alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17-1548V

Filed: October 9, 2018

UNPUBLISHED

JOYCE LINEBERGER,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Bruce William Slane, Law Office of Bruce W. Slane, P.C., White Plains, NY, for 

petitioner.

Glenn Alexander MacLeod, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for 

respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On October 17, 2017, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2

(the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine 

administration (“SIRVA”) after receiving the influenza vaccination on September 23, 

2016. Petition at 1, ¶¶ 2, 17-18. Petitioner further alleges that she received the 

vaccination in the United States, suffered the residual effects of her injury for more than 

six months, and that neither she nor any other party has filed a civil action or received 

compensation for her injury, alleged as vaccine caused. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 19-21. The case 

was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the 

undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with 

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).
On October 9, 2018, respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, respondent believes that petitioner’s injury meets the definition of a 

Table SIRVA and thus, “petitioner is entitled to a presumption of vaccine causation.” Id.

at 4. Respondent further agrees that petitioner has satisfied all other statutory and 

jurisdictional issues. Id.

In view of respondent’s position and the evidence of record, the 

undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

Chief Special Master
Exhibit
32.1






Certification
of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002






In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Green Irons Holdings Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended January 31, 2009 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the
"report"), I, Sandy McDougall, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
President, Principal Accounting Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, and a member of
the Board of Directors of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and









(2)
            The
      information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Green Irons Holdings Corp., and will be retained by Green Irons Holdings Corp.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.






Dated
this 20th day of March 2009.




/s/
      Sandy McDougallSandy
      McDougallChief
      Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
              President,
      Principal Accounting Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, and a member of the
      Board of Directors
#### First Union National Bank, Respondent, v Incorporated Village of Hempstead, Appellant. American Key, Inc., et al., Nonparty Respondents.

[823 NYS2d 111]

In an action to foreclose a tax lien pursuant to the Nassau County Administrative Code (L 1939, chs 272, 701-709, as amended), the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roberto, J.), dated April 4, 2005, which denied its motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court entered October 17, 2002, upon its default in answering or appearing.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the plaintiff-respondent and nonparty respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The defendant Incorporated Village of Hempstead (hereinafter the Village) owned certain real property in the Village subject to various tax liens preexisting the date the Village took title to the property. The respondent First Union National Bank, as custodian for National Tax Funding, L.P. (hereinafter First Union), purchased the liens from Nassau County and eventually brought a foreclosure action. The Village did not answer or otherwise appear. First Union obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale upon the Village’s default, and the property was eventually sold to nonparty respondents American Key, Inc., All Homes, LLC, and Millennium Home and Land, Ltd. Seven *659months later, the Village moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1). The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the Village had established neither a reasonable excuse for its default nor a meritorious defense.

On appeal, the Village raises only one argument, that RPTL 995 divests the Supreme Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Although this argument was not raised in the Supreme Court, an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even after a default *(see Editorial Photocolor Archives v Granger Collection,*61 NY2d 517, 523 [1984]; *Matter of Watervliet Hous. Auth. v Bell,*262 AD2d 810, 811 [1999]).

RPTL 995 provides, in part, that “[r]eal property owned by a municipal corporation shall not be sold or conveyed by foreclosure or otherwise for the nonpayment of any tax or special assessment.” It also provides for a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to recover taxes due on such real property and for sales on consent of the municipality. Nothing in the text of the statute or in the legislative history suggests, however, that the Legislature intended RPTL 995 to divest the Supreme Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over tax foreclosure proceedings relating to municipally-owned real property *(see*Bill Jacket, L 1958, ch 890; *cf. Matter of Fry v Village of Tarrytown,*89 NY2d 714, 719 [1997]; *Lacks v Lacks,*41 NY2d 71, 75 [1976]). Had the Village appeared in the action at the appropriate time, it could have raised RPTL 995 and avoided the loss of the real property that is the subject of this action. Miller, J.P, Ritter, Goldstein and Lunn, JJ., concur.
@conference{1207991,
  author = {Robert B. Bohn and Abdella Battou and Tao Zhang},
  title = {The Era of Knowledge Plane (KP) Platforms Driven Networking—Anchor for Federation of Autonomic/Autonomous Networks (ANs) Across Industry Sectors},
  year = {2022},
  month = {2022-11-25 05:11:00},
  publisher = {International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), DOI: 10.1109/ICTC55196.2022, Jeju, KR},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=956268},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952650},
  language = {en},
}
@article{1210056,
  author = {Kavita Jeerage and Cheryle Beuning and Adam Friss and L. Cinnamon Bidwell and Tara Lovestead},
  title = {THC in breath aerosols collected with an impaction filter device before and after legal-market product inhalation – a pilot study},
  year = {2023},
  number = {17},
  month = {2023-05-22 04:05:00},
  publisher = {Journal of Breath Research},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=933817},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1088/1752-7163/acd410},
  language = {en},
}
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk November 20, 2012

d1113 

# Order

November 20, 2012

145488

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145488

COA: 309109

Jackson CC: 11

- 004212

- FH

TOREY LEE ANKNEY,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 1, 2012 order of

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that

the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARILYN K ELLY , J., would grant leave to appeal for the reasons set forth in her

dissenting statement in People v Luckett , 485 Mich 1 076 , 1078 (2010).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6432

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. ROBERT EUGENE MOTT, Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:00-cr-00046-RLV-3)

Submitted: June 22, 2009 Decided: July 1, 2009

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Eugene Mott, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Robert Eugene Mott appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. United

States v. Mott , No. 5:00-cr-00046-RLV-3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2009).

