In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2422

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Teng Yang,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 CR 677--Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

Argued January 7, 2002--Decided April 4, 2002

 Before Manion, Rovner, and Evans, Circuit

Judges.

 Manion, Circuit Judge. Defendant Teng

Yang appeals his conviction under 21

U.S.C. sec. 952(a) for importation of

opium into the United States. Mr. Yang

pleaded guilty to the charge after the

district court conducted an evidentiary

hearing and denied his motion to suppress

evidence of drugs seized at the airport

after he had passed through customs. Mr.

Yang expressly reserved the right to

appeal the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress and now appeals that

order. We affirm.

I. Background

 Teng Yang ("Teng") and his cousin Lee

Pao Yang ("Lee Pao") flew into Chicago’s

O’Hare International Airport on September

7, 1999, from Laos connecting through

Tokyo, Japan. Both men were booked on an

American Airlines flight from O’Hare to

St. Paul, Minnesota. Teng and Lee Pao are

both American citizens who had traveled

to Laos to attend Teng’s father’s

funeral. But when they returned to the

United States from Laos, their suitcases

had been packed with clothes which had

been soaked in an opium solution and then

dried. Teng passed through customs at

O’Hare without incident. His suitcase was

x-rayed at the agricultural inspection
area, but his luggage was not searched by

hand. After leaving the customs area,

Teng took his luggage and proceeded to

the American Airlines terminal, less than

a mile away, via the O’Hare airport tram.

 His cousin was less fortunate. Lee Pao

was detained randomly for an enforcement

exam and the inspectors discovered some

unusually stiff clothing made of sweatpant material in his suitcase. The

clothing, which had a very strong odor,

chemically tested positive for opiates.

Lee Pao was arrested on the scene and,

following questioning by the customs

officials, he admitted that he was

traveling with another person. American

Airlines officials confirmed that Teng

was booked on the same itinerary as his

cousin. The customs agents then decided

to intercept Teng based on Lee Pao’s

admission that they were traveling

together, the fact that drugs were found

in Lee Pao’s bag, and the fact that both

men were traveling on the same itinerary

from Laos, a drug source country, to St.

Paul, a drug destination city. They did

not obtain a search or arrest warrant.

The customs agents requested that the

baggage crew separate Teng’s baggage from

the other luggage on the flight to St.

Paul. The agents then proceeded to the

American Airlines terminal and announced

Teng’s name over the loudspeaker. When no

one responded, agents proceeded to search

the terminal. One of the agents,

Inspector Joseph Marcocig, recognized

Teng, as he had seen him in line at

customs with Lee Pao. Teng was taken down

to the tarmac where he identified his

luggage. He then agreed to return to the

international terminal for questioning.

The agents handcuffed him pursuant to

customs policy for transportation of

individuals in a vehicle ("for [their]

protection and his") and returned to the

international terminal. A search of his

bags revealed more opium-soaked clothes.

 Teng and Lee Pao were charged in an

indictment with conspiracy to import

opium and importing large quantities of

opium. Teng and Lee Pao filed a motion to

suppress the evidence seized at the

airport, which the court denied after an

evidentiary hearing. In February 2001,

Teng pleaded guilty to count three of the

indictment which charged him with the

importation of 2,737 grams of opium. In

doing so, he reserved the right to appeal

the trial court’s denial ruling on his
motion to suppress. The district court

then sentenced him to 24 months in prison

followed by three years of supervised

release. He now appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress

the evidence found in his suitcase.

II. Analysis

 In reviewing a district’s court’s ruling

on a motion to suppress, this court

reviews questions of law de novo

andfindings of fact and reasonable

inferences drawn from those findings for

clear error. United States v. Peters, 153

F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1998). Teng

argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress, claiming

that the customs agents searched his

suitcase in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. Alternatively, he argues that

his detention at the American Airlines

terminal constituted an illegal arrest,

not supported by probable cause, and

therefore the evidence must be excluded

as it was a search incident to an

unlawful arrest.

