MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Eric P. Babbs

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James D. Sowder,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

40A05-1409-CR-454

Appeal from the Jennings Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jon W. Webster, 

Judge

Case No. 40C01-1208-MR-1

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] James D. Sowder appeals the trial court’s judgment following his convictions 

and seventy-year aggregate sentence for class A felony voluntary manslaughter, 

class A felony burglary, class C felony intimidation, class D felony criminal 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 1 of 15
recklessness, and class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. 

We address five issues presented for our review: (1) whether the State presented 

sufficient evidence to support Sowder’s burglary conviction; (2) whether his 

burglary conviction violates principles of double jeopardy because he was 

acquitted of residential entry; (3) whether his burglary conviction violates 

double jeopardy principles because the same evidence used to enhance the 

conviction to a class A felony was used to support the criminal recklessness 

conviction; (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in considering an 

aggravating factor at sentencing; and (5) whether his sentence is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We conclude as follows:

(1) the evidence presented was sufficient; (2) the first double jeopardy argument 

is an impermissible claim of inconsistent jury verdicts; (3) the burglary 

enhancement violates double jeopardy principles vis-à-vis the criminal 

recklessness conviction; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion; and (5)

Sowder failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Therefore, we vacate 

his criminal recklessness conviction on double jeopardy grounds, but affirm his 

remaining convictions and sentence. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Sowder and his ex-wife, Candice Sowder, had been divorced since 2001 but 

maintained an on-again, off-again relationship in the years that followed. In 

July of 2012, Sowder was living in Seymour, Jackson County, and Candice was

living in North Vernon, Jennings County. Candice’s adult daughter, Regina 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 2 of 15
Johnson, and Regina’s boyfriend, John Charles, lived with Candice. Sowder 

still had strong feelings for Candice, including jealousy. 

[3] On July 25, 2012, Sowder received an explicit text message from Candice’s 

phone describing Candice’s sexual encounters with Regina’s boyfriend, John. 

Although the text was sent from Candice’s phone, it was actually authored and 

sent by Regina. On July 29, 2012, Sowder was still upset by the text and called 

his brother, Lester Sowder, to vent. Sowder accused Regina of sending the text 

and said that he should kill Candice. Lester told Sowder to move on, and from 

that point Sowder considered himself split up from Candice. 

[4] Meanwhile, Candice had invited her grandson, Josh Johnson, and Josh’s four 

friends over to swim and have drinks by her pool. Candice, Josh, and Josh’s

friends left the house after dinner and drove to visit a friend of Candice. Regina 

and John stayed at home and went to sleep in their shared bedroom. Shortly 

thereafter, Sowder walked into Regina and John’s bedroom demanding to 

know Candice’s whereabouts. Sowder had driven from his house in Seymour to 

Candice’s house in North Vernon and entered the house uninvited, without a 

key. Sowder punched Regina in the face, and in retaliation, John picked up a 

lamp and swung it at Sowder. Sowder repeatedly said, “[I]t all ends tonight.” 

Tr. at 529. Sowder struck Regina two more times before leaving the bedroom. 

Once he exited, John called 911.

[5] Shortly thereafter, Candice, Josh, and Josh’s friends returned to the house and 

pulled into the driveway. When Candice saw Sowder’s vehicle parked at her 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 3 of 15
house, she wondered aloud why he was there and said that he needed to leave. 

Candice encountered Sowder on her front deck and told him to “get the f**k 

out of here.” Id. at 440. Sowder walked past Candice to his vehicle and 

retrieved a handgun. He walked back up to the deck with his gun and said, 

“[T]his all ends tonight, mother f**kers.” Id. at 463, 481, 514. Candice opened 

the front door of the house, and Sowder immediately grabbed her and pulled 

her back onto the deck. Sowder held his gun to Candice’s head and pulled the 

trigger, killing her. 

[6] Sowder then re-entered the house and rammed against Regina and John’s

bedroom door, which they were bracing to hold shut. Sowder broke the door off 

its hinges and entered the bedroom. He told Regina that he had killed her 

mother and was going to kill her next. Sowder raised his gun to Regina’s face 

and fired. The bullet grazed Regina’s skull, and she fell to the floor, bleeding. 

Sowder left the house, and police stopped his vehicle nearby. A .38 caliber 

revolver was found on the front passenger seat. Police found Candice’s body on 

the front deck of her home. Regina was admitted to an Indianapolis hospital for 

observation, and while the gunshot wound did cause bodily injury, her treating 

physician reported that it did not cause a substantial risk of death.

[7] The State charged Sowder with the murder of Candice, class A felony 

attempted murder of Regina, class B felony aggravated battery of Regina, class 

A felony burglary resulting in bodily injury to Regina, class D felony residential 

entry, class C felony intimidation of Regina, class C felony intimidation of 

John, class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, and class A misdemeanor 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 4 of 15
carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court granted Sowder’s motion 

for directed verdict and dismissed the aggravated battery charge on grounds of 

insufficient evidence. The jury convicted Sowder of class A felony voluntary 

manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder; class D felony criminal 

recklessness while armed with a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of 

attempted murder; class A felony burglary resulting in bodily injury; class C 

felony intimidation of Regina; and class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun 

without a license. The jury found Sowder not guilty of class D felony residential 

entry and class C felony intimidation of John. The trial court vacated the jury’s 

guilty verdict for criminal trespass due to double jeopardy concerns vis-à-vis the 

burglary conviction.

[8] Sowder was sentenced to thirty-five years for voluntary manslaughter, a 

consecutive term of thirty-five years for burglary, and concurrent terms of six 

years for intimidation, two and one-half years for criminal recklessness, and one 

year for carrying a handgun without a license, resulting in an aggregate seventyyear sentence. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Section 1— The State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Sowder’s burglary conviction because it was not required to 

prove the completion of the underlying felonies.

[9] Burglary is the breaking and entering of a building or structure of another 

person with the intent to commit a specific felony therein. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 

(2012). The State alleged that Sowder committed burglary by breaking and 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 5 of 15
entering Candice’s house with the intent to commit aggravated battery or 

murder upon Regina. Appellant’s App. at 36. Sowder argues that because the 

State failed to prove that he committed aggravated battery or murder upon 

Regina, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary. Sowder’s 

argument misunderstands Indiana law. The burglary statute requires an intent to 

commit a specific underlying felony. It does not require actual completion of 

the underlying felony. See Swaynie v. State, 762 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 2002) 

(holding that burglary is a separate offense from the predicate intended felony). 

“The person’s culpability is established at the point of entry regardless of 

whether the underlying intended felony is ever completed.” Id. 

[10] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the 

verdict. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 573 (Ind. 2014). We do not assess 

witness credibility or reweigh evidence. Id. Rather, we consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the verdict and will affirm the conviction unless no 

reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. 

[11] To sustain a conviction for burglary, the State needed to prove that Sowder 

broke and entered Regina’s house with the intent to commit the felonies of 

murder or aggravated battery against her. The State did not need to prove that 

Sowder killed Regina, that he attempted to kill her, or that she suffered a degree 

of injury rising to the level of aggravated battery. The evidence that Sowder, 

after killing Candice, re-entered the house while armed, threatened to kill 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 6 of 15
Regina, and then fired his gun at her head is sufficient to support his burglary 

conviction. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Sowder reentered the house with his gun because he intended, at the moment of entry, to 

commit murder or aggravated battery against Regina. 

Section 2— Sowder’s claim that his burglary conviction 

violates double jeopardy principles because he was acquitted 

of residential entry is really an impermissible claim of 

inconsistent jury verdicts.

[12] A person who knowingly or intentionally breaks and enters the dwelling of 

another person commits residential entry. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. Sowder 

asserts that his acquittal of residential entry requires that his burglary conviction 

be vacated on double jeopardy grounds. We agree with the State that Sowder’s 

argument is really an impermissible claim of inconsistent jury verdicts.1

 

Jury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds 

that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable. Beattie v. State, 924 

N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). A ‘“criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one 

count [cannot] attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jury’s 

verdict of acquittal on another count.’” Id. at 645 (quoting United States v. 

Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 (1984)). 

1 We are unpersuaded by Sowder’s reliance on Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ind. 2013), which 

involved “acquittal on one offense and retrial on another offense,” not an acquittal on one offense and a 

conviction on another offense, which happened in this case.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 7 of 15

 
[13] In Beattie, the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine within 1000 feet 

of a family housing complex yet acquitted of possession of cocaine. Id. at 644. 

Our supreme court held that the jury’s acquittal on the lesser included charge 

did not require the vacation of the jury’s guilty verdict on the greater charge. Id. 

at 649. Similarly, the jury’s acquittal on the lesser included charge of residential 

entry in this case does not require the vacation of the jury’s verdict on the 

greater charge of burglary. 

Section 3—The enhancement of Sowder’s burglary conviction 

violates double jeopardy principles because the same evidence 

used to enhance the conviction was used to support the 

criminal recklessness conviction.

[14] Sowder’s second double jeopardy argument asserts that enhancing his burglary 

conviction to a class A felony violated double jeopardy principles because the 

same facts were used to support his criminal recklessness conviction.

2 The 

punishment classification of certain crimes may be enhanced if the behavior 

which constitutes the crime is accompanied by certain specified additional 

behavior or causes certain specified additional harm. McCann v. State, 854 

N.E.2d 905, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In situations where a defendant has been 

convicted of one crime for engaging in the specified additional behavior or 

2 The State asserts that Sowder waived this argument because he did not “develop or clarify the legal basis for 

his argument” and thus “failed to make a cogent argument as required by Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).” 

Appellee’s Br. at 14 n. 9. The State’s argument is well taken, but we prefer to address arguments on the merits 

and exercise our discretion to do so here.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 8 of 15

 
causing the specified additional harm, that behavior or harm cannot also be 

used as an enhancement of a separate crime. Id. 

When two convictions are found to contravene double jeopardy 

principles, a reviewing court may remedy the violation by reducing 

either conviction to a less serious form of the same offense if doing so 

will eliminate the violation. In the alternative, a reviewing court may 

vacate one of the convictions to eliminate a double jeopardy violation.

In making that determination, we must be mindful of the penal 

consequences that the trial court found appropriate.

Id. at 915.

[15] In McCann, we found that the enhancement of a burglary conviction was 

improper where the defendant was convicted of A felony burglary, enhanced 

due to shooting the victim, and attempted murder, wherein an essential element 

was shooting the victim. Id. at 912. We held that because the same evidence 

was used to support the conviction for attempted murder and the enhancement 

of the burglary conviction, the enhancement should not stand. Id. at 914. 

[16] Here, Sowder was convicted of burglary and criminal recklessness. A person 

who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to 

commit a felony in it, commits class C felony burglary. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. 

Burglary may be enhanced to a class B felony if it is committed while armed 

with a deadly weapon and to a class A felony if it results in bodily injury or 

serious bodily injury to any person other than the defendant. Id. A person who 

recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial 

risk of bodily injury to another person commits class B misdemeanor criminal 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 9 of 15
recklessness, which may be enhanced to a class D felony if it is committed 

while armed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2. 

[17] In this case, the class D felony criminal recklessness conviction rests on the 

evidence that Sowder recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performed an act 

that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Regina, namely shooting her, 

while armed with a deadly weapon. The class A felony burglary conviction 

rests on the evidence that Sowder broke and entered Candice’s home with the 

intent to commit a felony which resulted in bodily injury or serious bodily 

injury to Regina, namely her gunshot wound. As such, we are presented with a 

double jeopardy violation. 

[18] While it is typical for this Court to reduce the enhancement where there is a 

double jeopardy issue of this nature, we must be mindful of the penal 

consequences that the trial court found appropriate. McCann, 854 N.E.2d at 

915. Given the trial court’s determination that Sowder’s actions merit a seventyyear sentence, we elect to vacate the criminal recklessness conviction to 

eliminate the double jeopardy violation. 3

3 We note that reducing the burglary conviction to a class B felony would not cure the double jeopardy 

violation because an essential element of that offense is “armed with a deadly weapon,” which is also an 

essential element of class D felony criminal recklessness. And reducing the burglary conviction to a class C 

felony would reduce Sowder’s sentence far below its current seventy years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (setting 

sentencing range for a class C felony between two and eight years). 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 10 of 15

 
Section 4 — The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

considering an aggravating factor at sentencing.

