J-S35032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: K.A.K., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER

No. 621 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order January 7, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Orphans' Court at No.: 2014-0018

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2015

J.B. (Mother) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northampton County, entered January 7, 2015, that terminated her parental 

rights to her daughter, K.A.K. (Child), born in July of 2006, and changed 

Child’s goal to adoption. We affirm.1

The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on November 21, 2012, 

pursuant to a Child Protective Services (CPS) report that alleged that Mother 

had struck Child. Child has been in the continuous custody of Northampton 

County Children Youth and Families (NCCYF) since that time. At the time of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child’s father, J.K., consented to the termination of his parental rights on 

December 16, 2014. He is not a party to this appeal. (See N.T. Hearing, 

12/16/14, at 15-16). 
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her birth, Child tested positive for cocaine due to Mother’s drug use. (See 

N.T. Hearing, 12/16/14, at 18). Mother has an extensive history of drug 

abuse and mental health issues. As a direct result, she has been 

incarcerated repeatedly and was, at the time of the hearing on this matter, 

serving a sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty months’ 

incarceration at State Correctional Institution (SCI) Muncy that was to be 

followed by a consecutive term of thirty-six months of probation. (See id. 

at 49; Petition for Involuntary Termination, 4/24/14, at unnumbered pages 

2-5).

NCCYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights on April 24, 2014. The petition alleged that termination 

would best serve Child’s needs and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

At the hearing on the termination of Mother’s parental rights held on 

December 16, 2014, NCCYF presented the testimony of Child Protective 

Services Monitor and Caseworker, Cortney Caflin; Diakon Adoption and 

Foster Care Child Prep and Profile Specialist, Christine Smith-Hoh; and 

Elizabeth Yost, a licensed professional counselor. Mother testified on her 

own behalf and presented the testimony of Edwin Garcia, her treating 

psychotherapist at Lehigh Valley Community Mental Health, and Jennifer 

Lively, Clinical Director at Recovery Revolution.
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Testimony at the termination hearing established that NCCYF has been 

involved in Child’s life since she was born, when they received a general 

protective service (GPS) referral. NCCYF received subsequent GPS referrals 

in 2010 and 2011, when Mother “appeared under the influence of alcohol at 

a Protection From Abuse hearing,” and when Child “had fallen out of a 

second story window.” (Id. at 18). On November 9, 2012, NCCYF received 

a CPS report that Mother had struck Child. NCCYF issued a safety plan on 

November 16, 2012, and placed Child with her paternal grandmother. (See 

id.). Child remained in kinship foster care with her paternal grandmother at 

the time of Mother’s hearing. (See id. at 49).

Mother was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) in January 

of 2013. In February of 2013 she was charged with possession of a 

controlled substance. (See id. at 21). In August of 2013, Mother was 

charged with burglary, and, in 2014, with forgery. NCCYF established a 

permanency plan for Mother by which she was to: undergo a psychiatric 

evaluation and follow up with mental health treatment; submit to a drug and 

alcohol evaluation and random urine screens; maintain stable income and 

housing for at least six months; and attend supervised visitation with Child. 

(See id. at 22). Mother’s compliance with NCCYF’s permanency plan was 

tenuous, at best.

Mother was unable to maintain stable housing for a period of at least 

six months. When she was not incarcerated, Mother floated between her 
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mother’s residence and shelters. (See id. at 23). Mother was unable to 

maintain stable employment and steady income, although she sporadically 

worked as a waitress from March, 2013 to September, 2014. (See id. at 

24-25).

On March 1, 2013, Mother completed a psychiatric evaluation through 

Lehigh Valley Community Mental Health. (See id. at 27). The evaluation 

determined that Mother “was diagnosed upon Axis I with bipolar I disorder, 

with the most recent episode as manic, and Axis II as havoc abuse.” (Id.). 

The recommendation was for medication management and individual 

therapy weekly. Mother, however, failed to appear for appointments “during 

the months of June, July, and August or September of 2013.” (Id.). Mother 

attended her weekly therapy sessions in October of 2013 and for a time 

thereafter. 

The Lehigh Valley Drug and Alcohol Intake Unit performed drug and 

alcohol evaluations of Mother in both 2012 and 2013. (See id. at 31). The 

recommendations were consistent in calling for “Level 3 long term residential 

treatment in a program designed for individuals with co-occurring disorders.” 

(Id.). Mother refused the treatment, stating, “she didn’t feel the treatment 

was necessary.” (Id. at 33). Mother elected instead to enroll in outpatient 

treatment at Northeast Treatment Center. She was discharged due to noncompliance on March 21, 2013. (See id.). Mother was admitted into 

Brandywine Bowling Green for inpatient treatment on July 9, 2013, but “left 
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against medical advi[c]e from the facility a few days later.” (Id. at 34). On 

September 4, 2013, Mother completed a program at White Deer Run 

Treatment Center. (See id. at 35). Mother then relapsed and incurred new 

criminal charges for forgery. Mother was incarcerated in Northampton 

County Prison on January 31, 2014. While in prison, Mother completed the 

Sister to Sister drug and alcohol program. According to Jennifer Lively, the 

clinical director of Recovery Revolutions who administers the Sister to Sister 

program, she observed positive changes in Mother. (See id. at 145-46). 

Mother was released on June 9, 2014. (See id. at 37). 

In July 2014, nearly one month following her release, Mother exhibited 

signs of drug use when her weekly random urine screens came up abnormal 

or positive. When NCCYF met with Mother at the end of August, 2014, she 

admitted to drug use. (See id. at 38-39). On or about September 2, 2014, 

Mother met with her probation officer who gave her the choice to reenter 

treatment or return to prison. Mother entered Valley Forge Hospital on 

September 3, 2014, for detox and inpatient treatment. (See id. at 41).

Valley Forge discharged Mother on September 19, 2014, and directed her to 

follow-up with outpatient treatment. (See id.). Mother was re-incarcerated 

on a probation violation in Lehigh County on October 14, 2014, and is 

currently serving a sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than thirty 

months in SCI Muncy. Mother admits that the earliest she will be out on 
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parole is the fall of 2015, and that she will go from jail to a halfway house. 

(See id. at 67). 

Despite her substance abuse issues and intimacy with the criminal 

justice system, Mother loves Child and has, whenever possible, taken 

advantage of supervised visits with Child, sent her cards and letters, and 

received Child’s school report cards, projects and photographs. (See id. at 

82). Child “loves her mother and . . . she wishes that she was doing well.” 

(Id. at 49). 

However, Child is in a stable home with a structured routine. Child’s 

behavior has markedly improved since placement with her paternal 

grandmother. (See id. at 50). She is “less anxious and not as easily upset” 

or reactive and is “able to process things a little bit better.” (Id.). Child and 

her paternal grandmother are affectionate and loving with each other. (See 

id. at 100). Since placement, Child has earned good grades in school and is 

showing pride in her schoolwork and enjoying friendships with other 

children. (See id. at 175-76). According to Elizabeth Yost, Child’s 

counselor, Child is “feeling very stable” with her paternal grandmother and 

has “a lot of trust with her grandmother[.]” (Id. at 177). Child “really cares 

about [Mother], but she knows that [Mother] is not able to take care of her.” 

(Id. at 180). Child “wants to move on and continue with the way her life is 

going.” (Id.).
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The trial court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) on January 7, 

2015. Mother filed her notice of appeal on February 3, 2015, and her 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on February 17, 2015.2 See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Mother raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [NCCYF] 

demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother 

has refused or failed to perform parental duties for a period of at 

least six months and demonstrated repeated and continued 

incapacity . . . [sic] neglect or refusal, causing [Child] to be 

without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary 

for her physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, . . . [sic] and that the neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by Mother, thereby establishing 

the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511 (a)(1), (2)?

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [NCCYF] met its 

burden and demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that [Child] has been removed from the natural parent for a 

period of at least twelve months, and the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of [Child] continue to exist, in that 

Mother cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the Mother are not likely to remedy the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of parental rights best 

serves the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A Section 

2511 (a)(5) and (a)(8)?

