1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-20-00096-CR

NO. 09-20-00097-CR

NO. 09-20-00098-CR

__________________

ANTHONY HARBOUR, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. CR33946, CR33947, CR33948

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant Anthony Harbour of three charges of aggravated 

robbery and assessed punishment at thirty-six years of confinement in each case, 

with the sentences to run concurrently. In two issues, Harbour challenges the legal 

sufficiency of the evidence and asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

allowing the State to present evidence of extraneous offenses during the punishment 

phase. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
2

THE EVIDENCE

Emma Broussard testified that she resides on a county road in Dayton, Texas, 

and she was in a travel trailer on the property because her home was being built by 

Joe.

1 Broussard explained that on the date in question, her dogs began to bark and 

growl, and she saw “the suspect running, getting out of the car and running around 

to the millworker.” According to Broussard, the suspect was pointing a gun at one 

of the millworkers, David, and yelling at David to give him an envelope. Broussard 

testified that Joe was also present, and she saw the suspect point a gun at Joe. 

Broussard explained that she called 911 and tried to describe what was happening. 

Broussard testified that she saw David give the envelope to the suspect. According 

to Broussard, the man with the gun was wearing dark denim pants, a plaid shirt, a 

handkerchief on his face, sunglasses, and a cap, and she estimated that he was 

approximately five feet seven inches tall and appeared to be stocky. 

David testified that he was doing some carpentry work for Joe at a residence 

in the Kenefick area on April 23, 2018. David explained that he had gone to the bank 

to cash a check before going to the job site. David testified that the check was for 

$7000, and he deposited $5000 and asked for $2000 in cash. According to David, 

1

To protect the privacy of the victims, we refer to them using the fictitious 

names Joe, John, and David. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the 

right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy 

throughout the criminal justice process”). 
3

the bank gave him $2000 in $100 bills in a white envelope. David explained that one 

of his workers, John, was with him when he went to the bank. According to David, 

when he got out of his van at the job site, he felt something hit his head, and when 

he turned around, he realized that someone was holding a gun on his forehead and 

yelling at David to give him the white envelope. 

When asked what he recalled about the gunman, David testified that the 

gunman’s “mouth was covered from the nose down, and he was a colored person.” 

David explained that he felt threatened, and his coworkers told him his face and lips 

turned white. David testified that he gave the envelope, which contained $2000 in 

cash, and his cellphone to the gunman. According to David, the gunman also pointed 

the weapon at John and Joe, and John gave the gunman his wallet. David explained 

that after the robbery, he and the other victims found his cellphone and John’s wallet

between the house and where the police stopped the suspects’ vehicle approximately 

four blocks away. David testified that Joe called 911. 

John testified that he accompanied David to the bank to deposit a check and 

get cash, and he saw that David had the money in an envelope. According to John, 

when he and David reached the job site, a car entered with them, and someone got

out of the car and “went straight to [David].” John testified that the person had a 

black and purple gun in his hand and was pointing the gun at David, and the gunman 

forced David to get the envelope from the van. John explained that he gave the 
4

gunman his wallet, which contained over $400, because he saw the gunman pointing 

a gun at both David and John. According to John, the gunman was wearing gloves 

and had a handkerchief on his face. John explained that the gunman got into the 

passenger side of the car after the robbery, and the driver did not get out of the 

vehicle. John testified that he saw the numbers “4623” on the car’s license plate. 

Joe testified that on April 23, 2018, he was working as the contractor building 

a home for Broussard and her husband. According to Joe, he saw David’s van enter 

the jobsite, and someone jumped next to the door with a gun. Joe explained that the 

gunman was African-American, and he knew that no African-American

subcontractors were working at the site. Joe testified that he heard the gunman saying 

“Give me the money. Give me the money.” According to Joe, the robber was 

pointing a gun at David, and David gave the robber his wallet. Joe then offered the 

robber money from his own wallet. Joe testified that the robber instructed him to put 

his hands up and continued to ask for money. According to Joe, the robber asked 

David for the white envelope. 

