IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

FRANCISCO JAVIER MUNOZ 

QUINTERO,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 34512-2-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.C.J. — Francisco Munoz Quintero appeals from his 

conviction for the crime of second degree murder. He argues the trial court erred in 

entering a lifetime no-contact order prohibiting him from having any contact with his 

daughter. We disagree. The record establishes a clear basis for the order, and the trial 

court recognized its authority to modify the order. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

On December 24, 2015, Luisa Garcia left her job at Walmart and picked up her exboyfriend, Munoz Quintero, and their two-year-old daughter A.M. Sometime during the 

trip, Munoz Quintero shot Garcia twice. Munoz Quintero pushed Garcia out of the car in 

FILED

MARCH 8, 2018

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

2

the middle of the street and later threw the murder weapon out the window. The 

witnesses who found Garcia on the street called emergency personnel, but she died from 

her injuries. A.M. had been in the back seat the entire time. After the incident, Munoz 

Quintero told several people that he had shot Garcia. 

Munoz Quintero turned himself in to law enforcement on December 25, 2015. 

Munoz Quintero revealed he was a citizen of Mexico during the questioning. The law 

enforcement department had a policy, consistent with Article 36(b) of the Vienna 

Convention, requiring it to inform foreign nationals of their right to contact the 

appropriate consulate. Despite the interviewing detectives’ knowledge of both Munoz 

Quintero’s nationality and the policy, they did not inform him of this right. Munoz 

Quintero gave a recorded statement to police.

The investigation by law enforcement also uncovered several prior incidents of 

domestic violence. In one incident, a witness saw Munoz Quintero choking Garcia while 

she was pregnant with A.M. After the witness’s brother intervened, the witness observed 

Munoz Quintero in his car with a gun pointed at his head. In another incident, Munoz 

Quintero shoved Garcia against a wall and began choking her while she was holding 

A.M., then an infant, in her arms. A third incident began when Garcia sought help in the 

middle of the night because Munoz Quintero was choking her in their car. The witness 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

3

went outside and saw Munoz Quintero in the front passenger seat of the car, with A.M. in 

the backseat. Munoz Quintero had a gun in his hands and cocked it, threatening to kill 

Garcia and the witness. A fourth incident occurred a few days later. Munoz Quintero 

snapped Ms. Garcia’s cell phone, shoved her to the floor, and assaulted her in front of 

A.M. 

The State charged Munoz Quintero with second degree murder. The State also 

charged an enhancement and various aggravating factors. 

Munoz Quintero filed a motion to suppress his police interview. One of his 

arguments was that law enforcement had violated the Vienna Convention because it failed

to advise him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate. The trial court ruled that 

although law enforcement admitted they did not timely inform Munoz Quintero of his 

right to contact the consulate, suppression was not a remedy as a matter of law. The court 

permitted the State to use the statements at trial, but suppressed the recording itself for a 

separate violation of RCW 9.73.090(1)(b)(iii). Despite the favorable ruling, the State did 

not actually introduce Munoz Quintero’s statements to law enforcement at trial. 

The State moved the court to admit evidence of the prior bad acts of domestic 

violence and argued it was admissible under ER 404(b). After a hearing, the trial court 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

4

issued findings of facts and conclusions of law analyzing and admitting the evidence. 

Munoz Quintero does not challenge the admission of this evidence on appeal. 

After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for second degree murder.

The jury also returned special verdicts for the firearm enhancement and each of the 

aggravating circumstances the State had charged. The State argued for an exceptional 

sentence upward, which the trial court imposed. Munoz Quintero received a sentence of 

390 months’ confinement with 36 months of community custody.

In addition, the State sought a no-contact order to protect A.M. and restrain Munoz 

Quintero from contacting A.M. for life. Munoz Quintero opposed the order. The State 

argued the order was necessary because Munoz Quintero needed to treat his domestic 

violence problem first or A.M. would be at risk. The State also was concerned that if the 

trial court did not impose the no-contact order, it would lose jurisdiction and be unable to 

enter an order later, in the event one was necessary. The State claimed the order would 

not guarantee Munoz Quintero would be restrained for life because he could modify it in 

the future, assuming he made progress in his domestic violence treatment. 

The trial court agreed, reasoning as to the duration:

Okay. So I am mindful of that request, and I am going to indicate that 

there’s more information that this Court would need before I—I am going 

to sign this no-contact order today, and it would include [A.M.]. I don’t—I 

should say that I acknowledge that I just ordered domestic violence 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

5

counseling for Mr. Munoz Quintero, and I certainly would be interested 

in—in addressing a motion in the future relative to [A.M.] provided—

certainly, anyone can bring that back before me, but—and to look at what 

information would show that that would be in her best interest, and so that 

door is not closed.

