NO. 12-15-00043-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TWELTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

AT TYLER, TEXAS 

CAUSE NUMBER 2014-0129 

IN THE 159TH DISTRICT COURT 

IN ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS 

MIKO PARKS, APPELLANT 

vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE 

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

T. RYAN DEATON 

TBC # 24007095 

103 E. Denman 

Lufkin, Texas 75901 

(936) 637-7778 

Attorneys for Appellant 

Appellant respectfully requests oral argument in this case. 

ACCEPTED

12-15-00043-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

7/15/2015 5:23:59 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN

12th COURT OF APPEALS

 TYLER, TEXAS

7/15/2015 5:23:59 PM

 CATHY S. LUSK

 Clerk
i 

NO. 12-15-00043-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TWELTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

AT TYLER, TEXAS 

CAUSE NUMBER 2014-0129 

IN THE 159TH DISTRICT COURT 

IN ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS 

MIKO PARKS, APPELLANT 

vs. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE 

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT: 

 COMES NOW Appellant, Miko Parks, Appellant in the above styled 

and numbered cause, by and through his attorneys of record, and respectfully 

submits this, his Brief, pursuant to the rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 
ii 

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

 The following is a list of the parties to this action and their counsel 

and is provided to assist this Court with possible disqualifications or recusal: 

HONORABLE Paul White, presided at trial 

T. Ryan Deaton, represented Appellant at trial 

Katrina Carswell, represented the State at trial 

T. Ryan Deaton, represents Appellant on Appeal 

April Ayers-Perez, Angelina County District Attorney’s Office, represents 

the state on appeal 

Address for Appellate counsel is 103 E. Denman, Lufkin, Texas 75901 

Mailing address for State counsel is P.O. Box 908, Lufkin, Texas 75902-

0908 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES .............................................. ii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................... iii 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .................................. vii 

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................ viii 

ISSUES PRESENTED .................................................................................. ix 

I. Was it error by the trial court to deny appellant’s 

motion to suppress evidence because the initial entry 

into appellant’s residence was done without consent 

or under exigent circumstances? 

STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................x 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......................................................... xiii 

GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. ONE ..............................................................1 

PRAYER ....................................................................................................... 11 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................... 12 
iv 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. CASE AUTHORITIES 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Brick v. State, 738, S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ............... 10

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .................2 

Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ..... 1, 5, 6, 7 

Juarez v. State, 758 S.W. 2d 772, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ......................3 

Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296,297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ...........................9

Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ......................... 2, 4 

Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) .......................3 

McNairy v. State, 835 S.W. 2d 101, 106 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) .........................................................................2 

Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........................2 

State v. Ross, 32 S.W. 3d 853,855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ............................2 

Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ....................................................... 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 

Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .........................................................................2 

Texas Court of Appeals

Corea v. State, 52 S.W.3d 311 

(Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) ........................................3 
v 

Pace v. State, 318 S.W.3d 526, 533 

(Tex. App. – Beaumont 2010, no pet.) ............................................ 7, 9 

Rhodes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 242, 249 

(Tex. App. – Fort Worth 1995), aff’d, 945 S.W.2d 115 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .........................................................................7 

State v. Bagby, 119 S.W.3e 446, 450 

(Tex. App. – Tyler 2003, no pet) .......................................................... 2, 9, 11 

United States Court of Appeals

United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 721 (5th circ. 2001) ....................... 7, 8 

United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244 (5th circ. 1993) .................................7 

United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 798(5th Circ. 2000) ..............................7 

United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 355 

(5th Circ. 207) ................................................................................... 7,8 

United States v. Jones, 239 F,3d 716, 720 (5th Circ. 2001) ...........................7 

United States Supreme Court

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) ....................................3 

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) ......................................................2 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ..................................2 

II. RULES & STATUTES 

Texas Rules & Statutes

 

U.S. CONST., Amend. 4 ....................................................................................1 
vi 

TEX. CONST., Art. I, § 9 ............................................................................... 1,2 

Tex. R. App. P. 26.21 ...................................................................................... i
vii 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant respectfully requests oral argument in this case. 

 
viii 

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 6, 2014, Miko Parks was charged by indictment with one 

count of Possession of Marijuana and one count of Possession of Substance 

in Penalty Group 1. CR 12. The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on 

April 21, 2014. CR 17. A hearing on Motion to Suppress was held on April 

29, 2014, and continuing on May 27, 2014. On June 6, 2014, the court 

signed an order denying the Motion to Suppress. CR 36. On December 2, 

2014, the defendant pled guilty to both counts. CR 42. On January 30, 2015, 

the Honorable Paul White sentenced the defendant to one hundred nineteen 

(119) months confinement in the Institutional Division, TDCJ on count one 

and ten (10) years deferred adjudication on count two. CR 47. On February 

2, 2015, Parks timely filed his written Notice of Appeal as required by Tex. 

