J-A11038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JONATHAN PARKS

Appellant No. 852 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of March 13, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0007840-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

Jonathan Parks appeals his March 13, 2014 judgment of sentence. 

Specifically, Parks contests the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to 

suppress certain evidence and statements. We hold that, while the initial 

detention of Parks was constitutional, he ultimately was formally arrested 

without constitutionally adequate probable cause. We reverse the 

suppression order, and we vacate Parks’ judgment of sentence. 

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On January 23, 2014, [the trial court] conducted a full and fair 

hearing concerning a motion to suppress argued on behalf of 

[Parks.] This matter concerned confiscated physical evidence 

and inculpatory statements that [Parks] made pursuant to his 

arrest on June 1, 2013. [The trial court] denied [Parks’] motion 

and proceeded to a bench trial, incorporating all testimony and 

previously contested evidence into the record. [The 

Commonwealth] proceeded on charges of carrying a firearm 
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without a license[, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106,] (“the § 6106 charge”), 

carrying a firearm in public in the City of Philadelphia[, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 6108,] (“the § 6108 charge”), and criminal trespass[, 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3503.] Finding [Parks] guilty of all charges, [the 

trial court] imposed consecutive sentences of 11 1⁄2 to 23 months 

of imprisonment and 5 years of probation on [both] the § 6106 

charge and [] on the § 6108 charge. [The trial court] imposed 

no penalty on the criminal trespass charge. [Parks] then filed a 

notice of appeal and a [concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 17, 2014, 

the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).]

* * *

The location at issue in this case is a transportation facility 

known as 30th Street Station, a privately operated building that 

permits limited public access for purposes of travel to and from 

the trains located beneath the station. The “South Arcade” 

section of the lobby is an area designed for food purchasing and 

consumption. The use of tables in the South Arcade is also 

limited to persons eating food. Within all sections of the station, 

posted signs identify the limited scope of permitted access and 

related rules of conduct. Vagrancy and public sleeping in food 

court areas is not permitted. Uniformed Amtrak Police Officers 

are assigned to patrol the building in an effort to keep all 

patrons, travelers, and employees safe. 

In the morning of June 1, 2013, uniformed Amtrak Police 

Officers Tom McCormick and Dean Stecklair were on patrol at 

the 30th Street Train Station in the City of Philadelphia. At 

approximately 6:30 a.m., they noticed [Parks], who was wearing 

several layers of “dirty, baggy clothing” and sleeping at a table 

designated for food consumption with a bag under his seat in the 

South Arcade area of the train station. They did not recall 

seeing any food or other personal items on or near the table. 

The officers approached [Parks] and roused him from his sleep.

Upon awakening, [Parks] jumped from his chair, pushed the 

chair backwards and faced the officers with closed fists. He 

avoided eye contact, anxiously surveyed his surroundings and 

“looked at the exits” in the train station. He then grabbed the 

bag that had been under the seat and seemed to be “protecting 

it” from the officers. Alarmed by [Parks’] behavior and fearing a 

physical confrontation, the officers asked [Parks] to return to his 

seat.
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The officers asked [Parks] to show them a train ticket or 

otherwise explain his presence in the station. [Parks] could not 

produce a ticket, and he stated that he had not patronized any 

of the businesses in the station. [Parks] told the officers that he 

intended to purchase a “Megabus” ticket. The officers were 

aware of the fact that Megabuses operated from a location 

outside the station and approximately two blocks away. As 

such, [Parks’] explanation for his presence in the station did not 

make sense to the officers.

At that time, Officer Stecklair asked [Parks] for permission to 

search his bag. When [Parks] declined, the officers asked 

[Parks] to produce his identification. [Parks] complied with this 

request, and the officers began to check his information in the 

law enforcement database. Suddenly, [Parks] grabbed his bag 

and attempted to run. The officers, acutely aware of the 

incidents of extreme violence that recently occurred when 

individuals placed bombs in bags and detonated them in public 

areas surrounding the Boston Marathon, responded to the 

immediate potential threat: they stopped [Parks], searched his 

bag, and arrested him for criminal trespass. 

Inside the bag, the officers found a loaded firearm, additional 

rounds of ammunition, two knives, pepper spray, a wig, a mask, 

blue overalls, four checkbooks (none of which were in [Parks’] 

name), car rental receipts, Western Union receipts, and various 

forms of paperwork, among other items.

In his formal post-arrest statement to Detective Richard 

Antonini, [Parks] admitted to being in possession and ownership 

of the bag and its contents, including the unlicensed firearm. He 

explained that he arrived in Philadelphia on a Megabus from New 

York City on May 30, 2013. He stated that he entered the train 

station around 12:00 a.m. on June 1, 2013, and slept there 

overnight. He confessed that he purchased the firearm in Little 

Rock, Arkansas, and carried it with him in his travels. Finally, 

[Parks] admitted that he had attempted to flee from the officers.

At trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony to prove that a 

Megabus passenger invariably must travel on some public street 

in Philadelphia in order to enter the 30th Street Train Station. 

Also, the Commonwealth introduced the train station “Rules of 

Conduct.” Those rules explain that entry into the station 

constitutes an agreement to comply with the rules, and that 

anyone who violates “any of these Rules or any existing state 
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statutes or local ordinances will be subject to ejection and/or 

criminal prosecution in accordance with the Pennsylvania Crimes 

Code.” The rules also provide that no person in the train station 

shall “[e]ndanger the safety of others, engage in fighting, 

assault another person,” or “threaten another person with such 

conduct.” 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 7/17/2014, at 1-4 (minor grammatical 

modifications). 

Parks raises three questions for our review:

1. Did not the trial court err as a matter of law in denying 

[Parks’] motion to suppress evidence in violation of his state 

and federal rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures where [Parks] was subjected to an investigatory 

detention without reasonable suspicion that he was engaged 

in criminal activity, in that he was merely sleeping at a table 

in a facility that was open to the public at the time he was 

seized?

2. Did not the trial court err as a matter of law in denying 

[Parks’] motion to suppress evidence in violation of his state 

and federal rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures where [Parks] was arrested without probable cause 

that he had committed or was committing a crime?

3. Did not the trial court err as a matter of law in denying 

[Parks’] motion to suppress evidence in violation of his state 

and federal rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures where [Parks’] bag was searched without probable 

cause, a search warrant, or exigent circumstances?

Brief for Parks at 3. 

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 
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108, 115 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 

A.2d 495, 499 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in 

reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts. 

Jones, 874 A.2d at 115 (quoting Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 

66, 67 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

We first must determine the type of interaction that occurred between 

Parks and the Amtrak police officers, a conclusion that then will dictate the 

level of suspicion that the officers were required to exhibit before interacting 

with Parks. Interactions between police and citizens are broken down into 

three categories: mere encounters, investigative detentions, and custodial 

detentions. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 725 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 

2000). Each level requires a distinct level of justification, depending upon 

the nature of the interaction between the police and the citizen. Id. A mere 

encounter can be any formal or informal interaction, and carries no official 

compulsion to stop and respond. Thus, it does not require any level of 

suspicion. Commonwealth v. Guzman, 44 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. 

2012). An investigative detention carries with it an official compulsion to 

stop and respond, and, while temporary, must be justified by “specific and 

articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged 

in criminal activity.” Jones, 874 A.2d at 116. (quoting Dehart, 725 A.2d at 
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636). An arrest, otherwise known as a custodial detention, must be 

supported by probable cause. Id. 

Both the trial court and the Commonwealth maintain that the initial 

contact with Parks was a mere encounter. At 6:30 a.m., the officers 

observed Parks wearing several layers of clothing and sleeping on a table in 

the South Arcade area of the train station. Seeing no food or drinks on the 

table, the officers decided to wake Parks. At this juncture, the trial court 

and the Commonwealth correctly assert that the interaction constituted a 

mere encounter, requiring no particular level of suspicion by the officers 

before confronting Parks. See Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 

325 (Pa. Super. 2010) (noting a mere encounter occurs when an officer 

approaches a citizen in public for the purpose of making inquiries.) (citations 

omitted). 

However, the mere encounter quickly escalated into an investigatory 

detention, which, as we discuss below, was supported by reasonable 

suspicion. See id. at 326 (“Because the level of intrusion may change 

during the course of the encounter, the record must be carefully scrutinized 

for any evidence of such changes.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 

A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

“An investigative detention occurs when a police officer 

temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a 

show of authority for investigative purposes.” Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. 

2005)). In other words, in view of all the circumstances, if a 

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
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leave, then the interaction constitutes an investigatory 

detention. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 642 A.2d 1126, 

1129 (Pa. Super. 1994) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harper, 

611 A.2d 1211, 1215 (Pa. Super. 1992)); Commonwealth v. 

Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1218-19 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 562 (Pa. Super. 

2004)). An investigatory detention triggers the constitutional 

protection of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, and the prerequisites for such a detention as set 

forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–26, (1968); Smith, 904 

A.2d at 35 (quoting Barber, 889 A.2d. at 592).

An investigative detention is lawful if supported by reasonable 

suspicion. Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 269 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (quoting Hill, 874 A.2d at 1217). “To meet the 

standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer must point to 

specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational 

inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Smith, 

904 A.2d at 35 (quotation omitted). In addition, “we must look 

to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 

officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” 

Id. at 35–36 (quoting Barber, 889 A.2d at 593). An 

investigative detention may last “as is necessary to confirm or 

dispel such suspicion.” Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 

495, 500 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000)).

Cauley, 10 A.3d at 325-26 (citations modified; footnote omitted). 

Once the police officers woke Parks from his slumber, Parks hopped 

out of his chair, pushed the chair to the ground, and assumed an aggressive 

posture. The officers immediately commanded Parks to sit down.1 Parks 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court incorrectly states that the officers “asked [Parks] to 

return to his seat”. T.C.O. at 3. The record does not support the trial 

court’s cordial characterization of this critical moment. Officer McCormick 

clearly testified that he “told him to sit down.” Notes of Testimony, (“N.T.”), 

1/23/2014, at 19. 
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complied with the order. However, once seated, Parks looked toward the 

exits of the Arcade multiple times. The police officers each took a position 

on a side of Parks, ensuring that he could not leave the area while they 

questioned him. 

We have no trouble concluding that, when the officers instructed Parks 

to sit and then surrounded him, an investigative detention occurred. Faced 

with these compelling actions, no reasonable person would have felt that he 

or she was free to walk away from the officers. See Commonwealth v.

Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 1216-17 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that a mere 

encounter escalated into an investigatory detention, and that the suspect 

was seized for constitutional purposes, when a police officer commanded a 

suspect not to run); see also Commonwealth v. Zogby, 689 A.2d 280, 

282 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“The reality of the matter is that when a police 

officer requests a civilian to do something, even something as simple as 

“move along,” it is most often perceived as a command that will be met with 

an unpleasant response if disobeyed. Thus, unless told that they have a 

right to decline, most individuals are not likely to perceive a request from a 

police officer as allowing for a choice.”). In fact, Parks was blocked from 

moving from his chair by the officers. No one in that position would believe 

it reasonable to remove himself or herself from those circumstances. 

Our inquiry then turns to whether the investigatory detention was 

supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court found that reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot was present due to Parks’ 
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“apparent trespass and slumber in the food section, his clothing, his 

skittishness, his lack of eye contact, his surveying the area, his peering at 

the exits, his aggressive posture, his clenched fists, [and] his safeguarding 

the bag.” T.C.O. at 8. Aside from the “apparent trespass,” which we discuss 

in more detail below, the trial court correctly assessed the totality of the 

circumstances, and concluded that the Amtrak officers had reasonable 

suspicion to detain Parks. As a general rule, “[f]urtive movements and 

nervousness, standing alone, do not support the existence of reasonable 

suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 670 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). Thus, Parks’ skittishness and lack of eye contact, as well 

as his perusal of the area for means of exit, do not, by themselves, 

constitute reasonable suspicion. However, those actions are relevant 

considerations in assessing the totality of the circumstances, and, when 

combined with other suspicious behaviors, may result in finding that 

reasonable suspicion existed. Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 606 