____________________________________________

2 Because there was no objection or claim of prejudice from NCCYF, we have 

accepted the late filing of Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement in reliance on our 

decision in In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747-48 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [Child] does not 

have a strong emotional bond with Mother, and severing this 

bond would not cause [Child] to suffer a loss or destroy 

something necessary and beneficial to [Child’s] emotional wellbeing?

4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that termination was in 

the best interests of [Child]?

5. Whether the trial court erred in finding that no compelling 

reasons exist to refrain from terminating Mother’s parental 

rights?

(Mother’s Brief, at 6-7).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 
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clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

We note our standard of review of a change of goal:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the placement 

goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard is abuse of 

discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion, we must determine that the court’s judgment was 

manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or 

that the court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, as shown by the record. . . .

In the Interest of S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946-47 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 

1141 (Pa. 2004).

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.─The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

* * *
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(b) Other considerations.─The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the 

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and 
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convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the 

filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrates a settled purpose to 

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties. See In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. 

Super. 2003).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988) (citation 

omitted). 

Additionally, 

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). 

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make 
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specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but 

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

“is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citation omitted). 

In regard to incarcerated persons, our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a 

determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for 

termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and 

continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence and that [sic] the causes of the incapacity cannot or 

will not be remedied.

* * *

. . . [W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not 

a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the 

question of whether a parent is incapable of providing “essential 

parental care, control or subsistence” and the length of the 

remaining confinement can be considered as highly relevant to 

whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent,” 

sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). See e.g. Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 

[883,] 891 (“[A] parent who is incapable of performing parental 

duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform 

the duties.”); [In re:] E.A.P., [944 A.2d 79, 85 (Pa. Super. 

2008)] (holding termination under § 2511(a)(2) supported by 

mother’s repeated incarcerations and failure to be present for 

child, which caused child to be without essential care and 

subsistence for most of her life and which cannot be remedied 

despite mother’s compliance with various prison programs). If a 

court finds grounds for termination under subsection (a)(2), a 

court must determine whether termination is in the best 

interests of the child, considering the developmental, physical, 
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and emotional needs and welfare of the child pursuant to § 

2511(b). In this regard, trial courts must carefully review the 

individual circumstances for every child to determine, inter alia, 

how a parent’s incarceration will factor into an assessment of the 

child’s best interest.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828, 830-31 (Pa. 2012).3

In considering Mother’s first issue, we have chosen to analyze her case 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). See B.L.W., supra at 384. Mother 

argues that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her parental 

rights pursuant to subsection (a)(1):

In the case at hand, Mother has not exhibited a settled 

purpose of abandoning [Child] or otherwise relinquishing 

parental rights. Mother has remained in contact with [Child] and 

has demonstrated her intention to remain in [Child’s] life. 

Mother appeared at trial to contest the termination of her 

parental rights. Mother believes and therefore avers that she 

has not exhibited a “settled purpose” of relinquishing parental 

claim to [Child]. To the contrary, she has repeatedly 

[expressed] a desire to parent [Child]. This is not a “settled 

purpose” towards relinquishment. 

(Mother’s Brief, at 15). We disagree.

Even when she was not incarcerated, Mother did little to parent Child. 

The fact that Mother believes she has not exhibited a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her rights and the fact that she has repeatedly stated her 

desire to parent Child do not change the fact that she has not parented Child 

____________________________________________

3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited its decision in In re: Adoption of 

McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. 1975), for the proposition that termination 

may be appropriate for an incarcerated parent who has failed to perform his 

parental duties for a six-month period of time. See S.P., supra at 828. 
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for over two years. We quote the trial court’s analysis of this issue, with 

approval:

[NCCYF] has presented clear, convincing, and competent 

evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a). [Child] has been removed from 

Mother’s care for over two (2) years and the conditions which led 

to [Child’s] removal continue to exist. Mother cannot fulfill her 

parental duties to [Child] as she is not capable of meeting the 

essential needs of the young child and will be unable to do so 

within a reasonable time. Mother’s repeated drug use, mental 

health issues and criminal activity throughout [Child's] life, show 

a pattern of incapacity to parent, particularly while not 

incarcerated. Mother is currently incarcerated at SCI Muncy and 

will be for the foreseeable future. Mother’s future with respect 

to adequate housing and employment is completely indefinite. 

