[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14–11814

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:12–cv–61580–RSR

BLANCO GMBH + CO. KG,

 PlaintiffCounter DefendantAppellee,

versus

VITO ANTONIO LAERA,

 DefendantCounter ClaimantAppellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(July 16, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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2

Defendant Vito Antonio Laera (“Defendant”) appeals from a number of 

post-judgment orders issued by the district court in a trademark infringement case. 

Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and for the reasons set forth 

below, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Blanco GmbH + Co. KG (“Plaintiff”) is a German corporation that 

manufactures sinks, faucets, and kitchen accessories, which products the company

distributes internationally, including in the United States. Defendant is President 

of co-defendants Vlanco Industries, LLC (“Vlanco”) and G-Tech-I, Inc. (“G-TechI”; with Vlanco, the “Corporate Defendants”; with Defendant and G-Tech-I, 

“Defendants”), which companies also manufacture and distribute kitchen fixtures.

1

 

In August 2012 Plaintiff filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against 

Defendants, alleging the latter were “blatantly infringing its BLANCO marks by

selling VLANCO-branded products” identical to Plaintiff’s sinks and faucets. 

Plaintiff further alleged that it wrote to Defendants upon discovery of the allegedly 

infringing actions to request that they desist selling their VLANCO products and 

assign to Plaintiff their mark in the name. Defendants did not desist, however, but

allegedly doubled-down by appropriating Plaintiff’s marketing efforts for their 

 

1

 Defendant claims on appeal that he has never served as President of Vlanco, though he 

does concede that he was, at one point, President of G-Tech-I. 

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own use, filing twenty-three applications with the United States Trademark Office,

petitioning the Trademark Office to cancel one of Plaintiff’s marks, and registering 

“a large number of domain names containing the infringing designations BLANCO 

or VLANCO, with the specific intention of diverting consumers from 

consummating sales of Plaintiff’s goods bearing the BLANCO [m]arks.” 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not last long—at least initially—proceeding only to 

the motion to dismiss stage, at which point the parties reached a settlement during 

mediation. Consequently, on April 3, 2013, they jointly filed a Stipulation of 

Dismissal and request for the court to enter a final judgment. The district court 

obliged shortly thereafter by entering its Final Judgment Upon Consent (the 

“Consent Judgment”), over which it retained jurisdiction to ensure the parties’ 

compliance, and closing the case. 

Generally, the terms of the Consent Judgment (1) enjoined Defendants from 

attempting to register as a mark with the Trademark Office or as an internet 

domain any term similar to “Blanco[,]” and from opposing Plaintiff’s applications

with the Trademark Office regarding such term; (2) obligated Defendants to cancel 

a number of pending trademark applications; and (3) required Defendants to 

transfer to Plaintiff the infringing internet domain names they previously

registered. Should Defendants breach any of the terms of the Consent Judgment, a

liquidated damages clause required them to pay Plaintiff $150,000 per violation

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and reimburse Plaintiff for any attorneys’ fees and costs it incurred recovering

those damages. 

Not long after the district court closed the case, Plaintiff moved the court to 

reopen it and impose sanctions upon Defendants after discovering they had

violated several provisions of the Consent Judgment. In short, Plaintiff learned 

that Defendants, through the use of aliases, fictitious persons, or agents, (1) filed 

applications with the Trademark Office that concerned prohibited marks, (2) 

registered fifty-five new domain names containing versions of the prohibited 

marks, (3) redirected those domain names and twenty-three others to a website 

“using the Prohibited Designation BLANCO[,]” and (4) refused to transfer domain 

names to Plaintiff in accordance with the Consent Judgment, transferring them to 

third parties instead. 

A second, subsequent motion for contempt alerted the court that Defendant

was committing further violations of the Consent Judgment by prosecuting two 

lawsuits—both in federal court, one in the District of South Carolina and one in the 

Southern District of Florida—in which he sought to circumvent the Consent 

Judgment by obtaining verdicts that would enable the Corporate Defendants to use 

the prohibited marks.2

 And Defendant’s violations of the Consent Judgment did 

 

2 Plaintiff speculates that Defendant, by filing the South Carolina action on behalf of the 

Corporate Defendants and a third-party alias against himself, had the additional goal of rendering

himself “judgment-proof” in the present lawsuit. 

