NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 08a0417n.06 Filed: Jul y

14, 2008 No. 07-3274 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
SEL ENA REED, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. ARNEI LROSE, CI TY OF CL EVEL AND, De fe nd ants , and TI MOTHY CL ARK, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI ST R I CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO OPI NI ON

Be for e : K

EN NE DY , G ILM AN , a nd G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. RONALD LEE GILMA N, Circ uit Jud ge . This action, broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state la

w, ar ises from the fata l shooting of B randon Robinson by one of two police office rs
e mpl oy e d b y

the City of Cle ve land . Se le na

Re e d, Rob ins on ’s mot

he r a nd the a dmi nis tr a tr ix o f h is estate, c laims that the office r who shot and killed Rob inson use d excessive forc e and the reby violated his rights unde r the Fourth and Fourtee nth Amendments to the U.S. Consti tution. R obinson was shot while attempti ng to flee a fter he and his frie nd Courtney May s were confr onted by Offic ers Timothy Clark and Ar

neil Rose.No. 07-3274

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- 2 - Offic er Clar

k claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity for his ac tions, but t he district

c ourt c on c lud e d th a t g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l fa c t pr e c lud e d the g ra nt of su mma

ry jud g me nt i n h is fa vo r. On a pp e a l, C lark

c on te nd s th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in d e nyingsu mma ry jud g me nt o n h is qualified-immunity

claim. He a lso renew s his arg ument that he wa s never proper ly serve d with a fe de ra l- c ourt

su mmo ns , th e re by

makin g the dis tr ic t

c o u r t ’ s e xe r c ise of

pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r h im improper. F or the re asons set for th below, we D I S M I SS t h i s i n terlocutory appea l for lac k of jurisdiction.
I. BACKG ROUND The pa rties ar e of c ourse f

amiliar with the fa cts underly ing the prese nt case . We theref ore inc lud e a br ie f s umm ary

on ly ins of ar a s is ne c e ssa

ry to p ro vid e ba c kg ro un d f

or the ana ly sis se t f

or th in Part I I . below. A. F ac tu al b ac kgr ound On the af ternoon of January

18, 2004, May s and Robinson picke d up food at a B urg er K ing restaur ant. May s then drove his c ar, w ith Robi nson in the passeng er seat, to 3598 East 151st St ree t in Cleveland, whe re the two men sat in the parke d car while they ate their food. In his deposition, May s st a te d th a t Robin so n als o att e mpt e d to hook up a po rt a ble te le vis ion to t

he c ig are tte lig hte r s o that they could watc h a movie. Me anw hil e , O ff

ic e rs Cla rk and Ros e re c e ive d a ra di o d isp a tc h th at r e po rt e d d ru g a c tiv ity takin g pla c e in a

c ar o n 1 51 st St

re e t. T he c a ll g a ve a

sp e c if ic a dd re ss a nd a de sc ri pti on

of the ve hic le in question. Clark and Rose drove to 151st Stree t a nd, upon their arr ival, parke d behind a ca r thatNo. 07-3274

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- 3 - fit the descr iption that they had bee n g iven by

the dispatche r. Ac cording to Clark’s deposition te sti mony , th e of

fi c e rs saw two me n in sid e the c ar. Th e dr ive r, la te r i de nti fi e d a s Ma y s, a pp are ntl y matched the dispatcher ’s desc riptio n o f one of the individuals reporte dly eng ag ing in the dr

ug
a c t i v i t y. Of fi c e r C lark

the n mad e a c a ll to the dis patc he r to run a che c k on the ve hic le ’s lic e ns e -p la te

numbe r. B e fo re re c e iv in g any inf or ma tio n b a c k, ho we ve r, the of fi c e rs saw “ fu

rt ive mov e me nts ” inside the suspect c ar a

nd told the dispatche r to “hold” the information. Off icer Rose descr ibed the suspicious movements as “people t urning back, looking at you, then re achingdown in a downwa rd mot ion c on tin uo us ly .” With ou t di sc us sin g ho w to pr oc e e d, bo th of fi c e rs e xite d th e patr ol c ar w ith the ir g un s d ra wn and a pp ro a c he d th e c ar i n f

ro nt o f t he m. Offic er Clar

k went to the passe ng er side of the vehicle and Of fice r Rose we nt to the driver’ s side. Rose order ed May s to ex it the car , at which point Rose imm ediately handcuf fed him. Clark the n o rd e re d Ro bin so n o ut a nd too k h im t ow ard

th e back of the c ar. B e fo re Cla rk wa s a ble to handcuf f Robinson, however , Robinson took off r unning down the street. Clark cha sed Robinson and tac kled him to the gr ound. Both pa rties ag ree that a strug g le then ensue d. Te sti mony of

fe re d b y fo ur wi tne sse s—Ma

y s, Of fi c e rs Cla rk and Ros e , a nd B e ssi e Mathi s,
a r es i d en to f a h o u s e o n1 5 1 s tS t re et n ea r w h er e t h e s t ru ggl e t o o k p l ac e— p ro v i d es v ary i n g, conflicting acc ounts of what happe ned duringthis strugg l e. Fo r t he purpose s of our a naly sis, the most im portant discre pancie s exi st betwee n the testimony of Clark a

nd that of Mathis. Offic er Clar

k, for his pa

rt, stated that Robinson manag ed to g et on top of him and punche d him in the face . He a lso testified that, during the s trug g le, R obinson rea ched for the gun in Clark’sNo. 07-3274

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- 4 - holster. As they

wre stled over the gun, Clark ac k n o wl edg ed that he f ired a single g unshot at Robinson. The latter wa s killed by a sing le bullet to the chest. Clark c laimed that he shot Robinson be c a us e he fe are d f

or his lif e and the liv e s o f o the rs . On the other

hand, Mathis testified that she saw “eve ry bit” of t he st rug g le betwe en Of fice r Clark and Robinson and the e ventual shoot ing of Robinson. She claimed that Robinson was ne ver on top of Clark and that she did not see Robinson p u n ch C l ar k

. Fur thermore , she stated that Robinson neither wre stled with Clark, t ried to get a way , nor re ache d for Clark’ s g un. Mathis instead said that she saw Robinson put his ha nds up in the air when Clark ta ckled him onto his back, a nd that C l a r k h a d h i s kn e e o n R o b i n s o n . In c o n t r a s t t o C l ar k ’ s o w n a d m i s s i o n an d O f f i c e r R o s e ’ s t e s t i m o n y, Mathis said that Rose (who ra n over to the two me n afte r ensur ing that May s’s handc uffs we re
se c ur e ), and

no t Cla rk , a c tua lly

sh ot R ob ins on . Mathi s e xpla ine d that he r ba sis fo r s ay ingthat Ro se fi re d th e fata l sh ot i s th e wa y Ros e ha nd le d his g un

imm e diate ly

a ft e r s he sa

w R ob ins on

slump t o the g round. B. P r oc e dur al b ac kgr ound I n Marc h of 2004, Reed f iled this action in Ohio state court a g ainst Offic er Clar k, Offic er Rose, and the City

of Cleveland. T he City

promptly filed a pe tition t o remo v e t h e ca s e to fe dera l court, to which both off

icer s consented. I

n October of 2005, all three defe ndants filed a motion for summary judgme nt. Clark conceded that he had shot and kil led Robinson but claimed that he wa s
e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d im mun ity

fo r h is a c tio ns . The district cour

t gr anted the motion as to the City but denied the motion as to Clark and Ros e . A do pti ngthe Re po rt and Re c omm e nd a tio n is su e d b y the ma g istra

te jud g e to w ho m th e c a seNo. 07-3274

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- 5 - had bee n ref

err ed, the court found that g enuine issues of m ater ial fac t exis ted as to (1) whic h office r shot Robins on, and (2) whether the offic er w h o s h o t R obinson reasona bly believed that the latter posed a thre at to the office r or to the public. The court there fore conclude d that g enuine issues of

