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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50134-2022 

D.L. EVANS BANK,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

HENRY W. DEAN,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

VALLEY CLUB HOMES, LLC and SUN 

VALLEY DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

Defendants.

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Boise, August 2023 Term 

Opinion filed: October 30, 2023 

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 

Blaine County. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge. 

The decision of the district court is affirmed. 

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., Boise, for Appellant. 

Bradley D. VandenDries argued. 

Parsons, Loveland, Shirley & Lindstrom, LLP, Burley, for Respondent. Rhett M. 

Miller argued.

 

ZAHN, Justice.

This appeal primarily concerns when the statute of limitations begins to run on a claim for 

action on a judgment. Respondent, D.L. Evans Bank, obtained a default judgment against 

Appellant, Henry W. Dean, in 2010. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1111(1), D.L. Evans 

obtained orders renewing the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019. In 2020, D.L. Evans filed this

lawsuit, alleging a single claim for action on the 2010 Judgment and seeking a new judgment for 

the amount that Dean owed on the 2010 Judgment plus accrued interest, attorney fees, and costs. 
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The district court concluded that D.L. Evans properly renewed the 2010 Judgment in 2015 

and 2019, and that each renewal restarted the applicable six-year statute of limitations on D.L. 

Evans’ claim for an action on a judgment. Dean argues that the district court erred because the 

limitation period on D.L. Evans’ claim began to run when the judgment was first issued in 2010. 

Dean also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and denying his Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the 2010 

Judgment as void. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, D.L. Evans filed a complaint against Dean (and others who have not appeared in

this appeal) to collect on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. Dean was the guarantor on 

the promissory note pursuant to a continuing commercial guaranty. After unsuccessful attempts to

personally serve Dean with a copy of the complaint and summons, D.L. Evans mailed copies of 

the documents to Dean via certified mail. D.L. Evans also served Dean via publication. Less than 

two months later, Dean sent a letter dated December 9, 2009, to D.L. Evans’ attorney 

acknowledging the complaint and asking D.L. Evans to dismiss the lawsuit. However, Dean never 

appeared in the action, and, on January 12, 2010, D.L. Evans obtained the 2010 Judgment against 

Dean for $1,063,503.16. On January 9, 2015, after filing a motion to renew the 2010 Judgment, 

D.L. Evans obtained an order from the district court renewing it. On October 22, 2019, after filing 

another motion to renew the 2010 Judgment, D.L. Evans obtained a second order renewing the 

judgment.

On February 21, 2020, D.L. Evans filed a complaint (“2020 Complaint”) against Dean (and 

others who have not appeared in this appeal) alleging a single claim for action on the 2010 

Judgment. Dean’s former counsel filed a document entitled, “Notice of Appearance on Behalf of 

Defendant Henry W. Dean,”’ which stated that “[t]his appearance is without waiver of any 

defenses, including, but not limited to, insufficient service of process and lack of personal 

jurisdiction.” Dean later retained his current counsel, who moved to dismissthe complaint, arguing

that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Dean later filed a second motion 

to dismiss, asserting that the claim was time-barred.

The district court denied both motions. The district court denied the first motion after 

concluding that Dean had voluntarily submitted to the court’s personal jurisdiction by filing a 

general notice of appearance. The district court denied the second motion on the basis that the 
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parties had failed to adequately brief the issue of whether the 2020 Complaint was timely filed and 

advised the parties that they could brief the issue in a motion for summary judgment. 

Both parties later filed motions for summary judgment. Dean argued that the 2020 

Complaint should be dismissed because it was time-barred. D.L. Evans argued that it was entitled 

to partial summary judgment because the 2010 Judgment had been properly renewed in 2015 and 

2019, and each renewal restarted the six-year statute of limitations for an action on the 2010 

Judgment. As a result, the bank was entitled to summary judgment because there were no genuine 

issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The district court denied Dean’s motion and 

granted D.L. Evans’ motion. The district court concluded that the 2020 Complaint was timely filed 

because D.L. Evans had properly renewed the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019 and each renewal 

restarted the statute of limitations for an action on the 2010 Judgment.

