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Filed 7/22/15 P. v. Thomson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLES D. THOMSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A142906

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. SC079611)

Appellant, Charles D. Thomson, appeals from a judgment convicting him of 

embezzlement of personal property entrusted to him by another (Pen. Code, § 506),

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entered on his plea of no contest and admission of an allegation that the property taken 

had a value exceeding $65,000. (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1).) His court-appointed counsel 

has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to independently review the 

record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant’s counsel served 

him a copy of the Wende brief and informed him of his right to personally file a 

supplemental brief within 30 days raising any issue he wishes to call to the attention of 

this court. Appellant has filed such a brief, which has been read and considered by the 

court.

FACTS

As prior to sentencing the trial court conducted no evidentiary hearing, we take the 

facts from the probation officer’s report.

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Appellant, who is 55 years old, has no criminal history. In 1993 and 1994, while 

he was the executor of his deceased stepfather’s estate, he wrote multiple checks from the 

estate to each of his siblings totaling $87,076. In April 1994, he filed a false accounting 

of the estate and in June 1995, when an investigation was commenced, he fled the 

country and started a family in the Czech Republic, where he taught English and 

Business Administration for about 10 years. In 2004, he relocated to Taiwan where he 

taught English until his arrest and extradition to the United States in June 2013. 

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On December 4, 2013, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a five-count 

information charging appellant with two counts of embezzling private property (Pen. 

Code, § 506) and single counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), perjury (§ 118), and 

preparing false instruments. (§ 115, subd. (a).) Additionally, with respect to the two 

embezzlement counts, a great taking enhancement was alleged pursuant to section 12022, 

subdivision (a). On April 1, 2014, with respect to the first embezzlement count, that 

allegation was amended to specially allege that the value of the personal property taken 

exceeded the value of $65,000. (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1).)

Also on April 1, 2014, appellant plead no contest to the first embezzlement count 

and admitted the allegation pursuant to section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). In return for 

the plea, the district attorney dismissed the remaining counts and allegations and agreed 

that appellant would receive a sentence of no more than two years (§ 1170, subd. (h)), 

and that restitution of not less than $65,000 would be awarded. Appellant waived his 

rights under People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

At the time of sentencing, appellant resided in Oregon. The probation report 

stated that he was separated from his wife who remains in the Czech Republic with their 

two teenage children. The report also stated that appellant had accepted “partial 

responsibility” for the embezzlement. At the time, he believed that as executor of the 

estate he was entitled to the amounts distributed to him and the other heirs without the 

court’s approval; although he subsequently realized such approval was required. 

Appellant did not intend to steal the funds and stated that if he had he would have taken 
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the entire estate. He also said he distributed much of the monies to himself to prevent his 

stepfather’s widow, Andrea Laird, from receiving her share of the estate because she had 

mismanaged the sale of the stepfather’s Woodside property. Appellant also pointed out

that he was never in hiding when he lived abroad and “did not believe there would be any 

reason for a warrant against him.” 

Prior to sentencing, appellant had made no reimbursement payments and told the 

probation officer he would have difficulty repaying the large amount he expected the 

court would require. 

On May 30, 2014, the district attorney filed a sentencing memorandum requesting 

that appellant be ordered to pay $159,701.94 in direct victim restitution to Andrea Laird. 

Appellant filed a sentencing memorandum contending that the amount recommended by 

the district attorney should be reduced by $17,125.65, so that he should pay $142,576.29

in victim restitution. The claim for this reduction was based on an order in the probate 

proceedings. Appellant also said the restitution payment should be made to the estate of 

George Thomson, not to Andrea Laird, his widow, as recommended in the probation 

report.

At the sentencing hearing that took place on July 10, 2014, the court denied 

probation and imposed the agreed upon two-year sentence, which was the midterm for 

the offense, and ordered that the sentence would be served in county jail pursuant to 

section 1170, subdivision (h). The specially alleged enhancement was stayed and 

appellant was given credit for 27 days actually served and 26 days for good conduct. As 

to restitution, the court rejected appellant’s request that payment be made to the estate 

rather than Andrea Laird. After the district attorney claimed for the first time that the 

$159,701.65 in restitution payable to Andrea Laird should be subject to an interest rate of 

10 percent pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G),

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the issue of direct victim 

restitution was bifurcated to be heard at a later date.

 

2 As material, that provision states that: “The court shall order full restitution 

unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states them on 

the record. . . . [T]he restitution order shall . . . be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to 
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On July 21, 2014, the district attorney filed another restitution memorandum 

acknowledging that Laird, the primary victim, had agreed to restitution at an interest rate 

of two percent per year rather than the 10 percent allowed by the statute, and waived any 

interest that might accrue after the date of sentencing. Thus, the amount the district 

attorney sought on Laird’s behalf, which only included interest at two percent on 

$159,701.65 that had accrued prior to sentencing, was $232,655.57. 

At the restitution hearing on July 30, 2014, appellant was ordered to pay Laird that 

amount. As indicated (see ante, p. 3, fn. 2), section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G) requires 

the court to order full restitution—which includes “interest, at the rate of 10 percent per 

annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing”—“unless it finds compelling and 

extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states them on the record.” At the hearing, the 

court indicated for the record that it found compelling and extraordinary reasons for 

reducing interest from 10 percent to two percent per annum in the unusual fact that the 

victim and the prosecution stipulated to the lower figure. 

In his supplemental brief, appellant maintains that the trial court failed to consider 

the value of a significant asset of his stepfather’s estate, a property known as 20555 

Skyline Boulevard in Woodside, California. According to appellant, “[t]his asset was not 

considered in the calculation carried out by the San Mateo court that determined the 

amount of assets received by Andrea Laird and the corresponding restitution owed to 

Andrea Laird from [appellant].”

DISCUSSION

Because appellant pled no contest and admitted the enhancement allegation, the 

scope of reviewable issues is restricted to matters based on constitutional, jurisdictional, 

or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings leading to the plea; guilt or 

innocence not included. (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.)

 

fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as a 

result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, all of the 

following: [i]nterest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of 

sentencing or loss, as determined by the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(G), italics added.)
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It is questionable whether appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider 

the value of an asset of his stepfather’s estate that passed to Andrea Laird, which would 

have reduced the amount of compensatory restitution he was required to pay Laird, is 

reviewable, as this matter does not appear to relate to the legality of the proceedings 

leading to his plea. In any case, the matter is clearly unreviewable for another reason. 

Appellant says that the facts supporting his restitution claim “are available as a matter of 

public record.” Appellant does not identify the “public record” he has in mind, but it is 

not the record in this case, which contains no reference to the property known as 20555 

Skyline Boulevard.”

“ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments 

and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, 

and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate 

practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.” [Citation.] 

[Citations.] ‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for 

meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be 

affirmed.’ [Citations.]” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 

Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) The record appellant has presented does not provide a basis 

upon which we could confidently determine his restitution claim, even assuming that 

issue relates to the proceedings that led to his plea.

The admonitions given to appellant at the time he entered his plea and made his 

admission fully conformed with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 

238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, and appellant’s waiver of rights as knowing and 

voluntary.

Appellant was at all times represented by competent counsel who assiduously 

protected his rights and interests.

The record provides a factual basis for the plea.

The sentence imposed, including the restitution order, is authorized by law. 
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DISPOSITION

Our independent review having revealed no arguable issues, the judgment, 

including the sentence imposed, is affirmed.
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_________________________

Kline, P. J.

We concur:

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Richman, J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.

People v. Thomson (A142906)
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