1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Allstate New Jersey Insurance Co. v. Gregorio Lajara (A-70-13) (073511)

Argued January 5, 2015 -- Decided July 16, 2015

ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

The issue in this appeal is whether a civil defendant sued by an insurance company for violating the 

Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30, has a right to trial by jury. 

In December 2008, plaintiffs Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company and affiliated companies filed a 604-

paragraph complaint alleging that sixty-three defendants violated the IFPA. The complaint alleges that defendants 

engaged in a “broad, multi-faceted scheme to defraud” plaintiffs of $8.14 million in personal injury protection 

benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35. Plaintiffs sought 

various forms of relief: payment of compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees under the IFPA; a 

declaration that allegedly fraudulent benefits do not have to be paid; disgorgement of benefits paid; and constructive 

trusts and equitable liens on defendants’ assets. Although plaintiffs demanded a jury trial in the complaint, they 

later moved to withdraw that demand. 

The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their jury-trial demand and denied defendants’ 

request for trial by jury. The court determined that State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001), was “the 

controlling precedent.” In that case, the State brought an action under the IFPA against an individual defendant for 

giving false information to an insurance carrier regarding an automobile accident. The State sought restitution on 

the claim paid to the defendant. The Appellate Division determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial 

because the Act did not expressly provide such a right and because the remedy at issue was equitable in nature. 

Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and affirmed 

the trial court’s denial of defendants’ demand of a jury trial. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 433 N.J. Super. 20, 44 

(App. Div. 2013). The panel held that, in an insurer’s action under N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7, the IFPA contains no express 

right to a jury. Id. at 38. It also declined to find an implied right from the statute’s silence. Ibid. Additionally, the 

panel found that defendants did not possess a constitutional jury-trial right. Id. at 42. 

The Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. 

HELD: The right to a civil jury trial provided by Article I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution applies to 

private-action claims seeking compensatory and punitive damages under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30. 

1. The right to a jury trial was foremost in the minds of the drafters of New Jersey’s first Constitution, which 

declared “that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law of this colony, 

without repeal, forever.” N.J. Const. (1776) art. XII. That bedrock principle was reaffirmed in the State’s 1844 and 

1947 Constitutions, both of which proclaimed that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” N.J. Const.

(1844) art. I, § 7; N.J. Const. (1947) art. I, ¶ 9. The right of a civil jury trial is preserved in the Seventh Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. VII, but that guarantee extends only to federal trials. Thus, 

“the right to a trial by jury in New Jersey must arise under either a statute or the state constitution.” In re Envtl. Ins. 

Declaratory Judgment Actions, 149 N.J. 278, 292 (1997). (pp. 11-14)

2. Neither the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution nor New Jersey’s constitutional counterpart 

was ever intended to guarantee a right to a jury trial in all civil cases. The jury-trial right did apply to all commonlaw “suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 

(1974). Under New Jersey’s constitutional jurisprudence, the right to a jury trial applies to causes of action -- even 

statutory causes of action -- that sound in law rather than equity. Federal courts look almost exclusively to whether 
2

the remedy is legal in nature, but New Jersey courts consider not only the nature of the relief -- the remedy -- but 

also the historical basis for the cause of action. The nature of the remedy, however, “remains the most persuasive 

factor.” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 589 (2013). (pp. 14-16) 

3. Under the IFPA, “[a]ny insurance company damaged as the result of a violation of [the Act] may sue . . . to 

recover compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys 

fees.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). The IFPA does not set forth equitable remedies for private-party insurance actions, 

but that does not preclude insurance companies from seeking equitable remedies available at common law. Like the 

Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -109 (CFA), the IFPA does not expressly confer the right to a jury trial. 

The Court must determine whether the remedies in a private action under the IFPA are legal in nature and whether 

the cause of action is similar to one recognized under the common law. (pp. 16-18)

4. The IFPA authorizes an insurance company to pursue compensatory and treble damages against a violator. 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a), (b). Treble damages are intended to punish, and only partly to compensate, and therefore 

have the classic features of punitive damages. Compensatory damages, including attorneys’ fees and costs, are 

trebled if the court finds that a defendant engaged in a pattern of violating the IFPA. Because only the first third of a 

treble-damages award is intended to compensate the victim for actual damages, the remaining award is clearly in the 

nature of punitive damages. Monetary damages, such as compensatory and punitive damages, are a typical form of 

legal relief. In contrast, equitable processes “are available only to the party who cannot have a full measure of relief 

at law.” Wood v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 562, 578 (2011). By any measure, the relief available to insurance 

companies in IFPA actions -- compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs -- is legal in 

nature. (pp. 18-22) 

5. To succeed on an IFPA claim, an insurance company must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant “presented” a 

“written or oral statement”; (2) the defendant knew that the statement contained “false or misleading information”; 

and (3) the information was “material” to “a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or 

the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(1). The insurance company must also prove 

a fourth element -- that it was “damaged as the result of a violation of [the IFPA].” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). Those 

elements permit an insurer to seek money damages, and even treble damages. Attorneys’ fees, investigatory costs, 

and costs of suit are, by definition, compensatory damages under the IFPA, and therefore a successful lawsuit 

initiated by an insurance company will necessarily involve an award of damages. N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). (pp. 22-24)

6. The Court has no reason to conclude that, in IFPA private-party actions, the Legislature intended a result 

inconsistent with the demands of the State’s Constitution. When the Legislature provides for legal remedies, it can 

be inferred that it “intended to authorize a jury trial.” Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Housing Authority of Newark, 362 

N.J. Super. 124, 138 (App. Div. 2003). The right to a jury trial is implied in the IFPA, just as it is in the CFA. The 

right to a jury trial under Article I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution is triggered because the IFPA 

provides legal relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and because an IFPA claim is comparable to 

common-law fraud. (pp. 24-29)

7. The availability of common-law equitable remedies, in addition to legal remedies, cannot extinguish the right to a 

jury trial. If the jury finds that the insurance companies are entitled to legal remedies because of violations of the 

IFPA, the resolution of the equitable remedies-- a declaration that fraudulent benefits do not have to be paid, 

disgorgement of benefits paid, constructive trusts and equitable liens on defendants’ assets -- will be guided 

accordingly. Because the private-party legal claims predominate, the Court need not address Sailor, supra, 355 N.J. 

Super. 315. In this private-party IFPA action, the right to a jury trial is compelled by Article I, Paragraph 9 of the 

New Jersey Constitution. Also, the right to a jury trial is implied in the IFPA by the Legislature’s choice of legal 

remedies and by the similarities between an IFPA action and common-law fraud. (pp. 29-31) 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law 

Division for proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON; and 

JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA

did not participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-70 September Term 2013

073511

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE INDEMNITY 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE PROPERTY 

AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY 

PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY AND 

ENCOMPASS INSURANCE, f/k/a 

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, and COMMERCIAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, 

NJ,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

GREGORIO LAJARA; PEDRO 

GONZALEZ; MILEYDIS T. DIAZ 

a/k/a MILLY DIAZ; AWILDA D. 

RODRIGUEZ a/k/a AWILDA D. 

GONZALEZ; KENNETH J. VIAFORA; 

JOSE ORLANDO HERNANDEZ; 

FRANCISCA HERNANDEZ; 

FRANCISCO CABA; AQUALINA 

RAMOS; ASHRAF Y. AZIR; 

MUHAMMAD A. SHAMSHAIR; 

MICHAEL C. GOLOWSKI; ELVIA 

BEDOYA; NYDIA MARTINEZ; 

NEREDA ZUNIGA; ALEXANDRA 

GALLEGOS; BIBARS KAGHDOU, 

D.C.; STEPHEN LOMANTO, D.C.; 

DAVID STEPHENS, D.C.; THOMAS 

J. BONACUSO, D.C., MICHAEL 

CARLESIMO, D.C.; BRYAN 

SIEGEL, D.C.; KEITH 

LEWANDOWSKI, D.C.; WEI JU; 

LUCY LIU; JIANMIN LI, a/k/a 

JIAN MIN LI; SHAN S. 

NAGENDRA, M.D.; ALEKSANDR 

LEVIN, M.D.; MANOJ D. 
2

PATHARKAR, M.D.; ALFRED REZK 

TAWADROUS, M.D.; HOWARD 

KESSLER, M.D.; NATALIO 

DAMIEN, M.D.; DAVID WALKER, 

ESQ.; MEDICO MANAGEMENT CO., 

INC.; UNION COLLECTIONS, LLC; 

PLAINFIELD MEDICAL 

MANAGEMENT, INC.; SPINAL 

ADJUSTMENT CENTER, P.C. f/k/a 

SPINAL ADJUSTMENT CENTER, 

INC.; RAHWAY SPINAL INJURY 

P.C. f/k/a RAHWAY SPINAL 

CENTER CORP.; ADVANCED SPINAL 

CARE, P.C.; MILLENNIUM TOTAL 

HEALTH, P.C.; ALEVE 

CHIROPRACTIC, P.C.; IN-LINE 

CHIROPRACTIC, P.C.; BAYVIEW 

HEALTH, P.C.; a/k/a BAYVIEW 

HEALTH SERVICE, P.C.; BOUND 

BROOK CHIROPRACTIC, P.C.; NEW 

WAVE CHIROPRACTIC, P.C.; 

ABSOLUTE CHIROPRACTIC, P.C.; 

BACK PAIN P.C.; AM PAIN CARE, 

P.C.; ACUPUNCTURE ACADEMY 

P.C.; TCM ACUPUNCTURE P.C.; 

AMERICAN ACUPUNCTURE ACADEMY, 

P.C.; CONVERY MEDICAL GROUP, 

P.C.; RARITAN PAIN MANAGEMENT 

AND REHAB CENTER, P.C.; 

ASBURY MEDICAL AND 

REHABILITATION P.C.; PAIN 

MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES OF 

CENTRAL JERSEY, P.A.; BEST 

HEALTH MEDICAL, P.C.; PERTH 

AMBOY HEALTH CARE, LLC d/b/a 

“PERTH AMBOY DIAGNOSTIC 

IMAGING”; LIBERTY SUPPLIES, 

L.L.C.; K-MED SERVICES, INC.; 

PRESTIGE MEDICAL SUPPLIES, 

LLC; THERAPEUTIC DEVICES, 

INC., 

Defendants,

and
3

A.P. DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, INC. 

and DR. HARSHAD PATEL,

Defendants-Appellants.

Argued January 5, 2015 – Decided July 16, 2015

On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate 

Division, whose opinion is reported at 433 

N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2013).

Carl A. Salisbury argued the cause for 

appellants (Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, 

attorneys).

Thomas O. Mulvihill argued the cause for 

respondents (Pringle Quinn Anzano, 

attorneys).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we must decide whether a civil defendant 

sued by an insurance company for violating the Insurance Fraud 

Prevention Act (IFPA), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30, has a right to 

trial by jury. The trial court determined that, in an action 

arising under the IFPA, neither the statutory scheme nor the New 

Jersey Constitution grants a civil defendant the right to a jury 

trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. 

v. Lajara, 433 N.J. Super. 20, 44 (App. Div. 2013). 

We now reverse. The right to a civil jury trial is one of 

the oldest and most fundamental of rights. It predates the 

founding of our Republic, is enshrined in the Federal Bill of 

Rights, and is part of the fabric of all three of New Jersey’s 

Constitutions. A jury trial is self-government at work in our 
4

constitutional system, and a verdict rendered by one’s peers is 

the ultimate validation in a democratic society. 

In determining whether the jury-trial right applies to a 

statutory cause of action, we assess whether the grant of a jury 

trial is consistent with our common-law tradition. An IFPA 

claim meets that standard because compensatory and punitive 

damages are legal -- not equitable -- in nature and because the 

elements necessary to prove an IFPA claim are similar to commonlaw fraud.

By this measure, we conclude that the right to a civil jury 

trial provided by Article I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey 

Constitution applies to private-action claims seeking 

compensatory and punitive damages under the IFPA. We also 

presume that the Legislature, in passing the IFPA, intended the 

statutory scheme to conform to the Constitution. We therefore 

remand to the trial court to allow defendants in this case to 

exercise their right to a jury trial.

I.

A.

In December 2008, plaintiffs Allstate New Jersey Insurance 

Company and affiliated companies, Encompass Insurance, and 

Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, filed a 604-

paragraph complaint alleging that sixty-three defendants
5

violated the IFPA.1 The sixty-three defendants include

physicians and chiropractors; medical, imaging, and painmanagement practices; medical equipment and billing companies; 

employees, owners, and shareholders of those practices and 

companies; and an attorney and unlicensed individuals.

The complaint alleges that defendants engaged in a “broad, 

multi-faceted scheme to defraud” plaintiffs of $8.14 million in

personal injury protection benefits under the New Jersey 

Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35. 

According to the complaint, defendants played different roles 

and engaged in singular and multiple fraudulent acts in this 

far-reaching scheme. Unlicensed defendants provided “purported 

healthcare services” through companies that concealed their true 

status. Defendants provided unnecessary care and prescribed 

unnecessary medical equipment, engaged in fraudulent testing of 

patients, misrepresented test results and patients’ symptoms, 

and unlawfully split fees and concealed prohibited selfreferrals -- all for the purpose of wrongly securing or 

enhancing recoveries for claimants or price gouging. The 

complaint also contends that some defendants paid fees to 

 

1 Also included as plaintiffs are Allstate Insurance Company, 

Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Property and Casualty 

Insurance Company, and Allstate New Jersey Property and Casualty 

Insurance Company.
6

individuals who staged accidents, created fraudulent medical 

records and bills, and recruited persons involved in accidents 

who suffered either minor or no injuries.

Plaintiffs sought various forms of relief: payment of 

compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees under 

the IFPA; a declaration that allegedly fraudulent benefits do 

not have to be paid; disgorgement of benefits paid; and

constructive trusts and equitable liens on defendants’ assets.

Although plaintiffs demanded a jury trial in the complaint, 

they later moved to withdraw that demand. That motion was 

opposed by defendants A.P. Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. and Dr. 

Harshad Patel, who are parties to this appeal, as well as by 

other defendants.2

B.

The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw 

their jury-trial demand and denied defendants’ request for trial 

by jury. The court determined that State v. Sailor, 355 N.J. 

Super. 315 (App. Div. 2001), was “the controlling precedent.” 

 

2 The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, who had earlier 

intervened in the suit, moved to strike the jury demand as it 

related to the Commissioner’s claims. See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d) 

(authorizing Commissioner to join in insurance company’s private 

action, in order to recover civil penalties authorized by 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5). No party contends that there is a right to 

a jury trial on the Commissioner’s claims. See State v. Sailor, 

355 N.J. Super. 315, 322 (App. Div. 2001). The Commissioner is 

not a party to this appeal.
7

In that case, the State brought an action under the IFPA against 

an individual defendant for giving false information to an 

insurance carrier regarding an automobile accident. Id. at 318-

19. The State sought restitution on the claim paid to the 

defendant. Id. at 318. The Appellate Division determined that

the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial because the Act 

did not expressly provide such a right and because the remedy at 

issue was equitable in nature. Id. at 322-23. The trial court 

ruled that “Sailor makes clear that the issue turns on the fact 

that the remedies available under the [IFPA] are in the form of 

restitution, an equitable form of relief,” and therefore at 

common law plaintiffs would not have been entitled to a jury 

trial.

Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal.

C.

The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and

affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ demand of a 

jury trial. Allstate, supra, 433 N.J. Super. at 27, 44. The 

panel held that, in an insurer’s action under N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7,

the IFPA contains no express right to a jury. Id. at 38. It

also declined to find an implied right from the statute’s 

silence. Ibid. 

Additionally, the panel found that defendants did not 

possess a constitutional jury-trial right. Id. at 42. The 
8

panel acknowledged that, “‘[g]enerally, the New Jersey 

Constitution protects the right of trial by jury in legal, but 

not equitable, actions.’” Id. at 41 (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. 

v. Anthony Amadei Sand & Gravel, Inc., 162 N.J. 168, 176 

(1999)). However, it determined that the insurers’ claims under 

the IFPA more closely resemble an equitable action for which 

there is no jury-trial right. The panel noted that “[t]he 

remedy sought ‘remains the most persuasive factor.’” Ibid. 

(quoting Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co.

(JCP&L), 212 N.J. 576, 589 (2013)). With that in mind, the 

panel maintained that the monetary relief “denominated as 

compensatory damages” under N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a) “is in the 

nature of restitution,” which is typically an equitable remedy. 

