IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1430

Filed May 11, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEPHANIE MARIE FATLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, James M. Drew, 

Judge.

Defendant appeals her convictions for two counts of child endangerment 

resulting in bodily injury. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED 

AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli Huser, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Defendant Stephanie Fatland appeals her convictions for two counts of 

child endangerment resulting in bodily injury. We determine the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing conditions prohibiting Fatland from having 

unsupervised contact with children under the age of five and becoming pregnant 

while on probation. We vacate her sentences and remand to the district court for 

resentencing as directed in this opinion.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Fatland was charged with three counts of child endangerment resulting in 

serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(5) (2013), class “C” 

felonies. The State alleged Fatland had shaken her five-month-old baby on three 

occasions, causing injury to the child. Fatland entered into a plea agreement in 

which she pled guilty to two counts of child endangerment resulting in bodily 

injury, in violation of section 726.6(6), class “D” felonies. The State agreed to 

dismiss the third charge of child endangerment and to stand silent at sentencing.

The district court accepted Fatland’s guilty pleas. The court sentenced 

her to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years on each count, to be 

served consecutively. The court then suspended the sentences and placed 

Fatland on probation for a period of five years with the conditions, “Shall have no 

unsupervised contact with children under the age of 5 years,” and “Shall not 

become pregnant while on probation.”

Fatland filed a Motion to Reconsider a Condition of Probation, stating the 

court had improperly infringed upon her fundamental right to bear children by the 

condition on her probation prohibiting her from becoming pregnant. The court 
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denied the motion, finding “temporarily prohibiting the defendant from becoming 

pregnant is directly related to the defendant’s criminal conduct and her 

rehabilitative needs.” Fatland now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“When a defendant challenges the terms of probation, ‘[i]t has long been a 

well-settled rule that trial courts have a broad discretion in probation matters 

which will be interfered with only upon a finding of abuse of that discretion.’” 

State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). “[O]ur task 

on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to 

determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 445.

III. Conditions of Probation

A. Fatland first claims the district court abused its discretion by 

prohibiting her from having “unsupervised contact with children under the age of 

5 years.” She states the restriction is unnecessarily restrictive because it does 

not provide an exception for unintended, incidental, or innocuous contact. 

Fatland states the restriction would prohibit her from most everyday activities, 

such as going to the store, because a child under the age of five might be 

present.

In State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 2010), a probation 

condition was imposed on a defendant ordering him to “have no contact with 

anyone under the age of 18 without the permission of his supervising officer.” 

The Iowa Supreme court noted, “[t]he legislature has given the courts broad, but 

not unlimited, authority in establishing the conditions of probation.” Lathrop, 781 

N.W.2d at 298–99. A condition of probation should be “reasonably related to the 
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crime of which defendant was convicted or to future criminality,” and at the same 

time not be unnecessarily harsh or excessive. Id. at 299. The court concluded 

the probation condition was unreasonable and stated:

We vacate the no-contact condition of the defendant’s probation, 

and remand this case to the district court for the opportunity to 

fashion a more realistic and precise condition on the defendant’s 

probation that would ensure he does not have contact with minors 

in situations that would jeopardize the safety of the community and 

the defendant’s rehabilitation.

Id. at 301.

In State v. Hall, 740 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007), a probation 

condition was imposed prohibiting the defendant from being “in the immediate 

vicinity of locations where children are normally found,” and he was ordered to 

“have no contact with minors [with the] exception [of] incidental contact in public 

places where other responsible adults are present.” We found:

We disagree with Hall’s assertion that the restriction on 

contact with minors would prevent him from going to public places 

where children are present because the restriction contains an 

exception for “incidental contact in public places where other 

responsible adults are present.” We find the prohibition against 

being “in the immediate vicinity of locations where children are 

normally found,” with an exception for incidental contact, is neither 

an overbroad nor unreasonable condition of Hall’s probation.

Hall, 740 N.W.2d at 204. We found, however, the probation condition was 

ambiguous concerning communication with minors, and possibly excessively 

broad, because there was no exception for incidental communication with 

minors. Id. at 205. We remanded to the district court for “clarification of the 

restriction on communication with minors to allow an exception for incidental 

communication with minors where other responsible adults are present.” Id.
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We vacate the condition on Fatland’s probation prohibiting her from having 

unsupervised contact with children under the age of five years. We remand to 

the district court for resentencing in order to create a more realistic and precise 

condition on her probation regarding contact with young children. The condition 

should not jeopardize the safety of the community and her rehabilitation, but at 

the same time, it should not be overbroad and unduly restrictive of her freedom 

and autonomy. See Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d at 301. The condition should contain 

an exception for “incidental contact in public places where other responsible 

adults are present.” See Hall, 740 N.W.2d at 204.

B. Fatland claims the condition on her probation prohibiting her from 

becoming pregnant while she is on probation violates a constitutionally protected 

fundamental right. The State agrees this probation condition is unreasonable. 

See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding a 

condition prohibiting a defendant from getting pregnant during the term of her 

probation was unlawful and must be stricken); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 

10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding a condition of probation prohibiting 

defendant from becoming pregnant was invalid because the condition was not 

reasonably related to future criminality); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290–

91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating a condition of probation prohibiting defendant 

from becoming pregnant, finding the condition “excessively impinges upon her 

privacy right of procreation and serves no discernible rehabilitative purpose”); 

State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (finding the probation 

condition ordering the defendant to refrain from becoming pregnant should be 

stricken because it unduly intruded upon her right to privacy); State v. Livingston, 
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372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (finding a condition prohibiting 

defendant from having another child during the five-year probationary period was 

void because it was unconstitutional and an unreasonable burden); but see State 

v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding a condition of probation 

requiring a defendant to complete drug counseling and anger management 

treatment before fathering any children should be upheld because it did not 

impose a total ban on his reproductive rights); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 

212–13 (Wis. 2001) (upholding a condition prohibiting a defendant from fathering 

any more children until he demonstrated he had the ability to support them and 

was supporting the children he already had, finding the condition was reasonable 

and not overly broad as it was less restrictive than incarceration).

We determine the condition prohibiting Fatland from becoming pregnant 

while on probation should be eliminated from the sentencing order. The 

condition impinges upon her fundamental right to procreation. See Catholic 

Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Iowa 1975) (Reynoldson, J., 

concurring specially) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 

existence and survival of the race.” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 

541 (1942))).

We affirm Fatland’s convictions for child endangerment causing bodily 

injury. We vacate the sentencing order and remand to the district court for 

resentencing as directed in this opinion.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE 

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.