1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State v. Evan Reece (A-79/80-13) (073284)

Argued April 14, 2015 -- Decided July 20, 2015

SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether the police officers’ entry into defendant’s home without a 

warrant was justified under the emergency-aid doctrine, and whether the requisite elements for obstruction of the 

administration of law under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) were established by the evidence.

The police arrived at defendant’s home to investigate a dropped 9-1-1 call that originated there. In 

response to questions from Sergeant Delagarza, defendant denied making any such call, and insisted that he was 

alone in the home, although Delagarza had observed three vehicles in the driveway. Defendant retrieved and 

displayed his cordless home phone to Delagarza, which did not show any call to 9-1-1 in its memory. Delagarza 

looked into the house through the front door that defendant had left open, and saw nothing unusual or suspicious. 

Nevertheless, Delagarza called for a backup, and with defendant present, confirmed with the police dispatcher that 

the originating number of the call was defendant’s home phone number. During these communications, Delagarza 

noticed a small abrasion on the knuckle of defendant’s hand, which Delagarza stated was similar to the result of 

punching something. Delagarza asked defendant if he was married, and defendant stated that he was, further stating 

that his marital status was none of Delagarza’s business. Delagarza noticed that defendant’s demeanor began to 

change at this point, and he became frustrated with Delagarza’s presence and his questioning. Delagarza asked if he 

could enter the house and look around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza then called for assistance and told 

defendant that he and the other officers needed to check the house. Defendant responded by slamming the door 

closed and attempting to lock it, while the officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that defendant was 

under arrest, and the officers entered defendant’s residence. Defendant attempted to block their entry, and a struggle 

ensued. After being subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault under N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-1(a)(1), one count of resisting arrest under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a), and one count of obstructing the 

administration of law under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). 

Defendant’s trial proceeded in municipal court. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge held that, under the 

emergency-aid doctrine, the officers were entitled to enter defendant’s home without a warrant. Based on this 

finding, the court held that defendant’s attempt to deny them access constituted obstruction. The court also made 

specific credibility findings. Defendant was found guilty of one count of simple assault, resisting arrest, and 

obstruction. Defendant was acquitted of the other count of simple assault. On appeal to the Law Division, 

defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction, and not guilty of simple assault. 

In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed 

the conviction for obstruction, a majority of the panel finding that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply. A 

dissenting member of the panel disagreed with the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction for resisting 

arrest. 

Defendant appealed as of right to this Court under Rule 2:2-1(a) based on the dissent in the Appellate 

Division. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification on the dismissal of the obstruction charge. 217 N.J.

296 (2014).

HELD: The emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s home. Based thereon, 

defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest is affirmed, and defendant’s conviction for obstruction is reinstated. 

1. An appellate court must defer to the factual findings of the trial court, provided they are based on sufficient 

credible evidence in the record. Appellate review of the factual and credibility findings of the municipal court and 
2

the Law Division is therefore exceedingly narrow because such findings are substantially influenced by the 

opportunity to observe witnesses and obtain the feel of a case, which a court reviewing the matter cannot do. 

Similar deference is not required for the court’s legal determinations. (pp. 14-16).

2. As a general rule, police officers must obtain a warrant before searching a person’s property, unless the State 

satisfies its burden of proving that a warrantless search was justified by established and well-delineated exceptions 

to the warrant requirement. Here, the State relied upon the emergency-aid doctrine, as described in State v. Frankel, 

179 N.J. 586, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876 (2004). The emergency-aid exception is derived from the commonsense 

understanding that exigent circumstances may require public safety officials to enter a dwelling without a warrant 

for the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury. In determining whether the emergencyaid doctrine justifies a warrantless search, the court applies the objective reasonableness test. The State must 

therefore satisfy a two-prong test by establishing that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that

an emergency exists, requiring that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or prevent serious 

injury, and there was a reasonable connection between the emergency and the area to be searched. (pp. 16-18). 

3. A dropped 9-1-1 call from a residence has been recognized as creating a presumptive emergency requiring an 

immediate response, although the presumption created is a rebuttable one. Therefore, the emergency-aid exception 

presents a fact-sensitive inquiry in which a court must weigh the competing interests at stake, more particularly, the 

privacy interests of an individual in the home, against the interest in acting promptly to render potentially life-saving 

assistance to a person who may be incapacitated. (p. 19).

