The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Chief Judge, United States

1

District Court for the District of North Dakota, adopting the

report and recommendation of the Honorable Karen K. Klein, United

States Magistrate Judge for the District of North Dakota.

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No. 96-1342

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Gregory L. Bockness, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of North Dakota.

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner *

of Social Security, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: December 27, 1996

 Filed: January 9, 1997

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Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Gregory L. Bockness appeals the district court's grant of summary

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judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's (Commissioner)

decision to deny Bockness disability insurance benefits (DIB) and

supplemental security income (SSI). We affirm.

Bockness applied for DIB and SSI benefits based upon back and

shoulder pain. Evidence at a hearing before an administrative law judge

(ALJ) indicated that Bockness suffered from a personality disorder, drug

and alcohol addiction (in remission since 1982),
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depression, LSD flashbacks, loss of memory, lack of concentration, impaired

judgment, and daily headaches caused by Bockness's antidepressant

medication.

Based on Bockness's testimony, his medical records, and vocational

expert and physician testimony, the ALJ denied Bockness DIB and SSI

benefits. The ALJ concluded that there was no medical evidence to support

Bockness's complaints of physical disability, that Bockness's subjective

description of pain was not credible, and that Bockness's psychological

problems did not prevent him from performing nonexertional work which did

not involve more than superficial contact with coworkers or the general

public. Examples of the type of employment that Bockness could perform

included cleaner/polisher, light assembler, entry level office worker, and

security positions. 

We shall affirm the Commissioner's decision denying DIB and SSI

benefits if the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record

as a whole. See Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1996).

On appeal, Bockness asserts that the ALJ improperly assessed Bockness's

credibility, improperly discounted the testimony of Bockness's treating

physician, and ignored evidence of organic brain damage.

In Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam),

this Court set out a multi-factored analysis for assessing the credibility

of a claimant's allegations of disabling conditions. In addition to

objective medical evidence, subjective descriptions of pain and incapacity

must also be considered and may be evaluated in light of evidence of the

claimant's daily activities and the effects of medication, as well as other

factors. Id. at 1322. In this case, range-of-motion, x-ray, and

neurological examinations of Bockness yielded normal results. Evidence at

Bockness's administrative hearing revealed that pain from Bockness's

headaches could be controlled with over-the-counter
 Furthermore, evidence suggested that Bockness had significant 2

motivational problems. Bockness refused to accept alternative work

programs pending his disability determination, Bockness's medical

records indicated repeated concern for his lack of motivation, and

Bockness testified that he "would rather play the guitar than work

. . . ." Tr. of Admin. H'rg at 30 (Aug. 3, 1993), reprinted in

Admin. R. at 66. This apparent lack of motivation was a proper

factor for the ALJ to consider in evaluating the credibility of

Bockness's complaints. See, e.g., Locker v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d

725, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1991).

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medications and the prescription drug Doxepin. Testimony also revealed

that Bockness's daily activities included guitar-playing, driving, reading,

and helping his mother with chores and grocery shopping. In light of this 2

evidence, we do not believe that the ALJ erred in concluding that

Bockness's subjective complaints were not credible.

Although a treating physician's opinion is generally accorded great

weight, see Ghant v. Bowen, 930 F.2d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 1991), we hold that

the ALJ properly rejected Bockness's treating psychiatrist's conclusion

that Bockness "will not be able to maintain substantial and gainful

activity." Letter from Dr. R. A. Aligada to Bonnie J. Askew at 1,

reprinted in Appellant's App. at 85. This ultimate conclusion is not a

medical determination within the competence of a physician, see Nelson v.

Sullivan, 946 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), but rather

is a legal determination which must be made by the Commissioner. In

addition, Bockness's treating psychiatrist's conclusion was cursory,

conflicted with the psychiatrist's own treatment notes, and was based in

part on Bockness's purported physical impairments that were discounted by

the ALJ. In these circumstances, the ALJ properly rejected the

psychiatrist's unsupported conclusion. See Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d

233, 236 (8th Cir. 1996) (treating physician's opinion given no greater

deference than that of other physicians where the opinion is vague and

conclusory).

We reject Bockness's contention that the ALJ improperly
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ignored evidence that Bockness suffered from organic brain damage.

Psychological testing revealed no organic brain damage, and Bockness's

assertion that he suffered from LSD flashbacks--first mentioned in

Bockness's testimony before the ALJ--was adequately considered by the ALJ.

Finally, we conclude that Bockness's suggestion that his physical pain

derives from a somatoform disorder must be rejected, as there is no support

for this suggestion in Bockness's treatment records.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.