J-A02021-15

2015 PA Super 152

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALWASI YONG

Appellant No. 1972 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of June 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0002313-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

OPINION BY WECHT, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

This appeal requires that we determine the precise scope of the 

“collective knowledge doctrine” in Pennsylvania. We conclude that the trial 

court’s application of the doctrine to the facts of Alwasi Yong (“Yong”)’s 

arrest stretched the rule beyond its breaking point. As a result, the trial 

court erred in denying Yong’s pretrial motion to suppress physical evidence. 

We reverse the trial court’s order denying that motion, and we remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

On September 21, 2011, Officer Joseph McCook of the Philadelphia 

Police Department was conducting narcotics surveillance on the 3200 block 

of North Fairhill Street in Philadelphia. On that day, Officer McCook used a 

confidential informant (“CI”) to conduct a controlled narcotics purchase. 

Officer McCook observed Yong standing in front of a residence located at 
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3202 Fairhill Street. The CI approached Yong, had a brief conversation with 

him, and then handed him $120 in pre-recorded currency. Yong passed the 

money to his codefendant, Samuel Vega, who then entered the residence 

and later returned with twelve packets of marijuana. Vega then handed the 

marijuana to the CI. 

On September 22, 2011, police conducted surveillance of the same 

area, but did not observe Yong. The CI purchased twenty-five packets of 

marijuana, which were similar to the twelve packets that the CI previously 

had purchased from Yong and Vega. However, the record does not disclose 

who sold the marijuana to the CI on September 22, 2011. See Notes of 

Testimony Suppression (“N.T.S.”), 4/17/2013, at 16 (“[T]here was a 

transaction. I’m not sure if it was with Vega or not.”). 

On September 23, 2011, the police continued their narcotics 

surveillance in the same area. Officer McCook observed Yong and Vega in 

front of 3202 Fairhill Street. Linwood Fairbanks, an undercover narcotics 

officer, approached Vega and handed him $40 in pre-recorded currency. 

Vega then walked over to a nearby vacant lot, retrieved something from the 

ground, and returned with eight packets of marijuana, which he gave to 

Officer Fairbanks. 

Approximately ten minutes after this transaction, police executed a 

search warrant on 3202 North Fairhill Street. When police entered the home 

to execute the search warrant, Yong was standing in the first-floor living 

room. Without being prompted to do so by any other officer, and without 
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knowing that other officers had observed Yong’s prior drug activity, Officer 

Gerald Gibson immediately arrested Yong. Officer Gibson discovered a 

loaded .38 revolver concealed under Yong’s waistband. 

As a result of these events, Officer McCook filed a criminal complaint 

charging Yong with various drug and firearm offenses. On September 7, 

2012, Yong filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress the physical 

evidence obtained from the search of his person. Therein, Yong argued that 

Officer Gibson had neither reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry1frisk, 

nor probable cause to arrest and search him. 

On April 17, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Yong’s motion to 

suppress. The Commonwealth’s sole witness, Officer McCook, testified that 

he personally observed Yong accept money from the CI on September 21, 

2011. Officer McCook further testified that Yong then handed the money to 

Vega, who gave the CI twelve packets of marijuana. Officer McCook also 

testified that, throughout his eighteen-year career as a Philadelphia Police 

Officer, he had observed “hundreds” of narcotics transactions where one 

participant accepts the money and then hands it off to a co-conspirator. 

N.T.S. at 12. 

____________________________________________

1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that police officers 

may conduct a limited pat-down search for weapons if they reasonably 

believe that criminal activity is afoot and that the individual is armed and 

dangerous). 
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Officer Gibson did not testify at the suppression hearing. Officer 

McCook testified that he observed Yong participate in what he believed to be 

a narcotics transaction on September 21, 2011. Officer McCook further 

testified that Officer Gibson arrested and searched Yong on September 23, 

2011 when police executed the search warrant on 3202 North Fairhill Street. 

