The Honora ble Gre g ory

L . Fr ost, United States District J udg e for the Southern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0734n.06 F iled: October 11, 2007 No. 06-6313 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
BA RR Y L AM ON T P RI CE , ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE Petitioner-Appellant , ) UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT ) CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN v. ) DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE ) UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, ) ) OP IN ION Respondent-

Appellee . )

BEFORE: COLE an d COOK, Circ uit Jud ges; and F ROST, District Judge. * GREGORY L. F ROST, District Judge. Petitioner-Appellant, B arr y L amont Price, appea ls from the denia l of his motion t o vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a related motion to alter or ame nd that judgme nt. Price ar g ues that he is entitled to habe as re lief beca use his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to attac k an under lying f eder al sentenc e he
rec eived that include d an ar med ca ree r cr iminal enhance ment. For the re asons that follow, the Court AF F IRMS
. I. BACKG ROUND2

F o l l o w i n g a

j u r y t r i a l , P r i c e w a s c o n v i c t e d i nl a t e 2 0 0 1 o f

p o s s e s s i o no f

a f i r e ar mb y a
c on vic te d f

e lon in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g ). Citi ngthr e e pr ior dr ugc on vic tio ns in s tate court, the district c ourt classified Pric e as a n arme d car eer

criminal pursua

nt to 18 U.S.C . § 924(e) and sente nced him to 264 months of imprisonment. Price timely appea led, and this Court
a ff ir me d h is c on vic tio n in

United States v. Price , 329 F.3d 903 ( 6th Cir. 2003). I n April 2004, Price f

iled a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district cour

t denied that motion in August 2006. Price then filed a motion for
rec onsideration that the tria l court construe d as a motion to alter or amend the judg ment of denial. The district court also denie d the motion to alter or ame nd judgme nt in September 2006. Price succ essfully

moved to proce ed in forma pauper is and obtained a

cer tificate of appea lability , which led to the f iling of this appe al. He now argues that his three prior convictions for the sale of c ocaine wer e insuffic ient to support application of the a rmed c are er criminal enha

nceme nt and that his counsel wa s ineffe ctive for not raising this iss ue both at
se nte nc ingand

in h is d ir e c t a

pp e a l. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, “[a] prisoner in custody under se ntence of a [fede ral] court . . . claiming the rig ht to be rele ased . . . ma y move the cour

t which imposed the sentenc e to vac ate, set aside or

corr ect the se ntence .” In order to preva il on his § 2255 mot ion , th e pr iso ne r m us t
asser t as a ba sis for re lief: “ ‘( 1) an e rror of constitutional mag nitude; (2) a se ntence imposed outside the statutory

limit s; or (3) a

n err or of f

act or law that wa s so fundamenta l as to rende r the3

entire pr ocee ding inva lid.’ ” Mallett v. United States , 334 F.3d 491, 496- 97 (6th Cir. 2003) (q u o t i n g W

einberge r v. United States , 268 F.3d 346, 351 ( 6th Cir. 2001) ). This Court conducts a de novo revie w of a district court’s de nial of a pr isoner’s § 2255 motion and examines the district court’s finding s of fa ct for c lear err or. Id. Claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l are mix ed questions of law and fa ct, howeve r, and r ece ive de novo revie w on appea l. Id. (c i t i n g Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)). B. Discussion Ti tle 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (e )( 1) pr ov ide s: I n the ca se of a person who violates section 922(g) of t his title and has three pr evious convictions by

any court re fer

red t o i n section 922(g )(1) of this titl e for a violent felony or a serious drug offe nse, or both, committed on occ asions differ ent from one another , such per son shall be f i n ed u n d er this ti tle and imprisoned not less than fiftee n y ear s, and, notwithstanding a ny other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sente nce of

, or g rant a probationar

y sentenc e to, suc h person with respec t to the conviction under

section 922(g ). Se e als o U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a ). Section 924 also provide s that the term “se rious drugoffe nse”
me ans “ an o ff

e ns e un de r S tate law i nv olv ingmanu fa c tur ing , d ist ri butin g , o r p os se ssi ngwi th intent to manufac ture or distribute, a controlled substanc e . . . for which a max imum term of imprisonment of ten y ear s or more is pre scribed by law.” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)(2) (A)( ii). Pr ic e argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in a pp lyingthi s se nte nc inge nh anc e me nt t o h im beca use his three state cour

t convictions for the sa le of c ocaine involved only .3 g rams of c ocaine
eac h, which under

Tenne ssee law

at the time of his fe dera l conviction car ried maximum penalties of six y ear s eac h. Thus, Price re asons, bec ause the state cour t convictions failed to qualify as
se ri ou s d ru g of fe ns e s, his tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e un de r t

he Sixth A me ndme nt f

or fa ili ngto raise this issue in reg ard to the pr esente nce r eport a nd at sentenc ing. T he end r esult was that the4

district court found a

total offense level of 33 w ith a criminal history cate g ory of VI under the SentencingGuidelines, re sulting in a guidelines rang e of 235 to 293 months, rathe r than a n of fe ns e le ve l of

24 wi th a c ri min a l hi sto ry

c a te g or y of VI , f or a ra ng e of 10 0 to 12 5 mo nth s. The g overnme nt argues that Price c annot asser t his ineffec tive assistance and sente ncing arguments on collatera l attack be cause he wa ived his assertion of inc orre ct sentenc ing by withdrawingit from his direct appe al. Price in turn de nies such wa iver a nd contends that the g ov e rnme nt c ann ot r e ly

on wa ive r o n a

pp e a l be c a

us e it d id n ot d o s o in

the dis tr ic t c ourt . T his Court need not re solve the wa iver issue, howe ver, be cause even a ssuming, without deciding , that Pr ic e c an a dv anc e thi s b a sis fo r h a be a s r e lie f, his argume nt f or su c h r e lie f f

a ils on the me ri ts. The district cour

t rea soned below that the g overnme nt had to show that Price’ s three dr ug offe nses wer e ser ious drug offe nses at the time of his state c ourt sentenc ing. T his Court has previously

explained that the g overnme nt was re quired to prove that the offe nses wer e ser ious drugoffe nses base d on the sentenc ing la ws of Te nnessee at the time of Price ’s fe dera l sentenc ing. Jame

s v. United States , 2 1 7 F. Ap p ’x 4 3 1 , 4 4 0 n . 3 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Morton , 17 F.3d 911, 915 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). I f, howe ver, the permissible rec ord bef ore the sentenc ing c ourt made it impossible to conclude how Price would have be en sente nced f or his state court c onvictions at the time of his fede ral sente ncing –a condition the district cour t found to be true here –then the g overnme nt indeed wa s require d to show only that the offe nses
we re se ri ou s d

ru gof fe ns e s b a se d o n th e se nte nc inglaws of Te nn e sse e a t th e tim e of

Pr ic e ’s state sentenc ing. Ma lle tt , 334 F.3d a t 503. The district cour

t’s corr ect c onclusion arose from its rea soning that it was bound by the “categ orica l approa ch.” Under this appr oach, a court looks “ ‘ only

to the statutory

definitions of5

the prior of

fense s, and not to the particula r fa cts underly

ing those convictions’ to deter mine whether a sente nce should be enhanc ed.” United States v. Flores , 477 F.3d 431, 434 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Tay lor

v . U nite d S tates, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)). This a pproac h teac hes in fac t that “ ‘it is not only

impermissible, but point less, for the c ourt to look through to the de fenda nt’s actua l criminal conduc t.’ ” United States v. Montane z , 442 F.3d 485, 489 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (q u o t i n g United States v. Butler , 207 F.3d 839, 843 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). I n making such a “ cate g orica l approa ch” inquiry , the United States Supreme Court ha s explained what ty

pes of mate rials a c ourt ca n traditionally

consider: I n Tay lor v . U nite d S tates, 495 U.S. 575, 11 0 S
. C t . 2 143, 109 L .Ed.2d 607 (1 99 0) , w e he ld t

hat a c ourt se nte nc ing un de r the [Ar me d Car e e r Cri min a l Ac t] c ou ld look to statutory

elements, ch ar gi ng documents, and jury instructions to determine whether an ear lier conviction afte r trial was for g ener ic burg lary . The que stion here is whe the r a se nte nc ing c ourt c an loo k to po lic e re po rt s or c omp la int

a pp lic a tio ns to deter mine whether an ea rl ier guilty plea ne cessa

rily admitted, and supported a conviction fo r, gen eric burg lary . We hold that it m ay not, and that a late r cour t deter mining the c hara cter

of an a dmitted burg lary

is ge nera lly

limit ed to examining the stat u t o ry

d ef i n i t i o n , ch ar gi n g d o cu m en t , wr i t t en p l eaagr ee m en t , tra n s cr ipt of plea colloquy , an d any

expli cit fac tual finding by the trial judg e to which the de fenda nt assented. Shepard v. U

nited States , 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). B y analog y , a district cour

t conductingan inq uir y int o w he the r a

pr ior dr ugc on vic tio n c on sti tut e s a se ri ou s d ru g of fe ns e is a rgua bly simil arly limit ed to the same ty

pe of material. See U

nited States v. Brandon , 247 F.3d 186, 188- 8 9 n . 1 (2 0 0 1 ) ( ap p l yi n g Taylor ’s categ orica l approa ch to serious drugoffe nse inquiries). But see Un ite d S tates v . M oo re , 2 86 F .3 d 4 7, 49 -5 0 ( 20 02 ) ( ho ldi ngthat a “ se ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e ” ana ly sis is more limited than other Arme d Caree r Criminal Act inquiries and involves lookingonly at the statutory definition of a c rime).6

As sumin g argue nd o th a t a c ourt c an lo ok be y on d th e state c ri min a l st a tut e inv olv e d in Pr ic e ’s Te nn e sse e c on vic tio ns , th e la bo ra tor y re po rt s Pr ic e of

fe re d in the c ourt be low fa il t o f a ll within the categ ories re cog nized as viable in Taylor and Sh e pa rd . The re ports lack a

ny stamp or
se a l of any state c ourt , a

nd the re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic a te that th e y we re oth e rw ise inc or

po ra te d in the cha rg ing pa pers unde rlying the state cour t convictions. Se e Un ite d S tates v . W hite , No. 06- 4563, 2007 WL 1988480, at *1 (4th Cir. J uly 6, 2007) (r ejec ting, unde r the c ateg orica l approa ch, a stateme nt of probable cause as supportingarme d car eer criminal enha

nceme nt beca

use it lacke d such indicia of inc orporation into s tate convic tion procee dings)
. A notably simil ar se t of fac ts ex ists in United States v. Allen , 282 F.3d 339 ( 5th Cir. 20 02 ). Th e re , a

de fe nd ant atta c ke d a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c la ssi fi c a tio n o f h is s tate c on vic tio n a s a serious drugoffe nse by

pointing to information conta ined within a police r eport involved in that
c a se . T he re po rt

wa s th e on ly

mate ri a l th a t se t f

or th t he qu anti ty

of dr ug s invo lve d in

the state conviction, and the a

mount of drug s involved in that case a ffe cted the max imum term of imprisonment possibl e. Id. at 342-43. Citing the na rrow sc ope of the cate g orica l approa ch, the Fifth Circuit held that c onsideration of the repor t went beyond the bounds set forth in Taylor
. The Allen c ourt

e xpla ine d: We rea d T

a ylor as allowingthe sentenc ing c ourt to consider only the statutory de fi nit ion of the of fe ns e , the c ha

rg ing pa pe r a nd jur y ins tr uc tio ns . Any dif

fe re nt r ule raises the possibili ty

of mini-trials to determine the fac ts underlying a prior off ense. Suc h a n “ e la bo rate fa c tf

ind ing pr oc e ss r e g ard ingthe de fe nd ant’ s p ri or of fe ns e s, ” is s p e c i f i c a l l y b ar r e d b y Taylor
. Id. at 3 4 3
. Be cau s e t h e m an d at edn arro w i n qu i ry p re cl u d edco n s i d er at i o no f t h e a m o un to f d ru gs involved in the prior convic tion, the Fifth Circuit conc luded that it could not classify the7

de fe nd ant’ s d

ru g of fe ns e , w hic h me ant t

hat it ha d to re ta in t

he c la ssi fi c a tio n o f t

he state of

fe ns e
as a se rious drugoffe nse. Id. This Court cited Allen with approva l in Ma lle tt , 334 F.3d a t 503. Ma lle tt prese nted a
scena rio in which a c hang e in the law of the State of Ohio–fr om unit dose measure s of drug quantities to gr am measur es–eliminated the of fense of which a

defe ndant was c onvicted. Be cause the state did not provide a sy stem for c onvertingthe diffe rent mea surements, ther e wa s no means of a ssessing the rele vant punishment at the time of fe dera l sentencingwithout conductinga fa ctual inquiry into the specific qua

ntity of drug s involved in the state conviction. Id. at 502-03. A ma

jority of the Ma lle tt panel r easone d that “a de termination [of the max imum term of imprisonment] is no l ong er possible at the time of sentenc ing in f eder al cour

t, however , un le ss t he state -c ourt

ind ic tme nt o r j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns c on ta in t

he inf or matio n th a t w ou ld e na

ble the district court to dete rmine the punishment that would apply to the defe ndant’s convic tion under the . . . state laws.” Id. at 503. The indictment did not contain the a mount, and the Ma lle tt majority held that “the district c ourt should not eng ag e in an e x amination of the c onduct involved in a prior c onviction bey ond looking at the indictment or jury instructions.” Id. Th e ma jor ity cited Allen as employing similar r easoningto support the conclusion that there was thus no way to d e te rm ine fr om t

he re c or d th e state se nte nc e a pp lic a ble to t he de fe nd ant at th e tim e of his fede ral sente ncing
. Id. at 503. The Ma lle tt majority there fore conclude d that under suc h circ umstances, pr ior convictions ar e prope rly evaluated by

looking to the se ntence s available at the time of the state c ourt convictions. Id. Pr ic e argue s th a t Ma lle tt

applies only

to Ohio case s and that the c ateg orica l approa ch does not apply to Tennesse e convic tions pursuant to Morton . This argument overlooks that the8

amount of drug s was not at issue in Morton , as it was in Ma lle tt , and that neither opinion
c on ta ins any

so rt of state -s pe c if

ic qu a lif ic a tio n. Rathe r, the c a te g or ic a l a pp ro a c h w a s r e le va

nt i n Ma lle tt but irreleva

nt in Morton . Both c ases pr esent a cross-the -boar d rules that may or may not apply dependingon the circ umstances of eac h case . Moreove r, they do not present inconsistent rules as Price contends the district c ourt found. His ar g ument that the district court he ld that Morton “ [doe s] no t r e qu ir e the dis tr ic t c ourt to c on fi ne its inq

uir y int o o the r p ri or

c on vic tio ns to a ‘c ateg orica l approa ch,’ when dec iding whe ther they wer e ‘se rious drugoffe nses’ ” misses the po int . ( Ap lt. Re ply

B r. a t 2. ) T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld n o s uc h th ing , b ut s imp ly summa ri zed bo th Morton and Price ’s flaw ed interpr etation of that c ase be fore concludingthat the categ orica l approa ch re mained applica ble. (J.A. at 62 n.4.) The district cour

t corre ctly

conclude d, then, that the ca teg orica l approa ch applies he re a nd that it forec loses Price’s r eliance on the laboratory repor ts. W ithout these repor

ts, the district court wa s left with no rec ord evide nce to support Price ’s alleg ations that his prior drugoffe nses did no t qu a lif

y a s se ri ou s d

ru g of fe ns e s. To establish ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel, Price must show that: (1) his trial counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt, and (2) the defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced him. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687. The fa ct that Price’ s prior counse l failed to attac k the ar med ca ree r cr iminal enhanc ement by

introducing laboratory

repor ts that the sentencingjudge could not consider under the cate g orica l approa ch is not err or. B eca use Price ha s failed to produc e evide nce of a demonstrable e rror , he ca nnot show that his prior counsel wa s deficie nt. Accor dingly , the district court did not err

in denying Pric e’s motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the r elated motion to alter or amend that judg ment.9 III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e Cou rt AF F IRMS
.