IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 14, 2015

DOUGLAS M. MATHIS v. WAYNE CARPENTER, WARDEN

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 14C2407 Amanda McClendon, Judge

No. M2014-01552-CCA-R3-HC – Filed July 16, 2015

The petitioner, Douglas M. Mathis, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he repeats the claim of his first such petition, that the trial 

court was without jurisdiction to conduct his trial. Because the petitioner has failed to 

state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the 

petition. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,

JR. and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Douglas M. Mathis, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Brent C. Cherry, Senior 

Counsel, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

As set out in State v. Douglas Marshall Mathis, No. M2002-02291-CCA-R3-CD, 

2004 WL 392710, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 

11, 2004), the petitioner was indicted for first degree murder and second degree murder 

for the shooting death of the victim, Selwyn Ward. He pled guilty in 2000 to second 

degree murder, which resulted in a fifteen-year sentence. He subsequently filed a 

successful petition for post-conviction relief and was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 

At his 2002 trial, he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life 
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imprisonment. After his unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, claiming a fatal procedural defect in the procedure of withdrawal of his guilty plea 

to second degree murder and subsequent conviction for first degree murder:

Petitioner argues that the first degree murder indictment used for his 

trial was not valid. Petitioner argues that the trial court discharged him 

with regard to the first degree murder indictment in a nolle prosequi order 

entered pursuant to his prior guilty plea to second degree murder. 

Petitioner argues that for this reason he was prosecuted without an 

indictment. The State argues alternatively, that Petitioner has waived this 

issue for failing to raise it previously and that the indictment was valid 

because he sought the withdrawal of his guilty plea.1

Douglas Marshall Mathis v. State, No. M2006-02525-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 1850800, 

at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008).

As to this issue, the court found that the claim was waived because it had not been 

presented prior to the trial, at the motion for new trial, or in the direct appeal of the 

conviction. Id. at *8. Considering then the merits of the claim, the court determined that 

the trial court had “acted properly in reinstating the indictment for first degree murder.” 

Id.

The petitioner next presented a jurisdictional claim in his first petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. Douglas Marshall Mathis v. State, No. M2010-00730-CCA-R3-HC, 2011 

WL 300143, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 26, 

2011). In that petition, he argued that his conviction and sentence were illegal because 

the post-conviction court, in allowing withdrawal of his guilty plea and ordering a trial on 

the first degree murder indictment, had “failed to make the proper finding „that a 

constitutional violation occurred during the plea proceedings.‟” Id.

Once again, the petitioner was unsuccessful in the complaint regarding his 

conviction for first degree murder, this court concluding that the petition properly had 

been dismissed without a hearing, because as a procedural matter, he had failed to attach 

to it either the judgment of conviction for first degree murder or the records of 

proceedings which had resulted in his earlier guilty plea having been set aside. Id. at *3. 

The court observed that the petitioner‟s best path would have been to appeal the 2001 

order allowing the withdrawal of the petitioner‟s guilty plea to second degree murder and 

reinstating the indictment for first degree murder:

 

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In his direct appeal, the petitioner did not present as an issue his claim that the trial court erred 

in reinstating the first degree murder indictment after allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty to 

second degree murder. 
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We agree with the habeas corpus court that the Petitioner's best, and 

possibly only, avenue of relief would have been to appeal the 2001 

judgment of the post-conviction court, not to wait almost nine years until 

the new trial he admittedly actively sought produced an unfavorable 

outcome which he twice appealed unsuccessfully. 

Id. at *3. 

In the appeal of this, his second petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner 

argues that the court was without jurisdiction to grant his first petition for post-conviction 

relief, allow him to withdraw his guilty plea to second degree murder, but then order that 

he be tried on the original indictment for first degree murder. Further, in his view, the 

habeas corpus court in this matter erred in dismissing his second petition without first 

appointing counsel and conducting a hearing.

It is well-established in Tennessee that the remedy provided by a writ of habeas 

corpus is limited in scope and may only be invoked where the judgment is void or the 

petitioner‟s term of imprisonment has expired. Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 

(Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport, 980 

S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A void, as opposed to a voidable, judgment 

is “one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to 

render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007) (citing 

Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998)).

A petitioner bears the burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal 

confinement by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 

(Tenn. 2000). Furthermore, when a “habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a 

judgment is void, a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing.” Summers, 

212 S.W.3d at 260 (citing Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005)). Whether 

the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief is a question of law. Id. at 255; Hart v. 

State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000). As such, our review is de novo with no 

presumption of correctness given to the habeas court's findings and conclusions. Id.

In his second petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner simply repackaged 

the claims of his first such petition, as well as his earlier petition for post-conviction 

relief. In both of those proceedings, the claims were dismissed without an evidentiary 

hearing, a panel of this court affirmed the dismissals, and our supreme court denied his 

application for permission to appeal. Once again, we conclude that these same 

complaints, now raised for the third time, are not cognizable in a habeas corpus 
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proceeding and that they entitled the petitioner neither to appointment of counsel nor to

an evidentiary hearing. 

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed.

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE