IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60220

YASMIN HUGHES,

Petitioner - Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS; ATTORNEY GENERAL JIM HOOD,

Respondents - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:09-CV-284

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Yasmin Hughes was convicted in Mississippi state court of one count of 

armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault, and his convictions were

affirmed on direct appeal. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in federal court, alleging that the evidence presented at his trial was legally 

insufficient to support his convictions. The district court granted habeas relief, 

and the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections timely 

appealed. We REVERSE and RENDER.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 3, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on May 2, 2006, Jack Warner answered a 

knock at his door, finding two young males, later identified as Adrion Webster 

and Yasmin Hughes. Webster stated that they had run out of gas and asked 

to use Warner’s phone. Warner handed a cordless phone to Webster, and 

Webster made a phone call during which he purported to tell a person on the 

other end of the line that he had run out of gas. As Webster returned the phone 

to Warner, Hughes pulled his hood over his head. Sensing that something bad 

was about to transpire, Warner offered the men a few gallons of gas that he 

kept under his carport. Webster declined the offer, stating that someone would 

be bringing them gas. Hughes and Webster then turned to walk away. When 

Warner turned to go back into his house, Webster shot Warner three times. 

Hearing the gunshots, Warner’s wife ran to the door and was also shot. Warner 

ran toward Webster in defense of his wife, and he was shot a fourth time.

Webster and Hughes then ran out of the carport and toward the back of the 

Warners’ home, away from the road.

In actuality, Webster and Hughes had not run out of gas. Webster also 

had not spoken to anyone on the phone, but had instead called the house at 

which Hughes was staying and spoken to an answering machine as if someone 

had answered. Earlier in the day, Webster had picked Hughes up and they

had driven around, discussing ways to make money, including hustling and 

robbing. Shortly before the incident, the two had parked for a few minutes in 

the driveway of one of the Warners’ neighbors. Webster and Hughes had then 

continued on and parked their vehicle on a small dirt road approximately 150 

to 200 yards from the Warners’ home before walking to the Warners’ home.

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After the shooting, they returned to their vehicle, and Webster said to Hughes, 

“Why did you run? That was our lick.”1

Hughes was indicted on one count of armed robbery and two counts of 

aggravated assault.2 The case was submitted to the jury pursuant to an aiding 

and abetting instruction, and Hughes was convicted on all three counts. 

Hughes appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, contesting, among other 

things, the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Hughes 

argued that there was “no evidence to show that he had prior knowledge of 

Webster’s criminal intent, that he participated in the crimes in any way, or 

that he otherwise aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.” Hughes v. 

State, 983 So. 2d 270, 276 (Miss. 2008). The Mississippi Supreme Court

affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hughes aided and abetted the crimes of 

armed robbery and aggravated assault. Id. at 276–80. The United States 

Supreme Court denied Hughes’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Hughes v. 

Mississippi, 555 U.S. 1052 (2008).

Hughes filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal 

district court, again challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions. The district court granted the petition, holding that no reasonable 

trier of fact could have found that the state proved the elements of the charged 

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court’s opinion was primarily 

based on its conclusion that there was no evidence to show that Hughes knew

of Webster’s gun, which the district court concluded was an element necessary 

to sustain Hughes’s convictions. The district court also found that there was 

1 There was testimony at trial that a “lick” typically means to rob somebody or to steal 

something.

2 Webster was also indicted on all three counts. He pleaded guilty to the aggravated 

assault counts, and the prosecution dropped the armed robbery count.

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insufficient evidence that Hughes took any action in support of the crimes of 

armed robbery and aggravated assault.

II. Discussion

When reviewing a district court’s grant of habeas relief, we review issues 

of law de novo and factual findings for clear error. Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 

774, 788–89 (5th Cir. 2010).

Hughes’s petition challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

his convictions—an issue that he unsuccessfully adjudicated in state court. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court has no authority to grant 

habeas relief after an adjudication on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d). “A 

state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does 

not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 786. 

Therefore, to receive habeas relief, a state prisoner “must show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786–87. Moreover, a state court’s factual 

findings are presumed correct unless the applicant rebuts that presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1). 

“The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction whenever, ‘after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

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rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2152 (2012)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Under Mississippi law, 

“one who aids and abets another in the commission of an offense is guilty as a 

principal.” King v. State, 857 So. 2d 702, 739 (Miss. 2003). To convict Hughes 

of aiding and abetting the crimes of aggravated assault and armed robbery, the 

prosecution was required to prove that the crimes were committed and that 

Hughes “was present, consenting, aiding, and abetting” in the commission of 

the crimes. Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1279 (Miss. 2004) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Hughes does not contend that the evidence 

was insufficient to prove that Webster committed the crimes of armed robbery 

and aggravated assault. He argues only that evidence was insufficient to prove 

that he had the intent to aid and abet the commission of the crimes and that 

he took actions in aid of these crimes.

As a threshold matter, contrary to Hughes’s assertion and the district 

court’s conclusion, it was not necessary under Mississippi law that the 

prosecution prove Hughes knew Webster had a gun.3 This is because 

Mississippi has adopted the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine:

“Where parties combine to commit crime, the law imputes the guilt of each to 

all thus engaged, and pronounces all guilty of any crime committed by any, in 

the execution of the common purpose, as one of its natural and probable 

consequences . . . .” Eakens v. State, 289 So. 2d 687, 689 (Miss. 1974) (quoting 

3 State law determines the substantive elements of a crime, while federal law 

determines federal constitutional sufficiency of the evidence. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 

2060, 2064 (2012) (per curiam). To the extent that there is disagreement about the 

parameters of applicable Mississippi aiding and abetting law, we note that “federal habeas 

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2011)

(per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is not the province of a 

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Franklin v. State, 196 So. 787, 792 (Miss. 1940)); see generally Gonzales v. 

Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 190–91, 196–98 (2007) (explaining that “many 

States and the Federal Government apply some form or variation” of the

“‘natural and probable consequences’ doctrine,” and cataloging those states 

that have adopted some form of the doctrine). Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme 

Court has applied this doctrine to reject the argument made by Hughes,

holding that a conviction for armed robbery (or even a conviction for murder)

may be sustained although the defendant was unaware of the weapon and 

intended to aid only in the commission of a simple robbery. See Eakens, 289 

So. 2d at 688–89; see also Anderson v. State, 397 So. 2d 81, 84–85 (Miss. 1981)

(“Had Taylor murdered someone during the commission of the robbery, 

Anderson could have been indicted and punished for the murder, 

notwithstanding the fact that he was only aiding and abetting the robbery. It 

follows that Anderson was properly indicted and punished for robbery by use 

of a firearm.”). Therefore, since the use of a firearm is a natural and probable 

consequence of a simple robbery, Hughes could be convicted of armed robbery 

and aggravated assault committed by Webster in furtherance of the intended 

robbery, even if the prosecution proved only that he intended to aid and abet a 

simple robbery.4

4 This case is not controlled by Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), 

where the United States Supreme Court recently held that a defendant must have advanced 

knowledge that a codefendant would use or carry a firearm to be convicted of aiding and 

abetting the federal crime of using or carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 

crime. That case arose under federal law, not Mississippi law. Further, its reasoning is 

distinguishable because the Court explicitly noted that it was not addressing whether the 

charged crime was a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. Id. at 1248

n.7 (“[N]o one contends that a § 924(c) violation is a natural and probable consequence of 

simple drug trafficking. We therefore express no view on the issue.”). Here, the Mississippi 

Supreme Court has clearly held that the use of a firearm is a natural and probable 

consequence of simple robbery. See Eakens, 289 So. 2d at 688–89. 

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Considering the evidence in this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court 

held that Warner’s testimony that Hughes and Webster together turned 

around and walked away before the shooting began supported a finding that 

“Hughes knew what was about to transpire.” Hughes, 983 So. 2d at 277. The 

court also held that Webster’s statement after the crime regarding a “lick” 

would allow a juror to “reasonably infer that a ‘lick’ or robbery had been their 

mutual intent beforehand.” Id. Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court

thoroughly explained how a finding of a mutual intent to commit robbery was 

supported by the totality of the circumstances, including that the two discussed 

the subject of robbery beforehand, parked for a while in a neighbor’s driveway, 

and both walked together 150 to 200 yards to the Warners’ home to tell a false 

story about running out of gas. Id. at 279.5

Likewise, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered Hughes’s argument 

that he was merely present and did not aid in the commission of the crimes. It

explained that, under Mississippi law, “[m]ere presence, even with the intent 

of assisting in the crime, is insufficient unless the intention to assist was in 

some way communicated to [the principal].” Id. at 276–77 (emphasis added) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court distinguished the 

cases cited by Hughes and held that the evidence in his case was sufficient to 

show that he aided and abetted the commission of the crimes by being present 

and communicating his intent to aid Webster by (1) accompanying him the 150 

to 200 yards to the Warners’ house after the two discussed robbery, and (2) 

“acting, along with Webster, as if he were leaving just before Webster began 

shooting.” Id. at 277.

5 Indeed, the district court noted that “the talk earlier in the day of potentially robbing 

someone may establish Hughes’[s] knowledge that Webster might do such a thing.” 

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As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized, there was evidence 

presented at Hughes’s trial as to both his intent and his actions in aid of 

Webster’s commission of armed robbery and aggravated assault. The court’s 

factual findings were not unreasonable in light of this evidence, especially 

given the rebuttable presumption that applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), 

(e)(1). Nor can we say that the court unreasonably applied the United States

Supreme Court’s sufficiency of the evidence standard as established in 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. See § 2254(d)(1).

A district court cannot engage in its own analysis without explaining 

how the Mississippi Supreme Court’s thorough analysis “was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 131 

S. Ct. at 786–87. Such an approach would “illustrate[] a lack of deference to 

the state court’s determination and an improper intervention in state criminal 

processes, contrary to the purpose and mandate of AEDPA.” Id. at 787. 

Because Hughes failed to show that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision 

“was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement,” the district court was without authority to grant habeas relief. 

Id. at 786–87.

The judgment granting habeas relief is REVERSED, and judgment is 

RENDERED, denying habeas relief.

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