1

Filed 7/15/15 P. v. Hernandez CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEVERO TASI HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

C075574

(Super. Ct. No. 12F04987)

In this appeal, defendant Severo Tasi Hernandez challenges the magistrate’s 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a nonconsensual entry of

his home. The parole agents who entered the home did so because they thought a person 

on searchable probation lived there, but they were mistaken. The parties agree that to 

justify their entry into defendant’s home, the agents had to have objectively reasonable 

grounds to believe the probationer lived there, but the parties do not agree on the level of 

certainty required to meet that standard. We need not resolve that disagreement, 

however, because even assuming the agents violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
2

rights in making their warrantless entry into his home, we conclude any violation of 

defendant’s rights was neither deliberate, nor reckless, nor grossly negligent, and 

therefore the evidence was not subject to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we will 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We take the following facts from the evidence elicited at the preliminary 

examination, which also served as the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. 

In July 2012, Agents John Edelman and Ron Dunne -- parole agents employed by 

the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation working on the California Parole 

Apprehension Team -- were trying to locate a parolee named Kenneth Langford. While 

reviewing Langford’s field file, Agent Dunne noticed that Langford had noted a 

girlfriend by the name of Larann Tibben. (There was no evidence as to when Langford 

provided this information.) Agent Dunne called a telephone number that Langford had 

listed for Tibben, but the number was disconnected. 

Agent Dunne ran Tibben’s name through the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department’s known person finder, which is a Web site available to law enforcement.

1

 

From the information on that Web site, he found that Tibben was on searchable probation

and had two warrants for her arrest, one from 2010 and one from 2011. The Web site

also showed her address as 6534 Meader Avenue (the Meader Avenue residence). Agent 

Dunne did not know if anyone had attempted to serve the warrants on Tibben at that

address (or anywhere else for that matter), nor did he know if anyone had ever tried to 

confirm the Meader Avenue residence as Tibben’s address. He did not know who put the 

address information for Tibben into the sheriff’s Web site, where the information came 

from, or when the information was entered into the Web site. 

 

1 For ease of reference, we will refer to this as the sheriff’s Web site.
3

Agent Dunne wanted to talk to Tibben about Langford, so he and Agent Edelman 

went to the Meader Avenue residence with two Sacramento Sheriff’s deputies. Just 

before arriving at the residence, Agent Dunne called the Sacramento County Probation 

Department and found that the probation department had the same address listed for 

Tibben as the sheriff’s Web site. There was no evidence that Agent Dunne had any 

knowledge as to the source of the address information the probation department had or 

how old that information was. However, Agent Dunne testified that in his experience 

address information from the probation department is correct about 70 percent of the 

time. (Neither agent testified as to the reliability of information on the sheriff’s Web 

site.)

Other than checking the sheriff’s Web site and calling the probation department, 

Agent Dunne took no further steps to confirm that Tibben actually lived at the Meader 

Avenue residence. In particular, he did not check Department of Motor Vehicles records 

for her driver’s license record or for vehicle registration information, and he did not 

check utility records for the Meader Avenue residence. 

Upon arriving at the Meader Avenue residence, Agent Dunne noticed surveillance 

cameras out front and three cars in the driveway. No one attempted to run the license 

plates of the cars for vehicle registration information at that time.

2

 Instead, Agent Dunne 

knocked on the front door, and Kao Nai Saelee answered, opening the door so that only 

his face and upper torso were visible. Agent Dunne told Saelee that they were there to do 

a probation search for Tibben. Saelee responded that Tibben did not live there and he did 

not know anybody by that name. Saelee told the agents he did not want them in the 

house, but Agent Dunne told Saelee they were going to conduct the search anyway. 

Agent Dunne asked Saelee to come outside and at that time he showed Saelee a picture of 

 

2 They did so later, after they entered the residence. 
4

Tibben, but Saelee said he had never seen her. Saelee told the agents he had one 

roommate who was home. 

The officers then began their search of the residence. Saelee led them to the 

bedroom of his roommate who was at home -- defendant. The door was closed, but 

Saelee knocked and told defendant through the door that the agents were there to conduct 

a probation search. Defendant came out of the room, and Agent Edelman entered to see 

if Tibben was there. In plain sight, he found marijuana, a baggie containing what 

appeared to be a small amount of methamphetamine, and various types of ammunition. 

Defendant also told them he had a .40-caliber handgun behind the chair next to his bed. 

After defendant refused to sign a consent form for the officers to search the property, the 

agents froze the residence until a search warrant could be produced. After the warrant 

was obtained, a full search of the home was performed. The officers located numerous

marijuana plants in the backyard of the home. They did not find Tibben. In fact, the 

person who had owned the Meader Avenue residence since 2006 testified at the hearing 

that he had never rented it to anyone named Larann Tibben and no one by that name ever 

resided there. 

Ultimately, the record does not reflect how the Meader Avenue residence came to 

be listed as Tibben’s address either on the sheriff’s Web site or in the probation

department’s records. With respect to the probation department’s records, the evidence 

showed that Tibben’s probation was informal, so she was not under supervision by the 

probation department and thus had no obligation to provide the department with current 

contact information, but a probation officer testified that the Meader Avenue residence 

was listed in the department’s records as Tibben’s address in June 2009 and again in 

November 2010. The officer could not tell how the address information got into the 

database in 2009, but the 2010 entry had a comment on it that it was an automated entry. 

The probation officer said that because it was an automated entry, “it look[ed] like she 

reported [the address] to someone who had the capability of entering it into the system, 
5

whether it be law enforcement or a court officer,” and the information was then 

automatically transferred into the probation department’s system. The officer admitted, 

however, that he was “not an IT person” and so he could not say what event triggered the 

entry in November 2010 or just where the information came from. Neither agent testified 

to any awareness about how old the information in the probation department’s records 

was or where that information came from.

Agent Edelman testified that he has probably conducted over a couple of hundred 

parole or probation searches. While it was difficult for him to determine, he thought that 

in maybe a little less than half of those searches, the person who greeted him at the door 

said the person he was looking for did not live there. In “probably less than half” of 

those cases, he later found out that the person was actually there. 

Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale and 

possession of methamphetamine while armed with loaded, operable firearms. He filed a 

motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless entry into his 

home, but the magistrate concluded the search was valid. In ruling, the magistrate first 

observed that the agents “checked two sources. And I grant you they may not [have] 

be[en] independent sources, but they’re not even required by law or constitution to check 

more than one source as long as the source that they check is reasonably reliable and 

sufficient that they could base their conduct on that information. But they do more than 

they need to do, and they not only get it from the known persons file, but they also get it 

from the probation department just moments or minutes before they arrive at the house.” 

The magistrate concluded that the information from these sources gave the agents “a 

basis to knock on the door and see if Ms. Tibbe[n] lived there,” but the magistrate was 

“inclined to the view that,” without more, “there [wa]s not a sufficient basis to just press 

forward” and enter the house. Nevertheless, the magistrate relied on the presence of 

surveillance cameras, Saelee’s “secretive” behavior in opening the door, the presence of 

marijuana plants in the backyard, and the frequency with which people falsely deny that a 
6

probationer or parolee is present3to conclude that the agents were reasonable in believing 

that Saelee was or might have been lying about Tibben living there and were therefore 

justified in entering the home to find out for themselves whether Tibben was there. 

Moreover, regarding the reliability of the sources the agents used for Tibben’s supposed 

address, the magistrate stated that “[p]olice are not required to take information off of 

CJIS or known persons file, KPF, or from probation and not reasonably rely on that 

information, but they’re not required to go further and verify the source of that 

information. If they were, the police would simply not be able to function in the field 

that way. . . . There are practical limitations to how much the police must verify 

information before they go forward.” 

After he was held to answer, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information 

under Penal Code section 995, asserting that the magistrate erred in denying the motion 

to suppress. The superior court upheld the magistrate’s decision and denied the motion to 

dismiss. Defendant then pled no contest and the court sentenced him to three years in 

prison. This timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

“ ‘[T]he “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 

the Fourth Amendment is directed.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘searches and seizures inside a 

home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ [Citation.] ‘Nevertheless, 

because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the 

warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.’ ” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 599, 602.) One such exception is “where consent to the search has been given” 

 

3 Specifically, the magistrate said it is “frequently the case” and “it happens all the 

time” that “when probation officers or parole agents or police go to a residence to seek to 

speak to or contact somebody and are told that person isn’t there when the person is 

there.” 
7

(People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795) -- as when a person granted probation 

consents to be subject to warrantless searches. “In California, a person may validly 

consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity 

to avoid serving a state prison term. [Citations.] Warrantless searches are justified in the 

probation context because they aid in deterring further offenses by the probationer and in 

monitoring compliance with the terms of probation.” (Ibid.)

