UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4286

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HARVEY WILSON WARD, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00208-WO-1)

Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 14, 2012

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Graham Tod Green, Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Harvey Wilson Ward, Jr., appeals his conviction and 

188-month sentence imposed following his conditional guilty plea1

to possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (2006), and 

possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Ward’s attorney has 

filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), stating there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but questioning the reasonableness of his sentence. Ward filed 

a pro se supplemental brief, in which he challenges the district 

court’s denial of his suppression motion and argues that he was 

denied effective assistance of counsel. Because we find no 

meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm.

First, Ward questions the soundness of the district 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Ward 

questions whether the police had the requisite reasonable 

suspicion to initially detain him. In considering the denial of 

a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 

United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). 

 1 Ward’s guilty plea reserved his right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
3

It is well established that “the police can stop and 

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the 

officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable 

facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer 

lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 

(1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). In 

assessing the validity of a Terry stop, this court “consider[s] 

the totality of the circumstances . . . giv[ing] due weight to 

common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their 

experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). 

Here, two known, reliable informants told officers 

about drug activity at Ward’s residence. The officers verified 

portions of those tips during their investigation. Further, the 

officers had apprehended one of Ward’s customers, who admitted 

buying marijuana from Ward just minutes before. Finally, an 

officer observed Ward engage in what appeared to be a hand-tohand drug transaction. These circumstances, taken as a whole,

provide articulable facts from which the officers could form a 

reasonable suspicion that Ward was engaged in criminal activity.2 

 2 To the extent Ward asserts that a pat down search occurred 

that exceeded the permissible scope of the Terry stop, we 

conclude the record shows no pat-down or frisk ever took place. 

Instead, the officer who detained Ward testified that when Ward 

(Continued)
4

Next, Ward asserts he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to challenge 

the admissibility of the evidence against him on the grounds

that Ward was not given his Miranda warnings and that Ward’s 

consent for the search of his car and his home was involuntary. 

The record does not provide conclusive evidence of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we decline to address 

Ward’s claim on direct appeal. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 

F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006).

Finally, Ward questions the reasonableness of his 

sentence. We review Ward’s sentence under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007). In reviewing a sentence, this court must first 

determine whether the district court committed any significant 

procedural errors, examining the record for miscalculation of 

the Guidelines range, treatment of the Guidelines as mandatory, 

failure to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, the 

selection of a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and 

whether the court sufficiently explained the selected sentence. 

Id. at 51. If we find no significant procedural error, we next 

assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United 

 

turned around and placed his hands on his car the officer

observed a firearm in Ward’s back pocket. 
5

States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010). In 

doing so, we “examine the totality of the circumstances to see 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding 

that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 

(4th Cir. 2010). After thoroughly reviewing the record, we 

conclude that Ward’s within-Guidelines sentence was both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We also deny 

Ward’s pending motion to place the case in abeyance and to 

appoint of new counsel.3 This court requires that counsel inform 

Ward in writing of the right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Ward requests that 

such petition be filed, but counsel believes that the petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Ward. 

 3 To the extent Ward argues that appellate counsel is 

ineffective based on counsel’s decision to file an appeal in 

accordance with Anders, we conclude that argument is without 

merit.
6

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED