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or whether statutory grounds for termination were shown. 

And because we conclude that termination of Tom’s parental 

rights was in error, we decline to address Tom’s arguments that 

Nicole’s statements were inadmissible hearsay. An appellate 

court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not 

needed to adjudicate the controversy before it.18

VI. CONCLUSION

We affirm the county court’s order terminating Brandy’s 

parental rights. But because the State did not rebut the presumption that Tom was a fit parent, the county court’s order 

terminating Tom’s parental rights is reversed.

Affirmed in part, and in part reve

18 In re Interest of Aaron D., 269 Neb. 249, 691 N.W.2d 164 (2005).

Brenda R. Rice, appellant, v. Christina

Personal Representative of the Esta

Dale E. Rice, deceased, appell

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 21, 2014. No. S-13-458.

1. Divorce: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a divorce decree 

presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches a 

conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below.

2. Judgments: Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements. A dissolution decree 

which approves and incorporates into the decree the parties’ property settlement 

agreement is a judgment of the court itself.

3. Courts: Jurisdiction: Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements. A district 

court, in the exercise of its broad jurisdiction over marriage dissolutions, retains 

jurisdiction to enforce all terms of approved property settlement agreements.

4. Courts: Jurisdiction. A court that has jurisdiction to make a decision also has 

that power to enforce it by making such orders as are necessary to carry its judgment or decree into effect.

5. Divorce: Insurance. The general rule is that divorce does not affect a beneficiary 

designation in a life insurance policy.

6. Divorce: Property Settlement Agreements: Intent. If the dissolution decree 

and any property settlement agreement incorporated therein manifest the parties’ intent to relinquish all property rights, then such agreement should be given 

that effect.
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7. Contracts. Ambiguity exists in a document when a word, phrase, or provision 

therein has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.

8. Divorce: Intent. If the contents of a dissolution decree are unambiguous, the 

decree is not subject to interpretation and construction, and the intention of the 

parties must be determined from the contents of the decree.

9. Divorce. If the contents of a dissolution decree are unambiguous, the effect of the 

decree must be declared in the light of the literal meaning of the language used.

10. Divorce: Modification of Decree: Property Settlement Agreements. Where 

parties to a divorce action voluntarily execute a property settlement agreement 

which is approved by the dissolution court and incorporated into a divorce decree 

from which no appeal is taken, its provisions will not thereafter be vacated or 

modified in the absence of fraud or gross inequity.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Stev

D. Burns, Judge. Affirm

Robert B. Creager, of Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck, P.C., 

L.L.O., for appellant.

James A. Cada, of Cada, Cada, Hoffman & Jewson, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, M

Miller-Lerman, and Cassel,

Miller-Lerman,

NATURE OF CASE

Brenda R. Rice and Dale E. Rice were married in September 

2001. In May 2011, Brenda filed for divorce. Brenda and Dale 

entered into a property settlement agreement, and on August 

8, 2011, the district court for Lancaster County filed a decree 

dissolving their marriage and incorporating the property settlement agreement. Dale died shortly thereafter on August 15. At 

the time of his death, Dale owned two life insurance policies 

and Brenda was still listed as the primary beneficiary on both 

policies. After Brenda filed claims for the proceeds of the life 

insurance policies, the personal representative of Dale’s estate 

filed a motion to enforce the decree, arguing that under the 

property settlement agreement, Brenda no longer had any legal 

claim to the policies. Following the receipt of evidence, the 

district court filed its “Judgment of Enforcement of Decree” 

on April 23, 2013, in which it ordered Brenda to withdraw her 
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claims under Dale’s life insurance policies. Brenda appeals. 

We conclude that by the four corners of the property settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce 

decree, Brenda clearly and unambiguously relinquished her 

beneficiary interests in Dale’s life insurance policies, and we 

therefore affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Brenda and Dale were married in September 2001. No children were born of their marriage, but both Brenda and Dale 

had children from prior marriages. Brenda filed for divorce in 

May 2011. On August 6, Brenda and Dale signed a property 

settlement agreement. On August 8, the district court entered 

a decree dissolving the marriage, which incorporated the property settlement agreement. Relevant portions of the property 

settlement agreement are quoted below. Paragraph VI of the 

property settlement agreement provided:

VI. STOCKS, BANK ACCOUNTS, LIFE 

INSURANCE POLICICES [sic], PENSION PLANS 

AND RETIREMENT PLANS

[Brenda] shall be awarded all interest in all pension 

plans, stocks, retirement accounts, 401(k), IRA, life insurance policy and checking or savings account in [Brenda’s] 

name, free from any claim of [Dale] including all ownership interest in the LincOne Federal Credit Union joint 

account. [Dale] shall be awarded all interest in any pension plans, stocks, retirement accounts, 401(k), IRA, life 

insurance policy and checking or savings account in 

[Dale’s] name, free from any claim of [Brenda]. The parties shall divide evenly the sums in the LincOne Credit 

Union accounts.

Paragraph IX of the property settlement agreement provided:

IX. PROPERTY PROVISIONS AND SETTLEMENT 

OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF PARTIES

It is expressly understood by and between the parties 

hereto that the provisions of this agreement relating to 

the property and liabilities of each, set aside and allocate 

to each party his or her respective portions of the properties belonging to the parties and of the liabilities of the 
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parties at the date hereto; and each party acknowledges 

that the properties set aside to him or her, less the liabilities so allocated to him or her, will be in full, complete 

and final settlement, release and discharge, as between 

themselves, of all rights, claims, interests and obligations 

of each party in and to the said properties and the same 

in their entirety constitute a full, fair and equitable division and the partition of their respective rights, claims 

and interests in and to the said properties of every kind 

and nature.

Paragraph X of the property settlement agreement was labeled 

“WAIVER AND RELEASE OF MARITAL RIGHTS.” 

Subsections (a) and (b) of paragraph X contain almost identical 

language, except that subsection (a) refers to Dale and subsection (b) refers to Brenda. Paragraph X provided in part:

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 30-2316, the parties 

hereby agree as follows:

(a) In consideration of the provisions of this agreement, [Dale] waives and relinquishes any and all interest 

or rights of any kind, character, or nature whatsoever, 

including but not limited to all rights to elective share, 

homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance in the property of [Brenda], and renounces all benefits which would otherwise pass to [Dale] from [Brenda] 

by intestate succession or by virtue of the provisions 

of any Will executed before this Settlement Agreement 

which he, as husband, or as widower, or otherwise, has 

had, now has, or might hereafter have against [Brenda], 

or, in the event of her death, as an heir at law, surviving 

spouse, or otherwise. [Dale] also waives and relinquishes 

any and all interest, present and future, in any and all 

property, real, personal, or otherwise, now owned by 

[Brenda] or hereafter acquired, and including all property 

set aside for her in this agreement, it being the intention 

of the parties that this agreement shall be a full, final, and 

complete settlement of all matters in dispute between the 

parties hereto.

(b) In consideration of the provisions of this agreement, [Brenda] waives and relinquishes any and all 
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interest or rights of any kind, character, or nature whatsoever, including but not limited to all rights to elective 

share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance in the property of [Dale], and renounces 

all benefits which would otherwise pass to [Brenda] 

from [Dale] by intestate succession or by virtue of the 

provisions of any Will executed before this Settlement 

Agreement which she, as wife, or as widow, or otherwise, has had, now has, or might hereafter have against 

[Dale], or, in the event of his death, as an heir at law, 

surviving spouse, or otherwise. [Brenda] also waives and 

relinquishes any and all interest, present and future, in 

any and all property, real, personal, or otherwise, now 

owned by [Dale] or hereafter acquired, and including all 

property set aside for him in this agreement, it being the 

intention of the parties that this agreement shall be a full, 

final, and complete settlement of all matters in dispute 

between the parties hereto.

At the time of Dale’s death, he owned two separate life 

insurance policies, one with Primerica and one with Unum. 

Both life insurance policies were awarded to Dale in the property settlement agreement. Brenda was still listed as the primary beneficiary for both policies when Dale died. Subsequent 

to Dale’s death, Brenda made claims for the proceeds of the 

life insurance policies.

On September 1, 2011, the personal representative of Dale’s 

estate filed a motion entitled “Motion to Enforce Divorce 

Decree,” which stated that Brenda had waived her status as 

the beneficiary to Dale’s life insurance policies. The motion 

also stated that by the property settlement agreement, Brenda 

had waived all rights and claims that she had to Dale’s pension 

plan, stocks, retirement accounts, 401K, IRA, life insurance 

policies, and checking or saving accounts held by Dale.

On October 3, 2011, the district court filed an order granting the motion to enforce the divorce decree. The district 

court’s order was vacated by the Nebraska Court of Appeals 

on July 30, 2012, in case No. A-11-938. The order was 

vacated, because the dissolution proceedings had not been 
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revived by Dale’s estate and therefore the district court did not 

have jurisdiction.

Following the mandate, on October 1, 2012, the personal 

representative of Dale’s estate filed a “Verified Motion for 

Revivor” pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1403 (Reissue 

2008). The district court sustained this motion by order filed 

January 4, 2013.

Brenda filed a motion entitled “Motion to Modify/Reform 

Property Settlement Agreement” on March 8, 2013. In her 

motion, Brenda asserted that as part of their dissolution proceedings, Brenda and Dale intended to keep each other as 

beneficiaries on the other’s life insurance policies and that 

nothing in the property settlement agreement was intended to 

change that intention. Brenda sought to offer evidence to substantiate her contention. Brenda requested an order from the 

court determining that the property settlement agreement did 

not change the parties’ status as beneficiaries of each other’s 

life insurance policies or, in the alternative, an order modifying or reforming the property settlement agreement to reflect 

that intention.

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 

motion to enforce the divorce decree and the motion to modify 

or reform the property settlement agreement on April 10, 

2013. Prior thereto, the district court entered a pretrial conference order on March 21. In the pretrial conference order, the 

parties described several legal issues presented by the case, 

including whether the district court had authority to enforce 

the decree and whether the property settlement agreement 

was ambiguous.

The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. That on August 8, 2011, the Court entered a Decree 

and approved the Property Settlement Agreement entered 

into by Brenda . . . and Dale . . . and signed by them on 

the date indicated.

2. That Dale . . . died on August 15, 2011.

3. That Christina Webb was appointed Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Dale . . . pursuant to 

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1403 et seq.
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4. That this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.

5. That Christina Webb is the Personal Representative 

of the Estate of Dale . . . and as an heir and oldest child, 

appears on behalf of the heirs of Dale . . . .

6. That at the time of his death, Dale was the owner of 

certain life insurance policies with Primerica and Unum 

which policies were awarded to [Dale] in the Property 

Settlement Agreement.

7. That at the time of his death Brenda was listed as 

the primary beneficiary of the Primerica and Unum life 

insurance polic[ies].

8. That at the time of his death, Dale was the owner of 

a LincOne account.

9. That at the time of his death, . . . Brenda was the 

joint owner of the . . . LincOne account.

10. That at the time of his death, Dale was the owner 

of a 401(k) retirement account with Vanguard which 

account was awarded to him in the Property Settlement 

Agreement.

11. That at the time of his death, Brenda was listed 

as the primary beneficiary of the Vanguard retirement 

account.

12. That Brenda directly relinquished her survivor 

claim to the Vanguard retirement account which was 

then awarded to her son who was the contingent/alternate 

beneficiary.

13. That upon his death, Brenda made application to 

receive the proceeds of the Primerica life insurance policy.

14. That by agreement of the parties, the proceeds from 

the death benefit of the Primerica policy are being held in 

escrow pending resolution of [this] case.

At the hearing, Dale’s estate offered exhibits 15 and 16, 

which the district court received without objection. Exhibit 15 

is a stipulation of facts as to what the attorney representing 

Brenda during the divorce proceedings, Terrance A. Poppe, 

would testify to if he were called. Exhibit 15 states:

1) That . . . Poppe . . . is an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State of Nebraska[.]
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2) That Poppe was counsel to Brenda . . . in the divorce 

proceeding styled and captioned Brenda Rice v. Dale Rice

in the District Cou[rt] of Lancaster County, Nebraska, 

CI 11-2081.

3) That . . . Dale . . . was not represented by counsel in 

that proceeding.

4) That all dealings that Poppe had concerning the 

agreement of the parties with respect to their property 

settlement agreement were with his client Brenda . . . .

5) That Poppe had no conversations, discussions or 

other communications with Dale . . . concerning the terms 

of the parties[’] property settlement agreement, prior to 

the drafting and execution of the agreement.

6) That at no time during the discussions leading up to 

the preparation and execution of the property settlement 

agreement that Poppe prepared, was Poppe informed by 

Brenda that the parties had an agreement that they would 

retain their status as beneficiary of the other’s life insurance and other accounts.

7) To the best of Poppe’s recollection, the issue of the 

parties’ beneficiary status was not discussed.

8) That at no time did Poppe discuss with Brenda . . . 

that the provisions of the property settlement agreement, 

as drafted, could affect the parties’ status as beneficiary of 

the other’s life insurance policy or accounts.

9) That attached hereto and marked Exhibit A is a true 

and correct copy of . . . Poppe’s billing records showing 

the dates of conferences and meetings with Brenda . . . .

Exhibit 16 was also a stipulation of facts, in which the parties stipulated that “in addition to an agree facts [sic] set forth 

in the Pretrial Order, the following facts are true and may be 

relied upon by the Court in its disposition of this matter.” The 

stipulation of facts in exhibit 16 states in relevant part:

Dale’s Primerica Life Insurance Policy

11. Prior to his marriage to Brenda, Dale was the 

owner of a term life insurance policy with Primerica with 

a death benefit of $250,000.00.

12. When the original policy was issued in 1992, 

his former wife Peggy was the primary beneficiary 
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and his “children of the marriage” were the contingent 

beneficiaries.

13. On or about January 3, 1997, after his divorce 

from Peggy, Dale identified his primary beneficiaries as 

Christina Rice, David E. Rice and Cynthia Rice [Dale’s 

three children].

14. On or about January 17, 1997 Dale identified his 

contingent beneficiary as Loren Huddle [Dale’s mother].

15. That on or about January 26, 2001, before his marriage to Brenda, Dale identified Brenda as his primary 

beneficiary and [Dale’s three children] as his contingent beneficiaries.

16. Dale did not further change the beneficiary designation of the Primerica policy prior to his death.

17. At the time of the divorce, Dale still owned the 

Primerica policy.

18. Although not specifically mention[ed] in the property settlement agreement, it was the intention of the parties that Dale was awarded his Primerica policy.

19. At the time of his death, Brenda was still listed as 

the primary beneficiary and [Dale’s three children] as the 

contingent beneficiaries.

20. After his death, Brenda made application for the 

death benefit as the primary beneficiary.

Dale’s Unum Life Insurance Policy

21. At the time of the divorce Dale owned a term life 

insurance policy with Unum Insurance with a death benefit of $50,000.00.

22. At the time of the divorce Brenda was the primary 

beneficiary of the Unum policy and John Kelch [Brenda’s 

son] was the contingent beneficiary.

23. Although not specifically mention[ed] in the property settlement agreement, it was the intention of the parties that Dale was awarded the Unum policy.

24. At the time of his death Brenda remained the primary beneficiary of the Unum policy and [Brenda’s son] 

was the contingent beneficiary.

Brenda testified at the hearing, primarily regarding conversations she and Dale had had regarding their statuses as 
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beneficiary of the other’s life insurance policies. The attorney 

representing Dale’s estate objected “based on hearsay, not 

the best evidence, no probative value, and in violation of the 

parole [sic] evidence rule.” The district court granted a standing objection. Brenda offered exhibit 17, a transcript of telephone voice messages between Brenda and Dale, and exhibit 

18, a transcript of text messages between Brenda and Dale. 

The attorney representing Dale’s estate reiterated the standing 

objection, and the district court received exhibits 17 and 18 and 

took the objections under advisement.

The district court filed its “Judgment of Enforcement of 

Decree” on April 23, 2013, in which it agreed with the personal representative of Dale’s estate that Brenda had relinquished her beneficiary interest in Dale’s life insurance policies, and it rejected Brenda’s contentions to the contrary. The 

district court relied on Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 

264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 (2002), and concluded that 

the property settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous. The court determined that under the property settlement 

agreement, Brenda and Dale intended to relinquish their beneficiary and ownership interests in each other’s life insurance 

policies and retirement accounts. The court rejected Brenda’s 

arguments that the property settlement agreement was ambiguous, that parol evidence could be employed to determine 

Brenda’s and Dale’s intent on this issue, and that the property 

settlement agreement should be reformed. The court ordered 

Brenda to withdraw her claims under Dale’s life insurance 

policies and to renounce her rights to any property or interest 

in Dale’s estate and proceeds from any insurance policies on 

Dale’s life.

Brenda appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Brenda generally assigns, restated, that the district court 

erred when it (1) determined that the terms of the property 

settlement agreement were unambiguous and that by its terms, 

Brenda waived her status as the designated beneficiary of Dale’s 

life insurance policies; (2) failed to award her the proceeds 

of Dale’s life insurance policies; and (3) granted the motion 
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of Dale’s estate to enforce the decree by removing her as the 

designated beneficiary of Dale’s life insurance policies.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The meaning of a divorce decree presents a question of law, in connection with which we reach a conclusion 

independent of the determination reached by the court below. 

Hohertz v. Estate of Hohertz, 19 Neb. App. 110, 802 N.W.2d 

141 (2011).

ANALYSIS

At issue in this appeal is the meaning of the portions of 

the decree for dissolution which touch on the disposition of 

two life insurance policies on Dale’s life. The district court 

determined that under the decree, which incorporated the parties’ property settlement agreement, Brenda had relinquished, 

renounced, and waived any right, title, or interest in and to any 

property interest in the proceeds from any insurance policies 

on Dale’s life. To enforce the decree, Brenda was ordered to 

withdraw her claims made against the Dale’s estate and to the 

life insurance policies.

Dale’s estate contends that the property settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous and that, by the language of 

the property settlement agreement, Brenda relinquished her 

beneficiary interests in Dale’s life insurance policies as the 

district court determined. In contrast, Brenda contends that 

the district court erred. Brenda first asserts that she did not 

relinquish her beneficiary interests in Dale’s life insurance 

policies under the terms of the property settlement agreement. 

Second, Brenda asserts that the property settlement agreement 

is ambiguous and that parol evidence would show that Brenda 

and Dale intended that they each remain the designated beneficiary on each other’s life insurance policies. Third, Brenda 

asserts that if it is determined that the property settlement 

agreement is unambiguous, it should nevertheless be reformed 

to reflect such intent. We find no merit to Brenda’s arguments, 

and we affirm.

[2] We set forth some preliminary matters which are useful 

to our analysis. We have long held that a dissolution decree 
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which approves and incorporates into the decree the parties’ 

property settlement agreement is “a judgment of the court 

itself.” Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 206 Neb. 808, 818, 295 

N.W.2d 391, 397 (1980). See Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 

Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006). It has been observed that 

once the court adopts the agreement and sets it forth as a 

judgment of the court with corresponding ordering language, 

the contractual character of the property settlement agreement 

is subsumed into the court-ordered judgment. Henderson v. 

Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983). “At that 

point the court and the parties are no longer dealing with a 

mere contract between the parties.” Id. at 407, 298 S.E.2d at 

350. Thus, in the present case, we are considering the meaning 

of a judgment rather than a contract.

The decree dissolving a marriage becomes final and operative on the date of death of one of the parties to the dissolution 

if such death occurs before 30 days have passed after entry of 

the decree. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-372.01(1) (Reissue 2008). See, 

also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-372 (Reissue 2008). Thus, in the 

present case, the marital status of Brenda and Dale was fixed 

as divorced persons upon the happening of Dale’s death.

[3,4] We have held that the district court, in the exercise of 

its broad jurisdiction over marriage dissolutions, retains jurisdiction to enforce all terms of approved property settlement 

agreements. Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, supra. A court that has 

jurisdiction to make a decision also has that power to enforce it 

by making such orders as are necessary to carry its judgment or 

decree into effect. Id. The obligations of the decree involved in 

this case concern property rights. The district court revived the 

action at the request of Dale’s estate, which sought to enforce 

the terms of the property settlement agreement. Thus, in the 

present case, “the action taken by the district court [was] nothing more and nothing less than enforcing that portion of the 

decree which obligated” the parties regarding Dale’s life insurance policies. See Dennis v. Dennis, 6 Neb. App. 461, 465, 574 

N.W.2d 189, 192 (1998).

In Nebraska, appellate courts have repeatedly considered 

the meaning of a dissolution decree after the death of one of 

the parties particularly as to the terms of the decree pertaining 
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to life insurance policies. E.g., Hohertz v. Estate of Hohertz, 

19 Neb. App. 110, 802 N.W.2d 141 (2011) (considering meaning of provisions in decree regarding scope of deceased former 

husband’s obligations to name former wife as beneficiary of 

death benefits). See, also, Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb. App. 

579, 732 N.W.2d 368 (2007) (considering meaning of provisions in decree regarding former wife’s status as beneficiary 

of deceased former husband’s life insurance policy). In doing 

so, we have applied the principles we articulated in Pinkard 

v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 

85 (2002).

[5] Under Nebraska law, the general rule is that divorce 

does not affect a beneficiary designation in a life insurance 

policy. Id. This rule is based on the notion that the beneficiary’s claim to the proceeds evolves from the terms of the 

policy rather than the status of the marital relationship. Id. But 

a spouse may waive such a beneficiary interest in a divorce 

decree. See id. See, also, Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. 

Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 N.W.2d 320 (2005), abrogated 

in part, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and 

Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 129 S. Ct. 865, 172 L. Ed. 2d 

662 (2009).

[6] In this case, the trial court determined that although 

the beneficiary forms for Dale’s life insurance policies still 

listed Brenda as the designated beneficiary of the policies at 

the time of his death, Brenda had unambiguously relinquished 

her beneficiary rights in the life insurance policies by virtue 

of the terms of the property settlement agreement. In making this determination, the trial court relied on the principles 

explained in Pinkard. In Pinkard, we followed the waiver rule 

and explained that under the waiver rule, the focus of whether 

a spouse has waived such a beneficiary interest

should be upon the language of the dissolution decree 

and any agreement which sets forth the intentions of 

the parties concerning property rights. If the dissolution 

decree and any property settlement agreement incorporated therein manifest the parties’ intent to relinquish 

all property rights, then such agreement should be given 

that effect. We make no distinction among IRA’s, life 
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insurance proceeds, or other types of annuities that 

designate the beneficiary in the event of the death of 

the payee.

264 Neb. at 318, 647 N.W.2d at 89.

A competing rule, the document rule, has been discussed 

but not adopted in our case law. The relative merits of each 

rule have been compared. See Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. 

Pension Plan, supra (Connolly, J., dissenting; Stephan, J., 

joins). In Nebraska, pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the document rule is limited to benefit plans governed 

by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 

U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011), and therefore, 

it does not apply to the present case. See Kennedy v. Plan 

Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan, supra

(abrogating in part Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension 

Plan, supra).

[7-9] A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its meaning, including the settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law 

from the four corners of the decree itself. See Metropolitian 

Life Ins. Co. v. Beaty, 242 Neb. 169, 493 N.W.2d 627 (1993); 

Hohertz v. Estate of Hohertz, 19 Neb. App. 110, 802 N.W.2d 

141 (2011). In Hohertz, the Court of Appeals summarized the 

applicable principles as follows:

The principles of law regarding the meaning of a 

judgment are well settled. Ambiguity exists in a document when a word, phrase, or provision therein has, or 

is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting 

interpretations or meanings. Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 

Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006). If the contents of a 

dissolution decree are unambiguous, the decree is not 

subject to interpretation and construction, and the intention of the parties must be determined from the contents 

of the decree. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Neb. App. 681, 684 

N.W.2d 49 (2004). In such a case, the effect of the decree 

must be declared in the light of the literal meaning of the 

language used. See Bokelman v. Bokelman, 202 Neb. 17, 

272 N.W.2d 916 (1979).

19 Neb. App. at 115, 802 N.W.2d at 145.
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The trial court’s order quotes the language of the property 

settlement agreement at length and concludes that the decree 

is unambiguous and that Brenda waived and relinquished her 

interest in Dale’s life insurance policies. We have quoted the 

property settlement agreement language above and need not 

repeat it at length here. We note, however, that paragraph VI 

of the property settlement agreement provided that Dale “shall 

be awarded all interest in any pension plans, stocks, retirement accounts, 401(k), IRA, life insurance policy and checking 

or savings account in [Dale’s] name, free from any claim of 

[Brenda].” (Emphasis supplied.)

Paragraph IX of the property settlement agreement provides 

that “each party acknowledges that the properties set aside to 

him or her . . . will be [a] release and discharge, as between 

themselves, of all rights, claims, interests and obligations of 

each party in and to the said properties.” Furthermore, paragraph X(b) of the property settlement agreement provides 

that Brenda

waives and relinquishes any and all interest or rights 

of any kind, character, or nature whatsoever, . . . and 

renounces all benefits which would otherwise pass to 

[Brenda] from [Dale] by intestate succession or by virtue of the provisions of any Will executed before this 

Settlement Agreement which she, as wife, or as widow, 

or otherwise, has had, now has, or might hereafter have 

against [Dale], or, in the event of his death, as an heir 

at law, surviving spouse, or otherwise. [Brenda] waives 

and relinquishes any and all interest, present and future, 

in any and all property, real, personal, or otherwise, now 

owned by [Dale] or hereafter acquired, and including all 

property set aside for him in this agreement . . . .

We find no ambiguity in the decree. Under paragraph VI, 

the life insurance policies in Dale’s name were awarded to 

Dale, and under paragraphs IX and X(b), Brenda waived and 

relinquished all interest in property set aside to Dale. Similar 

waiver language was at issue in Pinkard v. Confederation 

Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 (2002), and 

we concluded that the former wife therein waived her beneficiary interest in an annuity by entering into a property 
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settlement agreement and that although the former husband 

had not changed the beneficiary designation after the divorce, 

the waiver was effective. Upon our independent review, we 

conclude as a matter of law that under the terms of the 

decree, Brenda unambiguously waived her beneficiary interest 

in Dale’s life insurance policies. The district court was correct 

when it so concluded.

[10] In this case, Brenda filed a “Motion to Modify/

Reform Property Settlement Agreement.” And in the “PreTrial Conference Order,” Brenda contended that parol evidence 

would clarify the parties’ intent in what she claimed was an 

ambiguous property settlement agreement or, in the alternative, 

serve as a basis to modify and reform the property settlement 

agreement to reflect her version of the parties’ intentions. In 

Nebraska, we have stated that where parties to a divorce action 

voluntarily execute a property settlement agreement which 

is approved by the dissolution court and incorporated into a 

divorce decree from which no appeal is taken, its provisions 

will not thereafter be vacated or modified in the absence of 

fraud or gross inequity. Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 

917, 708 N.W.2d 821 (2006). Elsewhere, it is generally considered appropriate for a court to modify or vacate a decree 

after the death of a party for the limited purpose of establishing 

property rights where there has been fraud or lack of process. 

