In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19‐3530

DANIEL LOUGHRAN and MARGARET LOUGHRAN,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 19 C 4023 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 22, 2021

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit

Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. Daniel and Margaret Loughran de‐

faulted on their home mortgage in 2011. In the ensuing fore‐

closure litigation, the Loughrans have not contested that they

are in default. Instead, they have pursued a series of proce‐

dural delay tactics, as a result of which they remain in posses‐

sion of their home despite not having made a mortgage pay‐

ment in nine years.  
2 No. 19‐3530

This case concerns one of the Loughrans’ many maneu‐

vers. In January 2019, after their state‐court foreclosure litiga‐

tion was already over seven years old, the Loughrans accused

U.S. Bank and its counsel of committing fraud in the course of

those proceedings. In May 2019, sensing that their fraud claim

was going nowhere, the Loughrans tried their luck in federal

court, with a complaint that copied and pasted large swaths

of text from their state‐court filings. Citing the doctrine first

announced in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and noting the practical

identity between the federal and state actions, the district

court stayed the federal proceedings. The Loughrans have ap‐

pealed that decision, which we now affirm.  

I

This saga began in 2005, when plaintiffs Daniel and Mar‐

garet Loughran took out a $395,380 home‐mortgage loan from

defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). Wells

Fargo securitized the mortgage by transferring it to a New

York common‐law trust (the “Trust”). The Pooling and Ser‐

vicing Agreement (“PSA”) that governs the Trust appointed

U.S. Bank as Trustee and Wells Fargo as Servicer. In its capac‐

ity as Servicer, Wells Fargo is responsible for receiving and

processing loan payments and “initat[ing] or caus[ing] to be

initiated” foreclosure proceedings if a loan goes into default.

The PSA also designates Wells Fargo as the Custodian of the

Trust. In this capacity, Wells Fargo keeps physical possession

of the original notes and mortgages on the Trustee’s behalf.

As we noted, the Loughrans defaulted on their mortgage

in 2011. In December of that year, U.S. Bank, in its capacity as

Trustee, initiated a foreclosure proceeding against the
No. 19‐3530 3

Loughrans in the Circuit Court of Grundy County, Illinois.

Acting as Servicer, Wells Fargo retained counsel to pursue the

foreclosure proceedings on U.S. Bank’s behalf.

During the first two years after the suit was filed, the

Loughrans attempted to obtain a Home Affordable Modifica‐

tion Program (HAMP) loan modification through Wells

Fargo.1 Only in 2014, when it appeared that a modification

was not forthcoming, did the Loughrans file an answer, af‐

firmative defenses, and counterclaim in the foreclosure ac‐

tion. In these pleadings, the Loughrans alleged (among other

things) that U.S. Bank lacked standing to file the foreclosure

action and that Wells Fargo had violated Treasury Depart‐

ment guidelines by not (yet) offering the Loughrans a HAMP

modification. In March 2015, explaining that certain provi‐

sions in the Trust PSA prevented it from modifying the loan,

Wells Fargo formally denied the Loughrans’ request for a

HAMP modification.

In October 2015, U.S. Bank moved to strike and dismiss

the Loughrans’ affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It de‐

fended its standing to sue on the ground that, as Trustee, it

was the “holder” of the Loughrans’ note by virtue of its trans‐

fer to the Trust. U.S. Bank also argued that Wells Fargo, as

Servicer, did not have any obligation to follow HAMP Treas‐

ury Guidelines that were inconsistent with the Trust PSA. The

1 HAMP is a program administered by Fannie Mae, under which “fi‐

nancially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying loans to

a level that is affordable ... and sustainable ... .” See Overview, HOME

AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, https://www.hmpadmin.com/por‐

tal/programs/hamp.jsp.  
4 No. 19‐3530

Loughrans did not oppose U.S. Bank’s motion, and so their

affirmative defenses and counterclaim were stricken.

