Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A05-1412-CR-589 | July 20, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jared Michel Thomas

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Eric P. Babbs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William Eugene Slaton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff,

July 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

82A05-1412-CR-589

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, 

Judge

Case No. 82D02-1307-FB-879

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, William Slaton was convicted of attempted dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and possession of methamphetamine, a 
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Class D felony, and he was found to be an habitual substance offender. He 

received an aggregate sentence of eighteen years imprisonment. Slaton appeals 

his convictions and sentence, raising two issues for our review: (1) whether 

evidence admitted at trial was obtained as a result of an illegal search of 

Slaton’s curtilage and residence, and (2) whether his sentence is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Concluding Slaton’s 

Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and that his sentence is not 

inappropriate, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 27, 2013, the Evansville Police Department received a report of 

suspected methamphetamine manufacturing at Slaton’s address. Four officers 

arrived at the address and smelled a chemical odor, which they associated with 

the manufacture of methamphetamine, coming from the house. Officers Robert 

Hahn and Nick Henderson approached the house, which was divided into two 

apartments. The officers walked up onto the porch, which allowed access to 

doors belonging to each apartment. 

[3] The officers first knocked on the door to the rear apartment, and a woman 

answered. The officers explained why they were at the house. The woman

informed them that the odor was coming from next door and pointed them to 

the other apartment. The officers walked across the porch to the front 

apartment. The door to that apartment was boarded up, but next to the door 

was an open window. Officer Hahn looked through the window and into the 
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apartment that belonged to Slaton. He saw Slaton inside, carrying a glass jar 

toward the kitchen sink. Officer Hahn asked Slaton to stop. Slaton made eye 

contact with Officer Hahn, but Slaton, still holding the jar, continued more 

quickly toward the sink despite the officer’s repeated requests to stop. At that 

point, Officer Henderson dove through the open window and grabbed Slaton. 

[4] The police detained Slaton and two other individuals located in the house. 

Once outside, Slaton consented to a search of the apartment. The search 

produced a number of items associated with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine, including: pseudoephedrine blister packs; lithium batteries; 

ammonium nitrate cold packs; aluminum foil; lye; acid-based drain cleaner; a 

glass jar with tubing attached to it; and several empty two-liter bottles. 

Additionally, 0.69 grams of methamphetamine was found in Slaton’s bedroom. 

[5] The State charged Slaton as follows: Count 1, dealing in methamphetamine, a 

Class B felony; Count 2, maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony; 

and Count 3, dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The State also 

alleged that Slaton was an habitual substance offender. Slaton filed a pre-trial 

motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. A jury trial was held in 

September 2014, and the jury found Slaton guilty of attempted dealing in 

methamphetamine, a lesser included offense of Count 1, and guilty of 

possession of methamphetamine, a lesser included offense of Count 3.1 Slaton 

 

1

 Count 2 was dismissed pursuant to the State’s motion. 
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admitted to being an habitual substance offender. The trial court sentenced 

Slaton to fifteen years on Count 1, enhanced by three years due to his habitual 

substance offender status, and one and one-half years on Count 3, to be served 

concurrently with Count 1. This appeal followed. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Fourth Amendment

[6] Slaton argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence at trial that was 

obtained by an illegal search of his curtilage and residence in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The trial court’s 

decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Young v. State, 980 N.E.2d 412, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. The 

constitutionality of a search is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Kelly 

v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ind. 2013). 

[7] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures

. . . .” A warrantless search of a person’s home or curtilage is presumptively 

unreasonable. See J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). But 

 

2

 Slaton does not raise a separate claim under the Indiana Constitution. 
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because the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” 

the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Kentucky v. King, 131 

S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). 

[8] Slaton first argues that the officers’ presence on his porch and act of looking 

through his window was an impermissible search of his curtilage. There is no 

question that Slaton’s porch is curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment. 

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (“The front porch is the 

classic exemplar of an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of 

home life extends.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, “law 

enforcement officers are not strictly prohibited from entering a person’s 

curtilage” without a warrant. J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229. “[L]aw enforcement 

officers enjoy a limited invitation to approach a home through ordinary routes 

of ingress and egress open to visitors.” Id. An officer is permitted to “approach 

the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and 

then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Id. at 232 (quoting Jardines, 133 

S.Ct. at 1415). A traditional “knock and talk” conducted within the parameters 

described above does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 229. 

