Filed 7/20/15 Stone v. O’Mara CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHRISTOPHER M. STONE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SHAE O’MARA,

Defendant and Respondent.

F068653

(Super. Ct. No. 402688)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Jack M. 

Jacobson, Judge.

Christopher M. Stone, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Stockton Law Center and Peter Koulouris for Defendant and Respondent.

-ooOoo-
2.

In child custody proceedings between Christopher M. Stone (the father) and Shae 

O’Mara (the mother) regarding their minor child, the father appeals from the trial court’s 

order determining among other things that (1) the mother shall have sole physical custody, 

(2) the father’s visitation of the child shall be supervised, and (3) the father must submit to 

a psychological evaluation by a clinical psychologist at a cost of $1,500 as a precondition

to seeking any future modification of the custody or visitation arrangement. The father 

contends the trial court failed to consider his inability to afford the expense of the 

psychological evaluation and, therefore, the requirement that he obtain and pay for the 

evaluation as a condition on his right to request any modification of the parenting plan 

constituted an abuse of discretion. We agree and reverse that portion of the trial court’s 

order. The father also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

custody and visitation arrangement. We disagree and hereby affirm the custody and 

visitation determination as within the trial court’s broad discretion. In summary, we 

reverse the discrete portion of the trial court’s order that required the father to pay the 

expense of the psychological evaluation and made said requirement a condition on seeking 

any modification of visitation or custody, but in all other respects we affirm the judgment 

and order of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties’ minor child, a daughter, was born in 2007. In 2009, after family law 

proceedings were initiated and following mediation, an initial custody order was entered 

that the parties were to have joint legal and shared physical custody. The father’s 

custodial time included alternate weekends as well as alternate midweek visitation. In 

July 2012, the mother requested a modification to accommodate the child’s upcoming 

school schedule, which would begin in the fall of that year. Apparently, the mother 

believed the midweek visits to the father would interfere with the child’s school schedule. 

The trial court granted the mother’s request.1 On September 14, 2012, the trial court 

 

1 The father was not present at this hearing, choosing instead to launch an unsuccessful 

challenge to the mother’s service of notice of the petition for modification.
3.

ordered that “the parties shall have joint legal and shared physical custody with the 

Mother designated as the primary caretaker.” The father continued to have custodial time 

on alternate weekends, but not during midweek.

The father subsequently moved to set aside the above custody order and also 

objected to the custody recommendations of the child custody counselor. On 

December 12, 2012, the trial court denied the father’s motions, but set a “long cause” 

evidentiary hearing for August 13, 2013, “on the Father’s desire to have 50-50 custody, 

counter to the counselor’s recommendation.”

On March 19, 2013, the mother filed an application for temporary protective orders 

and for emergency orders to modify custody based on an incident in March 2013. The 

father filed opposition to the application. The trial court denied the requested temporary 

relief, postponing action until the hearing. At the hearing on April 10, 2013, the trial court 

ordered that “This matter is referred to a focused Family Court Services Evaluation of 

limited scope, appointed under Family Code Section[] 3110, et. seq., Evidence Code 

Section 730 at 800 11th St. Modesto Ca. The Father, Mother and child are to appear on 

4/17/13 at 2:00 p.m. and any further meetings as directed by the Evaluator.” Lorrie 

Freitas, M.F.P., was appointed to serve as the Family Court Services Evaluator (the 

Evaluator). For the meantime, the trial court ordered that “[t]he parties shall have joint 

legal custody with the Mother having sole physical custody.” (Italics added.) Further, the 

father’s visitation with the child (on alternate weekends) was to be supervised: “All 

contact of the child with the Father, including during transportation, shall be under the 

direct supervision and in the physical presence of the Father’s wife, Christina ....” Both 

parents were referred to Dr. Ed Moles, a clinical psychologist, for a psychological 

evaluation. The child was referred to Dr. Debra Johnson. The matter was continued to 

May 22, 2013, for further hearing to consider the Evaluator’s report.

