In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13‐3767

PARASHU GIRI,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the  

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A078‐872‐597

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 2, 2014 — DECIDED JULY 17, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and TINDER, Cir‐

cuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Parashu Giri, a citizen of Nepal,

was living in the United States as a conditional permanent

resident based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen, Tammy Giri,

until the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”) terminated his conditional resident status after

finding that his marriage was entered into for the purpose of
2 No. 13‐3767

remaining in the United States. Removal proceedings com‐

menced shortly thereafter. On the day of his merits hear‐

ing—after the court granted his request to advance the date

of his merits hearing—Parashu1 sought a continuance on the

grounds that he had not been fingerprinted, as required, and

was not able to timely submit documentation to support the

validity of his marriage to his U.S. citizen spouse. The immi‐

gration judge (“IJ”) denied the request finding that Parashu

had ample time to get fingerprinted and submit his petition

for relief and evidence supporting the bona fides of his mar‐

riage, but he was not diligent in completing these tasks. Be‐

cause the IJ previously had found that Parashu conceded

removability, and there were no additional matters pending

before the IJ, the IJ ordered Parashu removed to Nepal. The

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld the IJ’s ruling.

Parashu petitioned this court for review. Because the immi‐

gration courts provided a reasoned explanation for the IJ’s

decision not to grant a continuance that did not depart from

established policies or rest on an impermissible basis and

because the record indicates that Parashu conceded remova‐

bility and was removable to Nepal, we deny the petition for

review.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 29, 1998, Parashu Giri, a citizen of Nepal, law‐

fully entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor. In

2001, he married a U.S. citizen, Tammy Giri, and gained

conditional permanent residence based on his marriage to

Tammy. This was Parashu’s second marriage.

                                                  1 To avoid confusion, we will refer to Parashu and Tammy Giri by

their first names throughout this opinion.
No. 13‐3767 3

In May 2003, Parashu and Tammy submitted a joint I‐751

petition to remove the conditions of his permanent resi‐

dence. USCIS denied the petition in February 2007 based on

Parashu’s and Tammy’s failure to appear for the I‐751 inter‐

view and a letter Tammy sent to USCIS in July 2003 with‐

drawing her support of the I‐751 petition. In April 2007, Pa‐

rashu and Tammy filed a second joint I‐751 petition. On Jan‐

uary 29, 2010, USCIS denied the petition finding that Para‐

shu maintained a relationship with his first wife after their

purported divorce in 1998, lived and had a child with his

first wife during his marriage to Tammy, Parashu did not

consistently live with his U.S. citizen spouse, and other evi‐

dence led to the conclusion that Parashu entered into the

marriage with Tammy to avoid immigration laws. In Febru‐

ary 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

served Parashu with a notice to appear, which commenced

removal proceedings.

Sakina Carbide, Parashu’s counsel, refiled a motion for

an individual hearing on October 21, 2010. (The immigration

court rejected the initial motion packet, filed on September 8,

2010, because of a missing signature.) The motion packet

contained the motion and a response to the notice to appear,

among other documents. The motion for an individual hear‐

ing informed the court that Parashu and Tammy wished to

renew their I‐751 petition. But a copy of an I‐751 petition was

not included. The motion requested that the IJ schedule a

merits hearing regarding the same as soon as possible. The

response to the notice to appear, signed by Parashu, admit‐

ted almost all of the allegations in the notice to appear, spe‐

cifically, that he: (1) is not a U.S. citizen, (2) is a citizen of

Nepal, (3) was admitted to the United States on or about

April 29, 1998, and (4) became a permanent resident on a
4 No. 13‐3767

conditional basis on July 31, 2001. He also admitted that his

conditional status was terminated, but he denied that he was

removable.  

On October 21, 2010, by written order, the immigration

court granted the motion for a merits hearing, finding that

Parashu conceded removability. The order also stated that

“The application(s) for relief must be filed by 45 days before

next hearing”; and Parashu must be fingerprinted “by 60

days before next hearing.” The next day the immigration

court issued a notice of hearing stating that Parashu’s merits

hearing would take place on July 25, 2012. On February 17,

2012 the court issued another notice rescheduling the merits

hearing to August 23, 2012.

The immigration court held the merits hearing on August

23, 2012. Parashu appeared at the hearing with his counsel,

Carbide, who had not yet entered an official appearance

even though she had been representing Parashu in this mat‐

ter since at least August 2010. She acknowledged that she

failed to enter an appearance.

