United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 4, 2006

Decided May 31, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2188

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IGNACIO PANZO-ACAHUA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-151-C-01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

After a traffic stop revealed that Ignacio Panzo-Acahua was in the United

States without authorization after being removed, he pleaded guilty to that offense. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). His removal had followed a prior Wisconsin conviction for

“third degree sexual assault,” which, the district court held, constituted a conviction

for sexual abuse of a minor. The court therefore concluded that Panzo-Acahua was

subject to the enhanced statutory maximum under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) because

sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony. The court also increased his base

offense level under the sentencing guidelines because sexual abuse of a minor is a

crime of violence. On appeal Panzo-Acahua challenges the court’s conclusion that

he assaulted a minor. But counsel conceded that the victim was a minor, and so we

affirm his sentence.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2188 Page 2

A Wisconsin police officer followed the car Panzo-Acahua was driving after

noticing that it was missing its front license plate. When the car stopped at an

apartment complex, the officer spoke with Panzo-Acahua and his sixteen-year-old

female passenger and determined that Panzo-Acahua, who was twenty-two at the

time, was in the United States illegally. Panzo-Acahua was charged by indictment

with one count of being in the United States without authorization after having

been removed. The indictment included separate sentencing allegations that he

committed the offense after being deported for committing an “aggravated felony”

and a “crime of violence.” 

Panzo-Acahua moved to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop on

the basis that the stop was an unlawful detention. A magistrate judge held a

hearing on the motion, and Panzo-Acahua called as a witness his female passenger,

who described herself as a “friend” of Panzo-Acahua and said she was sixteen in

September 2004 when the stop occurred. On cross-examination, the government

asked her whether she was actually Panzo-Acahua’s girlfriend (she responded no)

and whether she was the same girl he had been convicted of sexually assaulting. 

Panzo-Acahua’s counsel objected, arguing that the requested information was

irrelevant. The girl, whose initials are CML, did not answer the question and was

removed from the courtroom. The government then represented to the court that

the victim of the sexual assault for which Panzo-Acahua had been convicted was the

passenger, who was fifteen at the time of the assault. The court asked defense

counsel whether Panzo-Acahua would stipulate that “she was a victim of a statutory

sexual assault under Wisconsin law, that the victim was Ms. L, that it was

apparently a consensual relationship but nonetheless illegal, that that was the

basis for [Panzo-Acahua] being deported the first time.” The following exchange

ensued:

[COUNSEL]: Almost, Your Honor. I’m just in a poor position

because I don’t know whether it was consensual. I never talked to my

client about this. And to concede that seems to me to help their bias

argument and that—I don’t think that that’s the case under Wisconsin

law, a person her age. I think—well, I’m trying to think when her

birthday was but it’s getting close to 15 years old.

THE COURT: Sixteen-year-olds and younger are deemed

incapable of giving consent.

[COUNSEL]: Right, so the law seems to say this is by definition—

THE COURT: Okay.
No. 05-2188 Page 3

[COUNSEL]: —a coercive relationship.

The parties then stipulated that the prior offense “was not a forcible sexual

assault.” The magistrate judge ultimately recommended denying the motion to

suppress, and the district court adopted the report and recommendation. PanzoAcahua eventually pleaded guilty to the § 1326(a) charge. 

In the presentence report the probation officer characterized Panzo-Acahua’s

prior conviction for third-degree sexual assault, see Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3), as one

for a crime of violence. Consequently, the probation officer concluded that PanzoAcahua was subject to both an increased statutory maximum and an upward

adjustment in his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines. Although the

probation officer did not clarify what “crime of violence” he was referring to, the

parties understood him to mean sexual abuse of a minor. Sexual abuse of a minor

constitutes an aggravated felony, and the statutory maximum for a defendant

removed after committing an aggravated felony is 20 years. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b)(2),

1101(a)(43)(A). The guidelines further provide for a 16-level increase where a

defendant was deported after committing a crime of violence, and sexual abuse of a

minor qualifies as a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) & cmt.

n.1(B)(iii). 

Before sentencing Panzo-Acahua objected to the characterization of his prior

offense as a crime of violence. He focused on the fact that the prior conviction was

not for “statutory rape” and did not involve the use of force. To show that he had

not been convicted of a forcible offense, Panzo-Acahua attached to his written

objection the state-court judgment convicting him of third degree sexual assault in

violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3). That statute provides: “Whoever has sexual

intercourse with a person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class G

felony. Whoever has sexual contact in the manner described in sub. (5)(b)2. with a

person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class G felony.” PanzoAcahua also attached a criminal complaint charging him with violating a different

provision, Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), for allegedly having sexual contact with a victim

under age sixteen. In response the government conceded that Panzo-Acahua had

been convicted of the lesser crime of third degree sexual assault under § 940.225(3),

not the more-serious violation of § 948.02(2) alleged in the information. But the

government argued that the conviction was still the “functional equivalent” of

“statutory rape” and “sexual abuse of a minor”; though conceding that § 948.02(2)

explicitly covers those offenses, the prosecutor asserted that “[b]y pleading guilty,

defendant admitted having sexual intercourse with CML” when “CML was only 15.” 

The government, however, did not produce a plea agreement, a transcript of the

plea colloquy, or any other documentation of Panzo-Acahua’s prior conviction to

back up its representations that the victim was fifteen. The only documentary
No. 05-2188 Page 4

evidence of Panzo-Acahua’s conviction is the judgment he provided, which does not

identify the victim or give the victim’s age.

