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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re SOLIS-CRUZ, Minors. July 14, 2015 

No. 325559 

Ingham Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC Nos. 13-002083-NA 

13-002084-NA 

13-002085-NA 

13-002086-NA 

 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and OWENS and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

to her four minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). Because we conclude there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm. 

 Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that the Department of Health 

and Human Services had established a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that a ground for termination 

has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 

NW2d 505 (2004). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s 

special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. at 296-297. 

 The trial court found that the Department established three separate grounds for 

terminating respondent’s parental rights: MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the trial court may terminate a parent’s 

parental rights if the parent “was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or 

more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and” it finds by clear 

and convincing evidence that the “conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and 

there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age.” 

 The record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that respondent’s mental health 

issues continued to be a significant barrier to reunification. After missing two scheduled 

psychological evaluations, respondent was finally evaluated. However, she did not follow 

through with the recommended treatment. Instead, she left Michigan and travelled to Nevada, 
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which is where, she stated, she first learned that she was again pregnant. While in Nevada, 

respondent suffered panic attacks and suicidal ideation that required hospitalization. Her current 

caseworker noted that she received only one report from respondent’s psychiatrist in Nevada, 

which indicated that respondent was on Zoloft for depression, had no plans for the arrival of her 

newborn, and suffered from decreased energy. The trial court did not clearly err when it found 

that respondent’s mental health issues continued to exist and that there was no reasonable 

likelihood that the issues would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s 

ages. 

 A trial court may also terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent, “without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide 

proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g). Here, there was evidence that respondent’s mental health and care-giving skills 

were still an issue after being provided with numerous services. Respondent admitted that she 

was unemployed and had no housing. She was also unsure about when she would have the 

finances to return to Michigan. She further conceded that if the court placed the children with 

her, she would be unable to care for them. When the court asked how long it would take her to 

find a job and housing, respondent thought it would take six months after returning to Michigan, 

which she is hoping to do within the next couple of months. When asked whether she was 

medically capable of working, respondent equivocated: “I think I feel better enough to go back to 

work.” 

 Given the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that respondent failed 

to provide proper care and custody and that there was no reasonable expectation that she could 

provide care and custody in a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. The evidence 

shows that her mental health, employment, and housing issues remain unresolved. She provided 

no concrete plan for resolving them. Indeed, what plans she had were nothing more than 

aspirational. 

 Finally, a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that there “is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s 

parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). On appeal, respondent cites her testimony that new medication is helping her 

feel better, and she has her diabetic neuropathy under control. However, it is clear from the 

record that her mental stability is an ongoing issue. Respondent also failed to comply with other 

remedial services. With regard to the parenting classes that respondent actually attended, the 

caseworker testified that respondent did not benefit from them: she would just “zone out” during 

parenting. This inattention to her children is particularly troubling in light of the fact that she 

had previously, apparently inadvertently, left her then weeks-old baby unattended in a van for 45 

minutes on a hot summer day. Moreover, the record shows that respondent’s children were 

living in deplorable, condemned home before being placed in the Department’s care. At the 

time, respondent stated that she was overwhelmed and could not care for her children. And the 

record shows that respondent’s ability to provide a safe home and proper care has not improved. 
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 The trial court did not clearly err when it found that there was a reasonable likelihood that 

the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. 

 Respondent also argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial 

court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental 

rights.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); MCL 

712A.19b(5). When considering whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best 

interest, the court may consider “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the 

child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). 

 Respondent emphasizes that the trial court found that there was a bond between her and 

the children. However, the trial court also found that respondent’s bond with her children was 

weak because her mental health issues prevented her from maintaining the bond. The court’s 

findings in this respect were bolstered by the testimony of a caseworker that respondent would 

“zone out” during parenting time and that it was not always noticeable that she returned the 

children’s love and affection. The court also found that respondent’s extended stay in Nevada 

prevented her from working on her case-service plan and from reestablishing parenting time. 

Respondent argues that she could work on the case plan because she began seeing a psychiatrist 

in Nevada. Her case-service plan here in Michigan called for her to make additional strides 

toward reunification. Moreover, she only provided one report from the Nevada therapist. This 

does not establish determined and ongoing efforts to address her mental-health issues. Further, 

her decision to travel to Nevada and her hospitalization there kept her away from parenting time 

with her children. 

 Given the evidence that respondent has been unwilling or unable to redress the issues that 

prevented her reunification with the children and that the children were at risk in her care, we 

cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. 

 There were no errors warranting relief. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly