### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Febru ary 24, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1531 5

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00020 CR-3- RV UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us MARC O D. DUN CAN, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (F eb ru ar y 24 , 200 5) ON PETI TI ON FOR REHE ARING Before AN DE RSO N and BIRCH , C ircuit Judg es, and LA ND *, D istrict Judg e.

____ ____ ____ ____ *Honora ble Clay D. L and, United States District Judge f or the Middle District of G eorg ia, sitting by desig nation.In h is i nit ia l br ie f, Dunc an ma de thi s App re nd i- ty pe argume nt o nly

wi th r e sp e c t to 1 the drugty

pe issue, and not with re spect to the other two enhanc ements re fer ence d in any of the briefs, i.e ., the fire arm a

nd role e nhance ments. Acc ording ly , he is not entitled to have this Court enter tain the ar gument with respec t to those other two enha nceme nts. See United States v. L evy , 379 F.3d 1241( 11th Cir. 2004) (holding that defe ndant waive d his Blake ly claim as issue on a pp e a l by fa ili ngto r a ise it i n h is i nit ia l br ie f) ; U nit e d St ate s v . N e a ly , 2 32 F .3 d 8 25 , 8 30 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 0) (" De fe nd ant a

ba nd on e d th e [Ap pr e nd i] in dic tme nt i ssu e by no t r a isi ngthe iss ue in h is ini tia l br ie f. " ); Un ite d St ate s v . F or d, 27 0 F .3 d 1 34 6, 13 47 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 1) (" [O]ur

we ll 2 AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge: The panel' s opin ion in this case issued on August 18, 2004 , and was publ ished in 3 81 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004). A petition for r ehearing en banc w as fi le d. W e co nstru e it al so a s ape tit ionf or r eh eari ng b y

the or igi na l pane l. W e now gr an t pane l r eh eari ng, va cate the pr ev iou s op ini on p ubl ish ed in 381 F. 3d 1 070, and subs titute in its stead the instant op inion . In this op inion , w e focus on Duncan's sentencing argum ent, r eviewing for plain err or in light of the Suprem e Court's decision in United State s v. Booker, 542 U.S . __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5). W e co nc lud e that D unc anc annot ove rc om e the thi rd

pr ong of pla in e rr or

ana ly sis because he cannot show an err or that aff ected his subs tantial rights. See United St at es of A m er ic a v. Ro dr igu ez , ___F. 3d.

____ , 200 5 W L 272 952 (1 1thCi r. F eb . 4, 2005 ). In his init ial brief on appeal, Duncan ar gued that th e j ury and not th e district co urt j udge sho uld

have m ad e the de te rm inatio n of the ty pe and quanti ty

of dr ugs invo lved in a drug cons piracy for the purpose of sentencing. Af ter the initial 1established rule is that issues and contentions not timely raised in the br iefs ar e dee med a ba nd on e d. " ); Un ite d St ate s v . Curt is, 38 0 F .3 d 1 30 8 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 4) (d e c lin ingto p e rm it a supplemental brief

raisinga B lakely

issue for the f

irst time, following Ne aly and F ord). Mo re ov e r, e ve n in

his su pp le me nta l br ie f D un c an f oc us e s o n th e dr

ugty pe fi nd ing , b are ly mentioning the othe r two enha nceme nts, and eve n that mention is both conclusory and vague. We rea dily

conclude that Dunca

n has aba ndoned any

Blakely challeng e except with re spect to the drugty pe. 3 briefing in this case, the Suprem e Court decided Blakely v. W ashingt on, 542 U. S.

___, 124 S . Ct . 253 1 ( 2004 ), and a cc or din gly , w e or de re d su ppl em en ta l br ie fi ng on the iss ue . I n B lake ly , the S upr em e Co urt a ppl ie d th e ru le se t ou t i n Appr en di v . N ewJe rs ey , 530 U . S. 466 , 120 S . Ct . 234 8 ( 2000 ), and h el d th at the im posi tio n – ba se d so le ly

on the se nte nc ing j udge ' s f ac tua l f ind ing s – o f a se nte nc ing enhanc em en t a

bove the r an ge ind ic at ed

in the S ta te of

W as hin gto n' s S en te nc ing Re fo rm A ct vio la te d B lake ly ' s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts b ec au se the f ac ts supp orting th e findings were neither adm itted by Blakely nor found bya j ury . In our initial op inion , w e re viewed D uncan's sentence for plain er ror and concluded that the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d no t have c om m itt ed "p la in" e rr or

by f ai lin g to appl y Blakely in the context of the Federal S entencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). A ft er our ini tia l op ini on, the S upr em e Co urt de ci de d U nit ed S ta te s v. Booker, 542 U. S. at __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5). In Booker, the Suprem e Court iss ue d tw o se parate m aj or ity opi nio ns. I d. F ir st, Jus tic e St ev en s wro te f or the Co ur t an d h el d t ha t t he rul e an no un cedinBla ke ly app li edto th e Gui de li ne s.4

Booker, 542 U. S. __, 125 S. C t. at 745. He based his op inion on the prem ise that the G uid el ine s w er e m an da tor y and i m pose d bi ndi ng r equir em en ts o n a ll sentencing judges. Id. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 749. Se cond, and in ligh t of Justice St ev en s’ ho ld in g, J us ti ce Br ey er wro te forth e Co ur t an d i nv al id at edtwo pr ovi sio ns o f the S en te nc ing Re fo rm A ct of 198 4 th at

ha d th e ef

fe ct of m ak ing the G uid el ine s m an da tor

y . I d. a t __

_, 125 S . Ct

a t 75 6. T he Co urt i nstru ct ed that bo th hol din gs –

the S ixth A m en dm en t ho ldi ng and the r em ed ia l i nte rp re ta tio n of the Se n t en ci n g Ac t–

s h o u l db e ap p l i edt o al l ca s es o nd i re ct re v i ew . Id . a t7 6 9 . We r e qu e s t e dan dr e c e i v e ds up p l e me n t a l b r i e f s a d dr e s s i n g th e e f

f e c to f th e S up r e me Co ur t's de ci si on in Bo ok er. W e n ow co ns id er Du nc an 's c la im in li gh t o f Bo ok er. On Fe bruary

20, 2002, the appellant, Mar co D. Duncan, and several other co -d ef en dants w er e ch ar ge d w ithc onsp ir ac y to dis tr ibu te and t o po sse ss w ith int en t t o di str ibu te f

ive kil ogr am s or

m or e of c oc ai ne and f

if ty gr am s or m or e of co cai ne ba se , pu rs ua ntto 21 U.S.C. §§ 84 1( a)(1 ), (b )(1 )(A)(i i), a nd21 U.S.C. § 846. T he ind ic tm en t a lso a lle ge d ac ri m ina l f or fe iture c ount . P ri or

to tr ia l, D unc anf ile d am oti on t o su

ppr es s a ll ev ide nc e obt ai ne d f ro m the se ar chof

his ve hi cl e atth e ti m e o f hi s arres t. The di st ric t co ur t d en ie d t he m ot io n. D unc an ' s tr ia l c om

m en ce d onJul y

21, 200 3. T he j ur

y f ound D unc angui lty as c harg ed , and b y

aspe ci al ve rd ic t f

ound be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t theIn light of D uncan’ s criminal history , cate g ory IV, and with the other 2 enhanc ements, see for e x ample note 1, supra , the Guidelines indicated a life sentenc e.

A bifurc ated f

orfe iture proc eedingwas c onducted, a nd the jury

returne d a 3 forf eiture ve rdict of $340,000 a g ainst the defe ndant. 5 co nspi ra cy

inv olv ed f ive kil ogr am s or

m or e of c oc ai ne , but

f ound that the governm ent failed to prove bey ond a reasonable doub t that the conspi racy invo lved fifty

gram s or m ore of coca ine base. At sentencing, the district court ca lc ulate d D unc an ' s ba se of fe nse le ve l by

f ind ing that a

portio n of

c oc ai ne powder had been converted into 12.24 kil ogram s of cocaine base, or cra ck. Ha d D unc an ' s ba se of

fe nse le ve l be enc al cu la te d so le ly usi ng the j ur

y ' s sp ec ia l ve rd ic t, his ba se of

fe nse le ve l w oul d have be en32 i nst ea d of 38 unde r the G uid el ine s. How ever, the district court set the base offense level at 38 statin g, "I certa inly find from

the evidence, by

a preponderance at least, and actually m ore than th at , that M r. D unc ankne wand i t w as r ea sona bly f or es ee ab le to him

that i t wa s being con verted into crack coca ine, m ost of it conv erted, and sold in that form ." On O ctober 10, 2003, the district court sentenced Duncan to life im pr iso nm en t and o rd er ed

f or fe iture in the a m ount

of $34 0, 000. D unc anti m el y 2 3 ap pe al ed . Duncan ra ised various argum ents with respect to his convictio n, sentence, an d f or fe iture . A ft er

or al arg um en t and c ar ef

ul c onsi de ratio n, w e re

j ec t w ith outWit h respe ct to these other sentenc ing a

rguments, Dunca

n also failed to r aise a

n 4 Appre ndi-ty

pe objec tion in the dist rict cour t or in his init ial brief on a ppeal. See note, 1, supra. 6 ne ed f or f urthe r dis cu ssi on the f

oll ow ing arg um en ts a sse rt ed by D unc anon a

ppe al : (1) that the district court err ed by deny ing hi s m otion to supp ress the evidence obt ai ne d f

ro m the Apr il 21, 200 3 se ar ch ; ( 2) that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by enhanc ing his se nte nc e tw o le ve ls f or the pos se ssi on o f a fi re ar m ; ( 3) that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by e nhanc ing his se nte nc e fo ur le ve ls b as ed

upo n hi s r ole in the of fe nse ; and ( 4) that the f

or fe iture c ount

of the ind ic tm en t f

ai le d to se t f

orth w ith 4 the spe ci fi ci ty

r equir ed by the F if th A m en dm en t D ue P ro ce ss C lause the pr ope rty th atth e Gov ern m en t cl ai m edwas o bt ai ne d a s a r es ul t o f th e al le ge d c on sp ira cy . D unc an ' s r em ai nin g arg um en t onappe al is that the spe ci al ve rd ic t by the j ur y , f ind ing that the c onsp ir ac y inv olv ed onl y c oc ai ne pow de r, pr ec lud ed the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ro m se nte nc ing D unc anba se d, in part , on i ts f ind ing that the of

fe nse inv olv ed 12. 24 k ilo gr am s of

c oc ai ne ba se , or

c ra ck . D unc anf

ai le d to r ai se thi s is su e in th e d is tri ctco ur t at an y ti m e, ei th er dur in g t he tri al or a t s en te nc in g. A lth oughD unc andid

obj ec t be lowto the se tti ng o f the ba se of fe nse le ve l purs uant to a finding o f coca ine base instead of cocaine powder, his argum ent below w as lim ite d to asuf

fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce arg um en t tha t i t w as im poss ibl e to determ ine from

the evidence w hat quantit y of the cocaine powder

had been7

cooked int o crac k. T hat Duncan's obj ection below wa s lim ited to the sufficiency of the e vid en ce ind ic at ing c oc ai ne ba se and d id n ot i nc lud e any ty pe of obj ec tio n ba se d up on the S ixth A m en dm en t i s c le ar f ro m his w ri tte n ob

j ec tio ns t o hi s Pr es en te nc e In ve sti ga tio n R ep ort ( "P SI ") a s w el l a s th e tr an sc ri pt f ro m the sentencing h earing. Ther efore , be ca use D unc anf

ai le d to r ai se aS ixth A m en dm en t ar gum en t be low

, our r ev ie wis lim ite d to de te rm ini ng whe the r se tti ng the ba se of fe nse le ve l ba se d onaj udi ci al f ind ing of c oc ai ne ba se c onst itu te s pl ai n e rr or in lig ht o f the S upr em e Co urt' s ho ldi ng i n B ooke r. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Cande lari o, 240 F. 3d 1 300, 130 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( not ing that whe re ade fe ndant d id n ot m ak e anAppr en di- ba se d ob

