J-A05036-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LAW OFFICE OF BRUCE J. CHASAN, 

LLC AND BRUCE CHASAN, ESQUIRE 

Appellant

v.

FREUNSLICH & LITTMAN, LLC AND 

GREGORY LITTMAN, ESQUIRE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2928 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 00623 Feb. Term, 2015

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 29, 2018

Appellants Bruce J. Chasan, Esq. et al., (hereinafter Chasan) appeal

from the Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

on August 22, 2016, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees 

Gregory Littman, Esq. et al. (hereinafter Littman) and dismissing Chasan’s 

defamation action. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the pertinent facts and procedural history herein 

as follows: 

This is a defamation suit arising from the conduct of 

attorneys in the litigation of a separate matter, Govberg v. 

Feierstein, Philadelphia CCP no. 130704676. The allegedly 

defamatory statements were made in three letters written by 

Attorney Littman and sent to multiple third parties while the 

Govberg case was pending. Attorney Littman was plaintiffs' 

counsel, and Attorney Chasan represented defendant Edward 

Feierstein. It is undisputed that Attorney Littman made the
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statements, intended their apparent meaning, and meant them to 

apply to Attorney Chasan. It is further undisputed that the 

recipients of the letters understood the intended meanings of the

statements.

In the Govberg matter, Attorney Littman conducted a pre -

Complaint deposition of would-be defendant Mr. Feierstein. After 

the deposition, Attorney Chasan repeatedly urged Attorney 

Littman and his clients not to pursue the matter, saying it lacked 

merit. Attorney Littman's clients refused and filed a Complaint 

against Mr. Feierstein. Mr. Feierstein's Answer laid a counterclaim

against the plaintiffs and against Attorney Littman personally, 

suing for attorney's fees under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 2503(9) for 

vexatious filing of a baseless suit.

The February 5, 2014 letter (Dragonetti Notice) to 

Attorney Chasan

Shortly after the filing of the Govberg Answer, Attorney 

Littman sent a Dragonetti Notice to Attorney Chasan. The letter 

contained several allegations of misconduct and included the 

following statements:

1. the counterclaim brought by Attorney Chasan and his 

client was baseless, unlawful, and constituted 

wrongful use of civil proceedings;

2. Attorney Chasan and Mr. Feierstein were engaged in 

witness intimidation by using their counterclaim 

against Attorney Littman to discourage Attorney 

Littman's brother, Matthew Littman, from testifying 

against Mr. Feierstein in an upcoming, unrelated 

criminal trial for which Matthew Littman had been 

subpoenaed;

3. Attorney Littman had notified the Attorney General's 

Office of Attorney Chasan and Mr. Feierstein's 

"egregious and criminal offense" of witness 

intimidation;

4. Mr. Feierstein had claimed mental incompetence to 

stand trial in his criminal matter and had checked 

himself into a mental health facility, although he 

simultaneously continued to file and sign legal papers 

for the Govberg matter; Attorney Littman therefore 
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suspected that Mr. Feierstein was defrauding the 

criminal court and that Attorney Chasan was be 

knowingly participating in this conduct; and

5. that Attorney Chasan's actions violated the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, and the 

counterclaim was brought "with gross negligence, 

without probable cause and with the intention to 

annoy, forcing [Attorney Littman and his clients] to 

spend more time and money with [the Govberg] 

litigation, while attempting to intimidate a witness 

that will testify against Mr. Feierstein in his criminal 

trial," and that this conduct warranted a disciplinary 

report.

The letter instructed Attorney Chasan to withdraw the Govberg 

counterclaim within three days or be subject to an ethics 

complaint. The letter was carbon-copied to Deputy Attorneys 

General Kenneth McDaniels and Eric Schoenberg, the prosecutors 

in Mr. Feierstein's criminal trial; Bruce Castor, Esq., Mr. 

Feierstein's criminal defense attorney; James Schwartzman, Esq., 

an ethics attorney with whom Attorney Littman had consulted 

about the instant matter; and Attorney Littman's clients, the 

Govberg plaintiffs. Attorney Chasan and/or Mr. Feierstein declined 

to withdraw the Complaint.

