United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2568

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Claudia Cristina Linares-Campos; C.I.G.

 Petitioners 

v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

 Respondent

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Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

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Submitted: June 11, 2024

Filed: July 11, 2024 

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Claudia Linares-Campos and her minor daughter are citizens of El Salvador 

who were charged with inadmissibility because of their presence “in the United 

States without being admitted or paroled . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). In 

immigration court, Linares-Campos conceded inadmissibility and applied for 
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asylum1 and withholding of removal based on the violent acts of the father of her 

children, Mauricio Gonzalez, and his family. Linares-Campos claimed that she was 

persecuted on account of her membership in the following social groups: “mother of 

Mauricio Gonzalez’s children” and “women in El Salvador viewed as property.”

An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the applications, and Linares-Campos 

appealed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded that LinaresCampos’s proposed social groups were not cognizable and that, even if they were, 

she failed to establish a nexus between them and the alleged persecution. The BIA 

also concluded that she had failed to prove that Salvadoran authorities were unable 

or unwilling to protect her from harm. Linares-Campos petitions for review of the 

BIA’s decision.

We review the denial of an application for asylum or withholding of removal 

for substantial evidence. Uriostegui-Teran v. Garland, 72 F.4th 852, 855 (8th Cir. 

2023); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Only the BIA order is subject to our review, 

including the IJ’s findings and reasoning to the extent they were expressly adopted 

by the BIA.” Uriostegui-Teran, 72 F.4th at 855.

To be eligible for asylum, Linares-Campos must show that she is a refugee, 

see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), meaning that she is unwilling or unable to return to 

her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion,” see id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Persecution requires harm “inflicted 

either by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the 

government was unable or unwilling to control.” Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 

918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005). And to “qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant 

has the burden of showing a clear probability that [her] life or freedom would be 

threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, 

1

Linares-Campos listed her daughter as a derivative beneficiary of her 

application for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). Here, the daughter’s asylum 

claim rises and falls with her mother’s. 
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Malonga 

v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).

To demonstrate membership in a particular social group, the applicant “must 

establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common 

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 

within the society in question.” Uriostegui-Teran, 72 F.4th at 855. The BIA ruled 

that Linares-Campos’s first proposed social group, “mother of Mauricio Gonzales’s 

children,” was not cognizable. Linares-Campos does not challenge this ruling. 

Instead, she attacks the BIA’s determination that her second proposed social group, 

“women in El Salvador viewed as property,” failed for lack of social distinction.

“Whether a given particular social group is perceived as distinct by the society 

of which it is part depends on evidence that the society makes meaningful 

distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics defining the group.” 

Fuentes v. Barr, 969 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). To grant the petition for review, we must find that any “reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), that the 

record establishes that Salvadoran society views Linares-Campos’s proposed social 

group as socially distinct. See Lemus-Coronado v. Garland, 58 F.4th 399, 404 (8th 

Cir. 2023). 

Linares-Campos presented no evidence that Salvadoran society regards 

“women in El Salvador viewed as property” as a distinct group. The evidence 

Linares-Campos submitted to the BIA tends to show the prevalence of domestic 

violence in El Salvador. For example, one report describes violence against women 

in El Salvador as a “widespread” and “serious problem.” And an expert’s affidavit2

contends that a “set of misogynistic gender biases that relegate women to being the 

2

Linares-Campos asserts that this affidavit was overlooked by the agency. 

The record refutes this contention. See Admin. R. at 5, 168, 169-182. 
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property of men . . . is ingrained in [El Salvador]’s history and culture . . . .” But

this evidence does little to explain how “women in El Salvador viewed as property” 

are meaningfully distinguished from others, particularly other women, within 

Salvadoran society. See Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871. Indeed, our cases hold that 

evidence of the sort submitted by Linares-Campos does not prove social distinction. 

See De Guevara v. Barr, 919 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 2019); Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 

872. Thus, the record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s 

determination that Salvadoran society does not see “women in El Salvador viewed 

as property” as a socially distinct group.

3

 

Because Linares-Campos failed to establish membership in a cognizable 

particular social group, the BIA did not err in denying her applications for asylum 

and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Constanza v. Holder, 647 

F.3d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011). We therefore need not address Linares-Campos’s 

arguments concerning particularity, nexus, humanitarian asylum, or whether the 

harms at issue were inflicted by persons that the Salvadoran government was unable 

or unwilling to control. See Aguliar v. Garland, 60 F.4th 401, 407 (8th Cir. 2023).

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review. 

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3

Linares-Campos argues that the BIA erred when it failed to consider that the 

Department of Homeland Security did not file a brief when this case was before the 

BIA. Given that Linares-Campos bears the burden of proof, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), we reject this argument.