J-S36025-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

MONROE WEEKLEY, III 

 Appellant No. 1732 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 19, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0002162-2011 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015

Appellant Monroe Weekley, III, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial 

conviction for third degree murder,1 receiving stolen property,2 and firearms 

not to be carried without a license.3 We affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). 

3

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a). 
J-S36025-15 

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 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets 

forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. See 1925(a) 

Opinion, pp. 1-12.4 Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

I. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in determining that the evidence was 

sufficient to support a conviction for [r]eceiving [s]tolen 

[p]roperty, where the Commonwealth failed to offer any 

evidence that [Appellant] knew the firearm was stolen. 

II. The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in imposing 

consecutive sentences, using an incorrect offense gravity score 

of 9 (loaded weapon) rather than 7, which resulted in an unduly 

harsh sentence, without considering [Appellant’s] specific 

circumstances and rehabilitative needs when compared to the 

need to protect the public. 

Appellant’s Brief, p. 6. 

 When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court’s 

standard of review is as follows: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

____________________________________________ 

4

 The introductory paragraph of the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion incorrectly 

indicates that the instant matter is an appeal of the disposition of Appellant’s 

PCRA petition. See 1925(a) Opinion, p. 1. In actuality, the instant appeal is 

of Appellant’s judgment of sentence following the trial court’s grant of 

Appellant’s PCRA petition requesting reinstatement of his direct appeal rights 

nunc pro tunc after this Court dismissed his first appeal because Appellant’s 

direct appeal counsel failed to file a brief. See Commonwealth v. 

Weekley, 424 WDA 2013, Order filed January 22, 2014. The body of the 

trial court’s 1925(a) opinion correctly states the procedural posture of the 

matter (see 1925(a) Opinion, pp. 10-12) and the trial court’s misstatement 

has no bearing on its thorough analysis of the issues raised. 
J-S36025-15 

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evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa.Super.2014). 

 Regarding Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claim, we 

observe: 

[T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to 

affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of 

discretion. . . . [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere 

error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused 

its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, 

our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion may not be 

found merely because an appellate court might have reached a 

different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the 

concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the 

sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper 

penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it. 
J-S36025-15 

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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-70 (Pa.Super.2010) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 Further, we note that “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle a petitioner to review as of right.” 

Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super.2011). Before 

this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an appellant must 

comply with the following requirements: 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was 

properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) 

whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Id. at 1064. 

“A substantial question will be found where the defendant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the [sentencing] code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal citations omitted); see 

also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). “We determine whether a particular case raises a 

substantial question on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 10. 

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and preserved his 

issues in a post-sentence motion. Further, Appellant’s brief includes a 
J-S36025-15 

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concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief, p. 10. A court’s 

exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively 

does not ordinarily raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. 

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa.Super.2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 

825 (Pa.2011). Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent 

sentences will present a substantial question in only “the most extreme 

circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, 

considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa.Super.2012), appeal 

denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa.2013). This Court has stated that 

a defendant may raise a substantial question where he receives 

consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case 

involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines 

would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive 

sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the 

consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial 

question. 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa.Super.2013), 

reargument denied (Nov. 21, 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa.2014) 

(emphasis in original). However, an allegation that a trial court employed 

an improper calculation of an Offense Gravity Score raises a substantial 

question for appellate review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 

A.2d 203, 210-211 (Pa.Super.1998) (claim that sentencing court used 

incorrect Offense Gravity Score raises a substantial question regarding 
J-S36025-15 

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discretionary aspect); see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 585 A.2d 

533, 534 (Pa.Super.1991) (“Where [an] appellant avers that the sentencing 

court failed to properly apply the sentencing guidelines a substantial 

question as to the appropriateness of the sentence has been raised.”). 

Therefore, Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review, and we 

can properly address Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing on 

appeal. 

 After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Kim Tesla, 

we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. See Trial Court Opinion, dated November 20, 2014, pp. 12-21 

(finding: (1) evidence that Appellant was in possession of firearm within 

three months of its theft and sold firearm after murder, without proof of 

ownership and with the help of a known illegal firearms dealer, was sufficient 

to support conviction for receiving stolen property; (2) court properly 

sentenced Appellant after considering 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) sentencing 

factors, Appellant’s pre-sentence report, sentencing guidelines, Appellant’s 

prior record, evidence presented at sentencing, Appellant’s allocution, and 

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; and (3) court properly employed offense 
J-S36025-15 

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gravity score of 95 because jury could infer that firearm Appellant used to 

shoot victim was loaded while in Appellant’s possession). Accordingly, we 

affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/10/2015 

____________________________________________ 

5

 In sentencing Appellant on the firearms not to be carried without a license 

conviction, the trial court would have properly used an offense gravity score 

of 9 if the weapon were loaded, whereas an offense gravity score of 7 would 

have been appropriate were the weapon unloaded. 
APP.B 

in a pool of blood. His waist was positioned at the edge of a scat cushion with his feet resting on 

officers observed a black male identified as Rashawn T. Cameron (hereinafter, "Cameron") lying 

the reported address. L pon arrival at the residence at approximately l l :40 a.m .. the responding 

a result of the caller· s in formation, the Emergency Control Center dispatched Aliquippa Police to 

unknown male was lying on the living room couch unresponsive and bleeding from the face, As 

Cooper Street. Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. The female reported that, inside the residence. an 

telephone call from an unidentified female located at the residence of Willie Martin at 308 

on Sunday, '.!\o·vember 21, 2010. the Beaver County 911 Emergency Control Center received a 

This matter arises out of the death of Rashawn T. Cameron. At approximately 11 :35 a.m, 

A. Facts and Investigation 

FACTS AND PROCEDliRAL HISTORY ) 

Opinion issued by this Court. For the reasons staled below, Defendant's Petition is denied. 

Weekly. Ill. This is the second time this matter has been appealed, and this the second 1925(a) 

the Post C onviction Relief Act ( hereinafter. ··PCR.A .. l filed on behalf of Defendant Monroe 

Before this Court for disposition is the petition for post-conviction collateral relief under 

Rt;LE 1925(a). OPINION 

Tesla, J, November 90 . 2014 

Defendant 

MONROE WEEKLEY. ur, 

J'\o. 2162 of 20l l 

vs. 

COMYIOI\\VEAL TH OF PE:t\~SYL VAN IA, 

1:",I THE COL"RT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BEAVER COL'"KTY 

PE~".\:S YLVA NlA 

CRJ\ifIJ\AL DlVJSION - LAW 

) 

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Karas toJd Detectives Gall and Heberle that. upon returning lo Stewart's residence. 

Defendant described the murder of Cameron. Defendant told Karas that he and an unidentified 

black male purchased a S50.00 piece of crack cocaine from an unidentified individual at a crack 

the floor. A preliminary examination of Cameron's body by the responding officers and Deputy 

') Coroner Wayne Tatalovich revealed that Cameron sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his 

head behind his left ear with a large exit wound on his forehead above the right t!}'~- He was 

pronounced dead at the scene. During the search of the crime scene, law enforcement located 

fragments of a lead projectile. After performing an autopsy. Dr. James Smith determined that 

Cameron died as a result of the gunshot wound and that Cameron was the victim of a homicide. 

On February 10. 10 IL Assistant Chief County Detective Andrew Gall and County 

Detective Robert Heberle interviewed Bradley J. Karas (hereinafter. "Karas") in connection with 

their investigation of this matter. Karas told the officers that, during the morning of November 

21. 2010. he was sleeping at the residence of James C. Stewart II] (hereinafter ... Stewart": at 181 

Baker Street. Aliquippa. Pennsylvania, According to Karas. Defendant arrived at Stewart's 

residence between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m, wearing dark jeans. black boots. a black hoodie, and 

carrying a black book bag. Karas stated that. after seeing Defendant. he fell asleep again and 

awoke at· approximately 10:30 a.m, Shortly thereafter, Karas walked into the kitchen and 

observed Defendant and Stewart talking, Karas slated that he also observed Defendant remove 

what appeared to be a .44 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver handgun from his black book bag. 

Defendant {hen asked Karas to lake the handgun downstairs to clean it and warned that the 

handgun should not be touched until after it was deaned. Karas stated that, after he complied 

with Defendants request. Defendant and Stewart left Stewart's residence and attempted to sell 

the handgun to James E. Connor HI (hereinafter ... Connor .. ). 

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the end of November 10 l 0. Stewart came to his residence and sold him the Redhawk revolver 

regarding how he acquired the Redhawk revolver. Connor indica« .. --d that. at some point towards 

On February l 1. 2011. Connor reported to the police station and provided a statement 

was reported missing by the owner in May of 2010. 

enforcement officials discovered the identity of the owner of the Redhawk revolver and that it 

revolver, Through an inquiry conducted at the Beaver County Emergency Control Center, law 

on information provided by Connor, the investigators were able to recover the Redhawk 

Maznum ~ Ruger ~ Redhawk revolver (hereinafter, "Redhawk revolver") from Stewart. and. based 

allegedly .sold to Connor on behalf of Defendant. Connor admitted that he purchased a .44 

Pennsylvania to question Connor and to attempt to retrieve the .44 caliber revolver that Stewart 

Aliquippa Police Department reported to Connor's residence at 171 Baker Street Aliquippa. 

) 

Also on February l 0. .2011. Detective Heberle and Sergeant Steve Roberts of the 

Defendant left. he was carrying the same black book bag that had previously held the revolver. 

picked Defendant up and drove him from the residence. Kara'> told the detectives that, as 

approximately 4:00 p.m .• when an unidentified white female driving a white Chevrolet Cavalier 

After he related these events. Defendant remained at Stewart' s residence umll 

proceeded to Stewart's residence. 

pockets. Defendant then walked to Valley Terrace, left his clothes near a dumpster. and 

"Vic .. in the head. Defendant stated that he attempted to rob the "Vic" but found nothing in his 

the couch and bent over to retrieve something from under the coffee table, Defendant shot the 

and Defendant went back inside the crack house. Defendant stated that. when the "Vic" sat on 

referred to as the "Vic" went outside or the crack house for about a minute and then the "Vic .. ) 

house on Plan 11 in Aliquippa, Defendant, the unidentified black male. and someone Defendant 

) 

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) 

interviewed Roger L. Henderson, Jr. (hereinafter. "Henderson") regarding a statement Stewart 

On F cbruary 1 7. 201 I, Detective Heberle. Captain M"'-Clurc. and Detective Tim Staub 

then gave Che gun to Connor and returned the black book bag to Defendant, 

Defendant and that Defendant handed Stewart the black hook bag containing the gun. Stewart 

went to Connor's residence to arrange the deal. Stewart stated that he gave Connor's money to 

lo him but Stewart declined and suggested selling it to Connor. Defendant agreed. and Stewart 

his gun, and Karas complied. After cleaning the gun, Karas wrapped it in a black t-shirt and 

placed lt in Defendant's black book bag. Stewart indicated that Defendant offered to sell the gun 

