662 October 18, 2023 No. 548

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH RICHARD HERMAN CIVIL, 

aka Joseph Richard Civil,

Defendant-Appellant.

Clackamas County Circuit Court

20CR37322, 20CR54615;

A175546 (Control), A175547

Ulanda L. Watkins, Judge.

Argued and submitted November 21, 2022.

Joshua B. Crowther, Deputy Public Defender, argued the 

cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, 

Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public 

Defense Services.

David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. 

Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief 

Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.*

AOYAGI, P. J.

Affirmed.

______________

*Jacquot, J., vice James, J. pro tempore.
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 663
664 State v. Civil

AOYAGI, P. J.

This case addresses when law enforcement may 

run a “warrants check” during a traffic stop. A police officer 

stopped defendant for a bicycle traffic violation. During the 

stop, the officer used defendant’s identification card to run a 

“records check,” including a warrants check, which alerted 

the officer to the fact that defendant had an outstanding 

warrant for his arrest. The officer arrested defendant on the 

warrant and, during a search incident to arrest, found a 

handgun. That led to defendant being charged with felon 

in possession of a firearm, ORS 166.270. Defendant moved 

to suppress the evidence, arguing that running the records 

check was not reasonably related to the traffic stop and thus 

violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, as 

interpreted in State v. Arreola-Botello, 365 Or 695, 451 P3d 

939 (2019). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant 

then pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, in his sole assignment of error, 

defendant challenges the suppression ruling. We conclude 

that the warrants check was reasonably related to the traffic stop and, accordingly, affirm.1

I. FACTS

Around 3:00 a.m., Officer Inman observed defendant riding his bicycle without any lights in a dimly lit 

residential area. Inman initiated a traffic stop, because he 

believed that defendant was violating ORS 815.280, which 

requires riding with proper lighting equipment. Inman 

asked for identification, and defendant produced an Oregon 

Driver and Motor Vehicle Services (DMV) identification 

card. Using the name and number on the identification 

card, Inman contacted dispatch to run a “records check.” 

A few minutes later, dispatch confirmed the validity of the 

identification card and also informed Inman that there was 

an active warrant for defendant’s arrest. Inman arrested 

defendant on the warrant, searched him incident to arrest, 

and discovered a handgun.

1 Defendant appealed the judgments in two cases—20CR37322 and 

20CR54615—resulting in this consolidated appeal. However, his sole assignment of error pertains to the judgment in case 20CR37322. The judgment in case 

20CR54615 is affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 665

Defendant was subsequently charged with felon in 

possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence, 

arguing that Inman’s act of running the records check was 

not reasonably related to the traffic stop and, thus, was an 

impermissible subject-matter expansion of the stop under 

Arreola-Botello. If Inman had not run the records check, he 

would not have learned of the outstanding warrant, would 

not have arrested defendant, and would not have found the 

handgun. The state opposed suppression, relying primarily 

on State v. Leino, 248 Or App 121, 273 P3d 228, rev den, 352 

Or 76 (2012), to argue that the records check was reasonably 

related to the traffic stop.

The trial court held a hearing on the suppression 

motion. The dispatch communications manager for the 9-1-1 

center, Scobert, testified regarding the “records check” that 

Inman sought. She explained that, when an officer asks dispatch to run a records check for a traffic stop, the officer 

provides the number from the driver’s license or identification card that was given to the officer, and the dispatcher 

types that number and a command into the computer-aided 

dispatch system (CAD). The system automatically generates 

three different sets of records for that number: Oregon DMV 

records; Oregon Law Enforcement Data Systems (LEDS) 

records; and federal NCIC records.2 The records appear on 

the screen sequentially, which takes about one to 10 seconds, depending how quickly the system is running. Scobert 

explained that the automatic generation of the three reports 

with a single command is due to the CAD vendor having 

“made the short commands for us to run integrated into the 

system.” It is possible to request DMV, LEDS, and NCIC 

records individually in the CAD system, but it takes longer than requesting them together. Scobert testified that 

the combined-reports procedure is easier, faster, and helps 

ensure “data integrity” and “transparency.”

As for the content of the individual reports, Scobert 

testified that the DMV records help the officer verify the person’s identity and the validity of the driver’s license or identification card given to the officer. If the traffic stop involves 

2 The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is a national database 

managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
666 State v. Civil

a motor vehicle, the dispatcher also inputs the license plate 

number, and the DMV records will include the registered 

owner’s name and if the vehicle has been reported stolen. As 

for the LEDS and NCIC records, they include information 

regarding outstanding warrants, protective orders, stalking 

orders, restraining orders, missing minors and vulnerable 

adults, “corrections clients,” and wanted-persons information. Those records are provided for officer safety and community caretaking.