R. App. P. 26.21. CR 52. This brief is due on July 15, 2015, after two duly 

granted extension. 
ix 

 

ISSUE PRESENTED

ISSUE ONE

IT WAS ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE INITIAL ENTRY 

INTO APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE WAS DONE WITHOUT CONSENT 

OR UNDER EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND ANY SUBSEQUENT 

CONSENT WAS TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 
x 

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prior to July 31, 2014, members of the Texas Department of Public 

Safety received information concerning the trafficking of marijuana from 

3507 N. John Redditt Drive, Apartment 52, Lufkin, Texas. 2 RR 10. 

The agents decided to make contact with the resident of the apartment 

to discuss that information, a procedure known as a “knock and talk”. 2 RR 

15. The agents did not have a search or arrest warrant. 2 RR 17. 

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on the morning of July 31, 2014, Agents 

Shroeder, Holland, and Cortines arrived at the High Point Apartments, 3507 

N. John Redditt Drive, Apartment 52. Officer Shroeder, who was in plain 

clothes, walked up a flight of stairs and knocked on the door. 2 RR 14. The 

other agents were wearing police-type uniforms and raid gear with exposed 

badges and waited downstairs. 2 RR 15. 

The agents had a preplanned signal that when the door was opened, 

the police officers who were in police-type uniforms waiting at the bottom 

of the stairs were to come up the stairs. 2 RR 63. The defendant, who is 

6’2” and 300 pounds, opened the door twelve to eighteen inches. 3 RR 8. 

The officer could not have seen anything within the apartment. 3 RR 8. The 

officer then stated I smell marijuana, so you need to get back, and all three 

of the officers entered the apartment. 3 RR 9. 
xi 

At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Agent Schroeder testified 

that there was no other basis for the agents to enter the apartment other than 

their belief that the defendant gave valid consent to enter the apartment. 2 

RR 92. Agent Shroeder also states that the agents entered the residence by 

consent but could not recall the conversation that led him to believe that the 

defendant consented for the agents to enter the apartment. 2 RR 90. 

Although the defendant had the right to consent because he resided there 

three or four nights out of the week and kept his belongings in the apartment 

( 3 RR 6), the defendant states that the agents never asked for permission to 

come into the apartment. 3 RR 10. 

Two days after the arrests Agent Shroeder completed an affidavit in 

which he indicated that he “smelled marijuana” and “observed a Smith & 

Wesson .40 Caliber pistol positioned at the arm of the couch in the living 

room within an arm’s reach of the female who was identified as Magin Cne 

Watts” and also that “investigators entered the residence and secured the 

firearm on the couch.” Nothing in Agent Shroeder’s affidavit mentioned 

that the agents entered the house by consent. 2 RR 67-68. 

The agents later obtained search warrants regarding some telephones 

taken from the residence. An affidavit was made for that search warrant as 
xii 

well. The agents never mentioned anything in that affidavit about entering 

the house by consent. 2 RR 88. 

 
xiii 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In examining all of the evidence submitted by the state and all of the 

evidence offered by the defendant at the hearing on Motion to Suppress, the 

state did not prove that the initial entry into Appellant’s residence was done 

with consent. 
1 

ISSUE NO. 1 

IT WAS ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY APPELLANT’S MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE INITIAL ENTRY INTO 

APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE WAS DONE WITHOUT CONSENT OR UNDER 

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CONSENT WAS 

TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ENTRY. 

A. Consent to Enter the Residence

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

U.S. CONST., Amend. 4. The Texas Constitution equivalent, Article I, Section 9, 

provides: 

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

possessions, from all unreasonable seizures, and no warrant to search 

any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without 

describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation. 

