[Cite as Campbell v. Schlegel, 2015-Ohio-2808.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DEFIANCE COUNTY 

 

TAMMY CAMPBELL, ET AL., 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, CASE NO. 4-14-19 

 v. 

AMY D. SCHLEGEL, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 12-CV-42214 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: July 13, 2015 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Brian W. Kaiser for Appellant 

 J. Alan Smith for Appellee 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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ROGERS, P.J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tammy Campbell (“Tammy”), Kelsie Campbell 

(“Kelsie”), Kasey Campbell (“Kasey”), and Brian Campbell (“Brian”) 

(collectively “the appellants”), appeal the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Defiance County, which granted summary judgment in favor of DefendantAppellee, Amy Schlegel, and denied their motion to amend their complaint. On 

appeal, the appellants argue that the trial court erred: (1) in finding that their 

amendment to the complaint would not relate back under Civ.R. 15(C); (2) in 

finding that the amended complaint would necessarily be barred by Civ.R. 3(A) 

and the applicable statute of limitations; and (3) by not allowing evidence 

regarding the legal representation of Amy and her family. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. 

{¶2} On December 14, 2012, Tammy, Brian, and Kasey1

 filed a complaint 

against Amy. In their complaint, they alleged that on December 17, 2010, Amy 

was operating a 2003 Chevrolet Impala and negligently operated her vehicle 

resulting in a collision with Tammy’s vehicle. On that same day, Kelsie filed a 

separate complaint alleging nearly identical facts in the Campbells’ complaint. 

 

1

 We note that there is an inconsistent spelling of “Kasey” throughout the record. Since she testified at her 

deposition that the correct spelling of her name is “Kasey” that is what we will refer to her throughout this 

opinion. 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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Both complaints repeatedly referred to Amy as the operator of the vehicle that 

caused the car accident. 

{¶3} Amy filed her answers to both complaints on January 4, 2013. Amy 

generally denied the allegations in both complaints and asserted several 

affirmative defenses. 

{¶4} On November 12, 2013, the trial court consolidated the two cases as 

both causes of action arose from the same set of facts. (Docket No. 11). 

{¶5} Amy filed a motion for summary judgment on May 14, 2014. In her 

motion, Amy asked the court to grant summary judgment in her favor as it was 

undisputed that she was not involved in the motor vehicle accident. Instead, it was 

her daughter, Katelyn Schlegel, who was operating the motor vehicle the day of 

the accident. In support of her argument, Amy attached the police report to her 

motion, which stated that Katelyn was the driver of Unit #2 and Jacob Schlegel, 

her son, was the occupant of Unit #2. The report identifies Amy as the owner of 

the vehicle that Katelyn was driving. See (Docket No. 17, Exhibit F, p. 1, 5). 

{¶6} Amy also argued that the Campbells’ claim against Katelyn had 

expired under the two-year statute of limitation, and that they could not rely on 

Civ.R. 15(C) to file an amended complaint as there was no mistake concerning the 

identity of the proper party. In the alternative, Amy argued that the Campbells’ 
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complaint could not be amended under Civ.R. 3(A) since the time had expired for 

proper service of the complaints. 

{¶7} The Campbells filed their response to Amy’s motion for summary 

judgment and a request for leave to file an amended complaint on July 3, 2014. 

They argued that they should be allowed to amend their complaint and add 

Katelyn as the proper defendant since their misnaming of the defendant was a 

misnomer. 

{¶8} The trial court held a hearing on the Campbells’ motion to amend the 

complaint on September 16, 2014. At the hearing, the Campbells called Katelyn 

to testify. Katelyn testified that she was married November 24, 2012, and is now 

known as Katelyn Ruiz. She stated that she remembered the car accident and that 

it occurred while she was on her way to school. Katelyn then had the following 

exchange: 

Q: Okay. So, following the initial discussion of this accident with 

your parents, I assume you had some follow-up conversation with 

them at a later date about it; is that correct? 

A: Just when they told me I was, uh, my mom was actually getting 

sued. That’s when we started talking about it. 

Q: Okay. So, how, when did that come about? Do you recall? 

A: It hasn’t been that long, maybe six months, a year, if that. 

Q: Six months, a year, that she stated she was being sued? 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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A: She said that I might get a call, and I was to contact my lawyer 

– well, her lawyer. 

Q: Did she tell you why you might get a call? 

A: No. She didn’t really discuss her business with me. 

* * * 

Q: Okay. And you never got a call about it from anyone, I assume 

the insurance company, attorneys, anybody? 

A: No. 

Sept. 16, 2014 Hearing, p. 11-13. 

{¶9} Katelyn testified that she moved out of her parents the night of her 

18th birthday, which was October 27, 2011. 

{¶10} Amy then testified that she received the Campbells’ complaints 

sometime near Christmas a year or two after the accident. After receiving the 

complaints, she contacted her insurance company. She stated that her insurance 

company provided her with an attorney. She then had the following relevant 

exchange: 

[Amy]: But to say exactly, I just told [the insurance company] I 

don’t understand why I was getting [the complaints] and – and, uh, 

and like I said it had been a year or two after the accident. So, it was 

– I mean I 

The Court: Did you recognize that these suit papers related – that 

those had to do with your daughter being in the car? 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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[Amy]: I didn’t at the time until, um, when I first received them 

I didn’t, but then when I called the insurance company, my agent 

here in town, and told them that I had received them, and then they 

had said, they had told me that it was due to an accident that Katelyn 

was involved in. 

Id. at p. 29-30. 

{¶11} Amy stated that it was her belief that the insurance company was 

handling the matter for herself, not Katelyn. Id. at p. 33. Amy then testified that 

she did not tell Katelyn about the lawsuit right away. She explained, 

I didn’t say anything to Katelyn until after I spoke with the lawyer. 

Because like I said, I wasn’t really sure what it pertained to, ‘cause 

like I said, it listed me as driving her car. So I didn’t know if it was 

supposed to be for me, because I own the car. ‘Cause that was what 

my agent said, “Well, maybe it’s because the car is in your name.” 

Id. at p. 36. 

{¶12} However, Amy admitted that she told Katelyn about the complaint a 

few weeks after being served. Id. at p. 35-36. She also admitted that she realized 

the complaint mistakenly named herself as the driver of the car and that she 

brought this mistake to her insurance agent’s attention. Id. at p. 31. 

{¶13} On October 24, 2014, the trial court filed its judgment entry wherein 

it denied the Campbells’ request to amend the complaint and dismissed all claims 

against Amy. 

{¶14} The Campbells timely appealed this judgment, presenting the 

following assignments of error for our review. 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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Assignment of Error No. I 

THE TRIAL LOWER [SIC] COURT ERRORED [SIC] IN 

FINDING THAT THE AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT 

WOULD NOT RELATE BACK UNDER CIVIL RULE 15(C). 

Assignment of Error No. II

THE LOWER COURT ERRORED [SIC] IN FINDING THAT 

THE CLAIMS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WOULD 

NECESSARILY BE BARRED BY CIVIL RULE 3(A) AND 

THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 

Assignment of Error No. III 

THE LOWER COURT ERRORED [SIC] IN NOT ALLOWING 

EVIDENCE REGARDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION. 

{¶15} Due to the nature of the assignments of error, we elect to address the 

first and second assignments together. 

Assignments of Error Nos. I & II 

{¶16} In their first and second assignments of error, the Campbells argue 

that the trial court erred in finding that Civ.R 3(A) would necessarily bar any 

claims raised in an amended complaint and by finding that the amendment of the 

complaint would not relate back to the original filing date under Civ.R. 15(C). We 

agree. 

Standard of Review 

{¶17} We review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to amend a 

complaint under an abuse of discretion standard. Patterson v. V & M Auto Body, 
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63 Ohio St.3d 573, 576 (1992). A trial court will be found to have abused its 

discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the 

evidence, or grossly unsound. State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 2010-Ohio278, ¶ 16-18 (2d Dist.). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a 

reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

Civ.R. 3(A) & 15(C) 

{¶18} Civ.R. 3(A) explains how to commence a civil action and states: 

A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if 

service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a named 

defendant, or upon an incorrectly named defendant whose name is 

later corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(C), or upon a defendant 

identified by a fictitious name whose name is later correct pursuant 

to Civ.R. 15(D). 

(Emphasis added.) Thus, for an action to be considered “commenced,” not only 

must a complaint be filed, but the plaintiff must serve the defendant with the 

complaint within one year from the date of the filing of the complaint. Gibson v. 

Summers, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2008-P-0032, 2008-Ohio-6995, ¶ 22. Further, 

the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that Civ.R. 3(A) must be read in pari materia 

with Civ.R. 15(C). Cecil v. Cottrill, 67 Ohio St.3d 367, 370 (1993), citing 

Amerine v. Haughton Elevator Co., 42 Ohio St.3d 57 (1989). 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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{¶19} Civ.R. 15 concerns amended and supplemental pleadings. “Under 

Civ.R. 15(C), an amendment changing a party may relate back to the filing date of 

the original complaint for purposes of applying the statutes of limitations.” 

Mollette v. Portsmouth City Council, 179 Ohio App.3d 455, 2008-Ohio-6342, ¶ 37 

(4th Dist.). Specifically, Civ.R. 15(C) provides: 

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 

relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment 

changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if 

the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided 

by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be 

brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the 

institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining 

his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, 

but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the 

action would have been brought against him. 

Thus, for an amendment to relate back to the original pleading, three requirements 

must be met. Cecil at 370. First, the amended complaint must arise from the same 

occurrence as the original complaint. Id. “Second, the party ‘brought in’ by the 

amendment must receive, ‘within the period provided by law for commencing an 

action,’ such notice of the action that the party is able to maintain a defense.” Id., 

quoting Civ.R. 15(C). Third, the new party must have known or should have 

known that but for the mistake concerning the proper party’s identity, the action 

would have been brought against the new party. Cecil at 370. “Pursuant to Cecil, 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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* * * this must occur within the same period as provided in the second 

requirement, i.e., within one year after the filing of the complaint.” Sims v. 

Agosta, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 95-CA-0019, 1996 WL 72610, *3 (Jan. 29, 1996). 

{¶20} “The plain language of [Civ.R. 15(C)] relates to the substitution of a 

proper party for one previously misidentified in the original complaint.” Coleman 

v. Featheringill, 5th Dist. Richland No. 01CA094, 2002-Ohio-4664, ¶ 17, citing 

Cecil; see also Knotts v. Solid Rock Enterprises, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

21622, 2007-Ohio-1059, ¶ 31. “The concluding clause of Civ.R. 15(C) provides 

further support for this view inasmuch as it refers to a mistake regarding the 

identity of the proper party in the original pleading.” Coleman at ¶ 17. 

{¶21} The first issue we must decide in this appeal is whether naming Amy 

as the defendant was the type of mistake that was contemplated by Civ.R. 15(C). 

Thus, the resolution of this case partially turns on the definition of “mistake,” 

which is not defined by the Civil Rules. “Mistake” is defined as “to fail to 

recognize or to identify wrongly.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1446 

(2002). We find that naming Amy instead of Katelyn as the driver of the car was a 

“mistake” pursuant to Civ.R. 15(C). See Sims, 1996 WL 72610, *4. 

{¶22} We find that the mistake the Campbells made, concerning the 

identity of the proper party, is akin to the facts in Gardner v. Molnar, 5th Dist. 

Stark No. CA-8651, 1992 WL 61595. In Gardner, the plaintiffs mistakenly 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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named Robert Molnar, the owner of the vehicle, as the defendant even though he 

was not in the car at the time of the accident or involved in the accident in any 

way. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs sought to substitute Anthony Molnar, Robert’s son, 

as Anthony was the driver of the vehicle. Id. The trial court found that the 

plaintiffs had made a mistake concerning the identity of the driver, and went on to 

analyze whether the three elements in Civ.R. 15(C) were met. Id. at *2. 

{¶23} Similarly, in Cecil, the Court found that the mistake in that case was 

that the appellants merely called the appellee by a different name. 67 Ohio St.3d 

at 371. The Court found that there was no confusion as to the identity of the 

proper defendant to be sued. Of importance, the Court found that the insurance 

carrier who adjusted the claim was given notice of the suit. Id. at 372. Further, 

the Court found that the original complaint made clear the appellants never 

intended to sue the father, but intended to sue the driver. This was evident “by the 

fact that the body of the original complaint referred only to the driver of the 

vehicle.” Id. Therefore, it was obvious “ ‘from the original complaint who the 

intended defendant was, and if [appellee] did not infer this from the summons and 

complaint, [he] should have done so.’ ” Id., quoting Hardesty v. Cabotage, 1 Ohio 

St.3d 114, 117 (1982). 

{¶24} The Court found that “ ‘[s]uch a result comports with the purpose of 

the Civil Rules. “The spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon their 
Case No. 4-14-19 

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merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.” ’ ” Id., quoting Hardesty at 117, quoting 

Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175 (1973). “Unless there is a showing 

of bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party, the rules allow 

for liberal amendment.” Roche v. On Time Delivery Servs., Inc., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 94036, 2010-Ohio-2358, ¶ 37, citing Turner v. Cent. Local School 

Dist., 85 Ohio St.3d 95, 99 (1999). 

{¶25} Since we have found that the Campbells made a mistake in naming 

the proper defendant, we must now decide whether the amendment would relate 

back to the date of the original filing under Civ.R. 15(C) and 3(A). Amy argues 

that the Campbells’ failure to serve Katelyn within one year of filing their original 

complaint is fatal to their appeal. Specifically, Amy argues that in Cecil, “the 

Ohio Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to amend their complaint to correct an 

inadvertently misspelled name of the defendant because, although his name had 

been misspelled, the proper defendant was actually served with the complaint 

within the one (1) year time period set forth in Civ.R. 3(A).” (Emphasis sic.) 

(Appellee’s Br., p. 10). We find that the appellee misrepresents the facts in Cecil. 

{¶26} The Court in Cecil made no such statement that the correct defendant 

was served within one year after the original complaint was filed. See generally 

Cecil; see also Reighard v. Cleveland Elect. Illuminating, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 

05MA120, 2006-Ohio-2814, ¶ 18. Two days after filing the original complaint, 
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service was made only upon the misnamed defendant—the father. Although the 

father and son lived together and had the same name except for the middle initial, 

the court did not rely on proper service being made as the reason for its decision. 

Rather, the Court found that the son had notice for purposes of relation back. 

Cecil, 67 Ohio St.3d at 371 (“defendant sought to be sued was given timely 

notice”). The Court also noted that service on the son did not occur until 17 

months after the original complaint was filed. Id. at 367, fn. 1. See also id. at 373 

(Wright J., dissenting) (“the plaintiff did not serve the correct defendant until more 

than seventeen months after the initial filing of the complaint”). 

{¶27} Like the plaintiff in Cecil, the Campbells named a party that had the 

capacity to be sued, i.e., Amy. The Campbells commenced the action by serving 

the complaint on Amy, even though she was not the real party in interest. Doing 

so commenced the action for purposes of Civ.R. 3(A). Thus, we must next 

determine whether the Campbells complied with Civ.R. 15(C) in order for their 

amended complaint to be deemed timely filed. 

{¶28} First, we note that it is undisputed that the proposed amended 

complaint arose from the same occurrence as the original complaint, and thus, the 

first requirement is met. Next, we note that “Civ.R. 15(C) requires notice of the 

action—not personal service—within the time period provided [by] Civ.R. 3(A).” 

Mollette at ¶ 42; see also Reighard at ¶ 17 (“[Notice] to the intended defendant 
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must occur within one year of the filing of the original complaint if the SOL has 

run and that such notice does not require service”).2

 While service can constitute 

notice, notice can exist without service. Reighard at ¶ 21. 

{¶29} Here, both Amy and Katelyn testified that Katelyn learned of the 

complaint shortly after Amy was served with it. Katelyn testified that shortly after 

the accident, she learned that her mother was served with the complaint and was 

being sued by the Campbells. See Sept. 16, 2014 Hearing, p. 12. Amy similarly 

testified that she talked to Katelyn about the complaint around Christmas time, 

shortly after being served the complaint on December 19, 2012. Id. at p. 35-36. 

Amy also testified that she realized that the complaint mistakenly named herself as 

the driver, rather than Katelyn. Amy testified that she brought this fact to her 

insurance agent’s attention. Id. at p. 31. Just as in Cecil, the mistake in this case 

is that the Campbells simply called Katelyn by a different name. Instead of the 

incorrect middle initial, they used the wrong first name. Further, the insurance 

carrier adjusting the claim was given notice of the suit. In addition, the complaint, 

by its very terms, reveals that the Campbells never intended to sue Amy, but in 

fact, intended to sue the driver, Katelyn. The body of the complaint repeatedly 

refers to the operator of the vehicle. Thus, just as in Cecil, it is evident from the 

 

2

 We note that at least one court has stated that “[t]he amended complaint must be served upon the correct 

defendant within one year of the filing of the complaint.” Cross v. Biviano, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2000-

T-0123, 2001 WL 1217011, *3 (Oct. 12, 2001). We find that such a statement is in conflict with the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s decision in Cecil, and thus, find the case unpersuasive. 
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original complaint who the intended defendant was, and if Amy and Katelyn “ ‘did 

not infer this from the summons and the complaint, [they] should have done so.’ ” 

Cecil, 67 Ohio St.3d at 372, quoting Hardesty, 1 Ohio St.3d at 117.3

 

{¶30} To avoid this result, Amy compares the case sub judice to the two 

cases of Brady v. Bucyrus Police Dept., 194 Ohio App.3d 574, 2011-Ohio-2460 

(3d Dist.), and McAbee v. Merryman, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 3, 2013-Ohio5291. However, we find both cases distinguishable. This court’s decision in 

Brady dealt with Civ.R. 15(D), not Civ.R. 15(C). In McAbee, the plaintiffs did not 

perfect service on anyone within the one-year period pronounced in Civ.R. 3(A). 

Thus, we find both cases to be unpersuasive and not controlling to the outcome in 

this case. 

{¶31} In conclusion, we hold that the amendment to name Katelyn and 

dismiss Amy should have been freely granted under the facts and circumstances 

presented in this case. The amended complaint would have related back to the 

date of the original complaint and that the proper defendant received timely notice 

of the pending action. 

 

3 We also find it odd that Amy, a party whom the appellants agree should be dismissed from the action, 

continues to advance arguments to uphold the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to amend. Since no 

one contests Amy’s lack of liability in this case, she has no standing to oppose the motion to amend. Amy 

and Katelyn are covered under the same insurance policy, so they presumably have the same attorney. This 

further shows that Katelyn would not be prejudiced by the amended complaint, as her attorney has been 

involved in the litigation since its inception and has been advocating on her behalf the entire time. 
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{¶32} Accordingly, we sustain the Campbells’ first and second assignments 

of error. 

Assignment of Error No. III 

{¶33} In their third assignment of error, the Campbells argue that the trial 

court erred by not allowing evidence regarding Amy’s and Katelyn’s legal 

representation. Due to the resolution of the Campbells’ first and second 

assignments of error, this argument is moot and we elect not to address it. App.R. 

12(A)(1)(c). 

{¶34} Having found error prejudicial to the Campbells in their first and 

second assignments of error, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this 

matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment Reversed and 

Cause Remanded 

SHAW and PRESTON, J.J., concur. 

/jlr