j ec tio n be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt at se nte nc ing , r ev ie wis lim ite d to pla in e rr or

r ev ie w , and tha t a

suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce obj ec tio n is not a co nst itu tio na l ob

j ec tio n) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1 250, 128 0 ( 11th Ci r. 200 1) ( enbanc ) (a

ppl y ing pla in e rr or

r ev ie ww he re Appr en di c la im r ai se d f or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al ). T he f

ac t tha t B ooke r w as de ci de d su bse que nt t o th e jud gm en t i n t he di st ric t co ur t d oe s n ot alt er o urus e o f th e p la in erro r st an da rd . Se e U nit ed

S ta te s v. Co tto n, 535 U . S. 625 , 122 S . Ct . 178 1 ( 2002 ) (a ppl y ing pla in error to an Apprendi claim

wher e Apprendi was decided w hile the appeal wa s pe ndi ng i n th e Fo urth C ir cu it) ; J ohns on v . U nit ed S ta te s, 520 U . S. 461 , 117 S . Ct . 1544 ( 1997 ) (a

ppl y ing pla in e rr or

r ev ie wto the iss ue of

w he the r the m at er ia lity

of8

a fa lse state m en t w as an e le m en t of an of fe nse suc h th at

it ha d to be sub m itt ed

to a j ur y w he re the arg um en t w as f ir st r ai se d onappe al and w as ba se d up on a c as e decided by

the Suprem e Court af

ter the defe ndant's convi ction bu t before her ap pe al ). I nde ed , the S upr em e Co urt i n B ooke r expr es sly dir ec te d a

ppe llate c ourts to “ ap ply or din ar y pr ude nti al doc tr ine s, ” inc lud ing pla in e rr or , in co nduc tin g rev ie w of B oo ke r erro rs . Boo ke r, 54 2 U.S. _ _, 1 25 S. Ct. at 76 9. W e have discretion to correct an error under the plain error standard w here (1) an er ror occurr ed, ( 2) the err or wa s plain, (3) the e rror a ffec ted subs tantial ri ght s, and ( 4) the e rr or

se ri ousl y a ff ec ts the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty

or pub lic r ep utatio n of j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. U nit ed S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U . S. 725 , 732 -3 6, 113 S . Ct . 17 70 , 17 77 -7 9 (1 99 3) . InU nit ed S ta te s v. Ro dr igu ez , w e ap pli ed pla in e rr or

ana ly sis in lig ht o f Bo oke r to a

c la im that the de fe ndant' s se nte nc e vio la te d hi s F if th and S ixth Am endm ent rights because it was based on a j udge's finding of fac ts that wer e n ei th erch ar g edi nan i n d i ct m en tn o r p ro v en t o a ju ry. _

_ F. 3 d . _ _ , 2 0 0 5 WL 2729 52 (11th Cir. Feb 4, 2005 ). T he Rodriguez opini on stated that, after Booker, a se nte nc e enhanc em en t ba se d onaf ac t, oth er than apr ior

c onvi ct ion , f

ound sol el y by the j udge in a m an da tor

y gui de lin e sy ste m

m et the f ir st and s ec ond prongs of the plain error test. I d. at *7. T he court stated that the error wa s not th at9

there w ere "extra-ver dict enhancem ents" that led to an increase in the defendant's sentence, but rather that those enhancem ents wer e applied in a m andatory gu id el in e syst em . Id. at*8 . T he c ourt i n R odr igu ez he ld tha t the de fe ndant i n th at c as e co uld

not ove rc om e the thi rd

pr ong of the pla in e rr or

te st b ec au se he c oul d no t sh owthat the error – apply ing th e G uidelin es as m andatory instead of as advisory

– "aff ected subs tantial rights." Id. at *10. T he court stated that for an er ror to have "af

fecte d subs tantial rights," it m

ust have affec ted the outcom e of the district court pr oc ee din gs. I d. a t *7 ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. Co tto n, 535 U . S. a t 63 2, 112 S . Ct . at 186 ). Appl y ing the thi rd pr ong, the c ourt a ske d " [w ] he the r the re is a re as ona ble probabilit y

of a diff erent re sult if the gui delines had been appli ed in an adviso ry ins te ad of bin din g f as hio n by the se nte nc ing j udge in thi s c as e. " I d. a t *9 . T he co urt st at ed

that i t di d no t kn oww ha t the r es ult w oul d have be enif

the se nte nc ing j udge had appl ied the Guidelines in an adviso ry m anner. Id. T he court em pha siz ed that the de fe ndant b or e the bur de n of pe rs ua sio n w ithr es pe ct

to pr ej udi ce , and that whe re the e ff ec t of an e rr or w as unc er

ta in, the de fe ndant c oul d not m ee t hi s burd enbe ca

use he c oul d no t sh owar ea sona ble pr oba bil ity that the result would have been differe nt butfor the er ror. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Jones, 527 U. S. 373, 394-95, 119 S. Ct. 2090 , 2105 (1999)).J ustice Stevens ac knowledg ed that ther e would have been no Sixt h Amendment 5 constitutional viol ations in the case s befor e them if the Guidelines wer e advisory . "I ndeed, ever yone agree s that the constitutional issues presented by these c ases would have bee n avoided 10 Duncan ar gues that the error com m itted in hi s case is that the district court im pose d ase nte nc e gr eate r than th e m ax im um auth or iz ed

by the f ac ts f ound by the j ur y a lon e, vio la tin g th e pr inc ipl e announ ce d inBo oke r. D unc anstate s th at the fa ct s f ound by the j ur y auth or iz ed

the j udge to ap ply

ase nte nc e w ith in the r an ge of anof fe nse le ve l of

32 i n th e G uid el ine s, and the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed e rr or by im posin g a sentence greater than w hat is authorized byoffense level 32. D uncan co nc lud es that the se nte nc ing c ourt' s e rr or sub stanti al ly