See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 401 (2005). In this case, no appeal 

was taken regarding property rights awarded in the decree, and 

Brenda has not alleged that there was a fraud or gross inequity 

in connection with the entry of the decree.

Brenda’s contentions that we consider parol evidence or 

modify the property settlement agreement are founded on the 

proposition that the property settlement agreement is ambiguous, a proposition we have already rejected. Under the unambiguous terms of the property settlement agreement, Brenda 

relinquished her beneficiary rights to Dale’s life insurance 

policies. Where the language used in the property settlement 

agreement is unambiguous, we are bound to consider such language from the four corners of the agreement itself, and what 

the parties thought the agreement meant is irrelevant. Strunk v. 

Chromy-Strunk, supra.
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Many of the arguments and supporting authorities urged 

upon us for consideration in this case are taken from cases 

where contracts or other documents were at issue. These 

topics include parol evidence and reformation. As noted, 

the property settlement agreement once approved and incorporated into the decree becomes a judgment rather than a 

contract. Id. And the meaning of the judgment is a question 

of law. Hohertz v. Estate of Hohertz, 19 Neb. App. 110, 802 

N.W.2d 141 (2011). The district court considered but rejected 

the contract concepts in its order; however, we believe these 

concepts are not suited to the central issue in this case. Thus, 

although our reasoning differs somewhat from that of the 

district court, we find no reversible error in its refusal to consider evidence other than the decree and its refusal to modify 

the decree.

CONCLUSION

Because we conclude as a matter of law that Brenda relinquished all rights to Dale’s life insurance policies in the parties’ property settlement agreement, which was incorporated 

into the decree, the district court did not err when it enforced 

the dissolution decree and ordered Brenda to withdraw claims 

to Dale’s life insurance policies.

Affirme

Cassel, J., concurring

The majority opinion, which I join, is entirely correct 

under existing law. But existing law relies upon the general 

rule that divorce does not affect a beneficiary designation in 

a life insurance policy. This in turn requires close examination of the judgment dissolving the marriage. This framework lacks certainty, contradicts ordinary expectations, and 

encourages litigation. These flaws could easily be remedied 

by legislation, and I suggest a simple approach to accomplish 

this change.

The basic practical problem is that after a marriage is 

dissolved, the former spouses frequently do not change preexisting beneficiary designations in life insurance policies and 

similar contractual arrangements. Sometimes there is only a 
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brief interval between the dissolution and the policyholder’s 

death.1 That circumstance applies to the case before us. Other 

times, the policy owner overlooks the policy’s existence. 

Or perhaps the owner encounters bureaucratic difficulties in 

changing the beneficiary. For whatever reason, beneficiary 

designations often go unchanged. Human experience teaches 

that most policyholders would prefer a death benefit pass to 

someone other than a former spouse. Of course, a few may 

feel otherwise.

A beneficiary’s claim to the proceeds of a life insurance 

policy evolves from the terms of the policy rather than the 

status of the marital relationship.2 The Nebraska Probate 

Code3 recognizes that a provision for a nonprobate transfer 

on death in an insurance policy is nontestamentary.4 This 

focus on the policy leads to the general rule that divorce 

does not affect a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy.5

While the general rule is correct on a theoretical level, 

in practice it breaks down, because it operates contrary to 

ordinary human expectations. The response of most courts, 

including this one, is to scrutinize the marital dissolution 

documents searching for a “waiver” of the beneficiary designation by the surviving former spouse. Sometimes the court 

will find a waiver.6 Other times, no waiver can be found.7 As 

Justices Connolly and Stephan recognized in the context of 

the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

1 See Larsen v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins., 463 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. App. 

1990).

2 See Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 312, 647 N.W.2d 85 

(2002), citing Larsen v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins., supra note 1.

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2201 to 30-2902, 30-3901 to 30-3923, and 30-4001 

to 30-4045 (Reissue 2008, Cum. Supp. 2012 & Supp. 2013).

4 See § 30-2715(a).

5 See Pinkard, supra note 2.

6 See, e.g., id.; Sorensen v. Nelson, 342 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa 1984).

7 See, e.g., Trueblood v. Roberts, 15 Neb. App. 579, 732 N.W.2d 368 

(2007); Lynch v. Bogenrief, 237 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 1976).
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(ERISA),8 whether a waiver has occurred often depends upon 

hairline distinctions.9

Under ERISA, Congress has implemented a scheme employing a document rule that looks solely to the beneficiary designation in the plan documents.10 “[B]y giving a plan participant 

a clear set of instructions for making his own instructions 

clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into 

nice expressions of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering 

to an uncomplicated rule.”11 A document rule “yield[s] simple 

administration, avoid[s] double liability, and ensure[s] that 

beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol 

essential under less-certain rules.”12

But courts have favored the waiver rule because they perceive that the document rule will lead to windfalls where 

the surviving former spouse intended to waive the interest.13

Ultimately, this is a policy decision. And by inaction, our 

Legislature has acquiesced in the waiver rule applied in this 

court’s jurisprudence.14 Thus, while I favor the document rule 

as a matter of policy, I recognize that this court should not 

judicially implement a document rule.

