alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### FORSTNER CHAIN CORPORATION v. GEMEX CO.

No. 566.

District Court, D. New Jersey.

Jan. 22, 1940.

Nathaniel Frucht, of Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.

Blair, Curtis, Dunne & Hayward, by John C. Blair, of New York City, and Bernard M. Shanley, III, of Newark, N. J., for defendant.

FAKE, District Judge.

During the noon recess I went over the brief that has been filed here by the attorney for the plaintiff on this question of a dismissal of the counterclaim, and I incline to the view, for the reasons set forth in that brief, that the counterclaim in this case should be stricken.

It appears that the owner of the patent is not before the Court, and it may well be that under the issues raised in the counterclaim there would be issues which would be beyond the issues that are raised on the action before the Court, which is one instituted by an assignee of a chose in action, for a specific violation of the patent. Moreover, I find upon reading the counterclaim that it contains a clause which leads to the field of unfair competition, and the question of the proper joinder of parties would therefore be involved, and the owner of the patent is an indispensable party to such a counterclaim, in my humble opinion. But the real, prompting basis of my conclusion that the counterclaim should be dismissed is this: The complaint and answer raise all of the issues which should properly come before the Court in this case. Assuming that the counterclaim was filed for the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from withdrawing his cause of action, after answer filed and under Rule 41, Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, the action cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the Court, and I can’t conceive that the Court would permit, in view of what is disclosed by the complaint and the answer, this cause of action to be thus lightly dealt with. The Court undoubtedly would hold it, if the defendant so desired. At least that would be my conclusion; because I have always felt under this Rule that where the defendant had set up a cause of action that he wanted threshed out, whether by way of answer or counterclaim, certainly the plaintiff should not be able to run away and leave the defendant *116in a bad position for having prepared himself to defend here, or for the purpose of getting in some other jurisdiction. There again the Court would frown upon that, in view'of the state of the pleadings in this case.

The motion therefore to dismiss the counterclaim is granted for the reasons set forth in the plaintiff’s memorandum.
<PAGE>


                                                                      Exhibit 21

                                Davox Corporation
                              List of Subsidiaries

Name of Subsidiary                                          Jurisdiction of
                                                            Incorporation
------------------                                          ---------------
Concerto Software (Asia Pacific) Pte. Ltd.                  Singapore
Concerto Software GmbH                                      Germany
Concerto Software (Canada) Inc.                             Nova Scotia
Concerto Software (UK) Limited                              England
Davox Sales Corporation                                     Barbados
Davox Belgium S.P.R.L.                                      Belgium
Davox International Holdings, Inc.                          Massachusetts
Concerto Software Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.                Mexico
Davox Securities Corporation                                Massachusetts
Davox do Brasil Ltda.                                       Sao Paulo
Concerto Software (Australia) Pty Limited                   New South Wales
Davox Corporation Hong Kong Limited                         Hong Kong
Davox (Japan) Corporation (Branch)                          Tokyo
Davox (Japan) Corporation                                   Delaware
Concerto Software BV                                        Amsterdam
Davox India Private Limited                                 New Delhi
CellIt, Inc.                                                Florida
#### Brighton Manuf’g Co. *v.*Reliance Ins. Co.

*(Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois.*

July 25, 1887.)

At Law. Suit to recover on a policy of insurance.

Action by the Brighton Manufacturing Company against the Reliance Insurance Company on a policy of insurance,. ■

*M. W. Russell,*for plaintiff.

*Gary, Cody & Gary*and *Fred’It Oilman,*for defendant.

Blodgett, J.

The facts in this case are the same as in the preceding case; and the defenses set up that the risk was increased with the knowledge of the assured, of which no notice was given to the defendant; that the assured allowed the building to become vacant and unoccupied, without notice Lo¡the *236defendant; and that, being a manufacturing establishment, it ceased to be operated without the consent of the defendant. I have already passed upon these defenses in the preceding case, and therefore the finding will be for the plaintiff.
TDCJ Offender Details Page 1 of2 

Tt;~AS OE.PARTMI;.NT: 017 CRIMlNAJ;. JUSTICE [iii iio[!!II#J,J..t@ 1iJ New Offender Search 

Offender Information Details 

Return to Search list 

SID Number: 

TDCJ Number: 

Name: 

Race: 

Gender: 

DOB: 

Maximum Sentence Date: 

Current Facility: 

Projected Release Date: 

Parole Eligibility Date: 

Offender Visitation Eligible: 

07415408 

01289716 

PELLOAT,JAMES ALLEN 

w 

M 

1947-04-20 

2044-11-07 CUMULATIVE OFFENSES 

TERRELL 

NOT AVAILABLE 

2014-11-07 

YES 

Information provided is updated once daily during weekdays and multiple times per day 

on visitation days. Because this information is subject to change, family members and 

friends are encouraged to call the unit prior to traveling for a visit. 

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULED RELEASE: 

Scheduled Release Date: Offender is not scheduled for release at this time. 

Scheduled Release Type: Will be determined when release date is scheduled. 

Scheduled Release Location: 

Parole Review Information 

Offense History: 

Offense 

Date 

I 

Offense 

I 

Will be determined when release date is scheduled. 

Sentence C t Case Sentence (YYDate oun Y No. MM-DD) 

I I I 

http://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/OffenderSearch/offenderDetail.action?sid=07415408 7116/2015
#### PICKING et al. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. et al.

Civ. No. 1227.

District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 21, 1946.

See also 3 Cir., 152 F.2d 753.

Ida M. Picking, Of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Nauman, Smith & Hurlock, of Harrisburg, Pa., for Pennsylvania R. Co.

J. McD. Sharpe, and Edmund C. Wingerd, both of Chambersburg, Pa., for J. Glenn Benedict,' Watson R. Davison, H. S. Beyers, and Paul H. Winger.

Wm. M. Rutter, Deputy Atty. Gen., and James H. Duff, Atty. Gen., for Arthur H. James, J. L. Pochyba, Samuel D. Mackey, and G. J. Sweeney.

James A. ■ Strite, of Chambersburg, Pa., for Roy G. Kell, J. L. Kell, and Mrs. J. L. Kell.

Edwin D. Strite, of Chambersburg, Pa., for W. R. Kieffer.

Wingerd & Long, of Chambersburg, Pa., for C. B. Rotz.

WATSON, District Judge.

This is a civil action in .trespass, in which it appears that the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, improper venue, and insufficiency of process or service of process. The motion was granted by the District Court. 3 F.R.D. 425. That order vyas appealed from and reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 240. The defendants then filed motions for more definite statement, which the plaintiff claims were in violation of Rule 12(g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; and further, that the defendants failed to make answer within the time allowed, the motion for more definite statement allegedly having been of no effect in tolling the time for reply.

Plaintiff now moves the Court under the authority of Rule 12(g) to enter judgment by default, with damages to be ascertained by a jury, against fourteen defendants in the above entitled case.

Rule 12(g), which plaintiff claims to be controlling since it requires consolidation of motions, reads as follows: “A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other' motions herein provided for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available to him which this *85rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, < except that prior to making any other motions under- this rule he may make a motion in which are joined all the defenses numbered (1) to (5) in subdivision (b) of this rule which he cares to assert.”

Upon an examination of the motions previously filed, it is apparent that -the defenses. were all such as are contained in subsections -(b) (1) to (b) (5) of Rule 12; and it is,, therefore, clear, that the motion of the, defepdanta for a more definite statement was properly made.

The motion: of the plaintiffs for judgment by default against the fourteen defendants is -denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Terry Bligen, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 42]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth L. Sussman, J.), entered on or about May 25, 2005, which adjudicated defendant a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant’s constitutional challenge to the use of the risk assessment instrument is barred by the stipulation of settlement (96 Civ 1657 [DC]) entered into by the parties, including defendant, in *Doe v Pataki*(3 F Supp 2d 456 [SD NY 1998]). This stipulation clearly provides that for each plaintiff whose risk level was to be redetermined pursuant to that decision, the new risk assessment instrument would continue to apply the guidelines established under Correction Law § 168-Z (5).

Were we to conclude that the stipulation does not bar defendant’s constitutional claim, we would reject that claim. The classification procedure satisfies all the requirements of *490due process *(see Mathews v Eldridge,*424 US 319 [1976]). Although defendant offers some scientific criticisms of their predictive value, he has not shown that the factors on which the guidelines are based are unreliable indicators of the risk of reoffense by a sex offender so that their use violates the sex offender’s right to due process *(cf. Kansas v Hendricks,*521 US 346, 360 n 3 [1997]; *Scholl v Martin,*467 US 253, 278 [1984]; *Jones v United States,*463 US 354, 365 n 13 [1983]).

The People established by clear and convincing evidence various risk factors bearing a sufficient total point score to support a level three adjudication. The grand jury minutes constituted “reliable hearsay evidence” (Correction Law § 168-n [3]).

We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining contentions. Concur—Buckley, EJ., Mazzarelli, Marlow, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.
@conference{11201,
  author = {Yuqin Zong and Yoshihiro Ohno},
  title = {NEW PRACTICAL METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF HIGH-POWER LEDS},
  year = {2008},
  number = {CIE x033:2008},
  month = {2008-10-01},
  publisher = {The CIE Expert Symposium 2008 on Advances in Photometry and Colorimetry, Turin, IT},
  language = {en},
}
@misc{1214211,
  author = {Julie Haney},
  title = {IoT Cybersecurity Labels: Lessons Learned When Applying Human-Centered Research to Practice},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-05-23 04:05:00},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936739},
  language = {en},
}
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Fifth Circuit

_____________________________________

No. 97-40251

_____________________________________

JAMES D. ROBBINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

JOHN DALTON, Secretary of the Navy,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-95-CV-635)

______________________________________________________

December 10, 1997

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After reviewing the record in this case, we are satisfied that

the district court committed no legal error and that its judgment

should be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
#### Carlisle SoHo East Trust, Respondent, v Lexington Insurance Company, Appellant.

