FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

April 28, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 Honorable Cecilia M. Altonaga, United States District Judge for the Southern District of *

Florida, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-10270

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 06-00358-CV-2-IPJ

INGRID REEVES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus 

C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_________________________

(April 28, 2008)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and ALTONAGA,*

District Judge.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:
2

Ingrid Reeves appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of C.H.

Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“CHRW”) on her hostile work environment sexual

harassment claim. We must determine whether daily exposure to language and

radio programming that are particularly offensive to women but not targeted at the

plaintiff are sufficient to satisfy the “based on” and “severe or pervasive” elements

of a hostile work environment claim. Because Reeves satisfied the “based on”

element and a jury could reasonably conclude that the conduct at issue was

sufficiently pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim, we reverse the

entry of summary judgment in CHRW’s favor. 

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2001, Reeves began working as a Transportation Sales

Representative (“TSR”) in CHRW’s Birmingham, Alabama branch office. She

was the only female TSR in the office, and she worked in a workstation pod

cubicle near other TSRs. Only one other woman worked at the Birmingham

branch office, but her desk was not in Reeves’s pod. 

Reeves alleges that sexually offensive language permeated the work

environment in her pod at CHRW every day. She testified in her deposition that

from the summer of 2001 to the spring of 2004, she “could point at every day of

the year that some of this behavior went on. It went on every day.” [Doc. 12-3: 7]. 
3

She asserts, moreover, that sexually explicit radio programming playing on a daily

basis and her one-time exposure to a pornographic image of a woman on a coworker’s computer also support her claim. Reeves testified that the offensive

language and radio programming continued even after she complained to coworkers and her supervisor on several occasions.

One of Reeves’s co-workers frequently used sexually crude language that

offended her. This employee “was consistent, [a]cross the board, day in and day

out, in the sexually offensive language, phrases, jokes, songs, comments, remarks.” 

[Doc. 12-2: 41]. He often used the phrase “fucking bitch” or “fucking whore” after

hanging up the phone, [id. at 42, 50]; he once called the only other female

employee in the office a “bitch” after she had left the room, and he once remarked

that she had “a big ass.” [Id. at 44]. Sexual jokes by this co-worker were also

commonplace, including one for which the punch-line was “fuck your sister and

your mother is a whore.” [Id. at 49-50]. Finally, he once said, “she’s a cunt,”

referring to a female. [Doc. 12-3: 10]. Reeves communicated to this co-worker on

multiple occasions that the language made it difficult for her to work, but the

employee did not change his behavior. 

Another co-worker also offended Reeves when he used sexually crude

language. Reeves overheard this employee talk about (1) “getting off” in reference
4

to masturbation, [id. at 1], (2) a song that referenced “women’s teeth on a man’s

dick,” [id.], and (3) an experience in a hotel with naked women, [id. at 1–2]. On

the day before this co-worker’s last day at the office, moreover, Reeves was told

that she should bring earplugs to work the next day because the co-worker had said

that he could behave however he wanted on his last day. [Id. at 1]. Reeves

testified that the co-worker’s last day “was just like any other day: full of sexually

offensive remarks, comments, stories, conversation, language—just like any other

day . . . .” [Id.]. 

The branch manager, who was Reeves’s direct supervisor, also made

comments that offended Reeves. He once referred to a former female co-worker as

a “lazy, good-for-nothing bitch,” [Doc. 12-2: 52], and another time asked Reeves

to “talk to that stupid bitch on line four,” referring to a female customer. [Doc. 12-

3: 5]. He once said, referring to the only female employee other than Reeves,

“[s]he may be a bitch, but she can read,” [Doc. 12-2: 167], and on another occasion

said “[s]he’s got a big one,” [id.], referring to her buttocks. Reeves often

complained to the branch manager about both his use of offensive language and the

use of such language in the office generally. 

Reeves was also offended by a radio program that was played every morning

on the stereo in the office. Discussions of the following material on the show
5

offended her: (1) breast size of female celebrities and Playboy Playmates; (2)

sexual arousal and women’s nipples as indications thereof; (3) masturbation, both

in general and with animals; (4) erotic dreams; (5) ejaculation; and (6) female

pornography. [Id. at 14–18]. Advertisements for or including the following

material that were aired during the program also offended her: (1) sexual favors;

(2) a bikini contest that instructed women to wear their most perverse bikinis; (3) a

statement that a woman was found in bed with three elves and a candy cane; and

(4) a drug called Proton that promised to increase sexual performance, please a

partner, and make the user a “sexual tyrannosaurus rex.” [Id. at 19-21]. When

Reeves complained about the radio programming, she was often told that she could

play her own music or change the station. She testified, however, that if she did so

the other employees would soon change the radio back to the offensive program.

The branch manager testified in his deposition that he had used, and heard

others use, the term “bitch” in the office. He could not recall hearing anyone in the

office use “whore” in a sexual context. He denied hearing any employee use the

word “cunt” but estimated that the word “dick” was used about once a week. He

also testified that he had one or two talks with one of Reeves’s co-workers about

language, and mentioned language to others during performance evaluations after

Reeves complained. 
6

Reeves resigned from CHRW on March 24, 2004. In February 2006, she

filed a complaint against CHRW alleging in part that the use of sexually offensive

language created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district

court entered summary judgment for CHRW on the ground that the alleged

harassment was not “based on” Reeves’s sex. 

On appeal, Reeves asserts that, contrary to the district court’s reasoning,

whether the allegedly harassing language was directed at the plaintiff is not

determinative of whether the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment. 

CHRW argues that we should affirm the district court because men and women

were subjected to the same behavior in the office. Alternatively, CHRW argues

that this Court should affirm on the ground that the harassment was not severe or

pervasive.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chambless v.

Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
7

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party opposing summary

judgment must make “enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for

that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.” Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The ground for a Title VII sexual

harassment claim can be either a tangible employment action or, as Reeves asserts

here, the “creation of a hostile work environment caused by sexual harassment that

is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of work.” 

Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, — U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 499, — L. Ed. 2d. — (2007). An employee cannot

recover under the hostile work environment theory unless she shows that (1) she

belongs to a protected group; (2) she has been subject to unwelcome sexual

harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her membership in a protected group;

(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and

conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5)

a basis for holding the employer liable exists. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d

1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The only elements at issue here are the
8

“based on” and “severe or pervasive” elements. 

A. “Based on”

The Supreme Court has declared that in hostile work environment cases,

“‘[t]he critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to

disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other

sex are not exposed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80,

118 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114 S. Ct. 367, 372, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring)). Thus, to satisfy the “based on” element, a plaintiff must essentially

show “‘that similarly situated persons not of [her] sex were treated differently and

better.’” Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting Mendoza, 195

F.3d at 1254 n.3 (Edmondson, J., concurring)).

The specific question that faces us here is whether harassment in the form of

offensive language can be “based on” the plaintiff’s membership in a protected

group even when the plaintiff was not the target of the language and other

employees were equally exposed to the language. We noted in Baldwin that “sex

specific” profanity, including words such as “bitch,” “tramp,” and “slut,” is “more

degrading to women than to men” and thus “may be considered, for whatever
 The district court did not have the benefit of this reasoning from Baldwin because it 1

entered summary judgment for CHRW before we decided Baldwin.

 Similarly, in Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1972), disapproved of on 2

other grounds, E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 104 S. Ct. 1621, 80 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1984),

the former Fifth Circuit considered an optometrist employee’s Title VII claim based on the

employer’s segregation of patients from a minority group of which the employee was a member.

Id. The Court declared that the employer’s failure to intentionally direct any discriminatory

treatment toward the employee was “not material.” Id. at 239. See also, Busby v. City of

9

weight [it has] on the sexual harassment scales.” Id. at 1302. Though we have 1

never explicitly held that such “sex specific” language satisfies the “based on”

element in a sexual harassment hostile work environment case even when the

language does not target the plaintiff, we do so today in light of our racediscrimination cases. 

It is well established that racially offensive language need not be targeted at

the plaintiff in order to support a Title VII hostile work environment claim. For

example, in Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982), the

plaintiff, a black male, who had just begun working as a trainee at a car dealership,

claimed that other employees repeatedly used offensive racial epithets, including

references to poorly repaired cars as “nigger-rigged” and to the salesman with the

lowest sales volume as “the black ass.” Id. at 1358. We concluded that the fact

that many of the epithets were not directed at Walker was not determinative

because the offensive language was often used in Walker’s presence after he had

voiced objections. Id. at 1359 n.2. The harassment that Walker experienced was 2
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 785 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (reiterating the Walker principle).

 Our sister circuits have also recognized the importance of this principle, for both the 3

“based on” and “severe or pervasive” elements, and in both the race- and sex-discrimination

contexts. See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir.) (en banc)

(“[S]exually charged comments . . . even if not directed specifically to the plaintiff, are relevant

to determining whether the plaintiff was subjected to sex-based harassment.”), cert. denied, —

U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 247, — L. Ed. 2d — (2007); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 660

(6th Cir. 1999) (“[O]ffensive comments need not be directed at a plaintiff in order to constitute

conduct violating Title VII.”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022,

1033–34 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Walker for the proposition that “racist attacks need not be

directed at the complainant in order to create a hostile . . . environment”). 

10

“based on” his race because the “race specific” language that was used was

particularly offensive to him as a black male, regardless of whom the language

targeted.3

Our Walker reasoning can correctly be extended here. The language in the

CHRW office included the “sex specific” words “bitch,” “whore,” and “cunt” that,

under Baldwin, may be more degrading to women than men. The subject matter of

the conversations and jokes that allegedly permeated the office on a daily basis

included male and female sexual anatomy, masturbation, and female pornography,

all of which was discussed in a manner that was similarly more degrading to

women than men. The radio programming that Reeves claims was also similar. 

Therefore, even if such language was used indiscriminately in the office such that

men and women were equally exposed to the language, the language had a

discriminatory effect on Reeves because of its degrading nature. Accordingly, just

as the language in Walker was sufficient to support Walker’s hostile work
11

environment claim because it particularly offended Walker as a black man, we hold

that the evidence Reeves presented was sufficient to survive summary judgment on

the “based on” element here. 

CHRW argues that we should not look to race cases here because, “race is

different” than sex. In the Title VII context, however, CHRW’s argument is

simply misplaced. We have made it abundantly clear that 

[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment

for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual

equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. 

Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual

abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a

living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial

epithets.

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). The Supreme

Court, moreover, drew upon race discrimination cases when it held that Title VII

covered hostile work environment claims and has “followed the lead of such cases

in attempting to define the severity of the offensive conditions necessary to

constitute actionable sex discrimination under the statute.” Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998). 

Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that it is proper for us as we decide

sexual harassment cases to draw “on standards developed in cases involving racial

harassment.” Id. at 787 n.2, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 n.2. Accordingly, we see no reason
12

to analyze the “based on” element differently here than we would in a race

discrimination case. 

Having concluded that Reeves satisfied the “based on” element, we turn to

the “severe or pervasive” element.

B. “Severe or Pervasive”

CHRW argues that even if the harassment was “based on” Reeves’s sex,

summary judgment was appropriate because, as a matter of law, the harassment

was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of

Reeves’s employment. We disagree. 

The “severe or pervasive” element “tests the mettle of most sexual

harassment claims.” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir.

2000). Thus, when properly applied, this element will “filter out complaints

attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of

abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Faragher, 524

U.S. at 788, 118 S. Ct. at 2284 (internal quotation marks omitted). The element is

only satisfied, moreover, “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370. 

The “severe or pervasive” element “includes a subjective and an objective

component.” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. We have no doubt that Reeves
 Again, our sister circuits agree with us concerning this proposition. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. 4

v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Under the totality of the

circumstances test, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, could give rise to a

viable Title VII claim as well as a continuous pattern of much less severe incidents of

harassment.”); Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the test is

for “quality or quantity” of harassment (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted));

Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A] sufficiently severe

episode may occur as rarely as once, while a relentless pattern of lesser harassment that extends

over a long period of time also violates the statute.” (citation omitted)); Bowen v. Missouri Dep’t

13

subjectively perceived the harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to

violate Title VII. The question before us is whether that perception was

objectively unreasonable as a matter of law such that the district court

appropriately entered summary judgment in CHRW’s favor. 

We must judge the objective severity of the harassment from the perspective

of a reasonable person in Reeves’s position, considering the totality of the

circumstances rather than acts in isolation. Id. As we have recognized, this

inquiry is somewhat fact-intensive, id., but the Supreme Court has identified the

following four factors to guide us in our analysis: (1) the frequency of the conduct;

(2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct

unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance. Faragher, 524 U.S.

at 787–88, 118 S. Ct. at 2283. Importantly, no single factor is determinative,

Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371, and either severity or pervasiveness can

satisfy the element, if sufficient. See Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247–48. 

4
of Soc. Servs., 311 F.3d 878, 884 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A claimant need only establish discriminatory

conduct which is either pervasive or severe.”); Smith v. Norwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d

1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The [Supreme Court’s] test is a disjunctive one, requiring that the

harassing conduct be sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently severe . . . .”). 

14

1. Frequency

For nearly three years, CHRW employees allegedly used “sex specific”

language in Reeves’s presence every day and the offensive radio program was

played every morning. The frequency factor thus undoubtedly weighs in Reeves’s

favor. 

2. Severity

As for severity, the words and phrases that were used fall variously on the

spectrum of language that is particularly offensive to women. Rather than consider

the severity of each instance of alleged harassment, however, we must determine

the severity of all the circumstances taken together. It is arguably severe for the

sole woman in a workplace to be exposed to: (1) the words “cunt” and “whore;”

(2) vulgar references to sexual acts such as “a woman’s teeth on a man’s dick” and

“fuck your sister;” and (3) conversations concerning ejaculation, men’s erotic

dreams, female sexual anatomy, sources and indications of female sexual arousal,

and female pornography. Because the alleged conduct was never directed at

Reeves, however, we cannot say that the nature of the overall harassment here was

as objectively severe as the conduct that we and our sister circuits have previously
 Our reasoning in Walker makes clear that whether offensive language is directed at the 5

plaintiff is not determinative, even in the “severe or pervasive” analysis. See Walker, 684 F.3d

at 1358, 1359 n.2; see also, cases cited supra, note 3. 

 Because this factor requires that we consider whether the harassing conduct was

6

physically threatening or humiliating, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that the absence of

physical threats “is in no way dispositive, when there is sufficient evidence from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that allegedly harassing conduct was otherwise humiliating.”

White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 298–99 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

15

deemed actionable under the severity factor. See Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246–52. 

Accordingly, we conclude that, while it is not determinative, the severity factor 5

weighs against Reeves. 

3. Physically Threatening or Humiliating

Nothing occurred in the office that was physically threatening.6

Nevertheless, a jury could find that the language and radio programming created an

objectively humiliating work environment, particularly because Reeves was the

only woman in the workstation pod. Given the conduct described in our discussion

of the severity factor, it is objectively reasonable that a woman in Reeves’s

position would have felt humiliated in such circumstances. Reeves’s exposure to

the pornographic image on her co-worker’s computer also contributed to the

objectively humiliating environment. 

The humiliating atmosphere is further revealed in the warning that Reeves

received from a co-worker who used offensive language concerning another
16

offensive co-worker’s last day of work. The earplugs comment suggests that those

who used derogatory language in the office knew that their conduct made Reeves

uncomfortable, and perhaps even intended to do so. It is certainly reasonable that

such treatment would be humiliating for a woman in Reeves’s position. 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in Reeves’s favor, despite the lack of physically

threatening conduct. 

4. Unreasonable Interference with Job Performance

Finally, we believe that a jury could properly conclude that the conduct

unreasonably interfered with Reeves’s job performance. CHRW argues that this

factor should weigh in its favor because Reeves received positive performance

reviews and was given significant responsibilities. As the Supreme Court declared

in Harris, however, the conduct in question need not have tangibly affected the

plaintiff’s job performance in order to be actionable. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114

S. Ct. at 371. Reeves testified that the conduct made it difficult to concentrate on

work and caused her to leave the pod and stand in the hallway. She claims that she

started to shake when she saw the pornographic image on her co-worker’s

computer. She also often took time away from her work to complain to her

superiors, ask her co-workers to stop, or write notes to herself so she would have a

record of some of the more offensive incidents. This factor, therefore, also weighs
17

in Reeves’s favor. 

5. Our “Severe or Pervasive” Determination

After considering the Supreme Court’s four factors in light of the totality of

the circumstances in which Reeves worked at CHRW, we hold that a reasonable

jury could find that the harassment Reeves faced was sufficiently pervasive to alter

the conditions of her employment. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that “a work

environment viewed as a whole may satisfy the legal definition of an abusive work

environment, for purposes of a hostile environment claim, even though no single

episode crosses the Title VII threshold.” Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d

553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999). Reeves has presented evidence of sufficient

pervasiveness to survive summary judgment, even if none of the incidents she has

described, standing alone, would be actionable. Accordingly, this case can only be

appropriately resolved after a jury weighs the factors and decides whether the

harassment was such that a reasonable person would have felt that it affected the

conditions of her employment. 

We recognize that the conduct at issue here is not what typically comes to

mind when one thinks of sexual harassment under Title VII. We were careful in

Mendoza, moreover, not to “establish a baseline of actionable conduct that is far

below that established by other circuits,” Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1251, or “trivialize
 The plaintiff also alleged other instances of harassment, but the Court did not consider 7

those in its pervasiveness analysis. Lauderdale, 2007 WL 4465204 at *3. 

18

true instances of sexual harassment.” Id. at 1252 n.10. Furthermore, summary

judgment is meant to “police [that] baseline for hostile environment claims.” Id. at

1244. Nevertheless, what Reeves experienced at CHRW was not the “ordinary

socializing,” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.

Ct. 998, 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998), or “ordinary tribulations of the

workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and

occasional teasing” that the “severe or pervasive” element is meant to filter out. 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. 

As we mentioned earlier, either severity or pervasiveness can form the basis

of a hostile work environment claim, and our holding today focuses on the latter. 

While it would be impossible to find a prior case that perfectly supports our

reasoning, two of our sister circuits have held that similar facts satisfied the “severe

or pervasive” element on pervasiveness specifically. 

In Lauderdale v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, No. 06-41636, 2007 WL

4465204, at *1 (5th Cir. December 21, 2007), the Fifth Circuit recently held that

evidence of frequent but non-severe harassment was sufficiently pervasive to

survive summary judgment. The relevant harassment in Lauderdale consisted of

multiple nightly phone calls from the plaintiff’s supervisor for nearly four months.7
19

Id. at *3. While the calls clearly indicated the supervisor’s romantic interest in the

plaintiff, the call that was most sexual in nature merely invited the plaintiff to

travel to Las Vegas with the supervisor and “snuggle.” Id. In reversing the district

court’s entry of summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit panel declared that frequent

harassment can be sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile work environment even

if the individual incidents of harassment are “not severe.” Id.

In Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.

2005), the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion when it was faced with

evidence of pervasiveness. The plaintiff testified that her supervisor told sexually

explicit jokes “like every day,” id. at 1035 (internal quotation marks omitted), and

that she “could write a book” about all the times her supervisor had said that he did

not think the plaintiff, or a female generally, could do the work that a man is

required to do. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit panel

held that the evidence of sexually explicit jokes and demeaning comments was

“more than sufficient” to create “genuine factual disputes . . . as to both the

severity and pervasiveness of [the supervisor’s] conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Just as the plaintiffs did in Lauderdale and Dominguez-Curry, Reeves has

presented evidence of pervasive conduct that is sufficient to survive summary

judgment. 
20

IV. CONCLUSION

The evidence that Reeves presented prevents us from holding that, as a

matter of law, the conduct in question did not satisfy the “based on” or “severe or

pervasive” elements of a hostile work environment claim. The entry of summary

judgment in CHRW’s favor is thus reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.