While Officer McCook averred that he was present when Officer Gibson 

recovered the firearm from Yong’s waistband, he stated that Officer Gibson 

arrested Yong “[j]ust as [he] was going inside.” Id. at 18. Officer McCook 

explained that “there were six or seven, maybe eight” officers executing the 

search warrant, and that he was “towards the rear” as they entered the 

home. N.T.S. at 17. Officer McCook did not testify that he informed Officer 

Gibson of Yong’s role in the narcotics transaction on September 21, 2011, 

nor did Officer McCook testify that he instructed Officer Gibson to arrest 

and/or search Yong. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, Yong argued that his arrest was 

unsupported by probable cause because the Commonwealth failed to 

establish that “anyone spoke to Officer Gibson and told him what they had 

seen on the 21st.” Id. at 19. The trial court denied Yong’s motion to 

suppress, reasoning that Officer Gibson possessed sufficient probable cause 

to arrest Yong because Officer McCook’s knowledge could be imputed to all 

of the officers who were executing the search warrant. 

On April 22, 2013, Yong proceeded to a jury trial. On April 24, 2013, 

the jury found Yong guilty of carrying a firearm without a license and of 
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conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”).2 Because 

Yong stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction that prohibited him 

from owning a firearm, the trial court also found Yong guilty of persons not 

to possess a firearm3in a severed proceeding. 

By oral motion advanced during his sentencing hearing on June 12, 

2013, Yong argued that the jury’s guilty verdict on the conspiracy to commit 

PWID count was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied 

Yong’s motion, and sentenced him to five to ten years’ imprisonment for 

persons not to possess a firearm, with concurrent terms of three and one 

half to seven years’ imprisonment for firearms not to be carried without a 

license and five to ten years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit PWID. 

On July 8, 2013, Yong timely filed a notice of appeal. On July 15, 

2013, the trial court directed Yong to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Yong timely 

complied. 

Yong presents two issues for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err in denying Yong’s pretrial motion to 

suppress the search of his person where the arresting officer 

had neither probable cause to arrest Yong nor reasonable 

suspicion to perform a [Terry] frisk where Yong was merely 

present during the execution of a search warrant?

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), and 903 (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30)), 

respectively. 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). 
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2. Was the evidence insufficient to support Yong’s conviction for

criminal conspiracy where a veteran police officer wrote in his 

investigation report that Yong entered one house and then 

handed a clear bag to a confidential informant[,] but that 

same officer twice testified that it was [Vega] who went into a 

different house and handed the same small objects to the 

same confidential informant? 

Brief for Yong at 7 (footnote omitted).

Yong first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the physical evidence obtained from his person. Our standard of 

review in this context is well-settled:

In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a 

suppression motion, we are limited to determining whether the 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the 

Commonwealth prevailed in the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Our scope of review in suppression matters includes only the 

suppression hearing record, and excludes any evidence elicited at trial. See

In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013). 

Probable cause to arrest is not mere suspicion or conjecture. The 

relevant inquiry is “whether the facts and circumstances which are within the 

knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has 

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of 
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reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is 

committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 

(Pa. 1991). 

Yong does not dispute that Officer McCook’s knowledge that Yong 

participated in a narcotics transaction two days earlier amounted to 

sufficient probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest. It was Officer 

Gibson, not Officer McCook, who ultimately arrested Yong. Yong argues 

that the trial court erred in imputing Officer McCook’s knowledge to Officer 

Gibson.4 See N.T.S. at 23 (“[T]he knowledge of one is imputed to all on the 

scene that day, all the [officers] who are executing the search warrant.”). 

The Commonwealth maintains that Officer McCook’s knowledge of 

Yong’s participation in the earlier drug transaction was imputed to Officer 

Gibson under the “collective knowledge doctrine.” The Commonwealth cites 

no Pennsylvania case law to support such an expansion of the rule. For the 

reasons that follow, we conclude that such an interpretation would stretch 

the doctrine well beyond its stated purpose. 

____________________________________________

4 At Yong’s suppression hearing, the trial court also reasoned that the 

police were “entitled” to search everyone inside of the residence because 

they were executing a valid search warrant. N.T.S. at 22. This is incorrect. 

