## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Tram ble , 2012 IL App (3d) 110867

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ODEL LP. TRAMBL E, Def endant- Appellee

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District & N o. Third District Docke t No. 3-11-0867

Rule 23 Order

filed Motion to publ ish allowed Opinion filed November 6, 2012

Dec ember

10, 2012
Dec ember

10, 2012

Held (Note : This sy ll abus

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The order suppressing the ammunition discovere d in defe ndant’s vehicle following a traffic stop was rever sed and the cause wa s re m anded for a hearing to resolve the fac tual disputes arising from the alleg ation that the stop was j ustified by defe ndant’s failure to g ive a turn signa l befor e stopping his vehicle

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Knox County
, No. 11-CF- 217; the Hon. Scott Shi pplett, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded.Counsel on

Appea l J ohn T. Pepmeyer, State’ s Attorney
, of Galesburg (Ter ry A. Merte l and Richard T. L eonar d, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor ’s Offic e, of c ounsel), for

the People.

Thomas A. Kar alis, of State Appellate Def ender ’s Offic e, of Ottawa, for appellee

.

Panel J USTI CE McDADE de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
J ustice L y tton concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.
J ustice Wright c oncurr ed in par t and dissented in par

t, with opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endant, Odell P. Tramble, was charg ed with unlawful possession of ammunition by

a felon (720 I L CS 5 / 2 4 -1

. 1 (a ) (West 2010)). Prior to trial, defe ndant filed two motions to suppress evidenc e. The trial court suppressed the evidenc e afte r finding that the police office rs lacke d sufficie nt g rounds to stop defe ndant’s vehicle. The State appea ls, arguing that the officers had probable cause to believe that defe ndant v i o l at ed section 11-804(a) of the I llinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 I L CS 5/11-804(a) (West 2010)). We reve rse and rema nd.

¶ 2 FACTS ¶ 3 Following a tra ffic stop, de fenda nt was ar rested a nd charg ed with unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (720 I L CS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2010)). On August 9, 2011, defe ndant filed two motions to suppress evidenc e, arguing that the police office rs made an unlawful stop and search of his vehicle. The S tate fi l ed a wr i t ten response to both motions, arguing that defe ndant had violated section 11-804(a ) of the Code and that the subsequent stop and

sear ch of his vehicle was lawful. The cause proce eded to a hearing on defe ndant’s motions. ¶ 4 At the hearing, defe ndant testified that he was driving his g irlfriend’ s car with D eandr e Br own and DeJuan Irons as passeng ers. The three i n d i v iduals wer e returning from a McDona ld’s restaur ant when defe ndant missed the turn back to Br own ’s apar tment. Def endant noticed that two marke d police squad car s wer e following his vehicle. Def endant then turned onto a road that went behind Brown’s apartment. At the end of t he road was a yield sign. Def

endant stopped right befor e the y ield sign to let Br own and Irons out. At this point, the police offic ers a ctivated their lights and ma de a tr aff

ic stop. ¶ 5 Def

endant further testified that the road he was stopped on was very narr ow and did not contain a shoulder. Instead, the road ran along side a ditch. When defe ndant stopped, he did
not use his turn signa l beca use he was not making a turn. In fac t, defe ndant testified that he

-2-did not turn the steeringwhee l at all. The off icer s then asked defenda

nt for his license and
reg istration, and a K-9 unit was dispatched to walk around the vehicle. Despite a protest by defe ndant and Br own, the office rs sear ched the entire vehicle, including the trunk of the car

. In the trunk, off

icer s found ammunition. ¶ 6 Br own testified that he had asked defe ndant to drive him to McDona ld’s the night of the stop. On their way back to his house, defe ndant missed the turn to his apar tment, and Br own instructed defe ndant to take the back way

. They noticed tw o m ark ed police squad car s following them. The police initiated a traff ic stop on the vehicle afte r defe ndant had stopped behind Br own’s apar

tment to let him and Irons g et out. Brown testified that defe ndant simply stopped and did not turn. B rown de scribed the road a s a conc rete street with a grave l ditch and no room to move to the side. ¶ 7 Offic er Christopher Hootman testified that he and another office r observe d defe ndant’s vehicle near an addre ss wher e there had been heavy drug traff icking

