1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

____________________________________ 

WILLIAM C. BOND, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 10-01617 (RCL) 

 ) 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ) 

JUSTICE, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 The point of a motion to alter or amend a previous judgment under Rule 59(e) is not to 

cry over spilled milk; rather, litigants should use this opportunity to highlight new evidence that 

would correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Unfortunately, the plaintiff—who 

believes that he is a modern incarnation of David in his epic battle against Goliath (here, the 

Government and the Washington Post)—has illustrated none of these. Plaintiff has filed lawsuit 

after lawsuit, the most recent on September 23, 2010, alleging, among other claims, that this 

Court conspired with Goliath to prevent him from obtaining justice. But, plaintiff’s claims were 

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in December 2011. Now pending before the Court is 

plaintiff William C. Bond’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s December 6, 2011 Judgment 

and Memorandum Opinion. Upon consideration of the Motion, the Oppositions, the Replies 

thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court denies the plaintiff’s Motion 

for the reasons set forth below. 
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II. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff’s “highly embellished” 2 manuscript of his life story sets the stage for this 

protracted litigation that has endured, in a variety of Courts and forms, for more than ten years. 

Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Oct. 20, 2010, ECF No. 6. Plaintiff filed the instant suit on September 23, 2010 

against two categories of defendants: the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and DOJ 

officials (collectively “Federal defendants”), and the Washington Post and its reporter, Manuel 

Roig-Franzia (collectively “the Post”). Plaintiff’s claims against both categories of defendants 

are best understood coupled with a brief history of his past claims. 

A. Factual History 

In 2001, Bond discovered that someone stole the manuscript of his fictionalized 

autobiography. Am. Compl. ¶ 2, Oct. 20, 2010, ECF No. 6. He then filed suit against the 

alleged thieves in Maryland for conversion and invasion of privacy. Id. ¶9. When the District 

Court ruled in favor of the defendants in that case, he appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit 

Court of Appeals, which affirmed and awarded substantial attorney’s fees. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7. Rather 

than cut his losses, plaintiff became increasingly paranoid. He believed that the defendants and 

the Federal judges assigned to his case were conspiring against him, and that the defendants lied 

during trial. Id. ¶11–14. Attempting to expose these alleged misdeeds, Bond referred the 

matters of perjury and judicial misconduct to the United States Attorney’s Office for the District 

 1

 As this is the third memorandum opinion addressing the merits of this case, the Court will merely provide 

a brief overview of the pertinent facts relevant to plaintiff’s most recent claims. A more detailed description of the 

factual and procedural background can be found in this Court’s December 6, 2011 Memorandum Opinion. See 

Bond v. U.S. Department of Justice, 10-CV-01617, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139898 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2011). 2

 Bond’s manuscript describes the story of a juvenile boy who kills his father. Bond, however, describes 

his manuscript as a “highly embellished” and “fictionalized” account of his past acts. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Oct. 20, 

2010, ECF No. 6. When Bond was 17, he beat his father to death with a hammer. After he was arrested and 

detained in a juvenile detention facility, he entered into a guilty-plea agreement in juvenile Court, was transferred to 

a Baltimore hospital for psychological treatment, and was released in 1982. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 390 (4th 

Cir. 2003). Bond avers in his complaint that the Federal defendants have discriminated against him, in part because 

of this criminal record. 
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of Maryland (“USAO”) in 2004. Id. ¶ 15. The USAO’s office declined Bond’s referral in 

writing, citing “discretion” as a basis for its decision not to investigate. Id. ¶ 22. In the “summer 

and fall” of 2006, Bond sought reconsideration of the USAO’s decision, which the USAO again 

declined. Id. ¶ 24. In response, Bond filed three related actions in Federal Court: a FOIA 

request seeking the USAO’s “‘final report,” and two actions alleging “fraud upon the Court” on 

the part of the defendants in the Maryland case. Id. ¶ 25. The Federal District Court again 

dismissed Bond’s complaints and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. ¶ 26. Undeterred by his lack 

of success, Bond petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari in 2008 and 2009. Id. ¶ 27. 

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court denied both petitions. Id. ¶¶ 40, 43. 

While a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court ends the legal journey for most 

litigants, Bond decided that his case had to be heard. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia on September 23, 2010, seeking damages and 

mandamus relief for violations of his constitutional rights with respect to the Federal defendants 

for violating the “civil rights laws of the United States, i.e., 42 USC [sic] § 1981 et. seq.” Id. 2. 

He alleges that since 2004, the Federal defendants have acted with callous disregard for plaintiff 

and his property, and have treated him prejudicially because of his juvenile-delinquent past and 

the criminal subject matter of his manuscript. Id. ¶ 71. 

Seeking public recognition of his legal battle, Bond pitched a story about his impending 

petitions in the Supreme Court to a Washington Post reporter, Manuel Roig-Franzia. Id. ¶ 29. 

That Bond felt comfortable to pitch a story to this particular reporter is peculiar, since the same 

journalist had previously written a piece about Bond that he characterized as “unflattering” in 

2001. Id. Nevertheless, Bond fully cooperated with Roig-Franzia regarding the content of the 

upcoming article, agreeing to sit for multiple photographs and interviews. Id. ¶ 39. When the 
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long-awaited article appeared in the Washington Post in 2009, Bond found himself “surprised 

and humiliated” by the piece because Roig-Franzia included numerous subjects that they had 

allegedly agreed would remain off the record. Id. ¶ 52. 

Feeling slighted by the actions of both Roig-Franzia and the Washington Post (for failing 

to supervise its employee), Bond filed suit in this Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief 

for the common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, negligent 

misrepresentation, and for breach of contract. Id. ¶ 96. He also alleges civil rights violations 

under “the D.C. Criminal code 22-3221 [sic] . . . and the Federal civil rights act.” Id. 2. Bond 

states that Roig-Franzia knowingly misled him by making continual false representations to him. 

Id. ¶ 91. Bond also maintains that there are “unknown individuals” at the Post who “are filled 

with ill will, spite and hatred” toward him and who “have taken actual acts to cause [him] harm.” 

Id. ¶ 103. He further alleges that the Post failed to supervise Roig-Franzia and that it failed “to 

right the wrong” it committed by publishing a “defamatory article.” Id. ¶ 102. 

B. Procedural History 

After plaintiff filed his Complaint, both categories of defendants filed motions to dismiss. 

Post Mot. Dismiss, Nov. 24, 2010, ECF No. 10; Federal Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Dec. 30, 2010, 

ECF No. 24. On December 6, 2011, this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, 

granting the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and denying plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike and Motion 

for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Mem. Op. 2, Dec. 6, 2011, ECF No. 46. This 

Court determined that Bond’s Amended Complaint was futile and that it failed to establish either 

subject matter jurisdiction or state a claim upon which relief could be granted with respect to the 

Federal defendants. Id. at 17. With regard to the Post, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s suit on 
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similar grounds.3

 Id. at 25. In response, plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Alter or Amend the 

Court’s Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for Discovery and Motion to 

Expedite with Request for a Hearing. Mot. Alter/Amend1, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. 

Plaintiff offers the following arguments to persuade the Court that reconsideration is 

warranted. First, plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider its final Judgment, pursuant to Rule 

59(e), arguing that “newly discovered evidence” proves the existence of a conspiracy against 

him. Id. at 17. Plaintiff also raises the issue of his photographs for the first time, arguing that the 

Washington Post should cease publishing them. Id. at 30. Although this Court dismissed his 

claim because it was untimely, plaintiff now argues that a District of Columbia law—the 

discovery rule, which is a statutory rule that applies when there is an obscure connection between 

an alleged injury in fact and tortious conduct—should have prevented his claim from being 

dismissed in the first place. Id. at 19. Plaintiff also argues that even if his claim was untimely, 

the Bivens rule—which allows a party to recover against Federal officials in their individual 

capacities—saves his claim because he has now individually named the Federal defendants 

responsible for his woes. Id. at 18. Plaintiff’s final argument in support of reconsideration 

alleges that this Court committed a “clear error” when it dismissed his claim pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6), arguing that instead, it should have evaluated his claim utilizing a Rule 56 Summary 

Judgment standard. Id. at 13. Plaintiff’s second motion requests reconsideration pursuant to 

Rule 60(a); plaintiff alleges that this Court made clerical errors that entitle him to the relief he 

originally requested. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also petitions this Court for Discovery, citing Rules 56 

and 27 for support. Id. at 22. Plaintiff’s final motion consists of a motion to expedite, coupled 

 3

 The Court determined that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the 

plaintiff’s amended complaint was futile. Id. 25. 
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with a request for a hearing. Id. at 33. This Court denies plaintiff’s motions in toto for the 

reasons explained below. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Motion to Alter/Amend a Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e) 

Plaintiff proceeds pro se in this matter. Although the Supreme Court has relaxed certain 

standards and rules when confronted with pro se filings by prisoners in criminal cases, it “ha[s] 

never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to 

excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 

113 (1993); see also Bowie v. Maddox, 677 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281 (D.D.C. 2010). While the 

Court will not excuse a pro se plaintiff’s procedural missteps in a civil case, see Bowie, 677 F. 

Supp. 2d at 281, the Court will construe his filings liberally. See Richardson v. United States, 

193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his claims against the Federal 

defendants pursuant to Rule 59(a)(2).4

 As this rule is inapplicable to the instant motion, the 

Court will instead, look to Rule 59(e) for guidance in evaluating plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration. Rule 59(e) permits a party, within 28 days following entry of a judgment, to file 

a motion to alter or amend that judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Such motions are “disfavored” 

and are reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.” Liberty Prop. Trust v. Republic Props. 

Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 95, 97 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. 

Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)). “Extraordinary circumstance[s]” include (1) an intervening 

change of controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear 

 4

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2) permits a Court, on a motion for a new trial after a nonjury trial, to “open the 

judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 

new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment.” Since the instant case never proceeded to trial, jury or otherwise, 

applying a rule that specifically pertains to actions taken after a nonjury trial is inappropriate. 
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error or prevent manifest injustice. Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057–58 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). Re-litigating arguments or legal theories, that could have been raised earlier, do not 

qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule 59(e). See Taylor v. DOJ, 268 F. Supp. 

2d 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2003). 

Plaintiff has repeatedly modified his pleadings by adding new allegations in response to 

the arguments of the defendants or the Opinion of this Court. Plaintiff offers the following as 

“new evidence,” warranting reconsideration: (1) a 2007 New York Times article (which would 

prove the existence of a conspiracy against him) and (2) the identifying information of individual 

Federal defendants who conspired against him (which would allow him to recover pursuant to 

the Bivens doctrine).5

 Plaintiff now argues that the New York Times article bolsters his case 

because it provides the logical connection between the “cause of his harm” and the Federal 

defendants, which he previously lacked.6 Mot. Alter/Amend 16, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. This 

article, however, is neither “new,” nor was it “previously unavailable” because it has been 

accessible to the public since 2007. See Messina v. Fontana, 439 F. 3d 755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (explaining that Rule 59(e) applies to evidence that “was not previously available,” as 

opposed to newly asserted facts). This Court finds it difficult to believe that plaintiff could not 

proffer this evidence when it was timely—especially since he admitted that he worked with “due 

 5 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 403 U.S. 388 (1971). As this Court has previously 

explained in its Dec. 6, 2011, Memorandum Opinion, to state a cognizable Bivens claim against Federal officials 

acting in their individual capacities, a plaintiff must plead facts that, when accepted as true, show he is entitled to 

relief for a violation of his constitutional rights in which the named defendants were personally involved. See 

Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The complaint must at least allege that the 

defendant Federal official was personally involved in the illegal conduct.”), cf. Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 

253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“In the absence of any allegations specifying the involvement of [individual officerdefendants] in this case, the claims against them are based on nothing more than a theory of respondeat superior, 

which of course cannot be used in a Bivens action.”). 6

 Plaintiff admits that he did not realize the significance of the New York Times article until the summer of 

2010. Id.
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diligence” for years to determine his cause of action. Mot. Alter/Amend 16, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF 

No. 50. 

Similarly, Bond also argues that he has “new evidence” because he has now identified the 

individual Federal defendants who conspired against him. Mem. Op. 15–18, Dec. 6, 2011, ECF 

No. 46. But handing the Court a list of names will not solve plaintiff’s problem: for Bond’s 

motion to succeed, he needed to provide the Court with substantiating evidence that the named 

individuals actually conspired against him. Id. Without this evidence, he cannot persuade a 

Court to reconsider its Judgment. Id. A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue for plaintiff 

to complain about the Court’s ruling if he does not allege previously unavailable evidence or 

where as here, he simply tries to include evidence that this Court has already precluded.7

 See 

Taylor, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 35. 

Rule 59(e) motions are not vehicles that disgruntled plaintiffs may use to litigate novel 

claims or assert innovative legal theories for the first time. See Lurie v. Mid-Atlantic 

Permanente Medical Group, P.C., 787 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff argues two 

novel legal theories in response to the Court’s Opinion: (1) that the Court should force the Post 

to release the rights to his portrait sessions and; (2) that the Discovery Rule rebuts the Court’s 

determination that his claim was untimely. Mot. Alter/Amend 30, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. 

With respect to the Post defendants, Bond alleges that he has new evidence “for the first time in 

detail” regarding a new legal issue—his photographs. Id. A Motion to Alter or Amend is used 

solely to evaluate the Court’s judgment on claims that were before the Court when it passed its 

initial judgment—it is not an avenue for plaintiffs to re-litigate entirely new claims. See 

Messina, 439 F. 3d 755 at 759. That plaintiff has new evidence regarding a novel claim (here, 

 7

 This Court, in its Dec. 6, 2011, Memorandum Opinion, did not allow plaintiff to amend his second 

complaint to include these names. Mem. Op. 22, Dec. 6, 2011 ECF No. 46. 
9

his photographs) is irrelevant to the current motion. Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on the 

discovery rule is misguided.8 Plaintiff’s use of the discovery rule is a ruse simply designed to 

assert a novel legal theory, which he could have articulated prior to this Court’s Opinion. See 

Lurie, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 63. Since Bond failed to do so when appropriate, this Court will not 

entertain his current motion to alter its Judgment. 

Plaintiff essentially argues (without explicitly explaining this in his Motion) that the 

Court committed a clear error under Rule 59(e) when it evaluated his first motion using the Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard. Mot. Alter/Amend 13, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. Plaintiff 

argues that the Court should have used a Rule 56 summary judgment standard, id., basing his 

mistaken belief on a footnote in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion.9 Mem. Op. 2, Dec. 6, 2011, 

ECF No. 46. This Court, however, did not commit a clear error when it evaluated plaintiff’s 

claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Although Courts have not generally defined what constitutes 

“clear error” under Rule 59(e), Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 355 F. Supp. 2d 414, 422 (D.D.C. 

2005), what can be learned from scarce case law on the subject is that clear error should conform 

to a “very exacting standard.” Id. (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 

2000)). District Courts should have “a clear conviction of error” before finding a final judgment 

was predicated on clear error. Id. The Seventh Circuit declared that a final judgment must be 

“dead wrong” to constitute clear error. Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 

866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff argues that the Court “deprived him of his rights” when the Court determined 

that it would only consider the exhibits incorporated into his complaint. Mot. Alter/Amend 14, 

 8

 The District’s discovery rule applies when there is an obscure connection between the fact of injury and 

the alleged tortious conduct. Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472–73 (D.C. 1994). 9

 In relevant part, this footnote explains that “the Court considers only the well-pleaded factual allegations 

set forth in Bond’s amended complaint and the exhibits attached to Bond’s memoranda insofar as they are 

incorporated by reference into the complaint.” Mem. Op. 2, Dec. 6, 2011, ECF No. 46. 
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Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50; Mem. Op. 2, Dec. 6, 2011, ECF No. 46. Plaintiff argues that if his 

claim were evaluated using a summary judgment standard, this Court could consider additional 

evidence that was not incorporated into the complaint. Mot. Alter/Amend 13, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF 

No. 50. But plaintiff’s belief reflects a basic misunderstanding of the law—his claims did not 

fail for lack of factual evidence, rather, the Court assumed that all of his allegations were true. 

See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (explaining that a Court construes the 

allegations and facts in a complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and it must grant the 

plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged when it consider a 

Motion to Dismiss). Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the only remaining issue is one of law, not where as here, the claim is legally 

deficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. If this Court were to evaluate his claim using a summary judgment 

standard, however, it would have to view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, which 

in this case would be the defendants. See. e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). Because plaintiff could not succeed on his motion when the facts were construed in the 

light most favorable to him, he certainly could not succeed if the Court viewed the facts in the 

light most favorable to the defendants. Thus, this Court was not “dead wrong” when it 

determined that plaintiff failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Mem. Op. 2, Dec. 6, 

2011, ECF No. 46; see Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(a) 

 

In his motion, plaintiff argues that Rule 60(a), which permits a party to petition for relief 

from a Judgment or Order on the basis of clerical error, applies to the Court’s Memorandum 

Opinion. The word “clerical,” however, does not imply that Rule 60(a) remedies only 

ministerial errors. Jones & Guerrero Co. v. Sealift Pacific, 650 F.2d, 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1984). 
11

Rule 60(a) also allows correction of clerical mistakes when they are not committed by the Office 

of the Clerk of Court (or by the chambers’ clerical staff), since the purpose of Rule 60(a), is “to 

make an order reflect the actual intentions of the Court, plus necessary implications.” Id. The 

Third Circuit defines a ‘ministerial error’ as encompassing “only errors mechanical in nature, 

apparent on the record and not involving an error of substantive judgment,” or including only 

“mindless and mechanistic mistakes [and] minor shifting of facts.” Pfizer Inc. v. Uprichard, 422 

F.3d 124, 129–130 (3d Cir. 2005). Although the Court has the power to correct such mistakes, a 

party may not use “the power to correct inadvertent ministerial errors . . . as a guise for changing 

previous decisions.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133, 146 (1958). 

Plaintiff argues that the Court must grant him relief pursuant to Rule 60(a) because its 

Memorandum Opinion incorrectly identified the position of one Federal defendant, incorrectly 

stated that plaintiff failed to identify a Federal judge and also described the plaintiff as having a 

“criminal record.” Mot. Alter/Amend 7, 10, 14, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. As an initial matter, 

plaintiff argues that these mistakes are a “clear error” on the part of the Court, warranting 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e). These minor “errors,” however, fail to withstand Rule 59(e) 

scrutiny. Mot. Alter/Amend 32, Jan. 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 

60(a) is misguided. Since making these minute, factual changes will not alter the Opinion of the 

Court, these “errors” cannot be considered a “ministerial error.” See Pfizer, 422 F.3d at 129–

130. Rule 60(a) shall not be used where the plaintiff seeks to change facts in what is nothing 

more than a thinly veiled request for the Court to alter its judgment. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 

358 U.S. at 146. 
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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery 

Although plaintiff has also filed a motion for discovery, citing Rules 56 and 27, 

plaintiff’s reliance on these rules is misguided. Rule 56 applies to motions for summary 

judgment. While the plaintiff has expressed his belief that this Court improperly used the Rule 

12(b)(6) standard when it evaluated his complaint, as explained above, the Court did not commit 

a legal error. Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 27 is misguided. A Rule 27 motion may be 

granted if the Court is “satisfied that perpetuating the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of 

justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(e). A Rule 27 motion, however, “is not a method of discovery to 

determine whether a cause of action exists; and if so, against whom action should be instituted.” 

Petition of Gurnsey, 223 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D.D.C. 1963); see also Biddulph v. United States, 

239 F.R.D. 291, 293 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying a Rule 27 petition where petitioner’s interest is in 

“assessing the viability of various causes of action in advance of filing a complaint.”). While 

Bond properly filed his complaint prior to petitioning for Rule 27, his January 3, 2012, filing 

makes it perfectly clear that he intends to use any potential depositions as an opportunity to 

determine details about his cause of action, which the Court has already dismissed. Indeed, 

plaintiff explains that “it is impossible for plaintiff to plead to the Court exactly what person did 

exactly what to plaintiff” because “[t]he harm caused to plaintiff has been very well hidden from 

plaintiff.” Mot. Alter/Amend 22, Jan 3, 2012, ECF No. 50. Plaintiff failed to state of cause of 

action in his first complaint and he has yet to present a plausible claim to this Court. Just as 

David must ensure that he is prepared for his battle with Goliath, so too must Bond—it is not this 

Court’s responsibility to give him the stones for his sling. Thus, this Court must deny plaintiff’s 

motion for discovery. 
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D. Motion to Expedite with Request for a Hearing

Plaintiff finally requests that this Court both expedite his motion and grant his request for 

a hearing. Both of these motions are moot as this Court is denying plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or 

Amend its Judgment. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court will deny with prejudice plaintiff’s Motion to 

Alter or Amend the Court’s Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, and Motion for 

Discovery. Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite with Request for a Hearing is denied as moot. An 

appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on July 2, 2012.