Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 45A04-1501-CR-31 | July 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Rodney S. Perry

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rodney S. Perry,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

July 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1501-CR-31

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Clarence D. Murray, 

Judge

Trial Court Case No. 

45G02-9701-CF-2

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Rodney Perry (“Perry”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

correct erroneous sentence. Perry raises one issue, which we restate as whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying Perry’s motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 45A04-1501-CR-31 | July 20, 2015 Page 2 of 6

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The underlying facts of this case were set forth in our earlier opinion in Perry’s

direct appeal as follows:

On January 6, 1997, Perry broke into the house of his estranged 

wife, Marsheila Perry, after his mother-in-law, Florida Clark, 

refused to let him in. Marsheila struck Perry with a baseball bat, 

but Perry then took the bat away. When Clark attempted to make 

a phone call, Perry struck her in the head with the bat at least 

four times. He then struck Marsheila in the head with the bat at 

least five times. Both Clark and Marsheila died. Perry’s three 

children were present when he killed Clark and Marsheila.

The State charged Perry with two counts of murder. On June 26, 

1997, Perry agreed to plead guilty to two counts of Class A 

felony voluntary manslaughter. The agreement left sentencing 

entirely to the trial court’s discretion. The agreement also stated 

in part, “The defendant also understands that by pleading guilty 

he will not have the right to directly appeal the conviction(s) to 

the Indiana Court of Appeals or the Indiana Supreme Court but 

may appeal the conviction(s) directly to the trial court by filing a 

Petition for Post–Conviction Relief (PCR).” The agreement did 

not advise Perry that he could directly appeal the sentence 

imposed by the trial court.

On July 24, 1997, the trial court sentenced Perry to thirty-five 

years for each voluntary manslaughter conviction, to be served 

consecutively for a total sentence of seventy years.

Perry v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1093, 1094-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations 

omitted). 

[3] On direct appeal, Perry argued that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him and that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and the character of the offender. On April 20, 2006, our court 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 45A04-1501-CR-31 | July 20, 2015 Page 3 of 6

affirmed Perry’s sentence. See id. On October 20, 2006, Perry filed a petition for 

post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel. The post-conviction court denied Perry’s petition and our

court affirmed. See Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[4] Perry filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence on August 19, 2014,

which the trial court denied. This court affirmed the trial court in a 

memorandum decision. See Perry v. State, No. 45A04-1409-CR-435, 2015 WL 

2448715, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. May 22, 2015). On December 15, 2015, Perry 

filed a second pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence, which the trial court 

denied the same day. 

[5] Perry now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying Perry’s second

motion to correct erroneous sentence. We review a trial court’s decision on a 

motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion. Fry v. State, 939 

N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Id.

[7] An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion 

to correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-1-15, which 

provides:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 45A04-1501-CR-31 | July 20, 2015 Page 4 of 6

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

[8] A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence may only be used to correct 

sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the 

sentence in light of the statutory authority. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 

787 (Ind. 2004). “Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of 

the judgment and the applicable statutory authority without reference to other 

matters in or extrinsic to the record.” Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). If a claim requires consideration of the proceedings 

before, during, or after trial, it may not be presented by way of a motion to 

correct sentence. Id. Such claims are best addressed on direct appeal or by way 

of a petition for post-conviction relief. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.

[9] Here, Perry claims that the trial court committed fundamental error in denying 

his petition to correct erroneous sentence. He argues that his petition presents 

“undisputable evidence of proof on the face of the record, that Defendant’s 

criminal history which consists entirely of offenses unrelated to the present 

offenses as aggravating circumstance before sentencing was in fact abuse of 

discretion” and that the trial court erred in “fail[ing] to examine petition to see 

whether that appellant raised a new fundamental error issue.” Appellant’s Br. at 

8. He also claims that the trial court erred when it listed as aggravating factors 
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during sentencing that each killing was a separate incident, involving separate 

decisions to kill each victim, and that the killings occurred in the presence of 

children. He further contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider his 

proffered mitigating factors in sentencing.1 

[10] Perry received consecutive thirty-five year sentences for each of his two Class A 

felony voluntary manslaughter convictions, for an aggregate sentence of seventy

years. These sentences fall within range for Class A felonies prescribed by the 

sentencing statute in effect at the time Perry committed his crimes. See Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-4 (“A person who commits a Class A felony (for a crime 

committed before July 1, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between 

twenty (20) and fifty (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) 

years.”). 

[11] Perry’s arguments fall outside the parameters of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-

15 because he asks us to look beyond the face of the sentencing order and the 

applicable statutory authority.2 To consider Perry’s claims, we would need to 

review the sentencing hearing transcript, the plea agreement, and the 

presentence investigation report. This would be beyond the scope of appropriate

review of a denied motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Fulkrod, 855 

 

1 Perry also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence without first 

giving the State thirty days to respond. We disagree. The trial court acted within its discretion when it denied 

Perry’s petition without giving the State thirty days to respond, after it determined that Perry’s petition was 

meritless on its face.

2 Perry repeatedly argues that his sentence is erroneous “on the face of the record,” but the correct standard 

requires that a sentence be erroneous on the face of the judgment, or sentencing order. See Fulkrod, 855 

N.E.2d at 1066. 
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N.E.2d at 1066 (“Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of 

the judgment and the applicable statutory authority without reference to other 

matters in or extrinsic to the record.”). See also Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786 

(motion to correct erroneous sentence is not available for claims concerning 

how the trial court weighed factors in imposing sentence). Furthermore, the 

issues Perry raises have already been resolved in his direct appeal, postconviction proceeding, and post-conviction appeal, and Perry may not relitigate these issues.

[12] Because the motion to correct erroneous sentence was not the appropriate 

means to challenge his sentence, we conclude that the trial court properly 

denied Perry’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[13] Affirmed.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.