alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)



--------------------------------------------------------------------



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Royal Equine Alliance Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Demitro Marianovich, Principle Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2)       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|Registrant               |  | Royal Equine Alliance Corporation                                                                     
|------------------------ |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                         |  |                                                                                                       
|Date:  November 14, 2008 |  | By:  /s/ Demitro Marianovich                                                                          
|                         |  |                                                                                                       
|                         |  | Demitro Marianovich
Chief Executive Officer (Principle Executive Officer, Principle Financial Officer)



16



|
|
Exhibit 31.1

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

I, Chris Xu, Ph.D., certify that:

|   | 1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Cesca Therapeutics Inc.; |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|                    |   |   | Cesca Therapeutics Inc. |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|-------------------------|
|                    |   |   |                    |
|                    |   |   |                    |
| Dated: October 20, 2017 |   | By:/s/ | Chris Xu                |
|                    |   |   | Chief Executive Officer |
<PAGE>




                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Crown Partners,  Inc. on Form 10-KSB for
the period  ended  December 31, 2003 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  each of the  undersigned,  in the
capacities and on the dates indicated  below,  hereby  certifies  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

                                    /s/ John Bonaventura
                                    --------------------
                                    John Bonaventura, Interim President

                                   /s/ Charles Smith
                                   -----------------
                                   Charles Smith, Chief Financial Officer

Dated: May 17, 2004
#### In the Matter of Charnel T., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. Joyce T., Appellant; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

[853 NYS2d 346]

The finding of neglect is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]) showing that respondent inflicted excessive corporal punishment (Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; *Matter of Adonis P,*33 AD3d 405 [2006]). The child’s out-of-court statement that respondent hit him with an extension cord was sufficiently corroborated by the uncontroverted medical evidence of the child’s injuries indicating linear abrasions and welts on his face, forearm, and back *(see Matter of S./C. Children,*256 AD2d 88 [1998]). The denial of respondent’s applications pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028 for return of the child pending completion of neglect proceedings have been rendered moot by Family Court’s subsequent fact-finding determination of neglect *(Matter of Jabarry W.,*24 AD3d 218 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 711 [2006]). We have considered respondent’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Nardelli, Catterson and Moskowitz, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO

MANDATE

THE STATE OF TEXAS

To the 237th District Court of Lubbock County, Greeting:

BEFORE our Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas, on July 13,

2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

In the Matter of the Marriage of

Christina Lynn Fletcher and Robert Hugh Fletcher

Case Number: 07-15-00176-CV Trial Court Number: 2014-510,128

was determined and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated July 13, 2015, it is ordered, adjudged

and decreed that the appeal is abated and the cause is remanded to the 237th District

Court of Lubbock County, Texas for further proceedings in accordance with this Court’s

opinion entered this day.

o O o

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of said Court of

Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Honorable Justices of our said Court, with the seal thereof

annexed, at the City of Amarillo on July 13, 2015.

Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

FILE COPY
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerome Ackerman, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 447]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J., at plea; Bruce Allen, J., at sentence), rendered October 21, 2003, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of six years to life, unanimously affirmed.

The amelioration doctrine does not apply where, as here, a defendant was sentenced before the new law’s effective date *(People v Utsey,*7 NY3d 398 [2006]). Concur—Buckley, EJ., Tom, Saxe, Sullivan and McGuire, JJ.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 19

- 00708

- CR

Imelda BARRERA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 79th Judicial District Court

, Brooks County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18

- 06

- 11255

- CRSI

Honorable Federico Hinojosa , Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 6, 2020

DISMISSED

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal . The motion is signed by both appellant

and her attorney. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.2(a). We, therefore, grant the motion and dismiss this

appeal. See id.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-10449 Conference Calendar

