IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1748

Filed October 15, 2014

MERCY HOSPITAL, IOWA CITY and

CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES,

Petitioners-Appellants,

vs.

SUSAN GOODNER,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Hutchinson, 

Judge.

The employer and its insurer appeal from the district court’s entry of 

judgment upon Susan Goodner’s petition for enforcement of the workers’

compensation commissioner’s award. AFFIRMED.

Peter M. Sand, Des Moines, for appellants.

Paul J. McAndrew of Paul McAndrew Law Firm, PLLC, Coralville, for 

appellee.

Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
2

DANILSON, C.J.

The employer, Mercy Hospital, and its insurer, Cambridge Integrated 

Services,1appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment upon Susan 

Goodner’s petition for enforcement of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s 

award. The commissioner entered the following award:2“Defendants [Mercy] 

shall pay unto the claimant [Goodner] permanent total disability benefits at the 

rate of [$996] per week from January 18, 2000, except for any periods of time 

claimant returned to employment, and during the time claimant remains 

permanently and totally disabled.” On appeal, Mercy contends the district court 

“did not properly construe the award when entering judgment.” Finding no error, 

we affirm.

I. District Court’s Authority. 

Under Iowa Code section 86.42 (2013),

3

a district court is “bound to enter 

a judgment in conformance with the workers’ compensation award.” Rethamel v.

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, our use of the term “Mercy” will refer to both the employer 

and the insurer.

2 Adopting the deputy’s arbitration ruling, but modifying the rate, which was capped by 

statute.

3

Iowa Code section 86.42 provides:

Any party in interest may present a file-stamped copy of an order 

or decision of the commissioner, from which a timely petition for judicial 

review has not been filed or if judicial review has been filed, which has not 

had execution or enforcement stayed as provided in section 17A.19, 

subsection 5, or an order or decision of a deputy commissioner from 

which a timely appeal has not been taken within the agency and which 

has become final by the passage of time as provided by rule and section 

17A.15, or an agreement for settlement approved by the commissioner, 

and all papers in connection therewith, to the district court where judicial 

review of the agency action may be commenced. The court shall render 

a decree or judgment and cause the clerk to notify the parties. The 

decree or judgment, in the absence of a petition for judicial review or if 

judicial review has been commenced, in the absence of a stay of 

execution or enforcement of the decision or order of the workers’

compensation commissioner, or in the absence of an act of any party 
3

Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 2004) (Rethamel I). The district court’s role 

in rendering judgment on a commissioner’s award determination is a “ministerial 

function.” Id. at 629; Rethamel v. Havey, 715 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 2006)

(Rethamel II).

“General jurisdiction is not given to a court to determine any 

question of fact or law necessary to support the award as rendered 

by the Workers’ Compensation Board or Commission in the first 

instance; at the time application is made to enter judgment on the 

record the rights of claimant have been established.

“The court must render a judgment in accordance with the 

award. The court has no power to change the award, it cannot 

review, or reverse or modify the award, or construe the statute. . . .”

. . . .

On an application for entry of a judgment, a court may, 

however, construe the award.

Rethamel I, 679 N.W.2d at 628-29 (citations omitted).

II. Standard of Review. 

We review the district court’s entry of judgment for errors of law. 

Rethamel II, 715 N.W.2d at 266. 

III. Discussion.

In an earlier appeal to this court, we set out the background facts. See 

Mercy Hosp. Iowa City v. Goodner, No. 12-0186, 2013 WL 104888, at *1-6 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013). There we affirmed the commissioner’s award of 

permanent total disability benefits to Goodner, finding “[t]here was substantial 

reliable medical evidence to support the agency’s conclusion that Goodner’s 

mononucleosis and subsequent chronic fatigue syndrome arose out of and in the 

 

which prevents a decision of a deputy workers’ compensation 

commissioner from becoming final, has the same effect and in all 

proceedings in relation thereto is the same as though rendered in a suit 

duly heard and determined by the court.
4

course of her employment. There is also substantial evidence supporting the 

agency’s conclusion that Goodner is permanently and totally disabled as an oddlot employee.” Id. at *18.

