FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

August 11, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-15724

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-20387-CV-UNGARO-BENAGES

MANUEL VALLE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Florida Department of Corrections, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(August 11, 2006)

Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:
2

Manuel Valle appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition for writ of habeas corpus. We address the following issues: (1) whether

Valle was denied the effective assistance of counsel at resentencing due to

counsels’ presentation of model prisoner evidence; (2) whether Valle’s rights

under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986),

were violated; (3) whether Valle’s rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments were violated when the trial court denied his motions to suppress

incriminating statements; and (4) whether Valle was denied Due Process and Equal

Protection based on the manner in which the jury was selected. After argument

and consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts of this case, as summarized by the Florida Supreme Court, are as

follows:

On April 2, 1978, Officer Louis Pena of the Coral Gables Police

Department was on patrol when he stopped appellant and a

companion for a traffic violation. The events that followed were

witnessed by Officer Gary Spell, also of the Coral Gables Police

Department. Officer Spell testified that when he arrived at the scene,

appellant was sitting in the patrol car with Officer Pena. Shortly

thereafter, Spell heard Pena use his radio to run a license check on the

car appellant was driving. According to Spell, appellant then walked

back to his car and reached into it, approached Officer Pena and fired

a single shot at him, which resulted in his death. Appellant also fired

two shots at Spell and then fled. He was picked up two days later in

Deerfield Beach. 
 In Skipper, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion from the sentencing hearing of 1

testimony regarding petitioner’s good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail awaiting

trial deprived petitioner of his right to present relevant mitigation evidence. 476 U.S. at 4, 106

S. Ct. at 1671.

3

Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1985) (Valle II).

On April 13, 1978, Valle was indicted for the first degree murder of Pena,

the attempted first degree murder of Spell, and the possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam)

(Valle I). At trial, which began on May 8, 1978, the jury found Valle guilty of all

crimes charged. Id. at 1006. The jury recommended a sentence of death, which

the trial court followed. Id. Valle then appealed his convictions and death

sentence, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions in 1981 after

finding that Valle was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when he

was required to go to trial within 24 days after his arraignment. Id. at 1005. 

After remand, Valle was again convicted of first degree murder, received a

death sentence, and appealed. Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 798. The Florida Supreme

Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, id., but the United States Supreme

Court subsequently vacated judgment and remanded the case to the Florida

Supreme Court in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S. Ct. 1669,

90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986). Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S. Ct. 1943, 90 L. Ed. 1

2d 353 (1986) (Valle III). 
4

On remand, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Valle was entitled to

resentencing because he was previously precluded from putting on the expert

testimony of a clinical psychologist and two corrections consultants to show that

Valle would be a model prisoner in the future, in violation of Skipper. Valle v.

State, 502 So. 2d 1225, 1225-26 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam) (Valle IV). At this

resentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of death by eight to four, and the

court imposed the death penalty, finding that: “(1) Valle had been previously

convicted of another violent felony; (2) the murder was of a law enforcement

officer; (3) the murder was for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest; (4) the

murder hindered the enforcement of laws; and (5) the murder was cold, calculated

and premeditated.” Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam)

(Valle V). The judge merged factors two, three, and four, and treated them as one

aggravating factor. Id. The court did not find any mitigation. Id. 

After this sentencing, Valle again appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,

raising a number of claims, including his claim that during jury selection, the judge

failed to hold an adequate inquiry into the state’s peremptory challenges of black

venire members. Id. The Florida Supreme Court rejected his claims, and Valle

again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Valle

v. Florida, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S. Ct. 597, 116 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1991) (Valle VI). 
5

He then filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.850. Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 1997) (per

curiam) (Valle VII). The Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary

hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his assertion that

his defense team unreasonably introduced model prisoner evidence. Id. at 1334. 

After remand, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that

his ineffective assistance claim based on Skipper was without merit. Valle v. State,

778 So. 2d 960, 966-67 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (Valle VIII). 

Valle then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was

denied. Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (Valle IX). 

He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,

which was also denied. Valle v. Crosby, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D. 1017 (2005)

(Valle X). The district court granted a certificate of appealability with respect to

the four issues outlined above, and this appeal followed.

III. Standard of Review

Valle filed his petition after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Therefore, this case is governed

by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as modified by the Act. Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). With respect
6

to claims adjudicated on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) restricts the issuance of habeas

relief to those cases resulting in a decision that was contrary to, or involving an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

United States Supreme Court. Section 2254(d)(2) provides for habeas relief where

the state court determination “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 

The AEDPA also mandates deference to state court factual determinations. 

Under § 2254(e)(1), a state court’s determination of a factual issue is presumed

correct. One seeking habeas relief must rebut this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. Discussion

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Valle argues that his 1988 resentencing counsel’s performance was deficient

because their decision to present model prisoner evidence was based on the

mistaken belief that they were required to do so or the previous death sentence

would be reinstated. Valle argues that as a result of the introduction of this

evidence, the door was opened to the State’s presentation of evidence that Valle

had twice attempted to escape from prison and an instruction to the jury that Valle
7

had been on death row for ten years. Moreover, Valle argues that he can show

prejudice because considering the totality of the evidence, confidence is

undermined in the jury’s eight to four death recommendation. See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1503, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000)

(“[E]rrors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state

adjudication certainly justify the issuance of” the writ of habeas corpus.).

The State responds that the state courts found that counsel made a strategic

decision to present prison behavior evidence because other mitigation evidence had

previously failed to persuade the jury or trial court not to recommend death. 

According to the State, Valle has failed to rebut these factual findings by clear and

convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1). Here, the State argues, there is ample

support for the finding that the attorneys were not credible. Therefore, the state

courts’ application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established

federal law. See § 2254(d)(1).

To show that counsel was so ineffective as to require reversal of the

conviction, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and

that prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. 

To do so, a defendant must show that counsel committed errors that were so
8

serious as to deprive the defendant of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment as well as a fair trial whose result is reliable. Id. 

Here, the trial court found that “despite their claim to the contrary, [counsel]

did not believe that they were required . . . to introduce evidence that the defendant

was, and in the future, would be a model prisoner,” but rather they believed that

“without additional mitigating evidence, . . . the result of the sentencing proceeding

would be the same” as it was in 1981. Valle VIII, 778 So. 2d at 966. Counsel’s

performance, therefore, was reasonable and not deficient under Strickland. 

The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that

counsel’s performance did not constitute deficient performance and that Valle was

unable to show prejudice in light of the fact that the trial court found no statutory

mitigating circumstances, gave little weight to nonstatutory mitigators, and found

three “very powerful” aggravating circumstances. Id. at 967. 

In this case, as the State correctly points out, Valle has failed to show that

the state court’s factual findings were incorrect or that its legal determinations were

unreasonable or contrary to federal law. See § 2254(d)(1). Valle merely reiterates

the testimony produced at the evidentiary hearing that the state courts already

rejected. Further, the state courts’ conclusions regarding prejudice were not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, particularly in light of the
9

absence of mitigating factors and the presence of three strong aggravating

circumstances. Therefore, Valle’s ineffective assistance claim is without merit. 

B. Batson Claim

Valle claims that his rights under Batson were violated when six of the

State’s nine peremptory challenges at his resentencing proceeding were used to

strike black prospective jurors. He says the trial court refused to conduct an

inquiry into his Batson claim, requiring reversal of his death sentence. 

Furthermore, he contends that the state trial court never made findings with regard

to Valle’s claim of discrimination following the state’s race neutral explanation,

and therefore, the claim should be reviewed de novo. Because the trial court failed

to apply Batson reasonably, Valle argues that habeas relief is warranted.

The State first claims that Valle’s Batson claim was properly denied because

it is procedurally barred. See Valle V, 581 So. 2d at 43-44. Even if the claim was

not barred, the State argues that the district court still properly denied the claim on

the merits. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Valle’s Batson claim because, in

addition to being procedurally barred, the claim was factually without basis. Id. at

44 n.4. The State contends that the AEDPA standard of review is correct, and the

district court properly determined that the rejection of Valle’s claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Batson. 
10

The Florida Supreme Court summarized what occurred at the 1988

resentencing jury selection:

After the jury had been selected but before it had been sworn, one of

Valle’s attorneys claimed “an impropriety in the record” as to the

state’s use of peremptory challenges against certain jurors. The

defense attorney noted that six blacks and two Hispanics were

peremptorily excused by the state. The judge then observed that if

there was a problem with any particular juror he wanted “the state to

be able to respond in whichever manner they wish.” One of the

prosecutors then asked the judge if he was making a finding that the

state had somehow improperly excused jurors. The judge responded,

“I’ve been asked to make no findings and I am making no findings but

for record-keeping purposes she has some objection to the state’s

action and, of course, I’m giving the state an opportunity to respond in

time.” The state then voluntarily gave its reasons for peremptorily

excusing the eight jurors. After the prosecutor finished giving his

reasons for exercising the peremptory challenges, the defense attorney

stated, “I object on the basis of [Valle’s] Sixth, Eighth and 14th

amendment rights, to the combination of the challenges for cause,

either peremptory challenges leading to a jury that is in favor of the

death penalty.”

Valle V, 581 So.2d at 43-44.

Batson prescribes a three-part test to evaluate equal protection challenges to

a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at

1722-24. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. 

Id. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Next, the State must give a race neutral explanation

for challenging black jurors. Id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Finally, the trial court

has the duty to determine whether the defendant has established purposeful
11

discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. 

Here, it is unnecessary to address the issue of the procedural bar, because

even assuming the claim is preserved, Valle is not entitled to habeas relief based on

Batson. The Florida Supreme Court did address the merits of the Batson claim,

concluding that Valle failed to show that “it is likely the challenges were used in a

racially discriminatory manner.” Valle V, 581 So. 2d at 44 n.4. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[t]wo blacks served as jurors and a third

served as an alternate,” the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenges “appear[ed] to

be racially neutral,” and “Valle, himself, is not black.” Id. (citing Kibler v. State,

546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989)). At the time Valle’s conviction became final, these

reasons were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. See § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, Valle’s Batson claim is

unavailing. 

C. Confession Claim

Valle argues that because he individually and through his attorney invoked

his rights to silence and to have counsel present during interrogation, the trial court

erred in admitting the subsequently obtained confessions into evidence, and the

state courts’ adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Here,
12

Valle claims that he invoked his right to silence and his right to counsel when he

told Detective Wolf, an interviewing officer, that he had consulted with a public

defender and that “she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign

anything.” Further, the lieutenant with custody of Valle was instructed through

counsel, and the lieutenant agreed, not to permit police officers to question Valle. 

Valle contends that under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30

L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971), this was sufficient to invoke the Edwards v. Arizona rule

forbidding further questioning. See 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883, 68

L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981) (holding that when a suspect invokes the right to consult with

an attorney, the suspect is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made

available). Valle cites Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001), in

support of his contention that we must review his claim involving his right to

silence de novo because the Florida Supreme Court did not address Valle’s

argument on this point. 

The State responds that the confession claim was properly denied. After

conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Valle never asserted his

right to remain silent or to have counsel present, either himself or through the

public defender. The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusions. 

According to the State, the district court properly applied the AEDPA standard of
13

review and determined that Valle had not rebutted the presumption of correctness

afforded state court factual findings and that the state court’s conclusions were not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

In this case, there was an evidentiary hearing where the trial court heard the

testimony of the public defender, Wolf, and other participants in the arrest and

interrogation of Valle. The trial court found that Valle never told the public

defender that he intended to invoke his rights to silence and counsel, that Wolf was

unaware that Valle had spoken to an attorney until after Valle himself advised him

of this fact during the interrogation, and that Valle’s statement to Wolf was that he

had spoken with the public defender who had told him not to say anything or sign

anything. The trial court further found, as a matter of law, that “at no time did

[Valle] ever assert his constitutional rights to remain silent or to have counsel

present or in any way invoke any of his constitutional rights under . . . Miranda . .

.,” that “the defendant never intended to and did not invoke his rights to remain

silent and to counsel through [the public defender],” and that Valle’s “subsequent

written waiver of his constitutional rights was freely, knowingly and voluntarily

executed by . . . Valle, and that he freely and voluntarily first spoke with Detective

Wolf and then freely and voluntarily made a formal written confession.” 
14

The Florida Supreme Court found that Valle waived his Miranda rights and

did not subsequently invoke them. Valle II, 474 So.2d at 798-99. Valle’s

statement that his lawyer had advised him not to sign anything or answer any

questions was, the Florida Supreme Court said, at best equivocal, and as such,

interrogating officers were permitted to clarify Valle’s wishes. Id. at 799. Valle’s

statement that he had several experiences with police officers in the past and that

he had cooperated in the past and was willing to do so on that occasion showed that

Valle voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. Further, only the defendant may

invoke the right to counsel. Id. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Valle’s

“statement, combined with the previous oral waiver, a later express written waiver,

and the fact that at not [sic] time before, during, or after questioning did [Valle]

request an attorney, convinces us that he made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent

waiver of his Miranda rights.” Id. 

In Miranda, the Supreme Court recognized that an accused has a

constitutional right not to be compelled to make incriminating statements during

the process of interrogation. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at 1624. Because “[t]he

circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to

overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege” against compulsory

self-incrimination, a suspect in custody also has the right to consult with counsel
15

prior to and during questioning. Id. at 469, 86 S. Ct. at 1625. The defendant may

waive the privilege against self-incrimination, but the prosecutor must show that

the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. 

Here, while it is not disputed that Valle informed Wolf that he had spoken to

an attorney and that “she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign

anything,” it was not unreasonable nor contrary to precedent for the state courts to

conclude that this was not an invocation of Valle’s Miranda rights. See, e.g.,

Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring officers to

seek clarification of the suspect’s wishes when the suspect’s statements are

ambiguous), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct.

2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) (clarifying that a suspect must

unambiguously assert the right to counsel in order to stop interrogation until

counsel is available). This is further buttressed by Valle’s statement that he had

always cooperated with police and his execution of a written waiver of his

Miranda rights. The state courts also reasonably rejected Valle’s claims that his

attorney invoked his rights to silence and to counsel for him. See Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1147 n.4, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986)

(explaining that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can only be 
16

invoked by the defendant). Therefore, Valle’s claims based upon the denial of his

motion to suppress do not warrant habeas relief. 

D. Composition of Grand and Petit Juries

Valle next claims that the grand jury that indicted him, as well as all other

grand juries dating back to 1971, were selected from venires chosen in a way that

resulted in a gross underrepresentation of Latins in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 1279,

51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977). He also claims that the process for selecting petit juries

systematically excluded distinctive groups in the community and thereby violated

the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.

Ct. 692, 702, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-

31, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1225, 31 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1972). Here, the state courts and the

district court concluded that Valle failed to prove that “Latins” were an identifiable

minority and denied his requests for an evidentiary hearing. Because his

contention that Latins are a cognizable minority has not been subjected to

evidentiary development, Valle argues that the district court should have granted

an evidentiary hearing.

The State contends that the state courts properly denied these claims without

granting an evidentiary hearing. Castaneda requires a defendant to show that a
17

group is a cognizable class by demonstrating that the group is “singled out for

different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.” 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S.

