[Cite as In re D.J., 2024-Ohio-738.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE D.J. :

: No. 112970

A Minor Child :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 29, 2024

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case No. DL-23101709

Appearances:

Rosel C. Hurley, III, for appellant. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Chadwick P. Cleveland, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

D.J. (“appellant”), a minor child, appeals his adjudication of 

delinquency in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. He 

raises the following assignments of error for review:

1. The trial court erred by finding the juvenile delinquent on Count 1 

grand theft of weapons charge and Count 2 tampering with evidence 

which originated from the same conduct due to the insufficient 

evidence presented by the state.
2. Under manifest weight review the trial court erred by finding the 

juvenile delinquent of the grand theft of weapons charge and the 

subsequent tampering with evidence [charge] as the situation was a 

self-defense action which allowed the complete elimination of the 

threat.

After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual History

On February 7, 2023, appellant was named in a four-count complaint 

in the juvenile court, charging him with grand theft in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1), with one- and three-year firearm specifications (Count 1); tampering 

with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), with a one-year firearm 

specification (Count 2); receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), 

with a one-year firearm specification (Count 3); and improperly handling firearms 

in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) (Count 4). 

On April 25, 2023, the matter proceeded to an adjudication hearing, 

where the following relevant facts were adduced.

At the hearing, it was established that in November 2022, a bronze, 

2017 Kia Sportage was stolen from a parking lot located in Cleveland, Ohio. The 

owner of the Kia, S.C., testified that a Taurus DT 9 mm handgun was located inside 

the middle console of the vehicle when it was stolen. 

On November 19, 2022, appellant, then 14-years old, drove the stolen 

Kia to a drive-thru beverage store located on St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. 

Appellant was accompanied by his friend, Kenyae Sims (“Sims”), who was sitting in 
the passenger’s seat of the vehicle. While waiting in the drive-thru line, appellant 

was approached by two individuals who had exited a silver vehicle that was parked 

near the entrance of the drive-thru area. The two individuals, later identified as 

Lawrence McKissic (“McKissic”) and Zaveeyon Teasley (“Teasley”), were 

brandishing firearms while wearing all black clothing and black masks. 

Sims confirmed that appellant exchanged words with McKissic and 

Teasley as they approached his vehicle. Sims maintained, however, that she exited 

the vehicle and fled the scene before the confrontation escalated. Thereafter, 

appellant retrieved a firearm from inside the Kia and, believing his life was in 

danger, discharged the weapon at McKissic, who had approached the driver’s side 

area of the Kia. McKissic sustained a single gunshot wound to the face. The injury 

resulted in McKissic’s death on November 22, 2022. 

Connor Lally (“Lally”) testified that he is employed as a cadet firefighter 

for the city of Cleveland. On November 19, 2022, Lally was working at his station 

when an unidentified male came to the garage door and reported that his brother 

had just been shot at the beverage store. Lally testified that he and another 

firefighter responded to the scene where they discovered “a gentleman lying face 

down * * * with blood all around him.” (Tr. 26.) Lally testified that when he rolled 

McKissic over to check his airway, he observed a single gunshot wound on the left 

side of McKissic’s nose. McKissic was breathing on his own; however, he was not 

moving and was unresponsive. Lally stated that he used a bag-valve mask to assist 

in McKissic’s ventilation until emergency-medical personnel arrived. According to 
Lally, no firearm was discovered on McKissic’s person during the administration of 

emergency medical care.

In the course of the subsequent police investigation, surveillance-video 

footage depicting the shooting was recovered from the beverage store. The video 

was played for the trier of fact as the assigned investigator, Detective Jonathan 

Dayton (“Det. Dayton”), narrated the events as they unfolded. (Tr. 104-112.) In 

relevant part, Det. Dayton testified that after appellant fired his weapon, McKissic 

immediately fell to the ground and did not move. (Tr. 115.) Once shots were fired, 

Teasley immediately fled the scene. In contrast, appellant did not seek safer grounds 

after the shooting. Instead, appellant exited his stolen vehicle and walked past 

McKissic’s body towards the rear of the drive-thru. Appellant then pointed his gun 

at the driver of the silver vehicle, L.H., who then ran away from the store. Thereafter, 

appellant’s precise movements inside the drive-thru area were obstructed from 

view. However, appellant is seen returning to the stolen vehicle approximately 20 

seconds after the initial shot was fired. He then drove away from the beverage store 

before the police arrived at the scene. Det. Dayton reiterated that the firearm 

McKissic was seen brandishing on the surveillance-video footage was not discovered 

on his person by the responding officers or medical personnel. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties offered closing 

arguments. In pertinent part, defense counsel argued that appellant’s use of selfdefense against McKissic and Teasly extended to his conduct after the shooting was 

completed. Defense counsel summarized his position as follows:
The state reviewed the same facts presented to this court and found that 

this was a justified shooting. It logically extends to [appellant’s] right 

to protect his own life by removing the continuing threat. What that 

meant was removing the firearm from someone who could still access 

it, someone who entered the building with the intent to possibly kill 

him.

(Tr. 130-131.)

On May 4, 2023, the juvenile court rendered a verdict, adjudicating 

appellant delinquent of all counts and firearm specifications alleged in the 

complaint. With respect to appellant’s self-defense claim, the court summarized its 

findings as follows:

Ms. Sims gets out of the car, she starts running at 3:29, and the car in 

front of [the] bronze Kia simultaneously starts moving out of the drivethrough. It was at this point that Ms. Sims testified that she heard a 

gun go off. Both the girl and the car [were] out of the drive-through by 

3:31. 

Then, [appellant] gets out of the Kia to go to the, I guess I’ll call it the 

back entrance of the drive-through. This is a break in any claim of selfdefense, as the child never needed to open the car door, let alone get 

out of the car. He could have driven straight out and away from Mr. 

McKissic or anyone else who was behind him.

This is issue number two, the separate issue. Fire Fighter Connor Lally 

testified that Lawrence McKissic was shot in the face. There was one 

wound on the left side of his nose. When he and his partner arrived on 

scene, Mr. McKissic was lying face down on the cement floor in the 

beverage drive-through in a pool of blood, and he was not moving.

* * *

Significantly, his head, his arms, his feet, his legs, nothing else moves. 

And given all of the other testimony * * * it does not support the 

argument that the gun had to be taken for self defense. 

(May 2, 2023, tr. 11-14.)
At the time of disposition, the juvenile court committed appellant to 

the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a total minimum term of two years and 

six months up to a maximum term of his twenty-first birthday. 

Appellant now appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In the first and second assignments of error, appellant argues the 

evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support an adjudication of 

delinquency on the offenses of grand theft and tampering with evidence. He further 

contends that the adjudications were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Notably, appellant does not challenge the evidence supporting the adjudications on 

Counts 3 or 4 of the complaint. 

A juvenile court may adjudicate a juvenile to be a delinquent child 

when the evidence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child 

committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. R.C. 

2151.35(A); Juv.R. 29(E)(4); In re R.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99562, 2013-Ohio5576, ¶ 26; In re Williams, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-64, 2011-Ohio-4338, ¶ 18. 

“[D]ue to the ‘inherently criminal aspects’ of delinquency proceedings,” claims 

involving the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the evidence in 

delinquency appeals are subject to the same standards of review applicable to 

criminal convictions. In re T.J., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27269, 2014-Ohio-4919, ¶ 19, 

quoting In re R.D.U., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24225, 2008-Ohio-6131, ¶ 6; In re R.S. 
at ¶ 26, citing In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 91, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989); see also 

In re S.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100529, 2014-Ohio-2770, ¶ 17, 25.

A sufficiency challenge requires a court to determine whether the state 

has met its burden of production at trial and to consider not the credibility of the 

evidence but whether, if believed, the evidence presented would sustain a 

conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 

273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 

2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

“‘Proof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, 

and direct evidence, or any combination of the three, and all three have equal 

probative value.’” State v. Rodano, 2017-Ohio-1034, 86 N.E.3d 1032, ¶ 35 (8th 

Dist.), quoting State v. Zadar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94698, 2011-Ohio-1060, ¶ 18. 

Although circumstantial evidence and direct evidence have obvious differences, 

those differences are irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence, and 

circumstantial evidence carries the same weight as direct evidence. Id., citing State 

v. Cassano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97228, 2012-Ohio-4047, ¶ 13. Further, 

circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, ““‘but may also be more certain, 

satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.’”” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v. 
Hawthorne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96496, 2011-Ohio-6078, quoting Michalic v. 

Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 20 (1960).

In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest-weight challenge 

questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. State v. Armstrong, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109709, 2021-Ohio-1087, ¶ 24. When considering an 

appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the 

appellate court functions as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree “with the 

factfinder’s resolution of * * * conflicting testimony.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 387, 

678 N.E.2d 541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 

652 (1982). The appellate court examines the entire record, weighs the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, considers the witnesses’ 

credibility and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier 

of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that 

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Reversal on 

manifest-weight grounds is reserved for the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting Martin at 175.

A trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of 

each witness testifying at trial. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108371, 2020-

Ohio-3367, ¶ 85; State v. Sheline, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106649, 2019-Ohio-528, 

¶ 100. Thus, “[a] conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply 
because the jury believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved the 

defendant.” Id. 

Relevant to this appeal, appellant was adjudicated delinquent of 

grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and tampering with evidence in 

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). 

The grand theft statute provides, in pertinent part:

(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or 

services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the 

property or services in any of the following ways:

(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give 

consent;

* * *

(4) If the property stolen is a firearm or dangerous ordnance, a 

violation of this section is grand theft. Except as otherwise provided in 

this division, grand theft when the property stolen is a firearm or 

dangerous ordnance is a felony of the third degree, and there is a 

presumption in favor of the court imposing a prison term for the 

offense.

A person acts “purposely” when “it is the person’s specific intention to 

cause a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of 

purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a 

certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). In 

determining whether the defendant acted knowingly or purposely, the jury may 

infer the defendant’s state of mind from the surrounding circumstances. State v. 

Sharp, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103445, 2016-Ohio-2634, ¶ 19, citing State v. Rock, 

3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-38, 2014-Ohio-1786, ¶ 13. 
R.C. 2913.01(C) defines “deprive” as follows:

(1) Withhold property of another permanently, or for a period that 

appropriates a substantial portion of its value or use, or with purpose 

to restore it only upon payment of a reward or other consideration;

(2) Dispose of property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will 

recover it;

(3) Accept, use, or appropriate money, property, or services, with 

purpose not to give proper consideration in return for the money, 

property, or services, and without reasonable justification or excuse for 

not giving proper consideration.

In turn, R.C. 2921.12(A), which prohibits tampering with evidence 

provides that “[n]o person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in 

progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall * * * [a]lter, destroy, 

conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its value 

or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]”

In examining R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), the Ohio Supreme Court 

acknowledged that there are three elements to tampering with evidence: “(1) the 

knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in progress or likely to be 

instituted; (2) the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal of the potential 

evidence; and (3) the purpose of impairing the potential evidence’s availability or 

value in such proceeding or investigation.” State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 

2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 11. “Likelihood is measured at the time of the act 

of alleged tampering.” Id. at ¶ 19. “Knowledge that a criminal investigation is 

imminent is based upon a reasonable person standard.” State v. Evans, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108648, 2020-Ohio-3968, ¶ 75, citing State v. Workman, 2015-Ohio-
5049, 52 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 51 (3d Dist.). “Moreover, circumstantial evidence can be 

relied on to establish that a defendant has purposely impaired the availability of 

evidence.” Id. at ¶ 80, citing State v. McGee, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150496, 2016-

Ohio-7510, ¶ 28.

1. Ownership of Firearm

On appeal, appellant does not dispute that he removed the firearm 

from McKissic’s person before he fled the scene. (Tr. 13.) He nevertheless argues 

“the prosecution failed to establish every element of Count One, grand theft of a 

firearm by not establishing ownership of the firearm in question.” Appellant states 

that “no testimony was presented stating ownership of the firearm in question and 

no documents were presented.” We find no merit to appellant’s position. 

R.C. 2913.01(D) defines an owner as follows:

“Owner” means, unless the context requires a different meaning, any 

person, other than the actor, who is the owner of, who has possession 

or control of, or who has any license or interest in property or services, 

even though the ownership, possession, control, license, or interest is 

unlawful.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has succinctly stated that the focus of the 

ownership statute is whether a defendant has lawful ownership at the time of the 

offense:

It is apparent from the language of R.C. 2913.01(D) that title ownership 

in a specific person other than the defendant is not an element of a theft 

offense. Indeed under this definition a thief can steal from a thief. 

* * * 

It is * * * the defendant’s relationship to the property which is 

controlling. The important question is not whether the person from 
whom the property is stolen was the actual owner, but rather whether 

the defendant had any lawful right to possession.

State v. Rhodes, 2 Ohio St.3d 74, 76, 442 N.E.2d 1299 (1982). Thus, “the gist of a 

theft offense is the wrongful taking by the defendant, not the particular ownership 

of the property.” State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92921, 2010-Ohio-902, 

¶ 12, citing State v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87666, 2006-Ohio-6588.

Consistent with the foregoing, we find the state’s alleged failure to 

establish title ownership of the firearm removed from McKissic’s person was not 

material. Rather, the state was “merely [required] to prove that [appellant] deprived 

someone of property who had ‘possession or control of, or any license or any interest 

in’ that property.” Rhodes at 76, quoting R.C. 2913.01(D). Here, there is no dispute 

that appellant removed a firearm from McKissic that was previously in McKissic’s 

possession or under his control. Accordingly, McKissic was the “owner” of the 

firearm as defined by R.C. 2913.01(D), and as contemplated under R.C. 

2913.02(A)(1). We therefore turn to the evidence supporting the remaining 

elements of the offenses.

2. Evidence Presented

In this case, the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that 

appellant drove a stolen vehicle to a beverage store located in Cleveland, Ohio. At 

all relevant times, appellant was in possession of a firearm. While waiting in the 

beverage store’s drive-thru line, appellant’s stolen vehicle was approached by 

McKissic and Teasley, who were brandishing firearms. Believing his life was in 

imminent danger, appellant discharged his weapon, resulting in a fatal gunshot 
wound to McKissic. Once the shooting was completed, appellant’s ability to exit the 

beverage store’s drive-thru was unobstructed. However, rather than fleeing the 

scene and any remaining danger, appellant exited the stolen vehicle and walked to 

the rear entrance of the drive-thru. Appellant remained in the drive-thru area for 

approximately 20 seconds before he eventually returned to the stolen vehicle and 

left the beverage store. During this intervening time period, appellant was the only 

individual who had access to McKissic, who was severely injured and not moving on 

the concrete floor. Trial counsel did not dispute, and the circumstantial evidence 

reveals, that appellant removed the firearm from McKissic’s control before he fled 

the beverage store.

Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we 

find a reasonable trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

appellant knowingly, and without consent, obtained control of the firearm 

previously in McKissic’s possession with the specific purpose to deprive McKissic of 

the property. As discussed further below, McKissic did not pose a threat to 

appellant’s safety at the time appellant unnecessarily exited his stolen vehicle. As 

such, a reasonable trier of fact could infer from the totality of the surrounding 

circumstances that appellant took advantage of McKissic’s inert condition and acted 

with the specific intention to withhold the firearm from McKissic on a permanent 

basis. 

Regarding the tampering offense, we find the same trier of fact could 

have found that a reasonable person in appellant’s position would have known that 
an official investigation into the shooting was in progress or likely to be instituted at 

the time he removed McKissic’s firearm from the scene. In this case, the shooting 

occurred in a public place and in the presence of several innocent bystanders. Thus, 

a police investigation into the deadly shooting was imminent. 

Finally, we find sufficient, circumstantial evidence supports the 

conclusion that appellant removed the firearm from the scene with the specific 

intention of impairing its availability in the criminal investigation. This case 

presents the unique scenario where the evidence removed from the crime scene (1) 

is the same property underlying the theft claim,1 and (2) would have further 

corroborated appellant’s self-defense claim had he been charged in relation to the 

shooting. Nevertheless, we find appellant’s purpose to impair the firearm’s 

availability could be reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence 

establishing that the firearm was not recovered once appellant was identified as the 

shooter during the police investigation. See State v. McGee, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-150496, 2016-Ohio-7510, ¶ 29 (“McGee's specific intent to impair the 

investigation after the shooting can be inferred from the fact that police could not 

find the gun[.]”). Accordingly, we find appellant’s juvenile adjudications are 

supported by sufficient evidence.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

1 See United States v. Technodyne L.L.C., 753 F.3d 368, 385 (2d Cir. 2014) (“It is 

commonplace that the law recognizes that there may be multiple motives for human 

behavior; thus, a specific intent need not be the actor's sole, or even primary, purpose.”).
3. Self-Defense

Regarding the manifest weight of the evidence claim, appellant argues 

the state failed to meet its burden of persuasion where the evidence demonstrates 

that he acted in self-defense during the entirety of the incident on November 19, 

2022. Appellant contends that he had the right “to eliminate the continuing threat 

based upon the limited information known to him in the split-seconds it took to 

defend his life[.]” Stated another way, appellant asserts that he “was in the act of 

self-defense when he removed the weapon [from McKissic’s person] to ensure his 

safety from future harm.”

“Under Ohio law, a person is permitted to act in self-defense.” State 

v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111620, 2023-Ohio-1903, ¶ 29. A self-defense 

claim includes the following elements:

“(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving 

rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he 

[or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that 

his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of 

such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat 

or avoid the danger.”

State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, ¶ 14, 

quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). 

Revised Code 2901.05(B)(1) describes the process of raising this 

affirmative defense at trial and reads, in relevant part:

If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the 

person’s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that 

tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, 

* * * the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

accused person did not use the force in self-defense * * *.
R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).

Under R.C. 2901.05(B)(1),”[t]he defendant has the initial burden of 

production, which is the burden of producing evidence that ‘tends to support’ that 

the defendant used the force in self-defense.” State v. Davidson-Dixon, 2021-Ohio1485, 170 N.E.3d 557, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2901.05(B)(1); Messenger at ¶ 21 

(indicating that self-defense is still an affirmative defense and the burden of 

production is still on the defendant). 

If the defendant meets his or her initial burden of producing evidence 

tending to support a claim of self-defense, the burden then shifts to the state to 

establish its burden of persuasion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant did not use force in self-defense. State v. Ratliff, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

111874, 2023-Ohio-1970, ¶ 26. The state’s burden of persuasion is subject to a 

manifest-weight review on appeal. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, at ¶ 27. To satisfy this burden of proof, the state must 

disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense. Davidson-Dixon at ¶ 18.

In this case, appellant was not charged with an offense directly 

relating to McKissic’s death due to the state’s determination that appellant was 

justified in using deadly force. (Tr. 14.) The state maintained, however, that the 

self-defense claim did not apply to the criminal acts committed after the initial 

threat was neutralized. 

Preliminarily, we note that appellant has not identified any case law to 

suggest the affirmative defense of self-defense would apply to the deprivation or 
impairment of property after the underlying use of force is completed. See State v. 

Washington, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-640, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2417 (June 

8, 2000) (finding defendant’s theft of a police cruiser did not fall within the 

parameters of a self-defense claim.). As referenced above, R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) 

contemplates a person’s use of force as opposed to a person’s removal of property 

without consent or for an unlawful purpose. 

Nevertheless, to the extent appellant contends that the greater weight 

of the evidence demonstrates that he only removed the weapon from McKissic’s 

person with the specific intent to eliminate a continuing threat, we find no merit to 

such an assertion. As astutely recognized by the juvenile court, the evidence 

presented at trial demonstrated that McKissic was immediately rendered immobile 

and unresponsive due to the significant injuries caused by the gunshot wound to his 

face. The video surveillance footage reflects that McKissic was lying face down on 

the ground after the shooting and he did not move until emergency responders 

turned him over to render medical aid on the scene. Firefighter Lalley, who 

responded to the scene shortly after the shooting, testified that McKissic was 

covered in blood. McKissic had trouble breathing, was unresponsive, and was not 

moving on his own.

Under these circumstances, we find the evidence presented by the 

prosecution established that appellant could not have had an objectively reasonable 

belief that he was in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm at the time he 

completed the grand-theft and tampering-with-evidence offenses. See State v. 
Hughkeith, 2023-Ohio-1217, 212 N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, we are 

unable to conclude that the trier of fact lost its way in finding that appellant obtained 

control of McKissic’s firearm for the purposes of depriving McKissic of the property

while simultaneously impairing its availability during the imminent criminal 

investigation. The adjudications of delinquency are not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence.

The second assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR