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SJC-11742

LINDA PINTI & another1 vs. EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., & 

another.

2

Middlesex. January 8, 2015. - July 17, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 

Hines, JJ.

Mortgage, Foreclosure, Real estate. Real Property, Mortgage, 

Sale. Sale, Real estate. Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage.

Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Declaratory 

proceeding, Summary judgment.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

January 31, 2013.

The case was heard by Maureen B. Hogan, J., on motions for 

summary judgment.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Richard M.W. Bauer (Stefanie A. Balandis, Amanda B. Loring,

& Geoffry Walsh with him) for the plaintiffs.

Howard M. Brown (Sarah Ann Smegal, Tom Looney, & Lauren 

Solar with him) for Harold Wilion.

Michael P. Robinson for Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc.

 

1 Lesley Phillips.

2 Harold Wilion.
2

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

James P. Long, pro se.

Daniel D. Bahls & Courtney Clemente for Community Legal 

Aid.

Grace C. Ross, pro se.

BOTSFORD, J. In 2012, the defendant Emigrant Mortgage 

Company, Inc. (Emigrant), foreclosed on the mortgage of the 

plaintiffs Lesley Phillips and Linda Pinti by exercise of the 

power of sale contained in the mortgage. Thereafter, the 

plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court against 

Emigrant and the defendant Harold Wilion, the purchaser of the 

property at the foreclosure sale, seeking a declaratory judgment 

that the sale was void because Emigrant failed to comply with 

paragraph 22 of the mortgage, which concerns the mortgagee's 

provision of notice to the mortgagor of default and the right to 

cure, and also the remedies available to the mortgagee upon the 

mortgagor's failure to cure the default, including the power of 

sale (notice of default provisions). We agree with the 

plaintiffs that strict compliance with the notice of default

provisions in paragraph 22 of the mortgage was required as a 

condition of a valid foreclosure sale, and that Emigrant failed 

to meet the strict compliance requirement. Accordingly, we 

reverse the allowance of the defendant Emigrant's motion to 
3

dismiss and of the defendant Wilion's motion for summary 

judgment.3

Background.

4 Phillips purchased a condominium unit 

(property) in Cambridge in 1982. In 2005, she transferred title 

to the property by quitclaim deed to herself and her spouse, 

Pinti, as tenants by the entirety. On March 13, 2008, Pinti and 

Phillips granted a mortgage on the property to Emigrant to 

secure a $160,000 loan.5 Paragraph 22 of the mortgage provides

that, prior to acceleration of the loan following any breach of 

the mortgage by the plaintiffs, Emigrant is required to notify 

the plaintiffs of "(a) the default; (b) the action required to 

cure the default; (c) a date, not less than [thirty] days from 

the date the notice is given to [the plaintiffs], by which the 

default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default 

on or before the date specified in the notice may result in 

acceleration of the sums secured by [the mortgage]." Paragraph 

22 further provides that such notice must inform the plaintiffs 

"of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to 

bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or 

 

3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by James P. 

Long, Community Legal Aid, and Grace C. Ross.

4 The facts are drawn from the summary judgment materials 

before the motion judge.

5 Linda Pinti was a party to the note underlying the 

mortgage, but Lesley Phillips was not.
4

any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale" 

(emphasis added), and adds that upon failure to cure the 

default, Emigrant may invoke "the statutory power of sale."

6

 

6 Paragraph 22 of the mortgage provides in full:

"Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to 

Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's breach 

of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument 

. . . . The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) 

the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not 

less than [thirty] days from the date the notice is given 

to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) 

that failure to cure the default on or before the date 

specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the 

sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the 

Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the 

right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to 

bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a 

default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration 

and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the 

date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may 

require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by 

this Security Instrument without further demand and may 

invoke the STATUTORY POWER OF SALE and any other remedies

permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to 

collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies 

provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, 

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence.

"If Lender invokes the STATUTORY POWER OF SALE, Lender 

shall mail a copy of a notice of sale to Borrower, and to 

other persons prescribed by Applicable Law, in the manner 

provided by Applicable Law. Lender shall publish the 

notice of sale, and the Property shall be sold in the 

manner prescribed by Applicable Law. Lender or its 

designee may purchase the Property at any sale. The 

proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the following 

order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not 

limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums 

secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to 

the person or persons legally entitled to it."
5

In August and September of 2009, the plaintiffs failed to 

make the monthly mortgage payments that were due. On 

September 29, 2009, Emigrant sent a notice of default to the 

plaintiffs pursuant to paragraph 22. The notice stated that the 

plaintiffs had failed to make monthly mortgage payments, 

demanded payment of a sum sufficient to satisfy the outstanding 

amount by December 28, 2009, and noted that the mortgagee could 

invoke the statutory power of sale if the plaintiffs failed to 

cure the default in the time allowed. Finally, the notice 

stated that "notice is hereby given that [the plaintiffs] have 

the right to assert in any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale the 

nonexistence of a default or any other defense [they] may have 

to acceleration and foreclosure and sale" (emphasis added).

In 2011, Pinti sent Emigrant a "qualified written request"

(QWR) that asked Emigrant to identify the holder of the 

plaintiffs' mortgage and the owner of Pinti's loan.7 The letter 

also requested copies of any assignment of the plaintiffs' 

mortgage, and of Pinti's promissory note "in its current 

condition showing all endorsements and/or allonges." Emigrant's 

 

7 A "qualified written request" (QWR) is "a written 

correspondence" that "includes . . . the name and account of the 

borrower" and "a statement of the reasons for the belief of the 

borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error 

or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other 

information sought by the borrower." 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B)

(2012).
6

response to the QWR, dated August 22, 2011, indicated that ESBMH Holdings, LLC (ESB-MH), owned the loan, but that Emigrant 

held and serviced the loan. The response enclosed a copy of 

Emigrant's assignment of the plaintiffs' mortgage and note to 

ESB-MH; the assignment was signed by Filippo Ruggiero, "Vice 

President" of Emigrant. It appears on the face of the 

assignment that Ruggiero executed it on November 30, 2009, but 

Emigrant's response to the QWR asserts that "the assignment 

transferring ownership of the note and mortgage to [ESB-MH] has 

not been recorded and the original note and mortgage, as well as 

the assignment of the mortgage[,] are in the possession of 

[Emigrant,] which is prosecuting the foreclosure action as the 

holder and servicer of the loan." Emigrant's response to the 

QWR also enclosed Pinti's note with an allonge indicating that 

the note had been paid to the order of ESB-MH without recourse 

by Emigrant, and then endorsed in blank without recourse by ESBMH.

Emigrant published a notice of foreclosure sale regarding 

the plaintiffs' property in the Boston Herald on June 12, 19, 

and 26, 2012. Wilion purchased the property at the foreclosure 

sale held on August 9, 2012, and obtained a foreclosure deed 

from Emigrant dated September 10, 2012. Wilion then initiated a 

summary process action against the plaintiffs in the District 

Court.
7

On January 31, 2013, the plaintiffs filed the present 

action against the defendants in the Superior Court. The 

plaintiffs' complaint sought a judgment declaring that the 

foreclosure sale was void, and asserted multiple theories 

supporting this claim, two of which are relevant to this appeal: 

(1) Emigrant's September 29, 2009, notice of default did not 

comply with paragraph 22 because it did not explicitly inform 

the plaintiffs of "the right to bring a court action to assert 

the non-existence of a default or any other defense of [the 

plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale," as required by the 

paragraph; and (2) Emigrant did not hold the relevant mortgage 

and promissory note when it foreclosed on the property. In 

addition, the complaint sought a judgment declaring that Wilion 

failed to comply with the prerequisites for initiating a summary 

process action on the ground that Wilion, to whom Emigrant sold 

the property, did not have superior title to the property 

because Emigrant did not lawfully foreclose.8

Emigrant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 

complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) and (6), 365 Mass. 

754 (1974). Separately, Wilion filed a counterclaim seeking a 

judgment declaring that the foreclosure and foreclosure sale 

 

8 The complaint also sought injunctive relief against Wilion 

to preclude him from pursuing a summary process action against 

the plaintiffs or from offering the property for sale. The 

plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied.
8

were valid and, consequently, that Wilion possessed superior 

title to the property by virtue of the foreclosure deed. 