Id. at 43. Moreover, based on a historical view of the common 

law, the panel concluded that a private-party action under the 

IFPA “is significantly different from legal fraud” and “is more 

akin to equitable fraud, to which no jury trial right attaches.” 

Ibid. Accordingly, the panel “discern[ed] no constitutional 

right to a trial by jury for private claims under the [IFPA].” 

Id. at 44.

This Court granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal.

II.

A.

Defendants, Dr. Harshad Patel and A.P. Diagnostic Imaging, 
9

Inc., contend that the Appellate Division erred in holding that 

a defendant in a private action under the IFPA has no right to a 

jury trial. Defendants point to Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. 

Housing Authority of Newark, 362 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div. 

2003), in which the Appellate Division found an implied 

statutory right to a jury trial under the Consumer Fraud Act 

(CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -109. Defendants maintain that the 

elements and remedies (compensatory damages, treble damages, and 

attorneys’ fees) in a CFA claim are nearly identical to those in

an IFPA claim. They argue that an IFPA claim is more akin to 

common-law fraud than equitable fraud. They emphasize that in 

Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 138, the Appellate Division 

classified the CFA remedies as the “hallmark of a legal action.”

Defendants further stress that in JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. 576, we 

adopted Zorba’s reasoning for determining when a jury trial is 

mandated.

B.

In contrast, plaintiffs argue that the remedies available 

under the IFPA are equitable in nature and, accordingly, there 

is no right to a jury trial under the IFPA. They assert that 

the differences between the IFPA and the CFA make Zorba’s 

analysis inapplicable. Plaintiffs submit that “damages are not 

an element of a cause of action under the IFPA” and that “the 

Legislature specifically described the [IFPA’s] damages” as a 
10

form of restitution, thus signaling that their claim sounds in 

equity. They highlight that the wording of the IFPA states that 

“the court” -- not a jury -- makes the fact-finding on the award 

of treble damages. Additionally, plaintiffs reject the idea 

that the prior use of jury trials in IFPA cases suggests an 

implied right to a jury trial. According to plaintiffs, the 

“entire history of the IFPA” suggests that the statute’s 

drafters wanted to avoid the “delays and inefficiencies” that 

come with jury trials in combatting insurance fraud. In 

addition, plaintiffs posit that the complaint made by the State, 

as an intervenor in the IFPA action, must be decided by the 

court and therefore combining all claims in a bench trial “will 

result in numerous procedural efficiencies.” Finally, 

plaintiffs assert that “a right to a jury trial is not 

constitutionally required because the cause of action available 

under the IFPA is distinctive from common law fraud.” 

III.

Our task is to determine whether the right to a jury trial 

in a private action brought under the IFPA is implicit in the 

statutory scheme or, alternatively, is mandated by Article I, 

Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const. art. I,

¶ 9 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate[.]”). 

In interpreting a statute or the Constitution, our review is de 

novo. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. 
11

Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 215 N.J. 522, 535 (2013). As such, we owe no 

deference to the interpretive conclusions of the trial court or 

Appellate Division. Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J.

581, 584 (2012).

IV.

The issue before us is whether defendants in a private 

action brought under the IFPA have a right to trial by jury. 

Resolving that issue requires an understanding of the historical 

development and importance of the jury-trial right in our 

constitutional scheme.

A.

The right to a jury trial is deeply rooted in the English 

common law and traces its origins as far back as the Magna 

Carta. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151, 88 S. Ct.

1444, 1448, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 497 (1968). The common-law 

tradition of trial by jury was carried over to the American 

colonies and, in time, took the form of a fundamental right. 

Lyn-Anna Props. v. Harborview Dev. Corp., 145 N.J. 313, 318-19 

(1996). In the Seventeenth Century, the provinces of West and 

East Jersey codified the jury-trial right in two separate 

enactments, one stating that “the tryals of all causes, civil 

and criminal, shall be heard and decided by the virdict or 

judgment of twelve honest men of the neighbourhood,” The 

Concessions and Agreements of the Proprietors, Freeholders and 
12

Inhabitants of the Province of West New-Jersey, in America, 

Chap. XXII (1676), and the other stating that “all trials shall 

be by the verdict of twelve men,” East Jersey House of 

Representatives’ 1699 Declaration of Rights and Privileges

(1699). In New Jersey, as in the other colonies, the right to

trial by jury retained its hold in the years preceding the 

American Revolution. In its 1774 Declaration of Rights, the 

first Continental Congress proclaimed, “‘the respective colonies 

[were] entitled to the common law of England, and more 

especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried 

by their peers.’” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 

340 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 645, 656 n.3, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 568 n.3 

(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Journals of the 

Continental Congress 69 (1904 ed.)).

One of the precipitating causes of the American Revolution 

was the British Parliament’s passage of Acts that extended the 

jurisdiction of the admiralty courts “beyond their antient 

limits thereby depriving [the colonists] of the inestimable 

right of trial by jury” and thus subjecting the colonists “to 

the arbitrary decision of a single and dependent judge.” Reid 

v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 29 n.51, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1237 n.51, 1 L. 

Ed. 2d 1148, 1170 n.51 (1957) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, 2 

Journals of the Continental Congress 132 (Ford ed.)). Indeed,

one of the specific grievances listed in the Declaration of 
13

Independence was that the Crown had deprived the colonists “in 

many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” The Declaration 

of Independence para. 3 (U.S. 1776).

The right to trial by jury was foremost in the minds of the 

drafters of New Jersey’s first Constitution. Ratified on July 

2, 1776, just two days before the Declaration of Independence, 

the New Jersey Constitution declared “that the inestimable right 

of trial by jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law of 

this colony, without repeal, forever.” N.J. Const. (1776) art. 

XII; see Wood v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 562, 574 (2011). 

That bedrock principle was reaffirmed in our 1844 and 1947 

Constitutions, both of which proclaimed that “[t]he right of 

trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” N.J. Const. (1844) art. 

I, § 7; N.J. Const. (1947) art. I, ¶ 9. 

The right of a civil jury trial is preserved in our 

national charter as the Seventh Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.3 U.S. Const. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment’s 

“guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases” extends only to 

 

3 The Seventh Amendment provides: 

In Suits at common law, where the value in 

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 

right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and 

no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 

re-examined in any Court of the United States, 

than according to the rules of the common law.

[U.S. Const. amend. VII.]
14

federal trials because the Seventh Amendment has not been made 

applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause. See In re Application of LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 

587 n.7 (1981). Thus, “the right to a trial by jury in New 

Jersey must arise under either a statute or the state 

constitution.” In re Envtl. Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 

149 N.J. 278, 292 (1997).

B.

Neither the Seventh Amendment nor New Jersey’s 

constitutional counterpart was ever intended to guarantee a 

right to a jury trial in all civil cases. Thus, “the thrust of 

the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial 

as it existed in 1791” -- the time of the Amendment’s 

ratification. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94, 94 S. 

Ct. 1005, 1007, 39 L. Ed. 2d 260, 265 (1974). At that time, the 

right to a jury trial did not extend to matters falling within 

the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts or equity courts, 

“where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable 

remedies were administered.” Id. at 193, 94 S. Ct. at 1008, 39 

L. Ed. 2d at 265-66 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

jury-trial right did apply to all common-law “suits in which 

legal rights were to be ascertained and determined.” Ibid.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Not surprisingly, federal 

and New Jersey jurisprudence are in agreement on this point. 
15

Lyn-Anna Props., supra, 145 N.J. at 318-19. The historical 

annals do not suggest that the drafters of the 1776 New Jersey 

Constitution and the 1791 Federal Bill of Rights had different 

conceptions of the scope of the right to a civil jury trial. 

The United States Supreme Court has given an expansive 

interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, finding that the right 

to a jury trial extends “beyond the common-law forms of action 

recognized” at the time of the Constitution’s ratification to 

new statutory causes of action, provided those statutes 

“create[] legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action 

for damages in the ordinary courts of law.” Curtis, supra, 415 

U.S. at 193-94, 94 S. Ct. at 1007-08, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 265-66. 

C.

Under New Jersey’s constitutional jurisprudence, the right 

to a jury trial applies to causes of action -- even statutory 

causes of action -- that sound in law rather than equity. 

JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. at 589. The federal courts look almost 

exclusively to whether the remedy is legal in nature in 

determining whether a party has a right to a jury. Curtis,

supra, 415 U.S. at 197, 94 S. Ct. at 1010, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 268 

(stating that in Title VII cases compensatory and punitive 

damages constitute legal, not equitable, relief).

New Jersey courts have taken a slightly different approach, 

considering not only the nature of the relief -- the remedy --
16

but also the historical basis for the cause of action. JCP&L, 

supra, 212 N.J. at 589; Wood, supra, 206 N.J. at 575. This 

second factor examines whether the cause of action resembles one 

that existed in common law. See JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. at 593-

94; Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 139-40. Nevertheless, the 

nature of the remedy “‘remains the most persuasive factor.’” 

JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. at 589 (quoting Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 

N.J. 333, 344 (1991)). The weight given to the remedy makes it 

unlikely that our courts and federal courts will diverge in the 

types of cases in which a jury trial would be available.

V.

A.

The IFPA was enacted to “confront aggressively the problem 

of insurance fraud.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-2. In pursuit of that 

goal, the “IFPA interdicts a broad range of fraudulent conduct.”

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 172 (2006).

The IFPA provides, in relevant part, that a “person or 

practitioner” violates the Act when he

(1) [p]resents or causes to be presented any 

written or oral statement as part of, or in 

support of or opposition to, a claim for 

payment or other benefit pursuant to an 

insurance policy . . . knowing that the 

statement contains any false or misleading 

information concerning any fact or thing 

material to the claim; or

(2) [p]repares or makes any written or oral 

statement that is intended to be presented to 
17

any insurance company, . . . in connection 

with, or in support of or opposition to any 

claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to 

an insurance policy . . . knowing that the 

statement contains any false or misleading 

information concerning any fact or thing 

material to the claim; or

(3) [c]onceals or knowingly fails to disclose 

the occurrence of an event which affects any 

person’s initial or continued right or 

entitlement to (a) any insurance benefit or 

payment or (b) the amount of any benefit or 

payment to which the person is entitled[.]

[N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(1), (2), (3).]

The IFPA authorizes two separate causes of action to 

enforce the statutory scheme -- one a State action brought by 

the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5,4

and the other a private civil action brought by insurers 

“damaged as the result of a violation of any provision of [the 

IFPA],” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7. The right to a jury trial in a 

private civil action is the only issue in this case. 

Under the IFPA, “[a]ny insurance company damaged as the 

result of a violation of [the Act] may sue . . . to recover 

compensatory damages, which shall include reasonable 

 

4 The IFPA permits the Commissioner to bring a civil action 

seeking monetary penalties, ranging from “not more than $5,000 

for the first violation, $10,000 for the second violation and 

$15,000 for each subsequent violation”; “restitution to any 

insurance company or other person who has suffered a loss as a 

result of a[n] [IFPA] violation”; and attorneys’ fees and costs. 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-5. 
18

investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorneys fees.” 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). Moreover, an insurance company “shall 

recover treble damages if the court determines that the 

defendant has engaged in a pattern of violating [the IFPA].” 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b). The IFPA does not set forth equitable 

remedies for private-party insurance actions. That, however, 

does not preclude insurance companies from seeking equitable 

remedies available at common law. See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 

N.J. 488, 516 (1993) (stating that “courts are not limited to 

the statutory remedies, but have a wide array of equitable 

remedies available to them”).

