HILLSDALE COUNTY SENIOR SERVICES, INC v HILLSDALE COUNTY 

Docket No. 144630. Argued March 13, 2013 (Calendar No. 3). Decided May 31, 2013. 

 Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS), Ella Asaro, Lyle Green, and others, filed 

an action in the Hillsdale Circuit Court against Hillsdale County, seeking mandamus to enforce 

the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill 

property tax in Hillsdale County to fund HCSS. The Hillsdale County voters approved the 

millage proposition in 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by 

HCSS. Defendant entered into a contract with HCSS from January 1, 2009 through 

December 31, 2010, but did not levy and spend the full, voter-approved, 0.5 mill. The circuit 

court, Michael, R. Smith, J., granted plaintiffs’ writ for mandamus and ordered defendant to levy 

the entire 0.5 mill for the length of time approved by the voters. In an unpublished opinion per 

curiam, issued January 3, 2012 (Docket No. 301607), the Court of Appeals, MARKEY, P.J., and 

FITZGERALD and BORRELLO, J.J., reversed the order, concluding that the circuit court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the Tax Tribunal had exclusive and original 

jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s application for leave to 

appeal. 493 Mich 852. 

 In an opinion by Justice MARKMAN, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices KELLY, 

ZAHRA, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held: 

 The Tax Tribunal possessed exclusive and original jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim for 

mandamus because the claim, which sought to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot 

proposition, was a proceeding for direct review of a final decision of an agency relating to rates 

under Michigan’s property tax laws. 

 1. Under MCL 205.731(a), the Tax Tribunal has original and exclusive jurisdiction of a 

claim when it involves: (1) a proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, 

determination, or order; (2) of an agency; (3) relating to an assessment, valuation, rate, special 

assessment, allocation, or equalization; (4) under the property tax laws. In this case, the Tax 

Tribunal has original and exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to MCL 

205.731(a). The appeal involved a proceeding for direct review of a final decision of the 

Hillsdale County Board of Commissioners not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill and the board 

constitutes an agency for purposes of MCL 205.731(a). Because MCL 400.576 allows defendant 

to levy up to 1 mill of property tax for services to older citizens, the issue arose under the 

property tax laws. The board’s decision not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill authorized by the 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

Reporter of Decisions: 

Corbin R. Davis 
ballot proposition related to “an assessment, valuation, rate, special assessment, allocation, or 

equalization” because plaintiffs’ claim that the ballot proposition mandated defendant to levy and 

spend the full 0.5 mill approved by the voters constituted a dispute pertaining to the amount of a 

charge or payment with reference to some basis of calculation, which is a challenge to a “rate.” 

The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the circuit court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ mandamus claim. 

 2. When proceeding under MCL 205.731(a), the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction is 

determined by the subject matter of the proceeding, not by the type of relief requested. 

Accordingly, the involved parties may not affirmatively divest the tribunal of jurisdiction by 

seeking an equitable remedy. In this case, plaintiffs’ request for mandamus did not divest the 

tribunal of jurisdiction. 

 Court of Appeals decision affirmed. 

 Justice CAVANAGH concurred in the result only. 

©2013 State of Michigan 
FILED MAY 31, 2013 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

HILLSDALE COUNTY SENIOR 

SERVICES, INC., ELLA ASARO, LYLE 

GREEN, RUTH GREEN, DONELDA 

POTTS, JOHN POTTS, and KERBY 

RUSHING, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v No. 144630 

COUNTY OF HILLSDALE, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

MARKMAN, J. 

This case concerns whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over 

plaintiffs’ claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition 

that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to 

fund plaintiff Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS). Because that claim falls 

within the scope of MCL 205.731(a) as a “proceeding for direct review of a final 

decision . . . of an agency relating to . . . rates . . . under the property tax laws of this 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Stephen J. Markman 

Mary Beth Kelly 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

David F. Viviano 
2

state,” we conclude that the tribunal possesses exclusive and original jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which vacated and 

reversed the circuit court’s judgment for mandamus for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. 

I. FACTS AND HISTORY 

 Under the activities or services for older persons act (ASOPA), MCL 400.571 et 

seq., “[a] local unit of government may appropriate funds to public or private nonprofit 

corporations or organizations for the purposes of planning, coordinating, evaluating, and 

providing services to older persons.” MCL 400.573. ASOPA further provides: 

 A governing body of a local unit of government may submit a 

millage proposition to the electorate to levy up to 1 mill for services to 

older citizens. This proposition may be submitted at any election held by 

the local unit of government, but shall not be submitted at a special election 

of the local unit of government called solely for the purpose of submitting 

this millage proposition. [MCL 400.576] 

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Hillsdale County Board of Commissioners, as 

defendant’s legislative body, submitted a millage proposition to the county’s voters in 

August 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by HCSS. The 

proposition posed the following question: 

Shall the limitation on the amount of taxes on the general ad valorem 

taxes within the County of Hillsdale imposed under Article IX, Section 6, 

of the Michigan Constitution be increased for said County by .5 mill ($0.50 

per $1000 of taxable value) for the period of 2008 to 2022, inclusive, for 

the intended purpose of planning, coordinating and providing services to 

older persons by Hillsdale County Senior Services Center, Inc., as provided 

by Public Act 39 of 1976 [ASOPA]? Shall the county levy such increase in 

millage for this purpose during such period which will raise in the first year 

an estimated $676,532? 
3

The proposition was approved at the August 5, 2008 election. Thereafter, in November 

2009, HCSS entered into a contract with defendant for the latter to provide services for 

older persons from January 1, 2009, through December 31, 2010. Hillsdale Co Senior 

Servs Ctr, Inc v Co of Hillsdale, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, 

issued January 3, 2012 (Docket No. 301607) at 2-3. However, in the two fiscal years 

2009-2011, for budgetary reasons defendant declined to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill.1

 

In response, plaintiffs filed a “Verified Complaint for Mandamus with Request for 

Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, and Request for Preliminary 

Injunction” in the circuit court, requesting in part that the court: 

 Issue its permanent Order of Mandamus directing the Defendant, its 

Board and all of its officers to instruct all pertinent tax billing authorities or 

agencies (e.g., city or township officials) to levy the full 0.5 mill required 

by the Proposal, in 2010 and all future years covered by the proposal. . . . 

* * * 

[A]ppropriate the full amount of the proceeds of the levy to [HSSC] 

for the provision of services to the older population of the County of 

Hillsdale. 

The circuit court ruled in pertinent part that “the Plaintiffs’ Writ for Mandamus shall be 

granted and Defendant shall levy the entire 0.5 mill forthwith, to be reflected on the 

December, 2010, tax notices and every year hereafter until 2022, inclusive, as set forth in 

 

1

 In 2009-2010, defendant levied and spent 0.15 mill, and in 2010-2011, defendant 

budgeted to levy and spend 0.25 mill. 
4

the voter approved ballot proposal.”2

 Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the exclusive and 

original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.3

 The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant 

and vacated the circuit court’s judgment. Plaintiff then applied for and was granted leave 

to appeal to this Court. Hillsdale Co Senior Servs Ctr, Inc v Co of Hillsdale, 493 Mich 

852 (2012). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de 

novo. Elba Twp v Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ 

(2013). Issues of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Id. 

 

2

 The ruling did not, as requested by plaintiffs, order the appropriation of “the full amount 

of proceeds of the levy” to HCSS. That is, the circuit court did not order defendant to 

spend the full 0.5 mill by transferring the proceeds to HCSS. 

3

 Defendant did not raise the jurisdictional issue in the circuit court. However, as the 

Court of Appeals asserted: 

Although defendant included lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as 

an affirmative defense, defendant neither briefed nor argued the issue of 

subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court. Consequently, the trial court 

did not rule on whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the 

“[l]ack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time and 

the parties to an action cannot confer jurisdiction by their conduct or action 

nor can they waive the defense by not raising it.”. [Hillsdale unpub op at 3-

4, quoting Paulson v Secretary of State, 154 Mich App 626, 630-631; 398 

NW2d 477 (1986).] 
5

III. ANALYSIS 

 This Court is charged with determining whether the circuit court or the Tax 

Tribunal possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. As always, we begin by 

considering the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. 

