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AppeAjdi.

COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

APRIL 30, 2015

NO. 12-13-00333-CR

WILBERT WALKER,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 349th District Court

ofHouston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 12CR-115)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion ofthis court that there was no error in the

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court

below for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.

Panel consisted ofWorthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
NO. 12-13-00333-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

WILBERT WALKER, § APPEAL FROM THE 349TH

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STA TE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE § HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS

=___ OPINION __^_=

Wilbert Walker appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. He raises

four issues on appeal. We affirm.

Background

A Houston County grand jury returned an indictment against Appellant that alleged he

committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely, cocaine. The indictment

further alleged that Appellant was an habitual offender. Appellant pleaded "not guilty," and a jury

trial was held. The jury found Appellant guilty, found the State's allegations that Appellant was

an habitual offender "true," and assessed punishment at seventy-five years of imprisonment. This

appeal followed.

PotentialJuror Statement

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to quash the jury

panel after a potential juror made a remark relating to his being incarcerated in the past. Because

the juror's remark was made before the entire jury panel, Appellant contends he was denied his

right to an impartial jury.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to quash the venire for an abuse of discretion.

See Mendoza v. State, 552 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). An abuse of discretion

occurs when a trial court's decision is so clearly wrong that it lies outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. See Gonzalez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Among the most precious rights afforded an accused is the right to be tried before an

impartial jury with the presumption of innocence fully intact and free of prejudice. Culverson v.

State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (citations omitted). The presumption of

innocence is a fundamental right, and "its enforcement lies at the foundation ofthe administration

of our criminal law." Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1933, 56 L. Ed. 2d

468 (1978); Exparte Clark, 545 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

The jury selection process is designed to insure that an intelligent, alert, disinterested,

impartial, and truthful jury will perform the duty assigned to it. Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d

361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). An impartial jury is one that does not favor a party or

individual due to the emotions of the human mind, heart, or affections. See Durrough v. State,

562 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

When a potential juror makes a possibly prejudicial statement in front ofthe entire panel,

the appellant must show harm by demonstrating that (1) other members of the panel heard the

remark, (2) potential jurors who heard the remark were influenced to the prejudice of the

appellant, and (3) the juror in question or some other juror who may have had a similar opinion

was forced upon the appellant. See Callins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176, 188 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989); Sledge v. State, No. 12-11-00026-CR, 2012 WL 3104392, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012,

pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Jury Selection

During the beginning ofjury selection, the trial court asked the members ofthe panel who

knew or thought they knew Appellant to identify themselves. After they were identified, the trial

court questioned each potential juror regarding their relationship with Appellant and whether their

relationship would affect his or her ability to be fair. During this phase of questioning, potential

juror number four testified that she remembered Appellant from twenty years ago. When asked

whether she could be fair, she stated, "Well, I really don't know. He was in and out, you know,

locked up and I don't—we were in business and when he wasn't locked up, you know, he traded
with us." The trial court gave no instruction to disregard potential juror number four's statement.

Thereafter, the trial court discussed the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the

defendant's right not to testify.

In its voir dire, the prosecutor discussed mens rea, possession, witness credibility, drug

dealers, drug users, the burden of proof, and factors applicable to determining punishment. The

prosecutor informed the panel that the jurors selected to serve on the jury would determine

Appellant's punishment if he was found guilty. The following discourse then took place:

Prosecutor: What's something you would want to know before you decide how much punishment

he should get?

Potential Juror: I would like to know his criminal history.

Prosecutor: Bingo. Everybody wants to know what their criminal history is.

Ladies and gentlemen, that may or may not be admissible in the guilt/innocence phase.

And why not? Because you don't—you don't want to look at what he's done and say,

"Well, since he's done all that, he probably did this."

Potential Juror: Right.

Prosecutor: The only issue at the guilt/innocence phase is did he do this? Have we proved to you

beyond a reasonable doubt that on December 14, 2011, he was in possession of cocaine?