U.S. Bank followed up with a motion for summary judg‐

ment. That triggered a two‐year fight over the Loughrans’

right to obtain a copy of the Trust PSA and to view their orig‐

inal note. Eventually the Loughrans obtained a copy of the

PSA, which (they say) revealed to them for the first time that

Wells Fargo—not U.S. Bank—was in physical possession of

the original note (albeit on U.S. Bank’s behalf and in its capac‐

ity as Servicer). Materials turned over in discovery also

alerted the Loughrans for the first time that Wells Fargo had

hired U.S. Bank’s counsel in the foreclosure proceeding

(again, in its capacity as Servicer).

Though the terms of the Trust PSA explained Wells

Fargo’s involvement on both counts, the Loughrans seized on

this new information as proof of misconduct. In June 2018,

they filed a third‐party complaint against Wells Fargo, in

which they alleged that Wells Fargo had intentionally misrep‐

resented which entity possessed the Loughrans’ note in the

course of denying their HAMP modification. (As we under‐

stand it, the Loughrans’ theory was that restrictions in the

Trust PSA would have bound Wells Fargo only if the Trust

physically possessed the note. Because Wells Fargo held the

note, nothing in their view prevented a HAMP modification.)

Around this time, the Loughrans also filed a petition to re‐

move the judge presiding overthe foreclosure action for cause

under 735 ILCS 5/2‐1001(a)(3). The judge denied that motion,

after which the Loughrans voluntarily dismissed their third‐

party complaint against Wells Fargo.  

In January 2019, U.S. Bank filed another motion for judg‐

ment of foreclosure. In response, the Loughrans raised three
No. 19‐3530 5

new affirmative defenses: (1) U.S. Bank lacked standing to

bring the foreclosure action because it did not have physical

possession of the note; (2) the foreclosure complaint was null

and void because Wells Fargo had brought it in U.S. Bank’s

name but without U.S. Bank’s authorization; and (3) U.S.

Bank, Wells Fargo, and their lawyers had perpetrated a fraud

on the state court by representing that U.S. Bank was in pos‐

session of the note.

U.S. Bank moved to strike the affirmative defenses. On

June 14, 2019, while that motion was pending, the Loughrans

filed the federal action now before us. The new complaint

named as defendants Wells Fargo; its parent company; and

the three law firms that had represented U.S. Bank and Wells

Fargo in the foreclosure proceeding—Pierce & Associates,

P.C.; McCalla Raymer Liebert Pierce, LLC; and Mayer Brown

LLP (the “Law Firm Defendants”). (Unless the context re‐

quires otherwise, we refer to the defendants collectively as

Wells Fargo.) The Loughrans did not include U.S. Bank as a

defendant. The allegations of fraud and misrepresentations in

the federal complaint mirror the Loughrans’ affirmative de‐

fenses in state court. In fact, substantial portions of the federal

complaint are copied verbatim from the Loughrans’ filings in

the state foreclosure action. The federal complaint seeks dam‐

ages underten different legal theories, including the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Illinois Consumer

Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, common‐law

fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress.  

Wells Fargo responded to the federal complaint by mov‐

ing to stay the action pending the outcome of the state
6 No. 19‐3530

foreclosure proceedings. It also moved to dismiss the com‐

plaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Loughrans failed

to state a claim for fraud because the complaint and relevant

documents show that under Illinois law, U.S. Bank was the

legal holder of the Loughrans’ note by virtue of the transfer of

the note to the Trust and Wells Fargo’s physical possession of

the note as Trust Custodian.

The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to stay.

Given this decision, it did notrule on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

The Loughrans appealed. Following the district court’s stay

order, U.S. Bank withdrew its motion to strike the Loughrans’

affirmative defenses in the state foreclosure proceeding. The

Loughrans then withdrew Affirmative Defenses 2 and 3.  

II

Before turning to the merits, we need to say a few words

about appellate jurisdiction. When the district court invoked

the Colorado River doctrine, it stayed, rather than dismissed,

the federal action. Ordinarily a stay of district‐court proceed‐

ings is not immediately appealable because it is not a “final

decision[]” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and it does not

fall within any statute or rule permitting interlocutory ap‐

peals. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that cer‐

tain stay orders should be treated as final for purposes of ap‐

peal if the practical effect is equivalent to a dismissal.  

In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction

Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Court held that a stay of federal

litigation pending the resolution of a state suit was final for

the purposes of section 1291 where the federal and state ac‐

tions “involved [an] identical issue” and that issue was “the

only substantive issue present in the federal suit.” Id. at 10
No. 19‐3530 7

(internal quotation omitted). The Court observed that because

“the state court’s judgment on the issue would be res judi‐

cata,” the stay of federal proceedings pending the resolution

of the state suit “meant that there would be no further litiga‐

tion in the federal forum.” Id. As a result, the Court reasoned,

the stay order was final in the sense that it put the plaintiff 

“effectively out of court.” Id.

A stay may be appropriate where issues are “substantially

the same,” not just “identical.” Freed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A., 756 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2017). The critical question

is “whether the state case is likely to dispose of” the claims in

federal court. Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F.3d 641, 646

(7th Cir. 2011). We have the necessary substantial similarity

here. It is true that, unlike in Moses Cone, the state‐court action

here may not resolve everything. The problem is asymmetry.

If the state court decides that U.S. Bank is the legal holder of

the Loughrans’ note, and thus had standing to litigate the

foreclosure action, then the Loughrans’ federal action will

largely go away. But if the state court decides the issue in the

Loughrans’ favor, then the fraud claims that they have raised

in federal court may not be completely resolved. But that is a

common pattern.

We do not read Moses Cone as establishing rigid criteria for

stay orders. In fact, the opinion signals that the contrary is

true. As support for its jurisdictional analysis, the Moses Cone

Court drew heavily from Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.

Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962), a case that involved a stay of fed‐

eral‐court proceedings under the abstention doctrine an‐

nounced in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S.

496 (1941). In Idlewild the Court held that the district court’s

stay order was final and appealable because a Pullman stay
8 No. 19‐3530

puts the appellant “effectively out of court.” 370 U.S. at 715

n.2. In this context, “effectively out of court” does not neces‐

sarily mean permanently out of court. That is because, as the

Court noted in Moses Cone, a “stay pursuant to Pullman ab‐

stention” (such as the one in Idlewild) “is entered with the ex‐

pectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that

the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court on state‐law

grounds.” Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).  

Thus, under Idlewild and Moses Cone, appellate jurisdiction

over stay orders is not limited to situations in which the state

court will finally decide the federal court claims with preclu‐

sive effect, as was the case in Moses Cone. Rather, jurisdiction

under section 1291 extends to cases in which there remains

some chance that the case will return to federal court to dis‐

pose of residual issues. The key question for jurisdictional

purposes is whether the “object of the stay order is to require

all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state

forum.” Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 10–11 n.11 (emphasis added).

Since the stay order in the present case was entered with the

expectation that the state litigation would “largely” resolve

the federal litigation, that test is met.

This is enough to resolve the jurisdictional question. We

have no need to reach the question whether the collateral‐or‐

der doctrine would also support appellate jurisdiction. See

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Alt‐

hough the Supreme Court reaffirmed Cohen in Mohawk Indus‐

tries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009), it also cautioned

that the Cohen theory should be used sparingly. Id. at 106–07.

What matters for our case is that, without any help from Co‐

hen, our appellate jurisdiction is secure. We are now ready to
No. 19‐3530 9

consider whether the district court properly stayed its pro‐

ceedings.

III

We begin with the acknowledgement that federal courts

have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the ju‐

risdiction given them.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. It fol‐

lows that “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdic‐

tion is the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 813.  

Nonetheless, in a limited number of circumstances federal

courts may decline to hear cases that otherwise fall within

theirjurisdiction. The Supreme Courtrecognized one such sit‐

uation in Colorado River, in which it held that a court may dis‐

miss a federal suit in favor of a concurrent state‐court action

if “exceptional circumstances” merit abstention and deference

to the state‐court action would promote “wise judicial admin‐

istration.” Id. at 813, 818. Indeed, the authority to coordinate

mirror‐image cases is one that courts have long enjoyed. We

assess the present stay under the Colorado River rubric because

that is where the Supreme Court discussed these issues most

directly, and that is how the parties presented their case.

We have used a two‐step inquiry in our assessment of

whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate. First, we ask

“whether the concurrent state and federal actions are ... par‐

allel.” DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 953 F.3d 469,

477 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,

879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989)). If not, then we do not have

mirror‐image cases. If so, we consider “whether the necessary

exceptional circumstances exist to support a stay or dismis‐

sal.” DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477. A variety of considerations can
10 No. 19‐3530

inform this inquiry. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818–20.

Courts have developed a checklist of ten common ones:

1.   Whether the case concerns rights in property, and if so,

whether the state has assumed jurisdiction over that

property;

2. The inconvenience of the federal forum;

3. The desirability of consolidating litigation in one

place—that is, the value in avoiding “piecemeal” liti‐

gation;

4. The order in which jurisdiction was obtained in the

concurrent fora;

5. The source of governing law—federal or state;

6. The adequacy of the state court action to protect the

federal plaintiffs’ rights;

7. The relative progress of the state and federal proceed‐

ings;

8. The presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction;

9. The availability of removal; and

10. Whether the federal action is vexatious or contrived.

DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477; see also Lumen Constr. Corp. v. Brant

Const. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 694–95 (7th Cir. 1985). This list, we

emphasize, is primarily useful as a heuristic aid: it is designed

to be helpful, not a straitjacket. Different considerations may

be more pertinent to some cases, and one or more of these fac‐

tors will be irrelevant in other cases. A district court is free to

“tak[e] into account a special characteristic of the case before

it” in assessing whether the circumstances meriting absten‐

tion are “exceptional.” DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477.
No. 19‐3530 11

We evaluate a district court’s determination that state and

federal proceedings are parallel de novo, and we review its

overall decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. See Freed,

756 F.3d at 1019, 1021; see also DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477.

A

Turning to the first step of the inquiry, we agree with the

district court that the Loughrans’ federal suit and the state

foreclosure action are parallel. It is not necessary for concur‐

rent suits to be “formally symmetrical.” Freed, 756 F.3d at

1019. It is enough if the state and federal suits involve “sub‐

stantially the same parties ... contemporaneously litigating

substantially the same issues.” Huon, 657 F.3d at 646 (internal

quotation omitted). At bottom, the “critical question” is

whether there is a “substantial likelihood that the state litiga‐

tion will dispose of all claims presented in the federal case.”

Id. (internal quotation omitted).

The Loughrans contend that the cases are not parallel be‐

cause U.S. Bank is not a defendant in the federal suit, and

Wells Fargo and the Law Firm Defendants are not plaintiffs in

the state foreclosure action. That much is true, but it alone is

not dispositive. We have held that “the parallel nature of the

actions cannot be destroyed by simply tacking on a few more

defendants,” Clark v. Lacy, 376 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2004),

or by removing key parties for “no legitimate reason,” Freed,

756 F.3d at 1020. The parties in the two suits need only be sub‐

stantially the same. Id. What matters is whether the interests

of the parties are “nearly identical.” Clark, 376 F.3d at 686. Put

another way, the question is whether the addition of new par‐

ties with different interests alters the central issues in the
12 No. 19‐3530

concurrent case, thereby undermining the “overall similarity

of the disputes.” Id.  

Here, Wells Fargo and the Law Firm Defendants are de‐

fendants in the federal action solely by virtue of their involve‐

ment in the state foreclosure case. As for U.S. Bank’s absence

from the federal suit, there is no doubt that the Loughrans

could have named the bank as a defendant but “actively chose

to exclude” it. Freed, 756 F.3d at 1020.

The parties’ interests in the two suits also align: the federal

defendants are being sued for actions that they took on U.S.

Bank’s behalf with respect to the sole issue that U.S. Bank is

litigating in the state court—its possession of the Loughran’s

note. The parties in both cases thus have similar incentives

and goals. That is enough to make the parties in the two suits

functionally the same.

The federal and state litigation also involve parallel issues.