The February 24, 2014 letter to Attorney Chasan

Three weeks later, Attorney Littman sent a second allegedly 

defamatory letter addressed to Attorney Chasan and copied to the 

same parties from the previous letter. The letter reiterated that 

Attorney Chasan was acting in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of 

Professional Conduct 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal. 

Furthermore, he alleged, Attorney Chasan's conduct was being 

used for illegitimate purposes to harass and intimidate others, it 

violated statutory law, and it disrespected the legal system and 

attorneys. He furthermore stated, "[I]f you continue to represent

Mr. Feierstein with the knowledge that he is defrauding the Court, 

you will leave me no choice [but to lodge an ethics complaint]."

The March 28, 2014 letter to the Court

One month later, Attorney Littman wrote a third letter 

allegedly defaming Attorney Chasan, this time addressed to the 
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Honorable Ellen Ceisler, the presiding judge in the Govberg case, 

and copied only to Attorney Chasan. The letter stated that 

Attorney Chasan and Mr. Feierstein were acting "in bad faith" in 

the Govberg matter, that Attorney Littman's attempts to resolve 

the issue with Attorney Chasan had been met with silence, that 

Mr. Feierstein had sued Attorney Littman personally for filing the 

Govberg suit, that Mr. Feierstein was alleging mental 

incompetence to stand trial in the contemporaneous Montgomery 

County criminal proceeding, and that Attorney Chasan was suing 

Attorney Littman for defamation due to Attorney Littman's copying 

of outside parties on the prior two letters. He furthermore 

requested a conference with the court and Attorney Chasan "so 

that this matter can be litigated without jeopardizing the integrity

of the Court." Attorney Littman also attached copies of the prior 

two letters to the Judge Ceisler letter.

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1Appellants and Appellees are suing in their personal capacity as 

individual attorneys and as their respective related professional 

entities/law practices. We refer to them herein as "Attorney 

Chasan" and "Attorney Littman," respectively, for clarity.

2 Appellants raised eight allegations of error in their 1925(b) 

Statement of Matters Complained on Appeal. However, for the

sake of relative brevity and due to the duplicative nature of certain 

allegations, we limit this Opinion to the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 

1925(a).

Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/30/17, at 1-4. 

In its Order entered on August 22, 2016, the trial court granted 

Littman’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Chasan’s claims with 

prejudice. On September 7, 2016, Chasan filed a timely notice of appeal with 

this Court. On September 9, 2016, the trial court ordered Chasan to file a 

concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal within twenty-one 

(21) days. Chasan filed the same on September 28, 2016, wherein he set 

forth the following eight issues: 
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1. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] on 

[Chasan’s] defamation complaint wherein the record included 

evidence to support each element on which [Chasan] bear[s] the 

burden of proof under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a), thus showing a 

disputed issue of material fact as to each element.

2. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] in 

the mistaken belief that it was necessary for [Chasan] to introduce 

expert testimony in support of the elements on which [Chasan]

bear[s] the burden of proof under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a).

3. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] 

when there were disputed issues of material fact as to truth of the 

alleged defamatory communications.

4. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] 

when there were disputed issues of material fact as to whether 

the letters authored by Attorney Littman were privileged.

5. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] 

when there were disputed issues of material fact as to whether 

the subject matter of the defamatory comments was a matter of 

public concern.

6. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman], 

relying on [Littman’s] beliefs and [Littman’s] advisor's belief and 

opinions, since the credibility of the movant's oral testimony is for 

the jury to determine.

7. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] 

when relying on [Littman’s] expert report, as the credibility of the 

expert is for the jury.

8. The court erred in granting summary judgment to [Littman] in 

relying on two October 2014 emails by Feierstein, which [Chasan]

had no role in composing or sending, and which were authored by 

Feierstein more than six months after [Littman] sent [the] 

defamatory communications, and were therefore irrelevant.

See [Chasan’s] Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of, filed 

9/28/16, at ¶¶ 1-8. 
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In his brief, Chasan presents the following two questions for this Court’s 

review:

1. Did the court err as a matter of law in holding that [Chasan] 

had insufficient evidence to show [Littman] published the 

defamatory statements with fault, i.e., with negligence and/or 

reckless disregard of their falsity?

2. Did the court err as a matter of law in holding that [Chasan] 

had insufficient evidence of damages to support a claim for 

defamation based on [Littman’s] publication of defamatory 

statements? 

[Chasan’s] Brief at 5. 

Before reaching Appellant’s claims raised on appeal, we must first 

determine whether they are properly before us. Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925 provides that a Rule 1925(b) statement “shall 

concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge 

with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in 

accordance with the provisions of this [Rule] are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii). Regarding Rule 1925(b), our Supreme Court has stated: 

Our jurisprudence is clear and well-settled, and firmly 

establishes that: Rule 1925(b) sets out a simple bright-line rule, 

which obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b) 

statement, when so ordered; any issues not raised in a Rule 

1925(b) statement will be deemed waived; the courts lack the 

authority to countenance deviations from the Rule's terms; the 

Rule's provisions are not subject to ad hoc exceptions or selective 

enforcement; appellants and their counsel are responsible for 

complying with the Rule's requirements; Rule 1925 violations may 

be raised by the appellate court sua sponte, and the Rule applies 
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notwithstanding an appellee's request not to enforce it; and, if 

Rule 1925 is not clear as to what is required of an appellant, onthe-record actions taken by the appellant aimed at compliance 

may satisfy the Rule.13 We yet again repeat the principle first 

stated in Lord that must be applied here: “[I]n order to preserve 

their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply 

whenever the trial court orders them to file a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues 

not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed 

waived.” [Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 2011)].

Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 427, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011) (footnote 

omitted).

This Court also has considered the question of what constitutes a 

sufficient 1925(b) statement on many occasions, and it is well-established 

that “Appellant's concise statement must properly specify the error to be 

addressed on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 2011 PA Super 129, 24 

A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 

(2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific 

enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes 

to raise on appeal.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation 

omitted). In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa.Super. 2013). Moreover, “[a] 

theory of error different from that presented to the trial jurist is waived on

appeal, even if both theories support the same basic allegation of error which 

gives rise to the claim for relief.” Commonwealth v. Ryan, 909 A.2d 839, 

845 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 714, 951 A.2d 

1163 (2008).
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 In his appellate brief, Chasan contends the trial court erred in finding 

the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defamatory statements had 

been published with fault and that there had been insufficient evidence of 

damages to support Littman’s defamation claims. However, while he

presented a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in paragraph one of

his concise statement, the claim is a general one pertaining the evidence to 

support “each element on which [Littman] bear[s] the burden of proof under 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8343(a).” See concise statement, supra, at ¶1. That statute 

lists seven (7) issues which a plaintiff has the burden of proving in a 

defamation action. It is well-established that “[i]n order to preserve a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule 

1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon 

which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient.” 

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013). While the 

trial court herein ultimately granted Littman’s motion for summary judgment 

upon finding that Chasan had failed to provide sufficient evidence of fault or 

damages to prove a defamation or defamation per se claim, see Trial Court 

Opinion, filed 6/30/17, at 4, the fact that a trial court addressed an appellant’s 

sufficiency claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion is of no moment to a waiver 

analysis. Commonwelth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.Super. 2009), 

appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010). 
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 Here, Chasan failed to identify specifically in his concise statement how 

the evidence had been insufficient to satisfy any of the elements necessary to 

establish a defamation claim. Moreover, Appellant’s claims raised in his 

appellate brief are not subsumed in the remaining seven issues presented in 

his concise statement. Because only claims properly presented before the trial 

court are preserved for appeal, and Chasan’s sufficiency of the evidence

challenge in his Rule 1925(b) statement not only was vague but also did not

mention publication with negligence and/or reckless disregard or refer to 

damages, his contentions in his appellate brief concerning those statements

are waived. See Hansley and Ryan, supra. 

Order affirmed.1 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/18

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1 We may affirm the trial court's order on any valid basis. Plasticert, Inc. v. 

Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa.Super. 2007).