ma te ri a l fa c t pr e c lud e d g ra nti ng qu a lif

ie d immun ity to Cla

rk on a mot ion fo r su mma ry ju dg me nt. Clark timely

appea led. II. AN AL YSI S Qualified immunity

protec ts gove rnment off

icials from liability

for civil da

mag es stemming fr om t he ir pe rf or manc e of dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio ns so lon g a s “ the ir

c on du c t do e s n ot v iol a te c le arl y established statutory or constitutional rig hts of which a re asonable person would have known.” Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant , 1 4 2 F. 3 d 8 9 8 , 9 0 2 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 4 57 U. S. 80 0, 81 8 ( 19 82 )) . Adis trict c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt o n a

qu a lif ie d- immun ity

c la im

co n s t i tutes an appe alable f inal decision under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e .g. , Du nig an v . No ble , 390 F.3d 486, 488 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (ex erc ising appellate jurisdi ction, pursuant to § 1291, over the district court’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt based on qualified immunit y ). The de nial of summary

judgme nt on such a c laim, however , is subject to challeng e as a final decision within the meaningof § 1291 only to the extent that it turns on an issue of la w. Mi tc he ll v . F

or sy th , 472 U.S. 511, 529 n.9, 530 (1985) ( emphasizing that “ the appe alable issue is a purely leg al one: whether the f acts a lleg ed (by the plaintiff, or, in some c ases, the de fenda nt) support a c laim of violation of clearly established law” ); see also Johnson v . Jones , 5 1 5 U. S

. 3 0 4 , 3 1 9 -2 0 (1 9 9 5 ) (h o l d i n g t h at a d ef en d an tra i s i n g a claim of qua lified immunit y “may not appea l a district cour t’s summary

judgme nt order insofa

r as that order deter

mines whether or not the pretria l r ecor d sets forth a ‘g enuine’ issue of fac t for trial” ).No. 07-3274

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- 6 - I n other wor ds, “for

appellate jurisdiction to li e over an interlocu t o ry appeal, a def endant seekingqualified immunity must be willing to conc ede the fac t s as alleg ed by the plaintiff and discuss only

the leg al issues raise d by the ca s e.” Sheets v . Mullins , 287 F.3d 581, 585 ( 6th Cir. 20 02 ). To the e xten t th a t th e argume nts ra ise d b y a de fe nd ant re g ard ing qu a lif ie d im mun ity

“ re ly exclusively

on a disputed ver sion of the fa cts, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider [the] appea l.” McKenna v . City of Royal Oak , 469 F.3d 559, 561 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Re e d a rgue s th a t w e do no t hav e jur isd ic tio n o ve r O ff ic e r C la rk ’s a pp e a l be c a

us e Cla rk is dis pu tin g the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa c tua l fi nd ing s rathe r tha n its le g a l c on c lus ion s. We a g re e . D e sp ite Clark’s re peate d attempts to chara cter ize the qualified-immunity claim befor e us as a

purely leg al question, his arg uments “in fact re l y on [hi s] own dis puted ver sion of the fa cts, not the fac ts as alleg ed by

[R eed].” See id. Cla

rk ’s c la im ( br ok e n d ow n in to s e ve ra l di ff e re nt a rgument s) is essentially

that Mathis’s testimony must be dis cre dited in its entirety beca use i t conflicts with other evidenc e and is ther efor e totally unreliable . I n particula

r, he contends that (1) Mathis’s belief that Offic er Rose fi r e d

th e f a ta l s h o t i s r e f

u te d b y th e c o r o n e r ’ s r e p o rt s h o w in g th a t t h e s h o t w a s f

ir ed within a quarte r i nch of Robinson’s chest, a nd (2) Mathis’s testimony that she did not see Robinson g rab Clar k’s g un “does not mea

n that it did not, i n fac t, happen.” Of fi c e r C lark ’s fi rs t argume nt f a ils be c a us e , e ve n a ssumin g that Mathi s’ s r e c oll e c tio n is contra dicted by

the cor oner’ s repor

t and that Clark did indeed shoot Robinson (a f act that Clark himself admits), such an a ssumption would neither require n o r p ermit us to ignore the entire ty of Mathis’s testimony

