In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-1424 

IN RE: JOHN FLISS, 

Debtor-Appellee, 

v.

GENERATION CAPITAL I, LLC, 

Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:19-cv-08187 — Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 7, 2022 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 27, 2023 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. John Fliss and Larry 

Wojciak were once business partners. But their relationship 

soured when their jointly owned companies defaulted on a 

bank loan. After the bank obtained a consent judgment in 

state court, Wojciak used one of his companies, Generation 

Capital I, LLC, to take over as the judgment creditor and 
2 No. 22-1424 

attempt to enforce the judgment against Fliss. When Fliss filed 

for bankruptcy in federal court (because of his overall insolvency), Generation Capital I asserted a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings against Fliss in the amount of the consent 

judgment, plus interest. Fliss objected, and the bankruptcy 

court disallowed Generation Capital I’s claim in its entirety.

This appeal asks us to decide whether the bankruptcy 

court violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by disallowing 

Generation Capital I’s claim, or alternatively, whether the 

prior state court litigation precluded Fliss from objecting to 

Generation Capital I’s claim in bankruptcy court. We hold 

that the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider the claim objection—the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

posed no obstacle—and that Fliss was not otherwise barred 

from objecting to the claim. We therefore affirm. 

I 

More than ten years ago, John Fliss, Larry Wojciak, and 

Mark Barr went into business together. They took out a 

$200,000 secured loan from a bank as working capital for their 

two jointly owned companies. Each man personally guaranteed the loan, and a trust established in Sherry Wojciak’s 

name (Larry’s spouse), was the fourth guarantor. When the 

businesses failed and the borrowers defaulted on the loan, the 

bank sought to recoup its losses in state court. In May 2011, 

the state court issued a consent judgment in the amount of 

$208,639.95 against Fliss, Barr, Wojciak, their companies, and 

Sherry Wojciak’s trust, and held the four guarantors jointly 

and severally liable.

What happened next was either a stroke of ingenuity or 

scheming, depending on who you ask: Wojciak negotiated a 
No. 22-1424 3

deal with the bank that allowed him to step into the bank’s 

shoes as a judgment creditor.1 He then sought to enforce the 

entire amount of the debt against his former business partners, Fliss and Barr. The feat was accomplished in multiple 

steps, using three entities owned and operated by the 

Wojciaks: Generation Capital, Generation Capital I, and Generation Capital II.

Larry Wojciak’s initial moves were as follows: on February 

24, 2012, he entered into a sale and assignment agreement 

with the bank, through Generation Capital I, to purchase the 

promissory note and judgment debt for $240,000. Two days 

later, he also entered into a settlement agreement with the 

bank under which he (and Sherry’s trust) agreed to pay 

$240,000 to settle the judgment debt and have the loan documents assigned to Generation Capital pursuant to the sale and 

assignment agreement. The next day, on February 27, Larry 

Wojciak had Generation Capital II wire $240,000 to the bank. 

See Generation Cap. I, LLC v. Fliss (In re Fliss), 586 B.R. 21, 23–

24 (N.D. Ill. 2018). This transaction completed the first part of 

Wojciak’s plan.

Wojciak then kicked off the second part of his plan: stepping into the bank’s shoes in the state court proceedings. On 

May 8, 2012, the state court entered an order substituting Generation Capital I for the bank as the plaintiff. Wojciak next 

moved to enforce the judgment, through Generation Capital 

I, against Fliss and Barr by commencing a supplemental proceeding and seeking turnover of property in satisfaction of the 

1 Although the transactions involved Sherry’s accounts and trust, 

Sherry testified that her husband controlled all business and financial decisions and that she signed documents because he asked her to.
4 No. 22-1424 

judgment. Fliss and Barr filed a motion for determination in 

the main proceeding, arguing that the debt was extinguished 

when the Wojciaks paid $240,000 to the bank in exchange for 

settling the judgment. The state court disagreed, found that 

the settlement agreement was not executed, and entered a determination order in May 2015 stating that the debt was still 

owed. 

In August 2015, Fliss filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition 

in bankruptcy court. Chapter 13 allows an individual debtor 

who cannot fulfill his financial obligations to submit to the 

bankruptcy court “a plan for paying his creditors as much as 

possible over a period of years, upon completion of which he 

is given a discharge of his remaining dischargeable debts.” In 

re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2003). The Bankruptcy 

Code requires creditors to file a proof of claim. FED. R. BANKR.

P. 3002(a). Thus, in December 2015, Wojciak had Generation 

Capital I file a secured claim in bankruptcy court seeking to 

enforce the entire state court judgment, now $359,967.69 including post-judgment interest, against Fliss. Fliss objected to 

the claim. 

The bankruptcy court disallowed Generation Capital I’s 

claim in its entirety and approved the Chapter 13 plan proposed by Fliss. The bankruptcy court found that Wojciak used 

Generation Capital I as his alter ego and, as a result, became 

both the creditor and debtor of the state court judgment. This 

merger of interests extinguished the debt. As relevant on appeal, the bankruptcy court further held that the doctrines of 

Rooker-Feldman, res judicata, and collateral estoppel did not 

bar it from deciding whether the claim should be allowed or 

disallowed. 
No. 22-1424 5

Generation Capital I appealed to the district court, which 

affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. We now consider 

these issues. 

II 

We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for 

clear error and the legal conclusions of both the bankruptcy 

court and the district court de novo. In re Kempff, 847 F.3d 444, 

448 (7th Cir. 2017). Our review of the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is de novo. Andrade v. City 

of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Generation Capital I advances two arguments on appeal. 

First, it asserts that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 

bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim objection filed by Fliss. Alternatively, Generation Capital I argues that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the claim objection. We consider the 

Rooker-Feldman issue first because it is jurisdictional. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a creature of two Supreme 

Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 

(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 

U.S. 462 (1983). It “is a principle of jurisdiction that precludes 

the lower federal courts from applying appellate review to 

state court decisions.” Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 759 

(7th Cir. 2003). “An action in federal court that alleges an injury ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision, 

such that success in the federal court would require overturning the state court decision, is barred by the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine.” Id. 
6 No. 22-1424 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable here for at 

least two reasons. First, Fliss did not file a federal suit seeking, 

as a cause of action or prayer for relief, to set aside a state 

court judgment. See id. at 759 (federal court jurisdiction barred 

by Rooker-Feldman where the plaintiffs’ “prayer for relief 

ask[ed] the district court to set aside the [state court] judgment . . . and ‘refund’ . . . the damages assessed by the state 

court”). Instead, Fliss petitioned for bankruptcy court protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code because his income and assets were not enough to meet his liabilities. The 

issue of the state court judgment was only raised after Generation Capital I (not Fliss) filed a claim asserting a $359,967.69 

secured debt and Fliss objected to that claim pursuant to federal bankruptcy law and procedures. 

Second, the state court never decided (nor could it) the 

key issue facing the bankruptcy court in Fliss’s and Wojciak’s 

dispute: whether Generation Capital I’s bankruptcy claim 

should be allowed or disallowed under federal bankruptcy 

law. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine asks: is the federal plaintiff 

seeking to set aside a state judgment, or does he present some 

independent claim,2 albeit one that denies a legal conclusion 

that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a 

party? . . . [I]f the latter, then there is jurisdiction.” GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993). 

The state court judgment and the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of Generation Capital I’s claim simply “are not two 

sides of the same coin.” Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 

2 We treat as the “independent claim” Fliss’s objection to Generation 

Capital I’s claim. We recognize that the objection is not a claim in a traditional sense. Perhaps this incongruence is another indication for why 

Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable here. 
No. 22-1424 7

F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 

660, 668 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rooker-Feldman not applicable where 

state court proceeded under state law allowing only consideration of state law question); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct 

of Cal., 326 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman did 

not bar jurisdiction because federal claim arose under federal 

law and existed irrespective of state court’s handling of state 

law issues). 

Generation Capital I argues that we can glean Fliss’s intent 

to attack the state court judgment because Fliss wrote in his 

briefs before our court, the district court, and the bankruptcy 

court that the state court “got it wrong.” But those statements 

alone do not make Rooker-Feldman applicable. Zurich Am. Ins. 

Co., 326 F.3d at 823–24 (“A mere assertion that a [lower federal] court, in considering a claim that is independent of the 

state court judgment, might negate a legal conclusion that the 

state court reached is insufficient to trigger application of 

Rooker–Feldman.”); Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 

555–56 (“[T]he fact that the plaintiff’s pursuit of his federal 

claims could ultimately show that the state court judgment 

was erroneous [does] not automatically render Rooker–Feldman applicable.”). 

We next turn to Generation Capital I’s argument that the 

claim objection filed by Fliss is barred by the doctrines of res 

judicata and collateral estoppel. While different in scope, both 

doctrines function to preclude a party from relitigating issues 

decided in a prior adjudication. The party asserting res judicata and collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense must 

show that a final judgment on the merits was entered in the 

prior proceedings. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 

1199, 1204 (Ill. 1996) (res judicata); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
8 No. 22-1424 

Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 451 (Ill. 2000) (collateral estoppel).3

Generation Capital I argues that the state court entered two 

orders that satisfy the final judgment requirement: the consent judgment entered in 2011 and the determination order 

entered in 2015. Neither order has the effect Generation Capital I would like to assign it. 

Take the consent judgment first. We agree with the district 

court that it was a final judgment, but it ultimately has limited 

preclusive effect. The district court based its conclusion, at 

least in part, on the bankruptcy court’s finding that a judgment obtained by confession has a limited preclusive effect 

because it is not “actually litigated.” Indeed, Illinois courts are 

generally “reluctant to give preclusive effect to consent judgments.” Ekkert v. City of Lake Forest, 588 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 1992). We must, however, add a critical observation 

to the analysis: consent judgments are treated differently under res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines, and neither 

the district court nor the bankruptcy court acknowledged this 

distinction. 

A consent judgment is not entitled to collateral estoppel 

effect because the doctrine of collateral estoppel relies on “actual” litigation of issues in the prior proceeding, Savickas, 739 

N.E.2d at 451, while a consent judgment is “an administrative 

act of the court recording an agreement of the parties, rather 

than a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and 

the issues involved,” Arnett v. Env’t Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 657 

3 We apply Illinois law to this question of preclusion because “the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a federal case is a matter of state 

rather than of federal law.” CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, 294 

F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2002).
No. 22-1424 9

N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). See also Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 

F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A] default judgment is normally not given preclusive effect under the collateral estoppel 

doctrine because no issue has been ‘actually litigated.’”); 

Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987) (consent judgments not given preclusive effect unless parties 

clearly indicate that intent).

The question of whether res judicata applies to the consent 

judgment is more complicated. There is an unresolved split in 

Illinois appellate courts as to whether dismissal pursuant to a 

settlement agreement amounts to a final judgment on the 

merits for res judicata purposes. Jackson v. Callan Publ’g, Inc., 

826 N.E.2d 413, 427–28 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); see also Urban v. J.P. 

Morgan Chase & Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 211389-U, ¶ 24. Under 

a “modern view,” Illinois courts “generally recognize[] that a 

valid consent judgment is entitled to a res judicata effect, so 

as to preclude relitigation of the same claim or cause of action 

as was covered by such judgment.” Jackson, 826 N.E.2d at 428. 

The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion 

that the consent judgment is a final judgment, and Fliss does 

not contest that finding on appeal. We therefore proceed with 

the assumption that the consent judgment has preclusive effect pursuant to the res judicata doctrine and focus our analysis on the extent of the preclusion here. 

The consent judgment is brief—it simply states the 

amount owed to the bank by each of the four guarantors and 

the companies jointly owned by Fliss, Barr, and Wojciak. The 

district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the 

consent judgment “has limited preclusive effect—only as to 

the existence of the debt and its amount.” We agree because a 

consent judgment “is conclusive with respect to the matters 
10 No. 22-1424 

settled by the order, judgment, or decree.” Elliott v. LRSL Enters., Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (emphasis 

added); see also Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) 

(noting that under federal law, “consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude any further litigation on the claim

presented but are not intended to preclude further litigation 

on any of the issues presented” (emphasis added)). The matters settled by the consent judgment were only the existence 

of the debt and its amount: “Judgment by confession in the 

amount of $204,797.70 plus $407 costs and $3,435.25 attorney’s fees is entered against John W. Fliss.” We therefore see 

no reason to disagree with the district court on the limited 

preclusive effect the consent judgment has in the present litigation.

The state court’s determination order is the last obstacle 

Generation Capital I raises to thwart Fliss’s claim objection—

unsuccessfully so, though for different reasons. To explain, 

we begin with an overview of a relevant procedural mechanism used by judgment creditors in Illinois—initiation of supplemental proceedings to recover on the judgment, also 

known as Section 2–1402 proceedings. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2–

1402(a); see Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Wholesale Life Ins. Brokerage, 

Inc., 915 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). At the conclusion of 

these supplemental proceedings, the presiding court may order a turnover of the judgment debtor’s assets to the judgment creditor. GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 627 (7th 

Cir. 2013). An order entered in supplemental proceedings is 

final when the judgment creditor “is in a position to collect 

against the judgment debtor or a third party,” or has been “ultimately foreclosed from doing so.” Inland Com. Prop. Mgmt., 

Inc. v. HOB I Holding Corp., 31 N.E.3d 795, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2015). 
No. 22-1424 11

Turning back to the facts of this case, consider how Generation Capital I obtained the determination order. After taking over as the judgment creditor, it brought a supplemental 

proceeding in state court and filed a motion that sought, 

among other things, an order directing Fliss to turn over his 

real property in satisfaction of the consent judgment. The 

judge presiding over the supplemental proceeding declined 

to rule on the turnover motion until “the issue concerning a 

determination as to the amount which may be due and owing” to Generation Capital I was decided. This prompted Fliss 

(and Barr) to file a motion in the primary proceeding arguing 

that the debt had been extinguished when the Wojciaks settled the judgment with the bank. The judge presiding over the 

main proceeding disagreed and in May 2015 entered a determination order stating that the debt was still owed and due to 

Generation Capital I. 

Does this make the determination order a final order? We 

think not. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304 governs appeals 

from final judgments that do not dispose of the entire proceeding. Rule 304(a) requires “an express written finding” by 

the court “that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(a); see Xcel 

Supply LLC v. Horowitz, 100 N.E.3d 557, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). 

The determination order did not include this special finding, 

meaning that it is not a final appealable order under Illinois 

rules. Generation Capital I insists that the court was not required to include a special finding because the determination 

order was “[a] final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under section 2-1402,” which is excepted under Rule 

304(a). ILL. SUP. CT. R. 304(b)(4); Xcel Supply LLC, 100 N.E.3d 

at 563. We are not persuaded by Generation Capital I’s argument for three reasons. 
12 No. 22-1424 

First, to state the obvious: the exception does not apply 

here because the determination order was entered in the main 

proceeding, not the supplemental proceeding. In re Marriage 

of Arjmand, 74 N.E.3d 1140, 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“[T]he 

plain language of Rule 304(b)(4) is unambiguous: it permits 

interlocutory appeals only from final judgments entered in citation proceedings under section 2-1402 of the Code.”). 

Second, but no less evident: there was no final judgment 

in the supplemental proceeding when the determination order was entered. To the contrary, the supplemental proceeding had pending turnover motions filed by Generation Capital I that could be decided only after the determination order 

was entered. 

Finally, because Generation Capital I’s turnover motions 

had not been decided, it was not “in a position to collect 

against the judgment debtor or a third party.” Inland Com. 

Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 31 N.E.3d at 800; see also Chi. Police Sergeants’ 

Ass’n, Policemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n, Unit 156A v. 

Pallohusky, 86 N.E.3d 1123, 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (a turnover 

order was final under Rule 304(b)(4) where it “require[d] the 

payment of specific assets to a judgment creditor” and put the 

creditor in a position to collect). True, the determination order 

stated that “[t]here remains an outstanding judgment 

against” Fliss and others “in the amount of $204.797.70.” But, 

unlike a turnover order, it did not “requir[e] the payment or 

liquidation of assets to satisfy a judgment.” Pallohusky, 86 

N.E.3d at 1127–28 (collecting cases). 

Thus, neither the consent judgment nor the determination 

order was a final judgment that, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, precluded Fliss from objecting 
No. 22-1424 13

to Generation Capital I’s claim in bankruptcy court and raising the arguments he did in the process.

In closing, we note a key gap in the record and Generation 

Capital I’s preclusion arguments: the state court entered a 

turnover order in the supplemental proceedings in July 2015. 

This order put Generation Capital I in a position to collect the 

judgment against Fliss’s real property. Had the order been included in the record and relied on for arguments, it would 

indeed qualify as a final judgment under Illinois Supreme 

Court rules. But Generation Capital I never presented this order—before our court, the district court, or the bankruptcy 

court. Arguments not raised in the district court are waived 

on appeal, Brown v. Auto. Components Holdings, LLC, 622 F.3d 

685, 691 (7th Cir. 2010), and “raising an issue in general terms 

is not sufficient to preserve specific arguments that were not 

previously presented,” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 

718 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, it was Generation Capital I’s 

burden to demonstrate that the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply, Oshana v. FCL Builders, 

Inc., 994 N.E.2d 77, 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (res judicata); Pederson v. Village of Hoffman Ests., 8 N.E.3d 1083, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2014) (collateral estoppel), just as it was Generation Capital I’s 

responsibility “to allege facts and indicate their relevance under the correct legal standard,” Econ. Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). 

Generation Capital I had numerous opportunities to present the state turnover order and argue its finality in this case. 

But at every stage of litigation, it steadfastly relied on other 

orders to convince us, the district court, and the bankruptcy 

court that it had obtained a final judgment in state court. Even 
14 No. 22-1424 

when asked at oral argument about the turnover order, counsel for Generation Capital I once again referred us to the determination order. Under these circumstances, we have no 

doubt that Generation Capital I waived any arguments concerning the finality of the turnover order for purposes of res 

judicata and collateral estoppel. We therefore do not consider 

the turnover order in deciding this appeal. See, e.g., Lauth v. 

Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e can invoke waiver sua sponte . . . .”). 

Having found that Generation Capital I failed to demonstrate the existence of a final judgment as required by both res 

judicata and collateral estoppel, we do not address the parties’ 

arguments about the other elements of these doctrines. Similarly, we do not reach Generation Capital I’s argument about 

the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of its claim as a discovery sanction. 

III

Rooker-Feldman is an important principle that preserves 

appellate review of state court decisions exclusively for the 

Supreme Court. It does not bar federal bankruptcy courts 

from deciding issues of federal bankruptcy law. To hold otherwise would expand the doctrine far beyond its reach. Accordingly, Rooker- Feldman was not an obstacle when Fliss objected to Generation Capital I’s claim, and neither were the 

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

AFFIRMED.