In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2949

YVONNE AVERHART,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 7444 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MAY 21, 2014 — DECIDED MAY 28, 2014

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Yvonne Averhart, formerly employed as a 

guard at the Cook County Jail, was suspended without pay 

in 2001 and fired in 2003. She filed her first federal lawsuit in 

2001; the current suit is her fourth. She has lost them all. She 

filed and lost two state suits as well. The district court dismissed the current suit as barred by the earlier decisions.

Averhart believes that the Sheriff’s Department, which 

manages the Jail, set out to punish her for corroborating a 
2 No. 13-2949

coworker’s accusation of sexual harassment by a male 

guard. See Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1999). 

The Department retaliated, she maintains, by falsely accusing her of insubordination and other infractions. In 2000 she 

filed an administrative charge of discrimination. That charge 

was pending before the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission in January 2001 when Averhart learned that the 

Department was investigating her recent arrest for shoplifting and allegations that she was fraternizing with prisoners 

and smuggling drugs and other contraband into the jail. The 

Sheriff decided that Averhart should be fired and in May 

2001 suspended her without pay. He asked the Merit Board 

to approve her discharge, contending that Averhart had lied 

to the Department during its investigation and engaged in 

inappropriate contacts with prisoners.

The Merit Board, whose members are appointed by the 

Sheriff with the approval of the Cook County Board of 

Commissioners, see 55 ILCS 5/3-7002, approved Averhart’s 

discharge in mid-2003, effective as of May 2001. (In other 

words, the Board decided that Averhart would not receive 

back pay for the time between her suspension and her discharge.) Averhart challenged the Board’s decision in state 

court. In 2007, after twice remanding the matter to the Board 

for further consideration, a circuit judge upheld Averhart’s 

discharge. The judge later denied Averhart’s motion to vacate that ruling, and the appellate court affirmed both rulings. Averhart v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department, 387 Ill. 

App. 3d 1170 (2009) (table decision), 2011 IL App (1st) 

103109-U (Dec. 16, 2011). Averhart also sued the Merit Board 

and each of its members; the circuit court dismissed that suit 

in 2008 for want of prosecution. See id. at ¶12 n.1.
No. 13-2949 3

Federal litigation began even before Averhart was fired. 

Before receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Averhart filed a Title VII case in the district court. She alleged 

that the Sheriff’s Department had imposed discipline for 

contrived or exaggerated infractions because she supported

her female coworker. Then in June 2002, after receiving the 

EEOC’s permission but while the Merit Board was still considering her case, Averhart filed a second Title VII suit. This 

time she alleged that the Sheriff’s Department had retaliated 

against her “by suspending her based upon false allegations 

on or about May 29, 2001.” The district court consolidated 

the two lawsuits and in September 2004 granted summary 

judgment for the defendants. The judge explained that the 

Department had “offered a legitimate explanation for terminating Plaintiff, which Plaintiff has failed to rebut.” We affirmed. Averhart v. Sheahan, No. 04-3625 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 

2005) (nonprecedential disposition).

Averhart filed and dismissed a third federal suit. This is 

her fourth. Her complaint again alleges that her discharge 

was retaliatory, and for the first time she raises allegations of 

race and sex discrimination. The district court concluded 

that Averhart does not have a claim against the Merit Board, 

because it was an adjudicatory body rather than her employer. With respect to the Sheriff’s Department, the court

concluded that Averhart’s claims are precluded by her earlier lawsuits in both federal and state court. 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 133530 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2012).

Averhart’s appeal is frivolous. She does not explain how 

the Merit Board, as an adjudicator, could be liable under Title VII or any other federal statute. She was never the 

Board’s employee. As for the claim against the Sheriff’s De-
4 No. 13-2949

partment: it was filed almost a decade beyond the statute of 

limitations (which allows only 90 days from the right-to-sue 

letter, see 42 U.S.C. §2000e–5(f)(1)) and, as the district judge 

observed, also is barred by the doctrine of preclusion (res 

judicata). That Averhart added new theories (race and sex 

discrimination) to this latest suit does not avoid preclusion, 

which requires all legal theories that concern the same 

events to be brought in a single suit. See, e.g., Herrmann v. 

Cencom Cable Associates, Inc., 999 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1993);

Czarniecki v. Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2011); Palka v. Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 437–38 (7th Cir. 2011).

Averhart has abused the judicial process by attempting 

to relitigate the outcome of her earlier suits. Refusal to take 

no for an answer, and a campaign of unending litigation, are 

intolerable and sanctionable. See, e.g., Homola v. McNamara, 

59 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995). We give her 14 days to show 

cause why the court should not impose sanctions under Fed. 

R. App. P. 38. The potential sanctions include but are not 

limited to a financial penalty and an order revoking her 

privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. Any financial 

penalty must be paid promptly, or Averhart will be subject 

to a preclusion order under Support Systems International, Inc. 

v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995). See also, e.g., In re Chicago, 500 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED; ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ISSUED