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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.B.K. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.W., BIRTH MOTHER, :

:

 Appellant : No. 168 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2014-A0057

IN RE: ADOPTION OF B.J.L.K. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.W., BIRTH MOTHER, :

:

 Appellant : No. 170 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2014-A0058

IN RE: ADOPTION OF K.F.L.K. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.W., BIRTH MOTHER, :

:

 Appellant : No. 174 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2014-A0059

IN RE: ADOPTION OF T.L.K., JR. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.W., BIRTH MOTHER, :

:

 Appellant : No. 178 EDA 2015
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Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2014-A0060

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND LAZARUS, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 10, 2015

A.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders that granted the petitions to 

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her four children, K.F.L.K. born 

in 2001, T.L.K., Jr. born in 2003, B.J.L.K. born in 2005, and S.B.K. born in 

2006 (“the Children”), filed by the Montgomery County Office of Children 

and Youth (“OCY”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b) of 

the Adoption Act. We affirm.

T.K., Sr. (“Father”), and Mother met in 2000 and over the course of 

six years had four children. Father and Mother never married, and their 

relationship included several periods in which they lived together and several 

periods in which they were separated. From 2007 until 2011, Mother had 

primary custody of the Children except for K.F.L.K., who resided with Father. 

During March or April of 2011, Father took custody of all the Children. They 

remained with Father and his girlfriend until OCY’s involvement in March 

2012. At that time, OCY began investigating an allegation that Father 

sexually abused K.F.L.K.

OCY devised a safety plan which prevented Father from having contact 

with K.F.L.K. and her sister, B.J.L.K. The girls were living with Father’s 
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girlfriend, who subsequently allowed contact with Father. Upon learning of 

Father’s contact with the girls, OCY placed them in foster care on April 16, 

2012. The remaining children, both boys, were subsequently removed and 

placed into foster care on May 4, 2012.

OCY eventually located Mother and established a family service plan 

(“FSP”) for her. The FSP goals for Mother included: maintaining appropriate 

and stable housing, providing proof of employment or financial stability, 

completing a parenting class, obtaining a drug and alcohol evaluation and a 

mental health evaluation, consistently visiting with the Children, and 

maintaining a parental bond with the Children.

On April 8, 2014, OCY filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights to the Children. Hearings occurred on October 1, 

2014 and November 12, 2014. OCY caseworker, Julia Solomon, (“Solomon”) 

testified that she was assigned the case from June 2012 until June 2014. 

(Notes of testimony, 10/1/14 at 41, 60.) She stated that Mother made 

inconsistent progress towards housing. (Id. at 54.) Solomon listed Mother’s 

different living situations: Mother resided with her boyfriend’s parents until 

late 2012; Mother and her boyfriend lived with friends for a time; they next 

obtained housing for a short term; none of these places was big enough to 

house the Children. (Id. at 54-55.) It was not until August of 2013 that 

Mother presented appropriate housing for the Children. (Id. at 55-56.) 

Solomon never saw this housing because it was in Franklin County; 
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however, the Office of Franklin County Children and Youth conducted a 

courtesy visit and took pictures as well as verified that the home was 

appropriate for the Children. (Id. at 56.) Mother only stayed in that home 

for four months until November 2013. (Id.) Mother told Solomon the 

landlord was selling the home and informed her that she had to leave. (Id.) 

In December 2013, Mother and her boyfriend were residing with friends. 

(Id. at 57.)

Solomon described Mother’s financial situation while she was assigned 

to the case as “relatively unstable.” (Id.) According to Solomon, Mother 

indicated that she applied for disability but she had not received it. (Id.) 

Solomon believed the issue of disability was never resolved. (Id.) Solomon 

stated Mother had obtained various different jobs in the places she lived, 

e.g., at a gas station, a restaurant, and a garage. Mother provided Solomon 

with one or two paystubs, but noted the employment situation was very 

unstable. (Id. at 58.)

When asked to discuss Mother’s transportation, Solomon referred to it 

as “somewhat unstable.” (Id.) According to Solomon, Mother had different 

cars, but Mother cited a lack of reliable transportation as reasons for missing 

visits, as well as a lack of money for gasoline. (Id.) In August 2013 when 

Mother was finally residing in appropriate housing in Franklin County, 

Solomon attempted to arrange for Mother to have Saturday visits with the 

Children in Pottstown. (Id.) However, Mother was required to provide her 
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driver’s license and a copy of her insurance information. (Id. at 59.) 

