[Cite as Sullivan v. Sullivan , 2021-Ohio-1117.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

LISA ANN HORVATH SULLIVAN Plaintiff-Appellee

v. BRENDAN E. SULLIVAN Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 28961

Trial Court Case No. 2016-DR-1086 (Domestic Relations Appeal)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 2nd day of April, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . BRIAN A. KRUSE, Atty. Reg. No. 0087411, 10532 Success Lane, Day ton, Ohio 45458 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee BRENDAN E. SULLIVAN, 1199 Dur ham Drive, Centerville, Ohio 45459 Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se

. . . . . . . . . . . . . TUCKER, P.J.-2- {¶ 1} Appellant Brendan E. Sullivan appeals from the trial court’s or der overruling his motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief from the trial court’s July 17, 2020 judgment. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Brendan’ s 1 motion, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} The parties’ divorce proceeding culminated in the June 21, 2018 filing of a final judgment and decree of divorce (“divorce decree”). Perti nent to this appeal, the divorce decree required Brendan, a retired military officer, to pay his former wife, Lisa Ann Horvath Sullivan, 46.52 percent of his disposable military retirement pay. The divorce decree also required Brendan to directly pay Lisa this amount until “a separate document captioned MILITARY RETIRED PAY DIVISION ORDER,” which was to be prepared by the “QDRO Group,” became effective. 2 {¶ 3} On October 12, 2018, Lisa filed a motion requesting that Brenda n be found in contempt of court for his failure to directly pay Lisa her p ortion of the retirement benefit. A hearing before a magistrate was conducted on February 22, 201 9. The magistrate concluded Brendan had not paid Lisa the entire amount of retire ment pay to which she was entitled and that Brendan was therefore in contempt of cour t. According to the magistrate’s decision, the deficit was $4,394.18. The magistra te ordered that Brendan could purge the contempt by paying Lisa $244 per month toward t he arrearage until it

1 For clarity, we will refer to th e parties by their first names.

2 Based upon the parties’ statements at oral argument, it seems t hat this document has yet to be finalized.-3- was eliminated and by further paying Lisa $500 toward her attor ney fees. Brendan filed objections and, upon receipt of the hearing transcript, supplem ental objections. In a judgment filed on July 17, 2020, the trial court overruled the objections, but the court modified the purge order, stating: “Brendan may purge the conte mpt by signing and filing the paperwork to have Lisa paid her portion of the retirement d irectly and pay[ing] $500 in attorne[y] fees to Lisa within 90 days * * *.” The trial co urt further ordered that the $4,394.18 arrearage be added to Brendan’s support enforcement a ccount to be repaid at the rate of $250 per month. {¶ 4} Brendan appealed pro se. On October 23, 2020, we affirmed the trial court’s July 17, 2020 judgment. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28848, 2020- Ohio-5036. In the appeal, Brendan, though not setting forth an y assignments of error, articulated the following issues for review: 1. The Appellant requests the Honorable court’s review of 10 U. S. Code 1408. The Appellant is subject to the effects of two Trial Cour t Orders “Agreed Order Regarding Survivor Benefit Designation and Premiu m” dated 21 Sept 2017 and the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce” date d 21 June 2018. In an attempt to bypass 10 U.S. Code 1408 Section (e) pro tections of 50% of his disposable retired income. 2. The Appellant requests the Honorable court’s review of “The Military Pay Division Order” prior to signature. The order is not in complia nce with 10 U.S. Code 1408, as it fails to protect 50% of the service membe r’s disposable income, through a manipulation of calculations. 3. The Appellant requests the Honorable court’s review and to p arse the-4- Decision and Judgment dated 17 July 2020. The judgment has cons iderable errors, prejudices, and deliberate misrepresentations of facts and law. 4. The Appellant requests the Honorable court to review inciden ts of corruption, fraud, and judicial misconduct that not only violat e the basic right of equality before the law but deny procedural rights guarantee d by the United States Constitution. Determining if the Appellant was re presented honestly and fairly throughout the domestic relations court pro ceedings and if the officers of the court acted properly.

Id. at ¶ 12. In our decision, we stated the following regarding th e arrearage issue:

Based on the evidence before the trial court * * * we see no er ror in its determination that Brendan had not paid Lisa the required a mount, despite his belief to the contrary and notwithstanding the fact that he had made some payments. In order to establish civil contempt, it is necessary to establish only the existence of a court order, knowledge of the order, and

a violation of it. Intent to violate the order need not be sho wn. (Citation omitted.) Id . at ¶ 15. Finally, we stated the following regarding Brendan’ s other retirement pay concerns: * * * On appeal, Brendan suggests that the trial court violated 10 U.S.C.1408 by awarding Lisa more than 50 percent of his disposa ble retired pay. But the trial court’s calculations fail to support that as sertion. He also suggests that Lisa has not paid the “survivor benefit premium” as required. Under the terms of the divorce decree, however, Lisa’s percenta ge of Brendan’s military pension was r educed from 50 percent to 46.52 percent-5- to account for her obligation to pay that premium. Thus, Lisa i s paying the premium through this reduction. Brendan further argues that thi s deduction of 3.48 percent does not cover the full cost of the premium. Bu t Brendan consented to this percentage when he signed the agreed divorce decree containing it. * * * If Brendan believes the divorce decree is erroneous, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion would be the proper avenue of relief. As it currently exists, the divorce decree only requires Lisa to pay 3.48 perce nt, which is being done through the deduction addressed above. Brendan also appears to suggest that other deductions to his disposable retired pay might apply under 10 U.S.C. 1408, but he did not present evidence of any at the hearing.

