[Cite as In re D.L.S., 2015-Ohio-2809.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

IN RE: 

 CASE NO. 5-15-04 

 D.L.S. 

ALLEGED DEPENDENT CHILD. O P I N I O N 

[JASON SHEARER - APPELLANT] 

 

IN RE: 

 CASE NO. 5-15-05 

 D.W.S. 

ALLEGED DEPENDENT CHILD. O P I N I O N 

[JASON SHEARER - APPELLANT] 

 

Appeals from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court Nos. 20133023 and 20133024 

Judgments Affirmed 

Date of Decision: July 13, 2015 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

F. Stephen Chamberlain for Appellant 

Rebecca S. King-Newman for Appellee 

 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, Father-Appellant, Jason Shearer (“Jason”), 

appeals the February 3, 2015 judgments of the Hancock County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, which granted the motions for permanent custody of his 

children, D.L.S. and D.W.S., filed by Appellee, Hancock County Job and Family 

Services—Children’s Protective Services Unit (“the Agency”), and terminated 

Jason’s parental rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

Background and Procedural History 

{¶2} D.L.S. and D.W.S. are minor children of Jason and Heather Shearer 

(“Heather”). D.L.S. has multiple medical conditions, which include cerebral 

palsy, polycystic kidney disease, and a seizure disorder. He is fed via tube and 

cannot move without assistance. As of January 2015, he was described as 

medically fragile, underweight, and non-verbal at eight years old. 

{¶3} On September 18, 2013, the Agency filed complaints alleging that 

D.L.S. and D.W.S. were dependent children and requesting a disposition of 

protective supervision by the Agency or a disposition of temporary custody. (R. at 

1.1

) Together with the complaints, the Agency filed motions for dispositional 

interim orders. On September 23, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the 

 

1

 Proceedings relevant to this appeal were held together in the trial court. As a result, the relevant docket 

entries are the same in both cases. For simplicity, we cite to the Hancock County Common Pleas Court’s 

docket number 20133023 throughout this opinion. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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motions (“a shelter care hearing”), and placed the children in protective 

supervision of the Agency. The children remained in the physical custody of 

Heather at the time. (R. at 5.) The trial court ordered the parents to complete 

mental health and substance abuse assessments and continued the matters for 

adjudication on November 7, 2013. (Id.) Jason was not present at that hearing, 

“as his whereabouts [were] unknown.” (Id.) The trial court appointed a guardian 

ad litem for the children. (R. at 7.) 

{¶4} Jason appeared at the hearing on November 7, 2013, and requested 

that the matters be continued so that he could obtain an attorney. (R. at 9.) The 

rescheduled adjudication hearing took place on November 26, 2013. Jason was 

not present, although the trial court noted that he was “duly notified” of the 

hearing. (R. at 12.) “[U]pon agreement of all parties,” the trial court found by 

clear and convincing evidence that that D.L.S. and D.W.S. were dependent 

children. (Id.) The trial court ordered that the children remain in protective 

supervision of the Agency while in Heather’s custody. At the same time, the trial 

court allowed Heather and the children to move to West Virginia, to live with 

relatives. (Id.) 

{¶5} On December 13, 2013, the matters again came before the trial court 

upon the Agency’s request for an ex parte order of emergency temporary custody. 

(See R. at 13.) The Agency reported that Heather was back in Ohio and that she 

had placed the children in Jason’s care, because she was in need of substance 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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abuse treatment and did not have “anywhere to live or care for the children.” (Id.) 

Based on the Agency’s report, which listed concerns about Jason’s domestic 

violence, criminal history, refusal of drug screening, residing with a person who 

had criminal charges for possession of cocaine, and his refusal to cooperate with 

the Agency, the trial court placed the children in the emergency temporary custody 

of the Agency. (Id.) 

{¶6} Another hearing took place on December 18, 2013. Jason was present 

with his legal counsel, Brad Hubbell. The trial court ordered that the ex parte 

orders remain in effect upon “agreement of all parties present,” but allowed both 

parents to have supervised visitations with the children at the discretion of the 

Agency. (R. at 17.) The matters came again before the trial court on February 21, 

2014. Jason was present with his new counsel, Carroll Creighton. Upon the 

parties’ sworn testimony, and agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered 

temporary custody of the children to the Agency. (R. at 26.) 

