alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Black Hills Power, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, David R. Emery, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------|

15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|

respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

| Date:  March 21, 2007 |                    |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
|                  |                    |
|                  | /s/ David R. Emery      |
|                  | David R. Emery          |
|                  | Chairman, President and |
|                  | Chief Executive Officer |
NO.03-JS-00333-CV

In the Court of Appeals

for the Third Judicial District of Texas

at Austin

JOSEPH P. THWEATT,

Appellant,

v.

BILLINGSLEY HOUSE MOVING, INC., and OLIVER BILLINGSLEY,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the 353rd Judicial District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-I-GN-14-005006

AGREED MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1, appellant, Joseph P. Thweatt,

files this Agreed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, seeking voluntary dismissal of this appeal

with prejudice.

Thweatt perfected this appeal by filing a notice of appeal on June 2, 2015, of an

interlocutory order of the 353rd Judicial District Court of Travis County. The order

denied a motion to dismiss a defamation claim asserted by Billingsley, which motion

Page 1 of2

ACCEPTED

03-15-00333-CV

6108174

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/17/2015 9:04:28 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/17/2015 9:04:28 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
Thweatt filed pursuant to Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code chapter 27. The

Parties have resolved the dispute between them with respect to the defamation claim

only; therefore, Thweatt no longer wishes to prosecute this interlocutory appeal of his

motion to dismiss the defamation claim. Accordingly, Thweatt requests that the Clerk

dismiss this appeal with prejudice, with costs of appeal to be paid by the Thweatt.

Appellees Billingsley House Moving, Inc., and Oliver Billingsley are in agreement

with this motion, as reflected by the signature of their counsel below.

Dated: i/11 {,('

I I

Respectfully submitted,

Tom~-

Law Office of Tom Murphy

9600 Great Hills Trail, Suite 150 W

Austin, TX 78759

Telephone: (512) 477-5680

Facsimile: 512-493-0691

tom@tommurphyslaw.com

L. Lee Thweatt

State BarNo. 24008160

TERRY & THWEATT, P.C.

One Greenway Plaza, Suite 100

Houston, Texas 77046-0102

Telephone: (713) 600-4710

Facsimile: (713) 600-4706

Ithweatt@terrythweatt.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Carl R. Galant

State Bar No. 24050633

MCGINNIS LOCHRIDGE

600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2100

Austin, Texas 78701

Telephone: (512) 495-6083

Facsimile: (512) 505-6383

cgalant@mcginnislaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Page 2 of2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         913,372                       0
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  580,877                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (400,000)                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,999,469                       0
<PP&E>                                       4,785,600                       0
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,657,731)                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,427,022                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          796,258                       0
<BONDS>                                      2,184,393                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                    690,000                       0
<COMMON>                                         6,527                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,749,844                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,427,022                       0
<SALES>                                              0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,330,240               1,271,224
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,161,626               1,911,038
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             117,690                  38,086
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,949,076)               (677,900)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (455,964)                (20,089)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,493,112)               (657,811)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,493,112)               (657,811)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.23)                  (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.23)                  (0.10)


</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.2





Certification of Principal
Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Scout Acquisition, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended
March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Christopher Kelly, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Christopher KellyChristopher
      Kelly
                  Principal
      Financial Officer
                  May
      17, 2010
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-6321
WARREN CHASE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. WAYNE M. EVERD; THE ANNAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:07-cv-02581-CCB) Submitted: May 22, 2008 Decided: May 30, 2008 Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Warren Chase, Appellant Pro Se. Michael John Winkelman, MCCARTHY & COSTELLO, LLP, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Warren Chase appeals the district court’s order dismissing his complaint seeking the return of property and money as frivolous. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district court. See Chase v. Everd , No. 1:07-cv-02581-CCB (D. Md. Jan. 14, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
----

** Exhibit 31.2**

**  CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Martin S. Smiley, certify that:

1.  

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of mPhase Technologies, Inc.;

2. 

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. 

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4. 

The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant's and have:

a. 

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b. 

Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

c. 

Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. 

The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a. 

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b. 

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting.

/s/ Martin S. Smiley                

Martin S. SmileyChief Financial Officer

November 14, 2007

 

----
#### AMERMAN et al. v. BUTTE COPPER & ZINC CO. et al.

