An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-358

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 16 September 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

Randolph County

Nos. 12 JT 33-36

R.J.C.M., R.J.M.,

T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr.

Appeal by respondent from orders entered 18 November 2013

and 20 December 2013 by Judge James P. Hill in Randolph County 

District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2014.

No brief for petitioner-appellee Randolph County Department 

of Social Services.

Edward Eldred Attorney at Law, PLLC, by Edward Eldred, for 

respondent-appellant.

Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Kari R. Johnson, for 

guardian ad litem.

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.

Respondent, the father of the juveniles R.J.C.M., R.J.M., 

T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr., appeals from orders terminating his 

parental rights. After careful review, we affirm. 

Background
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On 13 February 2012, the Randolph County Department of 

Social Services (“DSS”) filed petitions alleging that R.J.C.M., 

R.J.M., T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr. were neglected and dependent 

juveniles. DSS stated that respondent and the mother had 

engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the juveniles; 

the mother had left the juveniles alone in their home without 

proper supervision on multiple occasions; and respondent and the 

mother had cared for the juveniles while under the influence of 

illegal substances. Additionally, on 13 February 2012, the 

mother was admitted to the hospital due to suicidal ideations. 

While in the hospital, she tested positive for benzodiazepines, 

cocaine, marijuana, and methadone. Upon the mother’s admission 

to the hospital, the juveniles were placed with relatives 

because respondent admitted to DSS that he could not care for 

the children. The relatives, however, were unable to care for 

the juveniles, and neither respondent nor the mother was able to 

provide alternative child care arrangements for DSS’s 

consideration. The juveniles were taken into non-secure custody 

and were subsequently adjudicated neglected and dependent. 

On 29 January 2013, the trial court ceased reunification 

efforts. On 22 March 2013, DSS filed motions to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. On 18 November 2013, the trial 
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court entered an adjudicatory order in which it determined that 

grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), 

(2), and (3) (2013) to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

The trial court further concluded that grounds existed to 

terminate the mother’s parental rights. On 20 December 2013, 

the trial court entered a dispositional order in which it 

concluded that it was in the best interests of the juveniles 

that respondent’s and the mother’s parental rights be 

terminated. The trial court therefore terminated their parental 

rights. Respondent appeals.

Discussion

Respondent’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief on 

respondent’s behalf in which he states that he has “conducted a 

conscientious and thorough” review of the record and trial 

transcript and was “unable to identify any issues of merit on 

which to base an argument for relief.” Consequently, counsel 

conceded that he could not in “good faith” argue that the trial 

court erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d), 

he requests that this Court conduct an independent examination 

of the case. In accordance with Rule 3.1(d), counsel wrote 

respondent a letter on 28 April 2014 advising him of counsel’s 
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inability to find error, his filing of a “no-merit” brief, and 

of respondent’s right to file his own arguments directly with 

this Court within thirty days of the date of the filing of the 

no-merit brief. Respondent has not filed his own written 

arguments.

In addition to seeking review pursuant to Rule 3.1(d), 

counsel directs our attention to potential issues with regard to 

certain of the trial court’s conclusions that grounds existed to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights. However, counsel 

acknowledges that any one ground is sufficient to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. See In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 

57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990) (noting that a finding of 

any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to 

support termination). Counsel concedes that he cannot in good 

faith argue that all three grounds found by the trial court to 

support termination of respondent’s parental rights were

erroneous. 

Conclusion

After carefully reviewing the transcript and record, we are 

unable to find any possible prejudicial error in the trial 

court’s orders terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

Accordingly, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.

Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).