Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael P. Quirk 

Muncie, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Larry D. Allen 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Samuel Pinkston, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

January 13, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No. 

18A04-1607-CR-1629 

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Marianne Vorhees, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

18C01-1408-FB-20 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
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Case Summary 

[1] Samuel Pinkston was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and 

entered into a plea agreement that required him to serve a sentence of six years 

but that left to the trial court the decision of where that time would be served. 

The trial court ordered Pinkston to serve all of his time in the Department of 

Correction, and Pinkston appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] In July 2016, Pinkston pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in 

methamphetamine (manufacturing). The statutory sentencing range at the time 

of his offense (April 2014) was six to twenty years, with an advisory sentence of 

ten years, see Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-5 (West 2012), but his plea agreement 

called for a sentence of eight years, with six years to serve in a setting 

determined by the trial court and the other two years suspended to probation. 

[3] At the sentencing hearing, Pinkston asked to be allowed to serve his time on 

electronic home detention. He also asked that, if any of his time was to be 

served in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), he be recommended for 

placement in a therapeutic community as part of the DOC’s Purposeful 

Incarceration program. In considering the appropriate placement, the trial 

court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) while this case was pending, 

Pinkston was arrested for and charged with operating while intoxicated and 

operating a vehicle after lifetime license forfeiture; (2) Pinkston was on 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A04-1607-CR-1629| January 13, 2017 Page 3 of 5

supervised probation in another case when he committed the offense in this 

case; and (3) Pinkston has at least seven prior felony convictions stretching back 

to 1991. The court found one mitigating circumstance: Pinkston accepted 

responsibility for his actions and saved the State the expense of going to trial by 

pleading guilty. Explaining that “the circumstances could have supported the 

advisory, if not an enhanced sentence,” Tr. p. 28, the trial court rejected 

Pinkston’s request to serve his time on home detention and instead ordered him 

to serve all of his time in the DOC. However, it found that Pinkston “is an 

appropriate candidate for Purposeful Incarceration through a Therapeutic 

Community” and said that “once Defendant has One (1) actual year or less to 

serve, he may petition the Court to consider ordering him to serve the 

remaining One (1) actual year as a direct commitment to electronic home 

detention.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 29. 

[4] Pinkston now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[5] Pinkston contends that the trial court committed several errors in deciding how 

he would serve his six years. Our trial courts enjoy broad discretion in making 

sentencing decisions, and we will reverse such a decision only for an abuse of 

that discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). 
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[6] Pinkston first argues that the trial court “did not give a detailed reason why [he] 

could not serve his executed time on electronic home detention.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 9. We disagree. After specifically laying out the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances, the court explained that Pinkston “has not taken 

advantage of prior opportunities for rehabilitation, including prior 

commitments to the Department of Correction and prior attempts at adult 

probation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 40 (emphasis added). While 

probation does not always include electronic home detention, the bottom line is 

that Pinkston has not succeeded when given non-DOC alternatives in the past. 

The trial court’s sentencing statement was more than adequate. 

[7] Next, Pinkston points out that he was originally facing three charges 

(possession of reagents or precursors and maintaining a common nuisance, in 

addition to dealing) and that the pre-sentence investigation report “lists all three 

(3) counts as the ‘present offense’, even though it is clear in the plea agreement 

that the Defendant was only pleading guilty to Count 1.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. 

We first note that Pinkston did not challenge this aspect of the pre-sentence 

investigation report, so he waived any objection in this regard. Waiver 

notwithstanding, the probation officer specifically noted in the report that she 

“concurs with the plea agreement,” which called for two of the three charges to 

be dismissed. Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 16. And in any event, there is no 

indication that the trial court relied on the dismissed charges in making its 

decision. 
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[8] Pinkston’s final argument is that his juvenile delinquency adjudications “should 

not have played a role in the Trial Court’s decision on the method of service of 

the [his] sentence.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. This claim assumes that Pinkston’s 

adjudications did “play a role” in the trial court’s decision. There is no 

evidence that they did. The trial court made no mention of those adjudications, 

either in its oral sentencing statement or its subsequent written order. In fact, in 

finding Pinkston’s lengthy criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance, it 

only addressed his adult felony convictions.1

 

[9] Affirmed. 

Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur. 

 

1

 Pinkston does not cite Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows an appellate court to “revise a sentence authorized 

by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court the finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” To the extent Pinkston 

is arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, we disagree.