a ff ec te d hi s r igh ts b ec au se the se nte nc e im

pose d e xc ee de d th at

w hic h is auth or iz ed

by an of fe nse le ve l 32 in th e Gui de li ne s. As Rodriguez suggests, Duncan' s argum ent m isstates the error c omm itted by the sentencing judge. I d. at *8 ("T he err or that wa s com m itted in pre-Booker sentencing, like that which occurre d in thi s case, is not th at there w ere extrave rd ic t e nhanc em en ts. . . . T he e rr or is that the re w er e ex tr a- ve rd ic t e nhanc em en ts used in a m andatory

guidelin es sy stem .") . Rodriguez explains h ow w e know that the sam e enhancem ents m ade in a non-m andatory Guidelines sy stem

are constitu tionallyperm issib le, and thus how w e know that the err or wa s the failure t o tr e atth e Gu i d e l i n e s a s a d v i s o ry: 5entirely

if Congr ess had omitted from the SRA the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judge s; it i s that circumstanc e that make s the Court' s answer to the second que stion prese nted possible. For

when a trial judg e exerc ises his discretion to select a specific sentenc e within a define d rang e, the de fenda nt has no rig ht to a jury

deter mination of the fac ts that the judge deems re levant." 542 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct . at 750. 11 O ne r ea son is tha t Ju sti ce S te ve ns' m aj or ity opi nio n in Booker explicitly

tells us that: "If the Guidelines as currently wr itten couldbe rea d as m erely advisory pr ovi sio ns tha t r ec om

m en de d, r athe r than r equir ed , the se le ct ionof

part ic ular se nte nc es in re spon se to dif fe ri ng se ts o f fa ct s, the ir

use w oul d no t i m

pli cate the S ixth A m en dm en t. " B ooke r, 125 S . Ct . a t 75 0; i d. a t 76 4 (B re y er , J. , m aj . op. ) (" [W ] ith out thi s pr ovi sio n – n am el y the provisi on that m akes the relevant sentencing rules m an da tor y and i m pose s bi ndi ng r equir em en ts o n a ll se nte nc ing j udge s – the statut e fa lls out sid e the sc ope of Apprendi‘ s requirem ent." ( internal quotatio n om itted)). The other r eason we know that the use of extra-ver dict enhanc em en ts i n anon -m an da tor y gui de lin es sy ste m

is not unc onst itu tio na l i s th at

the oth er Bo oke r m aj or ity opi nio n, the one auth or ed by Jus tic e Br ey er , spe ci fi ca lly provides for extra-verdict e nhancem ents in all future se nte nc ing s. I d. a t 76 4- 65. T he Co urt sp ec if ic al ly he ld th atth e g ui de li ne s s y st em was c on st itut io na l o nc e two part s of the S en te nc ing Re fo rm

A ct w er e ex ci se d: the part in 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(b)(1) m aking th e guidelines re sul t bi ndi ng o n th e se nte nc ing c ourt; an d th e part in § 3742 (e ) re qui ri ng d e novo r ev ie wof se nte nc es on a

ppe al . Id . at 76 4. Id . a t *9 . N ec es sari ly

im pli ed in the Ro dr igu ez ana ly sis is the f ac t tha t a ppe llateIn identifying the rele vant er ror, the Rodriguez panel applied both B ooker 6 h o l d i n g s r e tr o a c t i v e l y. 12 co urts s houl d a

ppl y r etro ac tiv el y

both B ooke r hol din gs. I nde ed , the O pin ionof 6 the Co urt announc ed

by Jus tic e Br ey er

e xpr es sly

m an da te s th is. 542 U . S. __, 125 S. Ct . a t 76 9 ( “ A s th es e dis posi tio ns i ndi cate , w e m ust appl y tod ay ' s ho ldi ngs – both th e Si xthA m en dm en t ho ldi ng and o ur r em ed ia l i nte rp re ta tio n of the Sentencing Act – to all ca ses on direct review .” ). In the sam e breath, Justice Br ey er dir ec ts a ppe llate c ourts t o a

ppl y “ or din ar y pr ude nti al doc tr ine s, ” inc lud ing th e p la in erro r ru le . Id. Thu s, Ro dr ig ue z’ pla in erro r an al y si s fa it hf ul ly foll ows th es e Supr em e Co ur t d ire ct io ns . Whe n Ju sti ce Br ey er ' s op ini on i s r etro ac tiv el y appl ie d ondir ec t r ev ie w , th e G uid el ine s are de em ed

to have be en"e ff

ec tiv el y a dvi sor y . " B ooke r, 542 U . S. __, 125 S. Ct . a t 75 7. T his m eans tha t the vari ous top r an ge s of the G uid el ine s are no long er binding, and therefore, no lon ger constitute "littl e re levant m axim um s." This leaves as the only

m axim um sentence the one set out in the United States Co de . Jus tic e Br ey er ' s op ini on m ak ing the G uid el ine s a dvi sor y e sse nti al ly changes what sentence is authorized by a j ury verdict – from

the sentence that w as authorized by

m andatory

Guidelines to the sentence that is autho rized by the U. S. Co de .13

In Duncan' s case, the U. S. Code authorizes a sentence of up to li fe im pr iso nm en t ba se d onthe j ur y ' s f ind ing that he pos se sse d a t l ea st 5 kil ogr am s of co ca ine pow de r. S ee 21 U . S. C. § 84 1( b) (1 )( A )( ii) (I ). D unc an ’ s li fe se nte nc e, of co ur se , f al ls w ith in this m ax im

um . A nd this li fe se nte nc e doe s no t r un a fo ul o f Justi ce S tevens’ holdi ng, w hich also has to be applied retroactively . When Just ice Br ey er ’ s ho ldi ng i s a

ppl ie d r etro ac tiv el y , the m ax im um se nte nc e au tho re d by Duncan’ s jur

