IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1917

Filed February 26, 2016

Amended May 9, 2016

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

JAMIE F. DEREMIAH,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommended thirty-day suspension of 

attorney’s license. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Tara M. van Brederode and Susan A. Wendel, Des Moines, for

complainant.

F. Montgomery Brown of F.M. Brown Law Firm, P.L.L.C., West Des 

Moines, for respondent.
2

APPEL, Justice.

In this disciplinary case, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board charged the respondent, Jamie F. Deremiah, with 

violations of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b) (stating it is 

professional misconduct to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 

on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer”) in 

connection with a domestic assault on Jane Doe. After a hearing, the 

majority of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa 

(commission) recommended a thirty-day suspension of the respondent’s 

license; a two-year probationary period, with conditions related to 

maintaining his sobriety; and medical documentation showing his 

compliance with treatment providers’ recommendations. One member of 

the commission dissented on the sanction, recommending instead a 

ninety-day suspension. A second commission member also dissented on 

the sanction but recommended a public reprimand.

For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the respondent 

violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). We suspend the 

respondent’s license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of 

reinstatement for three months and impose conditions upon any 

application for reinstatement.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

A. Factual Findings. Most of the facts are not disputed. 

Witnesses at the hearing before the commission included police officers 

and a county attorney with knowledge related to the underlying criminal 

case, persons engaged in Deremiah’s treatment for alcoholism, and 

Deremiah himself. Based on our review of the entire record, we make the 

following findings of fact.
3

Deremiah began drinking alcohol at an early age and had a 

number of alcohol-related incidents prior to becoming a lawyer. 

Specifically, he had “two or three” citations for possession of alcohol and 

one incident of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI) 

while attending college but prior to attending law school. He had no 

involvement with the criminal justice system for alcohol-related offenses 

until the recent events described in this opinion.

Deremiah graduated from law school in 2008 and is licensed to 

practice law in Iowa. He practiced in a number of professional settings 

for relatively short periods of time. One firm terminated Deremiah for 

what he described as alcohol-related absences.

Deremiah is currently employed as “of counsel” with a Des Moines 

metropolitan area law office. He practices primarily in the areas of 

criminal and family law. Under his arrangement with the law office, he 

retains fifty percent of his billings collected from clients.

Deremiah and Doe knew each other in high school but began 

dating only after meeting at a bar several years ago. During the course of 

their relationship, they maintained separate residences, but they usually 

slept together in the evening. Doe gave Deremiah a set of keys to her 

home, where she lived with her ten-year-old daughter.

The relationship, however, was marked by jealousy and allegations 

of infidelity. In April 2014, Des Moines police responded to a domestic

incident at Doe’s home. The facts of this incident were not thoroughly 

developed at the hearing, but police were apparently called to Doe’s home 

after a jealous and intoxicated Deremiah burned some of Doe’s DVDs 

and refused to leave the residence. Police who arrived at the scene called 

a cab to transport Deremiah home. At this point, Doe retrieved the keys 

to her residence from Deremiah.
4

The April 2014 event was a precursor for the events that gave rise 

to this disciplinary proceeding. Deremiah and Doe had been drinking at 

various Des Moines bars on the night of July 25, 2014. An argument 

ensued at one of the locations, resulting in Deremiah and Doe going their 

separate ways. After the altercation, Deremiah went to Doe’s home and 

broke in the front door, causing damage to the door. Doe, however, was 

not at home. Deremiah then left the Doe residence.

Deremiah later returned to the residence. This time Doe was at 

home. Deremiah asserts he suffered from an alcohol-related blackout 

and does not remember what happened next. Similarly, Doe’s memory of 

the event is cloudy. Nonetheless, the record establishes that Deremiah 

assaulted Doe in her bedroom. He punched Doe in the face multiple 

times, causing facial swelling and bruising to her eyes. Her left eye soon 

became swollen shut. According to a police officer who responded to the 

reported domestic assault, “I thought it was a broken eye socket because 

it was so swollen.” Deremiah also pulled Doe’s hair, leaving a clump of 

hair in the bedroom where the assault occurred. After the assault, 

Deremiah called his father who picked him up and drove him to his 

home, where Deremiah was also living at the time.

Doe called 911 in the early morning hours of July 26. After 

interviewing her and investigating the scene, the police took photographs 

of Doe’s injuries, the clump of hair in the bedroom, and the damage to 

the door. Police noted that Doe was distraught. After completing their 

investigation at the scene, police traveled to Deremiah’s father’s home 

and, after Deremiah admitted he had been with Doe the previous 

evening, he was arrested. The district court entered a no-contact order 

following Deremiah’s arrest.
5

The state charged Deremiah with two crimes. In Count I, the state 

charged him with domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict a serious 

injury, an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code §§ 708.1, .2A(2)(c)

(2013). In Count II, the state charged Deremiah with trespass causing 

bodily injury and/or property damage, a serious misdemeanor. Id.

§§ 716.7, .8(2).

Deremiah pled guilty to both charges. On Count I, the court 

sentenced Deremiah to two years in prison with all but two days 

suspended and two years of probation with fines and surcharges. On 

Count II, the court sentenced him to one year in prison, all suspended, to 

run consecutively with the sentence under Count I.

As result of his probation, Deremiah was required to undergo 

substance abuse evaluation. The substance abuse evaluation 

recommended treatment. Deremiah was further required to attend a 

twenty-four-week program related to domestic assaults. Deremiah 

complied with these recommendations and requirements of probation. 

He also engaged a therapist, Winnie Hall, to provide him with private 

counseling twice a week. As part of his recovery program, Deremiah 

attends Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings regularly, meets with his 

sponsor, and has consulted regularly with Hugh Grady of the Iowa 

Lawyers Assistance Project. 

At the time of the hearing, Deremiah had recently received his oneyear AA chip commemorating his sobriety. He was also continuing to 

attend AA meetings on a regular basis and to receive counseling from 

Hall and Grady on a regular basis.

Deremiah testified that he has come to understand the role of 

alcohol in his life. Both Hall and Grady testified at the hearing that 
6

Deremiah was actively engaged in recovery and that his prognosis with 

respect to managing his alcoholism was good.

At the time of the hearing, Deremiah and Doe talked to each other 

on a daily basis and saw each other weekly. Deremiah testified that he 

avoids being with Doe when she consumes alcohol.

B. Proceedings Before the Commission Related to Sanctions. 

The parties agreed that Deremiah’s conduct violated rule 32:8.4(b). The 

central contested issue before the commission was the appropriate

sanction under the facts and circumstances.

The Board argued for a three-month suspension. It emphasized 

that in this case, Deremiah committed two serious infractions, one 

relating to the breaking into Doe’s home and the other arising out of the 

assault. As a result, the Board contended this was not a case of a singleincident domestic assault, but a case involving multiple incidents of 

wrongful conduct.

The Board also asserted the record showed a lack of remorse on 

Deremiah’s part and some minimizing of his behavior. It further noted 

that Deremiah had not taken proactive steps to reimburse Doe’s landlord 

for the damage to the door or to reimburse Doe for her medical expenses 

that arose from her injuries.

Deremiah argued the appropriate sanction was a public 

reprimand. Among other things, Deremiah asserted a suspension would 

have a severe impact on his legal practice and on his clients. He noted 

that he was involved in long-term representations in a number of juvenile 

matters and that it would be difficult to get another attorney up to speed 

in these cases, thereby causing damage to clients. Deremiah also 

submitted financial information to the commission that showed his 

income was sufficient to meet his expenses with little to spare, that his 
7

very modest assets were exceeded by credit card debt accumulated in his 

drinking days, and that he was also carrying substantial debt from law 

school. 

The commission fractured on the question of sanction. Three 

members of the commission recommended a one-month suspension, a 

probationary period of two years, and various reporting requirements. 

One member of the commission proposed a ninety-day suspension. 

Another member of the commission proposed a public reprimand, along 

with a two-year probationary period and various reporting requirements.

II. Standard of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Iowa 

2013). An attorney’s ethical misconduct must be proved by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. “We respectfully consider the 

commission’s findings and recommendations, but are not bound by 

them.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Englemann, 840 

N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 2013). “If we find a violation, we ‘may impose a 

lesser or greater sanction than the discipline recommended by the 

grievance commission.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(1)).

III. Discussion.

A. Violation of Iowa Code of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). 

The parties do not dispute that Deremiah violated Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). While the parties agreed to the violation, 

we nonetheless exercise independent judgment to ensure that the record 

and the law support the conclusion of the commission that ethical 

violations occurred. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Wright, 857 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 2014).
8

We begin with a discussion of general principles. We have long 

held that domestic assault cases may give rise to professional discipline. 

For instance, in Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Patterson,

we suspended a lawyer’s license for three months as a result of a 

domestic assault lasting two hours that occurred in front of a child and 

caused bodily injury. 369 N.W.2d 798, 799, 801 (Iowa 1985). We also 

cited domestic assaults as subject to sanction in other cases involving a 

number of additional violations of our ethical rules. See, e.g., Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 636 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 2001) 

(concerning an OWI and domestic assault); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &

Conduct v. Lapointe, 415 N.W.2d 617, 618–19 (Iowa 1987) (involving 

domestic assault and tampering with a witness).

These cases, however, arose under ethical rules somewhat different 

than our present regime. Our findings related to ethical violations 

arising out of domestic assaults rested on “moral turpitude” under the 

Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Ruth, 636 N.W.2d at 

88; Lapointe, 415 N.W.2d at 619; Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 800–01. In 

2005, we adopted an Iowa version of the Model Rules of Professional 

Responsibility. The model rules removed ethical provisions related to 

moral turpitude from the lawyer’s ethics regime. The deletion of moral 

turpitude was based on fear that the open-ended provision could draw 

within its scope activities that did not have any impact on the ability of a 

person to practice law and did not adversely reflect on the law or the 

courts in any substantial way. See Ellen J. Bennett, et al., Annotated 

Model Rules of Professional Conduct, R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (8th ed. 2015) 

(explaining how the concept of moral turpitude could be construed to 

contain matters of personal morality that have no specific connection to 

fitness to practice law).
9

But while we deleted provisions related to moral turpitude, our 

rules defined professional misconduct broadly enough to include offenses 

not directly involved in the practice of law. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,

et al., The Law of Lawyering, § 69.04, at 69-11 (4th ed. 2015 Supp.)

[hereinafter The Law of Lawyering] (referring to moral turpitude as 

“notoriously ambiguous”). Instead, the new rules provide that “[i]t is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as 

a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b).

This rule is both broader and narrower than prior disciplinary 

rules. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Keele, 795 N.W.2d 507, 

512 (Iowa 2011) (citing a prior edition of The Law of Lawyering, now at 

69-12). Under rule 32:8.4(b), not all crimes subject a lawyer to 

professional discipline. Only those crimes with a nexus to the practice of 

law subject a lawyer to professional discipline. Keele, 795 N.W.2d at 

512.

We considered the application of rule 32:8.4(b) in what has been 

referred to as a landmark case in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2010). See

Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, 16 Iowa Practice Series, Lawyer and 

Judicial Ethics, § 12:4(c), at 10.55 (2015). In Templeton, the respondent 

engaged in repeated incidents of window peeping. 784 N.W.2d at 765. 

Templeton was ultimately convicted of six counts of invasion of privacy. 

Id. at 765–66. We concluded that Templeton engaged in a pattern of 

criminal conduct that “raise[d] serious misgivings about whether 

Templeton underst[ood] the concept of privacy and respect[ed] the law 

protecting individuals’ privacy rights.” Id. at 767–68. As a result, we 

found a violation of rule 32:8.4(b). Id. at 768.
10

In reaching our result in Templeton, we discussed at length, and 

ultimately adopted, an approach to rule 32:8.4(b) similar to that adopted 

under a comparable disciplinary rule by the Oregon Supreme Court in In 

re White, 815 P.2d 1257 (Or. 1991). In White, the Oregon Supreme Court 

observed that not every criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 

fitness to practice law. Id. at 1265. In particular, the court noted that a 

simple misdemeanor assault arising from a private dispute would not, in 

and of itself, be sufficient to establish a violation. Id. In analyzing 

criminal misconduct, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that each case 

must be judged upon its own facts in determining whether a violation of

disciplinary rules occurred. Id. Factors to be considered included

the lawyer’s mental state; the extent to which the act 

demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the 

presence or absence of a victim; the extent of actual or 

potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence of a 

pattern of criminal conduct.

