alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
OF /S-00577.Cg

Houston, Texas
ea
RE: Case NO ee sae pees

i, Henry Pave: i
e State of Te

2 § 000.34"

JUN 26

aa

On Thursday, June 25, 2015 the reporter’s record was filed.
reporter’s record is incomplete, appellant or any other party should seek t
supplement t! record. Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c). If the clerk’s record has
already been filed, appellant's brief is due 30 days from this date; if i
an accelerated appeal, appellant’s brief is due 20 days from this date.

R. App. P. 38.6(a). motions or other documents (i. dled wi
the Court must comply with Tex. R. App. P. 9.

T. C. Case # 1436278



TDCJ Offender Details

EXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE [am Ct ammonia

Offender Information Details

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SID Number:

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05191146
02001974
SKILLERN,JOHN HENRY
w

M

1972-08-22

2059-07-29

GARZA WEST
2059-07-29

2019-10-07

NO

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1 2 | New Offender Search

The offender is temporarily ineligible for visitation. Please call the offender's unit for any

additional information.

The visitation information is updated once daily during weekdays and multiple times per day

on visitation days.

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULED RELEASE:

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Parole Review Information

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Offender is not scheduled for release at this time.
Will be determined when release date is scheduled.

Will be determined when release date is scheduled.

Offense

http://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/OffenderSearch/offenderDetail.action?sid=05191146

County Case No.

7/21/2015


TDCJ Offender Details
Offense Sentence Sentence (YY-MM-
Date Date DD)
1993-09-24 | AGGSEXASLT | 1904.06.08 |uvaLDE} %407:8025- 20-00-00
2014-07-24 | PROMOTE CHILD | 9915-05-20 | HARRIS | 143627901010 45-00-00
2014-07-24 | POSS CHILD PORN| 2015-05-20 | HARRIS | 143627801010 20-00-00

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The Texas Department of Criminal Justice updates this information regularly to ensure that it is
complete and accurate, however this information can change quickly. Therefore, the information
on this site may not reflect the true current location, status, scheduled termination date, or other

information regarding an offender.

For questions and comments, you may contact the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at (936)
295-6371 or webadmin@tdcj.texas.gov. This information is made available to the public and law
enforcement in the interest of public safety. Any unauthorized use of this information is forbidden
and subject to criminal prosecution.

New Offender Search

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http://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/OffenderSearch/offenderDetail.action?sid=05 191146

7/21/2015
#### Charles R. Livecchi, Appellant, v John Nacca, Respondent.

Submitted May 20, 2013;

decided June 27, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### Deere *v.*Board of County Com’rs of Rio Grande Co.

*(Circuit Court, D. Colorado.*

January 13, 1888.)

Statutes—Repeal—Effect to Take Away Remedy.

The right of a creditor to enforce by *mandamus*the levy and collection of a poll-tax, if necessary for the payment of his debt, is not abridged by the subsequent repeal of the act authorizing such tax.

Application for Writ of *Mandamus.*

This was an application by Charles Deere for a writ of *mandamus*to compel the hoard of county commissioners of Bio Grande county, Colorado, to levy a tax. The defendant answered, and plaintiff filed demurrer thereto.

*Wells, McNeal & Taylor,*for plaintiff.

*W. 31. Maguire*and *E. F. Richardson,*for defendant.

*824Brewer, J.

In *Deere*v. *Board of County Com'rs,*which is a petition in *mandamus*to compel the defendant to levy taxes to pay a judgment, the defendant has filed an answer to petition, which presents this state of facts: The judgment is based upon indebtedness created in 1874. At that time there ivas a law in force authorizing the county commissioners to levy a poll-tax, according to their discretion, both as to amount and the purposes for which the tax collected should be used. The law authorizing that was subsequently repealed; and there is to-day no law' in force authorizing the levy and collection of poll-tax. The answer sets up that the county commissioners each year are levying, and will continue to levy, a real-estate tax to the full extent allowed by law, and that they are ready to give the plaintiff a warrant on the county treasury payable to his order. That has been tried once, but the plaintiff received no money, and sued over, and got a second judgment on the warrant issued to him, which he is now seeking in this way to collect. It is sufficient to say that the collection of the real-estate tax apparently will work no payment to this plaintiff of the judgment; and it is well settled by repeated decisions of the supreme court that any authority which exists in the county commissioners to levy and collect taxes to satisfy a debt at the time it is created becomes a part and parcel of the contract; and if there is no other recourse,—no other remedy,—the judgment creditor may avail himself of that authority although it may since have been taken away by statute. In other words, if to-day the legislature gives to a county the power to levy two cents of taxation, and that county creates a debt, and the next year the legislature takes away the power, or reduces it to one cent, the creditor has a right to insist, if necessary for the payment of his debt, upon the levy of a two-cent tax. The legislature, by abridging the power, cannot thereby destroy the value of the claim against the county. The demurrer to the answer will therefore be sustained, and the plaintiff will be entitled to a *mandamus*directing the county commissioners to levy a poll-tax. It is stated, and I suppose there is no question about it, that while this is a small judgment, the population and W'ealth of the county are also quite small. In view of that, the order will not be to levy and collect in one year a poll-tax sufficient to pay this judgment, hut in two years. ,
Exhibit
      32


Section
      1350 Certifications




**STATEMENT
      FURNISHED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




The
      undersigned is the Financial Officer of Imperiali Inc. This Certification is
      made pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This
      Certification accompanies the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Imperiali
      Inc
      for the quarter ended February 29, 2008.




The
      undersigned certifies that such 10-QSB Report fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
      and that the information contained in such 10-QSB Report fairly presents, in
      all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      Imperiali Inc as of February 29, 2008.




This
      Certification is executed as of March 28, 2008.




/s/
                Eric SkysEric
                Skys-Chief Executive Officer(Principal
                Executive Officer)




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      us, Inc. and will be retained by Imperiali Inc and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
FLORIDA HOSPITAL 

ORLANDO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 

ADMINISTRATION,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-178

_____________________________/

Opinion filed November 6, 2014.

An appeal from an order of the Agency for Health Care Administration.

Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary.

John D. Buchanan, Jr. and Joseph V. Gardner of Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber, 

& Carter, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Tracy Lee George, Assistant General Counsel, and Cynthia L. Hain, Assistant 

General Counsel, Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises out of a Medicaid integrity audit of Florida Hospital 

Orlando’s (“Hospital”) inpatient services claims. As a result of the audit, the 

Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) determined it had reimbursed 
the Hospital for services submitted to Medicaid which were not “medically 

necessary.” See § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013). After a hearing, AHCA issued a 

Final Order adopting the administrative law judge’s findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and recommendation that the Hospital repay certain overpayments, as well as

a small fine and costs.

On appeal, the Hospital asserts that AHCA and its auditor unlawfully 

reviewed entire patient files to determine whether each patients’ inpatient 

admission was a “medical necessity,” without limiting the audit to just the 

information that was available to the Hospital at the time that the patient was 

admitted. The Hospital asserts that it is unlawful and unfair for AHCA’s auditors 

to deny reimbursements based on hindsight analyses of entire patient files, which 

give greater and better information than was available to the Hospital’s doctors 

when they made the real-time decisions to admit their patients to the hospital. 

The Hospital is correct about how “medical necessity” must be determined 

for purposes of section 409.913(1)(d). The statute is perfectly clear that 

“[d]eterminations of medical necessity . . . must be based upon information 

available at the time the goods or services are provided.” § 409.913(1)(d), Fla. 

Stat. (emphasis added). It gives no room for evaluating medical necessity 

determinations post hoc, using later-available information “from a post-discharge 

standpoint,” as the Hospital alleges here. 

2
Nevertheless, with respect to the fourteen subject patients at issue in this 

appeal, the Hospital has not shown that AHCA and its auditor relied on hindsight 

information in penalizing the Hospital’s admission decisions. Rather, the record 

supports the administrative law judge’s finding adopted by AHCA that the claims 

were “described and evaluated based upon the medical documentation available to 

the treating physician at the time the services were rendered.” And so we must 

affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, ROBERTS, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR. 

3
#### FOCH ESTATES, Inc., v. McDONALD, Federal Housing Adm’r.

Civ. No. 1154.

District Court, E. D. New York.

Nov. 19, 1940.

Robinson, Hennessy & Weitzer, of New York City (Joseph S. Robinson, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Harold M. Kennedy, U. S. Atty., of Brooklyn, N. Y. (Albert V. De Meo, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant.

MOSCOWITZ, District Judge.

This is a motion for an order directing the removal of this action from the jury calendar to the non-jury calendar.

This action was commenced in the State Court and removed to this Court. Thereafter an answer was interposed on June 3, 1940, and is the last pleading served in this action.

On October 3, 1940, plaintiff’s attorneys served upon defendant’s attorney a demand for a jury trial. Subdivision (b) of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provides that a demand for a trial by jury must be served not later than ten (10) days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Subdivision (d) of Rule 38 provides that the failure to serve such a demand constitutes a waiver of trial by jury.

Rule 39, subdivision (b), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by jury of any or all issues. No reason has been indicated why such discretion should be exercised.

