SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1141-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM B. WOODS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted May 10, 2021 – Decided May 26, 2021

Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-05-

0604.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-1141-19

Defendant William B. Woods appeals from an October 25, 2019 judgment 

of conviction after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon, focusing 

his argument on the November 1, 2018 order denying his motion to suppress 

evidence. We affirm.

The facts are based on the testimony adduced during the October 30, 2018 

suppression hearing. The judge considered the testimony of Patrolmen Joshua 

J. Treusch and Michael Hampton of the Mount Laurel Police Department. In 

addition, the judge viewed the DVD footage from the officers' body-worn

cameras (BWCs). 

On February 17, 2018, Patrolman Treusch was dispatched to the Red Roof 

Inn after several hotel guests reported a domestic violence incident in Room 

233. One of the guests told a hotel employee about a fight between a man and 

a woman, reporting the man "was like walking in the room and wouldn't let her 

out and hurting her like." Another guest reported "that a female was being held 

against her will and that the male had threatened her life." The hotel manager 

told the patrolman that "the lady in 233 call[ed her and said] that's me and my 

baby's daddy out there but we're not really fighting." 

Treusch called for backup and waited outside the hotel for other officers

to arrive. Due to the report of a domestic violence incident, Treusch was 
3

A-1141-19

required to investigate to ensure "the safety and well-being of all individuals 

inside of the room." 

Patrolmen Hampton and Levy arrived about five minutes later. The 

officers proceeded to Room 233, and Treusch knocked on the door several times, 

announcing "Mount Laurel Police." When no one answered the door, the 

officers obtained a master key from the hotel staff in order to enter the room and 

confirm the female occupant was "okay." 

After opening the door and entering the room, the officers saw a dog lying 

on the bed next to a silver, snub-nose .38 revolver with a wooden handle. The 

officers removed the gun and checked the room, searching for occupants who 

might be injured or endangered. Except for the dog, the room was empty. While 

checking the room, the officers detected a strong odor of marijuana and saw a 

safe on the floor with the door ajar.

1

Shortly after the police entered Room 233, the female occupant arrived. 

Treusch asked her about the male occupant. The woman said that was her 

boyfriend, and he left the hotel to return home. The female occupant gave the 

officers a false name and date of birth for her boyfriend. 

1

 Inside the safe, the officers found marijuana and money.
4

A-1141-19

Treusch asked the female occupant if she was okay. She replied, "I'm 

perfectly fine." She further told the officer the couple was fighting but "we was 

just playing so." 

While the female occupant was speaking to the officers, defendant 

returned to Room 233 and yelled out, "Babe, babe, come on, tell them we were 

playing." Defendant gave Patrolman Treusch a false first name and incorrect

date of birth. The officers detained defendant and explained why he was being 

detained. Defendant then yelled, "Yo officer, everything's mine, everything. 

Whatever's there is mine. Whatever's in there – she don't got nothing to do with 

nothing, officer . . . She don't got nothing to do with it. It's mine, it's mine." 

The officers frisked defendant. Defendant asked if their BWCs were

activated, and the officers confirmed the cameras were recording. Defendant 

then gave the officers his true name and date of birth. After checking the serial 

number on the gun found in Room 233, the officers learned the gun had been 

stolen. 

After his arrest, defendant was charged with second-degree possession of 

a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); second-degree 

possession of a weapon during the course of committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 
5

A-1141-19

2C:39-4.1(a); third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a); thirddegree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4); third-degree 

distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); fourth-degree possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-10(a)(3); and second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges. 

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized 

from Room 233 the night of the incident. The judge conducted an evidentiary 

hearing and heard the arguments of counsel on October 30, 2018. At the 

conclusion of the testimony, and after reviewing the footage from the officers' 

BWCs, the judge denied the suppression motion. The judge found the testimony 

of Patrolmen Treusch and Hampton credible and they testified "consistently." 

He noted "the testimony [wa]s also supported by the body cam footage that was 

marked as S-2 and S-3 in evidence and displayed during the course of [the] 

proceeding." The judge explained he found the officers' "testimony to be 

credible and that it's corroborated by the body worn cameras." 

The judge concluded:

I find in this particular case that the police, that the 

State have met their burden of showing that [there] was 

a basis for the emergency aid and/or community 

caretaking doctrine. The court finds that the actions of 
6

A-1141-19

Patrolman Treusch and Patrolman Hampton were 

entirely reasonable in light of all of the facts and 

circumstances presented to them. They c[a]me to a call 

of domestic violence. They are told that there are 

several complaints from guests on the second floor that 

a female (1) is being held against her wishes and (2) 

that there was a threat to kill the female.

Based on that information alone it would be reasonable 

for the officers to go to the room to investigate. . . . 

Now there is a call from the [female occupant of Room 

233] saying we were just playing. The officers as well 

as the hotel manager are not required to accept a call 

from the victim, alleged victim of domestic violence, 

that there is no domestic violence. It is entirely 

common, reasonable and understood generally that 

victims of domestic violence at times will deny that 

they've been abused. . . . 