Id.

We embraced the approach of White in Templeton. Templeton, 784 

N.W.2d at 767. Although the substantive language changed with our 

adoption of the model rules, our approach in Templeton was consistent 

with the methodology under our previous ethics regime in which we 

emphasized the need to avoid per se rules or mechanical application of 

labels in determining the existence of ethical violations. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 79 (Iowa 2008); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Marcucci, 543 N.W.2d 879, 

883 (Iowa 1996). We now consistently use the Templeton factors to 

determine whether a lawyer’s criminal misconduct amounts to an ethical 

violation under rule 32:8.4(b). See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 588–89 (Iowa 2015); Iowa 
11

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rousch, 827 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Iowa 

2013); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 

873, 877–78 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Weaver, 812 N.W.2d 4, 11 (2012).

After the adoption of the model rules and our gloss in Templeton, 

we considered the rule in the context of domestic assault in Iowa 

Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d 33

(Iowa 2011). In Schmidt, an attorney who had never before been violent 

toward his wife assaulted her, chased her around the house, choked her 

to the point of unconsciousness, and pursued her into a neighbor’s 

garage in the presence of the couple’s children. Id. at 37–38. Schmidt 

further attempted to prevent her and a neighbor from calling 911. Id. at 

37, 41. When arriving officers placed him in a police car, he damaged 

the steel cage in the interior of the vehicle. Id. at 38. Schmidt’s spouse 

was taken to the emergency room at a local hospital in moderate distress 

with abrasions to her neck, a three-centimeter laceration, abrasions on 

her neck and knees, and pain and stiffness of the neck. Id.

We concluded that Schmidt’s behavior violated rule 32:8.4(b). Id. 

at 41. In doing so, we applied the Templeton factors. Id. at 40–41. While 

we stated that not all acts of violence will lead to professional discipline, 

we noted that the acts of violence by Schmidt were more than trivial. Id. 

at 41. We cited Schmidt’s conscious decision to act on his hostility to his 

wife and assault her multiple times instead of walking away from the 

situation. Id. We further noted that Schmidt attempted to prevent his 

wife from calling 911 and lied to a neighbor to prevent him from calling 

911. Id. We stated that while Schmidt suffered from depression, this did 

not excuse the choices he made, particularly in light of the lack of 

medical support that his mental condition clouded his judgment. Id. 
12

Finally, we noted that the lack of a pattern of misconduct did not prevent 

his violent acts from amounting to a violation of rule 32:8.4(b). Id.

We now turn to apply the Templeton factors to determine whether

there has been a violation of rule 32:8.4(b) in this case. On the issue of 

mental state of mind, Deremiah suggests that he does not remember the 

assault because of an alcohol-related blackout. In several cases, we 

rejected such claims, noting that they were not supported by adequate 

medical testimony. See Rousch, 827 N.W.2d at 717 (finding that 

respondent presented no evidence that depression or alcohol clouded his 

judgment); Cannon, 821 N.W.2d at 878 (explaining that depression and 

substance abuse are not excuses, especially with no medical evidence of 

their effect on respondent’s mental state); Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 41 

(stating depression and alcohol did not excuse mistakes, and no medical 

evidence as to how depression affected his mind and decision-making 

was submitted); Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 801 (noting beyond his own 

contentions, no professional opinion offered to support respondent’s 

claim that he lost his reason and had no recollection of the event).

Here, Deremiah presented the testimony of Winnie Hall, a licensed 

mental health therapist and a certified substance abuse counselor. She 

stated that “he was in a blackout” when the event occurred. It is not 

entirely clear from the transcript whether Hall was stating an opinion or 

simply reporting what Deremiah had told her. Hall further testified that 

when an alcoholic is in a blackout state, the alcoholic can fully function 

but does not remember what happened.

Deremiah has presented more evidence concerning alcoholic 

blackouts than was presented in Patterson, Cannon, Rousch, and 

Schmidt. Yet, Hall testified that an alcoholic in a blackout state could 

still distinguish between right and wrong. Further, while we have 
13

generally found that the use of drugs or mental illness may be relevant 

for mitigation of sanctions, they do not provide an excuse for ethical 

violations. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841 

N.W.2d 114, 129 (Iowa 2013) (stating depression and posttraumatic 

stress disorder were mitigating factors, but did not excuse misconduct); 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 661 

(Iowa 2013) (holding alcoholism may be considered in mitigation where 

alcohol contributed to misconduct and lawyer undertakes rehabilitative 

efforts to control addiction); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Van Beek, 757 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Iowa 2008) (finding depression and 

alcoholism to be mitigating factors); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics 

& Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa 2002) (noting 

depression does not excuse unethical conduct but is a mitigating 

circumstance). Our view is consistent with the vast majority of cases in 

other jurisdictions. See In re Harrington, 293 P.3d 686, 694 (Kan. 2013) 

(per curiam) (including addiction to alcohol as a mitigating factor when 

supported by medical evidence); In re Arata, 150 So. 3d 302, 306 (La. 

2014) (recognizing that chemical dependence, along with meaningful 

efforts to address this dependence, serves as mitigation); In re Karlsen, 

778 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2010) (describing depression and medical 

issues as mitigating factors when established by clear and convincing 

evidence); In re Charron, 918 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. 1996) (explaining 

that depression could serve to mitigate punishment, but not excuse 

guilt). We adhere to these cases today. 

The second Templeton factor is disrespect of the law or law 

enforcement. The use of violence to settle disputes is the antithesis of 

the rule of law. Lawyers who use violence undermine the legal system 

which requires respect, restraint, and resort to the legal process. See In 
14

re Walker, 597 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ind. 1992) (observing that attorneys 

who commit violent acts can cause the public to rightfully question 

“whether the system itself is worthy of respect”); In re Grella, 777 N.E.2d 

167, 171 (Mass. 2002) (describing the essential role of a lawyer as 

facilitating resolutions of conflict without violence); In re Magid, 655 A.2d 

916, 919 (N.J. 1995) (stating that society condemns acts of violence and 

that domestic violence always involves victims); In re Rosenblatt, 687 

N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (App. Div. 1999) (admonishing that an attorney is 

expected to use legal means to solve his problems, not violence).

Further, the trespass issue here is problematic. Like the 

trespasses in Templeton, breaking through a locked door of a home does 

not show respect for the sanctity of the home and the privacy interests 

associated with it. Such an invasive violent act shows disrespect for the 

law, which consistently recognizes the special value of the home as a 

place of safety and refuge. See Iowa Code § 561.16 (providing for an 

unlimited exemption of one’s homestead from judicial sale); People v. 

Jones, 821 N.E.2d 955, 957 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing the exception to the 

self-defense duty to retreat when the defender is at home and noting

“peoples’ homes are their castles, and that as such one’s home is a place 

of sanctuary”); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. 

L. Rev. 957, 987 (1982) (describing how one tends to identify one’s 

“home” as an attribute of oneself and not a mere possession); Stephanie 

M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 

Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1100–05 (2009).

The third Templeton factor is the existence of a victim and the 

degree of injury resulting from the lawyer’s misconduct. Here, Deremiah 

engaged in an escalating course of conduct that included destruction of 

Doe’s private property, trespass of her home with intent to commit a 
15

serious injury, and an ongoing assault that resulted in significant 

bruising and swelling of both eyes, swelling in her face, hair being ripped 

out, and obvious resulting psychological harm. This was not a case 

involving slight or no injury. There clearly was a victim with palpable 

injuries.