A. STATUTORY TEXT 

 The jurisdiction of the circuit court is governed by Const 1963, art 6, § 13, which 

provides: 

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not 

prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and 

tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and 

determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control 

over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in 

accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases 

and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court. 

MCL 600.605 further provides: 

 Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all 

civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in 

the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts 

are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state. 

MCL 205.731 provides an exception for jurisdiction in tax cases: 

The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all of the 

following: 

(a) A proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, 

determination, or order of an agency[4] relating to assessment, valuation, 

 

4

 MCL 205.703(a) defines “agency” as “a board, official, or administrative agency 

empowered to make a decision, finding, ruling, assessment, determination, or order that 

is subject to review under the jurisdiction of the tribunal or that has collected a tax for 

which a refund is claimed.” 
6

rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property 

tax laws of this state. 

(b) A proceeding for a refund or redetermination of a tax levied 

under the property tax laws of this state. 

* * * 

(e) Any other proceeding provided by law. 

Thus, for the tribunal to have jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 205.731(a), four elements 

must be present: (1) a proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, 

determination, or order; (2) of an agency; (3) relating to an assessment, valuation, rate, 

special assessment, allocation, or equalization; (4) under the property tax laws. Where all 

such elements are present, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is both original and exclusive. 

 The instant appeal is a proceeding for direct review of a “final decision”-- the 

board’s decision not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill. The board constitutes an 

“agency” pursuant to the definition set forth in MCL 205.703(a). And the issue here is 

one arising “under the property tax laws.” See MCL 400.576 (specifically allowing 

defendant to “levy up to 1 mill [property tax] for services to older citizens”); Const 1963, 

art 9, § 6 (governing property taxes).5

 Thus, the central issue in this case is whether the 

 

5

 The ballot proposition explicitly referenced Const 1963, art 9, § 6, which provides in 

part: 

Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the total amount of 

general ad valorem taxes imposed upon real and tangible personal property 

for all purposes in any one year shall not exceed 15 mills on each dollar of 

the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized. Under procedures 

provided by law, which shall guarantee the right of initiative, separate tax 

limitations for any county and for the townships and for school districts 
7

board’s decision not to levy and spend the full 0.5 mill “relat[es] to assessment, 

valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization.” 

 None of the listed terms is statutorily defined, so we begin by consulting a 

dictionary. Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). 

On initial review of this list, “rates” appears to be the most relevant term under the facts 

of this case. “Rate” means “the amount of a charge or payment with reference to some 

basis of calculation.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). During the 

pertinent time periods, the board levied 0.15 and 0.25 mills, although plaintiffs claim that 

the ballot proposition mandated a 0.5 mill levy. Thus, the heart of the dispute pertains to 

the “amount of a charge” by defendant to its property taxpayers. Although plaintiffs 

conceded at oral argument that this case does pertain to rates,6

 they argued to the contrary 

in their briefs on the grounds that the ballot proposition could achieve only two ends: 

either it absolutely required the levy of the full 0.5 mill or it required nothing. However, 

despite plaintiffs’ all-or-nothing approach, the instant dispute does involve rates for the 

 

therein, the aggregate of which shall not exceed 18 mills on each dollar of 

such valuation, may be adopted and thereafter altered by the vote of a 

majority of the qualified electors of such county voting thereon, in lieu of 

the limitation hereinbefore established. 

6

 For example, plaintiffs’ counsel stated: 

 The County decided not to follow the mandate [in the proposition] 

but to impose a lesser amount and that’s what the County’s board did. 

They believed they have the discretion to do so. So why is it not a rate? It 

is a rate, but what they’ve done to resolve this dispute is not going to draw 

on any of the expertise of the Tax Tribunal that underlay the creation of the 

Tribunal in the first place. 
8

simple fact that both “all” and “nothing” constitute rates-- 0 percent and 100 percent of 

the full 0.5 mill-- and in any case, defendant did levy and spend portions of the 0.5 mill: 

30 percent of the 0.5 mill in 2009-2010 and 50 percent of the 0.5 mill in 2010-2011. 

