NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-2993

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ELIZABETH JOYCE,

Appellant 

v.

TAYLOR HEALTH AND REHABILITATION CENTER LLC,

d/b/a Riverside Rehabilitation & Nursing Center,

f/k/a Taylor Nursing and Rehab Center

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-12-cv-01124)

District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 18, 2015

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 16, 2015)

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OPINION*

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AMBRO, Circuit Judge

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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I. Background

Appellant Elizabeth Joyce, a licensed nurse, was employed for 18 years by 

Appellee Taylor Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (“Taylor Health”). She was 

dismissed after her supervisor, on successive days (July 19 and 20, 2010), caught her 

treating patients in public view—a violation of facility rules. Joyce sued for age 

discrimination under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 261 

et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955 

et seq. The District Court granted summary judgment to Taylor Health, holding that 

Joyce didn’t make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because she failed to 

show that she was replaced by a “sufficiently younger person.” In the alternative, even if 

she had made out a prima facie case, the Court held that Joyce didn’t carry her burden 

under the familiar McDonnell-Douglas analysis noted below. She appeals.1 

II. Analysis

Because Joyce relies on circumstantial (rather than direct) evidence of age 

discrimination, we follow the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).2 Under it, Joyce must first establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination, which requires her to show that (1) she is 40 or older, (2) 

Taylor Health took an adverse action against her, (3) she was qualified to do her job, and 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

2

 Because the standard under the PHRA is the same under the federal age-discrimination 

statute, we apply the federal standard. Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 

509 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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(4) she was replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger. See Burton v. 

Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 

Only the fourth element is at issue here: whether Joyce submitted enough evidence 

to satisfy the “sufficiently-younger” prong. Joyce argues that she did because, soon after 

she was fired, Taylor Health hired 25-year old Brandon Billings, which, in her view, 

establishes that a “sufficiently younger” person replaced her. We disagree. As the 

District Court noted, though the hiring of Billings correlated with Joyce’s dismissal, there 

is no evidence he assumed any of her responsibilities. See Joyce v. Taylor Health and

Rehabilitation Center, LLC, No. 3:12-CV-1124 at 12-13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2014). And, 

only two weeks after he was hired, Taylor Health hired someone eleven years Joyce’s 

senior: 64-year-old Mary Beth Hart. We thus conclude that Joyce failed to make out a

prima facie case. 

But, even assuming she did, Joyce still loses. Because Taylor Health offered a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for dismissing her, McDonnell-Douglas puts the 

ball in Joyce’s court to show it was a cover-up for the real reason the company allegedly 

fired her: to hire someone younger. To do so, she must introduce evidence that gives us 

reason either to (1) doubt the facility’s explanation or (2) believe it is more likely than not 

that age played a role in her dismissal. See Burton, 707 F.3d at 427 (quoting Fuentes v. 

Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994)). 

Regarding the former, to cast doubt on Taylor Health’s reason for firing her, Joyce 

has to highlight a weakness, implausibility, inconsistency, incoherency, or contradiction 

in its story from which “a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [it] ‘unworthy of 
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credence.’” Fuentes 32 F.3d at 765 (citation omitted). But she points to nothing of the 

sort, asserting only that Taylor Health’s reason for firing her—violating company 

policy—was subjective and thus susceptible to abuse. We cannot agree. Despite her 

supervisor’s caution against treating patients in public, Joyce disregarded the warning and 

broke the same rule only one day later. Hence the ultimate firing decision—though 

discretionary—was based on an objective violation of patient-care protocol. 

We are likewise unpersuaded by Joyce’s secondary arguments. First, contrary to 

her contention, the facility’s failure to apply its progressive discipline policy to her case 

is not evidence of pretext. Under facility policy, when an employee willfully “fail[s] to 

carry out orders . . . or refus[es] to meet standards of performance,” it is a “critical 

violation[]” that can lead to immediate termination. Joyce’s conduct met that standard. 

Only one day after she was warned not to treat patients in public view, she did so again. 

Second, Joyce’s assertion that it wasn’t until her advanced age that the company began to 

scrutinize her work is belied by her employment record, which details a number of 

previous disciplinary actions. 

We also conclude that Joyce has pointed to no evidence from which a reasonable 

juror could conclude that age played a role in her dismissal. As she herself testified, no 

supervisor ever mentioned anything about her age, the company relied heavily on older 

employees, and at the time of her termination there were ten other employees older than 

her in the same position. 

In sum, even if Joyce has made out a prima facie case of age discrimination, she 

has failed to shoulder her burden that Taylor Health’s reason for firing was a pretext.
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* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision.