FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS;

EL DORADO FARMS; LAGUNA

EXCELSIOR FARMS, LLC; JLK; RYAN

FAMILY FARMS LP; MARLU FARMS;

SIMCOT FARMS; BRAD GLEASON;

ROSS ALLEN; CALIFORNIA

PISTACHIO LLC; DOUBLE B. FARMS;

BUSTER ALLEN, INC.; TURK STATION

LLC; C.S. STEFANOPOULOS; ELENA

STEFANOPOULOS; D. D.

STEFANOPOULOS; PAGONA

STEFANOPOULOS; UNIVERSAL LAND

CO.; CORT BLACKBURN; LAURA

BLACKBURN; MC FARMS LLC;

MARTY ACQUISTAPACE; CURTIS

STUBBLEFIELD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-16122

D.C. No.

1:09-cv-01871-

OWW-DLB

OPINION
2 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

 The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for *

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

**

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Oliver W. Wanger, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 5, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed March 1, 2013

Before: Stephen S. Trott and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Frederic Block, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Trott

SUMMARY

**

Water Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor

of the United States Bureau of Reclamation in an action

brought by farmers under the Administrative Procedure Act

seeking to compel the Bureau to provide irrigation districts

with more water.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 3

The panel held that the Bureau was not legally required to

take a discrete action to deliver the farmers’ preferred amount

of water from the San Luis Unit of the Central Valley Project

for irrigation before it provides water for other purposes. The

panel held that there was no final agency action, nor was there

any action that the Bureau had unlawfully withheld. The

panel concluded that the farmers had not established subject

matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act.

COUNSEL

Theodore A. Chester, Jr., Smiland & Chester, Los Angeles,

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Peter Krzywicki and Michael T. Gray, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellees.

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Today we consider whether farmers and farming entities

(collectively, “Farmers”) that irrigate their land using water

from the San Luis Unit of the Central Valley Project – the

nation’s largest reclamation project – may maintain a claim

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to compel

the United States Bureau of Reclamation (“the Bureau”) to

provide the Farmers’ irrigation districts with more water than

it is currently providing. The Farmers argue that several

federal statutes require the Bureau to provide irrigators with
4 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

 We express no opinion on the district court’s other reasons for 1

dismissing the Farmers’ claims.

sufficient irrigation water to satisfy the Farmers’ needs before

delivering water to any other party for any other purpose. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

Bureau on several grounds, including that the Bureau does not

have a statutory duty to release a certain amount of water for

irrigation and that, consequently, the Farmers’ claims did not

satisfy the final agency action requirement of the APA.

Although the district court discussed this issue in terms of

sovereign immunity, we resolve the case slightly differently.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”),

542 U.S. 55 (2004), we hold that the Bureau is not legally

required to take a discrete action to deliver the Farmers’

preferred amount of San Luis Unit water for irrigation before

it provides water for other purposes. The Bureau retains the

discretion to allocate San Luis water among various parties to

satisfy its various obligations. There is no final agency

action, nor is there any action that the Bureau has unlawfully

withheld. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704 & 706(1). The Farmers’

claims amount to a broad programmatic attack on the way the

Bureau generally operates the Central Valley Project, see

SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64, and therefore the Farmers have not

established subject matter jurisdiction under the APA,1

Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008,

1019–20 (9th Cir. 2007).
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 5

I

Reclamation projects are indispensable features of

agriculture in the Western United States. “The Reclamation

Act of 1902 set in motion a massive program to provide

federal financing, construction, and operation of water storage

and distribution projects to reclaim arid lands in many

Western States.” Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 598

(2005); see generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600e. When the

Department of the Interior decides to build and operate a

reclamation project, the agency must “appropriate, purchase,

or condemn necessary water rights in strict conformity with

state law.” California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665

(1978). As the Farmers acknowledge, theBureau obtained all

of the water rights involved in the San Luis Unit “in the 1960s

under both federal and state law.” Op. Br. at 36.

The Central Valley Project (“CVP”) is “a system of dams,

reservoirs, levees, canals, pumping stations, hydropower

plants, and other infrastructure [that] distributes water

throughout California’s vast Central Valley.” Orff, 545 U.S.

at 598. The CVP was originally “taken over and executed” by

the United States under the Reclamation Act and was

reauthorized by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, Pub. L.