We have held that, unless the police obtain an “all persons present” warrant, 

mere presence during the execution of a search warrant, by itself, is 

insufficient to justify a search of the person. In re J.V., 762 A.2d 376, 382 

(Pa. Super. 2000). 
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The collective knowledge doctrine (sometimes called the “fellow-officer 

rule”) was first articulated by then circuit-court judge Warren Burger in 

Williams v. United States, 308 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1962). There, an 

appellant argued that his arrest was unconstitutional because the arresting 

officer lacked “adequate first hand information” amounting to probable 

cause. The Court rejected this theory, finding that the arresting officer 

acted based upon the knowledge of another officer within the department 

who clearly had probable cause to arrest the appellant. 

[I]n a large metropolitan police establishment the collective 

knowledge of the organization as a whole can be imputed to an 

individual officer when he is requested or authorized by 

superiors or associates to make an arrest. The whole complex 

of swift modern communication in a large police department 

would be a futility if the authority of an individual officer was to 

be circumscribed by the scope of his first hand knowledge of 

facts concerning a crime or alleged crime. 

When the police department possesses information which would 

support an arrest without a warrant in the circumstances, the 

arresting officer, if acting under orders based on that 

information, need not personally or first hand know all the 

facts. The test, as we have said, is whether a prudent and 

cautious officer in those circumstances would have reasonable 

grounds—not proof or actual knowledge—to believe that a crime 

had been committed and that appellant was the offender. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), the United States 

Supreme Court echoed the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning. There, a county sheriff 

received an uncorroborated tip stating that Whiteley and an accomplice had 

burglarized two local businesses. The sheriff then obtained an arrest 
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warrant based upon an insufficient showing of probable cause. See id. at 

565 (“Th[e] complaint consists of nothing more than the [sheriff’s] 

conclusion that the individuals named therein perpetrated the offense 

described in the complaint. The actual basis for [the sheriff’s] conclusion 

was . . . omitted from the complaint.”). Following the issuance of the arrest 

warrant, the sheriff distributed a statewide bulletin via police radio, 

requesting that any officer who encountered the suspects arrest and 

extradite them.5 After hearing the bulletin, a patrol officer in a nearby 

county arrested the two men and discovered evidence of the burglaries in 

Whiteley’s vehicle. 

The Whiteley Court held that: (1) the sheriff’s complaint was 

insufficient to support the issuance of an arrest warrant; and (2) the 

informer’s tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the sheriff with 

probable cause. Still, the state argued that the arresting officer reasonably 

relied upon the police radio bulletin and, therefore, had sufficient probable 

cause to arrest the suspect. The state urged that preventing “officers from 

acting on the assumption that fellow officers who call upon them to make 

an arrest have probable cause for believing the arrestees are [perpetrators] 

____________________________________________

5 Specifically, the bulletin contained the names and physical descriptions 

of the two suspects, described the vehicle that they were believed to be 

traveling in, and stated that an arrest warrant for the two men had been 

issued. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 564. 
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of a crime would . . . unduly hamper law enforcement.” Id. at 568 

(emphasis added). 

Justice John Harlan, writing for the majority, rejected this logic. 

We do not, of course, question that the . . . police were entitled 

to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly police 

officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest 

warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid 

offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an 

independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, 

however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal 

arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the 

instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest. 

Id. This rule, which later became known as the “collective knowledge 

doctrine,” was a matter of common sense. Had the Court concluded 

otherwise, the probable cause requirement could be easily circumvented; 

any officer could simply instruct another officer to make an illegal arrest. 

In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the United States 

Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of an arrest based 

upon a law enforcement bulletin. Expounding the collective knowledge 

doctrine’s rationale, the Court explained: 

Whiteley supports the proposition that, when evidence is 

uncovered during a search incident to an arrest in reliance 

merely on a flyer or bulletin, its admissibility turns on whether 

the officers who issued the flyer possessed probable cause to 

make the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on 

the flyer were themselves aware of the specific facts which led 

their colleagues to seek their assistance. In an era when 

criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly likely 

to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a matter of 

common sense: it minimizes the volume of information 

concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other 
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jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act 

promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction. 

Id. at 231. 

Read jointly, Whiteley and Hensley instruct that the collective 

knowledge doctrine serves an agency function. When a police officer 

instructs or requests another officer to make an arrest, the arresting officer 

stands in the shoes of the instructing officer and shares in his or her 

knowledge. In Commonwealth v. Kenney, 297 A.2d 794 (Pa. 1972), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Whiteley, and upheld 

a warrantless arrest made by a detective who lacked probable cause, where 

he acted at the direction of his superior who had specific knowledge of facts 

and circumstances sufficient to constitute probable cause. Pennsylvania 

courts have since cited Whiteley and Hensley for the general proposition 

that an arresting officer need not possess encyclopedic knowledge of the 

underlying facts supporting probable cause. Instead, he or she may rely 

upon an instruction6to arrest from another officer who possesses the 

required knowledge. See In re D.M., 727 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1999); 

Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 A.2d 443, 445 (Pa. 1994); 

____________________________________________

6 There are no “magic words” that must pass between police officers to 

invoke the collective knowledge doctrine. The requirement that there be an 

actual communication between the fellow officers presents only a negligible 

burden to law enforcement. An officer may issue a conclusory directive to 

arrest a particular suspect. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 

Seizure § 3.5 (5th ed. 2012). 
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Commonwealth v. Wagner, 406 A.2d 1026, 1030 (Pa. 1979); 

Commonwealth v. Cotton, 740 A.2d 258, 262-63 (Pa. Super. 1999); 

Commonwealth v. Fromal, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (Pa. Super. 1990).7 

Instantly, there is nothing in the suppression record to suggest that: 

(1) Officer McCook ordered or directed Officer Gibson to arrest Yong; or (2) 

Officer Gibson received information justifying Yong’s arrest; or (3) Officer 

Gibson received information, which, coupled with facts that he personally 

observed, provided probable cause to arrest Yong. This lack of evidence 

compels the conclusion that Officer Gibson—acting of his own accord—made 

a warrantless arrest. The fact that, unbeknownst to Officer Gibson, his 

colleague Officer McCook had observed Yong participate in a drug 

____________________________________________

7 We are aware of no cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

has departed from or expanded upon the rule announced in Whiteley. In 

Commonwealth v. Gambit, a panel of this Court stated that a police 

officer’s knowledge can be imputed to his fellow officer where there “is some 

communication or connection” between them. 418 A.2d 554, 557 (Pa. 

Super. 1980). This seems to suggest that the collective knowledge may 

apply in the absence of a communication, so long as a particular officer is 

“connected to” an arrest. But, read in context, the inclusion of the word 

“connection” appears to be an imprecise statement of the law, and not an 

explicit enlargement of the doctrine. Indeed, the Court in Gambit rejected 

the Commonwealth’s argument that relevant information possessed by an 

officer could be imputed to an arresting officer in the absence of an 

instruction or directive to arrest. Moreover, in the thirty-five years since 

Gambit was decided, it has never been cited for the proposition that 

knowledge can be imputed between officers in the absence of a 

communication between them. Instead, our own Supreme Court has 

explained that Whiteley simply allows an officer to make a warrantless 

arrest “undertaken at the direction of his superior who had sufficient 

knowledge of facts and circumstances to constitute probable cause to arrest 

the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 A.2d 443, 446 (Pa. 1994). 
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transaction two days earlier cannot suffice to permit the Commonwealth to 

leapfrog the Fourth Amendment. 

Citing decisions issued by various federal courts, the Commonwealth 

encourages us to adopt a far more expansive rule. A series of conflicting 

interpretations of the collective knowledge doctrine have emerged over the 

last several decades. Some courts have conceptualized the collective 

knowledge cases as falling into two distinct categories, vertical and 

horizontal. The “vertical” collective knowledge cases present a 

straightforward application of Whiteley and Hensley (i.e., where one law 

enforcement officer who possesses probable cause instructs a fellow officer 

to act). As discussed supra, Pennsylvania courts have consistently applied 

this version of the doctrine for several decades, with little controversy. 

By contrast, the “horizontal” collective knowledge cases arise when 

individual law enforcement officers each possess pieces of the probable 

cause puzzle, but no single police officer possesses information that amounts 

to probable cause. United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338, 1345 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503-05 (10th 

Cir. 1996)). Under this approach, which has never been adopted in 

Pennsylvania, courts evaluate probable cause by aggregating the knowledge 

of two or more police officers who are working together on an investigation. 

The Commonwealth cites several of these horizontal collective 

knowledge cases for the general proposition that “the information available 

to a close group of officers functioning as a team is assessed as a whole.” 
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Brief for Commonwealth at 10. According to the Commonwealth, we must 

consider the facts within Officer McCook’s knowledge in order to determine 

whether Officer Gibson had probable cause to arrest Yong. 

The view that a broader, “horizontal,” collective knowledge doctrine 

exists is far from unanimous. Many courts have declined to enlarge the 

scope of the doctrine, and will only impute knowledge among fellow officers 

where there is evidence that the arresting officer acted at the direction of 

another officer. See United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493 

(4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he collective-knowledge doctrine simply directs us to 

substitute the knowledge of the instructing officer or officers for the 

knowledge of the acting officer. . . .” (emphasis in original)); Haywood v. 

United States, 584 A.2d 552, 557 (D.C. 1990) (“An arresting officer need 

not have firsthand knowledge of the facts giving rise to probable cause 

provided that he or she is acting at the suggestion of someone who does.” 

(emphasis in original)); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 

1976) (holding that supervising officer’s knowledge could not be imputed to 

arresting officer where the evidence fails to demonstrate that the arrest was 

based upon supervising officer’s order to arrest); State v. Cooley, 457 A.2d 

352, 356 (Del. 1983) (citing Gambit, 418 A.2d 554); State v. Mickelson, 

526 P.2d 583, 584 (Or. App. 1974) (“A police officer working in a team or in 

a modern police organization is entitled reasonably to arrest or search on the 

command or summary information of another officer.”). 
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There does not appear to be a coherent rationale for enlarging the 

scope of the doctrine beyond the situation where an officer with probable 

cause directs a fellow officer to make an arrest.8 Extending the collective 

knowledge doctrine to apply in the absence of a directive or instruction to 

arrest issued by an officer who possesses probable cause serves none of the 

legitimate law enforcement purposes behind the rule. See Hensley, 469 

U.S. at 231 (“In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and 

increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a 

matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of information concerning 

suspects that must be transmitted to other jurisdictions and enables police in 

one jurisdiction to act promptly in reliance on information from another 

jurisdiction.”). Many of the courts that have adopted the horizontal 

approach to the collective knowledge doctrine have ignored the original aim 

of the rule—to allow officers to rely upon succinct directives received from a 

fellow officer. Paradoxically, these courts have expanded the rule, which 

was intended to encourage communication between police officers while 

minimizing the volume of information that officers must transmit, by 

____________________________________________

8

Indeed, some courts have adopted the horizontal collective knowledge 

approach while purporting to apply the collective knowledge doctrine in its 

traditional form. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo, 617 F.3d 565 (1st 

Cir. 2010) (assessing “the collective knowledge of the agents working . . . on 

[an] investigation.”). 
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eliminating the requirement that officers actually communicate with one 

another. 

The Supreme Court has endorsed the view “that effective law 

enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions 

and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who 

must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow 

officers about the foundation for the transmitted information.” Id. If there 

is no ‘transmitted information,’ a different result obtains. Our law does not 

permit a police officer to make a warrantless arrest and then later justify it 

based upon his colleague’s knowledge. To adopt the horizontal collective 

knowledge approach would be to sever the doctrine from its constitutional 

impetus. 

Moreover, an expansive interpretation of the collective knowledge 

doctrine does not comport with the fundamental requirement that 

warrantless arrests be supported by probable cause. The benchmark of a 

warrantless arrest is “whether the facts and circumstances which are within 

the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has 

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is 

committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 

(Pa. 1991). In the context of probable cause to conduct a warrantless 

arrest, the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
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Because many situations which confront officers in the course of 

executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must 

be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes 

must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading 

sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable 

cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best 

compromise that has been found for accommodating these often 

opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law 

enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding 

citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.

* * *

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name 

implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they 

are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 

which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. 

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). 

To hold that a warrantless arrest is constitutional where the arresting 

officer is without direct knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information 

justifying it would be to ignore the “sensibl[e] . . . conclusions of probability” 

made by reasonable people. Id. A reasonable arresting officer cannot reach 

a sensible conclusion based upon facts that are beyond his or her 

knowledge. The post hoc imputation of knowledge among police officers is 

an exercise for “legal technicians,” not “reasonable and prudent men.” Id. 

In the absence of any clear authority from the United States Supreme Court, 

or from our own Supreme Court, we decline to revise this standard. 

Even if we were willing to adopt the horizontal collective knowledge 

doctrine, it would not apply to the facts of the case before us. As the 

Commonwealth notes, the courts that have accepted this formulation impute 

knowledge among police officers who are “functioning as a team.” Brief for 
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Commonwealth at 10. However, the horizontal collective knowledge 

approach also requires “some degree of communication between the officer 

who possesses the incriminating knowledge and the officer who does not.” 

United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 2008); see also 

United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 766 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Agent Hehr, 

who arrested Correa, was in constant communication with Agent Becka 

and Agent Chamulak. On this basis, we find the collective knowledge 

doctrine applicable[.]” (emphasis added)); United States v. Terry, 400 

F.3d 575, 581 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We impute information if there has been 

“some degree of communication” between the officers.” (emphasis 

added)); United States v. Lee, 962 F.2d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1992) 

(“[P]robable cause can rest upon the collective knowledge of the police, 

rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest, when 

there is ‘some degree of communication between the two.’” (emphasis 

added)). Instantly, the suppression hearing transcript lacks any testimony 

that Officer Gibson and Officer McCook communicated with each other. 

Thus, even the expanded collective knowledge doctrine advocated by the 

Commonwealth would not preclude suppression based upon the record 

before us. 

Pennsylvania courts have never expanded the doctrine beyond the 

situation where a police officer who possesses probable cause instructs a 

fellow officer to act. See Queen, 639 A.2d at 446. We decline to adopt the 

“horizontal” approach to collective knowledge, which some federal courts 
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have used to aggregate knowledge among police officers functioning as a 

team. In any event, even if Pennsylvania law recognized such a broad rule, 

the absence of any evidence that Officers Gibson and McCook actually 

communicated with one another would render the rule inapplicable to this 

case. 

We understand the trial court’s temptation to infer that Officer McCook 

instructed Officer Gibson to arrest Yong. When a police officer observes a 

suspect engage in criminal conduct and then a second police officer arrests 

the suspect, one might reasonably assume that the officers communicated 

with one another. The testimony presented at Yong’s trial suggests that this 

is what occurred. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 4/22/2013, at 68-69 

(“When I got in there I wanted to make sure that everybody was patted 

down, so I told them to pat them down again. And Officer Gibson picked 

[Yong] up . . . and then he started patting him down.”). Nevertheless, as a 

matter of law, our scope of review in suppression matters is limited to the 

suppression hearing record, and excludes any evidence elicited at trial. In 

re L.J., 79 A.3d at 1085. 

The result we reach in this case is not a consequence of a hypertechnical legal rule. The collective knowledge doctrine unquestionably 

authorizes police officers to act upon information or instructions from their 

fellow officers. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568; Hensley, 469 U.S. at 231. At 

Yong’s suppression hearing, it was the Commonwealth’s burden to establish 

that Officer McCook directed Officer Gibson to arrest Yong. See 
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (“The Commonwealth shall have the burden of going 

forward with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged evidence 

was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.”). The suppression 

record before us lacks any evidence to that effect. We are compelled to 

conclude that Yong’s arrest was unconstitutional. 