Plaintiffs simply argue that defendant is required to levy and spend more-- that defendant 

must levy a larger “amount of charge,” 100 percent of the full 0.5 mill. Accordingly, this 

case does pertain to “rates.”7

 Thus, all four elements of MCL 207.731(a) are satisfied, 

and the tribunal possesses exclusive and original jurisdiction in this case. 

B. CASELAW 

 Despite the foregoing, confusion has arisen from earlier caselaw-- namely, our 

decisions in Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and Romulus City 

Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d 152 (1982), and the 

Court of Appeals’ decision in Jackson Dist Library v Jackson Co No 2, 146 Mich App 

412; 380 NW2d 116 (1985) (Jackson); rev’d on other grounds, Jackson Dist Library v 

Jackson Co, 428 Mich 371; 408 NW2d 801 (1987) (Jackson II). We take this 

opportunity to clarify the general import of those decisions as to the jurisdiction of the 

tribunal. 

 

7

 Because we conclude that this case pertains to rates, we need not address the other 

terms listed in MCL 205.731(a). 
9

Wikman and Romulus were companion cases addressing “special assessments” 

under MCL 205.731.8

 In Wikman, the plaintiff taxpayer filed suit against the defendant 

city in circuit court, seeking injunctive relief and claiming that special assessments levied 

against him for paving a portion of a road had been calculated in an arbitrary and 

inequitable manner. After issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining the collection of the 

special assessment, the court declared the special assessment void and permanently 

enjoined the defendant from its collection. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded 

to the tribunal, concluding that the latter possessed jurisdiction, and this Court affirmed. 

Much of our analysis considered the particularities of special assessments. Wikman, 413 

Mich at 633-635 (“We recognize that significant differences exist between special 

assessments and other forms of taxation.”). However, Wikman, id. at 647-648, explained 

more generally: 

 [The] Tax Tribunal lacks the power to issue an injunction. The 

issuance of an injunction is an exercise of judicial power. The constitution 

limits the Legislature’s power to transfer judicial power to administrative 

agencies, see Const 1963, art 3, § 2, Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, 

Inc, 357 Mich 254, 258; 98 NW2d 586 (1959). . . . MCL 205.732 . . . does 

not expressly grant the tribunal the power to issue injunctions, and such 

power will not be extended by implication. 

Still, Wikman clarified: 

 Although injunctive relief may not be directly available, the tribunal 

is empowered to issue “writs, orders, or directives,” see MCL 205.732,[9]

 

8

 “Special assessments” are “pecuniary exactions made by the government for a special 

purpose or local improvement, apportioned according to the benefits received.” Wikman, 

413 Mich at 632-633. 

9

 MCL 205.732 provides: 
10

and nothing in the Tax Tribunal Act prohibits one from seeking equitable 

relief to enforce a tribunal decision. [Id. at 648 (citations omitted).] 

Wikman then concluded that the plaintiffs’ “requests for preliminary and permanent 

injunctions in these proceedings do not take them out of the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

tribunal” because the tribunal “has the jurisdiction and ability to resolve all the claims 

presented.” Id. at 648-649. 

 In Romulus, the plaintiffs, township and city treasurers and landowners, 

challenged special assessments for drain taxes, alleging that the defendants, the county 

and its board, drain commissioner, and treasurer, all committed constructive fraud by 

 

 The tribunal’s powers include, but are not limited to, all of the 

following: 

 (a) Affirming, reversing, modifying, or remanding a final decision, 

finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency. 

 (b) Ordering the payment or refund of taxes in a matter over which it 

may acquire jurisdiction. 

 (c) Granting other relief or issuing writs, orders, or directives that it 

deems necessary or appropriate in the process of disposition of a matter 

over which it may acquire jurisdiction. 

 (d) Promulgating rules for the implementation of this act, including 

rules for practice and procedure before the tribunal and for mediation as 

provided in [MCL 205.747], under the administrative procedures act of 

1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.328. 

 (e) Mediating a proceeding before the tribunal. 

 (f) Certifying mediators to facilitate claims in the court of claims and 

in the tribunal. 
11

using drain funds to pay administrative expenses.10 At the time of the suit, several 

hundred thousand dollars were held in escrow and controlled by the plaintiff treasurers. 

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing 

the special assessments and from using the drain funds for administrative expenses, and 

an order that the funds held in escrow be returned to the landowner plaintiffs. In circuit 

court, the defendants moved for accelerated judgment on the grounds that the circuit 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding 

that the claims were within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals then 

reversed in part because it concluded that the tribunal lacked equitable jurisdiction. 

Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 86 Mich App 663, 669-670; 273 

NW2d 514 (1978). This Court granted leave to appeal to consider “whether the 

Michigan Tax Tribunal is the only forum in which relief can be sought . . . .” Romulus 

City Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 406 Mich 976, 976-977 (1979). Romulus, 

413 Mich at 746, answered that question in the negative and affirmed the Court of 

Appeals, concluding: 

 [I]t is apparent that under extraordinary circumstances a city or 

township treasurer may not be required to fulfill his or her ministerial 

duties.[11] If the instant case presents such circumstances, so as to justify 

 

10 This issue was apparently rendered moot when the Drain Code, MCL 280.1 et seq., 

was amended. Romulus, 413 Mich at 733 n 2. 

11 Romulus cited two cases involving such “extraordinary circumstances.” Both involved 

situations in which courts had refused to issue writs of mandamus compelling ministerial 

acts: Huron Co Drain Comm’r v Chandler Twp Supervisor, 90 Mich 278, 279; 51 NW 

282 (1892) (the Court refused to issue mandamus because the “proceedings [were] so 

defective that no legal drain could be laid out, [and] the supervisor was not in the wrong 
12

the withholding from the county of the funds now in escrow, the circuit 

court will need to determine what should be done with the funds. We 

conclude that, if the funds in escrow have been justifiably withheld from 

the county, the landowner plaintiffs’ claim that the funds should be repaid 

to them because of defendants’ constructive fraud is not a claim for a tax 

refund [pursuant to MCL 205.731(b)] within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

the Tax Tribunal. 

The Romulus Court further explained that the “Tax Tribunal Act does not prevent a court 

of equity from determining what should be done with funds that in extraordinary 

circumstances have been properly withheld from the county.”12 Id. at 747. However, 

Romulus also stated: 

 In cases not involving special assessments, the tribunal’s 

membership is well-qualified to resolve the disputes concerning those 

matters that the Legislature has placed within its jurisdiction: assessments, 

 

in refusing to assess the tax.”); Cheboygan Co Bd of Supervisors v Mentor Twp 

Supervisor, 94 Mich 386, 387-388; 54 NW 169 (1892) (the Court refused to issue 

mandamus where the taxes received therefrom would be put to an illegal use). A 

ministerial act is one in which “the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed 

with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or 

judgment.” Toan v McGinn, 271 Mich 28, 34; 260 NW 108 (1935) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

12 Wikman foreshadowed this “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the tribunal’s 

jurisdiction: 

 Case law exists indicating that the constitution places some 

limitations on the Legislature’s power to divest the court completely of 

equity jurisdiction and the judicial power to grant an injunction; see 

Haggerty v City of Dearborn, 332 Mich 304; 51 NW2d 290 (1952). Thus, 

while there may be an extraordinary case which justifies the exercise of 

equity jurisdiction in contravention of a statute, this is not such a case. 

[Wikman, 413 Mich at 648.] 

As the foregoing and Romulus’ reference to the Tax Tribunal Act not “prevent[ing]” 

courts from acting in equity suggest, such an exception does not actually divest the 

tribunal of jurisdiction but rather limits the exclusivity of such jurisdiction. 
13

valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. . . . Although the tribunal, in 

making its determinations, will make conclusions of law, MCL 205.751,[13]

the matters within its jurisdiction under MCL 205.731 most clearly relate to 

the basis for a tax, and much less clearly to the proper uses which may be 

made of the funds once collected. Questions concerning how the funds 

collected may be expended do not appear to be implicated in disputes 

related to assessments, valuations, rates, allocation and equalization. The 

question presented here is whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax 

Tribunal extends to such questions when the funds are collected pursuant to 

special assessment laws. [Id. at 737-738 (citation omitted).] 

Thus, as with Wikman, Romulus was largely concerned with the particularities of special 

assessments. 

 Accordingly, it should first be noted that Wikman and Romulus are of limited 

application outside the context of special assessments. To the extent that those opinions 

address the tribunal’s jurisdiction generally, Wikman indicates that although the tribunal 

cannot itself issue injunctions, it can issue orders that may be enforced in circuit court. 

Thus, Wikman does not suggest, as plaintiffs contend, that parties may affirmatively 

divest the tribunal of jurisdiction by seeking equitable remedies. Indeed, Wikman 

involved a request for an equitable remedy, and this Court concluded that the tribunal 

possessed jurisdiction. Moreover, as Wikman additionally explained, when proceeding 

under MCL 205.731(a), the tribunal’s jurisdiction is determined by the subject matter of 

 

13 MCL 205.751(1) provides: 

 A decision and opinion of the tribunal shall be made within a 

reasonable period, shall be in writing or stated in the record, and shall 

include a concise statement of facts and conclusions of law, stated 

separately and, upon order of the tribunal, shall be officially reported and 

published. 
14

the proceeding, not on the type of relief requested.14 Thus, plaintiffs’ requested relief 

here-- mandamus-- does not divest the tribunal of jurisdiction.15 

 Moreover, Romulus suggests that in “extraordinary circumstances”-- those so 

extraordinary that a court may deny mandamus compelling ministerial acts-- the circuit 

court retains equitable jurisdiction to decide a case that arguably falls within the scope of 

MCL 205.731(b) (proceedings for refunds). Although this case involves a request for 

mandamus, it does not present “extraordinary circumstances” such as those present in 

Romulus, Huron, and Cheboygan. Further, this case does not involve a proceeding for a 

refund under MCL 205.731(b); rather, it involves a proceeding under MCL 205.731(a). 

Once again, therefore, the subject matter, not the type of relief requested, determines the 

 

14 Wikman explained: 

 The tribunal’s jurisdiction is based either on the subject matter of the 

proceeding (e.g., a direct review of a final decision of an agency relating to 

special assessments under property tax laws) or the type of relief requested 

(i.e., a refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax laws). In 

the instant case, the jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal is governed by the first 

subsection since plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin permanently the collection 

of a special assessment rather than to obtain a refund of a tax. [Wikman, 

413 Mich at 631.] 

15 Plaintiffs alternatively argue that defendant’s defenses raise constitutional claims that 

the tribunal is unfit to consider, citing Wikman’s statement that “[g]enerally speaking, an 

agency exercising quasi-judicial power does not undertake the determination of 

constitutional questions or possess the power to hold statutes unconstitutional.” Wikman, 

413 Mich at 646-647. However, plaintiffs omit the sentences that follow: “However, the 

constitutional claims in this case do not involve the validity of a statute. Rather, 

plaintiffs’ claim is merely an assertion, in constitutional terms, that the assessment was 

arbitrary and without foundation.” Id. at 647. As in Wikman, defendant does not seek to 

invalidate a statute. Defendant’s constitutional defenses do not provide an alternative 

basis for divesting the tribunal of jurisdiction. 
15

tribunal’s jurisdiction. Thus, neither Wikman nor Romulus provides a basis for divesting 

the tribunal of jurisdiction. 

 The Court of Appeals’ decision in Jackson is in accord. In 1977, Jackson County 

voters approved a 20-year levy of one mill to establish a public library system, thereby 

creating the petitioner, Jackson District Library.16 In 1982, the respondent, Jackson 

County Board of Commissioners, rolled back the millage to 0.9651 mill pursuant to MCL 

211.24e.17 The petitioner filed a complaint in circuit court, alleging that the board lacked 

authorization to roll back the mill. The complaint was subsequently amended to add a 

second count seeking declaratory judgment as to whether the levy was subject to the 

statute. These two counts were dismissed by stipulation of the parties for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and a petition containing two virtually identical counts was filed with 

 