No. 75-392, 50 Stat. 844, 850 (“the CVP Act”). Westlands

Water Dist. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1092, 1095 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2003). The Bureau is the agency within the Department

of the Interior charged with administering the CVP.

Congress initially prioritized the purposes of the CVP as

follows: “[T]he said dam and reservoirs shall be used, first,

for river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood

control; second, for irrigation and domestic uses; and, third,
6 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

for power.” CVP Act § 2 (1937) (emphasis added).

However, Congress amended the CVP Act in 1992 with the

Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-

575, 106 Stat. 4600 (“CVPIA”), which re-prioritized the

purposes of the CVP. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,

686 (9th Cir. 1995). The hierarchy of purposes now reads,

“[T]he said dam and reservoirs shall be used, first, for river

regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood control;

second, for irrigation and domestic uses and fish and wildlife

mitigation, protection and restoration purposes; and, third,

for power and fish and wildlife enhancement.” CVPIA

§ 3406(a)(2) (emphasis added); CVP Act § 2. The CVPIA

also requires that the Bureau operate the CVP to “meet all

obligations under State and Federal law, including but not

limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

1531, et seq.” CVPIA § 3406(b).

In 1960, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior

to construct and operate the San Luis Unit “as an integral

part” of the CVP. Act of June 3, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-488,

§ 1(a), 74 Stat. 156, 156 (“the San Luis Act”). The San Luis

Act (1) states that the “principal purpose” of the Unit is to

furnish water for irrigation and (2) identifies four

“incident[al]” purposes – among them, “fish and wildlife

benefits.” Id. The San Luis Act also provides that “[t]he

principal engineering features of said Unit shall be a dam and

reservoir at or near the San Luis site, a forebay and afterbay,

the San Luis Canal, the Pleasant Valley Canal, and necessary

pumping plants, distribution systems, drains, channels, levees,

flood works and related facilities.” Id.

The Reclamation Act authorizes the Bureau to enter into

contracts for the use of reclamation water for several
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 7

purposes, including irrigation. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 423e & 521.

As is relevant here, the Bureau contracts with irrigation

districts for the delivery of water from the San Luis Unit.

Each contract contains a shortage provision excusing the

Bureau from the full amount of its contractual water delivery

obligations if water shortages are caused by, among other

things, drought, mechanical malfunctions, or statutory

obligations on the part of the Bureau to deliver water for other

purposes – such as obligations imposed by the Endangered

Species Act and the CVPIA. Once the Bureau contracts with

an irrigation district, the district in turn contracts with endusers like the Farmers.

According to the Bureau’s Deputy Regional Resources

Manager, every year the Bureau projects the amount of CVP

water that will be available “based upon reservoir storage,

precipitation, runoff forecasts, and other indices.” Decl. of

Richard Stevenson, April 26, 2010, ¶ 5. It then allocates that

water among the Bureau’s contractors, including irrigation

districts and wildlife refuges.

The Farmers allege that for decades the Bureau delivered

enough water to the irrigation districts – which then sold the

water to the Farmers – for the Farmers to irrigate 100% of

their lands to their satisfaction. But in the last several years

the Bureau has provided less water for irrigation, allocating

substantial amounts of San Luis water for other purposes –

particularly for the protection and restoration of fish and

wildlife. The Bureau also allows a significant volume of

water to flow naturally, rather than capturing it to be used for

irrigation. According to the Farmers, the Bureau has

unlawfully “transmute[d] the Unit from an irrigation project

into a fish and wildlife enterprise.” Op. Br. at 8.
8 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

The Farmers filed suit under the APA in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California. The

Farmers contended that the Bureau is required by federal law

to deliver more water for irrigation and less water for nonirrigation purposes such as fish and wildlife. They claim they

are entitled to the amount of water that they have historically

put to beneficial use – presumably making this historical

measurement sometime before the Bureau began curtailing its

deliveries of irrigation water. At oral argument, counsel for

the Farmers estimated this amount as approximately

1,000,000 acre-feet, at least in times when there is no water

shortage.

