Filed 7/21/15 Anthony P. v. Super. Ct. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ANTHONY P.,

Defendant and Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

 B263683

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK62928)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Annabelle 

G. Cortez, Judge. Petition denied.

Law Offices of Alex Iglesias, Steven Shenfeld and Elizabeth Jacobo for Defendant 

and Petitioner.

Mary C. Wickham, Interim County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in 

Interest.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Anthony P., the alleged father of 10 month-old A.P. (the child), has filed an 

extraordinary writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452.1 Anthony 

seeks to set aside an April 7, 2015 dispositional order which set the matter for a Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 366.26 parental rights termination hearing.

2 Anthony 

contends the juvenile court’s failure to determine whether he is the child’s biological 

father requires reversal of the order setting the matter for a parental termination rights 

hearing. We conclude the juvenile court did not err. But if there was error, it was 

harmless. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The child was born in September 2014 with drugs in her system. Learning of the 

child’s positive toxicology test, the Department of Children and Family Services (the 

department) detained her in the hospital and filed a section 300 petition. The department 

then placed the child in the home of a nonrelative extended family member who was 

caring for two of the youngster’s half-siblings. 

The mother, A.R., reported that Anthony was the father. Anthony had been 

incarcerated since being arrested three months before the child’s birth. Anthony was 

serving a two and one-half year, state prison sentence for vehicle theft. (Veh. Code, § 

10851, subd. (a). His expected release date was March 19, 2016. (As will be noted, the 

March 19, 2016 expected release date was beyond the period of time available for 

reunification services.) The mother and Anthony were not married. The mother said 

Anthony was not present at the child’s birth and did not sign the birth certificate. 

Moreover, Anthony did not: hold himself out openly as the child’s parent; receive the 

 

1 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

stated otherwise.
3

child into his home; or help to support the child. Paternity testing had not been 

conducted. 

At the September 10, 2014 detention hearing, the juvenile court found Anthony 

was an alleged father. As there had not been enough time to bring him to court, Anthony 

was not present at the hearing. The matter was continued to October 7, 2014, for a 

contested adjudication hearing. 

Anthony was present at the October 7, 2014 hearing. His attorney, Elizabeth 

Jacobo, submitted a Statement Regarding Parentage, Judicial Council Form JV-505, that 

she stated she completed with Anthony at the hearing. The form was not personally 

signed by Anthony. It was signed for Anthony by Ms. Jacobo. The form states Anthony 

believed he was the father and requested a judgment of parentage. Anthony did not 

request a finding of presumed parenthood. Based on Anthony’s form JV-505, the

juvenile court found the previous finding he is an alleged father was appropriate. 

Anthony did not object, request a finding he is the biological father nor request paternity 

testing. The matter was continued to December 4, 2014, for a further adjudication 

hearing. 

On December 4, 2014, Anthony’s attorney, Ms. Jacobo, requested a continuance 

of the dispositional portion of the adjudication hearing. Anthony was absent from the

hearing as he had waived his right to be present. Ms. Jacobo wanted Anthony to be 

interviewed, to learn if a basis existed for finding him to be a presumed father and thus 

entitled to reunification services. Ms. Jacobo offered, “Perhaps he was involved with the 

mother during her pregnancy.” The juvenile court denied Ms. Jacobo’s continuance 

motion. The child was declared a dependent of the juvenile court based on sustained 

allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The sustained allegations 

indicate: the child was born “suffering from a detrimental condition consisting of a 

positive toxicology screen for amphetamines and marijuana”; this detrimental condition 

existed only because of “unreasonable acts by the child’s mother”; the mother’s 

misconduct placed the child at risk of physical harm and damage; the mother has a 

history of unlawful drug use and is a current amphetamine and marijuana user; the drug
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use renders the mother incapable of providing regular care for the child; the mother used 

illicit drugs during her pregnancy; and two of the child’s siblings received permanent 

placement services due to the mother’s illicit drug use. Custody was taken from the 

parents, and, as no reunification services were ordered, the matter was set for a selection 

and implementation hearing under section 366.26. The juvenile court found “by clear 

and convincing evidence” pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a) that no reunification 

services were warranted. The juvenile court found Anthony had not played the role of 

parent for the child in that he: had not signed a paternity declaration; was not married to 

the mother; was not present at the birth; was not named on the birth certificate; did not 

sign the birth certificate; and did not receive the child into his home. The juvenile court 

expressly ruled, “[Anthony] has not risen to the level[] that he should be deemed a 

presumed father.” 

III. DISCUSSION

Anthony contends the order setting the matter for a parental termination rights 

hearing must be reversed because the juvenile court failed to make a parentage 

determination as required by rule 5.635. He contends that had the juvenile court found he 

is the biological father, it might have ordered reunification services. We disagree with 

the contention. The juvenile court did not err. Even if there was error, any error was 

harmless. 

Rule 5.635 provides, in pertinent part: “(e) If . . . there has been no prior 

determination of parentage of the child, the juvenile court must take appropriate steps to 

make such a determination. [¶] (1) Any alleged father and his counsel must complete 

and submit Statement Regarding Parentage (Juvenile) (form JV-505). . . . [¶] (2) To 

determine parentage, the juvenile court may order the child and any alleged parents to 

submit to genetic tests and proceed under Family Code section 7550 et seq. [¶] (3) The 

court may make its determination of parentage or nonparentage based on the testimony, 

declarations, or statements of the alleged parents. The court must advise any alleged 
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parent that if parentage is determined, the parent will have responsibility for the financial 

support of the child, and, if the child receives welfare benefits, the parent may be subject 

to an action to obtain support payments.” Form JV-505 requires both the alleged father 

and his attorney to personally sign the form. Rule 5.635 has been said to implement the

provisions of section 316.2, which provides, in subdivision (a), “At the detention hearing,

or as soon thereafter as practicable, the court shall inquire of the mother and any other 

appropriate person as to the identity and address of all presumed or alleged fathers.” 

(E.g., In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1121; see In re B.C. (2012) 205 

Cal.App.4th 1306, 1311-1312.)

In order to obtain a determination of parentage, Anthony and Ms. Jacobo were 

obliged to timely provide a properly completed form JV-505. They did not. Anthony did 

not personally sign the form. There are sound reasons to require an alleged father to 

personally sign a statement requesting a determination of parentage. It is no trifling 

matter to assert one’s parentage. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 3900 [parents have a duty to 

support their child]; Thompson v. Thames (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1310-1311.) 

Requiring the alleged father’s personal signature ensures that a request of such 

consequence comes from him. The juvenile court was not required to make a 

determination of biological paternity based on an unsigned request.

In any event, if the failure to make the parentage determination was a mistake, the 

error is harmless. In the circumstances of this case, there is no possibility reunification 

services would have been ordered had the court found biological paternity. Harmless 

error analysis under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 is applied in 

dependency cases when a statutory mandate is disobeyed. (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 588, 624-625; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) 

Only a presumed father is entitled to receive reunification services. (In re 

Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451; In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 437.) 

Anthony does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that he was merely an alleged 

father. (§ 316.2, subd. (a); In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 449, fn. 15; In re 

Jovanni B. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1488.) Nonetheless, the juvenile court has 
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discretion to grant reunification services to a mere biological father if the services will 

benefit the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (a) [“Upon a finding and declaration of paternity by the 

juvenile court or proof of a prior declaration of paternity by any court of competent 

jurisdiction, the juvenile court may order services for the child and the biological father, 

if the court determines that the services will benefit the child”]; In re B.C., supra, 205 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1312, fn. 3; In re Raphael P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 716, 727, fn. 7.) 

Here, there is no reasonable possibility reunification would have been ordered at the 

disposition hearing, because Anthony could not gain custody within the requisite time 

period for reunifying. Under these circumstances Anthony’s prison term would not be 

completed within the 12-month reunification period. Thus, there is no possibility the 

juvenile court would have found that reunification services would benefit the child. 

(§ 361.5, subd. (a); compare In re Kobe A., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122-1123 

[harmless error where there was no possibility reunification would be found to be in the 

child’s best interest], In re Joshua R. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026 [harmless error 

where the court found reunification was not in the child’s best interest]; In re J.H. (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 635, 650 [error not harmless because it was possible that offering 

reunification services would be in the child’s best interest], In re B.C., supra, 205 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1311-1312, 1315 [a determination of biological paternity was sought 

not for reunification but solely so that the alleged father could meet his parental 

obligations].) 

Anthony makes no contention nor offers any reason to believe that reunification 

services would benefit the child. The child was under three years of age. For such a 

child, the maximum time period during which reunification services may be provided 

shall not exceed six months from the date physical custody was taken from the parent. 

(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1), (3); In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 121.) The period may 

be extended up to a maximum period of 12 months. In this case, the maximum 

reunification period would be extended to September 2015. But then only if the juvenile 

court finds there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to parental custody 

within six months. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); In re V.C. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 521, 528.)
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Anthony cannot gain custody within the requisite time period, because he will be in 

custody until March 16, 2016. Moreover, Anthony had no relationship with the child. In 

these circumstances, granting a reunification period would only delay resolution of the

child’s status. (§ 352, subd. (b); In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 625 [there is a 

strong legislative policy “that dependency actions be resolved expeditiously”]; In re 

Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384 [the state has a “legitimate interest in providing an 

expedited proceeding to resolve the child’s status without further delay”]; see In re 

Joshua R., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) Any alleged error is harmless.

IV. DISPOSITION

The extraordinary relief writ petition is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TURNER, P. J.

We concur:

KRIEGLER, J.

KIRSCHNER, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.