IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

December 09, 2014 Session

TIMOTHY JOHN McCORMICK v. STEPHANIE RENEE CROUCH 

McCORMICK

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Warren County

No. 4409 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2014-00457-COA-R3-CV – Filed July 16, 2015

Husband in divorce action appeals trial court’s division of marital property and award of 

alimony in futuro to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s division of marital property; we 

vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand to the trial court for reconsideration.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in 

Part, Vacated in Part and Remanded.

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P. J., M. S., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Eric J. Burch, Manchester, Tennessee, for the appellant, Timothy John McCormick.

Donald N. Capparella and Elizabeth N. Sitgreaves, Nashville, Tennessee; Ryan Julian 

Moore and Steven R. Roller, McMinnville, Tennessee for the appellee, Stephanie Renee 

Crouch McCormick.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Timothy John McCormick (“Husband”) and Stephanie Renee Crouch McCormick 

(“Wife”) were married in 1990; no children were born to the couple. Husband and Wife 

separated in 2012, and Husband filed for divorce on March 12, 2013, citing inappropriate 

marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Wife filed her Answer and Countercomplaint on April 3, 2013, also citing inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable 

differences; the Counter-complaint was amended to request spousal support and her 
2

attorney’s fees and costs. On Wife’s motion for spousal support pendente lite, the court 

ordered Husband that pay Wife a lump sum of $750, $300 per week during the pendency 

of the divorce, and that he be responsible for Wife’s car payments and the electric and 

water bills at the marital home, pending further orders of the court. 

Trial was held on January 3, 2014; both Husband and Wife testified, along with 

Wife’s psychologist, Husband’s girlfriend, and Husband’s cousin. At the close of proof, 

the court issued an oral ruling, which was memorialized in its Final Decree entered on 

March 5, 2014.

The court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129. 

The court awarded the wife the marital home and her car, stating that she would be 

responsible for the debt accompanying those items; she was also awarded Wal-Mart stock 

valued at $35, various household items, and $8,150 cash from Husband for her interest in 

three cars, three boats, and a camper, all of which were awarded to him. Husband was 

also made responsible for the indebtedness on one of the vehicles, a truck. The court 

awarded Husband various household items and required him to pay off the credit card 

debt totaling $4,800. The parties were to share equally all the retirement benefits each 

earned during their marriage. The order further provided that, if Wife were successful in 

a pending action to recover social security disability benefits and was awarded back pay, 

Husband would be entitled to “one-half of said back pay which accrued during the 

marriage.” The court awarded Wife alimony in futuro of $1,950 per month for 18 

months, beginning February 1, 2014. On August 1, 2015, the alimony was to decrease to 

$1,450 per month. 

Husband appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by 

failing to make an equitable division of the parties’ marital property, and (2) whether the 

trial court erred in awarding the appellee alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,950 for 

18 months and $1,450 per month thereafter. Wife seeks her attorney’s fees for defending 

the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

The trial court did not make findings of fact or state its conclusion of law as to the 

division of marital property and the award of alimony in either the oral ruling or the Final 

Decree. When the trial court fails to explain the factual basis for its decisions, we may 

conduct a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the 

evidence lies or remand the case with instructions to the court to make the required 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly. See Lovlace v. 

Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 36 (Tenn. 2013); Ganzevoort v Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 

(Tenn. 1997). We have determined, as more fully explained below, that the record 
3

permits us to make a de novo review of the evidence pertaining to the division of marital 

property, but not of the award of spousal support.

Husband testified that he was 44 years old at the time of the hearing; that he 

finished high school but had no additional education besides on-the-job training; that the 

“tax card” value of the parties’ home was $87,000,1though he felt it was worth between 

$90,000 and $95,000; that the parties owed $9,100 on the home; that the 2005 truck was 

worth $9,500 with $7,000 owed on it; that the Lincoln LS did not run and was worth 

$300 to $500 scrap value; that the 1995 Chevy Tahoe was worth $1,500; that Wife’s 

Volvo was worth $7,000 with $6,800 owed on it; that the 1992 Bennington Alante bass 

boat was worth $2,300; that the pontoon was worth $3,000; that the flat-bottom boat was 

worth $500; and that the camper was worth $10,000. He further testified about his 

pension plans, which he was not eligible to receive for another 21 years, stating that he 

would receive $112 per month from his pension fund with former employer A.O. Smith

and that he had retirement and savings benefits in the amount of $5,407 through his 

current employer, UTC.

2 Husband testified as to his income for 2011, 2012 and 2013; 

that the parties had $4,800 in credit card debt, $1,600 of which he had acquired during 

the couple’s separation; that he had certain health conditions, including a hole in his 

bowel from a four-wheeler wreck, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, Raynaud’s 

Syndrome, and that he suffered from depression. He testified that despite his health 

problems, he was able to maintain his job and work overtime. 

Clinical psychologist Nancy Garrison appeared on behalf of Wife, testifying that

she had seen Wife in therapy once a month for the preceding year and a half and had seen

 

1 The parties stipulated that the “tax card” value was $87,000.

2 The testimony related to the parties’ retirement accounts was sparse; counsel for the parties stipulated 

that Husband would receive $629 a month from his current employer when he reaches age 65; that, 

although the monthly payment would increase as he continued to work for the company, the parties 

agreed that Wife would only be entitled to half of the $629. His current employment also provided a 

401(k) account, the current value of which was $11,762.94, an amount that the parties did not dispute. 

Wife did not testify about her Pillsbury IRA; in response to the court’s questions prior to trial, her counsel 

stated it was worth $1,675. Neither did she testify about her $35 Wal-Mart stock, though it was identified 

on the Sales and Dispositions of Capital Assets schedule on the parties’ 2011 tax return. Husband did not 

include these accounts in the Rule 7 of the Court of Appeals’ Rules table in his brief; Wife’s Rule 7 

statement shows the following values for the retirement accounts:

UTC 401K: $11,762.94

AO Smith 401K: $112/month [Husband’s valuation] 

$11,530.95 ($9,299.16 in 2005) [Wife’s valuation]

Pillsbury IRA: $1,675

UTC pension: $629/month
4

the couple in marriage counseling for four months prior; that Wife has “clinically 

significant major depression that ranges from mild to severe,” the symptoms of which 

“interfere with a person’s ability to function and in their daily routines and in their 

relationships”; that Wife has had “suicidal thoughts, hopelessness, feelings of 

worthlessness, extreme fatigue, ... [been] bedridden when she has a bad episode of 

depression, ... [experienced] weight loss from 20 to 30 pounds from her base line weight, 

... [and had] difficulty falling asleep at night.” She further testified that “it’s difficult to 

predict for [Wife] what her energy levels, what her pain level and what her mood is going 

to be like.” Ms. Garrison testified through her monthly counseling sessions and 

reviewing Wife’s journal, she had seen Wife have “really erratic and unpredictable 

changes in mood. She has good days and then unexpectedly she’ll have really severe 

episodes of depression where she is not able often at least for parts of the day to get out 

of bed.” Ms. Garrison testified that she had advised Wife on those days to “stay home, 

do [her] self care ... that includes maintaining nutrition, doing what stretching and 

exercising she can, meditation, relaxation exercise, deep breathing, muscle relaxation, 

[and] taking her medications as prescribed.” 

Wife was 46 at the time of the hearing; she testified that she dropped out of school 

at age 16 after completing the ninth grade; that she had worked outside the home at 

various jobs for most of the marriage; that she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 2006; 

that she had depression and dry eye syndrome; that she continued to work until 2009, 

when she was laid off due to the closing of the business where she was employed. She 

testified that she had drawn unemployment benefits from 2009 through 2011; during that 

time, she was offered her previous job again when the business reopened, but she could 

not take it because she “wasn’t able but also financially I didn’t have to because Tim was 

making well enough money to support he and I especially with no children.” Wife 

testified that not being able to afford health insurance was her “worst fear.” Wife did not 

place a value on the home, cars, or boats but testified that the marital home was in 

disrepair. She testified that she would not be able to work in the future; that she had

applied twice for social security disability and been denied both times, but if she were 

successful, the benefit would include back pay from the date she was last able to work. 

Wife said she was able to use the Internet and was “somewhat” computer literate but did 

not type. 

A. Division of Property

In a divorce action, the division of the marital estate begins with classifying the 

parties’ property as either separate or marital. Miller v. Miller, 81 S.W.3d 771, 775 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Marital property is defined as “all real and personal property, 

both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the 

marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses 
5

as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(1). Once property has been classified as marital property, the court is to place a 

reasonable value on the property that is subject to division. Edmisten v. Edmisten, No. 

