NOTICE
 

The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 

Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 

errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts: 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
 

Fax: (907) 264-0878
 

E-mail: corrections @ akcourts.us
 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ROBERT DEE NICKLIE, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-12179 

Trial Court No. 3AN-13-461 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2563 — August 18, 2017 

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Michael Spaan, Judge. 

Appearances: Jane B. Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. 

Martinez, LLC, and Richard Allen, Public Advocate, 

Anchorage, for the Appellant. Elizabeth T. Burke, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and 

Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg, 

Judges. 

Judge ALLARD. 

A jury found Robert Dee Nicklie guilty of third-degree and fourth-degree 

assault based on evidence that he beat up and strangled his girlfriend. At sentencing, 

both the prosecutor and the defense attorney agreed that the jury’s verdicts on these two 

counts should merge into a single conviction for third-degree assault (the more serious 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

crime). The judge agreed with the parties, and he imposed only one sentence on Nicklie 

— a sentence for third-degree assault. 

However, the judgment form that was prepared following the sentencing 

hearing declares that Nicklie was “convicted” of both counts of assault and that the two 

counts were merged only “for sentencing purposes.” 

On appeal, Nicklie argues that his separate conviction for fourth-degree 

assault must be vacated, and the State concedes that this should occur. 

We conclude that the State’s concession is well-taken.1 As we explained 

in Garhart v. State: 

[W]hen the counts of the defendant’s indictment charge 

separate theories of the same crime, or when the counts of the 

indictment charge separate crimes that will ultimately be 

treated as the “same crime” under the rule announced in 

Whitton v. State, [479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970),] Alaska law 

allows the government to seek a jury verdict on each count. 

The double jeopardy clause comes into operation later, when 

the sentencing court is asked to enter judgement on those 

verdicts. At that time, the court must merge one or more of 

the verdicts so that the defendant receives only the number of 

convictions and sentences allowed by the double jeopardy 

clause.2 

1 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to 

independently assess any concession of error by the State in a criminal case); see also Allain 

v. State, 810 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Alaska App. 1991) (finding State’s concession that merger of 

two counts should result in a single conviction to be well-taken). 

2 Garhart v. State, 147 P.3d 746, 753-54 (Alaska App. 2006) (citing Gilbert v. State, 

598 P.2d 87, 91 (Alaska 1979); Robinson v. State, 487 P.2d 681, 682 (Alaska 1971); 

Atkinson v. State, 869 P.2d 486, 495 (Alaska App. 1994)). 

– 2 – 2563
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thus, Alaska law does not recognize the existence of a merger “for 

sentencing purposes only.” Because of the prohibition against double jeopardy 

announced in Whitton, when a defendant is found guilty of counts that must merge, the 

merger results in a single conviction of record (and thus a single sentence).3 

(This is distinctfromsituationswhereseparateconvictionsarelawful under 

Whitton, but the sentencing judge believes that concurrent sentences will satisfy the 

Chaney sentencing criteria. In those instances, a judge must enter a separate sentence 

for each conviction, but those sentences can be concurrent to the extent permitted by 

AS 12.55.127.) 

We recognize, however, that the current Alaska Court System form for the 

entry of criminal judgments makes it difficult for sentencing judges to issue a judgment 

that complies with Whitton. Instead of beginning with the words “The defendant has 

been found guilty of” various counts of the indictment, the Court System’s judgment 

form begins with the words “The defendant has been convicted of ” the various counts. 

(Emphasis added.) In other words, the form does not distinguish between the jury’s 

guilty verdicts and the ultimate convictions of record that are later entered by the trial 

court based on those verdicts. This becomes a problem for cases where the verdicts are 

subsequently merged under Whitton and multiple guilty verdicts should be entered as a 

single conviction of record. Often, as occurred here, the judge will try to address this 

problem by indicating that the counts have merged but will then erroneously state that 

the counts are merged “for sentencing purposes only,” leaving the convictions of record 

for the merged counts intact. 

See Newsome v. State, 782 P.2d 689, 692 (Alaska App. 1989); see also State v. 

McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 660 n.14 (Alaska App. 1994); Allain, 810 P.2d at 1021. 

– 3 – 2563
 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Because the current form makes it difficult for judges to comply with the 

double jeopardy requirements of Whitton, we encourage the Alaska Court System to 

modify this form. And, until that occurs, we urge sentencing judges not to use this form 

in cases where two or more counts must merge under Whitton. 

Nicklie raises one other contention on appeal. He argues that the trial judge 

committed plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the need for factual 

unanimity. To understand Nicklie’s claim, and our rejection of it, we must supply some 

background on how this case was litigated. 

The State charged Nicklie with second-degree assault and fourth-degree 

assault based on allegations that he strangled and beat up his girlfriend, Bernita Ballot. 

At trial, the State introduced evidence that Nicklie hit Ballot and tore out a chunk of her 

hair. The State also introduced evidence that Nicklie choked Ballot, resulting in bruises 

to Ballot’s neck and petechia behind her eyelids and ears. 

Duringclosingargument,theprosecutor explained that Nickliewascharged 

with second-degree assault based on the strangulation and that Nicklie was charged with 

fourth-degree assault based on the hair-pulling incident. The prosecutor further 

explained that, to find Nicklie guilty of second-degree assault, the jury needed to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Nicklie “intentionally caused physical injury [to Ballot] 

by means of a dangerous instrument” — i.e., using his hands to impede Ballot’s 

breathing and circulation. The prosecutor also explained that this second-degree assault 

charge included the lesser offense of third-degree assault — an offense that would apply 

if the State proved only that Nicklie “recklessly caused physical injury [to Ballot] by 

means of a dangerous instrument” — again, by using his hands to impede Ballot’s 

breathing and circulation. 

– 4 – 2563
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Following deliberations, the jury acquitted Nicklie of second-degree 

assault, but convicted himofthelesser-includedoffenseofthird-degreeassault. The jury 

also convicted Nicklie of fourth-degree assault. 

On appeal, Nicklie argues that his conviction for third-degree assault is 

flawed because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the need for factual unanimity. 

Nicklie contends that some members of the jury may have convicted Nicklie of thirddegree assault based on the strangulation, while other members of the jury may have 

convicted Nicklie of third-degree assault based on the hair-pulling. 

We find no merit to this contention, given that the prosecutor expressly told 

the jury that the strangulation and the hair-pulling were charged in separate counts, and 

also given the fact that the jury was specifically instructed that the phrase “dangerous 

instrument” meant hands or other objects used to impede a person’s breathing. 

Nicklie also argues that a factual unanimity instruction wasneeded because 

Ballot testified that Nicklie applied pressure to “different parts” of her throat. Nicklie 

contends that his conviction for third-degree assault is flawed because some members 

of the jury may have believed that the strangulation occurred when Nicklie placed his 

hands “around” Ballot’s throat, while other jurors may have concluded that the 

strangulation occurred when Nicklie used his hands to apply pressure to the “sides” of 

Ballot’s throat. 

Evenassumingthat this might betrue, thejury’s verdict wouldnevertheless 

be proper. Regardless of the precise details of the strangulation, Nicklie’s strangulation 

of Ballot was a single criminal act for purposes of the requirement of jury unanimity. 

(Conversely, it would have been improper for Nicklie to be convicted of two separate 

acts of strangulation under these facts.4

) 

See S.R.D. v. State, 820 P.2d 1088, 1092-93 (Alaska App. 1991). 

– 5 – 2563
 

4 
 

 

 

 

We therefore find no error in the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte instruct 

the jury that they needed to reach factual unanimity regarding Nicklie’s precise mode of 

strangling Ballot. 

Conclusion 

We REMAND this case for correction of the judgment to clarify that the 

jury verdicts on third-degree assault and fourth-degree assault merged into a single 

conviction for third-degree assault. The judgment of the superior court is otherwise 

AFFIRMED. 

– 6 – 2563