Stewart told the officers that. following this conversation. Defendant asked Karas to clean 

Cameron with his gun and then shot him. 

his gun atCarneron and demanded his money. According to Defendant. Cameron reached for his 

gun and a fight over Defendant's gun ensued. Defendant stated that he ultimately struck 

Defendant went to Willie Martin· s residence to aet his monev from Cameron and cauzht 

- J " 

Cameron doing something .. foul .. as he entered the house. Defendant stated that he then aimed 

the murder of Cameron. Defendant stated that he regretted bringing Cameron to Stewart's 

residence to purchase a gun because Cameron was working with the police and Cameron owed 

him $600.00. Defendant also stated that, at approximately 3:00 a.m, earlier that morning. 

morning of ~OYemher 11, :!OlO. he awoke to find Defendant in his residence. According to 

Stewart, Defendant stated that he had <lone something bad and proceeded to tell Stewart about 

Later that day, Sergeant Roberts. Detective Heberle, and Captain Anthony Q. McClure 

interviewed Stewart at the Aliquippa Police Department. Stewart told the officers that, on the 

until he located the previous owner. 

for 5400.00. Stewart told Connor that he would be unable to transfer ownership of the firearm 

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5 ,) 

made to him. Henderson indicated that on December 29. 201 O. he met with Stewart lo exchange 

) handguns; According to Henderson. Stewart stated that Defendant had previously given him a 

bloody handgun that was used in the shooting death nf Cameron, 

On February l 8. 201 I. Sergeant Donald Couch of the Aliquippa Police Department 

submitted the Redhawk revolver and the mutilated bullet fragment seized from the crime scene 

to the Pennsylvania State Police Greensburg Regional Crime Laboratory. On February 24. 10J l , 

The forensic scientist from the serology department at the Greensburg Laboratory notified 

Sergeant Roberts that the firearm tested positive for the presence of blood and that there would 

be future tests comparing the blood from the firearm with the blood samples obtained from 

Cameron. The forensic examination also revealed that the mutilated bullet fragment recovered 

from the crime scene was discharged from the Redhawk revolver. 

On February 28, 201 L Captain McCJure submitted an application for a search warrant 

requesting that he be permitted to take the following actions: report to the Community College of 

Beaver County. where Defendant was a student, and seize the black. book bag Defendant may be 

carrying and the black boots and black hoodic he may be wearing: transport Defendant to the 

Heritage Valley M edical Center so that two purple top rubes of blood may be extracted fl-om 

him: search Defendant's residence at 717 Washington Street. Aliquippa. Pennsylvania as well as 

the curtilagc for any black book bags .. 44 caliber ammunition. black boots, black hoodic, indicia 

of residence, and any other items believed to be associated with the shooting death of Cameron: 

and search any vehicles that are possessed by Defendant. ln support of his request. Captain 

J'\.kCJure · s application included the information listed above that was gathered from the witness 

interviews and initial investigation, At 8:40 a.m. on February 28. 2011. the Honorable Judge 

John P. Dnhanich signed and authorized Captain·~ \1eClurc · s search warrant application. 

) 

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) 

After securing the search warrant. Captain McClure and other detectives proceeded to the 

Community College of Beaver County to execute the search warrant. Upon arriving at 

Defendant's class. the detectives and campus security asked the instructor to have Defendant exit 

the classroom, Defendant stepped into the hallway. and the detectives put him in handcuffs. He 

was subsequently searched for weapons. and a campus security officer took the black book hag 

he was carrying and gave it to the detectives. Defendant was then transported to the detectives 

office, While at the office. the detectives discovered that the search warrant ( hereinafter. 

"unexecuted search warrant") they obtained earlier that day provided the wrong date of birth and 

wrong Pennsylvania Driver's License Number for Defendant. After realizing. their mistake, the 

officers transported Defendant back to the Community College and returned his book bag to him. 

Later that day, Captain McClure retyped the search warrant application and submitted it 

to Judge Dohanich, who signed and authorized it at 3 :20 p.m, Other than the corrected date of 

birth and driver's license number, the new search warrant contained the same information as the 

unexecuted search warrant. After obtaining the search warrant (hereinafter ... search warrant for 

Defendant's clothes. book bag. and blood .. ). the detectives proceeded lo Defendant's residence at 

approximately 5 :05 p.m, and searched the premises. seizing Defendant's black and plaid Dakine 

back pack from his living room as well as De fondant's Carhart black hooded jacket size 5X. 

black and yellow reversible hooded sweatshirt. and black Nike Reax size 13 shoes from his 

person. They subsequently transported Defendant to the Heritage Valley Medical Center to have 

Defendant's blood drawn. ultimately obtaining two purple capped tubes of Defendants blood. 

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 1. '.W 11. Captain ~1cClure again met with Stewart. 

who indicated that he received a call from Defendant on his cell phone earlier that evening. 

According to Stewart. Defendant related to Stewart how the police drew blood from him and 

) 

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7 

seized his book bag and some of his clothing on February 28. 2011. Defendant also indicated that 

he believed it was Karas. Alvin J. Flowers (hereinafter. =Flowers"], or a woman named Donzi 

Perry: (hereinafter. "Perry") who were providing information about Cameron's murder lo the 

police. Defendant explained that both Perry and Flowers had first-hand knowledge of the 

homicide because Perry was sitting outside of Willie Martins home when it occurred and 

Flowers was performing oral sex on Cameron inside ihc house just hefore Defendant shot 

Cameron. Stewart told Captain :\kCl ure that, at some point during his conversation with 

Defendant, Stewart suggested that they communicate by text message rather than talk on the 

phone. Defendant agreed. and the tv • .o sent several text messages to each other speculating about 

who was responsible for notifying law enforcement about the homicide. During the interview, 

Stewart permitted Captain McClurc to review the text messages using Stewart's cell phone. 

