FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGARET JOHN,  No. 05-56125

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v. CV-04-

00048(AHM) CITY OF EL MONTE,

Defendant,  ORDER

AMENDING and

OPINION AND

ERIC YOUNGQUIST, AMENDED

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 7, 2007—Pasadena, California

Filed September 26, 2007

Amended February 5, 2008

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Daniel M. Friedman,*

and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedman

*Daniel M. Friedman, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 

1709
COUNSEL

Peter J. Ferguson, Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, Santa Ana,

California, and Timothy T. Coates, Greines, Martin, Stein &

JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1711
Richland LLP, Los Angeles, California, for appellant Eric

Youngquist. 

John Burton, The Law Offices of John Burton, Pasadena, California, and William J. Osborne, Osborne & Associates, Sherman Oaks, California, for appellee Margaret John. 

ORDER

The opinion filed on September 26, 2007, slip op. at 13251,

is amended as follows:

Slip op. at 13261, Lines 8-16

Delete <Likewise, in Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942

F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1991), we found that, because the

officer knew the victim had been assaulted, the officer had probable cause to make an arrest based on

the “victim’s reliable identification of his attacker.”

942 F.2d at 262 (citation omitted); see also id.

(“Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause

than an identification by name of assailants provided

by a victim.”).> 

Slip op. at 13262, Line 6 

Insert <Even if a reasonable jury might conclude the

officer lacked probable cause, the arrest was not contrary to any clearly established law, so the officer

was entitled to qualified immunity from a jury trial.>

after <could have reached the opposite conclusion.>

The petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is otherwise denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 35; Fed. R. App. P. 40. No

further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will be

accepted.

1712 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST
OPINION

FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal challenges a district court’s denial of summary

judgment dismissing a damage suit by a female school teacher

against a police officer for improperly arresting her for allegedly sexually molesting a ten-year-old female student. The

district court held that the officer did not have probable cause

for the arrest and was not entitled to qualified immunity for

his conduct. We hold, however, that the officer had probable

cause for the arrest and therefore reverse the denial of summary judgment.

I

The basic facts, undisputed unless otherwise indicated, may

be summarized as follows: 

The appellee, Margaret John, a fifth-grade public school

teacher, intercepted notes written by her ten-year-old student

Ashley to Ashley’s friend. In the notes Ashley stated that she

“hop[ed] Ms. John dies today like poisoning her or something,” and that John was “a fucken [sic] perv” and a “lesbian

bitch.” Five days later, after John had shown those notes to

the school principal, the latter requested a police investigation. 

The appellant, Eric Youngquist, a police officer with ten

years experience on the city policy force, conducted the investigation. Youngquist had had extensive training, including

courses in child abuse (which included interviewing suspects)

and advanced interviewing techniques. 

When Youngquist interviewed Ashley at the school, she

was unresponsive. Youngquist asked her whether she would

prefer that the discussion take place at the police station.

When she indicated that she would, he took her there and conJOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1713
tinued the interview. According to Youngquist’s declaration,

Ashley then told the following story: 

A few weeks earlier, John had imposed detention on her

and six other students, and had required them to stay after

class. After all the other students (whom she could not identify) had left the room 

Ms. John came up and stood behind her. 

That without any words being spoken, Ms. John

placed her right hand on her left shoulder area of her

shirt and then moved her hand down and began

caressing her left breast with her hand. 

That Ms. John rubbed on the outside of her clothing in an upward and downward motion on her left

breast. 

After rubbing her breast area she began moving

her hand down near her vaginal area on the outside

of her pants. 

She stated that Ms. John left her hand on the outside of her crouch [sic] area adjacent to her vagina

on the outside of her clothing. Her hand remained

there for approximately one minute. 

Youngquist further stated: 

Prior to her description of the touching, she

became very quiet. She stopped communicating

momentarily. She provided short word descriptions. This is consistent behavior of a victim of

sexual abuse. I would then have her point, for

example, to the area where she just described having been touched. She would then point to the area

where she just described. This was done for pur1714 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST
poses of looking for deception. A deception might

be shown if a description and then a physical act

of pointing to another area was given. 

I would continue to validate the information by

providing her false or exaggerated facts into her

descriptions of the incident. Each time she would

correct me and would stay consistent with her original description. This was done to allow her to embellish or fabricate the facts regarding the events. She

would not allow it. 

I believed her to be a mature 10 year old. Her

description of the events, her consistency and accuracy without any detection of exaggeration, fabrication, or deception was paramount for me to form the

belief that she was a genuine victim. 

Likewise, the notes themselves provide independent corroborating evidence that the act occurred.

