COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Hum phreys, Beales and Powell

DWIGHT ALEXANDER DIXON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2217-08-2 PER CURIAM MARCH 17, 2009 MARJORIE HAGOOD WESTON DIXON PUGH

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF CHARLOTTE COUNTY William N. Alexander, II, Judge (Dwight Alexander Dixon, pro se , on brief). No brief for appellee.

Dwight Alexander Dixon (Dixon ) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his “Complaint or Motion to Vacate Judgment.” Dixon argues that the trial court erre d by not determining whether he owed Marjorie Hagood Weston Di xon Pugh (Pugh) any am ount under previous court orders. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

Dixon filed a written statement of facts, but it was not accompanied by the requisite notice of presentment, it was not presente d to the trial court, and it was not signed by the judge. “[A] written statement of facts becomes a part of the record only if all of th e requirements of Rule 5A:8 are complied with by the pa rties and the trial judge.” Mayhood v. Mayhood , 4 Va. App. 365, 368-69, 358 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1987). Dixon did not comply with Rule 5A:8, so the written statement of facts did not become part of the record.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Since the written statement of f acts is not part of the record, we need to determine whether it is indispensable to a determinat ion of the issue on appeal. See Anderson v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 506, 508-09, 413 S.E.2d 75, 76-77 (1992). This matter was instituted by Dixon’s filing of a motion and Pugh’s answer. There was no fo rmal hearing in this ma tter. The parties had a telephone conference with the judge and submitted their arguments and evid ence in written form, and the judge issued an op inion letter detailing the pr ocedural history of the ca se and his ruling. The

record contains all of the information that is needed to decide the issue on appeal. In 1982, Dixon and Pugh were divorced. The final decree awarded spousal support to Pugh, along with child support, attorney ’s fees, and costs. The final decree did not reserve the right to modify the spousal support in th e future, although the trial cour t intended to ma ke a lump sum award to Pugh in the future. In 1985, Pugh sought to modify the spousal support and child support

awards. Over Dixon’s ob jection, the trial court amended the 1982 decree nunc pro tunc to reserve the right to modify spousal supp ort and award a lump sum. The trial court awarded Pugh a lump sum award of $130,000, and $20,000 in attorney’s fe es and 80% of the costs. 1 Dixon appealed the trial court’s ruling and argued that the trial court did not have jurisdic tion to modify the 1982 decree because the right to modify spou sal support was not preserved in the 1982 decree. The matter reached the Supreme Court of Virginia, which noted that [t]he narrow issue we consider in this divorce proceeding is whether the chancellor may amend a final decree nunc pro tunc and thereby make a lump sum aw ard of spousal support, even though the original decree did not contain a clear and explicit reservation of jurisdiction to modi fy the award of spousal support. Dixon v. Pugh , 244 Va. 539, 540, 423 S.E.2d 169, 169-70 (1992). The Supreme Court of Virginia held

1 The trial court also addressed the issue of ch ild support. They really didn’t modify it, but left it the same.- 3 - we will reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting a lump sum spousal support award to Pugh. We will affirm the remainder of the judgment of the Court of A ppeals because no issue is raised before us about those provisions. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and final judgment will be entered here deleting the lump sum spousal support award.

Id. at 543-44, 423 S.E.2d at 171-72. Accordingl y, the only issue before the Supreme Court of Virginia was the issue of the lump sum spousal su pport award, not the attorney’s fees and costs

award. Dixon now argues that since the trial court di d not have jurisdiction to order the lump sum spousal support award, it did not have jurisdiction to order th e attorney’s fees and costs award. Dixon argues that the award for attorney’s fees and costs was in cluded in the lump sum award. “[T]rial courts speak only through their writte n orders and . . . such orders are presumed to reflect accurately what transpired.” McMillion v. Dryv it Systems, Inc. , 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001) (citations omitted). See also Anonymous B v. Anonymous C , 51 Va. App. 657, 672, 660 S.E.2d 307, 314 (2008) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Virginia did not address the attorney’s fees an d costs issue because it

was not before that Court. Atto rney’s fees and costs were not included in the lump sum spousal support award. Therefore, the prior or der relating to the atto rney’s fees and costs is final. Rule 1:1. Dixon is obligated to pay th e attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the prior order. The trial court did not err in dismissing Dixon’s “Complaint or Motion to Vacate Judgment,” and th e ruling is summarily a ffirmed. Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.