The Bureau moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the

Farmers moved for summary judgment. The district court

granted the Bureau’s motion, denied the Farmers’ motion, and

granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The district court

determined that with respect to most of the statutory

provisions cited by the Farmers, (1) the Bureau did not have

a mandatory duty to act to provide a certain amount of

irrigation water, (2) the Farmers thus did not satisfy the final

agency action requirement of the APA, and (3) the Farmers’

claims were therefore barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. The court held in the alternative that the Farmers

lacked prudential standing. With respect to four of the

Farmers’ claims, the district court held that the Farmers

lacked constitutional standing.

The Farmers timely appeal.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 9

II

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of

federal statutes such as the Reclamation Act, the CVP Act,

and the San Luis Act. Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States,

203 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2000). When interpreting a

statute, “our starting point is the plain language of the

statute.” Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali v.

United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). That

plain meaning controls “except when its application leads to

unreasonable or impracticable results.” De Osorio v.

Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Where no other statute provides for judicial review of

agency action, as is the case here, the APA allows challenges

to final agency action. Agency action includes a “failure to

act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). The Farmers do not challenge a

specific water allocation by the Bureau. Rather, they allege

that the Bureau has generally failed to deliver enough water

to the irrigation districts for those districts to sell sufficient

water to the Farmers. In such a “failure to act” case, a court

can “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

The Supreme Court explained the requirements of

§ 706(1) in SUWA. In that case, the Court considered an APA

claim that the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) violated

several statutory provisions by failing to take action with

respect to off-road vehicle use on federal land. 542 U.S. at

60–61. Noting that a “failure to act” within the meaning of

the APA is the failure of the agency to issue an “agency rule,

order, license, sanction or relief,” id. at 62, the Court held that
10 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

judicial review of a failure to act under § 706(1) “is properly

understood to be limited . . . to a discrete action,” id. at 63

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “General

deficiencies in compliance . . . lack the specificity requisite

for agency action,” id. at 66, and thus “broad programmatic

attack[s]” on an agency’s administration of a program are

prohibited, id. at 64.

The Court also explained that even discrete agency action

cannot be compelled under § 706(1) unless that action is

“demanded by law.” Id. at 65. Statutory goals that are

“mandatory as to the object to be achieved” but leave the

agency with “discretion in deciding how to achieve” those

goals are insufficient to support a “failure to act” claim

because such discretionary actions are not “demanded by

law.” Id. at 66.

Therefore, “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only

where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a

discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Id. at 64.

“Absent such an assertion, a Section 706(1) claim may be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Alvarado, 509 F.3d at

1019–20; see also Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States,

469 F.3d 801, 814 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district

court’s dismissal of an APA claim for lack of jurisdiction

because the government was not required “to take discrete

nondiscretionary actions”).

With these standards in mind, we turn to the Farmers’

claims.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 11

III

The Farmers have no contractual rights with the Bureau

to irrigation water obtained as a result of its reclamation

works, and the Farmers do not contend that they are thirdparty beneficiaries of the Bureau’s contracts with the

irrigation districts. See Orff, 545 U.S. at 597–98, 603–04

(holding that the government had not waived its sovereign

immunity with respect to suits brought by farmers claiming

third-party beneficiary status); Klamath Water Users

Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1209, 1211–12

(9th Cir. 1999) (construing contract between the Bureau and

the California Oregon Power Company and holding that

irrigators were not intended third-party beneficiaries).

Rather than basing their claims in contract, the Farmers

argue that various reclamation statutes independently impose

mandatory obligations upon the Bureau to distribute more

water to the irrigation districts. The Farmers contend they are

entitled to whatever amount of water they historically put to

beneficial use and that the Bureau may use only “surplus”

water for any purpose other than irrigation. Op. Br. at 20.

The Farmers divide their claims into three groups. They

contend that the Bureau is violating statutory duties (1) to

“operate” the San Luis Unit in a manner that fully utilizes it

for irrigation above other purposes, (2) to “exercise” its water

rights to San Luis water, and (3) to “recoup Project costs.”

Op. Br. at 16, 27, 39. We conclude that none of the statutes

identified by the Farmers requires the Bureau to take a

discrete nondiscretionary action.
12 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

A

We first consider whether four federal statutes impose on

the Bureau a mandatory duty to “operate” the CVP so as to

provide the Farmers with their preferred amount of water.

