J-S02044-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CYNTHIA SHANER, 

Appellant

v.

UPMC SUSQUEHANNA AND GERILYN 

KOONTZ

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 922 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Civil Division at No(s): 18-1363

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2020

Cynthia Shaner (“Shaner”) appeals from the Order sustaining the 

Preliminary Objections of UPMC Susquehanna (“UPMC”) and Gerilyn Koontz 

(“Koontz”) (collectively, “the Defendants”) and dismissing Shaner’s 

Complaint. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant history underlying the instant 

appeal as follows:

Plaintiff [Shaner] contends that Defendant [Koontz], 

employed as a registered nurse at [UPMC], had accessed 

[Shaner’s] medical records when [Shaner] was admitted 

overnight with complaints of chest pain. [Shaner] alleged that 

[Koontz] had invaded [Shaner’s] privacy, and that a Facebook 

post by [Koontz,] which read[,] “Getting older is such an 

adventure. Like is this chest pain indigestion or a heart attack? 

Can’t wait to see if I’m alive tomorrow,” amounted to unlawful 

publication of [Shaner’s] personal and private health information.
J-S02044-20

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[] Shaner filed her [C]omplaint[1] on or about September 18, 

2018, to which [Koontz] filed Preliminary Objections on October 

9, 2018. [The trial court] issued an Opinion and Order sustaining 

[Koontz’s] Preliminary Objections and dismissing all counts of 

[Shaner’s] Complaint on December 12, 2018. A Motion to 

Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint [were] filed on 

December 24, 2018; said [M]otions were denied on February 4, 

2019, with leave to file an Amended Complaint. An Amended 

Complaint was filed on February 5, 2019. [] Koontz filed 

Preliminary Objections to [Shaner’s] Amended Complaint on 

February 15, 2019. [The trial court] then sustained [] Koontz’s 

Preliminary Objections and dismissed [] Shaner’s Amended 

Complaint in its entirety on May 14, 2019.[2] [Shaner] filed her 

Notice of Appeal on June 3, 2019, and filed her [C]oncise 

[S]tatement of matters complaint of on appeal on July 9, 2019 ....

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/19, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (footnotes added). 

Shaner presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that [Shaner] did not 

allege any disclosure by her physician, or particularly cite 42 

Pa.C.S.[A. §] 5929[?]

2. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that the disclosure of 

[Shaner’s] medical condition is limited to sexually transmitted 

diseases[?]

3. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that a nurse who was 

not involved in [Shaner’s] care, who looked at [Shaner’s] medical 

records and posted about her hospital stay on Facebook, which 

was seen and forwarded to [Shaner] by friends, did not satisfy the 

publicity standard for invasion of privacy[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that a Facebook post 

by [] Koontz about [Shaner’s] medical stay did not satisfy the 

element of publication of private facts[?]

____________________________________________

1 Shaner’s Complaint averred causes of action for invasion of privacy against 

UPMC and Koontz.

2 The trial court’s Order, although dated May 14, 2019, was not filed until May 

22, 2019.
J-S02044-20

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Brief for Appellant at 5-6. In the Argument section of her appellate brief, 

however, Shaner presents the following two claims: “Invasion of Privacy” and 

“Breach of Physician-Patient Confidentiality”. See id. at 14, 19. We will 

accordingly limit our discussion to those issues addressed in Shaner’s brief. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (mandating that an appellant must develop an 

argument with citation to and analysis of relevant legal authority), 2116 

(setting forth the requirements for the statement of questions involved); see 

also Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(stating that an appellate court is required to deem abandoned those issues 

which have been identified on appeal but are unsupported by argument in the 

brief). 

Our Supreme Court has set forth the applicable standard of review as 

follows:

On appeal, we “exercise de novo review of a lower tribunal’s

order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a

demurrer.” William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., ...

170 A.3d 414, 434 (Pa. 2017). A demurrer “tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint.” Ins. Adjustment Bureau[, Inc.

v. Allstate Ins. Co.], 905 A.2d [462,] 468 [(Pa. 2006)]. “For the

purpose of evaluating the legal sufficiency of the challenged

pleading, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded, material,

and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference

that is fairly deducible from those facts.” Mazur v. Trinity Area

Sch. Dist., ... 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008).

The “question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the

facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is

possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should

be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling

it.” Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio,
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... 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005) (quoting MacElree v. Phila.

Newspapers, Inc., ... 674 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Pa. 1996)).

Commonwealth v. UPMC, 208 A.3d 898, 908-09 (Pa. 2019). 

Shaner first claims that the trial court improperly sustained the 

Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and dismissed Shaner’s cause of action 

against the Defendants for invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion. Brief 

for Appellant at 15. According to Shaner, Koontz was working in the 

Emergency Room at UPMC, but had no contact with Shaner, “except what 

[Koontz] could presumably discern from medical information on her

computer.” Id. at 16. Shaner contends that Koontz improperly accessed 

Shaner’s private medical information from her computer, and then posted 

about it on Facebook. Id. Shaner acknowledges that Koontz did not disclose 

Shaner’s name in the post, but “used the exact symptoms reported by 

[Shaner’s] medical records that day.” Id. at 17. Thus, Shaner asserts, Koontz 

“intruded into the private affairs of [Shaner] by accessing her private medical 

records.” Id. Further, Shaner asserts that Koontz’s Facebook post was “liked”

by 39 people; Shaner’s personal medical issues were made public; a 

reasonable person would be highly offended by the disclosure; and the act 

caused Shaner humiliation in the community, “as others came up to talk to 

[Shaner] about the Facebook post and her medical issues.” Id. at 19. In 

support, Shaner relies upon this Court’s decisions in Haddad v. Gopal, 787 

A.2d 975 (Pa. Super. 2001), and Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 

Super. 1985).
J-S02044-20

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To assert a claim for invasion of privacy—intrusion upon seclusion in 

Pennsylvania,

a plaintiff must aver that there was an intentional intrusion on the 

seclusion of their private concerns[,] which was substantial and 

highly offensive to a reasonable person, and aver sufficient facts 

to establish that the information disclosed would have caused 

mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary 

sensibilities.

Pro Golf Mfg. v. Tribune Review Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 247 (Pa.

Super. 2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, Comment C 

(providing that “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, 

upon the solitude or seclusion of another in his private affairs or concerns, is 

subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would 

be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”). 

As explained in the Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instructions, “[c]onduct 

that is highly offensive to a reasonable person is conduct that a reasonable 

person, in similar circumstances, would find very objectionable or that a 

reasonable person in similar circumstances could be expected to take with 

serious offense.” Pa. SSJI (Civ. 13.12). 

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Shaner’s claim and concluded 

that it lacks merit, reasoning as follows:

In order for [] Shaner’s claims of intrusion to be sufficient[,] there 

must be specific averments that [] Koontz[’s] alleged intrusion 

was so egregious that it caused “mental suffering, shame or 

humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities,” as held by the 

Court in Chicarella[, 494 A.2d at 1114.] In Chicarella, the 

[Superior] Court asserted that the disclosure of a specific medical 

diagnosis was insufficient to allege a substantial and highly 
J-S02044-20

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offensive intrusion upon seclusion. In addressing allegations 

sounding in intrusion upon seclusion, the Chicarella Court stated 

that “the brief description of [the] appellant’s medical treatment 

cannot be deemed a substantial intrusion.” Id. at [1114]. In the 

matter at bar, [the trial court] does not believe that [] Shaner has 

alleged that the intrusion would have been highly offensive to a 

reasonable person, nor that it was substantial enough for a 

reasonable person to strongly object. DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 

A.2d 594, 595 (Pa. Super. 1986).

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/19, at 2 (unnumbered). We agree with the sound 

reasoning of the trial court, as set forth above, and affirm on this basis as to 

Shaner’s first claim.3 See id.

In her next claim, Shaner asserts that the trial court improperly

dismissed her cause of action for breach of physician-patient confidentiality. 

See Brief for Appellant at 19. Shaner contends that her “medical information

was posted on Facebook for all to see.” Id. at 21. According to Shaner,

“Koontz accessed [Shaner’s] medical treatment for that day and tried to

humiliate [Shaner] by making fun of her conditions.” Id. Shaner asserts that

anyone at UPMC could access her medical information; she did not consent to

the release of her information; Koontz intentionally looked up Shaner’s

medical records; and Koontz “talked about what she saw on Facebook.” Id.

____________________________________________

3

In affirming, we particularly note that Koontz’s Facebook post did not identify 

Shaner by name, or indicate that it pertained to any UPMC patient. Further, 

the Facebook post did not disclose that Shaner, or any patient, had contracted 

an illness or suffered from a condition such that the post would be highly 

offensive to a reasonable person. 
J-S02044-20

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In Haddad, supra, this Court held that a cognizable action sounding in 

breach of physician-patient confidentiality exists in this Commonwealth. 

Haddad, 787 A.2d at 978. In Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276 (Pa.

Super. 2005), this Court relied on Haddad and the evidentiary privilege set 

forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929, physicians not to disclose information, for a 

rough formulation of what a breach of the confidential duty between physician 

and patient entails:

[In Haddad,] [t]his Court found an actionable breach of

physician-patient confidentiality and stated[,] “[d]octors have an

obligation to their patients to keep communications, diagnosis,

and treatment completely confidential.” [Haddad, 787 A.2d] at

981. However, in stating this standard, the [Haddad] Court

emphasized the fact that a sexually transmitted disease was at

issue. See id. Our courts have recognized sexually transmitted

diseases to be loathsome diseases which blacken one’s character.

See Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., ... 483 A.2d 456, 470 (Pa.

Super. 1984); see also Evans v. Workmen’s Compensation

Appeal Board (Julia Ribaudo Home), ... 617 A.2d 826, 828 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1992) ([stating that the] “[b]lackening of the character

results from testimony concerning a loathsome disease.”).

Therefore, the Haddad standard ... must be limited to the context

of the privilege statute[4] which protects against the disclosure of

information directly related to a patient’s confidential information

that blackens their reputation.

Grimminger, 887 A.2d at 280 (footnote added). 

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4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929 (providing that “[n]o physician shall be allowed, in 

any civil matter, to disclose any information which he acquired in attending 

the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him 

to act in that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, 

without consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by such 

patient, for damages on account of personal injuries.”).
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In her Complaint, Shaner avers that Koontz posted the following

statement on Facebook: “Getting older is such an adventure. Like is this 

chest pain indigestion or a heart attack? Can’t wait to see if I’m alive 

tomorrow.” Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 6. As set forth above, the Facebook post 

did not identify Shaner, or state that the post pertained to any patient at 

UPMC. Further, the post did not disclose a medical condition or diagnosis, or 

that Shaner, or any patient, had contracted an illness or suffered from a 

condition that would blacken their character. See Grimminger, supra. 

Consequently, we discern no error by the trial court in sustaining the 

Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, and dismissing Shaner’s Complaint.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/24/2020