alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Nora Kavner, Appellant, v Matthew Geller et al., Respondents.

[854 NYS2d 343]

*282Plaintiff does not allege any affirmative misstatement of material facts with the requisite particularity to support a claim for fraud in the inducement of the stipulation into which she entered with her former husband, defendant Geller *(see*CPLR 3016 [b]; *New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v St. Barnabas Community Health Plan, 22*AD3d 391 [2005]; *J.A.O. Acquisition Corp. v Stavitsky,*18 AD3d 389, 390-391 [2005]). Nor may plaintiff assert that she reasonably relied on defendants’ silence or any misrepresentation regarding whether the CIBC defendants’ job offer to Geller was contingent on plaintiff settling her dispute with him. She was an intelligent professional separately represented by counsel in the negotiations in this adversarial proceeding, and chose to forgo any discovery in the bankruptcy action, out of which arose the settlement of her claims seeking to enforce the divorce judgment *(see Kojovic v Goldman,*35 AD3d 65, 69-70 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 804 [2007]; *see also Cosh v Cosh,*45 AD3d 798 [2007]). Moreover, even if, arguendo, Geller had a duty to speak, CIBC clearly did not, as it was merely an adversary creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, and owed plaintiff no fiduciary duty *(see National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v Red Apple Group,*281 AD2d 296, 297 [2001]; *900 Unlimited v MCI Telecom. Corp.,*215 AD2d 227 [1995]).

Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the record establishes that in Geller’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding, to which plaintiff was a party, he revealed that a pending disputed arbitration against himself and CIBC, which he had listed as a contingent liability, would not exist following the dismissal of the bankruptcy. This put plaintiff on notice that the arbitration had been disposed of insofar as Geller was concerned, yet plaintiff neither opposed the motion nor sought any discovery as to the status of the arbitration.

The unjust enrichment cause of action was properly dismissed inasmuch as the settlement between Geller and plaintiff is a valid and enforceable contract which controls the rights of the parties as they relate to the instant dispute *(see Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co.,*70 NY2d 382, 388-389 [1987]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.
96-1271.

#### VFW 1238 v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm.

Huron App. No. H-95-065. Reported at 78 Ohio St.3d 1482, 678 N.E.2d 946. This cause came on for further consideration upon appellant’s motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration. Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion to withdraw motion for reconsideration be, and hereby is, granted.

Resnick, J., not participating.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Shearson Select Advisors Futures Fund L.P. (the ‘‘Partnership’’) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the ‘‘Report’’), I, Jerry Pascucci, President and Director of Citigroup Managed Futures LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|          |                                                                                                                       |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|          |                                                                                                                                                          |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2.  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership. |

/s/ Jerry Pascucci                             Jerry PascucciCitigroup Managed Futures LLCPresident and Director

March 30, 2007                                 Date

----
#### In the Matter of Katie Kickertz, Respondent, v New York University, Appellant.

Submitted December 3, 2012;

decided January 15, 2013

Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.
#### CHALMETTE OIL DISTRIBUTING CO., Inc., v. CHALMETTE PETROLEUM CORPORATION.

No. 409.

District Court, E. D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

Feb. 6, 1941.

Ed. J. De Verges and McCloskey & Benedict, all of New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Monroe & Lemann and Nicholas Callan, all of New Orleans, La., for defendant.

CAILLOUET, District Judge.

Under Rule 56 (c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, it is *only*when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”, that a sought-for summary judgment should be rendered.

In view of the fact that there is here a genuine issue as to the material facts alleged by the defendant in and under the closing paragraphs of its answer, whereon defendant predicates its prayer that the admittedly executed agreements “be set aside and that judgment be entered requiring the plaintiff to account to defendant for all earnings and profits made by virtue” thereof, a summary judgment should not be rendered, and the motion therefor is, accordingly, Denied; but the Court,- at the same time, in view of its examination of the pleadings and of the evidence before it, and of its interrogation of Counsel, concludes that there exists no substantial controversy as to all other material allegations of fact in the pleadings, and

It is, therefore, ordered that upon such trial as may hereafter follow in due course, the sole material facts in dispute shall be only such as are so alleged by the defendant as the basis for its prayer aforecited, and none other, and each and every other material fact alleged in the pleadings and as to which there so exists no substantial controversy shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,532-01

IN RE DIETRICK LEWIS JOHNSON SR, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NOS. 219-81234-2012; 219-81235-2012; 219-82905-2012

IN THE 219 DISTRICT COURT FROM COLLIN COUNTY th

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original

jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed applications for writs of habeas corpus in

the 219 District Court of Collin County, that more than 35 days have elapsed, and that the th

applications have not yet been forwarded to this Court.

In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. Respondent, the District Clerk of Collin

County, is ordered to file a response, which may be made by submitting the record on such habeas

corpus applications, submitting a copy of a timely filed order which designates issues to be

investigated (see McCree v. Hampton, 824 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), or stating that
2

Relator has not filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Collin County. Should the

response include an order designating issues, proof of the date the district attorney’s office was

served with the habeas application shall also be submitted with the response. This application for

leave to file a writ of mandamus shall be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted the

appropriate response. Such response shall be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order.

Filed: July 22, 2015

Do not publish
#### McCarthy et al. v. Schumacher et al.

District Court, S. D. New York.

Dec. 7, 1939.

Hunt, Hill & Betts, of New York City (William Logan, Jr., of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Debevoise, Stevenson, Plimpton & Page, of New York City (William E. Stevenson, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant Frank C. Nicodemus.

CONGER, District Judge.

This is a motion for a bill of particulars and the motion papers contain a demand for some 335 items, with respect to which it is stated that particulars should be granted. The defendant contends that he is unable to answer the complaint without these particulars. I have considered the particulars demanded in the light of what would be necessary to answer the complaint.

A great number of the particulars demand data that is obviously evidentiary in character and should not be granted. On the whole, the complaint is complete and the fact that the other two defendants have been able to answer, is some indication that it does not need a great deal of supplementation. I have gone through the papers carefully and, in my opinion, for the purposes of filing an answer, the following particulars should be granted:

(a) Demands numbered 14f, I5f, 16f, 17f, 18f, 22f, 23f, 24f, 25f, 29f, 32f, 33f, 53f, 54f. All of these relate facts and representations which are alleged to have been false and fraudulent, and the particulars request plaintiffs to “State the facts and representations which it is claimed were fraudulent, etc.” In view of Rule 9(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which requires that circumstances constituting fraud be stated with particularity, I think that the allegations contained in the complaint to which these particulars are addressed, should be amplified. There are other allegations of fraud, but I think that the particulars with respect to these other averments are sufficiently set forth in the complaint.

(b) Demands numbered 5a, b, c, 7, 32, 35a, 43d, 45a, 47a, 49a, 50a, 55a, b. One of defendant Nicodemus’ objections to the complaint is that it does not set forth with sufficient particularity the part which he is alleged to have played in the conspiracy for which plaintiffs seek to recover. The particulars set forth in these items should cure that defect, if it is a defect.

In general, the present motion is part of a practice which the new Rules sought to end. If the present particulars were allowed to any great extent, the result would be that the pleadings will be cluttered up with matters which properly should not be included within them.

Settle order on notice.
**Exhibit 31.1**CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002I, Anthony A. Cook, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report of DCP Holding Company (the “Company’) on Form 10-Qfor the period ending March 31, 2007;     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 12a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:          a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;          b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and          c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):          a) All significant deficiencies and material weakness in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and          b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:    May 14, 2007   Signature: /s/ Anthony A. Cook  Anthony A. Cook  Principal Executive Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### March 24, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 134491 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 134491 COA: 266170 St. Joseph CC: 03-011781-FC JEFFERY TODD BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 19, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.

s0317 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 24, 2008

Clerk
#### In the Matter of Katie Kickertz, Respondent, v New York University, Appellant.

Submitted December 17, 2012;

decided January 15, 2013

Motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal dismissed upon the ground that the Appellate Division order does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-3301-EM; Docket ID FEMA-2008-0018]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of an emergency declaration for the State of Arkansas (FEMA-3301-EM), dated January 28, 2009, and related determinations.

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         June 20, 2009.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator, under Executive Order 12148, as amended, Gerard M. Stolar, of FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal Coordinating Officer for this emergency.

This action terminates the appointment of W. Michael Moore as Federal Coordinating Officer for this emergency.

                        The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA);                               ( print page 31040)                            97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.                    

W. Craig Fugate,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. E9-15356 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
No. 03-15-00174-CV 

Levi Morin

Third Court of Appeals

Austin, Texas

v.

Law Office of Kleinhans 

Gruber, PLLC

Erratum to Brief of Appellant Levi Morin

On page 24 of Morin’s opening brief, the second paragraph opens 

with, “The affidavit ....” That sentence should read: 

The subpoena was false on its face and ineffective to demand compliance.

Respectfully submitted,

The Olson Firm PLLC

/s/ Leif A. Olson

Leif A. Olson

leif@olsonappeals.com

State Bar No. 24032801

PMB 188

4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300

Humble, Texas 77396

(281) 849-8382 

Counsel for Appellant Levi Morin

ACCEPTED

03-15-00174-CV

6157649

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/21/2015 1:49:50 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/21/2015 1:49:50 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
Case 03-15-00174-CV, Morin v. Kleinhans Gruber Page 2 of 2

Erratum to Brief of Appellant Levi Morin

Certificate of Service

On July 21, 2015, I served a copy of this Erratum to Brief of Appellant Levi Morin by electronic filing upon:

Law Office of Kleinhans Gruber, PLLC

Kimberly G. Kleinhans

kim@lawofficeofkg.com

700 Lavaca, Suite 1400

Austin, Texas 78701

Counsel for appellee

/s/ Leif A. Olson
EXHIBIT 23.1CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos.333-85866, 333-63855, 333-34197 and 333-34050) pertaining to the Atlantis Plastics, Inc. 2001Stock Option Plan, the Atlantis Plastics, Inc. 1998 Stock Option Plan, the Atlantis Plastics, Inc.1997 Stock Option Plan and the Atlantis Plastics, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan, respectively,of our report dated April 3, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements andschedule of Atlantis Plastics, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year endedDecember 31, 2006./s/ Ernst & Young LLPAtlanta, Georgia
Exhibit 10.27  March 10, 2005   Steven R. McCracken One SeaGate Toledo, Ohio 43666   Dear Steve:  Reference
is made to a certain letter agreement dated March 31, 2004 between you and
the Owens-Illinois, Inc. (the Company) setting forth the terms of your employment
as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.  1.Upon your
acceptance hereof, paragraph 5 of the Letter will be deemed to be amended to
read, in its entirety, as follows:  5. EmployeeBenefits and
Perquisites.  You will participate in
the Companys employee benefit plans (except for severance or incentive plans)
as in effect from time to time, including its health plan and life insurance
plan (collectively, the Employee Benefits), on the same basis as those
benefits are generally made available to other senior executives of the
Company.  You will be provided with four
weeks (20 days) per year of paid vacation. 
You will have use of a Company car and will be reimbursed for reasonable
fees paid for financial consulting.  You
will participate in the Companys supplemental retirement plan, with
accelerated vesting in order to meet the service requirements after five years
of service.  Provided
you earn at least five years of service with the Company, the retirement
benefit (annuity and/or lump sum) payable to you upon your retirement from the
Company under the Owens-Illinois Salary Retirement Plan and Supplemental
Retirement Benefit Plan (the Plans) would be calculated based on a Life
Annuity equal to the O-I Annuity Amount (as defined below).  Capitalized terms used herein without
definition shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Plans.  The
O-I Annuity Amount means an amount equal to the Calculated Annuity Amount (as
defined below) less the Offset Annuity Amount (as defined below).  The
Calculated Annuity Amount means a Life Annuity calculated upon your
retirement from the Company based on Years of Service equal to your Years of
Service with the Company, plus your years of service with your prior employer.  The
Offset Annuity Amount means a Life Annuity calculated by taking the monthly
annuity amount receivable by you from your prior employer as of April 1,
2004 and calculating the actuarial equivalent thereof on the date of your
retirement using (i) the Applicable Interest Rate and (ii) a remaining life
expectance at the time of retirement using the Applicable Mortality Table.  The O-I Annuity Amount would be used for the
calculation of benefits (annuity and/or lump sum) due to you upon your
retirement from the Company based on your Final Average Earnings with the
Company.


2.Except as
otherwise provided herein, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.  Sincerely,/s/
  James W. BaehrenBy: James W. BaehrenIts: Senior Vice
  PresidentAcknowledged and Agreed:/s/
  Steven R. McCrackenSteven R. McCracken
#### Deepak Trivedi, Appellant, v Robert Golub, Defendant, and Flushing Hospital Medical Center, Respondent.

Submitted January 14, 2013;

decided February 12, 2013

*1034Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied *[see*20 NY3d 984 (2012)].

Judge Rivera taking no part.