1

The Honorable Donald P. Lay took permanent disability retirement on January

3, 2007. This opinion is being filed by the remaining judges of the panel pursuant to

8th Cir. R. 47E.

2

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of Janie S. Mayeron,

United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1870

___________

Jane E. Stewart, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Independent School District No. 196, *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: April 6, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY1

 and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Jane Stewart appeals the district court’s2

 grant of summary judgment on claims

under the anti-retaliation provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (“ADEA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
-2-

12203(a) (“ADA”). She also seeks review of the district court’s refusal to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Minnesota statutory and common-law claims. We

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Independent School District No. 196 (“the District”) is Minnesota’s fourth

largest school district. Starting in 1994 and continuing through July 1, 2000, Stewart

served as the Director of Education Services for the District. In this position, she was

a member of the superintendent’s cabinet. The superintendent for the District during

this time was John Haro. Haro previously had worked with Stewart in California and

was superintendent when the District hired Stewart. As Director of Education

Services, Stewart had many duties, including responsibility for a budget of over

$3,000,000. She also chaired a committee to create an alternative school and

performed a number of other administrative-level tasks. 

Prior to holding this position, Stewart had worked as a teacher in a number of

schools in Wisconsin, Florida, and California. She then worked as a specialist for a

drug abuse program in the County Office of Education in San Diego, California, a

counselor in an adult high school diploma program, and a counselor in a high school.

Next, she taught special education, worked as an elementary school vice-principal,

and worked as a high school vice-principal at a school in Antioch, California.

Immediately before starting work for the District, she worked as a testing and

curriculum consultant to school districts in California on behalf of a publishing

company. She holds a B.A., an M.A., and a Ph.D.

As a result of budget cuts and a failed tax levy, the District eliminated Stewart’s

position in 2000. She does not allege that the elimination of her position in 2000 was

improper, discriminatory, or in retaliation for any type of protected conduct. The

District placed her on an unrequested leave of absence following the elimination of
3

Stewart argued below and argues on appeal that her retaliation claims arise

under the ADEA and the ADA. Although she also alleged gender discrimination in

her November 2001 EEOC complaint, the present action does not include a retaliation

claim under Title VII. 

-3-

her position. This entitled her to recall rights that allowed her to return to her previous

position (if the position were to be restored) or to other positions of equal or lesser

rank or pay level that might become available (if she had the necessary licenses and

seniority to fill such other positions) for a period of five years. When the District

eliminated her position, Haro provided a favorable letter of recommendation for

Stewart. Before her last day of work as Director of Education Services, Stewart

obtained a new job as the principal of an elementary school in Wisconsin. Stewart

worked as principal at the elementary school in Wisconsin throughout the 2000-01

and 2001-02 school years.

In 2001, the position of Director of Secondary Education came open in the

District. According to Stewart, this position was second in rank only to the position

of superintendent. Stewart asked to be named Director of Secondary Education and

claimed her recall rights applied to the position. The District told Stewart she didn’t

have recall rights to the position because it was a higher rank than her prior position.

Stewart claims that it was not truly a position of higher rank but that the District added

a stipend to the salary for the express purpose of raising the position to a pay level

above that covered by her recall rights. The District also told her that she lacked

experience as a high school principal and that such experience was important for the

position. The District hired John Currie, a former high school principal within the

District, for the position.

In November 2001, Stewart filed an EEOC complaint alleging age and gender

discrimination because Currie was male and younger than Stewart (Stewart was born

in 1942). Stewart identifies this EEOC complaint as her first act of protected conduct

and relies on this EEOC complaint as one of her protected acts for the purpose of her

retaliation claim under the ADEA.3
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Between November 2001 and April 2002, the District notified Stewart of

several different jobs that were open and available to her through the exercise of her

recall rights, given her qualifications and seniority. As to each job, she declined to

exercise her recall rights. None of the jobs that Stewart rejected were at a pay level

equal to or greater than her prior position.