__________________ DAVID R. CALLAWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:95-CV-388-P
- - - - - - - - - - (October 18, 1995) Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * To obtain relief under § 1983 a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a right under the Constitution or laws of the U.S. and that the person depriving him of that right acted under color of state law. Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. , 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 75 (1993). Individuals are acting under color of state law "only when it can be said thatNo. 95-10449 -2- the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc. , 774 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir. 1985). David R. Callaway has alleged no facts to establish that Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. (Racetrac), his former employer, is acting under color of state law. Callaway's assertions that the management falsely accused him of theft and verbally harassed him are private in nature, and the state cannot be considered responsible for this conduct by Racetrac. Therefore, Callaway has failed to state a viable claim for relief. See id
. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Callaway's appeal is DENIED. AFFIRMED.
**IMMUCELL CORPORATION**

**EXHIBIT 32**

**SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Inconnection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ImmuCell Corporation (the “Company”) for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Michael F. Brigham, President, Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe Company. 

/s/ Michael F. Brigham 

Michael F.Brigham 

President, Chief Executive Officer and Treasurer 

March 26, 2009 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to ImmuCell Corporation and willbe retained by ImmuCell Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

FREDDY L. FLONNORY,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§

§ No. 350, 2015

§

§

§ Court Below—Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware,

§ in and for New Castle County

§ Cr. ID No. 9707012190

§

§

Submitted: July 17, 2015

 Decided: July 21, 2015

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.

O R D E R

This 21st day of July 2015, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On July 7, 2015, the Court received the appellant’s notice of 

appeal from a Superior Court order, dated June 4, 2015 and docketed on 

June 5, 2015, denying his third motion for postconviction relief. Under

Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(iii), a timely notice of appeal should have been 

filed on or before July 6, 2015.

(2) The Senior Court Clerk issued a Supreme Court Rule 29(b) 

notice directing the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be 

dismissed as untimely filed. In his response to the notice to show cause, the 
2

appellant contends that he was not aware the appeal deadline was July 4, 

2015 because his postconviction counsel (who was permitted to withdraw in 

the Superior Court proceedings) incorrectly informed him that the appeal 

deadline was July 6, 2015, he could not mail the notice of appeal until he 

received copies from the law library on June 29, 2015, and he only missed 

the appeal deadline his counsel identified by one day due to the Fourth of 

July holiday. 

(3) In Delaware, the thirty day appeal period is a jurisdictional 

requirement.1

 A notice of appeal must be received by the Office of the 

Clerk of this Court within the applicable time period.2

 Delaware has not 

adopted a “prison mailbox rule” that allows tolling of the appeal period for 

prisoners.3

 The appellant’s counsel correctly informed the appellant that the 

appeal deadline was July 6, 2015. Unless the appellant can demonstrate that 

the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to court-related 

personnel, his appeal cannot be considered.4

(4) There is nothing in the record suggesting that the appellant’s 

failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to court personnel. 

Accordingly, this case does not fall within the exception to the general rule 

 1 Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989).

2 Smith v. State, 47 A.3d 481, 483 (Del. 2012).

3 Id. at 486-87; Carr, 554 A.2d at 779-80.

4 Bey v. State, 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979).
3

that mandates the timely filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the Court 

concludes that this appeal must be dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 

29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.

Justice
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 120 (Wednesday, June 24, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 30101]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-14897]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. Customs and Border Protection


Accreditation and Approval of Saybolt LP, as a Commercial Gauger 
and Laboratory

AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 
Security.

ACTION: Notice of accreditation and approval of Saybolt LP, as a 
commercial gauger and laboratory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 
CFR 151.13, Saybolt LP, P.O. Box 7416, Garden City, GA 31408, has been 
approved to gauge and accredited to test petroleum and petroleum 
products, organic chemicals and vegetable oils for customs purposes, in 
accordance with the provisions of 19 CFR 151.12 and 19 CFR 151.13. 
Anyone wishing to employ this entity to conduct laboratory analyses and 
gauger services should request and receive written assurances from the 
entity that it is accredited or approved by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to conduct the specific test or gauger service requested. 
Alternatively, inquires regarding the specific test or gauger service 
this entity is accredited or approved to perform may be directed to the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection by calling (202) 344-1060. The 
inquiry may also be sent to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2e4d4c5e00424f4c465f6e4a465d00494158"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ef8c8d9fc1838e8d879eaf8b879cc1888099">[email protected]</span></a>. Please reference the Web 
site listed below for a complete listing of CBP approved gaugers and 
accredited laboratories.
    http://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/operations_support/labs_scientific_svcs/commercial_gaugers/

DATES: The accreditation and approval of Saybolt LP, as commercial 
gauger and laboratory became effective on March 26, 2009. The next 
triennial inspection date will be scheduled for March 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anthony Malana, Laboratories and 
Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1300 
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Suite 1500N, Washington, DC 20229, 202-344-
1060.