M2001-00081-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21077990 at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2003). 

In this matter, no issue is raised by the parties as to the classification or valuation of the 

parties’ property.

After valuation, the trial court is to make an equitable division of the property. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1); Miller, 81 S.W.3d at 775. Dividing a marital estate is 

not a mechanical process but, rather, is guided by considering the factors in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-4-121(c)3, Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). 

Although marital debt is not defined by statute, it is subject to equitable division in the 

same manner as marital property. Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tenn. 

2010). In dividing the marital debt equitably, the trial court should “consider the 

following factors: (1) which party incurred the debt, (2) the purpose of the debt, (3) 

which party benefitted from incurring the debt, and (4) which party is better able to pay 

the debt.” Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d 810, 814 (Tenn. 2003). Trial courts have wide 

 

3 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) states:

(c) In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors including:

(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning 

capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the education, training or 

increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;

(5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation, appreciation, 

depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution 

of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of 

a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party has 

fulfilled its role;

(B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means wasteful 

expenditures which reduce the marital property available for equitable distributions and 

which are made for a purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint 

for divorce or legal separation has been filed.

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to 

become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable 

sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

(10) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

(11) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
6

latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital property, Fisher v. Fisher, 648 

S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983), and this Court accords great weight to the trial court’s 

division of marital property. Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1996). Thus, we defer to the trial court’s division of the marital estate unless it is 

inconsistent with the factors at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1994). 

The trial court did not assign values to the marital assets. We have reviewed the 

Rule 7 statements in both Husband and Wife’s briefs, as well as the testimony and 

exhibits, and have identified the following marital assets at issue with the corresponding 

values, the debt encumbering the same, other debt, and the spouse to whom awarded:

Asset: Husband’s Value: Wife’s Value Awarded To: Debt:

Marital home $92,500 $87,000 Wife $9,010

2005 Truck $9,500 $9,500 Husband $7,000

2007 Volvo $7,000 $7,000 Wife $6,800

2000 Lincoln $300 ----- Husband

1995 Tahoe $1,500 ----- Husband

Bass Boat4$2,300 $2,650 Husband

Flat Bottom Boat $500 $500 Husband

Pontoon Boat $3,000 $3,000 Husband

Camper $10,000 $10,000 Husband

Riding Lawn Mower $750 ----- Wife

Grill5$75 $250 Wife

Freezer6$150 ----- Husband

Wal-Mart Stock ---- $35 Wife

UTC 401k7$11,762.94 $11,762.94 Split

AO Smith 401k $112/month $9,299.16 Split

Pillsbury IRA $1,675 $1,675 Split

UTC pension $629/month $629/month Split

 

4 Husband testified that he thought Wife’s valuation of the bass boat at $2,650 was “a little high.” When 

asked how much he thought the bass boat was worth, Husband replied, “23,” which we take to mean 

“$2300.” However, prior to this testimony, counsel for Husband had stipulated to the $2,650 valuation, 

stating “We’re okay with the bass boat. That’s a little high. We said $2,500 but it’s close.” 

5 The grill was not included in Husband’s Rule 7 statement. 

6 The freezer was not included in Husband’s Rule 7 statement; Wife included the asset in her statement 

and based its value on testimony. Given the record, we conclude that the value of the freezer is $150.

7

See footnote 2, supra.
7

Other Debt:

Chase credit card $4,800 $4,800 Husband $4,800

The parties largely agree as to the values of their assets; they do not agree on the 

value of the marital home, the bass boat, and the grill. As to the home, we assign a value 

of $87,000, the amount stipulated as the tax value; for the bass boat, we assign a value of 

$2,500 in light of the testimony of Husband that it was an old boat and not worth $2,650, 

the amount stated by Wife’s counsel in response to the court’s inquiry; as to the grill, we 

conclude that it should be valued at $75 based on the testimony that it was approximately 

four years old and purchased new for $250. In light of the foregoing values, the division 

of the assets (excluding the future retirement benefits which were divided equally) 

resulted in wife receiving $94,860 (net $85,850) and Husband receiving $27,450 (net 

$12,950) worth of assets.8

Husband contends that the division is “completely inequitable” and requests an 

“equal” division of the marital estate. He requests in the alternative that we reverse the 

$8,150 cash payment awarded Wife and award him a portion of the equity in the marital 

home.9 Wife does not dispute that the division of property was not equal; she argues that 

the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s division and the “fact that it is 

not equal does not render it inequitable.”

