J-S27028-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PEDRO SANTANA

Appellant No. 1835 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered March 25, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0002788-2012

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and FITZGERALD,*JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2015

Pedro Santana appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court), after he pled guilty to 

robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.1 On appeal, Appellant 

challenges only the trial court’s denial of his motion to transfer his case to 

juvenile court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

On May 29, 2012, Detective Michael Williams, Allentown Police 

Department, charged Appellant with, inter alia, robbery, conspiracy to 

commit robbery, burglary, and theft by unlawful taking. In his affidavit 

accompanying the complaint, Detective Williams stated in part:

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), and 903(a), respectively. 
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2) [I] was asked to assist with a home invasion robbery being 

[investigated] by Detective Michael Popovich that occurred on 

May 26, 2012 at approximately 1245 hrs[.]

3) The victim reported a home invasion robbery, stating 3 males 

entered her home without permission and 2 of the 3 males were 

armed with handguns. Victim reported that the males 

demanded money and place[d] a handgun to her head and her 9 

year old daughter[’]s head.

4) Victim reported the males took computers, jewelry, cash and 

a cell phone. Value of all items estimated at $3000.00.

5) Detective Popovich responded to 973 Cedar St where one of 

the Defendants-Marco Tavarez[-] had been stopped and was 

found in possession of some of the stolen items and a mask.

6) Detective Popovich and Detective Almonte conducted 

interviews with two of the actors and it was determined that 

Juvenile-[Appellant-] (6/18/94) was the third actor in the home 

invasion robbery.

7) Detective Popovich was able to confirm this during a 

mirandized interview with [] Juan Cruceta. Cruceta identifie[d] 

the father and older brother of [Appellant] from photos provided 

by Detective Popovich.

8) Detective Popovich obtain[ed] a photo of [Appellant] from 

Facebook and actor Juan Cruceta positively identifie[d] him from 

the photo as being part of the home invasion robbery.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/29/12. 

On October 29, 2012, Appellant filed a motion for decertification titled 

“Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Court,” alleging that he was 17 years old at 

the time of the home invasion robbery.2 Motion for Decertification, 

10/29/12, at ¶ 2. Based on his age, Appellant argued he was “in need of a 

program of supervision, care and rehabilitation.” Id. at ¶ 3. He argued his 

____________________________________________

2 To put his age in proper perspective, he was 17 years old at the time of the 

May 26, 2012 home invasion robbery. It is undisputed that, less than one 

month after the robbery, Appellant turned 18 on June 24, 2012, based on 

his date of birth of June 24, 1994.
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criminal prosecution would not serve the public interest. See id. at ¶ 4. 

Appellant also argued that, although he was involved in the home invasion 

robbery, his involvement was limited to staying outside of the victim’s 

house. See id. at ¶ 5. 

On July 2, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s 

decertification motion. In support of his motion, Appellant presented the 

testimony of Dr. Frank Dattilio. Dr. Dattilio testified he obtained his Ph.D. in 

clinical psychology from Temple University and practiced as a clinical and 

forensic psychologist in Allentown. N.T. Decertification Hearing, 7/2/13, at 

6-8. Dr. Dattilio testified he evaluated Appellant in connection with 

Appellant’s motion for decertification. Id. at 12. Dr. Dattilio testified he met 

Appellant on two occasions at the Lehigh County Prison, researched and 

reviewed the complete history of Appellant’s life, and examined, among 

other documents, the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause, 

Lehigh County Prison records, and Appellant’s ninth-grade high school 

progress reports. Id. at 12-13. Dr. Dattilio also testified that he 

administered a mental status examination and “a battery of psychological 

tests and appraisals” that included an IQ test. Id. at 13. 

In discussing the results of the tests, Dr. Dattilio testified:

I found that [Appellant] was oriented in time, place and person 

when I assessed his mental status. I also found that he was 

devoid of any psychotic ideation interfering with his primary and 

secondary thought processes. [Appellant] also denied any 

serious anxiety and depression, but did admit that he could be 

impulsive at times and has difficulty thinking through his actions. 