After the appeal and issuance of the procedendo, Mercy paid no additional 

benefits. In response, Goodner filed an action in the district court seeking entry 

of judgment. The district court questioned whether the present issue should be 

remanded to the agency. Upon Mercy’s insistence that the matter was properly 

decided by the district court and should not be remanded, the court entered a 

ruling first describing the contested proceedings: 

As difficult as it is to believe, the issues before the Court are 

the remnants of a dispute between the parties dating back to 

Goodner’s work-related injury in January 2000. The original 

disputes between the parties came in alternate care proceedings, in

which [Mercy] admitted Goodner had suffered a work-related injury, 

accepted responsibility for her expenses and sought to control her 

medical care. [Mercy and its insurer] paid benefits, which they 

characterized as healing period benefits, temporary partial disability

benefits and permanent partial disability benefits, from January 

2000 through May 13, 2007. [Mercy and its insurer] then chose to 

terminate payment of benefits and tried to contest that Goodner 

had suffered a work-related injury and that they were responsible 

for paying benefits to her. The Commissioner, district court, and 

Court of Appeals all ruled that [Mercy and its insurer] were barred 

from contesting these issues by the doctrine of judicial estoppel,

having admitted the injury was work-related and their own 

responsibility for that injury in the alternate care proceedings.

[Mercy and its insurer] further contested the Commissioner’s 

finding and conclusion that Goodner was permanently and totally 

disabled. Once again, the district court and Court of Appeals 

affirmed the Commissioner’s ruling. Finally, [Mercy and its insurer]

argued that some of Goodner’s medical expenses were not related 

to the work-related injury. On this issue, [Mercy and its insurer]

enjoyed their sole success, with the Court of Appeals holding that 

[they] did not have to pay for Goodner’s bariatric surgery.[4]The 

 

4 This court affirmed the agency’s finding that Mercy need pay only one-half the cost of 

family therapy—that portion of the therapy that benefitted Goodner. Goodner, 2013 WL 

104888, at *18.
5

Court of Appeals decision was entered January 9, 2013, and 

procedendo issued soon thereafter.

Despite their lack of success on virtually every issue 

presented to the Commissioner and the courts, [Mercy and its 

insurer] continued to resist responsibility for the award sought by 

Goodner. On May 8, 2013, Goodner filed an application for 

judgment, seeking a determination from the Court as to the exact 

amounts owed by [Mercy and its insurer] to her. [Mercy and its 

insurer] resisted the application, leading to the hearings on August 

5 and August 30, 2013.

The district court then explained its view of the issue and summarized the 

parties’ positions:

Central to the primary dispute between the parties is the following 

language from the deputy’s decision: his order required [Mercy and 

its insurer] to pay [Goodner] weekly benefits from the date of injury 

forward, “except for any periods of time Claimant returned to

employment, and during the time Claimant remains permanently, 

totally disabled.”

In order to put the present dispute in context, it is necessary 

to understand the facts before the deputy at the time of the original 

hearing. The record evidence was that from and after the date of 

injury in January 2000 until the hearing on April 30, 2009, Goodner 

had at times worked full time, at times part time, and at times not at 

all. The deputy lauded Goodner for her efforts in trying to return to 

work, and to find work that would be compatible with her symptoms. 

However, the deputy ultimately concluded that whenever Goodner 

returned to work at any level, her symptoms were aggravated. He

concluded as a result that Goodner was totally and permanently 

disabled from the date of the original injury in January 2000—

despite the fact she had worked for significant time periods 

between January 2000 and April 2009. That specific finding was 

affirmed by the Commissioner, the district court, and the Court of 

Appeals, and remains the law of the case.

At the outset of the hearing on August 5, 2013, counsel for 

the parties advised the Court there were two remaining issues: (1) 

when exactly Goodner had worked between January 2000 and 

April 30, 2009; and (2) whether Goodner was entitled to any weekly

benefits during periods when she was working part time between 

January 2000 and April 30, 2009. [Mercy and its insurer] conceded 

that they owed benefits for any time Goodner was not working at 

all, and respondent conceded she was not entitled to benefits 

during any time period she was working full time. However, the 

parties disagreed as to the effect of the deputy’s ruling, quoted 
6

above, that she would not receive benefits for any time period she 

returned to employment.

The parties ultimately reached a stipulation as to the exact 

days Goodner had worked between the dates of her injury and final 

hearing. However, they continued to disagree as to the meaning of 

the deputy’s ruling with regard to the times when Goodner was 

working part time. The Court expressed concern about its role in 

interpreting the decision of the deputy, and inquired about the 

possibility of remanding the case to the Commissioner for that 

express purpose. However, [Mercy and its insurer] advocated—

and respondent ultimately agreed—that it was the Court’s duty to 

interpret the Commissioner’s decision, and not to remand the case.