D.L. Evans next moved the district court for summary judgment on the amount it was 

owed. D.L. Evans sought an award of $1,780,479.56—the principal amount of the 2010 Judgment 

plus accrued interest. In his memorandum in opposition to the motion, Dean argued that the 2010 

Judgment was void and requested that the district court set it aside under Idaho Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(4). Specifically, Dean argued that D.L. Evans failed to properly serve him with 

the summons and complaint in 2009 and failed to mail other court filings to Dean’s last known 

address. The district court denied Dean’s motion, concluding that Dean could not collaterally

attack the 2010 Judgment because Dean had failed to demonstrate that it was void on its face. The 

district court also concluded that, even if Dean were able to collaterally attack the 2010 Judgment, 

his attempt to do so was untimely. The district court entered a final judgment in favor of D.L. 

Evans, which Dean timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in denying Dean’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction.

2. Whether the district court erred in granting D.L. Evans’ motion for partial summary 

judgment because D.L. Evans’ claim for an action on its judgment was time-barred.

3. Whether the district court erred in denying Dean’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the 

2010 Judgment as void.

4. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When reviewing a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to dismiss, the 

standard of review for this Court depends on which subsection of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b) is at issue. Compare Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 171 Idaho 296, 300, 520 P.3d 708, 712 

(2022) (de novo review of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)), with Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 

674, 678–79, 201 P.3d 647, 651–52 (2009) (bifurcated review of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(5)). We freely review a district court’s decision that it possessed personal jurisdiction over 

an out-of-state defendant, which may be challenged pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2). See Dep’t of Fin., Sec. Bureau v. Zarinegar, 167 Idaho 611, 621, 474 P.3d 683, 693 

(2020). 

“When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 

the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion.” Neeser v. Inland Empire 

Paper Co., 170 Idaho 692, 696, 516 P.3d 562, 566 (2022) (quoting Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 

Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008)). “The court must grant summary judgment if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment.” Neeser, 170 Idaho 

at 696, 516 P.3d at 566 (quoting Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 

986 (2009)). “If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over 

which this Court exercises free review.” Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen, 171 Idaho 917, 921, 

527 P.3d 520, 524 (2023) (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The district court had personal jurisdiction over Dean.

Dean argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Dean asserts that the 2020 Complaint failed to allege a basis for the district 

court’s personal jurisdiction over him. Dean also disputes the district court’s conclusion that he 

voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court because the notice of appearance 

specifically stated that it did not waive any defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction.

D.L. Evans counters that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Dean under Idaho 

Code section 5-514(a) because the 2010 Judgment arose from a business relationship that Dean 

had in Idaho. Additionally, D.L. Evans asserts that Dean waived his objection to personal 
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jurisdiction when he consented to jurisdiction in a continuing commercial guaranty and when his 

attorney filed a notice of appearance in the matter.

The district court denied Dean’s motion. It first concluded that the 2020 Complaint alleged 

sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction under Idaho Code section 5-514(a) and (c) because 

the 2010 Judgment was “predicated on the transaction of business by the parties and on the 

ownership, use and possession of real property.” The district court then determined that Dean 

voluntarily submitted to the court’s personal jurisdiction when his counsel filed a general notice 

of appearance in the action. 