Otherwise, he certainly was oriented in time, place – oriented in 

time, place and person and knew what he was doing. I also 
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found on an IQ test that he complete[d] full scale IQ score of 56, 

which placed [Appellant] in the mild mentally retarded range. 

He did seem to have the highest scores in his abilities to learn 

from past experiences which fell in the low, average rage, but 

otherwise he is clearly in the mild mentally retarded range at 56.

In addition I found that [Appellant] had some problems 

with hostility as well as depression. There’s some difficulty with 

impulse control. He does not have any other serious 

psychopathology nor was there any indication of serious 

substance abuse or dependence with him.

[Appellant] also – he had some difficulties with family 

problems, particularly, his stepmother. And he also has difficulty 

at times expressing himself. He’s also very prone towards being 

influenced by others and he is a little bit vulnerable to peer 

pressure.

I did not find that he had any serious psychopathology that 

would warrant the diagnosis of anti-social personality or 

anything more serious than that. And I found that he also was 

able to take responsibility and experience remorse.

Id. at 24-25. With respect to Appellant’s level of maturity, Dr. Dattilio 

opined:

Well, he’s a little bit on the immature side despite the fact that 

he’s eighteen. He’s really more on the level of a fifteen or 

sixteen-year-old. [Appellant] was a little bit sheltered during 

[his] life, and I think that part of what happened with him is that 

he became involved with some Dominican youths who he – he 

kind of followed the fleet. You know. He is mentally retarded. 

His ability to develop insight is not as good as what we would 

find with most individuals who are average IQ. I think 

[Appellant] was very vulnerable. And so, that immaturity played 

against him. So, we’re not talking about somebody who is very 

sophisticated or, you know, eighteen going on thirty, this is 

really somebody that’s very immature for his age.

Id. at 27. Dr. Dattilio noted the absence of a criminal record on Appellant’s 

part. Specifically, Dr. Dattilio testified “this is the first incident and that 

counts for a lot. It certainly says that [Appellant is] amenable to treatment 

because he does not have this hardened history of becoming involved in 

anti-social acts.” Id. at 34. In recommending Appellant would benefit from
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the juvenile system, Dr. Dattilio opined with a reasonable degree of 

psychological certainty:

[Appellant] is amenable to treatment and decertification in the 

juvenile system prior to the age of twenty-one, and that it would 

be in the best interest of the public for him to do so. I’m 

recommending that [Appellant] be considered for a juvenile 

placement such as ARC or Loysville . . . because they have a 

Spanish component to the program that also involves English 

emergence so that he will learn English through that program. 

. . . I also believe that at this program, [Appellant] will be 

afforded the type of individual and group psychotherapy that will 

help him work on his issues of anxiety and depression as well as 

his poor impulse control. I also see that there are some anger 

issues with him that he needs how to learn to facilitate and 

redirect and these programs are excellent for acquiring 

management skills, as well as emotional regulation.

 . . . .

In addition, I think that, you know, consultation with a 

psychiatrist in this program may be helpful too if his depression 

or anxiety doesn’t abate.

He also needs some direction with regard to goals and 

objectives for him in his life to complete the GED. I think he 

would be a prime candidate once he acquires more fluency in 

English to become involved in Job Corp[s] Program or something 

that would provide him with skills, training.

Id. at 37-38.

On cross-examination, Dr. Dattilio acknowledged Appellant was aware 

that his cohorts were going to commit an armed home invasion robbery prior 

to its occurrence. Id. at 44-45. Dr. Dattilio also acknowledged Appellant 

was aware prior to the armed home invasion robbery that people would be 

inside the house. Id. at 45. Dr. Dattilio, however, clarified that Appellant 

was not aware that there was going to be a child inside the house and that 

Appellant “was a little upset when he found out there was a child involved.” 

