alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### ABEL et al. v. LOUGHMAN et al.

No. 8476.

District Court, E. D. New York.

May 12, 1941.

*735Abraham Fishbein, of New York City, for plaintiffs.

Edwin V. Hellawell, of New York City, for defendants.

MOSCOWITZ, District Judge.

This is a motion for an additional allowance of costs to be payable by plaintiffs to cover the expenses incurred by the defendants in the defense of this suit. The request for additional costs is based upon the charge that plaintiffs instituted this litigation in bad faith and have recklessly charged the defendants with fraud and wrongdoing without foundation in fact. Defendants ask the Court to exercise its power as an equity court to grant such additional costs.

The historical power of an equity court to allow additional costs is well recognized. It has only recently been adverted to in Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 61 S.Ct. 485, 85 L.Ed. _, and discussed in Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184, and Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 8 Cir., 28 F.2d 233, reversed on other grounds 281 U.S. 1, 50 S. Ct. 194, 74 L.Ed, 659.

The consolidation of law and equity pursuant to the New Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, being merely procedural, has not affected this inherent power of a court sitting as an equity court. These Rules, therefore, have not affected the power to grant additional costs.

The question of power, however, is apart from that of the practice with reference to the exercise of the court’s discretion in granting such costs. In Gold Dust Corporation v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451, the Circuit Court of Appeals of this Circuit recognized the power of a federal equity court to award additional costs where gross and wilful charges have been made and are unsustained, but it went on to point out that “the allowance of costs has with practical uniformity been restricted to those authorized by the fee bill or by some other statutory provision. The Circuit Court therefore reversed the decree of the District Court, 13 F.Supp. 794, allowing additional costs. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., supra, was distinguished as being a case where a fund had been brought into court.

The court has already decided that there was no foundation for the claim of fraud against the defendants. The plaintiffs’ counsel at the opening of the trial conceded that there was no “moral” fraud but merely “legal” fraud. Evidently, the form of action brought herein was the only one that could determine the character of the issues raised. Defendants have suffered no personal loss. Plaintiffs have lost their case and will be required to pay the statutory costs and should not be further penalized.

Motion denied. Settle order on notice.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 15 (Monday, January 26, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 4441]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-1520]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human 
Development; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development Initial Review Group; Health, Behavior, and Context 
Subcommittee.
    Date: February 23-24, 2009.
    Time: 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Embassy Suites at the Chevy Chase Pavilion, 4300 Military 
Road, NW., Washington, DC 20015.
    Contact Person: Michele C. Hindi-Alexander, PhD, Division of 
Scientific Review, National Institutes of Health, Eunice Kennedy 
Shriver National Institute For Child Health & Development, 6100 
Executive Boulevard, Room 5b01, Bethesda, MD 20812-7510, (301) 435-
8382, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#0f6766616b666e63624f626e66632161666721686079"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="385051565c51595455785559515416565150165f574e">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.864, 
Population Research; 93.865, Research for Mothers and Children; 
93.929, Center for Medical Rehabilitation Research; 93.209, 
Contraception and Infertility Loan Repayment Program, National 
Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: January 15, 2009.
Jennifer Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. E9-1520 Filed 1-23-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-2385

JOHN PAUL TURNER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; AUGUSTA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT; COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA; GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge. (7:08-cv-00594-SGW)

Submitted: January 28, 2009 Decided: February 11, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Paul Turner, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

John Paul Turner appeals the district court’s order

granting his request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissing

this case as patently frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

(2000). We have reviewed the record and find that this appeal

is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for the

reasons stated by the district court. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

HUGH REKEME MURRAY , Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA , Appellee

.

No. 4D 17

- 754

[ May 31, 2018 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Samantha Schosberg Feuer , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2013

- CF

- 006458

- AXXX

- MB

.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assista nt Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

G ERBER , C.J., G ROSS and C ONNER , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

GLENN FORD,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 60 WAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
EXHIBIT 10.7

Southern Graphics Inc.

626 West Main Street, Suite 500

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 637-5443

August 9, 2006

Henry R. Baughman

626 West Main Street

Suite 500

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Dear Mr. Baughman,

Please refer to the Southern Graphics Inc. Stockholders Agreement dated as of December 30, 2006 (the Stockholders Agreement), your Joinder Agreement to the Stockholders Agreement dated
February 1, 2006 (the Joinder Agreement) and the Stock Subscription Agreement dated as of February 2, 2006 between Southern Graphics Inc. and yourself (the Subscription Agreement). Capitalized terms used in this
letter and not otherwise defined in this letter shall have the meaning given to them in the Stockholders Agreement.