Motion granted.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 

Room 352-G 

200 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20201 

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 14, 2017

Contact: CMS Media Relations

(202) 690-6145 | CMS Media Inquiries

En español

CMS Reveals New Medicare Card Design 

Removing Social Security numbers strengthens fraud protections for about 58 million Americans

Today, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) gave the public its first look at the 

newly designed Medicare card. The new Medicare card contains a unique, randomly-assigned 

number that replaces the current Social Security-based number. 

CMS will begin mailing the new cards to people with Medicare benefits in April 2018 to meet 

the statutory deadline for replacing all existing Medicare cards by April 2019. In addition to 

today’s announcement, people with Medicare will also be able to see the design of the new 

Medicare card in the 2018 Medicare & You Handbook. The handbooks are being mailed and will 

arrive throughout September. 

“The goal of the initiative to remove Social Security numbers from Medicare cards is to help 

prevent fraud, combat identify theft, and safeguard taxpayer dollars,” said CMS Administrator 

Seema Verma. “We’re very excited to share the new design.” 

CMS has assigned all people with Medicare benefits a new, unique Medicare number, which 

contains a combination of numbers and uppercase letters. People with Medicare will receive a 

new Medicare card in the mail, and will be instructed to safely and securely destroy their current 

Medicare card and keep their new Medicare number confidential. Issuance of the new number

will not change benefits that people with Medicare receive. 

Healthcare providers and people with Medicare will be able to use secure look-up tools that will 

allow quick access to the new Medicare numbers when needed. There will also be a 21-month 

transition period where doctors, healthcare providers, and suppliers will be able to use either 

their current SSN-based Medicare Number or their new, unique Medicare number, to ease the 

transition.
This initiative takes important steps towards protecting the identities of people with Medicare. 

CMS is also working with healthcare providers to answer their questions and ensure that they 

have the information they need to make a successful transition to the new Medicare number. For 

more information, please visit: www.cms.gov/newcard

###

Get CMS news at cms.gov/newsroom, sign up for CMS news via email and follow CMS on 

Twitter @CMSgovPress
Filed 7/21/15 P. v. Mena CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SALVADOR MENA,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B261292

(Super. Ct. No. F278034)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Salvador Mena appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for 

resentencing pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 ("the 

Act"). (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.126.) Appellant is serving a sentence of 25 years to life as a 

result of his 1999 conviction for possessing a controlled substance in a jail facility 

(§ 4573.6) and his admission of two prior strikes. The court found that appellant's prior 

convictions for committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 

(§ 288, subd. (a)) render him statutorily ineligible for resentencing under the Act. 

(§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv), 1170.126, subd. (e)(3).) 

We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After counsel's 

examination of the record, he filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

On April 14, 2015, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which 

to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has 

been received from appellant.

We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's 

attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. 

(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 

126.)

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
3

Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director, 

Richard B. Lennon, Staff Attorney, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Exhibit 13.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

CEO
Certification

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United
States Code) in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of BHP Billiton Plc and BHP Billiton Limited, (the Companies) for the annual period ended 30 June 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), the undersigned officer of the Companies, hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |                        
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                    
|/s/ Andrew Mackenzie
|Name:                |  | Andrew Mackenzie       
|Title:               |  | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:                |  | 25 September 2013      

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to
the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section.
# FEB 10  0919AM

CDR420

Line-In Record

Other

1008.2003
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 96-7083 ANDRE SYLVESTER WATTS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-87-13-A, CA-96-784-AM) Submitted: September 8, 1998 Decided: September 23, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________ Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Andre Sylvester Watts, Appellant Pro Se. Ellyn Marcus Lindsay,OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from a district court order that concluded his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) was barred by the one-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1998). Appellant's conviction b ecame final in 1988, and he filed his habeas motion on May 31, 1996. Appellant had until April 23, 1997 to file his § 2255 motion. See Brown v. Angelone , ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 389030 (4th Cir. July 14, 1998) (Nos. 96-7173, 96- 7208) (decided after the district court's order). Therefore, his motion was not time barred. For these reasons, we grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, vacate the district court's order, and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. VACATED AND REMANDED 2
#### Francesca Diliberti et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant.

[854 NYS2d 372]

Defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by producing the 911 recording and Sprint report, revealing a 30-second call that did not include any assurance by the operator that help was on its way, or any direction to the infant caller that she should not do anything, before the call was broken off *(see Doe v Town of Hempstead Bd. of Educ.,*18 AD3d 600 [2005]). This shifted the burden to plaintiffs who, even after granting them all favorable inferences, failed to establish an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the infant plaintiff *(see Laratro v City of New York,*8 NY3d 79 [2006]; *Cuffy v City of New York,*69 NY2d 255 [1987]). In this regard, we find the opinion of plaintiffs’ expert speculative and conclusory, and thus insufficient to withstand summary judgment *(see Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp.,*99 NY2d 542 [2002]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Gonzalez and Catterson, JJ.