We agree that Dean’s notice of appearance constituted a voluntary appearance waiving any 

right to contest personal jurisdiction and affirm the district court’s decision on that basis. Our 

analysis of this issue begins with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(a), which provides that the 

voluntary appearance of a party, except as provided in subsection (b) of the rule, constitutes a 

voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Subsection (b) of the rule then

identifies how a party can specially appear to contest personal jurisdiction:

(b) Motion or Special Appearance to Contest Personal Jurisdiction. The following 

do not constitute a voluntary appearance by a party under this Rule:

(1) a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), whether raised before or after 

judgment;

(2) a motion under Rule 40(a) or (b);

(3) a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear;

(4) the joinder of other defenses in a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5);

(5) a response to discovery or to a motion filed by another party after a party 

files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), action taken by that party in 

responding to discovery or to a motion filed by another party;

(6) pleading further and defending an action by a party whose motion 

under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied; or

(7) filing a document entitled “special appearance,” which does not seek 

relief but merely provides notice that the party is entering a special 

appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, if a motion under Rule 

12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is filed within fourteen (14) days after filing the special 

appearance, or within such later time as the court permits.

I.R.C.P. 4.1(b) (emphasis added). We have held that a notice of appearance that “reserve[d] all 

objections and defenses, including but not limited to defenses provided for under Rule 12(b) of the 

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure” had “no effect” and constituted a general appearance. Engleman 
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v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 85, 44 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2002). Here, counsel for Dean filed a notice of 

appearance, which could only constitute a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction if it 

met the requirements of Rule 4.1(b)(7) and if he subsequently filed the necessary motion within 

fourteen days after filing the special appearance. 

We hold that Dean’s notice of appearance did not meet the requirements of Rule 4.1(b)(7) 

and therefore constituted a general appearance. First, the notice of appearance was not entitled 

“special appearance.” Second, Dean did not file a motion under Rules 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) within 

fourteen days after filing his notice of appearance, nor did he seek leave from the court to extend 

the time for such a filing. Having failed to satisfy the requirements to contest personal jurisdiction

under Rule 4.1(b)(7), Dean’s notice of appearance constituted a voluntary submission to the 

personal jurisdiction of the court. I.R.C.P. 4.1(a).

Dean argues that the district court erred in concluding that he voluntarily submitted to the 

district court’s personal jurisdiction because his notice of appearance purported to reserve his right 

to contest personal jurisdiction. Dean also contends that his motion to dismiss was timely under 

the rule because D.L. Evans’ counsel granted him a ten-day extension to respond to the complaint 

and Dean filed a motion contesting the district court’s personal jurisdiction within that timeframe. 

Dean’s first argument is foreclosed by our decision in Engleman. Dean’s notice of 

appearance is virtually identical to the one we found lacking in Engleman. It was not entitled 

“special appearance” and contained only a general statement that Dean was not waiving any 

defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The notice of appearance did not comply with 

Rule 4.1(b) and, as a result, it constituted a general appearance under the rule. See Engleman, 137 

Idaho at 85, 44 P.3d at 1140. 

Dean’s second argument, that D.L. Evans’ extension to answer the complaint served to

extend his time to file a motion to dismiss under Rule 4.1(b)(7), is also unpersuasive. Dean cites

no authority for his contention that parties can agree to extend the rule’s fourteen-day timeframe

without the court’s express approval. Further, for reasons already discussed, Dean cannot satisfy 

the other requirements of Rule 4.1(b)(7). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion 

that Dean voluntarily submitted to the district court’s personal jurisdiction. 

B. The 2020 Complaint was timely filed.

Having determined that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Dean, we now turn 

to the merits of Dean’s appeal. The district court concluded that D.L. Evans’ claim for an action 
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on its judgment was not barred by the six-year limitation period in Idaho Code section 5-215 

(2004).1 The district court concluded that each time D.L. Evans obtained a court order renewing 

the 2010 Judgment, the order restarted the limitation period for filing an action on the judgment.

It then concluded that D.L. Evans timely renewed the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019, and 

therefore, its 2020 Complaint for an action on the judgment was timely filed.

Dean argues that the district court erred because the six-year statute of limitations for an 

action on the judgment began to run when the judgment was originally entered in 2010. Dean 

maintains that the 2015 and 2019 orders renewing the 2010 Judgment are not “judgments”;

therefore, they did not restart the statute of limitations for an action on the judgment. D.L. Evans 

counters that Idaho law unequivocally provided for the “renewal” of its 2010 Judgment. Therefore,

the 2015 and 2019 orders renewing the 2010 Judgment restarted the limitation period for an action 

on the judgment.

At the time the 2010 Judgment was entered, Idaho Code section 10-1111 provided that a 

judgment was valid for five years. I.C. § 10-1111 (2004).2 Idaho law also provided two processes 

for a judgment creditor to ensure the judgment remains effective after the initial five-year period: 

(1) renewing the judgment under Idaho Code section 10-1111, and (2) bringing a common law 

“action on the judgment.” See Smith v. Smith, 131 Idaho 800, 802, 964 P.2d 667, 669 (Ct. App. 

1998) (Smith I). 

Under the first method, a creditor could file a motion in the original case to renew the 

judgment for an additional five-year period. I.C. § 10-1111. The parties agree that the 1995 version 

of section 10-1111, which was in effect at the time the 2010 Judgment was entered, is applicable 

here.

Under the second method, a creditor could bring a common law claim for an “action on the 

judgment.” Smith I, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669; see also I.C. § 5-215. An action on a 

judgment is a new lawsuit seeking a new judgment for the amount remaining due on the original 

judgment. See Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 67, 294 P.3d 184, 193 (2013) (“An action on a 

judgment results in a completely new Idaho judgment in favor of the judgment creditor.”). When 

1 All references to Idaho Code section 5-215 in this opinion are to the version that existed before it was amended 

during the 2015 legislative session. 2 All references to Idaho Code section 10-1111 in this opinion are to the version that was enacted in 1995 and that 

remained in effect until it was amended during the 2011 legislative session.
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the 2010 Judgment was issued, Idaho law provided a six-year statute of limitations for an action 

on a judgment. I.C. § 5-215. 

The crux of Dean’s statute of limitations argument is that an order renewing a judgment is 

different than a judgment. Dean does not argue that the 2015 or 2019 orders renewing the 2010 

Judgment were improper. Instead, Dean argues that, because the six-year statute of limitations in 

Idaho Code section 5-215 pertains to an action upon a judgment, the 2015 and 2019 orders did not 

restart the six-year statute of limitations. According to Dean, only a document entitled “judgment” 

can restart the statute of limitations. Dean’s argument requires us to interpret the 1995 version of 

section 10-1111 to determine whether the district court’s 2015 and 2019 orders renewed the 

judgment and, therefore, restarted the six-year statute of limitations for an action on the judgment.

“The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that 

adopted the act.” Chester v. Wild Idaho Adventures RV Park, LLC, 171 Idaho 212, 223, 519 P.3d 

1152, 1163 (2022) (quoting Nelson v. Evans, 166 Idaho 815, 820, 464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020)). 

Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute giving the words their plain, 

usual, and ordinary meaning. See Access Behav. Health v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 170 Idaho 

874, 881, 517 P.3d 803, 810 (2022) (citation omitted). “If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 

does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” Chester, 171 Idaho at 223, 519 P.3d 

at 1163 (quoting Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 

506 (2011)). “Statutory language is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be 

uncertain as to its meaning.” Nordgaarden v. Kiebert, 171 Idaho 883, 890, 527 P.3d 486, 493 

(2023) (alteration omitted) (quoting City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 

582, 416 P.3d 951, 954 (2018)).

The plain language of section 10-1111 provides that a court may “renew” a judgment at 

any time prior to the expiration of the judgment. It does not specify that a new judgment must be 

issued in order to renew the prior judgment:

Unless the judgment has been satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of the 

lien created by section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court 

which entered the judgment, other than a judgment for child support, may, upon 

motion, renew such judgment. The renewed judgment may be recorded in the same 

manner as the original judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for 

five (5) years from the date of judgment.