The Loughrans’ main contention in both suits is that U.S.

Bank lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action because

Wells Fargo, not U.S. Bank, had physical possession of the

Loughrans’ note. The Loughrans further allege that U.S. Bank,

Wells Fargo, and their lawyers perpetrated a fraud against the

Loughrans and the state court when they repeatedly asserted

that U.S. Bank was the “note holder.” (They never explain

why Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, and the Law Firm Defendants

would be motivated to commit such a fraud, particularly

when the Loughrans’ default is not in dispute, but for present

purposes we do not need to explore this anomaly.)  

Our earlier summary of the proceedings leaves no doubt

that the Loughrans raised nearly identical allegations of fraud

against Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, and their lawyers throughout
No. 19‐3530 13

the state proceedings. Trying to avoid the obvious compari‐

sons, the Loughrans argue that we may not consider the alle‐

gations of fraud that they made in their affirmative defenses

in the foreclosure action because they dismissed Affirmative

Defense 3 (the fraud defense) shortly after the district court

issued its stay order in the federal case. We have our doubts,

however, that a party may circumvent, afterthe fact, a federal‐

court stay by dismissing without prejudice parallel aspects of

the concurrent state case. We need not decide that issue,

though, because the two suits remain parallel even if we limit

our analysis to the Loughrans’ sole remaining affirmative de‐

fense (i.e., that U.S. Bank lacked standing).

Although the federal complaint invokes several different

theories, the allegation at the heart of each of them is the same:

that U.S. Bank was not the legal possessor of the note; Wells

Fargo, U.S. Bank, and their lawyers knew this; and yet they

falsely represented that it was. This is the precise issue before

the state court; in the course of adjudicating the Loughrans’

standing defense, the foreclosure court will necessarily and

conclusively determine whether U.S. Bank was the “holder”

of the Loughrans’ note as a matter of Illinois law. The remain‐

der of the Loughrans’ claims depend on the answer to their

standing argument; if it fails, so will everything else.  

The Loughrans insist that this must be wrong, because the

pleadings in the state and federal suits invoke different rights

and remedies (that is to say, different theories in support of a

single claim). The Loughrans point out that they are seeking

to vindicate federal and state statutory rights in federal court,

whereas they are asserting only affirmative defenses in state

court.
14 No. 19‐3530

This argument is fundamentally mistaken. In Clark, we ex‐

plained that the parallel nature of concurrent cases cannot “be

dispelled by repackaging the same issue under different

causes of action.” 376 F.3d at 687. Whether the rights and rem‐

edies differ in the two suits is beside the point: the key inquiry

is not whether the alignment of the claims and remedies in the

two cases is the same, but rather whether “the central legal

issues[] remain the same in both cases.” Id. They are.  

One further objection, which the Loughrans do not

squarely raise but is implicit in their arguments, arises from

the fact noted earlier that the preclusive effect of the state

court’s standing determination is one‐sided. If the state court

determines that U.S. Bank is the legal holder of the

Loughrans’ note, then a foundational building block of all the

Loughrans’ federal‐court claims will disappear. If, on the

other hand, the state court determines that U.S. Bank is not the

legal holder of the Loughrans’ note, then there may be more

work for the federal court to do to resolve their claim.  

As we said earlier, this one‐sidedness is neither unusual

nor fatal to a finding that the two cases are parallel. We con‐

fronted a similar situation in Freed. There, the plaintiff in con‐

current state and federal actions raised claims in the federal

court that would have been fully resolved if the state court

ruled one way, but only partially addressed if the state court

ruled in the other direction. See Freed, 756 F.3d at 1021. Nev‐

ertheless, we held that the state and federal actions were par‐

allel. We found that the federal‐ and state‐court claims were

interdependent, and we reasoned that because “[a] resolution

in state court of [the predicate] issues ... [wa]s necessary be‐

fore” the federal case could be decided, “it was rational for the

district court to determine that the state court litigation will
No. 19‐3530 15

be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolu‐

tion of the larger dispute.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see

also Lumen, 780 F.2d at 696 (finding that deference to state‐

court proceedings was appropriate where “a decision on [fed‐

eral‐court] claims [could] not be had until [an] underlying ...

dispute[,] ... [fully] presented only in the state court proceed‐

ing and ... governed by state law,” was resolved). We find the

same to be true of the Loughrans’ dispute here.

