1 Rule 10(b) (Court of Appeals). MEMO RANDUM OPINI ON. The Court, with the

concurren ce of all judges participating in t he case, mayaffirm, rever se or modify the actio ns of t

he tr ial court by memoran dum opinion when a formal op ini on wou ld have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memora ndum opi nion it shall be designat

ed “MEMORANDUM OP INION,” shall not be published, an d sh all not be cit

ed or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case. 

# FILED July 30, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT

OF APPEA LS OF TEN NESSEE WESTER N SECTION AT J ACKSON

______________________________________________________________________________ MARY HELEN PIERS ON (JOHNSON) Gibson Chancery No. H-3 287 C.A. No. 02A0

1-9609-CH-00210 Plaintiff, Hon. George R. El lis, Cha ncel lor v. LUTHER WILLIAM JOHNSON, Defe nda nt. SAM WATRIDGE, Humboldt, Attor ney for Plaintiff. MI TCH TO LLI SON , Haw ks & Tol li son , Hum bol dt, Attorney f or De fend ant. DISMISSED AND REMANDED Opinion filed:

______________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 TOMLIN, Sr. J. M ary He len Johnso n (hereafter “W ife”) filed suit for divorce in the C hancery Court of Gibson County against Luther Willi am Johnson (hereafter “Husband”) s eeking a divorce on the grounds of irreconci lable diff erences, along with di visi on of marital property, chi ld cust ody, chi ld support , et c. . . . Husband f iled acounter- complaint f or divo rce on the gro und s of ad ultery, in appr opriate m arital con duct a nd irre conc ilable diff erences. The chancell or enter ed an Inte rim Decree of Divorce on October 23, 1995, wh ich gra nted a divo rce to b oth p arties up on stip ulation , at the tim e spe cifically
reserv ing “th e issue s of pro perty r ights, ch ild custo dy, an d pate rnity issu es” u ntil a hearing i n early J anuary, 1996. These iss ues were res erved forthe Juveni le Court of Gibson County, which was deemed to have pr oper jurisdi ction ove r such i ssues. The interim decree of di vorce al so postponed a ny decisi on as to the divis ion of marit al property.2 On Decem ber 14, 1995, Husband fil ed a motion to continue the finalhearing s et for January 3, 1996 on the grounds that he i ntended t o appeal the decisi on of the Gibs on Cou nty Juven ile Court relative to child su pport. W hile there is no orde r in the record pertai ning to the Husband’s motion t o continue , it appears that the motion was denied as th ere w as a hea ring held on J anu ary 3, 19 96. On Janu ary 5 , 1996 , W ife filed a M otion to Spe cify P rope rty to be Sold at Pu blic Sale. In this m otion W ife acknow ledged tha t on Janua ry 3, 1996 , the trial court “ordered the sale of

all mari tal pr operty at

a heari ng held on January 3, 1995, i ncluding the home, Aerostar van and othe r persona l property.” Husband thereaf ter f iled a Response to Pl ainti ff’s Motion to Specif y Property to be Sold at Public Sal e. On February 23, 1996, the chancel lor ent ered a Fina l Decree of Divorce, whic h ordered the sale of

certa in marita l asse ts for the purpos e of paying de bts. On M arch 18, 1996, the tri al court

entere d an order denyi ng W ife’ s Motion to Speci fy Marital Property to be Sold. On M arch 26, 1996, the chancel lor ent ered an orde r dismiss ing Hu sba nd’ s M otio n fo r Ru ling on P atern ity af ter h avin g be en w ithd raw n by Hu sba nd. In th e sa m e or der , the tr ial co urt d enie d W ife’s M otio n fo r Co sts an d A ttorn ey F ees . On April 24, 1996, W ife f iled he r Notice of

Appeal and Cost Bond, al though in her not ice o f ap pea l she did not des ign ate th e jud gm ent f rom wh ich s he w as a ppe aling
. From a review of thi s recor d, it appears that the Final Decre e of Divorce e ntered on February 23, 1996, inc orporat ed by refer ence the f indings in the I nteri m D ecree of Div orce. It a lso div ided th e m arital pro perty a nd aw arded W ife a cre dit of $5 ,219.2 4 in the marit al property. It appe ars to th is cou rt that the decre e of the chan cellor th at brou ght fina lity to the proce edings was that ent ered on February 23, 1996. Ther efore Wife’s Notice of Appeal fil ed on April 24, 1996 was fil ed beyond the thirty (30) day time period set forth in T.R.A.P. 4(a). W e also not e thatW ife f aile d to fi le any motion f or rel ief pur sua nt to Ru le 60 .02 T .R.C .P.. In li ght of the factthat Wife f aile d to ti mely file her noti ce of appeal we have no juris dicti on o n th e issu es ra ised ther ein. A cco rdin gly , the a ppe al m ust b e dis m issed
. In li ght of the clar ity of these ci rcumstances, we are of the opinion that3

Hu sban d’s req uest fo r costs a nd atto rney fees in curred by h im in con nectio n w ith this ap pe al is wel l t ak en . T he re fo re , w e a war d t he se co st s a nd e xpe ns es pur su an t t o T. C. A. § 27-1-1 22. In con nection therew ith, this matter w ill be rema nded to the Chan cery Court of Gibson County for a hearing in that court to ascertain the nature and amount of costs a nd attorney fees t o be awarded to Husband. Co sts in this c ause on ap peal a re taxe d to W ife, for w hich e xecu tion m ay issu e if
necessary.

________________________________________ TOMLIN, Sr. J.

________________________________________ CRAWFORD, P. J., W .S. (CONC URS)

________________________________________ HIGHERS, J. (CONC URS)