TEX. CONST., Art. I, § 9. “A warrantless entry into a residence is presumptively 

unreasonable.” Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 

(citing Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The two 

available avenues to justify a warrantless search are, first, if valid consent to search 

has been obtained and, second, if probable cause is present at the time of the search 

and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable. State v. 
2 

Bagby, 119 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) (citing McNairy v. 

State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 

813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion through application of a bifurcated standard of 

review. Id. at 449 (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). 

Almost total deference is given to the trial court’s determination of historical facts 

while the trial court’s application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Id.

(citing Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). When 

no findings of fact are filed by the trial court, the evidence is reviewed in a light 

most favorable to the ruling with the assumption the trial court made implicit 

findings of fact. Id. (quoting State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000)). These implied findings of fact must be supported by the record. Id. 

“Consent to search is one of the well-established exceptions to the 

constitutional requirements of both probable cause and a warrant.” Maxwell v. 

State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). Validity of consent is a fact question 

determined by all the circumstances. Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 

(1996)). The state must prove the validity of consent to search by a preponderance 

of the evidence under the federal constitution and by clear and convincing 
3 

evidence under the Texas Constitution. Id. The State must show, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that the consent was given freely and voluntarily; positively 

and unequivocally; and not under duress or coercion. Corea v. State, 52 S.W.3d 

311, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (citing Bumper v. North 

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,548 (1968); Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1988)). Acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority cannot discharge 

this burden. Id. Consent to search cannot be lightly inferred. Meeks v. State, 692 

S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); accord Corea, 52 S.W.3d at 316. 

Mr. Parks testified that he lived at the apartment located at 3507 North John 

Redditt, Apartment 52, Lufkin, Texas, three or four nights out of the week. He 

further testified that he kept his clothing and belongings in the apartment. RR Vol 

3 at 6. Although Mr. Parks’ testimony establishes his ability to give consent for 

the agents to enter the apartment, nowhere in the record before the court can clear 

and convincing evidence be found that indicates Mr. Parks freely, voluntarily, 

positively, and unequivocally gave consent for Agents Shroeder, Cortinez, and 

Holland to enter the apartment without a warrant. The only evidence provided by 

the State was Agent Shroeder’s testimony regarding “a discussion” of which he 

can’t recall any words or phrases used, R.R. Vol 2 at 27, only that they were 

“allowed to come in.” Id. at 29. Nowhere during the his testimony does Agent 

Shroeder provide any words or phrases that Mr. Parks used to freely, voluntarily, 
4 

positively, or unequivocally give consent to enter the apartment, but instead 

repeatedly admits he cannot give the exact words and that he never summarized 

any of the consents or conversations in any affidavits. Id. at 27; 29; 70–71; 88–90. 

Further, none of Agent Shroeder’s testimony regarding the consent was able to be 

corroborated by any other individual. See id. at 119–20 (Agent Holland admitting 

to not hearing the initial conversation at the door); R.R. Vol. 3 at 10–11; 13 (Mr. 

Parks testifying that Agent Shroeder never asked permission to enter and was 

never granted permission to enter); R.R. Vol. 3 at 37–38 (Ms. Watts testifying that 

Mr. Parks never gave consent and she did not hear anyone ask permission to enter). 

Agent Shroeder does however admit that his sole justification for entering the 

residence was the alleged consent he received. R.R. Vol. 2 at 92–93. While Agent 

Shroeder’s testimony may provide some scintilla of evidence of consent, it does 

not reach the high clear and convincing standard that is required in Texas. See 

Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281. 

B. Exigent Circumstances

Lacking consent, the agents must have had probable cause coupled with 

exigent circumstances to justify entering Mr. Parks’ residence. See Turrubiate v. 

State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“the State has the burden of 

showing that probable cause existed at the time the search was made and that 

exigent circumstances requiring immediate entry made obtaining a warrant 
5 

impracticable.”). “Probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy 

circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer on the scene would lead 

him to reasonably believe that evidence of a crime will be found.” Id. Once 

probable cause exists, exigent circumstances may dictate immediate, warrantless 

entry of a residence under three circumstances: (1) when officers are providing aid 

to persons reasonably believed to be in need of it; (2) when officers are protecting 

other officers from persons reasonably believed to be present, armed, and 

dangerous; and (3) when officers are preventing the destruction of evidence or 

contraband. Id. (citing Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007)). 

In the instant case, the existence of probable cause is not in dispute at the 

time of the initial “knock” and was likely established just prior to the initial 

“knock” based on Agent Shroeder’s detection of the odor of marijuana from 

around the door prior to the “knock.” See R.R. Vol 2 at 84–85 (“I believed there 

was a possibility of probable cause because I could smell marijuana in the area at 

that point, not until the door opened did I realize it was coming from the 

apartment.”). The State must still prove exigent circumstances existed at the time 

of the initial entry. Only the second and third categories listed above have any 

inkling of support in the record, but still fall short of justifying a warrantless entry 

into Mr. Parks’ residence.
6 

 I. Odor of Marijuana 

The prevention of destruction of evidence or contraband is one of the three 

categories of exigent circumstances. Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 151(citing 

Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). It has been 

conclusively established that the odor of marijuana coupled with an officer making 

his presence known does not justify the warrantless entry of a residence on the 

premise of preventing destruction of evidence. Id. at 149 (“We agree with the 

holding by the court of appeals that probable cause to believe that illegal drugs are 

in a home coupled with an odor of marijuana from the home and a police officer 

making his presence known to the occupants do not justify a warrantless entry.”). 

Courts require additional evidence that indicates destruction of evidence was 

imminent. Id. at 154. 

Here, Agent Shoeder’s own testimony indicates that he perceived no 

indication that Mr. Parks or Ms. Watts intended to destroy any evidence. R.R. Vol. 

2 at 93. Further, Agent Shoeder affirmed that he believes his sole justification or 

“authority to enter the residence rises or falls upon proof of a valid consent by Mr. 

Parks” and not upon any imminent destruction of evidence. Id. at 92–93. Without 

any additional evidence indicating destruction of evidence was imminent, the 

warrantless entry into the residence was not justified. See Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d 

at 153 (“In other words, the Court required that the record show proof of imminent 
7 

destruction based on affirmative conduct by those in possession of narcotics in a 

particular case.”). 

 II. Presence of Firearm 

 The protection of other officers from present, armed, and dangerous persons 

is a second of the three categories of exigent circumstances. Turrubiate, 399 

S.W.3d at 151(citing Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007)). “The perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene is a consideration in 

the analysis of the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion.” Pace v. State, 

318 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (citing Rhodes v. 

State, 913 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995), aff’d, 945 S.W.2d 115 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Courts have distinguished between situation where 

suspects detect law enforcement surveillance—and the exigent circumstances 

exception applies—and situations where officers make their presences known—

and the exigent circumstances exception does not apply. United States v. Jones, 

239 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Circ. 2001) (referring to United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 

244 (5th Circ. 1993)). The actions or inaction of the government cannot be the 

cause of the exigent circumstances. Id. at 720 (citing United States v. Vega, 221 

F.3d 789, 798 (5th Circ. 2000)). The “reasonableness of the officers’ investigative 

tactics leading up to the warrantless entry” is used to determine whether the 

officers created the exigency. United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 355 
8 

(5th Circ. 2007) (quoting United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Circ. 

2001)). The “knock and talk” tactic has been considered reasonable where officers 

approaching a house are not convinced criminal activity are taking place and have 

no reason to believe the occupants are armed. Id.

 In the instant case, Agent Shroeder testified that he knew Mr. Parks was a 

licensed concealed handgun carrier and probably had a weapon with him. R.R. 

Vol. 2 at 32, 93–94. Agent Shroeder further admits that at the time he carried out 

the knock and talk, he believed he had enough information to secure a search 

warrant, but instead proceeded with the knock and talk tactic because it was simple 

“a faster and easier process.” Id. at 85–87. These two aspects are an affront to the 

rational that Courts have used to justify the reasonableness of the “knock and talk” 

tactic. See Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d at 355. Agent Shroeders own testimony 

establishes that he felt probable cause that criminal activity was taking place 

existed prior to performing the knock and talk procedure and further that he knew 

Mr. Parks was probably armed; both of which indicate that any exigency was 

created by government action. Id. The record also supports the conclusion that Mr. 

Parks was completely unaware of any police surveillance or suspicion. R.R. Vol 2 

at 34 (indicating Mr. Parks and Mrs. Watts acted surprised at the fact officers had 

knocked on their door). Agent Shoeder could have chosen to secure a warrant 

without ever alerting Mr. Parks or Ms. Watts to police presence but instead chose 
9 

to announce his presence and create potential exigent circumstances to gain entry 

into the residence. 