{¶7} On November 3, 2014, the Agency filed motions for permanent 

custody of the children. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions. 

Neither parent was present at the hearing, although their attorneys appeared on 

their behalf. The trial court made a finding that the parents “have been duly 

notified.” (R. at 56.) The parts of the hearing testimony that are relevant to this 

appeal are summarized below. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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Trial Testimony 

{¶8} Rebecca Shumaker (“Ms. Shumaker”), was an ongoing caseworker for 

the Shearer family on behalf of the Agency. She testified that the Agency became 

involved with the family pursuant to “multiple reports” regarding neglect and 

medical neglect in the care of D.L.S. and D.W.S., which caused the Agency to 

investigate the case further. (Tr. at 35, 37.) Ms. Shumaker indicated that there 

had been prior reports and investigations into the family by the Agency for 

medical neglect, drug use, and truancy for the children. (Tr. at 37.) Ms. 

Shumaker testified that upon the Agency’s involvement in September 2013, the 

children remained in Heather’s custody, while the Agency assumed protective 

supervision. (Tr. at 36-38.) At the time, Jason was not involved in the protective 

supervision because he lived in California according to the Agency’s reports. (Tr. 

at 48-49.) There was a civil protection order (“CPO”) in place, which prohibited 

Jason from contacting Heather or the children because of “extensive violent 

history regarding Mrs. Shearer.” (Tr. at 48.) 

{¶9} Ms. Shumaker testified that Heather lived in the domestic violence 

center in November 2013, but she was asked to leave due to the fact that she was 

violating the shelter’s rules by “having a great deal of contact” with Jason, in spite 

of the CPO. (Tr. at 45-46.) It appeared that on October 31, 2013, the trial court 

terminated the CPO upon Heather’s petition. (Tr. at 72; Ex. 21.) Ms. Shumaker 

testified that the Agency was aware of Heather’s plans to terminate the CPO 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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because she wanted Jason’s support in caring for the children. (Tr. at 74.) The 

Agency was concerned about the situation due to the severity of the prior domestic 

violence incident. (Tr. at 75.) Ms. Shumaker testified that Open Arms, Domestic 

Violence and Rape Crisis Services, was also concerned about Heather’s safety 

with respect to dropping the CPO. (Tr. at 74-75.) 

{¶10} Ms. Shumaker testified about another location that Heather was 

asked to leave due to Jason’s violent nature and her contact with Jason in spite of 

the CPO. (See Tr. at 109.) With respect to Heather’s move to West Virginia, Ms. 

Shumaker stated, 

According to her uncle in West Virginia, the family wanted to 

provide her with support and he was even willing to allow her to 

stay. When she showed up with Mr. Shearer, the family at that time 

realized this is not what they had intended, because they were 

helping her escape the problems of Mr. Shearer. And then she ended 

up showing up in West Virginia with Mr. Shearer. 

(Tr. at 110.) 

{¶11} Ms. Shumaker testified about a report that the Agency received at the 

beginning of December 2013, which indicated that Heather returned from West 

Virginia and that Jason “took the children.” (Tr. at 46-47.) The Agency contacted 

Jason and notified him about their intention to supervise the children and ensure 

their safety. (Tr. at 47, 49.) The Agency had concerns about Jason “living in a 

home with a woman that had recently received felony charges of drug possession.” 

(Tr. at 48.) The Agency also had concerns about Jason’s “extensive violent 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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history regarding [Heather,] as well as drug use and criminal history.” (Tr. at 48.) 

Jason was asked to work with the Agency and to undergo “a drug screen.” (Tr. at 

48-49.) He refused to cooperate. (Tr. at 50.) 

{¶12} As a result, on December 13, 2013, the Agency requested removal of 

the children from the parents’ custody and placement of the children with the 

Agency. (Tr. at 50.) That is when the ex parte motions for emergency temporary 

custody were filed with the trial court. (Id.) Ms. Shumaker explained additional 

reasons for the emergency motions, which consisted of the fact that Heather “was 

not able to provide care for the children,” as she was homeless at the time and was 

having contact with Jason, which was perceived as a failure “to provide for her 

safety.” (Tr. at 51.) The orders of emergency temporary custody were granted on 

December 20, 2013, and the children had remained in the Agency’s custody since 

that time. (Tr. at 54-57.) The children were placed with a foster family. (Tr. at 

169.) 

{¶13} Ms. Shumaker testified that in February 2014, when the case was 

heard on the motions for change of disposition, both parents were interested in 

working with the Agency so that the children could be “reunified into their home.” 

(Tr. at 58.) But both parents eventually stopped “participating actively with the 

services as indicated on the case plan and there [was] little-to-no contact with 

either parent.” (Tr. at 59.) Therefore, no extensions were granted and in 

November 2014, the Agency filed motions for permanent custody of D.L.S. and 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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D.W.S. (Tr. at 59-60.) Ms. Shumaker testified that the motions were based on a 

claim of abandonment by the father and a claim that “the children cannot and 

should not be returned to either parent within a reasonable amount of time.” (Tr. 

at 60-61.) 

{¶14} Ms. Shumaker testified about the case plan prepared for the family 

and approved by the court, which included visitation schedules and other services 

for Jason’s involvement. (Tr. at 64-66.) Among other items, the plan indicated 

that Jason was in need of domestic violence therapy due to his felony conviction 

for “a severe case of domestic violence” against Heather, as well as other incidents 

of domestic violence. (Tr. at 67-71.) The Agency referred Jason to Open Arms in 

Findlay, Ohio, to attend a domestic violence offender’s program. (Tr. at 76.) 

Jason did not complete the program. (Tr. at 77.) The Agency again referred him 

to a program in Toledo, Ohio, but there was no indication that he ever completed a 

program there either. (Tr. at 80.) The Agency concluded that Jason had not 

completed this objective of the case plan. (Tr. at 80.) 

{¶15} Jason did not achieve the second objective of the case plan, which 

was to undergo mental health and substance abuse assessments. (Tr. at 80, 89, 

93.) Except for taking one drug test, which was positive for cocaine, Jason did 

nothing to comply with this objective. (Tr. at 92-93.) 

{¶16} Ms. Shumaker testified that Jason failed to achieve the next 

objective, which was “to cooperate with the Agency and service providers.” (Tr. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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at 104.) In particular, Ms. Shumaker stated that Jason did not keep appointments 

or keep in contact with the caseworker. When he did attend, he was resistant and 

“not always corporative.” (Tr. at 105.) He eventually moved out of state and had 

not contacted the Agency since July 2014. (Tr. at 105.) 

{¶17} The next objective on the case plan required appropriate housing, 

which included special accommodations for D.L.S. (Tr. at 105.) Ms. Shumaker 

testified that Jason “did not ever have a safe and stable living environment 

throughout the life of the case.” (Tr. at 106.) From the information available to 

her, it appeared that Jason was in California during the beginning phases of the 

case. (Tr. at 112.) He returned to the area around September or October 2013, but 

did not become involved in the case until December 2013, when he removed the 

children from Heather’s custody. (Id.) At that time, he lived with his girlfriend, 

identified as “Mrs. Green.” (Id.) He later lived with his parents in Findlay, Ohio 

where he was under house arrest “for a period of time.” (Id.) He then moved in 

with Heather in Toledo for a while, and after July 2014, he was reported to be 

working for a traveling carnival. (Id.) At the time of the hearing, Jason’s living 

situation was unknown. (Tr. at 23, 113.) The last time Ms. Shumaker had contact 

with Jason was in July 2014. (Tr. at 23.) Online research indicated that he was in 

Miami, Florida at some point. (Tr. at 23.) The research also indicated that Jason 

had open cases in the Court of Common Pleas of Wood County, Ohio, and in 

Findlay Municipal Court, as well as active arrest warrants out of these courts. (R. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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at 23-25.) Ms. Shumaker explained the importance of a stable living situation for 

the children, especially due to D.L.S.’s “incredible amount of medical needs,” 

which require a feeding tube, wheelchair accessibility, and a specialized bed. (Tr. 

at 114.) She talked about the importance of the children’s safety in their place of 

residence. (Id.) A steady place of residence also had effect on stability in the 

children’s educational services, which included specialized services for D.L.S. 