Ct. at 1280. Based on the conclusory allegations that Valle proffered, the State

argues that the state courts did not act unreasonably or in a way contrary to federal

law in finding that Valle failed to show that Latins are a cognizable class or in

denying Valle’s requests for an evidentiary hearing. See Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d

234, 237 (Fla. 1973). Further, the State says that the district court properly denied

the evidentiary hearing because Valle failed to develop the record as required by §

2254(e).

To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of grand

jury selection, a defendant must demonstrate that “the procedure employed resulted

in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which

he belongs.” Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, 97 S. Ct. at 1280. To make such a

showing, a defendant must first show that the group is a “recognizable, distinct

class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or applied.” Id. 

Next, the defendant must show the degree of underrepresentation by comparing the

proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion of the group

chosen to serve as grand jurors over a significant period of time. Id. Finally, a 
18

selection process that is prone to abuse or one that is not racially neutral supports a

presumption of discrimination. Id. 

The Due Process Clause is violated when petit juries are not drawn from a

source fairly representative of the community. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S. Ct. at

702. To prove a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a

defendant is required to demonstrate that: (1) the allegedly excluded group is

“distinctive” in the community; (2) the representation of the excluded group in

venires is not “fair and reasonable” relative to the number of such persons in the

community; and (3) this underrepresentation is caused by the “systematic

exclusion” of the group in the process of jury selection. Duren v. Missouri, 439

U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979).

Here, the trial court summarily denied Valle’s motions to dismiss the

indictment and to strike the petit venire. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the

denial of these motions, concluding that in light of Castaneda and Duren, Valle

failed to establish that “Latins” were an single, cognizable group. Valle, 474 So.

2d at 800. Both courts denied Valle’s requests for evidentiary hearings.

Because Valle attempted to secure an evidentiary hearing in the state courts,

Valle’s failure to develop a factual basis for his claim in state court does not

preclude this Court from granting an evidentiary hearing. § 2254(e)(2); see also
19

Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 2002). Even so, “no evidentiary

hearing is necessary where the proffered evidence would not affect the resolution

of the claim.” Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1555 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Therefore, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, Valle must demonstrate that

his factual allegations, if proven, would indicate that the state courts acted contrary

to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when they rejected his

Equal Protection and Due Process claims. See § 2254(d). 

Valle’s factual proffer in state court included the following: (1) the Dade

County Commission’s creation of the Department of Latin Affairs in 1973 based

on a recognition of difficulties encountered by people from Cuba, Mexico, Spain,

and other Latin American countries who do not speak English; (2) expert

testimony that Latins differ from other residents of Dade County because of

language and culture; (3) an expert’s conclusion that grand jury venires had not

been randomly selected with regard to Latins; (4) and evidence that showed that no

Latin forepersons had been selected to preside over grand juries between 1967 and

1977, and the foreperson on the grand jury indicting him was a non-Latin male. 

Because Valle does not offer any evidence in support of his claim that was not

already considered by the state courts, we consider whether the state courts acted 
20

contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal law when they

rejected his claims. See Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1555 n.9; see also § 2254(d).

Here, the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[t]he term ‘Latin

American’ encompasses people from too many different countries and different

cultural backgrounds and attitudes to constitute a single cognizable class for equal

protection analysis” is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Castaneda

or Duren. See Valle II, 474 So. 2d at 800; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 588

F.2d 1003, 1007 (11th Cir. 1979) (stating that appellant’s mere assertion that his

statistics indicated that the number of Latin registered voters had more than

doubled since the master jury wheel was last filled indicated purposeful

discrimination was insufficient to show that “persons of such diverse national

origins as Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans possess such similar interests that

they constitute a cognizable group . . . .” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, Valle is

not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

V. Conclusion

Based upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, briefs, and the record,

we affirm the district court’s denial of Valle’s petition for habeas relief.

AFFIRMED.