Based upon the parties’ joint assertion that the Court and not the 

Commissioner should decide the meaning of the deputy’s ruling, 

and the authority cited by the parties, the Court agreed to take up

the remaining issue and held the final hearing on August 30, 2013.

Goodner’s argument is simple and straightforward. She 

contends that the deputy could not have intended to penalize her in 

effect for attempting to return to work between January 2000 and 

April 2009 by ruling that she would receive no weekly benefits 

during any week in which she had worked at all during that time 

period. That is indeed the effect of [Mercy’s] argument; regardless 

of how many hours [Goodner] had worked in a given week, if she 

worked at all she would receive no weekly benefits for that week

under [Mercy’s] interpretation of the deputy’s ruling.

[Mercy and its insurer] admit that the result of their argument 

is harsh, but argue that it is justified not only by the language of the 

deputy’s ruling but the logic inherent in the deputy’s ruling. 

The district court rejected Mercy’s construction of the commissioner’s 

award, as do we. Mercy’s position would deny Goodner any benefits even if she 

was capable of only working one hour per week, though under workers’

compensation provisions she is entitled to benefits if she is partially disabled, 

temporarily or permanently. See Iowa Code §§ 85.33, .34. The district 

concluded this result was clearly contrary to the commissioner’s ruling and to the 

goals of the workers’ compensation provisions, which is to benefit the worker. 

Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2002); 

McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980).
7

The district court also noted that Iowa case law supports the proposition 

that the commissioner may find permanent total disability, even though the 

employee has worked to some extent in the past or is capable of working to 

some extent in the future. See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Iowa 

2000) (stating “total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness”); 

see also Acuity Ins. v. Forman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 219-20 (Iowa 2004) (affirming 

finding of total permanent disability where employee continued to be employed), 

abrogated on other grounds by Kohlhaas v. Hog Slat, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 387, 391-

92 (Iowa 2009). The district court concluded, based upon this rationale, the 

commissioner could have awarded Goodner weekly benefits for the entirety of 

the period between January 2000 and April 30, 2009, without any credit to Mercy

for the wages Goodner in fact earned but instead “chose to follow a different 

course” and gave the employer credit.

In addition, the district court found Mercy should be judicially estopped 

from asserting a position inconsistent with its earlier position that it should be 

entitled to credit for any and all time periods Goodner was working between 

January 2000 and April 2009, which times were included in a stipulation made at 

the arbitration hearing.5 See Winnegago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 

567, 574-75 (Iowa 2006). We find it significant that this same principal was 

 

5 The district court observed that Mercy stipulated on the arbitration hearing report with 

Goodner and before the hearing deputy in open hearing that “[p]rior to hearing, claimant 

was paid indemnity as shown in Claimant’s Exhibits 48 and 49.” Exhibits 48 and 49 are 

itemized statements of the money-benefits (i.e., indemnity) paid by Mercy before 

hearing. Mercy’s current position was contrary to its stipulation that the itemization of 

indemnity set forth in Claimant's Exhibits 48 and 49 are to be honored and used to 

determine proper amounts of indemnity paid before hearing.
8

invoked in the original appeal from the award. See Goodner, 2013 WL 104888, 

at *10.

Mercy disputes Goodner’s contention that the court should construe the 

award in a way that is “reasonable.” Mercy describes Goodner’s contention the

“most problematic argument.” In sum, Mercy argues the agency’s award must be 

construed solely upon the legislative policy established in the code not upon a 

reasonableness standard. We find no error in a reasonable reading of the 

commissioner’s award. Temporary partial disability is paid to an employee “for 

whom it is medically indicated that the employee is not capable of returning 

employment substantially similar to the employment in which the employee was 

engaged at the time of injury.” Iowa Code § 85.33(2). “Temporary benefits 

compensate the employee for lost wages until he or she is able to return to work

. . . . [T]emporary partial benefits are designed to reimburse the employee while 

he or she was temporarily disabled and still working for the employer (albeit in a 

different position).” Mannes v. Fleetguard, Inc., Travelers Ins. Co., 770 N.W.2d 

826, 830 (Iowa 2009). The district court’s construction of the commissioner’s 

ruling is in keeping with the goals of workers’ compensation. Mercy paid 

temporary partial benefits and the commissioner ruled it “shall be given credit for 

benefits previously paid.” The district court’s ruling properly construes the award 

to allow benefits to Goodner during times she was still working less than full 

time—that is, when she was “not capable of returning to employment 

substantially similar to the employment in which the employee was engaged at 

the time of injury”—and giving Mercy credit for those payments. This is a 
9

reasonable construction of the award and is mindful of the policies established by 

the legislature but does not involve construing a statute or modifying the award.6

The district court entered judgment, which provides in part:

(5) Attached as “Exhibit A” is an Award Calculation. Exhibit 

A accurately sets forth the amount of the compensation (i.e., 

indemnity or weekly monetary benefits) awarded by the Iowa 

Workers’ Compensation Division Deputy Commissioner in his 

December 30, 2009, Arbitration Decision, which compensation was 

affirmed by all reviewing courts.

(6) Mercy has paid all Section 85. 2 7 expenses presented at 

hearing and awarded in the December 30, 2009, Arbitration Award. 

(7) Mercy has also paid all hearing costs. 

(8) The parties at hearing in this Court on August 30, 2013, 

stipulated to the following dates concerning Goodner’s 

employment:

(a) 1/18/00–2/7/00: Goodner was working full-time at Mercy 

Clinic.

(b) 2/7/00–3/6/00: Goodner was off work at this time.

(c) 3/7/00–6/30/03: Goodner was working part-time at Mercy 

Clinic.

(d) 7/15/03–8/31/03: Goodner was unemployed at this time.

(e) 9/1/03–1/15/04: Goodner was working full-time at UI 

Student Health.

(f) 1/16/04–2/18/05: Goodner was working part-time at UI 

Student Health.

(g) 2/22/05–12/26/05: Goodner was working part-time at the 

VA. (This stipulation was agreed to at the hearing before the Court 

on August 9, 2013, adding 19.5 part-time weeks to Mercy’s credit).

(h) 12/27/05–9/1/2006: Goodner was working part-time for 

Amish house-call service.

(i) 9/2/06–11/29/07: Goodner was not working at this time.

 

6 Mercy argues the district court impermissibly awarded Goodner both permanent partial 

and permanent total disability benefits for the same work-related injury. Iowa Code 

section 85.34(3)(b)—the section governing permanent total disability awards—states, in 

part: “No compensation shall be payable under this subsection for any injury for which

compensation is payable under subsection 2 [which governs permanent partial disability 

awards] of this section.” Subsection three explicitly prohibits creating a hybrid award of 

permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits for the same injury. See Bell 

Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning v. Gwinn, 779 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Iowa 2010) (“Any 

disability that remains after stabilization of the condition gives rise to ‘either a permanent 

partial or a permanent total award.’”) (quoting 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s 

Workers’ Compensation Law § 80.03, at 80–4 (2009)). We do not conclude the district 

court created a hybrid award.
10

(j) 11/30/06–1/23/08: Goodner was working part-time for 

Unity Healthcare at this time.

(k) 1/24/08–present: Goodner was not working at this time;

(9) The Court entered its Ruling on Respondent’s Application 

for Judgment Entry on October 9, 2013, directing, among other 

things, that counsel for respondent/Goodner shall prepare a 

judgment entry for weekly benefits consistent with the stipulation of 

the parties concerning Goodner’s employment between January 

2000 and April 30, 2009, and the contents of the ruling that counsel 

for respondent shall prepare a judgment entry for weekly benefits 

consistent with the stipulation of the parties concerning Goodner’s 

employment between January 2000 and April 30, 2009, and the 

contents of this ruling, obtain the signature of petitioners’ [Mercy’s] 

counsel approving the ruling as to form only, and present it to the 

Court for signature on or before November 1, 2013. This filing is 

now made to comply with that Ruling.

The court entered judgment in favor of Goodner and against Mercy in the 

principal amount $320,007.64 and for $91,134.90 in interest accrued on the 

principal amount from “11/27/07–11/1/13”; and for costs in an amount to be 

determined by the clerk of court. 

The district court’s judgment entry properly construes the agency decision 

to compensate Goodner when she was unable to work, whether that was a full 

week or a partial week. However, the judgment allows Mercy to receive a credit 

proportionally for the weeks when Goodner was able to work a partial week.

Finally, the judgment gives credit to Mercy for past payments in accordance with 

the agency ruling.

We find no error. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Mercy.

AFFIRMED.