RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4394-13T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.N.S.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF E.J.S.,

a minor.

______________________________

Submitted May 20, 2015 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Ashrafi, and Kennedy.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, 

Camden County, Docket No. FN-04-423-13.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Jennifer L. Gottschalk, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Reid 

Adler, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Caitlin A. 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

July 17, 2015

APPELLATE DIVISION

July 17, 2015
2 A-4394-13T3

McLaughlin, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

ASHRAFI, J.A.D. 

This is an appeal from an order finding abuse or neglect of 

a seven-month-old boy who was severely injured by the boyfriend 

of defendant-mother K.N.S. The issue is whether defendantmother neglected the child by allowing the boyfriend to be his 

babysitter for several hours while she worked. We conclude 

there was sufficient evidence for the trial court's finding of 

neglect, and so, we affirm.

I.

Defendant gave birth to the child when she was nineteen 

years old. The biological father, who was eighteen, initially 

did not acknowledge paternity, and he is not involved in this 

case. A few months after the child was born, defendant began 

living with a man who was nine years older than she was. 

Defendant knew the man had been convicted of a drug offense. 

She did not know he had also been convicted of a sexual offense 

against a very young child.

The boyfriend was unemployed. Defendant had a job at a 

McDonald's restaurant near her apartment. The child had been 

enrolled in a daycare program until November 16, 2012, when he 

was diagnosed with croup. Following the illness, defendant did 
3 A-4394-13T3

not have medical clearance for him to return and also lacked

convenient transportation to take the child to daycare. For a 

period of about three weeks, defendant left the child in the 

boyfriend's care when she worked. 

Shortly before Thanksgiving in 2012, the boyfriend left the 

child alone in the bathtub, and the child fell and hurt his 

head. When defendant came home from work, she saw that the 

child had a large bump on his head. 

On December 9, 2012, defendant came home from her job 

during a break and saw that the boyfriend was bathing the child, 

but the child was blue and shivering. He was very cold to the 

touch. For about twenty minutes, she tried to heat the child's 

body by holding him near a heater. Defendant called a friend

for advice and then decided to take the child to a hospital 

emergency room, but she first walked back to the McDonald's to 

tell the manager she would have to miss the rest of her work 

shift. She returned to her apartment and called a taxi for 

transportation to the hospital.

At the hospital, the child's body temperature was eightyeight degrees. Doctors determined that he had severe injuries. 

His skull was fractured, as well as several ribs and parts of 

his vertebrae. He had healing fractures of his forearm and leg

indicating that some of the injuries had occurred at least days 
4 A-4394-13T3

in the past. The hospital made a child abuse referral to the 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division).

When interviewed at the hospital, defendant was extremely 

distraught about the nature and severity of her son's injuries. 

She said she did not know how or when the injuries occurred, 

except the incident a few weeks earlier when the child fell in 

the bathtub. Since the child was born, she had taken him to 

doctors' appointments as necessary, including on November 16, 

2012, for treatment of his croup. The doctors had not detected 

any injuries. She also said the child was usually a happy baby 

but had been whining and crying and not sleeping through the 

night for the past few days. She and her boyfriend were the 

only caretakers for the child during the past several weeks. 

Once she learned the child was injured, she insisted that the 

boyfriend would leave her apartment and not have any further 

contact with the child.

The Division obtained a court order to take temporary 

custody of the child. Upon the child's release from the 

hospital a week later, the Division placed him in the care of a 

registered nurse. Subsequently, the Division placed the child 

with defendant's sister while defendant enrolled in parenting 

classes and counseling. 
5 A-4394-13T3

On April 10, 2013, the Family Part conducted a fact-finding 

hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44 to adjudicate the charges 

of abuse or neglect against defendant and the boyfriend. The 

Division relied on documentary evidence, specifically, the 

Division caseworker's detailed report, medical records from the 

hospital, and the report of a physician who specialized in child 

abuse. Defendant and the boyfriend did not testify. The only 

witness was the Division caseworker.

The Family Part found that the boyfriend had physically 

abused the child and had caused the injuries. The court further 

found that defendant had neglected the child in that she left 

him in the care of the boyfriend with knowledge that he had a 

criminal past, that he had allowed the child to fall and hit his 

head in the bathtub, and that he had repeatedly cursed and made 

derogatory comments about the child in defendant's presence. In 

addition, the court found that defendant had neglected the child 

by failing to act expeditiously in getting him medical attention 

when she found him blue, cold, and shivering on December 9, 

2012. The court was skeptical that defendant had no idea that 

the child had suffered injuries at the hands of the boyfriend 

before that date, given the extent and severity of the injuries 

found at the hospital.