“It is settled that where probation officers or law enforcement officials are justified 

in conducting a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence, they may search a 

residence reasonably believed to be the probationer’s.” (People v. Palmquist (1981) 123 

Cal.App.3d 1, 11-12), disapproved on another point by People v. Williams (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 119, 135.) In determining whether a probation search of a particular residence 

was valid, “California case law is clear that the appropriate test is whether the facts 

known to the officers, taken as a whole, gave them objectively reasonable grounds to 

believe that [the probationer] lived at the [residence].” (People v. Downey (2011) 198 

Cal.App.4th 652, 661.)

Here, defendant argues that the reasonable belief standard is equivalent to 

probable cause, and he contends that under that heightened standard the agents did not 

have objectively reasonable grounds to believe that Tibben lived at the Meader Avenue

residence and therefore their warrantless entry into the residence was unlawful. The 

People disagree, contending “the reasonable belief standard is lesser than the probable 

cause standard” and “substantial evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that the 

officers reasonably believed that the address was Tibben’s” because “they verified the 

address with two different sources, the Sheriff’s Known Person File and Sacramento 

County probation.” The People further argue that “the magistrate enumerated multiple 

factors that supported the finding that after the officers arrived at the residence and made 

contact with Kao Saelee at the front door, the officers reasonably believed Saelee was 

lying to them about Tibben and that she was actually inside the house.” The People also
8

argue that, regardless of the legality of the warrantless entry into the home, the evidence 

was properly admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because 

“the officers’ actions were neither deliberate, reckless, nor grossly negligent, as the 

officers reasonably relied on two official sources informing them that [Tibben] lived at 

[the home].”

We conclude that it ultimately does not matter whether the agents had objectively 

reasonable grounds to believe Tibben lived at the Meader Avenue residence when they 

made their warrantless entry to look for her, because even assuming they did not, we 

agree with the People that any violation of defendant’s constitutional rights was neither 

deliberate, nor reckless, nor grossly negligent, and therefore the entry of the home does 

not justify application of the exclusionary rule.

Under United States Supreme Court precedent, “evidence obtained from a search 

should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had 

knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 

unconstitutional.” (United States v. Peltier (1975) 422 U.S. 531, 542 [45 L.Ed.2d. 374, 

384].) If “ ‘the officer was acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar 

circumstances,’ ” the rule has no application. (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 

897, 920 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 697].) “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 

be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently 

culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in 

our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 

conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring v. United 

States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144 [172 L.Ed.2d 496, 507].)

Here, in concluding the agents had objectively reasonable grounds to believe

Tibben lived at the Meader Avenue residence, the magistrate relied on the following 

factors: (1) the agents obtained that address for Tibben from two sources, the sheriff’s 

Web site and the probation department; (2) there were surveillance cameras on the 
9

residence; (3) Saelee acted “secretive[ly]” when he opened the door; (4) there were 

marijuana plants in the backyard; and (5) people often tell probation officers, parole 

agents, and police that someone the officers are looking for is not there when he or she 

actually is there. In addition to these factors, the People rely on the presence of the three 

cars in the driveway, when Saelee said only he and defendant were at home, as 

supporting a reasonable belief that Saelee was lying about Tibben not living there and 

that “she was home but was evading the officers with the assistance of her roommates.” 

For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to focus on the first factor alone -- the 

information in the two databases -- in deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies 

here. Even assuming none of the other factors gave the agents objectively reasonable 

grounds to believe Tibben lived at the Meader Avenue residence, the evidence regarding 

the information in the databases -- particularly, the probation department’s records --

leads to the conclusion that the agents did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment 

rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence in entering the home without a 

warrant.

With respect to the information in the databases, the People contend the agents 

acted reasonably because “they verified the [Meader Avenue] address with two different 

sources, the Sheriff’s Known Person File and Sacramento County probation,” but that 

argument is flawed for two reasons. First, to the extent the People are suggesting the 

agents already had the Meader Avenue address for Tibben and verified that preexisting 

information against the two databases, that is not what the evidence showed. Rather, the 

evidence showed that Agent Dunne obtained the information that Tibben lived at the 

Meader Avenue residence from the sheriff’s Web site and then verified that information 

against one additional source: probation department records. Second, to the extent the 

People are suggesting that these two “different” and “separate” sources were shown to be 

independent of each other with respect to the information the agents obtained from them, 

the evidence does not bear that out. There was no evidence as to where the information 
10

on the sheriff’s Web site came from -- either generally or with respect to Tibben in 

particular. For all we know on this record, the information on the sheriff’s Web site

could have been taken directly from the information in the probation department’s 

records, in which case the agents would not have had two “different” and “separate”

sources for Tibben’s address, but only a single source -- the probation department. For 

this reason, we focus on that source.

One of the last questions asked of Agent Dunne was if he “ever ha[d] any instance 

where the information in the database checked was incorrect.” Agent Dunne responded 

as follows: “It’s probably about 70, you know -- if you’re going from 100 it’s probably 

70/30. It’s 70 where the address is right and 30 where the probation department don’t 

take it out of the system for whatever reason, but as law enforcement that’s our job and 

when we go in there and we check it, and if it’s not we will contact the probation 

department and say that this is not a good address for this person and they will remove it 

from the system.” Thus, it was Agent Dunne’s testimony that the information in the 

probation department’s records is correct probably 70 percent of the time and incorrect 

only 30 percent of the time.

That leads us to frame this dispositive question: Where a law enforcement officer

has reason to believe, based on personal experience, that the address information for 

probationers maintained by the probation department is correct 70 percent of the time, is 

it grossly negligent (or worse) for the officer to rely on that information to enter a 

residence to look for that probationer, without first making an effort to corroborate that 

information through other sources? We conclude the answer to that question is “no.” 

Thus, even if the agents violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering his 

house to conduct a probation search for Tibben, because the agents were acting based on 

information in a database that, in Agent Dunne’s experience, is correct 70 percent of the 

time, the agents cannot be deemed to have engaged in deliberate, reckless, or even 
11

grossly negligent conduct triggering application of the exclusionary rule. For this reason, 

the magistrate did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

To the extent defendant challenges the agents’ entry into his bedroom, as opposed 

to the house as a whole, no different result is justified. Defendant cites People v. Woods 

(1999) 21 Cal.4th 668 for the proposition that, in a probation search, “officers generally 

may only search those portions of the residence they reasonably believe the probationer 

has complete or joint control over.” (Id. at p. 682.) His contention is that the agents here 

could not have reasonably believed Tibben had complete or joint control over the 

bedroom that belonged to defendant. Even if we assume defendant is correct on this 

point, however, the question still remains whether the agents violated defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence when they entered 

his room to look for Tibben.

As with the house as a whole, we conclude the answer to this question is “no.” 

First, what argument defendant offers on this point is not persuasive, as he fails to focus 

on the entry into the bedroom in particular. Second, given our conclusion that it was not

grossly negligent (or worse) for the agents to enter the house to look for Tibben based on 

the address information they obtained from a database that in their experience is correct 

70 percent of the time, we see no reason why it was grossly negligent (or worse) for them 

to enter each part of the house where Tibben could have been -- including the bedroom 

occupied by defendant. Had they entered the bedroom and conducted a full-blown 

probation search -- e.g., opening cabinets and drawers -- without first satisfying 

themselves that Tibben, in fact, lived at the Meader Avenue residence, the outcome of 

this question -- the applicability of the exclusionary rule -- might be different. But on the 

facts before us, where all the agents were doing when they saw contraband in plain sight 

was looking for a probationer who they thought lived in the house based on information 

in a database that is correct 70 percent of the time, we cannot find that the agents’

conduct in entering the bedroom to look for her rose to the level of culpability necessary 
12

to trigger the exclusionary rule. Thus, even looking at the entry into the bedroom in 

particular, the magistrate correctly denied the motion to suppress.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 ROBIE , J.

We concur:

 NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.

 HOCH , J.