Inman also testified at the suppression hearing. 

He testified that it is his standard procedure to request a 

“records check” during all traffic stops. He runs a “records 

check” to verify the person’s identity and ensure proper issuance of a citation, as well as to obtain other information about 

the person. That other information includes if the person is 

on a “watch list,” has an outstanding warrant in Oregon 

or another state, is on supervision (probation or post-prison 

supervision), or is an “armed career criminal,”3 in addition 

to information about restraining orders, protective orders, 

and missing children associated with the person. A “records 

check” does not include the person’s criminal history, which 

would have to be requested separately.

Inman confirmed that he wanted all of the “records 

check” information when he requested the records check 

on defendant. He also confirmed that he received all of the 

information at the same time.

Inman gave limited testimony regarding the specific value of the LEDS and NCIC records included in the 

records check. He testified that having such information 

“absolutely” aids his contact with the stopped individual. 

Inman extrapolated, “Well, in this instance, as in a number of them, traveling by myself at night in a dimly lit area 

with an individual I’m unfamiliar with, the more information that I can *** gain about previous violent-type behaviors *** or things that are of concern to my safety, being 

within contact distance with that individual, I’d say is very 

3 The Armed Career Criminal Act is a federal statute. See 18 USC § 924(e) 

(creating minimum penalties for armed career criminals, i.e., persons who violate 18 USC § 922(g) and have “three previous convictions by any court referred 

to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or 

both, committed on occasions different from one another”).
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 667

important.” With respect to warrant information in particular, Inman testified that he believed it is important to know 

if the person has an outstanding arrest warrant for a violent 

crime. He was not asked for his own articulation as to why 

that information is important to know, but he agreed when 

asked that it would help explain a person’s behavior and 

mannerisms while interacting with him and that it would 

assist him in protecting himself, particularly when he is 

alone with a person whom he knows nothing about.

In making their arguments to the trial court at the 

suppression hearing, the parties made clear that they agreed 

on the facts and that the legal issue reduced to whether running the records check was reasonably related to the traffic 

stop or, conversely, was an unconstitutional subject-matter 

expansion under Arreola-Botello.

Defendant argued for the latter, essentially conceding that asking for a check of DMV records was reasonably 

related to the traffic stop, but asserting that asking for a 

check of the other records was not reasonably related. He 

emphasized that, under Arreola-Botello, each officer action 

and inquiry must be analyzed against the facts of the particular case, to determine whether it is reasonably related 

to the lawful purpose of the stop, and that it did not matter 

that it was Inman’s standard practice to request a “records 

check” in all traffic stops. In response, the state emphasized that requesting DMV records was reasonably related 

to the traffic stop, due to their value for identification and 

issuance of the citation. As for the LEDS and NCIC records, 

the state argued that their inclusion in the results did “not 

negate the fact that the officer had lawful authority to obtain 

a records check to verify the identity of the defendant” and 

that combining the reports served efficiency, record keeping, 

officer safety, and community caretaking. And, as previously 

mentioned, the state relied on Leino as establishing that a 

“records check” is generally reasonably related to a traffic 

stop.

The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. 

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the 

right to appeal the suppression ruling.
668 State v. Civil

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Article I, section 9, prohibits unreasonable seizures 

by the government. Or Const, Art I, § 9 (“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or 

seizure.”). A traffic stop is a type of seizure. Arreola-Botello, 

365 Or at 701. “Police authority to perform a traffic stop 

arises out of the facts that created probable cause to believe 

that there has been unlawful, noncriminal activity, viz., a 

traffic infraction.” State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610, 623, 

227 P3d 695 (2010).

Officer activities during a traffic stop must be “reasonably related to [the traffic offense] investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate it.” State v. Watson, 353 Or 

768, 781, 305 P3d 94 (2013); see also id. at 778-81 (explaining 

that the traffic-stop statute, ORS 810.410(3), and the criminal-stop statute, ORS 131.615(3), like Article I, section 9, 

require officer activities to be reasonably related to the 

stop and necessary to effectuate it). If the police engage in 

conduct or make inquiries that are not reasonably related 

to the traffic offense investigation—either in the midst of 

the investigation or after the issuance of a citation (if any) 

is completed or reasonably should be completed—it “must 

be justified on some basis other than the traffic violation.” 

Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or at 623 (emphasis omitted); see also 

State v. Thompson, 370 Or 273, 286-87, 518 P3d 923 (2022) 

(distinguishing Fourth Amendment case law and stating 

that, under Article I, section 9, police activities that exceed 

what is reasonably necessary to effectuate the investigation 

require an independent constitutional justification).

In Arreola-Botello, the Supreme Court announced 

for the first time that Article I, section 9, imposes both temporal and subject-matter limitations on traffic stops, rejecting the “unavoidable lull” doctrine that our court had previously recognized. 365 Or at 712. Under the “unavoidable 

lull” doctrine, officers were permitted to engage in activities 

unrelated to a traffic stop without violating Article I, section 

9, “so long as the officer d[id] not delay the processing of a 

citation or extend the duration of the traffic stop.” Id. at 705. 

The Supreme Court rejected that view of Article I, section 9: 
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 669

“Put simply, an ‘unavoidable lull’ does not create an opportunity for an officer to ask unrelated questions, unless the 

officer can justify the inquiry on other grounds.” Id. at 712. 

Rather, during a traffic stop, all law enforcement “activities” 

and “inquiries” must be reasonably related to the traffic-offense investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate 

it, which results in both subject-matter and durational limitations. Id. Interpreting Article I, section 9, to impose both 

subject-matter and durational limitations on traffic stops 

“ensures that officers do not turn minor traffic violations 

into criminal investigations without a constitutional basis 

for doing so.” Id. at 713.

III. SCOPE OF OUR ANALYSIS

With that legal framework in mind, we turn to the 

specifics of this case. We first address a threshold issue 

regarding the scope of our analysis.

As previously mentioned, defendant essentially conceded in the trial court that Inman asking dispatch to check 

his DMV records was reasonably related to the traffic stop. 

See Watson, 353 Or at 782 (“[A]n officer’s determination of a 

person’s identity generally is reasonably related to the officer’s investigation of a traffic infraction.”). To the extent that 

defendant now contends on appeal that Inman should have 

accepted his DMV identification card at face value and not 

run a DMV check, he did not make that argument to the 

trial court, and we therefore decline to address it.

As for Inman simultaneously requesting a check of 

defendant’s LEDS and NCIC records, both in the trial court 

and on appeal, defendant has focused on the warrant information. Indeed, he refers to what Inman requested as a “warrant check.” That is unsurprising, because defendant’s warrant status was the only information that Inman obtained 

from the records check that played any role in Inman arresting defendant and finding the handgun. The state does not 

dispute that Inman’s request for warrant information led to 

the discovery of the evidence that defendant seeks to suppress; conversely, defendant does not dispute that Inman’s 

request for other information in the LEDS and NCIC records 

did not lead to the discovery of any evidence.
670 State v. Civil

Nonetheless, defendant sometimes alludes to other 

information included in LEDS and NCIC records—beyond 

the warrant information—in making his arguments, so 

we pause to clarify the scope of our analysis. Because it is 

undisputed that Inman’s request for warrant information 

was the only part of the “records check” that led to the discovery of evidence that defendant seeks to suppress, we need 

not—and do not—address whether it was reasonably related 

to the traffic stop for Inman to request other information 

contained in the LEDS and NCIC records. Those additional 

record checks did not affect the duration of the stop and, to 

the extent they expanded the subject matter, they did not 

result in the discovery of any evidence.

We find support for that approach in Watson. There, 

an officer stopped the defendant for failure to maintain a 

lane. Watson, 353 Or at 769-70. The officer called dispatch 

and “requested records and warrants checks pursuant to 

his routine practice” and, during the resulting “unavoidable 

lull,” engaged in unrelated investigative activities that led to 

the discovery of incriminating evidence. Id. at 770-71, 784-

85. The defendant moved to suppress that evidence, arguing 

that the officer “exceeded the limits of Article I, section 9, by 

detaining defendant for 10 minutes to conduct records and 

warrants checks and an unrelated criminal investigation.” 

Id. at 781-82. The Supreme Court concluded that the “records 

check” was reasonably related to the traffic stop, because it 

was done to verify the defendant’s driving privileges and did 

not extend the stop’s duration. Id. at 782-83. The Supreme 

Court addressed the “warrants check” separately but concluded that it did not need to decide whether the warrants 

check was reasonably related to the traffic stop, because it 

“came back clean” and “did not lead to the discovery of the 

evidence that defendant sought to suppress.” Id. at 783-84. 

