In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-12-0213-CR 

________________________

Henry D. Sanders, Appellant 

 

v. 

 

The State of Texas, Appellee 

 

On Appeal from the 137th District Court 

Lubbock County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2011-431,742, Honorable John J. McClendon III, Presiding 

 

April 30, 2013 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Henry D. Sanders was convicted of “sexual assault-child bigamy.” He challenges 

the conviction by arguing that 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, 2) 

the trial court erred in admitting evidence of extraneous offenses, and 3) he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel during the punishment phase. We affirm the judgment. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

According to appellant, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 

because testimony from the child victim and her mother was inconsistent or 

contradictory. The issue is overruled.

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard 

discussed in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Furthermore, 

the testimony of a child complainant is alone sufficient to sustain a conviction. Cantu v. 

State, 366 S.W.3d 771, 775-76 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Glockzin v. State, 

220 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). 

Here, the child complainant testified that appellant had engaged in sexual 

intercourse with her. Other evidence discloses that 1) the complainant was fifteen at 

the time, 2) the complainant’s mother encountered the victim and appellant together in 

bed wherein appellant’s and complainant's underwear were off or down, 3) complainant 

was on her knees in bed facing away from appellant when found by the mother, 4) it 

appeared to the mother that appellant had been putting his penis in her daughter’s 

vagina from behind, 5) the complainant had a recent tear at the bottom of her vaginal 

area consistent with penetration, 6) after his arrest, appellant called the complainant 

and her mother from jail on more than one occasion and said, “the devil made him do 

these things,” he would take all the counseling he could get, that he was going to “run to 

the church house,” and he “didn’t mean for nothing to happen,” 7) in other telephone 

calls, he told his wife to “school” the children on what to say when they were 

interviewed, 8) appellant had once choked the complainant for talking to a boy on the 

phone, and 9) appellant also had sexual relations with the complainant on another 
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occasion when she was fourteen. This evidence permits a rational trier of fact to 

conclude that appellant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Inconsistencies or contradictions in the foregoing evidence did not strip it of probative 

value. At best, they merely created issues of fact for the jury to resolve. Franco v. 

State, 339 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2011, no pet.). And, we defer to the 

way in which they were resolved. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d at 899. 

Extraneous Offenses

Next, appellant complains of the admission of extraneous bad acts or crimes. 

The latter consisted of his once choking the victim for talking to a boy on the phone and 

of his engaging in a prior sexual liaison with the complainant. This evidence was 

admitted without the State proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the acts occurred, 

according to appellant; thus, it allegedly was inadmissible. However, no one objected to 

the testimony involved. Consequently, the matters were not preserved for review. 

Malpica v. State, 108 S.W.3d 374, 377-78 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2003, pet. ref’d). And, the 

issue is overruled.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 

punishment phase of the trial because his attorney advised him to admit to and 

apologize for committing the sexual assault. Purportedly, this was deficient conduct 

because appellant received a life sentence. We need not conjecture on whether such 

advice would have been considered deficient if the sentence was less than that levied 

here. It is enough to say that a trial strategy founded upon confessing or apologizing for 

the purpose of seeking leniency has been deemed reasonable and beyond the pale of 
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ineffectiveness. See Idehen v. State, No. 14-05-00901-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4395, 

at *6-7 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] May 18, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for 

publication) (stating that “even assuming counsel advised appellant to confess during 

punishment, appellant fails to show that the suggestion was not based on reasonable 

trial strategy, such as seeking to appear honest or remorseful with the jury”); see also

Flemming v. State, 949 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.)

(declining to find ineffective assistance when counsel failed to suggest during closing 

that the defendant was not guilty because it was “plausible” that counsel “concluded that 

the best strategy might be to appear open and honest to the jury in hopes of mitigating 

punishment”). Like the situation in Idehen, the jury here had also “found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant sexually assaulted [the child victim]”; so the suggestion 

that appellant confess, to conceivably mitigate punishment, is not so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have pursued it. The issue is overruled. 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

Brian Quinn 

Chief Justice 

Do not publish.