Like the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -109, the 

IFPA does not expressly confer the right to a jury trial. The 

absence of express language is just the start of the analysis. 

Because we presume that the Legislature intended to act in 

conformity with the Constitution, the statutory and 

constitutional analysis is closely aligned. We must determine 

whether the remedies in a private action under the IFPA are 

legal in nature and whether the cause of action is similar to 

one recognized under the common law.

B.

We begin by examining the “‘the most persuasive factor’” --

the remedy available to insurance companies. See JCP&L, supra, 

212 N.J. at 589 (quoting Weinisch, supra, 123 N.J. at 344). The 
19

IFPA authorizes an insurance company to pursue compensatory and 

treble damages against a violator. N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a), (b). 

Under the IFPA, “compensatory damages” include not only actual 

damages, but also “reasonable investigation expenses, costs of 

suit and attorneys fees.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). Treble damages 

are intended to punish, and only partly to compensate, and 

therefore have the classic features of punitive damages. 

Liberty Mut., supra, 186 N.J. at 185 (noting that purpose of 

treble damages under Consumer Fraud Act is “to punish the 

wrongdoer” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under the IFPA, 

compensatory damages, including attorneys’ fees and costs, are 

trebled “if the court determines that the defendant has engaged 

in a pattern of violating th[e] [A]ct.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a), 

(b). Because only the first third of a treble-damages award is 

intended to compensate the victim for actual damages, the 

remaining award is clearly in the nature of punitive damages. 

Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishi, 163 N.J. 484, 494-96 (2000) 

(indicating that award of treble damages under Consumer Fraud 

Act is form of punitive damages); Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super.

at 138 (same).

Monetary damages, such as compensatory and punitive

damages, are a typical form of legal relief -- “the traditional 

form of relief offered in the courts of law.” Curtis, supra, 

415 U.S. at 196-97, 94 S. Ct. at 1009-10, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 267-
20

68; see also Wood, supra, 206 N.J. at 578 (characterizing claim 

for “money damages” as “invok[ing] solely legal and not 

equitable relief”); Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 138 (“[T]he 

forms of relief specifically authorized by N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 [of 

the Consumer Fraud Act] are monetary -- compensatory damages, 

trebling of those damages and attorneys fees -- which is a 

hallmark of a legal action.”). 

In contrast, equitable processes “‘are available only to 

the party who cannot have a full measure of relief at law.’” 

Wood, supra, 206 N.J. at 578 (quoting Bolte v. Rainville, 138 

N.J. Eq. 508, 512 (E. & A. 1946)). “Equitable remedies ‘are 

distinguished for their flexibility, their unlimited variety, 

their adaptability to circumstances . . . . [T]he court of 

equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as 

to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex 

relations of all the parties.’” US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 

Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 476 (2012) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & 

Co. v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 411-12 (E. & A. 1938)). A few 

examples of equitable actions are specific performance of a 

contractual obligation, partition, rescission of a contract, 

labor-strike injunctions, quiet-title matters, declarations of 

incapacity, and injunctive restraints of a nuisance. See 

generally William A. Dreier & Paul A. Rowe, Guidebook to 

Chancery Practice in New Jersey (8th ed. 2012).
21

By any measure, the relief available to insurance companies 

in IFPA actions -- compensatory damages, treble damages, and 

attorneys’ fees and costs -- is legal in nature.

C.

In determining the right to a jury trial, the other prong 

of our analysis is whether the statutory cause of action 

authorized by the IFPA is comparable to an action known at 

common law. See JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. at 593-96 (comparing

claim filed pursuant to Underground Facility Protection Act 

(UFPA), N.J.S.A. 48:2-73 to -91, to common-law negligence cause 

of action); Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 139-40 (comparing 

CFA claim to common-law fraud action). 

In JCP&L, supra, we found that a cause of action for 

property damages arising under a provision of the Underground

Facility Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 48:2-80(d), was similar to 

common-law negligence because it “impose[d] liability on the 

excavator for any negligent damage to an operator’s underground 

facility.” 212 N.J. at 583, 593-96 (emphasis added). We 

concluded that the Act’s requirement that property-damage claims 

of less than $25,000 be submitted for mandatory, binding 

arbitration to the Office of Dispute Settlement within the 

Office of the Public Defender violated New Jersey’s 

constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 583-84, 600. We 

reached that conclusion because the statutory cause of action 
22

was based on “principles of common-law negligence” and provided 

for monetary damages. Id. at 593-94, 596. We thus held that 

“[t]he Legislature was not at liberty to ignore the right to a 

civil jury trial for property damages when enacting the

[Underground Facility Protection Act].” Id. at 596. 

In JCP&L, supra, 212 N.J. at 592-93, we cited favorably to

Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 128-30, in which the Appellate 

Division held that private-party claimants have a right to a 

jury trial when seeking damages under the CFA, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. 

In Zorba, supra, the Appellate Division concluded that, “even 

though the Legislature did not specifically refer to the right 

to a jury trial,” that right was implied in private actions 

under the CFA because the relief authorized was “legal in 

nature.” 362 N.J. Super. at 138-39. That conclusion was 

buttressed “by the close relationship between the private cause 

of action [under the CFA] and common-law fraud.” Id. at 139. 

Significantly, we have observed that “[t]he closest statutory 

analogue to [the] IFPA in New Jersey is the Consumer Fraud Act.” 

Liberty Mut., supra, 186 N.J. at 176.

VI.

A.

A private-party action brought under the IFPA resembles a 

cause of action for common-law fraud. The elements of commonlaw fraud are “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently 
23

existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant 

of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on 

it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) 

resulting damages.” Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J.

161, 172-73 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To succeed on an IFPA claim, an insurance company must

demonstrate that: (1) the defendant “presented” a “written or 

oral statement”; (2) the defendant knew that the statement 

contained “false or misleading information”; and (3) the 

information was “material” to “a claim for payment or other 

benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or the Unsatisfied Claim 

and Judgment Fund Law.” N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4(a)(1). The insurance

company must also prove a fourth element -- that it was “damaged 

as the result of a violation of [the IFPA].” N.J.S.A. 17:33A7(a). The presence of those elements permits an insurer to seek

money damages, and even treble damages if “the defendant has 

engaged in a pattern of violating [the IFPA].” N.J.S.A. 17:33A7(a), (b). Notably, attorneys’ fees, investigatory costs, and 

costs of suit are, by definition, compensatory damages under the 

IFPA, and therefore a successful lawsuit initiated by an 

insurance company will necessarily involve an award of damages. 

N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(a). 

The only element of a claim for common-law fraud absent 

from an IFPA claim is reliance by the plaintiff on the false 
24

statement. Although an IFPA claim does not precisely match all

of the elements of common-law fraud, neither does it match all 

of the elements of equitable fraud. Equitable fraud does not 

require proof that a defendant knew of the falsity of a 

statement, Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 

624-25 (1981) -- an element that must be established in a 

private-action claim under the IFPA.5 

Perfect alignment between the elements of an IFPA claim and 

common-law fraud is not necessary to trigger the right to a jury 

trial. As the Appellate Division pointed out in Zorba, supra: 

a “noteworthy difference between the [Consumer Fraud Act and 

common-law fraud] causes of action is that ‘common law fraud 

requires proof of reliance while consumer fraud requires only 

proof of a causal nexus between the concealment of the material 

fact and the loss.’” 362 N.J. Super. at 139 (quoting Varacallo 

v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 332 N.J. Super. 31, 43 (App. Div. 

2000)). Nevertheless, a jury trial is required in a consumerfraud case despite the lack of complete symmetry between a CFA 

claim and a common-law fraud claim. 

B.

 

5 In a claim of equitable fraud, a plaintiff must only prove: 

“(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or 

past fact; (2) the maker’s intent that the other party rely on 

it; and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party.” First Am. 

Title Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 177 N.J. 125, 136-37 (2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
25

The historical record of the early Republic suggests that

those who secured the right to a jury trial in New Jersey’s 1776

Constitution -- as well as this State’s two subsequent

Constitutions -- did not intend for that right to be given a

crabbed interpretation. New Jersey’s 1776 Constitution was

drafted at a time when Acts passed by the British Parliament

depriving colonists of their time-honored jury-trial rights were

of recent memory. The declaration in that first Constitution

that “the inestimable right to trial by jury shall remain

confirmed . . . without repeal, forever” was a promise to the

people and a message to lawmakers. The State’s subsequent

Constitutions have reinforced that original declaration.

The plaintiff insurance companies claim that the drafters

of the IFPA wanted to avoid the “delays and inefficiencies” of

jury trials. To be sure, other means of trying cases are more

expeditious and efficient than a jury trial. But those who gave

us the guarantee of trial by jury had their eye on a higher

value -- the validation that comes from a judgment of one’s

peers. We reject the insurance companies’ argument that a jurytrial right is not implied in a private-party IFPA action.

We presume that the Legislature is aware that New Jersey’s 

jury-trial right attaches to statutory actions that confer legal 

remedies and resemble actions in common law. See Zorba, supra, 

362 N.J. Super. at 138-39. In other words, we will presume, as 
26

we must, that the Legislature intended to conform to the 

Constitution. See Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of 

Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 359 (2007) (noting presumption that 

“Legislature acted with existing constitutional law in mind and 

intended the statute to function in a constitutional manner”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

We have no reason to conclude that, in IFPA private-party 

actions, the Legislature intended a result inconsistent with the 

demands of our State Constitution. When the Legislature 

provides for legal remedies, it can be inferred that it 

“intended to authorize a jury trial.” Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. 

Super. at 138; see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 98 

S. Ct. 866, 871, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40, 47 (1978) (“We can infer . . . 

that by providing specifically for ‘legal’ relief, Congress knew 

the significance of the term ‘legal,’ and intended that there 

would be a jury trial . . . .”). 

The Legislature clearly understands the high, preferred 

place of the right of trial by jury, as is clear from its 

response to our decision in Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J.

433 (1989). In Shaner, supra, the Court had to determine 

whether, in the absence of express language granting the right 

to a jury trial in a private-action case, such a right was 

implied in the language of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), 

N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. 116 N.J. at 446. The LAD provided for 
27

compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief 

for a victim of discrimination. N.J.S.A. 10:5-17. The Court 

found no historical corollary in the common law to a LAD claim 

and ultimately concluded, based on its analysis, that neither 

the statute nor the New Jersey Constitution compelled a jury 

trial in private-action LAD cases. Shaner, supra, 116 N.J. at 

446, 455. 

Seven months after the Shaner decision, the Legislature

amended the LAD to provide the right to a jury trial in privateparty LAD actions. L. 1990, c. 12, § 2 (codified as amended at 

N.J.S.A. 10:5-13). The swiftness of the Legislature’s reaction 

to this Court’s decision leads to the inference that the 

amendment was curative, intended to express that the Legislature 

actually meant to confer a jury-trial right despite its failure 

to expressly say so. See 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 22:31, at 375 (7th 

ed. 2009) (noting that when amendment is expeditiously adopted 

to overturn judicial interpretation of statute, courts may 

“logically conclude that a[n] amendment was adopted to make 

plain what the legislation had been all along from the time of 

the statute’s original enactment”).

We find that the right to a jury trial is implied in the 

IFPA, just as it is in the CFA. See Zorba, supra, 362 N.J. 

Super. at 138-39. In summary, the right to a jury trial under 
28

Article I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution is 

triggered because the IFPA provides legal relief in the form of 

compensatory and punitive damages and because an IFPA claim is 

comparable to common-law fraud.

C.

We reject Allstate’s argument that the Legislature did not 

intend the jury to act as the fact-finder in an IFPA case 

because N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(b) states that the claimant “shall 

recover treble damages if the court determines that the 

defendant has engaged in a pattern of violati[ons].” (Emphasis 

added). First, the statute does not consign to the “court” the 

determination of facts for actual damages. Second, the term 

“court” is not inconsistent with the jury serving as factfinder. See Curtis, supra, 415 U.S. at 189, 198, 94 S. Ct. at 

1006, 1010, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 263, 268-69 (stating that Seventh 

Amendment jury right applies to Section 812 of Civil Rights Act 

of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612, even though statute grants “court” 

ability to “grant relief, as it deems appropriate”); Sibley v. 

Fulton Dekalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830, 832-33 (11th Cir. 

1982) (“In this case, we likewise choose to interpret the word 

‘court’ to encompass trial by both judge and jury. This 

interpretation serves to avoid the serious constitutional 

questions that would be raised under the seventh amendment if we 

adopted a construction of the [Fair Debt Collection Practices] 
29

Act that prohibited trial by jury.”); Rucker v. Wabash R.R. Co., 

418 F.2d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1969) (“The term ‘court’ need not 

always be construed as referring to the judge in the performance 

of his duties. It also has an institutional meaning and may 

sometimes refer to the deliberative body of jurors.”). 

Thus, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended nonjury trials because of the singular reference to “court” in 

reference to trebling damages.

D.

We do not agree with plaintiffs that the statutory legal 

claims they advanced are ancillary to their equitable claims --

equitable claims that do not rise under the IFPA. The 

availability of common-law equitable remedies, in addition to 

legal remedies, cannot extinguish the right to a jury trial. If 

the jury finds that the insurance companies are entitled to 

legal remedies because of violations of the IFPA, the resolution 

of the equitable remedies -- a declaration that fraudulent 

benefits do not have to be paid, disgorgement of benefits paid, 

constructive trusts and equitable liens on defendants’ assets --

will be guided accordingly. “When equitable claims or defenses 

are lodged in what is predominantly a dispute at law, and when 

the claims may be viewed separately without fear of inconsistent 

determinations, the court must parse the equitable issues from 

the legal issues presented to the jury.” Sun Coast Merch. Corp. 
30

v. Myron Corp., 393 N.J. Super. 55, 86 (App. Div. 2007), certif. 

denied, 194 N.J. 270 (2008). Here, the “ancillary equitable 

issues may well be blazed by the jury’s resolution of the legal 

issues.” See ibid. That is true also of the ancillary claims 

filed by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance for 

violations of the IFPA regarding administrative penalties to be 

imposed. See N.J.S.A. 17:33A-7(d) (“[T]he commissioner may join 

in [an insurer’s] action for the purpose of seeking judgment for 

the payment of a civil penalty authorized under [N.J.S.A.

17:33A-5].”). Because the private-party legal claims 

predominate, we need not address Sailor, supra, 355 N.J. Super.

315, which denied the right to a jury trial for an IFPA action 

brought by the State seeking administrative penalties.

Accordingly, the jury will decide those issues that fall 

within its domain, and the court those issues falling within its 

compass. 

E.

Last, a jury trial in an IFPA action is not a recent advent 

or a break from a long-accepted practice of bench trials. IFPA 

claims have been tried before juries since at least 1994. See, 

e.g., Liberty Mut., supra, 186 N.J. at 165-66 (determining 

proper standard of proof in private action brought under IFPA on 

appeal following jury trial and remanding case to Law Division, 

which conducted second jury trial); Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. 
31

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448, 487 (App. Div.) 

(upholding jury charge given by trial court in private IFPA 

claim), certif. denied, 212 N.J. 198 (2012); Harleysville Ins. 

Co. v. Diamond, 359 N.J. Super. 34, 36 (Law Div. 2002) 

(discussing standard of proof in jury trial proceeding under 

IFPA); Thomas v. N.J. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 277 N.J. Super.

630, 633 (Law Div. 1994) (reviewing IFPA jury charge). The 

Legislature’s acquiescence to this practice gives some 

indication of its intent to allow jury trials in private-party 

actions.

VII.

For the reasons expressed, in this private-party IFPA 

action, the right to a jury trial is compelled by Article I, 

Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution. We also find that 

the right to a jury trial is implied in the IFPA by the 

Legislature’s choice of legal remedies and by the similarities 

between an IFPA action and common-law fraud. Accordingly, we 

reverse the Appellate Division and remand to the Law Division 

for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and 

SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE 

ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-70 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013

ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE

COMPANY, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

GREGORIO LAJARA, ET AL.,

Defendants,

and

A.P. DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, INC.

and DR. HARSHAD PATEL,

Defendants-Appellants.

DECIDED July 16, 2015

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Albin

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST REVERSE AND 

REMAND

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA -------------------- --------------------

JUSTICE SOLOMON X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 6