NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRA L. BENNETT,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-35821

D.C. No. 3:12-cv-05382-RAJ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 10, 2015**

Seattle, Washington

Before: NGUYEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and ZOUHARY,*** District 

Judge.

Sandra Bennett appeals from the district court’s affirmance of the denial of 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District 

Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 16 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Social Security disability benefits. We affirm.

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) gave “specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence,” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005), for discounting the opinion of Bennett’s treating 

physician. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the treating 

physician’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical record and Bennett’s work 

history. Any errors in the ALJ’s additional reasoning were harmless. See Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012).

The ALJ properly gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 

disbelieving Bennett’s subjective complaints of pain. See id. at 1112. Bennett’s 

work history and layoff date were sufficient reasons to support the ALJ’s adverse 

credibility determination. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 

2001). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reasoning was harmless. See Bray, 554 

F.3d at 1227.

The ALJ properly gave a germane reason for discounting Bennett’s 

husband’s testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. The inconsistency between 

Bennett’s abilities and her husband’s testimony is a germane reason to discount her 
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husband’s testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2008).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Bennett’s impairments 

do not meet or equal any listing. And the ALJ was not required to explain why 

Bennett’s impairments do not equal Listing 1.04, because Bennett did not present 

evidence in an effort to establish medical equivalence. See Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

Bennett’s argument that the ALJ erred in determining Bennett’s residual 

functional capacity rises and falls with other arguments that we have already 

rejected. In the same vein, an ALJ’s hypothetical to a vocational expert needs

only to include those limitations that are supported by substantial evidence, see 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217, so Bennett’s challenges to the ALJ’s hypothetical’s 

assumptions fail for the same reasons that we have already expressed. Cf. StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).

Bennett has waived her argument that the vocational expert’s testimony 

conflicts with Medical-Vocational Rule 201.00(f) by raising this argument for the 

first time on appeal. See Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Similarly, by failing to raise the argument “specifically and distinctly” in her 

opening brief, Bennett has waived her contention that the ALJ erred in failing to 

find (at step two) that Bennett’s depression and anxiety were severe impairments. 

See Mills v. United States, 742 F.3d 400, 409 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014).

AFFIRMED.