Filed 5/6/14 P. v. Sanchez CA4/1

Reposted to provide correct version

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MANUEL SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D063406

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD238471)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Charles G. 

Rogers, Judge. Affirmed.

Theresa O. Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Eric A. Swenson and William Murdoch Wood, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The People charged Manuel Sanchez with 15 counts of committing a lewd act on a 

child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 The alleged victims were his stepchildren, B.M.

(counts 1-13) and E.M. (counts 14-15). The People alleged that counts 1 through 13 and 

count 15 involved substantial sexual conduct, pursuant to section 1203.066, subdivision

(a)(8). The People further alleged that the information had been timely filed pursuant to

section 803, subdivision (f) (counts 1-9, 14-15) and section 801.1, subdivision (a) (counts 

10-13).

In November 2012, a jury found Sanchez guilty on counts 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 12. 

The jury also found true the special allegations discussed above pertaining to these 

counts. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining counts. 

In December 2012, the trial court sentenced Sanchez to a total term of 18 years in 

prison, consisting of an upper term of eight years on count 2, and consecutive two-year 

terms on the remaining counts. 

On appeal, Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his 

commission of various uncharged sexual offenses. Sanchez also claims that the trial 

court erred in admitting evidence of B.M. and E.M.'s out-of-court disclosures of the

molestations; in denying his request for a continuance of the trial; and in admitting 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
3

statements made by Sanchez's son that indicated his son's belief that Sanchez was guilty 

and lacked remorse. We affirm the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The People's evidence

1. The charged offenses2

In 1993, M.C. began dating Sanchez. At the time, M.C. had two daughters from a 

previous marriage, seven-year-old B.M., and 11-year-old E.M. Sanchez also had three 

children from a previous marriage: Glory, Manny Jr., and Cesar. About a year after they 

started dating, Sanchez and M.C. married and the families moved into a new house 

together. 

On one occasion, shortly after the families moved in together, Sanchez and B.M.

were alone in the new house. Sanchez locked the front door, looked out the windows, 

closed the curtains, sat on the couch, and asked B.M. to sit on his lap, which she did.

B.M. was wearing a sundress. Sanchez rubbed B.M.'s vaginal area over her underwear

(count 4). When someone attempted to enter the house, Sanchez pushed B.M. off of his 

lap and walked away. On another occasion around the same time, Sanchez was on a 

futon with a blanket on the living room floor watching movies with the family. After 

everyone else went to bed, Sanchez had B.M. rub his penis with her hand (count 2). 

 

2 Although the People presented evidence that Sanchez committed several lewd acts 

in addition to those discussed in the text, we focus on the charged offenses on which the 

jury found Sanchez guilty. 
4

As B.M. got older, Sanchez often gave B.M. massages, during which he would 

frequently touch B.M.'s vaginal area over her clothing (count 8). Sanchez also had B.M.

touch his penis (count 7). Sanchez continued molesting B.M., by touching her vaginal 

area both under and over her clothing (counts 10 and 12), until at least her twelfth

birthday. 

Although B.M. and E.M. both testified that Sanchez molested E.M., the jury was 

unable to reach a verdict with respect to the offenses in which E.M. was the named 

victim.3

2. Additional evidence pertaining to the charged offenses

At some point when B.M. was in sixth grade, B.M. told her mother that Sanchez 

had been touching her and E.M. inappropriately. M.C., Sanchez, B.M. and E.M. had a 

meeting during which Sanchez cried and apologized, but claimed that he did not 

remember having done anything inappropriate. Sanchez agreed that a lock should be 

placed on the girls' bedroom door. 

One night in January 2012, B.M. told M.C. that Sanchez had continued to molest 

her and E.M. even after the family meeting that took place when B.M. was in sixth grade. 

Cesar came to the family home and had a private discussion with Sanchez. Sanchez 

admitted to Cesar that he had touched B.M. inappropriately on one occasion, but

attempted to minimize the extent of the molestation. Cesar reported Sanchez's admission 

 

3 E.M. admitted during her testimony that she had a sexual relationship with 

Sanchez after she became an adult. E.M. stated that Sanchez would provide her with 

money or drugs in exchange for sex. 
5

to several other family members and B.M.'s boyfriend, and urged them to call the police. 

B.M.'s boyfriend called the police, who arrested Sanchez shortly thereafter. 

Catherine McLennan, a supervisor and forensic interviewer with the Forensic 

Health Department at Palomar Health, testified about a variety of misconceptions 

pertaining to victims of child molestation, including the reasons that children who are 

victims of sexual abuse may delay disclosing the abuse. 

3. The uncharged sexual offenses

The People presented evidence that Sanchez repeatedly molested Vanessa R. 

(Vanessa), the younger sister of his first wife, when she was between eight and 15 years 

old. The molestations included Sanchez touching Vanessa's vaginal area and having 

Vanessa rub his penis. 

Lynn A. (Lynn) was a friend of E.M.'s in junior high and high school. Lynn 

testified that on one occasion when she was in high school, Sanchez gave her a massage. 

He began by rubbing her legs, and then moved his hands up "close to the buttocks area."

Lynn explained that Sanchez was "very close" to touching her vaginal area and that she 

was "extremely uncomfortable."

Tess O. (Tess) is B.M. and E.M.'s cousin. Sanchez frequently tried to kiss Tess on 

the mouth, touched, massaged, and kissed her hands, and told her that her hands were 

beautiful. On one occasion when Tess was staying overnight, she went downstairs 

wrapped in a towel to retrieve some clothing. Sanchez was downstairs and turned his 

head to watch Tess go back upstairs. According to Tess, Sanchez tried to look 

underneath the towel as she ascended the stairs. 
6

B. The defense

Glory, Sanchez's daughter, testified that she never saw Sanchez act inappropriately 

with either B.M. or E.M. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Sanchez's 

commission of uncharged sexual offenses

Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his commission 

of uncharged sexual offenses. We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to 

Sanchez's claim. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 991 

(Robertson) ["A challenge to admission of prior sexual misconduct under Evidence Code 

sections 1108 and 352 is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard"].)

1. Governing law

a. The statutory scheme 

Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides:

"In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual 

offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual 

offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101,[4] if 

the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352."

 

4 Evidence Code section 1101 provides in relevant part: "(a) Except as provided in 

this section and in Section[] . . . 1108 . . . , evidence of a person's character or a trait of 

his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or 

evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to 

prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion."
7

Evidence Code section 352 provides:

"The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) 

create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 

or of misleading the jury."

b. Relevant case law

In People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 (Falsetta), the Supreme Court 

described the factors that a trial court should consider in determining whether to exclude 

evidence that is otherwise admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, pursuant 

to Evidence Code section 352:

" '[T]rial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, 

and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission 

and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors 

from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its 

likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant 

in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of 

less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as 

admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or 

excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the 

offense.' [Citations.]" (Falsetta, supra, at p. 917.)

The Falsetta court explained that "the probative value of 'other crimes' evidence is 

increased by the relative similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses, the 

close proximity in time of the offenses, and the independent sources of evidence (the 

victims) in each offense." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.)

A trial court need not expressly refer to all of the Falsetta factors in considering 

whether to exclude evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Villatoro

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1168 [" '[W]e are willing to infer an implicit weighing by the 
8

trial court on the basis of record indications well short of an express statement.'

[Citation.]"].)

2. Factual and procedural background

a. The People's motion

Prior to the trial, the People filed a motion seeking permission to present evidence 

at trial of Sanchez's commission of uncharged sexual offenses against four females,

pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. 

The People sought to admit evidence that Sanchez had repeatedly molested 

Vanessa, beginning when she was eight or nine years old. The People stated that 

Sanchez had touched Vanessa's vaginal area on approximately 10 occasions. 

The People also sought to admit evidence that Sanchez molested Tess. The People 

claimed that Sanchez "tried to kiss [Tess] on the lips every time he saw her," and that he 

"commented often on [Tess's] hands, which made her feel uncomfortable." The People 

also claimed that Sanchez "tried to look up [Tess's] towel" after she had taken a shower at 

his house. 

In addition, the People sought permission to introduce evidence that Sanchez had 

inappropriately touched Lynn on one occasion. The People stated that Sanchez 

"massaged her legs, buttocks, inner thighs, and got quite close to touching her vagina 

before the molest[ation] was interrupted . . . ."

Finally, the People sought to introduce evidence that Sanchez had inappropriately 

touched a woman named Chloe C., who rented a room in his house. The alleged 

touching occurred while Sanchez was giving Chloe a foot massage. The People claimed 
9

that Sanchez "began by touching her feet, moved up her legs, and [was] touching her 

inner thigh between the top of her leg and near her vaginal area."

The People argued that the uncharged offense evidence should not be excluded 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. In support of this contention, the People 

contended that the uncharged acts were similar in nature to the charged acts, but not more 

egregious. The People also maintained that the uncharged offenses involved girls similar 

in age to B.M. and E.M., and that the acts were not overly remote. 

b. The trial court's hearing on the motion

The trial court held a hearing on the People's motion. Defense counsel argued that 

the trial court should exclude all of the uncharged sexual offense evidence. With respect 

to Tess, counsel argued that Sanchez's comments regarding Tess's hands and his kissing 

her did not amount to sexual offenses. With respect to the alleged towel incident, counsel 

argued that the evidence consisted of "speculation about speculation." As to Chloe, 

defense counsel pointed out that she was approximately 21 years old at the time of the 

incident. Defense counsel further argued that the Chloe had consented to the massage 

and that Sanchez's actions did not constitute a sexual offense. Similarly, defense counsel 

argued that Sanchez's act in giving Lynn a "leg massage" did not constitute sexual 

misconduct. As to Vanessa, counsel argued that the uncharged conduct was "very remote 

in time."

In response, the prosecutor provided additional details of the uncharged offenses 

that she maintained warranted admitting the evidence. As to Tess, the prosecutor noted 

that Sanchez would "try to give her huge, big kisses on the mouth" in a "relatively 
10

aggressive . . . action that she . . . believed was wrong." The prosecutor also argued that 

the jury could infer that Sanchez harbored a "sexual intent" when he "massag[ed] and 

kiss[ed] [Tess's] hands and talk[ed] to her about how lovely her hands were." With 

respect to Chloe, the prosecutor contended that the touching in question was not 

"something innocuous during a massage," and claimed that Sanchez had touched Chloe 

"where [her] legs basically me[t] [her] vaginal area." As to Lynn, the prosecutor argued 

that "she was in junior high or high school," and that Sanchez "engaged her in a massage 

and again tried to touch her vaginal area." With respect to Vanessa, the prosecutor 

argued that she had disclosed the molestations "when it happened."5

c. The trial court's ruling

The trial court ruled that the People would be permitted to present evidence 

pertaining to Sanchez's commission of offenses against Vanessa, Tess, and Lynn,6 but 

would not be allowed to present evidence with respect to Chloe. The court began its 

analysis by stating that it believed that the evidence pertaining to Vanessa, Tess, and 

Lynn constituted evidence of Sanchez's commission of sexual offenses as defined by 

Evidence Code section 1108. 

