Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 1 of 5 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Michael P. Quirk Muncie, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Samuel Pinkston, A

ppellan t -Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana, A

ppelle e -Plaintiff. January 13, 2017 Court of Appeals Case No. 18A04-1607-CR-1629 Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable Marianne Vorhees, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C01-1408-FB-20

Vaidik, Chief Judge.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 2 of 5 

# Case Summary

[1] Samuel Pinkston was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and entered into a plea agreement that required him to serve a sentence of six years but that left to the trial court the decisi on of where that time would be served. The trial court ordered Pinkston to serve all of his time in the Department of Correction, and Pinkston appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. 

# Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2016, Pinkston pled guil ty to Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine (manufacturing). The st atutory sentencing range at the time of his offense (April 2014) was six to twen ty years, with an advisory sentence of ten years, see Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-5 (W est 2012), but his plea agreement called for a sentence of eight years, with six years to serve in a setting determined by the trial court and the ot her two years suspended to probation.

[3] At the sentencing hearing, Pinkston aske d to be allowed to serve his time on electronic home detention. He also as ked that, if any of his time was to be served in the Department of Correct ion (“DOC”), he be recommended for placement in a therapeuti c community as part of the DOC’s Purposeful Incarceration program. In considerin g the appropriate placement, the trial court found three aggravating circumstance s: (1) while this case was pending, Pinkston was arrested for and charged with operating while intoxicated and operating a vehicle after lifetime lice nse forfeiture; (2) Pinkston was onCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 3 of 5 supervised probation in another case when he committed the offense in this case; and (3) Pinkston has at least seven prior felony convictions stretching back to 1991. The court found one mitigating circumstance: Pinkston accepted responsibility for his actions and saved th e State the expense of going to trial by pleading guilty. Explaining that “the circumstances could have supported the advisory, if not an enhanc ed sentence,” Tr. p. 28, the trial court rejected Pinkston’s request to serve his time on home detention and instead ordered him to serve all of his time in the DOC. However, it found that Pinkston “is an appropriate candidate for Purposeful Incarceration through a Therapeutic Community” and said that “once Defendant has One (1) actual year or less to serve, he may petition the Court to consider ordering him to serve the remaining One (1) actual year as a di rect commitment to electronic home detention.” Appellant’s A pp. Vol. II, p. 29.

[4] Pinkston now appeals.


# Discussion and Decision

[5] Pinkston contends that the trial court committed severa l errors in deciding how he would serve his six years. Our trial courts enjoy broad discretion in making sentencing decisions, and we will revers e such a decision on ly for an abuse of that discretion. Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g , 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 4 of 5 [6] Pinkston first argues that th e trial court “did not give a detailed reason why [he] could not serve his executed time on el ectronic home detention.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. We disagree. After spec ifically laying out the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court expl ained that Pinkston “has not taken advantage of prior opportunities fo r rehabilitation, including prior commitments to the Depa rtment of Correction and prior attempts at adult probation .” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 40 (emphasis added). While probation does not always include electron ic home detention, the bottom line is that Pinkston has not succ eeded when given non-DOC al ternatives in the past. The trial court’s sentencing stat ement was more than adequate.

[7] Next, Pinkston points out that he was originally facing three charges (possession of reagents or precursors and maintaining a common nuisance, in addition to dealing) and that the pre-sent ence investigation report “lists all three (3) counts as the ‘present offense’, even though it is clear in the plea agreement that the Defendant was only pleading guilty to Count 1.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We first note that Pinkston did not challenge this as pect of the pre-sentence investigation report, so he waived an y objection in this regard. Waiver notwithstanding, the probation officer specifically noted in the report that she “concurs with the plea agreement,” which called for two of the three charges to be dismissed. Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 16. And in any event, there is no indication that the trial court relied on the dismis sed charges in making its decision.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 5 of 5 [8] Pinkston’s final argument is that his ju venile delinquency ad judications “should not have played a role in the Trial Cour t’s decision on the method of service of the [his] sentence.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. This claim assumes that Pinkston’s adjudications did “play a role” in the trial court’s decision. There is no evidence that they did. The trial court made no mention of those adjudications, either in its oral sentencing statement or its subsequent written order. In fact, in finding Pinkston’s lengthy criminal histor y to be an aggravating circumstance, it only addressed his adult felony convictions. 1

[9] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.

1 Pinkston does not cite Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows an appellate court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’ s decision, the Court the finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and th e character of the offender.” To the extent Pinkston is arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, we disagree.