1

Section 521 of Title 43 of the United States Code

authorizes the Secretary “to enter into contract to supply water

from any project irrigation system for other purposes than

irrigation” provided that “no water shall be furnished for the

uses aforesaid if the delivery of such water shall be

detrimental to the water service for such irrigation project, nor

to the rights of any prior appropriator.” 43 U.S.C. § 521

(emphasis added). The Farmers rely on § 521 to argue that

their lands are suffering just such a detriment and that,

therefore, the Bureau must operate the San Luis Unit to

provide them with more irrigation water before distributing

water for non-irrigation purposes.

The fatal flaw in the Farmers’ argument is that although

they allege generally that they are being harmed by the

Bureau’s practice of allocating water for the protection of fish

and wildlife – a purpose which, like irrigation, the Bureau is

required to promote under the CVPIA – they have not

identified a single contract as a cause of that harm. Further,

the statute does not describe any specific action the Bureau is

required to take in the event an irrigator claims detriment

resulting from a non-irrigation reclamation contract. Thus,

without addressing the Farmers’ argument that they are prior

appropriators within the meaning of § 521, we conclude that

these claims fail for lack of a discrete statutory duty.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 13

2

The Farmers next cite section 2 of the CVP Act, which

provides for “the sale of electric energy” generated by the

CVP “in order to permit the full utilization of the works

constructed” to accomplish the CVP’s purposes. Because

section 2 also states that “the CVP dam and reservoirs ‘shall

be used,’ after river regulation, for ‘irrigation’ and other

‘uses,’” the Farmers claim the entire infrastructure of the CVP

must be “used” for irrigation before the Bureau may distribute

water for non-irrigation purposes. Op. Br. at 22 (quoting

CVP Act § 2) (emphasis added).

The statute, as amended by the CVPIA, lists the purposes

of the CVP – e.g., improving navigation, river regulation,

irrigation, fish and wildlife protection and restoration, etc. –

and authorizes the sale of electricity to accomplish those

purposes. Section 2 does not indicate in the slightest that the

Bureau must take any nondiscretionary action, much less

deliver a certain amount of water to its irrigation contractors

so that those contractors can then sell it to the Farmers.

3

The Farmers also rely on the second sentence of section

1(a) of the San Luis Act, which states that the “principal

engineering features” of the San Luis Unit “shall be a dam

and reservoir . . . and necessary pumping plants, distribution

systems, drains, channels, levees, flood works and related

facilities.” The Farmers rely on our decision in Firebaugh

Canal for the proposition that this statutory language creates

a mandatory duty to distribute more water for irrigation.
14 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

Firebaugh Canal involved a challenge to the Secretary of

the Interior’s failure to complete construction of a master

interceptor drain for the San Luis Unit. 203 F.3d at 571–72.

The majority held that because section 1(a) of the San Luis

Act states that the principal engineering features of the San

Luis Unit “shall” include “necessary . . . drains,” the agency

was required to construct the interceptor drain. Id. at 573–75.

Firebaugh Canal described the government’s responsibility

under § 1(a) as a mandatory “duty to provide drainage

service” and held that providing such service “constitute[d]

agency action unlawfully withheld under § 706(1).” Id. at

570, 578. Although the majority held that “the district court

can compel the Department of Interior to provide drainage

service as mandated by the San Luis Act,” it recognized that

“the district court cannot eliminate agency discretion as to

how it satisfies the drainage requirement.” Id. at 578

(emphasis added).

The Farmers argue that section 1(a), as interpreted in

Firebaugh Canal, requires the Bureau to distribute the

Farmers’ preferred amount of irrigation water before it

engages in any fish and wildlife protection efforts. We

disagree that Firebaugh Canal stands for so attenuated a

proposition. Section 1(a) of the San Luis Act simply

describes the necessary engineering features of the San Luis

Unit, and Firebaugh Canal simply holds that the agency was

required to construct the interceptor drain. Neither the statute

nor Firebaugh Canal says anything in terms of a duty to

distribute a particular amount of water for irrigation.