While it appears that Mother has managed to remain drug-free 

in the confines of incarceration, whether she can maintain that 

status among the external pressures of the outside world 

remains to be proven. One can only speculate as to what the 

future conditions of Mother’s release from incarceration will 

entail and how soon she would be permitted to have supervised 

visits, let alone overnight visitation or full custodial care of a 

child she hasn’t parented in years. In fact, Mother’s life-long 

history of involvement with drug use bears heavily upon her 

probability of success. Mother will face significant challenges in 

achieving a sober and productive lifestyle. More importantly, we 

acknowledge the likelihood of severe detriment to [Child’s] 

developmental well-being if she were re-introduced to Mother’s 

precarious lifestyle of uncertainty, drug abuse, homelessness 

and lack of any financial stability.

(Trial Court Opinion, 1/07/15, at 9-10).

Because we have chosen to restrict our analysis of Mother’s argument 

pursuant to subsection (a)(1), we need not address her arguments pursuant 

to subsections (a)(5) and (8) in her second issue. (See Mother’s Brief, at 

6); see also B.L.W., supra at 384.
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We will address Mother’s issues three and four together as a challenge 

to the trial court’s determination regarding the best interests of Child under 

subsection (b). (See Mother’s Brief, at 7). Mother argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights pursuant to 

subsection (b) because it failed to order a bonding assessment. (See id. at 

18). We disagree. 

A trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal 

bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 

529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). That being said, we quote the trial court’s 

analysis of Child’s best interests, with approval:

At the termination hearing, Christine Smith-Hoh, Elizabeth 

Yost and [Child’s] [NCCYF] caseworker, Cortney Caflin all 

testified that the needs and welfare of [Child] dictate termination 

of parental rights and a goal change from reunification to 

adoption. Mother’s love and affection toward [Child] are not in 

dispute. Mother attended her weekly supervised visitation with 

[Child]. During those visits, Mother and [Child] were 

affectionate to one another. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 

12/16/14, at 83-85). Mother sent cards and letters to [Child] on 

a regular basis and was always interested in her school progress, 

reports, and projects and, receives photographs of her daughter. 

(See id. at 82). However, [Child] has benefited from placement 

by [NCCYF] with paternal grandmother and that developmental 

progress should not be thwarted. Even at the tender age of 

eight, [Child] recognizes that while she “loves her mother and 

wishes she was doing well,” she enjoys the stability and 

structure of her grandmother’s home. (Id. at 49). “[Child] and 

her grandmother are affectionate.” (Id. at 100). Paternal 

grandmother tends to all of [Child’s] educational, emotional, 

social and medical needs in addition to providing for her basic 

needs of food, clothing and shelter. [Child] “really believes that 

her grandmother can take care of her in the way that she needs 

to be taken care of.” (Id. at 179-80). “She really cares about 
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[Mother], but she knows that [Mother] is not able to take care of 

her.” (Id.).

(Trial Ct. Op., at 11-12) (record citation formatting provided).

Mother does not raise issue number five in her statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, nor does she address it in her brief. (See Mother’s 

Brief, at 7, 11-19; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/17/15, at 1). Therefore, she 

has waived the issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in 

the [Rule 1925(b)] Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 

535, 542 (Pa. Super. 2008) (same).

In the body of her brief, Mother also raises the question of whether 

NCCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunite her with Child. (See Mother’s 

Brief, at 18-19). However, she also waived this issue for her failure to 

include it in either her statement of errors or in her questions presented. 

(See id. at 6-7; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/17/15, at 1); see also Yates, 

supra. at 542; Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 

A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (noting that we will not address an issue 

that is not included in the statement of questions involved in appellant’s 

brief, citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)).

Testimony adduced at the hearing in this matter established that, for 

at least the six months immediately preceding the filing of NCCYF’s petition 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights, Mother either evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child or refused or failed to 
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perform her parental duties. That testimony also established that Child has 

been in placement with her paternal grandmother for more than two years 

and that she is thriving in that placement. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Northampton County that terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b), and changed Child’s goal to adoption. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2015