[Cite as State v. Reppucci , 2017-Ohio-1313.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. LOUIS A. REPPUCCI Appellant C.A. No. 16CA0047-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 14 TRC 00609

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: April 10, 2017

CALLAHAN, Judge. {¶1} Louis Reppucci appeals from his conviction in the Medina Municipal Court. This

Court reverses.

I. {¶2} In February 2014, Mr. Reppucci was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”) in vi olation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). He was also charged with an OVI refusal to submit to a chemi cal test while having a previous OVI conviction within the past twenty years in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). Both charges were first-degree

misdemeanors. {¶3} On February 20, 2014, Mr. Reppucci file d a motion to suppress. The State requested a pretrial prior to an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The trial court denied the State’s request noting: “The [m]otion to [s]uppress only raised two issues, reasonable suspicion for the initial detention and probable cause for the OVI arrest. The [c]ourt does not2

need to conduct a pretrial for a motion contai ning such limited issues.” On June 27, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppr ess. On December 14, 2015, the court issued its decision denying the motion to suppress. {¶4} Thereafter, Mr. Reppucci moved to dismis s the case based on a violation of his speedy trial rights. More particularly, he argued that the motion to suppress remained pending for 535 days after the hearing on the motion. The trial court acknowledged that this time period “is lengthier than would be desired.” Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss finding the delay was “not unreasonable under all the circumstances considering the nature of the

issues raised in the motion and the voluminous ca seload handled in this single-judge municipal

court.” {¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial in February 2016. The jury found Mr. Reppucci not guilty of the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) charge and guilty of the R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) charge. In June 2016, the trial court se ntenced Mr. Reppucci. {¶6} Mr. Reppucci appeals raising one assignment of error.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND UNREASONABLE DELAY. {¶7} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Reppucci argues that the trial court’s unreasonable delay in ruling on his motion to suppr ess violated his speedy trial rights. This Court agrees. {¶8} R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73 impose a mandatory duty on the prosecution and the trial court to bring a defendant to trial in a timely fashion. See State v. Martin , 56 Ohio St.2d 289,3

297 (1978). For a first-degree misdemeanor, a defenda nt shall be brought to trial within 90 days of the person’s arrest or the service of summ ons. R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). This time period may be extended by any period of delay necessitated by a defendant’s motion. R.C. 2945.72(E). “Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an offense shall be discharged if he is not broug ht to trial within the time re quired by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2945.73(B). {¶9} A defense motion tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable period to allow the State to respond and the court to rule on the motion. See State v. Sanchez , 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006- Ohio-4478, paragraph two of the syllabus. “This does not imply * * * that a trial court has unbridled discretion in taking time to rule on a defense motion.” Id. at ¶ 27. Rather, a trial judge is required to rule on motions “‘in as expeditious a manner as possible.’” Id ., quoting Martin at 297. In determining whether a trial court dispos ed of a motion within a reasonable time, this Court considers the complexity of the facts, the difficulty of the legal issues, and the demands on the time and schedule of the trial court judge. State v. Kolvek , 9th Dist. Summit No. 21808, 2004-Ohio-2515, ¶ 8; Accord State v. Miles , 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0102-M, 2013-Ohio4272, ¶ 8. {¶10} In the present case, Mr. Reppucci file d his motion to suppress on February 20, 2014. The trial court heard the motion to suppre ss on June 27, 2014. The trial court issued its decision denying the motion to suppress on Decem ber 14, 2015. From the time of the hearing until the trial court’s decision on the motion, 535 days elapsed. Mr. Reppucci moved to dismiss based on this delay. {¶11} By the trial court’s own assessment, Mr. Reppucci’s motion was not complex either factually or legally. Prior to the hearing, the trial court noted that it was faced with only4

two limited issues. In its decision denying the moti on to suppress, the tria l court reiterated those two issues were reasonable suspicion for deta ining Mr. Reppucci and probable cause for his

arrest. {¶12} The entry denying the motion to dismiss refers vaguely to “the nature of the issues raised in the motion [to suppress,]” but it does no t specifically discuss those issues. Rather, the focus of the denial was the size of the trial court’s docket. While this Court is not unsympathetic to the time demands on trial court judges, this factor alone does not justify a delay of over 17 months in ruling on a simple suppression motion. {¶13} This case is distinguishable from State v. Krzemieniewski , 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0015-M, 2016-Ohio-4991. In Krzemieniewski, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a delay in ruling on a motion to suppress in this same “‘one-judge court.’”

Id . at ¶ 6, 25. The time from the hearing until the decision in Krzemieniewski was approximately

10 months. Id. at ¶ 5. More importantly, Mr. Krzemieniewski waived his right to a speedy trial on multiple occasions. Id. at ¶ 25. In the present case, Mr. Reppucci never waived his speedy trial rights. {¶14} Because the trial court unreasonably dela yed in ruling on Mr. Reppucci’s motion to suppress, that time period did not to ll Mr. Reppucci’s speedy trial clock. See Kolvek, 2004- Ohio-2515, at ¶ 7. Mr. Reppucci’s argument focu ses on this 535-day period. This Court finds it unnecessary to calculate the time periods prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress or after the ruling on that motion although those periods are part of the speedy trial time. The 535 days that are at issue here far exceeded the 90-day statutory time period within which Mr. Reppucci was to be brought to trial. Even taking into consideration that some portion of this time may have been reasonable, Mr. Reppucci’s speedy trial rights were clearly violated under the facts of5

this case. Consequently, Mr. Reppucci was en titled to be discharged upon the filing of his

motion to dismiss. See R.C. 2945.73(B). {¶15} Mr. Reppucci’s assignment of error is sustained.

III. {¶16} Mr. Reppucci’s assignment of error is su stained. The judgment of the Medina Municipal Court is reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to discharge Mr. Reppucci. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the manda te, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this docum ent shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22 (C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee.

LYNNE S. CALLAHAN FOR THE COURT6

SCHAFER, P. J. TEODOSIO, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: MARK D. MCGRAW, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. J. MATTHEW LANIER, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.