[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-14812

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cr-00232-SDM-CPT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONALD JOHN BANKSTON, III, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(December 23, 2019)

Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge: 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 1 of 7 
2

Ronald John Bankston III appeals his 130-month sentence, which he 

received after convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing body 

armor as a violent felon, and distributing methamphetamine. On appeal, Bankston 

objects—for the first time—to a two-level enhancement to his sentence for the 

“use” of body armor under section 3B1.5 of the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines; he says there was no evidence that he used body armor as defined in 

that guideline. After careful consideration, we think he is right and vacate his 

sentence. 

I.

In the spring of 2016, guns, ammunition, and two body-armor vests were 

stolen from a law enforcement officer’s vehicle. Two days later, a confidential 

informant gave local police a tip about the location of one of the stolen guns. That 

same day, an undercover detective and the confidential informant went to see 

Bankston, who sold them one of the stolen guns, the two body-armor vests, 

ammunition, and methamphetamine. 

Bankston pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession and one count 

of distributing methamphetamine. In calculating Bankston’s sentence, the district 

court relied on the presentence investigation report (PSR). Pointing to Bankston’s 

selling of body-armor vests, the PSR enhanced Bankston’s sentence by two levels

for the “use” of body armor in a drug trafficking offense. See U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines § 3B1.5 (Nov. 2016). Without any objection from Bankston, the 

district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation on that issue. The two-level 

enhancement put Bankston’s offense level at 27. Combined with his criminal 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 2 of 7 
3

history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 130 to 162 months. The district 

court sentenced Bankston to 130 months, as recommended by the United States. 

II.

We review for plain error because Bankston failed to protest the application 

of the body-armor enhancement guideline in the district court. United States v. 

Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 842 (11th Cir. 2009). To meet the plain-error standard, 

Bankston must establish that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; (3) it 

affected his “substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not harmless;” and 

(4) it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 

proceedings.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). The Supreme Court has 

instructed that, once those “conditions have been met, the court of appeals should 

exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error.” See Rosales-Mireles v. United 

States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1905 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

III.

Applying that standard here is straightforward. An error is obvious when it 

flies in the face of either binding precedent or “the explicit language of a statute or 

rule.” See United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord United States v. Bennett, 472 

F.3d 825, 834 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (miscalculated Guidelines range was 

plain error). Here, we have no precedent interpreting the relevant language, and

our analysis begins and ends with the language of the Sentencing Guidelines. “Our 

interpretation of the sentencing guidelines and accompanying commentary is 

governed by traditional rules of statutory construction.” United States v. Perez, 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 3 of 7 
4

366 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004). The Guidelines also “must be read 

together” with the commentary. United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1029 

(11th Cir. 2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). In fact, “commentary in the 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is 

authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 

inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” United States 

v. Hall, 714 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

Section 3B1.5 provides a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant was 

convicted of a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence” and “the offense 

involved the use of body armor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5(1), (2)(A). The commentary 

defines “use” as either “active employment in a manner to protect the person from 

gunfire” or “use as a means of bartering.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5, cmt. n.1. In short, 

there are only two ways to “use” body armor under the guideline, and neither of 

them involves selling it.

Yet the only evidence of “use” here was that Bankston sold the armor for 

money. Although the PSR asserted that Bankston’s sale of body armor amounted 

to use as a means of bartering, selling is an activity that under both common usage 

and dictionary definition falls outside of bartering. In fact, “barter” means to trade 

goods or services without using money. See, e.g., Webster’s New World College 

Dictionary (5th ed. 2018) (“trade by exchanging goods or services without using 

money”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 

2016) (similar); New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (similar); Black’s 

Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (similar). 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 4 of 7 
5

Of course, the Guidelines could have defined “use” to “include both 

monetary and barter transactions”—as they did when defining “for pecuniary 

gain.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.5, cmt. n.5(A). But here they did not. And we “presume 

that the Sentencing Commission said what it meant and meant what it said” in the 

Guidelines and their commentary. United States v. Shannon, 631 F.3d 1187, 1190 

(11th Cir. 2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). So only using body armor for 

protection or barter gives rise to the enhancement at issue here. 

Despite the plain meaning of the guideline and its commentary, the 

government offers legislative history. That legislative history, we are told by the 

United States, reveals the guideline’s true purpose: “to take body armor out of the 

hands of violent criminals and drug traffickers.” No matter. A “guideline’s 

meaning is derived first from its plain language and, absent ambiguity, no 

additional inquiry is necessary.” United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600, 607 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “When the import of the words Congress has used is 

clear, as it is here, we need not resort to legislative history, and we certainly should 

not do so to undermine the plain meaning of the statutory language.” Harris v. 

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see Perez, 366 F.3d at 1182 

(rules of statutory construction apply to Sentencing Guidelines and commentary). 

As at least one other court has also concluded, the plain language of the bodyarmor enhancement guideline “precludes its application to the sale of body armor.” 

See United States v. Juarez, 866 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2017) (reviewing a 

preserved challenge). 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 5 of 7 
6

Understandably, the parties seem to agree that if Bankston shows that the 

district court obviously erred in applying the body-armor enhancement, he will 

have also satisfied the last two prongs of the plain-error standard. “When a 

defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not the 

defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, 

and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome absent the error.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 

1345 (2016). That showing of error satisfies the plain-error standard’s third prong, 

prejudice—unless a case presents some “unusual circumstances.” Id. at 1347. We 

find nothing unusual about the facts and circumstances of this case: following the 

government’s recommendation, the district court sentenced Bankston to 130 

months, the lowest end of his Guidelines range. Without the two-level 

enhancement for “use” of body armor, Bankston’s Guidelines range is 110 to 137 

months. We conclude that Bankston has shown a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would be different under the correct range. 

As for the plain-error standard’s last factor, “[t]he risk of unnecessary 

deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings in the context of a plain Guidelines error.” 

Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1908. A faulty enhancement, therefore, “ordinarily 

will satisfy” the fourth prong, at least when the other three factors are met. Id. 

Bankston meets this test. 

Bankston “was not ‘bartering’ by selling body armor.” Juarez, 866 F.3d at

633. The district court thus committed plain error by applying the two-level 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 6 of 7 
7

increase for use of body armor in the commission of a drug trafficking offense. 

We vacate Bankston’s sentence and remand for resentencing without the bodyarmor enhancement. 

VACATED AND REMANDED. 

Case: 18-14812 Date Filed: 12/23/2019 Page: 7 of 7