J-A04021-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 MARY JANE DOYLE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. JAMES T. DOYLE, Appellant No. 617 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree April 9, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): FD-98-009613-2004

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and S HOGAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 26, 2016 Mary Jane Doyle (“Wife”) appeals from the Divorce Decree entered on April 9, 2015. The issues raised by Wife relate ba ck to the December 30, 2013 order, which denied her request for declarator y judgment and upheld the marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”) entered b etween James T. Doyle (“Husband”) and Wife. We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case were summarized by the trial court as follows: The within matter comes before the court on [Wife’ s] request for declaratory judgment with respect to th e validity of the Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA) entered int o by the [p]arties on June 3, 2009. [Wife] requests declara tory judgment that the MSA is void, invalid, and non-binding. A trial on [Wife’s] Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was held on Octo ber 16, 2013. The [p]arties were married in November[ of] 1981[, ] and had three children, one of whom is deceased. [Husb and] workedJ-A04021-16

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as a pharmacist throughout the marriage while [Wife ] worked as a real estate agent beginning in 1993. Wife filed for divorce on four (4) separate occasions, the first filing occur ring on August 21, 1998. However, the complaint was never served on Husband as the couple reconciled. Wife filed an Am ended Complaint in Divorce on August 27, 1999[,] but Wife did not pursue this second attempt at divorce as the couple agreed to reconcile again. Wife filed a Second Amended Compl aint in Divorce on September 21, 2006, at which time she wa s represented by Attorney Lisa Petruzzi for a period of approximately six (6) weeks. On June 4, 2009, Wife filed her last Complaint in Divorce. During the pendency of Wife’s representation by Att orney Petruzzi, Wife provided a list of marital assets to [A]ttorney Petruzzi and, at trial, Wife testified that she was aware of certain marital assets which were valued at $360,869.51. A ttorney Petruzzi, on October 11, 2006, wrote a letter to Hu sband setting forth, in pertinent part, that “[Wife] indicates th at the two of you have discussed some manner of settling your marital property, and I will be preparing a Settlement Agreement alon g those lines and forwarding it to you for your review.” The relationship with Attorney Petruzzi ended after Attorney Petruzzi had forwarded to Husband a copy o f the Second Amended Complaint in Divorce, an Acceptance of Service, and the letter referred to above. The [p] arties thereafter met with Attorney Richard Malesky, a bus iness acquaintance of Wife, to memorialize a comprehensiv e agreement that they had reached. Wife acknowledged that a consensus regarding the division of the marital pro perty had been reached with Husband at that time. She also acknowledged that she entered into the agreement wi th Husband knowing that she lacked full knowledge of t he marital estate. She testified that she simply wanted to ge t out of the marriage, and that she knew that she had gotten a r aw deal although she just did not know how bad it was. Wife then sought the services of Attorney Mark Jose ph and, on April 29, 2009, both she and Husband executed a fee agreement with Attorney Joseph with the expectation that he would represent both [p]arties in a no-fault divorc e. Soon thereafter, Wife sent emails to Attorney Joseph out lining the terms she would like the MSA to contain. She also gave deadlines and set forth clear expectations of how s he would likeJ-A04021-16

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the [p]arties’ accounts to be divided. Furthermor e, Wife advised in these emails that she was reneging on th e deal that she and Husband had purportedly previously reached and demanded an increase of $15,000.00 with respect to Husband’s proposed cash payment to her. Specifically, Wife s tated in one of her emails the following: I am asking for a settlement of $100,000 and that I will remove my name from Husband’s TD Ameritrade account and release myself from all his checking accounts, savings accounts, pension account, retirement, IRAs, stocks and any other investments. In turn he will release him self from my checking account, savings accounts, pension account, 401(K) account, stocks, SEP and IRAs. At the time he gives me a certified check for $100,000 we will transfer the title and deed of our current home at 111 Magnolia Dr., Glenshaw, PA to James T. Doyle and remove my name from his Ameritrade account. Finally, at trial, Wife acknowledged that the MSA accomplished exactly what she demanded in her email s to Attorneys Maleski and Joseph. Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/30/14, at 1-3. After the hearing on Wife’s complaint for declarat ory judgment, the court entered an order finding that Husband and Wif e’s June 3, 2009 MSA was valid, binding, and enforceable against the par ties. See Order of Court, 12/30/13. Wife initially filed a notice of appeal o n January 23, 2014, followed by a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise stat ement of errors complained of on appeal. However, this Court deter mined that the subject order was not final and appealable and, thus, we qu ashed the appeal as interlocutory. The case was remanded to the trial court. On April 9, 2015, the lower court entered a divorce decree, rendering the December 30, 2013 order final and appealable. See Sneeringer v. Sneeringer , 876 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating “[ t]his CourtJ-A04021-16

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has ... determined that interim matters in divorce ac tions do not become final until a divorce decree is entered”). Wife imm ediately thereafter proceeded with filing notice of the instant appeal. The trial court adopted its January 30, 2014 opinion (TCO) as its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Order of Court, 4/15/15. Wife now presents the following issues for our rev iew on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court committed an error of law i n holding that the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreem ent could only be invalidated for lack of full and fair disclosure (which by itself has no “reliance” requirement) if Wife could prove misrepresentation (as to which reliance is required), when as a matter of law, nondisclosure a nd misrepresentation are separate and independent grou nds for invalidating the [MSA].

II. Whether the trial court committed an error of law i n holding that a waiver of disclosure need not be in writing.

III. Whether the trial court committed an error of law o r abuse of discretion in holding that [Wife] waived her rig ht to full and fair disclosure. Wife’s Brief at 4. To begin, we note our standard of review: The determination of marital property rights throug h prenuptial, postnuptial and settlement agreements has long been permitted, and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post-nupt ial agreements are contracts and are governed by contra ct law. Moreover, a court’s order upholding the agreement i n divorce proceedings is subject to an abuse of discretion or error of law standard of review. An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and convincing evidence that t he trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures. We will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding fu nction.J-A04021-16

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Paroly v. Paroly , 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Wife asserts that the trial court committed an erro r of law in holding that the MSA could only be invalidated by proving b oth a lack of full and fair

disclosure and

fraud or misrepresentation. Wife’s Brief at 13. However, after careful review, we conclude that the trial co urt properly applied the controlling law. We previously reviewed the seminal decision of Simeone v. Simeone , 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), regarding the standards fo r determining the validity of marital settlement agreements:

Under Simeone , we are not permitted to review the reasonableness of a marital settlement agreement to determine its validity, and the fact that the parties did not have separate representation is not relevant. That case abolishe d prior, paternalistic approaches to enforcing such agreemen ts and announced, “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or dur ess, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agree ments.” [ Simeone ,] 581 A.2d at 165. The Simeone Court reaffirmed the “longstanding principle that a full and fair disclosure of the financial positions of the parties is required....” Id. [at 165]. Paroly , 876 A.2d at 1065. See also Stoner v. Stoner , 819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003) (reaffirming “the principle in Simeone that full disclosure of the parties’ financial resources is a mandatory require ment”). Wife asserted in her declaratory judgment action th at the MSA is

invalid due to a lack of full and fair disclosure a nd as a result of fraud and misrepresentation. Amended Complaint for Declarato ry Judgment, 6/9/10,J-A04021-16

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at 2, ¶¶ 6-7 (unpaginated). However, the MSA conta ins the following disclosure language: “The parties hereto acknowledg e and agree that each has provided to the other and received from the oth er a full, fair, and frank disclosure of the parties’ and each of the party’s financial condition and position.” MSA, 6/3/09, at 5, ¶ 11 (unpaginated). “If an agreement provides that full disclosure has been made, a pres umption of full disclosure arises. If a spouse attempts to rebut this presump tion through an assertion of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Paroly , 876 A.2d at 1066 (quoting Simeone , 581 A.2d at 167). The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are we ll settled. In order to void a contract due to a fraudulent misrepresentation, the party alleging fraud must pr ove, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made false ly with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whet her it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another in to relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance . All of these elements must be present to warrant the extreme san ction of voiding the contract.

Porreco v. Porreco , 811 A.2d 566, 570 (Pa. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Clearly, there is a presumption of full disclosure in the present case, based on the disclosure language expressly stated i n the MSA. Because of Wife’s attempt to rebut this presumption with an as sertion of fraud and misrepresentation, the trial court properly applied the aforementionedJ-A04021-16

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elements outlined in Porecco , and concluded that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation involved in the execution of the MSA. The trial court’s conclusion is well-supported by the following: The court does not find that Husband made any mater ial representation to Wife that Wife relied on when ent ering into the MSA. On the contrary, Wife made numerous represent ations to Attorneys Maleski and Joseph prior to the execution of the MSA that show that she essentially initiated and contro lled the negotiations relative to the division of the marita l assets. She understood that Husband’s assets had a much greater value than hers and acknowledged, when making her settlem ent proposal some three (3) weeks before signing the MS A, in her May 5 th , 2009 email to attorneys Maleski and Joseph that “ what she is asking for is far less than what she is enti tled to.” Furthermore, Wife testified at trial that she was “ being more than fair with this settlement offer. If you total up Husband’s savings against hers, what she is asking for is far less than what she is entitled to...” TCO at 5-6. We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial cour t, as its decision to validate the MSA is based on facts well supported b y the record. Moreover, the MSA expressly states that a full and fair discl osure was made and Wife’s testimony is indicative that she had knowledge of t he value of Husband’s assets. “Case law provides that where the circumsta nces indicate that a spouse has knowledge of the general value of the co uples’ assets, an agreement will be upheld especially where ... the agr eement recites that full

and fair disclosure was made.” Paroly , 876 A.2d at 1067. Based on the presumption of a full and fair disclos ure in the MSA and Wife’s failure to rebut this presumption, we deem W ife’s second and thirdJ-A04021-16

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issues regarding waiver of disclosure to be moot. For the reasons provided above, we affirm the court’s order denying Wife’s r equest for declaratory judgment and upholding the MSA dated June 3, 2009.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/26/2016