alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

Certification ofPrincipal Executive Officer

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Owens-IllinoisGroup, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies that to such officer’sknowledge:

 

(i)                                     the Annual Report on Form 10-K of theCompany for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the “Report”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(ii)                                  the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated:  March 16,  2006 |   |                                                                                        | /s/ Steven R. McCracken |   |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
|                              |   | Steven R.  McCracken  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer  Owens-Illinois Group, Inc. |

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished tothe Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Jerry M. Kennelly, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
the Quarterly Report of Riverbed Technology, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in
such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Riverbed Technology, Inc.



|                    |  |                                                                    
|------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: July 27, 2007 |  | /s/ Jerry M. Kennelly                                              
|                    |  | Jerry M. Kennelly                                                  
|                    |  | President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal
Executive Officer)

I, Randy S. Gottfried, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Riverbed Technology, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Riverbed Technology, Inc.



|                    |  |                                                                     
|------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: July 27, 2007 |  | /s/ Randy S. Gottfried                                              
|                    |  | Randy S. Gottfried                                                  
|                    |  | Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and
Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 has been provided to Riverbed Technology, Inc. and will be retained by Riverbed Technology, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to
which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
Exhibit 23.1 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accountant


To the Board of Directors


Northeast Bancorp


Lewiston, Maine





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-85206), (No. 33-32095), (No. 33-58538), (No. 33-32096), (No. 33-87976) and (No. 333-135452) of Northeast Bancorp of our report dated September 17, 2010, related to our audit of the consolidated financial statements of Northeast Bancorp and Subsidiary included in the Annual Report Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2010.





/s/SHATSWELL, MacLEOD & Company, P.C.SHATSWELL, MacLEOD & Company, P.C.West Peabody, MassachusettsSeptember 23, 2010
Prepared by MERRILL CORPORATION









Exhibit

10.35




 




 




AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY NOTE




 




This AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY NOTE (the

“Amendment”) is made this 31st day of August 2001, between EpicEdge, Inc., a

Texas corporation (“Maker”), and Carl R. Rose 

(“Payee”).




 




PREAMBLE




 




WHEREAS, Maker executed a Convertible Promissory

Note on the 11th day of November, 2000 whereby it promised to pay to

the order of Payee the sum of $500,000, (the “Original Note”), and




 




WHEREAS, in order to maximize the purposes for which

the Original Note was procured, Maker and Payee have agreed to amend the

payment terms.




 




NOW, THEREFORE, in exchange for ten and

no/100 dollars ($10), the mutual promises contained herein, and other good and

valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby

acknowledged, the parties hereto agree to amend the Original Note as follows:




 




1.     Section (a) of the

introductory paragraph of the Original Note shall be amended to reflect that

interest shall be paid based on the principal amount plus accrued interest

commencing September 1, 2001;




 




2.     Section 1(b) of the

Original Note shall be deleted;




 




3.     Section 3(a) of the

Original Note shall be amended to increase the conversion rate from fifty cents

($.50) to one dollar ($1.00);




 




4.     Section 2 of the Original

Note shall be amended to increase the cure period upon written notice of an

event of default from ten (10) days to thirty (20) days;




 




5.     Section (b) of introductory

paragraph of the Original Note shall be amended to reflect that the principal

shall mature on December 1, 2002. If the company defaults, the Payee has at its

sole discretion the right to either convert the note at $.50 per share, demand

payment or to extend the maturity date until December 1, 2003. If the company

again defaults, the Payee has at its sole discretion the right to either

convert the note at $.25 per share, demand payment or extend the maturity date

until December 1, 2004.




 




6.     All other terms of the

Original Note shall remain unmodified.













 




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto

has executed this Amendment or has caused this Amendment to be executed on its

behalf by a representative duly authorized, all as of the date first above set

forth.




 




	

  MAKER:


  	

   


  
	

   


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

  EPICEDGE,

  INC.


  	

   


  
	

   


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

  By:


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

  Name:


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

  Title:


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

   


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

  PAYEE:


  	

   


  
	

   


  	

   


  	

   


  
	

   


  	

   


  
	

  CARL R.

  ROSE
II 

Calendar No. 559 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3609 

[Report No. 111–288] 

To extend the temporary authority for the performance of medical disability 

examinations by contract physicians for the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 19, 2010 

Mr. AKAKA introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

SEPTEMBER 2, 2010 

Reported under authority of the order of the Senate of August 5, 2010, by 

Mr. AKAKA, without amendment 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary authority for the performance of 

medical disability examinations by contract physicians 

for the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

S 3609 RS 

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR PERFORM2 ANCE OF MEDICAL DISABILITY EXAMINA3 TIONS BY CONTRACT PHYSICIANS. 

4 Section 704(c) of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 

5 (Public Law 108–183; 38 U.S.C. 5101 note) is amended 

6 by striking ‘‘December 31, 2010’’ and inserting ‘‘Decem7 ber 31, 2012’’. 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS

srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 559 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3609 

[Report No. 111–288] 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary authority for the performAffairs. tract physicians for the Department of Veterans ance of medical disability examinations by conSEPTEMBER 2, 2010 

Reported without amendment 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Atwood Oceanics, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John R. Irwin,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
the best of my knowledge:

    (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

    (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of
         operations of the Company as of, and for the periods presented.



Date:    December 13, 2006              /S/ JOHN R. IRWIN
                                        John R. Irwin
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
@article{1206286,
  author = {Maxime Malnou and Joe Aumentado and Michael Vissers and Jordan Wheeler and Johannes Hubmayr and Joel Ullom and Jiansong Gao},
  title = {Performance of a Kinetic-Inductance Traveling-Wave Parametric Amplifier at 4 Kelvin: Toward an Alternative to Semiconductor Amplifiers},
  year = {2022},
  month = {2022-04-05 04:04:00},
  publisher = {Physical Review Applied},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=933487},
  language = {en},
}
#### TERRELL v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY.

Civil Action No. 4117.

District Court, E. D.' Pennsylvania.

Dec. 17, 1945.

Freedman, Landy & Lorry, by Charles Lakatos, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

'Rawle & Henderson, by Joseph W. Henderson, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

KALODNER, District Judge.

This is a seaman’s action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, to recover for damages, wages, maintenance and cure, arising out of injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a .result of the alleged negligence of the defendant, owner and operator of a vessel on which the plaintiff was a member of the crew.

The plaintiff has propounded a series of forty interrogatories to be answered by the defendant, pursuant to Rule 33, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. The defendant has objected, in general, on the ground that the interrogatories are burdensome and vexatious. It has also made several specific objections: To interrogatory number '23, as being irrelevant and beyond the scope of proper interrogatories, to number 37, also on the latter ground, and to numbers 38, 39 and 40 as requiring privileged information and' hence outside Rule 33.

It is my opinion that the interrogatories should be allowed with the exception 'of numbers 23, 39 and 40. Insofar as interrogatory number 23 is concerned, the defendant appears to be willing to supply the information that it would otherwise find necessary to use in answering the question, which, in effect, calls for a collation of that information.

I do not regard interrogatory number 37 as being irrelevant, nor do I think it beyond the scope of Rule 33 since it calls merely for a copy and not for the original document. See Hickman v. Taylor and Anderson et al., 3 Cir., 153 F.2d 212.

Interrogatory number 38 is not improper since it does not require a statement of privileged matters. It requires only a .yes or no answer.

In view of the very recent decision in the Hickman case, supra, I will not require the defendant to answer interrogatories 39 and 40, since as put they refer to privileged matters. The Court should not be burdened with restating, for the propounder, interrogatories which in part require privileged and in part unprivileged information.

*147To avoid further controversy with respect to interrogatory 39, it should be pointed out, as-1 held in Eiseman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 F.R.D. 338, at page 339, that “the statements of the defendant’s employees making reports as to' the accident and submitted in the usual course of business following the accident are subject to the inspection of the plaintiff.”

Accordingly, an order may be entered, and the defendant will answer the interrogatories except as relieved therefrom in the above opinion.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 798 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 798

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                      January 15, 2020.
Appointing and authorizing managers for the impeachment trial of Donald John 
        Trump, President of the United States.
    Resolved, That Mr. Schiff, Mr. Nadler, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Jeffries, Mrs. 
Demings, Mr. Crow, and Ms. Garcia of Texas are appointed managers to conduct the 
impeachment trial against Donald John Trump, President of the United States, 
that a message be sent to the Senate to inform the Senate of these appointments, 
and that the managers so appointed may, in connection with the preparation and 
the conduct of the trial, exhibit the articles of impeachment to the Senate and 
take all other actions necessary, which may include the following:
            (1) Employing legal, clerical, and other necessary assistants and 
        incurring such other expenses as may be necessary, to be paid from 
        amounts available to the Committee on the Judiciary under applicable 
        expense resolutions or from the applicable accounts of the House of 
        Representatives.
            (2) Sending for persons and papers, and filing with the Secretary of 
        the Senate, on the part of the House of Representatives, any pleadings, 
        in conjunction with or subsequent to, the exhibition of the articles of 
        impeachment that the managers consider necessary.

                                        Speaker of the House of Representatives.

            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Quinones, Appellant.

[854 NYS2d 5]

A defendant seeking resentencing on a class A-II felony conviction under the 2005 DLRA (L 2005, ch 643, § 1) must be eligible for merit time under Correction Law § 803 (1) (d). Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) provides that merit time is not available to any person serving an indeterminate sentence for, among other things, a violent felony. On January 6, 1999, defendant received a group of sentences for both drug and nondrug convictions. These sentences included a term of *21h*to 7 years for a violent felony offense, to be served concurrently with life sentences on his class A-II felony drug convictions. Defendant did not preserve his present argument that the maximum term of the violent felony sentence had allegedly expired before he made his application, rendering him eligible for resentencing, *324and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject it on the merits *(see People v Merejildo,*45 AD3d 429 [2007]). Defendant is in the same situation as the defendant in *Merejildo,*except that this case involves concurrent rather than consecutive sentences. Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.30 (1) (a), “concurrent sentences represent a single punishment measured by the sentence for the highest grade offense into which all concurrent sentences merge.” *(People v Ramirez,*89 NY2d 444, 450 [1996]; *see also Matter of Deary v Goord,*32 AD3d 1074 [2006].) Accordingly, the motion court correctly concluded that because defendant is incarcerated pursuant to a judgment that includes a sentence for a violent felony, he is ineligible for merit time under Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) and thus is ineligible for resentencing. Concur— Tom, J.P., Buckley, Sweeny and Moskowitz, JJ.
Order entered July 21, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00557-CV

CHARLES ANTHONY ALLEN SR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV99-01573-V

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s request to take judicial notice of facts to the extent we TAKE 

JUDICIAL NOTICE of his prior appeal, appellate cause number 05-14-00389-CV, styled “In 

re Charles Anthony Allen.” See Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2004, pet. denied).

/s/ CRAIG STODDART 

JUSTICE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIRATH SINGH,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-71387

Agency No. A075-544-796

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 8, 2015** 

San Francisco, California

Before: GRABER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and FRIEDMAN,*** District

Judge. 

FILED

JUL 17 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 *** The Honorable Paul L. Friedman, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
Page 2 of 3

1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied Tirath Singh’s

claims for asylum and withholding of removal because it concluded that Singh’s

mistreatment by the police was not motivated by imputed political opinion but was

instead part of a legitimate investigation. See Dinu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 1041,

1044 (9th Cir. 2004). The BIA relied on Singh’s testimony that his cousin and

friends were involved in Babbar Khalsa, an underground militant organization, and

that the police questioned, detained, harassed, and beat Singh because they

believed he had information on the militants’ activities. Even assuming that the

BIA’s determination of no past persecution is contrary to the record, substantial

evidence supports its alternative basis for denying asylum and withholding. The

government submitted sufficient documentary evidence to rebut the presumption

that Singh has an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. That evidence

supports the BIA’s finding that the treatment of Sikhs in Punjab has improved over

the last two decades. The BIA specifically noted that former militants have

returned to the region and been able to remain there peacefully. See Singh v.

Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2014). Singh’s testimony that the police

continue to ask his sisters about his whereabouts does not compel the conclusion

that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Page 3 of 3

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Singh’s claim for

relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The evidence does not

compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Singh will be tortured if

he returns to India. The BIA was entitled to give little weight to the hearsay

declarations bolstering Singh’s testimony that the police still inquire about him. 

See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2006). The BIA emphasized

that Sikhs now hold political office and are well-represented across various

professions. See Singh, 753 F.3d at 830–31. Substantial evidence supports the

BIA’s determination that the change in Sikhs’ status outweighs Singh’s testimony

as to his past mistreatment and the declarations he submitted on the likelihood of

future torture.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### John R. Denza et al., Appellants, v Independence Plaza Associates, LLC, et al., Respondents.

Submitted August 20, 2012;

decided October 30, 2012

Motion by Fifth Avenue Committee et al., insofar as it seeks leave to appear amici curiae on the motion for leave to appeal herein, granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appear amici curiae on the appeal herein, dismissed as academic.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7108

BRETT C. KIMBERLIN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION,

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 97-7452

BRETT C. KIMBERLIN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-97-1687-AW)

Submitted: June 10, 1998 Decided: July 31, 1998
2

Before ERVIN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brett C. Kimberlin, Appellant Pro Se. Tamera Lynn Fine, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s orders denying relief

on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. Kimberlin v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. CA-97-1687-AW

(D. Md. June 6, 20, and 27, 1997, and Aug. 29, 1997). Additionally,

we grant Appellant’s motion to suplement the record. However, we

deny Appellant’s motions for sanctions and Appellee’s motion to

file a surreply. Further, we deny as moot Appellant’s motion for

expedited disposition of his appeal. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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