(Id.) Ms. Shumaker concluded that neither parent satisfied this objective of the 

case plan. (Tr. at 115.) 

{¶18} The next objective on the case plan was providing consistent 

specialized educational services for D.L.S., due to his developmental issues and 

the fact that he had not attended school on a regular basis in the past. (Tr. at 115, 

116.) His medical conditions required that the school have current medical 

information on file, as well as current doctor’s orders, which had been lacking in 

the past. (Tr. at 116-118.) Ms. Shumaker listed D.L.S.’s medical conditions, 

which included cerebral palsy, polycystic kidney disease, seizure disorder, 

pneumonia, and auditory sensory issues. (Tr. at 116-118.) She testified that 

D.L.S. had consistency in his education and medical care since he was placed in 

the Agency’s care, but Jason and Heather were not involved in providing it. (Tr. 

at 118.) 

{¶19} The last objective concerned a need for D.W.S.’s developmental 

assessment and addressing his emotional and behavioral issues. (Tr. at 119.) Ms. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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Shumaker testified that these needs were being met by the foster care provider. 

(Tr. at 120.) 

{¶20} Ms. Shumaker testified that the case plan provided for parents’ 

visitations with the children. (Tr. at 120.) She stated that the visitations were 

“sporadic,” but the reports indicated that the parents interacted well with the kids. 

(Tr. at 122.) Jason’s last visit with the children was in July 2014. (Tr. at 123.) 

{¶21} In sum, Ms. Shumaker concluded that Jason and Heather were not 

compliant with the case plan and they did not take advantage of the assistance 

opportunities provided to them by the Agency. (Tr. at 126-127.) In her opinion, 

neither parent “would be able to provide an adequate permanent home for the 

children in the near future,” and an additional amount of time would not change 

anything in this case. (Tr. at 127.) Further, in her opinion, it was in the best 

interest of the children that they be placed in the permanent custody of the Agency 

and not be placed with either parent. (Tr. at 128.) She opined that “a legally 

secure and permanent placement [was not] achievable without the granting of 

permanent custody to the Agency.” (Tr. at 132.) 

{¶22} Tabitha Whaley (“Ms. Whaley”), the case manager at Harmony 

House, a supervised visitation and exchange program, oversaw Jason and 

Heather’s visits with the children. (Tr. at 144-146.) The visits started in February 

2014, and she reported around thirty-two of them, with some of the visits only 

involving one of the parents. (Tr. at 149, 151.) Ms. Whaley indicated that Jason 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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was taken off the visitation schedule in March 2014, due to being incarcerated at 

the time. (Tr. at 154.) Ms. Whaley testified that Jason’s last visit with the 

children was in July 2014. (Tr. at 156.) Jason called in August 2014 to cancel the 

next scheduled visitation and because of multiple cancellations, both parents were 

placed on a 30-day suspension from visitations. (Tr. at 156.) Jason never resumed 

visitations after that time. Eventually, both parents ceased to visit the children and 

there were no visitations occurring as of the time of the hearing. (Tr. at 151.) Ms. 

Whaley testified that other than the attendance issues, there were no concerns 

about the parents’ visitations with the children. (Tr. at 159.) 

{¶23} Matthew Naylor (“Mr. Naylor”), testified that he and his wife had 

been foster parents for D.L.S. and D.W.S. since December 2013. (Tr. at 169-170.) 

He described D.L.S. as “an 8-year-old infant,” who is wholly dependent on adult’s 

care. (Tr. at 170.) He described the extensive, “minute-to-minute,” care that 

D.L.S. needs daily. (Tr. at 172-174.) Mr. Naylor also listed D.L.S.’s multiple 

medical providers, including specialists in Toledo, Ohio. (Tr. at 175-178.) He 

referred to D.L.S.’s frequent hospitalizations. (Tr. at 182.) He described 

improvement in D.L.S.’s mobility within the past year, resulting from therapy and 

consistent care. (Tr. at 183-184.) Mr. Naylor stated that when D.L.S. came into 

his care, he was underweight, his wheelchair was “extremely too small” for him, 

and he did not have much of other medical equipment needed for his care. (Tr. at 

184, 188.) Mr. Naylor indicated that D.L.S.’s future care is “going to be more 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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extensive,” as he grows and becomes heavier to lift. (Tr. at 190.) Mr. Naylor also 

described care for D.W.S. He testified that D.W.S. was malnourished when he 

came into his care, and refused to eat anything but cheeseburgers and chicken 

nuggets. (Tr. at 185.) Mr. Naylor stated that D.W.S. was struggling in 

kindergarten. (Tr. at 187.) 

