18-1968

Singh v. Barr

BIA

Cassin, IJ

A206 469 227

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 1st 4 day of July, two thousand twenty.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 DENNIS JACOBS,

8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

9 DENNY CHIN,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 PARWINDER SINGH,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 18-1968

17 NAC

18

19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, New 

25 York, NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

28 Attorney General; Walter Bocchini, 

29 Senior Litigation Counsel; Monica 

30 M. Twombly, Trial Attorney, Office 

31 of Immigration Litigation, United 
2

1 States Department of Justice, 

2 Washington, DC.

3

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

7 is DENIED.

8 Petitioner Parwinder Singh, a native and citizen of 

9 India, seeks review of a June 4, 2018, decision of the BIA 

10 affirming an August 21, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge 

11 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

12 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

13 (“CAT”). In re Parwinder Singh, No. A206 469 227 (B.I.A. 

14 June 4, 2018), aff’g No. A206 469 227 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

15 Aug. 21, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

16 underlying facts and procedural history.

17 Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s 

18 and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

19 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d 

20 Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

21 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 

22 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 

23 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

24 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 
3

1 determination on . . . the consistency between the 

2 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , 

3 the internal consistency of each such statement, the 

4 consistency of such statements with other evidence of 

5 record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, 

6 inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 

7 claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. 

8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 

9 determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 

10 it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

11 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 

12 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d 

13 at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s 

14 determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim 

15 that members of the Akali Dal Badal attacked him three times 

16 in India on account of his membership in a rival political 

17 party, the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”). 

18 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistent evidence 

19 regarding when Singh began his association with the SADA 

20 party, what harm his father suffered on account of politics, 

21 what happened during Singh’s alleged attacks, and when Singh 

22 went to the hospital for treatment. See 8 U.S.C. 
4

1 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). When provided an opportunity to 

2 explain these inconsistencies, Singh further undermined his 

3 credibility by changing his testimony so that it was 

4 internally inconsistent. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 

5 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer 

6 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

7 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact8 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal 

9 quotation marks omitted)).

10 The agency also reasonably relied further on Singh's

11 failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable 

12 corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to 

13 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, 

14 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 

15 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 

16 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 

17 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ reasonably found that 

18 affidavits from two of Singh’s acquaintances undermined 

19 Singh’s credibility further because the affidavits were 

20 identical in every respect, including grammatical and 

21 typographical errors. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of 

22 Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that we 
5

1 “ha[ve] firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that 

2 striking similarities between affidavits are an indication 

3 that the statements are 'canned'”). 

4 The IJ also reasonably declined to afford weight to the 

5 affidavit from Singh’s parents because, in addition to 

6 inconsistencies with Singh’s testimony about his medical 

7 treatment, the authors were interested parties who were not 

8 available for cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 

9 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e 

10 generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to 

11 be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence” and 

12 upholding BIA’s decision not to credit letter from 

13 applicant’s spouse); see also In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & 

14 N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that letters from 

15 alien’s friends and family were insufficient to provide 

16 substantial support for alien’s claims because they were from 

17 interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), 

18 overruled on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 

19 F.3d 130, 133–38 (2d Cir. 2012). And, contrary to Singh’s 

20 contention, the agency explicitly acknowledged statements 

21 from the doctors who purportedly treated him and did not err 

22 in finding those statements, which were prepared for the 
6

1 hearing rather than contemporaneously with the treatment,

2 insufficient to rehabilitate Singh’s credibility. See Y.C., 

3 741 F.3d at 332. 

4 Given the inconsistency and corroboration findings, the 

5 agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by 

6 substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

7 That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

8 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based 

9 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 

10 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

12 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

13 stays VACATED.

14 FOR THE COURT: 

15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

16 Clerk of Court