[9] The officers’ actions in this case were within the limitations of a permissible 

knock and talk. The officers approached the house using a walkway connected 

to the street, and the porch provided access to a door belonging to each of the 

two apartments located inside the house. It seems that the officers’ path was 

through ordinary routes of ingress and egress, and that the porch is a place 

where a visitor of Slaton’s apartment could be expected to go. The officers’ 
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entry onto Slaton’s porch and approach of his door and window did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment.

[10] Slaton also claims that Officer Hahn’s act of looking through his open window 

and into the apartment was an unconstitutional search. Slaton is mistaken. 

Officer Hahn was conducting a valid knock and talk and was able to see 

through the open window while standing on Slaton’s porch. Officer Hahn 

made his observations from a place where he was lawfully entitled to be, and 

what he observed was in “open view” from his vantage point. See Justice v. 

State, 765 N.E.2d 161, 164-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the open view 

doctrine). Therefore, an illegal search did not occur when Officer Hahn looked 

through Slaton’s window. Id. 

[11] Finally, Slaton contests the officers’ warrantless entry into his residence. The 

State asserts that the entry was justified by Officer Henderson’s belief that 

immediate entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Indeed, 

warrantless entry into a residence is permissible when it is necessary to “prevent 

the imminent destruction of evidence.” King, 131 S.Ct. at 1856 (citation 

omitted). In this case, the officers visited Slaton’s residence due to a report of 

possible methamphetamine manufacturing. Their suspicion was corroborated 

by a chemical odor emanating from Slaton’s apartment. Officer Hahn and 

Officer Henderson looked inside and saw Slaton carrying a glass jar. When 

asked to stop, Slaton made eye contact with the officer, then moved more 

quickly toward the kitchen sink. At that point, the officers had probable cause 

to believe that Slaton was manufacturing methamphetamine and that 
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destruction of evidence was imminent.3 Therefore, under the circumstances, 

the officers’ warrantless entry was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

II. Slaton’s Sentence

[12] Slaton requests that we reduce his eighteen year sentence. Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B) provides appellate courts with the authority to revise a defendant’s 

sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.” Generally, we defer to the trial court’s sentencing 

discretion “unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive 

light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and 

lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous 

traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111, 122 (Ind. 2015). It is the defendant’s burden to persuade the reviewing 

court that the sentence is inappropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 

(Ind. 2012).

[13] “When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the 

starting point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence.” Holloway v. State, 

950 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). At the time of Slaton’s offenses, a 

 

3

 Officer Hahn testified that liquid precursors used in the manufacture of methamphetamine could be easily 

disposed of by dumping them down the drain of a kitchen sink. 
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Class B felony carried an advisory sentence of ten years, with a range of six to 

twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(a). In addition, the habitual substance 

offender statute provided that “[t]he court shall sentence a person found to be a 

habitual substance offender to an additional fixed term of at least three (3) years 

but not more than eight (8) years imprisonment.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-10(f) 

(2013). Thus, Slaton’s habitual substance offender enhancement required him 

to receive an additional term of at least three and as many as eight years. He

received fifteen years for his Class B felony and an additional three years for his 

habitual offender enhancement.

[14] Admittedly, the nature of Slaton’s offenses seem, if anything, less egregious 

than the typical case involving manufacturing or dealing in methamphetamine. 

Slaton did not have an active methamphetamine lab, and less than one gram of 

methamphetamine was found inside his apartment. That said, Slaton’s 

criminal history belies any claim that he is deserving of a reduced sentence. At 

forty-six years of age, Slaton has amassed ten prior felony convictions and 

seventeen prior misdemeanor convictions. Moreover, lesser punishments doled 

out in the past have apparently failed to deter Slaton from further criminal

behavior, as he admitted to manufacturing methamphetamine on other 

occasions and to abusing methamphetamine on a daily basis. 

[15] Slaton asks us to consider an alleged hardship that would befall his father if he 

goes to prison, and that his crimes did not result in damage to another person or 

property. However, we are not persuaded that either circumstance, even if true, 

outweighs Slaton’s criminal history and renders his sentence inappropriate. 
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Conclusion

[16] We conclude that the officers’ warrantless entry of Slaton’s curtilage and 

residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We further conclude that 

Slaton’s eighteen year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm.

[17] Affirmed. 

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.