{¶24} Jane Davis (“Ms. Davis”), testified as the CASA/guardian ad litem 

for D.L.S. and D.W.S. She indicated that she had had contact with both parents at 

the very beginning of the case but she had not seen Jason since May or June 2014. 

(Tr. at 196.) Ms. Davis did not have any information regarding the current 

whereabouts of either parent, as they had not returned any phone calls that she had 

made. (Tr. at 196.) Ms. Davis recommended that D.L.S. and D.W.S. be placed in 

the permanent custody of the Agency. (Tr. at 197.) In support of this 

recommendation, Ms. Davis stated, 

I have grave concerns about both their safety and their well-being if 

they were with their parents. The parents have demonstrated violent 

behavior towards each other in the presence of the boys. They have 

abused drugs and alcohol in front of the boys. And have -- they’re 

incapable of taking care of particularly [D.L.S.], when they are in 

this condition. They’ve neglected [D.L.S.]’s medical needs and they 

have neglected their own medical needs. Both parents have 

substantial medical problems, too. 

(Tr. at 197.) 

{¶25} Attorney Creighton informed the trial court that he had “zero 

information” about his client, “no address or knowledge of his whereabouts.” (Tr. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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at 9.) Attorney Creighton stated that Jason had not contacted his office and that 

the only contact was during one of the prior hearings. (Id.) At the end of the 

proceedings, Attorney Creighton stated, “I would like to reiterate I have had no 

contact with my client basically since the first court hearing after my appointment 

despite numerous attempts.” (Tr. at 194.) 

{¶26} Following the hearing, the trial court issued written judgment entries, 

in which it terminated Jason and Heather’s parental rights and granted permanent 

custody to the Agency. Jason now appeals the trial court’s judgments alleging the 

following assignments of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING 

PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TO 

THE STATE OF OHIO. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO: 

THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF OF A 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE: 

THE TRIAL COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT WAS 

INEFFECTIVE AND AS SUCH, THE APPELLANT WAS 

DENIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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First and Second Assignments of Error—Grant of the Agency’s Motion for 

Permanent Custody 

{¶27} In the first and second assignments of error, Jason contends that the 

trial court erred in granting the Agency’s motions for permanent custody of D.L.S. 

and D.W.S. He demands reversal due to two reasons. First, Jason argues that he 

“was not given a significant opportunity to comply with case plan goals and 

objectives” because there were no extensions of the case. (App’t Br. at 12.) 

Second, he claims “that the award of permanent custody to the State in this case 

was not sufficient to meet the burden of clear and convincing evidence.” (Id. at 

15.) Of note, neither allegation is supported by “the reasons in support of the 

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on 

which appellant relies,” as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). The arguments in 

support of the two assignments of error consist of several-paragraph-long 

summaries of legal standards in permanent custody cases, followed by one- or 

two-sentence conclusory statements in support of reversal. (See App’t Br. at 11-

15.) App.R. 12(A)(2) allows this court to “disregard an assignment of error 

presented for review” for failure to “identify in the record the error on which the 

assignment of error is based.” In the interest of justice, we elect to review the two 

assignments of error at this time, addressing them together. 

{¶28} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award 

permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test, as required 

under R.C. 2151.414(B). See In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 

818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 9 (2004). The first prong of the test requires a finding by clear 

and convincing evidence that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the 

temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month 

period; the child or another child of the same parent has been previously 

repeatedly adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent; or that the child cannot be 

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with 

either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). “If the trial court determines that any provision enumerated 

in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies,” it must proceed to the second prong of the test, 

which requires the trial court to “determine, by clear and convincing evidence, 

whether granting the agency permanent custody of the child is in the child’s best 

interest,” based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D). (Emphasis sic.) In re 

A.F., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-11-27, 2012-Ohio-1137, ¶ 55; see R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1). 

{¶29} When reviewing the trial court’s decision in a permanent custody 

case, we “ ‘must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had 

sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.’ ” In re B.B., 3d Dist. 

Defiance No. 4-10-17, 2012-Ohio-2695, ¶ 33, quoting In re Adoption of Holcomb, 

18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). “A court’s decision to terminate 
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parental rights will not be overturned as against the manifest weight of the 

evidence if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which a court can 

determine by clear and convincing evidence that the essential statutory elements 

for a termination of parental rights have been established.” In re A.E., 3d Dist. 

Seneca Nos. 13-14-14 and 13-14-15, 2014-Ohio-4540, ¶ 28. “Clear and 

convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence but not as 

much evidence as required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt * * * in a 

criminal case; rather, it is evidence which provides the trier of fact with a firm 

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re H.M.K., 3d 

Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 42. 

{¶30} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that the first prong of the 

permanent custody test was satisfied because D.L.S. and D.W.S. could not be 

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with 

either parent. (R. at 57, ¶ 3.) This finding satisfied provision (a) of R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1). In making this determination, the trial court explicitly relied 

upon its consideration of R.C. 2151.414(E), which states that if one or more of the 

provisions of R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(16) “exist as to each of the child’s parents, the 

court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within 

a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.” R.C. 2151.414(E). 

The trial court particularly found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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the children’s parents have demonstrated a lack of commitment 

toward the children by abandoning the child [sic] and failing to 

regularly support, visit or communicate with the children. The 

present whereabouts of either parent is unknown. Mother’s last 

contact with the agency was in November of 2014 and father in July 

of that year. Mother’s last visit was in July of 2014 and Father in 

July, 2014. Father presently has an outstanding bench warrant from 

Findlay Municipal Court and an outstanding indictment from the 

Wood County Court of Common Pleas for Receiving Stolen 

Property. Mother has been a victim of Domestic Violence at the 

hands of the father but mother only attended 3 of 26 sessions in her 

case plan mandated Domestic Violence Program. Father refused to 

attend any sessions. 

(R. at 57, ¶ 5.) The above findings of the trial court implicate the following 

subsections of R.C. 2151.414(E): (1) failure to remedy conditions despite 

reasonable case planning; (4) lack of commitment; (10) abandonment; and (16) 

“[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant.” R.C. 2151.414(E). Therefore, 

the trial court’s findings satisfy several factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E). We 

further hold that these findings are supported by sufficient evidence to allow for a 

finding by the clear and convincing standard. 

{¶31} Regarding the second prong of the permanent custody test, whether a 

grant of permanent custody is in a child’s best interest, the trial court is required to 

consider all relevant factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), as well as any other 

relevant factors. In re H.M., 2014-Ohio-755, 9 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). The 

factors of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) include: “ ‘the interaction and interrelationship of 

the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and out-ofhome providers; the wishes of the child; the custodial history of the child; the 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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child’s need for legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of 

placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency’ ”; 

and whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7)-(11) apply. Id., quoting In re 

B.S., 184 Ohio App.3d 463, 2009-Ohio-5497, 921 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.); 

accord R.C. 2151.414(D). The trial court in the instant case stated that it had 

considered all the relevant factors as required by R.C. 2151.414(D). In particular, 

the court stated that it had considered provisions (E)(7) to (11) of R.C. 2151.414, 

as well as 

the relationship of the children with their parents, relatives, foster 

parents, out-of home providers and other people who may 

significantly affect the children’s need for legally secure permanent 

placement and the probability that this type of placement can be 

achieved only through the granting of permanent custody to CPSU. 

Both children have special needs and particularly [D.L.S.] who 

requires almost constant medical attention from the foster family and 

has a bleak prognosis. It is doubtful that even if the natural parents 

were to resurface and overcome their substance addiction that they 

could provide the time or intensive care that these children require. 

(R. at 57, ¶ 4.) 

{¶32} Our review of the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence to 

support these findings by the clear and convincing standard. Jason’s claim on 

appeal that he “was not given a significant opportunity to comply with case plan 

goals and objectives” because there were no extensions of the case, has no merit. 

