Filed 6/13/08 NO. 4-07- 0187 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE O F ILLINOIS, Plai ntiff-Appe llant, v. PHILLIP L. LEGGIONS, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal fr

om Circuit C ourt of Macon Co

unty No. 06CF1 546 Honorab le James R. Coryell, Judge Pre

siding

.

PRESIDIN G JUSTICE A PPLETON

deliver ed the op

inion of th

e court: In Novembe

r 2006, th

e State c harged defenda nt, Philli p L. Leg

gions, wi th unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)). In December 2006, he filed a motion for suppression of evidenc e on the grounds that the police lacked probable cause or reasonable, a rticulable suspicion to seize him. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the ci rcuit court granted the motion. The court found that th

e police lacked p robable c

ause to ar

rest defe ndant an d that two pe

ople exiting one vehicle and entering a nother--even in a high-crime area--did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so a s to justify an investigatory stop. The State

appeals , arguing the polic

e had a reasona ble suspi cion of crimin al activi ty, for the a

rea was known for na

rcotics traffickin

g, and wh

en people

got out of their own vehicle and into another vehicle, it often meant they were buying and selling narcotics. We conclude that a finding of reasonable suspi cion in these circum-- 2 -

stances would subje

ct too many

innoce nt traveler

s to arbitr

ary dete ntion-- and with

little more, in the way of justification, than their presence in a high-crime neighborhood. Therefore

, we affirm

the circ uit court's j udgment. I. BACK GROUND Michae l Gannon wa

s a patro l sergea nt with the D ecatur po

lice de partment, and he testified that on October 23, 2006, he organi zed a surveillance of the 1100 and 1200 blocks of East Leafland Avenue. During the first six months of 2006, there had been 12 shooting incidents in those blocks, where gangs , drugs, and murder were rampant. The house at 1128 East Leafland Avenue was a ha ngout of the Leafland Street Boys' Gan

g. Gannon

persona lly had " been in

volved in four weapon

s seizur es from people either coming to or leaving that residence two months prior to this inc ident," and he also "personally [had] been involved in numerous [drug] transactions at that location." Gannon tes tified tha t at 2:30 p

.m. on Oc

tober 23, 2

006, he to

ok a positi on two to three blocks away from 1128 East Leafland Avenue. He had an unobstructed view of the house. Within 15 minutes, he saw a green GMC Yukon sport utility vehicle park almost directly in front of the house. Within two minutes, a smaller, dark vehicle pulled up behind the Yukon, and two black men got out of that vehicle and into the Yukon. Gannon believed a drug deal was "going down" bec ause in his "12 years of observing numerous drug transactions," "individuals [met] at a location, exit[ed] their vehicle, g[o]t in another vehicle, complete[d] a transaction[,] and then le[ft]." On this occasion, Gannon did not see any drugs or guns from his vantage point two or three blocks away, nor did he see anything ch ange hands. About five minutes after the two men entered the- 3 -

Yukon, Gannon radioed the other police officers on the scene to move in and investigate, and a squad car pulled in front of the Yukon. Six to eight officers, pistols drawn, ordered everyone in the Yukon to show their hands.

Becaus e the sid e windows

of the Yukon we

re tinted , the offic

ers open ed its doors to make sure no one was pointing a firearm at them. The pa ssengers raised their hands, but defendant, in the driver's seat, put his hand s down toward his feet. A Decatur police officer, Chad Shull, ordered everyone out of the Yukon. He then saw, in plain view, a brown piece of paper in the mid dle of the driver's-side floorboard, between the driver's seat and the brake pedal, and on top of the brown paper, a white substance that looked like crack cocaine. The substance field-tested positive. The police arrested defendant for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2006)). II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review When revi ewing a c

ircuit co urt's ruling o

n a motion

for suppre

ssion of evidence, we uphold the court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Gherna , 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). If we accept the court's findings of fact, we decide de novo whether th

ose facts require a suppression of evidence. Gherna , 203 Ill. 2d at 175, 784 N.E.2d at 805. The parties do not dispute the facts in this case; they dispute the legal effect of those facts. Our standard of review is de novo. B. Initi ally, Was the Seiz ure of Defen

dant an I nvestiga

tory Stop or

Was It an A

rrest? The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure- 4 -

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches a nd seizure s, shall n ot be viola

ted." U.S . Const., a

mend. IV

. Likewise, unde

r our state constitution, "[t]he people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[, ] and othe

r posses sions a gainst unr

easona ble sear ches[] [an

d] seiz ures." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. We interpret article I, section 6, in "limited lockstep" with the fourth amendment. People v. Caballes , 221 Ill. 2d 282, 313, 8 51 N.E.2d

26, 44 (20

06) (reaffirming the "li mited loc kstep" do

ctrine). "Under th

is appr oach, [Ill inois c

ourts] will 'look first to the federal constitution, and only if federal law provides no relief [will they] turn to the state constitution to determine whether a specific criterion--for example, unique state history or state experience--justifies de parture from federal precedent.' " Caballes , 221 Ill. 2d at 309, 851 N.E.2d at 42-43, quoting L. Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism , 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93, 104 (2000). Neither of the parties argues for a departure from federal prec edent on the ground that article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution requires a different outcome than the fo

urth amen

dment. Th

erefore, we interp

ret the quote

d provis ions from the two constituti ons as h

aving the same me

aning a nd effect. In his motion for suppression of evidence, defenda nt claims the "seizure" of his "pe

rson" by the polic

e was "unr

easona ble." Se e U.S. Con

st., amen

d. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. The threshold question is whether a seizure occ urred. People v. Jones , 190 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421, 545 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1989). A seizure occurs when, by physical force or a show of authority, a police officer limits a citize n's liberty. Jones , 190 Ill. App. 3

d at 421, 545 N.E.2

d at 1334

. More pla

inly, a p olice offi cer "se

izes" a person when he or she accosts that person and denies that person the freedom to walk away.- 5 -

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). Obviously, by pulling their squad car in front of defendant's vehicle, pointing their pistols at him, commanding him to raise hi s hands and come out of the vehicle, and when he did come out (or they pulled him out), handcuffing him, the police limited his liberty and, therefore, seized him.

The next question is whether the "seizure" was "unrea sonable" (U.S. Const., a mend. IV

; Ill. Cons

t. 1970, a rt. I, §6); for

"what the

[c]onstituti on forbid

s is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable s earches and seizures" ( Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 222, 4 L. Ed. 2 d 1669, 1680, 80 S. Ct. 1 437, 14 46 (1960)). To answer that question, we must determine what kind of seizure it initially was. Case law recognizes two types of seizures of the person: an inves tigatory stop and an arrest. People v. Murray

, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311 (1990). To be reasonable, an

arrest re quires pr obable c ause, whe

reas an investig atory stop

requires reasona ble suspicion. People v. Montgomery , 332 Ill. A

pp. 3d 817

, 820-21, 773 N.E. 2d 225, 228 (2002). The former standard is more stringent than the latter. People v. L ampitok , 207 Ill. 2d 231, 255, 798 N.E.2d 91, 106 (2003). "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States , 361 U.S. 98, 102, 4 L . Ed. 2d 134, 138 , 80 S. Ct. 168, 171 (1959). "Reasonable suspicion exists when 'articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, *** warrant a reasonably prude nt officer' to investigate further [for criminal activity]." Lampito k, 207 Ill. 2

d at 255, 7

98 N.E.2d a t 106, quotin

g Maryland v. Buie

, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990). Though less than probable cause, reasonable suspicion is more- 6 -

than a hun

ch on the

officer's part; it i s an obje ctive sta ndard: the office

r's subjec

tive belief that he or she has an adequate ca use for suspicion will not suffice. Lampito k, 207 Ill. 2d at 255, 798 N.E.2d at 106-07.

