MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David M. Payne

Ryan & Payne

Marion, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daytwon Tyrone Black,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

27A04-1411-CR-514

Appeal from the Grant Superior 

Court

The Honorable Warren Haas, 

Judge

Case No. 27D03-1408-CM-118

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Daytwon Tyrone Black appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor theft. 

The dispositive issue presented for our review is whether the State presented 

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sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Finding the evidence sufficient, we 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August of 2014, Jason Lines owned an orange and silver VIP moped, which 

he stored on his front porch on the 2900 block of South Nebraska Street in 

Marion. The moped had duct tape on the seat, a “Village Scooter” sticker on it, 

and a heart drawn with marker by the handle bars. There was a light switch 

under the dash in place of a key ignition, and the moped was equipped with a

hard-shell luggage carrier. Lines went to bed one night at around 11:00 and 

noted that his moped was still parked on his porch. Lines’s neighbor also 

observed the moped on Lines’s porch that night at around midnight. Lines 

awoke at around 7:30 the following morning and discovered that his moped 

had been stolen from his porch. 

[3] At around the same time that morning, Detective Kent Wilson received an 

anonymous tip that Black was in the backyard of his residence working on a 

possibly stolen moped. Detective Wilson sent an officer to investigate. Officer 

Benjamin McKnight arrived at Black’s house and noticed that he was in the 

backyard working on a moped. Officer McKnight informed Black why he was 

there. Black told Officer McKnight that an acquaintance had dropped off the 

moped for him to work on. Officer McKnight observed the moped and noted 

that it was orange and silver with blue painter’s tape going up the side and 

covering the VIP logo. He further observed that a heart had been drawn near 

the handle bars and that the ignition key socket was removed and replaced by a 

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light switch. The seat was missing, but was later found alongside railroad tracks 

directly behind Black’s home. The seat had duct tape on it. Officer McKnight 

ran the VIN number and learned that the moped had not been reported as 

stolen. 

[4] Detective Wilson arrived at Black’s house and met with him and Officer 

McKnight in the backyard. Detective Wilson observed the orange and silver 

moped with parts stripped off of it. He noticed that the ignition was punched 

out and was replaced with a toggle switch, and that the seat and a hard-shell 

luggage carrier had been removed. The “Village Scooter” sticker had been 

removed and was lying on the ground, along with a luggage rack lock. 

Detective Wilson requested that Black go to the police department to be 

interviewed, and Black agreed. The moped was towed and impounded. 

[5] After the moped was towed, Officer McKnight received a tip that a moped had 

been stolen from the 2900 block of South Nebraska Street and that Black had 

been observed pushing a moped down an alley to his house. Officer McKnight

drove to that block to conduct an investigation. Lines approached Officer 

McKnight and reported that his moped had been stolen. Lines described his 

moped as an orange and silver VIP that had a light switch to turn on the 

ignition, duct tape on the seat, and a heart design drawn near the handle bars. 

Officer McKnight notified Detective Wilson of Lines’s report. 

[6] Meanwhile, Black gave a statement to Detective Wilson and claimed that a 

friend named Dustin Gannis had dropped off the moped at his house between 

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7:00 and 8:00 the previous night. Black could not provide any contact 

information for Dustin Gannis other than that he lived on 30th Street. Black 

explained that he did not have Gannis’s phone number because Gannis would 

just stop by if he needed any work done. Approximately fifteen minutes into the 

interview, Detective Wilson was informed that the moped had been confirmed 

stolen. Detective Wilson made efforts to locate Dustin Gannis via social media, 

interdepartment databases, and neighborhood interviews, but had no success

locating him or establishing that he even exists. 

[7] The State charged Black with class A misdemeanor theft. Following a bench 

trial, the court found Black guilty as charged. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] To sustain a conviction for class A misdemeanor theft, the State was required to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Black knowingly or intentionally exerted 

unauthorized control over Lines’s moped, with the intent to deprive Lines of 

any part of its value or use. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2. Black concedes that the State 

proved three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that he, Daytwon Black; 

(2) exerted unauthorized control; (3) over Lines’s moped. The contested issues, 

which Black argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are that 

he acted (1) knowingly or intentionally; and (2) with the intent to deprive Lines 

of any part of the moped’s value or use. 

[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the 

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verdict. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind. 2014). We do not assess 

witness credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. Rather, we consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the verdict and will affirm the conviction unless no 

reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. A conviction may be based solely on circumstantial 

evidence, which “need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence.” Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995).

[10] “A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he 

is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “A 

person engages in conduct intentionally if, when he engages in the conduct, it is 

his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). Intent is ‘“a mental 

function, and without a confession, it must be determined from a consideration 

of the conduct and the natural consequences of the conduct giving rise to the 

charge that the defendant committed theft.”’ Long v. State, 867 N.E.2d 606, 614 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Therefore, “intent may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence,” and it “may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural 

and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.”

Duren v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied (2000).

[11] “While the mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing 

alone does not automatically support a conviction for theft, such possession is 

to be considered along with the other evidence in a case” regarding the 

“circumstances of the possession.” Holloway v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The fact of possession and all the surrounding evidence 

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about the possession must be assessed to determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Both Lines 

and his neighbor confirmed that the moped was parked on Lines’s porch as late 

as 11:00 p.m. to midnight. An anonymous tip revealed that Black was pushing 

the moped down an alley toward his house that night, and he was 

disassembling the moped in his backyard hours later. Black alleged that a man 

named Dustin Gannis brought the moped to his house between 7:00 and 8:00 

that evening, but police, after much effort, were unable to confirm that this man 

even exists. Black had no phone number, address, or any other contact 

information for this man other than that he lived somewhere on 30th Street. It 

was reasonable for the trier of fact to infer from this evidence that Black lied 

when he explained how and when he came into possession of the moped. 

Black’s argument to the contrary is merely an invitation to reweigh evidence 

and judge witness credibility, which we may not do. Thus, the trier of fact could 

reasonably determine from these circumstances that Black knowingly or 

intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Lines’s property. 

[12] The same evidence that proves that Black acted knowingly or intentionally also 

supports the conclusion that he acted with the intent to deprive Lines of the use 

or value of the moped. The evidence would support the conclusion that Black 

took Lines’s moped from Lines’s porch sometime in the middle of the night,

without Lines’s permission, and transported it to his backyard where he began 

disassembling it. Parts were scattered around the yard, and the seat was

discarded along nearby railroad tracks. Breaking down or otherwise altering a 

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vehicle makes it more difficult to trace and identify. Thus, the trier of fact could 

reasonably determine that Black intended to deprive Lines of the use or value of 

his moped. Consequently, we affirm Black’s conviction. 

[13] Affirmed. 

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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