After discussing her failure to enter an appearance, coun‐

sel asked for a continuance based on the fact that Parashu

had not been fingerprinted and that counsel was unable to

timely submit the documentary evidence supporting the bo‐

na fides of Parashu’s marriage, which was over 800 pages of

documents illustrating the couple’s twelve‐year relationship

and included a copy of the I‐751 petition dated March 1,

2007. She stated that she had trouble getting an appointment

for USCIS to fingerprint Parashu. She stated that over the

past two years there had been difficulty trying to obtain the

documentary evidence from Parashu to support the bona

fides of the marriage, and that she just received the docu‐
No. 13‐3767 5

ments the previous afternoon. She admitted that her first

meeting with Parashu to prepare his case occurred two days

before the hearing. Though not stated at the merits hearing,

Carbide said at oral argument that she tried to meet with Pa‐

rashu several times prior to the merits hearing, but he would

cancel each meeting.

The IJ noted that her previous order indicated that Para‐

shu had to be fingerprinted sixty days before the merits

hearing and that he had to submit his application forty‐five

days before the merits hearing. The IJ also noted that Para‐

shu requested an early hearing date but did nothing to pre‐

pare for the hearing for two years. Ultimately, the IJ deter‐

mined that a continuance was not warranted because Para‐

shu had ample time to prepare for the hearing and failed to

do so and failed to present a reason why he was not ready

for the hearing. Since there was nothing further pending be‐

fore the court and Parashu had already conceded removabil‐

ity, the court ordered Parashu removed to Nepal.

Parashu appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. On Novem‐

ber 15, 2013, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling in an order rely‐

ing on the IJ’s determination of fact and law and supple‐

menting the ruling with its own analysis.

II. ANALYSIS

Parashu petitions the court for review. He raises two

main issues, whether (1) the IJ abused her discretion by

denying his motion for a continuance, and (2) the IJ erred by

finding that he conceded removability and ordering him re‐

moved to Nepal. Since the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ

and added its own analysis, we review the IJ’s decision as
6 No. 13‐3767

supplemented by the BIA. Palma‐Martinez v. Lynch, 785 F.3d

1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2015).

A. The IJ Did Not Err by Denying Parashu’s Motion for

Continuance.

The court reviews a denial of a motion for a continuance

for an abuse of discretion. See Calma v. Holder, 663 F.3d 868,

875 (7th Cir. 2011). “[A]s long as the immigration judge gives

a reason for his decision, this court will uphold the decision

unless it was made without a rational explanation, inexpli‐

cably departed from established policies, or rested on an im‐

permissible basis.” Id. The court reviews constitutional

claims de novo. Alvarado‐Fonseca v. Holder, 631 F.3d 385, 389

(7th Cir. 2011).

Parashu argues that a continuance was warranted be‐

cause he did not seek one for purposes of delay, had never

requested a continuance, and was unaware of the deadline

for filing supplemental evidence. He further argues that he

had good cause for his delay in filing, but the court never

allowed him to explain that because his abusive and control‐

ling wife was withholding documents from him, he was un‐

able to file the supplemental evidence earlier. He suggests

that he should receive a reprieve from the consequences of

his actions because he was pro se until the hearing.

An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good

cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Further an IJ “may set and

extend time limits for the filing of applications and related

documents and responses thereto, if any. If an application or

document is not filed within the time set by the Immigration

Judge, the opportunity to file that application or document

shall be deemed waived.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c).  
No. 13‐3767 7

The IJ denied the continuance because Parashu had over

a year and a half to prepare for the merits hearing, which Pa‐

rashu requested accelerated; he had been warned of the

deadlines for filing his application and completing finger‐

printing and failed to comply; he did not give a reason for

his lack of compliance; and he did not request a continuance

in advance of the merits hearing. This explanation is rational

and neither inexplicably departs from established policies

nor rests on an impermissible basis. Also, it was within the

IJ’s discretion to refuse to give Parashu more time to file the

supporting documents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c). Therefore,

the IJ’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. See Umezurike

v. Holder, 610 F.3d 997, 1003–04 (7th Cir. 2010). At the hear‐

ing, Parashu’s counsel seemed to acknowledge that under

the circumstances of this case, a hearing typically does not

go forward. Shortly after the IJ’s comments about how she

was troubled by Parashu’s insincere continuance request and

his attempt to tender a voluminous submission on the day of

the merits hearing, counsel said to the IJ, “I understand that

this is absolutely against protocol, this is absolutely against

the rules and procedures, and you know, ... you’re correct.”

