1

Filed 7/20/15

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re K.B., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A140960

 (San Francisco City & County

 Super. Ct. No. JW126082)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 23, 2013, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed a petition 

charging appellant, age 17, with two counts of possessing firearms. (Pen. Code,

§ 29610.) On November 19, 2013, after a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile 

court sustained the petition.

Appellant has appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence did not support the juvenile 

court’s finding that he violated Penal Code section 29610; (2) the trial court erred in 

admitting incriminating photographs over his objection on the ground they were not 

properly authenticated; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to give expert 

testimony about the make and model of the recovered firearms without first qualifying 

him as an expert; and (4) the court omitted required information about the maximum term

of confinement and custody credits from the dispositional order.

 

*

 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of parts III.A., III.C., and III.D.
2

In the published portion of this opinion we apply our Supreme Court’s recent 

guidance on authentication of electronic evidence in People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 

Cal.4th 258 (Goldsmith), and conclude there was no error in admitting the photographic 

evidence in this case. In the unpublished portion of this opinion we reject the balance of 

appellant’s assignments of error, except we agree with the parties that the matter must be 

remanded for the limited purpose of supplying the mandatory information in the 

dispositional order that was omitted. However, in all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

San Francisco Police Officers Dave Johnson and Eduard Ochoa testified that they 

were on routine patrol on October 21, 2013. Throughout that day, Officer Ochoa scanned 

Instagram, a social media website, looking for postings. Officer Ochoa was the 

“Instagram officer” in his department and had been so for three or four years. His 

training and experience had taught him “how to monitor and track individuals through 

Instagram.”

Officer Ochoa “was familiar with appellant from prior firearm investigations.” He 

testified, “I saw [appellant], [D.H.] and [Marquis] Mendez, all possessing a firearm at one 

point or another in these [Instagram] photographs. I knew [appellant] was on 

probation . . . . I knew Mr. M[endez] was a wanted felon and was [a] prohibited person.” 

In the Instagram photographs appellant wore a black and white print shirt and camouflage 

pants, and in some of the photos, he appeared to have a firearm tucked into the waistband 

of his pants. Also, in some of the photos there appeared to be a curtain made of 

camouflage material covering a window. The officers verified that appellant and Mendez 

were on active probation subject to search conditions, and were prohibited from 

possessing any type of firearm. Mendez was also in violation of his probation. Based on 

the Instagram photographs showing these individuals brandishing firearms, the officers 

decided to perform a probation search.
3

Officers Ochoa and Johnson, along with other officers, went to the Westpoint 

Middlepoint apartment complex around 9:23 p.m. “to conduct [a] probation search for 

[appellant and Mendez,] who [the officers] believed to be at that residence.” The officers 

walked around the building and saw a rear, second-story window covered by a 

camouflage curtain similar to that appearing in the photographs posted on Instagram.

That window was at the back of 59 Hare Street.

The officers heard voices coming from the camouflage-curtained window. Officer 

Johnson heard other officers knock on the front door of 59 Hare Street and announce 

their presence. Immediately thereafter, Officer Johnson saw D.H. peek out of the

camouflage-curtained window. Several of the officers illuminated D.H.’s face with their 

flashlights and announced their presence. D.H. withdrew from the window. Seconds 

later, two handguns were thrown from the camouflage-curtained window. The officers 

could not identify who threw the firearms out of the window.

Officer Ochoa and other officers entered the front of 59 Hare Street. The officers 

detained the occupants and conducted a preliminary sweep for weapons. No firearms

were found. D.H. was detained descending the stairs from the second floor. Appellant 

and Mendez were detained in an upstairs bedroom. They were wearing the same clothes 

they wore in the Instagram photographs that Officer Ochoa had viewed earlier that 

evening. The officers seized the two discarded handguns, the suspects’ cell phones, and 

the camouflage curtain. Appellant, D.H., and Mendez were arrested for possessing 

firearms.1

The handguns were transported to the police station where Officer Johnson 

examined them and discovered that they were both loaded. Over defense objection, 

Officer Johnson testified that one of the seized firearms was “a Smith [&] Wesson . . . 

[h]andgun,” model “SW40F,” and the other handgun “was a Glock 23.”

 

1

 Mendez was an adult, and did not appear in these proceedings. Appellant and 

D.H., then both minors, appeared jointly at this contested hearing but with separate 

counsel. This appeal has been brought solely by appellant.
4

Cell phones were seized from appellant and Mendez. Officer Ochoa examined

Mendez’s cell phone and saw that it contained what appeared to be screen shots of some

of the pictures that he saw on Instagram earlier that day. Officer Ochoa took photographs 

of the pictures displayed on Mendez’s cell phone.

