alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Carleton Samuels, Respondent, v Montefiore Medical Center et al., Appellants.

[852 NYS2d 121]

On January 26, 2005, after plaintiff in this medical malpractice action failed to comply with a November 2002 preliminary conference order and an August 2003 compliance conference order, Justice Tuitt conditionally precluded him from offering evidence at trial unless he provided all outstanding discovery within 45 days. Plaintiff never sought vacatur of that conditional order. At the scheduled status conference on March 21, 2005, Justice Tuitt found that plaintiff still had not complied with the prior orders and issued a “self executing order of preclusion.” Defendants moved in January 2006 for summary judgment based on the March 21 order. The court denied that motion on the ground defendants had failed to demonstrate the merit of their defense.

No such demonstration was necessary. The preclusion of plaintiff’s evidence rendered him unable to establish a prima facie case, thus requiring dismissal of the complaint *(Zapco 1500 Inv. v Wiener,*299 AD2d 206 [2002]). Contrary to plaintiffs contention, this was not a discovery-related motion requiring the submission of an affirmation of good faith pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.7 (a). Defendants inadvertently failed to submit the March 21 order on their summary judgment motion, but plaintiff did not dispute its contents as quoted in its entirety in the attorney’s affirmation in support of the dismissal motion. Even though the order is dehors the record on appeal, it is included in the motion court’s files, and we take judicial notice of it *(see People v Davis,*161 AD2d 787, 788 [1990], *lv denied*76 NY2d 939 [1990]). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Buckley, McGuire and Moskowitz, JJ.
2S7-/S'

ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA# 01-13-01028-CR OFFENSE: DWI

STYLE: Lesle Markle v. The State of Texas COUNTY: Harris

COA DISPOSITION: AFFIRM TRIAL COURT: Co Crim Ct at Law No 12

DATE: 02/05/2015 Publish: NO TC CASE #: 1865367

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

STYLE: Lesle Markle v. The State of Texas

fi??ELLAUT^^ Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

DATE:

JUDGE:

CCA#: 237-/5

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED:

PUBLISH:

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

PC:_

DNP:

MOTION FOR

ELECTRONIC RECORD
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19

- 60117 Summary Calendar

DONNA STURKIN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. VICKY PATRICK,

Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:16

- CV

- 434

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff

- Appellee Donna Sturkin filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Defendant

- Appellant Vicky Patrick , a state employee

. Sturkin alleg ed
that Patrick , in her official capacity as Sturkin’s probation officer in an
alternative state program, had extorted financial benefits by requiring Sturkin (1) as a store cashier, not to charge Patrick for various items during checkout ,

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 10, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-60117 Document: 00515230685 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/10/2019No. 19

- 60117

2 and (2) as a motel clerk , to allow Patrick and members of her family to room there without paying to do so

. Sturkin’s case was eventually tried to a district court jury

. The trial court
ruled that Patrick was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the jury found
that Patrick had violated Sturkin’s civil rights for which it awarded $350,000
in damages to Sturkin

. The district court also overruled Patrick’s challenge based upon the favorable te rmination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Heck ruling is the only issue Patrick raises on appeal. We have reviewed in detail the briefs of the parties and the relevant portions of the record on appeal. We conclude that the distri ct court did not reversibly err in the challenged ruling. AFFIRMED. Case: 19-60117 Document: 00515230685 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/10/2019
Document Headings

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###### Department of Veterans Affairs

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under Public Law 92-463 (Federal Advisory Committee Act) that the Rehabilitation Research and Development Service Scientific Merit Review Board will meet on August 25-26, 2009, at the Madison Hotel, 1177 15th Street, NW., Washington, DC, from 8 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. each day.

The purpose of the Board is to review rehabilitation research and development applications for scientific and technical merit and to make recommendations to the Director, Rehabilitation Research and Development Service, regarding their funding.

