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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41902

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAYNE RAY BURGESS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2015 Opinion No. 45

Filed: July 17, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for aggravated assault on certain law enforcement 

personnel; use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime; and resisting or 

obstructing officers, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly E. Smith, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge

Shayne Ray Burgess appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he was found 

guilty by a jury of aggravated assault upon certain personnel, use of a deadly weapon in the 

commission of a crime, and resisting and obstructing officers. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Burgess was the passenger in a vehicle being driven by his wife when a trooper attempted 

to stop the vehicle for not having a license plate. Burgess’s wife did not pull over, but attempted 

to flee from the trooper before finally stopping on the median side of the freeway. Burgess 

exited the vehicle with a knife in his hand. Several additional officers arrived on scene, and 

when Burgess failed to follow the officers’ commands to drop the knife, the officers resorted to 
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non-lethal measures to neutralize the threat by using a beanbag gun and a Taser on him. One of 

the officers testified that as he approached Burgess to use the Taser on him, Burgess lunged at 

him with the knife. Burgess testified that he did not lunge at the officer, but fell forward when 

he was hit by a beanbag. He further testified that he was suicidal and hoped that brandishing the 

knife would lead the officers to shoot and kill him. 

The State charged Burgess with aggravated assault upon certain personnel, Idaho Code 

§§ 18-915(1), 18-901(b); use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, I.C. § 19-2520; 

and resisting and obstructing officers, I.C. § 18-705. 

Burgess testified in his own defense at trial. During cross-examination of Burgess, the 

State sought to admit statements that Burgess made to the trooper in the patrol car during his 

transport to the hospital following his arrest. Defense counsel objected, arguing the statements 

were made in violation of Burgess’s Miranda1 rights and they were coerced. Additionally, 

Burgess moved to exclude a statement he made to hospital staff that he had used 

methamphetamine on the day of the offense. Burgess argued that the probative value of the

evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. The district court 

overruled both objections and admitted the statements. 

The jury found Burgess guilty of the charged offenses. The district court imposed a 

unified sentence of seven years with four years determinate for aggravated assault upon certain 

personnel, a consecutive sentence of five years indeterminate for use of a deadly weapon in the 

commission of a crime, and a concurrent sentence of one year determinate for resisting and 

obstructing officers. Burgess timely appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Pre-Miranda Statements Made to Police 

Burgess argues that the district court erred when it allowed the State to introduce, on 

cross-examination, Burgess’s non-Mirandized statements. Statements obtained by police in 

violation of an accused’s Miranda rights may not be used in the State’s case-in-chief, but are 

admissible to impeach the accused if he testifies at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 

(1971); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1990). Even this limited use is not 

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
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permissible, however, for statements that an accused made involuntarily. State v. Cherry, 

139 Idaho 579, 581-82, 83 P.3d 123, 125-26 (Ct. App. 2003). 

As an initial matter, the State argues that Burgess waived his right to challenge the 

admissibility of the statements made to the trooper, because he did not file a pretrial motion to 

suppress. Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(3) and (c) provides that “[m]otions to suppress evidence on 

the ground that it was illegally obtained” “must be raised prior to trial.” Failure to file a motion 

to suppress constitutes a waiver, but the court may grant relief from the waiver for cause shown. 

I.C.R. 12(f). The purpose of the rule is to avoid trial disruption. See State v. Collinsworth, 

96 Idaho 910, 912-13, 539 P.2d 263, 265-66 (1975); State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 590, 

944 P.2d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, Burgess did not file a pretrial motion to suppress the 

statements that he claims were obtained illegally in violation of Miranda, and made no assertion 

of good cause excusing such failure. He contends, however, that the State admitted the 

statements were obtained in violation of Miranda and therefore, he was excused from the 

Rule 12(b) requirements. Burgess misconstrues the statements of the prosecutor made after the 

State’s case-in-chief:

[Prosecutor]: Judge, the last issue for me. Those comments Mr. Burgess makes 

to [the trooper], I did not attempt to admit in my case-in-chief 

because there is no Miranda. I didn’t want to get into that issue. 

He’s in the back of the car on the way to the hospital. But there 

has been no claim that those are involuntary. So I think it is 

permissible for me to cross-examine Mr. Burgess on any 

statements he made to [the trooper], but I don’t want to do that 

without clarifying first.