Id. 
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Dr. Dattilio admitted Appellant did not “actually accept full 

responsibility” for his participation in the home invasion robbery and did not 

tell Dr. Dattilio exactly what Appellant had done. Id. at 47. Moreover, 

Dr. Dattilio admitted Appellant minimized his role in the home invasion 

robbery, as “most juveniles do that.” Id. Dr. Dattilio recognized Appellant 

was eighteen at the time he examined Appellant. Id. Dr. Dattilio 

acknowledged Appellant was living with his twenty-one-year-old girlfriend at 

the time of the crime, and attending school sporadically. Id. at 49.

Finally, Dr. Dattilio agreed Appellant would receive “all of the things 

that are recommended” by him if the court were to send Appellant to SCI 

Pinegrove instead of a juvenile facility. Id. at 56. By subjecting Appellant 

to the adult system, Dr. Dattilio also agreed Appellant would have “the 

added benefit of extended supervision.” Id. at 58. 

In response, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective 

Kevin Mriss, a sixteen-year veteran of the Allentown Police Department. Id.

at 66. Detective Mriss testified, as part of his job duties, he was familiar 

with the treatment options available to juvenile and adult offenders. Id. at 

67. Describing the nature of home invasion robberies, Detective Mriss 

testified they “are very serious due to very violent takeovers of homes. The 

violence that is employed by the actors. The threat of violence that could 

erupt once the act[or] is inside the home[.]” Id. at 68. He explained that 

home invasion robberies are sophisticated in nature because of “[t]he use of 

weapons, the use of gloves and masks,” as well as the need for surveillance 
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and a getaway driver. Id. at 69. Ultimately, Detective Mriss opined 

Appellant should remain in the adult system, given the nature of the crime, 

specially the use of handguns in the violent takeover of the victim’s house 

on a Saturday afternoon. Id. at 71. 

Following the hearing, on September 16, 2013, the trial court issued 

an opinion and order, denying Appellant’s motion for decertification. On 

January 27, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to robbery and conspiracy to commit 

robbery and on March 25, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 54 to 

120 months’ imprisonment. On March 31, 2014, Appellant filed a postsentence motion, which the trial court denied on June 16, 2014. Thereafter, 

Appellant timely appealed to this Court.3 

On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

[1.] Whether the trial court erred when it failed to thoroughly 

analyze the relative statutory factors and concluded that a 

transfer to juvenile court would not serve the public interest?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for decertification for abuse 

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 950 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[D]ecisions of whether to grant 

____________________________________________

3

Following Appellant’s filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, 

wherein the court incorporated its September 16, 2013 opinion addressing 

the denial of Appellant’s motion for decertification. 
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decertification will not be overturned absent [] abuse of discretion.”). “An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the 

misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly 

unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will.” Id. 

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a) [of the Juvenile Act (Act)], 

when a juvenile has committed a crime, which includes murder, 

or any of the other offenses listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) 

of the definition of “delinquent act” in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, the 

criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas is vested with 

jurisdiction. Likewise, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(e) explains that 

charges of murder, or any of the other offenses listed under 

paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of “delinquent act” in 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, requires that the offense be prosecuted in the 

criminal division. “Robbery,” when committed with a deadly 

weapon, is one of the offenses listed which requires jurisdiction 

to vest in the criminal division. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

When a case goes directly to criminal division, the juvenile has 

the option of requesting treatment within the juvenile system 

through a transfer process of “decertification.” 

[Commonwealth v.] Aziz, 724 A.2d [371,] 373 [(Pa. Super. 

1999)]. In determining whether to transfer such a case from 

criminal division to juvenile division, “the child shall be required 

to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer 

will serve the public interest.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). See 

also, Aziz, 724 A.2d at 373.

Commonwealth. v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 827 A.2d 430 (Pa. 2003).

In determining whether the child has established that the transfer will 

serve the public interest, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in 

Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) of the Act. These factors are as follows: 

(4) The court finds:

. . . .