 

5 In a pretrial motion, the People argued that the "molestation of Vanessa was likely 

in the early 1980s and late 1970s." The People alleged that the charged offenses took 

place between 1994 and 1997. Based on comments made by counsel at the hearing on 

the admissibility of the uncharged sexual offense evidence, the trial court could 

reasonably have found that the uncharged acts against Tess and Lynn were committed 

near, or within, this 1994 to 1997 time period. 

6 Vanessa, Tess, and Lynn all testified at trial concerning the uncharged sexual 

offenses as described in part II.A.2., ante.
11

The court then stated that the uncharged sexual offense evidence would not be 

excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The court reasoned:

"The overarching question on the probative value side is whether it 

is reasonable to infer from this conduct a certain character trait, 

which, in turn, would provide a basis for a reasonable inference [to 

find] that the defendant committed the charged crimes.

"I think that there are two significant character traits that these acts 

reveal. [¶] One is, frankly, a sexual interest in children, underage

women. That certainly provides a basis to infer that he committed 

the sexual acts that are charged in this case. [¶] Frankly, I think also 

important is the control issue, the power and control that those acts 

exhibit. That's important because that character trait shows or 

addresses the means by which he carries out his sexual intent. [¶] 

There is the real element of control, I think. These girls are all either 

family members or closely associated with family members. He 

occupies the position of trust.

"At least the acts with respect to Lynn and [Tess] . . . they're begun 

by subterfuge. They're clearly sexual.

"I think that . . . there's a strong probative value. I think it is 

sufficiently likely that they occurred, that we're not letting in 

ephemeral or speculative, could-have-happened evidence. I don't 

think it's going to be confusing. I think the requisite similarity is 

helpful. And they pertain to . . . the time period which I think is 

particularly relevant."

The trial court stated that although the evidence with respect to Chloe also could 

be said to show "an ongoing trait," the court would exclude the evidence on the basis that 

the incident involving Chloe was "qualitatively different" from the charged offenses. 
12

3. The trial court did not err in determining that Sanchez's conduct with 

respect to Tess and Lynn constituted sexual offenses as defined in Evidence 

Code section 1108

Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the 

uncharged sexual offenses with respect to the "acts relayed by Tess [] and Lynn [] 

[because they] do not qualify as 'sexual acts' under Evidence Code section 1108." 

a. The relevant statutory scheme

As noted above, in a criminal action in which a defendant is accused of a sexual 

offense, Evidence Code section 1108 may operate to remove evidentiary restrictions 

contained in Evidence Code section 1101 on the introduction of "evidence of the 

defendant's commission of another sexual offense." (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) 

"[A] sexual offense must qualify as a crime to be admissible under section 1108." 

(People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 287.) 

Evidence Code section 1108 defines "sexual offense" as including "Any conduct 

proscribed by Section . . . 288 . . . or Section . . . 647.6, of the Penal Code." (Evid. Code 

§ 1108, subd. (d)(1)(A).) 

Section 288, subdivision (a) criminalizes the commission of lewd acts "upon or 

with the body, or any part or member thereof . . . with the intent of arousing, appealing to, 

or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child . . . ."

Section 647.6, subdivision (a) makes it illegal to "annoy[] or molest[] any child." 

A violation of section 647.6 requires proof of the following elements:

"(1) [T]he existence of objectively and unhesitatingly irritating or 

annoying conduct; (2) motivated by an abnormal sexual interest in 

children in general or a specific child; (3) the conduct is directed at a 
13

child or children, though no specific child or children need be the 

target of the offense; and (4) a child or children are victims."

(People v. Phillips (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1396, fn. omitted.)

b. Application

Sanchez contends that evidence that he attempted to look under a towel that Tess 

was wearing as she walked up the stairs in his house was inadmissible because Tess's 

testimony concerning this event was "pure speculation," and he further maintains that her 

testimony was not credible. 

Attempting to look under a towel that a child is wearing constitutes "objectively 

and unhesitatingly irritating or annoying conduct" (People v. Phillips, supra, 188 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1396), which, when accompanied by the requisite prurient mental state, 

may give rise to a violation of section 647.6. In addition, the trial court could have 

reasonably rejected Sanchez's contention that Tess's testimony was speculative, and his 

suggestion on appeal that Tess's testimony was not believable is a contention that goes to 

the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence. 

Sanchez also claims that evidence that he would kiss Tess and massage and kiss 

her hands did not constitute a sexual offense. The trial court reasonably found otherwise. 

(See People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 291 ["Physical affection among relatives, 

generally considered acceptable conduct, nonetheless could satisfy the 'any touching'
14

aspect of section 288, subdivision (a), and violate that section if accompanied by the 

requisite lewd intent"].)7 

Finally, Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Sanchez's act 

of massaging Lynn's legs constituted a sexual offense. Again, the trial court reasonably 

found otherwise. (See People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 445 ["[A]ny touching 

of an underage child is 'lewd or lascivious' within the meaning of section 288 where it is 

committed for the purpose of sexual arousal"].)8

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that 

Sanchez's conduct with respect to Tess and Lynn constituted sexual offenses as defined in 

Evidence Code section 1108.

4. The trial court was not required to exclude the evidence of Sanchez's

commission of sexual offenses on the ground that the offenses in question

purportedly took place long before the trial 

Sanchez claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence 

of uncharged sexual offenses because they were purportedly committed so long ago that 

he was unable to prepare a defense. In support of this contention, Sanchez notes that the 

uncharged offenses against Vanessa ostensibly took place "between 28 and 35 years 

before trial," and that the offenses against Lynn and Tess purportedly took place "at least 

more than 10 years before trial." 

 

7 The trial court also could have reasonably found that Sanchez's conduct in kissing 

Tess and massaging and kissing her hands constituted a violation of section 647.6.

8 The trial court also could have reasonably found that Sanchez's massaging of 

Lynn's legs near her vaginal area constituted a violation of section 647.6.
15

"Numerous cases have upheld admission pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 

of prior sexual crimes that occurred decades before the current offenses." (People v. 

Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) For example, in Robertson, supra, at page 

992, the court rejected a defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting evidence 

of a sexual assault committed decades before the charged offense: 

"Appellant argues that the prior sexual assault, which occurred 

approximately 34 years before the current sexual offenses, was too 

remote to have probative value and should have been excluded for 

this reason. We disagree. 'No specific time limits have been 

established for determining when an uncharged offense is so remote 

as to be inadmissible.' [Citation.] ' "[S]ubstantial similarities 

between the prior and the charged offenses balance out the 

remoteness of the prior offenses. [Citation.]" [Citation.]'

[Citation.]"

In this case, while the uncharged offenses purportedly took place a number of 

years before trial, none of the uncharged offenses were particularly remote when 

compared to the charged offenses. Further, while Sanchez claims that due to the 

remoteness of the uncharged offenses, he was unable to defend against the evidence of 

those offenses, he had pretrial notice of the offenses that the prosecution intended to 

introduce, subjected Vanessa, Tess, and Lynn to cross-examination, and presented 

positive character evidence.9 Further, although Sanchez claims that the fact that the prior 

molestations were "unreported" made it particularly difficult to defend against the 

evidence pertaining to those offenses, he acknowledges that Vanessa "told family 

members [about the molestations] when she was 18 years old."

 

9 Sanchez's daughter, Glory, testified that he had never molested her or her children. 
16

The trial court could have reasonably concluded that any prejudice that Sanchez 

might suffer from having to defend against uncharged offenses that were purportedly

committed long ago was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence for the 

purpose of demonstrating Sanchez's sexual interest in underage women.10 Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

exclude the evidence of uncharged sexual offenses on the ground that the incidents at 

issue were so remote in time as to prevent Sanchez from preparing a meaningful defense. 

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of B.M.'s and 

E.M.'s out-of-court disclosures of Sanchez's molestations

Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of B.M.'s and 

E.M.'s out-of-court disclosures of his molestations. Specifically, Sanchez claims that the 

statements should have been excluded as hearsay and pursuant to Evidence Code section 

352.11 We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to this claim. (See e.g., 

People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 197 ["On appeal, a trial court's decision to 

admit or not admit evidence . . . is reviewed only for abuse of discretion"].)

1. Governing law

"[P]roof of an extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a sexual offense, 

disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a limited, nonhearsay purpose—

namely, to establish the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding, the victim's 

 

10 In this regard, we note that the trial court excluded evidence pertaining to Chloe, 

who was approximately 21 years of age at the time of the alleged incident involving her. 

11 We assume for purposes of this decision that Sanchez adequately preserved all of 

the evidentiary objections with respect to the disclosures at issue.
17

disclosure of the assault to others—whenever the fact that the disclosure was made and 

the circumstances under which it was made are relevant to the trier of fact's determination 

as to whether the offense occurred." (People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 749-750

(Brown).) The Brown court stated that "in light of the narrow purpose of its admission, 

evidence of the victim's report or disclosure of the alleged offense should be limited to 

the fact of the making of the complaint and other circumstances material to this limited 

purpose." (Id. at p. 763.) The Brown court explained, "Caution in this regard is 

particularly important because . . . a jury may well find it difficult not to view these 

details as tending to prove the truth of the underlying charge of sexual assault [citation], 

thereby converting the victim's statement into a hearsay assertion . . . ." (Ibid.)

"Such extrajudicial statements also may be admissible for a hearsay purpose (i.e., 

to prove the truth of the content of the statement) under an exception to the hearsay 

rule . . . provided the requirements for their admission under that exception are satisfied 

in the particular case." (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 749, fn. 1.)

2. Application

Sanchez contends that the trial court permitted "detailed testimony from a number 

of third party witnesses, including Lynn[], Tess[], [Tess's father], [D. O.], and [B.M.'s 

boyfriend], [A.G.], as to [E.M.] and [B.M.'s] reports to them that [Sanchez] had sexually 

molested them," and argues that the trial court should have excluded this evidence as 

inadmissible hearsay. We consider each witness's testimony in turn. 

Lynn testified that E.M. told her that Sanchez entered E.M.'s room at night, lifted 

up the covers, and touched her on her legs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
18

concluding that Lynn's testimony was admissible for the limited nonhearsay purpose 

identified in Brown—that is, to establish the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding, 

E.M.'s disclosure to Lynn. 

Tess testified as to the specifics of B.M.'s disclosures to her by describing the 

ways in which B.M. stated that Sanchez had molested her. The trial court admitted Tess's 

testimony in this regard pursuant to the prior consistent statement exception to the 

hearsay rule. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1236, 791.)12 Thus, B.M.'s statements to Tess were 

admitted for their truth. (See People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 849.) As such, the 

details of the molestations as stated by B.M. in the disclosures that she made to Tess were 

fully admissible. (See Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 749, fn. 1.) 

D.O testified that B.M. had disclosed to Tess "that [B.M.] had been molested by 

Mr. Sanchez." Similarly, A.G. testified only that B.M. had disclosed to him that Sanchez 

had sexually abused her. Neither D.O nor A.G. provided any details concerning the 

molestations revealed in these disclosures. We therefore reject Sanchez's contention that 

D.O's and A.G.'s testimony contained "detailed statements" of B.M.'s disclosures. 