In April 2002, approximately five months after she filed her EEOC complaint,

the District notified her via email that there was an opening for a high school principal

and that her recall rights applied to the position. Haro stated in his deposition that the

site of the vacancy was not determined when a position was first offered to Stewart

because the District followed a lateral transfer policy. The policy gave rights to

principals at other schools in the District to claim open positions and transfer laterally

when positions came open. Stewart responded that she would accept the position of

high school principal “provided that the following conditions are determined and

agreeable to me: 1) location of the position, 2) compensation package (i.e., salary

schedule, placement, health benefits, degree recognition, etc.).” The District

eventually determined that the vacancy was at Eagan High School and notified

Stewart of the location. Stewart accepted the position. 

Eagan High School is an award-winning school, and the position of principal

at Eagan is a high-profile position within the District. Stewart describes Eagan as the

flagship school for the District. The actions of concerned and interested parents and

faculty members at Eagan, as described below, suggest that these groups agree with

Stewart's characterization of the school. These actions also show that the faculty and

parents had no reservations about expressing their opinions on matters concerning

leadership at the school. These groups were not supportive of having the

administration appoint a new principal without first seeking their input.

After Stewart accepted the job at Eagan, Currie, Haro, and others told her that

the faculty had wanted an insider—one of the current assistant principals—to be

appointed principal and that the faculty were unhappy about Stewart's appointment.
-5-

According to Stewart, Haro told her on May 9, 2002 that the assignment would be

“interesting and tough.” Stewart also reports that Currie told her the position would

be “miserable.” Stewart spoke directly to some current and former staff members

who, according to Stewart, “cautioned me about taking this position because the staff

wanted one of their own and would make my life miserable.” The outgoing principal

told Stewart to ask for another assignment and reported that “the staff was doing

research on [Stewart] and trying to ‘dig things up.’”

Haro and Currie were aware of the situation with the faculty at Eagan and met

with the faculty immediately after the announcement of Stewart’s appointment.

Although Stewart was not present at the meeting between Haro, Currie and the staff,

she characterizes it as a meeting where Haro and Currie “listened to staff bickerings

concerning Stewart without making any effort whatsoever to positively support her.”

Haro and Currie state that they met with faculty members, told them Stewart was

entitled to the principal position through the exercise of her recall rights, and told

them the District believed Stewart deserved an opportunity to succeed at Eagan High

School. Haro and Currie also state that they would not normally meet with faculty in

relation to the announcement of a new appointment, but did so in this instance because

they knew of the faculty’s concerns and wanted to diffuse the situation. 

Stewart was scheduled to visit Eagan on May 16, 2002 to be introduced to the

faculty. She attempted to schedule an appointment with the departing principal prior

to the faculty meeting, but the departing principal refused to spend substantial time

with her in advance of the meeting, stating that it would be too disruptive and that she

should come one hour before the meeting. When Stewart arrived for the faculty

meeting, she encountered an apparently well-organized show of opposition. Many of

the teachers were wearing identical shirts as a show of solidarity. Many teachers

asked pointed and hostile questions that reflected a good deal of research into

Stewart's past and, although presented as questions, amounted largely to accusatory

statements indicting her qualifications, personality, and past performance. Many of
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the teachers participated in an organized walk-out from the introductory meeting. The

meeting was videotaped and transcribed, without advance notice to Stewart. 

Haro and Currie were present for the May 16 meeting. According to Stewart,

Haro introduced her and sat down, but did nothing to constrain the hostility from the

faculty nor to prevent the videotaping of the meeting. In depositions, Currie described

the meeting as “tense and pointed and hostile” and Haro described the meeting as

“tense.” A transcript of the meeting reveals that Haro introduced Stewart and turned

control over to her following the introduction. Stewart does not allege that she asked

anyone to turn off the recording equipment.

After the meeting, the videotape and Stewart’s resume appeared on the Eagan

High School Web site without her knowledge and consent. The videotape was taken

off the site because Haro deemed it inappropriate. It is not clear who placed the

materials on the site, arranged for the meeting to be taped, or arranged for the meeting

to be transcribed. Haro and Currie deny responsibility for these acts and Stewart

presents no evidence tending to show who was responsible. When the meeting

started, it was apparent to those present, including Stewart, that the meeting was being

videotaped.