The Evaluator’s report was submitted on May 22, 2013, and recommended to the 

trial court as follows: “1. The parties shall have joint legal custody with the Mother 

having sole physical custody. [¶] 2. All contact of the child with the Father, including 

during transportation, shall be under the direct supervision and in the physical presence of 
4.

a supervisor at Sierra Vista. The cost shall be paid by the Father. [¶] 3. The Father is 

referred to Dr. Ed Moles. The focus of the counseling shall be Psychological Evaluation. 

The Father shall participate and cooperate fully in the counseling at the direction of the 

counselor. The cost of the counseling shall be paid by the Father. [¶] 4. The child is to 

continue counseling with Debra Johnson. The focus of the counseling shall be child 

issues. The parties shall participate and cooperate fully in the counseling at the direction 

of the counselor. The cost of the counseling shall be paid equally among parties.”

The rationale set forth in the Evaluator’s report for the above recommendations 

included the Evaluator’s investigation of the March 2013 incident reported by the mother 

and the child’s apparent fear of the father. Concerning said incident, the Evaluator 

considered the various accounts. The mother asserted that, in picking up the child at the 

father’s home, the child was crying and very afraid because the father had aggressively 

spanked her “hard on the back” in response to something she (the child) said about the 

mother, while the father also uttered harsh and inappropriate comments about the mother, 

the child’s sister and stepfather. The father had admitted to spanking the child, but said it 

was because the child used the “F” word, and he denied doing anything wrong or injurious 

to the child. The Evaluator also considered her own interview sessions with the mother 

and the child, along with the opinions of Debra Johnson, with whom the child had been 

meeting for counseling. The Evaluator’s report indicated the father failed to appear at the 

designated time for the Evaluator’s interview of the parents and child for purposes of the 

evaluation. The Evaluator proceeded with those particular interviews in his absence.

On May 22, 2013, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing regarding 

the Evaluator’s report. The trial court adopted the recommendations in the Evaluator’s 

report, but set the matter for a long cause evidentiary hearing on calendar for August 13, 

2013, to fully consider the father’s objections to the recommendations contained in the 

report.

On August 13, 2013, the trial court commenced the long cause hearing of the 

father’s objections to the Evaluator’s recommendations. At the time of the proceedings in 

the trial court, the parties’ minor child was six and one-half years old. The trial court 
5.

heard testimony from the father, the mother, other family members, the Evaluator, and 

Sandra Centeno (a licensed clinical social worker who was counseling the father), among 

others.

On August 26, 2013, the trial court issued its tentative decision on the issues. The 

tentative decision adopted the Evaluator’s recommendations in toto, based on the trial 

court’s finding that “it is in the best interest of the minor child” to do so. The trial court 

explained: “Based upon the evidence presented at the long cause hearing and [the 

father’s] demeanor, attitude and behavior during the long cause hearing, the Court has 

concern for the safety of the minor child while in [the father’s] care. The Court believes 

that [the father] needs to follow through and obtain the psychological evaluation.” The 

trial court noted in the tentative decision that although the father “claims he cannot obtain 

the funds to pay for this evaluation, the Court believes he can obtain the funds.” In that 

regard, the trial court noted that the father had apparently been able to borrow money from 

his mother at some point in the past to meet his living expenses.

Based on the tentative decision, the trial court ordered that the mother would be 

granted “sole physical custody,” and the father would have “supervised visits at Sierra 

Vista.” As to the psychological evaluation, the trial court found that the father’s mental 

condition was “a significant issue in this custody proceeding.” Therefore, the trial court 

required the father to submit to a psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Moles as 

previously ordered or by another licensed clinical psychologist, at the father’s expense. 

Moreover, the trial court held that the father “will not be permitted to bring the matter 

back to court to modify either custody or visitation until he submits to the psychological 

evaluation ... and provides the court with a written report from the psychologist 

summarizing the evaluation and the psychologist’s findings.”