Sanchez also contends that evidence of the disclosures should have been excluded 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, because the "risk of undue prejudice far 

outweighed any probative value." Specifically, Sanchez appears to contend that the trial 

court erred in overruling defense counsel's Evidence Code section 352 objection that 

testimony concerning the disclosures should be excluded because the witnesses might not 

 

12 Sanchez does not contend in his opening brief that the trial court erred in admitting 

the statements pursuant to this exception. 
19

have an accurate memory of the victim's disclosures, and that the witnesses might be 

embellishing the disclosures in the criminal proceedings. The trial court carefully 

considered these objections, and Sanchez points to nothing in the record that would 

suggest that the court abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the 

evidence was not outweighed by the possibility of such prejudice. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the 

evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. 

We also reject Sanchez's contention that the "evidence should have been excluded 

as cumulative." "Evidence is cumulative if it is repetitive of evidence already before the 

jury." (People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 599, fn. 4.) A trial court may 

exercise its discretion to exclude cumulative evidence, pursuant to Evidence Code section 

352. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436, fn. 2.) The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that E.M.'s and B.M.'s various disclosures to different 

individuals were not cumulative. 

Finally, Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to 

"provide[] impressions . . . of what the girls reported." However, none of the testimony 

that Sanchez cites in support of this contention constitutes the witnesses' impressions 

concerning the credibility of the victims' complaints. Rather, the testimony consisted 

merely of various witness's observations of the victims near the times of the molestations. 

For example, Sanchez notes that Tess testified that B.M. frequently had stomachaches 

and D.O testified that B.M. was prone to "nervousness." Accordingly, we reject 
20

Sanchez's contention that the trial court erred in admitting " 'hindsight' impressions that 

bolstered the reliability" of B.M.'s and E.M.'s complaints. 

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's request for 

a continuance of the trial

Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request, 

made on the eve of trial, for a "short continuance" of the trial to permit counsel to consult 

with a videography expert concerning various video clips that the People intended to play 

at trial. 

1. Factual and procedural background

Two days before the commencement of voir dire, the People filed a trial brief in 

which they sought permission to admit certain items of evidence at trial, including "video 

clips of the victims' childhood." The People argued that "some of the video tapes have 

evidence of being erased or taped over," and that "some of the deleted material (which 

can be accessed by viewing the tapes frame by frame at slow speed) . . . appears to 

corroborate the [victims'] testimony."

At a hearing on the motion the following day, the prosecutor explained that police 

had found numerous videotapes at Sanchez's home, some of which appeared to have been 

taped over. The prosecutor explained that a videography expert had viewed a selection of 

the tapes at very slow speeds. When so viewed, it was possible to see preexisting images 

on the tapes (i.e. images that remained from a previous recording that had been almost, 

but not entirely, taped over). The preexisting images included a scene apparently taken 

from inside a laundry hamper, a scene of Sanchez in his boxer shorts, and a scene of 
21

Sanchez naked. The prosecutor argued that the scene taken from inside the hamper 

corroborated B.M.'s testimony that Sanchez had surreptitiously videotaped her. 

Defense counsel argued against the admissibility of the evidence and requested a 

continuance so that she could consult with a videography expert. Defense counsel argued 

that she needed to consult with an expert in order to understand how images from a 

previous recording section might remain on the videotape. The trial court responded that 

if a blank tape had been used then there would not "be something that was recorded there 

before, correct?" Defense counsel responded, "I understand that portion of it." The court 

then asked, "Well, what does an expert need to tell us about that?"

Defense counsel stated that she had just received an e-mail from the prosecutor's 

videography expert and that the e-mail contained technical language. Counsel stated that 

she would like to consult with an expert in videography in order to be able to fully 

understand the prosecution expert's e-mail. 

After further discussion concerning the admissibility of the evidence, the trial 

court stated:

"The fact that we have tape-overs is admissible. The People are 

going to be able to put in evidence from a witness, an expert or even 

an investigator, to explain that there were tape-overs. I'm satisfied, 

frankly, unless somebody tells me otherwise—I don't think this 

needs expert testimony."

The trial court ruled that the People would be permitted to present evidence of the 

preexisting image of the video clip apparently taken from inside a hamper. However, the 

court excluded the scenes of Sanchez in his boxer shorts and standing naked, pursuant to
22

Evidence Code section 352. The trial court also denied defense counsel's request for a 

continuance. 

2. Governing law and standard of review

In People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 650, the Supreme Court outlined the

law governing a trial court's ruling on a party's request for a continuance, and appellate 

review of such a ruling: 

" '[T]he decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a matter 

rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] The 

party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of 

establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a 

continuance is seldom successfully attacked. [Citation.] [¶] Under 

this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court 

exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. 

[Citations.] Moreover, the denial of a continuance may be so 

arbitrary as to deny due process. [Citation.] However, not every 

denial of a request for more time can be said to violate due process, 

even if the party seeking the continuance thereby fails to offer 

evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] '[T]he trial court may not exercise 

its discretion "so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a 

reasonable opportunity to prepare." [Citation.]' [Citation.]"

" 'Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice, the trial court's denial 

[of a request for a continuance] does not warrant reversal.' [Citation.]" (People v. 

Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 830.)

3. Application

Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request for a 

continuance to permit counsel to consult a videography expert who might be able to rebut 

the prosecution's expert's anticipated testimony that the People had found videotapes at 

Sanchez's house that appeared to have been taped over. We are not persuaded.
23

At the hearing at which defense counsel requested a continuance of the trial, the 

trial court indicated that expert testimony was not required in order for the People to 

present evidence that certain videotapes appeared to have been taped over. Further, the 

trial court indicated that it was common knowledge that a tape would not contain 

preexisting images unless it had been taped over. In response, defense counsel did not 

provide any compelling argument to the contrary or suggest that a defense expert might 

be able to provide any testimony to the contrary. 

Sanchez also suggests that a continuance was warranted to permit defense counsel 

to consult with an expert who would assist counsel in understanding technical terms 

contained in the prosecution's videography expert's e-mail. We reject this argument 

because the prosecutor's expert did not use such terminology during his testimony at trial 

and Sanchez fails to demonstrate that an understanding of such terms was material to his 

counsel's presentation of a defense.

Finally, we are not persuaded by Sanchez's contention that a "short continuance"

of the trial was warranted to permit defense counsel to "properly prepare for crossexamination or the presentation of rebuttal evidence." The People's videography expert 

did not testify until October 30, the same day that the People rested, which was more than 

two weeks after the trial court held the October 15 hearing on the People's motion to 

admit the video evidence. Thus, there was ample time for defense counsel to have 

consulted a videography expert and to gather rebuttal evidence. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defense counsel's request for a continuance of the trial.
24

D. The trial court did not commit any reversible error in admitting evidence 

concerning Cesar's belief that Sanchez was guilty and lacked remorse

Sanchez claims that the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings that 

he contends improperly permitted the jury to learn that his son, Cesar, believed that 

Sanchez was guilty and lacked remorse. We consider each ruling in turn, applying the 

abuse of discretion standard of review. (See e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 

p. 197.)

1. M.C.'s testimony concerning the aftermath of Cesar's conversation with 

Sanchez

M.C. testified that one evening in January 2012, Cesar had a conversation alone 

with Sanchez in an upstairs bedroom of the family residence. The conversation lasted 

approximately 45 minutes. The following colloquy then occurred:

"[The prosecutor:] And after [Cesar] came back down what 

happened?

"[M.]: He was white as a ghost. Collapsed on the couch. And he 

says I say call the police and have the motherfucker locked up in jail 

for life.

"[Defense counsel]: Objection. [Evidence Code section] 352, your 

honor.

"The court: Overruled." 

Sanchez argues that the above-quoted portion of M.C.'s testimony had no 

probative value and should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. 

Specifically, Sanchez maintains that M.C.'s testimony concerned "Cesar's statement 

regarding [Sanchez's] admission of guilt and Cesar's belief that [Sanchez] expressed no 

remorse." Sanchez further contends that M.C.'s testimony lacked probative value 
25

because an adjudication of his guilt "was solely within the province of the jury," and 

Cesar's opinion as to whether Sanchez was guilty or was remorseful for his actions was 

inadmissible. (Citing People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77 [" 'opinions on guilt or 

innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact' "].) 

The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Cesar's statement that the 

family should call the police was based on Sanchez having made an admission of guilt to 

Cesar during their conversation.13 Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by 

any prejudicial impact of the jury learning that Cesar believed that Sanchez was guilty. 

M.C. did not testify that Cesar said that he believed that Sanchez lacked remorse; 

Sanchez's argument in this regard is without merit. 

Sanchez also contends that M.C.'s testimony as to Cesar's statement was a "classic 

example[] of inadmissible hearsay." No hearsay objection was raised at trial. Sanchez's 

claim in this regard is thus forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

616, 654 [concluding that defendant's claim that admission of statement "violated the 

Evidence Code prohibition against hearsay evidence . . . was forfeited . . . by defendant's 

failure to make a hearsay objection at trial"]; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b) [reviewing 

 

13 The People stated in their trial brief that Sanchez admitted to Cesar during the 

conversation that he had touched B.M. inappropriately on one occasion. After M.C.

testified, Cesar testified that Sanchez had made such an admission during their 

conversation. Sanchez's statements to Cesar were admissible as statements of a party. 

(Evid. Code, § 1220.) 
26

court may reverse judgment only where "the admitted evidence should have been 

excluded on the ground stated [in the trial court]"].)

2. A.G.'s testimony concerning the events that took place after Cesar's 

conversation with Sanchez

A.G. testified that he was also present at the family residence on the night in 

January 2012 when Cesar had the conversation with Sanchez. In describing what 

occurred after the conversation, the following colloquy occurred during A.G.'s direct 

examination:

"[The prosecutor]: Okay. And what happened when Cesar came 

back downstairs?

"[A.G.]: [Cesar] was just—[Cesar] looked upset. And [Cesar] was 

shaking his head and saying, yes [Sanchez] did it, he's[14] ready—

"[Defense counsel]: Objection. Hearsay.

"[The court]: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to allow him to finish 

his answer. [¶] But this is an area of limited purpose testimony. . . . 

[¶] You may consider it as evidence as to what others were told to 

explain why they then took the actions that they took. . . .

"[¶] . . . [¶]

"[A.G.]: [Cesar] just said that, yes, [Sanchez] had, in a roundabout 

way, admitted it, but used I'm a man of God. I'm a man of faith. I 

will put it in [God's] hands as to what [God's] going to do. And 

whether you guys want to file charges on me, it's up to you. [¶] 

That's basically what Cesar had said when he came down." 

 

14 It appears that A.G.was referring to Sanchez, but in light of the interrupted 

sentence, we are not certain. Thus, we have maintained this pronoun as it appears in the 

transcript. 
27

A.G. continued, explaining that he called the police shortly after Cesar made these 

statements. 