4. The facts of this matter provided an objectively reasonable basis for Delagarza to believe that an emergency 

existed requiring immediate assistance, based on the dropped 9-1-1 call and the presumption of an emergency 

thereby created, and his observations that: defendant denied making the call while also claiming that no one else 

was home; there were three cars in the driveway; there was an abrasion on defendant’s hand; and defendant became 

agitated when asked if he was married. As a result, the emergency-aid exception justified the officers’ warrantless 

intrusion into defendant’s home. (pp. 19-22).

5. The offense of obstructing the administration of law under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), in prohibiting conduct that 

prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function, has been construed to 

mean action by a police officer in objective good faith, under color of law, in the execution of his duties. A suspect 

is therefore required to cooperate with the investigating officer even when the legal underpinning of the policecitizen encounter is questionable, because the validity of the underlying police action is inconsequential under the 

statute. When Delagarza announced his intention to enter the house, he was doing so to lawfully perform an official 

function. Because the emergency-aid doctrine applied and justified the warrantless intrusion into defendant’s home, 

defendant’s conduct in hampering their entry into his home constitutes obstruction. Defendant’s conviction for 

obstruction should have been upheld. (pp. 22-24).

6. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3), it is not a defense to a prosecution for resisting arrest that the law enforcement 

officer was acting unlawfully in making the arrest, provided he was acting under color of his official authority and 

that he announces his intention to arrest the defendant prior to defendant’s resistance. Additionally, a defendant 

does not have the right to respond to such conduct by resisting arrest or obstructing the police. In this case, because 

defendant pulled his hands away from the officers after it was announced that he was under arrest and dragged the 

officers to the floor, defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest was properly affirmed. (pp. 24-25).

7. Defendant’s claim of excessive force as a defense to the charges of obstruction and resisting arrest lacks merit.

Defendant’s failure to yield to the officers’ legitimate authority, and the altercation that resulted, allowed the officers 

to use the force that the municipal court and Law Division found necessary to subdue defendant. (pp. 25-26). 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART. 

Defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest is AFFIRMED, and defendant’s conviction for obstruction is

REINSTATED. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZVINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-79/80 September Term 2013

073284

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent 

and Cross-Appellant,

v.

EVAN REECE,

Defendant-Appellant 

and Cross-Respondent.

Argued April 14, 2015 – Decided July 20, 2015

On appeal from and certification to the 

Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Justin T. Loughry argued the cause for 

appellant and cross-respondent (Loughry and 

Lindsay, attorneys).

Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent and 

cross-appellant (John J. Hoffman, Acting 

Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Officers responded to defendant’s home to investigate a 

dropped 9-1-1 call. When the officers announced their intention 

to enter defendant’s home without a warrant, defendant attempted 

to block their entry and a struggle ensued. After being 

subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of 

simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1); one count of resisting 
2

arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); and one count of obstruction, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). 

Following trial, the municipal court judge found defendant

guilty of one count each of simple assault, resisting arrest, 

and obstruction. Defendant appealed de novo to the Superior 

Court, Law Division. The Law Division found defendant guilty of

resisting arrest and obstruction, but not guilty of simple 

assault. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed 

defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed 

defendant’s conviction for obstruction.

In this appeal, we are called upon to resolve two issues:

first, whether the officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s 

home was justified under the emergency-aid doctrine; and

second, whether the elements of obstruction were established by

the evidence presented. We conclude that the emergency-aid 

doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry into 

defendant’s home. Furthermore, because the credibility and

factual findings of the municipal court and Law Division were 

supported by substantial evidence, we affirm defendant’s 

conviction for resisting arrest and reinstate defendant’s 

obstruction conviction.

I.

The State presented the following proofs at trial. At dusk 

on January 7, 2009, Pemberton Police Department Sergeant Peter 
3

Delagarza responded to a dropped 9-1-1 call originating from 

defendant’s home.1 Upon arrival, Delagarza, who was in uniform,

walked around the property and observed three vehicles in the 

driveway. Moments later, Delagarza knocked on the front door. 

Defendant opened the door, and Delagarza asked if defendant made 

a 9-1-1 call. Defendant denied making any such call and, when 

asked, insisted that that he was alone in the home.

In an effort to show that no call had been made, defendant 

asked if he could retrieve his cordless home phone to show 

Delagarza. Delagarza assented, and defendant walked back into 

the residence, leaving the front door ajar. Delagarza peered

into the home through the open door but saw nothing unusual or 

suspicious. Nevertheless, Delagarza radioed for backup. 