On May 23, 2002, Stewart sent a letter to Haro asking him to provide more

support for her in the form of a transition plan. She also accused Haro of depriving

her of support in the new position as an act of retaliation for filing the EEOC

complaint in November 2001. Haro delegated responsibility over Stewart’s transition

to Currie, and Stewart alleges Currie did nothing to assist her. No one from the

District conducted an investigation regarding her charge in the letter that the hostile

meeting was an act of retaliation. Stewart identifies her May 2002 letter as a further

act of protected conduct for the purpose of her retaliation claims.
-7-

In May, following the meeting, over ninety percent of the teachers at Eagan

High School participated in a vote of no confidence regarding Stewart. On a vote of

ninety-eight to three, the teachers passed the following resolution:

Resolved: That the Eagan High School faculty express no confidence in

the qualifications of Dr. Jane Stewart, and urge Superintendent Haro and

the ISD 196 Board of Education to replace her with a principal who has

significant and recent leadership experience in a large, comprehensive

public high school that utilizes cutting edge technology, and who brings

a clear vision for continuing Eagan High School’s tradition of academic

and cocurricular excellence.

On May 28, 2002, Stewart sent Currie an email in which she stated, “It appears

that things have not been going well at Eagan and that conditions appear to be very

poor.” Stewart indicated in her email that she “offered to take and requested other

positions for which I am qualified and would like to know what the district plan is [at]

this point.” Stewart claimed in her deposition that, around the end of May, Currie

suggested that she could take a different job that the District would create for her in

the District office. She did not accept this offer, and on May 29, she signed a contract

to serve as principal at Eagan. On May 31, Haro sent an email to all staff and

approximately 6,000 parents. The email stated that Stewart had over thirty years of

experience in education including teaching, counseling, and administrative work at the

elementary, high school, and district levels. The email stated Stewart was qualified

to be principal, Eagan was a “great school,” and “[w]e will work to help Dr. Stewart

continue that success just as we do with all new principals and other employees.”

Stewart completed the 2001-02 school year in Wisconsin and returned to Eagan

in July 2002 to begin her new job as principal. In that same month, she was diagnosed

with endometrial cancer and had to schedule surgery and follow-up chemotherapy

treatments. She used sick leave to attend to her health issues and was off work for

parts of July and August. She returned to work on an essentially full-time basis after

mid-August. Upon her return, Currie again asked Stewart if she was interested in a
-8-

district office staff position. Stewart refused, stating that she wanted to work with

students, parents, and teachers. In September and October, she took only limited sick

leave for her chemotherapy treatments. These ongoing treatments left her physically

weakened, and she limited her participation in certain functions that might normally

involve a principal, including some extracurricular and after-hours events such as

football games and open house/parent meetings. 

Stewart claims that, during fall 2002 when she was present at Eagan in her

capacity as principal, she performed her duties well, exceeded all reasonable

expectations, and kept the school running smoothly. In addition, she states that some

teachers approached her and apologized for participating in the unfriendly

introductory meeting. Haro and Currie, however, received numerous complaints from

faculty and parents regarding Stewart’s performance. In mid-October, a

representative from the teachers union, Jim Smola, met separately with Haro and

Currie to discuss complaints about Stewart from teachers at Eagan.

Eventually, Currie presented a list of some of these complaints to Stewart, and

Stewart alleges that she addressed them to Currie’s satisfaction. Some of the specific

complaints related to Stewart’s absence from specific events; Stewart explained to

Currie that her absence was due to her physical weakness related to ongoing

treatments. Stewart claims that she responded promptly to all comments from

students, parents, or staff, and she received no replies indicating that her responses

were unsatisfactory. Notwithstanding Stewart’s acknowledgment that Currie

approached her with a partial list of complaints, Stewart claims that when anyone

made comments about Stewart to Haro or Currie, they referred the person to Stewart

for a response, and none of those persons made follow-up comments to Haro or

Currie. Stewart requested and received a meeting with Smola, and Stewart believes

she addressed the union’s concerns to Smola’s satisfaction because he did not raise

further concerns with Haro or Currie.
-9-

On October 16, 2002, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter related to the

November 2001 EEOC complaint. The EEOC found insufficient evidence to make

a determination as to the merits of Stewart’s complaint. 

