J-A04021-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MARY JANE DOYLE, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JAMES T. DOYLE, 

 Appellant No. 617 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Decree April 9, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): FD-98-009613-2004 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 26, 2016 

 Mary Jane Doyle (“Wife”) appeals from the Divorce Decree entered on 

April 9, 2015. The issues raised by Wife relate back to the December 30, 

2013 order, which denied her request for declaratory judgment and upheld 

the marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”) entered between James T. 

Doyle (“Husband”) and Wife. We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case were 

summarized by the trial court as follows: 

 The within matter comes before the court on [Wife’s] 

request for declaratory judgment with respect to the validity of 

the Marriage Settlement Agreement (MSA) entered into by the 

[p]arties on June 3, 2009. [Wife] requests declaratory judgment 

that the MSA is void, invalid, and non-binding. A trial on [Wife’s] 

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was held on October 16, 

2013. 

 The [p]arties were married in November[ of] 1981[,] and 

had three children, one of whom is deceased. [Husband] worked 
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as a pharmacist throughout the marriage while [Wife] worked as 

a real estate agent beginning in 1993. Wife filed for divorce on 

four (4) separate occasions, the first filing occurring on August 

21, 1998. However, the complaint was never served on 

Husband as the couple reconciled. Wife filed an Amended 

Complaint in Divorce on August 27, 1999[,] but Wife did not 

pursue this second attempt at divorce as the couple agreed to 

reconcile again. Wife filed a Second Amended Complaint in 

Divorce on September 21, 2006, at which time she was 

represented by Attorney Lisa Petruzzi for a period of 

approximately six (6) weeks. On June 4, 2009, Wife filed her 

last Complaint in Divorce. 

During the pendency of Wife’s representation by Attorney 

Petruzzi, Wife provided a list of marital assets to [A]ttorney 

Petruzzi and, at trial, Wife testified that she was aware of certain 

marital assets which were valued at $360,869.51. Attorney 

Petruzzi, on October 11, 2006, wrote a letter to Husband setting 

forth, in pertinent part, that “[Wife] indicates that the two of you 

have discussed some manner of settling your marital property, 

and I will be preparing a Settlement Agreement along those lines 

and forwarding it to you for your review.” 

The relationship with Attorney Petruzzi ended after

Attorney Petruzzi had forwarded to Husband a copy of the 

Second Amended Complaint in Divorce, an Acceptance of 

Service, and the letter referred to above. The [p]arties 

thereafter met with Attorney Richard Malesky, a business 

acquaintance of Wife, to memorialize a comprehensive 

agreement that they had reached. Wife acknowledged that a 

consensus regarding the division of the marital property had 

been reached with Husband at that time. She also 

acknowledged that she entered into the agreement with 

Husband knowing that she lacked full knowledge of the marital 

estate. She testified that she simply wanted to get out of the 

marriage, and that she knew that she had gotten a raw deal 

although she just did not know how bad it was. 

Wife then sought the services of Attorney Mark Joseph and, 

on April 29, 2009, both she and Husband executed a fee 

agreement with Attorney Joseph with the expectation that he 

would represent both [p]arties in a no-fault divorce. Soon 

thereafter, Wife sent emails to Attorney Joseph outlining the 

terms she would like the MSA to contain. She also gave 

deadlines and set forth clear expectations of how she would like 
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the [p]arties’ accounts to be divided. Furthermore, Wife 

advised in these emails that she was reneging on the deal that 

she and Husband had purportedly previously reached and 

demanded an increase of $15,000.00 with respect to Husband’s 

proposed cash payment to her. Specifically, Wife stated in one 

of her emails the following: 

I am asking for a settlement of $100,000 and that I will 

remove my name from Husband’s TD Ameritrade account

and release myself from all his checking accounts, savings 

accounts, pension account, retirement, IRAs, stocks and 

any other investments. In turn he will release himself 

from my checking account, savings accounts, pension

account, 401(K) account, stocks, SEP and IRAs. At the 

time he gives me a certified check for $100,000 we will 

transfer the title and deed of our current home at 111 

Magnolia Dr., Glenshaw, PA to James T. Doyle and 

remove my name from his Ameritrade account. 

 Finally, at trial, Wife acknowledged that the MSA 

accomplished exactly what she demanded in her emails to 

Attorneys Maleski and Joseph. 

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/30/14, at 1-3. 

 After the hearing on Wife’s complaint for declaratory judgment, the 

court entered an order finding that Husband and Wife’s June 3, 2009 MSA 

was valid, binding, and enforceable against the parties. See Order of Court, 

12/30/13. Wife initially filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 2014, 

followed by a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. However, this Court determined that the subject 

order was not final and appealable and, thus, we quashed the appeal as 

interlocutory. The case was remanded to the trial court. 

On April 9, 2015, the lower court entered a divorce decree, rendering 

the December 30, 2013 order final and appealable. See Sneeringer v. 

Sneeringer, 876 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating “[t]his Court 
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has ... determined that interim matters in divorce actions do not become 

final until a divorce decree is entered”). Wife immediately thereafter 

proceeded with filing notice of the instant appeal. The trial court adopted its 

January 30, 2014 opinion (TCO) as its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Order of 

Court, 4/15/15. 

 Wife now presents the following issues for our review on appeal: 

I. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in 

holding that the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement 

could only be invalidated for lack of full and fair disclosure 

(which by itself has no “reliance” requirement) if Wife 

could prove misrepresentation (as to which reliance is 

required), when as a matter of law, nondisclosure and 

misrepresentation are separate and independent grounds 

for invalidating the [MSA]. 

II. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in 

holding that a waiver of disclosure need not be in writing. 

III. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse 

of discretion in holding that [Wife] waived her right to full 

and fair disclosure. 

Wife’s Brief at 4. 

 To begin, we note our standard of review: 

The determination of marital property rights through prenuptial, 

postnuptial and settlement agreements has long been permitted, 

and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post-nuptial 

agreements are contracts and are governed by contract law. 

Moreover, a court’s order upholding the agreement in divorce 

proceedings is subject to an abuse of discretion or error of law 

standard of review. An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, 

as it requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court 

misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures. 

We will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function. 
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Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Wife asserts that the trial court committed an error of law in holding 

that the MSA could only be invalidated by proving both a lack of full and fair 

disclosure and fraud or misrepresentation. Wife’s Brief at 13. However, 

after careful review, we conclude that the trial court properly applied the 

controlling law. 

We previously reviewed the seminal decision of Simeone v. Simeone, 

581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), regarding the standards for determining the 

validity of marital settlement agreements: 

Under Simeone, we are not permitted to review the 

reasonableness of a marital settlement agreement to determine 

its validity, and the fact that the parties did not have separate 

representation is not relevant. That case abolished prior, 

paternalistic approaches to enforcing such agreements and 

announced, “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, 

spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.” 

[Simeone,] 581 A.2d at 165. 

The Simeone Court reaffirmed the “longstanding principle that a 

full and fair disclosure of the financial positions of the parties is 

required....” Id. [at 165]. 

Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1065. See also Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533 

(Pa. 2003) (reaffirming “the principle in Simeone that full disclosure of the 

parties’ financial resources is a mandatory requirement”). 

Wife asserted in her declaratory judgment action that the MSA is 

invalid due to a lack of full and fair disclosure and as a result of fraud and 

misrepresentation. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, 6/9/10, 
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at 2, ¶¶ 6-7 (unpaginated). However, the MSA contains the following 

disclosure language: “The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that each 

has provided to the other and received from the other a full, fair, and frank 

disclosure of the parties’ and each of the party’s financial condition and 

position.” MSA, 6/3/09, at 5, ¶ 11 (unpaginated). “If an agreement 

provides that full disclosure has been made, a presumption of full disclosure 

arises. If a spouse attempts to rebut this presumption through an assertion 

of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is 

proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1066 

(quoting Simeone, 581 A.2d at 167). 

The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are well settled. 

In order to void a contract due to a fraudulent 

misrepresentation, the party alleging fraud must prove, by clear 

and convincing evidence: (1) a representation; (2) which is 

material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely with 

knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or 

false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; 

(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) 

resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance. All of these 

elements must be present to warrant the extreme sanction of 

voiding the contract. 

Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 570 (Pa. 2002) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 Clearly, there is a presumption of full disclosure in the present case, 

based on the disclosure language expressly stated in the MSA. Because of 

Wife’s attempt to rebut this presumption with an assertion of fraud and 

misrepresentation, the trial court properly applied the aforementioned 
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elements outlined in Porecco, and concluded that there was no fraudulent 

misrepresentation involved in the execution of the MSA. The trial court’s 

conclusion is well-supported by the following: 

The court does not find that Husband made any material 

representation to Wife that Wife relied on when entering into the 

MSA. On the contrary, Wife made numerous representations to 

Attorneys Maleski and Joseph prior to the execution of the MSA 

that show that she essentially initiated and controlled the 

negotiations relative to the division of the marital assets. She 

understood that Husband’s assets had a much greater value 

than hers and acknowledged, when making her settlement 

proposal some three (3) weeks before signing the MSA, in her 

May 5th, 2009 email to attorneys Maleski and Joseph that “what 

she is asking for is far less than what she is entitled to.” 

Furthermore, Wife testified at trial that she was “being more 

than fair with this settlement offer. If you total up Husband’s 

savings against hers, what she is asking for is far less than what 

she is entitled to...” 

TCO at 5-6. 

We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, as its decision to 

validate the MSA is based on facts well supported by the record. Moreover, 

the MSA expressly states that a full and fair disclosure was made and Wife’s 

testimony is indicative that she had knowledge of the value of Husband’s 

assets. “Case law provides that where the circumstances indicate that a 

spouse has knowledge of the general value of the couples’ assets, an 

agreement will be upheld especially where ... the agreement recites that full 

and fair disclosure was made.” Paroly, 876 A.2d at 1067. 

Based on the presumption of a full and fair disclosure in the MSA and 

Wife’s failure to rebut this presumption, we deem Wife’s second and third 
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issues regarding waiver of disclosure to be moot. For the reasons provided 

above, we affirm the court’s order denying Wife’s request for declaratory 

judgment and upholding the MSA dated June 3, 2009. 

 Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/26/2016