B

Since the state and federal actions are parallel, we next

consider whether the district court abused its discretion in

reaching its decision to abstain. DePuy, 953 F.3d at 480. The

bottom line is no: district courts have discretion to stay pro‐

ceedings in federal suits that substantially duplicate litigation

that was well underway in state court when the federal case

was filed. Because it may be helpful to the parties and the dis‐

trict court, we explain why this conclusion is also consistent

with Colorado River. We do so with a quick look at the tradi‐

tional points courts have consulted.  

The district court determined that Colorado River factors 1,

3, 4, 6, 7, and 10 favored abstention—factors 1, 4, 7, and 10

heavily so. It thought that factors 2 and 9 pointed against ab‐

stention, and that factors 5 and 8 were neutral. We largely

agree with that assessment, as we now explain.  

1. The first inquiry is whetherthe state court has assumed

jurisdiction over the property at issue. It is relevant

only if there is property at issue in both the federal and

the state proceedings, but that is not the case here.

While the state foreclosure action concerns property

rights, the Loughrans’ federal suit concerns fraud and
16 No. 19‐3530

misconduct. This consideration is thus largely beside

the point.

2. The convenience (or lack thereof) of the federal forum

does not support abstention. The state and federal

courts here are in close geographical proximity to one

another and equally convenient.  

3. The interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation supports

the stay. As the district court noted, the state action will

likely “dispose of a majority of the factual and legal is‐

sues presented in this case” and so a stay would save

judicial resources.  

4. The orderin which the two courts obtained jurisdiction

strongly favors the stay. The state foreclosure action

began in 2011, and the Loughrans raised allegations of

standing and fraud at various points between 2014 and

January 2019. The Loughrans did not file their federal

action until May 2019. Enough said.  

5. The source of the governing law neither favors nor dis‐

favors abstention, because the federal action involves

both federal‐ and state‐law claims.  

6. We next ask whether the federal rights of the plaintiffs

will be adequately protected. As the district court

noted, because it stayed rather than dismissed the ac‐

tion, the Loughrans in principle could revive their fed‐

eral case in the event that certain issues survived the

resolution of the foreclosure action. See Freed, 756 F.3d

at 1023. This is so even though the Loughrans may suf‐

fer from a self‐inflicted wound stemming from their

voluntary dismissal with prejudice of their state com‐

plaint against Wells Fargo. The dismissal may affect
No. 19‐3530 17

the state court’s ability to address that claim, but the

Loughrans have no one but themselves to thank for

that. See Lumen, 780 F.2d at 696.

7. The relative progress of the two proceedings also sup‐

ports the stay. At the time of the district court’s order,

the state‐court proceedings were well advanced, while

the federal action had not progressed beyond the mo‐

tion‐to‐dismiss stage.  

8. The presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction

does not push the needle either way.  

9. Next we look at the availability of removal. The district

court thought that this weighed against abstention be‐

cause the Loughrans, Illinois citizens being sued in Il‐

linois, could not have removed the foreclosure action

to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). That much

is true, but the conclusion is wrong. The unavailability

of removal favors a stay, because the purpose of this

factor is to prevent litigants from circumventing the re‐

moval statute. See Freed, 756 F.3d at 1023.

10. Finally, there is the vexatious or contrived nature of the

federal claims. This too favors the stay. Recall that the

Loughrans tried to have the judge in their state foreclo‐

sure proceeding removed for cause. Only after the

judge denied that motion did the Loughrans file the

federal action. Their complaint frankly reports their

dissatisfaction with the state‐court proceedings; it as‐

serts that the state proceedings are unfair and the state

judge “does not have the time or resources to ade‐

quately apprise himself of the specifics of the foreclo‐

sure case.” Other actions also signaled forum‐
18 No. 19‐3530

shopping. The district court was entitled to infer from

the Loughrans’ litigation strategy to date that the fed‐

eral suit is another in a long line of delay tactics meant

to buy time before foreclosure.  

