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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

July 16, 2015 

v No. 309334 

Bay Circuit Court 

PATRICIA MILISSA KREINER, LC No. 11-010364-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee. 

ON REMAND 

Before: SAAD, P.J., and O’CONNELL and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In defendant’s prior appeal we upheld the trial court’s findings and conclusions that 

defendant had received the ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial counsel did not 

adequately explain the prosecution’s plea offer. People v Kreiner, unpublished opinion per 

curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2014 (Docket No. 309334). Specifically, the 

plea offer was for defendant to plead to the charged crime (first-degree criminal sexual conduct, 

MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a victim under 13 years of age)) and receive a 

sentence of 10 years in prison. Defendant rejected that offer (and that decision was the basis for 

the ineffective assistance of counsel argument), went to trial and was convicted as charged. She 

was then sentenced to the statutory 25 year mandatory minimum. After a Ginther1 hearing, the 

trial court held that defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and ordered as a 

remedy that the prosecution re-offer the plea. 

 On appeal, we affirmed on the only issue presented, i.e., the prosecution’s challenge of 

the trial court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Kreiner, unpub op at 1-4. On the 

prosecution’s appeal, the Supreme Court issued an order addressing the remedy ordered by the 

trial court, which was a plea offer of a 10-year sentence for a crime that has a 25 year statutory 

mandatory minimum: 

 

1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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Defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 

750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a victim under 13 years of age). Pursuant to 

the terms of a proposed plea agreement, she would have pleaded guilty as charged 

in exchange for a sentence agreement for a ten-year minimum sentence. 

Defendant rejected the plea offer, but following a post-conviction Ginther 

hearing, see People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 (1973), the trial court ruled that 

defendant’s decision to reject the offer was the result of ineffective assistance on 

the part of her trial counsel and ordered the prosecutor to re-offer the plea. 

However, MCL 750.520b(2)(b) provides that the statutorily authorized 

punishment for the offense to which defendant is to plead guilty under the 

proposed plea agreement is “imprisonment for life or any term of years, but not 

less than 25 years.” Therefore, the plea agreement calls for a sentence that the 

trial court is without authority to impose. Given this, on remand, we DIRECT the 

Court of Appeals to address the appropriate remedy, if any, for defendant under 

the circumstances of this case. See Lafler v Cooper, __ US __; 132 S Ct 1376; 

182 L Ed 2d 398 (2012). [People v Kreiner, 497 Mich 1024; 863 NW2d 41 

(2015).] 

As the foregoing makes clear, the Supreme Court did not direct this Court to reconsider that part 

of our opinion upholding the finding that defense trial counsel was ineffective, including the 

determination that defense trial counsel’s performance in the plea process was constitutionally 

deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Hence, in accordance with 

the narrow focus of the remand order, our attention is focused exclusively on the issue of 

remedy. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the trial court’s March 20, 2014 order to the 

extent it required the prosecutor to re-offer the original plea deal, and remand for the court to 

consider the appropriate remedy, if any, consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to the order 

issued with this opinion, we retain jurisdiction. 

 In Lafler, 132 S Ct at 1388, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of 

what constitutes an appropriate remedy when a defendant has shown that ineffective assistance 

of counsel caused the rejection of a plea offer leading to a more severe sentence after trial. The 

Supreme Court explained: 

 Sixth Amendment remedies should be tailored to the injuries suffered 

from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on 

competing interests. Thus, a remedy must neutralize the taint of a constitutional 

violation while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or 

needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the 

criminal prosecution. [Id. at 1388-1389 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] 

The Lafler Court further detailed the remedies available if, as in this case, the ineffective 

assistance led to the rejection of a plea deal that results in defendant being convicted of the same 

crime for which she was offered to plea: 

 The specific injury suffered by defendants who decline a plea offer as a 

result of ineffective assistance of counsel and then receive a greater sentence as a 

result of trial can come in at least one of two forms. In some cases, the sole 

advantage a defendant would have received under the plea is a lesser sentence. 
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This is typically the case when the charges that would have been admitted as part 

of the plea bargain are the same as the charges the defendant was convicted of 

after trial. In this situation the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to 

determine whether the defendant has shown a reasonable probability that but for 

counsel’s errors he would have accepted the plea. If the showing is made, the 

court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should 

receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence 

he received at trial, or something in between. [Id. at 1389 (citations omitted; 

emphasis added).] 

The Supreme Court expressed that “the trial court must weigh various factors” in determining the 

appropriate remedy, and though those factors were not defined by the Court, it noted that 

“[p]rinciples elaborated over time in decisions in state and federal courts, and in statutes and 

rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that should bear on the exercise 

of the judge’s discretion.” Id. at 1389. However, the Court did describe two considerations that 

are relevant in fashioning a remedy. Id. First, a court may take account of whether a defendant 

has expressed a willingness to accept responsibility for his or her actions. Id. Second, although 

it is difficult to restore the parties to the positions they occupied before the rejection of the plea 

offer, “that baseline can be consulted in finding a remedy that does not require the prosecution to 

incur the expense of conducting a new trial.” Id. That may include consideration of “any 

information concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea offer was made.” Id. See, 

also, People v McCauley, 493 Mich 872; 821 NW2d 569 (2012). 

 As our Supreme Court observed in its order remanding this case, the plea agreement 

called for a sentence that the trial court lacked authority to impose. The plea agreement would 

have allowed defendant to plead guilty as charged to CSC-I in exchange for the prosecutor 

requesting a 10-year cap on the minimum sentence. But MCL 750.520b(2)(b) provides that 

CSC-I is punishable “[f]or a violation that is committed by an individual 17 years of age or older 

against an individual less than 13 years of age by imprisonment for life or any term of years, but 

not less than 25 years.” It is undisputed that at the time of the offense defendant was more than 

17 years of age and the victim was less than 13 years of age; defendant was therefore subject to 

the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence set forth in MCL 750.520b(2)(b). Accordingly, the 

trial court lacked authority to impose a 10-year minimum sentence as provided in the plea 

agreement.2

 Consequently, the first remedy described by the Lafler Court—the state re-offering 

the original plea deal—is not available. 

 Under Lafler that leaves two options for the trial court: (1) impose the sentence 

defendant received after trial or (2) impose “something in between” that 25-year sentence and 

what was originally offered. Lafler, 132 S Ct at 1388. Although there is no current suggestion 

that the prosecutor would offer defendant the ability to plead to a lesser offense that would not be 

subject to the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence set forth in MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (which 

 

2

 The inability of a prosecutor to waive the statutory mandatory minimum is an unstated premise 

of the Supreme Court’s remand order, given that the Supreme Court stated that the trial court 

lacked authority to impose the 10-year minimum sentence called for in the plea agreement. 
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would be “something in between”), because this issue was initially raised by the Supreme Court, 

neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel has had the opportunity to articulate their current 

positions. And, because the Lafler Court emphasized the importance of the trial court’s

discretionary authority on the appropriate remedy (if any)3

, we remand for the trial court to 

determine in the first instance which of the two remaining remedies under Lafler best remedies 

the constitutional violation in this case. 

 We vacate the trial court’s March 20, 2014 order to the extent it required the prosecutor 

to re-offer the original plea deal, and remand for the court to consider the appropriate remedy, if 

any, consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to the order issued with this opinion, we retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

 

3

 “Today’s decision leaves open to the trial court how best to exercise that discretion in all the 

circumstances of the case.” Id. at 1391. 
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan 

ORDER 

People of MI v Patricia Milissa Kreiner 

Docket No. 309334 

LC No. 11-010364-FC 

Henry William Saad 

Presiding Judge 

Peter D. O'Connell 

Christopher M. Murray 

Judges 

Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrentl y with this order, this case is REMANDED for 

furthe r proceedi ngs consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction. 

Proceedings on remand in this matter sha ll commence within 28 days of the Clerk's 

certification of this o rder, and they shall be given priority on remand until they arc concluded. As stated 

in the accompanying opi nion, People v Kreiner, unpublished opi ni on per curiam of the Court of Appeals 

(Docket No. 309334), the trial court shall determine, consistent with this opi nion, the appropriate 

remedy, if any, for the violation of defendant's sixth amendment right lo the effective assistance of 

counsel. The proceedings on remand are limited to this issue . 

Appellant shall file with this Court a copy of the order entered by the trial court on 

remand within 14 days of its entry, along with any written opinion contai ning the court's reasoning. o 

more than 14 days after the filing of the order and opinion, both parties may fi le a brief with this Cou11 

addressing the trial court's decision. 

A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk. on 

JUL 16 2015 

Date 

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