NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOS CO., INC., DBA Dogtra, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

DOGTRA CO., LTD., a Republic of Korea 

corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

E-COLLAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC., an 

Indiana corporation; HO SUNG SO, an 

individual, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

C&D MICRO CO., LTD., a Republic of 

Korea corporation; GREG VAN CUREN, an 

individual, 

Defendants.

No. 19-55014 

D.C. No. 

2:16-cv-09667-AB-AFM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 12 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Submitted May 8, 2020**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and HUMETEWA,*** District 

Judge.

Plaintiff SOS Co., Inc., dba Dogtra (“Dogtra”) appeals from the district 

court’s judgment in favor of defendants E-Collar Technologies, Inc., and Ho Sung 

So in a diversity action alleging trade secrets claims under California law. We 

review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, as well as a grant of 

a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab 

Invs., 904 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2018). We review for an abuse of discretion a 

district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration. Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate 

of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000). As the parties are familiar with the 

facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.

The district court held that the parties’ purported waiver of the statute of 

limitations defense was invalid because it was not “signed by the person obligated” 

as required by California Civil Procedure Code section 360.5. On appeal, Dogtra 

does not dispute that the alleged waiver is governed by section 360.5, which it fails 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Diane J. Humetewa, United States District Judge for 

the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
3 

to satisfy because it is unsigned. However, Dogtra argues that the waiver is 

nonetheless enforceable based on equitable estoppel, related writings under 

California Civil Code section 1642, and ratification.

The district court correctly determined that section 360.5 does not permit the 

application of equitable estoppel, related writings, or ratification to enforce the 

unsigned waiver. The plain language of the statute unambiguously states that 

waivers of the statute of limitations defense must be signed. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 360.5 (“No waiver shall bar a defense to any action that the action was not 

commenced within the time limited by this title unless the waiver is in writing and 

signed by the person obligated.” (emphasis added)). In addition, several cases 

have held that a purported waiver was invalid under section 360.5 because it was 

not in writing and signed. See, e.g., Santangelo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 76 Cal. Rptr.

2d 735, 739 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that “there [wa]s no valid waiver” of the 

statute of limitations because “there was no written agreement signed by the party 

to be obligated”). 

Moreover, relaxing the signed writing requirement would hinder

section 360.5’s purpose to put an end to the practice of exacting unlimited and 

indefinite waivers of the statute of limitations. See Don Johnson Prods., Inc. v. 

Rysher Entm’t, LLC, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 593-96 (Ct. App. 2012) (detailing the 

legislative history of section 360.5). Dogtra’s reliance on Carlton Browne & Co. v. 
4 

Superior Court, 258 Cal. Rptr. 118, 122-23 (Ct. App. 1989), which held that a 

written waiver that is signed by the defendant’s authorized agent is valid under 

section 360.5, is misplaced. Unlike here, in Carlton Browne & Co., “[n]othing in 

the legislative history of section 360.5 indicate[d] that the Legislature intended to 

invalidate a waiver signed by an agent authorized by the defendant to waive the 

statute of limitations” and “[a]pplication of the law of agency would in no way 

defeat the purpose of section 360.5.” Id. at 123.

AFFIRMED.