J. S09013/15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MARK A. CAMPBELL :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

MARGARET R. PIZZI AND MELISSA 

PIZZI-EVENS, 

:

:

No. 1274 WDA 2014 

:

 Appellants :

Appeal from the Order, July 15, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County 

Civil Division at No. 2014-1294 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 10, 2015 

 Appellants appeal from the order denying their petition to open a 

default judgment. Finding no error below, we affirm. 

 We will accept appellants’ summation of the factual and procedural 

history of this case: 

 On September 1, 2013, the Appellant, 

Melissa Pizzi-Evans (“Pizzi-Evans”), entered into a

residential lease with the Appellee, Mark Campbell 

(“Campbell”). (RR, at 19a). In the lease, 

Pizzi-Evans agreed to lease certain property located 

in McMurray, Pennsylvania from Campbell for $1,725 

per month. The lease was guaranteed by 

Pizzi-Evans mother, Margaret Pizzi (“Pizzi”). 

 In early 2014, Campbell sued Pizzi-Evans and 

Pizzi for breach of the lease agreement before 

Magisterial District Justice James C. Ellis. 

Pizzi-Evans appeared at the hearing. On 

February 13, 2014, Magistrate Ellis entered 
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judgment against Pizzi-Evans and Pizzi (collectively, 

the “Appellants”) for $3,612. (RR, at 8a). 

 On March 11, 2014, the Appellants appealed 

the judgment to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Washington County, Pennsylvania. (RR, at 5a). 

 On April 10, 2014, Campbell filed an 

Arbitration Complaint with the Court of Common 

Pleas. (RR, at 10a). According to the Notice of [sic] 

Defend, the answer to the complaint was due twenty 

days after service of the complaint. (RR, at 11a).

 On May 21, 2014, Campbell filed with the 

Court a certificate of service for the complaint. (RR, 

at 24a). In the certificate of service, Campbell’s

attorney claimed to have served the complaint on 

the Appellants on April 10, 2014. 

 The answer to the complaint was therefore due 

twenty days later, on April 30, 2014. 

 On April 7, 2014, Pizzi-Evans was taken to the 

Emergency Room at St. Clair Hospital for 

complications arising from endometriosis and an 

insulinoma. Endometriosis is a painful condition that 

involves internal bleeding. An insulinoma is a tumor 

that produces an excess of insulin in the body, which 

can cause a life threatening condition. 

 Pizzi-Evans spent the eight days in the 

intensive care unit at St. Clair Hospital. She was

released from the intensive care ward on April 15, 

2014. 

 Between April 15 and April 25, 2014, 

Pizzi-Evans remained at her home, but remained 

seriously ill, and was in severe pain. 

 On April 26, 2014, Pizzi-Evans returned to the 

hospital for the same conditions, this time at UPMC

Montefiore Hospital, in Oakland, in Pittsburgh. 

Pizzi-Evans remained in the hospital for an additional 

four days, until April 30, 2014. During this time,
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Pizzi-Evans’ mother, Pizzi, was involved with 

Pizzi-Evans care on a daily basis. 

 After being released from UPMC Montefiore, 

Pizzi-Evans remained in treatment at her home. She

has not returned to work, as of this date in 

November 2014. 

 On May 21, 2014, Campbell’s attorney filed a 

praecipe for a default judgment in this case. (RR, at 

25a). In the praecipe, Campbell’s attorney claims to 

have mailed a notice of intent to enter default 

judgment on the Appellants on May 7, 2014. (RR, at

27a). The Appellants claim they never received any

such notice. 

 On that same day, May 21, 2014, the Court of 

Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania 

entered a default judgment against the Appellants 

for $6,447.59. (RR, at 25a). 

 Three days later, on May 24, 2014, the 

Appellants served on Campbell a Motion to Open 

Default Judgment. (RR, at 30a). The Appellants’ 

counsel, Elliott Schuchardt, originally intended to

present the motion to the Court of Common Pleas on 

Friday, June 6, 2014. (RR, at 41a). However, 

Campbell’s counsel was not available on that date. 

The parties therefore agreed that Schuchardt would 

present the petition on the following Friday, June 13, 

2014 -- provided that Campbell’s counsel would not 

raise an issue relating to the date of presentation. 

 On June 13, 2014, the Appellants presented 

their Motion to Open Default Judgment to 

Judge Deborah O’Dell-Seneca. Following the oral 

argument, Judge O’Dell-Seneca denied the petition 

because it did not attach a verified copy of the 

answer proposed to be filed by the Appellants. (RR, 

at 34a). A verified answer is required by Rule 237.3 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Immediately following the oral argument on 

June 13, 2014, the Appellants’ counsel filed the 
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Motion to Open the Default Judgment with the Court. 

The motion was therefore served three days after 

entry of the default judgment, and filed with the 

Court 23 days after the default judgment. 

 Four days later, on June 17, 2014, the 

Appellants served on Campbell’s counsel an 

Amended Petition to open the default judgment. 

(RR, at 35a). The Amended Petition complied in full 

with Rule 237.3, because it did attach a verified 

proposed answer to the complaint. (RR, at 45a). 

The Appellants filed the Amended Petition with the 

Court on the following day, June 18, 2014. (RR, at

35a). 

 Judge Katherine B. Emery heard oral argument 

in connection with the Amended Petition on June 30,

2014. Pizzi-Evans and both of her parents attended

the oral argument. At the beginning of the oral 

argument, the Appellants attorney provided Judge 

Emery with a brief summarizing the facts and the 

law with respect to the petition. (RR, at 53a). 

 During the oral argument, the Appellants’ 

lawyer, Elliott Schuchardt, explained to the trial 

court that Pizzi-Evans was in the hospital or ill for 

most of the time period when her answer to the 

complaint was due. In addition, Pizzi-Evans’ mother, 

Ms. Pizzi, was helping treat her daughter, Pizzi-Evans 

during this time. During the oral argument, the 

Appellants’ witnesses were not allowed to speak. 

 On July 15, 2014, the trial court issued a 

Memorandum Opinion denying the Appellants’ 

petition to open the judgment. (RR, at 61a). 

Appellants’ brief at 5-8. This timely appeal followed. 

 On appeal, appellants raise a single issue, contending that the trial 

court erred in finding that appellants did not state a reasonable excuse. 

 We begin by stating our standard of review of 

a denial of a petition to open a default judgment: 
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A petition to open a default judgment is 

an appeal to the equitable powers of the 

court. The decision to grant or deny a 

petition to open a default judgment is 

within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and we will not overturn that 

decision ‘absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion or error of law.’ 

Dumoff v. Spencer, 754 A.2d 1280, 1282 

(Pa.Super.2000) (citation omitted). This Court may, 

after a review of the case, find an abuse of discretion 

if equity clearly favored opening the judgment. Id. 

(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not a 

mere error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, 

or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as 

shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Seeger v. First Union National Bank, 836 A.2d 163 165 (Pa.Super. 

2003). 

 Our courts employ a three-prong test to determine the propriety of 

opening a default judgment. A default judgment may be opened if the 

moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the default judgment, 

(2) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the 

complaint, and (3) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to 

file a responsive pleading. Id. Instantly, the trial court found that 

appellants had satisfied the first two prongs, but failed to offer a reasonable 

excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading: 

 First, the Court finds it important to note that 

this action was an appeal from a Magisterial District 
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Judge where all parties were given the opportunity to 

have their case heard on its merits. Appellants, 

dissatisfied with the judgment against them filed the 

appeal to this Court. The Appellants were well aware 

that they were subject to litigation and the 

Complaint was properly sent to the Appellants’ listed 

address. 

 The averments related to Appellants’ failure to 

answer the Complaint were inadequate. The 

Appellants, through their counsel, averred that 

Ms. Pizzi-Evans was in the hospital for “the past 

month,” or for “the entire month when the answer to

the complaint was due to be filed.” R8, para. 7; R9, 

pg. 6. There are no averments of what condition 

caused Ms. Pizzi-Evans to allegedly be hospitalized. 

Nor does the Motion contain any medical form of 

verification or other affidavit. The Court would 

expect that a person hospitalized for an entire month 

had experienced a catastrophic illness and some 

detail or proof would be included in a pleading or, at 

the very least, in the brief. The motion also fully 

fails to explain why Margaret Pizzi, additional 

Appellant, failed to answer the Complaint. 

 Apparently, Ms. Pizzi-Evans gave the 

Complaint to a “non-lawyer” friend who averred that

he would take care of any response. R9, page 6. If 

true, such action is the true error in judgment, not 

this default. 

 The Motion contains only an empty assertion 

that one of the Appellants was hospitalized for some 

time when the answer to the Complaint came due. 

The Court found that too little information was 

provided to justify opening the judgment. In its 

discretion as prescribed under Schultz[ v. Erie 

Insurance Exchange, 477 A.2d 471 (Pa. 1984)], 

this Court denied the motion. 

Trial court opinion, 9/23/14 at 2-3. 
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 We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to open 

the default judgment. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/10/2015