A.Extended Border Search

 The Fourth Amendment protects

individuals from unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const., Amend IV.

Generally a search is not reasonable

unless the government has a warrant

supported by probable cause or there must

be an exception to the warrant

requirement. An administrative border

search has long been recognized as such

an exception. United States v. Ramsey,

431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). Thus an

administrative border search is

constitutional so long as it is

reasonable. See United States v. Chaidez,

919 F.2d 1193, 1196 (7th Cir. 1991).

Routine searches without a warrant at

this country’s international borders are

per se reasonable. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at

616. Courts have predicated this broad

power to conduct searches at

international borders on the sovereign’s

legitimate interest in protecting its

borders. Id. See also United States v.

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887 (1975)

(Rehnquist concurring) (noting that a

border search without probable cause is

necessary for national protection)./1

 O’Hare Airport is an international

gateway into the United States, and
incoming passengers from international

ports are subject to border searches

because the airport is the functional

equivalent of an international border.

United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287,

1290 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that

weight, flex and scratch tests performed

on luggage by a customs agent at O’Hare

were routine). Under the "functional

equivalent" doctrine, routine border

searches are constitutionally permissible

at places other than actual borders where

travelers frequently enter or exit the

country. See United States v. AlmeidaSanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).

Thus even though Chicago is not an

international border, searches at customs

at O’Hare are permissible under the

functional equivalent doctrine.

 In this case, Teng was routinely

searched at customs and no contraband was

discovered in his luggage. It was not

until he traveled to a different terminal

that other circumstances caused customs

agents to develop suspicion that he might

be smuggling drugs into the country. Teng

argues that because the search that

revealed the contraband did not occur at

customs, it was not a constitutionally

permissible border search. His argument

is that once a traveler has passed

through customs, left the international

terminal, proceeded to a separate

terminal in the airport and checked his

bags onto another flight, the opportunity

for a "routine" border search has passed.

The government contends, on appeal, that

even though Teng had passed through

customs, the search should still be

described as a routine border search,

relying on United States v. Ramos, 645

F.2d 318, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1981). In

Ramos, a search of an airline passenger

who had traveled past customs but was

still in the airport was deemed a routine

search. In that case, once Ramos had

passed through customs he proceeded to a

hotel that was part of the same terminal.

Id. Customs agents stopped Ramos in the

hotel lobby, less than a half-hour after

he had passed through customs and before

he had an opportunity to go to his room.

Id. The court reasoned that the search

was routine because the passenger had not

yet been assimilated into the "mainstream

of domestic activities so as to shield

him from appropriate border examinations

and searches." Id. See also United States

v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that a search conducted

minutes after a defendant had crossed the

border and was less than sixty feet from

the border was a routine border search);

United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932,

935 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding that when a

suspect has merely passed through a

luggage inspection but not yet left the

site of the border a secondary inspection

is still a routine border search).

Whether, under the facts before us, this

is a routine border search is a close

question. But because the search may be

justified as a nonroutine extended border

search, we need not address whether,

under these circumstances, it could still

be described as a routine border search.

 The district court held that this search

was not a routine border search, but was

justified under the extended border

doctrine, a doctrine our own circuit has

not examined or applied. United States v.

Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974)

(recognizing the existence of, but

expressing no view on the extended border

doctrine). The extended border doctrine

provides that non-routine border searches

that occur near the border are deemed

constitutionally permissible if

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To

determine whether an extended border

search is reasonable courts consider

whether: (1) there is a reasonable

certainty that a border crossing has

occurred; (2) there is a reasonable

certainty that no change in condition of

the luggage has occurred since the border

crossing; and (3) there is a reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity has

occurred. See United States v. EspinozaSeanez, 862 F.2d 526, 531 (5th Cir.

1988). The "extended border search

doctrine" has been adopted by several

other circuits. See Espinoza-Seanez, 862

F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1989); United States

v. Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d 1420 (9th

Cir. 1984); United States v. Garcia, 672

F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982); United States

v. Bilir, 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979).

Two additional circuits have recognized

it as a valid doctrine but have not yet

applied it in justifying a border search.

See United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116,

120 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.

Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13-14 n.3 (2d Cir.

1968).

 The constitutional concern of extending

the border in this manner is that it
potentially permits searches with less

than probable cause at significant

distances from our national borders. For

example in Caicedo-Guarnizo, a suspect

was searched in Los Angeles after he had

passed through customs in New Orleans and

changed flights en route in Houston. The

court allowed a search in that case under

the extended border doctrine, even though

several hours and over a thousand miles

had passed since his border crossing.

Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d at 1423. The

court allowed the search primarily

because the suspect was under constant

surveillance from the time he exited

customs in New Orleans to the time he

landed in Los Angeles. See id. at 1422.

See also, United States v. Fogelman, 586

F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (extended border

search allowed 254 miles and 20 hours

from observed border crossing); United

States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214 (5th

Cir. 1973) (extended border search 150

miles and 142 hours from observed border

crossing). Because an extended border

search entails greater intrusion on an

entrant’s legitimate expectations of

privacy than does a search conducted at

the border or its functional equivalent,

courts have instituted the three-part

test to ensure that the search is

reasonable. United States v. Cardenas, 9

F.3d 1139, 1148 (5th Cir. 1994). The test

ensures that a suspect still has a

significant nexus with a border crossing

so that agents can reasonably base their

search on statutory and constitutional

authority./2 Searches are reasonable

under the extended border doctrine when

officers have a reasonable certainty that

any contraband found on a suspect was not

obtained after the border crossing. See

United States v. Corral-Villavicencio,

753 F. 2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1985).

Because of the required relationship with

a border crossing, the extended border

doctrine respects "basic Fourth Amendment

concepts by striking a sensible balance

between the legitimate privacy interests

of the individual and society’s vital

interest in the enforcement of customs

laws." See Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F. 2d at

1422. The use of the doctrine in this

case where Teng attempted to smuggle

opium is especially appropriate in light

of the fact that "[t]he major impetus

behind the extended border search

doctrine is ’the government interest in

stopping drug traffic.’" See Cardenas, 9

F.3d at 1149 (citing William E. Ringel,
Searches and Seizures, Arrests and

Confessions sec. 15.3, at 15-20 (Supp.

1993)); see also Bilir , 592 F.2d 735,

740 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating "[t]he many

difficulties that attend the attempt to

intercept contraband and to apprehend

increasingly mobile and sophisticated

smugglers at the very borders of the

country have of course given birth to the

doctrine"). Teng’s plan to import opium

was very sophisticated in this case,

considering that even an x-ray of his

luggage did not reveal the presence of

contraband.

 Finally, the use of the extended border

doctrine allows this circuit to more

effectively analyze the reasonableness of

non-routine border searches that occur

near the border. Previously, in a case

concluding that a border search was

routine, this circuit observed that nonroutine border searches need at least be

supported by reasonable suspicion. See

Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1291. In Johnson,

the court examined the reasonableness of

an in-depth search, including a luggage

x-ray, of a passenger and her luggage

while at customs at O’Hare Airport. Id.

at 1291-94. The court noted that whether

or not a border inspection is routine

depends on the "degree of intrusion into

a border entrant’s legitimate

expectations of privacy." Id. at 1291

(citing United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d

509, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1988)). However,

this type of analysis does not lend

itself easily to the situation at hand.

As the district court noted "it is not

disputed that the search of Teng was

[n]onroutine." Here, customs inspectors

detained Teng at a completely different

airport terminal than the international

terminal after Teng had already been

subjected to a routine border search. Be

cause the search of Teng did not occur at

the border, but rather near the border,

the reasonableness of the search is more

aptly analyzed under the extended border

search doctrine.

 It is the enforcement of the customs

laws combined with the mandate of

protecting the borders of the United

States that permits the extension of the

search rights of border authorities to

allow non-routine searches in areas near

our nation’s borders. Because the

extended border doctrine strikes a

sensible balance between these two
interests we conclude that it is a valid

legal standard applicable in this

circuit. Thus, we now consider the

relevant factors under this standard for

determining the constitutionality of this

search.

 1. Reasonable certainty of a border

crossing.

 First, we ask whether there is a

reasonable certainty that a border has

been crossed. "Reasonable certainty is a

standard which requires more than

probable cause, but less than proof

beyond a reasonable doubt." See Cardenas,

9 F.3d at 1148 (citing United States v.

Delgado, 810 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir.

1987)). Teng was seen passing through

customs by customs officials and his bags

were x-rayed as part of an agricultural

check. The same customs officer who

identified him in customs also spotted

him in the American Airlines terminal

less than an hour later. In this case

neither party disputes this factor and

there is not even a question that Teng

crossed the border.

 2. Reasonable certainty of no change in

condition of his luggage.

 Next, we must determine whether there

was a reasonable certainty that no change

in the condition of the luggage occurred

since the border crossing. Again, neither

party disputes this element. Teng claims

he carried his own bags, via the O’Hare

airport tram, to the American Airlines

terminal. At the terminal, he waited in

line at the gate and checked his own

bags./3 Airport personnel then removed

his bags from the plane, where they were

identified by Teng. Teng does not contest

this factor and does not allege any

circumstances in his affidavit where his

luggage would have changed condition.

While neither party disputes this

element, it is this factor that

establishes the proper nexus with the

border to allow a search and so we will

examine it accordingly.

 Other circuits have considered the

totality of the circumstances in

determining whether officers had a

reasonable certainty that any contraband

discovered in a search was in the
possession of the suspect at the time the

suspect crossed the border. See United

States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 735 (9th

Cir. 1985). Circumstances that courts

consider include the time and distance

from the original entry and the manner

and extent of surveillance. Id. In a case

with facts similar to this one, the Ninth

Circuit upheld the search of a suspect

even though he had passed through airport

customs 90 minutes prior to the search

and was not under surveillance. See

United States v. Mejias, 452 F.2d 1190,

1192-94 (9th Cir. 1971). The court

reasoned that the subject’s luggage did

not look like it had been tampered with

and he was found near the customs

terminal. Id. Similar to the subject in

Mejias, Teng was not under surveillance

for the 30- to 45-minute period from the

time when he crossed the border to the

time when his luggage was searched.

Unlike Mejias, Teng was found at a

different terminal. However, because he

had to check in his bags at the second

terminal, his luggage was out of his

control for a significant portion of the

time that elapsed from when he crossed

the border.

 At some point a subject’s relationship

with the border becomes so attenuated

that customs officials lose the right to

detain him without a warrant. See

Caicedo-Guarnizo, 723 F.2d at 1423. But

in this case that limit was not reached.

Admittedly, the fact that Teng was found

at a different terminal does increase the

possibility that the contents of his

luggage had changed, but not

substantially. Based on the relatively

short period of time between Teng’s

border crossing and his apprehension, the

proximity to the border and the fact that

Teng’s luggage was in control of the

airport personnel for a significant

period of this time indicates that

customs agents had a reasonable certainty

that the condition of Teng’s luggage did

not change from the time of the border

crossing.

 3. Reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity.

 Last, we examine whether customs

inspectors had reasonable suspicion that

Teng was involved in criminal activity.

Teng contends that the only reason that
he was stopped and his luggage was

searched was that his traveling companion

was caught with drugs, and that this is

not enough to create a reasonable

suspicion that he was involved in

criminal activity. The government

responds that in addition to drugs being

found in Lee Pao ’s bag, both were

traveling on the exact same itinerary

from Laos, a drug source nation, to St.