When defendant returned with the phone, he displayed the 

phone’s screen to Delagarza and scrolled through the caller 

identification. Finding no 9-1-1 call in the phone’s memory,

defendant handed the phone to Delagarza, who then radioed 

dispatch to confirm that the 9-1-1 call originated from

defendant’s residence. Defendant stood next to Delagarza as the 

dispatcher repeated the originating number of the call, which 

defendant confirmed was his home phone number. 

 

1 A dropped 9-1-1 call is an emergency call received by the 

communication center of a law enforcement agency from an 

identified location where the caller disconnects before 

information can be received.
4

During this exchange, Delagarza noticed that defendant had

a small abrasion on his right hand. At trial, Delagarza 

testified on direct examination that the abrasion was “somewhere 

around the knuckle area of the hand,” and similar to “an 

abrasion that you would receive from punching something.” After 

noticing the abrasion, Delagarza asked defendant whether he was 

married. According to Delagarza, defendant responded, “I don’t 

see what business it is of yours anyway, but I’m married.”

Delagarza testified that after he asked this question

defendant’s demeanor began to change, and “it seemed like he was 

starting to get frustrated with the fact that I was there and 

that I was starting to ask these questions.” 

Delagarza then asked if he could enter the house and look 

around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza called for 

assistance. Officers Hall and Gant, who had responded to 

Delagarza’s call for backup and were seated in marked cars 

parked in front of the house, joined Delagarza at the doorway. 

Delagarza told defendant that he and the officers needed to 

check the house, at which point defendant slammed the door 

closed. While defendant attempted to lock the door, the 

officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that 

defendant was under arrest, and the officers entered defendant’s 

residence. 
5

Delagarza testified that, when he moved to place the 

defendant under arrest, defendant “immediately started to 

physically resist” by pulling his hand away. At this point, 

Officers Hall and Gant also “grabbed” defendant and all four men

“immediately . . . fell to the ground on the floor.” During the 

struggle on the floor, Delagarza was pinned beneath defendant, 

causing Officers Hall and Gant to fear for Delagarza’s safety. 

Hall and Gant each reacted by striking defendant once in the 

face with a closed fist. After securing defendant, Delagarza

and Gant checked the interior of the house and found nothing 

amiss. 

Defendant disputes the State’s factual assertions in four

significant respects. First, he said the officers did not 

announce their intention to arrest him.2 Second, he claims he 

did not resist arrest by pulling his hands away from the 

officers. Rather, after the officers grabbed him he executed a 

“controlled fall” similar to a maneuver learned in parachute 

training3 by simply “let[ting] [his] legs go” because he feared 

“get[ting] hurt otherwise,” and as a result of this controlled 

 

2 The trial transcript reveals that, upon entering the home, Hall 

and Gant heard the announcement that defendant was under arrest. 

Delagarza testified that he made the statement, and Gant 

identified Delagarza as the one who did so. However, Hall could 

not recall which officer made the announcement.

3 Defendant was a Captain in the United States Air Force.
6

fall, he and the three officers tumbled to the floor. Third,

defendant stated that Delagarza mischaracterized the abrasion on 

his hand. Finally, defendant asserted the officers did not 

limit themselves to one blow each, rather they struck defendant 

“in volleys of two to three, probably three to four total 

times.” 

After the incident, defendant was charged with resisting 

arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); obstructing the administration of 

law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a); and simple assault upon Delagarza and 

Hall, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). Trial occurred in Pemberton 

municipal court on four separate dates between June 14, 2010, 

and March 14, 2011.4

At the conclusion of the trial, the municipal court judge 

made specific credibility findings. The judge found defendant 

“less than credible” because the judge “found [defendant] to be 

a bit too glib, to have too many ready explanations for 

obvious[ly] inappropriate behavior.” The judge supported that 

conclusion by noting several instances where defendant’s 

credibility was undermined by attempts to craft an explanation

for his conduct. 

For example, defendant asserted that when the incident 

first began, he questioned whether Delagarza was indeed a police 

 

4 The procedures used by the municipal court are not challenged 

in this appeal. 
7

officer, despite Delagarza’s conspicuous uniform and badge. 

Defendant testified that he suspected Delagarza was not an 

officer because defendant was alone in the home and had not 

placed the 9-1-1 call. However, during direct examination,

defendant suggested that the dropped 9-1-1 call may have 

occurred as the result of a phone malfunction caused by the 

inclement weather. Finally, the judge characterized defendant’s 

purported “controlled fall” as a “convenient explanation.”

The municipal court judge found that defendant further 

undermined his credibility by giving a lengthy and detailed 

explanation of what he was wearing during the incident, and why 

he had chosen to wear each article of clothing. In the judge’s

opinion, this testimony was an attempt to explain away 

inappropriate conduct -- defendant contended that the wool socks 

he was wearing caused him to slide and lose his footing on the 

freshly polished hardwood floors. 

By contrast, while acknowledging minor discrepancies in the 

officers’ testimony, the judge found the officers credible. The

judge reasoned that, although the officers were sequestered 

during trial and were thus incapable of hearing each other’s 

testimony, the officers’ accounts were “very similar.” He

characterized the testimony of Delagarza and Hall as “good, 

open, honest, and credible,” because both officers limited their 

testimony to “that which they had seen and recalled from the 
8

incident.” The judge specifically credited Delagarza’s

explanation that he did not report that Hall and Gant struck

defendant because Delagarza was underneath defendant and did not 

see it happen. The judge also credited Hall’s statement that he

punched defendant once out of concern for Delagarza’s safety, 

and Gant’s testimony that he struck defendant in the face to end 

the encounter quickly after sensing Delagarza was on the floor 

underneath defendant. 

Ultimately, the municipal court made the following 

findings: (1) the officers announced their intention to arrest, 

(2) defendant was aware that the officers were in fact police 

officers, and (3) Officers Hall and Gant each punched the 

defendant once in the face because they perceived a threat to 

Delagarza. The judge then found defendant guilty of simple 

assault upon Officer Hall, resisting arrest, and obstruction, 

but acquitted defendant of simple assault upon Delagarza. 

In finding defendant guilty of resisting arrest, the judge 

stated:

I think it is clear that the testimony 

presented indicated that [defendant] was 

advised that he was under arrest on more than 

one occasion . . . . [I]t is abundantly clear 

to anyone and certainly to [defendant] that if 

you’re being told to stop resisting, that you 

should in fact stop resisting and allow 

yourself to be placed under arrest.
9

The judge also held that the officers were entitled to enter the 

home based upon the emergency-aid doctrine, as described in 

State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, cert. denied., 543 U.S. 876, 125 

S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d 128 (2004). The judge reasoned that,

because the officers “had the right to enter the home,”

defendant’s attempt to deny them entry constituted obstruction 

of justice. 

On de novo review, the Law Division affirmed defendant’s 

convictions for resisting arrest and obstruction. The Law 

Division held that, “upon these facts, [Delagarza] and his 

colleagues were justified in doing what was needed to insure 

that no one in that house was in need of emergent aid. They had 

the duty to enter to confirm or dispel an emergency situation.” 

The Law Division added that defendant’s testimony did not appear

credible.

[I]f [defendant] had “gone limp” or “did 

nothing” as he suggests, the whole matter 

would have been completed within a very short 

period as opposed to a several minute physical 

struggle on the floor with defendant’s face 

being struck and bruised. The testimony of 

the defendant is simply not worthy of belief.

Additionally, the Law Division determined that “defendant, by 

all the circumstances presented to him, knew that Delagarza and 

his officers were police and why they were there at his door.” 

The Appellate Division, in a split decision, affirmed 

defendant’s resisting arrest conviction but reversed defendant’s 
10

conviction for obstruction. Judge Alvarez, writing for the 

majority, found that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply 

because Delagarza “simply lacked sufficient information from 

which to conclude someone in the home was at risk of immediate 

danger.” Judge Alvarez explained 

[i]n the absence of facts triggering the 

emergency aid doctrine, which would make 

police entry lawful, defendant’s refusal to 

allow Delagarza to enter his home was not an 

act of obstructing. He was entitled to refuse 

to cooperate. We do not suggest, however, 

that Delagarza’s concern was unwarranted, only 

that the circumstances did not justify a 

forced entry. If the entry was unlawful, 

defendant’s conduct in refusing to admit the 

officers is not an act of “obstructing.”

Regarding the resisting arrest conviction, the majority, quoting 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a), held that because the arrest was made under 

“color of . . . official authority” and was announced, defendant 

was not entitled to resist arrest, even if the arrest was 

unjustified.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Waugh concluded that,

“although the police officers had lawful reason to enter 

[defendant]’s residence without a warrant or consent, 

[defendant]’s refusal of their request that he consent to a 

warrantless search was not a violation of [the obstruction 

statute].” 

