J-S29037-15 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v. 

NICOLE ANNETTE ABRAMS, 

 Appellant 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1851 WDA 2014 

 No. 1852 WDA 2014 

 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-32-CR-0001445-2013,

CP-32-CR-0001339-2013 

BEFORE: PANELLA, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015 

 Nicole Annette Abrams (Appellant) appeals from the order entered 

October 7, 2014, which granted in part and denied in part her petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546. 

We affirm. 

 On January 24, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to one count of forgery at 

docket number CP-32-CR-0001339-2013 (1339-2013) and one count of 

insurance fraud at docket number CP-32-CR-0001445-2013 (1445-2013). 

On April 11, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to 15 months to 10 years of 

incarceration for the forgery charge and 15 months to 5 years of 

incarceration for the insurance fraud charge, with the sentences to run 

consecutively. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to modify sentence at 

docket 1445-2013, requesting that the court modify her sentence to run 
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concurrently with the sentence imposed at docket 1339-2013. The court 

denied that motion by order entered on April 21, 2014. Appellant did not file 

a direct appeal. 

 Appellant pro se timely filed a PCRA petition on May 29, 2014. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, and a hearing was held on Appellant’s 

petition on September 30, 2014. Following the hearing, the PCRA court 

granted Appellant’s petition with respect to her request for boot camp 

eligibility.1 The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition in all other respects. 

Appellant then timely filed notices of appeal.2

 Appellant presents the following issues for review: 

1. Whether [plea] counsel was ineffective in [his] representation 

for not seeking alternatives to incarceration or lesser 

sentences. 

2. Whether Appellant’s guilty plea [wa]s knowing, voluntary and 

intelligent when she was not aware that the district attorney’s 

sentence recommendation was not binding. 

3. Whether a conflict of interest existed when the public 

defender’s office represented both Appellant and her 

co-defendant in the same case. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (proposed answers omitted). 

On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review 

calls for us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is 

supported by the record and free of legal error. The PCRA 

 

1

 Thus, the PCRA court amended the sentencing orders at both dockets to 

provide that Appellant was eligible to participate in a boot camp program. 

2

 On December 22, 2014, this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals. 
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court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support 

for the findings in the certified record. The PCRA court’s factual 

determinations are entitled to deference, but its legal 

determinations are subject to our plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Initially, we note that Appellant’s brief does not comply with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), as her argument section is not divided into parts which 

correspond to the three questions she presents on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued[.]”). Despite this defect, we attempt to address 

Appellant’s claims on appeal limited to the issues presented in the statement 

of questions. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is 

fairly suggested thereby”). In so doing, we find that Appellant has waived 

all of her issues on appeal for the reasons that follow. 

In her first issue, Appellant claims that plea counsel was ineffective for 

failing to “seek[] alternatives to incarceration or lesser sentences.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. “It is well-established that counsel is presumed 

effective, and the defendant bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness.” 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). To overcome this 

presumption, Appellant must demonstrate that: “(1) the underlying 

substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is 
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being challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or 

failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel’s deficient performance.” Id. Appellant’s claim will be denied if she 

fails to meet any one of these three prongs. Id.

Aside from the bald assertion provided above, Appellant fails to make 

any argument whatsoever to satisfy her burden under the three-pronged 

ineffectiveness test. “Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not selfproving.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002). In 

order to be entitled to relief, Appellant must set forth individually and 

discuss substantively each prong of the test outlined in Martin. Such 

underdeveloped claims, based on boilerplate allegations, cannot and do not 

satisfy Appellant’s burden of establishing ineffectiveness. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 386 (Pa. 2005). Because 

Appellant has failed to set forth all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test 

and meaningfully discuss them, her first issue is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 799-800 (Pa. 2008) (finding 

ineffectiveness claim fails where the appellant failed to develop argument 

meaningfully as to all three prongs of ineffectiveness test). 

 We hold that Appellant waived her second issue for the following 

reasons. To the extent Appellant seeks to argue that her guilty plea was not 

“knowing, voluntary and intelligent,” as stated in her questions presented, 

the claim is waived for her failure to raise it in a post-sentence motion to 
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withdraw her plea and to pursue it on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but 

failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a 

prior state postconviction proceeding.”); Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 

A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“While [the a]ppellant focuses on the 

voluntariness of his guilty plea, that issue should have been raised on direct 

appeal; it was not. Therefore the issue is waived.” (footnote omitted)). To 

the extent that Appellant seeks to argue that plea counsel’s ineffectiveness 

caused her to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea,3 we find such a claim 

waived for her failure to develop it. Again, Appellant fails to engage in any 

discussion of the three separate prongs of the ineffectiveness test. For 

these reasons, Appellant’s second issue is also waived.4,5

 

3 See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 732 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“If 

the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea, the PCRA will afford the defendant relief.”). 

4

 Assuming arguendo that this issue is not waived, Appellant is still not 

entitled to relief. It appears that Appellant’s only contention in support of 

this issue is that she understood that her sentences would be concurrent 

rather than consecutive. Appellant’s Brief at 8. At the plea hearing, when 

asked by the court whether there was any other agreement between the 

parties, Appellant’s counsel responded, “Just that we would ask that ... any 

sentences run concurrent with each other.” N.T., 1/24/2014 (incorrectly 

dated as 1/14/2014), at 3. Nevertheless, during the oral colloquy, the court 

notified Appellant of the maximum penalties she could receive for each 

offense and the total maximum penalty she could receive for both offenses 

(i.e., “15 years[’] incarceration and a $35,000 fine”). Id. at 7. When the 

court asked Appellant whether she understood those penalties, Appellant 

responded in the affirmative. Id. Moreover, in her written guilty plea 

colloquy at docket 1339-2013, Appellant answered “yes” to the following 
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 Turning to Appellant’s third issue, we find it waived for her failure to 

raise it in a timely manner. Appellant asserts that a conflict of interest 

existed because she and her codefendant (her husband) were both 

represented by attorneys from the Indiana County Public Defender’s Office. 

As stated previously, however, for purposes of the PCRA, “an issue is waived 

if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, 

during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). It is clear that this issue could have 

been raised at the plea and sentencing hearings and pursued on direct 

 

questions: “Do you understand that because you have been charged with 

more than one offense the court may impose a separate or consecutive 

sentence for each offense?”; and “Do you understand that this Court is not 

bound by any plea bargain entered into by you and the District Attorney?” 

Guilty Plea Explanation of Defendant’s Rights, 1/24/2014, at 3, 8. “A 

defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea colloquy, and a 

defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that 

contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 

A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012). Because Appellant’s current claims 

contradict the statements made during her colloquies, no relief is due.

5

 Appellant dedicates much of the argument in her brief to the contention 

that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Appellant properly with 

regard to presenting information about her drug and alcohol treatment to 

the court for sentencing purposes. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. This claim is not 

set forth in her statement of questions presented, nor is it fairly suggested 

thereby in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Moreover, Appellant again 

fails to engage in any meaningful discussion of the three-pronged 

ineffectiveness test with respect to this claim. For these reasons, Appellant’s 

claim is also waived. See Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 778 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that the appellant’s undeveloped claims were 

waived because they were “not set forth in the statement of questions 

involved and not fairly suggested thereby”); Steele, 961 A.2d at 799-800. 
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appeal. Consequently, Appellant waived her conflict-of-interest claim for 

purposes of the PCRA. 

Because Appellant has waived all issues raised on appeal, we affirm 

the order of the PCRA court.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/16/2015