For example, the notes call the plaintiff a “lesbian”

and “perv.” (assuming pervert). These words support

the activity she now describes. They were written

within a short time after the incident. They were

written (in secret) to a friend, not with the intent to

cause “trouble” for Ms. John. Necessarily, the notes,

or words taken from the notes support the belief of

the truth of her account. In other words, it was highly

probable that the described activity occurred. 

Based upon all the information I had received, I

believed I had legal, sufficient and reliable information to support probable cause to arrest Ms. John for

California Penal Code § 288(a)(c)(Lewd and Lascivious Acts with a child under the Age of 14 Years).

Following this interview, Youngquist attempted to interview John at the school. 

JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1715
Prior to the interview John had a telephone conversation

with a lawyer, who also spoke to Youngquist. In her declaration, John stated that her attorney 

told me that if I choose to speak with the police, I

should at least ask the police to make a record that

I requested an attorney. 

When I hung up the phone and returned to the

conference room with Officer Youngquist, he asked

me what I decided to do, and I told him I wanted him

to make a record of my request to have an attorney

present. However, before I could also inform him of

my decision to co-operate, he said that because I had

asked for an attorney, he could not question me, and

had “no choice” but to arrest me. Obviously, I was

shocked and greatly dismayed. 

Youngquist then arrested John, handcuffed her, and led her

handcuffed out of the school. She was confined for 36 hours,

and released after the district attorney declined to prosecute

her. 

John then filed the present damage suit in the United States

District Court for the Central District of California under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, against Youngquist, the city and other city

officials. She contended that Youngquist violated her constitutional rights by arresting her without probable cause. 

The district court denied cross motions for summary judgment. It held that Youngquist had not established probable

cause for the arrest because the evidence “could lead a fairminded jury to conclude that Officer Youngquist did not act

reasonably.” John v. City of El Monte, No. CV04-

0048AHM(BDKx), slip op. at 17 (C.D. Cal. July 6,

2005)(“Slip op.”). The court further held that Youngquist did

not have qualified immunity because Ninth Circuit precedent

“would have put any reasonable officer on notice that he

1716 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST
could not rely solely on the police station interview of tenyear-old A.M. to establish probable cause to arrest plaintiff.”

Id. at 18.

II

An order denying summary judgment ordinarily is not

immediately appealable because it is interlocutory. See Jeffers

v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001). Such orders

denying qualified immunity, however, are appealable because

that principle protects government officers not just from liability, but also from having to litigate the validity of their official actions. Id.

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court

instructed that “[i]n a suit against an officer for an alleged

violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified

immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence.”

“The first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right

would have been violated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the question [is] whether the

right was clearly established. . . . If no constitutional right

would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Id. at 200-01. This court has recognized its obligation to make the bifurcated Saucier inquiry. Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, before

considering qualified immunity, we must first determine

whether Youngquist had probable cause to arrest John. Since

we hold that he did, that ends the inquiry. 

[1] “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have

knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to

lead a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has

been or is being committed by the person being arrested.”

United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). This court

looks to “the totality of the circumstances known to the arrestJOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1717
ing officers, [to determine if] a prudent person would have

concluded there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had

committed a crime.” United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789,

792 (9th Cir. 1986). Probable cause is an objective standard

and the officer’s subjective intention in exercising his discretion to arrest is immaterial in judging whether his actions

were reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Lopez, 482

F.3d at 1072. 

[2] The determination whether there was probable cause is

based upon the information the officer had at the time of making the arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152

(2004)(“Whether probable cause exists depends on the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the

arresting officer at the time of the arrest”). It is essential to

avoid hindsight analysis, i.e., to consider additional facts that

became known only after the arrest was made. Cf. Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989)(stating that the “reasonableness inquiry [in an excessive force claim] is ‘judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of ‘hindsight’ ’ ”)(citation

omitted). 

[3] Youngquist did not just accept Ashley’s allegations of

John’s misconduct against her. He properly drew upon his

experience and his special training in dealing with sexual

abuse of children and advanced interviewing in evaluating her

story. See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“[I]t is settled law that officers may ‘draw on their own inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information

available to them that might well elude an untrained person.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206,

1210 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Youngquist tested Ashley’s veracity and reliability in various ways which, in his experienced judgment, indicated to

him that she was telling the truth. As Youngquist stated, her

statements of what happened were “short word descriptions.

1718 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST
This is consistent behavior of a victim of sexual abuse.” She

indicated the areas she stated had been touched by pointing to

them. When Youngquist provided “false or exaggerated facts

into her descriptions of the incident[,] [e]ach time she would

correct me and would stay consistent with her original

description. This was done to allow her to embellish or fabricate the facts regarding the events. She would not allow it.”