 
6 A-4394-13T3

II.

On appeal, defendant argues she did not harm the child 

herself, and the evidence gave no indication that she knew the 

boyfriend had physically abused him. 

A reviewing court must defer to the Family Part's findings 

of fact and conclusions of law based on those findings. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). 

"[F]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal 

when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super.

427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. 

Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). This 

deferential standard of review is especially appropriate because 

of the Family Part’s "specialized knowledge and experience in 

matters involving parental relationships and the best interests 

of children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 

N.J. 420, 427 (2012). 

An appellate court may expand its highly deferential scope 

of review when the alleged error does not involve credibility of 

witnesses but turns on the trial court's application of the law 

to the underlying facts. G.L., supra, 191 N.J. at 605. 

Nonetheless, an appellate court should only disturb the trial 
7 A-4394-13T3

court's findings and conclusions if they are "so wide of the 

mark that the judge was clearly mistaken." Ibid.

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) defines a child as abused or 

neglected when the child's

physical, mental, or emotional condition has 

been impaired or is in imminent danger of 

becoming impaired as the result of the 

failure of his parent or guardian . . . to 

exercise a minimum degree of care . . . 

(b) in providing the child with proper 

supervision or guardianship . . . or by any 

other acts of a similarly serious nature 

requiring the aid of the court . . . .

The Division must prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of 

the evidence. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 615 (App. Div. 2010).

In G.S. v. Department of Human Services, 157 N.J. 161, 176

(1999), the Court reviewed the meaning of the quoted statutory 

language and held it did not require that the parent intended to 

harm the child. "[T]he phrase 'minimum degree of care' refers 

to conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not 

necessarily intentional." Id. at 178. Conduct that can be 

described as ordinary negligence is not sufficient to prove 

abuse or neglect of a child within the meaning of the statute. 

Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 306-07 (2011). 
8 A-4394-13T3

Defendant contends the boyfriend's cursing and derogatory 

comments about the child were not sufficient to have alerted her 

to the danger of physical harm such that she can be found to 

have acted grossly negligently in leaving the child with him 

while she worked. She adds that she had regularly taken 

appropriate steps to assure the child's health and well-being, 

including prenatal care and regular doctors' appointments. She 

emphasizes that, until December 9, 2012, even the doctors that 

saw the child did not detect he had suffered injuries. 

A parent "fails to exercise a minimum degree of care when 

he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation and 

fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a 

risk of serious injury to that child." G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at

181. As we stated, the Division is not required to prove 

defendant intentionally abused or neglected the child. It is 

sufficient to show that defendant was grossly negligent in 

preventing or eliminating the risk of harm to the child. Id. at

176, 178. 

Negligence falls on a continuum of conduct from ordinary to 

gross based on the level of risk created, and it is determined 

on a case-by-case basis. T.B., supra, 207 N.J. at 309. In New 

Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.R., 419 N.J. 

Super. 538 (App. Div. 2011), we applied the following 
9 A-4394-13T3

formulation of gross negligence: "Where an ordinary reasonable 

person would understand that a situation poses dangerous risks 

and acts without regard for the potentially serious 

consequences, the law holds him responsible for the injuries he 

causes." Id. at 544 (quoting G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 179).

In this case, defendant's knowledge of the boyfriend's 

impatience and lack of attention to the child's safety, other 

negative character traits of the boyfriend, and the actual prior 

injury to the child made it grossly negligent for defendant to 

leave the child alone with him. Defendant had met and begun a 

relationship with the boyfriend just a few months earlier. She 

did not know enough about his reliability and responsibility 

such that she could leave the infant in his care for hours at a 

time. In fact, the boyfriend had shown in at least three ways 

that he was not a safe person to whom the seven-month-old infant 

could be entrusted. He had a criminal record, he cursed at the 

child and made comments indicating he was impatient when the 

child cried or whined, and he left the infant alone in a bathtub 

such that the child fell and struck his head. 

In addition, the child was "not himself" for several days

before December 9, 2012, crying and whining and not sleeping at 

night. Defendant should have detected a problem that made it 

particularly risky to leave the child alone with the boyfriend 
10 A-4394-13T3

on that day. Failing to protect a child against risk of harm by 

another can constitute neglect of the child. See F.M., supra, 

211 N.J. at 450; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 

N.J. 261, 289 (2007); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super. 76, 80 (App. Div. 2003)

(termination of parental rights affirmed where one aspect of the 

defendant-mother's unfitness was her failure to keep her 

children protected against physical and sexual abuse by her 

boyfriend).

Defendant's delay in seeking medical attention may not have 

been sufficient to warrant a finding of gross negligence if 

viewed in isolation. She attempted to warm the child herself, 

then returned to her job to report to her manager, and finally 

called a taxi instead of an ambulance. These mistakes might not 

rise to the level of gross negligence. But in conjunction with 

the precipitating act of leaving the child in the boyfriend's 

care, they were evidence of grossly inadequate attention to the 

child's safety and health. While not purposeful conduct, 

defendant's actions on the day that she found the child blue, 

shivering, and cold added to the demonstration of gross 

negligence in the care of a helpless, severely ill infant.

We conclude the proofs were sufficient for the Family Part 

to find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant 
11 A-4394-13T3

neglected her child by placing him in the care of an

untrustworthy and impatient man about whom she knew very little, 

and by delaying the emergency medical aid that the child needed.

III.

Despite her mistakes, defendant proved after the incident 

that she was capable of being a good parent. She complied with 

the counseling and services that the Division arranged for her, 

and the child was returned to her custody in August 2013. Her 

naïve trust in the responsibility of another person for the 

well-being of an infant made her a neglectful parent. Her 

learning from the experience and removing the boyfriend from her 

and the child's lives showed a likelihood that she is capable of 

providing the care and nurture the child needs.

The finding of neglect will now permanently stain the

reputation of this remorseful and rehabilitated mother. She 

will be considered unfit for certain types of employment, 

volunteer work, or personal relationships that involve children. 

A finding of abuse or neglect under the statute requires 

the inclusion of the person's name in the Central Registry 

maintained by the New Jersey Department of Children and Families 

of those found to have abused or neglected a child. Pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11, reports of child abuse or neglect must be 

forwarded to the child abuse registry operated by the Division, 
12 A-4394-13T3

which "shall be the repository of all information regarding 

child abuse or neglect that is accessible to the public pursuant 

to State and federal law." 

Such reports are confidential except as provided by 

statute. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a. The statute contains a lengthy 

list of institutions, governmental entities, and persons to whom 

the Division may release information contained in the registry. 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)-(g). In addition, the Department of 

Children and Families must check the registry before granting 

approval for the employment, volunteer services, and household 

relationships of certain caregivers for children and others. 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10c, -8.10e; N.J.S.A. 30:5B-25.3.

Inclusion of defendant's name in the registry will not only 

prevent her from participation in a field that involves children 

but is also likely to disqualify her from such potential

developments in her life as designation by a court or by the 

Division as a caregiver for a child that is related to her. See

generally W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry Statute for Abuse 

and Neglect Matters Is Constitutionally Flawed, 8 Rutgers J.L. & 

Pub. Pol'y 651, 654-56 (2011). Thus, for example, a person such 

as defendant who was found to have neglected her child at the 

age of twenty, or any parent whose momentary loss of patience 

resulted in an isolated incident of excessive punishment or 
13 A-4394-13T3

neglect, may be precluded twenty-five or thirty years later from 

serving as the caretaker or guardian of her own grandchild, even 

if she demonstrates during those years that she is a caring and 

attentive parent and never again could be accused of having 

abused or neglected a child. See id. at 652-56. 

The registry is a sensible measure for protecting children 

against harm, but one might reasonably question whether its 

disqualifications should last a lifetime in every case where 

abuse or neglect is found. Nothing in the statutes provides for 

expungement of substantiated reports of child abuse or neglect,

or removal of a person's name from the registry at an 

appropriate time despite rehabilitation and years of good 

conduct. This absence of an expungement or removal remedy 

contrasts sharply with our Criminal Code of Justice, which 

provides for expungement of many types of criminal and lesser 

offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32, and even with registration of 

sex offenders under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, which 

contains a provision for an offender to apply after fifteen 

years of good behavior for relief from the obligations of the 

registration law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). Considering the youth of 

this defendant and her motivation to correct her mistakes and 

prevent future harm to her child, a lifetime of "enormous 

implications upon careers or reputations" may be a harsh and
14 A-4394-13T3

unjust punishment. Miller, supra, 8 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol'y

at 652. 

Nevertheless, the trial court did not err in finding that 

defendant's past mistakes amounted to neglect of the child as 

defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). We reach that conclusion

on the record presented and pursuant to our standard of review

from the trial court's decision. We also seek to draw the 

attention of the other branches of our government and any other 

interested parties to the seeming disparity of the registration 

law under the abuse or neglect statutes. Unlike other such 

laws, the Central Registry provides no opportunity for the 

rehabilitated and reformed individual ever to clear her name and 

reputation, regardless of the degree of abuse or neglect in a 

particular case and regardless of future unblemished conduct and 

character. 

Affirmed.