Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kenneth I. Sondik

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel R. Jones,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A05-1502-CR-83

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior 

Court

The Honorable William J. Hughes, 

Judge

Cause No. 29D03-0810-FB-421

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 2 of 8

Statement of the Case

[1] Daniel R. Jones appeals his sentence following the revocation of his probation. 

He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused 

its discretion when it ordered him to serve all nineteen years of his previously

suspended nineteen-year sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] In September 2008, Jones hit a man and broke his jaw in the course of a

“barroom brawl.” Supp. Tr. at 13. As a result, in 2009, Jones pleaded guilty to 

aggravated battery, a Class B felony. At sentencing, the trial court stated in 

relevant part as follows:

Mr. Jones, your record establishes that you have a history of 

criminal or delinquent behavior. It establishes that you have a 

history of criminal behavior that’s associated with substance 

usage. You have a history of engaging in violent criminal 

behavior towards other people when in substance [sic]. You 

have also a history of smaller property crimes. If I look only at 

your history, I’m going to tell you it speaks louder than the words 

you give me today that it is quite likely, quite probable, quite 

expected that you’ll commit another criminal offense. This 

offense was committed while you were facing major felony 

charges in Superior 1, [which] for some unknown reason took 

four years to get resolved. But you were on bond there when this 

happened. Your history is your history, can’t change it, won’t 

change it, speaks loudly, and indicates that you are a crime 

waiting to happen.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 3 of 8

. . . I’m only looking at your convictions, the ones where you 

either pled guilty or were convicted of, as being a determinant of 

an aggravating factor. But it is an aggravating factor.

* * *

Mr. Jones, I want you to know with your record I could send you 

to prison for 20 years. Nobody would reverse me. Nobody 

would disagree with me. And you’d sit on a dungy [sic] for 20 

years. I want you to understand that. It’s time for you to get a 

clue through here. You pretty much reached the end of your 

rope. You pretty much reached the end of what you can get by 

with, and any slip up at this point in time is going to be painful 

beyond imagination. A 20 year sentence means you’ll next see 

your daughter, you’ll next get to hold her and to talk to her and 

to be a part of her life when she’s in middle school. Understand 

that and change your criminal ways.

* * *

Now, in my estimation this is a case that you should do some 

heavy prison time for. You broke a man’s face. You broke a 

man’s face. You did that, Mr. Jones. And there was no reason 

for you to do that. You weren’t even standing next to the guy. 

You didn’t need to break his face. But if I give you what I think 

is appropriate here and have to make it consecutive to Superior 

Court 1, then I think there’s a high risk that I take maybe the one 

last chance that you say you finally got the message and I turn

you into a hardened criminal, because you’ll come back. You’re 

going to come back. You’re going to be in this community and 

you’re going to continue to wreak havoc. So I’m not going to do 

that today because if I do that today, I don’t have an opportunity 

to back off of it because I only get you once. But I want you to 

understand something, Mr. Jones. I’m going to be giving you a 

very, very, very, very, very long and heavy suspended sentence, 

as long as I can under the terms of this plea. And you have my 

promise that if you lied to me today about changing your life and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 4 of 8

you’re back here, and you will be, I won’t have any problem 

sending you away so that you don’t see your little girl until she’s 

in middle school. . . . So now that I’ve had my say and my little 

tirade and you’ve heard what I’ve had to say, and thank you for 

listening, and so you know where I’m coming from I’ll tell you 

what your sentence is going to be.

So you have 20 years at the Indiana Department of Correction[]. 

I’m suspending all but one year of that. I’m requiring that one 

year be served on work release and I’m requiring that that be 

served consecutive to the Superior Court 1 case. I’m placing you 

on probation for ten years. . . . You have my word as long as I sit on 

this bench, you so much as violate by a whisper one of those rules and it 

puts anybody in this community at risk, you will do 19 years. Don’t 

challenge me. Don’t test me. I’m not threatening you. I’m not trying to 

intimidate you. I am giving you a promise. I won’t forget this sentence. 

I won’t forget that promise. And that’s what’s going to happen.

Id. at 46-53 (emphasis added).

1

[4] During the early morning hours of February 1, 2014, Jones was drinking with 

friends at a bar in Noblesville and became intoxicated. At some point, Jones 

exited the bar and vomited on a sidewalk. A group of men standing nearby saw 

Jones vomiting and started laughing. Jones became angry and, approaching 

one of the men, Michael Withrow, Jones said, “Who’s got the big mouth?” Tr. 

at 22. Jones drew close to Withrow and said, “Was it you, bitch?” Id. 

Withrow pushed Jones to the ground. Then a woman “c[ame] out of nowhere 

 

1

 Jones has not included in his appendix on appeal a presentence investigation report or other document 

showing the details of his criminal history.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 5 of 8

and blast[ed Withrow] right upside the head.” Id. at 23. At some point, Jones 

got up and “came back after [Withrow] throwing punches.” Id. at 47. At some 

point, Withrow was “knocked out cold, unconscious” and appeared to be 

having a seizure. Id. at 11. Jones crouched down over Withrow and said, “Ah, 

did you get knocked out?” Id. at 12. Jones then “proceeded to hit [Withrow] 

with both arms, with winding[-]up[,] closed[-]fist punches to his head.” Id. 

Eventually, police officers arrived and arrested Jones. Withrow was 

hospitalized for his injuries, including brain hemorrhaging. Withrow spent two 

days in the intensive care unit and one or two more days in the hospital before 

being released.

[5] On February 6, 2014, the State filed a notice of probation violation alleging that 

Jones had committed new criminal offenses, namely, battery, as a Class C 

felony, and three counts of battery, as Class A misdemeanors. Following a 

hearing, the trial court found that Jones had violated his probation, and the 

court ordered that Jones serve all nineteen years of his suspended sentence in 

the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to 

serve all nineteen years of his suspended sentence in the Department of 

Correction. Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a 

right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 

188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 6 of 8

may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3.

Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 

proceed. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. If this discretion were not afforded to trial 

courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might 

be less inclined to order probation to future defendants. Id. Accordingly, a trial 

court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the 

abuse of discretion standard. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[7] Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth a trial court’s sentencing options if it 

finds a probation violation and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any 

time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke 

is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one 

(1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[8] Here, Jones does not challenge the finding that he violated his probation. 

Rather, he argues that the sanction imposed was not warranted and should be 

revised. In particular, Jones maintains that the trial court’s “actions [in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 7 of 8

imposing sentence] have a perfunctory feel” in that the court had “promised” to 

impose the nineteen-year sentence if Jones violated his probation and the court 

“offered no explanation as to why no other prison sentence . . . would be 

satisfactory.” Appellant’s Br. at 8 (emphasis original). Jones also contends that 

his sentence is “unjust and unreasonable and constitute[s] an abuse of 

discretion.” Id. at 10.

[9] First, it is well settled that when we review a trial court’s decision to order a 

defendant’s previously suspended sentence to be executed after revoking 

probation, we will not review the propriety of an original sentence. Abernathy v. 

State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). So, to the extent Jones 

contends that the nineteen-year suspended sentence originally imposed was 

unreasonable, that contention must fail.2

[10] Second, the trial court is not obligated to explain its reasons for imposing 

sentence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h). See, e.g., Berry v. State, 

904 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding trial court not required to 

issue detailed sentencing statement when reinstating a portion of an already 

imposed sentence). Again, the trial court has discretion under Indiana Code 

Section 35-38-2-3(h) to impose all of a suspended sentence after probation is 

revoked. Jones does not challenge any part of the trial court’s 2009 sentencing 

statement, including the court’s characterization of Jones’ criminal history or 

 

2

 Likewise, we do not review sentences imposed after the revocation of probation under Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B). See Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind. 2008).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A05-1502-CR-83 | July 14, 2015 Page 8 of 8

the court’s statement that Jones deserved “heavy prison time” for the 2008 

aggravated battery. Supp. Tr. at 49. And Jones’ probation violation was not a 

mere technical violation but a significant violation which resulted in severe 

injuries to his victim. Given Jones’ criminal history and that he, while on 

probation for aggravated battery, punched an unconscious man in the head, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Jones to 

serve all of his nineteen-year suspended sentence in the Department of 

Correction.

[11] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.