The prosecutor did not admit a Miranda violation, only that he did not want to get into that issue 

during the State’s case-in-chief. Conversely, the prosecutor argued that the statements were 

voluntary and thus, indeed, not obtained in violation of Miranda. On the other hand, Burgess 

argued that the statements were coerced and thus, obtained in violation of Miranda, rendering 

them inadmissible. This is precisely the argument that Rule 12(b)(3) requires be made in 

advance of trial. Burgess waived his objection. 

Even if we were to entertain the issue, we can determine no error in the admission of the 

evidence. The requirement for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation. State 

v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Burgess was 

under formal arrest in the backseat of the patrol vehicle, he was in custody for Miranda purposes. 
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See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 

P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990). However, there is nothing in our record to suggest that the 

statements admitted at trial were the product of an interrogation. 

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court very simply stated that “by custodial 

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken 

into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1996). The term “interrogation” was later refined in Rhode Island v. 

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980) to refer “not only to express questioning, but also to any 

words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 

from the suspect.” Applying this test to the facts of Innis, the Court noted that the “first prong of 

the definition of interrogation” was not satisfied because express questioning had not taken 

place. Id. at 302. After having ruled out express questioning, the Court considered whether the 

police officers’ dialogue was the functional equivalent of questioning by examining whether it 

was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id.

In the present case, the following interaction occurred during the State’s crossexamination of Burgess at trial:

[Prosecutor]: Well, you talked about [the trooper]. He’s the one that took you to 

the hospital?

[Burgess]: Yes sir. 

[Prosecutor]: All right. And you did have a conversation with him, correct?

[Burgess]: Yes, I did, sir. 

[Prosecutor]: All right. As I listened to the tape, one of the first things that 

you’re worried about is a charge just like this, right?

[Burgess]: Uh-huh.

[Prosecutor]: Is that a yes?

[Burgess]: Oh, no. I do not believe I said that actually. 

[Prosecutor]: Well, let me ask you, you asked him, “What jail am I going to?” 

Do you remember that?

[Burgess]: Yes, I do, sir. 

[Prosecutor]: And he says, “I’m not taking you to jail. I’m taking you to the 

hospital,” right?

[Burgess]: Yes, sir. 

[Prosecutor]: And then you say, “You guys aren’t going to try and charge me 

with assault on an officer because I was trying to die, not hurt 

anybody?”

[Burgess]: I do not recall saying that. I do recall saying the part I was just 

trying to die, not hurt anybody though. 
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[Prosecutor]: Do you recall [ ] telling him, “That it’s still going to come out with 

assault with a weapon or some shit like that?”

[Burgess]: I do not recall saying that. Most of my general statements was 

apologizing and saying that I was trying--my intentions were to die 

that day. 

As to Burgess’s first two statements referenced by the prosecutor, Burgess posed questions to the 

trooper, not the other way around. “[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or 

actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit 

an incriminating response.” Innis, 466 U.S. at 302. Because these statements were not responses 

to questions, words, or actions by the trooper, he was not subjected to interrogation when he 

asked these questions. As to Burgess’s final statement referenced by the prosecutor, from our

record we cannot tell whether it was also volunteered or in response to questioning designed to 

elicit an incriminating response. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Burgess was subject to 

interrogation, and therefore, his statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda.

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district court did not err in admitting Burgess’s statements into evidence. 

B. Statement Made to Hospital Personnel

Burgess asserts that the district court erred when it admitted the statement he made to 

hospital staff that he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day, because its probative value is 

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. A 

lower court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to 

be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 405-06, 807 P.2d 610, 623-24 (1991); 

State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). 

In admitting the statement that Burgess injected methamphetamine on the same day he 

was alleged to have committed the charged crimes, the district court found that the evidence was 

relevant to Burgess’s state of mind, which is precisely what he put at issue. At trial, Burgess 

asserted that he was suicidal and hoped that brandishing the knife would lead the officers to 

shoot and kill him. Accordingly, his state of mind was relevant to his defense. In addition, 

 2 It is difficult to discern the inculpatory nature of the statements, as they were made 

contemporaneously with the events and are consistent with Burgess’s defense that he did not 

intend an assault, but wanted to be killed.
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because Burgess testified to the events in question, his drug use bore on the accuracy of his 

testimony and his credibility. The district court did not err in admitting Burgess’s statement. 

III.

CONCLUSION

Burgess has failed to show that the district court erred in admitting his statements to the 

police and to hospital personnel. Therefore, Burgess’s judgment of conviction and sentences are 

affirmed. 

Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.