The August 25 session will be open to the public from 8 to 9 a.m. for the discussion of administrative matters, the general status of the program and the administrative details of the review process. The meetings will be closed as follows for the Board's review of research and development applications:

August 25: From 9 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

August 26: From 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

The reviews involve oral comments, discussion of site visits, staff and consultant critiques of proposed research protocols, and similar analytical documents that focus on the consideration of the personal qualifications, performance and competence of individual research investigators. Disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Disclosure would also reveal research proposals and research underway which could lead to the loss of these projects to third parties and thereby frustrate future agency research efforts. As provided by subsection 10(d) of Public Law 92-463, as amended, closing portions of the meeting is in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6), and (c)(9)(B).

Those who plan to attend the open sessions should contact Ricardo Gonzalez, Administrative Officer, Rehabilitation Research and Development Service (122), Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20420, at (202) 461-1750.

Dated: June 22, 2009.

By Direction of the Secretary:

E. Philip Riggin,

Committee Management Officer.

[FR Doc. E9-15106 Filed 6-25-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8320-01-P
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00217-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.D.S., A CHILD

From the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1426969

ORDER

By her Motion to Supplement Record filed on June 25, 2015, appellant requests 

that this Court supplement the reporter’s record with an adversary hearing held in June 

of 2014. If any item relevant to the appeal is omitted from the reporter’s record, any 

party may, by letter, direct the official court reporter to prepare and file a supplemental 

reporter’s record containing the omitted item. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(d). However, 

supplementation is only necessary if the reporter’s record has already been filed. In this 

case, it has not been filed. The time to file the reporter’s record has been extended to 

July 20, 2015. If appellant wants the adversary hearing included in the reporter’s 
In the Interest of J.D.S. Page 2

record, appellant must make a request to the official court reporter that it be included in 

the reporter’s record. Id. 34.6(b)(1).

Accordingly, appellant’s Motion to Supplement Record is denied.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Motion denied

Order issued and filed July 16, 2015
@misc{1207196,
  author = {Aurelien Delaitre and Paul E. Black and Damien Cupif and Guillaume Haben and Loembe Alex-Kevin and Vadim Okun and Yann Prono and Aurelien Delaitre},
  title = {SATE VI Report: Bug Injection and Collection},
  year = {2023},
  month = {2023-06-14 04:06:00},
  publisher = {Special Publication (NIST SP), National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD},
  url = {https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=936867},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.500-341},
  language = {en},
}
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Odum, Appellant.

Submitted January 28, 2013;

decided March 28, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain this motion for leave to appeal from the order of the Appellate Division where the appeal to the Appellate Division was from an order entered in an appeal from another court *(see*NY Const, art VI, §3 [b] [7]; CPLR 5602 [a]).
S04A0939.

#### HARVEY v. ROBINSON.

(602 SE2d 615)

CARLEY, Justice.

In the November 2003 election for mayor of the City of Lenox, there were two candidates. The incumbent, James Robinson (Appellee) was challenged by Paul Harvey (Appellant). After the votes were counted, Appellant was ahead by 30 votes. However, Appellee filed an election challenge pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-524, alleging that Appellant was ineligible to hold the office of mayor because he was not a qualified elector as required by the municipal charter and by the Georgia Constitution. After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not eligible to hold office because he was not a registered voter and that Appellee was, therefore, the duly elected mayor of the City. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order.

“No person who is not a registered voter . . . shall be eligible to hold any office or appointment of honor or trust in this state.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. II, Sec. II, Par. III. Consistent with this constitutional requirement, the municipal charter provides that the “mayor shall be a qualified elector of this city and shall have been a resident of this city for twelve (12) months immediately preceding the mayor’s election.” “The General Assembly shall provide by law for the registration of electors.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Par. II. “The object of the voter registration law ‘is to insure and sustain the integrity of public elections----’ [Cit.]” *Johnson v. Byrd,*263 Ga. 173, 174 (2) (429 SE2d 923) (1993). “Registration laws are the means or machinery under which proofs are furnished showing the existence of the voter’s qualifications. [Cits.]” *Franklin v. Harper,*205 Ga. 779, *334790 (3) (55 SE2d 221) (1949). “The Secretary of State shall establish and maintain a list of all eligible and qualified registered electors in this state which shall be the official list of electors for use in all elections in this state conducted under this title.” OCGA § 21-2-211 (a). “[T]he list of registered voters is essential to show who are prima facie qualified and entitled to vote.” *Smith v. Bd. of Education,*174 Ga. 735, 741 (2) (164 SE 41) (1932). The list of registered voters “absolutely” controls, so as to bar from voting one whose name does not appear thereon. *Smith v. Bd. of Education,*supra at 735 (2) (b).

