No. 04-15-00287-CV

_______________________________________________________ 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT SAN ANTONIO 

________________________________________________________ 

CECIL ADAMS and MAXINE ADAMS, 

Appellants, 

v.

HARRIS COUNTY, REBECCA ROSS, KATHLEEN KEESE, and 

CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE, Clerk of the Court, 

Appellees. 

________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 269th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

District Court Cause No. 2014-35653 

APPELLEE HARRIS COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

________________________________________________________ 

VINCE RYAN 

Harris County Attorney 

/s/ Keith A. Toler 

KEITH A. TOLER

Assistant County Attorney 

State Bar No. 24088541 

1019 Congress, 15th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Phone: (713) 274-5265 

Fax: (713) 755-8924 

Email: Keith.Toler@cao.hctx.net 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 

HARRIS COUNTY 

ACCEPTED

04-15-00287-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

7/10/2015 2:28:48 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 07/10/2015 2:28:48 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
2

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellee Harris County files this Motion to Dismiss Appellants’ Appeal for 

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, respectfully showing this Court the following:

INTRODUCTION

Appellants are Cecil and Maxine Adams. Appellees are Harris County, 

Kathleen Keese, Rebecca Ross, and Christopher Prine.

The 269th District Court of Harris County, Texas, signed the interlocutory 

order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss Harris County’s interpleader suit

(hereinafter the “Interlocutory Order”) in the underlying case, Harris County v. 

Adams et al., cause number 2014-35653, on March 13, 2015.

1

Appellants appealed the Interlocutory Order, which is the subject of this 

motion.2 Appellants incorrectly rely on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.6 for 

the Court’s jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the Interlocutory Order.

3 Neither 

Rule 29.6 nor any other law authorizes interlocutory review of the Interlocutory 

Order. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the 

Interlocutory Order.

 

1

(C.R. at 231).

2 Appellants also appealed an order granting Appellee Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction. (C.R. 

at 259). See generally Adams’ Appellate Brief. This motion does not argue that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to review the district court order granting Appellee Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction.

3

See (C.R. at 259); Brief at 11 (praying “in the interest of justice, pursuant to TEX. R. 

APP. P. 29.6 Adams pray that this Court will review pending motions for review of interlocutory 

orders that impairs the effectiveness of the relief sought or that may be granted on appeal.”).
3

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Court has the authority under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 

42.3(a) to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court should dismiss this appeal because the Interlocutory Order is a 

non-appealable interlocutory order.4 Generally, a party may only appeal a final 

judgment.5“A judgment is final for purposes of appeal ‘if and only if either it 

actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its 

language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all 

claims and all parties.’”6The Interlocutory Order is not a final judgment because it 

does not dispose of any claims or parties or state that it is a final judgment.

7

A party may appeal an interlocutory order when jurisdiction is authorized by 

the Legislature.8 Here, the Interlocutory Order is only appealable if: (1) authorized 

by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.6, which Appellants incorrectly rely 

upon; (2) the specific interlocutory order is authorized by statute; or (3) a trial 

court issues an order permitting an appeal of an otherwise non-appealable order, as 

authorized by statute. None of these exceptions apply.

 

4 City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1993).

5

Id.; De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006).

6

Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2012) (quoting 

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001)).

7

(C.R. at 231).

8

Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd., 422 S.W.3d at 585 (citations omitted).
4

1. Rule 29.6 does not grant jurisdiction over this appeal.

This interlocutory appeal does not fall within the scope of Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 29.6. Rule 29.6 states that:

While an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending . . . the 

appellate court may review . . . (1) a further appealable interlocutory 

order concerning the same subject matter; and (2) any interlocutory 

order that interferes with or impairs the effectiveness of the relief 

sought or that may be granted on appeal.”9

By its plain language, Rule 29.6 does not apply when the pending order upon 

which other interlocutory orders rely is a final judgment. Rather, the pending order 

must be an appealable interlocutory order.

The order Appellants rely upon is a final judgment, not an interlocutory 

order. Appellants rely upon their pending appeal of the district court’s order 

granting Appellee Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction.10 That order is a final judgment, 

not an interlocutory order. The district court stated “with unmistakable clarity” that 

the order “operates as a final judgment.”11 Moreover, the order disposes of all 

parties and all cross-claims and counterclaims between Appellants and Appellee 

Prine.12

 

9

Tex. R. App. P. 29.6 (emphasis added). 

10 (C.R. at 259). Appellants incorrectly claim that the order granting a plea to the 

jurisdiction is an interlocutory order. 

11 (C.R. at 229).

12 Id.
5

Appellants cannot rely upon a pending appeal of a final judgment to grant 

supplemental jurisdiction over the Interlocutory Order. The necessary prerequisite 

of an appealable interlocutory order is absent in this appeal.13 Therefore, Rule 29.6 

does not grant jurisdiction over the Interlocutory Order.

2. No other law grants jurisdiction over this appeal.

The Legislature has not excepted motions to dismiss interpleader actions 

from the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. If no law authorizes 

a particular interlocutory appeal, then an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear 

the interlocutory appeal.14

Section 51.014(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly 

authorizes appeals of certain enumerated interlocutory orders.15 Appellants’ motion 

to dismiss is not included in the Section 51.014 list of appealable interlocutory 

orders.16 Therefore, Appellants’ appeal is not authorized by Section 51.014(a).

 

13 In addition, the Interlocutory Order does not concern the same subject matter as the plea 

to the jurisdiction order or interfere with or impair the effectiveness of the relief sought or that 

may be granted on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 29.6.

14 See De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578, 579–80.

15 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West 2013).

16 Although Section 51.014 authorizes appeals of interlocutory orders denying certain 

motions to dismiss, Appellants’ motion to dismiss an interpleader action is not included in the 

enumerated list. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a)(11), (12) (West 2013) 

(cross-referencing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 90.007 (authorizing motions to dismiss 

for failure to timely serve a report in an asbestos- or silica-related case) and 27.003 (authorizing 

motions to dismiss actions based on a party’s exercise of rights of free speech, to petition, or of 

association)).
6

Section 51.014(d) also authorizes appeals of interlocutory orders when a 

district court issues an order permitting an appeal of that court’s interlocutory 

order.17 The Clerk’s Record reveals that the district court issued no such order.18

Therefore, Appellants’ appeal is not authorized by Section 51.014(d).

Counsel for Harris County could not find any other law granting jurisdiction 

to hear an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss an interpleader action. 

Appellants have not directed the Court to any such law. Therefore, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ appeal of the Interlocutory Order.

CONCLUSION

This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ appeal of the district court 

order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss. Appellants incorrectly claim that 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.6 excepts the Interlocutory Order from the 

general rule that a party may only appeal a final judgment. Moreover, there is no 

other authority granting jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Interlocutory Order.

Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ interlocutory appeal of

the district court’s interlocutory order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss

Harris County’s interpleader suit.

 

17 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(d) (West 2013) (authorizing, but not 

requiring, a district court to, “by written order, permit an appeal from an order that is not 

otherwise appealable” if certain conditions are met).

18 See generally Clerk’s Record.
7

PRAYER

For these reasons, Appellee Harris County asks the Court to grant this 

motion and dismiss the appeal of the district court order denying Appellants’

motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to affirm the district court’s judgment and 

grant Appellee Harris County judgment for costs and all other relief to which 

Appellee Harris County shows it is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

VINCE RYAN

Harris County Attorney

/s/ Keith A. Toler

KEITH A. TOLER

Assistant County Attorney

State Bar No. 24088541

1019 Congress, 15th Floor

Houston, Texas 77002

Phone: (713) 274-5265

Fax: (713) 755-8924

Email: Keith.Toler@cao.hctx.net

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

HARRIS COUNTY
8

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I certify that I have attempted to confer with Cecil and Maxine Adams by 

email and telephone voice message on July 8, 2015, but the Adams have not 

responded to my attempts. 

/s/ Keith A. Toler

KEITH A. TOLER

Assistant County Attorney
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this the 10th day of July, 2015, a true and correct 

copy of the foregoing was served by electronic transmission and certified mail, 

return receipt requested, to Appellants Cecil and Maxine Adams, and by electronic 

transmission to counsel for the other parties.

Cecil & Maxine Adams

5510 Rice, #1206

Houston, Texas 77081

cecillovesmax@sbcglobal.net

Pro Se, Appellants

Sent via certified mail and email

Christin Cobe Vasquez

Office of Texas Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

christin.vasquez@texasattorneygeneral.gov

Attorney for Christopher A. Prine, Appellee

Sent via electronic transmission

Jayson Booth

Booth Richey, LLP

3730 Kirby Dr., Ste. 777

Houston, Texas 77098

jbooth@boothricheylaw.com

Attorney for Kathleen Keese, Appellee

Sent via electronic transmission

Timothy J. Henderson

Attorney at Law

6300 West Loop South, Ste. 280

Houston, Texas 77401

timjhenderson@msn.com

Attorney for Rebecca Ross, Appellee

Sent via electronic transmission

/s/ Keith A. Toler

KEITH A. TOLER

Assistant County Attorney