Additionally, there is no evidence on the record of good

cause supporting a continuance. There might have been

good cause if Parashu’s inability to file the supporting doc‐

uments earlier was because of spousal abuse. However, Pa‐

rashu never submitted any evidence supporting this and

failed to raise the argument to the IJ. Even on the record be‐

fore the court now, there is still no evidence that Tammy

abused or controlled Parashu, that she threatened to with‐

draw her sponsorship of Parashu’s visa petition, or that she

used his financial and emotional dependency on her to con‐

trol him by threatening to abandon him or have him deport‐
8 No. 13‐3767

ed. The IJ could not have found good cause due to spousal

abuse when Parashu did not present the argument or evi‐

dence supporting the argument to her. Counsel did have the

opportunity to present this argument at the hearing, but

failed to do so. Further, to the extent Parashu or his counsel

had trouble collecting supporting documents due to Tam‐

my’s failure to produce them, Parashu could have requested

that the immigration court issue a subpoena for the records.

See Reyes‐Cornejo v. Holder, 734 F.3d 636, 646 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)) (recognizing the immigration

court’s subpoena power); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b).

Parashu’s counsel disingenuously argues for leniency be‐

cause Parashu was appearing pro se until the day of the mer‐

its hearing. At the merits hearing, Parashu’s counsel present‐

ed a notice of entry of appearance of counsel (an “E‐28”) for

this matter dated August 2010 and admits that she did not

file it because “it fell through the cracks” at her office. She

also admits that she received the October 2010 order that ad‐

vised her that she needed to file an E‐28. She acknowledged

that she has represented Parashu since 2010 and believed

that she was his attorney of record all along. Therefore, Para‐

shu was pro se on the record, but she admits to representing

him, so his pro se status was merely technical due to her fail‐

ure to properly file an E‐28. She stated at oral argument that

immigration law has been her primary practice for twenty‐

one years. Her experience makes her familiar with the pro‐

cedural requirements of the immigration court. So her ar‐

gument that the court should be more lenient to Parashu be‐

cause he was pro se at the time is not only troubling, but in‐

sincere and misleading.
No. 13‐3767 9

Finally, Parashu asserts that the denial of the motion to

continue violates due process. Proceedings in immigration

court “satisfy due process so long as they conform to the ap‐

plicable statutory and regulatory standards” and impose

reasonable deadlines that afford the petitioner “a reasonable

opportunity to present evidence.” Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d

560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010). The proceedings conformed to statu‐

tory and regulatory standards. Also, Parashu had, at least,

from October 2010 until approximately June 2012 (sixty days

before his merits hearing) to present his evidence to the

court. That was a reasonable amount of time. See id. (finding

that providing a petitioner over a year to comply with the

fingerprinting requirement and sixty days to file an applica‐

tion was “plenty of time”). The immigration court did not

violate due process. Therefore, the IJ did not abuse her dis‐

cretion by denying Parashu’s request for a continuance.

B. The IJ Did Not Err by Finding Parashu Removable

and Ordering Him Removed.

Parashu argues that because he did not concede remova‐

bility and the government did not present evidence to meet

its burden to establish removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227,

the IJ should not have found that he conceded removability

or that he was removable. We review findings of fact for

substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Antia‐

Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2014).

“Any alien with permanent resident status on a condi‐

tional basis ... who has such status terminated ... is deporta‐

ble.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). Thus to establish that Para‐

shu was removable, the government only needed to estab‐

lish that: (1) Parashu was a conditional permanent resident;
10 No. 13‐3767

and (2) his status as a conditional permanent residence was

terminated.  

Although Parashu denied that he is removable, he admit‐

ted the key facts in the notice to appear that provided the

basis for removability. Specifically, Parashu admitted that he

is not a U.S. citizen, that he is a citizen of Nepal, that he ob‐

tained conditional permanent residence status in July 2001,

and that his status was terminated. These admissions have

the effect of withdrawing the issues from controversy. See

Selimi v. I.N.S., 312 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2002). By admitting

these facts, Parashu waived any objection to the IJ’s finding

of removability. Qureshi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 985, 990 (7th Cir.

2006). Therefore, the immigration court did not err by find‐

ing that Parashu conceded removability and finding him

removable.

Parashu contends that he filed a petition for relief from

removal and the IJ erroneously failed to consider it, and then

improperly dismissed the case for failure to file a petition for

relief. This argument is not supported by the record. Neither

Parashu’s petition for relief nor his supporting documents

appear in the administrative record until after the merits

hearing. He submitted the petition to the BIA but not the IJ;

therefore, this argument is without merit.

Parashu also argues that the immigration court erred by

ordering him removed because neither he nor the IJ desig‐

nated a country of removal. While Parashu did not designate

a country of removal, the IJ did. In the IJ’s August 23, 2012

order, the IJ ordered Parashu removed to Nepal. There was

no error. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543

U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) that

an alien must be removed to the country of his choice, if that
No. 13‐3767 11

is not possible, then the alien is removed to the country of

which the alien is a citizen).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is

DENIED.