Officer Steven Wood testified that after appellant and his associates were arrested,

he used Cellebrite2computer software technology to retrieve information from Mendez’s 

cell phone. Once a Cellebrite search is conducted, the information in the cell phone is 

sent to a computer. The officer then simply pushes a button, and a Cellebrite report is 

generated. The report lists all of the information stored in the cell phone—photographs; 

incoming, outgoing, and missed calls; text messages; app information; and emails.

The Cellebrite technology revealed, in detail, the contents of Mendez’s phone and 

printed out that information in a 37-page report. Included in the Cellebrite report were 

some of the same incriminating photographs showing appellant and his associates

brandishing firearms which were viewed and photographed by Officer Ochoa from the 

screen of Mendez’s phone when appellant was arrested. At the conclusion of the 

evidence, over defense counsels’ objection, the court admitted into evidence Officer 

Ochoa’s photographs from the screen of Mendez’s cell phone and the Cellebrite report

containing the identical photographs.3

Appellant did not testify and rested on the state of the evidence. After the court 

sustained the petition alleging two counts of violating Penal Code section 29610, a 

contested dispositional hearing was held. On January 19, 2014, the juvenile court 

committed appellant, age 18, to the custody of the chief probation officer for out-of-home 

placement, ordering that he complete an eight-month program at the San Francisco 

Juvenile Justice Center. This appeal followed.

 

2

 Various spellings of “Cellebrite” appear in the record. We adopt the spelling 

that is contained in the Cellebrite report that appears of record in this matter.

3

 In this case, although the police downloaded significant amounts of data from 

Mendez’s phone—including a contacts list, text messages, call records, and images––the 

court considered only certain photographs to be relevant evidence.
5

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence of Constructive Possession

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for 

two counts of violating Penal Code section 29610. Section 29610 provides: “A minor 

shall not possess a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the 

person.” Count 1 alleged that on October 21, 2013, appellant unlawfully possessed a 

Smith & Wesson firearm. Count 2 alleged that on the same date, appellant unlawfully 

possessed a Glock firearm. He argues the evidence did not show he possessed the 

firearms that were discarded from the window when the police arrived.

The issue here was whether there was substantial evidence appellant had 

constructive possession of the weapons. As appellant points out “though [he] was 

pictured in possession of a single purported firearm, the prosecution contended that 

appellant constructively possessed both the Smith & Wesson and the Glock thrown from 

the window at 59 Hare.”

One need not physically hold a weapon to possess it: possession may be 

constructive instead of actual, and possession may be shared by two or more people. 

(People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 (Sifuentes); see also People v. 

Pena (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083–1084 [an individual has constructive possession

“when the weapon, while not in his actual possession, is nonetheless under his dominion

and control, either directly or through others”].) Constructive possession may be 

established by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, but 

“mere proximity to the weapon, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession. 

[Citation.]” (Sifuentes, at p. 1417.)

We conclude that substantial evidence supports appellant’s possession conviction. 

In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim in juvenile proceedings, this court 

applies the same standard of review that is applicable in criminal cases. (In re 

Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809.) When a criminal conviction is challenged as 

lacking evidentiary support, “the court must review the whole record in the light most 
6

favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—

that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. 

Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 

318–319.)

Moreover, “ ‘[a]n appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of 

fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Before the 

judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must 

clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support the verdict of the [finder of fact].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

The evidence showed the handguns recovered by the police were in the apartment 

at the same time as was appellant. However, appellant argues, as he did at the contested 

hearing, that his mere presence in the apartment was not enough to connect him to the 

loaded guns that were tossed out the window when the police arrived. He stresses he 

“was not in possession of either a Smith & Wesson or a Glock when he was detained and 

there was no forensic evidence,” such as fingerprints or DNA “establishing that appellant 

actually possessed either at any point.”

We agree generally with appellant that presence alone is not enough to support a 

finding of constructive possession. Dominion and control are essentials of possession, 

and they cannot be inferred from mere presence or access. Something more must be 

shown to support inferring of these elements. Of course, the necessary additional 

circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be slight. (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 

Cal.App.4th 718, 728; People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 225.)

Contrary to appellant’s contention, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

court’s findings, the evidence went beyond appellant’s mere presence in the apartment

from which the two loaded handguns were thrown. Several of the photographs entered 

into evidence depicted appellant with a handgun tucked in his waistband. Certainly as to 

that weapon appellant cannot seriously contend it was not possessed, let alone 
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constructively possessed. Moreover, in the photographs appellant was wearing the same 

clothing he was wearing at the time of his arrest, and the background of the picture 

showed camouflaged curtains, which matched the curtains from the apartment where 

appellant was arrested. The photos also show appellant and his cohorts standing next to 

each other posing with the same handguns in the apartment earlier in the day that were 

later thrown from the window. These additional facts support a reasonable inference that 

appellant knew of the presence of the handguns in the apartment and exercised the 

requisite control over them to constitute constructive possession.

In addition, appellant contends there was no evidence “to support a conclusion that 

what appeared to be a firearm in appellant’s waistband in the photos was a real firearm, 

as opposed to a replica or a toy.” As used in Penal Code section 29610, a “firearm

capable of being concealed upon the person” is defined as “any device designed to be 

used as a weapon, from which is expelled a projectile by the force of any explosion, or 

other form of combustion . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 16530, subd. (a).) Accordingly, a toy 

firearm, a replica firearm and a pellet gun are not “firearms” as defined by the Penal 

Code, regardless of how much any of those items may look like real firearm. (See, e.g., 

People v. Monjaras (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436.)

Suffice to say appellant has offered no evidence, and there was none, from which 

it could reasonably be inferred that the gun in appellant’s waistband was a toy or a 

replica. (See People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851 [reasonable inference 

may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, 

surmise, conjecture, or guess work].) No “replica” guns were found at 59 Hare Street on 

the night of appellant’s arrest. Only real handguns were found—a loaded Glock and a 

loaded Smith & Wesson—the same two weapons alleged in the petition.

Because we are required to indulge every reasonable inference the trier of fact 

could have drawn from the evidence, we find there was enough evidence to support an 

inference that the gun tucked in appellant’s waistband was real, and that appellant 

exercised constructive possession over the real Smith & Wesson handgun that also was 

thrown from the apartment window when police arrived and announced their presence.
8

B. Admission of Incriminating Photographs Extracted from Cell Phone

Over appellant’s objection, the prosecution entered into evidence photographs

showing appellant, another juvenile, D.H., and Mendez posing with two handguns. 

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs over his

objection on the ground they were not properly authenticated because “none of the 

subjects appearing in the images testified, nor did anyone who was present at the time the 

photos were taken. Accordingly, there was no witness present at the time the images 

were created to establish that the [photographs] accurately depicted what they purported 

to depict––appellant and his co-minor, D.H., in possession of firearms.”

The general principles guiding the admissibility of photographic evidence over an 

objection that the evidence has not been properly authenticated were recently addressed 

by our Supreme Court in Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th 258.4“A photograph or video 

recording is typically authenticated by showing it is a fair and accurate representation of

the scene depicted. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 267.) This foundation may—but need not 

be—supplied by the photographer or by a person who witnessed the event being 

recorded; in addition, authentication “may be supplied by other witness testimony, 

circumstantial evidence, content and location” and “also may be established ‘by any other

means provided by law’ ([Evid. Code,] § 1400), including a statutory presumption. 

[Citation.]” (Goldsmith, at p. 268.)

The court in Goldsmith explained, “the proof that is necessary to authenticate a

photograph or video recording varies with the nature of the evidence that the photograph

or video recording is being offered to prove and with the degree of possibility of error. 

[Citation.] The first step is to determine the purpose for which the evidence is being

offered. The purpose of the evidence will determine what must be shown for

authentication, which may vary from case to case. [Citation.] The foundation requires

that there be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it

 

4

 Because Goldsmith was decided after briefing and oral arguments had been 

waived, on April 27, 2015, we requested and received supplemental briefs from the 

parties addressing this latest opinion on authentication of visual evidence.
9

purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered. [Citation.] Essentially, 

what is necessary is a prima facie case. ‘As long as the evidence would support a finding

of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn

regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its admissibility.’

[Citation.]” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.)

We review challenges to a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for 

an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling “ ‘except on a

showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently

absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.]”

(Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.)

We note that the law preceding Goldsmith governing authenticating images copied 

from social media, i.e., Facebook, MySpace, Instagram, has not been entirely consistent.

In People v. Beckley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509 (Beckley) the court considered 

whether a photo downloaded from MySpace had been properly authenticated. There, the 

girlfriend of one of the defendants testified that, when she began dating him, she insisted 

that he stop associating with his gang. (Id. at pp. 513–514.) To impeach her, the 

prosecution introduced a photo showing her flashing a gang sign. A police officer 

testified that he had downloaded it from the boyfriend’s MySpace page. The defendants 

objected based on lack of authentication. (Id. at p. 514.)

The appellate court in Beckley held that the trial court erred in admitting the photo. 