Sanchez claims that A.G.'s testimony as to Cesar's statements about Sanchez's 

admissions were inadmissible hearsay. However, as limited by the trial court, Cesar's 

and Sanchez's statements were not offered for their truth, and thus, did not constitute 

hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200 [" 'Hearsay evidence' " is evidence of a statement that was 

made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove 

the truth of the matter stated" (italics added)].)15 While Sanchez claims that the court's 

limiting instruction "did not provide an[y] limitation to the jury as to its considerations of 

Cesar's opinion that appellant admitted guilt," that is not correct. By informing the jury 

that it could consider the evidence only to explain the actions that A.G. and the other 

family members took in the wake of Cesar's statements, the limiting instruction did

prohibit the jury from considering the evidence for any other purpose.16 Sanchez also 

contends that A.G.'s testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 352. No such objection was raised at trial. Thus, Sanchez's claim in this regard is 

forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353.)

 

15 Sanchez does not contend that A.G.'s testimony was inadmissible for the purpose 

identified by the trial court, namely to explain the actions that the family members took in 

the wake of Cesar's statements.

16 The court also instructed the jury at the end of the case, "Where I did tell you that 

evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, please consider the evidence for that 

purpose, and not for any other reason." (Italics added.) 
28

3. Cesar's testimony concerning his January 2012 conversation with Sanchez 

a. Factual and procedural background 

At trial, immediately after Cesar testified that Sanchez had admitted having 

inappropriately touched B.M. on one occasion, the prosecutor asked Cesar if he had 

asked Sanchez "any other questions about the molestation." Cesar responded in part by 

stating that Sanchez was "just deflecting everything off of him all the time," and that 

Sanchez was "blaming other people and not accepting the blame on himself." The trial 

court overruled defense counsel's objections that this testimony was speculative and 

lacked foundation, ruling that Cesar's testimony constituted admissible lay opinion under 

Evidence Code section 800. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked Cesar, "Did it 

appear to you, based upon your conversation, that [Sanchez] was making excuses for 

what he had done?" Cesar responded in the affirmative, and added, "He was deflecting 

the whole time."

After this testimony, defense counsel stated, "Leading and same objection, which 

you've already overruled." The trial court responded, "Thank you. [¶] Overruled." 

Evidence Code section 800 provides:

"If a witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form 

of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is permitted by law, 

including but not limited to an opinion that is:

"(a) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and

"(b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony."

On appeal, Sanchez claims that the trial court erred in admitting Cesar's testimony 

as lay opinion. Sanchez contends that Cesar's statement was "in essence, [opinion] that 
29

[Sanchez] was not telling the truth," and that a lay witness's opinion as to the credibility 

of another person's statement is irrelevant and admissible.

We reject this argument because Cesar did not state that he believed Sanchez was 

being untruthful. Thus, Cesar's testimony was not inadmissible as impermissible lay 

opinion concerning the credibility of another witness. (See People v. Houston (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 1186, 1221 [concluding that witness's testimony was not inadmissible lay opinion 

as to the credibility of another witness because while witness's testimony "might have 

implied that [witness] thought defendant's molestation allegations were false, [witness]

did not actually offer an opinion on this ultimate issue of fact"].) Indeed, rather than

testifying that he believed Sanchez was being untruthful, Cesar testified that Sanchez had 

admitted touching B.M. inappropriately. Further, Cesar's testimony was based directly 

on his observations of Sanchez during their conversation. The trial court reasonably 

determined that such testimony was helpful to a clear understanding of Cesar's testimony. 

(Evid. Code, § 800.) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling that Cesar's testimony characterizing his conversation with Sanchez 

was admissible lay opinion.17

 

17 Sanchez also argues that the trial court erred in failing to exclude the evidence as 

irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. 

Sanchez did not object on these grounds to Cesar's testimony that Sanchez was "just 

deflecting everything off of him all the time" and "blaming other people and not 

accepting the blame on himself." Thus, his contentions with respect to this testimony are 

forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353.) 

With respect to Cesar's testimony that it appeared that Sanchez was making 

excuses for what he had done, we assume for purposes of this decision that defense 

counsel's remark that she was making the "same objection" adequately preserved 
30

4. Cesar's testimony that it did not appear that Sanchez had any remorse for 

his actions

Shortly after Cesar testified that Sanchez had admitted inappropriately touching 

B.M. on one occasion, the prosecutor asked Cesar, "[D]id it appear to you in your 

conversation you had with your dad that he was showing any remorse for what he had 

done?" Defense counsel raised a relevance objection, which the trial court overruled. 

Cesar responded, "No. And that was the main reason why—."

Defense counsel interrupted Cesar, and stated, "Objection. [¶] It's not relevant as 

to why he called the police."

The trial court sustained the objection and directed the jury to "disregard the 

statement about that was the main reason why."

Expressions of remorse have probative value in that they demonstrate 

consciousness of guilt. (See United States v. Caro (4th Cir. 2010) 597 F.3d 608, 629, fn. 

19 ["remorse implies consciousness of guilt"].) However, the absence of remorse may be 

irrelevant to prove that a defendant committed a charged crime. (See People v. Michaels

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 528 ["[a]bsence of remorse is irrelevant to prove that a defendant 

committed a homicide"].)