(App’t Br. at 12.) “R.C. Chapter 2151 evidences a clear purpose in preventing 

children from languishing in the foster care system for years.” In re C.C., 12 Dist. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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Warren Nos. CA2011-11-113, CA2011-11-127, 2012-Ohio-1291, ¶ 33. Due to 

Jason’s failure to appear at the majority of the court’s hearings, scheduled 

appointments with the caseworker, or visits with the children, any extensions 

would be futile and detrimental to the purpose of R.C. Chapter 2151. When Jason 

was given an “extension” on the hearing date upon his request in November 2013, 

he failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing. Furthermore, Ms. Shumaker 

testified about opportunities given to Jason to comply with the case plan and about 

Jason’s failure to take advantage of the assistance provided to him by the Agency. 

{¶33} We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination 

that (1) D.L.S. and D.W.S. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with either parent, and that (2) granting the Agency’s 

motions for permanent custody is in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, 

we overrule the first and second assignments of errors. 

Third Assignment of Error—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶34} In the third assignment of error, Jason raises an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim. Section 2151.352 of the Revised Code provides that parents are 

guaranteed the right to counsel at all stages of a permanent custody proceeding. In 

re C.H., 162 Ohio App.3d 602, 2005-Ohio-4183, 834 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.); 

In re Moore, 153 Ohio App.3d 641, 2003-Ohio-4250, 795 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 28 (3d 

Dist.). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. 

Moore at ¶ 28; In re Brooks, 10th Dist. Nos. 04AP-164, 04AP-202, 04AP-165, 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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04AP-201, 2004-Ohio-3887, ¶ 24. In permanent custody proceedings, where 

parents face losing their children, we apply the same test as the test for ineffective 

assistance of counsel in criminal cases announced in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the 

Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 

(1985). Moore at ¶ 29. 

{¶35} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

criminal defendant must first show that the counsel’s performance was deficient in 

that it fell “below an objective standard of reasonable representation.” State v. 

Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 534, 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997). Second, the defendant must 

show “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial.” Id., citing Strickland at 687. In order to demonstrate 

prejudice, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability that the result of the 

trial would have been different but for his or her counsel’s errors. Id. In applying 

these standards, the court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” State v. 

Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 108, quoting 

Strickland at 669. Therefore, the court must be highly deferential in its scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance. State v. Walker, 90 Ohio App.3d 352, 359, 629 N.E.2d 

471 (3d Dist.1993), quoting Strickland at 689. 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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{¶36} Jason’s argument under this assignment of error consists of the 

following three sentences in his appellate brief: “Trial counsel failed to object to 

any testimony. Such a failure left a significant portion of the evidence untested and 

untried. * * *2

 Therefore, due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, the decision of the 

trial court should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.” (App’t Br. 

at 16.) Jason does not substantiate any claim that he was prejudiced by his trial 

counsel’s performance at the permanent custody hearing or that the outcome 

would have been different but for trial counsel’s performance. Accordingly, Jason 

has not satisfied his burden in proving his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. See In re 

C.W., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-26, 2010-Ohio-2157, ¶ 30 (rejecting a claim of 

ineffective assistance for failure “to call Mother as a witness or present any other 

evidence,” where Mother “ha[d] not presented any argument as to what her 

testimony would have been, what other evidence there was to present, or how the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different if she had testified or other 

evidence had been presented”). 

{¶37} Therefore, we overrule the third assignment of error. 

 

2

 Although Jason also adds the following statement, “A cross examination is the only means by which this 

could be accomplished and failure to do to [sic] renders any hearing unreliable,” he does not allege any 

error or prejudice stemming from the trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine. (App’t Br. at 16.) See In re 

Shores, 3d Dist. Allen, Nos. 1-07-16, 1-07, 17, 2007-Ohio-5193, ¶ 27-32 (rejecting a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failure to cross-examine); see also In re C.W., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-26, 

2010-Ohio-2157, ¶ 27 (“An attorney’s decision not to cross-examine a witness falls within the category of 

tactical or strategic trial decisions.”). 
Case Nos. 5-15-04, 5-15-05 

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Conclusion 

{¶38} Having reviewed the arguments, the briefs, and the record in this 

case, we find no error prejudicial to Appellant in the particulars assigned and 

argued. The judgments of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, are therefore affirmed. 

Judgments Affirmed 

SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur. 

/hlo