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not stop there: he also moved the Trademark Office to “suspend the 

cancellation/opposition proceedings instituted by Plaintiff against [Defendant’s] 

trademark applications that are the subject of the consent judgment, and thereby 

disregard[ed]” the district court’s order to the contrary. 

The district court referred Plaintiff’s motions to a magistrate judge for 

review, who issued his first Report and Recommendations on December 12, 2013. 

In relevant part, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the

motions for contempt, having found that Plaintiff made a prima facie showing that 

Defendants violated the Consent Judgment, which the Defendants failed to rebut. 

As sanctions, in accordance with the Consent Judgment’s liquidated damages 

clause, the magistrate judge recommended imposing four fines of $150,000 against 

Defendants—one for each category of violation committed, i.e., the licensing of 

and registering domain names for prohibited marks, filing trademark applications 

for prohibited marks, registering prohibited domain names, and failing to transfer 

certain domain name registrations to Plaintiff. While the Consent Judgement 

technically would have authorized a fine of $150,000 for each violation 

Defendants committed, the magistrate judge felt that such an award would be

excessive given that all the violative actions traced back to Defendant, Plaintiff’s 

injuries were not quantifiable, and an award of $600,000 would effect the purpose 

of the liquidated damages clause by coercing Defendant’s compliance with the 

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terms of the Consent Judgment. In addition, the magistrate judge recommended 

that the court grant Plaintiff various injunctive relief and award it attorneys’ fees 

and costs, both in accordance with the Consent Judgment. 

After considering the motions, evidence, and the parties’ objections, the 

district court agreed that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of contempt, which

Defendants failed to rebut, and adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and 

Recommendations. Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiff was entitled to 

$600,000 in liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief as 

provided for in the Consent Judgment. Additionally, the court ordered the 

Trademark Office to “dismiss” three applications filed by an alias or agent of 

Defendant.3

 

Following the district court’s adoption of the magistrate judge’s December 

12, 2013 Report and Recommendations and issuance of its corresponding orders, 

the parties filed a number of motions, two of which are pertinent to this appeal. 

First, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Amended Order 

adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendations upon uncovering

further conduct of Defendants that violated the Consent Judgment. Specifically, 

Plaintiff—a German corporation—learned that Defendants redirected twenty-three 

 

3 Roughly a week after issuing its Order adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and 

Recommendations, on January 21, 2014 the district court issued an Amended Order to correct its 

instructions to the Trademark Office. That is, rather than “dismiss” the three pending trademark 

applications, the court ordered the Trademark Office to “abandon [them] with prejudice[.]” 

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domain names they previously owned to a website “featuring Adolf Hitler and 

atrocious Nazi war crimes, as well as a link to Heinrich Blanc, the founder of 

Plaintiff, implying his involvement with the[] atrocities.”4

 Thus, an individual who 

tried to visit Plaintiff’s American website would be redirected to a website “with 

graphic photographs of the carnage caused by Nazi Germany[,]” Nazi propaganda, 

and a pre-populated email field designed to allow the visitor to “receive ‘Nazi 

White Wars Propaganda’, purportedly from Plaintiff[.]” For this conduct Plaintiff 

requested that the court reconsider its Amended Order and excuse Plaintiff from 

certain acts it must perform under the consent judgment, and also order Defendants 

to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. 

Second, Defendant filed a motion to “Void for Vagueness” the parties’

Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Judgment, insofar as those documents 

pertained to him. Defendant’s motion did not allege that the Stipulation of 

Dismissal and Consent Judgment were unconstitutionally vague, though, but 

merely claimed that Plaintiff had “breached intentionally several times” its duties 

under the Consent Judgment, and requested that the court void the above

documents so that Defendant could “live free from fear or the chilling effect of 

unpredictable actions [of] [P]laintiff[.]” 