This will confirm that, provisions of
the Stockholders Agreement, the Joinder Agreement and the Subscription Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if you retire from active employment with SGS International, Inc. and its subsidiaries after December 30, 2008, any Unvested
Incentive Securities held by you at the time of your retirement will become Vested Incentive Securities effective upon your retirement. All other provisions of the Stockholders Agreement, the Joinder Agreement and the Subscription Agreement remain
in effect in accordance with their terms.

Please acknowledge your agreement with the foregoing by signing below and return a copy of this letter to the
undersigned.



Very truly yours,SOUTHERN GRAPHICS INC.By

/s/ Benjamin F. Harmon, IVBenjamin F. Harmon, IVVice President and Secretary




|                       
|-----------------------
|Agreed to and accepted:
|                       
|/s/ Henry R. Baughman  
|Henry R. Baughman
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KYUNG KI RYU,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-70456

Agency No. A089-587-884

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 9, 2015** 

San Francisco, California

Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Kyung Ki Ryu, a native and citizen of South Korea, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Ryu’s application for adjustment of status and

removal order. We lack jurisdiction and dismiss the petition for review.

FILED

JUL 14 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review questions concerning jurisdiction de novo. Andersen v. United

States, 298 F.3d 804, 807 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). We lack jurisdiction to review a

judgment regarding granting adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, unless the

petition raises constitutional claims. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(D). 

Ryu makes three due process claims: (1) Ryu alleges that the immigration

judge improperly ordered him removed from the courtroom while Ms. Lee

testified; (2) Ryu alleges that the immigration judge exhibited clear bias; and (3)

Ryu alleges that the immigration judge refused to admit relevant documentary

evidence to establish the bona fides of the marriage.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Ryu’s first two due process claims as these

arguments were not raised before the BIA, and thus Ryu failed to exhaust his

available administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Abebe v. Mukasey, 554

F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (only issues raised and argued on appeal

to the BIA are deemed exhausted); Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir.

2004) (requiring exhaustion to preserve issues alleging procedural errors).

Ryu’s third due process claim was properly exhausted, however, the claim is

insufficiently colorable to invoke this court's jurisdiction. Mendez-Castro v.

Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). Even if the immigration judge

2
erroneously excluded the evidence regarding the bona fides of Ryu’s marriage, the

BIA reviewed the issue de novo and affirmed the immigration judge’s conclusion

that Ryu was ineligible for adjustment of status solely as a matter of discretion.

Thus, the BIA rendered harmless any error in the immigration judge’s decision.

See Ghaly v. I.N.S., 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).

PETITION DISMISSED.

3
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00732-CV

Larry Patterson, Appellant

v.

Guaranty Abstract & Title Company of San Angelo, Appellee

FROM THE 340TH DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY

NO. C220088C, THE HONORABLE JAY K. WEATHERBY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice. We grant the 

motion and dismiss this appeal with prejudice. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2).

__________________________________________

Edward Smith, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Smith, and Jones*

Dismissed on Joint Motion

Filed: March 28, 2023

*Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by 

assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 10, 2015

d0603 

# Order

Clerk June 10, 2015

150891

EARL H. ALLARD, JR.,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 150891

COA: 308194

Wayne CC: 10

- 110358

- DM

CHRISTINE A. ALLARD,

Defendant

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 18, 2014

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The par ties shall

include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether MCL 552.23 and MCL 552.401 are

inapplicable where the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement; and (2) whether the

real estate held by the plaintiff’s limited liability companies

, includ ing the marital home

, and any income generated by those properties

, could be treated as marital assets and, if

so, under what conditions.

The Business Law and Family Law Sections of the State Bar of Michigan are

invited to file briefs amicus curiae. O ther persons or groups interested in the

determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to

file briefs amicus curiae.
#### Ralph Massaro et al., Appellants, v Jaina Network Systems, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Submitted June 24, 2013;

decided September 10, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60639 Summary Calendar

JOSE MANUEL CHAVARRIA Petitioner

v. MICHAEL B MUKASEY, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A29 693 130
Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Jose Manuel Chavarria, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has filed a petition for reviewofthe Board ofImmigration Appeals’ (BIA) order denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Chavarria argues that he suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group: family members of military officers in El Salvador. Chavarria contends that the BIA’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D August 20, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-60639

