IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-31320

Summary Calendar

GLENN E. ALPHONSE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ARCH BAY HOLDINGS, L.L.C.; SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, L.L.C.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:12-CV-330

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Glenn Alphonse, Jr. appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We AFFIRM.

Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C. initiated foreclosure proceedings on 

Alphonse’s house in 2010 after he defaulted on his mortgage. Alphonse did not 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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contest these proceedings in state court. Instead, he filed suit in federal court 

against Arch Bay and the mortgage servicer Specialized Loan Servicing, L.L.C. 

(“SLS”), under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) and 

Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Alphonse sought declaratory 

relief and damages. He alleged that Arch Bay wrongfully seized and possessed 

his home through “robo-signing,” a means of “attesting to foreclosure-related 

facts without first-hand knowledge.” Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C., 

548 F. App’x 979, 981 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all of 

the LUTPA claims and one of the FDCPA claims, with the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine being one of the bases for dismissal. We reversed, noting that we had 

found Rooker-Feldman inapplicable when faced with similar facts in Truong v. 

Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2013). See id. at 981-82. We noted 

that “[t]he district court also dismissed Alphonse’s various FDCPA claims that 

were not otherwise barred under Rooker-Feldman, but Alphonse does not press 

these claims on appeal.” Id. at 981.

On remand, Alphonse filed a memorandum seeking to establish diversity 

jurisdiction “now that his causes of action under Federal Law have been 

dismissed.” The defendants moved for summary judgment. In an order 

soliciting information regarding the defendants’ citizenship, the district court 

remarked that “any challenge to the dismissal of the FDCPA claims has been 

forfeited by the plaintiff and those claims are not mentioned in his opposition 

to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.” The court dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction, finding a lack of diversity and noting that “any challenge 

to the dismissal of the FDCPA claims has been forfeited . . . .” The court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 

claims. Alphonse timely appealed to this court.

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DISCUSSION

Alphonse claims that both federal question and diversity jurisdiction 

exist in this case, or, alternatively, that the court should have exercised 

supplemental jurisdiction. He also claims that the district court failed to follow 

the magistrate judge’s discovery order. We separately address each claim.

I. Federal Question Jurisdiction

The existence of federal question jurisdiction hinges upon whether 

Alphonse has waived his FDCPA claims. As this court recognized, and as 

Alphonse concedes, he waived all but one of those claims during his initial 

appeal. See id. at 981. As a result, the district court was not permitted to 

consider those claims on remand. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Holder, 634 F.3d 

830, 836 (5th Cir. 2011). Alphonse maintains, however, that he did not waive 

his remaining FDCPA claim, which was the subject of the reversal by this court 

in the initial appeal. We disagree.

Alphonse’s failure on remand to brief the one FDCPA claim that we 

revived in the first appeal constitutes abandonment of that claim. “[A] party 

may not allude to an issue in the district court, abandon it at the crucial time 

when the district court might have been called to rule upon it, and then 

resurrect the issue on appeal.” See Louque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 

779 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Reetz, 888 

F.2d 1497, 1501 (5th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).

Some language in the district court’s rulings on remand could be 

interpreted to mean that no federal claims were left after the first appeal and 

remand. If that was the district court’s interpretation, and we are not sure 

that it was, Alphonse needed to explain to the district court why one FDCPA 

claim remained for review on remand. Not having done so, Alphonse waived 

the FDCPA claim.

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II. Diversity Jurisdiction

We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Harvey v. Grey Wolf 

Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2008). Subject matter jurisdiction 

on the basis of diversity “requires that all persons on one side of the controversy 

be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.” Id. (citation 

and quotations omitted). When one of the parties is an LLC, its citizenship is 

determined by the citizenship of all of its members. Id. at 1080. Citizenship 

is based on domicile, i.e., where an individual resides and intends to remain. 

Acridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 334 F.3d 444, 448 (5th 

Cir. 2003).

The defendants argue that one of Arch Bay’s members is, like Alphonse,

a citizen of Louisiana. Their declarations indicate that the member has resided 

in Louisiana since 1994 and been registered to vote in the state since 1996. 

Moreover, the member has raised children in Louisiana, holds a Louisiana 

driver’s license, owns vehicles registered in Louisiana, and is an active member 

of numerous social and cultural organizations in the state. We have held that 

such factors may be used to establish domicile. See id.

Alphonse does not contest these facts or offer any evidence that the 

member is not a citizen of Louisiana. Instead, he argues that the standard 

established in Harvey “can be stretched to an illogical absurdity.” He claims

that such an absurdity exists in this case because the non-diverse member is 

in fact a member of a member of one of Arch Bay’s members, is a limited 

partner with no managerial responsibilities, and was difficult to locate. These 

arguments are unpersuasive.

The Supreme Court has explicitly “reject[ed] the contention that to 

determine, for diversity purposes, the citizenship of an artificial entity, the 

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court may consult the citizenship of less than all of the entity’s members.” 

Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195 (1990). Applying Carden, this

court, as well as all other circuits to address the issue, have held that “the 

citizenship of a LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its members.” 

Harvey, 542 F.3d at 1080 (collecting cases). Moreover, no case law has 

suggested that this conclusion may be disregarded when one of the LLC’s 

members is an artificial entity comprised of additional entities. Indeed, we 

have observed that the “appropriate tests for citizenship” involve “tracing

[entities’] citizenships down the various organizational layers where necessary 

. . . .” Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2009); see also 

Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 347-48 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, we reject Alphonse’s contention that less than all of an LLC’s 

members may be considered when determining its citizenship. 

III. Magistrate Judge’s Preliminary Discovery Order

We review a district court’s discovery-related rulings for abuse of 

discretion. See Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 

1993) (collecting cases). This includes a decision to defer to a magistrate

judge’s discovery order. The court must defer to such an order unless the order

is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R.

CIV. P. 72(a). An order is clearly erroneous if the court “is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citations and quotations omitted).

Alphonse claims the district court failed to follow the magistrate judge’s 

discovery order permitting him to conduct additional discovery regarding the 

citizenship of Arch Bay’s non-diverse member. He also asserts that the district 

court accepted the claims in the declarations from the member’s employers 

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despite the fact that the magistrate judge expressed doubts about their 

credibility. Because the magistrate judge’s order and credibility 

determinations were not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, Alphonse 

maintains, the court abused its discretion by failing to adopt them.

As Arch Bay notes, the district court did not fail to follow the magistrate

judge’s discovery order. Rather, it relied on the non-diverse member’s

declaration, a document that was not before the magistrate judge when it 

issued its order. That declaration outlined the member’s extensive ties to 

Louisiana and corroborated the information contained in the declarations from 

two of his employers. Alphonse has not addressed this contention or argued

that the court abused its discretion by relying on the declaration. Moreover, 

the magistrate judge did not actually find that the declarations from the nondiverse member’s employers lacked credibility. Although it expressed 

sympathy with Alphonse’s claims to that effect, it noted that “that’s not for me, 

that’s for [the district court] to evaluate . . . .” Thus, the district court did not 

fail to follow the magistrate judge’s orders or contravene its findings. It simply 

found that new evidence, taken in conjunction with evidence already in the 

record, obviated the need for additional discovery.

IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction

We review a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction 

for abuse of discretion. Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 226 (5th 

Cir. 1999). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

if: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim 

substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district 

court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims 

over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, 

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there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c). Other relevant factors include “judicial economy, convenience, 

fairness, and comity.” Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 

F.3d 595, 601-02 (5th Cir. 2009). As a general rule, “a court should decline to 

exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law 

claims are eliminated before trial . . . .” Id. at 602.

As we have discussed, Alphonse has abandoned his federal claims. The 

remaining claims involve novel and complex issues of state law. See Alphonse, 

548 F. App’x at 984-86. As a result, the first three Section 1367(c) factors, 

considerations of comity, and the general rule supporting dismissal when all 

federal claims are eliminated all weigh in favor of declining supplemental 

jurisdiction.

Alphonse does not contest these considerations but emphasizes that the

case has been ongoing for several years and that the parties have expended 

resources on discovery, dispositive motions, and an appeal to this court. Thus, 

he argues, considerations of judicial economy and convenience weigh in favor 

of maintaining jurisdiction. This position finds some support in our case law. 

We have held that, in certain situations, a district court may abuse its 

discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a suit after 

the parties have invested a significant amount of resources in the matter, even 

when no federal claims remain. See Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 595, 602-603

(collecting cases).

In Brookshire Brothers and our precedents cited therein we emphasized 

that the suits did not involve novel and complex issues of state law. See id. 

Nevertheless, the presence of novel issues of state law is not controlling. As 

we have noted, when analyzing supplemental jurisdiction, “no single factor is 

dispositive, and this Court must review the district court’s decision in light of 

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the specific circumstances of the case at bar.” Id. at 602. Indeed, we observed 

in Brookshire Brothers that “even if this case involved novel or complex state 

law issues, the significant amount of judicial resources invested by the district 

court would lead us to find that the district court abused its discretion in 

remanding this case.” Id. at 603.

Here, the “specific circumstances” demonstrate that the court did not 

abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. First, 

the resource expenditures are not analogous to those in Brookshire Brothers. 

That case “generat[ed] more than 1,300 entries in the district court docket.

The district court decided forty-one dispositive motions, fourteen Daubert

motions, and seven other motions in limine. Discovery had closed and the 

parties were making final preparations for trial. Trial . . . was continued four 

times.” Id. at 598. While the resources expended by the parties in this case 

are not insubstantial, they do not approach this exceptional level. Moreover, 

Alphonse has not argued that the research or discovery he conducted in the 

district court would need to be repeated in state proceedings. Absent such a 

risk, the investment of resources does not constitute a compelling reason to 

maintain supplemental jurisdiction. See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. 

Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1992).

Second, other common-law factors supported retaining jurisdiction in 

Brookshire Brothers. In particular, the court noted the “significant risk that 

[the plaintiff] will attempt to re-litigate in state court rulings made against it 

by the district court . . . .” Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 603. Alphonse has not 

argued that such a danger exists here. Indeed, a large portion of the 

proceedings in the district court related to the court’s disposition of Alphonse’s 

FDCPA claims and attempts to determine whether resolution of the state-law

claims was appropriate. Thus, as in Parker & Parsley, “we do not expect the 

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relitigation of other matters to pose undue hardship. The defendants can 

hardly contest jurisdiction, and we do not see other obstacles to resolution of 

the case in the state court, save those that ought to be there . . . .” 972 F.2d at 

588.

Given the presence of novel and complex issues of state law in this case, 

as well as Alphonse’s failure to argue or demonstrate that issues relating to 

resource expenditures or re-litigation weighed in favor of maintaining the case 

in the federal forum, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.

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