An arres t requires

a stronge

r justific ation tha n an inve

stigatory stop because an arrest is a lengthier se izure of the person. People v. W addell , 190 Ill. App. 3d 914, 926, 546 N.E.2d 1068, 1075 (1989). An investigatory stop (often called a " Terry stop" after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) is a short detention of the person--a detention lasting no longer than is nec essary to perform a brief investigation. People v. Hess , 314 Ill. App. 3d 306, 310, 732 N.E.2d 674, 677 (2000); 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2006). A detention for a period longer than i s necessary to perform a brief investigation is cons idered to be an arrest. People v. Hardy , 142 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114, 491 N.E.2d 493, 498 (1986); People v. R oberts, 96 Ill. App. 3d 930, 933-34, 422 N.E.2d 154, 156-57 (1981). "[During] a lawful traffic stop, the police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and the passengers out of the vehicle[,] pendin g the comp

letion of the

stop[,] witho

ut violating

the protec

tions of the

fourth amendment." People v. S ynnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228, 811 N.E.2d 236, 241 (2004).Because it would be illogical to grant police officers the authority to make an investigatory stop wh

ile deny ing them th

e authori ty to enforc

e or effec tuate that s

top, the sta

tus or nature o

f the inves

tigatory s

top does n

ot change

merely b

y virtue of th

e officer 's drawing a gun or using handcuffs. People v. Moore , 294 Ill. Ap p. 3d 41 0, 415, 689 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (1998); Waddell , 190 Ill. App. 3d at 928, 546 N.E.2d at 1076. "Regardless of the initial restraint of the person's movement, whether a stop becomes an arrest is determined by the length of time the person is detained and the scope of the- 7 -

investigation that follows the initial stop." People v. Ross , 317 Ill. App. 3d 26, 32, 739 N.E.2d 50

, 56 (2000

); see a lso People v. Walters , 256 Ill. App . 3d 231, 237, 627 N .E.2d 1280, 1285 (1994); People v. S mith , 208 Ill . App. 3d 44, 49-5 0, 566 N. E.2d 939, 9 43 (1991). By drawing their pistols and putting defendant in han dcuffs, the police did

not arres t him. Gan

non testifi ed he ra

dioed th e other offi cers to a

pproach the Yukon for the purpose of investigating a possible drug transaction. Soon after the police converged on the Yukon and ordered the occupants out, they saw the cocaine in plain view; at that point, they acquired probable cause to arrest defenda nt. See People v. S troud , 189 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 546 N.E.2d 293, 294 (1989). The issue is whether they had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop in the first place, for without the stop, they would not have opened the doors of the Yukon and seen the cocaine in plain view. See People v. Reynolds , 101 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 428 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1981) (evidenc e obtaine

d as a r esult of a vi olation of th e defend ant's fourth- amendm

ent rights must be supp

ressed as "fruit o

f the pois

onous tree"). C. Did the Police Have Cause for Reasona ble Suspicion? In Brown v. Texas , 443 U.S . 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 3 62-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641

(1979), the S upreme Co urt held tha

t a person 's prese

nce in a n area o f expected criminal activity was not enough, in itself, to support a reasonable, particularized s uspicio n that the p

erson wa s committing a cri me. The s tandard of reason

able suspicion required something more-- a nd that "something more" had to be something other than

what peop

le common

ly did (oth

erwise, the high

-crime area would

effective ly be the sole basis of reasonable suspicion). In Brown, two police officers were cruising in- 8 -

their patrol car through an area of El Paso that had a high incidence of drug traffic when "[t]hey observed [the] appellant and another man walking in opposite directions a way from one another in an alley. Although the two men were a few feet apart when they first were seen, Officer Venegas later testified that both officers believed the two had been together or were about to meet until the patrol appeared." Brown, 443 U.S . at 48, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 360, 99 S. Ct. at 2639. The Supreme Court explained: "The flaw in the State's case is that none of the circumstances prece ding the officers' detention of [the] appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was i nvolved in criminal conduct. Officer Venegas testified at [the] appellant's trial that the situation in the alley 'looked suspicious,' but he was unable to point to any facts supporting that conclusion." Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-52, 6 1 L. Ed. 2d at 362, 99 S. Ct. at 2 641. The n, in a foo

tnote, the S upreme Co

urt added

: "This situation

is to be d

istinguis hed from th

e observa

tions of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and artic ulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer." Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362 n.2, 99 S. Ct. at 2641 n.2. The Supreme Court continued: "There is no indic ation in the record that it was unusual for people to be in the alley. The fact that [the] appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the] appellant himself was engaged in crimin al conduc

t. In shor

t, the app

ellant's a ctivity wa

s no diffe

rent from th

e activi ty of other pedestrians in that neighborhood." Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362-63, 99 S. Ct. at 2641.

If Venegas had testified, as a "trained , experienced police officer," tha t drug dealers often met their clients in alleys, it seems doubtful that such testimony- 9 -

would have made a difference, for the fact would have remained that pedestrians commonly

and in p erfect in nocenc e encoun tered oth

er pede strians in alley s. Although

courts con

sider th e traini ng and e

xperie nce of the

officer a s part of the

totality of circumstances, they need not implicitly accept all of the officer's suspicions as reasonable, " 'nor does mere experienc e mean that an [officer's] perceptions are justified by the objectiv e facts. The "basis of the police action must be such that it can be reviewed judicia lly by an o

bjective standar d." ' " (Em

phasis in origi nal.) State v. Young , 212 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 569 N.W.2 d 84, 90 (Wi

s. App. 1 997), quoting United Sta tes v. Buenaventura-Ariza

, 615 F.2d 2

9, 36 (2d Ci r. 1980), quo ting United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 , 324 (2d Cir. 1979). In Illinois v

. Wardlow

, 528 U.S. 11

9, 121-22, 145 L. E d. 2d 570 , 574-7 5, 120 S. Ct. 673, 674-75 (2

000), the

objecti ve fact, ove

r and ab ove the he

avy narc otics trafficking in the neighborhood, was the defendan t's unprovoked flight at the approach of the police car. Running from a police officer is different from casually walking through an alley. L ots of peopl e walk throug h alleys, but, compa

ratively s peaking , not many

people spontaneously run from police officers. "Headlong flight--wherever it occurs--is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Wardlow , 528 U.S. a

t 124, 145

L. Ed. 2 d at 576, 1 19 S. Ct. at 676. Running from a police officer in a high-crime ne ighborhood--or, indeed, anywhere ("wherever it occurs")--was enough to arouse reasonable s uspicion. Wardlow

, 528 U.S. at 1

24, 145 L . Ed. 2d

at 576, 120

S. Ct. at 67

6. In the present case, defendant did not flee, and we have found no Illinois case wi th facts c omparab le to this o

ne. Bec ause the d

etermina tion of rea

sonable- 10 -

suspici on is multi faceted and fac t-intens ive, " 'on e determ ination will seldo

m be a use

ful "precedent" for another.' " Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 6 90, 698, 134

L. Ed. 2 d 911, 920, 1 16 S. Ct. 1657 , 1662 (1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 n.11, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 n.11 (1983). We have found two cases from other jurisdictions, however, that are analogous in their facts.

In the first case, Riley v. S tate , 892 A.2d 370, 372 (Del. 2006), some Newark poli ce office

rs were m

onitoring

the parki ng lot of a liq

uor store for

sales of liquor to minors. The Supreme Court of Delaware accepted the characteriz ation of this parking lo

t as a hi gh-cri me area

: it was " arguably a

location known for the

crime o f 'providing alcohol to minors.' " Riley , 892 A.2d at 376. At 8 p.m., a Ford Escort arrived with two female passengers, both of whom appeared to be underage. Riley , 892 A.2d at 372. Five to ten minutes later, a Ford Taurus parked one or two spaces from the Escort. Riley , 892 A.2d at 372. The defendant, John A. Riley, got out of the Taurus and entered the rear passenger side of the Esc ort. Riley

, 892 A.2d at 372. The two women then turned to fa

ce Rile y and, wh

ile peri odically

"'looking a

round,'" h

ad a co nversati on with him. Riley

, 892 A.2d a

t 372. "B ased upo

n these o bservati ons and

prior in vestigati ons ofadults providing alcohol to minors, [the] officers believed they might have been witnessing a request by the underage girls for the man to purchase them alcohol or, perh aps, a drug transaction." Riley , 892 A.2d at 373. The officers pulled their car behind the Escort to prevent it from driving away. Riley , 892 A.2d at 373. Displaying their badges and identifying themselves as police, they approached the Escort, and when Riley failed to show his hands, they opened the door an d asked him to step out. Riley , 892 A.2d at 373. They smelled marijuana an d saw a bottle of pills on the floor of the Escort (as it- 11 -

turned out, the bottle contained Xanax not in the original container). Riley , 892 A.2d at 373. An officer asked Riley where the drugs were, a nd Riley showed him the marijuana in his lap. Riley

, 892 A.2d at 373. The Supreme Court of Delaware stated that although Riley's presence in a high-crime area could have be en a factor for the police to consider when evaluating the possibi lity of a cr

ime in p rogress, it was not e

nough, by i

tself, to cre

ate reas onable suspicion. Riley

, 892 A.2d at 376. The court further held that Riley's getting out of the Taurus, entering the Escort, and speaking to underage girls--i n conjunction with the circums tance tha

t they were

in a hig h-crim e area- -still was

insuffici ent to cre

ate reasonable suspicion. Riley , 892 A.2d a

t 378. "Th

e observa

tions of the

officers were all consistent with innocent behavior." Riley , 892 A.2d a

t 378. In the second case, Davis v. S tate , 858 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ind. App. 2006), a 24-hour Marathon gas station in Indianapolis was the site of 20 to 50 arrests over the past four years, mostly for narcotics, illegal firearms, and prostitution. A police officer saw a For

d Taurus p

ull into the g

as statio n and, 1 0 minutes

later, a s econd ve hicle pull into the gas station and park next to the Taurus. Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 170. T

he frontseat passenger of the Taurus got into the front passenger seat of the second vehicle, which then circled the lot and left the gas station. Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 170. The officer stopped the Taurus on suspicion of drug activity. Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 171. Th

e Court of Appeals of Indiana agreed with the de fendant that "to label the behavior displayed by the vehicles in this case as suspici ous would give the police leave to legally stop anyone in a neighborhood known for its unlawful activity, regardless of the seemingly innocent behavio r portray ed by ci tizens. " (Empha

sis in o riginal. ) Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 173.- 12 -

Presence in a high-crime area, by itself, was insufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 173. The appellate court concluded that when weighed agains t the public interest, the individual's right to freedom from arbitrary interference by the police should prevail and that the trial court erred in denying the motion for suppression. Davis , 858 N.E.2d at 173.

When assessing the reasonableness of a seizure, we weigh " ' "the public interest" ' " against " ' "the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." ' " Brown, 443 U.S. at 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 361, 99 S. Ct. at 2640, quoti ng Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 109, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 3 36, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1977), quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L.Ed. 2d 607, 615, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2579 (1975). When the facts used to justify an investigatory detention " 'describe a very large category of presumably in nocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures' " ( People v. Ortiz , 317 Ill. A pp. 3d 21

2, 225, 738 N.E .2d 1011

, 1021 (20

00), quotin

g Reid v. Georgia

, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 894

, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2

754 (1980)), the balan

ce "tilts in favor of fr

eedom fro

m police interference" ( Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 363, 99 S. Ct. at 2641). A very larg e catego ry of inno

cent trave

lers get out o

f their own

cars an d into othe

r people's cars. Teenagers do so. Friend s do so when they simply want to confer together and make plans for the day. If we deemed such behavior, together with presence in a highcrime neighborhood, to create reasona ble suspicion, we would be giving the police absolute discretion to intrude into the lives of this broad category of innocent travelers simply because they had the misfortune to visit or reside i n a high-crime neighborhood. "If the fac

ts of this c

ase were sufficien

t grounds for

a tempora

ry deten tion, eve ry perso n- 13 -

who meets

a friend *** to ex

change football tic

kets or eng

age in a brief con

versatio n would be subject to police investigation." Green v. S tate , 744 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tex. App. 1988). We would be giving the police "implicit authorization to create and apply an inferior set of rights to individuals in high-crime a reas, presumably because those individuals are regarded a s being less worthy than other citizens." J. Herbe rt, Can't You See What I'm Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a C rime in High-Crime Area s , 9 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 135, 136 (2002). "The character of the neighborhood as one prone to c

rime or n

arcotic s sales c an come to domina

te the rea

sonable[- ]suspici on inquiry, allowing stops even where the particularized observations of the suspect offered in support of the stop are extremely minimal." M. Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Str

eet: Con sideri ng the Cha

racter of the Neigh

borhood i n Evaluati ng Reas onable Suspici on , 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99, 99 (1999). We conclude that beyond the character of the neighbo rhood, th

e observa

tions in th

is case are too mi nimal to s

upport a re

asonable suspicion and the balance tilts in favor of the individual's right to personal sec urity and freedom from arbitrary detention. III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment. Affirmed. KNECHT, J., concurs. MYERSCOUGH, J., dissents.- 14 - JUSTICE MYE RSCOUGH, dissen ting: I respectfully dissent. While I recognize the out-of-state precedent cited by the majority, the totality of the circumstances in this case de monstrates the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Whether a Terry

stop was reasonable is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. People v. Cordero, 358 Ill. Ap p. 3d 121 , 125, 830 N.E.2d 830, 834 (2005) (finding that mere presence of a car in a parking lot after hours was insufficient to justify a Terry stop where the officer did not testify that the area was a high-c rime ar ea or tha t she was aware of r

ecent cr iminal a ctivity i n the are

a). While being parked in a high-cri me area does not alone create rea sonable suspicion, it is a factor to consider. See Wardlow , 528 U.S. a

t 124, 145

L. Ed. 2 d at 576, 1

20 S. Ct. a

t 676. In this case, given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial seiz ure of defendant. Gannon testified that defendant had parked in a high-crime area in front of a house known as the hangout for a local gang. Gannon al so testifi ed that h

e had pe rsonally been involved in four weapon seizures from people either coming to or leaving 1128 Eas t Leaflan d in the tw

o months p

rior to this incid

ent and h

ad been involved in drug transactions "at that location." Evidence of recent cri me activity in the area can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. See People v. Rivera , 304 Ill. App. 3d 124, 128, 709 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1999) (finding the defendant's presence in an a irport parking lot at 8 p.m. when no airport offices were open and where prior burglaries had occurred supported reasonable suspicion justifying the stop). Moreover, Gannon testified he was familiar with drug transactions. Although Gannon did not observe drugs changing- 15 -

hands, he did

testify tha

t the acti ons of defe

ndant an d the othe

r two men- -meetin

g at a location, individuals exiting one vehicle a nd entering the other vehicle--were consi stent with other drug transactions he had observed.

I would also find that the officers' act of drawing their weapons was reasonable. When arrest-like measures are used, such as drawing weapons, the mea

sures must be "'"reasonable in light of the circumstances that prompted the stop or that developed during its course."'" People v. N itz, 371 Ill. App. 3d 747, 754, 863 N.E.2d 817, 823-24 (20

07) (involving hand

cuffing), quo

ting 4 W. L aFave, S earch & Seizure §9.2(d), at 304 (4 th ed. 20 04), quoti ng United Sta tes v. Aco

sta-Colon

, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998). Individuals involved in the drug trade often carry weapons. People v. Austin , 365 Ill. Ap

p. 3d 496, 506, 849 N.E .2d 112, 1 21 (2006) (i nvolving a

pat down fo

r officer safety). Because drug arrests have inherent dangers, it may be entirely reasonable for officers to draw their weapons if confronting a drug suspect. See United States v. Askew , 403 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that officers executed a Terry stop, not an arrest, when they surrounded the defendant's car and approached with their guns drawn; such actions were reasonable i n light of suspicion that one of the people in the car was about to commit a drug-related crime).

In this case, not only did the officers suspect defend ant was engaged in a drug transaction, the officers knew that the area was a high-c rime area where a number of weapon seizures had occurred. Moreover, when told to put his hands up, defendant reached down. On these facts, the officer's ac tions were reasonable. Because the officers had rea sonable, articula

ble suspi cion tha

t defenda

nt was com

mitting or

about to- 16 -

commit a crime, and beca use the officers acted reasonably when drawing thei r weapons, I would reverse the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.