y verdict is life; thus, D uncan’ s life sentence does not viol ate Justice Stevens’ holdi ng that "[a] ny fac t . . . which is necessary to supp ort a sentence exceeding the m axim

um authorized by

the fac ts establish ed by

a plea of guilt y

or a j ur y ve rd ic t m

ust be a dm itt ed

by the de fe ndant o r pr ove d to aj ur y be y ond a reas on ab le do ub t." Boo ke r, 54 2 U.S. _ _, 1 25 S. Ct. at 75 6. D unc ane sse nti al ly

a sks thi s c ourt t o a

ppl y Jus tic e St ev en s’ opi nio n in Booker retroac tively , but ref use to applyJustice Brey er' s opin ion in Booker re tr oa ct ive ly . Y et , in Bo oke r, the S upr em e Co urt e xpr es sly state d th at

both hold ings s houl d be applied to cases on d irect r eview. 542 U. S. __, 125 S. C t. at 769. T he onl y

e rr or that r em ai ns a ft er

appl y ing both B ooke r hol din gs retroac tively

is the fact that the j udge perceived that the Guidelines wer e m andatory , when in fact they are now deem ed to have been advisory . Rodriguez, 20 05 W L 27 29 52 at * 8.14

L ike the de fe ndant i n R odr igu ez , D unc anc anm ee t the f ir st tw o pr ongs of plain error analy sis. T he sentencing judge applied the Guidelines as if they we re m an da tor y , and tha t c onst itu te s e rr or w hic h is "c le ar ly

c ontrary to the lawa t the tim e of appeal" a fter B ooker. I d. at *7 (c iting Johns on v. United State s, 520 U. S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544 , 1549 (1977)). D uncan, however , c annot m eet the third pr ong of pla in e rr or

r ev ie wbe ca

use he c annot

sho wthat this e rr or

a ff ec te d hi s s ub s t an t i al ri g h t s . In h i s b ri ef ad dre s s i n g Bo o k er , Du n ca nac kn o wl ed g es th at " [i ]t is sim ply im poss ible to determ ine whether the district court would have im posed the sam e se nte nc e unde r a dis cr et ion ar y G uid el ine sc he m e. " A s in dic at ed by Ro dr igu ez , D unc anbe ar s th e bur de n of pe rs ua sio n w ithr es pe ct

to pr ej udi ce . I d. Duncan does not po int to anything indicating "a re asonable probabil ity of a dif fe re nt r es ult

if the gui de lin es ha d be enappl ie d inan a dvi sor y ins te ad of bin din g fas hi on ," an d t he refo re ca nn otm eethi s b ur de n. Id . at * 9. The only legal issue that dist ingu ishes the sentence im posed in Duncan' s ca se f ro m the se nte nc e im

pose d inRo dr igu ez is that the j ur y in D unc an ' s c as e iss ue d aspe ci al ve rd ic t tha t f ound D unc angui lty

of c onsp ir ac y

to dis tr ibu te and poss es s w ithint en t t o di str ibu te f ive kil ogr am s or

m or e of c oc ai ne , but

did not f ind him guiltyof the sam e char ge with re spect to fifty gram s or m ore of coca ine base. The district court enhanced D uncan's sentence based, in part, on a f indin g that15

som e of the c oc ai ne pow de r ha d be enc onve rt ed int o ov er 12 k ilo gr am s of

c oc ai ne ba se , af ind ing that the j ur

y ha d de cl ine d to m ak e be y ond a re as ona ble doubt. T his doe s no t c hange our

ana ly sis . O ur Ci rc uit ' s pr ec ed en t un if

orm ly state s, "[ r] el ev an t c ondu ct of w hic h a de fe ndant w as a cquitte d no ne the le ss m ay be take n in to a cc ount

in se nte nc ing f

or the offense of c onvi ction, as long as the gov ernm ent proves the acquitted con duct re lie d up on b y

apr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . " Unit ed

S ta te s v. Baraka t, 130 F. 3d 1 448, 145 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. W atts, 519 U . S. 148 , 153, 117 S . Ct . 633 , 636 ( 1997 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. F ra zi er , 89 F . 3d 1 501, 150 6 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Aver i, 922 F. 2d 76 5, 766 (11th Cir. 1991)). In U nit ed S ta te s v. W atts, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t the D oubl e Je opardy Cl au se perm itted a court to consid er a cquitted cond uct in sentencing a defe ndant un der the Guidelines because "consideration of inform ation abou t the defendant's charac ter at sentencing does not result in 'punishm ent' for any offense other than th e o ne of wh ic h t he de fen da ntwas c on vi ct ed ." 5 19 U.S. 14 8, 1 55 , 11 7 S . Ct. 633, 636 ( 1997 ) (c iti ng W itt e v. U nit ed S ta te s, 515 U . S. 389 , 401 , 115 S . Ct . 219 9, 2207 (1995)). Booker does notsuggest that the consideration o f ac quitt ed conduct violates the Sixth Am endm ent as long as the judge does not im pose a sentence thatIn h is B oo ke r o pin ion , Just ic e Ste ve ns dis c us se s Watts , a nd c on c lud e s th at it

" is 7 not inconsistent with today ' s decision." Booke r, 542 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 754. J ustice Stevens, howeve r, ac knowledg es that the c ase did not involve " any contention that the sente ncing e nh anc e me nt h a d e xce e de d th e se nte nc e a uth or ize d b y

the jur y ve rd ic t in

vio latio n o f t

he Sixth Amendment." I d. 16 exceeds w hat is authorized bythe j ury verdict. Thus, noth ing in Booker erodes