In our review of the evidence, the most relevant statutory factors to be considered 

in this matter are the length of the marriage, the employability and earning capacity of the 

parties, the financial needs of the parties, the relative ability of each party for future 

acquisitions of capital assets and income, and the economic circumstances of the parties 

at the time the division of property is to be effective. 

This was a 23 year marriage; Wife, who was 46 at the time of the hearing, had not 

worked in approximately four years due, in part, to the closing of the business in which 

she was employed and in part due to her decision not to return when the business 

reopened; she testified that she had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia during the time she 

was employed; she had been seeing a psychologist for a year and a half for depression. 

Husband was 44 and had maintained steady employment throughout the marriage; he 

testified that he anticipated working for the foreseeable future; that his income in 2011 

 

8 Although the court divided various other pieces of property between the parties, such as bedroom 

furniture, TVs and cocktail tables, the parties did not include these items in their Rule 7 statements; they 

do not take issue with the court’s division of those specific pieces of property on appeal and we have not 

included this property in our analysis.

9

In his Rule 7 statement, Husband included as a debt assigned to him the $8,150 he was ordered to pay 

Wife for her interest in the vehicles, boats, and camper he was awarded; this amount should not have been 

included in the calculation as it was not a marital debt subject to division by the court. 
8

was $87,56810 and his income for 2012 was “about $79,000”; his December 26, 2013 

earnings statement shows that his 2013 year-to-date earnings were $77,166.56. 

The primary marital assets (other than the pension and retirement accounts) 

consisted of the marital home, four vehicles, three boats, a camper, a riding lawn mower, 

a grill, and a freezer. The marital residence and the 2007 Volvo, both of which were 

awarded to Wife, were encumbered in the total amount of $15,810, while the 2005 truck, 

awarded to Husband, was encumbered in the amount of $7,000. The court also assigned 

Husband the credit card debt of $4,800, $1,600 of which had been accumulated by 

Husband after the parties’ separation.

The division of marital property does not require that the property be divided 

equally. Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tenn. 2002). Indeed, the trial 

court may adjust the division of marital property to assist the economically disadvantaged 

spouse when there is a disparity between the parties’ relative earning capacities. Melvin v. 

Melvin, 415 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011)(citing Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 341). 

Wife was not employed at the time of the divorce and had not worked for a 

number of years; according to her Local Rule 21.01 statement, the only cash available to 

her was the $600 balance in the parties’ joint checking account and her IRA, which had a 

value of $1,500 and was to be divided with Husband. Her condition was clearly disparate 

to that of Husband and, as she proceeded into an uncertain future, the award of the 

marital residence and one automobile to her met significant immediate needs and was 

certainly equitable.

11

 There was no evidence as to the practical or financial feasibility of 

selling the home, and the record does not show that Wife had the financial ability to 

relocate or to pay Husband for his equity in the residence. In contrast, Husband had the 

present ability through his employment to acquire assets and income in the future, 

providing the means by which to pay the credit card debt of $4,800 as well as to pay Wife 

$8,150 for her interest in the vehicles, boats, and camper that he was awarded. 

Considering the relevant factors and the character of the assets available for 

division, and affording the trial court the substantial deference we give to the division of 

marital property, the court did not abuse its discretion in the dividing the property and 

debt in the manner it did. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2010) 

(holding that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion only when it applie[s] an incorrect legal 

 

10 Husband’s tax return for 2011 reported wages of $87,207 and an adjusted gross income of $87,568; the 

explanation of compensation he received from his employer in 2011 shows compensation of $91,010, in 

addition to payments for income and asset protection ($295), health and wellness ($14,361) and 

retirement and savings ($5,407). 

11 As we consider the equities, we deem significant the fact that both the residence and the automobile 

were encumbered. 
9

standard or reach[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an 

injustice to the party complaining” (internal quotes and citations omitted).

B. Award of Spousal Support

Trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is needed 

and, if so, the nature, amount, and duration of support. See Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 

S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011); Garfinkel v.Garfinkel, 945 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1996). In making an award of spousal support, the court must undertake a careful 

balancing of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)12, the applicability of which 

are dependent on the unique facts and circumstances of the case. See Anderton v. 

Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Hawkins v. Hawkins, 

883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). In considering the award of alimony, a trial 

court should consider the factors listed at Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-121(i), but the two that 

are most important are “the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the obligor spouse’s ability 

to pay.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 110 (Tenn. 2011).

In Tennessee, four distinct types of spousal support are recognized: (1) alimony in 

futuro, (2) alimony in solido, (3) rehabilitative alimony, and (4) transitional alimony. 

 

12 The factors are as follows:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each 

party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other 

sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each 

party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure 

further education and training to improve such party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable 

level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;

(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical 

disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside 

the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions 

to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible 

contributions by a party to the education, training or increased earning power of the 

other party;

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it 

appropriate to do so; and

(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary 

to consider the equities between the parties.
10

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(1). Tennessee statutes concerning spousal support 

reflect a legislative preference favoring rehabilitative or transitional alimony rather than

alimony in futuro or in solido. Mayfield, 95 S.W.3d at 115 (internal citations omitted). 

Alimony in futuro is appropriate when the economically disadvantaged spouse cannot 

achieve self-sufficiency and economic rehabilitation is not feasible. Mayfield v. Mayfield, 

95 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tenn. 2012) (internal citations omitted). In Gonsewski, our 

Supreme Court held that “alimony in futuro should only be awarded when the court finds 

that economic rehabilitation is not feasible and long-term support is necessary.” 350 

S.W.3d at 109.

We review a trial court’s award of spousal support applying the abuse of 

discretion standard. Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 456-57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007 (citing 

Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). We do not secondguess a trial court’s decision regarding spousal support unless it is not supported by the 

evidence or is contrary to public policy. Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1994). When the trial court fails to explain the factual basis for its decisions, we 

may conduct a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the 

evidence lies or remand the case with instructions to the court to make the required 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

52.01; see Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 36; Ganzevoort, 949 S.W.2d at 296.

In ordering Husband to pay alimony, the court stated: 

The Plaintiff shall pay the sum of $1,950.00 per month as alimony in futuro 

to the Defendant for a period of eighteen (18) months beginning February 

1, 2014. Beginning August 1, 2015, the Plaintiff’s alimony obligation shall 

decrease to $1,450.00 per month and shall cease once the Plaintiff’s 

monthly retirement benefit is paid to the Defendant. This alimony may be 

modified if the court makes a finding of a material change in circumstance, 

decrease in pay or need, if the Defendant receives social security disability, 

or if the Defendant remarries.

Husband contends that alimony should not have been awarded because “there is no proof 

that the Wife is unable to earn an income sufficient to meet her needs. Even if she is 

disabled at this time, a shorter term of alimony at an amount sufficient to cover her needs 

should be awarded.” 

While it is clear that Wife has a need and Husband has the ability to pay support, 

neither the oral ruling nor the order includes a discussion of the evidence relative to the 

statutory factors listed at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i); of particular import to this case, 

the record does not include a finding, required by Gonsewski prior to the award of 
11

alimony in futuro, that economic rehabilitation is not feasible and long-term support is 

necessary. Further, we have no explanation of the manner in which the court determined 

that the particular award was appropriate.13 In the absence of the same, we cannot 

determine whether the award of spousal support was an abuse of the court’s discretion. 

C. Attorney’s Fees

Wife has asked that she be awarded the attorney’s fees she has incurred in this 

appeal. The decision to award a party his or her fees on appeal rests solely within the 

discretion of this Court. Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 

In light of our disposition of the appeal, we decline to make such an award to Wife. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s division of the marital 

property and debt; we vacate the award of spousal support and remand the case for 

reconsideration and entry of an order which includes findings of fact and a discussion of 

the statutory factors considered in making the award.14

________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

 

13 The factual basis for setting support at $1,950 per month is not apparent from the record; further, the 

court did not explain its reasoning for the decrease in amount from $1,950 to $1,450 after 18 months. 

14 In affirming the division of marital property and the $8,150 award to Wife, we have acknowledged 

Husband’s concern that the values of the assets which were divided are unequal; we hold that it is not 

inequitable. We encourage the trial court to consider the division of assets and debts as it reconsiders the 

award of alimony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(8).