Looking more broadly at the stay, it is plain that the

Loughrans have been engaged in what we have called “reac‐

tive litigation.” Lumen, 780 F.2d at 693 (cleaned up). These

suits, “filed by one who is a defendant in a prior proceeding

based upon the same factual controversy,” are usually “moti‐

vated by a desire to delay the progress” of the initial proceed‐

ing; “to impose travel burdens on one’s adversary; to take ad‐

vantage of procedural opportunities only available in one fo‐

rum; to obtain the supposed advantages of being a plaintiff;

to avoid perceived prejudice in the initial forum; or to benefit

perceived prejudice in the second forum.” Id. at 693–94.  

The Loughrans respond only that they have not yet suf‐

fered any adverse rulings in the foreclosure action, and so

they cannot be accused of forum shopping. But a court’s de‐

termination that a litigant is motivated by forum shopping

does not require a formal adverse ruling.  

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

staying the proceedings before it, in deference to the ongoing

state‐court litigation. At its core, the Loughrans’ federal suit

accuses the parties involved in their foreclosure action of en‐

gaging in misconduct during state‐court proceedings. Put

bluntly, they are asking the federal judiciary to monitor and

discipline how parties conduct themselves in state court. This

is a task that extends beyond our role. See Harold v. Steel, 773

F.3d 884, 885–87 (7th Cir. 2014); cf. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feld‐

man, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 416 (1923). If there has been an abuse of process or
No. 19‐3530 19

misconduct in state court—and we see no evidence of either—

the proper place to turn is the state court itself, which pos‐

sesses the authority to order sanctions or other penalties as

appropriate. That the state court in this case declined to order

sanctions is not a reason for the federal judiciary to intervene.

IV

In addition to contesting the district court’s Colorado River

analysis, the Loughrans raise an argument in the alternative.

Even if we think abstention appropriate, they say, we should

reverse and order a remand because the district court errone‐

ously denied the Loughrans leave to amend their complaint.  

We see no such error. This was a matter within the district

court’s discretion. The Loughrans asked to amend only in a

single sentence at the close of their response to the defend‐

ants’ motion to stay or dismiss. That sentence furnished none

of the necessary details, such as how the amended complaint

would be different or which defects it would cure. See Chaidez

v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 2019). Under

these circumstances, the district court’s denial was not an

abuse of discretion.  

V

This leaves one final matter for us to address. In its open‐

ing brief, Wells Fargo informed us that the Loughrans had

filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy shortly after the district court

issued its stay order. The bankruptcy petition had the effect

of automatically staying the state foreclosure proceedings.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). A few days before oral argument, Wells

Fargo informed us that the Loughrans’ bankruptcy case had
20 No. 19‐3530

been dismissed and the automatic stay lifted. See FED. R. APP.

P. 28(j).

The Loughrans responded with a motion for sanctions and

motion to strike Wells Fargo’s letter on the ground that it was

an inappropriate use of Rule 28(j). That rule, the Loughrans

contend, is for citations to legal authority only, not for inform‐

ing the court about developments in related litigation. The

Loughrans also accused Wells Fargo ofraising the bankruptcy

dismissal to “unduly prejudice” them and “mislead and im‐

properly influence the Court just days before oral argument.”

The Loughrans are making a mountain out of a molehill:

any citation error Wells Fargo may have committed was

harmless. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61. Once formal briefing in an ap‐

peal has concluded, parties are not prohibited from informing

the court of important developments in related court proceed‐

ings (about which we may take judicial notice), so long as

those developments have “a direct relation to the matters at

issue.” United States v. Hope, 906 F.2d 254, 260–61 n.1 (7th Cir.

1990) (internal quotation omitted). Here, because the bank‐

ruptcy petition’s automatic stay of the state foreclosure action

might have affected our analysis, Wells Fargo’s letter was not

improper.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and the

Loughrans’ motion to strike and motion for sanctions are

DENIED.