Paul, Minnesota, a known opium

destination, and that Teng failed to

respond when his name was called on the

speakers. After considering the evidence

presented in the evidentiary hearing, the

district court concluded that a

reasonable suspicion existed to detain

Teng and search his bags./4

 This final factor in the "extended

border search" doctrine is analogous to a

Terry stop. See United States v.

Lopez-Gonzalez, 916 F.2d 1011, 1013 & n.

3 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that

factors relevant to the reasonable

suspicion inquiry for a Terry stop might

also be relevant to the reasonable

suspicion inquiry in an extended border

search, particularly for those stops in

which the transportation of contraband is

suspected). Under Terry, the detention of

an individual or a luggage search without

a warrant is permissible under the Fourth

Amendment where there is reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity is

afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23

(1968); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.

696, 708 (1983). Reasonable suspicion "of

criminal activity must be based on

specific and articulable facts which,

taken together with rational inferences

therefrom, reasonably warrant [an]

intrusion." United States v. Mancillas,

183 F.3d 682, 695 (7th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted).

 The suspicion justifying a search of

this type must be "based on objective

factors and judged in light of the

experience of the customs agents." United

States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1219

(7th Cir. 1981). An illustrative, but not

exhaustive, list of these factors appears

in United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973,

976-77 (2d Cir. 1978). That list includes

"nervous or unusual conduct, tips from

informants, loose clothing, travel

itinerary, lack of employment, discovery

of incriminating matter during routine

searches, information from a search or
interrogation of a traveling companion,

inadequate luggage, and evasive or

contradictory answers." Dorsey, 641 F.2d

at 1219, n.12 (citing Asbury, 586 F.2d at

976-77). Here, Teng evaded contact with

the authorities at the terminal, they

learned his itinerary from his traveling

companion, and had discovered a

significant amount of drugs on his

companion. Additionally, the officers

knew that Laos was a source country for

opium and that St. Paul was a common

destination for opium in the midwest. All

of these factors, when considered in

concert, demonstrate reasonable suspicion

that criminal activity was occurring. See

Cardenas, 9 F.3d at 1151 (holding that

finding drug paraphernalia on a traveling

companion who had recently traveled from

the Philippines, combined with suspicious

behavior, constituted reasonable

suspicion for the purposes of an extended

border search).

 Therefore, under the extended border

search doctrine, we conclude that the

search of Teng was reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment. Officers had a

reasonable certainty that Teng had

crossed the border and that his luggage

had not changed in condition, and they

had a reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity was occurring.

B. Search Incident To An Arrest

 We now turn to Teng’s alternative

argument, that the evidence should be

excluded because it was obtained in a

search incident to an unlawful arrest.

The district court concluded that Teng

was not under arrest when he was

handcuffed and returned to the

international terminal. Teng argues that

he was arrested without probable cause

prior to the search of his luggage and

therefore the evidence recovered from his

luggage should be suppressed as the fruit

of an unlawful arrest. Generally, when

police actions create a situation that

exceeds a short detainment, a stop

becomes an arrest which requires probable

cause that the person is committing or

has committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964). Because we have

already determined that the search of the

luggage was reasonable under the extended

border search doctrine, this issue is

irrelevant. See United States v.

$73,275.00, 710 F.2d 283, 287-90 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the seizure of

currency was lawful where defendant

argued that the evidence was fruit of an

unlawful seizure, yet the court found

that the search was lawful on other

grounds).

 Nevertheless, we would agree with the

district court’s analysis. The detention

of Teng was necessary and limited in

scope and duration, and the handcuffing

and transportation of Teng back to the

international terminal did not convert

the stop into an arrest. This case is

different from our previous case law in

this area, see, e.g., United States v.

Glenna, 878 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1989)

(ruling that the use of handcuffs did not

transform an investigatory stop to an

arrest when the officer’s safety was at

risk), because Teng himself did not pose

a threat to the officers nor a flight

risk. But it still does not fall into the

category of cases where the use of

handcuffs transforms an investigatory

stop into an arrest. Under these facts

and in this unique situation, the use of

handcuffs was reasonable. First, Teng was

only handcuffed during the drive across

the airport tarmac, and the handcuffs did

not increase his level of confinement

given the fact that he was already

confined in a customs vehicle. The

transportation was of a short duration

and necessary to confirm the officers’

suspicions given that the drug testing

equipment was at the customs office.