Judge Fisher, dissenting in part, disagreed with the 

majority’s affirmance of defendant’s conviction for resisting 
11

arrest. In Judge Fisher’s view, his colleagues’ conclusion 

“oversimplifie[d] the troubling issues raised by th[e] case, 

namely, the clear disregard of defendant’s Fourth Amendment 

rights.” The dissent added that “[i]t is the fact that this 

event occurred in the home and not elsewhere that prompts my 

dissent,” asserting that defendant was not guilty of resisting 

arrest because the unlawful intrusion into defendant’s home and 

the officers’ use of excessive force permitted defendant to 

protect himself. 

The dissent disagreed with the Law Division’s factual 

findings, asserting that those findings should have been 

rejected because the Law Division failed to consider the 

discrepancy between Delagarza’s testimony that he saw an

abrasion on defendant’s knuckle and the photographs admitted 

into evidence which showed an abrasion at the base of his thumb. 

The dissent also rejected the factual findings of the municipal 

court and the Law Division because they did not consider that

Delagarza’s police report made no mention of the other officers 

striking defendant in the face. Thus, the dissent posited, the 

Law Division’s findings were “so plainly unwarranted that the 

interests of justice demand intervention and correction.” 

Defendant appealed his conviction as of right. R. 2:2-

1(a). Subsequently, this Court granted the State’s petition for 
12

certification regarding the dismissal of the obstruction charge. 

State v. Reece, 217 N.J. 296 (2014).

II.

Defendant argues that, to obtain a conviction for resisting

arrest, the State must show that the arresting officers

announced their intention to arrest prior to any resistance, the 

officers were acting under color of their authority, and the

“police [did] not use unlawful force in effecting the unlawful 

arrest.” N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a); State 

v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 157-58 (1970). Defendant contends

that the officers failed to announce their intentions to arrest 

prior to defendant’s resistance and used excessive force in 

restraining him. Thus, defendant argues, the majority erred in

affirming his resisting arrest conviction.

Defendant maintains that, in this case, the police used 

unlawful force by “physically set[ting] upon [defendant] with 

overpowering force when he never so much as attempted a punch, 

kick or push.” Defendant argues that the Appellate Division

majority, when considering the resisting-arrest charge, ignored

the officers’ unlawful force. Defendant also maintains that, 

given the reversal of his obstruction conviction, the Appellate 

Division impliedly concluded that “the police entered forcibly 

and illegally, without any justification,” and the officers’ 

“very presence inside the house and the measures by which they 
13

accomplished that presence were unlawful and constituted in and 

of themselves unlawful force.” 

Defendant emphasizes that, contrary to State v. Williams, 

192 N.J. 1 (2007), and State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, cert. 

denied, 549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d 563 (2006),

both of which dealt with police-citizen encounters on the 

street, the police in this case unconstitutionally invaded his

home. He urges this Court to consider the resisting arrest 

charge “in the context of this sacrosanct constitutional right 

of privacy and security and right to be left alone in the home, 

free of official intrusion.”

Defendant asserts that the majority failed to reverse the 

resisting arrest conviction based on plainly unwarranted, 

unsupported factual findings and credibility determinations. 

Specifically, defendant maintains as follows: Delagarza’s 

testimony that he saw an abrasion on defendant’s knuckle was 

“conclusively refuted” by photographs; Delagarza lacked candor 

because his report made no mention that defendant was punched in 

the face; and Hall testified he did not hear Delagarza say 

defendant was under arrest, which supports defendant’s claim 

that the officers did not announce defendant was under arrest. 

Finally, defendant asserts that “[t]he record does not permit a 

rational conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for 

‘resistance’ to an unlawful arrest.”
14

The State argues that the officers’ entry into the home was 

justified by the emergency-aid doctrine because a dropped 9-1-1 

call had been made from defendant’s residence, defendant denied 

making the 9-1-1 call but claimed no one else was home,

Delagarza observed a fresh abrasion on defendant’s hand, and

defendant became suspiciously defensive and hostile when asked 

if he was married. The State asserts that the facts here are 

“materially indistinguishable” from Frankel, and therefore the 

result should be the same. Additionally, the State argues that,

under Crawley, regardless of the constitutionality of the 

officers’ decision to enter defendant’s residence under the 

emergency-aid doctrine, defendant “still had no right to 

physically resist their efforts to enter the house, and when he 

did so, he was guilty of obstruction.” 