2 This court reviews the order of the BIA and will consider the underlying decision of the IJ only if it had some impac t upon the BIA’s decision. Ontunez-Tursiosv. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1994). Under the substantial evidence standard, this court will affirm the BIA’s decision unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Id. at 8. The record does not compel a conclusion contrary tothe determination that Chavarria was harassed and attacked by former guerillaswhose motivation was extorting money and other support from Chavarria, as opposed to Chavarria’s membership in a particular social group. Furthermore, the BIA’s finding that the Salvadoran government is able and willing to control Chavarria’s attackers is supported by substantial evidence. See Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1992). Chavarria cannot meet the more demanding standard for withholding of removal given that he cannot satisfy the standard for asylum. See Ozdemir, 46 F.3d at 8. The petition for review is DENIED.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 17, 2017

No. 04-17-00686-CV

THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, acting by and through its agent, City Public Service Board 

d/b/a CPS Energy,

Appellants

v.

Frank GOMEZ,

Appellee

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CI10475

Honorable Rosie Alvarado, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

In this accelerated appeal, Appellant’s brief is due to be filed with this court on 

November 22, 2017. Before the brief was due, Appellant filed an unopposed first motion for 

extension of time to file Appellant’s brief until December 20, 2017, for an extension of twentyeight days. 

Appellant’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due on December 20, 2017. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(d). 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of November, 2017.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Lydon, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 590]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Roger S. Hayes, J), rendered February 27, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of six counts of forgery in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 3 to 6 years, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. On six different occasions defendant telephoned a pizzeria and placed food orders for delivery using someone else’s credit card number as payment. On each of these occasions, defendant did not wait for a delivery, but instead went to the pizzeria to pick up his food and signed the credit card receipt with an illegible signature. In one instance, the signature resembled the name “Mike,” which was not the name of either of the two cardholders, who were husband and wife.

We reject defendant’s argument that since only one of the *336cardholders testified, there was insufficient evidence that he lacked permission to use the card. A representative of the issuing company testified that defendant did not have permission from the company to use the card, and one of the two cardholders testified that he did not know defendant and never gave him permission to sign the credit card receipts or to use the card number. In addition, defendant’s unusual and suspicious method of repeatedly buying pizza provided circumstantial evidence that he lacked permission. The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, established that defendant had no permission to use the card *(see People v Borrero,*26 NY2d 430, 435-436 [1970]; *Matter of Kevin B.,*128 AD2d 63, 70 [1987], *affd*71 NY2d 835 [1988]; *People v Shurn,*69 AD2d 64, 67 [1979]), and the other cardholder’s testimony would have been cumulative *(see People v Garcia,*290 AD2d 299 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 730 [2002]).

Defendant did not preserve his argument that because he signed what he now claims to be the “assumed” name “Mike” on one of the credit card receipts, he never misrepresented himself to be either of the actual cardholders and thus could not be convicted of forgery, and we decline to review this claim in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would find that defendant was properly convicted of forgery because his use of a fictitious name was for the purpose of misrepresentation and was “accompanied by a fraudulent design” *(People v Briggins,*50 NY2d 302, 307 [1980]). The evidence supports the inference that by scribbling an illegible signature, defendant was not simply signing an assumed name, but was attempting to create the impression that an actual cardholder had signed the documents *(see People v Pettus,*20 AD3d 369 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 855 [2005]).

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Saxe, J.E, Friedman, Williams, Catterson and Malone, JJ.
@misc{1197536,
  author = {Kenneth S Butcher and Linda D Crown and Elizabeth J Gentry},
  title = {The international system of units (SI) - conversion factors for general use:},
  year = {2006},
  month = {2006-01-01 05:01:00},
  publisher = {, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1038},
  language = {en},
}
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 122 (Friday, June 26, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 30642]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-15221]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-65,922]


Seton Identification Products, Inc., Branford, CT; Notice of 
Termination of Investigation

    Pursuant to Section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, an 
investigation was initiated on May 15, 2009 in response to a petition 
filed on behalf of workers at Seton Identification Products, Inc., 
Branford, Connecticut. The workers are engaged in activities related to 
the production of signs, tags and labels.
    The petitioners have requested that the petition be withdrawn. 
Consequently, the investigation has been terminated.

    Signed in Washington, DC, this 26th day of May 2009.
Richard Church
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-15221 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Adam Bobak, Appellant, and AIG Claims Services, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Submitted November 5, 2012;

decided February 19, 2013

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that the nonfinal order sought to be reviewed on appeal does not necessarily affect the final Appellate Division order, as required by CPLR 5601 (d), and thus cannot provide a constitutional predicate for the appeal. Motion for leave to appeal denied.

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
#### Jane Hauck et al., Appellants, v Lillian Lombardo, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Submitted December 3, 2012;

decided January 15, 2013

*1004Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.