Not for P ubl ication in West's Fe deral Report er



# U nit edSta tes C ou rt of App eal s

For t h e Firs t C ircu it

Nos. 10-1337 and 10-1501 BERNARD MOORE, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v . WILLIAMS COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

Before Torruella, Lipez and Thompson,

Circuit Judges.

Bernard Moore on brief pro se. Daryl J. Lapp, Robert G. Young and Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, on brief for appellee.

February 28, 2011We have consolida t e d M oore's appeal from the denial of a 1 preliminary injunction (Appeal No. 10-1337) with hi s a ppeal from the dismissal of his complaint (Appeal No. 10-1501). The denial of the preli m i n a r y injunction has merged in the final judgment, see Chaparro-Febus v. Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325, 331 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993), and so we need not address it separately. -2- Per Curiam . Bernard Moore has appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint. We review, de novo, 1 a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss f o r failure to state a claim. IOM Corp. v. Brown Forman Corp., 627 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir. 2010). Upon de novo review, w e a ffirm essentially for the r e a s o n s s t a t e di n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s m e m o r a n d u ma n do r der, dated April 7, 2010.

We add only the following: (1) We deem, as waived, Moore's claims of breach of employment contract, wrongful termination, and violation of tenant rights as he has failed to make any developed argument as to them. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st C ir. 1990) (reciting that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived"). (2) The only claim pursued on appeal is Moore's request for injunctive relief permitting him to acquire continuation of health insurance coverage under the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 116 1 ( a ). Presumably, he is asking that Williams College be dire c t e d to-3-

rescind its characterization of his actions as "gross misconduct" that has statutorily barred his eligibility. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 6 1 ( a ) (requiring a plan sponsor to provide that a qualified beneficiary that loses coverage as a result of a qualifying event is entitled to elect, within t h e election period, continuation coverage); § 1163(2) (excluding termination for g r oss misconduct from the definition of qualifying event). As Moore is currently incarcerated, it appears that the only claim pursued on appeal is now moot as he no longer has any n e e d f o r COBRA-provided health
care coverage. (3) In any event, assuming, without deciding, that the appeal is not moot, it is meritless. Moore contend s t h a t t h e district court erred in determining that his actions that resulted in his termination constituted "gross m i s conduct" for purposes of COBRA coverage because, he argues, he did not engage in gross misconduct while employed at Williams College from July 2008 to November 2009. Moore offers no persuasive authority for his contention that that which constitutes "gross misconduct" is limited to the p e r i o d of one's employment. While the two cases he cites involved instances of gross misconduct alleged to have occurred during a period of employment, see Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l. Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997); Richard v. Industrial Commercial Elec. Corp., 337 F.Supp. 2d 279 (D. Mass. 2 0 0 4 ) , t hey do not support the contention that an employer is permitted to terminate an employeeThe fact that the district court assumed in Moore's favor 2 that he did not commit any crimes while actively employed by Williams effectively resolves Moore's misdirected (and, it appears, legally incorrect) arguments that (a) the district court should not take judicial notice of the f i l i n gs in his criminal case and (b) his g u i lty plea was not the equivalent of a "conviction." SeeKowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is wellacc e p t e d t h a t f e d e r a l c o u r t s m a y t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand"); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (reciting that a guilty plea "is itself a conviction"). -4- only for instances of g ross misconduct that occurred during the period of employment. We need not determine whether that which constitutes "gross misconduct" for purposes of the COBRA provision is limited to the period of employment. Even assuming that "gross misconduct" is limited to the period of employment, Moore has no effective answer to the district court's charac t e r ization of his concealment and misrepresentation of his credent ials during the period of employment at Williams College as constituting "gross misconduct." Upon de novo review, we agree with this 2 characterization and find no error.

The judgment of the district co u r t e ntered on April 7, 2010 is affirmed.