19-4104

Lin v. Garland

BIA

Vomacka, IJ

A206 091 375

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 20th day of May, two thousand twenty-two.

PRESENT:

REENA RAGGI,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

EUNICE C. LEE,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

YUAN LIN,

Petitioner,

v. 19-4104

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, 

N.Y.

FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General; Holly 
2

M. Smith, Senior Litigation 

Counsel; David J. Schor, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Yuan Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s 

Republic of China, seeks review of a November 21, 2019 

decision of the BIA affirming a March 9, 2018 decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied Lin’s application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yuan Lin, No. A206 

091 375 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2019), aff’g No. A 206 091 375

(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 9, 2018). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the 

BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 

522 (2d Cir. 2005). The standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. 

Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse 
3

credibility determination for substantial evidence); Yanqin 

Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing 

factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of 

law de novo).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant facts, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of the 

applicant’s . . . account,” and inconsistencies within and 

between an applicant’s statements “without regard to whether 

[they] . . . go to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder 

could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin 

v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei 

Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports the 

agency’s determination that Lin was not credible as to his 

claim of religious persecution.

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between 

Lin’s application, credible fear interview, and testimony. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Lin was inconsistent 
4

about the date of his second arrest, which called into 

question the date he said he was handing out religious 

leaflets because, depending on the date of the arrest, he 

would still have been detained at the time he claimed to be

distributing leaflets. Moreover, he gave two different dates 

for when he allegedly distributed those leaflets. Further, 

the agency was not required to credit Lin’s explanations that 

he gave random dates at his interview because he was scared. 

See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

In addition to these inconsistencies, Lin omitted from 

his credible fear interview that his parents were permitted 

to take him out of detention to receive medical treatment for 

a hand injury caused by the police during his arrest and then 

return him to detention. The agency reasonably relied on 

this omission because Lin mentioned the injury during his 

credible fear interview but did not mention the unusual fact 
5

that the police allowed his parents to temporarily take him 

out of detention for medical treatment. See Singh v.

Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that

whether an omission hurts credibility “depends in part on the

importance that the omitted fact would have had for the

purpose of the earlier telling”); Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at

78–79 (explaining that an IJ should consider “whether

[omitted] facts are ones that a credible petitioner would

reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant

circumstances”). Moreover, the omission created an 

inconsistency about whether the police paid attention to his 

injuries. Cf. id. at 78 (holding that “omissions are less

probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by 

direct contradictions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The agency also reasonably relied on the lack of 

corroboration of Lin’s testimony. “An applicant’s failure 

to corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on credibility, 

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 

been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Lin presented no evidence of his 
6

church attendance in the United States. Further, the IJ did 

not err in rejecting, or in declining to credit, letters from 

his parents, aunt, and friends in China because Lin filed 

them after the deadline set by the IJ, the authors were not 

available for cross-examination, and some of the authors were 

interested witnesses. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(h) (“The 

immigration judge may set and extend time limits for the 

filing of applications and related documents.”); Y.C. v. 

Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer 

to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an 

applicant’s documentary evidence.”); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 

25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215–16 (B.I.A. 2010) (letters from 

applicant’s friends and family were insufficient to provide 

substantial support for alien’s claims because they were, 

among other deficiencies, from “interested witnesses who were 

not subject to cross-examination”), overruled on other 

grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133–38 (2d 

Cir. 2012).

In sum, the inconsistencies, omission, and lack of

corroboration provide substantial evidence for the agency’s

adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.
7

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–67. The

adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul 

v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Because 

the adverse credibility determination is dispositive, we do 

not reach the Government’s argument that Lin failed to exhaust 

his CAT claim before the BIA.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court