[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13160

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-04145-SLB-JEO

RICKY WALTER DENTON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PAT STOKES, 

SA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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(July 14, 2015)

Before ED CARNES, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Ricky Walter Denton, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, sued FBI Special 

Agent Pat Stokes for allegedly violating Denton’s Fourth Amendment rights.1 See

generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 

(1971). Before Stokes was served with Denton’s complaint, the district court sua

sponte dismissed it without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring district courts to screen civil 

actions filed by prisoners against government officers). Denton appeals that 

dismissal.

We take the allegations in Denton’s complaint as true. Alba v. Montford, 

517 F.3d 1249, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2008). A federal bank robbery investigation 

led to Denton’s convictions for armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and 

for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). After 

the investigation had begun but before his convictions, he was incarcerated in the 

county jail for a probation violation. During that incarceration, Stokes seized 

Denton’s nonlegal correspondence, photocopied it, and showed the copies to 

Denton’s fiancée and his son. The correspondence included letters to women other 

than Denton’s fiancée and letters that made unflattering comments about his son. 

 1 Denton’s Fourth Amendment claim is the only one that he has properly raised on appeal. 

He raised several other constitutional claims in the district court, but he has expressly abandoned 

those claims. Additionally, he attempts to add a First Amendment claim, but we do not consider 

it because he did not raise it before the district court. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 

385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

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According to Denton, Stokes hoped the letters would encourage them to testify for 

the government at trial.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss Denton’s Fourth 

Amendment claim against Stokes. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 

1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001). Construing the complaint liberally, see Boxer X v. 

Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), it sought damages from Stokes in 

both his official and individual capacities. By seeking official capacity damages, 

Denton is actually seeking to impose liability on Stokes’ employer, the FBI, for 

Stokes’ allegedly unconstitutional actions. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985). The Bivens theory of liability does not 

allow Denton to recover damages from the FBI. Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 

995 (11th Cir. 2003); see Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70, 122 

S. Ct. 515, 521 (2001) (“[T]he threat of suit against an individual’s employer was 

not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens.”). Denton may seek damages 

against Stokes only in his individual capacity.

Such damages are available as a general matter, but Denton must overcome 

qualified immunity to get them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) (requiring dismissal 

of prisoner complaints that “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief”); Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 

1998) (applying our qualified immunity precedent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

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Bivens interchangeably). He may receive damages only if he can show that Stokes 

violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law by seizing Denton’s nonlegal 

correspondence, photocopying it, and disclosing the copies to third parties as part 

of the ongoing federal investigation. Otherwise, Stokes is entitled to qualified 

immunity. See Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011).

At the time that Stokes seized, photocopied, and disclosed Denton’s 

nonlegal correspondence, it was not clearly established that doing so violated the 

Fourth Amendment. We had held that both the Sixth Amendment and the “right of 

access to the courts” limit the reading of correspondence from inmates with their 

attorneys. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 472–75 (5th Cir. 1976).2

 We had

also held that the First Amendment limits efforts to control of the volume of

nonlegal, “general correspondence” that inmates send and receive. Guajardo v. 

Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753–56 (5th Cir. 1978).

3

 But we had not held (and still have 

not held) that the Fourth Amendment bars the reading, photocopying, and 

disclosing of inmates’ nonlegal correspondence as part of an ongoing investigation. 

There are some indications that it may not. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 

526, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984) (“The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners 

 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted 

as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 

1981.

3 Both Taylor and Guajardo are still the law of this Circuit, but we have read them in light of 

more recent Supreme Court decisions. See Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1330–32 (11th 

Cir. 2008).

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in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of 

incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.”); Gassler v. 

Wood, 14 F.3d 406, 408–10 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no First Amendment violation 

where prison officials seized a prisoner’s nonlegal correspondence, photocopied it, 

and disclosed the copies to law enforcement as part of an ongoing investigation); 

cf. United States v. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing 

Taylor and Guajardo because neither case involved the Fourth Amendment).

In any event, we need not decide the merits of Denton’s Fourth Amendment 

claim to resolve this appeal, so we express no view on it. It is enough that no 

precedent of the Supreme Court or this Court would have put Stokes on notice that 

the Fourth Amendment prohibited him from seizing Denton’s nonlegal 

correspondence while he was incarcerated, photocopying it, and showing those 

copies to others as part of an ongoing investigation. See Coffin, 642 F.3d at 1013. 

That being the case, Stokes is entitled to qualified immunity from Denton’s claim.4 

See id.

AFFIRMED.

 4 Although § 1915A(b)(2) required dismissal of Denton’s complaint, he still had a right to 

amend it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1349 

(11th Cir. 2004). He does not argue on appeal that the district court should have granted him 

leave to amend his complaint, so we do not consider that argument. See Timson v. Sampson, 

518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

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