See United States v. Hood , 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). We deny Mott’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in  Registration  Statements  No.
33-16059,  No.  33-12755,  No.  33-55614,  No.  33-80504,  No.  33-3327  and No.
333-44180 of Sharper  Image  Corporation  on Form S-8 of our reports dated March
30, 2001,  appearing in and  incorporated  by reference in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Sharper Image Corporation for the year ended January 31, 2001.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

San Francisco, California
May 1, 2001
                                                                              36
Appeal Ordered Withdrawn and Opinion issued November 3, 1999 

In The 

C!tnurt nf l\ppenln 

111tft}J llintrirt nf we*nn nt llnllnn 

No. 05-99-01572-CR 

MICHAEL GLENN COPLEY, Appellant 

v. 

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 5 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. MB98-3375-F 

OPINION PER CURIAM 

Before Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Kinkeade and O'Neill 

Appellant has filed a motion to withdraw the appeal. Appellant's counsel has approved 

the motion. 

This Court hereby GRANTS the motion and ORDERS the appeal withdrawn and that 

this decision be certified below for observance. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

PER CURIAM 
Fifth Court of Appeals 

Case Attorney Address List 

Page: 

Date Printed: 11/03/1999 

Case Number: 05-99-01572-CR Date Filed: 09/20/1999 

Style: Copley, Michael Glenn 

v. 

The State of Texas 

Trial Judge: Fuller, Tom 

Trial Court Reporter: West, Donna 

Trial Court: COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO 5 Trial County: 

APP Bill Booth 

ATT 002648000 

Abrams Centre Bank Building 

9330 LBJ FWY. 

SUITE 900 

Dallas, TX 75243 

Phone 214/520-8982 

Fax 

ST A Kerry Fitzgerald 

ATT 007088000 

Assistant District Attorney 

133 N. Industrial, LB 19 

Dallas, TX 75207 

Phone 214/653-3600 

Fax I -

DALLAS
EXHIBIT 32.2
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 18 U.S.C. 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  ONLINE  ORIGINALS,  INC.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period ended  August 31, 2006,  as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Gregory Adams, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all  material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date:  October 13 2006


By: /s/ Gregory Adams
    -------------------------
         Gregory Adams
         Chief Financial Officer, principal financial officer and principal
         accounting officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sydney Thomas, Appellant.

[853 NYS2d 329]

*347Defendant’s guilty plea to a felony had been accompanied by a promise that he could obtain a misdemeanor disposition upon successful completion of a drug program. Defendant, who asserts he successfully completed the inpatient portion of the drug program, admittedly failed to complete the aftercare portion. He claims he was not informed, at the time of his plea, that he had to complete both the residential and aftercare portions, and argues that he was thus improperly sentenced under the felony plea. Regardless of whether defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal, or whether such a waiver would apply to this type of issue, defendant did not preserve his present claim *(see People v McNair,*22 AD3d 376 [2005], *Iv denied*6 NY3d 778 [2006]) and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject it on the merits. The objectively clear terms of the plea agreement *(see People v Cataldo,*39 NY2d 578 [1976]) obligated defendant, without limitation, to complete the drug treatment provided by Treatment Alternative to Street Crimes, and he failed to do so.

As the People concede, since the crime was committed prior to the effective date of the legislation (Penal Law § 60.35 [1] [a] [v] [former (1) (e)]), providing for the imposition of a DNA databank fee, that fee should not have been imposed. Concur— Lippman, P.J., Andrias, Williams and McGuire, JJ.
Edward J. (Nick) Nicholas Direct: 713-844-3405 Fax: 713-844-3504 Nick.Nicholas@lgbs.com 

LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP

4828 LOOP CENTRAL DRIVE, SUITE 600 

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77081 

MAIN TELEPHONE: 713-844-3400 

July 17, 2015 

Via E-File

The Honorable Keith E. Hottle, Clerk 

Fourth Court of Appeals 

Cadena-Reeves Justice Center

300 Dolorosa, Suite 3200 

San Antonio, Texas 78205-3037 

Re: Case No. 04-15-00437-CV; Larry A. Vick, et al., Appellant v. Floresville ISD, et 

al., Appellees. 

Dear Clerk: 

Please be advised that I represent and serve as lead counsel for Appellees Wilson County, 

Rashay K. Chapa and Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP in the above-referenced case. 

