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16-2006, 16-2326 

Celltrace Communications Limited v. Acacia Research Corporation 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary 

order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in 

a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 25th day of April, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

GUIDO CALABRESI, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

CELLTRACE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED, WAYNE 

MICHAELS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 16-2006, 16-2326 

v. 

ACACIA RESEARCH CORPORATION, ACACIA 

RESEARCH GROUP, LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

*

 

FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: REAGAN W. SIMPSON (Collin J. Cox, 

Christian J. Ward, April L. Farris, on the 

brief), Yetter Coleman LLP, Houston, TX. 

 

*

 The Clerk is directed to alter the caption of this case to read as indicated above. 
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FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: MARC J. SCHNEIDER (Travis P. Brennan, 

Justin Klaeb, on the brief), Stradling Yocca 

Carlson & Rauth, P.C., Newport Beach, 

CA. 

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 

York (Alison J. Nathan, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and the cause is REMANDED for the entry of 

an order STAYING the proceedings. 

We expect appeals such as this one to grow increasingly rare and soon become extinct. The 

District Court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissed, rather than stayed, 

the case. On appeal, both parties agree that the District Court erred in dismissing, rather than 

staying, the action. “[W]hen all claims are referred to arbitration and a stay requested,” as happened 

here, “the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (“FAA”), requires a stay of proceedings.” Katz v. 

Cellco P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 596 (2015) (emphasis added). Had the 

District Court entered a stay, moreover, this appeal would not exist. See id. at 346 (“[T]he FAA 

explicitly denies the right to an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that compels 

arbitration or stays proceedings.” (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)–(2)). While we are not thereby deprived 

of jurisdiction over the merits of this appeal, those merits require little discussion. Substantially for 

the reasons given by the District Court in its memorandum decision, we conclude that the parties 

agreed that, prior to litigating in court, they had “to try in good faith to settle [any] dispute” through 

a particular mechanism—“formal arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International 

Chamber of Commerce”—and that this condition has not been met. Thus we need not disturb the 

District Court’s ruling other than to vacate its order of dismissal and remand for entry of a stay. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED 

IN PART, insofar as it dismissed this action, and the cause is REMANDED for the entry of an 

order STAYING the proceedings. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk