IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60345

Summary Calendar

LIAN ZHU YE,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A099 714 364

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:*

Lian Zhu Ye, a native and citizen of China, seeks a petition of review to 

challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order granting a motion to 

reconsider but affirming the dismissal of her appeal. She also seeks a petition 

for review to challenge the denial of her motion to remand, which the BIA 

construed as a motion to reopen. Ye contends that the BIA’s adverse credibility 

determination is not supported by substantial evidence. She further asserts 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 10, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-60345

2

that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen based on 

changed country conditions. 

The BIA and the immigration judge may “rely on any inconsistency or 

omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the totality 

of the circumstances establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” 

Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). A credibility finding is a finding 

of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence. See Vidal v. Gonzales, 491 

F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007). Therefore, this court will defer to a credibility 

ruling “unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Wang, 

569 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Ye has not demonstrated that the record compels a conclusion that the 

adverse credibility finding was erroneous. Ye does not deny that she lied on 

her K-1 visa application, as well as a supplemental application for her visa, 

when she indicated that she had never been arrested. This documentary 

evidence, which conflicted with Ye’s testimony concerning her two arrests in 

China, are alone sufficient to uphold the BIA and immigration judge’s adverse 

credibility determination. See Wang, 569 F.3d at 538. Additionally, 

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Ye’s testimony 

surrounding her 2006 arrest conflicted with the Chinese government’s official 

certificate of no criminal record. See Rivera-Cruz v. I.N.S., 948 F.2d 962, 967 

(5th Cir. 1991). Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse 

credibility determination, the BIA’s ruling will not be disturbed. See Vidal, 

491 F.3d at 254; Wang, 569 F.3d at 538.

Ye’s argument that the BIA abused its discretion in affording limited 

weight to the documentary evidence submitted in conjunction with her motion 

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to reopen because the evidence was not authenticated is unpersuasive. See

Jisheng Xiao v. Holder, 459 F. App’x 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Matter 

of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N 209, 214-15 (BIA 2010), abrogated on other 

grounds by Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2010).1 Ye also claims that 

the BIA committed legal error in rejecting all but one of her documents for 

failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). She failed properly to exhaust 

this claim, however, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it in the instant 

petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d); Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319-21 (5th 

Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, Ye’s petition for review is DENIED IN PART and 

DISMISSED IN PART for lack of jurisdiction. 

 

1 This court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly deferential abuseof-discretion standard.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2005). This court will 

affirm the decision to deny a motion to reopen “so long as it is not capricious, racially 

invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is 

arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” Id.at 304 (quoting 

Pritchett v. I.N.S., 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993)).

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