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BETH KELLER v. RICHARD KELLER

(AC 36389)

Lavine, Beach and Prescott, Js.

Argued March 12—officially released July 14, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Adelman, J.)

Tara C. Dugo, with whom, on the brief, was Norman

A. Roberts II, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael J. Weil, with whom, on the brief, was Reuben

S. Midler, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BEACH, J. In this marital dissolution action, the plaintiff, Beth Keller, appeals from an order of contempt

entered against her by the trial court in the course of the

proceedings dissolving her marriage to the defendant,

Richard Keller. The plaintiff claims that the court erred

in finding her in contempt for failing to provide the

defendant with her address after leaving the family

home. The defendant argues that the appeal is moot.

We do not agree that the appeal is moot, and we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The record, including a prior opinion of this court,

reveals the following facts and procedural history. ‘‘The

parties married on August 15, 1992. They have three

minor children, born in 1996, 1999 and 2002. The plaintiff brought this dissolution action in May, 2011 . . . .

On July 15, 2011, the parties entered into a courtapproved stipulation agreeing, among other things, that

the defendant would have exclusive possession of the

jointly owned marital home located in Greenwich until

the final judgment in the dissolution action, [and] the

parties would share custody of the children subject to

an agreed parenting plan . . . .’’ Keller v. Keller, 141

Conn. App. 681, 682, 64 A.3d 776 (2013). The automatic

orders mandated in Practice Book § 25-5 were served

with the complaint. On June 8, 2012, the court approved

a parenting plan, which was agreed to by both parties.

The June, 2012 parenting plan contained a provision

requiring that each ‘‘parent will provide the other with

his or her residence address, e-mail address and all

telephone and fax numbers at which he or she may

regularly be reached, and will promptly provide updates

as necessary.’’ The plan also contained a provision

requiring notice regarding vacation travel with

children.1

Pursuant to the July, 2011 stipulation, the plaintiff

moved out of the family residence on Echo Lane in

Greenwich in July, 2011. From August, 2011 until October 16, 2013, the plaintiff lived on Hendrie Avenue in

Greenwich. On October 16, 2013, the plaintiff and the

minor children moved to Valley Road, Cos Cob.

On October 24, 2013, the defendant filed a motion

for contempt alleging that the plaintiff was in contempt

of court for violating Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2)2 and

the June, 2012 order of the court. Following a hearing

on November 6, 2013, the court held the plaintiff in

contempt for failing to provide the defendant with

required information regarding her new residence at 71

Valley Road. The court also held the plaintiff in contempt for violating paragraph 8 of the June, 2012 order

of the court, which, inter alia, required that the plaintiff

provide the defendant with sufficient notice and contact

information during a vacation she took with the children

to California. The court did not impose sanctions for
the contempt citations. This appeal followed.

The marriage was dissolved by the trial court in a

written memorandum of decision on July 9, 2014.

I

The defendant claims that the plaintiff’s appeal is

moot because the court provided two reasons for finding the plaintiff in contempt, and the plaintiff is challenging only one of the reasons on appeal. Because one

reason remains unchallenged, according to the defendant, the plaintiff cannot obtain practical relief, regardless of this court’s action on the challenged reason.

Although we generally agree with the proposition of

law relied on by the defendant, we disagree that the

proposition applies in the context of this case.3

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Because

courts are established to resolve actual controversies,

before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution

on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability

requires (1)that there be an actual controversy between

or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the

interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the

matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated

by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination

of the controversy will result in practical relief to the

complainant. . . .

‘‘Concentrating on the fourth factor for justiciability,

[i]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide

moot questions, disconnected from the granting of

actual relief or from the determination of which no

practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful

appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any

way. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal,

events have occurred that preclude an appellate court

from granting any practicalrelief through its disposition

of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . Mootness

implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, raising a question of law over which we exercise plenary

review.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn.

App. 654, 666–67, 77 A.3d 156 (2013).

The court found4

the plaintiff in contempt both for

failing to provide the defendant with her new address,

and failing to give the defendant sufficient details and

contact information for a trip that she took with the

children to California.5 The defendant argues that even

if this court were to conclude that the trial court erred

in holding the plaintiff in contempt for failing to provide

the defendant with her address, the plaintiff has not

challenged the order of contempt for failing to provide

details of the California vacation. The plaintiff argues

that the orders were two separate findings of contempt,
and the relief she is requesting is simply to have one

fewer finding of contempt on her record.6

From our review of the record, it appears that the

trial court made two separate findings of contempt.7

We construe the record in a manner favoring the existence of jurisdiction, where two constructions are possible. Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 695, 12 A.3d

783 (2011) (‘‘Where a decision as to whether a court

has subject matter jurisdiction is required, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . .

[T]he general rule of jurisdiction . . . is that nothing

shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a

Superior Court but that which specially appears to be

so . . . . [N]o court is to be ousted of its jurisdiction

by implication.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted]). ‘‘Even without the imposition of a

penalty, the fact that a trial court has made a finding

of contempt may well affect a later court’s determination of the penalty to be imposed after a future finding

of contempt.’’ Kennedy v. Kennedy, 114 Conn. App.