On September 3, 2013, the father filed written objections to the trial court’s 

tentative decision. He asserted certain findings were in error, or were not supported by the 

evidence at the hearing. He pointed out to the trial court that he “never objected to 

appearing for a mental evaluation” except on the basis that he could not afford it. He also 

challenged the trial court’s notion that his mother would pay for the evaluation, since he 
6.

had testified that “my mother would not loan me money for the assessment, and she 

shouldn’t be expected to loan me the money.” (Italics added.)

On September 12, 2013, in response to the father’s written objections to the 

tentative decision, the trial court corrected two inadvertent errors appearing in the 

tentative decision (i.e., regarding legal custody and the child’s full name), but did not 

address any other concerns raised by the father. The trial court held that, as so revised, its 

tentative decision constituted its final statement of decision on the issues. The father’s 

notice of appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation 

determinations is set forth in the Family Code .... Under this scheme, ‘the overarching 

concern is the best interest of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana

(2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 955; see Fam. Code, §§ 3011, 3020, 3040.)

For purposes of making an initial or temporary custody determination, the trial 

court and the family have the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the 

best interest of the child. (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255; In re Marriage 

of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 31–32.) When the parents are unable to agree on a 

custody arrangement, the trial court must determine the best interest of the child by setting 

the matter for an adversarial hearing and considering all relevant factors, including the 

child’s health, safety, and welfare, any history of abuse by one parent against any child or 

the other parent, and the nature and amount of the child’s contact with the parents. (In re 

Marriage of Brown & Yana, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 955–956.) Once a final or permanent 

custody arrangement is determined by the trial court, the parent seeking to alter the order 

for legal and physical custody can do so only on a showing that there has been a 

significant “‘change of circumstances’” indicating that a different custody arrangement 

would be in the child’s best interest. (Id. at p. 956 [noting that changed circumstances test 

is a variation on the best interest standard and recognizes the need for stability in custody 

arrangements]; In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37.) However, if a 
7.

requested modification would only alter the parenting schedule or the visitation 

arrangements, but would leave the existing custody the same, the change of circumstances 

rule does not apply and the trial court simply considers the ordinary best interest of the 

child standard. (In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077–1080.)

Appellate review of custody and visitation orders is highly deferential. “The 

standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of 

discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is whether the trial court could have 

reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child. 

We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether 

such basis was actually invoked. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 

Cal.4th at p. 32, italics added; see In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 

1087–1088.) “The test is not whether this court would have made the same order or 

whether the trial court could have reasonably made some other order, but ‘whether the 

trial court could reasonably have concluded that the order in question advanced the “best 

interest” of the child.’ [Citation.]” (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 595.)

“‘[I]t is generally accepted that the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not 

the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being 

considered.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Loyd (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 754, 759.)

To the extent an appealing party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

undergirding the trial court’s custody ruling, we affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is 

supported by any substantial evidence. (Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 

922, 931.) “‘“An appellate tribunal is not authorized to retry the issue of custody, nor to 

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of facts. Only upon a clear and convincing 

showing of abuse of discretion will the order of the trial court in such matters be disturbed 

on appeal. Where minds may reasonably differ, it is the trial judge’s discretion and not 

that of the appellate court which must control.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Finally, a judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, 

and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. (In re 

Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Because of this presumption of 
8.

correctness, error must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 

Cal.3d 557, 564.) Thus, an appellant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error 

based on sufficient legal argument supported by citation to an adequate record. (Yield 

Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 556–557.)

II. The Custody and Visitation Arrangement

Following the August 13, 2013, long cause hearing, the trial court granted the 

mother sole physical custody of the parties’ minor child and continued to allow only 

supervised visitation to the father, as recommended by the Evaluator. In the instant 

appeal, the father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s 

custody and visitation order.2 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

judgment. (In re Marriage of Kim (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 364, 370; In re Volkland (1977) 

74 Cal.App.3d 674, 678.) “‘All issues of credibility are ... within the province of the trier 

of fact.... All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the [judgment].’ 

