IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–0178

Filed May 29, 2015

Amended July 30, 2015

DANNY HOMAN, STEVEN J. SODDERS, JACK HATCH, PAT MURPHY, 

and MARK SMITH,

Appellees,

vs.

TERRY BRANSTAD, Governor, State of Iowa, and CHARLES M. 

PALMER, Director, Iowa Department of Human Services,

Appellants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. 

Rosenberg, Judge.

The Governor and the director of the department of human 

services appeal from the district court’s grant of a temporary injunction 

prohibiting them from closing the Iowa Juvenile Home. REVERSED AND 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor 

General, Meghan L. Gavin and Timothy L. Vavricek (until withdrawal), 

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

Mark T. Hedberg, Nathaniel R. Boulton, and Sarah M. Wolfe of 

Hedberg & Boulton, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
2

MANSFIELD, Justice.

During the 2013 legislative session, the Iowa General Assembly 

appropriated funds for the operation of the Iowa Juvenile Home (IJH) in 

Toledo for the 2014 fiscal year (July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014). 

Approximately five months into that fiscal year, the Iowa Department of 

Human Services (DHS) decided to close the home and find alternative, 

judicially approved placements for the twenty-one girls who resided 

there.

Two state senators, two state representatives, and the president of 

the labor organization representing employees at the IJH filed suit 

against the Governor and the director of DHS. In addition to other relief, 

the plaintiffs sought a determination that the defendants’ refusal to 

spend appropriated funds to continue operating the IJH was 

unconstitutional. Agreeing with the plaintiffs, the district court entered a 

temporary injunction preventing closure of the IJH.

The Governor and the DHS director sought interlocutory review of 

this injunction. We granted their request and stayed the injunction 

pending appeal. Meanwhile, the general assembly declined to fund 

ongoing operations of the IJH for the 2015 fiscal year (July 1, 2014 to 

June 30, 2015).

The Governor and the DHS director raise several arguments as to

why the injunction was wrongly entered. The plaintiffs, on the other 

hand, contend the injunction was properly granted. We decline to reach 

either side’s arguments. Instead, we determine the case is moot because 

the legislature is no longer appropriating funds for the operation of the 

IJH. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.
3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 20, 2013, subject to exceptions not relevant here, the 

Governor approved an act of the general assembly appropriating funds 

for health and human services for the 2014 fiscal year running from July 

1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 138. Section 17 of 

the act included, in part, an appropriation to DHS for the continued 

operation of the IJH:

Sec. 17. JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS. There is 

appropriated from the general fund of the state to the 

department of human services for the fiscal year beginning 

July 1, 2013, and ending June 30, 2014, the following 

amounts, or so much thereof as is necessary, to be used for 

the purposes designated:

1. For operation of the Iowa juvenile home at Toledo 

and for salaries, support, maintenance, and miscellaneous 

purposes, and for not more than the following full-time 

equivalent positions:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 8,859,355

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FTEs 114.00

Id. ch. 138, § 17.

On August 20, 2013, responding to reports of improper use of 

seclusion and restraint at the IJH, the Governor issued Executive 

Order 82, which created the Iowa Juvenile Home Protection Task Force. 

See Exec. Order No. 82 (2013), available at https://governor.iowa.gov/

sites/default/files/documents/Executive-Order-82.pdf. The executive 

order noted, among other things, that “protecting the health, safety and 

welfare of Iowa’s children is of the utmost importance,” and “all Iowa 

children deserve the best care and education we can provide.” Id. The 

executive order directed DHS to conduct “trauma-informed care training” 

for IJH staff within thirty days. Id. In addition, the executive order 

charged the task force with the following responsibilities:
4

a. Make recommendations about how to improve 

services for [IJH] residents;

b. Review incident data to ensure a high-level of care 

is delivered at the Iowa Juvenile Home;

c. Recommend a strategy for the permanent 

elimination of seclusion rooms outside the cottage 

setting;

d. Recommend a strategy outlining the transition of 

the Iowa Juvenile Home’s education plan from being 

managed from the Department of Human Services to 

Area Education Agency 267; and

e. Reach other goals and objectives as requested by 

the Office of the Governor.

Id. The task force was directed to “report its findings and make them 

available to the public no later than October 15, 2013.” Id.

Despite this tight time schedule, the IJH task force issued its 

report to the Governor on October 9.1 Iowa Juvenile Home Protection 

Task Force, Report of the Iowa Juvenile Home Protection Task Force 

(Oct. 9, 2013), available at https://dhs.iowa.gov/sites/default/

files/Report%20of%20the%20Iowa%20Juvenile%20Home%20Protection

%20Task%20Force.pdf. The task force stated it had undertaken its 

investigation “with one over-riding goal: to make recommendations 

guided solely by the best interests of Iowa’s youth.” Id. (cover letter). The 

task force made several findings. Among other things, it criticized the 

housing of two separate populations of girls at the IJH—namely, girls 

who had been adjudicated delinquent and girls who had been 

adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA). Id. at 2. Also, the 

task force found the IJH’s physical plant “is, in many respects, outdated 

and unsuitable for the use to which the IJH is put.” Id. Additionally, it 

noted that the IJH’s control rooms “have an extreme ‘prison-like’ 

1The plaintiffs cited and discussed the IJH task force report in their petition but 

did not attach a copy. We take judicial notice of the report’s actual contents. See King 

v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 6 & n.1 (Iowa 2012) (taking judicial notice of reports and studies 

referenced in the plaintiffs’ petition and citing authority for doing so).

 
5

appearance and contribute to the creation of the ‘corrections culture’ 

that was prevalent at the [IJH] in the past.” Id. The report also observed 

that private placements could enable the CINA youth to benefit from 

federal funding and would allow both the CINA youth and the delinquent 

youth to receive additional services upon reaching eighteen years of age. 

Id. at 4.

The task force then made a series of recommendations based on 

“the best interests of the youth.” Id. at 4–7. Among other things, the 

task force advised that CINA girls no longer be admitted to the IJH. Id.

at 6. Further, it recommended that if delinquent girls are to be placed at 

the IJH, “the cottages currently on the campus should be replaced with 

living units that are designed per current standards . . . and with 

seclusion rooms in the living units themselves.” Id. at 5.

Thus, the task force did not specifically recommend the closure of 

the IJH, but did recommend that the IJH stop admitting CINA girls and 

that the existing residences for delinquent girls be replaced if the IJH 

continued to serve delinquent girls.

Two months later, on December 9, the director of DHS announced 

his decision to find alternative placements for IJH residents and to 

shutter the IJH. The director stated his decision was “based on 

recommendations from the Iowa Juvenile Home Protection Task Force.” 

The director’s announcement pointed out that the IJH currently served a 

total of twenty-one girls, including eleven delinquent girls, nine girls who 

had been adjudicated CINA, and one girl who was being evaluated.

The director further observed that while “[n]ew methods of deescalating behavior [had] resulted in a 93 percent reduction in the use of 

seclusion measures” at the IJH, it would be preferable to work with other 

facilities and community-based providers “who can offer a variety of 
6

services and supports which would not be available on the Toledo 

campus if it were serving only a very small number of delinquent girls.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). The director offered his view that the 

girls currently in the IJH “will be served most successfully through courtapproved alternative placements.” (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The director added that employee layoffs at the IJH would occur effective 

January 16, 2014.

On January 2, AFSCME Iowa Council 61 President Danny Homan, 

Senator Steven J. Sodders, Senator Jack Hatch, Representative Pat 

Murphy, and Representative Mark Smith filed this action in Polk County 

District Court against the Governor and the DHS director. AFSCME Iowa 

Council 61 is the state branch of the American Federation of State, 

County, and Municipal Employees and represents public employees in 

Iowa, including the staff at the IJH. Sodders, Hatch, Murphy, and Smith 

were members of the Iowa General Assembly when the suit was filed.

The petition alleged that the Governor’s decision disallowing the 

spending of the $8,859,355 that had been legally appropriated to the 

operation of the IJH for fiscal year 2014 exceeded his constitutional 

authority. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had exceeded 

the recommendations of the task force, which they contended “at no 

point suggested the closing of the Iowa Juvenile Home at Toledo.” The 

plaintiffs did not allege that any provision of Iowa law apart from the 

2014 appropriation required the defendants to keep the IJH open.

The plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the “refusal to allow the 

spending of funds appropriated . . . is an unconstitutional 

impoundment,” (2) an injunction preventing the closure of the IJH, and 

(3) a writ of mandamus ordering the IJH to remain open. 
7

On January 10, the plaintiffs filed an application for a temporary 

injunction. The application asserted the defendants’ impoundment of 

appropriated funds would result in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. 

The plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction restraining the defendants 

from closing the IJH. An accompanying brief explained that the 

defendants’ actions had violated article IV, section 9 of the Iowa 

Constitution, which provides the Governor “shall take care that the laws 

are faithfully executed.” Iowa Const. art. IV, § 9.

The Governor and the DHS director moved to dismiss the petition 

on January 21. They asserted the plaintiffs lacked standing and had 

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The 

defendants also resisted the application for temporary injunction, 

arguing the plaintiffs had not met the standards for such an injunction 

because “the language of the appropriation at issue, coupled with the 

statutory discretion afforded the executive branch to manage the budget, 

provides no legal basis upon which a court could determine that there 

has been an [unconstitutional] impoundment of funds.” The defendants 

also contended that the plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm.

The plaintiffs, meanwhile, argued that plaintiff Homan had 

standing as the president of the union representing bargaining-unit 

employees at the IJH; that plaintiffs Sodders, Hatch, Murphy, and Smith 

had standing as legislators; and that all five plaintiffs had standing as 

residents, taxpayers, and citizens. The plaintiffs also maintained that 

the defendants’ actions amounted to an unconstitutional impoundment 

of funds in violation of article IV, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. A 

supporting affidavit from Homan explained that the closure of the IJH 

had adversely affected union members because it had resulted in job

losses.
8

A hearing on the motion to dismiss and the application for 

temporary injunction took place on January 31. The plaintiffs did not 

present any additional evidence at the hearing. The defendants 

introduced several exhibits, two of which were affidavits from DHS 

officials.

First, an affidavit from DHS’s chief financial officer stated that as 

of January 8, the department had spent $3,675,150 of the $8,859,355 

maximum appropriated for the IJH for the fiscal year ending on June 30. 

The affidavit also indicated that for the remainder of the fiscal year, the 

department would expend an estimated $2,297,187 “to pay for ongoing 

maintenance and infrastructure support” at the home, despite the 

decision to close it.

Second, DHS also submitted an affidavit from its division 

administrator for field operations. She stated that she was involved in 

the placement recommendations for children who were relocated as a 

result of the closing of the IJH. She explained that juvenile court 

approval was required before any placement recommendation was 

implemented, and most of the children who had been housed at the IJH

were transferred to less restrictive levels of care.

Lastly, the defendants offered several documents relating to the 

collective bargaining relationship between AFSCME Iowa Council 61 and 

DHS. These were a copy of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement;

the grievance filed by Homan with DHS over closure of the IJH; and a 

memorandum of understanding between AFSCME Iowa Council 61, 

DHS, and others concerning transfer rights for employees who had been 

impacted by the layoffs resulting from the closure of IJH.

The district court issued its ruling and order on February 5. It 

denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs’
9

request for a temporary injunction. As an initial matter, the court 

concluded the plaintiffs had standing:

Plaintiff Danny Homan is the President of the American 

Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 

(“AFSCME”) Iowa Council 61. . . . 93 members of the 

AFSCME Iowa Council 61 who worked at the Iowa Juvenile 

Home in Toledo were laid off following the closure of [the] 

facility. Therefore, the members have suffered an injury as a 

result of the Defendants’ actions, and Danny Homan has 

standing as the President of AFSCME Iowa Council 61 to 

represent their interests.

. . . The Plaintiff legislators have alleged that the 

Defendants’ decision to close the facility frustrated legislative 

intent and constituted an impoundment of appropriated 

funds in violation of Article IV Section 9 of the Iowa 

Constitution (“He shall take care that the laws are faithfully 

executed.”). Therefore, the Plaintiff legislators have been 

injured by the Defendants’ actions, and have standing in this 

case to protect the effectiveness of their votes.

On the merits, the court then determined a temporary injunction 

was appropriate:

The Court finds that the facts and circumstances of 

this case support the burden of proof required by the 

Plaintiffs seeking the preliminary injunction. First, Plaintiffs 

are entitled to relief because the actions of the Defendants 

constitute an act or omission that would greatly and 

irreparably injure the Plaintiffs. In addition, it appears the 

Defendants are threatening to do or have, in fact, already 

committed an act which violates the Plaintiffs’ rights: the 

ignoring or contravention of a duly enacted law of the Iowa 

Legislature.

The court went on to state that it considered the case likely to 

succeed on the merits because “the actions of the Defendants, and, in 

particular, the Governor of the State of Iowa, allowing an appointee to 

unilaterally frustrate and, in effect, change the laws as duly enacted by 

the Iowa Legislature cannot be allowed.” It elaborated:

If the Department of Human Services and the Toledo facility 

could operate with some amount less than the 

$8,859,355.00 appropriated, so be it. But to totally 
10

eliminate the operations of the Toledo Home under the guise 

of the language “or so much thereof as is necessary” is to 

essentially ignore the laws of the State of Iowa as enacted 

lawfully by the General Assembly and allows the Executive 

branch to unilaterally decide which laws it will obey and 

which laws it will not.

We granted the defendants’ application for interlocutory appeal on 

February 21. At the same time, we stayed the district court proceedings 

and the temporary injunction.

During the 2014 legislative session that ended May 2, the 

legislature adopted and the Governor subsequently approved the 

following appropriation for the IJH:

Sec. 147. JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS. There is 

appropriated from the general fund of the state to the 

department of human services for the fiscal year beginning 

July 1, 2014, and ending June 30, 2015, the following 

amounts, or so much thereof as is necessary, to be used for 

the purposes designated:

1. For operation of the costs of security, building and 

grounds maintenance, utilities, salary, and support for the 

facilities located at the Iowa juvenile home at Toledo and for 

salaries, support, maintenance, and miscellaneous 

purposes, and for not more than the following full-time 

equivalent positions:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 4,429.678

507,766

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FTEs 114.00

2.00

2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1140, § 147.2

2The Governor line-item vetoed a proviso which stated, “The full-time equivalent 

positions authorized by this subsection, as amended by this 2014 Act, are intended to be 

filled by the maintenance staff persons performing such duties at the time the Iowa 

juvenile home was closed in January 2014.” 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1140, § 147.

 
11

II. Standard of Review.

The parties disagree whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue. 

Compare Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 417, 423–24, 428 (Iowa 

2008) (finding a citizen–taxpayer lacked standing to bring a claim that 

the legislature’s enactment of a law violated the single-subject rule of the 

Iowa Constitution), with Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Iowa 

2004) (indicating citizen–taxpayers had standing to challenge the 

constitutionality of the Governor’s line-item vetoes).

The parties also disagree on the merits—namely, whether the 

Governor and the director of DHS could lawfully stop spending money to 

operate the IJH. See Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. No. 80-8-8 (Aug. 11, 1980), 

1980 WL 26040, at *6 (providing the attorney general’s views as to when 

the executive withholding of funds would and would not be 

constitutional). Compare Felicetti v. Sec’y of Cmtys. & Dev., 438 N.E.2d 

343, 344 (Mass. 1982) (finding executive impoundment of funds 

unlawful), and Cnty. of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 138 (N.Y. 1980) 

(same), with Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 851, 854–56 (D.C. Cir. 

1974) (upholding the executive’s decision not to spend appropriated

funds), and N.H. Health Care Ass’n v. Governor, 13 A.3d 145, 157–58

(N.H. 2011) (upholding the Governor’s decision to spend less than the 

amount that had been appropriated).3

We review questions of standing for correction of errors at law. 

Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 417. We review claims of state constitutional 

violations de novo. Id. Review of the issuance of a temporary injunction 

is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 523 

(Iowa 2011).

3Much of this caselaw was discussed in the district court’s thorough ruling.

 
12

Here, however, we confront a threshold question—whether the 

litigation is now moot because, in the 2014 legislative session, the 

legislature ended appropriations for the operation of the IJH. “It is our 

duty on our own motion to refrain from determining moot questions.” 

Albia Light & Ry. Co. v. Gold Goose Coal & Mining Co., 176 N.W. 722, 723 

(Iowa 1920), aff’d on reh’g, 192 Iowa 869, 185 N.W. 571 (1921).

III. Mootness.

Courts exist to decide cases, not academic questions of law. For 

this reason, a court will generally decline to hear a case when, because of 

changed circumstances, the court’s decision will no longer matter. This 

is known as the doctrine of mootness.

“A case is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable controversy 

because the issues involved are academic or nonexistent.” Iowa Bankers 

Ass’n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep’t, 335 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1983). In 

Iowa Bankers Association, we dismissed as moot the portion of an appeal 

that challenged certain administrative rules. Id. During the pendency of 

the appeal, the general assembly had passed legislation directing the 

agency to issue new rules, and the challenged rules had been rescinded. 

Id.

“Our test is whether an opinion would be of force and effect with 

regard to the underlying controversy.” Women Aware v. Reagen, 331 

N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1983). In Women Aware, a case with some 

similarities to the one at hand, the legislature had enacted the following 

provision as part of a two-year appropriation:

It is the intent of the general assembly that the schedule of 

living costs and the payment for persons on the aid to 

dependent children program shall be increased for all family 

sizes by six percent commencing October 1, 1979 and by an 

additional six percent commencing October 1, 1980.
13

Id. at 90 (quoting 1979 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 10(1)). However, in response to 

a budget shortfall, the department of social services indefinitely deferred 

the six percent increase that was to begin October 1, 1980. Id. at 89. 

Plaintiffs sought administrative and judicial relief on the ground that the 

department’s action violated the separation of powers, and was ultra 

vires, unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Id. at 90. The district 

court denied relief, and plaintiffs appealed. Id.

Meanwhile, though, the legislature retroactively amended the 

appropriation to delete the six percent increase beginning October 1, 

1980. Id. We found the case moot, reasoning, “The legislature’s 

retroactive repeal of the original statute providing for the benefit increase 

precludes recovery by petitioners and obviates any necessity to resolve 

the other issues raised.” Id. at 93.

In Wengert v. Branstad, the plaintiffs challenged a line-item veto 

striking the words “minimum security” from certain appropriations. 474 

N.W.2d 576, 577 (Iowa 1991). The Governor initially fought the lawsuit, 

but ultimately agreed to a decree that enjoined him from spending the 

appropriated money for any purpose other than minimum-security 

facilities. Id. We determined that the trial court had properly decided 

the case was moot. Id. at 579. As we put it,

Our lawgiving function is carefully designed to be an 

appendage to our task of resolving disputes. When a dispute 

ends, the lawgiving function ordinarily vanishes because it is 

axiomatic that we ordinarily do not answer academic or moot 

questions. We certainly should not go out of our way to 

answer a purely moot question because of its possible 

political significance. We regularly decline to address 

constitutional questions unless their answers are necessary 

to dispose of the case. . . .

. . . .

A pronouncement on the merits of plaintiffs’ challenge 

in this case would cast no light, would in no way expand, 
14

develop, or refine the understanding of the governor’s veto 

authority. It would serve only to state officially who was 

right and who was wrong. The governor’s consent to expend 

the appropriated funds in accordance with the demands in 

plaintiffs’ petition ended all practical aspects of the dispute.

This rendered plaintiffs’ challenge academic. The trial court 

was correct in so holding.

Id. at 578–79 (citation omitted).

We believe this case is likewise moot. The plaintiffs did not seek 

any monetary relief, only a declaratory judgment and a court order 

barring the closure of the IJH. During the 2014 legislative session, the 

legislature decided to close the IJH. See 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1140, 

§ 147.4 Our resolution of the present case will not affect that outcome.

One of our neighboring state supreme courts has applied the 

mootness doctrine to an impoundment case. W. Side Org. Health Servs. 

Corp. v. Thompson, 404 N.E.2d 208, 209–10 (Ill. 1980). In that case, the 

Illinois legislature had appropriated money for drug-abuse treatment 

services. Id. at 209. The Governor, citing budgetary concerns, ordered 

part of the funds to be withheld. Id. The plaintiffs sued to force the 

Governor to expend the full appropriation. Id. State law, however, 

provided that all appropriations automatically lapsed no later than three 

4The appropriations act for the 2015 fiscal year set a greatly reduced budget for 

the IJH—covering only preservation and protection of the building and grounds. See

2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1140, § 147 (stating the diminished budget of $507,766 was for “the 

costs of security, building and grounds maintenance, utilities, salary, and support for 

the facilities”). Thus, an injunction to keep the IJH open and operating—even if 

supported by the 2014 fiscal year appropriation, which has now expired—would be 

contrary to the 2015 fiscal year appropriation. As noted, the plaintiffs do not allege that 

any provision of law, other than the now-expired 2014 appropriation, required the 

continued operation of the IJH.

Although the appropriation for the 2015 fiscal year had not yet occurred at the 

time the district court granted the temporary injunction, we are permitted to consider 

matters that have transpired during the appeal for the purpose of determining whether 

a matter is moot. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 572 N.W.2d 537, 539 n.1 (Iowa 

1997). Additionally, courts may take judicial notice of legislative proceedings. See 

Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. State, 170 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 1969).

 
15

months after the end of the fiscal year. Id. at 209–10. Despite the 

expiration of this time period, the intermediate appellate court reached 

the merits and found the Governor lacked authority to impound the 

funds. Id. at 209. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the ground 

the case had become moot. Id. at 211. That court observed,

[W]here no actual rights or interests of the parties remain or 

where events occur which render it impossible for the 

reviewing court to grant effectual relief to either party, the 

issues raised by the litigation should not be resolved merely 

to establish a precedent or to govern potential future cases.

Id. at 210.

Notwithstanding the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, there is 

some federal appellate authority that courts have “the power to order 

that [appropriated] funds be held available beyond their statutory lapse 

date if equity so requires.” Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 

180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Budget authority lapse provisions impose deadlines that 

require agencies to obligate funds within a specified period. 

That period may be extended in the rare circumstance where 

the extension will serve the interests of justice and the ends 

Congress sought to bring about.

Id. But federal courts do not have authority to restore an appropriation 

that Congress has elected to rescind. See id. at 185. Thus, in Rochester 

Pure Waters District, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia reversed an injunction entered by the lower court, holding “the 

budgetary lapse cases do not control a situation in which Congress 

rescinds appropriations with full knowledge of pending claims.” Id. at 

186.

Previously, in Iowa, we have not extended the expiration date of an 

appropriation on equitable grounds when there is a pending lawsuit 

between the legislative branch and the executive branch concerning that 
16

appropriation. See Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1985) 

(indicating a line-item veto controversy became moot when the 

appropriation expired at the end of the fiscal year); Rush v. Ray, 332 

N.W.2d 325, 326 (Iowa 1983) (same). But even if we determined we had 

that authority, the principles of Rochester Pure Waters District would 

govern here. The judicial branch does not have authority to order state 

officials to keep the IJH open based on a prior fiscal 2014 appropriation 

when the legislative branch expressly decided not to appropriate funds 

for the facility’s operation in fiscal 2015. Otherwise stated, this case is 

definitely moot.

Even if a case is moot, we may nonetheless choose to decide it 

under certain circumstances. The potentially relevant exception here is 

the so-called public-importance exception: “An exception to the general 

rule [against deciding moot cases] exists where matters of public 

importance are presented and the problem is likely to recur.” In re 

Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We consider four factors in determining 

whether we should exercise our discretion to decide a moot action under 

this exception:

“(1) the private or public nature of the issue; (2) the 

desirability of an authoritative adjudication to guide public 

officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the 

recurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will 

recur yet evade appellate review.”

Maghee v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 234 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State v. 

Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 2002)).

For example, we exercised our discretion to decide an otherwise 

moot case under the public-importance exception in Maghee. Id. at 235. 

In that case, the petitioner had filed an application for postconviction 
17

relief challenging the revocation of his work release, but had died while 

the case was on appeal. Id. at 230–31. We noted the petitioner’s death 

rendered the case moot, but nevertheless decided to reach the merits of 

the appeal based on the public-importance exception. See id. at 235. 

We concluded the exception was warranted under the four-prong test set 

forth above:

[T]he present appeal presents an issue of general 

applicability that is likely to reoccur. Prisoners are 

transferred in and out of work release every day, and 

challenges to such transfers inevitably arise. Certainly, it is 

desirable to have an authoritative adjudication as to whether 

such challenges should be pursued as judicial review of 

agency action under chapter 17A or by filing a 

postconviction-relief action under chapter 822. Public 

officials as well as prisoners would benefit from such 

guidance. In addition, due to the effect of earned-time 

credits, work release, and parole, it is likely many actions 

similar to the one brought by Maghee could be rendered 

moot by the inmate’s release prior to the resolution of an 

appeal . . . .

Id.

In Guardianship of Kennedy, we also found the public-importance 

exception applied. 845 N.W.2d at 711. There, both parties urged us to 

decide whether sterilization of a male ward required advance court 

approval, even though the sterilization had already occurred. Id. at 710–

11. We found the issue was likely to recur. Id. at 711. In addition, 

while it might be possible for the issue to reach an appellate court in a 

future nonmoot case, the circumstances would be “less than ideal.” Id. 

Either the ward would suffer prolonged uncertainty while the case was 

being decided or he would already have been sterilized and would be 

seeking only collateral relief. Id.; see also In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 

428–29 (Iowa 2013) (“[O]ne exception [to the mootness rule] permits 
18

appellate review of otherwise moot issues when the issue is one of broad 

public importance likely to recur.”).

In Hernandez-Lopez, we were confronted with both facial and asapplied challenges to the Iowa statute that allows material witnesses to 

be held pending trial. 639 N.W.2d at 232. The State sought to dismiss 

the entire appeal as moot because the witnesses were no longer in state 

custody. Id. at 233. We applied the public-importance exception in 

order to hear the defendants’ facial challenge to the statute, explaining:

Our appellate courts have not yet interpreted section 804.11, 

and a decision would provide guidance to law enforcement 

personnel and judicial officers faced with similar situations 

in the future. It is a virtual certainty that another individual 

will be arrested under this statute. Most importantly, we 

believe this is a case capable of repetition, yet evading 

appellate review. Considering the time for processing an 

appeal, in addition to the relatively short duration of 

detentions under section 804.11, a detainee will often be 

released from custody before an appellate court can reach 

the issue.

Id. at 235 (citations omitted). At the same time, we declined to address 

the defendants’ as-applied challenges that related to the specific 

circumstances of their case. Id.

Clearly, the issue raised by this case is one of public importance. 

