J-S36014-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KEVIN HAMMONDS

Appellant No. 1382 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CC 200616040

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 17, 2015

Appellant, Kevin Hammonds, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on May 5, 2014, following revocation of his probation. On appeal, 

Hammonds argues that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and 

unreasonable. We affirm. 

On July 8, 2008, Hammonds pled guilty to one count of possession 

with intent to deliver cocaine, one count of delivering cocaine, and one count 

of possession of cocaine. Sentencing was deferred to allow for preparation of 

a presentence report. At the sentencing hearing, Hammonds assured the 

court that he had not used drugs since January 2008. At count 1, the trial 

court imposed a sentence of 22 months of house arrest with a condition that 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Hammonds maintain employment and be supervised by the Intensive Drug 

Unit. The court also imposed a concurrent period of three years of probation. 

At count 2, the trial court imposed a sentence of 22 months of house arrest 

and a concurrent period of three years of probation, all of which was to run 

concurrent to the sentence imposed at count 1. No further penalty was 

imposed at count 3. Hammonds was immediately required to submit to a 

screen for drug or alcohol use. He tested positive for cocaine and opiates. 

The trial court then amended Hammonds’s sentence as a result of his 

dishonesty. He was sentenced to 18 to 36 months’ incarceration, with three 

years of probation consecutive to the incarceration.

While serving his sentence of probation, his probation officer filed a

notice of violation for “submitting a false urinalysis” and “use of drugs 

(opiates).” Following a violation hearing, Hammonds’s probation was 

revoked. He was sentenced to a period of 31⁄2 to 8 years of incarceration, 

followed by three years of state probation. 

After he was sentenced, Hammonds filed a pro se motion for 

reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied. Hammonds then 

filed an appeal, which he subsequently discontinued upon filing a petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

In his PCRA petition, Hammonds alleged that his prior counsel had 

abandoned him and sought restoration of his rights to post-sentence 

motions and to a subsequent direct appeal. The PCRA court granted 
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Hammonds relief, and Hammonds filed a counseled post-sentence motion. 

The trial court denied the motion, and this timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Hammonds argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

in sentencing him to a manifestly excessive and unreasonable term of 

imprisonment following his probation violation. Our standard when reviewing 

a sentence imposed following the revocation of probation is as follows. 

Our review is limited to determining the validity of the probation 

revocation proceedings and the authority of the sentencing court 

to consider the same sentencing alternatives that it had at the 

time of the initial sentencing. Also, upon sentencing following a 

revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by the 

maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the 

time of the probationary sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation 

omitted). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). 

Hammonds challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. In 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), 

an en banc panel of this Court noted that our “scope of review in an appeal 

from a revocation sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” 

Id., at 1034. Therefore, Hammonds’ claim is properly before us. 

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 
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An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 12, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation 

marks and some citations omitted). 

Here, Hammonds challenged his sentence in a post-sentence motion 

and filed a timely appeal. Hammonds’s appellate brief also contains the 

requisite Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8. We 

must now determine whether Hammonds’s challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence raises a substantial question. 

“A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 

107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “[W]e cannot look 

beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) 

statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.” 

Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 
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Here, Hammonds claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement that his 

sentence is “so disproportionate as to implicate the fundamental norms 

which underline the sentencing process.” Appellant’s Brief, at 7 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2002)). In 

Sierra, a panel of this court held that “a substantial question is presented 

when a sentence of total confinement, in excess of the original sentence, is 

imposed as a result of a technical violation of parole or probation.” Id. at 

913. Accordingly, this claim raises a substantial question for our review. 

Hammonds further claims that not all factors demanded by the law were 

considered. As Hammonds indicated that the sentence imposed is 

inconsistent with § 9771, this also raises a substantial question for our 

review. See Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929-930 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). 

The standard of review with respect to sentencing is as follows. 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgement. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted). 

Although Hammonds claims that the trial court erred in imposing a 

sentence that was inconsistent with the protection of the community and his 
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rehabilitative needs, we note that the trial court reviewed a pre-sentence 

report. Where the trial court had the benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence 

report, we must

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendants character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. 

In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of 

engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that 

sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any 

extended or systematic definitions of their punishment 

procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence 

report, the sentencing courts discretion should not be disturbed. 

This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where 

it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will 

presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the 

position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to 

apply them to the case at hand.

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation 

omitted). As the trial court in this case had the benefit of a pre-sentence 

report, we must presume that it considered all relevant sentencing factors 

and did not impose a sentence based solely on the gravity of the offenses. 

Section 9721(b) specifies that in every case following the revocation of 

probation, “the court shall make as a part of the record and disclose in open 

court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the 

sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. 

2014). However, 

a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its 

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the 

statutes in question. Simply put, since the defendant has 
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previously appeared before the sentencing court, the stated 

reasons for a revocation sentence need not be as elaborate as 

that which is required at initial sentencing. The rationale for this 

is obvious. When sentencing is a consequence of the revocation 

of probation, the trial judge is already fully informed as to the 

facts and circumstances of both the crime and the nature of the 

defendant, particularly where ... the trial judge had the benefit of 

a PSI during the initial sentencing proceedings. 

Id. 

Here, the court provided adequate justification, although succinct, for 

the sentence imposed. During sentencing, the court demonstrated its 

knowledge of the case by noting that Hammonds did not have a good 

support system in response to defense counsel suggesting he did. The court 

stated, “he did not do well while living with his father.” N.T., Probation 

Violation and Sentencing Hearing, 5/5/14, at 4. The court summed up its 

reasoning stating, “Mr. Hammonds, in the past I’ve found you to be 

articulate, even charming, but dishonest. You fooled me into giving you a 

mitigated range sentence on this case the first time around because I 

believed you. I no longer do.” Id., at 6-7. 

It is clear that the trial court had sufficient information to make a fully 

informed sentence following the revocation of Hammonds’ probation. Thus, 

Hammonds’ sentence of 31⁄2 to 8 years’ incarceration was not manifestly 

excessive or unreasonable. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2015