J-S09041-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER COKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1499 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1200411-2003

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2021

Christopher Coker (“Coker”) appeals, pro se, from the Order denying his 

“Motion to Clarify Judgement of Order.” We affirm.

This Court previously summarized the procedural history underlying this 

appeal as follows:

[On July 19, 2005, Coker] was convicted of voluntary 

manslaughter and possessing an instrument of crime. On August 

30, 2005, the trial court sentenced [Coker] to an aggregate term 

of seven to fourteen years’ incarceration[,] followed by a ten-year 

probation term. [Coker] did not file a direct appeal, but later filed 

a timely PCRA [P]etition[,] seeking the reinstatement of his direct 

appeal rights. The PCRA court reinstated [Coker’s] appeal rights 

and appointed Richard Brown, Jr., Esquire [(“Attorney Brown”)], 

as appellate counsel. [Coker] subsequently presented a challenge 

to the trial court’s alleged ex parte interaction with the jury at his 

trial to this Court. We affirmed [Coker’s] judgment of sentence 

and our Supreme Court denied allocator. [See Commonwealth

v. Coker, 990 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, 996 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 2010).]

On November 12, 2010, [Coker] filed [a] PCRA [P]etition, 

alleging the ineffectiveness of both trial counsel, Todd Henry, 
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Esquire, and appellate counsel, Attorney Brown. The PCRA court 

appointed PCRA counsel, Elayne Bryn, Esquire [(“Attorney 

Bryn”)]. Attorney Bryn filed a Turney/Finley no-merit letter and 

[a P]etition to withdraw as counsel on May 11, 2015. The 

following day, the PCRA court granted Attorney Bryn’s request to 

withdraw and issued a Rule 907 [N]otice of its intent to dismiss 

the [P]etition without a hearing. [Coker] filed a [R]esponse, 

requested the appointment of new counsel, and requested a 

hearing. The PCRA court granted [Coker’s] request for new 

counsel and appointed David Rudenstein, Esquire [(“Attorney 

Rudenstein”)], on August 28, 2015.

Shortly thereafter, Attorney Rudenstein filed an [A]mended 

[PCRA] [P]etition through which [Coker] raised seven allegations 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, renewed [Coker’s] request for 

an evidentiary hearing, and requested a new trial. The PCRA court 

filed a Rule 907 [N]otice of its intent to dismiss the [Amended

PCRA Petition.] In response, [Coker] filed a [M]otion for leave to 

hold an immediate Grazier hearing. The PCRA [court] held the 

Grazier hearing, and after determining that [Coker] did not wish 

to proceed without counsel, denied the [Amended PCRA Petition]

on June 30, 2016. 

Commonwealth v. Coker, 175 A.3d 415 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-2). On appeal, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s Order, 

and our Supreme Court denied Coker’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. See

id., appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018).

On June 15, 2020, Coker filed a pro se “Motion to Clarify Judgement of 

Order.” In his Motion, Coker acknowledged that the PCRA court’s Order

addressed the issues raised by Attorney Rudenstein in the Amended PCRA 

Petition, but argued that the PCRA court erred in failing to address the issues 

that he had raised in his pro se November 12, 2010, PCRA Petition. On June 

15, 2020, the trial court entered an Order denying Coker’s Motion. Coker filed 
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a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise 

Statement of matters complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Coker restates the claim raised in his “Motion to Clarify 

Judgement of Order,” i.e., that the PCRA court failed to address the issues 

raised in his pro se November 12, 2010, PCRA Petition. See Brief for Appellant 

at 9-11 (pages unnumbered).

Initially, we consider whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider 

Coker’s “Motion to Clarify Judgement of Order.” Coker’s Motion purportedly 

requests that the PCRA Court reconsider its June 30, 2016, Order that 

dismissed his PCRA Petition. However, Coker previously filed a direct appeal 

from the PCRA court’s June 30, 2016, Order. See Coker, 175 A.3d 415, 

appeal denied, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1701(a) states that “after an appeal is taken ... the trial court or 

other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); see also Commonwealth v. Moore, 715 A.2d 448, 453 

(Pa. Super. 1998) (stating that “once a party has properly appealed a decision 

of the trial court, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to act further on the case.”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider
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Coker’s Motion. As the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction, we affirm the PCRA 

court’s denial of relief.1, 2

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2021

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1 Even if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Coker’s claim, it would fail 

on the merits. See Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 713 n.5 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that where a PCRA petitioner is represented by 

counsel, “the PCRA court is only permitted to address issues raised in a 

counseled petition.”). 

2 We further note that Coker’s claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543 (setting forth the requirements for pleading a case under 

the PCRA).