[19] Sowder claims that the trial court abused its discretion by expressing 

“disagreement with the jury’s verdict” in convicting him of voluntary 

manslaughter instead of murder as a reason for imposing a more stringent 

sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 18. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of 

discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 

875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion may occur if the court: (1) fails to enter 

a sentencing statement, (2) enters a sentencing statement that explains reasons 

for imposing the sentence but the record does not support the reasons, (3) the 

sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and 

advanced for consideration, or (4) the reasons given are improper as a matter of 

law. Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012). An abuse of discretion 

is shown only where the trial court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d 

at 490. 

[20] In the sentencing order, the trial court found as an aggravating factor that 

Sowder “had ample time to reflect on his actions before carrying through with 

the commission of these crimes.” Appellant’s App. at 216. The trial court did 

not explicitly say that it disagreed with the jury’s verdict, thus there is no basis 

to conclude that the court used Sowder’s murder charge as an aggravating 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 11 of 15
factor. Even giving due deference to the jury’s decision that Sowder acted in 

sudden heat when he killed Candice, it was a valid aggravator for the remaining 

crimes that he had time to consider his actions beforehand. See Bustamante v. 

State, 557 N.E.2d 1313, 1322 (Ind. 1990) (holding that an inference of planning 

or premeditation constitutes a valid aggravator). One may reasonably infer that 

Sowder planned to break into Candice’s house. He drove from his house in 

Seymour to Candice’s house in North Vernon, he was not invited over, and he 

did not have a key. He carried a gun in his vehicle. During the drive from 

Seymour to North Vernon, Sowder had time to cool off. Absent an explicit 

statement of disagreement with the jury’s verdict, Sowder has failed to show 

that the court abused its discretion. 

Section 5— Sowder has failed to establish that his sentence is 

inappropriate.

[21] Sowder argues that his seventy-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. This “Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Whether the 

reviewing court regards a sentence as inappropriate turns on a “sense of the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). This Court “must give ‘deference to a 

trial court’s sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 12 of 15
consideration to that decision and because we understand and recognize the 

unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.”’ Gil v. State, 

988 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Stewart v. State, 866 

N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). The defendant bears the burden of 

persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 

N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of showing 

both prongs of the inquiry—the nature of the offense and the character of the 

defendant—favor revision of his sentence. Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 

827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[22] Sowder first argues that there was nothing in the record tending to show that 

the nature of the offenses exceeded the statutory proscription. The advisory 

sentence is only “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494.

A person who commits a class A felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of 

between twenty and fifty years with the advisory sentence being thirty years.”

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. Sowder was sentenced to thirty-five years for class A 

felony voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive term of thirty-five years for 

class A felony burglary, with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. 

[23] Sowder committed voluntary manslaughter by knowingly or intentionally 

killing Candice while acting under sudden heat by means of a deadly weapon. 

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3. Additionally, he committed burglary by breaking and 

entering the home of Candice and Regina with the intent to commit murder or 

aggravated battery on Regina, which resulted in bodily injury to her when he 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 13 of 15
shot her. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. In light of the senselessness and brutality of 

these crimes, in which Sowder shot his victims in the head at point-blank range, 

a sentence only five years in excess of the advisory for each of these crimes is 

certainly reasonable. Ordering the sentences for voluntary manslaughter and 

burglary to be served consecutively is not inappropriate because multiple 

victims justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. Gleaves v. State, 859 

N.E.2d 766, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 

[24] Regarding his character, Sowder argues that his criminal history was “minor 

and remote,” rendering his sentence inappropriate. Appellant’s Br. at 9. We 

disagree. Sowder has an extensive history of domestic violence against Candice,

including two prior convictions for battery upon her; at least one admitted

incident of uncharged battery upon her; and eight prior misdemeanor 

convictions. He threatened in the past to kill Candice, and we now see that 

those threats were credible. Despite some evidence of provocation by Regina in 

sending the text message, Sowder’s killing of Candice was the culmination of 

years of domestic violence committed against her. Sowder also could have 

killed Regina when he shot her in the head. His behavior displayed in these 

crimes further reflects his poor character. Thus, Sowder has failed to show that 

both the nature of the offenses and his character render his sentence 

inappropriate. Consequently, we affirm his sentence and convictions with the 

exception of the criminal recklessness conviction, which we vacate. 

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 14 of 15
[25] Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1409-CR-454 | July 15, 2015 Page 15 of 15