J-S36038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee

v.

HUGH GILLESPIE FUNCHES,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2090 WDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 4, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001622-1999

BEFORE: PANELLA, JENKINS, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2015

Hugh Gillespie Funches (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order 

entered November 4, 2014, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the 

date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to 

this time requirement: (1) interference by government officials 

in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and 

(3) an after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner 

alleges and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the 

petition will be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one 

of these exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claims could have been presented. The timeliness requirements 

of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA 

court cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

 

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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On March 6, 2000, Appellant was found guilty in a non-jury trial of 

numerous offenses in connection with a sexual assault on a 20-month-old 

child. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’ 

incarceration. After the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence was affirmed by a panel of this Court on November 

13, 2001. Commonwealth v. Funches, 792 A.2d 613 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(unpublished memorandum). No petition for allowance of appeal was filed; 

thus, Appellant had until approximately December 13, 2002 to file timely a 

PCRA petition.2 

On August 11, 2014, Appellant filed the document at issue in this case, 

entitled “Motion for Modification of Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc.”3In that 

motion, Appellant argued that he was denied his right to a jury trial; 

therefore, he claims his sentence is illegal. Id. at ¶ 3. On October 6, 2014, 

 

2 Appellant timely filed his first pro se PCRA petition and counsel was 

appointed. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing. This 

Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, and our Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Funches, 

860 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2004) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 871 A.2d 188 (Pa. 2005).

3 That document provides some contradictory information. Appellant states 

that “on March 6, 2000, [he] was found guilty of charges set forth in CP-02-

CR-0006423-1998, and sentenced to [a term of incarceration] without the 

benefit of a jury.” Motion for Modification of Sentence, 8/11/2014 

(capitalization omitted). However, the criminal docket number associated 

with the aforementioned date and charges is docket number CP-02-CR0001622-1999. Docket number 6423 of 1998 is also Appellant’s case where 

it appears he pled guilty to criminal trespass and was sentenced to three 

months’ incarceration. Thus, the PCRA court corrected the docket number.
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the PCRA court, treating this document as a PCRA petition, filed its notice of 

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

Appellant filed a response, and on November 4, 2014, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both 

Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The instant petition, filed on June 25, 2014, is patently untimely. The 

PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s petition unless he 

pled and offered proof of one or more of the three statutory exceptions to 

the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant failed to do so. 

Moreover, “[t]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim 

may nevertheless be lost should it be raised for the first time in an untimely 

PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the 

court of jurisdiction over the claim. Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 

237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the PCRA 

court properly dismissed his petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2015