Captain McClure reviewed the messages and identified (724) 406&2036 as Stewart's cell phone 

number and (724) 513-[579 as the number for the cell phone Defendant was using. 

On March 3. 2:011. Captain vtcClure sent preservation letters to Cricket Communications 

and Sprint .' Nextel Communications to preserve the records from Stewart's and Defendant's cell 

phone numbers. respectively. Captain :\kClure requested that the subpoena compliance 

departments of the companies preserve these records tor the period of February 18, 201 l tu 

March 3. 20 l I. On March I 1. 20 l l , the subpoena specialist for Sprint : Next cl Communications 

confirmed that the call detail records. subscriber information, and customer account notes for the 

cell phone number ( 724} 5 JJ- l 579 were being preserved. The subpoena specialist further 

indicated that a search warrant was required to release any content or stored communications. 

On March 14. 201 l. Captain \fcClurc submitted two search warrant applications 

requesting the billing and account information, call detail records. and text messages for 

) 

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B. C rimlaal Proceedings 

On July 18, 201 J. Sergeant Roberts filed a Criminal Complaint against Defendant, 

charging him with criminal homicide (18 Pa.CS.A. § 250 l(a )), robbery ( rn Pa.CS .A. § 

370l(a){ l )(i)), receiving stolen property ( 18 Pa.CS.A. § 3925(a)>. firearms not to be carried 

without a license ( 18 Pa.CS.A. § 6 l 06{ a)( I),. and crimes committed with firearms {18 Pa.C. S.A_ 

§ 6103). On the same day. a warrant was issued for Defendant's arrest. and Defendant was taken 

into custody. While incarcerated in the Beaver County Jail. Defendant s phone conversations 

were recorded. During these conversations, a message was broadcasted multiple times warning 

that the conversation was being recorded. On September 2. 201 J. a subpoena duces tecum was 

issued for recorded telephone conversations involving Defendant from the date of his 

incarceration to September 1, 2011. Warden William Schouppe of the Beaver County Jail 

complied with the subpoena (hereinafter. "subpoena for jail recordings"). 

On November 15. :!O I L a subpoena duces tecum was issued to Sprint .' Nextel for the 

subscriber information. call detail records including text messages. and cell site tower location 

data for cell phone number (724} 513-1579 for the dates and times of November 19. 2010 at 

12:00 p.m. to July 18.2011 at 1.:toO p.m. Sprint: Nextel did not provide any of the requested 

) 

Stewart's and Defendant's eel] phones. The applications contained information obtained from the 

) March I, -]011 interview of Stewart as well as the same information included in the application 

thr the search warrant for Defendant's clothes. book bag. and blood. On March 14, 2011, this 

Court signed and authorized the search warrant for Stewart' s cell phone records at 3:05 p.rn. as 

well as the scare h warrant for Defenda 11 f s eel I phone record s ( he re i na frer. "first searc h w arrant 

for Defendant's cell phone records") at 3: 15 p.m. Based on a review .. of the record. no evidence 

was obtained as a result of these search warrants. 

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9 

information except for a list of phone numbers and a letter stating thal the requested data could 

) not be supplied because the proper paperwork was not issued. As a result. on November 13. 

20 I L Detective Chamberlain submitted an application for search warrant requesting the same 

information for the period ofNovember 19. 2010 at 12:00 p.m. to November 18. 2011 at 12:00 

p.m. In the affidavit, Detective Chamberlain indicated that Stewart testified during the November 

9. 2011 preliminary hearing regarding communications he had with Defendant. Stewart testified. 

that he was receiving text messages from Defendant. who was using a cell phone with the 

number (724) 513-1579. Detective Chamberlain also indicated that he verified that this cell 

phone was active before. during. and after the investigation into Cameron· s death. At 

approximately I: 12 p.m. on Xovember 13. 10 l L Judge Dohanich signed and authorized the 

search warrant (hereinafter ... second search warrant for Defendants cell phone records"), Sprint.' 

Nextel provided the requested information on December 5. 20 l 1. 

On that same- date, the Commonwealth fiJed an Information charging Def endant with 

criminal homicide. robbery, recci ving stolen property. and firearms not to be carried without a 

license. On \1ay 21. 2012. Defendant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Application, which included 

several different motions. A hearing on Defendaru's Application was held on June 1. :?OJ 2 and 

June 4. 20l2. During the hearing. the Court denied Defendant's request for a bill of particulars, 

and in an Order tiled on June 1 L .'.:!01.2. the Court addressed Defendant s discovery issues, On 

July 5, 20J 2, the Court issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 

Trial in this matter commenced on August 6, 2011. During the testimony of Stewart. the 

Commonwealth displayed to the jury a series nf photographs of text messages exchanged 

between Defendant and Stewart on March 1. 1011. Defendant initially objected to the 

presentation and admission of the photographs. and the Court overruled Defendam's objection. 

