UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2211

LUZMA KENIDA MARTINEZ-CERON, a/k/a Luzma Kenide Ceron, 

a/k/a Luzma K. Ceron, a/k/a Luzma Kenida Martinezceron,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: July 10, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Chester Smith, SMITH LAW GROUP, PLLC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, 

for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie M. Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel, James A. 

Hurley, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Luzma Kenida Martinez-Ceron (“Martinez”), a native and 

citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing her appeal from 

the immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”).* We have thoroughly reviewed the 

record, including the evidence presented to the immigration 

court and the transcript of Martinez’s merits hearing. We 

conclude that the record evidence does not compel any factual 

findings contrary to those made by the immigration judge and 

affirmed by the Board, particularly as to the finding that 

Martinez failed to satisfy the requisite nexus element, see 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); HernandezAvalos v. Lynch, No. 14-1331, 2015 WL 1936721, at *3 (4th Cir. 

Apr. 30, 2015) (“[A]n asylum applicant . . . must demonstrate 

that [membership in a particular social group was] more than an 

incidental, tangential, superficial or subordinate reason for 

[the] persecution . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)),

 * Martinez did not substantively challenge the denial of her

application for protection under the CAT. Accordingly, Martinez 

has waived appellate review of this issue. See SuarezValenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(failing to raise a challenge to the Board’s ruling or finding 

in an opening brief waives the issue).
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and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to 

uphold the denial of Martinez’s applications for relief. See

I.N.S. v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (“The BIA’s 

determination that [an applicant is] not eligible for 

asylum . . . can be reversed only if the evidence 

presented . . . [is] such that a reasonable factfinder would 

have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution 

existed.”).

Further, we reject Martinez’s claim that the immigration 

judge erred in failing to continue her removal proceedings. At 

the master calendar hearing prior to the merits hearing, counsel 

for Martinez informed the immigration judge that the state postconviction proceeding had not been successful, and counsel did 

not pursue a continuance at any point thereafter. 

Finally, we are not persuaded that the Board should have 

remanded this case to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (“USCIS”) because of an error in the USCIS’s decision 

to withdraw Martinez’s temporary protected status (“TPS”). To 

be sure, the USCIS ruling referred to a felony conviction that 

Martinez does not have. But the USCIS also detailed Martinez’s 

two misdemeanor convictions, which were conceded, and this is a 

proper basis for withdrawing TPS. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (an alien “convicted of any felony or 

2 or more misdemeanors committed in the United States” is not 
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eligible for TPS); 8 C.F.R. § 244.4(a) (2014) (same); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 244.14(a)(1) (2014) (authorizing the USCIS to withdraw TPS 

granted to an alien who “at any time thereafter becomes 

ineligible for such status”). We thus agree with the Board that 

there was no basis for a remand in this case. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the 

reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Martinez-Ceron (B.I.A. 

Oct. 9, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

PETITION DENIED