J-S36003-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN EDWARD GALLO

Appellant No. 649 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 25, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0002537-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 17, 2015

Appellant, John Edward Gallo, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County after he pled 

guilty to charges of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and terroristic threats. 

On appeal Gallo argues that the trial court erred in refusing to let him 

withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing. As we find no error in the trial 

court’s reasoning, we affirm.

Gallo appeared before the trial court for the scheduled start of trial. 

Instead, Gallo and the Commonwealth reached a negotiated plea agreement, 

whereby Gallo would plead “no contest” to the charges against him and 

receive guideline range sentences for each charge. After reviewing the plea 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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agreement, the trial court rejected it due to the fact that Gallo was not 

accepting responsibility for the crimes. When faced with the trial court’s 

rejection of the plea agreement, Gallo relented and pled guilty to the 

charges. The trial court immediately sentenced Gallo to an aggregate term 

of imprisonment of 3 to 6 years, pursuant to the plea agreement.

Gallo subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which 

the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.

While Gallo purports to raise only a single issue on appeal, it is in fact 

a two-part argument. Gallo first contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea after he was sentenced. In 

the alternative, Gallo argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on his post-sentence motion. 

There remains no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once 

sentence has been imposed. The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw 

their plea post-sentence is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382 

(Pa. Super. 2002). Furthermore, a request to withdraw a guilty plea made 

after sentencing is subject to a higher scrutiny “since courts strive to 

discourage [the] entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.” 

Commonwealth v. Flick, 802 A.2d 620, 623 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, in order to withdraw a guilty plea after the imposition of 

sentence, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice which resulted in a 
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“manifest injustice.” Id. (citation omitted). A defendant meets this burden 

only if he can demonstrate that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily, 

unknowingly, or unintelligently. See Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 

789, 790 (Pa. Super. 1999). Whether a defendant entered into the plea 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently requires an analysis of the totality of 

the circumstances, but, at a minimum, the court must make the following 

inquiries:

(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges 

to which he is pleading guilty?

(2) Is there a factual basis for the pleas?

(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to 

trial by jury?

(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed 

innocent until he is found guilty?

(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of 

sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged? [and,]

(6) Is the defendant aware that the sentencing judge is not 

bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered, 

unless he accepts the agreement? 

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 529 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Moreover, once a defendant enters a guilty plea, it is presumed that 

he was aware of what he was doing. See Stork, 737 A.2d at 790. 

Consequently, defendants are bound by statements they make at their guilty 

plea colloquy and may not successfully assert any claims that contradict 

those statements. See Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 384. Therefore, when the 

record establishes a guilty plea colloquy was conducted during which the 
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defendant states he understands the nature of the charges against him, the 

voluntariness of the plea is established and the burden of proving 

involuntariness rests upon the defendant. See Stork, 737 A.2d at 790. 

Additionally, since the law does not require that a defendant be pleased with 

the outcome of his guilty plea, the defendant’s mere disappointment in the 

sentence actually imposed does not represent a manifest injustice. See 

Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 737 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

A review of the certified record amply supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that Gallo was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea postsentencing. In his motion, Gallo alleged two grounds for relief. First, that 

the victim had indirectly contacted him prior to the plea and applied “undue 

pressure” on Gallo to plead guilty. Second, Gallo asserted that he did not 

understand the elements of the charges and the facts supporting them.

Both of these allegations are directly contradicted by Gallo’s 

statements under oath during the guilty plea colloquy. In his written guilty 

plea colloquy, Gallo was presented with questions asking whether he had 

consulted with his attorney on the elements of the crimes charged and the 

factual basis of each charge. Gallo answered “yes” to each. See Guilty Plea 

Colloquy, filed 3/26/14, at 2. Furthermore, the written colloquy contained 

questions assessing whether Gallo had been coerced into pleading guilty or if 

any undisclosed promises had been made. In each instance, Gallo answered 

“no.” See id., at 7-8.
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During the oral guilty plea colloquy, Gallo testified that he had filled 

out and signed the written guilty plea colloquy, and that after consulting with 

his attorney, he was pleading guilty knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily. 

See N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, at 11-12. When the court asked if he had any 

further questions after consulting with his attorney, Gallo answered, “No, 

Your Honor.” Id., at 13. Gallo also reiterated that he had received no 

undisclosed promises or threats in relation to his decision to plead guilty. 

See id., at 14.

As both grounds in Gallo’s post-sentence motion are contradicted by 

his sworn statements before the trial court, neither ground could support a

finding of manifest injustice, regardless of any evidence Gallo could present 

in support of these grounds. As a result, Gallo’s issues on appeal merit no 

relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2015