J-S56019-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.N.L., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1717 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000362-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1718 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered June 10, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002136-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2019

Appellant N.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered on June 10, 

2019, granting the petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her minor 

child, A.N.L., a/k/a A.L., (“Child”) a female born in July 2010, pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and the order 

changing the permanency goal for Child to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile 
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Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. On this direct appeal, Mother’s counsel, Attorney John 

M. Hayburn (“Counsel”), filed a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and 

an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and In re 

V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders briefing 

criteria to appeals by indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel 

in involuntary termination matters). Upon review, we grant Counsel leave to 

withdraw and affirm.

The trial court discussed the facts and procedural history of the instant 

matter as follows:

On July 21, 2017, Child’s [P]aternal [G]randmother began caring 

for Child by family arrangement after DHS visited 

[Grandmother’s] home and determined [it] to be appropriate. On 

July 21, 2017, [DHS] received a General Protective Services 

(“GPS”) report which alleged that Mother was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder. Mother had disclosed to DHS prior to July 

21, 2017[,] that she suffered from mental illness and that to deal 

with stress[,] she cut and harmed herself. She also related that 

she broke a lava lamp over her head.

On August 23, 2017, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) 

held a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting. The objectives identified 

for Mother were[:] (1) to attend intensive outpatient drug and 

alcohol treatment and follow all recommendations; (2) to refrain 

from using any illegal substance; (3) to continue mental health 

services at the Tree of Life Agency; (4) to take medications for 

anxiety, [attention deficit hyperactive disorder (“ADHD”)], 

depression, panic attacks[,] and mood swings; (5) to have [a] 

psychiatric medication check monthly; (6) to continue to explore 

proper housing; [and] (7) to have weekly supervised visits with [] 

Child.

On May 13, 2019, DHS filed the underlying [p]etition[] to 

[t]erminate [p]arental [r]ights because Mother was unable to 
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maintain her [SCP] objective[s]. Specifically, Mother [] tested 

positive on court ordered drug screens and was unable to secure 

stable housing. Mother [] also failed to address her mental health 

issues. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/19, at 1-8 (internal citations to the record 

omitted). 

The trial court held a hearing on the petition on June 10, 2019.1 At the 

hearing, the CUA representative, Michele Jackson, testified. See N.T., 

6/10/19, at 13-31. Jackson explained that Mother did not meet any of her 

SCP objectives. Id.

Jackson testified that Mother was discharged from drug treatment in 

April 2018 and March 2019 after failing to attend treatment sessions. Id. at 

16. Additionally, Jackson explained that Mother failed to participate in 

court-ordered random drug screens, and that, when Mother was finally tested 

in June 2019, she tested positive for marijuana and opiates. Id. at 17-21. 

Jackson also noted that Mother failed to obtain stable housing. Id. at 

13-14, and 25. Jackson testified that Mother was referred to the Achieving 

Reunification Center (“ARC”) in March 2019 to assist her in parenting classes 

and finding stable housing, but Mother never reported for intake. Id. at 25. 

Per Jackson, on a previous occasion, Mother was referred for housing but was 

discharged for non-compliance. Id. Additionally, Jackson discussed Mother’s 

visits with Child. Id. at 21-22. Jackson stated that Mother’s visits did not 

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1 Attorney James King was appointed to represent the Child as her legal 

interests counsel and Attorney Lee Kuhlmann was appointed as guardian ad 

litem (“GAL”) to represent Child’s best interests. See In re Adoption of 

L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 179-180 (Pa. 2017).
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progress beyond supervised visits; the visits had to be changed to therapeutic 

visits after Mother “coached” Child regarding Paternal Grandmother. Id. at 

21-22 and 28.

Lastly, Jackson discussed Child’s placement. She testified that Child has 

been in the care of Paternal Grandmother for over two years and that Paternal 

Grandmother meets Child’s physical, medical, and educational needs. Id. at 

11-12, 27-28. Moreover, Jackson explained that while Mother lives on the 

same street as Paternal Grandmother, a stay-away order against Mother has 

been obtained because Mother consistently makes unfounded allegations that 

Child is physically and verbally abused by Parental Grandmother. Id. at 27-

30. Jackson testified that although Child is glad to see Mother, the bond is 

not a parental bond, that Child wishes to be adopted by Paternal Grandmother, 

and Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Id. at 29-30. Jackson testified it is in Child’s best interests to be 

adopted. Id. at 30. Following Jackson’s testimony, Attorney Kuhlmann, 

Child’s GAL, stated on the record that Child confirmed she wished to be 

adopted by her foster parent. Id. at 31.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This timely 

appeal followed.2 

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2 Mother filed two notices of appeal on June 24, 2019, separately listing each 

docket number. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 
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On August 22, 2019, Counsel filed an Anders brief and a petition to 

withdraw as counsel. Therefore, before reviewing the merits of this appeal, 

this Court must first determine whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary 

procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth 

v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248–1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

“In order to withdraw from appellate representation pursuant to 

Anders, certain procedural and substantive requirements must be met.” 

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 176 A.3d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Procedurally, counsel must,

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant; and (3) advise the defendant that 

he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court's 

attention.

Id. at 359. Substantively, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which 

counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth 

counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

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2018). Mother also filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on the same date. The trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 23, 2019. 
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Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419–420 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

In this case, we acknowledge Counsel’s compliance with Anders’ 

procedural and substantive requirements. “Therefore, we now have the 

responsibility ‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an 

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 886 (Pa. Super. 2016), 

quoting Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1248. 

Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error[] when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed the 

goal from reunification to adoption where such determination was

not supported by the clear and convincing evidence under the 

[A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(2)?][3]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs of []

[C]hild as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether[] the trial court erred because the evidence was 

overwhelming and undisputed that Mother demonstrated a 

genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to 

maintain a parent-child relationship with [] [C]hild[?]

See Anders Brief, at 7 (un-paginated).

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3 Counsel’s Anders brief addresses both the goal change and the court’s 

Section 2511(a) determinations in one issue. For clarity, we first address the 

goal change issue and then discuss Mother’s challenge to the termination of 

her parental rights. 
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With regard to dependency cases:

[t]he standard of review which this Court employs in cases of 

dependency is broad. However, the scope of review is limited in 

a fundamental manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of 

the lower court. We accord great weight to this function of the 

hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule 

upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear 

before him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule 

his findings if they are supported by competent evidence.

In re N.A., 116 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2015). Thus, we employ an 

abuse of discretion standard. In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).

Regarding the disposition of dependent children, the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(e)-(g), provides the criteria for a permanency plan. The 

court must determine a disposition best suited to the safety and protection, 

as well as the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351(g). With a goal change petition, the trial court 

considers the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan 

developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal 

for the child might be achieved.

In Interest of A.N.P., 155 A.3d 55, 67 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting In re 

A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007).

We have further noted:

[w]hen a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper 

placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not on what 

the parent wants or which goals the parent has achieved. 

Moreover, although preserving the unity of the family is a purpose 

of the [Juvenile] Act, another purpose is to “provide for the care, 
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protection, safety, and wholesome mental and physical 

development of children coming within the provisions of this 

chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he relationship 

of parent and child is a status and not a property right, and one 

in which the state has an interest to protect the best interest of 

the child.”

In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some citations omitted).

Here, the court did not err in changing Child’s goal to adoption. 

Throughout the history of the case, Mother was required to participate in drug 

counseling and mental health services to achieve reunification. Mother, 

however, failed to achieve those goals. Indeed, Mother was discharged from 

her drug treatment program due to her failure to attend and did not participate 

in court-ordered random drug testing; when tested in June 2019, Mother was 

positive for marijuana and opiates. Mother also failed to obtain stable 

housing. Thus, Mother was not compliant with the family service plan, made 

no progress towards alleviating the circumstances that led to Child’s 

placement, and showed no indication that those circumstances would be 

remedied in any reasonable amount of time. See, e.g., A.N.P., 155 A.3d at 

67. Accordingly, a goal change was appropriate.

We turn now to Mother’s arguments regarding the termination of her 

parental rights. We review cases involving the termination of parental rights 

according to the following standards.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 
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of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

Termination requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). This 

Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of 

parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In 

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We conclude that 

termination was proper under section 2511(a)(2).

The relevant subsections of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 provide:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The 

grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward 

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id. 
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Here, to be reunited with Child, Mother was required to complete the 

following objectives, (1) attend intensive outpatient drug and alcohol 

treatment and follow all recommendations; (2) refrain from using any illegal 

substance; (3) participate in mental health services; (4) take the appropriate 

psychiatric medication and remain under the supervision of a doctor in doing 

so; (5) obtain stable housing; and (6) attend weekly supervised visits with 

Child. Mother failed to complete a single objective. Accordingly, we discern 

no error in the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence 

supported the termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2). See Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.

Next, we must consider whether Child’s needs and welfare will be met 

by termination pursuant to Subsection (b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In 

this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists between 

child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use 

expert testimony, and social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations 

as well. Id. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id.

We have stated:

[b]efore granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, 

security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of the relationships is 

also important to a child, for whom severance of close parental 

ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering 

what situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and 
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welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond to 

consider whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would 

destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121, quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

2000). The trial court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child 

and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa. Super. 2011); In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent and child, it is 

reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Id. “[A] parent’s basic constitutional 

right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure 

to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting 

and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted).

Here, the record supports the existence of a bond between Mother and 

Child, in that Child is glad to see Mother. However, testimony also supports 

the court’s conclusion that the bond is not parental and that the child/parent 

bond exists between Child and Paternal Grandmother. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 7/23/19, at 6. Testimony established that Child was thriving in her 

foster placement with a foster parent who provided for her emotional, 

physical, and developmental well-being, and that Child wished to be adopted 

by Paternal Grandmother. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 
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court’s conclusion that Child’s needs and welfare are best served by 

termination. 

Accordingly the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. We also agree with Attorney Hayburn 

that Mother’s issues are frivolous. We have independently reviewed the record 

and find no other issues of arguable merit that Mother could pursue on appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decree and order and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

Decree and order affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/20/19