13-3247-cv Annis v. State of Vt. Prosecutors UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA TABASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the Unite d States Court of Appeals fo r the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courth ouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28 th day of May, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT: ROBE RT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- WILLIS BOYD ANNIS, III, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 13-3247-cv STATE OF VERMONT PROSECUTORS, FEDERAL PROSECUTORS STATE OF VERMONT, Defendants-Appellees

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---------------------------- ---------------------------- -------------- FOR APPELLANT: Willis Boyd Annis, III, pro se , Burlington, Vermont. FOR APPELLEES: No Appearance. Appeal from a judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the District of Vermont (Christina Reiss, Chief Judge ).2 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entere d on June 27, 2013, is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff Willis Boyd Annis, III, procee ding pro se, appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of his amended complaint and denial of further leave to amend. We assume familiarity with the facts a nd underlying proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. We review de novo a district court’s su a sponte dismissal of a complaint. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 1 46, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2001). Upon such review, we conclude, substantially for the reasons st ated by the district court, that Annis’s complaint about defendants’ failure to prosecute persons tr acking his thoughts th rough a mind-reading device “lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). It was therefore properly dism issed sua sponte under Neitzke v. Williams. Even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), Annis’s allegations cannot support a plausible claim for relief in light of established precedent, see Denton v. Herna ndez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (approving dismissal of complaint based on “irrational or wholly incredible” allegations); accord Livingston v. Adirond ack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 19 98) (explaining that dismissal is proper where complaint’s fact ual allegations are the “product of delusion or fantasy” (internal quotatio n marks omitted)). In addition, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosec ution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda3 R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Moreover, b ecause there is no reason to think that a valid claim might be stated, the district court’ s denial of further leave to amend was appropriate. See Cuoco v. Mo ritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 , 112 (2d Cir. 2000). We have considered Annis’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordi ngly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court