or visitation rights because the adoption had terminated her legal 

relationship with the children and she had not established visitation 

rights at the time the adoption was finalized. The district courtS further 

concluded that even if Dolores had a legal basis for grandparent visitation, 

the court would nonetheless deny her request on the merits because 

visitation was not in the children's best interest. Dolores brought this 

appeal. 

Having considered the parties' arguments and the record 

before this court, we conclude that the district court did not err in 

dismissing Dolores's complaint. See Bopp v. Lino, 110 Nev. 1246, 1249, 

885 P.2d 559, 561 (1994) (stating that a district court's conclusions of law 

are reviewed de novo). Although Dolores originally filed her complaint 

under the grandparent visitationS statute, NRS 125C.050, the subsequent 

adoption affected her legal relationship with the children and consequent 

standing to obtain visitation rights. Under NRS 127.160, "[a]fter a decree 

of adoption is entered, the natural parents of an adopted child shall be 

relieved of all parental responsibilities for such child, and they shall not 

exercise or have any rights over such adopted child." 

In an effort to maintain grandparent visitation rights postadoption, the Nevada Legislature carved out an exception permitting 

visitation rights between an adopted child and the biological family to 

survive the adoption in limited circumstances. NRS 127.171(1)(b) allows 

the court in an adoption proceeding to grant reasonable visitation rights to 

"[c]ertain relatives of the child only if a similar right had been granted 

previously pursuant to NRS 125C.050." (Emphasis added.) An adoption's 

effect on grandparent rights was discussed at length in Bopp v. Lino 

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where this court concluded that because the grandparents had not been 

granted any visitation rights before the adoption, they lacked standing to 

petition for visitation eight months later. 110 Nev. at 1251, 885 P.2d at 

562, In commenting on NRS 127.171, this court stated 

[i]f the district court already had unfettered 

jurisdiction to grant visitation rights after an 

adoption, the Nevada Legislature would not have 

enacted NRS 127.171. Moreover, the Nevada 

Legislature would not have limited visitation 

rights to those already possessing that right if it 

had intended the district court to be able to create 

visitation rights after an adoption. 

Id. at 1253, 885 P.2d at 563. 

NRS 127.171 and the holding in Bopp are dispositive to the 

district court's jurisdiction in this case. One day after Dolores filed her 

complaint, the adoption by Patrick's new wife became final and Dolores 

had not already established any grandparent visitation rights. 

Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant Dolores any 

visitation rights as a grandparent under NRS 125C.050.' 

Our dissenting colleague concludes that because Dolores had 

filed her complaint one day before the adoption became final she somehow 

'The district court relied on the adoption in dismissing Dolores's 

complaint even though no evidence was placed in the record regarding 

these facts and the district court did not formally take judicial notice. 

Nevertheless, neither party dispute the fact and date of the adoption nor 

objected to judicial notice below, and thus any error in the judicial notice 

procedure was waived. See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., 

Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 437, 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010). 

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preserved her standing to secure visitation rights under NRS 125C.050. 

Such conclusion is misplaced. Even though Dolores had standing on the 

day she filed her complaint, by the time of the hearing, the adoption had 

been finalized, thereby divesting the court of jurisdiction to grant Dolores 

grandparent visitation rights. See Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 118 

Nev. 972, 975, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 (2002) (observing that "subsequent to an 

adoption decree, a natural parent has no rights to the child unless 

provided for in the decree"); see also State ex rd. Kaylor v. Bruening, 684 

N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ohio 1997) (holding that the adoption decree 

terminating the natural mother's parental rights divested the court of 

jurisdiction to proceed on her pending motion for visitation with the child). 

Thus, Dolores's complaint was properly dismissed on this ground. 

Finally, as an independent ground for denying the complaint, 

the district court at the hearing reached the merits of Dolores's request in 

finding that she was unable to rebut the presumption that visitation is not 

in the children's best interest under NRS 125C.050(4), and citing the 

parties' acrimonious relationship including threats, cussing, and assaults, 

as well as police involvement. The district court also referenced 

allegations that Dolores had improperly taken the children's social 

security benefits and had sought medical treatment for the children 

without permission and under the guise of a guardianship that never 

existed. See NRS 125C.050(6) (setting forth the factors for determining 

whether the presumption has been rebutted). We conclude that the 

district court's alternative ground for denying the complaint was not an 

abuse of discretion. See Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 257 

P.3d 396, 399 (2011) (stating that district court custody decisions are 

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reviewed for an abuse of discretion and that factual findings supported by 

substantial evidence will not be set aside). 

We are cognizant of the unfortunate circumstances of this case 

and we are sympathetic to Dolores's plight, but the law is clear and we 

must uphold it. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

OLAA 

Parraguirre 

CHERRY, J., dissenting: 

I disagree with the majority's application of NRS 127.171 and 

Bopp v. Lino. 110 Nev. 1246, 885 P.2d 559 (1994), and the result that 

followed. The majority decision strips a grandmother of a relationship 

with her grandchildren, whom she had nurtured and cared for during 

their mother's prolonged illness that ended in her untimely death. 

Dolores's complaint filed one day before the adoption 

preserved her right to secure visitation rights with her grandchildren. 

The holding in Bopp and its interpretation of NRS 127.171 is not as clear 

as the majority posits. The grandparents in Bopp petitioned for visitation 

rights eight months after the adoption, 110 Nev. at 1248, 885 P.2d at 560, 

whereas Dolores filed her petition in this case before the adoption was 

finalized. The discussion in Bopp focuses on the timing of the petition by 

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stating in different places that the grandparents "did not petition for 

visitation rights prior to or at the adoption proceedings;" "Nevada does not 

have a statute permitting ex-relatives to petition for visitation;" the 

grandparents had "no standing to petition for visitation" after the adoption 

decree was entered; and that "NRS 127.171 serves as a 'statute of 

limitations' on the right of a grandparent to petition for visitation rights to 

a grandchild." Bopp, 110 Nev. at 1251, 1253, 885 P.2d at 562-63 

(emphasis added). Under my reading of Bopp, Dolores had standing to 

petition for visitation rights at the time she filed her complaint and the 

district court retained jurisdiction to grant her request. 

Moreover, the adoption being finalized one day later was 

beyond Dolores's control. Dolores alleges that she never received notice of 

the adoption proceeding in time to intervene and establish her rights. 

Dolores attempted to participate in the adoption case, but by then it was 

too late and her motion to intervene was denied. 

Aside from the jurisdictional issue, the scant record before us 

does not support the district court's finding that Dolores failed to rebut the 

presumption under NRS 125C.050(4) that once Patrick denied Dolores 

visitation it is presumed that such visitation would not be in the children's 

best interest. The district judge reached this conclusion not after an 

evidentiary hearing fully developing the factual issues, but based merely 

on the pleadings and the judge's knowledge of these parties from related 

proceedings before him. See NRS 125C.050(6) (setting forth factors for 

determining whether the party seeking visitation has rebutted the 

presumption); see generally Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542-43, 853 

P.2d 123, 124-25 (1993) (noting that an evidentiary hearing is required on 

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a motion regarding custody if the moving party demonstrates a prima 

facie case). 

In fact, the limited record before this court could establish 

otherwise. According to Dolores, Andra and the children had periodically 

lived with her through the years and then with more frequency once 

Andra became ill. Dolores alleged that Patrick had been having an affair 

with Andra's cousin and then married her after Andra's death and began 

to alienate the children from Dolores. She claimed that Patrick had 

denied her visitation and had no intention of fostering any relationship 

between her and the children, and that without court intervention she 

would be forever alienated from them. As to Patrick's allegation that 

Dolores had taken the children for medical treatment without 

authorization, Dolores claimed she had taken the children for medical care 

in the past and that the children had breathing problems that sometimes 

needed immediate attention. 

The district court's reliance on the acrimonious relationship 

between Patrick and his new wife and Dolores to support the conclusion 

that visitation with Dolores is not in the children's best interest is 

inadequate. How often do parents and other relatives have to put aside 

their own differences for the benefit of the children in their lives? Are 

these children really better off without a relationship with their 

grandmother (who could be one of the only ties to their deceased mother) 

just because the adult parties in this case do not get along? I cannot say 

so based on the limited record before us. Under the majority decision, 

Dolores could very well be forever precluded from any contact with her 

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Cherry 

grandchildren by virtue of the fact that her daughter died an untimely 

death. 

Dolores deserves her day in court. I would remand this matter 

for an evidentiary hearing to determine what is truly in the best interest 

of these young children. See NRS 125C.050(4). For those reasons, I 

respectfully dissent. 

cc: Hon. William B. Gonzalez, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Sterling Law, LLC 

Pisanelli Bice, PLLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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