Accordingly, please change the record to reflect this designation and add the following contact 

information to your records: 

Edward J. (Nick) Nicholas 

Texas Bar No. 14991350 

Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP 

4828 Loop Central Drive, Suite 600 

Houston, Texas 77081 

Direct: 713-844-3405 

Facsimile: 713-844-3504 

E-Mail: Nick.Nicholas@lgbs.com 

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Please contact me if you have any questions. 

Sincerely,

Nick Nicholas

Elizabeth G. Neally at eneally@wabsa.com 

Elizabeth Guerrero-Southard at elizabeth.guerrero-southard@rampage-sa.com

Larry A. Vick – lv@larryvick.com 

ACCEPTED

04-15-00437-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

7/17/2015 8:10:23 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 07/17/2015 8:10:23 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3475

___________________________

John Vincent Mackovich

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: July 7, 2015

Filed: July 13, 2015 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

John Vincent Mackovich appeals from the judgment entered by the District

Court following a bench trial in this Federal Tort Claims Act suit arising out of an 1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.
alleged slip-and-fall accident at the United States Medical Center for Federal

Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. Following careful review, we conclude that the

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations are not clearly erroneous and

that the court correctly stated and applied Missouri premises-liability law. See

Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing the

standard for reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial and noting that factual

findings are reviewed for clear error while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo);

Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting the Supreme Court’s

explanation of why a trial judge’s evaluation of witness credibility can virtually never

amount to clear error); Stanley v. City of Independence, 995 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Mo.

1999) (setting forth the elements of a negligence claim under Missouri law); Huxoll

v. McAlister’s Body & Frame, Inc., 129 S.W.3d 33, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (per

curiam) (recognizing that the possessor of land has no duty to protect invitees from

open and obvious dangers “unless the landowner should anticipate the harm despite

the obviousness of the risk”).

We affirm.

______________________________

-2-
#### Welling *v.*La Bau.

*Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

June 18, 1888.

Patents fob Inventions—Infringement—Practice—Master’s Report—Review.

In suit for infringement of a patent, the issue being referred to a master as to whether defendant’s alleged infringing article is composed of equal parts of talc and shellac, there being- proof that defendant consumed in his business nearly equal amounts of each, and plaintiff’s experts testifying positively, and defendant’s by fair implication, that, defendant’s article "is composed of the two ingredients in equal parts, the master’s decision to that effect .’will not be disturbed.

*302In Equity. On motion for a rehearing.

This was a suit by William M. Welling against John H. La Bau for infringement of a patent. The report of the master in favor of the complainant was, on the 25th of February, 1888, confirmed, and the defendant’s exceptions thereto were overruled. 34 Fed.. Rep. 40. See, also, 12 Fed. Rep. 875, 32 Fed. Rep. 293, and *infra.*The defendant now moves for a rehearing upon the sole ground that the court fell into -error in not sustaining the exception to the master’s third finding of fact, which is as follows: “That the said white checks so manufactured and sold by the defendant, assuming the fiber white to be talc, contained shellac and talc in substantially equal parts.”

*Frederic H.*Betts, for complainant.

*Lucien Birdseye*and *James C.*Gloyd, for defendant.

Coxe, J.

To what was said upon the argument but little need be added further than the statement that, after a re-examination of the record, in the light of the elaborate argument and brief addressed to this single proposition, the court adheres to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the master’s finding The reasoning of the defendant, it is thought, gives undue prominence to the testimony produced by him, and practically ignores that of the complainant. The master might have credited the former, but evidently he was not convinced of its truth, and was therefore justified in rejecting it, and in accepting as true the statements of the complainant and his witness, confirmed as some of them were by the defendant’s testimony. The analysis of the experts, that of Prof. Chandler positively, and that of Dr. Ledoux by fair implication, show’ the white checks to be composed of shellac and talc'in substantially equal parts. In addition to this there w’as proof that during the period in question the defendant had consumed in his business nearly equal amounts of these ingredients,—about 16,000 pounds of each. The question w’as one of fact, and the master’s decision, sustained as it is by evidence, ought not to be disturbed. The motion is denied.
#### KLING v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.

Civ. No. 50.

United States District Court S. D. Florida, Key West Division.

May 3, 1949.

W. Curry Harris, Key West, Fla., for plaintiff.

Loftin & Wahl, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.

HOLLAND, District Judge.

This cause coming on to be heard after notice and argument of counsel, on consideration it is ordered:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is denied.

2. Defendant’s Motion for More Definite Statement is denied.

3. Defendant is allowed 30 days from date within which to file Answer to the Complaint.

4. Defendant’s oral motion for physical examination of the plaintiff is granted. The Court defers until a later date the naming of the doctor and the fixing of the time for such examination. ,

5. Plaintiff is required to furnish defendant within 30 days the names and addresses of the witnesses known to her at this time which she proposes to introduce at the trial, provided that before using any additional witnesses she shall give time and notice of their names and addresses to defendant.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lonnie Allen, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 116]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered on or about April 20, 2005, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Friedman, Nardelli, Williams and Malone, JJ.