Youngquist further stated that Ashley’s “notes themselves

provide independent corroborating evidence that the act

occurred. For example, the notes call the plaintiff a ‘lesbian’

and ‘perv.’ (assuming pervert). These words support the activity she now describes. They were written within a short time

after the incident.” 

[5] As Youngquist summarized the situation, Ashley’s “description of the events, her consistency and accuracy without

any detection of exaggeration, fabrication, or deception was

paramount for me to form the belief that she was a genuine

victim.” 

[6] In sum, Youngquist had probable cause to arrest John

because “under the totality of the circumstances known to the

arresting officer[ ], a prudent person could have concluded

that there was a fair probability that [she] had committed a

crime.” Peng v. Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir.

2003)(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).

The existence of probable cause necessarily turns upon the

particular facts of the individual case, and prior decisions generally are of little help in deciding a specific case. We know

of no case that fairly can be said to control the present one.

Our precedents, however, are consistent with our conclusion

here. 

For example, in Peng, we concluded that because the

alleged victim provided sufficiently detailed facts regarding

the incident, her allegations alone sufficed to establish probable cause for the arrest. 335 F.3d at 978. Arpin v. Santa Clara

JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1719
Valley Transportation, 261 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2001), is not

inconsistent. There, we concluded that because the officers

had based their arrest solely on an unexamined charge by a

bus driver that a rider had assaulted him and had done no further investigation, they did not have probable cause. Arpin,

261 F.3d at 925. Here, Youngquist probed Ashley’s allegations thoroughly prior to arresting John and did not base the

arrest solely on an “unexamined charge.” 

[7] The probable cause inquiry arises in this case in the

context of the denial of Youngquist’s motion for summary

judgment. In reviewing that action, all reasonable inferences

must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. U.S. ex rel. Ali v.

Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 355 F.3d 1140, 1144

(9th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, the movant’s uncontradicted factual allegations ordinarily are accepted. See e.g.,

British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952-53 (9th

Cir. 1978). In this case, John has not disputed Youngquist’s

factual statements explaining why he accepted Ashley’s statements about John’s alleged sexual misconduct against her.

Based on these statements and the supporting evidence of

Ashley’s notes we have discussed above, we have concluded

that Youngquist had probable cause to believe that John had

committed the alleged offense against Ashley. In the context

of the probable cause inquiry, we cannot say that on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have reached the opposite conclusion. Even if a reasonable jury might conclude the officer

lacked probable cause, the arrest was not contrary to any

clearly established law, so the officer was entitled to qualified

immunity from a jury trial. 

The rationale of the district court’s denial of summary

judgment for Youngquist was that in the circumstances here

he had a duty to investigate further before arresting John. The

court stated: “Here, a jury could find that under these circumstances he was not reasonable. He relied solely on information

he pried out of an indisputably troubled and very young victim, his view that her letters corroborated her accusation, his

1720 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST
assessment of her demeanor and what he claims was the

plaintiff’s refusal to undergo questioning. But that last factor

- whether plaintiff was willing to be interviewed - is disputed;

if the jury believes plaintiff, then it would find that she was

prepared to undergo questioning and was prevented from

doing so by Youngquist himself, by virtue of his possibly petulant, sudden arrest.” Slip Op. at 16 (footnotes omitted). For

the reasons we have given, however, we disagree. 

We do not minimize the serious effect this unfortunate incident must have had upon John. She had been a teacher for

thirty years, was highly regarded and had an unblemished

record. To be escorted by the police out of the school in handcuffs and confined for 36 hours must have had a devastating

impact upon her and upon her professional and personal reputation. 

Moreover, Youngquist appears to have acted with

unseemly haste in arresting her. Had he investigated the matter further before doing so, he might not have taken that

action at all. His stated reason for arresting her at that time—

to prevent her from engaging in similar misconduct against

other students—is unconvincing, because, in his presence,

John had been placed on administrative leave when he

informed the school authorities of the investigation. Indeed,

John’s statement about what happened immediately before

her arrest—which we accept for summary judgment purposes

—suggests that Youngquist’s arrest of her at that time may

have been prompted by her stated wish to have a lawyer present during the interview. 

[8] That being said, however, the probable cause inquiry is

an objective one: whether the information Youngquist had

when he made the arrest could have led a reasonable officer

to believe that John had committed an offense against Ashley.

For the reasons given, we answer that question affirmatively.

JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST 1721
CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court denying Youngquist’s

motion for summary judgment based on probable cause is

reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED

1722 JOHN v. YOUNGQUIST