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Filed 12/17/21 P. v. Garcia CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sutter)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID RICHARD GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C093120

(Super. Ct. No. 44791B)

In 1990, defendant David Richard Garcia pleaded guilty to a murder he 

participated in when he was 21 years old and was sentenced to 25-years-to-life. In 2020, 

defendant petitioned the trial court to hold a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and Penal Code section 1203.11to allow him to make a record 

of mitigating evidence tied to youth; the trial court denied defendant’s request. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Defendant appeals this denial, arguing he is entitled to such a hearing to prepare for a 

future youthful offender parole hearing. We affirm because defendant has already had a 

youthful offender parole hearing, so any Franklin proceeding is unlikely to produce 

fruitful evidence.

BACKGROUND

On March 21, 1990, when defendant was 21 years old, defendant and two others 

entered a home, tied up the two residents, took property from the house and the residents, 

and then one of the residents was beat to death with a baseball bat. Defendant pleaded 

guilty to first degree murder. He was sentenced on August 31, 1990, to an indeterminate 

term of 25-years-to-life. 

Defendant has had several parole hearings since he was first incarcerated. The 

most recent hearing occurred on June 25, 2019. Prior to this hearing, defendant had 

submitted commendations from prison staff and support letters from other individuals. 

At the hearing, where defendant was represented by counsel, the parole board found 

defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and was not suitable for parole at 

that time. The board noted it reviewed the evidence and documents received, defendant’s 

testimony, the factors under section 3051, subdivision (a), and took “into consideration 

[defendant is] a youthful offender.” For the latter consideration, this included “displaying 

immature thinking,” being “impulsive,” and “very vulnerable to negative influences,” so 

there “were definitely indications of the hallmark features of youth.” The board noted 

defendant has made improvement, has a “lot of . . . support letters,” and a lack of serious 

rule violations over the past eight years, but it found these circumstances are 

“outweigh[ed] by other circumstances tending to show unsuitability” for release, such as 

the viciousness of the crime and his continued involvement in gang related violence. The 

board then assessed a five-year denial length. 
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Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the parole board’s 

denial of parole. On January 22, 2020, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. 

On October 1, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a proceeding under Franklin and

section 1203.01. He asserted that he is entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing 

where the board must consider “the hallmark features of youth.” The trial court denied 

the motion on the same day finding, inter alia, that the parole board took “into 

consideration the fact that [defendant] was a youthful offender.”

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in not granting his request for a Franklin

proceeding because he has not had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence related 

to his youth. We disagree.

“A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when 

the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 

years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing 

during the person’s 25th year of incarceration.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(3).) At the youth 

offender parole hearing, the Board of Parole Hearings “shall give great weight to the 

diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, 

and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with 

relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd. (c); § 3051, subd. (f)(1).) Individuals with knowledge 

about the defendant “before the crime or the individual’s growth and maturity since the 

time of the crime may submit statements for review by the board.” (§ 3051, subd. (f)(2).)

In Franklin, a 16-year-old defendant shot and killed another teenager; he was 

convicted of murder with a firearm enhancement and received the statutorily mandated 

sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole in 50 years. (Franklin, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Our Supreme Court found Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. 

Sess.), which created the youth offender parole eligibility provisions, granted Franklin a 
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parole hearing during his 25th year in prison, which mooted his Eighth Amendment 

challenge to his sentence. (Franklin, at pp. 276-277.) But the Franklin court remanded 

“the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Franklin was afforded 

sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth 

offender parole hearing.” (Id. at p. 284.)

The Supreme Court later clarified the proper avenue to seek a Franklin proceeding 

is through section 1203.01 rather than by way of a habeas corpus petition. (In re Cook

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447 (Cook).) The court explained: “consistent with Franklin

and the court’s inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to ‘place on the 

record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may 

be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise 

may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability 

or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.’ 

[Citation.] [¶] Although Franklin mandates an opportunity for evidence preservation, 

the trial court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently’. . . . The 

court may consider whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful evidence 

considering such factors as the passage of time and whether the offender has already 

benefitted from the factfinding procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) 

and (2) with the assistance of appointed counsel (§ 3041.7; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 

§ 2256, subd. (c)).” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459.)

Cook confirmed the manner and extent of a Franklin hearing is left to the 

discretion of trial courts. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) Trial courts “may” also 

consider whether a Franklin proceeding is unnecessary because it will not produce 

“fruitful evidence.” (Cook, at p. 459) “Accordingly, we ask whether the trial court’s 

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are 

correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor 

capricious.” (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746.)
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A Franklin hearing is very unlikely to produce fruitful evidence here. Defendant 

has already had at least one youthful offender parole hearing, the one in June 2019. 

Before this hearing the board was required to accept evidence relevant to defendant’s 

youthful factors, and defendant did provide letters of support and commendations; the 

board noted it reviewed these letters. Defendant was also represented by counsel at this 

parole hearing. Defendant does not establish what additional evidence he would or could 

provide that he did not have the opportunity to produce at this youthful offender parole 

hearing.

Another panel of this court reviewed a case substantially similar to defendant’s in 

People v. Woods (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1080. There, the defendant had been convicted 

of a crime he committed at 19 years old and was sentenced to 40-years-to-life. (Id. at 

pp. 1082, 1086.) On appeal, the defendant argued he was entitled to a remand to place 

evidence on the record necessary for his eventual youth offender parole hearing. (Id. at 

p. 1086.) We disagreed because, though no evidence or discussion was submitted on the 

relevant youthful factors, “on the record here there is no reason to believe that defense 

counsel did not have every reasonable opportunity and incentive to make an adequate 

record for defendant’s eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Id. at p. 1089.) The 

trial court had given numerous invitations to add any information to the record and 

counsel had stated there was nothing to add. We therefore concluded “there is no basis 

for a Franklin remand here.” (Ibid.)

Like the defendant in Woods, defendant here had ample opportunity to supplement 

the record before the parole hearing. But unlike in Woods, defendant has already had a 

youthful offender parole hearing and his youthful status was considered in the decision to 

deny parole. This severely undermines any potential utility there could be for remanding 

to further develop the record. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defendant’s petition because defendant “was afforded sufficient opportunity to 
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make a record of information relevant to [defendant’s] eventual youth offender parole 

hearing.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 

ROBIE, J.

 

KRAUSE, J.