. When the vehicle beg an to move, Ho o t m an decide d to follow it. He did not have any specific rea son to follow the vehicle; he just “wa

nted to.” He testified that as he fo llowed the vehicle, it pulled over sharply without signa ling and came to a complete stop. The road on which it pulled over had

a slight shoulder and a small ditch. When defe ndant stopped he was 50 fee t from a yield sign. Hootman then initiated a traff ic stop. During the stop, a police canine walked ar o u n d defe ndant’s vehicle and aler ted to the prese nce of contra band. The office rs then sear ched the vehicle and found ammunition in the trunk. Hootman also testified that there was no video of the stop bec ause the came ra in his squad c ar w as not working

. ¶ 8 The trial court found that the office rs lacke d sufficie nt gro u n d s t o s t o p d ef endant’ s vehicle. T he cour

t concluded that defe ndant di d not violate any traff ic l aws because a turn signa l is not require d when a vehicle moves right or left upon a ro ad way

. The court interpre ted section 11-804(a ) of the Code as requiring a turn signa l only when a vehicle turns from a direc t course

. The co u rt fo und that defe ndant did not turn, so there fore he did not violate section 1 1 -8 0 4 (a ). Ba sed on its finding
, the court suppressed all of the evidenc e obtained as a

result of the stop. The State appea ls.

¶ 9 ANALYSI S ¶ 10 The State argues that the trial court err ed in suppressing the evidenc e obtained from the stop when it found that the police lacke d sufficie nt g rounds to initiate a traff ic s t o p o f defe ndant ’s v ehicle. We revie w a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidenc e pursuant to a two-par

t test. People v. Absher
, 242 I ll. 2d 77 (2011). First, we will uphold the court’s fac tual finding s unless they are ag ainst the m an i fest weight of the evidenc e. Id. Second, we assess t h e established fac ts in rela tion to the issues prese nted and revie w the ultimate leg al question of whe ther suppre ssion is warra nted de novo

. Id. ¶ 11 The fourth amen d m en t t o t h e Un ited States Constitution guara ntees the right of the people to be secur e in their persons, houses, papers , and eff ects ag ainst unrea sonable

sear ches and s e izu

r e s

. U

. S. Const., amend. IV. The temporar y detention of individuals during

a traff ic stop c onstitut es a seizure of persons within the mea

ning of the fourth amendment. W hren v. United States
, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). There fore
, the decision to stop an automobile

-3-is constitutional only if the pol ice have, at the very least, reasonable
, ar t i cu l ab le s uspicion

to justi fy an investig ative stop. People v . Hack ett , 2012 I L111781. ¶ 12 As an initial matter, the State argues that the trial court err ed when it held that section 11- 804(a) of the Code does not require an indi vidual to signa l befor e movingright or left and onto the shoulder of the road. Sec tion 11-804(a) states: “No person may turn a vehicle at an intersec tion unless the vehicle is in proper position
upon the roadw ay as require d in Section 11-801 or turn a vehicle to enter a private road

or drivewa

y , or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direc t course or move right or left upon

a roadw ay unless and until such movement can be mad e wi t h rea sonable safe ty

. No
person may so turn an y v eh i cle without g iving an appropriate signa l in the manner here inafter

provided.” 625 I L CS 5/ 11-804(a ) (West 2010). ¶ 13 In consideringthe propriety of t he st op of defendant’ s vehicle, the trial court made the followingcomments about the statute: “[S] o when they say turn a vehicle from a direc t course or move right or left upon a roadw ay , those are two differ ent things. One would be a turn , and one would be movement right or left.
*** [T] he next para g raph [ sic ] say s, no person may so turn any vehicle. Now, in my mind, that ref

ers back to the prec eding sentenc e talking about a turn from a direc t course

. It doesn’t say , may so turn or move right or left upon a roadw ay without g iving an appro p ri ate signa l in the manner here inafter provided. So in my mind, the movement right or left upon a r oadwa y does not nec essar ily

require a signal.” ¶ 14 T o t h e extent the t rial court understood the last sentenc e of the s tatute t o apply onlyto

a turn from a direc t course , that interpre tation would be incorre ct. The second sentenc e is
meant to apply to a ll of the turns and movements listed in the first sentence . There fore , we conclude that the statute require s an appropriate signa l be used when a vehicle makes a turn, chang es lanes, encr oache s onto the other side of the street or road, and leave s the roadw ay