 

4

 This was not the first time Defendant claimed that Plaintiff was connected to Nazi 

Germany. In a motion struck by a magistrate judge, Defendant alleged that Plaintiff had been in 

“active concert with the German State (country) which committed the acts/crimes of” genocide, 

slave/forced labor, crimes against humanity, and mass murder. 

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The district court ruled on both motions on May 21, 2014. As to the former, 

the court found Defendant’s actions to be “egregious and epitomiz[ing] bad 

faith[,]” and further found that Defendant had abused the terms of the consent 

judgment for the purpose of “besmirching Plaintiff’s business reputation.” Given 

Defendant’s use of “the redirection process solely for nefarious reasons” and his

“multiple attempts to associate Plaintiff with Nazi war crimes[,]” the court granted 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and awarded it fees and costs. 

As to Defendant’s motion, the court denied such for its lack of “factual or 

legal support . . . and fail[ure] to identify even a single provision [of the Stipulation 

of Dismissal and Consent Judgment] that [Defendant] seeks to dispute as vague.” 

Indeed, the court could not “discern any ambiguity from the terms of the Consent 

Judgment, which expressly sets forth the acts that are proscribed and the specific 

marks and designations that Defendants are enjoined from using[,]” and 

consequently denied Defendant’s motion as “entirely frivolous[.]” Because 

Defendant “has a history of submitting baseless filings” and “continu[ally] 

abus[ing] [] the litigation process,” the district court also awarded Plaintiff its 

attorneys’ fees incurred while defending the motion. 

Two days later the district court ordered the Clerk of Court to enter 

judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly and severally, for 

$600,000. The court then adopted the magistrate judge’s May 12, 2014 Report and 

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Recommendations regarding Plaintiff’s tabulation of the attorneys’ fees and costs

it incurred, filed in light of the multiple sanctions awarded to Plaintiff for

Defendant’s frivolous, abusive, and offensive conduct. In total, the court found 

Defendants liable for $227,387 in attorneys’ fees and $7,247.31 in costs. Later, 

upon Plaintiff’s motion, the court directed the Clerk to enter this judgment in 

Plaintiff’s favor, which the Clerk did on June 19, 2014.5

 

Consistent with his motions practice, at numerous points throughout this 

litigation, Defendant filed notices of appeal as to various actions taken by the 

district court. Specifically, on April 23, 2014 he filed a notice of appeal of the 

district court’s Amended Order adopting the magistrate judge’s December 12, 

2013 Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff moved the Court to dismiss that

appeal for untimeliness, which motion we denied. 

Defendant subsequently filed two amended notices of appeal so as to also 

contest (1) the district court’s initial Order adopting the magistrate judge’s 

December 12, 2013 Report and Recommendations, (2) Order granting Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Reconsideration, (3) Order denying Defendant’s Motion to “Void for 

Vagueness” the Consent Judgment, (4) Order directing the Clerk of Court to Enter 

Judgment for Plaintiff, (5) Order adopting the magistrate judge’s May 12, 2014 

Report and Recommendations, (6) the magistrate judge’s May 12, 2014 Reports

 

5

 The Clerk entered an Amended Judgment on June 24, 2014 to correct a scrivener’s 

error. 

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and Recommendations, (7) the Clerk of Court’s Entry of Judgment and Amended 

Entry of Judgment for Plaintiff, and (8) “[a]l motions/orders/matters in this case, 

including any and all pending motions or future motions[.]” 

Following Defendant’s filing of his amended notices Plaintiff again moved 

this Court to dismiss the appeal, which motion we granted in part and denied in 

part. Specifically, we held that Defendant’s appeal was untimely as to the 

magistrate judge’s May 12, 2014 Report and Recommendations, the district court’s 

Order adopting such, and the Clerk of Court’s Entry of Judgment and Amended 

Entry of Judgment for Plaintiff. We also dismissed the appeal as to any “orders 

not in existence at the time the second amended notice of appeal was filed.” On 

the other hand, we permitted Defendant’s appeal of the court’s Order adopting the 

magistrate judge’s December 12, 2013 Report and Recommendations, as well as 

“the other orders designated in [Defendant’s] notices of appeal not dismissed by 

this Court[,]” to go forward. 

Thus, presently before us on appeal are the district court’s (1) Amended 

Order adopting the magistrate judge’s December 12, 2013 Report and 

Recommendations; (2) initial Order adopting the magistrate judge’s December 12, 

2013 Report and Recommendations; (3) Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration; (4) Order denying Defendant’s Motion to “Void for Vagueness” 

the Consent Judgment; and (5) Order directing the Clerk of Court to Enter 

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Judgment for Plaintiff. Now fully briefed, we turn to Defendant’s appeal of these 

orders.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s order of civil 

contempt, order on a motion for reconsideration, and order on a motion for relief 

from a judgment. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 1221, 1231 (11th 

Cir. 2010); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010); and BUC 

Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008). We 

review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment for 

voidness. Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713, 736 

(11th Cir. 2014).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant proceeds pro se. While pro se litigants are afforded some 

leniency, they still must comply with procedural rules. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 

1337, 1340 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 

826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Defendant’s failure to do so here resolves this appeal. 

A. We Do Not Consider Arguments Raised For the First Time on 

Appeal

The substance of Defendant’s briefs on appeal focuses entirely upon the 

alleged improprieties of attorneys involved in the case, which allegations, in his 

Reply Brief, Defendant extends to the district court and magistrate judges. First, 

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Defendant makes a number of claims about the conduct of certain attorneys, the 

nub of which is that they represented they served him with documents when they 

did not actually do so, divulged items he told them in confidence, and made a 

number of misrepresentations to him and the court. Defendant believes this 

alleged pervasive dishonesty violates a number of professional responsibility and 

court rules, and, in his view, should subject the infringing individuals to 

“discipline.” Defendant then makes similar assertions about the district court and 

magistrate judges involved in the case, claiming they failed to serve him various 

documents, improperly considered statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel, and 

failed to conduct proceedings with order and decorum. Defendant asserts that 

these actions breach the Code of Judicial Conduct and constitute due process 

violations that “caused him harm and damage.” 

However, Defendant did not first present these arguments to the district 

court before presenting them to us in this appeal.6

 Generally, this Court does not 

consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 

Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1984). A number of exceptions to this 

rule exist, see Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1329 n.2 (11th Cir. 

 

6

 While he did make the above claims in motions filed during later stages of the 

proceedings, Defendant did not submit—nor did the court rule on—those motions before filing 

his Second Amended Notice of Appeal. As noted in our January 28, 2015 order, the latter event 

is the cutoff point for consideration in this appeal.

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2010), but none apply here. Indeed, “‘this circuit and the former Fifth Circuit have 

consistently held that a court will not consider on appeal for the first time a 

question that requires development of factual issues.’” Weitz, 913 F.2d at 1550 

(quoting Troxler v. Owens-Ill., 717 F.2d 530, 533 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also 

Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330–35 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Consequently, Defendant’s claims regarding the conduct of the attorneys, district 

court, and magistrate judges in this case are not properly before us, and we will not 

consider these newly-raised issues.

B. Defendant Has Abandoned His Arguments Regarding the Orders

Properly Before Us On Appeal

With respect to the orders properly before the Court on appeal—those 

adopting the magistrate judge’s December 12, 2013 Report and Recommendations, 

granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, denying Defendant’s Motion to 

“Void for Vagueness” the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Judgment, 

and directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for Plaintiff—Defendant has 

abandoned any arguments regarding their accuracy or error. 

As noted, Defendant’s briefs focus entirely on the conduct of attorneys

involved in this case, the district court, and magistrate judges. Simply put, 

Defendant makes no argument whatsoever about the propriety of the orders before 

the Court in this appeal. His few, fleeting references to the challenged orders in his

statement of jurisdiction do not suffice. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 

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739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant 

abandons a claim where he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in 

a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”).