In any event, the officers had no way of verifying that 

and so their investigation into the room was entirely 

justified. 

. . . .

The critical issue for the court is whether or not – and 

the parties acknowledge the issue – is whether or not 

the entry into the room was permissible. The court 

finds it was entirely permissible for the reasons stated.

 

After the judge's denial of the motion to suppress the physical evidence 

seized from Room 233, defendant entered into a negotiated agreement with the 

State wherein he pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon. At the plea hearing on July 15, 2019, the judge accepted the plea as 
7

A-1141-19

negotiated, including defendant's reservation of the right to appeal the denial of 

his motion to suppress the weapon. On October 25, 2019, the judge sentenced 

defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement to a term of five 

years in prison with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility under the 

Graves Act. The remaining charges were dismissed. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:

THE SEARCH OF THE HOTEL ROOM WAS AN 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARRANTLESS SEARCH, 

AND THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 

THE POLICE ENTRY WAS WARRANTED UNDER 

THE EMERGENCY AID OR COMMUNITY 

CARETAKING DOCTRINE WAS ERROR.

In our review of the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we "must 

defer" to the motion judge's factual findings "so long as those findings are 

supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 

538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). We ordinarily 

defer to those findings because they "are substantially influenced by [the 

judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the 

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 

(2014) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). We will disregard 

those findings only when a trial judge's findings of fact are "so clearly mistaken 

that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." State v. 
8

A-1141-19

Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37-38 (2018) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 

(2014)). We review a motion judge's legal conclusions de novo. Dunbar, 229 

N.J. at 538. 

"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution 

guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or 

seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012). The State has the burden 

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that warrantless searches and 

seizures are "justified by one of the 'well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant 

requirement." State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 

179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)).

The State argued the emergency aid and community caretaker exceptions

to the search warrant requirement applied in this case based on reports of a 

domestic violence incident involving a female occupant in Room 233. When 

exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a communitycaretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a home under 

the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Vargas, 213 

N.J. 301, 323 (2013). The emergency aid doctrine "is derived from the 

commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may require public 

safety officials, such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for 
9

A-1141-19

the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State 

v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frankel, 

179 N.J. at 598). Under the emergency-aid exception, the State must show "(1) 

the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 

require[d] that he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve 

life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between 

the emergency and the area or places to be searched.'" Id. at 470 (first alteration 

in original) (quoting State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012)). 

"The emergency-aid doctrine . . . must be 'limited to the reasons and 

objectives that prompted' the need for immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 

134 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in 

plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not 

exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." Hathaway, 

222 N.J. at 470 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600). 

Here, the officers were dispatched to the hotel based on reports from other 

hotel guests of a domestic violence incident in Room 233. Based on those 

reports and the failure of anyone to answer the door when the police knocked 

and announced their presence, the officers were unable to ascertain whether 

there was someone inside Room 233 who required immediate emergency 
10 A-1141-19

assistance. Police officers need not "stand by in the face of imminent danger 

and delay potential life-saving measures while critical and precious time is 

expended obtaining a warrant." Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599.

The community caretaking function also justified the officers' entry into 

Room 233. See State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (holding "police officers 

perform a wide range of social services, such as aiding those in danger of harm, 

preserving property, and 'creat[ing] and maintain[ing] a feeling of security in 

the community.)'" In Vargas, our Supreme Court held "[p]olice officers serving 

in a community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into 

a home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." 213 

N.J. at 323. 

While there are similarities between the emergency aid and community

caretaking exceptions, the two exceptions are doctrinally separate and distinct. 

State v. Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2011). "The communitycaretaker exception asks whether the police are 'engaged in "functions, [which 

are] totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 

relating to the violation of a statute."'" Id. at 192 (quoting State v. Navarro, 310 

N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App. Div. 1998)). The emergency aid exception focuses 

on an objectively reasonable belief an emergency exists and there is a reasonable 
11 A-1141-19

nexus between the emergency and the area to be searched. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 

at 470. 

Here, the officers were engaged in their function as community caretakers, 

investigating whether someone occupying Room 233 was in immediate danger,

requiring emergency aid. In addition, under the emergency aid exception, the 

officers' conduct was objectively reasonable based on multiple reports from 

other hotel guests that a woman was being threatened and held against her will

in the hotel room. Once the officers entered the room searching for someone 

who may have required immediate assistance, the officers conducted a limited 

search of the room. Based on their limited search, the officers found an open 

safe on the hotel room's floor, containing marijuana and cash, and a gun lying 

on the bed. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge did not abuse 

his discretion in determining the community caretaking doctrine and emergency

aid exception applied under these circumstances, justifying the warrantless 

search of the hotel room. Thus, the judge properly denied defendant's motion to 

suppress. 

Affirmed.