Around this same time, school board member Bruce Endler sent a voicemail to

Smola and copied it to Haro, Currie, and others. In the voicemail, dated October 25,

2002, Endler defended himself against rumors apparently being circulated by some

members of the Eagan High School faculty. He also expressed anger at the behavior

of some of the faculty. In the voicemail, Endler made it clear that he believed certain

teachers had falsely attributed to him adverse statements about Stewart. As relevant

to Stewart’s present claims, the content of the voicemail demonstrated that at least

some teachers at Eagan knew or believed Stewart had raised some type of legal claim

against the District and felt Haro and Currie had abandoned Eagan High School.

Also, Endler asserted that statements and actions by faculty at Eagan High School

might be interpreted as adding to a hostile work environment for Stewart. Finally,

Endler stated that he was disappointed in a perceived lack of integrity among the

faculty and in their unwillingness to give Stewart a chance to succeed.

 In late October and early November, in an alleged response to the perception

that there was conflict between Stewart and the faculty at Eagan, Currie repeatedly

offered Stewart the opportunity to transfer to a specially created position in the

District office, Principal on Special Assignment. The District asserts that a person

was needed in the District Office to coordinate compliance efforts regarding the newly

passed No Child Left Behind Act. The District also asserts that the transfer was

viewed as a solution to the faculty’s unhappiness with Stewart. The Principal on

Special Assignment was to coordinate the entire District’s K-12 compliance with the

No Child Left Behind Act and to receive a stipend of $2,500 above Stewart’s salary

as principal at Eagan. Although Currie told Stewart the District could transfer her

without her consent, Stewart repeatedly refused the invitation to transfer. Stewart

viewed the new job as being poorly defined in scope and being a dead-end position
-10-

in terms of possible advancement. On November 8, 2002, the District transferred

Stewart to the new position against her wishes.

In November 2002, shortly after her transfer, Stewart commenced an extended

absence from work using vacation leave, sick leave, and eventually, disability leave.

She returned to work briefly in July 2003, but stayed only a short while, resuming her

leave until January 2005. In January 2005, she returned to the District office.

According to Stewart, when she returned in January 2005, there was no longer a

furnished office for her, she had only a shared secretary, and her position had no

specific duties. It is undisputed that the District, during the more than two years that

elapsed between November 2002 and January 2005, distributed duties related to

compliance with the No Child Left Behind Act to other employees.

On December 17, 2002, one month after her transfer, Stewart filed a second

EEOC complaint. In this second EEOC complaint, she alleged that her transfer to the

position of Principal on Special Assignment was an adverse employment action taken

in retaliation for the filing of her November 2001 EEOC charge and in violation of the

ADEA and ADA.

Stewart filed the present action on March 26, 2004, while on leave from her

position as Principal on Special Assignment. The parties engaged in discovery and

the District moved for summary judgment. The case was assigned to a magistrate

judge to prepare a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge recommended

a grant of summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion for summary

judgment.

In granting summary judgment, the court analyzed Stewart’s claims as two

distinct claims based on two distinct protected acts: the filing of the two EEOC

complaints. As to the claim of retaliation arising out of Stewart’s filing of her first

EEOC complaint in November 2001, the court characterized Stewart’s claim as

alleging two retaliatory actions by the District: (1) her involuntary transfer in
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November 2002, and (2) exposure to a hostile work environment between April 2002

and November 2002. As to the transfer, the court found an outstanding question of

material fact as to whether the transfer was an adverse employment action,

specifically, whether Stewart received a reduction in title, prestige, job duties,

authority, and working conditions. The court ultimately held, however, that Stewart

failed to demonstrate a triable question of fact as to whether her involuntary transfer

was causally related to her filing of the November 2001 EEOC complaint.

Regarding Stewart’s hostile work environment claim, the court did not analyze

it as alleged hostility based on retaliation, as argued by Stewart. Rather, the court

analyzed the claim as a discrimination-type hostile work environment claim under the

ADEA. As a result, the court granted summary judgment because Stewart had not

presented “the requisite facts to make out a prima facie case of a hostile work

environment based on age.”

Regarding Stewart’s claims arising out of Stewart’s filing of her second EEOC

complaint in December 2002, the court considered two allegations of retaliatory

conduct by the District. First, the court considered the involuntary transfer in

November 2002, and second, the court considered the working conditions Stewart

found unacceptable upon her return to work in January 2005. Regarding the

involuntary transfer, the court noted that the November 2002 transfer preceded the

second EEOC complaint, which she filed in December 2002, such that the transfer

could not have been in retaliation for the second complaint. Regarding working

conditions in 2005, the court simply concluded that the extended time between

December 2002 and January 2005 was too long to support a claim of retaliation.

After the grant of summary judgment and after the parties had filed their initial

briefs in the present appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006). In Burlington

Northern, the Court expressly held that retaliation claims under Title VII could be

based on a hostile work environment and need not be based solely on discrete adverse
-12-

employment actions that affect the terms or conditions of employment. Id. at 2414.

The Court proceeded to establish a standard to define the concept of a hostile work

environment for the purpose of retaliation claims under Title VII. The Court held that

actions are considered materially adverse and are actionable in Title VII retaliation

claims if the actions “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, it is undisputed that Stewart participated in protected conduct.

Stewart alleges that there are triable questions of fact as to whether actions of the

District were adverse and whether such actions were causally related to her protected

conduct. Stewart objects in particular to the district court’s treatment of her hostile

work environment claim given the need to focus on causation related to retaliation

rather than age, and given the new standards set forth in Burlington Northern. In

addition, she argues that she participated in ongoing protected conduct (including her

letter in May 2002 alleging retaliation) beyond the mere filing of her EEOC

complaints and that this ongoing protected conduct is relevant to the question of

temporal proximity for the purpose of analyzing causation.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences

in that party’s favor. Green v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 910

(8th Cir. 2006).

Without direct evidence of a retaliatory motive, we analyze retaliation claims

(whether under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA), under the burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under
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this framework, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case,

consisting of evidence: “(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2)

an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (3) a causal

connection exists between the two events.” Green, 459 F.3d at 914. If the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show a “non

retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

If the defendant can show a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions, the

burden returns to the plaintiff who “is ‘then obliged to present evidence that (1)

creates a question of fact as to whether [defendant’s] reason was pretextual and (2)

creates a reasonable inference that [defendant] acted in retaliation.’” Logan v. Liberty

Healthcare Corp., 416 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smith v. Allen Health

Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002)). 

We have described the actual evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must meet at

the prima facie stage as “minimal.” Logan, 416 F.3d at 881. Where the evidence used

to establish a prima facie case meets this minimal burden but is not strong, that

evidence, standing alone, may be insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s case at the final

stage of the burden-shifting analysis. See id. at 881 (“[A]n employee’s attempt to

prove pretext requires more substantial evidence than it takes to make a prima facie

case because unlike evidence establishing a prima facie case, evidence of pretext and

retaliation is viewed in light of the employer’s justification.”) (quotation and internal

marks omitted); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 944-45 (8th

Cir. 1994) (stating that it was error to conflate the ultimate burden of proof with the

“minimal” threshold of proof necessary to make a prima facie case, but nevertheless

affirming a grant of summary judgment where a defendant had offered legitimate

reasons for its actions and there was “no genuine dispute on the issue of pretext and

the ultimate issue of defendant’s intentional discrimination”). Conversely, where the

evidence of causation for purposes of establishing a prima facie case is quite strong,

it may be sufficient, standing alone, to prove a defendant’s liability without resort to

further evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th
-14-

Cir. 2002) (“It is possible for strong evidence of a prima facie case to establish pretext

as well.”). 

Taken together, these cases demonstrate that the burden-shifting framework is

merely an analytical construct; the ultimate burden of proving retaliation remains at

all times with the plaintiff; and the level of proof required to show causation is less at

the prima facie stage than at the final stage of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis. As

such, if an employer has articulated a legitimate reason for its actions, it is permissible

for courts to presume the existence of a prima facie case and move directly to the issue

of pretext and the determinative issue of causation when bypassing the prima facie

case analysis leads to clarity in framing the issues under review. We choose to do so

in the present case.