I.C. § 10-1111 (emphasis added). Although the statute does not define the term “renew,” “[t]his 

Court often turns to dictionary definitions ‘[t]o ascertain the ordinary meaning of an undefined 
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term in a statute[.]’” State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 586, 448 P.3d 1005, 1014 (2019) (second

alteration in original) (citation omitted). The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in effect during 

1995 defined “renew” as “[t]o make new again; to restore to freshness; to make new spiritually; to 

regenerate; to begin again; to recommence; to resume; to restore to existence; to revive; to 

reestablish; to recreate; to replace; to grant or obtain an extension of.” Renew, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). The plain meaning of the term “renew” indicates that a court order 

granting a motion to renew a judgment “recommences” the judgment, thus making it new again.

Dean contends that the statutory language providing that “[t]he renewed judgment may be 

recorded in the same manner as the original judgment” indicates that a document entitled “renewed 

judgment” must be entered in order to renew a judgment. We disagree and decline to adopt such a 

narrow reading of the statute. Dean’s argument takes the term “renewed judgment” out of context. 

The sentence immediately prior to the language Dean relies on states that, “the court which entered 

the judgment . . . may, upon motion, renew such judgment.” Nothing in the statute indicates that a 

separate document entitled “renewed judgment” must be entered. Rather, when read in conjunction 

with the rest of section 10-1111 and the plain meaning of the word “renew,” the language that 

Dean references simply stands for the proposition that the court order granting the motion to renew 

constitutes the renewed judgment and may be recorded in the same manner as the original 

judgment.

We hold that the plain language of section 10-1111 indicated that an order renewing a 

judgment operated to renew the judgment itself; therefore, the entry of another judgment was 

unnecessary to renew the original judgment. Our holding is further supported by our recent 

decision in another case interpreting the 1995 version of section 10-1111, in which we held that 

“[Idaho Code section] 10-1111 provides for the renewal of judgments, not just judgment liens.” 

See Alpha Mortg. Fund II v. Drinkard, 169 Idaho 446, 452, 497 P.3d 200, 206 (2021) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Smith I, 131 Idaho at 802, 964 P.2d at 669). 

In Alpha Mortgage, the respondent, Alpha Mortgage Fund II, obtained a judgment against 

the appellants, Robert and Nancy Drinkard, and later moved to renew its judgment within five 

years after it was entered. Id. at 449, 497 P.3d at 203. The district court entered an order renewing 

the judgment, but Alpha Mortgage never filed or recorded the renewed judgment to extend its 

judgment lien. See id. Within five years of the order renewing the original judgment, Alpha 
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Mortgage filed another motion to renew the original judgment, which the district court granted. Id.

The Drinkards appealed the district court’s second order renewing the original judgment. Id.

On appeal, the Drinkards argued that the original judgment expired and the “2015 

Judgment”—which was actually the district court’s order renewing the original judgment—was 

not subject to renewal because it had never been recorded. Id. at 451, 497 P.3d at 205. Interpreting 

the same version of section 10-1111 as the one before us now, we concluded that recording a 

judgment is unnecessary to the renewal process and rejected the Drinkards’ argument because the 

second order for renewal was timely filed and Alpha Mortgage was not required to record a new 

judgment in order to renew it. Id. at 452–53, 497 P.3d at 206–07. 

Similarly, in this case, no additional action beyond entry of the orders of renewal was 

required to renew D.L. Evans’ 2010 Judgment. It was not necessary for D.L. Evans to also obtain 

a document entitled “renewed judgment,” because section 10-1111, “[b]y its terms, . . . provides 

for the renewal of judgments, not just judgment liens.” Id. at 451–52, 497 P.3d at 205–06 (citation 

omitted).

Dean argues that Alpha Mortgage does not control the outcome here because it did not 

concern whether the statute of limitations for an action on a judgment is reset by an order renewing 

a judgment under section 10-1111. We agree that, while Alpha Mortgage is instructive on the 

question of whether the 2015 and 2019 orders renewed the judgment, it did not address whether 

the orders could restart the statute of limitations for an action on the judgment. However, our 

holding today that the 2015 and 2019 orders renewed the 2010 Judgment resolves the issue. 

As previously discussed, we hold that the 2015 and 2019 orders renewed the 2010 

Judgment. The version of section 5-215 in effect in 2010 provided for a six-year statute of 

limitations to bring an action on a judgment. Each time the 2010 Judgment was renewed, the 

renewal restarted the six-year statute of limitations for an action on the judgment. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s decision that the 2020 Complaint, filed the year after the 2010 Judgment 

was last renewed in 2019, was timely filed.

C. The 2010 Judgment was not void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4).

Dean also argues that the district court erred in declining to set aside the 2010 Judgment. 

The district court concluded that Dean could not set aside the 2010 Judgment through a collateral 

attack because it was not void on its face. The district court concluded that, even if a collateral 

attack were allowed, Dean’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the 2010 Judgment was untimely 
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because the record demonstrated that Dean knew about the 2010 Judgment for over a decade before 

seeking to set it aside. As a result, the district court never reached the question of whether the 2010 

Judgment was void.

Dean argues that the district court’s decision is erroneous for several reasons. First, Dean 

argues that he could attack the validity of the 2010 Judgment in the present action as an affirmative 

defense to D.L. Evans’ action on that judgment. Thus, Dean argues that he did not collaterally 

attack the judgment and, therefore, the district court erred in concluding that he must demonstrate 

the 2010 Judgment was void on its face. Dean next argues that the district court erred when it 

concluded that he failed to timely move to set aside the 2010 Judgment because a motion under 

Rule 60(b)(4) can be filed at any time. Finally, Dean contends that the evidence he presented in 

support of his motion for summary judgment established that D.L. Evans had failed to properly 

serve him with the summons, complaint, and other documents in the underlying action that resulted 

in the 2010 Judgment.

D.L. Evans argues that the district court correctly held that Dean could not collaterally 

attack the 2010 Judgment because he has not argued that it is void on its face. D.L. Evans also 

argues that Dean’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion was untimely. Finally, D.L. Evans argues that Dean was 

afforded due process in the underlying action and that Dean had actual notice of the underlying 

action.

“Generally, ‘final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack.’” 

Jim & Maryann Plane Fam. Tr. v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015) (quoting 

Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012)). However, a void judgment can 

be collaterally attacked because a “void judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be based 

thereon[.]” Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50, 382 P.2d 910, 912–13 (1963) (citations omitted). 

This Court has historically held that, when collaterally attacked, a judgment must be void on the 

face of the judgment roll, and the judgment roll historically contained the record of the 

proceedings. See Weil v. Defenbach, 36 Idaho 37, 44, 208 P. 1025, 1026–27 (1922); Welch v. 

Morris, 49 Idaho 781, 783, 291 P. 1048, 1049 (1930); O’Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, 731–32, 93 

P. 20, 24 (1907).

Our holding in Weil predated the advent of our current rules of civil procedure. After we

promulgated the rules of civil procedure, a separate but related body of caselaw developed under 

Rule 60(b)(4), which allows a court to set aside a judgment upon motion when the judgment is 
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void. We have stated that, “[n]otwithstanding the timeliness requirements of Rule 60(b), void 

judgments can be attacked at any time.” Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157 Idaho 966, 970, 342 P.3d 

893, 897 (2015) (citing Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 291, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009)).

Accordingly, a litigant can mount a direct attack under Rule 60(b)(4) on a void judgment in the 

same action where it was entered or use Rule 60(b)(4) as a vehicle for avoiding the collateral 

consequences of a void judgment—such as in an enforcement action on the judgment. See id.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the district court twice erred in its analysis of Dean’s 

Rule 60(b)(4) motion. First, the district court erred by concluding that Dean’s collateral attack on 

the 2010 Judgment failed because he did not argue that the judgment was void on its face. In 

rendering its decision, the district court relied on this Court’s decision in Weil for the proposition 

that a collateral attack on a judgment can only succeed when the judgment is void on its face. See

Weil, 36 Idaho 37, 208 P. 1025. Setting aside that Weil references the face of the “judgment roll” 

not the face of the “judgment,” we reiterate today that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion can be brought at 

any time, including as a collateral attack on a void judgment in an action on that judgment. 

The district court also erred when it concluded that Dean’s collateral attack on the 2010 

Judgment was untimely. As noted, a void judgment may be attacked at any time. E.g., Golub, 157 

Idaho at 970, 342 P.3d at 897. Accordingly, Dean was able to challenge the validity of the 2010 

Judgment by arguing that it was void. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court’s ultimate 

conclusion denying Dean relief from the 2010 Judgment because Dean has failed to establish that 

the 2010 Judgment was void. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 

827, 367 P.3d 208, 222 (2016) (“The Court ‘will uphold the decision of a trial court if any 

alternative legal basis can be found to support it.’” (citation omitted)).

To balance the interest in upholding the finality of judgments with the interest in not 

enforcing void judgments, the concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed. Golub, 157 Idaho 

at 970, 342 P.3d at 897 (citation omitted). A judgment is void only when there is some 

jurisdictional defect or the judgment was entered without due process of law:

In order for a judgment to be void, there must generally be some jurisdictional 

defect in the court’s authority to enter the judgment, either [1] because the court 

lacks personal jurisdiction or [2] because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter 

of the suit. A judgment is also void where it is [3] entered in violation of due process 

because the party was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Skinner, 157 Idaho at 933, 342 P.3d at 645 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A judgment 

is void on due process grounds when the “court’s action amounts to a plain usurpation of power 
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constituting a violation of due process.” Meyers, 148 Idaho at 291, 221 P.3d at 89 (quoting Dep’t 

of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004)).

In this case, Dean contends that the judgment violated his procedural due process rights 

under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions because D.L. Evans failed to properly 

effectuate service of process on him in the 2009 lawsuit, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, both of which 

“must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[.]” S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County, 

170 Idaho 282, 307, 510 P.3d 635, 660 (2022) (citation omitted). We conclude that Dean has failed 

to demonstrate a violation of his procedural due process rights.

Although Dean asserts that D.L. Evans’ service of process in the 2009 action failed to 

comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the record establishes that Dean had actual notice

of the underlying lawsuit, which establishes that he was afforded due process. The record includes 

a letter that Dean sent to D.L. Evans’ attorney on December 9, 2009. In that letter, Dean states that 

“[y]ou [D.L. Evans] have filed an action against me and my former wife on our personal guarantees 

for the deficiency arising out of the foreclosure sale of two homes for the bank at the Village Green 

project located at the Valley Club.” A review of the complaint in the 2009 action reveals that 

Dean’s 2009 letter accurately recites the allegations set out in that complaint. The 2010 Judgment

was not entered until January 13, 2010, which means Dean had actual notice of the action more

than a month before judgment was entered against him. Despite having received the 2009

Complaint, Dean never appeared in the lawsuit. Moreover, Dean also admitted in a debtor’s 

examination that he had notice of D.L. Evans’ lawsuit and chose not to defend:

I continued with my problem with D.L. Evans, of course, and they chose --

I sent them a letter; I tried to work with them; they wouldn’t respond. And then a 

lawsuit was filed. I had no defenses to it, and I know what I’m saying. And so a 

judgment was taken.

