This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1331

Taras Lendzyk, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Laura Lee Wrazidlo, 

Appellant, 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 

a Delaware corporation, 

Defendant.

Filed July 13, 2015

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. 69DU-CV-12-1107

David L. Tilden, Hanft Fride, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Shawn B. Reed, Maki & Overom, Ltd., Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Stauber, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this appeal challenging the district court’s ruling that respondent has an interest 

in real property, appellant argues that the district court (1) misapplied caselaw 
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interpreting Minnesota anti-palimony statutes; and (2) erred in finding that, as a joint 

tenant, respondent is entitled to a one-half interest in the property. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Taras Lendzyk and appellant Laura Lee Wrazidlo began dating in 

2006. At that time, respondent owned a home on Blackman Avenue in Duluth, and 

appellant owned a home on Roosevelt Drive in Hermantown. In August 2007, appellant 

sold her home, and she and her two children moved into respondent’s home. 

After appellant moved into respondent’s home, the parties decided to have a new 

home built in the Hermantown area. In the spring of 2008, appellant bought a lot on 

LaVaque Junction Road in Hermantown. Appellant used her money to buy the lot, title 

to the lot was recorded in her name, and she financed a construction loan for the home. 

After construction was completed, the parties arranged to refinance the 

construction loan. The application for the new loan identified the parties as joint tenants, 

and both parties attended the closing on the new loan. At the closing, both parties signed 

a mortgage that identified them as joint tenants, and appellant signed a quitclaim deed 

that conveyed her interest in the property to herself and respondent as joint tenants. 

The parties’ relationship ended in 2010, and in 2012, respondent brought this

partition action claiming a one-half interest in the property and requesting a judgment 

ordering that the property be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. The case 

was tried to the court. Respondent testified as follows about the parties’ decision to build 

a home together:
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Q. So what – was there an agreement in terms of building a 

home?

A. Absolutely. In our discussions, [appellant] was receiving 

a large sum of equity from the sale of her home on Roosevelt 

Drive. And my debt-to-income level with my home on North 

Blackman Avenue was high. I wasn’t going to receive, and I 

really didn’t have a whole lot of money to put into the 

construction of the home or the purchase of the lot during the 

construction phase. It was our, you know, discussions that 

she was going to purchase the lot and spend, or purchase the 

majority of the – pay for the majority of almost all the 

construction costs during the building phase of the new home.

Once the new home was built, it was our agreement 

that I was going to take care of the re-financing cost and then 

pay for the mortgage. I was also to hold the insurance for the 

property as well.

Q. Was there any discussion as to who would pay for the 

initial purchase of the lot on which the home was built?

A. Yes, we had that discussion, and that was agreed upon 

between her and I that she was going to do that because she 

had the money coming from, you know, the sale of her home.

Q. Was there any discussion as to how the initial 

construction loan would be financed?

A. That was going to be financed through her as well because 

of the money from the sale of her home, and she had also 

received some funds through her parents’ estate as well.

Q. Now, I believe you previously testified that you discussed 

Hermantown as a potential location for the new home. Did 

you both come to an agreement as to where you wanted to 

build your new home?

A. Yes. We looked at multiple lots in Hermantown. One of 

the lots that we looked at was in Maple Ridge, which I 

believe is off of LaVaque Road in Hermantown. We did 

discuss, we liked the lots there at Maple Ridge, and we 

actually, I made an offer to the owners, or the owner of the 

lots or the development on a lot there. We also looked at 

Sterling Ponds, and we also looked at Timber Trails. So we 

looked at multiple lots that we wanted to build on.

Q. . . . You’ve already discussed agreements in terms of 

location and financing. Did you and [appellant] ever discuss 

who would own the home once the house was built?
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A. Yes, we did have that discussion. And our agreement that 

we were going to own that home together. We were building 

it together. We were starting a family together.

Q. Was that part of the discussion in terms of how the 

property would be financed?

A. Well, like I said, she was going to handle the financing of 

the construction because she had the funds to do so. Once the 

re-financing of the construction loan was complete, and my 

home at North Blackman Avenue sold approximately two or 

three days prior to closing our closing or re-financing of the 

construction loan on the new home. So it was after that point 

where I had the funds to put into our new home, paying for 

the re-financing and some of the things that I did to the home 

as well with the, you know, the driveway, the home 

entertainment system, so on and so forth. 

Respondent paid $10,532 in closing costs, paid for and provided labor for 

improvements to the home, paid the monthly mortgage payments from November 2008 

through September 2009, made partial mortgage payments from October 2009 through 

June 2010, and paid for property insurance from 2008 through 2010. Respondent’s 

payments totaled $77,323. Appellant presented evidence that she contributed $201,171 

toward purchasing the property and improvements to the home. 

The district court concluded that Minnesota anti-palimony statutes did not bar 

respondent’s claim to an interest in the LaVaque property and found that appellant and 

respondent, as joint tenants, were each entitled to a one-half interest in the property. The 

court ordered the property sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. This appeal 

followed.
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D E C I S I O N

1. Anti-palimony statutes

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. 

Halvorson v. Cnty. of Anoka, 780 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. App. 2010). But we review

the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Pamela 

Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Minn. 2012). In applying that 

standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings 

and defer to the district court’s assessment of witness credibility. Id. A factual finding is 

clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not 

reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen, 767 

N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 

1, 2010).

Minnesota’s anti-palimony statutes restrict a cohabitant’s ability to claim an 

interest in the property of another cohabitant. Minn. Stat. § 513.075 (2014) states:

If sexual relations between the parties are 

contemplated, a contract between a man and a woman who 

are living together in this state out of wedlock . . . is 

enforceable as to terms concerning the property and financial 

relations of the parties only if:

(1) the contract is written and signed by the 

parties, and

(2) enforcement is sought after termination of 

the relationship.

Minn. Stat. § 513.076 (2014) states:

Unless the individuals have executed a contract 

complying with the provisions of section 513.075, the courts 

of this state are without jurisdiction to hear and shall dismiss 
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as contrary to public policy any claim by an individual to the 

earnings or property of another individual if the claim is 

based on the fact that the individuals lived together in 

contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock within 

or without this state.

In In re Estate of Eriksen, the supreme court concluded that the anti-palimony 

statutes do not prohibit claims between cohabitants when a “claimant does not seek to 

assert any rights in the property of a cohabitant but to preserve and protect [his or] her 

own property, which [was] acquired for cash consideration wholly independent of any 

service contract related to cohabitation.” 337 N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Minn. 1983). The 

supreme court construed the anti-palimony statutes as applying “only where the sole

consideration for a contract between cohabiting parties is their ‘contemplation of sexual 

relations . . . out of wedlock.’” Id. at 674 (omission in original) (quoting Minn. Stat. 

§ 513.076). The supreme court held that, even though the cohabitants had not signed an 

agreement detailing their financial arrangements regarding a home and the home was 

titled solely in one cohabitant’s name, the probate court properly exercised jurisdiction 

over the other cohabitant’s unjust-enrichment claim to a one-half interest in the home

when each cohabitant equally contributed money to the expenses of purchasing and 

maintaining the home and to the purchase of a mortgage-protection life-insurance policy. 

Id. at 672, 674.

In re Estate of Palmen involved two cohabitants, Schneider and Palmen, who 

orally agreed to build a log cabin on property solely owned by Palmen. 588 N.W.2d 493, 

495 (Minn. 1999). After Palmen’s death, Schneider claimed an interest in the cabin,

asserting that Palmen promised her that if their relationship ended, he would reimburse 
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her for her labor and financial contributions to the cabin’s construction. Id. The district 

court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the case under the anti-palimony statutes,

and this court affirmed, but the supreme court reversed. Id. at 495-97. The supreme 

court explained that the anti-palimony statutes do not bar “enforcement of all unwritten 

agreements between individuals living together in contemplation of sexual relations out 

of wedlock.” Id. at 496.

If the claimant can establish that his or her claim is based on 

an agreement supported by consideration independent of the 

couple’s living together in contemplation of sexual relations 

out of wedlock or that he or she is seeking to protect his or 

her own property and is not seeking to assert any rights in the 

property of a cohabitant, the statutes do not operate to bar the 

claim.

Id. (quotations omitted).

Respondent presented evidence that he and appellant agreed that they would own 

the home together and that he paid the closing costs for refinancing the construction loan, 

contributed money and labor to improving the home, paid the monthly mortgage 

payments from November 2008 through September 2009, made partial mortgage 

payments through June 2010, and paid for property insurance from 2008 through 2010. 

Under Eriksen and Palmen, this evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s 

finding that respondent’s “claim is asserted to his own property interest and is not a claim 

based solely on the contemplation of sexual relations.” Because respondent’s claim was 

based on an agreement that was supported by consideration independent of any service 

contract related to cohabitation, sought to protect respondent’s own property, and did not
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assert any rights in appellant’s property, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction

over the claim.

2. Amount of respondent’s interest

Appellant’s argument that respondent’s interest in the property should be limited 

to the amount of his contributions toward it ignores the presumption that named grantees 

in a deed hold equal property interests. “Where two persons are named grantees in a 

deed, the presumption is that their interest in the land conveyed is equal. This 

presumption, however, is not conclusive, and the true interest of each may be shown.” 

Dorsey v. Dorsey, 142 Minn. 279, 281, 171 N.W. 933, 934 (1919). Intent is determined 

by reference to the written documents “and to all the facts and circumstances surrounding 

the transaction.” Gagne v. Hoban, 280 Minn. 475, 479, 159 N.W.2d 896, 899 (1968). 

Intent is a question of fact. Id. at 480-81, 159 N.W.2d at 900.

After noting that the fact that the parties were married was not relevant to its 

analysis, the Dorsey court stated:

We find no evidence in the record tending to rebut the 

presumption that these parties are equal co-owners of the note 

and mortgage, aside from the fact that the greater portion of 

the purchase price of the farm was furnished by defendant. 

We think this fact alone is insufficient to overcome the 

presumption. Defendant may have been willing to give his 

wife an interest in the note and mortgage equal to his own. If 

it was agreed that her interest should be less than his, no proof 

of the agreement was offered; hence the [district] court would 

have been fully justified in regarding the note and mortgage 

as the property of the parties equally.

Dorsey, 142 Minn. at 281-82, 159 N.W. at 935.
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Appellant testified at trial that respondent pressured her to put his name on the 

deed and mortgage, but the district court found that this testimony was not credible. The 

only other evidence that appellant presented to rebut the presumption of equal ownership 

was that appellant made greater contributions toward the property. Under Dorsey, this 

evidence, if accepted by the district court, was insufficient to overcome the presumption. 

Therefore, on this record, appellant has not shown that the district court erroneously ruled 

that appellant failed to rebut the presumption that respondent is entitled to a one-half 

interest in the property.

Affirmed.