Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TERELLE YOUNG, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1308-CR-712

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David M. Hooper, Commissioner

Cause No. 49F08-1301-CM-4769

March 31, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Terelle Young (Young), appeals his conviction for failure to 

stop after an accident resulting in personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code §§ 

9-26-1-1; -8. 

We affirm.

ISSUE

Young raises one issues on appeal which we restate as: Whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to disprove Young’s necessity 

defense. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 20, 2013, Melin Nesbitt (Nesbitt) was sitting in the front passenger 

seat of her car while parked outside a grocery store in Indianapolis, Indiana. Young, then 

eighteen-years-old, entered the driver’s side of a red Lexus, which was parked

approximately fifteen feet away. Putting his car in reverse, Young backed into Nesbitt’s 

car as Nesbitt’s husband was returning from the grocery store. Young exited his car, 

checked whether it was damaged, gave Nesbitt the finger, and drove away from the 

scene. Nesbitt copied down the car’s license plate number. Later that same day, police 

officers located Young and the red Lexus at Young’s mother’s residence. 

Because the collision caused Nesbitt’s knee to strike the dashboard of her car and 

become painful and swollen, she received treatment in the emergency room. At the time 

of the accident, Young held a learner’s permit and was prohibited from driving the car 

alone. Also, Young’s “license had been suspended” after a previous incident where he 
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received a learner’s permit violation and speeding infraction for driving over the speed 

limit. (Transcript p. 116).

On January 20, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Young with failure 

to stop after an accident resulting in personal injury, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 9-

26-1-1; -8. On April 29, 2013 and July 26, 2013, the trial court conducted a bench trial. 

During trial, Young asserted a necessity defense arguing that because Nesbitt’s husband 

was shouting at him and walking towards him, he rapidly left out of fear that Nesbitt’s 

husband would start a fight. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Young 

guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days with four days executed and 361 days 

suspended to probation. 

Young now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Young does not contest that he drove into Nesbitt’s car and left the scene of the 

accident. He argues, however, that he did so out of necessity because Nesbitt’s husband 

approached and acted as if he wanted to start a fight and that the State introduced 

insufficient evidence to prove otherwise. The common law defense of necessity has 

evolved over the years and is often referred to as the “choice of evils” defense. Toops v. 

State, 643 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Although the confines of the necessity 

defense vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the central element involves the emergency 

nature of the situation. Id. That is, under the force of extreme circumstances, conduct 

that would otherwise constitute a crime is justifiable and not criminal because of the 

greater harm which the illegal act seeks to prevent. Id. 
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Traditionally, in order to prevail on a claim of necessity, the defendant must show 

that (1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a significant evil; (2) 

there must have been no adequate alternative to the commission of the act; (3) the harm 

caused by the act must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) the accused must 

entertain a good faith belief that his act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) such 

belief must be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances; and (6) the accused 

must not have substantially contributed to the creation of the emergency. Dozier v. State, 

709 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

Our supreme court has noted that necessity is an affirmative defense and that an 

affirmative defense “admits all the elements of the crime but proves circumstances which 

excuse the defendant from culpability.” Melendez v. State, 511 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ind. 

1987). Thus, in order to negate a claim of necessity, the State must disprove at least one 

element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Dozier, 709 N.E.2d at 29. The State 

may refute a claim of the defense of necessity by direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the 

sufficiency of the evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. The decision whether a claim of 

necessity has been disproved is entrusted to the finder-of-fact. Id. Where a defendant is 

convicted despite his claim of necessity, this court will reverse the conviction only if no 

reasonable person could say that the defense was negated by the State beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. 

Reviewing the evidence before us, we do not conclude that a necessity justified 

Young’s departure from the scene of the accident without exchanging information with 

Nesbitt. By driving the vehicle with a learner’s permit and without a licensed driver, 
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backing into Nesbitt’s parked vehicle with enough force to injure her knee and giving her 

the middle finger, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Young substantially 

contributed to the existence of the emergency. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 

decision. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut Young’s necessity defense. 

Affirmed. 

ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur