NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SANDRA MARIA VALENZUELA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0531

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-450404-001

The Honorable Richard L. Nothwehr, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Paul J. Prato

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. VALENZUELA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Sandra Valenzuela appeals her conviction and sentence for 

Endangerment (Physical Injury), a class 1 misdemeanor, arguing the 

superior court should not have instructed the jury on flight because the 

State failed to present sufficient evidence warranting the instruction. We 

disagree, and accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by 

instructing the jury on flight. See State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 285, 286, ¶ 6, 339 

P.3d 668, 669 (App. 2014) (“We review a court’s decision to give a jury 

instruction for abuse of discretion.”). We therefore affirm Valenzuela’s 

conviction and sentence. 

¶2 Over Valenzuela’s objection, the superior court instructed the 

jury as follows:

In determining whether the State has proved 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, you may consider any evidence of the 

defendant’s running away, hiding, or 

concealing evidence, together with all the other 

evidence in the case. You may also consider the 

defendant’s reasons for running away, hiding, 

or concealing evidence. Running away, hiding, 

or concealing evidence after a crime has been 

committed does not by itself prove guilt. 

¶3 “A flight instruction should only be given if the State presents 

evidence of flight after a crime from which jurors can infer a defendant’s 

consciousness of guilt.” Solis, 236 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d at 669. The 

court must determine whether the evidence “supports a reasonable 

inference that the flight or attempted flight was open, such as the result of 

an immediate pursuit.” Id. at 287, ¶ 7, 339 P.3d at 670.

¶4 Here, the State presented evidence Valenzuela did not stop—

or even slow down—after nearly hitting a police officer with her car. After 

the near miss, the officer returned to his patrol car, activated his lights and 
STATE v. VALENZUELA

Decision of the Court

3

siren, and pursued Valenzuela. Valenzuela drove away from the scene for

approximately two blocks until she came up to vehicles stopped at a traffic 

light, which blocked her path. Valenzuela reversed to turn into a gas station 

parking lot she had passed, allowing the officer time to “catch up” to her. 

The officer ordered her out of the car and asked her, “What the hell were 

you thinking?” Valenzuela responded she “had places to go.” 

¶5 Contrary to Valenzuela’s argument on appeal, the foregoing 

facts supported the State’s requested flight instruction. As the superior 

court explained in denying her objection to the instruction: “There is 

evidence that the officer pursued [Valenzuela]” and “also evidence that she 

would have continued to drive but for the fact that the vehicles were 

stopped.” 

¶6 Valenzuela also argues that even if the State presented 

sufficient evidence to support a flight instruction, that evidence did not 

support including the sentence that stated, “You may also consider the

defendant’s reasons for running away, hiding, or concealing evidence.”1 

She further argues the sentence called “attention to the fact that Appellant 

did not testify to explain her reasons for failing to stop.” We disagree with 

both arguments. 

¶7 First, because Valenzuela failed to object to the instruction on 

this ground she has waived this argument on appeal, absent fundamental 

error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19–20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 

(2005). Second, even if not waived, Valenzuela’s comment to the officer that

she “had places to go” provided sufficient evidentiary support for the 

sentence. Third, the sentence cannot reasonably be understood as calling 

attention to her decision not to testify. Cf. State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 333, 

819 P.2d 909, 919 (1991) (“It is constitutionally impermissible for a 

prosecutor or a trial judge to comment on a defendant’s failure to testify . . 

. [, however,] [a] comment is impermissible only if the language used was 

manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally 

and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify.” (citations

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, our supreme court 

has instructed we are to presume jurors follow the court’s instructions. See 

 

1Valenzuela also argues the court should not have included 

the sentence in the instruction because the Revised Arizona Jury 

Instructions (“RAJI”) Standard Criminal 9 Use Note states it should be 

given only upon the defendant’s request. The superior court, however, is 

not required to follow the RAJI. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 566, ¶ 12, 

30 P.3d 631, 633 (2001); State v. Larin, 233 Ariz. 202, 212, ¶ 37, 310 P.3d 990, 

1000 (App. 2013). 
STATE v. VALENZUELA

Decision of the Court

4

State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68, 132 P.3d 833, 847 (2006). Thus, we 

must assume the jury followed the court’s instruction “not [to] let 

[Valenzuela’s] choice [not to testify] affect your deliberations in any way.” 

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Valenzuela’s conviction 

and sentence.