NO. 07-03-0495-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B OCTOBER 7, 2005

______________________________

JERRY JO NES, Appellant
v. THE STA

TE OF TEX

AS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 137 TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2001-401,610; HON. CECIL G. PURYEAR, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Appellant

Jerry Jones was convicted of aggravated robbery by causing bo dilyinjury to a person older

than 65 years of age. He challenges the conviction through one issue. In it, he contends that the trial court erred in overruling hi s objection to purported hearsay uttered at trial. The alleged hearsayconsisted of a police officer reiterating what the victim said the appe llant sa id to her . We overrule the issue an d aff irm the ju dgme nt of the trial court.2

Theda Krause , who was 78 years old at the time of the assault, lived alone and owned a 1977 blue Buick Regal. A man later identified as appellant occasionally asked her if she would sell the vehi cle to hi m a nd if she had any work for him to do. S he always decline d the sol icitatio ns. Eventually, on July 6, 2 002, arou nd 11:00p.m., she heard a s oft knock at the do or. Krause did not open it but instead talked to the person through the door. The person claimed he had car trouble and needed to use the telephone. However, as they talked, the victim eventually recognized the voice as that of the man who had asked about her car and odd jobs, i.e. appellant. She opened the door and allowed appellant to enter her abode and
use the telephone. After doing so and conversing with appellant for a w hile, he demanded money, struck her, tied her up, and stole mone y as well as her vehicle. The incident transpired over about an hour period. Officer David Houser began his investigation of the crime once the polic e were informed of it a day

later. He testified that Krause explained to him that at firstshe had not recognized appellant’s voice but as they conversed through the door, he told her things to help her recog nize him . At that point, appellant lodged a hearsay objection w hich was
o verruled. Houser then testified that the comments appellant uttered in cluded the foll owin g statements: “‘I’ve asked to do yard work for you, I have asked to buy you r car, I’ve asked to do odd jobs for you, I live in the neighborhood, and we’ ve talked on these occasions.’”1 Krause hersel f onl y tes ti fi ed that she rec ognized the m an ’s vo ice a s the m an wh o h ad ask ed he r if she wa s se lling h er v eh icle and if she had any odd jobs . She di d not t esti fy t hat he tol d her t hings t hat j ogged her m em ory a s to w ho h e w as. 3 Ap pe llantargues that Houser’s explanation of what a ppellant supposedly told Krause to induce her to open the door was inad missible hearsay. 1 Further, he claims that identity was the only real issue at trial, and the admission of this evidence a dversely affected his contention that another man who looked much like him may have committed the crime. In response, the State posit s that the ev idence was admissible because the officer simply was explaining how ap pellant became a suspect in the case. Assuming arguendothat the eviden ce was ina dmissibl e, we fin d the dec ision to admitit harmless. This is so for sever al reaso ns. F irst, the evidence of appellant’s guilt
was quite strong. Indeed, the victim identified appellant as her assailant several times and did so both i n and ou t of court. So too had she seen appellant numerous times before the incidentand had the opportunity to watch and interact wi t h him for ab out an hour immediatelybefore and during the assault and robbery. Moreover, a d ifferent witness informed t he jurorsthat appellant had allowed him to use a car akin to the one taken by appellant

during t he robbe ry. And, to the extent that appellant presented evidence that another individual who looked much li ke him had be en in the vi cinity a t the time , we are cited to no evidence suggesting, much less illustrating, that the voice of this other person
so unded like appellant’s. And, this is pi votal since the victim testified that she init iall y identified appellant as the person who en tered her house that night not by looking at

him but by he aring hi s voice.4

Next, though the State alluded to the police man ’s uttera nces in i ts jury arg ument, itdid so obliquely. Yet, it stressed that the victim “recognized his voice,” and that argument was clea rly suppo rted by th e victim’ s own tes timony. Finally, the victim herself testified that she recognized the voice asthat of the person who repeatedlyrequested the opportunity to do odd jobsfor her. This testimony may not be identical to thepurporte d hearsay at issue . N one theless, it had a like effect in that it also tied the voice to the person who previo usly solicited tasks from Krause. In short, an d upon co nsiderin g the ent ire record an d assessi ng itspotentia l impact,
we cannotsay that the admission of the evidenceeffected a substantial right of appellant
or had more than a sligh t, if any, effect up on the ve rdict. See Bagh eri v. Sta te, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (stating that if admission of the evidence is erroneous, it mustbe deemed harmless when after reviewing the entire record, the court is reasonably assured the error did not influence or had a slight af fect upon the jury’ s verdict ). Accordingly, the issue is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Per Curiam
Do not publish.