In another area involving the limits of executive branch authority, 

namely, the line-item veto, we have on several occasions applied the 

public-importance exception to mootness, deciding to hear cases even 

after the term of the affected appropriations expired. Thus, in Rush, we 

reversed a trial court’s dismissal of an action challenging a line-item 

veto, reasoning that “the question should have been considered under 

the public interest exception.” 332 N.W.2d at 327. There we 

emphasized, “[I]t seems probable that the vetoed language, or language 

calling for the suspension of the operation of some other statute, might 
19

be similarly placed in another appropriations bill.” Id.; see also Junkins 

v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Iowa 1988) (finding a line-item veto 

case not moot but also disagreeing with the district court’s determination 

that the public-interest exception did not apply); Colton, 372 N.W.2d at

187 (applying the public-importance exception to mootness in a line-item 

veto case). But see Wengert, 474 N.W.2d at 578–79 (declining to decide a 

moot line-item-veto case under the public-importance exception).

Yet this case is different. We have seen line-item-veto cases with 

some regularity since the Governor was given line-item veto authority by 

a 1968 constitutional amendment. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 16; see 

also, e.g., Homan v. Branstad, 812 N.W.2d 623, 629–30 (Iowa 2012) 

(citing cases). By contrast, a computer-aided review of this court’s 175 

years of caselaw does not reveal any previous case where we were called 

upon to interpret article IV, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution—let alone 

decide the constitutionality of an impoundment. We are not persuaded 

that the question of the Governor’s impoundment authority will recur 

any time soon.

If it does recur, it is likely to be framed somewhat differently. 

Some of the defendants’ arguments in this case focus on the specific 

language used in the 2014 appropriation—“or so much thereof as is 

necessary.” 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 138, § 17. Additionally, the defendants 

maintain they are obligated here to follow directives in Iowa Code chapter 

232. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 232.1 (2013) (“When a child is removed from 

the control of the child’s parents, the court shall secure for the child care 

as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by 

the parents.”); id. § 232.52(1) (requiring for delinquent youth “the least 

restrictive dispositional order appropriate in view of the seriousness of 

the delinquent act”); id. § 232.102(7) (requiring the disposition for CINA 
20

youth to “serve the best interests of the child”). Both sides invoke the 

report of the IJH task force. We are not saying these arguments are or 

are not valid grounds for closing the IJH, just that they might make it 

difficult to draw lessons from a decision on the merits of this case, if we 

were to render such a decision.

Perhaps most importantly, the general assembly clearly could have 

kept this case alive if it had appropriated funds for the continued 

operation of the IJH during the 2014 legislative session (and if necessary, 

overridden the Governor’s veto). Instead, the legislative branch, in effect, 

acquiesced in the executive branch’s action while the case was pending. 

Cf. Belfanti v. Casey, 596 A.2d 298, 302 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (finding 

no impoundment of funds where the Governor closed a state hospital 

and the legislature thereafter appropriated no funds for its continued 

operation). In a sense, this case presents the other side of the coin from 

Wengert, where the Governor effectively backed down from his previous 

line-item veto while the case was pending, and on that basis we declined 

to hear the case. Cf. 474 N.W.2d at 577, 579.

We recognize the decision to close the IJH was a controversial one, 

with effects not only on the youth who lived there but also on the 

individuals in Toledo and surrounding communities who worked there. 

Yet we owe great respect to the two other coequal branches of 

government. Part of that respect involves not telling them what they can 

and cannot do unless the answer is likely to matter in this or a future 

case. For all the reasons stated, we conclude the temporary injunction 

should be vacated and the underlying action dismissed as moot. See, 

e.g., Douglass v. Iowa City, 218 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1974) (finding an 

injunction “unwarranted insofar as it is based on” a moot ground).
21

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated, we determine that this action is moot and 

that the public-importance exception does not justify our hearing an 

otherwise moot case. We reverse and remand to the district court with 

instructions to dismiss the case. Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to 

the plaintiffs and one-half to the defendants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.