* * *

Id. at ¶ 16. {¶ 5} On October 27, 2020, seemingly in response to our Civ.R. 60(B) reference noted above, Brendan filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion “to correct” t he July 17, 2020 judgment. The motion set forth eight “issues” which, in one fashion or an other, asserted that the July 17, 2020 judgment was incorrectly decided. On November 12, 202 0, the trial court, without conducting a hearing, overruled Brendan’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion, finding that the issues raised in the motion were barred by collateral estoppel. This appeal followed.

Analysis Civ.R. 60(B) Principles {¶ 6} Civ.R. 60(B) allows a trial court to relieve a party from a fin al judgment for any of the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surpri se or excusable neglect; (2)-6- newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(B); (3) fraud (whe ther heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longe r equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. GMAC Mtge. L.L.C. v. Herring , 189 Ohio App.3d 200, 2010-Ohio3650, 937 N.E.2d 1077, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). Civ.R. 60(B) relief is appropriate when the moving party establishes the following: (1) entitlement to reli ef under one of the grounds for relief; (2) a meritorious claim or defense if relief is gra nted; and (3) the motion is timely made (if the asserted ground for relief is Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) , or (3), the motion must be filed within one year of the judgment.) Id. at ¶ 30, citing GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. , 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). As can be seen by the limited grounds for relief, Civ.R. 60(B) is not a mechanism to correct an erroneous decision. Such error correction is the purview of an appeal. State v. Pigg , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2001-CA-6, 2001 WL 1018367, *1 (Sep. 7, 2001) (Ci v.R. 60(B) motion asserted the trial court’s sexual predator designation was erro neously made; thus it was an attempt to use a Civ.R. 60(B) m otion as a “substitute for * * * an appeal.”). {¶ 7} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s Civ.R. 60(B) decisio n for an abuse

of discretion. Bissell v. Bissell , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26855, 2016-Ohio-3086, ¶ 9.

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “unrea sonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable.” Id. , quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. , 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).-7- {¶ 8} A movant is not automatically entitled to a hearing on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. GMAC Mtge. at ¶ 33, quoting Hrabak v. Collins , 108 Ohio App.3d 117, 121, 670 N.E.2d 281 (1995). Instead, a trial court abuses its discretion when it overrules “a Civ.R. 60(B) motion * * * without holding an evidentiary hearing only if the motion or supporting affidavits contain allegations of operative facts that would wa rrant relief under Civ.R. 60(B).” (Citations omitted.) Id.

Assignments of Error {¶ 9} Brendan asserts three assignments of error: The trial court abused [its] discretion by denying the Civ.R. 6 0(B) motion without [a] hearing. The trial court abused [its] di scretion by failing to follow sp ecific Federal Laws, Guidelines, Department of Defense Regulations, an d processes that prevent division of military retirement pay and transfer of

Survivor Benefits Plan. The trial court * * * permitted extrinsic fraud by not allowing a Civ.R. 60(B) hearing to admit evidence that goes directly against the facts of this

case. To facilitate our review, we will first discuss the second assi gnment of error. {¶ 10} Brendan’s second assignment of error, although stated in terms of the trial court’s purported abuse of discretion, is an assertion that the trial court erred by its failure to follow federal law, guidelines, and regulations regarding th e division of the military retirement benefits, and that this failure “prevented” the divi sion of the retirement pay in-8- the manner set forth in the divorce decree. Moreover, the asse rted errors seem to relate to the divorce decree, not the July 17, 2020 judgment. In any event, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, as discussed, is not the proper mechanism to seek corre ction of purported errors in a trial court’s judgment. 3 {¶ 11} Since Brendan’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion did not articulate any Civ. R. 60(B) ground for relief, except in a conclusory fashion, the trial co urt did not abuse its discretion by overruling the motion. As such, Brendan’s second assignment of error is overruled. 4

First and Third Assignments of Error {¶ 12} Brendan’s first and third assignments of error assert, respecti vely, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Civ.R. 60(B) m otion without a hearing and that the trial court “permitted extrinsic fraud” by not conduct ing a hearing during which “evidence that goes directly against the facts of this case” wo uld have been admitted into evidence. As already discussed, Brendan’s motion asserts trial court error as opposed to setting forth any Civ.R. 60(B) grounds for relief; as such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Brendan’s motion without conductin g an evidentiary hearing. Brendan’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.

3 We realize that our previous opinion references Civ.R. 60(B), b ut the reference was to the divorce decree, not the July 17, 2020 judgment.

4 Brendan’s claim, which includes an assertion regarding Lisa’s e ntitlement to a survivor benefit, that the retirement pay cannot be divided in the manne r set forth in the divorce decree, may be accurate. However, this is not the issue in thi s appeal. This issue, in the first instance, would have to be decided by the trial court upon the filing of an appropriate motion.-9- Conclusion {¶ 13} Having overruled Brendan’s assignments of error, the judgment o f the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Divisi on is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

HALL, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

Copies sent to:

Brian A. Kruse Brendan E. Sullivan Hon. Denise L. Cross