And without addressing the perceptions of fairness underlying the waiver rule, the document rule would merely substitute 

one flawed approach for another. The appellant in the case 

8 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

9 See Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 701 

N.W.2d 320 (2005) (Connolly, J., dissenting; Stephan, J., joins), abrogated 

in part, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment 

Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 129 S. Ct. 865, 172 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2009).

10 See Kennedy, supra note 9.

11 Id., 555 U.S. at 301.

12 Fox Valley & Vic. Const. Wkrs. Pension F. v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 

(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, dissenting; Bauer, Chief 

Judge, and Manion, Circuit Judge, join), abrogated in part, Kennedy, 

supra note 9.

13 See Strong, supra note 9 (Connolly, J., dissenting; Stephan, J., joins).

14 See Spady v. Spady, 284 Neb. 885, 824 N.W.2d 366 (2012) (when appellate 

court has judicially construed statute and construction has not evoked 

amendment, presumed that Legislature acquiesced in determination of 

Legislature’s intent).
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before us does not go so far as to suggest adoption of the 

document rule. Rather, she urges us to expand the scope of 

our examination under the waiver rule. Instead of focusing on 

only the dissolution decree and the property settlement agreement incorporated into it, she would have us look to extrinsic 

evidence of all of the surrounding circumstances. Thoughtful 

judges have advocated this approach.15 But I disagree, because 

the expansive waiver rule would move further away from the 

simplicity, speed, efficiency, and cost savings promised by the 

document rule.

In my view, the best solution is a twofold legislative 

approach: (1) adoption of a general rule that divorce automatically revokes a prior designation of a former spouse as a beneficiary in a life insurance policy or similar nontestamentary 

transfer upon death and (2) subject to the automatic revocation 

upon divorce, adoption of the document rule.

The first recommendation is easily accomplished—indeed, 

there is an existing model in the Nebraska Probate Code. 

Section 30-2333 revokes a disposition of property by will to a 

former spouse, unless the will specifically provides otherwise. 

In other words, a provision for a former spouse in a will made 

before dissolution of the marriage will not result in property 

going to the former spouse. Instead, the property will pass as if 

the former spouse died first.

In the context of a life insurance policy or other nontestamentary transfer, the statute could simply state that a divorce 

or dissolution of marriage revokes any designation of the 

former spouse as a beneficiary where the designation was 

made before the date of the dissolution decree. This would 

permit a life insurance policyholder to retain a former spouse 

as a beneficiary by express conduct. It would merely require 

the owner to reinstate the beneficiary designation after the 

divorce. And in most cases, it would automatically effectuate 

the policyholder’s intent that the death benefit not go to the 

former spouse. The automatic revocation rule, coupled with 

the document rule, would allow policyholders to effectuate 

their intent and enable beneficiaries and issuing companies to 

15 See Trueblood v. Roberts, supra note 7 (Sievers, Judge, concurring).
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maximize speed and efficiency of distributions while minimizing expenses.

Thus, the court today correctly declines the appellant’s invitation to expand its review under the waiver rule to evidence 

outside of the divorce decree and the associated property 

settlement agreement. But a better approach is available, and I 

commend it to the Legislature.

Paul D. Potter, appellant, v. Board of Regents

University of Nebraska et al., appellee

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 21, 2014. No. S-13-544.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower 

court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.

2. Public Officers and Employees: Immunity: Liability. Qualified immunity protects government officials acting in their individual capacities from civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

3. ____: ____: ____. Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing 

room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.

4. Constitutional Law: Civil Rights: Actions. A private right of action to vindicate 

violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws of the United States is created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

5. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Tort-feasors. The 14th Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause does not extend to citizens a right to be free of injury wherever 

the State may be characterized as the tort-feasor.

6. Due Process. Procedural due process limits the ability of the government to 

deprive people of interests that constitute “liberty” or “property” interests within 

the meaning of the Due Process Clause and requires that parties deprived of such 

interests be provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

7. Due Process: Termination of Employment. Neither liberty nor property interests are at stake when an at-will employee loses a job but remains as free as 

before to seek another.

8. Due Process: Libel and Slander. Standing alone, stigma to one’s reputation 

through defamatory statements is not sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.