process rights, the district court reversed Roose's conviction and barred 

retrial by the State. 

The district court has final appellate jurisdiction over a case 

arising in the justice court, see Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6; Waugh v. Casazza, 

85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d 359, 360 (1969); therefore the State cannot 

appeal the district court's order. We elect to exercise our discretion and 

consider the petition. See NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330; Smith v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991) ("[T]he 

issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is purely discretionary with 

this court."). 

First, the State challenges the district court's jurisdiction to 

consider Roose's appeal and asks this court to direct the district court to 

dismiss Roose's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a defendant who 

pleaded nob o contendere may appeal based on a constitutional challenge, 

the State has failed to demonstrate that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Roose's appeal. See NRS 177.015(4) (a defendant 

may appeal a judgment entered pursuant to a nob o contendere plea if "the 

appeal is based upon reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other 

grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings"); Franklin v. State, 

110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (claims appropriate on 

appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea include "a 

challenge to the sentence imposed on constitutional or other grounds," or a 

claim "that there were other conditions that rendered• the proceedings 

unfair"), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 

P.2d 222 (1999). To the extent the State argues that Roose's claim on 

appeal was one of bias and that such a claim had to be raised prior to the 

entry of his plea, "a claim that the [ ] court entertained an actual bias or 

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that there were other conditions that rendered the proceedings unfair" is 

appropriately raised on appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a 

guilty plea. 2 See Franklin, 110 Nev. . at 752, 877 P.2d at 1059. 3 

Second, the State challenges the district court's decision to bar 

retrial of Roose and asks this court to direct the district court to vacate its 

order filed on March 24, 2015. 4The State argues that the district court 

arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its discretion by barring retrial of 

Roose when it concluded that a new trial was not necessary and proper 

pursuant to NRS 177.265 (providing that "Mlle appellate court of 

competent jurisdiction . . . may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment 

appealed form, and may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial"). We 

agree. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) ("It would be a 

high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity 

from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible 

error in the proceedings leading to conviction."); Round Hill Gen. 

Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 

(1981) (mandamus available to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or 

capricious exercise of discretion); see also State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 84, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) ("An 

2"A nob o contendere plea is equivalent to a guilty plea." State v. 

Lewis, 124 Nev. 132, 133 n.1, 178 P.3d 146, 147 n.1 (2008). 

3As we have concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to 

consider Roose's appeal based on a constitutional challenge to the justice 

court's sentencing policy, we do not consider the State's remaining 

arguments regarding the district court's jurisdiction. 

4The State does not contest the district court's determination that 

Roose's constitutional rights were violated. 

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arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion is one founded on prejudice or 

preference rather than on reason, or contrary to the evidence or 

established rules of law." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Therefore, we grant the petition in part. 

For the reasons stated above, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN 

PART AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT 

OF MANDAMUS instructing the district court to strike the portion of its 

March 24, 2015, order that precludes a new trial and to remand the 

matter to the justice court, before a different justice of the peace, to allow 

Roose to withdraw his plea of nob contendere. 

aA_A o J. 

Parraguirre 

J. 

J. 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Mueller Hinds & Associates 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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