Fourth, on the question of a pattern of conduct, we note that 

Deremiah makes the argument that the domestic assault occurring in 

July was a singular event. In Keele, for instance, we found that the 

federal firearms violation was an isolated event that did not give rise to a 

violation. Keele, 795 N.W.2d at 514. Our cases have often emphasized 

the pattern of misconduct. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 226–27 (Iowa 2015); Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 589 (Iowa 

2011).

The facts of this case do not show a persistent pattern of repeated 

misconduct. Yet, there was the event in April, which involved Deremiah

burning Doe’s DVDs and a resulting call to the police. This occurrence 

seems to have been a precursor to events in July. We have in our cases 

noted that two occasions of misconduct are cause for concern. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Khowassah, 837 N.W.2d 649, 654

(Iowa 2013); Rousch, 827 N.W.2d at 718. In any event, when violent acts 

resulting in significant injury occur, a pattern of conduct is not required 

to establish a violation of our disciplinary rules. See Schmidt, 796 

N.W.2d at 41. When it comes to the application of rule 32:8.4(b) to 

violent assaults on intimate partners, one assault is one too many. 

Finally, in addition to the specific Templeton factors, we consider 

whether the domestic assault and trespass in this case has a bearing on 
16

Deremiah’s legal practice. In Schmidt, we stated that “domestic-abuse 

conduct did not affect [the attorney’s] behavior toward his clients, fellow 

lawyers, or judges.” Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 44. We made a similar 

statement in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Axt, 791 

N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 2010).

These observations in Schmidt and Axt were used only in the sense 

that the specific acts of misconduct in question had no direct impact on 

a particular identifiable case or client. Yet, our other cases recognize 

that a lawyer’s misconduct can have an indirect impact on the lawyer’s 

ability to practice law. For example, in Rousch, the attorney’s illegal drug 

usage did not have a direct impact on a particular case or client. 827 

N.W.2d at 718. We noted, however, that a criminal attorney’s illegal drug 

use could lead to difficult situations in his law practice when he 

represented drug offenders. Id. We noted that Rousch was violating the 

category of laws that he regularly encountered in his work. Id.

Here, Deremiah’s practice included family and criminal law. A 

competent family lawyer must be able to recognize and effectively deal 

with situations involving domestic abuse. See In re Walker, 597 N.E.2d 

at 1272; Magid, 655 A.2d at 919 (stating an attorney’s commission of 

domestic violence calls into question the zealousness of his advocacy 

when representing victims of such crimes or prosecuting perpetrators). 

For example, the American Bar Association has developed screening tools 

to assist lawyers in identifying domestic abuse and materials for 

comprehensive representation and advocacy of domestic abuse clients. 

See Comm’n on Domestic Violence, Am. Bar Ass’n Tool for Attorneys to 

Screen for Domestic Violence (2005), http://www.american

bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/screeningtoolcdv.authchec

kdam.pdf; Comm’n on Domestic Violence, Am. Bar Ass’n Comprehensive 
17

Issue Spotting: A Tool for Civil Attorneys Representing Victims of Domestic 

& Dating Violence, Sexual Assault & Stalking, (2008), 

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs

/Issue_Spotting_FINAL.authcheckdam.pdf. A lawyer engaged in the 

practice of family law who engages in acts of domestic abuse may be less 

effective in screening and addressing similar incidents of abuse 

experienced by clients. A family lawyer must protect clients from acts of 

family violence, not commit them. Cf. Magid, 655 A.2d at 919.

We conclude that consideration of the Templeton factors establish 

a violation of rule 32:8.4(b). In particular, the criminal trespass and 

violent injurious assault are salient facts showing a disrespect for the law 

as contemplated in the second Templeton factor.

B. Sanctions. We now turn to the question of sanctions. In 

considering sanctions, we must focus on their purpose. We do not seek 

in our sanctions to inflict punishment for criminal conduct in any 

general sense. That is the function of the criminal law. The range of 

penalties for criminal activities are established by the legislature and are 

enforced through criminal prosecutions. Imposing greater punishment 

for domestic assault crimes is a matter for the legislature and public 

prosecutors who exercise their discretion in enforcing the law.

That said, in addition to providing a mechanism to police poor 

lawyering, the rules authorize us to protect the public and maintain 

public confidence in the legal profession through the disciplinary 

process. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 

806, 810 (Iowa 2006). We further seek to impose discipline to deter 

individual attorneys from reoffending. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Qualley, 828 N.W.2d 282, 293 (Iowa 2013). We also 

seek to deter the misconduct of others. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 771; 
18

Thompson, 595 N.W.2d at 134. In calibrating our sanctions, we focus on 

these issues and not generalized criminal punishment.

In determining sanctions, we have generally rejected per se rules 

and have instead considered the totality of facts and circumstances of an 

individual case. Nonetheless, we have sometimes referred to general 

ranges of sanctions that arise from certain types of misconduct. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 

2015) (“When determining what sanctions to impose, we consider those 

imposed in similar cases while remaining aware of the different 

circumstances in each case.”). In Axt, we suggested that the sanctions 

imposed against lawyers committing domestic abuse “ranged from a 

suspension of two months to a suspension of two years depending on the 

nature and extent of other misconduct proved by the board in the same 

case.” 791 N.W.2d at 102.

In Schmidt, we suggested that in cases involving domestic assaults 

with injuries to the victims we generally would consider a suspension of 

up to six months before consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors. 796 N.W.2d at 45. In that case, we determined that the singular 

nature of the offense plus especially robust efforts to address alcohol and 

mental health problems were sufficient to lessen the suspension to a 

one-month period. Id.

The aggravating facts arise here primarily from the violation itself. 

The victim of domestic assault suffered notable physical injuries and 

psychological harm from an assault in her own bedroom. We do not find 

the domestic nature of the assault a mitigating factor; indeed it is an 

aggravating factor. Violence by an intimate partner is a raw assault on 

the basic individual right to physical security that lies at the core of 

civilized society.
19

We also note the escalating violence in this case. Although not 

well-developed in the record, it is clear that in April, Deremiah engaged 

in conduct cumulating in the destruction of Doe’s property and resulting 

in a 911 call by Doe to stabilize the situation. This, of course, is a lesser 

event compared to what occurred in July, but it should have been a clear 

harbinger to Deremiah. The significance of the event was not lost on 

Doe, who retrieved the key to her home from Deremiah after this 

incident. Yet, on July 26, Deremiah engaged in an act of trespass by 

breaking into Doe’s home and, ultimately, proceeded to repeatedly punch 

Doe in the face and pull out her hair in the confines of her bedroom in 

the early morning hours.

Finally, there is an issue regarding restitution. Deremiah damaged 

the door to Doe’s residence when committing the trespass offense. It is 

true that the damage was relatively minor and that a court order 

detailing required restitution was not entered. Yet, Deremiah must have 

known of the damage, and yet he appears to have taken no proactive 

steps to assume responsibility for it. This is, perhaps, an error of 

negligent omission more than anything else, but it does not foster 

confidence that Deremiah has forthrightly assumed full responsibility for 

his actions.

As in Schmidt, there are mitigating factors. Deremiah has not had 

prior discipline, which we have recognized as a mitigating factor. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 

(Iowa 2015). Notwithstanding the restitution issue, he has accepted 

responsibility for his acts and seems genuinely remorseful, a mitigating 

factor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 

109, 122 (Iowa 2015). In addition, Deremiah has engaged in robust 
20

efforts to deal with his substance abuse. We regard the effort to obtain 

help as a mitigating factor. Id. at 122; Schmidt, 796 N.W.2d at 39, 45.

We think the various opinions of the members of the commission 

reflect the range of possible sanctions in this case. We cannot, however, 

accept a public reprimand as an adequate sanction. Here, the escalating 

tumultuous relationship between Deremiah and Doe led to an assault 

resulting in substantial injuries. Notwithstanding the mitigating factors, 

we think a mere reprimand is not adequate under the circumstances.

We give respectful consideration to the majority’s recommendation 

of a thirty-day suspension, but we note that the majority also suggests a 

two-year period of probation. The majority thus proposed a sanction that 

offers protection well beyond the period of suspension. We have not 

imposed probation beyond the period of suspension in our prior cases on 

the ground that we lack the administrative machinery to provide effective 

supervision. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 792 

N.W.2d 674, 683 (Iowa 2010); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 871–72 (Iowa 2010); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Kirlin, 741 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2007).

We could impose a thirty-day suspension as in Schmidt. The 

nature of the assaults are somewhat similar. The physical harm in this 

case bears a resemblance to those in Schmidt. As in Schmidt, Deremiah’s 

acts included some damage to property.

There are also differences. There is no evidence that Deremiah 

interfered with efforts to summon help as in Schmidt. See Schmidt, 794 

N.W.2d at 41. And, although the assault in Schmidt occurred in front of 

children (which produced trauma so great that they did not want to see 

their father during subsequent visitations), id. at 38, the assault in this 

case did not involve injury to children who witnessed the abuse. Schmidt
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also involved a violation of an ethical rule unrelated to domestic abuse in 

the case, id. at 39–40; there was no similar unrelated infraction in 

Deremiah’s case. Yet, Deremiah was found guilty of two criminal 

infractions—one involving trespass and the other involving assault.

From time to time we step back and consider whether our 

approach to sanctions in our cases is generally sufficient to advance the 

purposes of our ethics rules. For example, we increased the sanctions 

for failure to file income tax returns in order to protect the reputation of 

the bar. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Jones, 368 N.W.2d 157, 157 

(Iowa 1985) (“[W]e are determined to continue to impose sanctions and, if 

necessary to end tax violations by members of the profession, to increase 

the periods of suspension.”). Similarly, in Schmidt, we took a step in 

ratcheting up the floor of sanctions for domestic assault by declaring that 

while an admonition for domestic abuse might have been appropriate in 

the past, we no longer considered an admonition a sufficient sanction for 

domestic abuse resulting in serious injury. 796 N.W.2d at 43.

After reviewing our cases and considering the issues raised in this 

matter, we take another step in strengthening our disciplinary approach 

to injurious domestic assaults by imposing a sanction in excess of the 

one-month suspension imposed in Schmidt. We impose the increased 

sanction in part because of the destruction of property and trespass of 

the home, which occurred prior to the assault, but also to reemphasize 

what was said in Schmidt, namely, that domestic abuse by lawyers is

out-of-bounds conduct that will not be tolerated by this court. Id. at 44. 

In escalating the sanctions for domestic abuse, we seek to preserve the 

reputation of the bar, ensure that family law lawyers are fit to offer 

holistic legal advice, and deter other lawyers from committing similar 

violations. We conclude that the proper sanction in this case is a 
22

suspension of Deremiah’s license to practice law indefinitely with no 

possibility of reinstatement for at least three months.

In addition, Deremiah should continue to address the issues of his 

substance abuse and mental health. The record demonstrates that 

Deremiah has made a good start in this regard. Before reinstating 

Deremiah’s license, however, we require that Deremiah present to us 

evidence that he is continuing in his recovery efforts and that he is 

mentally fit to practice law.

As a result, at the time of any application for reinstatement, we 

require Deremiah to provide the court with (1) a mental health evaluation 

by a physician who has signed an affidavit indicating that he is fit to 

resume the practice of law, and (2) a substance abuse evaluation 

indicating he is fit to practice law. See Rousch, 827 N.W.2d at 721. We 

also require that any application for reinstatement be set for hearing 

before us before the suspension in this case is lifted. Iowa Ct. R. 

34.25(2).

IV. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, we suspend Deremiah’s license to practice 

law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. 

This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. 

R. 34.23(3). Deremiah must comply with Iowa Court Rule 34.24 dealing 

with the notification of clients and counsel. Costs for this action are 

taxed to Deremiah pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24. Upon application 

for reinstatement, Deremiah must demonstrate that he has not practiced 

law during the period of his suspension and that he has complied with 

all of the requirements for reinstatement provided in Iowa Court Rule 

34.25. In any application for reinstatement, Deremiah must present an 
23

affidavit from a mental health professional and a substance abuse 

evaluation demonstrating Deremiah’s fitness to practice law.

LICENSE SUSPENDED.