Mother never provided the insurance information, so the Saturday visits did 

not take place. (Id.)

Mother did obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and a psychiatric and 

psychological evaluation. Mother also completed a parenting class. (Id. at 

59-60.) As far as visitation with the Children, Solomon testified Mother 

attended 34 out of 50 scheduled visits. (Id. at 62.) The reasons for missing 

visits were generally a lack of transportation or lack of gas money for the 

car, also Mother sometimes had doctors’ appointments or there were a few 

times where she was admitted to the hospital for various reasons. (Id. at 

63.)

On December 10, 2014, the trial court granted the petitions based on 

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). These appeals followed.1

Mother raises the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support the findings of this Honorable Court 

that the agency proved by clear and convincing 

evidence the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. 

2511(a)(1) and (2) for the involuntary 

termination of Birth Mother’s parental rights?

2. Whether this Honorable Court abused its 

discretion in terminating the parental rights of 

Birth Mother on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care, 

 

1

Father has filed separate appeals at Nos. 166, 173, 179, and 182 EDA 

2015.
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when those factors were beyond Birth Mother’s 

control pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 2511(b)?

3. Whether this Honorable Court abused its 

discretion in finding that the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the children will be best served by the 

termination of Birth Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 2511(b), when there is 

a strong and loving bond between Birth Mother 

and the children, and severance of that bond 

will cause irreparable harm to the children?

4. Whether this Honorable Court erred in granting 

the agency’s Petition to change the goal from 

reunification to adoption when the goal of 

reunification remains the most appropriate and 

feasible goal based on the statutory factors set 

forth in 42 Pa.C.S. 6351(f)?

5. Whether this Honorable Court erred in granting 

the agency’s Petition to change the goal from 

reunification to adoption when the agency 

failed to make reasonable efforts to finalize the 

permanency plan goal of reunification?

6. Whether this Honorable Court had sufficient 

evidence to determine the appropriateness of 

changing the goal from reunification to 

adoption when the court did not consult with 

the children regarding the permanency plan 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 6351(e)(1)?

Mother’s brief at 4-5.

In reviewing an appeal from the termination of parental rights, we are 

mindful of our standard of review:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 
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accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported

by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 

1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for 

an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will. 

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear 

reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard 

of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike 

trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the 

parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding 

the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist 

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose 

its own credibility determinations and judgment; 

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as 

the factual findings are supported by the record and 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). This 

court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of 
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parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Further, the 

court must also consider the provisions of Section 2511(b).

We note Mother presents an argument concerning Section 2511(a)(1). 

While OCY’s petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights were filed 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2), the trial court clearly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights under only one section, 2511(a)(2). Therefore, our 

analysis of this case centers on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 
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the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

Regarding the termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), 

our supreme court has observed as follows:

A decision to terminate parental rights, never 

to be made lightly or without a sense of compassion 

for the parent, can seldom be more difficult than 

when termination is based upon parental incapacity. 

The legislature, however, in enacting the [] Adoption 

Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of 

performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit 

as one who refuses to perform the duties.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (citation omitted).

Mother argues she took steps to improve her situation in order to have 

the Children returned to her. Mother contends that the difficulties she had in 

maintaining housing and employment were out of her control. She also 

maintains that she was close to having the Children returned to her and, 

therefore, should have been given more time. (Mother’s brief at 13.)

The trial court provided the following analysis:

Throughout the history of the placement of the 

children, mother’s ability to meet these [FSP] goals 

was “inconsistent.” Birth mother lived in multiple 

different living arrangements, including living with 

her then boyfriend’s parents in a residence that did 

not have enough room for the children to reside 

there as well. In August of 2013, birth mother 

advised OCY caseworker Julia Solomon that she had 
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obtained an appropriate home in Franklin County. 

The Office of Children and Youth of Franklin County 

visited the home and verified that it was 

appropriated [sic] for the children to reside there. 

However, in November 2013, the birth mother left 

that home at the request of the landlord. 

Thereafter, birth mother’s residential situation again 

became unstable. OCY Caseworker Stephanie Setty, 

who was assigned this case beginning in January 

2014, testified that birth mother moved into a new 

home in April 2014, with her then boyfriend, but that 

this home was not adequate to provide room for all 

four children. In September 2014, birth mother and 

her boyfriend split up, and birth mother moved to a 

motel, where she was living at the time of the 

hearing. N.T. October 1, 2014, pp. 167-68.

Although birth mother provided Ms. Solomon 

with pay stubs from various jobs from time to time, 

her employment also remained unstable. OCY 

caseworker Stephanie Setty testified that although 

birth mother claimed to be working full time at a 

Comfort Suites, the pay stub provided to OCY, which 

birth mother asserts was her first pay stub for this 

job, reflected work of approximately 15 hours. N.T. 

October 1, 2014, p. 168. Birth mother has been 

unable to provide pay stubs demonstrating 

consistent employment or financial security, a stable 

residence and proof of payment of rent and utilities.

Her ability to obtain transportation to permit 

her to attend visits with the children was 

inconsistent, and she frequently stated that she 

needed to borrow a car or lacked money to pay for 

gas to attend visits. Birth mother’s attendance at 

visits with the children was inconsistent. During the 

period Ms. Solomon was the caseworker, birth 

mother was offered 50 visits and attended 34. N.T. 

October 1, 2014, p. 62. Exhibit OCY-12. During the 

period April 2014 through September 2014, birth 

mother was offered 14 scheduled visits, and 

attended only 8. The visits that birth mother missed 

included times when she was in the hospital, as well 

as visits she requested be rescheduled. In addition, 
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at least one of the scheduled visits was cancelled due 

to a request of the foster family. However, 

Ms. Solomon testified that the children did not see 

their mother for over a month at the end of 2013, 

and that “often they would receive some gifts from 

mother, but it would be very late with regards to 

their birth and the holiday. And often she would 

promise gifts and they would not receive them.” 

N.T. October 1, 2014, p. 73.

Trial court opinion, 12/10/14 at 13-14.

Based on the above, Mother’s FSP goals of maintaining appropriate 

and stable housing, providing proof of employment or financial stability, and 

consistently visiting the Children were not met. We note that in accordance 

with her FSP goals, Mother did obtain psychiatric, psychological, and drug 

and alcohol counseling as well as complete a parenting class. However, the 

testimony from the therapists who worked on this case revealed Mother had 

not demonstrated an ability to meet the Children’s needs for safety or 

security.

Pinky Mehta, a licensed marriage and family therapist, who worked for 

Creative Health Services in their Family Based Program,2testified she 

worked with the Children from July of 2013 to February 25, 2014. (Notes of 

testimony, 10/1/14 at 9, 18.) Ms. Mehta also noted that she met with 

Mother either separately or with the Children usually once a week. (Id. at 

 

2 Ms. Mehta described the Family Based Program as an eight-month 

authorization program that offers the highest level of care in an outpatient 

setting in Pennsylvania. (Id. at 9.) The program works with children who 

are at risk of out-of-home placement or currently in out-of-home placement 

due to aggressive defiant behaviors. (Id.)
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14.) According to Ms. Mehta, the Children feared that if they were returned 

to Mother, she would not be able to protect them from Father. (Id. at 18.)

OCY Caseworker Solomon testified that she had discussions with 

Mother regarding how she would protect the Children and handle visits with 

Father if she regained custody. (Id. at 66.) Ms. Solomon stated she was 

concerned with Mother’s answer. According to Ms. Solomon, “the answer

that I received from mother repeatedly was that, you know, she wouldn’t let 

them be unsupervised with father right away, and she would let -- see what 

they were comfortable with. But she always indicated right away.” (Id. at 

67.) When Ms. Solomon asked, “does that mean you would allow them to 

be unsupervised with [Father] at some point,” Mother indicated that was the 

case, if that is what the Children wanted. (Id.)

Diana S. Rosenstein, Ph.D., performed assessments of Mother’s 

parenting capacity and evaluations of the attachment of each of the Children 

to both Mother and Father. She testified, “the Children have learned that 

they can’t count on [Mother].” (Notes of testimony, 11/12/13 at 36.) 