The record demonstrates that Dean received actual notice of the suit and opted not to appear 

and defend himself. Dean’s actual notice of the 2009 Complaint over a month before entry of the 

2010 Judgment satisfied the requirements of procedural due process as a matter of law. See S Bar 

Ranch, 170 Idaho at 308, 510 P.3d at 661 (holding that hearing notices lacking certain details 

related to conditional use permit application did not violate appellant’s procedural due process 

rights because the record revealed that appellant had actual notice of the details prior to the 

hearing).
14

Dean does not dispute that he received actual notice of the lawsuit, but instead argues that 

actual notice does not meet “the high burden of service of process and due process” because “[t]his 

Court has held on several occasions a defendant’s actual notice of a lawsuit—even a defendant’s 

possession of copies of a complaint and summons—is not sufficient to constitute legally required 

service of process.” While it is true that this Court has held that actual notice is insufficient to 

demonstrate legally sufficient service of process, we have also held that actual notice would meet 

the requirements of due process. Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 287, 271 P.3d 678, 685 (2010) 

(“In fact, we held in Campbell that receiving a copy of the summons and complaint in the mail, 

which would obviously meet the requirements of due process, did not constitute service of the 

summons and complaint.” (citing Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 159 P.3d 891 (2007))).

Dean has not cited us to any authority supporting his position that, despite a party having 

received actual notice of a lawsuit, the failure to properly serve that party constitutes a due process 

violation. State and federal caselaw hold the contrary. See id.; see also Espinosa v. United Student 

Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1203 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because ‘due process does not require 

actual notice, it follows a fortiori that actual notice satisfies due process. We find the argument 

that the Constitution requires something more than actual notice strained to the point of bizarre.” 

(internal citation omitted)).

Because Dean had actual notice of the complaint over a month prior to the entry of 

judgment against him, Dean failed to establish a violation of his procedural due process rights. See 

S Bar Ranch, 170 Idaho at 308, 510 P.3d at 661. As a result, Dean has failed to demonstrate that 

the 2010 Judgment is void, and we affirm the district court’s order refusing to set aside the 2010 

Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).

D. D.L. Evans is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the 

commercial guaranty.

D.L. Evans seeks attorney fees under the terms of the commercial guaranty that Dean 

signed, which was the basis for Dean’s liability in the underlying lawsuit that resulted in the 2010 

Judgment. “Attorney fees on appeal may be awarded to the prevailing party when the parties 

contemplated such fees in the underlying contract.” Gordon v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 166 Idaho 

105, 123, 455 P.3d 374, 392 (2019) (citation omitted).

D.L. Evans is the prevailing party here because we have affirmed the district court’s order. 

We hold that D.L. Evans is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal as provided in the commercial 
15

guaranty that Dean signed. The commercial guaranty contemplates an award of attorney fees 

related to D.L. Evans’ enforcement efforts, including its defense of this appeal:

Guarantor [Dean] agrees to pay upon demand all of Lender’s [D.L. Evans’] costs 

and expenses, including Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and Lender’s legal 

expenses, incurred in connection with the enforcement of this Guaranty. Lender 

may hire or pay someone else to help enforce this Guaranty, and Guarantor shall 

pay the costs and expenses of such enforcement. Costs and expenses include 

Lender’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and legal expenses whether or not there is a 

lawsuit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and legal expenses for bankruptcy 

proceedings (including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or 

injunction), appeals, and any anticipated post-judgment collection services. 

Guarantor also shall pay all court costs and such additional fees as may be directed 

by the court.

(Emphasis added.) D.L. Evans seeks recovery of attorney fees incurred in connection with its 

efforts to enforce Dean’s liability under the guaranty. The plain language of the guaranty permits 

this award and we, therefore, award D.L. Evans its reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 

Both parties also seek attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Section 

12-120(3) provides that, “[i]n any civil action to recover on . . . any commercial transaction unless 

otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be 

set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” Dean has not prevailed on appeal and,

therefore, is not entitled to an award of fees. We need not address whether D.L. Evans would be 

entitled to an award of fees under this statute because we have already determined it is entitled to 

attorney fees under the commercial guaranty.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of D.L. Evans and award D.L. Evans its 

reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the commercial guaranty. D.L. Evans is also entitled to its

costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40.

Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices STEGNER and MOELLER, and Pro Tem Justice BROWN 

CONCUR.