No. 135.

District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division.

Nov. 28, 1945.

*31H. L. Maury, E. N. Genzberger, and A. G. Shone, all of Butte, Mont., for plaintiffs.

W. H. Hoover, R. H. Glover, John V. Dwyer, James T. Finlen, Jr., and Sam Stephenson, Jr., all of Butte, Mont., for defendants.

BROWN, District Judge.

The plaintiffs have appealed from the action of the Clerk in disallowing an item of $24.75, expense of taking a deposition of the witness William O’Kelley claimed by the plaintiffs in their cost bill as lawful costs which should have been taxed.

The case was tried before the Court and jury, resulting in a verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The deposition of the witness O’Kelley was not offered in evidence at the trial of the case and was not received in evidence.

Rule 54(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provides, where material, as follows: “(d) Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; * *

This rule has been construed to place within the discretion of the Court what items shall properly be taxable as costs except where a statute or a rule provides that designated items are allowable as costs. Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 2 Cir., 139 Fed.2d 571.

Rule 70, paragraph 7 of the local rules of the United States District Court for the District of Montana, pertaining to costs and the taxation of costs by the Clerk, provides : “In taxing costs, the following rules (among others) shall be observed: (f) Every deposition, whether taken before an examiner or upon commission, and read or offered in evidence, shall be deemed to have been admitted in evidence, unless the Court has expressly excluded the same.”

As I read the above rule, it provides that only the cost of taking such depositions as are actually read or offered in evidence at the trial of the case by the prevailing party shall be taxed as costs. It thus appears that there is a prevailing rule in this District with reference to the subject matter which takes the question out of the discretion of the Court, and as the deposition for which costs are claimed was neither read nor offered in evidence at the trial by the plaintiff, the cost of taking it cannot be lawfully taxed against the defendant and the Clerk was right in refusing to tax the item claimed
xlgroup-6.30.2013-EX_10.9




EXHIBIT 10.9




AMENDMENT TO 
XL GROUP PLC DIRECTORS STOCK & OPTION PLAN
(as amended and restated as of April 30, 2010)
The Directors Stock & Option Plan (the “Plan”) is amended, effective April 26, 2013, as set forth herein.  
1.Section 5(a) of the Plan is amended to read in its entirety as follows:
“(a)    Initial Option Grant.  Each Director who is first elected to the Board subsequent to April 26, 2013 shall be granted an Option to purchase 5,000 Shares (or such other number of Shares, as determined from time to time by the Board) on the date such Director is first elected to the Board (or if such date is not within an open window period under the Company's Securities Trading Policy, on the first trading day of the next open window period) and such Option shall have an exercise price per Share equal to 100% of the Fair Market Value per Share on the date of grant; provided, however, that such price shall be at least equal to the par value of a Share.  Each Option granted to a Director under this Section 5(a) shall become vested and exercisable in three equal annual installments, beginning on the first anniversary of the date of grant and continuing on each of the following two anniversaries thereof, so long as the Director's service on the Board continues through such dates, and such Option shall expire on the earlier of (i) the second anniversary of the date the Director ceases to be a member of the Board for any reason and (ii) the tenth anniversary of the date of grant.  If a Director's service on the Board ceases for any reason prior to a date of vesting of the Option, the unvested portion of the Option shall be immediately forfeited; provided, however, that if the Director's service on the Board ceases due to the death or Disability (as defined below) of the Director, unless the Board determines otherwise in its discretion, the Director's Options will vest in full upon such termination of service.  For purposes of this Plan, “Disability” means a physical or mental incapacity which has rendered, or is likely to render, the Director unable to perform his or her material duties for a period of 180 days in any twelve-month period as determined by a medical physician selected by the Company and that is reasonably acceptable to the Director.”
2.Section 5(c) of the Plan is amended by deleting “5(a) or” therefrom.
@article{1207651,
  author = {John D. Wright and Aaron Johnson and Michael R. Moldover and Shin-ichi Nakao},
  title = {Gas Flow Standards and Their Uncertainty},
  year = {2022},
  number = {60},
  month = {2022-12-12 05:12:00},
  publisher = {Metrologia},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=934452},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1088/1681-7575/ac8c99},
  language = {en},
}
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Noel Ortiz, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 327]

Rose, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Catena, J.), rendered November 7, 2002, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree.