Decided September 13, 2004.

*Betty Walker-Lanier,*for appellant.

*Reinhardt, Whitley, Wilmot & Summerlin, Robert C. Wilmot, Sowell & Sandifer, T. Mark Sandifer,*for appellee.

It is undisputed that Appellant’s name does not appear either on the list of municipal electors or on the Secretary of State’s official list of eligible and qualified voters. Compare *Malone v. Tison,*248 Ga. 209 (282 SE2d 84) (1981). Therefore, he was ineligible to vote, and could not cast a ballot for himself or for any other candidate for public office in this state. Because he was not registered to vote, he did not meet the constitutional requirements to hold the office that he sought. Therefore, the trial court correctly held that Appellee was the duly elected mayor.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
#### Maria Auqui, as Guardian of the Property of Jose Verdugo, et al., Respondents, v Seven Thirty One Limited Partnership et al., Appellants.

Submitted April 1, 2013;

decided June 27, 2013

Motion by The Center for Popular Democracy for leave to appear amicus curiae on the motions for reargument herein granted and the affirmation and brief are accepted as filed *[see*20 NY3d 1035 (2013)].

Judges Rivera and Abdus-Salaam taking no part.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-13-00148-CR 

________________________

 

BRYAN KEITH PRICE, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 100th District Court 

Collingsworth County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2880, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding 

 

June 7, 2013 

 

ON ABATEMENT AND REMAND 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Bryan Keith Price appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault. The 

clerk’s record was filed on May 13, 2013. The court reporter has filed a motion to 

extend the time to file the record because appellant apparently failed to pay or make 

arrangements to pay for it, as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 

35.3(b)(3). By letter dated May 22, 2013, we directed appellant to certify to this court, 

by June 3, 2013, that he had complied with rule of procedure 35.3(b)(3). To date, this 
2

court has not received either the reporter’s record or notification that the record has 

been paid for or that arrangements have been made for payment. 

Accordingly, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the 100th District 

Court of Collingsworth County (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the 

trial court shall determine the following:

1. whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal; 

 2. whether appellant is indigent; and, if so,

3. whether appellant is entitled to a free record.

The trial court is also directed to enter such orders necessary to address the 

aforementioned questions. So too shall it include its findings on those matters 

(including the name, address, and phone number of any attorney it may appoint to 

represent appellant in this appeal) in a supplemental record and cause that record to be 

filed with this court by July 8, 2013. Should further time be needed to perform these 

tasks, then same must be requested before July 8, 2013. 

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
#### In the Matter of Tyrone L. Jackson, Appellant, v Appellate Division, First Department, et al., Respondents.

Submitted November 13, 2012;

decided February 14, 2013

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied *[see*9 NY3d 810 (2007)].

Judge Rivera taking no part.
1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District

Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.

___________

Nos. 95-3601/4140

___________

Dennis Russell, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, *

Arkansas Department of * [UNPUBLISHED]

Correction, ** Appellee. *

__________

 Submitted: January 5, 1996

 Filed: January 19, 1996 __________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Dennis Russell appeals from the district court's1 denials of

his motions for an evidentiary hearing and for reconsideration of

an earlier dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We construe

the motions as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motions and

affirm.

Because Russell's original appeal in his section 2254 petition

was untimely, we review the district court's denial of Russell's

subsequent 60(b) motion only for abuse of discretion without
-2-

considering the merits of the section 2254 petition. Robinson v.

Armontrout, 8 F.3d 6, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1993). Rule 60(b) relief

requires an adequate showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id.

at 7. We find no abuse of discretion because Russell made no

adequate showing for relief.

Accordingly, we affirm. 8th Cir. R. 47A(a).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 23

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
333-29157, 333-102383, 333-61640 and 333-108032 on Form S-8 of Bank of Granite
Corporation of our reports dated March 10, 2005, relating to the financial
statements of Bank of Granite Corporation and management's report on the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K of Bank of Granite Corporation for the year ended
December 31, 2004.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
---------------------------------------
Hickory, North Carolina

March 14, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 659 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 659

  Affirming that States should maintain primacy for the regulation of 
 hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas production on State and 
private lands and that the President should not declare a moratorium on 
 the use of hydraulic fracturing on Federal lands (including the Outer 
Continental Shelf), State lands, private lands, or lands held in trust 
 for an Indian Tribe unless such moratorium is authorized by an Act of 
                               Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 29, 2019

   Mr. Bishop of Utah submitted the following resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Natural Resources, and in addition to the 
   Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Affirming that States should maintain primacy for the regulation of 
 hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas production on State and 
private lands and that the President should not declare a moratorium on 
 the use of hydraulic fracturing on Federal lands (including the Outer 
Continental Shelf), State lands, private lands, or lands held in trust 
 for an Indian Tribe unless such moratorium is authorized by an Act of 
                               Congress.

    Resolved, That States should maintain primacy for the regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing for oil and natural gas production on State and 
private lands and that the President should not declare a moratorium on 
the use of hydraulic fracturing on Federal lands (including the Outer 
Continental Shelf), State lands, private lands, or lands held in trust 
for an Indian Tribe unless such moratorium is authorized by an Act of 
Congress.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10426

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SERGIO SUAREZ-COLIMA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CR-133

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Sergio Suarez-Colima has moved 

for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Suarez-Colima has filed a response and a supplemental response. 

The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of 

Suarez-Colima’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-10426 Document: 00513118251 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/16/2015
No. 14-10426

2

decline to consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. See

United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 123

(2014).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record 

reflected therein, as well as Suarez-Colima’s responses. We concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, 

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS 

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 14-10426 Document: 00513118251 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/16/2015
#### Providence Washington Ins. Co. *v.*Wager *et al.*

*(District Court. N. D. New York.*

February 28, 1888.)

Admiralty—Proceedings in Rem and in Personam,

An action in admiralty *in rem is*not a bar to an action *in personam, growing*out of the same facts, and the respondent in the action *in personam*is not entitled to a stay of the proceedings pending an appeal in the action *in rem.*

In Admiralty. Libel *in personam.*

*Edward D. McCarthy,*for libelants.

*Hyland & Zabrishie,*for respondent Wager.

*Clinton & Clark,*for respondents Morse.

Coxe, J.

This is a motion, in an action *in personam,*by the respond-

ent Charles E. Wager, for a stay pending an appeal to the supreme court, taken in an action *in rem,*growing out of the same facts. *The Sidney,*(Dist. Ct.,) 23 Fed. Rep. 88; *The Sidney,*(Cir. Ct.,) 27 Fed. Rep. 119. It is entirety clear that the suit *in rem*is not a bar to the present action. In view of the authorities it is, at least, doubtful whether the respondent is right in his theory that the libelants can, in the action *in rem,*by motion and amendment, obtain a decree *in personam.*But even if this can be done, it in nowise prevents them from proceeding in a separate action if they elect so to do. The weight of authority seems to sustain the proposition that the remedy against the vessel and the remedy against the owner cannot, in circumstances like the present, be united or enforced in the same action; certainly no case has been cited, or found by the court, which disputes the right of a libelant to pursue them separately. *The Jessie Williamson, Jr.,*108 U. S. 305, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669; *The Sabine,*101 U. S. 384; *The Zodiac,*5 Fed. Rep. 220; *Insurance Co.*v. *Alexandre,*16 Fed. Rep. 279, and cases cited; *Hale*v. *Insurance Co.,*2 Story, 176; *Newell*v. *Norton,*3 Wall. 257; Admiralty Rule 15.

*365The libelants, if they have a cause of action, are entitled to enforce it. It would be most unjust to require them to await, without security, the result in the supreme court. The motion is denied.