PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________

No. 14-1887

___________

DELAWARE STRONG FAMILIES, a Delaware nonprofit 

corporation

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

DELAWARE, in his official capacity as Attorney General of 

the State of Delaware; COMMISSIONER OF ELECTIONS, 

in her official capacity as State Commissioner of Elections

 Appellants

______________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

(D.C. Civ. No. 1-13-cv-01746)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

______________

Argued October 28, 2014

______________
2

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and 

KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: July 16, 2015)

Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, Esq. [ARGUED]

Seth P. Waxman, Esq.

Wilmer Hale

1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

Joseph C. Handlon, Esq.

Aleph A. Woolfolk, Esq.

Delaware Department of Justice

820 North French Street

Carvel Office Building, 6th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

 Counsel for Appellant

Allen J. Dickerson, Esq. [ARGUED]

Zachary R. Morgan, Esq.

Center for Competitive Politics

124 South West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, VA 22314

David E. Wilks, Esq.

Wilks, Lukoff & Bracegirdle

1300 North Grant Street, Suite 100

Wilmington, DE 19806

 Counsel for Appellee

David B. Hird, Esq.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges
3

1300 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900

Washington, DC 20005

 Counsel for Amicus Appellants League of Women 

Voters of Delaware and Common Cause

James Bopp., Jr., Esq.

James Madison Center for Free Speech

1 South Sixth Street

Terre Haute, IN 47807

Randy Elf, Esq.

James Madison Center for Free Speech

P.O. Box 525

Lakewood, NY 14750

 Counsel for Amicus Appellee James Madison Center 

for Free Speech

Heidi K. Abegg, Esq.

Webster, Chamberlain & Bean

1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20006

 Counsel for Amicus Appellees United States

Constitutional Rights Legal Defense 

 Fund and National Right to Work Committee
4

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

This case requires us to decide whether the Delaware 

Elections Disclosure Act (the “Act”) is constitutional as 

applied1to a 2014 Voter Guide (“Voter Guide”) that Appellee 

Delaware Strong Families (“DSF”) intended to produce and 

distribute. DSF’s Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment 

that the Act’s disclosure provisions are unconstitutional and a 

preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Act. 

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

(“District Court”) granted the preliminary injunction

declaring that the Act’s disclosure requirements are 

unconstitutional. Because the Act is narrowly tailored and 

not impermissibly broad we will reverse the District Court 

and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 23, 2013, DSF filed a Complaint alleging 

both facial and as-applied challenges to the Act.2 DSF 

 

1 DSF initially brought the instant action arguing 

overbreadth and vagueness. The District Court concluded 

that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to DSF; 

therefore, it did not reach the facial challenge. Del. Strong 

Families v. Biden, 34 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394 (D. Del. 2014).

2 The lawyers representing DSF in this appeal filed 

similar complaints in Colorado and Washington D.C.
5

planned to distribute the 2014 Voter Guide over the internet 

within sixty days of Delaware’s general election and planned 

to spend more than $500 on its creation and distribution. 3 

The State of Delaware (“State”) filed an answer and issued 

various discovery requests. DSF moved for a protective order 

and preliminary injunction. The District Court denied DSF’s 

motion for a protective order and instructed the parties to 

submit briefs addressing whether the Act is constitutional. 

J.A. 5–6. On March 31, 2014, Judge Robinson issued an 

opinion granting a preliminary injunction against Appellants

and, on April 8, 2014, entered an order granting DSF’s 

motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 4. This appeal 

followed.

 

3 The proposed 2014 Voter Guide is not part of the 

record. However, in its Complaint DSF alleges that “[i]n 

2014, DSF plans to produce and disseminate voter guides in a 

manner substantively similar to the process used in 2012.” 

J.A. 45. The 2012 Voter Guide lists a series of statements 

concerning, inter alia, “[a] Single Payer Healthcare System”; 

adding gender identity to the protected classes in Delaware 

law; “[s]trengthening and maintaining marriage as the union 

of one man and one woman”; and “[p]rohibit[ing] coverage 

for abortion in the state insurance exchanges mandated by the 

new federal health care law.” J.A. 61–64. It also lists all 

Delaware federal and state candidates and their respective 

stances in support of or opposition to each statement. The 

answers were provided by the candidates themselves or, if no 

response was submitted, were gleaned from the candidates’

“voting records, public statements, and/or campaign 

literature.” J.A. 61. In its Brief, DSF states that: “In 2014, 

DSF will . . . distribute this same voter guide, updated to 

apply to the upcoming election.” Appellee Br. at 15.
6

In 2012, DSF disseminated its 2012 Voter Guide 

without having to disclose its donors. However, enactment of 

the Act on January 1, 2013, changed the relevant disclosure 

requirements. The Act requires “[a]ny person . . . who makes 

an expenditure for any third-party advertisement that causes 

the aggregate amount of expenditures for third-party 

advertisements made by such person to exceed $500 during 

an election period [to] file a third-party advertisement report 

with the Commissioner.” 15 Del. C. § 8031(a).

The Act defines a “third-party advertisement” in part 

as “an electioneering communication.” Id. § 8002(27). An 

electioneering communication is:

a communication by any individual or other 

person (other than a candidate committee or a 

political party) that: 1. Refers to a clearly 

identified candidate; and 2. Is publicly 

distributed within 30 days before a primary 

election . . . or 60 days before a general election 

to an audience that includes members of the 

electorate for the office sought by such 

candidate.

Id. § 8002(10)(a). The “third-party advertisement report” 

must include “[t]he full name and mailing address of each 

person who has made contributions to [DSF] during the 

election period in an aggregate amount or value in excess of 

$100.” Id. § 8031(a)(3). Disclosure is not limited to 

individuals who earmarked their donations to fund an

electioneering communication.

The Act’s application here is undisputed since the 

Voter Guide: 1) meets the definition of “electioneering 
7

communication,” 2) would be distributed on the internet 

within the sixty days prior to Delaware’s general election, and 

3) would cost DSF more than $500 to produce.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1331 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1292(a)(1). We exercise plenary review over a challenge to 

the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Pendleton, 

636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011). In reviewing the grant or 

denial of a preliminary injunction, we employ a “tripartite 

standard of review”: findings of fact are reviewed for clear 

error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the 

decision to grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. 

Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013). “The decision to issue 

a preliminary injunction is governed by a four-factor test.” 

Id. The plaintiff must show: 1) likelihood of success on the 

merits; 2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm; 3) that 

denying relief would injure the plaintiff more than an 

injunction would harm the defendant; and 4) that granting 

relief would serve the public interest. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

We first address the District Court’s erroneous 

conclusion that the Act’s disclosure requirements are 

unconstitutionally broad by virtue of reaching “neutral 

communication[s]” by “neutral communicator[s].” Del.

Strong Families, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 395. We then turn to the 

relevant Supreme Court precedent, which analyzed the 

federal statute comparable to the Act — the Bi-Partisan 

Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) — and compare the 
8

respective disclosure requirements of BCRA and the Act to 

determine whether the Act survives constitutional scrutiny.

A. Advocacy and the Voter Guide

Campaign finance jurisprudence uses the terms 

“express advocacy” and “issue advocacy” to describe 

different types of election-related speech. The former 

encompasses “communications that expressly advocate the 

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976), while the latter are 

communications that seek to impact voter choice by focusing 

on specific issues. The Supreme Court has consistently held 

that disclosure requirements are not limited to “express 

advocacy” and that there is not a “rigid barrier between 

express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy.” McConnell 

v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003). Any possibility that the 

Constitution limits the reach of disclosure to express 

advocacy or its functional equivalent is surely repudiated by 

Citizens United v. FEC, which stated: “The principal opinion 

in [FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–76 

(2007)] limited . . . restrictions on independent expenditures 

to express advocacy and its functional equivalent. Citizens 

United seeks to import a similar distinction into BCRA’s 

disclosure requirements. We reject this contention.” 558 

U.S. 310, 368 (2010).

The District Court concluded that the Act’s disclosure 

requirements could not constitutionally reach DSF’s Voter 

Guide because it was a “neutral communication” by a 

“neutral communicator.” Del. Strong Families, 34 F. Supp. 

3d at 395. This formulation finds no support in the case law 

and is not one that we choose to adopt. The District Court 

found that DSF was a presumed neutral communicator by 
9

virtue of its status as a § 501(c)(3) organization. Id. 

Similarly, DSF argues in its reply brief that, by virtue of this 

status, it is not permitted to engage in “any political campaign 

on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 

office.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii). The Act and 

§ 501(c)(3), however, are separate and unrelated, and DSF 

has offered no compelling reason to defer to the § 501(c)(3) 

scheme in determining which communications require 

disclosure under the Act. Accordingly, we conclude that it is 

the conduct of an organization, rather than an organization’s 

status with the Internal Revenue Service, that determines 

whether it makes communications subject to the Act.