n.7 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Not only did the police 

witness the suspicious behaviors noted above, they also observed Parks 

jump up from his slumber and assume an aggressive position with clenched 

fists. At a minimum, the officers could have reasonably suspected that 

Parks was about to commit an assault on them, justifying the investigatory 

detention that followed Parks’ actions. 
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However, that is not the end of our review. Once Parks was detained, 

the officers asked him why he was at the station, and whether he had 

bought a ticket or was in the station to patronize one of the businesses or 

services located therein. Parks admitted that he was not there to shop or 

eat, but instead was waiting to board a Megabus, even though Megabus did 

not have a ticket counter in the station and even though he did not have a 

ticket for the Megabus. During this phase of the investigation, Parks acted 

protectively towards his bag, and would not let the police officers search its 

contents. While the police were running his identification through the police 

databases and informing him (albeit incorrectly) that the station was a 

private location, Parks grabbed his bag and attempted to flee from the 

officers. The police immediately placed him under arrest for an alleged 

trespass, and subsequently searched his bag. N.T. at 20. Because it is 

undisputed that this was a warrantless arrest, our inquiry becomes whether 

the arrest was supported by probable cause. We hold that it was not. 

Our probable cause inquiry is guided by the following principles:

[L]aw enforcement authorities must have a warrant to 

arrest an individual in a public place unless they have 

probable cause to believe that 1) a felony has been 

committed; and 2) the person to be arrested is the felon. 

A warrant is also required to make an arrest for a 

misdemeanor, unless the misdemeanor is committed in the 

presence of the police officer. The legislature, however, 

has authorized law enforcement officers to make 

warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside 

their presence in certain circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999) 

(citations omitted).
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In order to determine whether probable cause exists to justify a 

warrantless arrest, we must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. Id. at 1252; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 233 (1983). “Probable cause exists where the facts 

and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to 

warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an 

offense has been or is being committed,” and must be “viewed 

from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police 

officer on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his 

experience and training.” Clark, supra at 1252 (quotation 

omitted). As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] stated:

Probable cause is made out when the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the 

officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has 

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the 

suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The 

question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was 

correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require 

only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 

criminal activity. In determining whether probable cause 

exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) 

(emphasis in original; citations and quotation marks omitted).

In the Fourth Amendment context, “the fact that the officer does 

not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons 

which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does 

not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, 

viewed objectively, justify that action.” Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). In other words,

Fourth Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an 

objective inquiry. We ask whether the circumstances, 

viewed objectively, justify the challenged action. If so, 

that action was reasonable whatever the subjective intent 

motivating the relevant officials. This approach recognizes 

that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than 

thoughts. . . .

Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 

2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (citations and quotation mark 

omitted).
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In consideration of the above principles, the main focus of 

Appellant’s argument, which is on the specific crimes articulated 

by the arresting officer, is misplaced. See Maryland v. 

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (observing that the probable 

cause standard is a “nontechnical conception that deals with the 

factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”). 

Again, the inquiry must simply focus on whether the relevant 

facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge 

are sufficient to lead any person of reasonable caution to 

conclude that an offense has been or is being committed, based 

on a “probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal 

activity.” Thompson, supra at 931 (quoting Gates, supra at 

235).

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721-22 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

modified).

Hence, we must consider whether a person of reasonable caution 

would conclude that Parks probably had committed, or was committing, a 

crime. Having reviewed the record thoroughly, it is apparent to us that the 

only reasonable crime that the police could have suspected that Parks had 

committed was trespass. A person commits a criminal trespass if, “knowing 

that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he . . . enters, gains entry by 

subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1). 

Here, the evidence offered by the Commonwealth at the suppression falls 

short of establishing probable cause that Parks was trespassing on the date 

in question.

We first note that, as discussed above, the police had reasonable 

suspicion to detain Parks initially in large part due to his aggressive posture 
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and clenched fists. Once he was detained, suspicion that Parks was going to 

commit an assault obviously dissipated. Additionally, that behavior in no 

way contributed to a suspicion that Parks was trespassing. 

The remainder of the evidence also does not lead to the conclusion 

that a reasonable person would believe that Parks was trespassing. When 

Parks first was observed, he was wearing shabby clothes and was sleeping, 

neither of which lends any support to a reasonable conclusion that Parks 

illegally was in the train station. That he fell asleep does not distinguish him 

from any other person in any substantive way that outwardly would indicate 

that he was in a place in which he was not entitled to be. Additionally, no 

reasonable person could, or should, associate criminal behavior based 

strictly upon the cleanliness of one’s clothing, or how well that clothing fits. 

Parks also acted somewhat skittish, peering at exits and guarding his 

bag closely. At one point, Parks also grabbed his bag and attempted to flee 

the officers’ detention. Without more, this evidence establishes nothing 

more than Parks’ discomfort in police custody. See Commonwealth v. 

Banks, 658 A.2d 752, 753 (Pa. 1995) (noting that flight alone does not 

amount to probable cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant). To glean 

from these actions that a crime had been committed would amount to 

conjecture, at best. 

The only other evidence relevant to a potential trespass are the facts

that Parks did not have a ticket for a train and had not patronized any of the 

businesses or services located within the station. Our inquiry hinges, 
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therefore, on whether Parks simply was not permitted to be in the train 

station at all under these circumstances. The parties dispute this crucial 

point, each arguing that the “Rules of Conduct” that govern the behavior 

inside the train station support their relative positions. The preamble to the 

“Rules of Conduct” provides as follows:

Public areas with the Station are open to the public at such times 

as may be established by the National Railroad Passenger 

Corporation. Public areas are those of the facility which are 

intended for the use by the public in accessing transportation, 

arcades, restaurants, shops, officers and other businesses in the 

facility, in traveling through the station from one point to 

another, in waiting for transportation, and in utilizing public 

lavatory facilities and public pay telephones or other services as 

may be permitted by these Rules. 

Amtrak, 30th Street Station Rules of Conduct, at 1. 

The overnight operations provision of the Rules of Conduct provides as 

follows:

(a) Between the hours of midnight and 5:00 a.m. seven days 

a week the south arcade area of the station will be closed 

to the public. Seating in the remainder of the 30th Street 

Station accessible to the public is open to ticketed 

passengers only.

(b) Presentation of tickets: No person shall refuse or fail to 

present a valid Amtrak, SEPTA, or New Jersey Transit 

ticket, employee pass or dependent pass, or tender the 

applicable fare, as required during the period described in 

paragraph (a) of this section.

Id. at 2. 

Based upon the clear language of the overnight operations provision, 

the station, including the arcade section where Parks was located, is open to 
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the public at any time other than midnight to 5:00 a.m. Parks first was 

observed at 6:30 a.m., a time that the station is open entirely to the public. 

Moreover, subsection (b) of that provision only requires a person to have a 

valid ticket during those times set forth by subsection (a). Thus, to be 

permitted in the arcade section, Parks did not need to have a ticket at the 

time he was observed or arrested. 

The Preamble defines the areas that are open to the public during the 

time that Parks was there as “those of the facility which are intended for the 

use by the public in accessing . . . arcades.” Id. at 1. This was precisely 

where Parks was located when the police first observed him. 

In sum, Parks was at the train station at a time when he was allowed 

to be there, in a location that was open to the public, and at a time when a 

ticket was not required to lawfully be in that particular location. Parks in no 

way violated the relevant portions of the “Rules of Conduct.” No person of 

reasonable caution could conclude that Parks was trespassing under these 

circumstances, as he clearly was permitted to be there. Consequently, the 

Amtrak officers, undoubtedly familiar with the “Rules of Conduct,” lacked 

probable cause to arrest Parks. Because the arrest was unconstitutional, the 

subsequent search of Parks’ bag and any statements that he uttered to the 

police also are tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (holding that evidence 

discovered as a result of a violation of the Fourth Amendment must be 

excluded from evidence).
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Judgment of sentence vacated and order denying Park’s suppression 

motion reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015