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Filed 7/13/15 N.G. v. Superior Court CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

N.G.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

MENDOCINO COUNTY,

Respondent;

MENDOCINO COUNTY HEALTH & 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

A144096

(Mendocino County Super. Ct. 

 No. SCUK-JVSQ-13-16744)

Petitioner N.G., G.G.’s mother, petitions this court to set aside the juvenile court’s 

January 16, 2015 order denying her reunification services, and setting a May 12, 2015 

hearing, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.

1

 On March 16, 2015 

we issued an order to show cause and stayed the May 12, 2015 hearing. For the reasons 

given below, we deny the petition and dissolve the stay.

2

 

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 

2

Petitioner also filed an appeal challenging the January 16, 2015 order (see 

Mendocino County Department of Social Services v. N.G., A143908, which has yet to be 

decided), but filed this writ petition to “preserve” the issue on appeal. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2013 the minor, G.G., was detained by Mendocino County Health & Human 

Services Agency [the Agency]. G.G. was approximately one year old at the time he was 

detained. Several days before G.G. was detained N.G., the minor’s mother was arrested 

following a domestic altercation with G.G.’s father, J.-G.S. According to the Agency’s

April 3, 2013 detention summary, mother attempted to kick a police officer, refused to 

get into a patrol car and otherwise resisted arrest. The Agency’s detention summary also 

noted that mother told the social worker that she had had “one or two beers” prior to the 

altercation. However, test results conducted at the time of her arrest established that 

mother’s blood alcohol content was 0.127 percent. 

Prior to this incident this family was well-known to the Agency. At the time of 

G.G.’s detention, the Agency had an open case involving his two older siblings. G.G.’s

siblings were detained in August 2010 but were returned to the petitioner a short time 

later with full family maintenance services. Father was also offered reunification 

services. In March 2011, G.G.’s siblings were detained once more when the Agency

filed a petition pursuant to section 387. Petitioner and Father were offered reunification 

services once more. In March 2012 parents regained custody of the children and were 

provided with family maintenance services. However, in April 2013, the Agency filed a 

petition requesting that G.G. be detained and declared a dependent of the juvenile court 

pursuant to sections 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) as a result of mothers arrest on 

March 29, 2013. 

Specifically, the Agency alleged with regard to petitioner, (1) that G.G. had 

suffered or was at substantial risk to suffer serious physical harm or illness due to his 

mother’s substance abuse; (2) that G.G. had two siblings who had been abused or 

neglected by the mother; and (3) that G.G. faced a substantial risk of abuse or neglect.3 

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, in which both mother and father testified, 

the court found the allegations to be true. 

 

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In addition, the father’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to his two 

other daughters in May 2012. 
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A dispositional hearing was held on June 13, 2013. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for 

bypassing services to the father were present; however, it ordered that petitioner be 

provided reunification services regarding G.G., but set a section 366.26 hearing regarding 

petitioner’s parental rights with respect to G.G.’s two siblings.

Prior to the six-month hearing, the social worker filed the Agency’s status report. 

The report noted, inter alia, that G.G. “goes to his mother easily and the mother responds 

to [his] needs.” The Agency’s report stated “it is evident that [the mother] has a loving 

relationship with her child and can meet his needs despite obstacles.” The report 

cautioned that the mother should continue services “to learn boundaries and methods to 

protect herself and her son from exposure to violence.” 

The juvenile court conducted its six-month review on November 21, 2013. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered that G.G. be returned to his mother’s custody 

with family maintenance services. The juvenile court conducted its review of family 

maintenance on May 8, 2014, and ordered that mother continue to receive family 

maintenance services. 

On October 22, 2014, the 12-month family maintenance review was held. The 

Agency’s 12-month status report stated, in part: “Despite her struggle with providing 

safe and appropriate parenting to the child’s older siblings, [N.G.] has proven herself 

capable of meeting the needs of [her son]. [N.G.] has remained clean and sober, 

maintains a full time job, and adequately cares for the child. [N.G.] has consistently 

attended services, including Anger Management and individual therapy. [N.G.] 

successfully completed a 52-week Anger Management course with Santiago Simental, 

and reports feeling that the course was beneficial in the she learned tools to mange her 

anger.” 

“[G.G.] continues to display a healthy bond with the mother and continues to 

appear well adjusted in her care. The child’s needs continue to be met in the care of the 

mother. Despite services being terminated as to the mother with the older siblings, the 

mother’s relationship with [G.G.] is a positive one. The social worker, however, is 
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concerned with the history of physical abuse and unhealthy parenting between the mother 

and older siblings, the [tremendous] domestic violence relationship between the mother 

and father, and most recent admission of the mother wanting to drink on her upcoming 

30th birthday.” 

“It is respectfully requested that family maintenance services continue as to the 

mother to allow [N.G.] the opportunity to demonstrate her newly acquired anger 

management skills outside of the Alternatives to Violence while also ensuring that the 

mother stay[s] free from domestic violence and substance use.” The juvenile court, 

however, noting the long duration of the mother’s case, starting with her older children, 

commented on the different relationship N.G. had with G.G., as compared with the other 

children. The court noted that N.G. was meeting her son’s needs, had remained clean and 

sober, maintained a full-time job, completed a year-long domestic violence class and 

received an exemplary review from the program manager. She consistently attended 

anger management and individual therapy and G.G. was well-adjusted in her care. The 

court dismissed the dependency case, terminated jurisdiction, awarded the mother full 

physical and legal custody of G.G., and told her, “It’s up to you now. I never want to see 

you back in this court again.” N.G. assured the court that she would not. The court also 

determined that the father’s visitation had proven to be “detrimental,” and declined to 

order further visitation with the father. 

Unfortunately, on November 13, 2014 the Agency filed a subsequent petition on 

G.G.’s behalf, alleging that N.G. left him unsupervised with an inappropriate caregiver

— the father, who had an extensive history of substance abuse and domestic violence, 

and ignored the court’s October 22, 2014 order that visitation with Father would be 

“detrimental” to G.G. 

The petition alleged that the mother was unwilling and unable to provide 

appropriate care for her son due to her ongoing substance abuse and other unresolved 

issues, which put the minor at substantial risk of harm. Specifically, it alleged that on 

November 7, 2014 at 6:45 a.m., G.G. was found “walking in the middle of the street 

without shoes, in a soiled diaper and urine soaked clothing.” When N.G. spoke with the 
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Agency about this incident she was informed that she would be required to submit to 

drug testing. She declined, stating, “I’m at work, I don’t have time for this,” and hung up 

the phone. The Agency attempted unsuccessfully to visit her home on the weekend 

twice, to test mother for drugs. Three days after the incident, N.G. visited the Agency 

and provided a clean test. The petition also referenced N.G.’s “extensive [child 

protective services] history with her two older children,” which resulted in termination of 

services after 48 months of services being offered and alleged that the prior abuse and 

neglect of the other children placed G.G. at risk of substantial harm in his mother’s care. 

The petition noted that G.G. had previously been detained due to general neglect, 

including an incident of domestic violence between the parents, but that G.G. was later 

returned to N.G.’s care under a family maintenance plan, and that case was ultimately 

dismissed. It concludes, “[t]he mother does not appear to have corrected the issues that 

lead [sic] to the prior detention of [G.G.]” 

At the December 9, 2014 jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found by a 

preponderance of the evidence the allegations N.G. allowed G.G. to be supervised with 

an inappropriate care giver — the father — and that she had an extensive child protective 

services history with both her two older children and G.G., to be true. The court did not 

find that the evidence supported the allegation that the mother’s on-going substance 

abuse placed G.G. at risk. The court determined that despite the Agency’s concern about 

N.G. past drug abuse, it found no evidence to support a determination that her substance 

abuse presented a current risk to the child. 

A dispositional hearing was held on January 13, 2015. At that hearing the court 

acknowledged mother’s continuing efforts to improve her parenting skills, however the 

court expressed concern “that despite the fact that she’s continued in services, she 

continues to make decisions that place her child at risk despite having almost four years 

of services with [G.G.] in the prior case and with his older brother and sister.” The court 

indicated that it was doubtful that the Agency could effect real change in the mother

given the extended/extensive services provided to mother. The court then discussed with 

the parties whether it was appropriate to bypass reunification services for mother. After
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taking the matter under submission, on January 16, 2015 the court denied N.G.’s request 

for reunification services pursuant to the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivisions

(b)(10) and (b)(11).4 In so doing, the court acknowledged mother’s “sincere” efforts to 

address the problems that originally brought her to the court’s attention but noted that 

having received “almost every service available to the Agency over a four year period in 

the sibling cases,” N.G. “was unable to consistently implement safe parenting practices.” 

The court cited to the number of instances G.G.’s siblings were removed from and 

returned to mother. In addition, the court identified several examples (out of “numerous 

occasions”) of mother “stubbornly mak[ing] decisions contrary to her children’s best 

interests.”5 The order concludes: “With all of the foregoing in mind, the court is not 

convinced that [N.G.’s] efforts to address the problems which resulted in the removal of 

[G.G.’s] siblings . . . , and the subsequent termination of her parental rights over [those 

 

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Section 361.5, subdivision (b) reads in relevant part: 

“(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this 

subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the 

following:” [¶] . . . [¶]

“(10) That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half 

siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or 

half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been removed from that parent or 

guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or 

guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this 

parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems 

that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or 

guardian.” 

“(11) That the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had 

been permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent described in subdivision (a), 

and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a 

reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of 

that child from the parent.”

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Specifically, the court cited an incident in the spring of 2014 when N.G.’s decision 

to allow the father to visit her resulted in the children’s witnessing a fight between the 

father and a third-party; in the fall of that year, after completing a substance abuse 

program, commenting to her social worker that she wanted to go drinking to celebrate her 

birthday; and the November 2014 incident, described above, when she allowed the father 

to care for G.G., resulting in the child wandering alone in the street in a soiled diaper. 
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siblings] were reasonable. Despite having four years to learn and practice techniques to 

keep her children safe, [N.G.] did not demonstrate adequate progress towards this 

essential goal. Based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the 

court cannot find that ‘. . . there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the relationship 

with the current child could be saved’ with the provision of reunification services. 

(Renee J. [v. Superior Court (2002)] 96 Cal.App.4th [1450,] 1464.)” 

The court also rejected mother’s argument that her positive relationship with G.G. 

and her past ability to parent G.G. well demonstrates that reunification would be in 

G.G.’s best interest. The court determined that the bond between mother and child did 

not outweigh the child’s need “for permanency, stability, and an ongoing relationship 

with his siblings,” citing In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 383 for the 

proposition that the parent-child relationship may not support a “best interest finding 

where the child has been removed multiple times. The court then set a hearing, pursuant 

to section 366.26 to decide on a permanent plan for the child, to be held on May 12, 

2015. 

On January 22, 2015 N.G. filed her notice of intent to file writ petition. On 

March 16, 2015 petitioner filed her writ petition in this court; we issued an order to show 

cause and temporarily stayed the hearing below that same day. After the Agency filed its 

opposition to the petition, all parties waived oral argument. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two legal arguments in support of her request for writ relief: 

(1) that the juvenile court erred when it bypassed N.G. for reunification services because 

mother had made reasonable efforts to rectify the problems that led to the removal of 

G.G.’s siblings and the termination of her parental rights to them and (2) that assuming 

the bypass provisions were satisfied, the juvenile court erred when it determined that 

reunification was not in G.G.’s best interests, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c).

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In pertinent part, section 361.5, subd. (c) provides: “The court shall not order 

reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), 
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I. Standard of Review

Orders applying the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b), are 

reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088-1089, 

1092, fn. 7.) Under that standard we determine whether any substantial evidence exists

— regardless of whether or not there is also contradictory evidence — which supports the 

lower court’s factual findings. (In re Heidi T. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 864, 872, citing 

Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.) In order to prevail, petitioner must 

demonstrate that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the 

findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) It is for the juvenile court, 

which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, to make credibility determinations. 

(In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1295-1296.) 

We review the juvenile court’s determination that it would not be in G.G.’s best 

interests to continue reunification services for abuse of discretion. (In re. G.L. (2014) 

222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164-1165.) 

II. Substantial Evidence Supports The Juvenile Court’s Determination That 

The Mother Should Be Bypassed For Services Pursuant To Section 361.5, 

Subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11).

In general reunification services are required when a child is removed from the 

custody of his/her parents’ custody, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a). However, 

the legislature has adopted various exceptions to this general rule, reflecting a policy to 

provide services to parents only where those services will facilitate the return of children 

to parental custody. (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112.) When the 

court determines a bypass provision applies, the general rule favoring reunification is 

replaced with a legislative presumption that it would be an unwise use of resources to 

invest in reunification services in a particular case. (Ibid.) 