The District Court noted that voter guides are typically 

intended to influence voters even though they may “lack[] 

words of express advocacy.” Del. Strong Families, 34 F. 

Supp. 3d at 394 n.19. By selecting issues on which to focus, 

a voter guide that mentions candidates by name and is 

distributed close to an election is, at a minimum, issue 

advocacy. Thus, the disclosure requirements can properly 

apply to DSF’s Voter Guide, which falls under the Act’s 

definition of “electioneering communication” by, among 

other things, mentioning candidates by name close to an 

election. See 15 Del. C. § 8002(10)(a); see also McConnell, 

540 U.S. at 196 (endorsing the application of disclosure 

requirements to the “entire range” of similarly-defined 

“electioneering communications”). As long as the Act 

survives exacting scrutiny, disclosure of DSF’s donors is 

constitutionally permissible.

Because it concluded that the Act impermissibly 

reached DSF’s Voter Guide as a general matter, the District 

Court did not analyze the Act’s specific requirements to 

determine whether it is sufficiently tailored to pass 
10

constitutional muster. It is this analysis that we engage in

next.

B. Exacting Scrutiny

Acknowledging the interest in one’s privacy of 

association, the Supreme Court in Buckley announced that 

campaign finance disclosure requirements are reviewed under 

“exacting scrutiny.” 424 U.S. at 64–68. This is a heightened 

level of scrutiny, which accounts for the general interest in 

associational privacy by requiring a “‘substantial relation’ 

between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently 

important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. 

at 366–67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).4

DSF acknowledges that Delaware’s interest in an 

informed electorate is a sufficiently important governmental 

interest. Appellee Br. at 50. “[D]isclosure provides the 

electorate with information ‘as to where political campaign 

money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate’ in 

order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek [] office.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67. The Supreme Court endorsed 

this interest in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81 (stating “disclosure 

helps voters to define more of the candidates’ 

constituencies”), and has reiterated its importance, see 

 

4 Exacting scrutiny differs from “strict scrutiny” — the 

most demanding level of scrutiny applied in the First 

Amendment context — in that it does not engage in a “leastrestrictive-alternative analysis.” See, e.g., Ward v. Rock 

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989). Strict scrutiny 

is reserved for restrictions on speech that are content or 

viewpoint based. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 

2534 (2014).
11

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (countenancing 

the government’s informational interest and rejecting a 

challenge to BCRA’s disclosure provisions); Citizens United, 

558 U.S. at 371 (stating that “disclosure permits citizens . . . .

to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 

different speakers and messages”); see also Human Life of 

Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“Providing information to the electorate is vital to the 

efficient functioning of the marketplace of ideas, and thus to 

advancing the democratic objectives underlying the First 

Amendment.”). Therefore, we find that Delaware’s interest 

in an informed electorate is sufficiently important.

We now turn to the specific sections of the Act that 

DSF alleged in its Complaint were impermissibly broad5and 

 

5 For the first time on appeal, DSF argued that the Act’s 

“election period” is impermissibly long. The election period 

is essentially a “look back” period, requiring disclosure of 

donors who made donations during this defined time. In 

keeping with the “general rule,” we will “not consider an 

issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 

106, 120 (1976). Even were we to reach this argument, it 

would not alter our conclusion. It is true that the Act’s 

election period will generally be longer than BCRA’s. 

Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F) (defining the election 

period as “beginning on the first day of the preceding 

calendar year and ending on the disclosure date”), with 15 

Del. C. § 8002(11)(3) (stating that “the election period shall 

begin and end at the same time as that of the candidate 

identified in such advertisement”). We do not, however, find 

material to our analysis the difference between the Act’s 
12

therefore did not bear a substantial relation to the Act’s 

disclosure requirements, to wit: the monetary threshold and

the type of media covered. As noted above, the Supreme 

Court’s guidance in upholding BCRA’s disclosure provision 

under exacting scrutiny is particularly applicable to this case. 

The Act’s disclosure requirements are similar in structure and 

language to those of the analogous federal law. Thus, in 

applying exacting scrutiny to the Act’s disclosure 

requirements, we will examine similar aspects of BCRA that 

the Court has upheld and consider whether the Act’s

deviations from BCRA change the exacting scrutiny analysis.

1. Monetary Threshold

In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that deciding 

where to locate a monetary threshold “is necessarily a 

judgmental decision, best left . . . to congressional discretion” 

and determined that the thresholds presented were not 

“wholly without rationality.” 424 U.S. at 83 (discussing 

thresholds for direct contributor disclosure). Thus, even 

though election disclosure laws are analyzed under exacting 

scrutiny, we apply less searching review to monetary 

thresholds — asking whether they are “rationally related” to 

the State’s interest. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 

F.3d 34, 60 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Buckely and stating that 

“judicial deference [is granted] to plausible legislative 

judgments as to the appropriate location of a reporting 

threshold . . . unless they are wholly without rationality”) 

(quotation marks and internal citation omitted); Worley v. 

Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1251–52 (9th Cir. 2013) 

 

potential four year look-back and BCRA’s potential two year 

look-back period.
13

(same analysis of monetary thresholds in the political action 

committee context); Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800,

811 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). 

Under BCRA,6 groups that spend in excess of $10,000 

annually must report individual contributors of $1,000 or 

more. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1), (2)(F). Under the Act, 

groups that spend more than $500 annually must report 

individual contributors of $100 or more. 15 Del. C. 

§ 8031(a)(3). It is unsurprising that Delaware’s thresholds 

are lower than those for national elections. Delaware is a 

small state where direct mail makes up 80% of campaign 

expenditures. J.A. 135. “[F]or less than $500 a campaign can 

place enough pre-recorded ‘robo-calls’ to reach every 

household in a Delaware House district. If a hyper-targeted 

recipient list is used, as is common in campaigns, $150 would 

suffice.” J.A. 137. The expenditure thresholds are supported 

by the record and are rationally related to Delaware’s unique 

election landscape.

2. Type of Media Covered

BCRA defines “electioneering communication” as 

“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication,” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104(f)(3)(A)(i), except the following: “a communication 

appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial 

distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, 

unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political 

 

6 As of September 1, 2014, the relevant provisions of 

BCRA were transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 437 to 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104. We use the updated citations, but note, in the 

interest of clarity, that the District Court opinion and other 

disclosure-related opinions employ the old citations.
14

party, political committee, or candidate”; “a communication 

which constitutes an expenditure or an independent 

expenditure under this Act”; and “a communication which

constitutes a candidate debate or forum.” Id. 

§ 30104(f)(3)(B)(i–iii).

The Act is broader, defining “communications media” 

as “television, radio, newspaper or other periodical, sign, 

Internet, mail or telephone.” 15 Del. C. § 8002(7). Excluded 

from the Act’s definition of “electioneering communication” 

are the following: “membership communication”; 

“communication appearing in a news article, editorial, 

opinion, or commentary, provided that such communication is 

not distributed via any communications media owned or

controlled by any candidate, political committee or the person 

purchasing such communication”; and “communication made 

in any candidate debate or forum.” Id. § 8002(10)(b)(2–4).

Though the Act reaches non-broadcast media (by 

including direct mail and the internet), it is not unique in this 

regard. Many other state statutes also include non-broadcast 

media.7 Furthermore, the media covered by the Act reflects 

the media actually used by candidates for office in Delaware, 

and thus it bears a substantial relation to Delaware’s interest 

 

7 Nine other state statutes include direct mail. See Col. 

Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a); AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. 

Stat. § 9-601b(a)(2)(B); Idaho Code Ann. § 67-6602(f)(1);

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.6(8j);

17 V.S.A. § 2901(11); RCW § 42.17A.005(19)(a); W. Va. 

Code § 3-8-1a(12)(A). Three state statutes include internet 

communications. See AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 

9-601b(a)(2)(B); 17 V.S.A. § 2901(11).
15

in an informed electorate. Delaware does not have its own 

major-network television station and campaign television 

advertisements on nearby Pennsylvania and Maryland

stations are both expensive and “generally a poor investment, 

given that they reach primarily non-Delaware voters.” J.A. 

134. Statewide campaigns use radio advertising, but this “is 

typically too expensive for most legislative or local races.” 

J.A. 135.

Had the legislature limited “electioneering 

communication” to media not actually utilized in Delaware 

elections, the disclosure requirements would fail to serve the 

State’s interest in a well-informed electorate thereby resulting 

in a weaker fit between the two. Accordingly, we find that 

the media covered by the Act is sufficiently tailored to 

Delaware’s interest.

C. Earmarking

Throughout its brief, DSF represents that BCRA limits

disclosure to those donors who earmarked their donations to 

fund electioneering communications (Appellee Brief at 5, 20, 

33, 36) and implies that, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the 

Act must be similarly limited. However, BCRA itself does 

not contain an earmarking requirement. Rather, after the 

Court decided McConnell, the Federal Elections Commission 

(“FEC”) passed 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9), which contained an 

earmarking limitation.

8 The FEC regulation was in effect 

 

8

“Statements of electioneering communications filed 

under paragraph (b) of this section shall disclose the 

following information . . . . If the disbursements were made 

by a corporation or labor organization pursuant to 11 CFR

§ 114.15, the name and address of each person who made a 
16

when Citizens United was decided, but it was thereafter 

vacated as “an unreasonable interpretation of [] BCRA.” Van 

Hollen v. FEC, No. 11-0766, 2014 WL 6657240, at *1

(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2014).

9

Nothing in Citizens United implies that the Court 

relied upon the FEC earmarking regulation when approving

of BCRA’s disclosure regime. The opinion does not mention 

 

donation aggregating $1,000 or more to the corporation or 

labor organization, aggregating since the first day of the 

preceding calendar year, which was made for the purpose of 

furthering electioneering communications.” 11 C.F.R. 

§ 104.20(c)(9) (2014) (emphasis added).

9

In 2012, the D.C. District Court first invalidated the 

FEC regulation for impermissibly altering the meaning of 

BCRA. Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 

2012). The FEC did not appeal this ruling, but the Center for 

Individual Freedom intervened. The D.C. Circuit reversed, 

holding that the District Court erred in disposing of the case 

under Chevron step one, but remanded with instructions for 

the District Court to refer the matter to the FEC to explain the 

meaning and scope of the regulation or to engage in further 

rulemaking to clarify. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van 

Hollen, 694 F.3d 108, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The FEC 

decided not to undertake further rulemaking. Van Hollen, 

2014 WL 6657240, at *4. In its 2014 decision, the D.C. 

District Court once again invalidated the FEC regulation, this 

time holding under Chevron step two that the regulation was 

arbitrary and capricious. Id. at *1. The Center for Individual 

Freedom filed its notice of appeal in January 2015; resolution 

of this matter is still pending.
17

earmarking and 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) is not cited. As 

such, DSF’s representation that the Act must limit disclosure 

to those donors who earmarked their donations to fund 

electioneering communications is unavailing.

Our analysis does not change simply because an 

earmarking limitation would result in a more narrowly 

tailored statute. As discussed above, a disclosure requirement 

is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which necessitates a 

“substantial relationship” between the State’s interest and the 

disclosure required. The Act marries one-time, event-driven 

disclosures to the applicable “election period,” which is itself 

controlled by the relevant candidate’s term. This provides the 

necessary “substantial relationship” between the disclosure 

required and Delaware’s informational interest.10

 

10 Disclosure that is singular and event-driven is “far less 

burdensome than the comprehensive registration and 

reporting system [oftentimes] imposed on political 

committees.” Barland, 751 F.3d at 824 (discussing Citizens 

United and BCRA). But see Worley, 717 F.3d at 1250 

(rejecting facial challenge to ongoing [political action

committee] reporting regime by four individuals who wanted 

to spend $600 because such regime was not overly 

burdensome and “require[s] little more if anything than a 

prudent person or group would do in these circumstances 

anyway”). A comparison of the Act’s political action 

committee (“PAC”) disclosure requirements to the disclosure 

required of DSF shows that the former is much more 

extensive. Under § 8030, a PAC is required to file ongoing 

reports that disclose, inter alia: assets on hand; the name and

address of each person making contributions in excess of 

$100; the name and address of each political committee from 
18

IV. CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, the Act is constitutional as 

applied to DSF’s Voter Guide, therefore DSF has not 

established likelihood of success on the merits. We need not 

analyze the other factors implicating a preliminary injunction 

analysis. Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion 

in granting the preliminary injunction in favor of DSF. For 

the foregoing reasons we will reverse the judgment of the 

District Court granting DSF’s motion for preliminary 

injunction and remand for entry of judgment in favor of 

Appellants.

 

or to which it made any transfer of funds; the amount of each 

debt in excess of $50; proceeds from ticket sales, collections, 

and sales of items; total expenditures; and all goods and 

services contributed in kind. 15 Del. C. § 8030(d)(1–2), (4–

5), (6a–c), (10–11). Whereas DSF — and other organizations 

making “electioneering communications” — are required to 

make much more limited disclosures, and then only when a 

triggering communication is made. Id. § 8005. Whether the 

Act’s disclosure requirements for PACs would be overly 

burdensome as applied to DSF is not an issue that is before us 

and thus is not one we reach today.