B. Stewart’s Retaliation Claims

Turning to the issues of causation and pretext, the District asserted faculty

dissent and the need for a district-level employee to address the No Child Left Behind

Act as its legitimate reasons for Stewart’s treatment and eventual transfer. Stewart

must present sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether these reasons

were merely pretexts to hide an impermissible, retaliatory motive. 

i. Retaliation based on the November 2001 EEOC Complaint and 

the May 23, 2002 Letter.

Stewart focuses her arguments on showing adverse treatment, but offers little

support for her theory of causation. She relies primarily on two factors, temporal

proximity and the content of the October 25, 2002 voicemail from school board

member Bruce Endler.

Regarding temporal proximity, alleged retaliation which precedes protected

conduct cannot logically be used to show causation because a prior event cannot be
-15-

caused by a later event. Accordingly, the tense and hostile meeting on May16 and

other actions preceding the May 23 letter must be examined for causation only in light

of the November 2001 EEOC filing, not the May 23 letter. 

The District argues that the six months of time that elapsed between November

2001 and May 2002 preclude a finding of causation or, at a minimum, weigh heavily

against such a finding. Stewart argues that we should not consider the relevant time

frame to be six months because she was working outside the District and unavailable

to be subjected to retaliation. She asserts, instead, that temporal proximity weighs

strongly in favor of proving causation because the District retaliated against her at the

first available opportunity when she visited Eagan in May and the District

immediately took adverse action against her. Stewart points to the District’s failure

to control the faculty at the May 16 meeting. She also points to the taping and

transcribing of the meeting without her permission and the posting of the video and

her resume on the Internet. 

We agree with the District that the extended period of time in this case fails to

support a finding of causation. Although we have recently discussed the difficulty of

placing too much reliance on timing as evidence of causation, see Green, 459 F.3d at

915, it remains clear that “[a] gap in time between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action weakens an inference of retaliatory motive,” Hesse v.

Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 624, 633 (8th Cir. 2005), and that, given a delay

of sufficient length, the “causal nexus tends to evaporate.” Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397

F.3d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 2005). Here, Stewart’s attempt to compress the six-month gap

in time fails because her interaction with the District continued throughout the six

months. The District repeatedly offered her positions during the six-month window,

as required in light of her recall rights. Although Stewart argues that these offers were

related to undesirable, lower-level positions and are themselves evidence of

retaliation, she has not adduced any evidence tending to show that higher-level

positions came available prior to the opening for principal of Eagan High School. She

also has not provided any evidence to show that the District failed to offer any such
-16-

positions for her consideration. Because her interactions with the District continued

throughout the time she attempts to discount, and because the District took no adverse

actions during that time, we cannot accept Stewart’s attempt to discount the six-month

period.

Regarding events that occurred after she sent the letter on May 23, 2002, the

bulk of her interactions with the District occurred in the fall. She was present for a

short term in July, but she had to take time off due to her serious health concerns and

returned to work later in August. Upon her return, some of the faculty and parents

continued to resist her appointment, at least in their complaints and comments to the

union representatives and to Haro and Currie. Nine weeks after her return, the District

transferred her from her position. Stewart characterizes the District’s failure to control

faculty as an adverse action that created a hostile environment, and she characterizes

the transfer as adverse. Even if we were to assume that the environment at Eagan

following her surgery was, immediately upon her return, sufficiently hostile to meet

the Burlington Northern standard, two months had elapsed since she sent the May 23

letter, and more than eight months had elapsed since she filed the 2001 EEOC

complaint. 

More importantly, however, Stewart admits that the faculty’s opposition to her

appointment was based on permissible grounds, namely, the faculty’s desire to have

an inside candidate appointed principal. In her deposition, while discussing her

reaction to the May 16, 2002 meeting, Stewart stated, “I felt that they wanted

somebody inside the District and that I was a scapegoat, that they were going to

intimidate and bully me not to take the job because they wanted someone internally.”

