No

No. 98-070

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 176

IN THE MATTER OF A.P., 

A Youth in Need of Care.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth 

Judicial District,

In and for the County of Cascade,

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding.

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COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Terryl Healy, Cut Bank, Montana

For Respondent:

Bethany F. Schendel, Great Falls, Montana; Patrick Watt, Jardine, Stephensen, Blewett & 

Weaver, Great Falls, Montana; Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Sarah A. Bond, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, 

Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: June 11, 1998

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Decided: July 16, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ This is an appeal from the December 8, 1997 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 

and Order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying the 

motion of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Community 

Council (Tribes) to transfer jurisdiction of this matter to the Fort Belknap Tribal 

Court (Tribal Court). We affirm the decision of the District Court.

Background

¶ A.P. was born in Great Falls, Montana, on March 27, 1995. He and his biological 

mother, J.P., were domiciled in and residents of Great Falls. Great Falls is not 

located within the exterior boundaries of any Indian reservation. A.P.'s father has 

had no contact with the child or his mother since A.P. was born. J.P. is listed as onehalf "Indian" in the Fort Belknap Tribal enrollment book; other evidence presented 

to the District Court indicates that she is part Assiniboine. 

¶ Whether A.P. is eligible for tribal membership, and is, thus, an "Indian Child" for 

purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, is in 

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dispute. According to Bureau of Indian Affairs records, A.P. is not eligible for 

enrollment in the Fort Belknap Indian Community. A Tribal historian, however, 

testified that A.P. may be enrollable as either an Assiniboine or as a Gros Ventre by 

reason of his quantum of Indian blood. The Tribes' motion to transfer alleges that A.

P. is eligible for enrollment in the Assiniboine Tribe. For purposes of our decision 

here, we assume, arguendo, that A.P. is eligible for membership in one of these tribes 

and is, thus, an "Indian Child" for purposes of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). See 

also Adoption of Riffle (1995), 273 Mont. 237, 242, 902 P.2d 542, 545 (Riffle I) (tribe is 

the ultimate authority on eligibility for tribal membership).

¶ In September 1995, based upon information that A.P. was in danger as a result of J.

P.’s long-standing chemical abuse problems, the Montana Department of Public 

Health and Human Services (DPHHS) obtained an order for temporary investigative 

authority (TIA) and custody from the District Court. DPHHS notified the Tribes of 

these proceedings in accordance with the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), and counsel 

was appointed for J.P., 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b). Counsel was also appointed for A.P.

¶ DPHHS maintained custody of A.P. and worked with J.P. in an attempt to 

reconcile mother and child. Ultimately, however, J.P. was unable to complete her 

treatment plan. Various court proceedings with respect to A.P. occurred between 

September 1995 and before the closing of the case on DPHHS's petition for 

permanent custody and approval of preadoptive placement on June 9, 1997. 

Specifically, there was a show cause hearing on September 27, 1995, with respect to 

continuing the TIA; there was an adjudicatory hearing on the state's petition for 

legal custody on April 25, 1996; there was a hearing on October 22, 1996, to 

terminate A.P.'s father's parental rights and to terminate J.P.'s parental rights, the 

latter by consent; and the permanent custody award and permanency plan were set 

for review on June 5, 1997. On June 9, 1997, the court issued its written order 

awarding the state permanent legal custody and closing the matter, acknowledging 

that DPHHS had made an appropriate plan for A.P.'s permanency.

¶ The Tribes were given timely notice of each proceeding in accordance with 25 U.S.

C. § 1912(a). Furthermore, the Tribes received copies of the various petitions and 

motions filed in the state court proceedings along with copies of the District Court's 

orders resulting therefrom. Notwithstanding, the Tribes did not move to transfer A.

P.'s case to Tribal Court, did not move to intervene, and did not appear or file 

documents in any of these proceedings prior to the court's June 9, 1997 order. On 

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July 7, 1997, however, approximately one month after the case was closed and 

twenty-two months after first receiving notice of the proceedings involving A.P., the 

Tribes first appeared, moving to transfer A.P.’s case to Tribal Court under the 

ICWA.

¶ Apart from the proceedings in District Court, once custody had been awarded to 

DPHHS, this agency exercised its authority to make administrative placement 

decisions for A.P. In accordance with the placement preferences and spirit of the 

ICWA, DPHHS worked with the Tribes to attempt placement on the reservation and 

in accordance with J.P.’s wishes. In March 1997, DPHHS placed A.P. with a Fort 

Belknap Reservation family in accordance with the Tribes’ request. That placement 

failed when the family requested that the State remove A.P. from their home. The 

Tribes offered no other appropriate placements on the reservation.

¶ Finally, in the summer of 1997, A.P. was placed with his fifth and, thus far, last 

placement. A.P.’s present placement is with an Indian custodian and her husband 

who reside in Great Falls. The Indian custodian intervened in these proceedings in 

October 1997. The Indian custodian is a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of the 

Chippewa Tribe, and she has contacted the Tribes to attempt to enroll A.P. in his 

Tribe. The Indian custodian testified in District Court that, as an Indian, she 

understands the need for A.P. to be raised to appreciate his affiliation with the Gros 

Ventre Tribe and she has testified that she will maintain ties with the Fort Belknap 

Reservation and raise A.P. to understand the culture of the Tribes of which he is a 

part. A.P. remains with this family in Great Falls. It appears that they are providing 

a secure and loving home for him and that he is thriving.

¶ The instant appeal is from the District Court’s denial of the Tribes' July 7, 1997 

motion to transfer which was followed by a jurisdictional hearing held over three 

days on October 14, October 30 and November 13, 1997. In summary, 25 U.S.C. § 

1911(b) of the ICWA allows the tribe of an Indian child to move to transfer state 

court foster care placement and parental rights termination proceedings to tribal 

court. This statute provides that the tribal court is the preferred forum, but allows a 

state court to refuse to transfer based on a showing that good cause exists not to 

transfer, based upon objection by either parent or based upon declination by the 

tribal court.

¶ In the case at bar, the District Court found that it was not in A.P.'s best interests to 

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transfer his case. The court concluded that § 1911(b) did not apply as there was no 

state court proceeding when the Tribes’ transfer motion was filed; because the 

Tribes' transfer motion was not filed during a foster care placement of or 

termination of parental rights proceeding; and because this section is not applicable 

to a preadoptive placement proceeding. From the District Court's denial of the 

Tribes’ motion to transfer, this appeal followed.

Issues

¶ The issues on appeal, as framed by the State, are as follows:

¶ 1. Did the District Court correctly conclude that 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of the ICWA 

does not provide for transfer to tribal court of a state administrative preadoptive 

placement occurring after state court proceedings had closed and parental rights had 

terminated?

¶ 2. If 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) of the ICWA is applicable, did the court correctly 

conclude that good cause existed not to transfer jurisdiction because the proceedings, 

having commenced two years earlier and having closed one month prior to the 

motion to transfer, were at an advanced stage?

¶ 3. Did the District Court correctly apply this Court’s rule in In the Matter of T.S. 

(1990), 245 Mont. 242, 801 P.2d 77, and In the Matter of M.E.M. (1984), 209 Mont. 

192, 679 P.2d 1241, in considering the best interests of the child as modified by the 

considerations listed in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines, to find that it was 

not in the child’s best interests to transfer?

¶ Since our discussion of Issue 1 is dispositive, we decline to address Issues 2 or 3.

Standard of Review

¶ The issues raised in this case involve questions of law. We review a district court’s 

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conclusions of law simply to determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law 

is correct. Adoption of Riffle (1996), 277 Mont. 388, 391, 922 P.2d 510, 512 (Riffle II).

Discussion

¶ For purposes of our discussion, it is important to bear in mind that the progression 

of A.P.'s case involved different state court proceedings, each with its own statutory 

requirements. With its September 1995 petition for TIA, DPHHS proceeded under § 

41-3-404, MCA, and obtained temporary custody in April 1996. The agency then 

proceeded under §§ 41-3-601 to -612, MCA, for termination of parental rights and 

for permanent custody. On June 5, 1997, the court reviewed DPHHS permanency 

plan for A.P., closed the final case petition for permanent custody, and approved 

DPHHS to proceed with adoption and preadoptive placements. Following this order, 

the agency placed A.P. in a preadoptive placement with his present Indian custodian 

and her husband.

¶ These distinctions are important in our determination of whether the requirements 

of the ICWA have been met as regards the particular state court proceedings at 

issue. See M.E.M., 209 Mont. 192, 679 P.2d 1241; Riffle II, 277 Mont. 388, 922 P.2d 

510.

¶ In relevant part, 25 U.S.C. § 1911, provides:

(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court

In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination 

of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the 

reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause 

to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, 

absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the 

Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall 

be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.

As can be seen from the plain language of this statute, state court proceedings are required 

to be transferred to tribal jurisdiction where "foster care placement" or "termination of 

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parental rights" is the matter at issue. As noted by the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band 

of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989), 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29:

At the heart of the ICWA are its provisions concerning jurisdiction over 

Indian child custody proceedings. Section 1911 lays out a dual jurisdictional 

scheme. . . . Section 1911(b) . . . creates concurrent but presumptively tribal 

jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the reservation: on 

petition of either parent or the tribe, state-court proceedings for foster care 

placement or termination of parental rights are to be transferred to the tribal 

court, except in cases of "good cause," objection by either parent, or 

declination of jurisdiction by the tribal court.

Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).

¶ Foster care placement is defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) and involves temporary 

placement of the child "but where parental rights have not been terminated." 

Section 1903(1)(ii) defines termination of parental rights as "any action resulting in 

the termination of the parent-child relationship." Accordingly, under § 1911(b), the 

ICWA provides only for transfer of state court proceedings prior to termination of 

parental rights.

¶ In the instant case, prior to the termination of parental rights, there was no petition 

by either of A.P.'s parents for transfer of the state court proceedings to Tribal Court. 

Moreover, there was no challenge or objection by A.P.'s parents or the Tribes to such 

proceedings taking place in state court, to the temporary and permanent custody 

orders or to the termination of parental rights order issued by the court in October 

1996. Indeed, the Tribes effectively declined transfer of jurisdiction by failing to 

request transfer in the state court proceedings under § 1911(b) and by failing to 

intervene under § 1911(c) despite being given actual notice of the proceedings. 

¶ By the time the Tribes first appeared and moved to transfer, A.P.'s case had 

progressed to the point where his parents' rights had been terminated and to the 

point where custody had been permanently placed with DPHHS with approval for 

preadoptive placements and adoption. In fact, state court proceedings had 

terminated altogether before the Tribes' motion was filed. Accordingly, we conclude 

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that the District Court correctly determined that § 1911(b) did not apply to the 

Tribes' transfer motion because, at the time it was filed, there was no ongoing state 

court proceeding for foster care placement or termination of parental rights. 

¶ Rather, what was extant at the time the Tribes' motion to transfer was filed was A.

P.'s preadoptive placement with the Indian custodian and her husband. Section 1903

(1)(iii) defines "preadoptive placement" as "the temporary placement of an Indian 

child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior 

to or in lieu of adoptive placement. [Emphasis added.]" The District Court concluded 

that § 1911(b) does not apply to preadoptive placement proceedings. We agree.

¶ Our prior cases involving preadoptive and adoptive placements have involved only 

the intervention and placement preference provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1915, rather 

than transfer issues. See e.g., Riffle II, 277 Mont at 392, 922 P.2d at 513; Matter of 

Baby Girl Jane Doe (1993), 262 Mont. 380, 385-86, 865 P.2d 1090, 1093. Other courts 

faced with this question, however, have concluded that § 1911(b) only applies to 

foster care placements and termination of parental rights proceedings. See Matter of 

J.B. (Okla.App. 1995), 900 P.2d 1014 (transfer authority under § 1911(b) is limited to 

proceedings for "foster care placement" and "termination of parental rights" and 

not to "preadoptive placements" as § 1903(1) defines those terms); Matter of Ashley 

Elizabeth R. (N.M.App. 1993), 863 P.2d 451 (since children were neither residents nor 

domiciled on the reservation, § 1911(b) applies to the tribe's motion to transfer the 

foster care placement at issue).

¶ The Tribes argue that we should disregard the plain language of § 1911(b), and, 

because § 1911(c) empowers a tribe to intervene "at any point in the proceedings," 

that we should allow the motion to transfer despite the fact that the foster care 

placement proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings were 

completed prior to the motion being filed. We decline to do so. 

¶ We have stated that a tribe's right to intervene in a proceeding is not impaired if it 

does not intervene promptly after receiving notice. Riffle I, 273 Mont. at 241, 902 

P.2d at 544. However, timeliness aside, the Tribes' argument fails to recognize the 

fundamental difference between transferring a case to an entirely different court 

system, on the one hand, and granting participation by way of intervention in 

ongoing proceedings in the state court that already has had a substantial and lengthy 

involvement in various aspects of the case, on the other. As discussed in the BIA 

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guidelines at 44 Fed. Reg. 67590 (1979):

This section specifies that requests are to be made promptly after receiving 

notice of the proceeding. . . . While the Act permits intervention at any point 

in the proceeding, it does not explicitly authorize transfer requests at any time. 

Late interventions do not have nearly the disruptive effect on the proceeding 

that last minute transfers do. A case that is almost completed does not need to 

be retried when intervention is permitted. . . . Although the Act does not 

explicitly require transfer petitions to be timely, it does authorize the court to 

refuse to transfer a case for good cause. When a party who could have 

petitioned earlier waits until the case is almost complete to ask that it be 

transferred to another court and retried, good cause exists to deny the request.

See also People in Interest of J.J. and S.J. (S.D.1990), 454 N.W.2d 317 (tribal motion to 

intervene in an extant proceeding was granted; but appropriate, though untimely, § 1911

(b) motion to transfer was denied because, citing the BIA guidelines, intervention is far 

different than transfer and would subject children to potentially dangerous situations and 

not be in their best interest). 

¶ Here, as to the foster care placements and termination of parental rights, A.P.'s 

case was not "almost completed," but, rather, these proceedings had been completed 

and closed for a month when the Tribes' transfer motion was filed. Even if § 1911(b) 

allowed transfer at that point in time (which it does not), the disruptive effect of 

transfer to an entirely new court system for more litigation and possible retrial is 

manifest and is hardly in the best interest of the parents or the child.

¶ We conclude that the District Court properly denied the Tribes' § 1911(b) transfer 

motion inasmuch as it was filed at a time when there was no foster care placement 

nor termination of parental rights proceedings before the court, those proceedings 

having been completed. Moreover, we conclude that, in the context of a preadoptive 

placement following the termination of parental rights, the court properly 

determined that § 1911(b) is inapplicable. Accordingly, we hold that the District 

Court's denial of the Tribes' motion to transfer jurisdiction of A.P.'s case to Tribal 

Court was correct as a matter of law.

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¶ Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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