Moreover, because Firebaugh Canal was decided before

the Supreme Court decided SUWA, we did not then consider

whether “provid[ing] drainage service” would have
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 15

constituted a discrete agency action. Id. at 578. The case

likely would have come out differently, because – as we

acknowledged – the Bureau has discretion under section 1(a)

to decide how to provide drainage service. However, we need

not determine whether Firebaugh Canal remains good law

after SUWA, because even assuming it does, the Farmers do

not dispute that the Bureau is providing water for irrigation –

just not as much as they would like.

4

The Farmers’ last “operation” claim is based on section 6

of the Reclamation Act, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 491. Section

491 “authorize[s] and direct[s]” the Secretary of the Interior

“to use the reclamation fund for the operation and

maintenance of all reservoirs and irrigation works

constructed” under the Reclamation Act.

The Farmers assert that the word “operation” means

“utilization of the works as fully as practicable.” Op. Br. at

18. The argument goes as follows: Because the Reclamation

Act deals with irrigation projects, those projects must be

operated as fully as practicable for irrigation before they can

be used for non-irrigation purposes.

The Farmers would have us ignore every word in the

statute other than the word “operation.” Section 491 does not

require the Bureau to take any particular action in its

management of its reclamation projects. It simply provides

that the Bureau will use a dedicated funding source – which

was established by § 1 of the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C.

§ 391 – for whatever action it chooses to take. Decisions on

how to operate the CVP are left to theBureau’s discretion and
16 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

thus cannot be compelled under § 706(1). See SUWA,

542 U.S. at 64.

B

We next address the Farmers’ claims that the Bureau has

violated its alleged duty to exercise its water rights within the

San Luis Unit.

1

The Farmers rely on section 8 of the Reclamation Act,

codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 383, and section 1702 of the

California Water Code. Section 8 states in part,

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as

affecting . . . the laws of any State or Territory

relating to the control, appropriation, use, or

distribution of water used in irrigation, or any

vested right acquired thereunder, and the

Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the

provisions of this Act, shall proceed in

conformity with such laws . . . .

43 U.S.C. § 383. This section requires that the Bureau

comply with “any condition on the ‘control, appropriation,

use, or distribution of water’ through a federal reclamation

project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional

directives respecting the project.” California, 438 U.S. at 672

(quoting 43 U.S.C. § 383). Thus, state law restrictions on the

Bureau’s water use are incorporated into the Reclamation Act

so long as they are consistent with other federal law.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 17

The Farmers claim that the Bureau’s failure to release

more water to the irrigation districts violates section 1702 of

the California Water Code. Under California law, a permit

holder may apply to the State Water Resources Control Board

(“Board”) for a change in the “purpose of use.” Cal. Water

Code § 1701. Section 1702 states that the Board may not

grant any such application unless it finds that the permit

holder has “establish[ed] to the satisfaction of the [B]oard . . .

that the change will not operate to the injury of any legal user

of the water involved.” Cal. Water Code § 1702. According

to the Farmers, this “no injury” rule requires that the Bureau

deliver their preferred volume of irrigation water because the

amount of water they currently receive from the irrigation

districts is insufficient to irrigate all of their lands.

We disagree. The plain meaning of section 1702 requires

that the Board make a “no injury” finding prior to approving

a change in a water permit. It does not instruct the Bureau to

do anything.

2

The Farmers’ next claim regarding the Bureau’s alleged

duty to exercise its water rights relies on another part of

section 8 of the Reclamation Act. Originally enacted as a

proviso to section 8 and now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 372, the

statute provides that “[t]he right to the use of water acquired

under [the Reclamation Act] shall be appurtenant to the land

irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure,

and the limit of the right.” 43 U.S.C. § 372 (emphasis added).

Section 372 is the Farmers’ answer to the conundrum that

nowhere within the many statutes upon which they rely does
18 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

there appear any language specifying the amount of water to

which the Farmers are supposedly entitled. They claim that

under § 372 they are entitled to that amount of water they

have beneficially used each year when the Bureau allocated

enough water for the Farmers to irrigate 100% of their lands.

Whether or not the Farmers can be considered as having

rights under the Reclamation Act when they do not hold

contracts with the Bureau for the provision of irrigation water,

the statement that the beneficial use of water is the “measure”

of a water right is simply too vague to be construed as a

congressional directive to the Bureau to take a discrete action

such as delivering the Farmers’ preferred amount of irrigation

water. The amount of water the Farmers want is just that –

the amount that they want, not an amount to which they are

legally entitled. Simply put, to refer to § 372 as requiring a

“discrete” action is to distort the meaning of the word.

3

The Farmers’ last “exercise” claim rests on the final

sentence of section 1(a) of the San Luis Act, which provides

in relevant part:

Construction of the San Luis unit shall not be

commenced until the Secretary has . . .

secured, or has satisfactory assurance of his

ability to secure, all rights to the use of water

which are necessary to carry out the purposes

of the unit and the terms and conditions of this

Act . . . .

San Luis Act § 1(a).
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 19

The Farmers concede that the Bureau acquired the

necessary water rights long ago and agree that it “duly

exercised the rights for decades.” Op. Br. at 39. They

contend, however, that the Bureau’s “current non-irrigation

use, and even non-use, of the water is impermissibly

rendering the rights insecure.” Id.

By its plain terms, this statute imposes a condition only on

the construction of the San Luis Unit. Before the Unit could

be built, the Bureau had to acquire the necessary water rights

– which it did. There is nothing in the statute even remotely

suggesting that the Bureau must deliver a certain amount of

irrigation water prior to engaging in fish and wildlife

protection efforts.

C

Finally, the Farmers contend that various statutes require

the Bureau to sell more irrigation water to recoup the costs of

constructing, operating, and maintaining the CVP. None of

the statutes helps the Farmers.

Congress intended that reclamation projects would recoup

their own costs by requiring payments from those who benefit

from the federal government’s reclamation efforts.

Landowners who irrigate their land with reclamation water

must pay an operation and maintenance charge “whenever

water service is available for the irrigation of his land.”

43 U.S.C. § 492. Charges to recoup the cost of construction

“shall be determined with a view of returning to the

reclamation fund the estimated cost of construction of the

project.” 43 U.S.C. § 461 (emphasis added). The Bureau

must provide notice of “the charges which shall be made per
20 SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES

acre upon” the land to be irrigated, “the number of annual

installments in which such charges shall be paid[,] and the

time when such payments shall commence.” 43 U.S.C. § 419.

The Reclamation Act also states that contracts with

irrigation districts for the deliveryof irrigation water “shall be

. . . at such rates as in the Secretary’s judgment will produce

revenues at least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of

the annual operation andmaintenance cost and an appropriate

share of such fixed charges as the Secretary deems proper.”

43 U.S.C. § 485h(e) (emphasis added). Any such contract

must “provid[e] for payment by the district or districts of the

cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the works

. . . , such cost of constructing to be repaid within such terms

of years as the Secretary may find to be necessary, in any

event not more than forty years.” 43 U.S.C. § 423e (emphasis

added).

As the above-emphasized language illustrates, Congress

unmistakably vested with the agency the discretion to

determine how to recoup the costs of irrigation projects. In

passing the recoupment statutes, Congress’s goals were broad

and general – “the rehabilitation of the several reclamation

projects and the insuring of their future success by placing

them upon a sound operative and business basis.” 43 U.S.C.

§ 423f. Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Interior,

and by extension to the Bureau, the discretion to determine

the best way to meet those goals. None of these recoupment

statutes requires the discrete agency action the Farmers seek.

Therefore, the Farmers cannot compel the Bureau to act.
SAN LUIS UNIT FOOD PRODUCERS V. UNITED STATES 21

IV

In the end, the Farmers’ claims boil down to a broad,

programmatic challenge to the Bureau’s operation and

management of the CVP and, as such, are not cognizable

under the APA. Although the Farmers contend that the CVP

is designed to promote irrigation over the protection of fish

and wildlife, Congress decided otherwise. The Bureau is

tasked with “operat[ing] the Central Valley Project to meet all

obligations under State and Federal law, including but not

limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act.” CVPIA

§ 3406(b) (emphasis added). That is a mandatory goal. The

decision of how to achieve it, however, is the Bureau’s. None

of the statutes identified by the Farmers require that the

Bureau deliver the Farmers’ preferred amount of water to its

irrigation contractors. For this reason, the Farmers’ APA

claims fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.