Because we cannot, based upon the state of this record, impute Officer 

McCook’s knowledge that Yong had participated in a prior drug transaction to 

Officer Gibson, we must conclude that Yong’s arrest and the subsequent 

search of his person were unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 

court’s order denying Yong’s motion to suppress. 

In his second issue, Yong challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction for criminal conspiracy. Even though Yong’s first 

claim entitles him to relief, we nonetheless are required to address his 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, because double jeopardy 

principles would prohibit a retrial on the conspiracy charge in the event that 

this issue has merit. Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223, 227 (Pa. 

Super. 2000).

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 
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evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proof of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all the evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, 

the trier of fact while passing on the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part[,] or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835-36 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citation omitted). Additionally, in evaluating this claim, we do not review a 

diminished record. Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 

1989); Commonwealth v. Parker, 644 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 

1994). Rather, we are required to consider all of the evidence that was 

actually received, without consideration as to the admissibility of that 

evidence or whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were correct. Smith 

and Parker, supra.

Section 903 of the Crimes Code provides as follows:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of conspiracy 

with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime. 
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18 Pa.C.S. § 903. Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement, 

and that the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that 

defendant may be liable for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the 

conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act. See 

Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 463-64 (1998).

The essence of a criminal conspiracy, which distinguishes it from 

accomplice liability, is an agreement between the co-conspirators. See 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

However, “[a]n explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if 

ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a criminal partnership is 

almost invariably extracted from the circumstances that attend its activities.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 785 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en 

banc) (citations omitted). Therefore, where the conduct of the parties 

indicates that they were acting in concert with a corrupt purpose, the 

existence of a criminal conspiracy may properly be inferred. 

Commonwealth v. Snyder, 483 A.2d 933, 942 (Pa. Super. 1984). Nonexclusive circumstances that may establish proof of a conspiracy include: 

(1) an association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the 

commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4) 

participation in the object of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. 

Swerdlow, 636 A.2d 1173, 1177 (Pa. Super. 1994). 

Instantly, there was ample evidence that Yong intentionally aided Vega 

in selling marijuana. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that, 
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immediately after Yong accepted currency from the CI, Vega handed the CI 

twelve packets of marijuana. Two days later, Yong was present when Vega 

sold marijuana to an undercover officer, and was standing in the living room 

of the residence when police executed a search warrant. Based upon this 

evidence, the jury was free to conclude that Yong and Vega had an 

agreement whereby Yong would screen and accept payment from potential 

drug purchasers, while Vega would retrieve and dole out the narcotics. 

Compare Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 2004) (finding 

sufficient evidence to support conviction for conspiracy to commit PWID 

where appellant asked undercover officer if he was a “cop,” and then 

introduced him to his co-conspirator who sold the officer heroin). 

Accordingly, Yong’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without 

merit.9 

____________________________________________

9

In arguing that the evidence adduced at trial was “insufficient in both 

volume and quality,” Yong appears to conflate his challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence with a challenge to the weight of the evidence. 

Brief for Yong at 22. The sum of Yong’s sufficiency argument is that the 

evidence was insufficient because Officer McCook’s investigation report was 

inconsistent with his later testimony at trial. This argument challenges the 

credibility of the Commonwealth’s witness and, therefore, implicates the 

weight of the evidence—a claim that Yong has failed to preserve for our 

review. See Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 8/1/2013, at 1 

(“[The trial c]ourt erred by denying [Yong’s] post-verdict motion for a 

judgment of acquittal where [Yong] argued that there was insufficient 

evidence.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Yong has waived his challenge 

to the weight of the evidence. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vi) (“Issues not 

included in the [1925(b) statement] . . . are waived.”); see generally 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998). 
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For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Yong’s judgment of sentence, 

reverse the trial court’s order denying Yong’s motion to suppress, and 

remand for retrial. 

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judge Panella joins the opinion.

Judge Lazarus files a concurring statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015