[852 NYS2d 118]

Clear language in the relevant contract demonstrates the sub-subcontractor’s agreement to be bound by the insurance requirements of the subcontract incorporated by reference *(cf. Bussanich v 310 E. 55th St. Tenants,*282 AD2d 243 [2001]). The incorporated subcontract, which required, inter alia, that plaintiff be named as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s general liability and umbrella policies, expressly stated that all insurance required thereunder was binding on a sub-subcontractor retained by the subcontractor. Moreover, the sub-subcontractor, in agreeing to be bound by the subcontract, made specific revisions to the provisions setting forth the limits of umbrella coverage but made no change to the provision requiring that plaintiff be covered as an additional insured, thereby demonstrating a specific intent to be bound by the latter *(see Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers,*74 NY2d 487, 491-492 [1989]). Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to coverage under the terms of the policy issued by defendant to its named insured, the sub-subcontractor, which states that it includes as an additional insured “any person or entity that is required to be so named in a covered written contract with [the named insured].”

We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Buckley, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ. [See 2007 NY Slip Op 32734(U).]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6534

JAMES EDWARD FLANAGAN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department

of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District

Judge. (3:05-cv-00340-REP)

Submitted: August 31, 2006 Decided: September 6, 2006

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Edward Flanagan, Appellant Pro Se. William W. Muse,

Assistant Attorney General, Richard Carson Vorhis, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

James Edward Flanagan seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court

is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Flanagan has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Vinod Patel, Respondent.

Submitted January 14, 2013;

decided February 7, 2013

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Lynn WL. Fa-hey, Esq., Appellate Advocates, 2 Rector Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10006 assigned as counsel to the respondent on the appeal herein.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-END>                  NOV-30-1999
<CASH>                                  0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   82,091
<PP&E>                              1,284
<DEPRECIATION>                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    171,312
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             766,514
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                   0
<PREFERRED>                           226
<COMMON>                          495,010
<OTHER-SE>                     (1,495,136)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      171,312
<SALES>                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        0
<CGS>                                   0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  476,821
<LOSS-PROVISION>                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 46,345
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (514,564)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (514,564)
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</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1





Certification of Principal
Executive Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Scout Acquisition, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Christopher Kelly, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Christopher KellyChristopher
      Kelly
                    Principal
      Executive Officer
                    May
      17, 2010
@misc{1209991,
  author = {Yooyoung Lee and Peter Fontana},
  title = {Jim, Our Mentor: Inspiring Our Data-driven Sensitivity Analysis for Real-world Problems and Our Lives},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-07-20 19:07:02},
  language = {en},
}
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1100

TIGRESS MCDANIEL, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GREEN DOT CORPORATION; GREEN DOT BANK; FINGERHUT; EXPERIAN DATA CORP.; EXPERIAN SERVICES CORP.; TRANSUNION DATA SOLUTIONS LLC; TRANSUNION LLC; WEBBANK, Defendants - Appellees,

and BLUESTEM SALES, INC.,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:23-cv-00406-D-RN)

Submitted: May 21, 2024 Decided: May 24, 2024

Before WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1100 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 1 of 32 Tigress Sydney Acute McDaniel, Appellant Pro Se. Kristen Peters Watson, BURR & FORMAN, LLP, Birmingham, Alabama; Jonathan Harold Todt, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Caren D. Enloe, SMITH DEBNAM NARRON DRAKE SAINTSING & MYERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Camille R. Nicodemus, QUILLING SELANDER LOWNDS WINSLETT MOSER, Indianapolis, Indiana; Robert Cowan deRosset, IV, Christy Cochran Dunn, YOUNG MOORE & HENDERSON, PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1100 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 2 of 33 PER CURIAM: Tigress McDaniel seeks to appeal the district court’s order (a) denying McDaniel’s motions to amend her pro se complaint; (b) granting the motions to dismiss filed by all but one of the named Defendants and dismissing those claims with prejudice; and (c) directing McDaniel to show cause why the lone remaining Defendant, Bluestem Sales, Inc., should not be dismissed from the action. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). The order that McDaniel seeks to appeal is neither a final order, given that litigation on her remaining claims is ongoing, nor is it an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED USCA4 Appeal: 24-1100 Doc: 29 Filed: 05/24/2024 Pg: 3 of 3
FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 6, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

COMMONWEALTH PROPERTY

ADVOCATES,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 11-4168

v. (D. Utah)

U.S. BANK NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for the

Adjustable Rate Mortgage-Backed

Pass-Through Certificates, Series

2007-2, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,

Defendants - Appellees.

(D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00281-DB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

The issues presented in this appeal have been previously decided. Counsel

were given an opportunity to distinguish our prior cases but Appellant’s counsel

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 
used that opportunity to criticize, rather than distinguish, them. There is nothing

more to say. AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

PER CURIAM

-2-