 

(12), (13), (14), (15), or (16) of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
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N.G. concedes that services and her parental rights have been terminated with 

respect to G.G.’s siblings. However, termination of services and parental rights with 

respect to G.G.’s siblings are not sufficient to justify termination of reunification services 

regarding G.G. Both subdivisions relied upon by the juvenile court to support its 

decision to bypass reunification services to N.G. also require a finding that the parent has 

not subsequently made reasonable efforts to treat the problem that originally necessitated 

the other sibling’s removal. 

The juvenile court acknowledged this requirement when it noted N.G.’s efforts to 

reunify with G.G. The January 16, 2015 order states: “The evidence established that 

mother had participated in family reunification and family maintenance services with her 

children . . . from 2010-2014.” Later, it states: “Mother engaged in, and to some degree 

benefited from, family reunification and family maintenance services in the earlier 

dependency cases involving . . . . Upon receiving new referrals to services following 

[G.G.’s] re-detention on November 7, 2014, [N.G.] promptly re-engaged in the Intake 

Support group and domestic violence classes. She completed an assessment with the 

County’s Alcohol and Other Drugs program and was found not to require treatment. The 

Program Administrator of the “Alternatives to Violence” program opined that mother 

was ‘. . . sincere about doing all that has been asked of her towards hopes of regaining 

custody of her children. She has worked hard over the course of this time and I feel that 

she has not been given credit for her work and efforts.’ ” 

In assessing a parent’s efforts, a court may not require that the parent be cured of 

the original problem. (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914, citing 

K.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393.) Rather, the court should 

consider various factors including the duration, extent, context of the parent’s efforts and 

factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts. (Ibid.) “Simply stated, 

although success alone is not the sole measure of reasonableness, the measure of success 

achieved is properly considered a factor in the juvenile court’s determination of whether 

an effort qualifies as reasonable.” (Id. at p. 915.) 
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Here, the juvenile court weighed N.G.’s genuine efforts at resolving her issues 

against very specific evidence that she had not made sufficient progress, given the gravity 

of those issues. In particular, the court focused on N.G.’s decision to leave G.G. in his 

father’s care (which resulted in his being found by passers-by wandering in the middle of 

the street), despite the couple’s history of domestic violence, the father’s long history of 

substance abuse, the father’s failure to reunify with his four other children, the court’s 

prior order denying the father visitation with G.G., and emotional trauma one of G.G.’s 

siblings had as a result of the father’s unauthorized visit with her. The juvenile court then 

reviewed N.G.’s entrenched pattern of making poor decisions concerning her children’s 

well-being, despite having received “almost every service available to the Agency over a 

four year period.” The court listed three specific incidents: (1) N.G. allowing the father 

to come to her residence, which resulted in his getting into a fight in the children’s 

presence in the spring of 2014; (2) N.G. telling her social worker that she wanted to go 

drinking to celebrate her birthday after completing a drug court substance abuse program; 

and (3) leaving G.G. alone with his father, resulting in G.G.’s being found wandering in 

the street, on November 7, 2014. 

Unquestionably substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion to 

bypass reunification services regarding N.G. Given the extensive services provided to 

N.G. by the Agency to assist her in developing suitable parenting skills and good 

judgment, there was substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion that further 

services would not allow N.G. to achieve an acceptable level of success in parenting of 

G.G. Thus, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s determination that bypassing N.G. 

was appropriate.

III. Reunification Was Not In G.G.’S Best Interests. 

The juvenile court further held that the mother had not satisfied her burden of 

establishing by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in G.G.’s best 
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interests.7 The court determined that G.G.’s relationship with his mother did not 

outweigh “his need for permanency, stability, and an ongoing relationship with his 

siblings.” Implicitly, the juvenile court weighed G.G.’s stable placement with his 

siblings against a relationship with his mother in which she is unable to make judgments 

that reliably provide him with a secure, stable environment. The record before us clearly 

establishes that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. 

DISPOSITION

The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. The stay issued by this court on 

March 16, 2015 is dissolved. To expedite the prompt resolution of this case, our decision 

is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_________________________

Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Siggins, J.

 

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In order to avoid the bypass provision for a parent who otherwise would fall 

within one of the enumerated categories, the statute requires the court to find by clear and 

convincing evidence that reunification is in the child’s best interests. The Rules of Court 

clarify that the parent who is seeking reunification bears the burden to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that reunification is in the child’s best interest. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.695(O)(11).)