[Citation.] Moreover, in examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

challenged finding, we ‘“... must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the 

correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might 

reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion.”

[Citations.] If appellate scrutiny reveals that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings and conclusions, the judgment must be affirmed.’ [Citation.]” (Catherine D. v. 

Dennis B., supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 931.)

The evidence relied on by the trial court included the testimony of the Evaluator 

assigned to the case, Lorrie Freitas. Based on interviews with the child and the mother, 

and on observations of the parent-child interactions, Freitas testified that the child’s 

primary emotional relationship was with the mother, and that the child felt “safe” in the 

mother’s care but was “fearful” of her father. Freitas was aware of the spanking incident 

reported by the mother. Freitas testified that the father’s “bad things” spoken to the child 

 

2 There was apparently no court reporter to record or transcribe the trial court testimony 

below. Our understanding of the testimony derives from the trial court’s statement of decision 

and the summaries provided in the parties’ briefing.
9.

about her mother and sister were “scaring” the child. In addition, Freitas testified about a 

counseling session incident in which the father suddenly became aggressive toward her 

and sought to “escalat[e] the conflict.” Based on all that she had ascertained regarding the 

father’s conduct and demeanor, Freitas was convinced that a psychological evaluation was 

necessary. Her recommendation was that once the father obtained such an evaluation, he 

could bring this matter back to court to reconsider the supervised visitation. Freitas 

further testified that, in her opinion, a psychological evaluation would help the father to 

recognize that certain conduct on his part was adversely affecting his child.

The trial court also relied on the testimony of the mother, who described the child’s 

fear at the time of the March 2013 incident, and reported that the child was still fearful of 

the father and had ongoing difficulty sleeping. The mother described the father as a 

“loose cannon” who can be calm in one moment and explode in anger the next. She 

reported that the most recent episode of the father’s explosive anger was in May 2013, 

when the father approached the mother and her new spouse at an open house function at 

the child’s school and cursed them out with profanity and accused them of paying the 

judge $150,000. The mother also testified that since visitation has been taking place at 

Sierra Vista, the child has been more relaxed and confident, less withdrawn and more like 

her normal self. The mother believed that the then current order should be continued in 

the child’s best interest. The mother expressed her desire that the father undergo the 

psychological evaluation so “perhaps [the] father can get the help he needs and that this 

endless custody fight can conclude.”

The trial court also acknowledged the testimony of Sandra Centeno, a licensed 

clinical social worker who was meeting with the father to provide therapy. Centeno’s 

testimony included assertions that the father had significant depression and anxiety. 

Finally, the trial court relied on its own direct observation of the father’s erratic behavior 

in the courtroom during the long cause hearing, wherein the father, although calm and 

respectful at times, at other times, when it appeared he was not entirely getting his way in 

the proceedings, would quickly change his demeanor and become highly combative and 

disrespectful toward the parties and the court, and during such tirades would simply ignore 
10.

the court’s numerous admonitions. As a result, the trial court frequently “had to cut off 

his questioning or terminate his testimony.”

The father’s testimony at the hearing described his relationship with the child in 

much more positive terms. He denied saying negative things to the child about the

mother, and he expressed his belief that his visitation times with the child had gone very 

well. He believed that he should be allowed to have a more active role in his child’s life. 

The father acknowledged that he did spank his daughter on one occasion when she was 

using inappropriate language. On that occasion, he hit her with his open hand on the rear 

and did not cause any injury to her. Although he did not understand why his parental use 

of reasonable corporate punishment should be of concern, since the law clearly permits the 

same, he was willing to refrain from doing so if it meant that increased custody or 

visitation opportunities would be granted to him. The trial court carefully considered the 

father’s testimony, but ultimately concluded that the mother’s version of events was more 

credible than the father’s.

In applying the substantial evidence test, we resolve conflicts and credibility issues 

in favor of the judgment. Reviewing the matter in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s judgment, we conclude that there was adequate substantial evidence to support the 

trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion to continue with the supervised visitation 

arrangement and to grant sole physical custody to the mother. Among other things, the 

trial court appears to have been concerned by the father’s explosive anger, inappropriate 

comments and the child’s concomitant fear. Since the trial court “could have reasonably 

concluded that the order in question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child” (In re 

Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32), no abuse of discretion was shown. 

Accordingly, we uphold and affirm the trial court’s ruling on the custody and visitation 

arrangement.

III. The Psychological Evaluation

In determining the best interest of the child in custody proceedings, a trial court has 

discretion to appoint an expert to conduct a custody investigation, examine the parents and 

children, and file a written confidential report and/or testify at a hearing. (Fam. Code, 
11.

§ 3111; Evid. Code, § 730; In re Marriage of Kim, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 372.) In 

In re Marriage of Kim, where the family had severe problems due to the appellant’s acts 

of criminal violence, molestation and other physical and verbal abuse, a psychiatric 

examination of the entire family was deemed necessary to resolve remaining custody and 

visitation issues that were before the trial court. On appeal, no abuse of discretion was 

found in ordering the examination. (In re Marriage of Kim, supra, at p. 372.) We review 

the trial court’s decision to appoint an expert or evaluator for an abuse of discretion. (In 

re Marriage of E.U. & J.E. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1389.)

Here, the trial court concluded that the father’s mental or emotional condition was 

relevant to the court’s assessment of the father’s capability to responsibly handle visitation 

without supervision. Accordingly, the father was ordered by the trial court to submit to a 

psychological evaluation to be conducted by Dr. Moles or other clinical psychologist. The 

father objected on the ground of inability to pay. The cost was approximately $1,500. At 

the hearing, the trial court did not consider or receive any evidence on the father’s ability 

to pay, but simply stated its assumption that the father could get a loan from his mother 

since he had been able to obtain a loan to cover living expenses in the past. Based on that 

assumption, the trial court rejected the father’s assertion of financial inability. After the 

trial court issued its tentative decision, the father filed specific written objections thereto, 

stating that he “never objected to appearing for a mental evaluation except on the basis 

that [he] could not afford it.” The father emphasized that there was no evidence presented 

at the hearing to support the trial court’s finding that he had the financial ability to pay for 

the psychological evaluation. The trial court never responded to this objection. Despite 

the father’s objection, the trial court stood by its order that “Father will not be permitted to 

bring this matter back to court to modify either custody or visitation until he submits to the 

psychological evaluation ... and provides the court with a written report from the 

psychologist summarizing the evaluation and the psychologist’s findings.”

In the instant appeal, the father claims the trial court abused its discretion by 

(1) ordering him to pay the expense of the psychological evaluation without any 

meaningful evidentiary consideration of his actual ability to pay and (2) conditioning his 
12.

right to request any modification of the custody or visitation arrangements on first 

obtaining the same psychological evaluation at his own expense, which the father asserted 

he could not afford. We agree with the father on both of these points.

Under Family Code section 3112, subdivision (a), the trial court must “inquire into 

the financial condition” of a parent and ascertain whether he or she is “able to pay” the 

expense of an investigation, report, or evaluation that is being undertaken by a courtappointed investigator or evaluator.3

 Here, the trial court failed to make any evidentiary 

inquiry into the father’s financial condition or his ability to pay, despite the father’s 

specific objection on the ground of inability to pay. At most, the trial court appears to 

have assumed that the father’s mother would loan him money for the evaluation, but the 

record does not indicate there was any evidence to support that assumption and, in fact, 

the father directly challenged the trial court’s tentative decision as to that finding—

reminding the trial court that he had specifically “testified that my mother would not loan 

me money for the assessment ....” (Italics added.)

On the record before us, we conclude the trial court failed to comply with Family 

Code section 3112 and, accordingly, the trial court’s order that the father pay the expense 

of the psychological evaluation constituted error. More than that, the trial court 

exacerbated this error by also conditioning the father’s right to seek a reasonable 

modification of visitation or custody arrangements on his first obtaining (i.e., paying for) 

the same psychological evaluation. Considering the fundamental importance of the 

parent-child relationship, and in light of the lack of evidentiary support on the question of 

ability to pay, this financial roadblock barring the father’s access to the court was a clear 

abuse of the trial court’s discretion under the circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse 

 

3 Financial considerations are also considered under Evidence Code section 730 for experts 

appointed in the family law context. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Laurenti (2007) 154 

Cal.App.4th 395, 403 [construing Evid. Code, § 730 in conjunction with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.220(d)(1)(D)].)
13.

those discrete parts of the trial court’s overall order.4 We emphasize that our partial 

reversal does not affect the trial court’s determination of the custody and visitation 

arrangement, which determination remains intact.

IV. Other Issues

Additionally, the father argues that, to the extent the trial court’s order obligated 

him to undergo ongoing therapy over an extended period of time, the order and the 

findings set forth therein failed to comply with the special requirements of Family Code 

section 3190. Although the trial court’s order is not entirely clear, our construction 

thereof is that the father was only directed to obtain a single psychological evaluation, not 

ongoing therapy. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider the issue of compliance with 

Family Code section 3190.

At the oral argument of this appeal, the father reiterated his argument that during 

the long cause hearing in which he contested the evaluator’s recommendations, the trial 

court refused to allow certain testimony or argument and thereby denied him due process. 

The father also characterizes much of the testimony presented at that hearing as being 

objectionable. We are hampered by the lack of any transcript or other adequate record of 

those proceedings. It was the father’s burden, as appellant, to provide an adequate record 

on appeal to substantiate all of the points raised by him. Since he did not provide such an 

adequate record, these arguments are rejected.

Beyond what is discussed above, the father’s appeal raises in a perfunctory manner 

a number of other purported issues. As to such other issues, the father fails to provide 

more than conclusory assertions, fails to provide adequate legal discussion or authority to 

demonstrate error, and/or fails to cite to an adequate record. Since that is the case, we 

pass over such additional points or treat them as abandoned. (See, e.g., Yield Dynamics, 

Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556–557; McComber v. Wells

 

4

In so holding, we leave to the discretion of the trial court whether or not to revisit the issue 

by subsequently addressing the matter of financial ability on remand.
14.

(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522–523; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; 

Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700.)

V. Final Comments

At oral argument, the father stressed his desire to have an increased and more 

meaningful role in his child’s life. He emphasized the fundamental importance of the 

parent-child relationship as recognized in our jurisprudence, and maintained that his 

parental rights have been severely limited by the trial court’s order, in his opinion without 

adequate justification being shown, due to an unfair system or bias. In particular, he 

asserted his belief that the order for supervised visitation at Sierra Vista was unwarranted 

and should be modified. Although on the limited record before us we have affirmed the 

trial court’s order regarding custody and visitation, we note that the father is free to 

petition the trial court for a modification of the visitation arrangement. Indeed, the trial 

court contemplated there would be further hearings regarding supervised visitation, since 

that was apparently the reason for having the father obtain an evaluation by a licensed 

clinical psychologist. As to that psychological evaluation, unless on remand ability to pay 

is shown or other means of payment of that expense is provided, any petition for 

modification of the visitation arrangement would have to be determined on the basis of 

other evidence.
15.

DISPOSITION

The portion of the trial court’s order directing the father to pay the expense of the 

psychological evaluation and preconditioning his right to seek modification of visitation 

or custody on obtaining and paying the expense of the psychological evaluation is 

reversed. In all other respects, the judgment and order of the trial court is affirmed, 

including the determination of the custody and visitation arrangement. Each party shall 

bear their own costs on appeal.

___________________________

KANE, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________

POOCHIGIAN, J.

__________________________

SMITH, J.