1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-20934.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION as Receiver for Western

Bank-Westheimer, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ENVENTURE V, Allen B. Daniels, and Don C. Horton, DefendantsAppellants.

March 11, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") brought

suit on behalf of a failed bank to collect a debt owed the bank by

Enventure V, a Texas Limited Partnership ("Enventure"), Allen B.

Daniels ("Daniels"), and Don C. Horton ("Horton"). The court below

granted summary judgment in favor of the FDIC. The obligors have

appealed. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

On Ju ly 15, 1986, Enventure received a loan for $131,697.03

from Western Bank—Westheimer ("Western Bank"). Daniels and Horton,

in addition to being general partners in Enventure, also signed

continuing guaranties of Enventure's indebtedness on June 1, 1982.

On July 15, 1987 , Enventure defaulted on the promissory note.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Enventure V, 868 F.Supp. 870, 873

(S.D.Tex.1994).

On October 1, 1987, the FDIC was appointed recei ver for1 In relevant part, section 1821(d)(14) of FIRREA provides:

(A) Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the

applicable statut e of limitations with regard to any

action brought by the C o rporation as conservator or

receiver shall be—

(i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer

of—

(I) the 6-year period beginn ing on the date the

claim accrues; or

2 Western Bank after the bank was declared insolvent. On October 1,

1993, the FDIC initiated this action against Enventure, Daniels and

Horton to collect on the promissory note and guaranties. I d.

Following the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor

of the FDIC, Enventure, D aniels and Horton (collectively

"appellants") appealed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the

six-year statute of limitations contained in the Financial

Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") has

expired and bars the FDIC from collecting on the promissory note.

DISCUSSION

FIRREA c ontains the applicable statute of limitations for

actions brought by the FDIC as receiver. Under FIRREA, the statute

of limitations on contract claims is the longer of "the 6-year

period beginning on the date the claim accrues" or "the period

applicable under state law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (emphasis

added). The statute of limitations begins to run on a contract

claim on the date the FDIC is appointed receiver or the d ate the

cause of action accrues, whichever is later. 12 U.S.C. §

1821(d)(14)(B). 1(II) the period applicable under State law; ...

(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which

the st atute of limitations begins to run on any claim

described in such subparagraph shall be the later of—

(i) the date of the appointment of the Corporation

as conservator or receiver; or

(ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues.

3 The FDIC contends that as a general rule this court uses Rule

6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to interpret statutes

of limitations. Rule 6(a) provides that in computing any period of

time "the day of the act, event, or default from which the

designated period of time begins to run shall not be included [and]

[t]he last day of the period so computed shall be included."

FED.R.CIV.P. 6(a). The FDIC argues that since it was appointed

receiver on October 1, 1987, under Rule 6(a) that day is excluded

from the calculation of the limitations period, but October 1, 1993

is included in the calculation of the limitations period. Hence,

by filing the claim on the anniversary date of its appointment as

receiver, the FDIC contends its suit is within the six-year statute

of limitations period contained in § 1821(d)(14).

In support of the application of Rule 6(a), the FDIC cites

Lawson v. Conyers Chrysler, Plymouth, and Dodge Trucks, Inc., 600

F.2d 465 (5th Cir.1979) and Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bledsoe,

989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.1993). In L awson, this court interpreted the

statute of limitations contained in the Truth in Lend ing Act

( "TILA") to determine whether a suit filed on the one-y ear

anniversary date of the sale at issue was barred by the statute of4

limitations contained in TILA. Under TILA, the statute of

limitation provides that "[a] ny action under this section may be

brought in any United States district court

... within one year

from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. §

1640(e).

In interpreting the statute of limitations, the court applied

Rule 6(a) and found that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by the

one-year s tatute of limitations contained in TILA because under

Rule 6(a), the "day of the transaction is excluded and the last day

of the period is included." I d. at 465. Therefore, the court

reasoned, since the purchase by the plaintiff occurred on January

31, 1977 and the suit was filed on January 31, 1978, the plaintiff

was not barred by the statute of limitations.

In B ledsoe, the court was required to determin e the

appropriate statute of limitations period held by assignees of the

FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

("FSLIC"). In reaching its decision, the court stated the

following concerning FIRREA's statute of limitations:

In the instant cases ... the FSLIC was appointed receiver on

December 19, 1985. As the six year period began running on

December 19, 1985, the FDIC's claim filed on December 18,

1991, was filed one day befor e the expiration of the

limitations period, and thus was timely filed.

Id. at 809.

Although Lawson and Bledsoe are instruct ive, they provide

little support for the application of Rule 6(a) to § 1821(d)(14).

Lawson involved a statute of limitations which used the phrase

"within one year" as opposed to "beginning on the date" as2 Compare the above quoted passage from Bledsoe with language

at the end of the Bledsoe opinion: "With the six year limitation

period beginning to run on December 19, 1985, the note would have

become stale on December 19, 1991 . The FDIC's filing of this

action on December 18, 1991 was one day prior to the expiration

date and hence was timely." Id. at 811-12.

5 contained in § 1821(d)(14)(A). The phrase "within one year" is

vague as to when the limitations period is to begin and end and

thus the court properly applied Rule 6(a) in determin ing the

calculation of the limitations period. Such is not the case with

the phrase "b eginning on the date" which provides a specific

reference to the beg inning of the limitations period.

Additionally, the statement cited from Bledsoe is not necessary to

the holding of the case and is confusing dicta at best. 2

R ule 6(a) is a general statutory rule concerning the

computation of time. "A general statutory rule usually does not

govern if a more specific rule covers the case." R esolution Trust

Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir.1994); s ee Green v. Bock

Laundr y Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1992, 104

L.Ed.2d 557 (1989); s ee also Union Nationa l Bank of Wichita v.

Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 41, 69 S.Ct. 911, 913, 93 L.Ed. 1190 (1949).

Generally, the court must "assume that "the legislative purpose is

expressed by the ordinary me aning of the words used.' " U nited

States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1793, 85 L.Ed.2d

64 (1985), quoting Richards v. United S tates, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82

S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962).

In § 1821(d)(14)(A), Congress provide d that the limitations

period began "on the date the claim accrues." The use of the word6

"on" is clear and creates a more specific rule which overrides the

application of Rule 6(a). Therefore, because the FDIC was

appointed receiver on October 1, 1987, this day is included in the

calculation of the six-year limitations period, and thus the FDIC's

filing of the claim on Oc tober 1, 1993, is one day late.

Consequently, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations

contained in § 1821(d)(14), so that the FDIC's action must be and

is hereby dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is REVERSED AND RENDERED.