OCY Caseworker Solomon testified that although Mother completed 

some of the concrete goals of her FSP, OCY continued to have concerns 

about her parenting ability, her relationship with each child, and her ability 

to understand and address the Children’s fears, concerns, and emotional 

needs. (Notes of testimony, 10/1/14 at 73-74.)
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This court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to 

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340. The evidence here demonstrates that after 

approximately two years, Mother continues to be unable to safely house and 

care for the Children. Their lives cannot be put on hold indefinitely. See 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1125 (Pa.Super. 2010) (a child’s life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.”). After our review of the record in 

this matter, we find the trial court’s determinations regarding 

Section 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the 

record.

Having determined that the requirements of Section 2511(a) were 

satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of Subsection (b) 

were satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). This court has stated that the focus in 

terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under 

Section 2511(b), our supreme court stated:
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[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super.2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d at 485, this Court held that the 

determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Instantly, Mother argues that she has a bond with the Children. She 

maintains the Children love her and she has continued in her role as a 

parent throughout the pendency of the Children’s placement. Additionally, 

Mother points out that the guardian ad litem’s expert, Dr. Rosenstein, 

thought it would be in the Children’s best interest if they continued contact 

with her because the bond was so strong. (Mother’s brief at 15.)

Initially, we observe that the trial court concluded: “I find that 

although there is a strong emotional bond between each of the children and 

their birth mother, the attachment is not secure.” (Trial court opinion, 

12/10/14 at 18.) Clearly, it is undisputed that Mother has a bond with the 

Children. However, the existence of a parental bond with the Children does 

not preclude termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

764 (Pa.Super. 2008).
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As to Mother’s claim that Dr. Rosenstein thought continued contact 

with Mother would be in the Children’s best interest because of the strong 

bond, that claim is not entirely accurate. Dr. Rosenstein testified as follows:

[Attorney for Mother:] When you recommend[ed] 

mother’s rights to be terminated, is your 

recommendation also that they have no further 

contact with her in the future? That doesn’t appear 

to be addressed [in your report].

Dr. Rosenstein: No, it wasn’t addressed. Let me 

think about it for a moment. I believe that it would 

be in their interest to have contact with mother if 

she were more reliable, that the fact that mother 

often cancels scheduled visits upsets the children 

greatly, makes them feel that she’s untrustworthy. 

And that’s not in their interests.

If she could be reliable and visit with them 

reliably, then I would be in favor of contact.

Notes of testimony, 11/12/14 at 75.

The Children remain in foster care because Mother is not reliable and 

has been unable to meet her FSP goals concerning stable housing, steady 

employment or financial stability, and consistent visitation. Mother has had 

two years to meet the above goals, yet she needs more time. (See Mother’s 

brief at 13.)

According to Dr. Rosenstein, the girls expressed a desire to be 

adopted, and it seems “that they would rather have the stability and the 

loving care that they feel they’re getting in their foster home than always 

being concerned about whether mom is going to be able to continue to take 
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care of them.” (Notes of testimony, 11/12/14 at 38.) Additionally, 

Caseworker Solomon stated she was concerned about:

[Mother’s] ability to meet the emotional needs of the 

children. Multiple times when [the] children had 

expressed concerns or expressed being upset or 

visibly being upset, I observed the mother didn’t 

appear to really know how to deal with it and how to 

comfort [the] children and provide reassuring 

feedback.

Notes of testimony, 10/1/14 at 65.

Based on this record where stability, reliability, and ability to meet the 

Children’s emotional or developmental needs is still lacking on Mother’s part, 

we discern no basis for disturbing the trial court’s conclusion that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights served the needs and welfare of the 

Children. See In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 486 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. 

1984) (when a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct his 

or her life in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for a child, 

whether that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of the 

parent is irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the 

termination of parental rights is justified).

Mother’s remaining three issues concern the goal change from 

reunification to adoption. In her brief, Mother fails to present three 

arguments addressing each issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that 

the argument “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to 

be argued; and shall have at the head of each part -- in distinctive type or in 
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type distinctively displayed -- the particular point treated therein, followed 

by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). 

Instead, Mother repeats her earlier claim that the Children have a significant 

bond with Mother and the filing of the petition for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights does not meet the needs and welfare of the Children. 

(Mother’s brief at 17.) We have already determined that the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights does indeed meet the needs and welfare of the 

Children. 

Accordingly, the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights are 

affirmed.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2015