 Even if the Court concludes probable cause did not exist prior to the knock 

and talk procedure, the record does not reflect that Agent Shroeder believed the 

firearm, which he expected to be found, posed a danger, and he further testified 

that it played no part in his decision to enter the residence. R.R. Vol. 2 at 93. From 

Agent Shroeder’s perspective as a reasonable officer on the scene, the presence of 

the firearm did not pose a danger and did not create an exigency to justify entry 

into the residence. See Pace, 318 S.W.3d at 533 (acknowledging that the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene is a primary consideration as to the 

reasonableness of government action) ; see also Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 151 

(representing persons must be present, armed, and dangerous to create and 

exigency related to officer safety (emphasis added)). These factors would further 

indicate that the firearm present in Mr. Parks residence did not create an exigent 

circumstance that would justify a warrantless entry into the apartment. 

C. Subsequent Consent to Search not Attenuated from Unlawful Entry

 When consent follows and illegal entry into a residence, the consent must be 

analyzed to determine whether the consent was tainted by illegal police conduct. 

Bagby, 119 S.W.3d at 452 (citing Leal v. State, 773 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. Crim. 
10 

App. 1989). There are six factors Courts use to determine if consent is sufficiently 

attenuated from the illegal conduct: 

(1) the proximity of the consent to the arrest; 

(2) whether the seizure brought about observation of the particular 

object for which they sought consent to search, or, in other words, 

whether the illegal arrest allowed officers to view the area or 

contraband that the officers later received consent to search; 

(3) whether the illegal seizure was flagrant police misconduct; 

(4) whether the consent was volunteered rather than requested by the 

detaining officers; 

(5) whether the arrestee was made fully aware of the fact that he could 

decline to consent and, thus, prevent an immediate search; and 

(6) whether the police purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain 

the consent. 

Id. at 452–53 (citing Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676, 680–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1987)). 

The majority of the above factors favor a finding that consent was tainted by 

the illegal entry. The first factor is in Mr. Parks favor in that Ms. Watts gave 

consent shortly after police illegally entered their residence. R.R. Vol 2 at 44. The 

second factor again favors Mr. Parks in that the illegal entry into the apartment 
11 

resulted in officers seeing a quantity of marijuana and arresting both him and Ms. 

Watts. Id. at R.R. Vol 2 at 297. The third factor also favors Mr. Parks in that the 

agents entered Ms. Watts residence while she was in a state of undress and placed 

her in handcuffs, removed her boyfriend, Mr. Parks, from the residence before 

seeking her consent to search. R.R. Vol. 3 at 39–42. The illegal actions of the 

agents were aimed to cause surprise and fear in Ms. Watts and cause the third 

factor to favor Mr. Parks. See Bagby, 119 S.W.3d at 454. The fourth factor is in 

favor of Mr. Parks. Mr. Shroeder acknowledged to seeking the consent from Ms. 

Watts. R.R. Vol. 2 at 44. The fifth factor favors the State in that Agent Shroeder 

testified to informing Ms. Watts that she could refuse consent. R.R. Vol. 2 at 100. 

The sixth factor follows the same reasoning as the third factor and favors Mr. 

Parks. See Bagby, 119 S.W.3d at 454 (finding factors that support the third factor 

also support the sixth factor). 

PRAYER

 Wherefore, in accord with the facts, law, and argument offered above, 

Appellant Miko Parks asks this Court to reverse his conviction and order a 

dismissal of the charges, or, in the alternative, the suppression of all evidence 

obtained after entry into the apartment or grant him other such relief as is 

appropriate. 
12 

 

Respectfully submitted, 

DEATON LAW FIRM 

103 East Denman 

Lufkin, TX 75901 

Tel: (936) 637-7778 

Fax: (936) 637-7784 

 

By: _____________________________ 

T. Ryan Deaton 

State Bar No. 24007095 

Attorney for Miko Parks 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

This is to certify that on July 15, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above 

and foregoing document was served on the District Attorney's Office, Angelina 

County, Texas, by facsimile transmission. 

 

_________________________________ 

T. Ryan Deaton