And I also understand the record made relative to the other family 

law proceeding, and I would just indicate that whatever happens in that 

venue, I’m hopeful that—there’s lots of family members here present today 

that I’m sure love that little girl very, very much, and I think they are 

probably on both aisles, so that will be something for another judicial 

officer to address, and I won’t make any further remarks in that regard.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (May 9, 2016 & June 20, 2016) at 84-85.1 The 

trial court entered a domestic violence no-contact order pursuant to chapter 10.99 

RCW. That order provides in relevant part:

[Munoz Quintero] is RESTRAINED from:

. . . .

B. Coming near and from having any contact whatsoever, in 

person or through others, by phone, mail or any means, directly or 

indirectly, except for mailing or service of process of court documents by a 

3

rd party or contact by [his] lawyers with [A.M.].

. . . .

The term of this No-Contact Order is for LIFE.

Clerk’s Papers at 1352-53. There is nothing in the no-contact order that explicitly 

permits it to be modified or that sets any standards for its modification. 

Munoz Quintero timely appealed. 

 

1 A separate proceeding may well have terminated or otherwise affected Munoz 

Quintero’s parental rights to A.M. This opinion does not revive or modify any right that 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

6

ANALYSIS

NO-CONTACT ORDER

Munoz Quintero contends the no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting 

A.M. for life is impermissible. He contends the order is unreasonable in both scope and 

duration. We disagree. 

A trial court’s decision to impose crime-related prohibitions is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367, 374, 229 P.3d 686 

(2010). However, this court reviews a condition that interferes with a fundamental 

constitutional right more carefully. Id. 

Washington courts may impose “crime-related prohibitions” as conditions of a 

sentence. RCW 9.94A.505(9). Conditions on a sentence that impose limitations on a 

fundamental right must be “sensitively imposed” so that they are “reasonably necessary to 

accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order.” State v. Warren, 165 

Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the 

care, custody, and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 

S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). A court may impose a condition on a criminal 

sentence that restricts a fundamental right to parent if the condition is reasonably 

 

Munoz Quintero may have lost or had affected by any such proceeding. 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

7

necessary to prevent harm to a child. State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 654, 27 P.3d 

1246 (2001). “‘Prevention of harm to children is a compelling state interest, and the 

State does have an obligation to intervene and protect a child when a parent’s actions or 

decisions seriously conflict with the physical or mental health of the child.’” State v. 

Aguilar, 176 Wn. App. 264, 277, 308 P.3d 778 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(quoting Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 653-54). 

“Reviewing courts must analyze the scope and duration of no contact orders in 

light of the facts in the record.” State v. Howard, 182 Wn. App. 91, 101, 328 P.3d 969 

(2014). Remand is required when a reviewing court is unable to determine whether the 

scope or duration of a term is reasonably necessary. See Rainey, 168 Wn.2d at 382.

Munoz Quintero first claims the scope of the order is unreasonable because no 

evidence definitively established whether A.M. was sleeping or awake at the time of the 

shooting. We disagree. Her consciousness at the time is not determinative. The court’s 

exceptional sentence findings explicitly and clearly address the evidence supporting the 

no-contact order. 

The record establishes Munoz Quintero brandished a firearm and shot it multiple 

times in car where A.M. was at risk in the backseat. His inability to control his domestic 

violence during this crime is consistent with the several other instances in the record 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

8

where he put A.M. at risk of serious harm or death. In addition, A.M. will now grow up 

knowing her father killed her mother. There is no doubt the scope of the no-contact order 

is reasonably necessary to protect A.M.’s physical or mental health.

Munoz Quintero also contends the trial court made no record analyzing whether 

the duration of the no-contact order was reasonable, which requires remand. He relies on 

four published cases: Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367; Aguilar, 176 Wn. App. 264; Howard, 182 

Wn. App. 91, and In re Personal Restraint of Torres, 198 Wn. App. 685, 393 P.3d 894 

(2017). 

In Rainey, the court remanded a lifetime domestic violence no-contact order 

between the defendant and his child for resentencing because the trial court did not 

articulate reasoning for the length of the order nor did the State attempt to justify the 

necessity of a lifetime order. 168 Wn.2d at 381. The remaining cases cite Rainey for the 

proposition that the length of the order must also be reasonably necessary.

