the award and reiterated their request for 

injunctive relief “to bring this interminable litigation to an end.”

The district court granted summary judgment, terminating Dahiya’s 

“increasingly quixotic bid to win greater damages in the United States.” 

Neptune Shipmanagement Servs. (PTE.), Ltd. v. Dahiya, 2020 WL 6059647, at 

*1 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2020). The court thus enforced the Indian arbitration 

award and enjoined all pending and future legal actions arising from Dahiya’s 

1999 injuries. 

Following its ruling, the district court entered final judgment 

confirming Dahiya’s arbitral award in the amount of $300,580, a figure the 

parties proposed that includes accrued interest. Days later, the Vessel 

Interests paid that amount in full. 

These rulings came in the Vessel Interests’ newly filed federal case 

seeking confirmation of the arbitration award. But as a result of the 

injunction it issued, the district court closed the original state-court case that 

the Vessel Interests had again removed to federal court. Dahiya appeals only 

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from the new federal case; he did not file a separate appeal of the removed 

action.

II.

Dahiya challenges the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to 

confirm the arbitral award, the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, 

and the court’s determination that the award prevents him from pursuing 

litigation even against the Vessel Interests that were not parties in the 

arbitration.

Our review begins with Dahiya’s challenge to the district court’s 

jurisdiction to confirm the award. Federal courts have the power to enforce 

awards subject to the New York Convention because these actions “arise 

under the laws and treaties of the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 203. Any party 

to an arbitration that falls under the Convention may apply to a federal court 

“for an order confirming the award as against any other party.” Id. § 207. 

This case fits well within the heartland of that jurisdictional grant.3

 

Dahiya nonetheless argues that the district court lost its jurisdiction 

to enforce the award—or preside over any aspect of this dispute—in 2002, 

when it remanded the prearbitration suit to state court. He is mistaken. A 

3 As the district court held, Dahiya’s award falls under the Convention’s umbrella 

because it was issued in a signatory state (India), the parties seek enforcement in another 

signatory state (the United States), it arises from a commercial dispute, and it involves at 

least one non-U.S. citizen (Dahiya). See Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft 

mbH & Cie KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015).

It may be that, as the only plaintiff to participate in the arbitration, Neptune alone 

has a claim to confirm the award. But that provides the jurisdictional hook for the suit. The 

claims of the other Vessel Interests seeking to enjoin Dahiya from engaging in further 

litigation would come into federal court through supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1367(a), 1441(a). 

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remand order issued nineteen years ago in a different lawsuit has no impact 

on the district court’s ability to confirm the award.

To support his view that the 2002 remand binds this case, Dahiya

emphasizes that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which 

it was removed is not reviewable on appeal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). True 

enough, and we followed that command when we dismissed the Vessel 

Interests’ direct appeal from the 2002 remand order. Dahiya, 371 F.3d at 

209. But the removal statutes also contemplate that a lawsuit not removable 

at its inception may later become removable. See 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). 

Accordingly, we held that an earlier remand did not preclude a second 

removal based on diversity jurisdiction when a postremand deposition made 

clear the amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied. S.W.S. Erectors, 

Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The Fifth Circuit 

recognizes a defendant’s right to seek subsequent removals after remand.”). 

Thus, even in the same case, a defendant may seek removal more than once, 

so long as the request rests on different grounds, like new pleadings or 

ensuing events that reveal a basis for federal jurisdiction. Id.

Surely, then, a federal court may hear a separate action premised on 

new factual developments that support federal jurisdiction. That describes 

this new case, as it seeks to confirm an arbitration award that did not exist 

back in 2002. This case was never pending in state court; it is a new action 

distinct from the litigation seeking to compel arbitration. 

Dahiya attempts to circumvent this problem by arguing that even a 

new suit can be an impermissible collateral attack on a remand order issued 

in an earlier one. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Majoue, 802 F.2d 166, 

167–68 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no federal jurisdiction over an 

action that was “nothing more than an artful, if not subtle, attempt to 

circumvent . . . § 1447(d)”). Such a collateral attack occurs when the same 

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arguments advanced in new litigation “were fully before the court on the 

petition for removal and subsequent petition for remand.” Id. That is not 

what is happening here. The first lawsuit sought to compel arbitration before 

it had occurred. This one seeks to confirm an arbitration award that has now 

issued. This recent factual developmental—an award in an arbitration falling 

under the New York Convention—gives rise to federal jurisdiction. See 9 

U.S.C. § 207.

Consider a suit alleging state-law unfair competition and trade secret 

claims. Absent diversity, such a case would not be removable. But if the 

plaintiff later obtains a patent on the technology at issue, she could then file 

an infringement suit in federal court. A remand in the first suit would not 

matter because the second one is based on an intervening event—the 

acquisition of a patent—that gives rise to federal jurisdiction.

As this hypothetical illustrates, a remand order in an earlier case is not 

controlling in a new case with a new basis for federal jurisdiction. Yet Dahiya 

still pushes back, arguing that we must ignore the arbitral award in 

determining jurisdiction because the remand order in the earlier case held

that no enforceable arbitration agreement existed. That earlier ruling, Dahiya 

contends, gave rise to issue preclusion. 

The issue preclusion argument also fails, however, because an 

unappealable ruling like a remand order is not entitled to preclusive effect. 

Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 673 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that when “a 

litigant, as a matter of law, has no right to appellate review, then he has not 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and the issue is not precluded”); see

Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(suggesting that “collateral estoppel may not be applied offensively to a 

jurisdictional decision—such as one granting a motion to remand—that is 

not capable of being subjected to appellate review”); 18A Charles Alan 

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Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4433 n.39 

(3d ed. 2021).4 

The unappealability of remand orders is why, after a remand, a state 

court may revisit the federal court’s jurisdictional reasoning. Kircher v. 

Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 647 (2006); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 

160 U.S. 556, 583 (1896). We recognized this principle in dismissing the 

appeal of the 2002 remand: “[T]he district court determined that the 

arbitration clause was invalid in the process of ascertaining whether it had 

subject matter jurisdiction,” which meant the ruling “has no preclusive 

effect in state court.” Dahiya, 371 F.3d at 211. The state court could freely 

reexamine the issue and “reach a different conclusion about [the] dispute’s 

arbitrability.” Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674. 

The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal did just that, holding 

that federal law preempted the state statute prohibiting forum selection 

clauses and that the arbitration clause was enforceable. Dahiya, 931 So. 2d at 

1172. The remand order lacked preclusive effect then as it does now. It

determined the forum for the suit seeking to compel arbitration and nothing 

more. See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 647. 

III. 

Although a district court’s remand order does not have preclusive 

effect, the judgment of a state appellate court surely may. That is the 

4 There is another reason issue preclusion does not apply: this case and the earlier 

one do not involve an “identical issue.” See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus. Inc., 575 

U.S. 138, 153 (2015) (observing that issue preclusion applies only when “the issues in the 

two cases are indeed identical” (quoting 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks 

and Unfair Competition§ 32:99, at 32–244) (4th ed. 2014)). As we have explained, 

the issue in this case—whether a federal court has jurisdiction in a suit to confirm an 

arbitration award falling under the New York Convention—is not the same one decided in 

2002 before Dahiya and Neptune arbitrated. 

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problem with Dahiya’s final two arguments: first, that the arbitration clause 

is invalid because Neptune never signed it, and second, that Dahiya was not 

required to arbitrate his claims against the remaining Vessel Interests. 

A.

To begin, Dahiya contends that the district court erred in confirming

the arbitral award against Neptune because Neptune did not sign the contract 

containing the arbitration clause. He cites Article II of the New York 

Convention, which defines arbitration agreements as “agreement[s] in 

writing,” a term that “include[s] an arbitral clause in a contract or an 

arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of 

letters or telegrams.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 

Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 

3. Because Neptune never signed the Deed, and federal courts only have

jurisdiction over awards “falling under the Convention,” 9 U.S.C. § 207, 

Dahiya claims the district court had no authority to confirm the award. 

But this case is not the first time Dahiya has raised an Article II issue

with the Deed. Before the arbitration, he argued in front of the Louisiana 

appellate court that the agreement violated Article II because it was “signed 

only by him and not by Neptune.” The state court did not buy the argument. 

It held that “Mr. Dahiya’s arbitration clause easily meets all four 

requirements of the Convention,” including Article II’s agreement-inwriting provision. Dahiya, 931 So. 2d at 1172.

This ruling prevents us from revisiting whether the Deed contains an 

enforceable arbitration clause. Federal courts must “give preclusive effect 

to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the 

judgments emerged would do so.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). And under Louisiana law, “[a] judgment in favor 

of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action 

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between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if 

its determination was essential to that judgment.” In re Keaty, 397 F.3d 264, 

270 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting La. Stat. Ann. § 13:4231(3)). It would be 

hard to find an issue more essential to a decision compelling arbitration than 

the court’s determination that there is a binding arbitration agreement.

Dahiya’s argument that Neptune’s signature was required would have 

fared no better in our court. Fifth Circuit caselaw holds that Article II does 

not require a signature when the arbitration clause is part of a broader

contract. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th 

Cir. 1994). Our view may now be in the minority,5 but even so, we did not 

compel arbitration here—the state court did. Preclusion principles prevent 

us from revisiting that ruling. And the reliance interests that preclusion law

protects are especially strong here as the parties have spent years pursuing 

arbitration in India. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 

(1979) (explaining that preclusion protects against “the expense and vexation 

attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance 

on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions”). 

5 Other circuits, led by the Second Circuit, have rejected Sphere Drake’s approach 

and held that Article II requires both stand-alone arbitration agreements and contracts 

containing an arbitration clause to be signed by the parties. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. 

Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogation on other grounds recognized by 

Marks on Behalf of SM v. Hochhauser, 876 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Yang v. 

Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2017) (calling Sphere Drake an 

“outlier decision” and questioning whether our court would reach the same conclusion 

today), abrogated on other grounds by GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp. v. 

Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (2020); Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe 

Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2004) (following Kahn Lucas in holding that 

Article II requires a signed agreement); Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 

F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003) (adopting Kahn Lucas).

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B.

Finally, Dahiya argues that the district court erred in barring him from

litigating against Talmidge, American Eagle, and Britannia because only 

Neptune was a party to the Deed. But the state court’s ruling is preclusive 

on this question, too.6

Dahiya argued before the Louisiana appellate court that “[e]ven if 

Neptune were entitled to have its liability arbitrated, there is no basis for an 

arbitration defense for any of the other defendants.” The court disagreed, 

ruling that “the defendants’ Exceptions of No Right of Action, Improper 

Venue and Arbitration should have been sustained and the case stayed 

pending arbitration.” Dahiya, 931 So. 2d at 1173 (emphasis added). Even 

more important than what the court said is what it did--reverse the verdict 

that had been entered against all the Vessel Interests. Id. The arbitration 

agreement was the only reason cited for undoing that verdict not just as to 

Neptune but for all the defendants. See id. Despite Dahiya’s efforts, nothing 

in the state court’s opinion segregated his claims against the different parties 

on the basis of only some being subject to arbitration.

After the Louisiana appellate court remanded the case for the trial

court to issue a stay, Dahiya again argued that he should be allowed to litigate 

against the Vessel Interests other than Neptune. He maintained before the 

state trial court that the “defendants other than [Neptune were] not parties 

to the arbitration agreement, and have no right to avoid suit in favor of an 

arbitration to which they will not be a party.” The state trial court 

6 The district court also held that Dahiya’s claims against the Vessel Interests were 

intertwined, meaning that the entities excluded from the Deed could enforce its arbitration 

clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency,

L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526–27 (5th Cir. 2000). We need not address this question as issue 

preclusion alone provides sufficient grounds to affirm the judgment. 

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nonetheless stayed the litigation “in its entirety.” In doing so, the court

rejected Dahiya’s attempt to proceed to trial against some of the Vessel 

Interests while the arbitration was ongoing. See M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon 

Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 26 (La. 2008) (“Generally, when a trial court 

judgment is silent as to a claim or demand, it is presumed the relief sought 

was denied.” (citations omitted)). We must respect the state court’s 

judgment. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 

After the Louisiana courts halted the litigation, ordering Dahiya to 

arbitrate his claims, Dahiya had the opportunity to do just that. He could 

have named all the Vessel Interests as respondents in the arbitration. In fact, 

Dahiya’s submissions to the arbitrator included allegations, such as 

unseaworthiness, most appropriately directed at the Eagle Austin’s owner 

(Talmidge) or charterer (American Eagle). See Forrester v. Ocean Marine 

Indem. Co., 11 F.3d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1993). Yet Dahiya named only 

Neptune as the respondent. 

Dahiya’s failure to include Talmidge, American Eagle, and Britannia 

in the arbitration constitutes a failure to prosecute his claims against those

entities. See Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 845 (5th Cir. 2018)

(affirming dismissal for failure to prosecute after plaintiff refused to initiate 

arbitration as ordered by court). Having secured an arbitral award for his 

injuries, Dahiya cannot now double dip via litigation. 

* * *

The judgment is AFFIRMED. 

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