Finally, because the transportation

occurred in a volatile area, the

circumstances here are quite unique. The

car was driven in the highly restricted

tarmac area where planes are taxiing and

baggage trains are rolling. Risk to the

driver and everyone else in the

restricted area would be extreme if an

unauthorized person were to take control

of the vehicle and drive erratically.

Safety and common sense allow this extra

precaution with an unknown passenger

whose movement is already restricted when

he is riding in the car. Because of these

dangers, it is customs policy to

usehandcuffs while transporting

individuals across the tarmac. Given

these unique facts, the district court

was correct in finding that Teng was not

under arrest when he was transported to

the customs office in handcuffs.

III. Conclusion
 The search of Teng’s luggage was

reasonable under the extended border

search doctrine. The agents had a reason

able certainty that he had crossed the

border and that his luggage had not

changed condition, and they had a

reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity was occurring. In addition,

because Teng was not arrested prior to

the search, it was not a search incident

to an unlawful arrest. For these reasons,

we affirm the district court.

FOOTNOTES

/1 While this case does not involve issues of national security that might be implicated by

terrorist activities, the events of September 11,

2001, only emphasize the heightened need to

conduct searches at this nation’s international

airports. "[A]ttempts to counter foreign threats

to the national security require the utmost

stealth, speed and secrecy." United States v.

Truong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir.

1980) (adopting the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment). Searches without

probable cause can be constitutional "when special needs, beyond the normal needs for law

enforcement make the elements of a warrant and

probable cause requirement impracticable." Veronia School District 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,

653 (1995) (citations omitted). We now know the

serious threats that our border agents need to

guard against and we must be mindful of the

special needs of the agents in responding to

those threats.

/2 Customs agents have the statutory authority to

conduct searches pursuant to 19 U.S.C. sec. 482.

The statute allows searches of individuals "wherever found" with reasonable cause to believe that

the suspect has items that were imported into the

country "contrary to law." Id. The phrase "wherever found" is not infinite in scope but has been

interpreted to be limited by Fourth Amendment

reasonableness constraints. See Bilir, 592 F.2d

at 739, n. 6.

/3 Typically, once a passenger leaves customs at

O’Hare there is an opportunity within the international terminal to immediately check luggage

with any connecting airlines. If Teng had taken

advantage of the immediate check-in area then

there would be little doubt that his luggage was

in the same condition when it was searched by the

agents as it was when it crossed the border

because it would have been out of his control.

The agents were not aware at the time that his

luggage was pulled from the plane whether he had
checked his own bags at the American Airlines

terminal or the international terminal. It is

also unclear whether or not they could have

learned this information from Teng due to his

limited ability to speak English.

/4 The district court did not specifically mention

in its ruling that Teng’s failure to respond to

the page at the American Airlinesterminal contributed to the suspicion of the officers. Also,

the court did not mention that when he spotted

Teng, the inspector noticed Teng was "kind of

hunched over and trying to stay out of sight."

However, this information was disclosed during

the direct examination of Inspector Joseph Marcocig during the evidentiary hearing on the

motion to suppress. Inspector Marcocig was subsequently cross-examined by Teng’s attorney. Even

if the district court did not mention these

facts, this court may consider them in examining

the totality of the circumstances that led to

stopping Teng. See United States v. Brown, 232

F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that in

determining whether an officer had reasonable

suspicion to stop a suspect we "’look to the

record as a whole to determine what facts were

known to the officer and then consider whether a

reasonable officer in those circumstances would

have been suspicious.’"(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In

reviewing a suppression motion, we may consider

evidence introduced both at the pretrial hearing

and at the trial itself.").