The sentencing court held that Panzo-Acahua’s conviction for third degree

sexual assault was a conviction for sexual abuse of a minor and adopted the

probation officer’s guidelines calculations. In arriving at that conclusion, the

district court reasoned: “We have a 15-year-old girl who was the subject of a sexual

assault. I don’t see how anything could be clearer than that that is sexual abuse of

a minor.” The court did not identify the evidence it relied upon in finding that the

victim of Panzo-Acahua’s assault was fifteen. After discussing the factors under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Panzo-Acahua to 36 months’ imprisonment. 

Panzo-Acahua first challenges the conclusion that his Wisconsin conviction

for third degree sexual assault constitutes sexual abuse of a minor and is thus a

crime of violence within the meaning of the U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(1)(A)(ii). He argues

that the sentencing court improperly relied on the criminal complaint underlying

the dismissed charge of having sexual contact with a child under sixteen to conclude

that the victim of his third degree sexual assault was a minor. Without looking at

that information in the dismissed complaint, he insists, there was no way for the

court to conclude he assaulted a minor. 

In determining whether a prior conviction was for sexual abuse of a minor,

this court begins by considering only the elements of the statute and the language

of the indictment—the so-called categorical approach. United States v. MartinezCarillo, 250 F.3d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d

934, 941 (7th Cir. 2001)). Here, the Wisconsin statute under which Panzo-Acahua

was convicted makes no distinctions based on age. See Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3); see

also Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that Illinois

solicitation statute reaches conduct aimed at adults as well as minors). And no

indictment or document charging Panzo-Acahua with violating § 940.225(3) that

might include some factual allegations is in the record.

When the statute or charging documents are ambiguous about a defendant’s

prior conviction, courts may take a peek at other information in the record. See

Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d at 1140. That information, though, is limited to a plea

agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, or an admission by the defendant. See

Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257 (2005). Even though Shepard

interprets the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the same approach

governs recidivism adjustments under the sentencing guidelines too. See United

States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Shannon, 110

F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (recognizing that sentencing courts may look

beyond charging documents only if to do so would not require hearing to resolve

contested factual issues). Here the government did not introduce a plea agreement
No. 05-2188 Page 5

or a transcript of any plea colloquy but argues that the sentencing court could rely

on the criminal complaint because, the government says, Panzo-Acahua admitted

the substance of the complaint by introducing it. But Panzo-Acahua submitted the

complaint only to emphasize that his offense of conviction, third degree sexual

assault, is a different crime than the one alleged in the complaint. And his

conviction for a crime that is not only different but lesser than that alleged in the

criminal complaint in no way shows that he admitted the complaint’s version of

facts. See United States v. Hoults, 240 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that

district court erred in determining under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) that defendant had

committed burglary of dwelling where references to dwelling or residential place

were deliberately scratched from the information to which defendant later pleaded);

United States v. Bernal-Aveja, 414 F.3d 625, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with

United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d 1315, 1318-19 (10th Cir. 1997), and United States

v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1995), that where defendant pleads guilty to a

lesser charge than that in indictment, indictment alone is insufficient to prove

defendant was previously convicted of crime of violence). 

Nevertheless, Shepard does not help Panzo-Acahua because at the hearing on

his motion to suppress, he, through his counsel, handed the district court the

evidence necessary to find that his offense of conviction actually involved sexual

abuse of a minor. See United States v. Washington, 417 F.3d 780, 788 (7th Cir.

2005) (holding Shepard of no assistance to defendant where he admitted at

sentencing that he had reviewed and discussed his presentence report with his

attorney and had no objections). Just before stipulating that his prior conviction

involved a non-forcible sexual assault, Panzo-Acahua’s counsel elicited the age of

the passenger, CML, and agreed that she was the victim of the third degree sexual

assault his client pleaded guilty to. Thus, although Panzo-Acahua later objected to

the characterization of the crime as involving a minor, the damage was already

done. See United States v. Alvarez-Martinez, 286 F.3d 470, 475-76 (7th Cir. 2002)

(concluding that defendant’s initial failure to object to facts presented in

presentence report, though he later objected after he failed to appear for sentencing

and was caught, was de facto stipulation to those facts); Gattem, 412 F.3d at 761 n.4

(noting that alien admitted age of prior victim through counsel) . 

Panzo-Acahua’s remaining argument is that the court violated Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by finding that his victim was a minor because

that is a fact beyond the fact of conviction that was used to enhance the statutory

maximum for his offense. His statutory maximum was increased to twenty years

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) because the court adopted the sentencing

recommendation characterizing Panzo-Acahua’s third degree sexual assault as an

aggravated felony, which includes sexual abuse of a minor. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43). But that increase was proper because the analysis above—concluding

that Panzo-Acahua’s third degree sexual assault constituted sexual abuse of a
No. 05-2188 Page 6

minor because he admitted his victim’s age—applies equally here. See MartinezCarillo, 250 F.3d at 1104 (holding that defendant’s prior conviction constituted

“aggravated felony” because age of victim established that he had committed sexual

abuse of a minor). And because the fact of his victim’s age simply establishes his

recidivism under § 1326(b)(2), he was not entitled to have it proven to a jury beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247

(1998) (excluding fact of defendant’s recidivism from range of facts that must be

proven to jury before increasing statutory penalties); United States v. Williams, 410

F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2005) (determining that sentencing courts may make

findings as to fact and nature of prior convictions). 

We therefore AFFIRM Panzo-Acahua’s sentence.