The court stated, “ ‘It is well settled . . . that the testimony of a person who was present at 

the time a film was made that it accurately depicts what it purports to show is a legally 

sufficient foundation for its admission into evidence.’ [Citation.] In addition, . . .

authentication of a photograph ‘may be provided by the aid of expert testimony. . . .’

[Citation.]” (Beckley, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 515-516.) The court then reasoned, 

“Although defendants conceded that the face in the MySpace photograph was [the 

girlfriend]’s, the record does not contain . . . evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it 

is the photograph that the prosecution claims it is, namely, an accurate depiction of [the 

girlfriend] actually flashing a gang sign. [The police officer] could not testify from his 
10

personal knowledge that the photograph truthfully portrayed [the girlfriend] flashing the 

gang sign and . . . no expert testified that the picture was not a ‘ “composite” or “faked” ’

photograph. Such expert testimony is . . . critical today to prevent the admission of 

manipulated images . . . .” (Ibid.)

In People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429 (Valdez), the defendant argued 

for reversal of his convictions for attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and street 

terrorism on the ground that printouts of his MySpace social media Internet page had not 

been properly authenticated. (Id. at pp. 1433-1434.) The reviewing court disagreed, 

noting the defendant did not dispute that the MySpace page icon identifying the owner of 

the page displayed the defendant’s face, and other material on the page pointed to the 

defendant as the owner of the page. (Id. at p. 1435.) In holding that the trial court did not 

err, the appellate court noted that particular items on the page, including a photograph of 

the defendant forming a gang signal with his hand, met the threshold for the jury to 

determine authenticity. (Id. at p. 1436.) The court observed, “The contents of a 

document may authenticate it. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) While the defendant was free to argue 

otherwise to the jury, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the posting of 

personal photographs, communications, and other details that the MySpace page 

belonged to him. (Ibid.)

In finding the photo in that case was properly authenticated, the Valdez court 

distinguished Beckley because there was “evidence of the password requirement for 

posting and deleting content” and because of the “pervasive consistency” of the MySpace

content, “filled with personal photographs, communications, and other details tending 

together to identify and show owner-management of a page devoted to gang-related 

interests. [Citation.]” (Valdez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436.)

Respondent claims this case is like Valdez, citing the password-protected nature of 

Instagram and the “pervasive consistency” of the content of the disputed photographs. 

On the other hand, appellant relies heavily on Beckley to argue that,“[l]acking witnesses 

to testify as to personal knowledge that the images accurately depicted what they 

purported to depict and lacking expert testimony to support a finding that he 
11

photographic exhibits were not altered or faked, the evidence as to authenticity in this 

case was lacking . . . .”

To the extent Beckley’s language can be read as requiring a conventional 

evidentiary foundation to show the authenticity of photographic images appearing online, 

i.e., testimony of the person who actually created and uploaded the image, or testimony 

from an expert witness that the image has not been altered, we cannot endorse it. Such an 

analysis also appears to be inconsistent with the most recent language in Goldsmith

which explained that in authenticating photographic evidence, the evidentiary foundation 

“may—but need not be—supplied by the person taking the photograph or by a person 

who witnessed the event being recorded. [Citations.]” In addition, authentication “may

be supplied by other witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, content and location”

and “also may be established ‘by any other means provided by law’ ([Evid. Code,] 

§ 1400), including a statutory presumption. [Citation.]” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at

p. 268.)5

Furthermore, reading Beckley as equating authentication with proving genuineness

would ignore a fundamental principal underlying authentication emphasized in 

Goldsmith. In making the initial authenticity determination, the court need only conclude 

that a prima facie showing has been made that the photograph is an accurate 

representation of what it purports to depict. The ultimate determination of the 

authenticity of the evidence is for the trier of fact, who must consider any rebuttal 

evidence and balance it against the authenticating evidence in order to arrive at a final 

determination on whether the photograph, in fact, is authentic. As our Supreme Court 

explained in Goldsmith, “[t]he fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding

authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its admissibility.’

[Citation.]” (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267.)

 

5

 In reaching our result, we do not rely on statutory presumptions of 

authentication, which is the thrust of appellant’s supplemental brief distinguishing the 

analysis in Goldsmith from the facts of our case.
12

Measured by these principles, we conclude the incriminating photographs in the 

instant case were properly authenticated. The foundation for admitting the photographs 

into evidence was provided by the investigating officers.

As noted, all of the photographic exhibits were obtained from the cell phone 

seized from Mendez. Officer Woods used the Cellebrite program to extract images on 

Mendez’s cell phone included screenshots of the photographs which had been posted on 

Instagram, showing appellant, D.H., and Mendez posing with two handguns. The 

Cellebrite report indicated the photographs were created at 4:48 p.m. on October 21, 

2013, approximately five hours before appellant was arrested.

Officer Ochoa testified he routinely monitored appellant’s associations and 

activities by examining an Instagram account associated with appellant. As was 

explained at trial, Instagram is a web-based photograph sharing platform through which 

users share user-generated content. Among other things, it provides an application that 

allows users to upload photos, and share them with others. Officer Ochoa explained that 

when Instagram users create an account, they are assigned a username and password. 

Appellant used the screen name “40glock_”

Officer Ochoa also testified that when he viewed appellant’s own Instagram 

account on October 21, 2013, several images appeared of appellant and his cohorts, 

displaying firearms.6 The photographs taken from Mendez’s cell phone were the same as 

those observed by Officer Ochoa on Instagram earlier in the day.

Additionally, when appellant was arrested, he was wearing the same clothes and 

was in the same location depicted in the photographs. He was arrested along with several 

of the same individuals who appear with him in the photographs.

All of these factors point to the authenticity and genuineness of the photographs. 

We also note there was an absence of any evidence that the photos or those screen shots 

taken from Mendez’s cell phone were not accurate reproductions of the pictures uploaded 

onto appellant’s Instagram account and stored in the digital medium on Mendez’s cell

 

6

 The trial court ordered that the captions associated with the photographs be 

redacted as hearsay.
13

phone. Based on all of these factors, the trial court was authorized to conclude the 

prosecution sufficiently authenticated the incriminating photographs.

C. Necessity of Expert Testimony to Identify Firearms

Appellant claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in allowing Officer

Johnson to identify the make and model of the two handguns recovered from the scene of

appellant’s arrest. Over defense counsel’s objection, Officer Johnson testified that he

examined the seized handguns and determined that one was “a Smith [&] Wesson . . . 

[h]andgun,” model “SW40F,” and the other “was a Glock 23 handgun.” The juvenile 

court overruled the defense objection that the officer had not qualified as an expert in 

firearms. The court noted Officer Johnson “is a police officer and has been for seven

years[,] but you may ask these questions on cross.” During cross-examination of Officer 

Johnson, the defense did not challenge his ability to identify the two handguns at issue in 

this case.

Appellant contends this testimony should not have been admitted. He argues 

Officer Johnson should have been qualified as an expert witness because he was allowed 

to testify to matters beyond common experience without having provided his 

qualifications to render such an expert opinion. (People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103

[expert may testify only about subjects outside of common experience of jurors].) He 

asserts he was prejudiced because Officer Johnson’s identification of the firearms was the 

only evidence establishing that the firearms recovered from 59 Hare Street “were a Smith 

& Wesson and a Glock” and were working firearms, as opposed to replicas.

Admission of the testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Officer Johnson’s 

testimony was based on his perception of the guns and was not so far “beyond [the] 

common experience” that expert testimony was required. (See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1139-1140.) He had been a police officer for more than seven

years, and presumably had experience with firearms and their characteristics, and knew 

the difference between them. (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 503-504 [detective 

properly testified as lay witness about the significance of marks on exploded shotgun 

shells].) Officer Johnson’s familiarity with firearms permitted him to render opinion 
14

testimony regarding the make and caliber of the handguns seized in this case. (See 

People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 896–897 [rejecting a claim of improper

admission of testimony without qualifying the witness as an expert because the evidence 

established that the witness, a police detective, was “familiar with the use of firearms,”

which enabled him to offer his opinion].)

D. Court’s Failure to Set the Maximum Term of Confinement and to 

Calculate Credits

As to the setting of the maximum term of confinement, appellant claims the 

juvenile court failed to: (a) set the maximum term of confinement; (b) exercise its 

discretion whether to aggregate the maximum term of confinement on the current and 

prior sustained petitions; and (3) calculate his custody credits. The Attorney General 

concedes these claims have merit; and we agree. Remand is necessary for the limited 

purpose of allowing the juvenile court to amend the disposition order to reflect the 

omitted information.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the court to specify the 

maximum term of confinement and to exercise its discretion whether to aggregate the 

maximum term of confinement with previously sustained petitions. The court is also 

required to calculate appellant’s custody credits against that maximum term of 

confinement. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
15

_________________________

RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

REARDON, J.

_________________________

RIVERA, J.

A140960, In re K.B.
16

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Suzanne Ramos Bolanos

Counsel for Defendant and Appellant: Suzanne M. Morris, by appointment of

the Court of Appeal under the First District

Appellate Project’s Independent Case System

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent: Kamala D. Harris

Attorney General of California

Gerald A. Engler

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Eric D. Share

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Christina vom Saal

Deputy Attorney General

A140960, In re K.B.