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10 

appellate case was docketed as Case '\'o. 424 WDA 2013. Defendant was directed to fi1e a Rule 

On March 5. 2013. Defendant filed an appeal of the February 8. 2013 Order. That 

C. Defendant's First Appeal 

sentence motions. 

on February 4. 2013. On February R. 2013. the Court issued an Order denying Defendant· s postApplication on January 2. 2012. Oral argument on Defendant's post-sentence motions was held 

transcription of the notes of testimony. Defendant filed a Supplemental Omnibus Post-Sentence 

Judgment. a Motion for a New Trial. and a Motion for Modification of Sentence. Following the 

Defendant filed an Omnibus Post-Sentence Application containing a Motion in Arrest of 

56.500.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund for funeral expenses. On October 15, 2012, 

Police Laboratory for lab fees, $1-71 LOO to Cameron's father for funeral expenses. and 

) 

Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in th<: amounts of S9.440.t>O to the Pennsylvania State 

half years to 51 years of incarceration and to pay an aggregate fine of S 1 1,500.00. In addition 

On October 3. 2012. Defendant was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 24 and onejury verdict or not guilty on the charges of first and second degree murder and robbery. 

degree murder. firearms not to be carried w .. ithout a license. and receiving stolen property and a 

The trial concluded on August 20. 20J 2 with a jury verdict of guilty on the charges of third 

on August 1-L 201:2 and issued an Order on August 15. 2012 denying Defendant's Trial Motion, 

Control Act <hereinafter. "Wiretap Act"). The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Trial Motion 

~vkClur~·s direction in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 

According to Defendant. Stewart testified that he sent text messages to Defendant at Captain 

\ seeking to suppress the text message exchange and all evidence derived from the seizure of it. 

! 

On August 10, 2012. Defendant filed a Trial Motion for Suppression of Evidence and Mistrial, 

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11 

On September 19. 10 I 4. The Court signed an Order reinstating Defendant s appellate 

rights and granting him 30 days in which to file a. notice of appeal, Defendant filed his notice of 

Appeal on October 17. 2014. On October 31. 2014. the Court issued an Order directing 

Defendant to file a 1925{b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Defendant 

filed his Concise Statement the same day. raising: only two issues. These rwo issues, challenging 

reinstated nunc pro tune. 

Amended PCRA Petition. Defendant argued ineffective assistance of his prior counsel. Dennis 

Di Martini. on the basis of counsel's failure to file a timely brief which resulted in the dismissal 

of Defendant's first appeal. Defendant !3 sole request for relief was that his appeal rights be 

granted on May 7. 2014. The Amended PCRA Petition was tiled on July 7. 2014. Through his 

) 

1925(b) statement which he submitted on March 25. 2013. Defendant raised numerous 

) allegations of error in his 1925(b) statement. An extensive J 925(a) Opinion was issued on April 

29. 2013 addressing the twenty-one issues. 

Defendant's counsel. Dennis Di:'vfartini, was granted three extensions by the Superior 

Court to file an Appellate Brief. The first extension was granted on J unc 20. 20 l 3. the second on 

September 19, 2013. and the third on Novem bcr 2~. 2013. Defendant's counsel then failed either 

to file an Appellate Brief or to request another extension. The Superior Court dismissed 

Defendant's appeal on January 2:2. 201-4- for failure to file a Brief. 

D. Defendanr's Cu rrcnt Appeal 

Defendant's case having been dismissed due to his counsel's failure to file an Appellate 

Brief or request an additional extension. Defendant himself ti led pro se a Post Conviction Relief 

Act Petition on March 17. 2014. On April J.1014, new counsel was appointed for Defendant and 

Defendant ·°' Motion for an extension of time in which to file an amended PCRA petition was 

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) 

i Ncvcrthcicss. Defendant 1:-. hmned to rhose issues raised in his present 19251 b) Concise Statement. C'om. ,·. Rut]er, 

571 P.J. -1-1 l. 445. 812 ,\.~d 63 l. 6'.U (JOO:? J ("'In lord, however, this Court climmated any aspect of discretion and 

c.~1.abll~hed a bright-line rule for waiver under Ruic 192.5: ·[i]n order to preserve their claims for appellate review. 

[ajppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them t" file a Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal pursuant lo Ruic 19~5. Any issues not raised in a 19::!~(b} statement 1\"l"/1 ht' deemed waived. · lord, 7] 9 A.~d 

at 309 ( emphasis added). Thus. \\<li\ er under Rule 1915 is automatic." 1. 

whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, is sufficient 

property; When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the standard to be applied is 

evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Defendant was guilty of receiving stolen 

Defendant's first allegation or error is that the Court improperly held that the record 

A. Sufficiency of t2,:idcncc 

Defendant's first and second Concise Statements. 1 

sentencing analysis is here included with additional explanatory footnotes distinguishing 

comprehensively address any of Defendant's legitimate sentencing issues. the Court's entire ) 

Concise Statement were broader than those which arc raised at present appear co be. in order to 

issues being now raised again. Although the sentencing issues complained of in Defendant's first 

here only those portions fmm the Court's first 1925(a) opinion which may be relevant to the two 

Dennis Di:Man1n1. this Court instead will, for the convenience of appellate review, reproduce 

this Court's lengthy response to the twenty-one issues previnusly raised by Defendant' s counsel 

Opinion. In the interests of judicial efficiency, rather than simply referring to an attached copy of 

raised appear to be the same as those previously addressed hy the Court in its first I 925ta} 

The Court has reviewed Defendant's new Concise Statement and the (\VO issues now 

ANALYSIS 

) propriety of Defendant's sentence, are the same first two issues previously raised by Defendant's 

counsel Dennis Di Martini in his l 925( b] Concise Statement (rum his first appeal, 

the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the Receiving Stolen Property charge and the 

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) 

knowledge that the Redhawk revolver was probably stolen. Defendant states that the only 

probably stolen: and {3) intent to deprive permanently. Commonwealth Y. Young. 1011 Pa, 

Super. '277. 35 A.Jd 54, 63 (201 l ). 