As the result of a violent altercation that caused the victim’s hospitalization with a broken nose and subdural hematoma, defendant was indicted for the crimes of assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree and menacing in the second degree. Following a trial during which he claimed self-defense, defendant was found guilty of assault in the second degree.

Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the testimony by a police officer concerning a statement made to him was *1045hearsay that should not have been admitted under the present sense impression exception. The officer testified that, shortly after an adult eyewitness had called 911 to report the altercation, he questioned a “group of kids” who told him that defendant had chased the victim down the street. We are persuaded by defendant’s argument that the youths’ statement did not satisfy the requirement that “the description of events must be made ‘substantially contemporaneously’ with the observations” *(People v Vasquez,*88 NY2d 561, 575 [1996], quoting *People v Brown,*80 NY2d 729, 734 [1993]). Inasmuch as at least seven minutes had elapsed between the time of the event described and the officer’s conversation with the youths, the reported statement was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the observation.

This error was harmless, however, because even if the officer’s testimony had been excluded, there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt *(see People v Kello,*96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; *People v Watson [Chippy],*299 AD2d 735, 738 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 627, 633 [2003]; *People v Mitchell,*288 AD2d 622, 623 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 758 [2002]). The testimony of eyewitnesses provided ample independent evidence that defendant intentionally caused physical injury to the victim by, among other things, kicking him in the face while wearing work boots *(see*Penal Law § 120.05 [2]) and, as to his defense, that his slamming of the victim’s head onto the pavement numerous times and kicking him in the face were unjustified *(see*Penal Law § 35.15 [1]; *People v Terk,*24 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2005]).

Peters, J.E, Spain, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### Daniel Kirk et al., Appellants, v Schindler Elevator Corp., Respondent.

[854 NYS2d 4]

*301Plaintiff was reassigned, on the basis of performance reviews and other criteria, from a managerial position to a supervisory, nonmanagerial position, possibly with a reduction of pay; he was assured, however, that his employer needed him and he would remain employed. Rather than accept what he viewed as a demotion, plaintiff resigned and took a new managerial position at another company, albeit at a lower salary. Since he left voluntarily, defendant did not provide him with a severance package. After plaintiff left, he realized that he could receive higher compensation by utilizing his master electrician’s license in his new position. However, the transfer of the license from the former employer to the new employer was delayed under New York City regulations until old building code violations were resolved. By the time of the motion, the matter appears to have been resolved.

The delay in clearing plaintiffs license for transfer did not amount to tortious interference with business relations. Defendant was not shown to have acted intentionally with malice toward plaintiff, nor to have targeted any improper conduct at plaintiffs new employer with the intention of interfering with that employment *(Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp.,*50 NY2d 183, 189-190 [1980]; *Carvel Corp. v Noonan,*3 NY3d 182, 189 [2004]; *Jacobs v Continuum Health Partners,*7 AD3d 312 [2004]), which does not appear to have been compromised. Nor did the conduct alleged constitute the extreme and outrageous wrongdoing necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress *(Freihofer v Hearst Corp.,*65 NY2d 135 [1985]; *see also Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp.,*58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Gonzalez and Acosta, JJ.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN BERMAN,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

JOHN DOE; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 13-35739

D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00958-PA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Owen M. Panner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 10, 2015** 

Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. 

John Berman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his action alleging state law claims arising from the burglary of a rental property. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a determination

of subject matter jurisdiction. Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1191 n.6 (9th

FILED

MAR 20 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2004). We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal without leave to

amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We vacate

and remand.

Although the district court properly dismissed Berman’s action for failure to

allege facts sufficient to show complete diversity between the parties, see Molnar

v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956) (“in the absence of []

identification or connection or name, [] the allegation of citizenship ... is illusory”),

the district court abused its discretion by dismissing without giving Berman an

opportunity to amend. See Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.

2007) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1653 (“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the

trial or appellate courts.”). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to the

district court with instructions to provide Berman with an opportunity to file an

amended complaint. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

2 13-35739