. It does not appea

r that movingwithin a single traff ic lane r equire s a sig nal. ¶ 15 We cannot, howeve r, deter mine whether the trial court based its ruling on its ostensible misint erpr etation of the statute beca use it made no fac tual finding s to guide our consideration of whe ther the of

fice rs had suff

icient grounds to stop defenda nt’s vehicle. ¶ 16 The S tate has assumed that the def en d an t p u l led ont o the s houlder of the road and has based its c laim that the court err ed in grantingthe motion to suppress on that premise. The defe ndant has a

rgued that ther e wa s no shoulder and that he pulled over within his l ane. 1 ¶ 17 I f the trial court believed the defe ndant pulled onto a shoulder without signa ling his turn indicator, its decision is based on its misint erpr etation of the statute and is wrong

. I f, on the other hand, the court believed defe ndant mere ly moved as far right with i n h i s l ane as possible, there may not have been a misint erpr etation of the statute and the decision g ranting

T h e r e a p p e a r to be some fa ctual inc ons is te nci es in the two m oti ons to sup pre ss and 1 def end ant ’s te st imony re la ti ve to “pu ll ing off ” the roa d whic h have not bee n addre sse d by the par ti es

or the tr ia l c our t.

-4-the motion to suppress would be cor rec t. ¶ 18 We cannot resolve the fac tual disputes inhere nt in the issue on appea l. Acc ording ly
, we

rema nd the cause to the trial court so that it can make t h e n ec es s ary fac tual finding s and apply those fac ts to the above-sta ted interpre tation of the statute.

¶ 19 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 20 The judgme nt of the circ uit court of Knox County is reve rsed and the cause is r emande d for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s decision.

¶ 21 Reverse d and re manded.

¶ 22 J USTI CE WR I GHT, c oncurring in pa rt and dissentingin part. ¶ 23 In this case , defe ndant filed two motions to suppress evidenc e. T h e fi rs t m o t i o n t o suppress cha lleng ed the law fulness of the stop of the vehicle, which t he trial court grante d and is at issue bef

ore this cour

t. The second motion to suppress challeng ed the duration of the stop and the trial court did not rule on that motion due to its decision on the initial motion to suppress. ¶ 24 I concur with the m ajority ’s decision and reasoning reve rsing th e t rial court’s g ranting of defe ndant’s first motion to suppress evidenc e based on the validity of the orig inal traff ic stop. The trial court conclude d that defe ndant did not violate any traff ic laws beca

use a turn signa l is not require d when a vehicle move s rig ht or left upon a r oadwa y , or specific ally to stop a long the shoulder of the road in this instance. I agree with the majority ’s holding that section 11-804(a ) of the I llinois Vehicle Code (Code) require s an appropriate signa l befor e

a vehicle moves left or right onto the shoulder of a road, and the trial court err ed in g ranting suppression on those grounds. 625 I L CS 5/ 11-804(a ) (West 2010). ¶ 25 I disagree with the majority ’s position that this issue should be rema nded to the trial court for additional fac tual finding s on the first motion to suppress reg arding the lawfulne ss of the initial traff

ic stop in this case

. The defe ndant’s motion to suppress, filed on August 9, 2011,
repe atedly admits defe ndant “pulled off the roadw ay .” As a matter of law, based on the fac ts and p l eading s involving the initial stop of the vehicle, as applied to the majority ’s i n t erp re tation of section 11-804(a ) of the Code, the fac ts are sufficie nt to deny the initia l motion to s uppress. ¶ 26 I wo u l d re m an d t h i s case to the trial court only to examine the merits of the sec o n d motion to s uppress re g ardingthe duration of the stop, and any other fur ther proc eeding s. ¶ 27 For

these re asons, I

respe ctfully

concur in part and dissent in par t.

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