In his Rule I 925(b) statement. Defendant does nol specify what part of the 

Commonwealth's case chat he found lacking with respect to the receiv ing stolen property charge. 

In his Omnibus Post-Sentence Application. however, Defendant claims that insuffici c "Ilt evidence 

was presented at trial to establish the second clement of receiving stolen property. that he had 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances," Commonwealth v. Brown, 201 l Pa. Super. 67. 23 A.3d 544. 559 (2011 ) . 

.. A person is guilty of [receiving stolen property] if he intentionally receives. retains, or 

disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen. or believing that it has 

probably been stolen. unless the property is receiving, retained or disposed with intent to restore 

it to the owner." 18 Pa.C.S.A. * 3925(a). Accordingly. the elements of receiving stolen property 

are as follows: ( 1) intentionally acquiring possession. control or title. retaining. disposing. or 

lending on the security of movable property of another; (::?.) with knowledge or belief that it was 

be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth r. Kendricks. 2011 Pa. Super. 2 l S, 30 A.3d 499, 

508 (2011 ). In applying this standard. the entire record and all evidence should be evaluated and 

considered. Commonwealth ,·. Hairston. 603 Pa. 660. 668. 985 A.:!d 804, 809 (2009) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Kennedy. 598 Pu. 621. 959 A.2d 916, 9.:W (2008)). ··Any doubts regarding a 

) reasonable doubt. Commomvcalth v. Hartzell, 2009 Pa. Super. 137. 988 A.2d 141. 143 (2009). 

The Court is also required to give the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences to 

to enable the fact-finder lo find that all of the clements of the crimes were established beyond a 

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) 

it 13: 12_ at 2 l. He also tcsti fied. however. that he believed he reported the firearm stulen on 

Township police report which indicated that the firearm was stolen on May 8, 20l0. 'S'.T .. 

of the firearm, testified on redirect examination that he would have no reason to doubt a. Raccoon 

possession of the firearm six months after it was reported stolen. James Sarvey. the record owner 

Defendant is correct chat some of the testimony at trial indicated that he was in 

Carson, 405 Pa. Super. 492, 497. 592 A.2d 1318. 132 J ( 1991 ). 

attempt to avoid capture and the condition of the property indicating a theft." Common,i,:ealth \. 

possession of recently stolen property, flight from the police or other evidence indicating an 

citations omitted). Other factors to consider .. include but arc not limited to the unexplained 

Commonwealth v. Foreman. 1002 Pa. Super. 125, 797 A.2d 1005. 1012· l 3 (2002) (internal 

[AJ permissible inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the 

unexplained possession of recently stolen goods without infringing upon an 

accused's right of due process or his right against self-incrimination, as well as 

other circumstances. such as the accused's conduct at the time of the arrest. 

Nenctheless, the mere possession of stolen property is insufficient to prove guilty 

knowledge. and the Commonwealth must introduce other evidence, which can be 

either circumstantial or direct. that demonstrates that the defendant knew or had 

reason to believe that the property was stolen. This additional evidence can 

include the nature of the goods. the quantity of the goods involved. the lapse of 

time between possession and theft. and the ease with which the goods can be 

assimilated into trade channels. Further. whether the property· has alterations 

indicative of being stolen can be used to establish guilty knowledge. Finally. even 

if the accused offers an explanation for his possession of stolen property, the trier 

of fact may consider the possession as unexplained if it deems the explanation 

un sati s foe tory, ) 

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has stated: 

support an inference that Defendant knew the firearm was stolen. 

) and the evidence that he was in possession of the gun six months after it was reported stolen. 

Defendant argues chat possession of a stolen item six months after it was reported stolen does not 

evidence presented at trial that relates to this element is the evidence that he did not steal the gun 

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) 

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for any other clement of the receiving 

firearm approximately three months after it was reported stolen. There is no indication that 

knowledge. when combined with the evidence of Defendant's unexplained possession of the 

the firearm with the help of a known illegal firearms trafficker permits an inference of guilty 

Defendant's possession and sale of the Redhawk revolver as well as Defendant's decision to sell 

l\.T., 8.'8:l2. at .27-29. 40. The absence of any documentation demonstrating the legality of 

known that his fulJ payment for the firearm was conditioned upon the transfer of ownership, 

to act as his agent. When the Redhawk revolver was sold to Connor, no proof of ownership was 

provided by Defendant and no legal transfer of ownership occurred, even though Connor made 

achieve legal transfer of ownership, Substantial evidence was presented at trial indicating that 

Defendant. in selling the Rcdhawk revolver, enlisted Stewart, a known illegal firearms trafficker. 

property. As a firearm, the Rcdhawk revolver will> subject to a highly regulated process to 

In addition to this evidence. the jury was entitled to consider the nature of the stolen 

after it was reported stolen. 

permit the jury to find that Defendant was in possession of the firearm sooner than six months 

months after it was reported stolen. The Court concludes that chis was sufficient evidence to 

evidence indicating that Defendant was in possession of the stolen firearm one, three. or four 

the description of the Redhawk revel vcr, Id. at 25_ 18. As a result. the jury was presented with 

or September of 2010 and observed in Defendant's bookbae the barrel of a revolver that matched 

) Defendant was in possession o r the stolen firearm earlier than six months after it was reported 

stolen. Larry Alston testified that he gave Defendant a ride to the community college in August 

October 10. 20 I 0. ld. at l 7. F urthermore, there was evidence presented at trial indicating that 

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) 

,,' 

= Defendant s prcse nt Cone i se Statem enr stares on b ... The Tri a I Court ab used its di screii on in i Ill posing consec ut he 

sentences, usmg an mcorrect offense gra\·ity ~.::0r1: 0f9 (loaded weapon) rather than '.\ which resulted in an unduly 

harsh sentence, without considering Mr. Weekleys specific circumstances and rchabihtauve needs when compared 

to the need to protect the public." J'hus, it appears that Defendant's present sentencing issue complained of on 

appeal i~ m~re narrow and focused 1han that prev iously raised. 

based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it. ... Commonwealth ,·. Perrv, 

sentencing court is "in the best position to de term inc the proper penalty for a particular offense 

such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the 

Common~walth v. Glass . .2012 Pa. Super. 137, 50 A.Jd 720. 7'27 (2012). ··The rationale behind 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and 

a sentence wi II not he disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. 

In this context. an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in 

judgment. Rather. the appellant must establish. by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons 

of partiality. prejudice, bias or ill will. or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable 

decision. 

) 

De Cs 19~5(b) statement. The Superior Court has repeatedly stated: 

The Court abused its discretion in imposing an aggregate of consecutive 

minimum and maximum sentences carefully designed to impose a virtual life 

sentence contrary to the \ erdict by imposing the virtual maximum penalty 

permitted under the Sentence Code, where the Offense Gravity Score (O.U.S.) for 

Currying Firearm Without a License was incorrect nothing in the record could 

support a finding. of either an aggravating circumstance or the death had a great 

impact on the community, evidence in the record could support a finding of 

mitigated circumstances. and amounts to an unwarranted expression of victim 

family sympathy. and the monetary penalty disregarded the rehabilirarive needs of 

Defendant and is tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment.t 

statement: 

upon him by this Court on October 3. 201:!. Specifically, Defendant states in his J925(b) 

[n his next issue on appeal, Defendant challenges various aspects of the sentence irnpnsed 

) trial for the jury to find Defendant guilty of receiving stolen property. 

B. Sentencing 

stolen property charge. Therefore, the Court concludes that sufficient evidence was presented at 

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) 

.t Thi: Court also our lined the reasoning for its sentence during the sentencing hearing on October 3. ~O l.:!. ~-L 

10 3 l~ . .it 97-100. 

invasion and therefore constituted a crime of violence, Defendant disregarded this prohibition 

transferring a firearm due to his prior conviction for burglary. which was found to be a home 

Under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(l) and (b). Defendant was prohibited from possessing or 

that the firearm was stolen and that Defendant knew or should have known that it was stolen. 

firearm Defendant used was a .44 Magnum revolver with a l2-inch barrel. The jury determined 

victim's skull and travel through a nearby wall before coming to rest on the porch outside. The 

in the back of the head. The shot fired was powerful enough to destroy a large portion of the 

presented indicated that Defendant shot the victim at close range. execution style. behind the car 

murder. receiving stolen property. and firearms not to be carried without a license. The evidence 

sentence imposed.' Following a lengthy jury trial. Defendant was convicted of third degree ) 

for a reduction in his sentence. the Court offers the following general explanation for the 

counts concurrently. and lower the monetary penalty. In response to Defendant" s overall request 

maximum sentence for each count with which he was charged. run the sentences on the lesser 

For several reasons. Defendant requests that the Court decrease the minimum and 

\', C4.b.-erson, 2011 Pa. Super. 255. 34 A.3d 135. 144 {Pa. Super.2011). 

and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" as well as the sentencing guidelines, Commonwealth 

the protection of the public. gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community. 

sentence. the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. * 9721 (h l, that is. 

disturbed." Id. at 137. Nevertheless. the Court's discretion is not unfettered ... When imposing a 

) A.2d 957 {1007) ). "Moreover. the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate 

review, bringing to its decisions an expertise. experience. and judgment that should not lightly be 

612 Pa. 557. 565. 32 A.3d 232. 236 {2011) (citing Commonwealth,·. \Valls. 592 Pa. 557. 926 

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,) 

" "[ WJh~re the trial court is tnforrncd by a pre-sentence report. it is presumed 1ha1 the court i~ aware of all 

appropriate sentencing factors and considerations." Conunouweahh \", Vemura. '.!QQ9 Pa. Super. 96. 975 A.~d 11~8. 

l 135 {~009). 

sentence was either prohibited by statute or contrary to the sentencing guidelines themselves. Jn 

virtual maximum penalty allowed by the Sentence Code. Defendant does not assert that tbe 

Defendant also claims in his allegation of sentencing error that the Court imposed the 

guidelines. is somehow a misapplication of the law or a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

demonstrating how this sentence, which is permitted by statute and within the sentencing 

sentence does not constitute a "virtual life sentence." Furthermore. Defendant cites no authority 

to be carried without a license. At the time of sentencing, Defendant was 29 years old. Such a 

years after being found guilty of third degree murder. receiving stolen property. and firearms not 

sentence." Defendant was sentenced 10 undergo imprisonment for 24 and one-half years to 52 

Defendant claims that the aggn:gatc sentence imposed constitutes a ··virtuaJ life 

acting within its discretion. imposed its sentence upon Defendant. 

thorough review of the pre-sentence report 4. sentence guidelines. and applicable law. the Court, 

ultimately led to the shooting. death of Cameron. In light of these considerations and after a 

neglected to take full advantage of these opportunities. Instead, Defendant chose a path that 

athletic scholarships and attended five different colleges. hut, in one way or another, Defendant 

Defendant had numerous educational and athletic opportunities available to him. He received 

year-old adult at the time these crimes were committed. Prior to committing th1..."SC crimes. 

environment or his chosen lifestyle being the only one available to him. Defendant was a 27· 

Defendant · s crimes cannot be attributed to youth. nor can his mistakes be blamed upon his 

exhibited no remorse or sympathy whatsoever for the loss suffered by the victim· s family. 

