J-A24025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JRA INC. 

Appellant

v.

SPRINGFIELD REALTY PARTNERS, 

L.P., PENNSYLVANIA CVS 

PHARMACY, L.L.C. AND CVS HEALTH 

CORPORATION

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3154 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at 

No(s): CV-2020-003245

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 25, 2024

Appellant JRA, Inc. appeals from the November 22, 2022 order entered 

by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, granting the motion for 

summary judgment filed by Appellees Pennsylvania CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C., 

and CVS Health Corporation and joined by Appellee Springfield Realty 

Partners, L.P. and Intervenor Provident Bank. In so doing, the court dismissed 

with prejudice Appellant’s complaint filed in this commercial landlord-tenant

action. After careful consideration, we affirm.

The factual and procedural history are as follows. On May 21, 1999, 

Appellant JRA, Inc. (“Landlord”) and Appellee Springfield Realty Partners, L.P. 

(“Tenant”) entered into a commercial ground lease (“Lease”). Relevantly, the 

Lease defined an “Event of Default” as including “a failure by Tenant to 
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make . . . any payment of Basic Rent which continues unremedied for a period 

of five (5) days after written notice ("Nonpayment Notice") thereof from 

Landlord . . . .” Lease at ¶ 19. The Lease additionally mandated that all 

notices and requests be in writing and provided by registered mail, certified 

mail, or air courier service to the specific addresses listed.

1

 Id. at ¶ 21.

Also in May 1999, Appellee CVS Health Corporation (“Guarantor”) 

executed a Corporate Guarantee, through which it assumed responsibility 

under the Lease in the event of Tenant’s default. The Corporate Guarantee

stated that Guarantor would pay the rent due in addition to “all damages and 

all costs and expenses that may arise in consequence of any default by Tenant 

under the Lease” “after the expiration of any applicable cure period after any 

required notice.” Corporate Guaranty, dated 5/21/1999, at 1. In August 

1999, Tenant subleased the property to the predecessor in interest of Appellee

Pennsylvania CVS Pharmacy L.L.C. (“Subtenant”). 

In March 2000, Landlord and Tenant signed an amendment to the Lease, 

which included a provision instructing Tenant to make monthly payments to 

Landlord’s mortgage lender (“Landlord’s Lender”). Second Amendment to 

Lease, dated 3/14/2000, at ¶ 12. On April 14, 2000, in conjunction with the

amendment, Landlord, Tenant, and Subtenant entered into an agreement 

(“Letter Agreement”) which directed Subtenant to make each rent payment 

____________________________________________

1 Paragraph 21 provided specific addresses for Landlord and Tenant and 

mandated that all notices to Tenant be sent “c/o Goodman Properties” “[w]ith 

a copy to” Tenant’s counsel and CVS Corporation. Id. For ease of discussion, 

we will utilize the term “Tenant” to include Goodman Properties.
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to Landlord’s Lender. It further provided, “Landlord, Tenant and Subtenant 

have agreed that this notification of the payment of rent may not be modified 

or revoked without [Landlord’s] Lender's written authorization.” Letter 

Agreement at 2. 

Also in April 2000, Landlord and Subtenant executed a Non-Disturbance 

and Attornment Agreement (“NDA”), to which Tenant consented. The NDA

required Landlord “to give Subtenant and [Guarantor] written notice of any 

default” under the Lease and provide Subtenant and Guarantor the same

opportunity to cure the default as provided to Tenant under the Lease. NDA, 

April 4, 2000, at ¶ 4. Indeed, the NDA specified that no “notice of default 

shall be deemed given to [Tenant] unless and until a copy of such notice shall 

have been delivered to Subtenant and [Guarantor].” Id. Moreover, the NDA 

mandated that “[a]ny notice, election, communication, request or other

document or demand required or permitted under this Agreement shall be in 

writing[.]”

2 Id. at ¶ 11.

In September 2018, Tenant entered into a Leasehold Mortgage with 

Provident Bank (“Tenant’s Bank”), as permitted under Paragraph 35 of the 

Lease. Under Paragraph 35 of the Lease, Landlord agreed to “simultaneously 

serve” the holder of a leasehold mortgage with a copy of “any notice of 

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2 The paragraph indicated a specific address for notices to Subtenant “with a 

copy to” a specific address for Guarantor. Neither address included an email 

address. Id.
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default” served on Tenant and provide the holder with the same period to 

remedy the default as provided to Tenant. Lease at ¶ 35(b). 

For approximately twenty years, Subtenant paid rent as required to 

Landlord’s Lender. 

On April 6, 2020, Landlord’s vice president emailed Tenant’s leasing 

representative to inform her that Landlord had paid off the mortgage with 

Landlord’s Lender and to request that all future rent payments be made

directly to Landlord. In the weeks following the initial email, Landlord’s vice 

president repeatedly communicated with Tenant’s representatives attempting 

to secure the change in payment instructions. 

Landlord did not provide direct written notice from Landlord to

Subtenant requesting a change in payment method prior to the May 1, 2020 

due date. Landlord also did not provide written authorization from Landlord’s 

Lender of the change in payment method as required by the April 2000 Letter 

Agreement. 

On May 1, 2020, Subtenant paid rent to Landlord’s Lender, which 

rejected it on May 6, 2020, as the account had been closed after Landlord paid 

off the mortgage. 

On May 5, 2020, Landlord’s vice president emailed Guarantor’s lease 

administration manager, Tenant’s leasing representative and Tenant’s senior 

property coordinator attaching a “formal letter for your file[.]” Email of John 

Rhodes, 5/5/2020. The attached letter, addressed to Guarantor and Tenant,

stated that it was “a formal notice to you demanding you make immediate 
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payment of the May 2020 rent in the amount of $40,416.66 that was due May 

1, 2020” as well as $1,458.33 resulting from a base rent adjustment for the 

second half of April (“Emailed Demand Letter”). The Emailed Demand Letter 

further stated that Landlord “would appreciate that the monthly payments be 

made on the first day of each month going forward” and provided instructions 

for wiring funds to Landlord. Id. Notably, the Emailed Demand Letter did not 

include the term “default,” address the five-day cure period, or threaten legal 

action. 

On the same day, Landlord also sent a nearly identical Demand Letter 

via Federal Express to Guarantor and Tenant, which differed only due to the 

addition of Tenant’s counsel as an addressee (“Mailed Demand Letter”). 

Importantly, there is no indication in the record that Landlord provided the 

Emailed or Mailed Demand Letter to Subtenant.

We emphasize that eleven days later, on May 16, 2020, Landlord filed a 

Complaint against Tenant, Subtenant, and Guarantor (collectively 

“Defendants”), claiming breach of the Lease for failure to pay rent. Landlord

sought (1) to collect from Tenant rent and other damages, including attorneys’ 

fees; (2) to eject Tenant and Subtenant; and (3) to collect from Guarantor

rent and other damages, including attorneys’ fees.

3

 

Ten days later, on May 26, 2020, Tenant paid the rent directly to 

Landlord. Indeed, by June 1, 2020, Subtenant and Tenant’s Bank had also

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3

In August 2020, Tenant’s Bank sought intervention, which the trial court 

granted in March 2021.
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sent the rent payment to Landlord.

4

 The Defendants, however, did not pay 

the attorney fees and costs Landlord claimed it incurred to collect the pastdue rent, which Landlord claims currently totals in the “hundreds of thousands 

of dollars[.]” Landlord’s Br. at 23. Although the rent was now fully paid, 

Landlord continued this litigation.

5

On July 27, 2022, Subtenant and Guarantor filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment, which Tenant and Tenant’s Bank joined. On September 8, 2022, 

Landlord responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

On November 22, 2022, following oral argument on November 3, 2022, 

the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. It first concluded 

that Landlord could not prove breach of the Lease “because Landlord failed to 

comply with the notice requirements set forth in the parties’ agreements, 

[such that] Tenant had no opportunity to cure any purported default by 

Subtenant.” Trial Ct. Op., 3/27/23, at 13-14. The court highlighted that “the 

purported notice was not provided at all to Subtenant[.]” Id. at 14. Secondly, 

the court concluded that, absent breach of the Lease, Landlord was “not 

entitled to eject” the Defendants from the property. Id. at 16. Finally, based 

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4 Landlord subsequently refunded the rent paid by Tenant’s Bank and Tenant.

5 Although we analyze this appeal on the basis of the various agreements, we 

question Landlord’s tactics in filing a complaint when Subtenant paid the rent 

to Landlord’s Lender as the documents required and Landlord failed to notify 

Subtenant to pay the May 2020 rent to Landlord. Indeed, Landlord still filed 

a complaint less than a month later, continued to pursue this litigation even 

after Tenant paid the May 2020 rent on May 26, 2020, and now claims a right 

to hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney fees. 
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upon the same reasoning, the court held that Landlord could not prove breach 

of contract by Guarantor absent proper notice of default. Id. at 17. 

Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all three 

counts of the Complaint, denied Landlord’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, and dismissed Landlord’s complaint with prejudice. 

On December 15, 2022, Landlord filed its notice of appeal to this Court, 

after which, the trial court and Landlord complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Landlord raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt [err] by finding [Landlord] failed to 

comply with notice requirements under the governing agreements 

as to [Tenant], [Subtenant,] and [Tenant’s Bank] warranting the 

entry of summary judgment against [Landlord] and the denial of 

[Landlord’s] cross-motion for summary judgment?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt [err] in ostensibly excusing the 

nonpayment of rent by [Tenant] and [Subtenant] based on some 

“obligation” to continue to pay the rent to [Landlord’s] Lender 

even though the loan was repaid and the Lender had stopped 

accepting payments?

Landlord’s Br. at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

A.

As Landlord challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we 

reiterate that “summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where 

the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (citation 

omitted). “An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if 

there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Nicolaou v. Martin,
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195 A.3d 880, 892 (Pa. 2018). The determination of whether any questions 

of material fact remain is a question of law, for which “our standard of review 

is de novo.” Summers, 997 A.2d at 1159 (citation omitted). 

In addressing a summary judgment motion, a court “must take all facts 

of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. In so doing, the trial court . . . may only grant summary 

judgment where the right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt.” 

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

It is well-established that leases, such as those involved in the instant 

case, “are in the nature of contracts and are, thus, controlled by principles of 

contract law, including the well settled rules of interpretation and 

construction.” Fraport Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Allegheny Cnty. Airport Auth.,

296 A.3d 9, 15 (Pa. Super. 2023). Our purpose in interpreting a lease is “to 

ascertain the intention of the parties, and such intention is to be gleaned from 

the language of the lease.” Id. To establish a cause of action for breach of 

contract, a party must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract, including 

its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract[, and] (3) resultant damages.” 

Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. L. Firm of Malone 

Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016).

B.

Landlord argues that the trial court erred in finding that Landlord could 

not demonstrate default under the Lease because Landlord did not provide the 

requisite notice of default. Landlord’s Brief at 21-23. Landlord maintains that 
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its communications to the Defendants provided each with “actual notice” of 

the default, emphasizing that the entities were all “sophisticated business 

entities[.]” Id. at 21-22. Landlord asks this Court to reverse the grant of 

summary judgment and direct the trial court to grant summary judgment to 

Landlord and to address Landlord’s ejectment request and assess damages, 

including attorney fees. Alternatively, it requests that this Court reverse 

summary judgment and remand for trial. Id. at 40. 

After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court correctly 

granted summary judgment to Defendants because Landlord failed to

establish a breach of the Lease. Trial Ct. Op. at 13-16. As the trial court 

noted, the Lease established that an Event of Default occurred only if Tenant 

failed to remit payment after Landlord provided written notice and a five-day

opportunity to cure. Moreover, the NDA provided that Tenant would not be 

deemed to have received the requisite notice of default until Landlord provided 

both Subtenant and Guarantor with notice of default. While Landlord emailed 

and mailed the demand letter to Guarantor or Guarantor’s representative, the 

record does not include any evidence that Landlord provided the notice to 

Subtenant. Trial Ct. Op. at 14. Absent the requisite notice of default to 

Subtenant, Landlord cannot establish a breach by Tenant.6 We additionally 

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6 The trial court additionally identified several technical deficiencies related to 

the addresses to which Landlord sent the Mailed Demand Letter as well as the 

Landlord’s failure to provide written authorization from Landlord’s Lender 

regarding the change in payment method as required by the April 2000 Letter 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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emphasize that the Mailed and Emailed Demand Letters failed to provide

sufficient notice of default as they did not include the word “default” or 

reference the five-day cure period.

Absent the requisite notices of default and opportunity to cure, Landlord 

cannot establish that Defendants breached the Lease.

7

 Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, its denial of 

summary judgment to Landlord, and the dismissal of Landlord’s complaint.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/25/2024

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Agreement. Trial Ct. Op. at 13-15. We do not address these other 

deficiencies.

7 As we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment 

based upon the failure to provide the requisite notice of default, we do not 

address Landlord’s second question challenging the trial court’s reliance on 

Landlord’s failure to provide written authorization from Landlord’s Lender for 

a change in payment methods pursuant to the April 2000 Letter Agreement.