(iii) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public 

interest is served by the transfer of the case for criminal 

prosecution. In determining whether the public interest can be 

served, the court shall consider the following factors:
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(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

(B) the impact of the offense on the community;

(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual 

posed by the child;

(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly 

committed by the child;

(E) the degree of the child’s culpability;

(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives 

available under this chapter and in the adult criminal 

justice system; and

(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, 

supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering 

the following factors:

(I) age;

(II) mental capacity;

(III) maturity;

(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited 

by the child;

(V) previous records, if any;

(VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent 

history, including the success or failure of any 

previous attempts by the juvenile court to 

rehabilitate the child;

(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to 

the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;

(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;

(IX) any other relevant factors[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). Although it requires a trial court to consider 

all of these factors, the Juvenile Act is silent on the weight assessed to each 

by the court, as “[t]he ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to 

stand trial as an adult is within the sole discretion of the [trial] court.” 
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 492-93 (Pa. Super. 2011); see 

also Sanders, 814 A.2d at 1251 (“A decertification court must consider all 

of the factors set forth in Section 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not 

address, seriatim, the applicability and importance of each factor and fact in 

reaching its final determination.”).

Instantly, Appellant challenges only the weight the trial court 

attributed to each Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) factor.4 Specifically, Appellant 

argues “the trial court gave significantly more weight to factors A, B and D 

. . . than the remaining factors.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. We construe 

Appellant’s argument as inviting this Court to reweigh the Section 

6355(a)(4)(iii) factors. As a reviewing court, however, we may not reweigh 

statutory factors set forth in Section 6355(a)(4). See Commonwealth v. 

In re E.F., 995 A.2d at 326, 333 (Pa. 2010) (“It is further not the role of an 

appellate court to reweigh statutory factors to conclude that the seriousness 

of the offense and the deleterious effects suffered by the victim warrant 

certification.”). Moreover, as noted earlier, the Juvenile Act is silent as to 

the weight to be afforded to each factor, as that is left to the sole discretion 

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4 Here, it is undisputed that Appellant was charged with an offense that 

properly vested jurisdiction in the criminal court. Specifically, Appellant was 

charged in connection with an armed home invasion robbery, and under 

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act, robbery with a deadly weapon is excluded 

from the definition of “delinquent act.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. 
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of the trial court.5 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 722 A.2d 1030, 1033-34 

(Pa. 1999). Accordingly, we reject as meritless Appellant’s challenge to the 

weight ascribed by the trial court to the Section 6355(a) factors. 

Nonetheless, based upon our review of the record, as set forth above, 

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

decertification motion. As the trial court reasoned:

[Appellant] has failed to meet his burden. [Appellant] 

participated in a home invasion robbery, wherein two of his codefendants threatened a mother and her 9 year old daughter by 

holding guns to their heads. The crime occurred on a Saturday 

afternoon. The impact of this on the victims and the community 

can only be described as severe. [Appellant] was aware of what 

was going to happen prior to any of the actors entering the 

home. He had the opportunity to reflect on what he was going 

to do, but still chose to participate. There was evidence that the 

actors planned this home invasion, including targeting that 

specific home, arriving with gloves, masks, and handguns, and 

having a getaway driver. [Appellant] participated in a violent, 

adult crime, and was himself just shy of being legally an adult at 

the time. While [Appellant] suffers from mild mental 

retardation, his needs in this area can be addressed in the adult 

system. [The trial court does] not find [Appellant] has met his 

burden of establishing that a transfer to the juvenile system will 

serve the public interest. As such, the motion must be denied.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/13, at 4.

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5 Even if the trial court did not explicitly address certain factors enumerated 

in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) of the Juvenile Act, such a scenario does not 

automatically render the juvenile court’s decision an abuse of discretion, 

particularly when the record contains adequate facts supporting the juvenile 

court’s ruling. Commonwealth v. Spotti, 94 A.3d 367, 373 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citing Jackson, 722 A.2d at 1034 (“The presumption in this 

Commonwealth remains that if a court has facts in its possession, it will 

apply them[,]” and “[w]hen evaluating the propriety of a certification 

decision, absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must presume 

that the juvenile court carefully considered the entire record.”)), appeal 

granted on other grounds, 107 A.3d 748 (Pa. 2015).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2015