. A finding that Clark shot Robinson would also do nothing to esta blish the more

c e ntr a l qu e sti on

of wh e the r t

hat us e of fo rc e was ob

je c tiv e ly re a so na ble un de r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s,No. 07-3274

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- 7 - wh ic h is the inq

uir y that we wo uld un de rt a ke if Cla rk we re wi lli ng to vie w the fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t favor able to Ree d. See, e. g. , Tennesseev. Garne r , 4 71 U. S. 1 , 1 1- 12 (1 98 5) (h old ingthat c ourt s must evaluate the constitutionalit y of an of fice r’s use of

deadly forc e to appr ehend a

flee ing suspe ct based on the rea sonablene ss standard c ontained in the F ourth Amendment). Offic er Clar

k’s re ading o f Mathis’s testimony (i.e., that she simply

did not see what happene d) ig nores Mathis’s own repe ated state ments that she watched “ever y bit” of the incide nt and that Robinson im mediately raised his ha

nds in the air afte r being tackled by Clark. This conflicting interpre tation of the re cord c onstitut es pre cisely the ty pe of imper

missibl e re solution of a disputed fac t that is inappropriate in e valuating a cla im of qualified immunity , and that, in t h e co n t ex t of a denial of suc h a cla im, deprives us of jurisdiction to revie w Clark’s c laim in the first instance. I nd e e d, our i nd e pe nd e nt r e vie w of the re c or d d e mon str a te s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y fo un d th a t g e nu ine iss ue s of mat eri al fa c t pr e c lud e the c on c lus ion that O ff ic e r C lark is e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d im mun ity a s a matt e r of law. Mathi s’ s e y e wi tne ss t e sti mony c a lls int o q

ue sti on no t on ly who shot Robinson but , more importan t l y , wh et her the forc e used w as re asonable under the

c ir c u ms ta n c e s . Wi th o u t b e in g a

b le to r e s o lv e th e d is p u te d f a c tu a l q u e s ti o no f w h e th e r Ro binson actua lly attempted to g ain control of Clar k ’s gu n , we c annot conc lude that the use of forc e wa s
rea sonable a s a matter of

law. See G arner , 47 1 U .S. a t 11 (e xpla ini ngtha t an o ff ic e r m ay re a so na bly use dea dly

forc e to pre vent the esc ape of a suspec t only if the off icer “has pr obable c ause to be lieve that the suspect pose s a threa t of serious phy sical har

m, either to the off

icer or to others” ). Clark’s ar g ument that we c an dec ide his claim as a matter of law require s us to ignore or discount the testimony

in the rec ord that contra dicts his own fac tual acc ount. T h i s we cannot do.No. 07-3274

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- 8 - See B erryman v . Rieger , 150 F.3d 561, 562 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I ]n orde r for

. . . an i n t erloc utory appea l based on qua lified immunit y to lie, the defe ndant must be prepa red to ove rlook any

fac tual dis p u t e an d to conce de an inter pretation of the fac ts in the light most favora ble to the plaintiff’s

case .”). And bec ause w e lac k jurisdiction to consider the qualified-immunity claim ra ised by

Offic er Clark, we ne cessa

rily lack jurisdiction to consider his pe ndent claim that he w as not proper ly serve d with a summons. See M

cKenna , 469 F.3d at 562-63 (explaining that pe ndent appe llate jurisdiction exis ts over issues that ar e other wise not revie wable in a n inte rlocutory

appea l but that are “inextricably

inter tw in e d w ith matter s over whic h the appe llate cour t properly and indepe ndently

has jur isd ic tio n , ” a

n d c o n c l u din g that th e c ourt

la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r t

he of fi c e rs ’ p e nd e nt c la im in the absenc e of jurisdiction over the qualified-immunity

issue (interna l quotation marks omitted)). We t he re fo re de c lin e to a dd

re ss t he me ri ts o f t

his pe nd e nt c la im.

III . C ON CL USI ON For all of the re asons set for th above, we DI SM ISS this int erloc uto ry ap p ea l fo r l ack of jurisdiction.