“[E]ven if the warrants check was not reasonably related to 

the investigation, it was not a basis for suppression of the 

incriminating evidence that the police discovered.” Id. at 784.

The Supreme Court discussed Watson at some length 

in Arreola-Botello. As relevant here, it spoke approvingly of 

Watson’s approach of evaluating each officer action individually, i.e., evaluating the “records check” and “warrants check” 
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 671

separately, even though they were run simultaneously. 365 Or 

at 703. It also spoke approvingly of Watson’s conclusion that 

there was “no need to resolve the question whether the warrants check had been reasonably related to the stop because 

that check had not produced suppressible evidence and had 

not extended the stop.” Id. at 707 (emphasis omitted).

We therefore conclude that the only issue that 

requires determination in this case is whether Inman’s 

request for warrant information on defendant was reasonably related to the traffic stop, such that the trial court did 

not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 

obtained as a result of that request. We turn to the merits.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that Inman’s request for warrant information was not reasonably related to the traffic 

stop. He acknowledges that a police officer who learns of 

the existence of a duly issued arrest warrant is statutorily 

authorized to “arrest a person without a warrant,” ORS 

133.310(2), including during a traffic stop, ORS 810.410(3)(g) 

(a police officer “[m]ay make an arrest of a person as authorized by ORS 133.310(2), if the person is stopped and 

detained pursuant to the authority of this section”). He also 

does not dispute that the warrants check here was done 

very quickly and did not extend the duration of the stop. 

He argues, however, that a warrants check impermissibly 

expands the subject-matter scope of a traffic stop, as it is 

designed to discover information that is necessarily unrelated to a traffic violation. The state disagrees. We begin by 

addressing Leino, which the state views as controlling.

A. Leino Is Not Controlling

The state relies on Leino as established precedent 

that it does not violate Article I, section 9, for an officer to 

run a records check during a traffic stop, including a warrants check. The state acknowledges that we decided Leino

(2012) before the Supreme Court decided Watson (2013)

and Arreola-Botello (2019), and that Leino’s reliance on the 

“unavoidable lull” doctrine is no longer good law. But the 

state maintains that Leino remains controlling good law on 

the “records check” issue.
672 State v. Civil

We disagree. Regardless of whether portions of 

Leino remain good law, Leino is factually distinguishable 

from the present case in ways that are highly significant 

after Watson and Arreola-Botello.

In Leino, during a bicycle traffic stop, the officer “ran 

defendant’s name through the system for a ‘records check,’” 

as it was “‘standard procedure’ to check a person for warrants in the course of a traffic stop.” 248 Or App at 123-24. 

The officer used the “unavoidable lull” created by the records 

check to conduct an unrelated investigation that led to the 

discovery of incriminating evidence. Id. at 123-25. The defendant moved to suppress that evidence, arguing that running 

the records check was not reasonably related to the traffic 

stop and therefore did not give rise to a legitimate unavoidable lull. Id. We concluded that “an officer’s act of contacting 

dispatch with a person’s identifying information is reasonably related to the identification of the person and the issuance of the citation.” Id. at 128. We declined to address the 

“warrant check” separately from the “records check,” because 

“[n]either the parties nor the trial court drew any legal distinction between a records check and a warrant check,” because 

no existing case law drew that distinction, and because the 

evidentiary record did “not establish a factual basis for any 

such distinction.” Id. We emphasized the lack of evidence that 

the warrant check itself extended the stop’s duration. Id.

In this case, by contrast, defendant has drawn a 

legal distinction between a DMV records check and a warrants check, that distinction is supported by Watson and 

Arreola-Botello as discussed in the last section, and the 

record provides a factual basis for the distinction. Leino is 

not controlling in this case. The practical consequence of 

that conclusion is that we are writing on a blank slate, as no 

other existing case law addresses whether a warrants check 

was reasonably related to a traffic stop.

B. Existing Case Law Requires An Individualized Inquiry

The state next cites a host of practical reasons that 

officers should be allowed to run warrants checks as a routine 

matter during traffic stops. The state contends that a warrants check is not a procedure to detect crime in general, as 
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 673

defendant contends, but instead “a negligibly burdensome, 

nonintrusive procedure to determine whether a judge has 

commanded the arrest of the person temporarily seized for 

a traffic violation.” The state argues that it is reasonable for 

an officer to “assume that a person detained for a traffic violation, who is a fugitive from justice, presents a greater risk 

to officer safety than a person without that status.” The state 

argues that permitting officers to run a warrants check simultaneously with a DMV records check promotes efficient law 

enforcement and public safety. Finally, the state argues that a 

warrants check “is at bottom directly relevant to determining 

whether the person temporarily detained for a traffic violation 

has the right to be released and returned to free-person status at all,” which the state analogizes to checking a detained 

motorist’s driving privileges before allowing the motorist to 

drive away. See Watson, 353 Or at 782 (concluding that, in a 

traffic stop, it is reasonable for an officer to determine whether 

the driver has valid driving privileges before allowing them to 

continue on their way). The state appears to be arguing for a 

per se rule under the “reasonably related” standard.

The practical arguments for routine warrants checks 

during traffic stops are compelling. They would seem to promote both officer safety and public safety in quite obvious 

ways. If officers are not allowed to check for warrants as a routine matter, they will frequently be in the position of releasing 

someone from a traffic stop who should have been arrested on 

an outstanding warrant. Or, officers will have to adopt a habit 

of checking warrants after releasing people, then chasing a 

person down to arrest them—creating a much more dangerous situation for the officer and the public than if the officer 

had conducted the arrest while the person was stopped.

Outstanding warrants are a matter of public record, 

and checking for them is fast and easy with modern technology. Checking for outstanding warrants is very different 

from an officer asking a stopped individual to disclose the 

presence of weapons, drugs, or contraband that the officer 

otherwise would not be able to discover. It likewise is very 

different from an officer asking a stopped individual for consent to search their vehicle or person, in the hopes of finding 

evidence that the officer otherwise could not find. The fact 
674 State v. Civil

that warrants are a matter of public record not only makes 

the nature of the police action (running a warrants check) 

different, but it creates a situation in which a stopped individual may reasonably assume that the officer is aware of 

an outstanding warrant and intends to arrest them, which 

is a more dangerous situation for the officer if the officer is 

actually unaware of the outstanding warrant.

No matter how compelling the practical arguments 

for routine warrants checks during traffic stops may be, 

however, we understand the Supreme Court to have largely 

rejected per se rules for traffic stops. See Arreola-Botello, 365 

Or at 712 (“We realize that our decision precludes officers 

from asking certain investigative questions during investigatory stops—those unrelated to the purpose of the investigation and without independent constitutional justification. 

But that is as the constitution requires and, for statutory 

purposes, what the legislature intends.”); State v. Jimenez, 

357 Or 417, 426 & n 10, 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (rejecting the 

state’s proposed per se rule that, because of the inherent dangers of traffic stops, a weapons inquiry is either necessarily 

reasonably related to a traffic stop or inherently “reasonable” 

under Article I, section 9; “[w]hen an officer does not reasonably suspect that the officer’s safety or the safety of the public is threatened, safety concerns do not provide a connection 

between the officer’s traffic and weapons investigations”).

To the extent that there is a legally sound path 

to concluding that a warrants check is always reasonably 

related to a traffic stop, without the need for an individualized inquiry, the state has not identified it in this case. 

Accordingly, we proceed to an individualized inquiry as to 

whether the warrants check in this case was reasonably 

related to the traffic stop of defendant.4

C. Individualized Inquiry

The question before us, then, is whether the state 

demonstrated a “‘reasonable, circumstance-specific’” relationship between the challenged conduct—Inman’s request 

4 It is not entirely clear whether the trial court viewed a warrants check as 

per se reasonably related to a traffic stop, or whether the trial court ruled based 

on the circumstance-specific facts of this case. However, the relevant facts are 

undisputed, and the issue presented is purely legal (as it was in the trial court).
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 675

for warrant information on defendant—and the lawful purposes of the traffic stop. State v. Pichardo, 360 Or 754, 759, 

388 P3d 320 (2017) (quoting Jimenez, 357 Or at 429). In 

Jimenez, the Supreme Court addressed how to determine 

whether a weapons inquiry based on officer-safety concerns is reasonably related to a traffic stop. 357 Or at 419. 

Although Jimenez involved a weapons inquiry, we understand it to apply to any officer action taken for officer-safety 

reasons. See id. at 424 (concluding that, “in appropriate 

circumstances, an officer’s safety concerns may make the 

officer’s actions, including questioning about weapons, reasonably related and necessary to effectuate a traffic stop”).