7 our bin din g pr ec ed en t. B ooke r sugg es ts tha t se nte nc ing j udge s c anc ont inu e to consider relevant acquitted condu ct w hen apply ing th e G uidelin es in an advisory m anne r, "[ f] or

w he n atr ia l j udge e xe rc ise s hi s di sc re tio n to se le ct aspe ci fi c se nte nc e w ith in a

de fi ne d r an ge , the de fe ndant h as no r igh t t o aj ur y de te rm inatio n of the fac ts that the judge deem s relevant." Booker, 542 U.S . at __, 125 S. C t. at 750. H er e, appl y ing Jus tic e Br ey er ' s op ini on r etro ac tiv el y , w e co nc lud e that the j ur y ve rd ic t auth or iz ed

li fe im pr iso nm en t. T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e that i t w as not error for the sentencing j udge to finda fa ct that had been acquitted by the j ury whe n d et erm in in g Du nc an 's s en te nc e. W e ar e aw ar e of

the opi nio ns r ec en tly

iss ue d by

the F ourth, S ixth, and N inth Ci rc uit s st at ing that de fe ndants in D unc an ’ s po sit ionm et pla in e rr or

r ev ie wand re m an din g th ei r ca se s f

or r es en te nc ing in lig ht o f Bo oke r. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. Am eline, __F. 3d__ , 2005 W L 350811 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005) (review ing Book er issue sua sp onte and ho lding , upon rehear ing, that defendant's sentence violated Booker because district court applied Guideline enhancem ents based on judicial17

factf indin g that went bey ond th e fa cts adm itted by defendant in his pl ea); United St at es v. O liv er , __F . 3d__ , 200 5 W L 233 779 (6 th C ir . F eb . 2, 200 5) ( fi ndi ng the dis tr ic t c ourt pl ai nly

e rr ed by inc re as ing de fe ndant' s se nte nc e pur suant t o th e G u i d e l i n e s b a s e dup o nth e j u d g e - f o u n df a c to f d e f e n d an t ' s p r e tr i a l f

l i g h tf r o m a re sid en tia l ha lf

w ay hou se ); U nit ed

S ta te s v. H ughe s, __ F . 3d__ , 200 5 W L 147 059 (4th Cir. Jan.24, 2005) (vacating and rem anding defendant's pre- Booker sentence unde r pla in- er

ro r re vie wbe ca

use dis tr ic t c ourt ha d no t y et ha d an op portun ity

to im pose ase nte nc e unde r ana dvi sor y gui de lin e sy ste m ). W e de cl ine to fo llo w th o s e o p i n i o n s fo r s ev er al re as o n s . F i rs t , we ar e b o u n dt o fo l l o w t h i s Ci rc u i t ’s precedent in Rodriguez. Sm ith v. GT E C orp., 236 F.3d 1292 , 1300 n.8 (11 Cir. th 2001 ) (“ U nde r the w el l- es ta bli she d pr ior

pane l pr ec ed en t r

ule of thi s C ir cu it, the hol din g of

the f ir st p an el to ad dr es s an is sue is the lawof thi s C ir cu it, the re by bind ing all sub sequent panels u nless and un til the first panel’ s hold ing is o verruled by the Court sitting en banc or the Suprem e Court. ”). Sec ond, as Rodriguez ind ic at es , tho se opi nio ns m isi de nti fy the Bo oke r er

ro r by appl y ing Jus tic e St ev en s’ op in io n re tro act iv el y , bu t fa il in g t o app ly Jus ti ce Br ey er’s o pi ni on ret ro act iv el y . Ro dr igu ez , 200 5 W L 272 952 a t *8 . F ina lly , a s di sc uss ed in Ro dr igu ez , tho se opi nio ns d o no t c or

re ct ly appl y pla in e rr or

ana ly sis be ca

use the y do n ot i de nti fy

or ap ply the bur de n of

pe rs ua sio n, and the y

dis co nne ct

the pr ej udi ce ana ly sis f

ro mF or e xamp le , th e Mil an p ane l do e s n ot e xpla in t he e rr or it a pp are ntl y se e s in 8 Rodrigue z’ identification of the re levant er ror, or in its retroac tive application of not only J ustice Ste ve ns ’ B oo ke r h old ing , b ut a lso Justi c e B re y e r’ s.

I t is true that the Seventh Circuit in Booke r indicate d that Booke r had not 9 prese rved the err or in the district court, a lthough the Seve nth Circuit overlooked the pla in error issue beca

use the Gove rnment had not a rgued it. United States v. Booke r, 375 F .3d 508, 515 (7 th Cir. 2004). 18 the tr ue e rr or that r em ai ns a ft er both B ooke r opi nio ns are appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y . I d. at *11 ( “ A nothe r w ay

of puttin g it is that the H ughe s r ea soni ng i s wro ng b ec au se it disconn ects the err or to be rem edied on rem and from the decision of whether there is to be a rem and.”) . InU nit ed S ta te s v. Mi lan, the S ixth C ir cu it co nc lud ed that R odr igu ez is incorrect, and that Milan’ s rights were “ subs tantially aff ected” by the Booker er ro r. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mi lan, __ F . 3d__ , 200 5 W L 309 934 at *6- 7( 6 Ci r. F eb . 10,

th 2005 ). O ur

r ea din g of

Mi lan do es not

de te ct any c ri tic ism of the sub stanc e of

the plain error analy sis in Rod riguez. Id. Rather , Milan see m s to have rej ected 8 Ro dr igu ez onl y

be ca use the S upr em e Co urt r em an de d R es pond en t B ooke r’ s c as e for re sentencing. Id. The Sixth Circuit assum ed that the Suprem e Court considered the plain error analy sis in Boo ker. Id. T he Sixth Circuit reasoned that Respondent Booker did not m ake a S ixth Am endm ent objection in the district co urt, and the f

ac t tha t the S upr em e Co urt r em an de d hi s c as e fo r re se nte nc ing 9

“ am ount s – at the very

least – to a holdin g that sentencing Booker in a m anner thatThe pa rties’ brie fs to the Supreme Court in B ooker do not a ddress the standa rd of 10 err or that should be applied, a nd do not urg e the Supre me Court to apply a plain er ror a naly sis. See B rief f

or the United States, United States v. B ooker, 542 U .S. ___, 125 S. C t. 738 (2005), 2004 WL1967056; Brie f of Responde nt, 2004 WL1967056. Indeed, c ontrary to the sug g estion in Milan, 2005 W L309934 at *7, we do not de tect in the g overnme nt’s petition for ce rtiorar i that the Court was a sked to revie w for pla in error . See Pet. for Ce rt., 2004 WL1638204.

See Chandris, Inc. v. L atsis, 515 U.S. 347, 353, 115 S. C t. 2172, 2182 n.* (1995) 11 (dec lining to consider

a plain er ror issue r aised for

the first time in petitioner’s openingbrief beca use of the Supre me Court rule providingthat “[o] nly the questions set forth in the pe tition [for cer tiorari], or fairly

included ther ein, will be consider ed by the Court.”). 19 vi ol at edth e Si xt h Am en dm en t af fect edhi s s ub st an ti al rig ht s.” Id . W ithr es pe ct , w e ar e not

pe rs ua de d by

Mi lan f or anum be r of r ea sons . F ir st, w e be lie ve that the Mi lan op ini on m isi de nti fi es the Bo oke r er ro r as “ [s ] en te nc ing a de fe ndant o n th e ba sis of j udi ci al f ac t- fi ndi ng, ” id. a t *6 , w hic h m isi de nti fi catio n results from

their having appl ied retroac tively only Justice Stevens’ Booker ho ld in g a ndth ei r fai lu re t o a ls o app ly retro act iv el y Ju st ic e Bre y er’s h ol di ng . Second, an inference that the Suprem e Court im plicitlyreview ed for plain err or, an dr e man d e dB o o k e r ’s c a s e b e c au s e i ta f f e c t e dh i s s ub s t an t i a l r i g h t s , s e e ms unw ar rante d inli ght

of the f ac t tha t pl ai n e rr or

w as not dis cu sse d ine ith er

of the two O pinio ns for the Court or in the various dis sents. W e believe there are m ore pla usi ble e xpl an at ion s f

or the S upr em e Co urt’ s f

ai lur e to a ddr es s th e pla in e rr or iss ue : i t w as not

arg ue d, and the pla in e rr or iss ue w as not

e nc om pa sse d w ith in 10 the que sti ons ac ce pte d f

or c er tio rari . F ina lly , appl y ing both de ci sio ns

11 re tr oa ct ive ly , it

is hard to unde rs tand h owthe Co urt c oul d have appl ie d pl ai n e rr orIn this case, Dunc an invokes the pr inciple of fa ir war ning a s to the conseque nces 12 of his conduct. This is one of the four c ateg ories identified in Calder v. Bull, 3 Da ll. 386, 390 (1798), a s impli catingthe Ex Po st F ac to Clause. Althoug h Roge rs itself involved another Calder 20 an al y sis and r ea ch ed

the c onc lus ionthat B ooke r carr ie d hi s burd enof pe rs ua sio n on all of the relevant prongs. W e ar e not willing to assu m e the Suprem e Court im pli ci tly appl ie d pl ai n e rr or

ana ly sis in Bo oke r in a

m anne r that w oul d se em to us to b e unor

tho dox. In addition to arguing that thi s Court shou ld adopt the rea sonin g em ploy ed by the Fourth, S ixth, and Ninth Circuits, D uncan m akes a cr eative ar gum ent based on expos t f

ac to pr inc ipl es . A lth oughD unc anur ge s th e re tr oa ct ive appl ic at ionof the Booker holdi ng anno unced by Justice Stevens, he argues that apply ing Ju stice Br ey er ' s op ini on r etro ac tiv el y vio la te s th e D ue P ro ce ss C lause be ca use of the Su pr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng i n B oui e v. Co lum bia , 378 U . S. 347 , 353 , S . Ct . 169 7, 1702 (1964). I n Bouie, the Court held that j udicial enlargem ent of a cr im inal statute, applied retroac tively , violated the D ue Proce ss Clause because it w as unf or es ee ab le and l ike an expos t f ac to law . Id. The S uprem e Court later clarif ied thi s do ctri ne in Ro ge rs v. T enne sse e, 532 U . S. 451 , 468 , 121 S . Ct . 169 3, 170 3 (2001), explaining th at, while the E x P ost F ac to Clause does not of its own force apply to the Judi cial Br anch, the D ue Proce ss Clause encom passes the expos t fac to pr inc ipl e of

f ai r w ar nin g. 12cate g ory , and although Roge rs expressly disavowed a

ny intention to “incorporate jot-for- jot the specific cate g ories of Calde r,” Rog ers, 125 S. Ct. at 1699, Dunca n does invoke the f

air wa rning pr inc ipl e art ic ulate d in

Rog e rs . We c an a ssume argue nd o, wi tho ut d e c idi ng , th at Ro g e rs ’ f a ir war ning pr inciple does a

pply to retroa ctive incr ease s of punishment as well as to the c ore Calde r c ate g or y of re tr oa c tiv e c ri min a lizatio n o f c on du c t. 21 Duncan ar gues that Ju stice Bre y er’ s rem edial interpretation, if applied re tr oa ct ive ly , w oul d in cr ea se the se nte nc e au tho ri ze d by the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t t o a m axim um of life, and therefore would operate, in ligh t of his life sentence, as an expos t f ac to lawin viol ation of his due process rights. W e look to th e principles announ ce d inRo ge rs and e xam ine w he the r the S upr em e Co urt’ s B ooke r opi nio n w oul d vi olate the due pr oc es s pr inc ipl es of f ai r w ar nin g. R oge rs , 532 U . S. a t 46 1, 12 1 S . Ct. at16 99 . A t the ti m e D unc anc om

m itt ed his of fe nse , 199 9 - 200 2, the U . S. Co de inf orm ed D unc anthat i f a j ur

y c onvi ct ed

him of pos se ssi ng at l ea st 5 kil ogr am s of cocaine powder, he w as subject to a sentence of life im prisonm ent. S ee 21 U. S. C. §841 (b )( 1) (A )( ii) (I ). T he G uid el ine s at the ti m e al so i nf orm ed D unc anthat a j udge w oul d e nga ge in fa ct -f ind ing to de te rm ine his se nte nc e an d c oul d im pose up to a se nte nc e of

li fe im pr iso nm en t. 18 U . S. C. § 35 51 et seq . Duncan, therefor e, had am ple war ning at the tim e he com

m itted his crim e that life im prisonm ent was a pot en tia l c onse que nc e of his a ct ion s. Appl y ing the pr inc ipl es announc ed in Ro ge rs , Dun can ’s du e p ro ces s ri gh ts can no t b e sa idto ha ve be en vi ol at ed .22

D unc an ’ s arg um en t i s si m ilar to the one r ej ec te d by the S upr em e Co urt i n D obbe rt v. F lor ida , 432 U . S. 282 , 97 S . Ct . 229 0 ( 1977 ). A ft er D obbe rt ’ s m

ur de rs , the Florida death penalty statutes wer e found uncon stitut ional un der the principles of F urm anv. G eo rg ia , 408 U . S. 238 , 92 S . Ct . 272 6 ( 1972 ). H ow ev er , F lor ida pr om ptl y e na ct ed ane wde ath pe na lty

pr oc ed ur e, und er

w hic h D obbe rt

w as tr ie d, co nvi ct ed and s en te nc ed

to de ath. D obbe rt

arg ue d th at

the re w as no d eath p en al ty in e ff ec t i n F lor ida

a t the ti m e of

his c ri m ina l c ondu ct , be ca use the the n e xtant Florida statute wa s declared invalid after the tim e of his crim inal condu ct, an argum ent based on th e E

x P ost F ac to Clause. T he Suprem e Court re adily rej ected D obbe rt ’ s arg um en t, hol din g inr el ev an t part :

Bu t this sop his tic arg um en t m oc ks the sub stanc e of the E x P ost F ac to Cl au se . Whe the r or not the old statut e w oul d inthe f

uture , w ith stand c onst itu tio na l atta ck , it clear ly indicated Florida’ s view of the sever ity of m urder and of the degree of punishm ent which the legislature wished to im

pose upo n m

urderer s. T he statute was int en de d to pr ovi de m ax im um de te rr en ce , and i ts existence on the statute bo oks prov ided fair w arning as to the de gr ee of

c ulp ab ili ty

to w hic h th e St at e as cr ibe d to the act of m

urder. Petitioner’ s high ly

technical ar gum ent is at odds with [a state m en t f

ro m Ch ic ot C ounty

D ra ina ge D istri ct

v. Bax te r St at e Ban k , 3 08 U.S. 37 1, 6 0 S . Ct. 3 17 (19 40 )]. H er e the e xis te nc e of

the statut e se rv ed

a s an “ ope rativ e fa ct ” to w ar

n th e pe tit ion er

of the pe na lty

w hic h F lor ida w oul d se ek

to im pose on h im

if he w er e co nvi ct ed

ofMiller v. Florida , 482 U.S. 423, 107 S. C t. 2446 (1987), is inapposite. It did not 13 involve a ca se like the instant ca se and D obbert, in which the widely rec og nized potential sentenc e re mained uncha

ng ed fr om the time of the cr iminal conduct. Dobber t v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. C t. 2290 (1977). 23

fi rs t- de gr ee m

ur de r. T his w as suf

fi ci en t c om

pli an ce w ith the expos t f

ac to provisi on of the United States Co nst itu tio n. 43 2 U.S at 29 7- 98 , 97 S. Ct. at 23 00 (ci ta ti on s an d q uo ta ti on s o m it te d) . As in D obbert, at the tim e of D uncan’ s crim inal condu ct, the recognized state of the lawloo ke d to the U . S. Co de a s e sta bli shi ng m ax im

um se nte nc es – i n Duncan’ s case, a life sentence.. A lthou gh m andatory Guidelines we re in place, 13 the lawof

thi s C ir cu it the n r ec ogni ze d th e U . S. Co de a s th e sour ce of the m axim um sentence. U nited States v. S anchez, 269 F.3d 1250 , 1268 (11th Cir. 2001 ). A s another Circuit has noted, “ In fac t, bef ore Blakely

wa s decided, ever

y fe de ra l c ourt of

appe al s ha d he ld tha t Appr en di d id n ot a ppl y to gui de lin e ca lc ulatio ns m ad e w ith in the statut or y m ax im um . ” S im

psonv. U nit ed

S ta te s, 376 F. 3d 6 79, 681 ( 7 Ci r. 200 4) ( ci tin g U nit ed S ta te s v. H ughe s, 369 F . 3d 9 41, 947 th (6th Cir. 2004 ); U nited States v. F rancis, 367 F.3d 805 , 820 (8th Cir. 2004 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. Jard ine , 364 F . 3d 1 200, 120 9 ( 10th C ir . 200 4) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. A lvare z, 358 F . 3d 1 194, 121 1- 12 ( 9thCi r. 200 4) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. P hil lip s, 349 F. 3d 1 38, 143 ( 3d C ir . 200 3) : Unit ed S ta te s v. P atte rs on, 348 F . 3d 2 18, 228 -2 924

(7th Cir. 2003 ); U nited States v. Randle, 304 F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); U nit ed S ta te s v. S an ch ez , 269 F . 3d 1 250, 126 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. W eb b, 255 F . 3d 8 90, 898 ( D . C. Ci r. 200 1) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. A ngl e, 254 F . 3d 5 14, 518 (4th Cir. 2001 ); U nited States v. Ca ba, 241 F. 3d 98 , 100 (1st Cir. 2001 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. G ar ci a, 240 F . 3d 1 80, 183 -8 4 ( 2d C ir . 200 1) ). W e re ad ily co nc lud e that D unc anha d su ff ic ie nt w ar nin g to satis fy

the due pr oc es s c onc er

ns articulated in Rogers v. T ennessee. W e have c ar ef

ull y r ev ie w ed e ac h arg um en t a sse rt ed

on a ppe al , and f

or the foregoing reasons, the j udgm ent, sentence, and forfe iture of the district court are AFFIR MED.