She also stated that she was told as much by the departing principal. From the time

Stewart’s appointment as principal was announced to the faculty, she lacked faculty

support based on the faculty’s perception of her qualifications and based on the

faculty’s anger at not having been given a chance to have input into the hiring process.

The transcript of the hostile meeting shows without exception that hostility was based

on the faculty’s perception of Stewart’s qualifications, and this is reinforced by the
-17-

vote of no confidence passed shortly after the meeting. Given this evidence

supporting the District’s legitimate reasons for its action, Stewart may not satisfy her

burden of proving causation merely by arguing that temporal proximity ties the

adverse action to protected conduct that occurred two to eight months in the past.

Stewart attempts to buttress her claim of causation and pretext by relying on the

contents of the voicemail from Endler. Taken in a light most favorable to Stewart,

Endler’s voicemail revealed that at least some faculty members knew or believed

Stewart had filed complaints against the District, some faculty members were

circulating rumors that Endler had characterized Stewart’s complaints as claims for

hundreds of thousands of dollars, and persons at the District were aware of a need to

be mindful of possible litigation with Stewart and to avoid acting in a manner that

could be viewed as contributing to a hostile work environment. 

There is no evidence, however, to suggest what certain faculty members may

have known about Stewart’s complaint, or when or how these faculty members may

have learned of her complaint. There is also no evidence linking this apparent

knowledge to any actions by the faculty that made the environment hostile or led to

Stewart’s reassignment by the District. In contrast, there is clear evidence—Stewart’s

own admission—that the faculty wanted an insider to be hired as principal at Eagan

rather than Stewart and that the faculty members were resentful of the fact that the

administration did not seek their input when making the decision to hire Stewart.

Finally, vague statements regarding apparent concern by directors or supervisors as

to possible litigation with persons who file complaints cannot suffice to prove

retaliatory animus. Directors and supervisors would be ill-advised not to act in a

guarded and careful manner after the receipt of a complaint. The exercise of such care

in no way demonstrates that adverse actions are motivated by a desire to retaliate. If

anything, it is evidence of a desire to placate.

At most, then, Endler’s October 25, 2002 voicemail might appear suspicious.

It does not, however, suggest that the hostile actions Stewart identifies were based in
4

Because Stewart alleges no protected conduct other than the filing of her

December 2002 EEOC complaint to support her ADA retaliation claim, we need not

address that claim further.

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any manner on her protected conduct. The evidence is simply insufficient to permit

a reasonable jury, without resort to speculation, to draw the inference that any adverse

action or hostile environment was based on Stewart’s November 2001 EEOC

complaint or May 23, 2002 letter. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's

position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). 

ii. Retaliation Based on the December 2002 EEOC Complaint.

We also find that Stewart failed to generate a jury question as to causation

based on the December 2002 EEOC filing. No allegedly adverse actions that preceded

the 2002 EEOC complaint could have been in retaliation for the later-filed complaint.

Regarding allegedly retaliatory actions that followed the 2002 complaint, Stewart

identifies only the unsupportive and ill-defined situation upon her return to the District

in January 2005, labeling it a hostile working environment. We hold on the facts of

the present case that any conditions in January 2005 were simply too far removed in

time from the filing of her December 2002 complaint to establish a causal connection.

See Shanklin, 397 F.3d at 604 (stating on the facts of the case that “[w]ith [a] lengthy

delay [of ten months], any causal nexus inference tends to evaporate”). Also, given

the practical considerations involved in holding a position open for an employee

during a two-year absence, no reasonable jury could find that the lack of immediate

support and lack of well-defined duties in January 2005 is the type of response that

could “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination” Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (quotations omitted).4
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Because Stewart has not presented evidence sufficient to create a jury question

as to pretext and causation, summary judgment was proper on her retaliation claims.

C. Stewart’s State Law Claims

The district court holds broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to

dismiss related state law claims after federal claims are dismissed. Moran v. Clarke,

296 F.3d 638, 650 n.6 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, Stewart argues only that the dismissal

of her state law claims was an abuse of discretion because she believes the grant of

summary judgment on her federal claims was improper. Because the grant of

summary judgment on Stewart’s federal claims was not improper, we find no abuse

of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of the state claims.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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