) that he poses a significant threat to the public, especially in light uf the fact that Defendant 

and committed third degree murder using an illegal weapon. Defendant's actions demonstrate 

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~ Mere Defendant' s previous issee raised in his first appeal appears identical 10 that n(m argued in his instant appeal. 

challenging applicanon of a gra\ i1y score c,f9 for a loaded weapon. as opposed ro 7 tor an unloaded weapon, 

) 

his gun" before struggling with and eventually shooting Cameron. ~.T .. 8:8· l.2, at 126. The jury 

prior to shooting Cameron. for example. Stewart testified that De fondant told him he "pulled out 

could infer from statements made during the trial that Defendant concealed the loaded weapon 

did in Stewarts residence, hut carry it unconcealed when it was loaded. Furthermore, the jury 

residence. It is also illogical that Defendant would conceal the gun when it was unloaded. as he 

that Defendant upon shooting Cameron. failed to conceal the firearm as he walked to Stewart's 

trial demonstrated that Defendant frequently carried the firearm in his hook hag. lt is unlikely 

the Redhawk revolver was loaded at the time of concealment. Substantial evidence presented at 

loaded while he carried it concealed. The jury was able to infer from circumstantial evidence that 

was unloaded. Defendant argues that nothing was presented at trial showing that the firearm was ) 

that the firearm Defendant carried was loaded. as opposed to seven. indicating that the firearm 

Application. Defendant states chat {he offense gravity score was determined to be nine. indicating 

firearms not to be carried without a license was incorrect.i ln his Omnibus Post-Sentence 

Defendant also suggests that the calculation of the offense gravity score for the count of 

that the aggregate sentence was unduly harsh. 

5::! AJd 36.5. 372 (2012). Taking into account the nature of Defendan f~ crimes. it cannot be said 

the crimes and the length of imprisonment." CummonwcaJth \', Lamonda. 2012 Pa. Super. 180. 

circumstances. such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of 

rather than concurrent. sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme 

) maximum penall) ·· was not appropriate in this instance. Assuming Defendant is alleging that it 

was error to run his sentences consecutively, the Court notes that .. the imposition of consecutive. 

addition. Defendant does not indicate why a sentence that was, in his words. the "virtual 

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) 

,I 

sentence in the mitigated range. 

burglary. In light of these and many other factors. Defendant was not entitled to a minimum 

Defendant along with the fact that Defendant had a previous conviction in a home invasion 

in determining Defendanr's sentence. For example, the Court weighed the factors raised by 

person. The Court was aware of these factors and weighed them along with ocher considerations 

Defendant nearly completed a Bachelor's degree and had a reputation for being a peaceful 

argument .. stating that a minimum sentence in the mitigated range was warranted because 

circumstances. In his Omnibus Post-Sentence Application. Defendant elaborates on this 

Defendant next argues that evidence in the record could support a finding of mitigated 

considen .. xl the prescntcncc report and the particular circumstance of the crime). 

) 

discretion in imposing a series of consecutive. standard range sentences when the court 

v. Boyer, 2004 Pa. Super. 303. 856 A.2d 149 (2004) (concluding that the court did not abuse its 

other than to note that it acted within its discretion in sentencing Defendant. See Commonwealth 

again restating its rationale for the sentence imposed. the Court is unable to address this issue 

for the sentence imposed during the sentence hearing and previously in this Opinion. Apart from 

~oldy based on the impact Cameron's death had on the community. The Court stated its reasons 

standard range. but the sentences were run consecutively. Further. the sentence imposed was not 

Court notes that Defendant was not sentenced in the aggravated range. He was sentenced in the 

aggravating circumstance or that the- victim's death caused a great impact on the community. The 

) Therefore. the use of an offense gravity score of nine was appropriate in this case. 

Defendant also asserts that nothing in the record could support a finding of an 

could infer from this testimony that Defendant had concealed the loaded Redhawk rcvol ver, 

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!l 

I ,t • C 7 1 .. _ - '-• • .. 

. .., 

J . 

BY THE COLiR T. 

directed to file the record of proceedings in this case with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 

the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. The Beaver County Clerk of Courts is hereby ) 

his present i 925(b) statement are without merit. Therefore. the Court respectfully submits {hat 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the issues Defendant raises in 

COI\CLUSIO:"i 

abuse of discretion. 

victims family. and Defendant cites no authority holding that such a statement constitutes an 

statement. however. there is no indication that the Court was motivated by sympathy for the 

Cameron family for the loss that they have incurred." \:.T .. 10.J:12. at 97-98. Apart from this 

Be fore issuing De tendant' s sentence, the C ourt did state: ··J will express my sympathy lo the 

sentence imposed amounted to an unwarranted expression of sympathy for the victim's family, 

') of "victim family sympathy." Again, the Court outlined its reasons for Defendant· s sentence in 

this Opinion and during the sentencing hearing. Defendant offers no explanation as to why the 

Defendant also claims that the sentence imposed amounted to an unwarranted expression 

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