143, 147, 968 A.2d 1002, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 918,

973 A.2d 1275 (2009); see also Sgarellino v. Hightower,

13 Conn. App. 591, 594–95, 538 A.2d 1065 (1988). The

relief requested in this appeal by the plaintiff, reversal

of one of the charges of contempt, would benefit the

plaintiff, however slightly.

The defendant alternatively argues that a judgment

of dissolution has since been entered in this case, and

the court’s finding of contempt regarding the pendente

lite order was subsumed by the final judgment. The

defendant is correct that ‘‘[p]endente lite orders necessarily cease to exist once a final judgment in the dispute

has been rendered because their purpose is extinguished at that time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaFaci-Zitzkat v. Zitzkat, 19 Conn. App. 805, 806,

562 A.2d 527 (1989); see, e.g., Altraide v. Altraide, 153

Conn. App. 327, 332, 101 A.3d 317 (appeal from pendente lite orders moot after final judgment of dissolution rendered), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 905, 104 A.3d

759 (2014). The plaintiff, however, has appealed from

an order of contempt for violating Practice Book § 25-

5 (a) (2), which was not subsumed into the final judgment on the divorce action. See Stoner v. Stoner, 163

Conn. 345, 359, 307 A.2d 146 (1972) (‘‘[a]n adjudication

of contempt is final and may be reviewed only on questions of jurisdiction such as whether the court had

authority to impose the punishment inflicted and

whether the act or acts for which the penalty was

imposed could constitute a contempt’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The appeal is not moot, and this

court has jurisdiction to consider the merits.

II

The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in finding

her in contempt for violating Practice Book § 25-5 (a)

(2) and paragraph 7 of the June, 2012 court order con-
taining the parenting agreement.8 We disagree.

We turn first to the standard of review. ‘‘First, we

must resolve the threshold question of whether the

underlying order constituted a court order that was

sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a

judgment of contempt. . . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . Second, if we conclude

that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear

and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing

to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a

review of the trial court’s determination of whether the

violation was wilful9 or excused by a good faith dispute

or misunderstanding.’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mekrut v. Suits, 147 Conn. App.

794, 799, 84 A.3d 466 (2014).

Immediately after finding the plaintiff in contempt

for failing to provide information about the vacation,

the trial court stated: ‘‘Regarding the house, I’m going

to find the plaintiff in contempt. . . . Moving to the

new house, the giving of the address. I think it’s clear

that [the defendant] knew where the people were, but

you have an absolute duty to give him specific information as to what your address and phone number

[were].’’10 The plaintiff testified that she had verbally

informed the defendant of herrelocation on an occasion

when they were exchanging the children: ‘‘I told him I

was moving across from Dave’s Cycle’s into one of the

two townhouses on Valley Road at the corner.’’ She

also testified that there were only two townhouses on

that road, both on the corner, and that they had the

same address, but one of them was clearly vacant. The

plaintiff’s first claim essentially is that the automatic

order in Practice Book § 25-5, was at best ambiguous.

The plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied § 25-

5 (a) (2) when it found her in contempt. The plaintiff

argues that § 25-5 (a) (2) does not apply to the move

from the Hendrie Avenue address to the Valley Road

address because the plaintiff had moved to the Hendrie

Avenue address from the family residence two years

earlier. Application of § 25-5 (a) (2) is, according to the

plaintiff, limited by its terms to requiring information

about the new residence after only the initial move from

a family home, and not after any subsequent moves.

The defendant argues that ‘‘the trial court could have

reasonably interpreted this provision to require that

any time a parent who previously resided at the family

residence relocates to any residence, that parent must

provide the other party with written notification.’’ The

defendant also argues that from a public policy perspective, it makes little sense to require one parent to inform

the other only of his or her first address after moving

out of the family residence.

Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The

following automatic orders shall apply to both parties,
with service of the automatic orders to be made with

service of process of a complaint for dissolution of

marriage . . . . The automatic orders shall be effective

with regard to the plaintiff or the applicant upon the

signing of the complaint or the application and with

regard to the defendant or the respondent upon service

and shall remain in place during the pendency of the

action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by further order of a judicial authority upon motion of either

of the parties . . . (a) . . . (2) A party vacating the

family residence shall notify the other party orthe other

party’s attorney, in writing, within forty-eight hours of

such move, of an address where the relocated party

can receive communication. This provision shall not

apply if and to the extent there is a prior, contradictory

order of a judicial authority . . . .’’11

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in

finding her in contempt for violating an ‘‘absolute duty’’

under the June 8, 2012 stipulation and failing to notify

the defendant of her new address. The plaintiff argues

that she orally provided the defendant with a description of the location of her residence, and that he knew

where she and the minor children were residing,

because he had dropped off the children at the Valley

Road address on more than one occasion before filing

the motion for contempt. The June, 2012 order incorporated paragraph 7 of the parenting agreement: ‘‘Each

parent will provide the other with his or her residence

address, e-mail address and all telephone and fax numbers at which he or she may regularly be reached, and

will promptly provide updates as necessary.’’ The order

is clear and unambiguous.