III.

We begin our review with the well-settled proposition that 

appellate courts should give deference to the factual findings 

of the trial court. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 

(1999). Those findings must be upheld, provided they “‘could 

reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence 

present in the record.’” Id. at 471 (quoting State v. Johnson, 

42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Deference is warranted because the 

“‘findings of the trial judge . . . are substantially influenced 

by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 
15

“feel” of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.’” 

Ibid. (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161).

In Locurto, the defendant appealed a municipal court 

conviction to the Law Division. Id. at 467. As with the 

instant case, the Law Division’s factual findings in Locurto

were predicated upon the credibility findings of the municipal 

court, and we noted that

the rule of deference is more compelling where

. . . two lower courts have entered concurrent 

judgments on purely factual issues. Under the 

two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily 

should not undertake to alter concurrent 

findings of facts and credibility 

determinations made by two lower courts absent 

a very obvious and exceptional showing of 

error.

[Id. at 474.]

Therefore, appellate review of the factual and credibility 

findings of the municipal court and the Law Division “is 

exceedingly narrow.” Id. at 470. 

However, to the extent the Law Division or municipal court 

makes a legal determination, that determination is reviewed de 

novo. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011) (stating 

“appellate review of legal determinations is plenary”). Thus, 

we must defer to the factual findings of the municipal court and 

the Law Division so long as they are supported by sufficient 
16

credible evidence, but we review the legal conclusion that the 

emergency-aid doctrine applies here de novo. 

IV.

A.

With those standards in mind, we must first consider

whether warrantless entry of defendant’s home was justified by 

the emergency-aid doctrine. 

Article I, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution assures 

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 

except upon probable cause . . . .” Thus, as a general matter, 

“police officers must obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial 

officer before searching a person’s property.” State v. Deluca, 

168 N.J. 626, 631 (2001). 

In recognition of our strong policy against warrantless 

searches and seizures, the burden falls upon the State to prove 

a warrantless search was justified by one of the “‘specifically 

established and well-delineated exceptions’” to the warrant 

requirement. Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598 (quoting Mincey v. 

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L. Ed. 290, 

298-99 (1978)). Therefore, police officers are entitled to 

conduct a warrantless search when the search is supported by “a 
17

known exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Eckel, 

185 N.J. 523, 539 (2006). 

The exception to the warrant requirement at issue here is 

the emergency aid doctrine, an exception “derived from the 

commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may require 

public safety officials, such as the police, firefighters, or 

paramedics, to enter a dwelling without a warrant for the 

purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious 

injury.” Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598. Under those 

circumstances, our constitution does not “demand that public 

safety officials stand by in the face of an imminent danger and 

delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious 

time is expended obtaining a warrant.” Id. at 599.

In determining whether the emergency-aid doctrine justifies 

a warrantless search, we follow federal jurisprudence and apply 

“the objective reasonableness test.” Kevin G. Byrnes, Current 

N.J. Arrest, Search & Seizure, § 11:2, at 226 (2014-15). In 

Frankel, supra, we adopted a “three-prong test to determine 

whether a warrantless search by a public safety official is 

justified.” 179 N.J. at 600. Under Frankel,

the public safety officer must have an 

objectively reasonable basis to believe that 

an emergency requires that he provide 

immediate assistance to protect or preserve 

life, or prevent serious injury; his primary 

motivation for entry into the home must be to 

render assistance, not to find and seize 
18

evidence; and there must be a reasonable nexus 

between the emergency and the area or places 

to be searched.

[Ibid.]

 

In State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012), we revisited 

the test articulated in Frankel and concluded that the 

subjective motivations of a public safety official were “no 

longer consonant with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 

131-32. Consequently, Edmonds framed a two-part test to be 

applied in determining whether the emergency-aid doctrine 

justifies a warrantless search:

1) the officer had ‘an objectively reasonable 

basis to believe that an emergency requires 

that he provide immediate assistance to 

protect or preserve life, or to prevent 

serious injury’ and

2) there was a ‘reasonable nexus between the 

emergency and the area or places to be 

searched.’

[Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 

600.]

In this case, the nexus between the perceived emergency and the 

scope of the officers’ search is not challenged. Therefore, the 

issue here concerns only the first prong of the analysis. 

In Frankel, supra, we explained that the first prong asks 

“whether [the officer] was ‘able to point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant[s]’ his entry into 
19

defendant’s home under the emergency aid doctrine.” 179 N.J. at 

610 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 

1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)). Applying that principle, 

we held that a dropped 9-1-1 call from a residence creates “a 

presumptive emergency, requiring an immediate response,” because

such a call suggests “a person whose life is endangered but [is] 

unable to speak” made the call. Id. at 604. 

However, the presumption that an emergency exists when

there is a dropped 9-1-1 call “may be dispelled by any number of 

simple explanations given by the homeowner to the responding 

officer.” Ibid. For instance, a parent “may explain that her 

child, who appears at the door with her, impishly dialed the 

number”; or “[a] resident, who otherwise raises no suspicions, 

may state that he intended to call 4-1-1 but pushed the wrong 

digit.” Id. at 604-05. Courts applying this presumptive 

emergency “must weigh the competing values at stake, the privacy 

interests of the home versus the interest in acting promptly to 

render potentially life-saving assistance to a person who may be 

incapacitated.” Id. at 605. This is a fact-sensitive inquiry. 

Id. at 606. 

The facts in Frankel inform our inquiry here. In Frankel,

a police officer responded to a dropped 9-1-1 call originating 

from the home of the defendant. Id. at 593. The officer 

knocked on the front door, and the defendant answered, but the 
20

officer could not see into the home because his view was 

obscured by a white sheet hanging behind the front door. Ibid. 

The defendant denied placing a 9-1-1 call and claimed that he 

was alone in the home. Id. at 593-94. The officer, noting the 

defendant’s increasing nervousness, began to fear for his safety 

and asked the defendant to come out from behind the sheet. Id.

at 594. Once the defendant complied, the officer frisked him

for weapons. Ibid. The officer then asked for permission to 

enter the home. Ibid. However, because the officer did not 

have a warrant, the defendant refused entry. Ibid. The officer 

then called for backup. Ibid. 

The officer and the defendant continued their conversation

on the porch. Ibid. The officer confirmed with the police 

dispatcher that the 9-1-1 call originated from the defendant’s

phone, and a follow-up call to that number elicited a busy 

signal. Id. at 594-95. While the defendant retrieved his 

cordless phone, the officer entered the foyer with the 

defendant’s consent and noticed a lawn chair propped against a 

sliding glass door which he believed may have been intended to 

impede entry. Id. at 594-95. When backup arrived, the officer 

entered the home and conducted a search limited to places where 

a body could be concealed. Ibid. No one else was found, but 

the search revealed marijuana plants, ultraviolet lights and an 

elaborate watering system. Id. at 596. The defendant was 
21

charged with fourth-degree possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A.

2C:35-10a (3), and first-degree operation of a marijuana 

manufacturing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4. Id. at 596. 

On those facts, we held that the totality of the 

circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless search under 

the emergency-aid doctrine because the dropped 9-1-1 call 

created “a duty to presume there was an emergency.” Id. at 609. 

Moreover, the defendant’s nervous demeanor and the dispatcher’s

confirmation that the 9-1-1 call came from the defendant’s phone 

reinforced the officer’s suspicion that there was an 

incapacitated person in the home. Ibid. 

Similarly, the dropped 9-1-1 call in this case permitted 

Delagarza to presume that there was an emergency. In light of 

that presumption, and based upon his observations –- defendant 

denied making the 9-1-1 call while also claiming no one else was 

home, there were three cars in the driveway, there was an 

abrasion on defendant’s hand, and defendant became agitated when 

asked if he was married -- Delagarza had “an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] that he 

provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to 

prevent serious injury.” Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 600.

The facts presented here are strikingly similar to those 

present in Frankel. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the 
22

police officers’ intrusion into defendant’s home. Having 

determined that the officers’ warrantless entry was justified 

under the emergency-aid doctrine, we now turn to the specific 

charges against defendant. 

B.

1.

A person is guilty of obstructing the administration of law 

or other governmental function when he or she

purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the 

administration of law or other governmental 

function or prevents or attempts to prevent a 

public servant from lawfully performing an 

official function by means of flight, 

intimidation, force, violence, or physical 

interference or obstacle, or by means of any 

independently unlawful act. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added).]

We have “construe[d] ‘lawfully performing an official 

function’ to mean a police officer acting in objective good 

faith, under color of law in the execution of his duties.” 

Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 460-61. In Crawley, we stated

A police officer who reasonably relies on 

information from headquarters in responding to 

an emergency or public safety threat may be 

said to be acting in good faith under the 

statute. However, a police officer who 

without any basis arbitrarily detains a person 

on the street would not be acting in good 

faith. 

[Id. at 461 n.8.]
23

A suspect is required to cooperate with the investigating 

officer even when the legal underpinning of the police-citizen 

encounter is questionable. See Williams, supra, 192 N.J. at 10 

(“[D]efendant was obliged to submit to the investigatory stop, 

regardless of its constitutionality.”); Crawley, supra, 187 N.J.

at 459-60 (holding defendant committed obstruction by impeding 

stop, despite officer’s lack of reasonable suspicion).

When Delagarza announced his intention to enter the house,

he was doing so in order to lawfully perform an official 

function under the emergency-aid doctrine. Defendant’s attempt 

to close the door on the officers constituted an attempt to 

prevent the officers from performing their official function. 

Defendant’s interference is not excused by his suspicions about

the officers’ intentions. Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 459-60,

and Williams, supra, 192 N.J. at 10, establish that once an 

officer makes his investigatory intentions clear, and he is 

acting under the color of law, the validity of the underlying 

police action is inconsequential. We hereby confirm that, 

whether on the street or at a residence, a person who “prevents 

or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing 

an official function by means of . . . physical interference or 

obstacle” is guilty of obstruction. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).

Because the emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers’ 

warrantless intrusion into defendant’s home, and because
24

defendant hampered their entry by slamming the door, defendant’s 

obstruction conviction should have been upheld. 

2.

A person is guilty of third-degree resisting arrest when he 

or she:

(a) Uses or threatens to use physical force or 

violence against the law enforcement officer 

or another; or

(b) Uses any other means to create a substantial 

risk of causing physical injury to the public 

servant or another. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3).]

“It is not a defense to a prosecution [for resisting 

arrest] that the law enforcement officer was acting unlawfully 

in making the arrest, provided he was acting under color of his 

official authority and provided the law enforcement officer 

announces his intention to arrest prior to the resistance.” 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a); see also Mulvihill, supra, 57 N.J. at 155-

56 (“[I]n our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or 

illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the 

event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for 

the invasion of his right of freedom.”). “By the express terms 

of the [resisting arrest] statute, a person has no right to 

resist arrest by flight or any other means, even if the arrest 

constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the constitution.” 

Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 453; see also State v. Herrerra, 211 
25

N.J. 308, 334-35 (2012) (“It is well-settled that defendants 

have ‘no right’ to resist arrest, elude or obstruct the police, 

or escape ‘in response to an unconstitutional stop or 

detention.’” (quoting Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 455)). 

Because defendant pulled his hands away from the officers after 

Delagarza announced defendant was under arrest, and in doing so 

dragged the officers to the floor, the Appellate Division was 

correct to affirm defendant’s resisting arrest conviction. 

3.

Defendant contends that his obstruction and resisting 

arrest convictions should not stand because his actions were 

justified by the officers’ use of excessive force. We 

acknowledge that a person’s use of force against a law 

enforcement officer may be justified when the officer “employs 

unlawful force to effect [an] arrest.” N.J.S.A. 2C:3-

4(b)(1)(a). However, a private citizen may not use force to 

resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is 

an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his 

duties. Mulvihill, supra, 57 N.J. at 155-56. 

As we said previously, the record below supports the 

findings of the municipal court and Law Division, that the 

officers announced their intention to arrest, defendant was 

aware that the officers were in fact police officers, and

Officers Hall and Gant each punched the defendant once in the 
26

face because they perceived a threat to Delagarza. Under these 

circumstances, defendant had a duty to yield to the commands of 

the officers who were engaged in the performance of their 

duties. Ibid. Therefore, defendant’s failure to yield to the 

officers’ legitimate authority resulted in an altercation during 

which the officers were entitled to use the force the municipal 

court and Law Division found necessary to subdue defendant.

V.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed in part 

and reversed in part. Defendant’s conviction for resisting 

arrest is affirmed, and defendant’s obstruction conviction is 

reinstated. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, 

and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join 

in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-79/80 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013

ON APPEAL FROM AND CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent

and Cross-Appellant,

v.

EVAN REECE,

Defendant-Appellant

and Cross-Respondent.

DECIDED July 20, 2015

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Solomon

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST AFFIRM IN PART/

REVERSE IN PART

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X

JUSTICE SOLOMON X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 7