That is the only issue. Then and only then, ifyou decide he was, you go to his punishment.

And then you get to hear, if there is any—I'm not implying that there is, but then and only

then do you get to hear criminal history....

At no point during the State's voir dire did anyone refer to potential juror number four's comment

about Appellant's being "in and out ofjail," or mention that he had a criminal history.

Defense counsel first discussed the presumption of innocence in his voir dire. He asked

the panel who believed Appellant was innocent when they walked into the courtroom. The record

indicates several potential jurors raised their cards. It is unclear how many potential jurors

answered defense counsel's question affirmatively, but several explained their reasoning upon

further questioning. Defense counsel also discussed mens rea, the Dallas County District

Attorney's Office and the innocence project, the potential jurors' opinions regarding the

imprisonment of innocent persons, the burden of proof, and the credibility of police officer

testimony. At no point during defense counsel's voir dire, did anyone mention Appellant's

criminal history.
Discussion

A statement that makes a jury panel aware of a defendant's prior criminal history is

inherently prejudicial. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (admission

of extraneous offenses prejudices defendant because ofjury's "natural inclination to infer guilt" to

charged offense). But the constitutional right to an impartial jury is not violated by every error.

Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). This is because there is no

presumption that a defendant is denied due process and an impartial jury when a jury panel has

been exposed to his criminal history. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S. Ct.

2031, 2036, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975) (holding that qualified jurors need not be "totally ignorant,"

and that "to hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of

an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's

impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard.") (citations omitted).

Here, the potential juror's statement illustrated that Appellant's criminal history was

remote (her knowledge was based on business dealings from twenty years ago). The record does

not show that the potential jurors who heard that Appellant had been "in and out of jail" were

influenced to Appellant's prejudice. See Callins, 780 S.W.2d at 188. Moreover, the record does

not show that potential juror number four or some other potential juror who may have shared a

similar opinion was forced upon Appellant. See id. To the contrary, the trial court granted all but

one of defense counsel's challenges for cause, and among those granted challenges was potential

juror number four.

Here, potential juror number four's statement did not amount to a structural error, negating

a showing of harm. See Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ("A

structural error affects the framework within which the trial proceeds[.]"). Only a narrow line of

cases have reversed a conviction based on structural error, and we are aware of none that have

reversed due to a potential juror's statement during jury selection. See Johnson v. U.S., 520 U.S.

461, 468-69, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549-50, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997) (listing cases involving

structural error: total deprivation of right to counsel, lack of impartial trial judge, unlawful

exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race, denial ofright to self-representation at trial, right to

public trial, erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction to jury) (citations omitted); Gonzales v. State,

994 S.W.2d 170, 171 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, there must be a showing of harm in
order to determine whether Appellant was deprived of his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.

See Callins, 780 S.W.2d at 188.

Appellant did not show, as required by Callins, that he was harmed by potential juror

number four's statement. See id. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

denying trial counsel's motion to quash the jury panel. See Mendoza, 552 S.W.2d at 447.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's first issue.

Preservation of Error

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting cocaine from

an extraneous offense during the punishment phase of trial. The State contends that the error was

not properly preserved.

Applicable Law

Error preservation is a threshold issue because challenges to the propriety of trial court

rulings must be preserved for appeal. Moore v. State, 371 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012); Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that error

preservation is "systemic requirement"). Failure to present a timely and specific request,

objection, or motion to the trial court for a ruling results in forfeiture of the right to present the

claim on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 341-42 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004). The requirement that complaints be raised in the trial court (1) ensures that the trial

court will have an opportunity to prevent or correct errors, thereby eliminating the need for a

costly and time-consuming appeal and retrial; (2) guarantees that opposing counsel will have a

fair opportunity to respond to complaints; and (3) promotes the orderly and effective presentation

of the case to the trier of fact. Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006); Stinecipher v. State, 438 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, no pet.).

In determining whether an objection is sufficiently clear to provide an opportunity to

correct the purported error, the appellate court should consider the context in which the complaint

was made and the parties' understanding of the complaint at the time. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d

530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Moreover, an issue on appeal must comport with the objection

made at trial, i.e., an objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal

theory on appeal. See Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Rezac v.

State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When an appellant's trial objection does not
comport with his argument on appeal, he has forfeited his right to raise the issue. See Clark, 365

S.W.3d at 339; Goffv. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Discussion

In his brief, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting cocaine from an

extraneous offense during the punishment phase of the trial because the State did not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense. But at trial, defense counsel's objection

to the admission of the cocaine was "I'm going to object to chain of custody and for

authentication."

At the time of defense counsel's objection, testimony regarding Appellant's involvement

in the controlled buy ofthe cocaine had already been presented. At no point did defense counsel

lodge an objection regarding the State's burden of proof as it pertains to the admission of

extraneous offense evidence. It cannot be said that the State or the trial court understood

Appellant's objection was related to the State's burden of proof for extraneous offenses during the

punishment phase oftrial. See Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533.

Appellant's argument on appeal does not comport with his objection at trial. See Clark,

365 S.W.3d at 339. Thus, he has forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal. See Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1; Goff, 931 S.W.2d at 551. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's second issue.

Motion to Suppress

In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress. He argues, "[T]he search that disclosed the cocaine was constitutionallyunreasonable."

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is ordinarily limited to

the record at the time of the suppression hearing. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150-51

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). But when, as here, the suppression issue has been consensually relitigated by the parties during trial, our review may include evidence adduced at trial. Zt/. at 151.

A warrantless search is "per se unreasonable subject only to specifically established and

well-delineated exceptions." See Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

A search conducted with the consent of the suspect is one such exception, as long as it is

voluntary. Id.
Voluntariness is determined by analyzing the totality ofthe circumstances ofthe situation

from the view of an objectively reasonable person, without regard for the subjective thoughts or

intents of either the officer or the citizen. Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012); Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In determining

voluntariness, the ultimate question is whether the person's "will has been overborn and his

capacity for self-determination critically impaired," such that his consent to search must have

been involuntary. Id.

The voluntariness of a person's consent is a question of fact that the state must prove by

clear and convincing evidence. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

A trial court's finding of voluntary consent is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and must be

accepted on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 460.

The Evidence

Officer Alfrado Fajardo testified during the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress and

during trial. His testimony at trial showed that it was after 11:00 p.m. when he conducted a traffic

stop ofAppellant's vehicle because its taillights were not turned on. While Appellant was looking

for his driver's license and insurance, Officer Fajardo asked him where he and his passenger were

going. Appellant "kind of hesitated for a second . . . and then he sa[id], 'We're going to the

bank.'" Officer Fajardo testified that it seemed "odd" that the two men would be going to the

bank so late in the evening. He also explained that the way Appellant answered him made him

question Appellant's truthfulness.

The video from Officer Fajardo's patrol car was played at trial. The video shows that after

receiving the passenger's identification, Officer Fajardo told Appellant that he was going to issue

a warning, and asked Appellant to exit the vehicle to look over some paperwork.1 Once Appellant

was outside the vehicle, Officer Fajardo asked Appellant whether he had anything on him that he

was not supposed to have. Appellant responded, "No," and Officer Fajardo asked, "Nothing

whatsoever?" Appellant responded by mumbling something. At trial, Officer Fajardo testified

that it sounded as if Appellant had stated, "[N]othing but some cigarettes."

The video shows that as Appellant was walking towards the back of his vehicle, Officer

Fajardo asked him, "Do you care if I pat you down real quick?" Appellant responded by stating

1The video also shows that prior to OfficerFajardo's conductingthe traffic stop, the taillights on Appellant's

vehicle were not illuminated.