    Dated: June 18, 2009.
Ira S. Reese,
Executive Director, Laboratories and Scientific Services.
[FR Doc. E9-14897 Filed 6-23-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P


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2

GGR Trending

+2% +5% +4% +4%
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1996
<CASH>                                         116,330
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          36,220
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                15,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    337,420
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         588,404
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           576,894
<LOANS>                                      3,096,246
<ALLOWANCE>                                     37,318
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,337,546
<DEPOSITS>                                   3,259,369
<SHORT-TERM>                                   380,484
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             61,391
<LONG-TERM>                                    260,760
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              201
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     375,341
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               4,337,546
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                110,646
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                5,954
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                28,709
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               145,309
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              68,996
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              83,860
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           61,449
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 855
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 47,732
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 29,304
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      18,943
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    18,943
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.53
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.06
<LOANS-NON>                                     11,828
<LOANS-PAST>                                     4,095
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 3,950
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 46,011
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                38,619
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    2,659
<RECOVERIES>                                       358
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               37,318
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            37,318
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
#### THE POLING BROS. NO. 6. Petition of CHESTER A. POLING, Inc.

No. 16381.

District Court, E. D. New York.

May 12, 1942.

Kirlin, Campbell, Hickox, Keating & McGrann, of New York City, for claimants Cities Service Oil Co. and Atlas Assur. Co.

Alexander & Ash, of New York City, for petitioner.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

Damage claimants Cities Service Oil Company and Atlas Assurance Company, except to the interrogatories propounded by the petitioner.

 As Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and Rule 31 of the Admiralty Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723, are identical, they are entitled to the same construction, and a construction of Admiralty Rule 31 giving it less latitude than Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rendered prior to the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be considered as authority. The Christina (The Bern, Christiansen v. Reading Co.), D.C., 35 F.Supp. 522; American S. S. Co. v. Buckeye S. S. Co., D.C., 1 F. R. D. 773; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. The Velox et al., D.C., 35 F.Supp. 929.

Interrogatory No. 1 allowed, except that portion thereof which requires the damage claimant to state “the date and hour thereof”. Exception overruled, except as noted.

Interrogatory No. 2 disallowed as it requires the giving of the name of a witness and evidence. Exception sustained.

Interrogatory No. 3 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 4 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 5 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 6 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 7 allowed. Exception overruled.

*337Interrogatory No. 8 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 9 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatory No. 10 allowed. Exception overruled.

Interrogatories Nos. 11 and 12 are allowed, as it is contended by the petitioner that the cause of the fire is unknown, and if it is known by the damage claimants there is no reason why it should not be stated, and it is in no sense a fishing inquiry, but of course this does not impose any duty on the damage claimant to make any investigation. If the cause of the fire is not known, the damage claimants may so state.

Interrogatory No. 13 allowed, except that portion reading as follows: “and if such agreement was reduced to writing, set forth a copy of the same in answer to this interrogatory appending thereto all subsequent modifications, endorsements, etc.” The information sought is to make clear the status of the claimant, but the production of the document called for should be by motion under Rule 32. Exception overruled, except as noted.

Interrogatory No. 14 allowed, except that portion required, reading as follows: “giving the particulars with respect to the number of employees so engaged, the length of time so engaged and the property and material of the Cities Service Oil Company used by them, in addition to the cost of such use.” The part, so excepted, goes to the question of damages, and is premature. Exception overruled, except as noted.

Settle order on notice.