In Howard, the defendant and his wife had four of eight children together. 182 

Wn. App. at 96. One morning, the defendant attempted to kill his wife as she and the 

children were leaving, and the children witnessed the attempt. Id. at 96-97. The trial 

court entered a lifetime no-contact order between the defendant and the children, 

including his biological children. Id. at 99. After analyzing the issue, this court 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

9

concluded the scope of the order was reasonably necessary but that the record was 

unclear, and the trial court did not articulate why a lifetime duration was necessary in that 

case. Id. at 102. This court remanded “for the trial court to address the parameters of the 

no contact order and sensitively impose a condition that is reasonably necessary to protect 

the four biological children.” Id. 

In Aguilar, the defendant murdered his wife and stabbed his daughter during the 

commission of the crime, as she tried to protect her mother. 176 Wn. App. at 267. The 

court entered a 10-year no-contact order between the defendant and his children. Id. The 

reviewing court agreed the duration of the order was appropriate, “the 10-year length of 

the no contact order allows Mr. [Aguilar] to regain contact with his children when the 

children are at a more mature age and can address their relationship with their father in 

light of the events that occurred.” Id. at 278. Munoz Quintero implies a 10-year nocontact order would therefore be sufficient in his case. This case is distinguishable. 

Here, A.M. would only be 12 years old when a 10-year no-contact order expired.

In Torres, the State charged the defendant with witness tampering after he 

instructed one son what to tell police about the details of another child’s death. 198 Wn. 

App. at 688. At sentencing, the State asked for a six-month no-contact order between the 

defendant and his child. Id. The trial court instead imposed a five-year no-contact order 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

10

without explaining why such an order was reasonably necessary to further the State’s 

interest nor explain why it entered an order 10 times the length requested by the State. Id.

at 689. This court remanded for resentencing, citing to the lack of reasons from the trial 

and the record to justify the length. Id. at 690.

The cases together suggest the trial court must articulate reasons for imposing a 

lengthy restriction on a parent’s fundamental right to parent, or the reason must be clear 

in the record. 

Here, the trial court articulated reasons for imposing the no-contact order. These 

reasons are articulated above and are supplemented by the trial court’s written factual 

findings when it imposed an aggravated sentence. The trial court additionally recognized 

its authority to modify the order and said it would consider a modification once Munoz 

Quintero could show that he has made satisfactory progress with domestic violence

counseling so as to lessen the risk of harm to A.M. The problem is that the order, as 

signed, does not reflect this important comment. 

But RCW 26.50.130(2) permits a person restrained for more than two years to 

request modification of a domestic violence no-contact order. The process for 

modification is described in RCW 26.50.130(4), and requires the restrained party to prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested modification is warranted. Nothing 
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

11

more needs to be proved, provided that the requested modification does not reduce the 

duration of the order or eliminate a provision in the order that enjoins acts of domestic 

violence. Id. 

If the requested modification includes either reducing the duration of the order or 

eliminating a provision that enjoins acts of domestic violence, the court would be required 

to consider the factors set forth in RCW 26.50.130(3)(c)(i)-(ix). RCW 26.50.130(4). 

These factors address whether the restrained person is likely to commit acts of domestic 

violence against the protected person. See RCW 26.50.130(3)(b). A no-contact order 

that exceeds two years can be terminated in accordance with RCW 26.50.130(3)(a) or by 

first modifying it to a term less than two years. See RCW 26.50.130(4). 

We conclude that the trial court articulated sufficient reasons to justify the scope 

and duration of the no-contact order. Important in our decision is that the trial court 

recognized its authority to modify the no-contact order and that there is a clear process for 

modifying and even terminating the order.
No. 34512-2-III

State v. Munoz Quintero

12

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

Munoz Quintero, a Mexican citizen, complains that law enforcement failed to 

advise him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate. 

At trial, he argued that this failure required suppression of his confession to law 

enforcement. The trial court ruled, “[s]uppression of statements given voluntarily after a 

valid waiver of Miranda[2]rights is not a remedy for violation of Article 36 of the Vienna 

Convention.” CP at 115. We agree.

This court reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law from a suppression hearing 

de novo. State v. Campbell, 166 Wn. App. 464, 469, 272 P.3d 859 (2011). Article 

36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires an arresting 

government to notify a foreign national who has been arrested or taken into custody of his 

or her right to contact consular officials. State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wn. App. 869, 873-

74, 999 P.2d 1275 (2000). However, suppression is not a remedy for a violation. State v. 

Jamison, 105 Wn. App. 572, 583, 20 P.3d 1010 (2001); see also United States v. 

Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2000) (suppression not warranted). 

We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Munoz Quintero’s request for 

suppression under this theory. 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 34512-2-111 

State v. Munoz Quintero 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

Pennell, J. 

13