J-S06045-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.F.F., M.F.I.F.F. 

AND J.D.L., MINOR CHILDREN

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.M.L., MOTHER No. 2756 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decrees entered August 15, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2014-0009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 21, 2015

This case returns to this Court following our remand for the trial court 

to complete an analysis of the nature of the parent-child bond, pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), and the effect on L.F.F., M.F.I.F.F. and J.D.L., 

(“Children”) of permanently severing that bond. Additionally, the trial court 

was to provide an analysis of its reason for changing the permanency goal to 

adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. We incorporate our prior 

memorandum decision in In the Interest of: L.F.F., M.F.I.F.F., and 

J.D.L., Minor Children, 2756 EDA 2014 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. 

Super. April 17, 2015).1 We affirm.

Mother argues Northampton County Division of Children, Youth and 

Families (“CYF”) has “not met its burden concerning 2511(b).” Appellant’s 

Supplemental Brief at 4. Mother contends there is a bond between her and 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

In our prior memorandum, we disposed of Mother’s remaining issues.
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Children, and therefore termination of her parental rights would not serve 

the needs and welfare of Children. Id. at 5; Mother’s Brief at 13.

Our review is governed by the following principles.

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict.

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (citations 

omitted).

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.─The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), this court has 

stated:

Once the statutory requirement for involuntary 

termination of parental rights has been established under 
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subsection (a), the court must consider whether the child’s 

needs and welfare will be met by termination pursuant to 

subsection (b). In this context, the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). This 

Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section 

2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(en banc). In analyzing the parent-child bond, the court is not required to 

order that an expert perform a formal bonding evaluation. In re K.K.R.-S., 

958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is 

a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of 

parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental 

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional 

bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of 

child). Rather, the orphans’ court must examine the 

status of the bond to determine whether its termination 

“would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.”

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the 

child, and should also consider the intangibles, such 

as the love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child 
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bond can be severed without detrimental effects on 

the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (some citations omitted 

and emphases added). 

This Court has stated:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our 

standard is abuse of discretion. . . . We are bound by the 

trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the record. 

The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the 

responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses 

and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying 

out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s 

findings are supported by competent evidence of record, 

we will affirm even if the record could also support an 

opposite result. 

Next, we note that in matters of placement for a 

dependent child, the trial court must be guided by the best 

interests of the child—not those of his or her parents.

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent 

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act[, which] place 

the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of 

goal proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and 

well-being of the child must take precedence over all other 

considerations, including the rights of the parents.

At each review hearing for a dependent child who has been 

removed from the parental home, the court must consider 

the following, statutorily-mandated factors:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement; the extent of compliance with the 

service plan developed for the child; the extent of 

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement; the 

appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by 
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which the goal for the child might be achieved. [42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)]. 

* * *

When the child welfare agency has made reasonable 

efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological 

parent, but those efforts have failed, then the agency must 

redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an adoptive 

home. This Court has held that the placement process 

should be completed within 18 months. 

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 532-33 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some citations 

omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s best interest and changed the goal 

to adoption. Specifically, the court found: 

In the instant case, . . . Children’s welfare would be 

best served by the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

. . . Children have been outside of Mother’s care since 

2011 when J.D.L. was two years old and M.F.I.F.F. was 

three months old.[2] Mother has not cared for the 

youngest child, L.F.F., since he was six weeks old. Thus, 

Mother has not cared for the elder two Children in four 

years, and the youngest for three years. Her last visit with 

. . . Children was in November 2013. Mother simply has 

not been in . . . Children’s lives enough to have a bond 

that would be destroyed by termination. Moreover, even if 

there were a bond between Mother and Children, Mother 

placed her romantic relationships before the safety needs 

of . . . Children by continually pursuing contact with Father 

2, despite being aware of his indecent assault against 

Mother’s oldest child, A.T.

 

2 Rebecca Sager, a caseworker with CYS, testified that CYS secured custody 

of Children on February 15, 2011, because of a domestic violence incident 

the previous evening. N.T., 7/15/14, at 91. On February 24, 2011, there 

was an adjudication hearing declaring Children dependent. Id. at 92.
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Consequently, . . . Children would not be negatively 

impacted by termination. They are placed together in a 

loving, safe and stable foster home, in which their special 

needs are being met. Mother has not met . . . Children’s 

developmental, physical, or emotional needs. . . . 

Children’s primary bonds are to the foster family. . . . The 

bond between . . . Children and foster parents is the 

primary bond to protect, given . . . Children’s young age 

and limited contact with Mother. Here, all of . . . 

Children’s needs are being fulfilled by the foster family, 

which seeks to adopt . . . Children.

Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt also changed the 

permanency goal for . . . Children to adoption. As noted 

above, . . . Children have been in foster care for most of 

their lives. Mother failed to complete the services provided 

by [CYS] and placed . . . Children in danger by continuing 

contact with Father 2. The circumstances that led to . . . 

Children’s placement in 2011 and 2012 continued to exist 

without progress by the biological parents. . . . Children 

are now placed together with a loving foster family that 

seeks to adopt them. It is in the best interests of . . . 

Children to be adopted by their foster family.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/15, at 1-2 (citations omitted). We agree no relief is due.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings pursuant to 

the parent child bond and change of goal to adoption. The record reveals 

Mother violated a condition of her probation by having contact with Father 2, 

who sexually abused Mother’s oldest son, A.T.3 N.T., 7/15/14, at 23-25, 29, 

75. Her probation was revoked and she was resentenced to 12-24 months’ 

imprisonment. Id. at 31. 

Krista Welter, a licensed professional counselor, testified Mother 

 

3 A.T.’s date of birth was April 23, 2005. Id. at 76. A.T.’s father is not a 

party in the instant case. Id. A.T. was removed from Mother’s care on 

February 15, 2011.
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reported having a lengthy history of domestic violence, 

that [Father 2] perpetrated abuse on her directly. There 

was an incident where he was abusive to one of her sons 

─I believe [J.D.L.]─ when she was present in the room. 

There were also allegations of sexual assault that he was 

convicted of criminally . . . . However, [Mother] continued 

to not believe that [Father 2] did that to her son.

Id. at 40-41. Ms. Welter was asked the role in the treatment process the 

acknowledgement of domestic violence plays in the assessment of a parent’s 

ability to protect their children. She stated:

It’s a very important component. If an individual 

continues to deny or excuse or minimize the behaviors 

perpetrated by, in this case, [Father 2], it becomes difficult 

for her to be able to protectively parent her children. For 

example, if she doesn’t believe that he’s a danger to 

herself or others, she wouldn’t put in safety guards that 

are needed to make sure her children are safe.

Id. at 42. Ms. Welter did not think Mother ever expressed an understanding 

of the trauma Father 2 caused her son or how the domestic violence affected 

her Children. Id. at 46. Ms. Welter found Mother to be an unsafe parent 

and could not recommend her serving in a parental capacity for Children. 

Id. at 47.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of 

Children and in changing the goal to adoption. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

at 103; In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121; In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008; In 

re A.K., 936 A.2d at 532-33; In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 383.
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For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decrees 

granting the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights and changing the 

Children’s goals to adoption.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/2015