J-S41036-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN HARDY CARTER,

Appellant No. 172 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 26, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-36-CR-0000422-2014

CP-36-CR-0000431-2014

CP-36-CR-0000439-2014

CP-36-CR-0000453-2014

CP-36-CR-0000463-2014

CP-36-CR-0000467-2014

CP-36-CR-0003374-2014

CP-36-CR-0003375-2014

CP-36-CR-0003376-2014

CP-36-CR-0003377-2014

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2015

Appellant, John Hardy Carter, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his entry of two open guilty pleas to thirty-five criminal 

offenses he committed in Lancaster and York Counties. Appellant challenges 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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We take the relevant factual and procedural history of this case from 

the trial court’s December 18, 2014 opinion and our independent review of 

the record. This case arises from Appellant’s several week long crime spree 

during which he robbed and burglarized numerous businesses and homes. 

Appellant brandished a firearm during several of the incidents, and he 

sometimes acted with other co-defendants. He fired a handgun during one 

of the robberies, and the bullet narrowly missed a store clerk. Following his 

arrest, and while in prison, Appellant formulated a failed plan to escape from 

his preliminary hearing by soliciting a cohort to assault the Pennsylvania 

State Constable taking him to the hearing. 

On June 26, 2014, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to numerous 

counts of burglary, robbery, theft, and related charges, along with a count of 

criminal solicitation at six separate Lancaster County docket numbers.1 The 

trial court ordered preparation of a supplement to an existing pre-sentence 

investigation (PSI) report. Prior to sentencing, four companion cases from 

York County2involving multiple counts of burglary, robbery and related 

charges were transferred to Lancaster County for resolution because they 

arose from the same course of conduct during the same time-period. See 

____________________________________________

1 Docket Nos. 0422-2014, 0431-2014, 0439-2014, 0453-2014, 0463-2014, 

and 0467-2014.

2 Docket Nos. 3374-2014, 3375-2014, 3376-2014, and 3377-2014.
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 555. Appellant entered an open guilty plea to these offenses 

on September 17, 2014. 

On September 26, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the 

Lancaster and York County cases, and it sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of not less than forty-three and one-half nor more than 

ninety-five years’ incarceration.3 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence 

motion to modify sentence on October 6, 2014. On December 18, 2014, the 

trial court entered an opinion and order denying Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion. This timely appeal followed.4

Appellant raises one issue for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court impose an unreasonable sentence 

which contravenes the policy underlying the Sentencing Code 

where the sentence is manifestly unreasonable, focuses solely on 

the seriousness of the offense without considering any mitigating 

factors, is not an individualized sentence and appears to be the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will? 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4). 

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

However, “[t]he right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

____________________________________________

3 At the time of sentencing, Appellant was twenty-two years old. (See N.T. 

Sentencing, 9/26/14, at 19). He already was serving sentences for other 

offenses he committed in Lancaster and Berks Counties. (See id. at 37; 

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 5). 

4 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 20, 2015, it 

entered an order relying on its December 18, 2014 opinion and order. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (citation omitted). 

Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we must engage 

in a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is 

timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence[, see Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise 

statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is 

appropriate under the sentencing code. . . . [I]f the appeal 

satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then proceed to 

decide the substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-30 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant has complied with the first three requirements because 

he filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim in a timely postsentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. See 

id.

With respect to the fourth requirement:

The determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A 

substantial question exits only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were 

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 77 A.3d 1258 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant concedes that the sentences 

imposed on the individual counts were within the standard range of the 

sentencing guidelines. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8, 10). However, he 

maintains that the aggregate sentence imposed is excessive and constitutes 

too severe a punishment. (See id. at 8-9). He contends that the court 

ignored mitigating factors including his young age and his potential for

rehabilitation, resulting in a sentenced that is not individualized. (See id. at 

9-10, 14). 

We are mindful that “a sentencing court generally has discretion to 

impose multiple sentences concurrently or consecutively, and a challenge to 

the exercise of that discretion does not ordinarily raise a substantial 

question.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 

2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). 

However, “this Court has held that an excessive sentence claim—in 

conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating 

factors—raises a substantial question.” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, 

we will address the merits of Appellant’s claim. 

Our standard of review in sentencing matters is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, 

the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion 

unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will.
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Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

“[T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent 

with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Therefore, 

“a sentencing court must formulate a sentence individualized to that 

particular case and that particular defendant.” Clarke, supra at 1287 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, at the sentencing hearing, the court heard a 

statement from Appellant and argument from defense counsel and the 

Commonwealth. (See N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/14, at 7-17). The court 

acknowledged the contents of several victim-impact statements and made 

the PSI report a part of the record. (See id. at 6, 13, 18, 31). It explained 

its rationale for the aggregate sentence as follows:

I have been reviewing all of this information; reviewing 

each criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause; 

reviewing each criminal information; reviewing everything in the 

pre-sentence investigation report; certainly reviewing the 

statements of the victims that have been offered; trying to 

discern [Appellant’s] motivation or path. And two things more 

than anything else stand out to me. 

Within mere months . . . of being released on the York 

County charges, which were serious charges and would have 

called for state time, [Appellant] resumed his prior activities, and 

he did so with an enthusiasm and apparent lack of any 

introspection of what he had been through in the juvenile 

system, what he had been through in the York County Prison 
J-S41036-15

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system, and certainly without ever appearing to stop and think 

about what he had done, maybe it was only minutes before in 

any of these given robberies or burglaries, never once pausing to 

stop this headlong flight, criminal behavior. 

And I am now faced with someone who is serving a state 

sentence imposed by this [c]ourt [by] my colleague . . . back in 

September. . . . 

. . . [Appellant], you are capable of great danger. And in 

your headlong flight through life, you take no care for what you 

leave behind you and I cannot risk anyone else’s safety, 

security, possessions, peace of mind by disregarding the fact 

that you are a very, very dangerous man. 

And to say that about a 22-year-old, frankly, pains me. 

But I look at everything in front of me. . . . 

To get my mind and my sense of fairness and justice for 

these victims around this has been very difficult.

The easiest thing, other than math, would simply be to 

make every single [sentence] consecutive. But I don’t think that 

takes into proper account the individual nature of the dockets, 

the individual nature of the various offenses. 

I think the tipping point comes for me when on recorded 

prison phone calls you try and plan with your girlfriend to 

dispose of evidence and embark on this plan to have . . . [a] 

breakout from [a] [magisterial district justice] hearing[.] . . . 

. . . And I say whether it is immaturity or simply no 

motivation on your part to view your conduct and grow from it in 

a positive way, I cannot and will not risk guessing that this time 

maybe the jail time has made a little difference in you. 

And as I say, in trying to fashion the sentences, it has not 

been easy, because I want each victim to feel that I have really 

looked at their facts and that I appreciate that the things you 

may have taken and the mayhem you may have left behind for 

them to find are nothing compared to that sense of safety and 

security they should have when they’re at home or when they’re 

at work.
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And knowing that your ego or your compulsion is such that 

doesn’t stop you from flashing the gun and firing the gun, means 

that whatever the controls are on that kind of behavior, you 

don’t have them. . . . 

The idea of confining a young man to a State Correctional 

Institution for an extended period of time, for what will largely 

be the better part of his life, is not something that I do with any 

sense of satisfaction or any sense of ill will towards you as a 

human being, but it is consistent with my duty to stop and think 

about the magnitude of the crimes, how they have affected 

those direct and indirect victims, how the community can be 

protected, and how others can be deterred when the [c]ourt 

makes a strong statement that behavior of this kind will not be 

countenanced in a civilized society, because it is the civilized 

society that is entitled to the greater consideration.

You say that reading the papers you feel that the papers 

paint you as a monster. [Appellant], I want you to know that I 

don’t see you as a monster. I see you as a troubled young man, 

but I also see you as a dangerous young man. And I don’t see 

any indication from your past that you’ve had any interest in 

ameliorating that danger. 

(Id. at 17-21). 

Thus, the record reflects that the trial court reviewed extensive 

documentation regarding this case, carefully considered the individual 

sentences, and exercised discretion in declining to run all of the sentences 

consecutively. The court’s comments at sentencing demonstrate that it took 

into account Appellant’s young age and was “pain[ed]” by it. (Id. at 19). 

Further, “where, as here, the sentencing court had the benefit of a 

pre-sentence investigation report, we can assume [it] was aware of relevant 

information regarding [Appellant’s] character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 
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Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 

(Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1746 (2012) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). While the trial court acknowledged that 

Appellant’s aggregate sentence is lengthy, (see Trial Court Opinion, 

12/18/14, at 7), we agree with the court that it is not manifestly excessive 

and Appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for his numerous crimes. 

Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995); see 

also Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 2015 WL 3444594, at *6 (Pa. Super. 

May 29, 2015) (en banc) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences resulting in lengthy aggregate sentence 

where appellant stole money from his neighbor’s apartment and fired 

gunshots at him on a crowded street). Accordingly, after review of the 

record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Clarke, supra at 1287. Appellant’s 

sole issue on appeal does not merit relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/15/2015