Under Jimenez, “[t]o demonstrate that an officer’s 

[action] is reasonably related to a traffic investigation and 

reasonably necessary to effectuate it, the state must present 

evidence that (1) the officer perceived a circumstance-specific 

danger and decided that [the action] was necessary to address 

that danger; and (2) the officer’s perception and decision were 

objectively reasonable.” Id. at 430. In assessing whether the 

state has met its burden, “a court must consider not only the 

factual circumstances that existed when the officer acted, 

but also the officer’s articulation of the danger that the officer perceived and the reason for the officer’s [action].” Id. The 

officer’s reasonable, circumstance-specific concerns “need not 

arise from facts particular to the detained individual; they 

can arise from the totality of the circumstances that the officer faces.” Id. at 429. “[T]he reasonable relationship test of 

Jimenez is not a demanding one.” State v. Miller, 363 Or 374, 

388, 422 P3d 240 (2018) (internal quotation makes omitted).

Applying the Jimenez standard, defendant does 

not challenge Inman’s subjective belief, so we address only 

whether it was objectively reasonable for Inman to request a 

warrants check as a safety measure. Objective reasonableness is a question of law. Miller, 363 Or at 386. Although 

the state put on fairly thin evidence regarding the warrants 

check specifically, we ultimately conclude that the record 

was sufficient to establish that Inman’s perception and decision to run a warrants check was objectively reasonable.

Inman testified that having information from 

the LEDS and NCIC records—which includes warrant 
676 State v. Civil

information—“absolutely” aids his contact with a stopped 

individual. In explaining how, he described circumstances 

of the stop of defendant:

“Well, in this instance, as in a number of them, traveling 

by myself at night in a dimly lit area with an individual I’m 

unfamiliar with, the more information that I can *** gain 

about previous violent-type behaviors * ** or things that 

are of concern to my safety, being within contact distance 

with that individual, I’d say is very important.”

That testimony establishes the objective reasonableness of Inman’s perception of danger. Inman’s perception of danger was based on circumstance-specific concerns, 

particularly that he was alone, at night, in a dimly lit area, 

in close contact with someone he knew nothing about. It is 

objectively reasonable for an officer under those circumstances to have heightened concerns about safety. Although 

the circumstances that Inman described are broadly applicable to most late-night traffic stops, as the Supreme Court 

has explained, “the state can meet its burden to prove that 

an officer possessed a circumstance-specific perception of 

danger, within the meaning of Jimenez, even if the circumstances that the officer identifies could be expected to exist 

for most individuals detained under similar circumstances.” 

Miller, 363 Or at 383; see also id. at 387-88 (concluding that 

officer’s perception of danger during a DUII traffic stop was 

objectively reasonable, where the officer testified that there 

is “absolutely nothing safe about administering field sobriety tests on the side of the road at 12:30 in the morning” 

and that “performing the field sobriety tests would put him 

in a compromising situation” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Because Inman’s perception of danger was objectively reasonable based on the circumstances alone, it was 

not necessary, as defendant contends, for defendant to have 

engaged in specific conduct that concerned Inman. See id.

at 388 (concluding that the officer’s objectively reasonable 

perception of danger and decision to ask about firearms 

“were not made unreasonable by evidence that defendant 

displayed a peaceful demeanor, that other cars were driving 

by, and that light sources illuminated the scene”).
Cite as 328 Or App 662 (2023) 677

Inman’s testimony also establishes the objective 

reasonableness of his decision to request a warrants check to 

address his perception of circumstance-specific danger, even 

if the state could have made a better record on that issue. 

Inman explained that knowing about an outstanding warrant can help explain a stopped individual’s behavior and 

mannerisms while interacting with him and assists him in 

protecting himself in an interaction with someone whom he 

knows nothing about, particularly when he is alone and particularly if the warrant is for a violent crime. Further, it is 

common sense that a person with an outstanding warrant 

has a motive to avoid police interaction and, if intending to 

avoid arrest, may present an additional danger to an officer 

in a traffic stop. It was objectively reasonable for Inman to 

want to know whether defendant had any outstanding warrants at the beginning of their interaction.

In sum, under the Watson and Jimenez reasonable-relationship standard, which is “not a demanding one,” 

Pichardo, 360 Or at 762, the evidence establishes a reasonable, circumstance-specific relationship between the warrants check that Inman requested and the lawful purpose 

of the traffic stop of defendant. The trial court did not err in 

denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.