The plaintiff argues that the contempt order must be

reversed because a close reading of both Practice Book

§ 25-5 (a) (2) and the June, 2012 order shows that neither by itself literally applied to the facts of this case.

The June, 2012 order is clear on its face and, by itself,

provides a basis for a finding of contempt.12 The motion

for contempt and the court’s 2013 order rely on both

the rules of practice and the June, 2012 order; there is

one finding of contempt, which concludes that both

orders were violated. Even if the defendant may have

known where the new home was, the court’s finding

of contempt stressed that the plaintiff did not provide

the defendant with all of the required contact information, including the actual address. The factual finding

is not clearly erroneous. An operative address fulfills

many purposes, including mailing, global positioning

system location for directions, and the like. The court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff did not affirmatively comply with the clear order,

and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the

plaintiff in contempt.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion LAVINE, J., concurred.
1 Paragraph 8 states: ‘‘Each parent will keep the other informed of the

whereabouts, including a telephone number of the minor children if the

children will not be sleeping in the residence of the parent for two or more

nights. Either parent may take the children out of state overnight on holidays

or for vacations or visitation, so long as a written itinerary containing the

address and telephone number of the destination(s), travel arrangements

and lodging accommodations is provided to the other parent 24 hours in

advance of the departure, unless the travel is outside the New York City

Metropolitan area, in which case five (5) days [advance] notice shall be

required.’’

2 Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A party vacating

the family residence shall notify the other party or the other party’s attorney,

in writing, within forty-eight hours of such move, of an address where the

relocated party can receive communication. . . .’’

3 The defendant also claims that the record is inadequate for review

because the court did not specify in its oral ruling whether it held the

plaintiff in contempt for violating Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2) or the court’s

June, 2012 order adopting the parenting plan and the plaintiff failed to seek

an articulation. Because we conclude that the court could have found the

plaintiff in contempt under both of the bases the defendant alleged in his

motion, we do not agree with the defendant that the record is inadequate

for review.

4 There was no written order of contempt. The order appears in a transcript

of the proceedings.

5 The court’s finding regarding the vacation itinerary was clear: ‘‘[The

plaintiff’s] itinerary was worthless. It’s nonsense. [The defendant] certainly

had the right, certainly under the plan and just in common decency to know

the name of the airline and to know the flight number. What would have

happened had there been a plane crash that day? . . . [Addressing the

plaintiff] . . . I think in terms of the notice regarding the vacation I will

find the plaintiff to be in contempt and that she’s violated [p]aragraph 8 of

the agreement dated June 8, 2012.’’

6 The court stated that ‘‘the mere finding of contempt is a serious sanction.

It will impact future courts who may have to make rulings in this case

because they will look in the file and see that you’ve been found to be in

contempt of the court order.

‘‘So, please don’t walk away thinking because I’m not paying any money

I’ve won. You haven’t won; you’ve been found to be wrong. And you need

to correct your behavior, you need to be more careful in the way you

communicate this information to [the defendant].’’

7 The court stated: ‘‘I think, in terms of the notice regarding the vacation,

I will find the plaintiff to be in contempt and that she’s violated paragraph

8 of the agreement dated June 8, 2012. . . . Regarding the house, I’m going

to find the plaintiff in contempt . . . . Moving to the new house, the giving

of the address. I think it’s clear that [the defendant] knew where the people

were, but you have an absolute duty to give him specific information as to

what your address and phone number . . . .’’

8 The plaintiff also argues that ‘‘it would be useless and futile to require

the plaintiff to notify the defendant of [her address] which he had demonstrated (by dropping off the children at the new residence) he already knew.’’

Even if the defendant knew generally where the children were, the plaintiff’s

obligation to provide him with the actual address of her residence under

Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2) and paragraph 7 of the June, 2012 order was

not satisfied. We further note that the plaintiff’s general location is different

from her actual address; a precise address serves a number of functions.

9 We do not address whether the plaintiff’s action was wilful, because the

court made no finding in that regard, and neither party has raised it in his

or her brief. ‘‘[W]e presume that the trial court, in rendering its judgment

. . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Brett Stone Painting & Maintenance, LLC v.

New England Bank, 143 Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d 1121 (2013).

10 Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant mentions in his or her brief the

failure to give a telephone number. Because we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion in holding the plaintiff in contempt for failing to

provide the defendant with her address, we need not consider whether the

plaintiff’s failure to provide the defendant with a current telephone number

or to inform him that her telephone number had not changed violated

Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2) and the June, 2012 court order.

11 The defendant correctly points out that the automatic orders were

attached to the plaintiff’s complaint and were summarized as follows: ‘‘Both
parties shall . . . [t]ell the other person in writing within forty-eight hours

about your new address or a place where you can receive mail if you move

out of the family home (if you share children under [eighteen] years old).’’

12 Although we need not decide whether Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2)

provided an alternative basis for contempt, we note that a construction of

§ 25-5 (a) (2) to the effect that there is no obligation to provide precise

information after the first move from the family home may be unworkable

and lead to bizarre results.