FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL HUFTILE,  No. 03-16734

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  CV-03-01522-FCD/

DAD L C MICCIO-FONSECA,

Defendant-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Frank C. Damrell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 10, 2004—San Francisco, California

Filed June 10, 2005

Before: Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher

6789
COUNSEL

Michael Huftile, Pro Se, San Luis Obispo, California, Melissa

A. Jones, J. Michael Stusiak, Morrison & Foerster, Sacramento, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6791
Margarita Altamirano, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the defendant-appellee and

for amicus California Department of Mental Health. 

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

In this case, we must decide a question of first impression:

Does the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994), apply to civil commitments under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act? We conclude that the

Heck rule applies. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Huftile’s § 1983 action for damages and declaratory

relief. However, we reverse the dismissal of his claim for prospective injunctive relief under Heck, and remand for further

proceedings concerning this form of relief.

I. Background

Michael Huftile filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint seeking

damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief against Dr.

L.C. Miccio-Fonseca in federal district court on July 17,

2003. When he filed the complaint, Huftile was being

detained under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act

(“SVPA”). The SVPA provides for a two-year term of civil

commitment if a court or jury determines beyond a reasonable

doubt that an individual is a “sexually violent predator.” Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604. Huftile contends that Dr. MiccioFonseca’s “policies, practices, and customs” in performing an

SVPA evaluation of him violated his constitutional rights to

due process, privacy, and equal protection. 

The events underlying Huftile’s complaint occurred when

Huftile was incarcerated at California Men’s Colony in San

Luis Obispo. According to Huftile’s complaint, Dr. Miccio6792 HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA
Fonseca met with him on February 2, 2001, to initiate an

SVPA evaluation. Dr. Miccio-Fonseca presented Huftile with

a “Notice of Evaluation as a Sexually Violent Predator.” Huftile signed the form to indicate that he refused to be interviewed by Dr. Miccio-Fonseca. Huftile alleges that he

understood that this refusal would bar Dr. Miccio-Fonseca

from reviewing his confidential records. According to the

complaint, Dr. Miccio-Fonseca again attempted to interview

Huftile on July 3, 2002. Huftile alleges that Dr. MiccioFonseca informed him that he was under a court order requiring him to speak with her. He further alleges that Dr. MiccioFonseca could not produce a copy of the court order and did

not tape the interview as required in the order. 

According to Huftile’s complaint, Dr. Miccio-Fonseca prepared a report and later testified against Huftile at the SVPA

civil commitment trial. Huftile alleges that because he did not

consent to be interviewed, Dr. Miccio-Fonseca’s evaluation

was based solely on Huftile’s record, including Huftile’s California Department of Corrections Central File. Huftile further

alleges that Dr. Miccio-Fonseca accessed his confidential

records without his consent, failed to follow proper procedures in conducting interviews, fabricated portions of her

report, and relied on stale data in preparing the report. 

Huftile requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the

district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The magistrate

judge granted in forma pauperis status and recommended that

Huftile’s action be dismissed for failure to state a claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The magistrate judge concluded that Heck v. Humphrey barred Huftile’s suit because

he challenged the validity of a mental health assessment

underlying his civil commitment, and because that commitment had not been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” (quoting

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487) (internal quotation marks omitted).

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6793
The district court adopted the findings and recommendations

of the magistrate judge. Huftile timely appealed. We review

de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) in the

same manner as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

II. Analysis

[1] In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,

the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has

already been invalidated. 

512 U.S. at 487. Huftile contends that Heck’s favorable termination rule does not bar his action because either (1) Heck

does not apply to suits brought by civil detainees or (2) his

suit does not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his continuing confinement. Huftile also argues that even if Heck would

otherwise apply, his subsequent release from Department of

Mental Health custody and his concomitant inability to petition for habeas corpus relief allow him to maintain a § 1983

action. We consider these arguments in turn. 

A. Applicability of Heck v. Humphrey to SVPA Detainees

Huftile argues that Heck’s references to “a state prisoner”

indicate that the favorable termination rule applies only to

“prisoners” convicted of criminal offenses. There is some

support for this argument. In creating the favorable termination rule in Heck, the Court relied on “the hoary principle that

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 486

6794 HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA
(emphasis added). SVPA commitment, by contrast, is a civil

proceeding. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 1138,

1166 (1999) (stating that the SVPA is a “nonpunitive, civil

commitment scheme”). Huftile also relies on our decision in

Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), in which we

held that an SVPA detainee was not a “prisoner” for the purposes of the exhaustion and financial reporting requirements

of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), id. at 1140.

The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation,

pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(h). In Page, we held that the “natural reading” of

“prisoner” required that “the individual in question must be

currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction, or

sentence for a criminal offense.” 201 F.3d at 1139. 

However, the PLRA definition of “prisoner” does not mark

the outer boundary of Heck’s favorable termination rule. Heck

dealt with the “intersection of the two most fertile sources of

federal-court prisoner litigation” — the basic federal civil

rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal habeas corpus

statute for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. at 480.

In Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), the Supreme

Court explained that Heck’s favorable termination rule

“served the practical objective of preserving limitations on the

availability of habeas remedies. Federal petitions for habeas

corpus may be granted only after other avenues of relief have

been exhausted. Prisoners suing under § 1983, in contrast,

generally face a substantially lower gate . . . .” Id. at 751 (citations omitted). In Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.

2003), we noted that the differing exhaustion requirements of

§ 1983 and § 2254 “left the two statutes on a ‘collision

course.’ ” Id. at 855 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 492 (Souter,

J., concurring in the judgment)). 

[2] Heck’s favorable termination rule was intended to prevent a person in custody from using § 1983 to circumvent the

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6795
more stringent requirements for habeas corpus. Unlike the

PLRA, the habeas statute is not textually limited to “prisoners.” Rather, § 2254 directs that a federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). It is well established

that detainees under an involuntary civil commitment scheme

such as SVPA may use a § 2254 habeas petition to challenge

a term of confinement. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,

176 (2001) (stating that a state court order of civil commitment satisfies § 2254’s “in custody” requirement). We therefore conclude that Heck applies to SVPA detainees with

access to habeas relief. 

B. Applicability of Heck to Huftile’s Suit

Huftile asserts that even if Heck’s favorable termination

rule applies to SVPA detainees in general, it does not apply

to his suit. He contends that his § 1983 suit is cognizable

because he is challenging the procedures used to evaluate him

under the SVPA, not the substantive merits of his underlying

civil commitment. Therefore, he argues, a judgment in his

favor would not “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his commitment or confinement. 

The Supreme Court has instructed, however, that Heck

envisioned “the possibility . . . that the nature of the challenge

to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the

invalidity of the judgment.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 645 (1997). In Balisok, the alleged procedural violations

involved a hearing officer’s decision, motivated by “deceit

and bias,” to exclude exculpatory evidence in a disciplinary

proceeding. Id. at 646-47. The Balisok Court reasoned that a

“criminal defendant tried by a partial judge is entitled to have

his conviction set aside, no matter how strong the evidence

against him.” Id. at 647. It therefore concluded that Balisok’s

§ 1983 claim for declaratory relief and money damages neces6796 HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA
sarily implied the invalidity of the disciplinary action and rendered his claim not cognizable under Heck. Id. at 648. 

[3] Huftile’s § 1983 claim is factually similar to that in Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). In Butterfield,

the prisoner-plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit on the ground that

the parole board allegedly relied on false information in his

prison file to deny him parole. Id. at 1024. We held that Heck

applied:

Butterfield alleges that defendants violated his due

process rights by considering false information in his

prison file to find him ineligible for parole. We have

no difficulty in concluding that a challenge to the

procedures used in the denial of parole necessarily

implicates the validity of the denial of parole and,

therefore, the prisoner’s continuing confinement. 

Id. 

[4] In determining whether a judgment in favor of a § 1983

plaintiff necessarily implies the invalidity of his underlying

conviction, we take into account the particular facts of the

criminal trial or other proceeding leading to the allegedly

improper detention. In Heck, for example, the Supreme Court

stated in a footnote that a challenge to an allegedly unreasonable search “would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s

conviction was unlawful” because of doctrines such as independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless error. 512

U.S. at 487 n.7. In this circuit, we have held that an unreasonable search necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction

where the evidence seized was “an essential element” in “the

present case.” Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015-16

(9th Cir. 2000). 

[5] The district court record does not include a transcript of

Huftile’s civil commitment proceeding. However, the structure of the SVPA statutory scheme indicates that the success

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6797
of Huftile’s § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil commitment. Before the California Director of

Mental Health can forward a request for an SVPA commitment petition to the appropriate county, two evaluators must

agree that “the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that

he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without

appropriate treatment and custody.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 6601(d). An attorney for that county may then file a petition

for commitment. Id. § 6601(i). A judge must then review this

petition to determine whether there is probable cause to

believe that the person “is likely to engage in sexually violent

predatory criminal behavior” upon release. Id. § 6602(a).

Because Dr. Miccio-Fonseca was one of Huftile’s evaluators,

a judgment in favor of Huftile in his § 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil commitment. That is,

if only one evaluator, rather than two, had concluded that

Huftile had a “mental disorder” within the meaning of

§ 6601(d), there would have been no basis for the state Director of Mental Health to send the request to the county, no

basis for the county attorney to file a petition for commitment,

and no basis for the judge to go forward with a probable cause

determination. 

[6] In addition to seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief, Huftile seeks injunctive relief that would “prevent[ ] Defendant from inflicting further injury” upon him.

The Supreme Court stated in Balisok that “[o]rdinarily, a

prayer for . . . prospective relief will not ‘necessarily imply’

the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so

may properly be brought under § 1983.” 520 U.S. at 648.

While Huftile’s claims for damages and declaratory relief are

barred by Heck, Huftile’s claim for injunctive relief is not

barred. We therefore reverse the portion of the district court’s

order finding a Heck bar to injunctive relief. We do not decide

whether Huftile is, in fact, entitled to injunctive relief. On

remand, the district court will be free, through appropriate

procedures, to decide on the propriety of such relief. 

6798 HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA
C. Availability of Habeas Corpus Review

[7] In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), five Justices

endorsed the idea that the unavailability of habeas relief permits a § 1983 action, regardless of whether the success of the

action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.1

See also Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 752 n.2

(“Members of the Court have expressed the view that

unavailability of habeas for other reasons may also dispense

with the Heck requirement.”). Based on the separate opinions

in Spencer, we have held that in certain limited cases, Heck

does not bar a § 1983 claim if habeas relief is unavailable. See

Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875-77 (9th Cir. 2002). Huftile contended in his opening brief that even if his damages

suit would otherwise be barred by Heck, his § 1983 action

was cognizable because he was no longer civilly committed

and hence was unable to file a habeas corpus petition. Huftile

is now in recommitment proceedings. We must therefore

determine whether habeas relief is available to Huftile under

Heck, given his current custody status. 

Huftile’s initial term of civil commitment began on

November 19, 2002. After he filed his complaint in this case,

Huftile was transferred to the custody of the California

Department of Corrections to serve time for a parole violation. We have been informed in a post-argument submission

that probable cause for a recommitment trial was found on

March 14, 2005, and that a trial has been set for August 23,

1

Justice Souter, writing for four members of the Court in Spencer, stated

in a concurrence that “a former prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring

a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.” 523

U.S. at 21 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that

“[g]iven the Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under

the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that he

may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting). 

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6799
2005. Huftile is being detained at Atascadero State Hospital

pending the civil recommitment trial. Dr. Miccio-Fonseca did

not conduct any of the evaluations underlying the state’s

recommitment petition. 

[8] Huftile still has standing to bring a federal habeas petition challenging his initial SVPA commitment even if the

term of that commitment has expired. In Jackson v. California

Department of Mental Health, 399 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005),

we considered the case of an SVPA detainee whose initial

term expired before he filed a federal habeas petition. Jackson’s standing was in doubt because his continuing confinement was due to his voluntary recommitment after his initial

term had expired. We noted, however, that the standing analysis would be different if Jackson had not voluntarily recommitted himself. Had Jackson instead been involuntarily

committed under successive SVPA petitions, “any future petition to recommit him could be traced back, through preceding

petitions, to his initial confinement” because “his initial

SVPA confinement would have served as a prerequisite for a

second petition, the second petition as a prerequisite for a

third, and so forth.” Id. This is Huftile’s case. Under California’s SVPA scheme, the current petition to recommit Huftile

is directly traceable to his initial term of confinement and is

thereby sufficient to confer standing for federal habeas purposes. 

Conclusion

[9] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal of Huftile’s claim for

damages and declaratory relief, but we reverse the dismissal

of his claim for injunctive relief, and we remand to allow the

district court to address this claim. Because Huftile’s § 1983

claim for damages and declaratory relief will not accrue

unless and until his civil commitment is invalidated, we also

remand to allow the district court to dismiss this claim without prejudice to Huftile’s later filing a § 1983 action if his

6800 HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA
civil commitment is invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-

90; Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam). 

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.

HUFTILE v. MICCIO-FONSECA 6801