 

Sanchez's relevance and Evidence Code section 352 objections. However, on the merits, 

the trial court did not err in failing to exclude the evidence on these grounds. The trial 

court could have reasonably concluded that evidence that Sanchez was making excuses 

for his actions was relevant in determining whether Sanchez had committed the charged 

offenses, and that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the 

possibility of prejudice. 
31

We assume for purposes of this decision that the prosecutor's question whether 

Sanchez displayed remorse to Cesar, and not just Cesar's answer, was objectionable.18

However, any error in failing to overrule defense counsel's objection to this single

question was harmless under any standard of prejudice. Immediately preceding this 

question, Cesar testified that Sanchez had stated after their conversation that he was ready 

to have the police called and that he was ready to go to jail. In addition, Cesar testified 

that Sanchez had admitted touching B.M. inappropriately and that Sanchez had explained 

that he had done so because he had been molested himself. The People also presented 

evidence that Sanchez did express remorse to Cesar after he was in jail. (See part III.E., 

post.) Under these circumstances, the admission of evidence that Cesar did not believe 

that Sanchez displayed remorse during their January 2012 conversation was harmless.

5. Cesar's letter to Sanchez while Sanchez was in jail awaiting trial

a. Factual and procedural background

In their trial brief, the People sought permission to introduce in evidence "a letter 

written by [Sanchez to Cesar] from jail as an admission pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 1220 and as consciousness of guilt."

 

18 To the extent that the prosecutor's question did not necessarily call for 

inadmissible evidence because Cesar might have responded that Sanchez did express 

remorse (see United States v. Caro, supra, 597 F.3d at p. 629), the trial court did not err 

in overruling the objection. (See, e.g., 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) § 397, p. 

553 ["If the question is not bad on its face, i.e., it is not apparent that it calls for 

inadmissible evidence, there is ordinarily no reason to object. It is only when the 

improper answer is given that the adverse party has cause for complaint. In this situation, 

the motion to strike the answer is sufficient and is necessary, and a prior objection is 

unnecessary and insufficient"].)
32

At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor explained that Cesar had written a letter to 

Sanchez while Sanchez was in jail awaiting trial. According to the prosecutor, in the 

letter, Cesar told Sanchez that "he needs to accept responsibility and accept the 

consequences for the molest of B.M. and E.M." The prosecutor noted that Sanchez wrote 

a letter back to Cesar that, according to the prosecutor, "[could] be read as clearly an 

adoptive admission by [Sanchez] of the acts." For example, the prosecutor stated that 

Sanchez had stated in his letter that "he wished he could change the history," and that he 

had "been a bad father."

Defense counsel argued against the admission of the letters, noting that they

contained a number of religious references and that it was a "stretch" to suggest that the 

letters referred to a "specific belief that [Sanchez is] guilty."

After reviewing the letters, the trial court ruled that they were admissible, pursuant 

to an adoptive admission theory. 

During trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel renewed her 

objection to the entirety of the letters, and also stated that she wished to raise a specific 

objection to a portion of Cesar's letter that stated the following:

" 'There's only been one thing I wanted from you during [¶] . . . this 

whole ordeal, remorse! Remorse for what you did and remorse for 

what you were doing. That was the main reason I told [B.M.] and 

[M.C.] to press charges. I saw no remorse in you. Seeing no 

remorse in you only told me one thing, that you would do it again.' "

In response, the prosecutor argued that this portion of Cesar's letter was "an 

important part of the letter because it explains [Sanchez's] response." The prosecutor 
33

explained that this was "[b]ecause [Sanchez] specifically addresses the remorse issue in 

his response."

The court sustained defense counsel's objection in part, ruling that the last 

sentence of the passage quoted above would be redacted. 

During his testimony, Cesar read the letter that he had written to Sanchez in jail, as 

redacted by the court. In addition, Cesar read the letter that Sanchez had sent to Cesar in 

response, in which Sanchez states in relevant part:

" 'Hi, mijo. I was an irresponsible father. I do accept my failures. I 

am paying the consequences. I love and miss you all. I am sad that 

your lives have changed so dramatically. I pray every day for you, 

for your healing. I'm not proud of the person that I am. The hurt 

that I've given you is the burden of . . . a lifetime. I wish I could 

change this history but I can't. I want to be healed as well. I never 

wanted to hurt anyone. The hate I saw on [M.C.]'s face was 

crushing. I'm so sorry I could ever make her that way. The hate and 

anger the girls have is just as disappointing. Seeing that I failed 

them so much, my mind is filled with scenarios of how I should have 

been as a father, not the selfish, unforgiving, manipulative person 

that I became. [¶] Mijo, this was—this wasn't God, just me taking 

my own path. Because of my drinking and drug use, my mind could 

not focus on remorse. But it is . . . there, mijo." (Italics added.) 

b. Application

Sanchez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Cesar to 

read that portion of Cesar's letter in which Cesar indicated that he believed that Sanchez 

lacked remorse for his actions. We are not persuaded. In his letter, Sanchez indicated 

that he felt remorse for his actions. Expressions of remorse have probative value in that 

they demonstrate consciousness of guilt. (See United States v. Caro, supra, 597 F.3d 608

at p. 629.) Further, as the prosecutor argued, the trial court could reasonably conclude 
34

that that portion of Cesar's letter in which he stated that he believed that Sanchez lacked

remorse was admissible in order to provide context to Sanchez's response in which he 

stated that he was remorseful. Further, even without the admission of that portion of 

Cesar's letter, Sanchez's statement itself suggested that Cesar had accused him of lacking 

remorse in that Sanchez explained to Cesar that he did indeed feel remorseful. 

E. There is no cumulative error

Sanchez claims that to the extent this court concludes that no individual error 

related to his claims merits reversal, the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of the 

judgment.

"Under the 'cumulative error' doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may 

nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial." (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 

694, 772, fn. 32.) Apart from one potential evidentiary error that we have concluded was 

harmless (see pt. III.D.4., ante), we have rejected the remainder of Sanchez's claims. 

There is thus no cumulative error on which to base a reversal of the judgment.
35

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

NARES, J.