Joe explained that the robber had both David and John kneeling on the ground, 

and the robber was pointing a gun at David’s forehead. According to Joe, the robber 

began counting down, and Joe told David to give the robber the envelope because 

they might get shot. Joe testified that he was “frightened to death.” Joe explained

that when the robber got the envelope, the robber jumped into the passenger side of 
5

the car, and the car “immediately took off.” Joe then called 911, and when he went 

to the scene of the traffic stop, he identified the car as the one that had been on the 

Broussards’ property. 

Mayela Pruneda testified that on April 23, 2018, she reported to the Houston 

Police Department that a black and purple firearm had been stolen from the trunk of 

her car. Pruneda testified that she knows Harbour, but she did not give the firearm 

to Harbour. 

Deputy John Tucker of the Liberty County Sheriff’s Office testified that on 

April 23, 2018, he responded to a call about an aggravated robbery. Based upon the 

information in the 911 call, Tucker located a blue Kia, which he believed to be the 

suspect’s vehicle. As Tucker approached the vehicle, it came to an abrupt stop, and 

Tucker explained that he almost struck the vehicle. Tucker testified that he initiated 

a felony takedown, and the driver got out of the vehicle as soon as the driver saw 

Tucker getting out. A second suspect remained in the vehicle, and Tucker informed 

dispatch of his location and waited for backup. The driver remained on the ground, 

and Tucker instructed the passenger to keep his hands on the dashboard. Tucker 

explained that he was the first law enforcement officer to encounter the occupants 

of the vehicle. Tucker identified Harbour in court as the passenger. According to 

Tucker, the license plate of the vehicle was HDV4623. 
6

Tucker instructed Harbour to get out of the vehicle, and he arrested Harbour 

and the driver. Tucker and other officers searched the vehicle and took photographs, 

and the photographs of the vehicle and its contents were admitted into evidence. 

Investigating officers found gloves, beanies, and cell phones inside the vehicle. 

Tucker explained that his vehicle is equipped with a video system that recorded the 

traffic stop, and a copy of the recording was admitted into evidence. Tucker testified 

that all the evidence from the scene was brought to him for processing. According 

to Tucker, officers knew a weapon was involved in the offense, so their “first priority 

was to try to locate that weapon[.]” Tucker testified that he was unable to locate the 

firearm. The victims came to the scene of the traffic stop, but Tucker explained that 

he could not communicate with them due to a language barrier. 

Sergeant Paul Young testified that he responded to an aggravated robbery call 

on the date in question, and his car was equipped with a video camera that recorded 

his response to the call. A copy of the video was admitted into evidence. Young 

explained that he eventually left the scene to check the immediate area for weapons, 

and he testified that constables in the area found a weapon approximately fifty feet 

from where the stop was made. Photographs of the firearm and its approximate 

location when it was found were admitted into evidence. The photographs show that 

the firearm the constables recovered was black and purple. According to Young, the 
7

weapon was loaded and ready to fire, and there were skid marks on the weapon “as 

if [it had] been thrown.” 

Patrol deputy George Daniels of the Liberty County Sheriff’s Office testified 

that he was dispatched to the Kenefick area on April 23, 2018, and he went to the 

scene of the traffic stop by Tucker. After ensuring that Tucker had the scene under 

control and discussing the case with Tucker, Daniels “went to the county road where 

the alleged crime started[]” and photographed the scene. Daniels explained that the 

scene was quite muddy, and he photographed footprints and tire tracks. Daniels then 

returned to the scene of the traffic stop and examined Harbour’s shoes, and he 

explained that Harbour’s shoes were muddy and looked “[v]ery similar to the 

photographs[.]” Daniels testified that he also examined the driver’s shoes, and the 

driver’s shoes were not muddy and did not match the footprint photographs from the 

scene. Daniels explained that he had examined the bottom of the shoes of everyone 

else who was at the crime scene, and he determined that none of those shoes could 

have made the footprints. 

ISSUE TWO

In issue two, Harbour challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his convictions. If sustained, issue two would result in rendition of a judgment of 

acquittal; therefore, we address it first. See Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. In 
8

evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could 

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks 

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). The jury is the ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given to their testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). A reviewing court must give full deference to the 

jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. 

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record contains conflicting inferences, we must 

presume that the jury resolved such facts in favor of the verdict and defer to that 

resolution. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 n.13; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition, we determine whether the necessary inferences 

are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. 

Section 29.03 of the Texas Penal Code provides, in pertinent part, that a 

person commits the first-degree felony offense of aggravated robbery if he commits 

robbery as defined in section 29.02 and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2), (b). Section 29.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides that 
9

a person commits the offense of robbery if, while committing theft, and with intent 

to obtain control of the property, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places 

another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Id. § 29.02(a)(2). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring 

to the jury’s authority regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give 

their testimony, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have found, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that Harbour was guilty of the aggravated robberies of John, 

David, and Joe. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19; 

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Penagraph, 623 S.W.2d at 

343. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient, and we overrule issue two.

ISSUE ONE

In issue one, Harbour asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

allowing the State to present evidence of extraneous offenses during the punishment 

phase. Harbour contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he committed the alleged extraneous offenses, and he argues that the harmful 

consequences of admitting the extraneous offense evidence outweighed its probative 

value under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Harbour also asserts that the 

trial court’s admission of the extraneous offense evidence was not harmless. 

The record shows that at the beginning of the punishment phase, the State 

offered into evidence exhibits 102 through 111, all of which constituted 
10

documentary evidence of Harbour’s previous felony offenses, including

unauthorized use of a vehicle, felon in possession of a weapon, and aggravated 

robbery with a deadly weapon. The proffered exhibits also pertained to Harbour’s 

juvenile offenses. When the State offered the exhibits into evidence, the trial judge 

told defense counsel that he was not required to stipulate as to authenticity, 

authentication, or identity. Defense counsel stated, “I have no objection, Judge.” The

trial judge then asked defense counsel, “[D]oes your client stipulate that he is in fact 

one and the same person as identified in each of those judgments?” Defense counsel 

responded, “Yes, sir[,]” and the trial judge admitted the exhibits into evidence.

Tim2 testified that on July 8, 2006, he was robbed by a juvenile at gunpoint. 

According to Tim, the juvenile demanded that Tim give him his wallet, and Tim

complied. Tim explained that he was unable to identify the robber, but the robber 

was caught and prosecuted. The prosecutor stated, “You seem almost emotional. Am 

I misreading that?” Tim responded, “No, you’re not.” Tim testified, “I don’t want 

him to hurt anybody, especially if he’s pointing guns at people[,] . . . [b]ut I’m also 

not excited about the prospect of helping put somebody in jail for a long time.” The 

prosecutor stated, “You’re just here to talk about what happened to you. Do you 

understand that?” In addition, the prosecutor told Tim that he did not intend to ask 

2

We identify the victim of Harbour’s juvenile offense by using a fictitious 

name. 
11

Tim for a recommendation about Harbour, and he instructed Tim that the decision 

“is up to the jury about what to do with Mr. Harbour.” Tim also testified that he was 

notified after the robbery that the weapon Harbour displayed was a BB gun. Defense 

counsel did not object to any of Tim’s testimony. The trial court’s punishment charge 

to the jury included the following instruction: 

You are further instructed that if there is any evidence before you in 

this case regarding the Defendant’s committing an alleged offense or 

bad acts other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in 

this case, you cannot consider such evidence for any purpose unless you 

find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 

committed such other offense or bad acts and even then you may only 

consider the same in determining the proper punishment for the 

Defendant in this case. 

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must demonstrate 

that the appellant made his particular complaint known to the trial court by a timely 

request, objection, or motion, and that the trial court ruled on the request, objection, 

or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Ross v. State, 678 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1984). The record reflects that Harbour did not file any motions, and defense 

counsel did not object to the admission of the documentary evidence regarding 

Harbour’s prior offenses or to any of Tim’s testimony. We conclude that Harbour 

failed to preserve issue one for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Ross, 

678 S.W.2d at 493. Accordingly, we overrule issue one. Having overruled both of 

Harbour’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction in each case.
12

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 W. SCOTT GOLEMON

 Chief Justice

Submitted on April 12, 2021

Opinion Delivered May 26, 2021

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.