“‘[T]he law is by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or 

argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its 

merits will not be addressed.’” Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330); see also Little v. T-Mobile 

USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). Although 

briefs submitted by pro se parties receive a more liberal reading than those 

submitted by counseled litigants, they are not exempted from this consequence:

“issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson 

v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, for his complete failure to 

brief his issues with the orders before this Court on appeal, Defendant has 

abandoned any claims he may otherwise have possessed. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d 

at 680–82 and Access Now, Inc., 385 F.3d at 1330. 

A further point: “[w]e do not address arguments raised for the first time in a 

pro se litigant’s reply brief[,]” as they are not properly before us. Timson, 518 

F.3d at 874; Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Walker v. 

Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994)). So, to the extent that Defendant 

questions the district court’s and magistrate judges’ compliance with the Code of 

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Judicial Conduct, he has similarly abandoned those concerns by omitting them

from his opening brief and asserting them only in his Reply.

Accordingly, the orders of the district court before us on appeal are hereby 

AFFIRMED.

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, Nor are the 

Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Judgment Void for 

Vagueness 

Were we to consider the substance of the district court’s orders, though, we

would not arrive at a different result. First, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of contempt that 

Defendants failed to rebut, nor did it abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate 

judge’s December 12, 2013 Report and Recommendations to that effect.7

 Below, 

Plaintiff presented evidence that Defendant—either personally, through aliases, or 

by agents—attempted to register prohibited trademarks, registered prohibited 

domain names, and redirected over twenty domains to a website filled with 

“atrocious” Nazi images and propaganda, among other things. Because this 

presentation would permit “‘a reasonable person [to] find a clear and convincing 

violation’ of the [C]onsent [D]ecree[,]” the district court did not abuse its 

 

7

 “‘A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies 

the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a 

determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 

Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 785 F.3d 477, 481 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Citizens for Police 

Accountability Political Comm. v. Browning, 572 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2009)).

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discretion by granting Plaintiff’s motions for contempt, awarding it sanctions, and 

adopting the relevant Reports and Recommendations of the magistrate judge.

Leshin, 618 F.3d at 1231–32.

Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Reconsideration. “‘The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion 

are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.’” Arthur v. King, 

500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Kellog, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 

(11th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original). Plaintiff filed its Motion for 

Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for precisely 

this reason: it uncovered new evidence of Defendant’s extensive, offensive, and 

continued violations of the Consent Judgment. In light of the nature of 

Defendant’s conduct and numerous violations of the Consent Judgment, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsideration.

Nor did the district court err by denying Defendant’s motion to “Void for 

Vagueness” the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Judgment. “‘It is a 

basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 

prohibitions are not clearly defined.’” Pine v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 762 

F.3d 1262, 1275 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 

104, 108 (1972)). Assuming arguendo that Defendant can challenge the 

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Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Judgment,

8 his claim that those documents 

are unconstitutionally vague would fail. Simply, the Stipulation of Dismissal and 

Consent Judgment set out in great detail the conduct Defendants were required to 

avoid and the acts they were obligated to perform, and Defendant does not identify 

a single provision that is impermissibly vague, confusing, or lacking adequate 

direction. Consequently, the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to 

Void for Vagueness the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal and Consent Decree.

Finally, given the foregoing, the district court was not wrong to direct the 

Clerk of Court to enter a judgment reflecting the liquidated damages, attorneys’ 

fees, and costs for which it found Defendants jointly and severally liable.9

 

Accordingly, for the above reasons, we AFFIRM the orders of the district 

court adopting the December 12, 2013 Report and Recommendations of the 

magistrate judge, granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, denying 

Defendant’s motion to “Void for Vagueness” the parties’ joint Stipulation of 

 

8 Ordinarily, “[a] party [] has no standing to appeal a judgment to which he or she 

consented[,]” Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted), 

and the vagueness doctrine typically applies to statutes or other legislative prohibitions, see, e.g., 

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).

9

 Contrary to Defendant’s half-hearted claims, the district court possessed jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s action because its claims arose under federal trademark law, and venue was 

proper in the Southern District of Florida because Defendants resided and conducted business 

there. 15 U.S.C. § 1121; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, 1391(b), (c).

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Dismissal and Consent Judgment, and directing the Clerk of Court to enter 

judgment for Plaintiff.

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