NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4535

___________

DONELL L. PRINCE,

 Appellant

v.

KEVIN C. ORR, Esq.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-06418)

District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 6, 2015

Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 13, 2015)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Donell Prince appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing his complaint, 

denying leave to amend, and denying his request for a stay. For the reasons below, we 

will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

The procedural history of this case and the details of Prince’s claims are well 

known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinion, and need not be 

discussed at length. Briefly, Prince filed a complaint alleging that his criminal defense 

attorney, Kevin Orr, had breached his contractual duty to represent Prince in a civil rights 

action after getting the criminal charges against Prince dismissed. The District Court 

requested that Prince set forth the basis for the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 

over the complaint. Orr also challenged the jurisdictional basis of the complaint by filing 

a motion to dismiss. 

Prince argued that the District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because they were related to a pending civil rights action 

Prince had filed. He also attempted to establish jurisdiction by requesting permission to 

amend his complaint to add claims of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985. He 

alleged that Orr’s failure to fulfill his contractual obligations and act competently were 

acts in furtherance of a conspiracy with the police officer, Thomas Aiellos, who had filed 

the criminal charges against Prince. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, 

dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and denied Prince’s motion to amend. 

Prince appealed.
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In his brief, Prince does not challenge the District Court’s determination that it 

lacked jurisdiction over his claims of breach of contract, good faith, and fiduciary duty.1 

Rather, he focuses on the District Court’s determination that the allegations in his 

proposed second amended complaint were insufficient to state a claim of conspiracy 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 and that amendment would be futile. We review the 

District Court’s denial of Prince’s motion for leave to amend for an abuse of discretion 

and review its determination that amendment would be futile de novo. United States ex 

rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014). 

Amendment is futile if the proposed allegations fail to state a claim. Budhun v. Reading 

Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014). In order to state a claim, a plaintiff 

must make sufficient factual allegations to allow a court to “draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is not enough for a plaintiff to offer only conclusory allegations 

or a simple recital of the elements of a claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). 

In his conspiracy claim, Prince repeated his allegations of breach of contract, good 

faith, and fiduciary duty. He made conclusory allegations that Orr conspired against him 

to deprive him of his rights. He alleged that Orr failed to disclose that he used to be a 

 

1 For the reasons given by the District Court, we agree. Prince’s claims of breach of 

contract, good faith, and fiduciary duty against Orr are based on state law, and there is no 

diversity of citizenship between Prince and Orr. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
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prosecutor. While Orr obtained a dismissal of the charges against him, Prince argued that 

he could have done so earlier. Prince related that while waiting for a court appearance, 

he observed Orr talking and laughing with Aiellos. They then went into a private room. 

Prince rejected Orr’s explanation that he was just trying to see “what kind of guy” Aiellos 

was.

Prince’s proposed allegations of conspiracy fail to state a claim. Prince has not 

pleaded any facts that suggest a meeting of the minds between Orr and any alleged coconspirators. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 

179 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, he has not set forth 

any facts supporting his claims that Orr’s actions were motivated by racial or class-based 

animus. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985. That Prince is a “black male on disability” is 

insufficient to allege that action taken against him is motivated by race or class 

discrimination. Prince’s failure to adequately plead a conspiracy also precludes his 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Orr conspired with state actors to deprive him of his 

constitutional rights. This is because he has not sufficiently alleged that Orr, as a private 

actor, acted jointly with Aiellos or any other state actor. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). The District Court did not err in determining that it 

would be futile to allow Prince to amend his complaint a second time.

Because the District Court was correct that it lacked jurisdiction over Prince’s 

original complaint and that further leave to amend would be futile, we need not reach the 

issues of whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Prince’s motion to 
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stay the litigation pending another District Court case in which he is the plaintiff and 

whether Prince’s appeal from that order was timely.

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.