Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 03A01-1412-CR-519 | July 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher L. Clerc

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kerry D. Ketchem

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

03A01-1412-CR-519

Appeal from the Bartholomew

Circuit Court

The Honorable Stephen R. 

Heimann, Judge

Trial Court Case No. 

03C01-1206-FD-3075

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Kerry Ketchem (“Ketchem”) pleaded guilty to three counts of Class D felony 

theft and was ordered to serve an aggregate sentence of eight years. Ketchem

appeals and argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing 

to consider certain factors as mitigating.
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[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Ketchem was employed by Faurecia, an automobile parts manufacturing 

company located in Columbus, Indiana. Between February 2011 and February 

2012, on at least seven occasions, Ketchem participated in the theft of auto 

parts manufactured by Faurecia. He did so by persuading his unsuspecting coworkers to help him load the parts onto unauthorized trucks to be taken, 

without payment, to a recycling facility operated by an associate. After the 

thefts were discovered and attributed to Ketchem, Ketchem admitted to a 

private investigator hired by Faurecia and to the police that he had committed 

the thefts. He claimed that he was coerced into participating in the thefts when 

two other parties threatened the life of his step-granddaughter. Ketchem 

profited personally from the thefts, receiving around $10,000 for one of the 

shipments alone. 

[4] On June 18, 2012, the State charged Ketchem with seven counts of Class D 

felony theft. Ketchem pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 4, and 7, and the State agreed 

to dismiss the remaining charges. The plea agreement provided that Ketchem’s 

sentence would be left to the trial court’s discretion but would be capped at an 

aggregate term of eight years. 

[5] At Ketchem’s sentencing hearing, Ketchem’s counsel argued that the trial court 

should find as mitigating that Ketchem was coerced into committing the thefts, 

that Ketchem admitted to the crimes and cooperated with police in their 
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investigation, that he is the sole financial provider for his wife and stepgranddaughter, and that he would likely suffer from health problems if he were 

incarcerated. The trial court, however, declared that Ketchem had “zero”

credibility and noted that he admitted to his crimes only after being caught with 

his “hand . . . in the cookie jar.” Tr. p. 49. The trial court rejected all of 

Ketchem’s proffered mitigating factors and found the following aggravating 

factors: (1) Ketchem’s age and education level;

1 (2) his prior seven convictions, 

five of which are felonies and include theft of government property and 

breaking and entering into FBI headquarters, fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud and 

embezzlement, possession of a forged instrument, forgery, and conversion; and 

(3) his previous parole violation. The trial court sentenced Ketchem to three 

years executed on Count 1, two and one-half years executed on Count 4, and 

two and one-half years executed on Count 7, all to run consecutively, for an 

aggregate sentence of eight years. The trial court also ordered Ketchem to pay 

restitution to Faurecia in the amount of $75,000.00 and to Chubb and Son, 

Faurecia’s insurance provider, in the amount of $910,012.00. 

[6] Ketchem now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Ketchem argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider as 

mitigating that he “took responsibility for his actions from the time the 

investigation began[,] admitted his guilt to a private investigator and the State 

 

1 At the time of the crimes, Ketchem was in his sixties. He has a degree from the University of Maryland. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision No. 03A01-1412-CR-519 | July 20, 2015 Page 4 of 6

Police before the charges were filed[, and] admitted again in court by entering a 

guilty plea.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. 

[8] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (“Anglemyer I”). So long as 

the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the 

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. 

A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, 

including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a 

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are 

unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing 

statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-

91.

[9] In its opinion on rehearing in Anglemyer I, our supreme court noted that:

a defendant who pleads guilty deserves “some” mitigating weight 

be given to the plea in return. But an allegation that the trial 

court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the 

defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is not only 

supported by the record but also that the mitigating evidence is 

significant. And the significance of a guilty plea as a mitigating 

factor varies from case to case. For example, a guilty plea may 

not be significantly mitigating when it does not demonstrate the 

defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, or when the defendant 

receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea.
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Anglemyer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ind. 2007) (“Anglemyer II”) (citations 

omitted).

[10] In this case, the evidence against Ketchem was overwhelming, and he faced a 

maximum sentence of twenty-one years, so the trial court’s conclusion that his

decision to plead guilty was more likely the result of pragmatism than 

acceptance of responsibility was not an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, 

despite his guilty plea, Ketchem continued to minimize his responsibility for the 

crime at his sentencing hearing, maintaining that he was coerced into 

committing the thefts and pointing blame at his associates. Under these facts 

and circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

omitting reference to his guilty plea when imposing his sentence.

[11] As for Ketchem’s expression of remorse, we note that, while an expression of 

remorse may be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court is under 

no obligation to accept a defendant’s alleged remorse as a mitigator. Phelps v. 

State, 969 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The trial court 

possesses the ability to directly observe a defendant and can best determine 

whether a defendant’s remorse is genuine. Id. Therefore, substantial deference 

must be given to the trial court’s evaluation of a defendant’s remorse. Id. Absent 

evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial court, we will accept 

its determination as to remorse. Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005).
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[12] Here, Ketchem asks that we accept his declaration of remorse, which was 

clearly rejected by the trial court. In fact, the trial court observed at the 

sentencing hearing that Ketchem had “zero” credibility. Tr. p. 48. Also, as we 

noted earlier, at the sentencing hearing, Ketchem continued to minimize his 

blame for the crime. Ketchem presents no evidence of any impermissible 

aggravator considered by the trial court. Therefore, the trial court was well 

within its discretion to discredit Ketchem’s self-serving claim of remorse.

[13] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

sentencing discretion in failing to consider Ketchem’s guilty plea and claim of 

remorse as mitigating factors.

[14] Affirmed.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.