Filed 7/16/15 In re J.C. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B259247

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.C.,

Appellant;

J.O.,

Respondent. 

(Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK02741)

APPEAL from and order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tony L. 

Richardson, Judge. Affirmed. 

Cameryn Schmidt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

Michele Anne Cella, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent. 

_____________________
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Minor J.C. appeals from the dependency court order dismissing for insufficient 

evidence a child abuse petition filed against the minor’s mother. We affirm because 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

In December 2013, acting on a child abuse petition filed by the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services (the department), the dependency 

court detained seven-year-old J.C. and her three-year-old brother J.E. The petition 

alleged that mother J.O. (mother) and her male companion Giovanni G., habitually struck 

the children in a variety of ways: mother struck J.E. in the mouth with her finger or 

otherwise struck the child; Giovanni would slap J.E.’s hand, causing him to call his sister 

for help; Giovanni pulled J.E.’s ears and arms and slapped his back and buttocks; 

Giovanni slapped J.C. on the back of her head, once causing her to fall; mother would 

pull and scratch J.C.’s ears, leaving red marks; and mother had so physically and 

emotionally abused J.C. that the child talked of suicide.

J.C.’s father was L.C., while J.E.’s father was E.E. In 2009, after L.C.’s arrest for 

threatening mother with a knife, J.C. reported that E.E., who was then mother’s 

boyfriend, had touched her inappropriately and placed a knife at her stomach. J.C. 

admitted that her father, L.C., told her to say those things and the matter was closed on 

the ground it was unfounded.

J.C.’s statements concerning what occurred remained fairly consistent. J.C. did 

not feel safe with mother or Giovanni, both of whom hit her brother, pinched and pulled 

their ears and slapped their heads. J.C. claimed mother did not feed her enough and kept 

the refrigerator door locked. She believed mother would intentionally hurt her and said 

she wanted to kill herself. According to J.C., mother hit J.E. daily with her hands, or a 

sandal or belt, and Giovanni hit both her and her brother. Mother hit her and laughed 

 

1 As is typical in dependency cases, the factual and procedural history is lengthy and 

detailed. We have distilled the facts where possible in order to focus on the relevant 

issues raised on appeal.
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when she did so. J.C. claimed mother did not feed or care for her and did not show her 

love. However, she wanted to live with mother, but not with Giovanni, and said she 

wanted her parents to be together.

J.E.’s version was inconsistent. He initially said he was afraid of Giovanni, who 

spanked him. He did not fear mother. J.E. said he was always well fed and had clean 

clothes. The boy claimed that mother would sometimes hit him and that mother and 

Giovanni each pulled and pinched his ears. A few months later, however, the boy denied 

that mother hit him and said he was not afraid of her. He also denied that Giovanni ever 

disciplined him or otherwise applied physical force. He did not recall calling out to his 

sister for help. Mother was nice to J.C. and did not use physical force against the girl.

The maternal grandmother said mother did not take care of the children and that 

J.C. once put a knife to her own chest. Grandmother claimed that mother hit the children, 

and once saw Giovanni pull on J.E.’s arm and ear. L.C. denied coaching J.C. and 

claimed the girl had told him about the abuse.

Mother and Giovanni denied any misconduct. Giovanni never disciplined the 

children and mother did not do more than administer spankings on her children’s 

buttocks from time to time. Both contended that mother’s ex-husband, L.C., and 

mother’s mother (maternal grandmother) had been coaching J.C. to lie, and that the 

accusations began after mother let them know she would be living with Giovanni. E.E., 

the father of J.E., believed J.C. was lying. J.E. never told about being hit, and instead 

said he loved mother and Giovanni and was attached to both of them. E.E. never saw any 

bruises or marks on his son. E.E. said that L.C. and maternal grandmother had coached 

J.C. before. He once overheard grandmother coaching J.C. to in turn coach her brother 

about what to say.

Several last minute reports for the court from department social workers also 

contained conflicting evidence. A February 2014 report stated that a social worker who 

interviewed J.C. did not believe the girl had been coached. An April 2014 report noted 

the conflicts and said forensic interviews of the parties would be conducted. The 

synthesized results of those interviews are included in our factual discussion, above. The 
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April report noted that marks and bruises were never found on the two minors and that 

J.C. had previously been coached to make false allegations. As a result, “the fact of the 

matter is at this time [the department] does not have enough evidence to prove or deny 

that the children . . . were in fact being physically abused and/or inappropriately 

disciplined by the mother or the mother’s live-in boyfriend . . . .” Even so, the 

department believed the children had been exposed to some type of inappropriate 

behavior and continued to recommend that the court take jurisdiction.

The final report, in September 2014, noted that visits between mother and J.C. 

were going well. They also spoke by phone every day, and J.C. cried when the visits 

ended. The social worker noted that J.C. said “she likes lying even though she knows it’s 

not good to lie.” As an example, J.C. admitted that she lied about being forced to walk to 

school. J.C. repeated this to mother the following week. Mother reminded J.C. that they 

lived only a block from school and J.C. liked to walk with the other kids. J.C. laughed 

and said, “ ‘I know. I’m just lazy.’ ” The report added that J.C. “has also reportedly 

made comments about [J.E.’s father, E.E.] that [the social worker] reported does not seem 

like they were original thoughts. [The social worker] further reported the comments were 

almost like [J.C.] was told not to like the [E.E.] father or as if she had heard comments 

about him.” The department recommended that all of the prior assessments, 

recommendations, and court orders stand.

No testimony was taken and no new evidence was introduced at the September 

2014 jurisdiction hearing. Mother moved to dismiss the petition under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 350, subdivision (c) on the ground that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the requested jurisdictional findings. Counsel for father E.E. and 

minor J.E. joined in that motion. J.C.’s counsel opposed dismissal. 

The trial court observed that there were clear conflicts in the evidence, with even 

minor J.E. unable to corroborate his sister’s account. Regardless, the boy’s statement that 

he had been hit on his hands did not rise to the level of jurisdictionally sufficient abuse. 

The court ran through the evidence that J.C. might have been coached, noted she was 

very bright, and pointed out that J.C. did not like Giovanni and wanted her family back 
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together. Even though J.C. was consistent about her allegations, the issue for the court 

was whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the allegations of the petition. Even 

though “there may be some smoke,” and even after absorbing “the information and the 

circumstances of this family,” the trial court found, “based on all the atmospherics,” that 

there was not enough to sustain the counts alleged in the petition. The trial court then 

dismissed the petition.

DISCUSSION

The department was required to prove the allegations of its petition by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 355, subd. (a).) However, after 

the presentation of evidence is over, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds that the 

burden of proof was not met. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 350, subd. (c).) Such a motion is 

akin to a motion for judgment in a bench trial (Code. Civ. Proc., § 631.8), meaning that 

the dependency court is the ultimate trier of fact and must weigh the evidence and assess 

the credibility of witnesses. (In re Roberto C. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1252-1253; 

In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479-1480.) We will affirm if the 

dependency court’s order is supported by substantial evidence. (Roberto C., at p. 1254.)

Minor J.C. contends that the trial court erred because: (1) it did not make express 

findings; (2) it did not weigh all the evidence in support of each allegation; (3) it 

improperly required corroboration by J.E.; and (4) the evidence was so strong it required 

the court to assume jurisdiction. 

Neither Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 nor 350 requires express 

findings. Accordingly, we will affirm implied findings that are supported by substantial 

evidence. (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 980.)

As for examining all the evidence, the court said it had reviewed “from the files 

the entirety of what [J.C.] has stated,” had read the forensic interviews, and had read and 

looked at “all the evidence and the forensic interviews.” Based on that the court did not 

see sufficient evidence to “sustain the counts which are presented in this petition.” Thus, 

the record shows the court did review all the evidence and apply it to all the allegations.
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The minor also asks us to reweigh the evidence, something we cannot do under the 

substantial evidence standard of review. Viewed most favorably to the court’s order, the 

record shows perhaps a troubled child living in a troubled household who said she likes 

to lie and has been coached to do so in the past to undermine mother. This is bolstered by 

a January 2014 social worker’s report, where the child was asked about her statements

concerning suicide. In response, the minor complained that mother was not caring for her 

or showing her love, acknowledged that she had made those statements, but admitted she 

“said that . . . because I was mad” and did not want to talk about it. There was no 

evidence of bruising or marks on the children and the only other supposed victim, J.E., 

was inconsistent at best, sometimes claiming that nothing untoward had ever happened.

Finally, we do not believe the court required corroboration of minor’ testimony. 

Instead, when weighing minor’s credibility, the court noted that not even her brother had 

supported her version of events. We read this as nothing more than a remark 

underscoring the overall weakness of the minor’s credibility. On this record, we 

conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s determination to dismiss 

the petition.

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing the department’s petition is affirmed.

RUBIN, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

BIGELOW, P. J. 

GRIMES, J.