16 The proposition asked the following question: 

 Shall the limitation on the total amount of taxes which may be 

imposed upon all property in the County of Jackson be increased by 1.00 

mill on each dollar ($1.00 per $1,000.00) of the assessed valuation, as 

equalized, for a period of twenty (20) years, 1977 to 1996, inclusive, said 

millage increase to be used exclusively for the purpose of establishing and 

operating a single public library system in Jackson County? [Jackson II, 

428 Mich at 375 n 5.] 

17 MCL 211.24e(2) provides in relevant part: 

 [U]nless the taxing unit complies with section 16 of the uniform 

budgeting and accounting act, 1968 PA 2, MCL 141.436, the governing 

body of a taxing unit shall not levy ad valorem property taxes for operating 

purposes for an ensuing fiscal year of the taxing unit that yield an amount 

more than the sum of the taxes levied at the base tax rate on additions 

within the taxing unit for the ensuing fiscal year plus an amount equal to 

the taxes levied for operating purposes for the concluding fiscal year on 

existing property. 
16

the tribunal, whereupon the tribunal determined that it lacked jurisdiction. However, 

citing Wikman, the Court of Appeals reversed that determination, concluding: 

 Petitioner’s claim fits the act’s jurisdictional requirement. Petitioner 

appealed from a final determination of respondent board to rollback a tax 

levy pursuant to MCL 211.24e. Respondent board may be viewed as an 

“agency” for such purpose. The appeal related to a determination of rates 

under property tax laws, since respondent board’s action was characterized 

as a tax rate rollback and petitioner asserted that public hearings were held 

to determine if one mill should be levied. Accordingly, the tribunal had 

exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim pursuant to MCL 205.731(a). 

Because jurisdiction over respondents was obtained when petitioner 

originally filed its action in the circuit court, the 30-day limitation period of 

MCL 205.735 was tolled, and thus this matter was not removed from the 

tribunal’s jurisdiction. Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 

(1982). [Jackson, 146 Mich App at 417-418 (citations omitted).] 

Although this Court subsequently reversed Jackson on other grounds, see Jackson II, 428 

Mich at 377-378, Jackson’s jurisdictional ruling was never appealed to this Court. 

 The circumstances surrounding the jurisdictional ruling in Jackson are analogous 

to those in this case. As the Court of Appeals explained in Hillsdale, unpub op at 5: 

 In Jackson[], the plaintiffs sought direct review of a “final decision, 

finding, ruling, determination or order of an agency.” In the present case, 

plaintiffs sought an order of mandamus to compel the county to levy the 

full amount of the millage approved by voters. However, the gist of 

plaintiff’s action concerns whether the county has authority to levy less 

than the millage limitation approved by voters. A jurisdictional claim 

“should be determined not by how the plaintiff phrases its complaint, but 

by the relief sought and the underlying basis of the action.”[18] Colonial 

Village Townhouse Cooperative v Riverview, 142 Mich App 474, 477-478; 

370 NW2d 25 (1985). As in Jackson[], the question presented by 

plaintiffs’ action relates to direct review of a determination of rates under 

 

18 As explained earlier, because this case proceeds under MCL 205.731(a), the tribunal’s 

jurisdiction is based on the subject matter of the proceeding, not the type of relief 

requested. 
17

the property tax laws. Accordingly, the Tax Tribunal has subject-matter 

jurisdiction and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of 

mandamus. 

We agree. As explained in Section III(A) of this opinion, this case falls within the 

tribunal’s jurisdiction, and, as further explained in this section, such a determination is 

entirely consistent with Wikman and Romulus. Thus, this case belongs to the tribunal 

“[n]o matter how skillfully plaintiff camouflages” its claims. Colonial Village, 142 Mich 

App at 478. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

This case concerns whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over 

plaintiffs’ claim for mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition 

that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to 

fund plaintiff HCSS. Because that claim falls within the scope of MCL 205.731(a) as a 

“proceeding for direct review of a final decision . . . of an agency relating to . . . rates . . . 

under the property tax laws of this state,” we conclude that the tribunal possesses 

exclusive and original jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals, which vacated and reversed the circuit court’s judgment for mandamus for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

 Stephen J. Markman 

 Robert P. Young, Jr. 

 Mary Beth Kelly 

 Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack

 David F. Viviano 

 CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.