Shortly thereafter, Wilion filed a motion for summary judgment 

with respect to the plaintiffs' complaint and his counterclaim,

and the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment in

their favor on both their complaint and Wilion's counterclaim.

After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court allowed 

Wilion's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' 

cross-motion. The judge rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 

Emigrant's notice of default rendered the foreclosure void, 

reasoning that Emigrant was not required strictly to comply with 

a term of the mortgage, such as the notice of default and rightto-cure provisions of paragraph 22, that had no direct 

relationship to the power of sale. The judge also determined 

there was no genuine factual dispute that Emigrant validly held 

the mortgage and the note at the time of the foreclosure sale. 

In accordance with her decision, a judgment entered in favor of 

Wilion on his counterclaim that declared the foreclosure of the 

mortgage and the foreclosure sale were valid and, therefore, 

that Wilion held good title to the property. In a separate 

decision, the judge also allowed Emigrant's motion to dismiss 

for reasons substantially similar to those in her summary 

judgment decision. The plaintiffs timely appealed, and we 

transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.
9

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review a grant of 

summary judgment de novo to determine 'whether, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 

material facts have been established and the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Juliano v. 

Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529-530 (2012), quoting Augat, Inc. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). "Because our 

review is de novo, we accord no deference to the decision of the 

motion judge." DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 

799 (2013). De novo review also applies to the judge's 

dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 

(b) (1) and (6). See Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 

Mass. 674, 676 (2011). See also Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 

451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007).

2. Compliance with paragraph 22. The plaintiffs argue 

that Emigrant was required to conduct the foreclosure sale in 

strict compliance with paragraph 22. They reason that under 

this court's decisions, compliance with the terms of the 

mortgage describing the steps that lead up to foreclosure, 

beginning with the notice of default provision spelled out in 

paragraph 22, is a necessary component of the power of sale

provided in the mortgage as well as of the statutory power of 
10

sale set out in G. L. c. 183, § 21 (§ 21).

9 Conversely, the 

defendants contend that this court's decision in U.S. Bank Nat'l 

Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, 422 (2014) (Schumacher), 

concerning the notice of default and right-to-cure notice

provisions of G. L. c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A), and the relationship 

between § 35A and the power of sale in § 21, dictates that 

strict compliance with the analogous contractual notice of 

default provision of paragraph 22 was not required because like 

§ 35A, paragraph 22 is not part of the power of sale. Agreeing 

 

9 General Laws c. 183, § 21 (§ 21), provides:

"The following 'power' shall be known as the 

'Statutory Power of Sale', and may be incorporated in any 

mortgage by reference:

"(POWER.)

"But upon any default in the performance or observance 

of the foregoing or other condition, the mortgagee or his 

executors, administrators, successors or assigns may sell 

the mortgaged premises or such portion thereof as may 

remain subject to the mortgage in case of any partial 

release thereof, either as a whole or in parcels, together 

with all improvements that may be thereon, by public 

auction on or near the premises then subject to the 

mortgage, or, if more than one parcel is then subject 

thereto, on or near one of said parcels, or at such place 

as may be designated for that purpose in the mortgage, 

first complying with the terms of the mortgage and with the 

statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 

exercise of a power of sale, and may convey the same by 

proper deed or deeds to the purchaser or purchasers 

absolutely and in fee simple; and such sale shall forever 

bar the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him from 

all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, whether 

at law or in equity" (emphasis added).
11

with the motion judge, they argue that Emigrant's notice of 

default was required only to comply with paragraph 22

substantially, not strictly, and that the notice sent by 

Emigrant to the plaintiffs met this standard. Even if we were 

to assume that Emigrant's notice did qualify as "substantial 

compliance" with the notice of default provisions of paragraph 

22, we disagree that such compliance was sufficient for a valid 

foreclosure sale in this case; strict adherence to the notice of 

default provisions in the paragraph was required.

"Massachusetts does not require a [mortgagee] to obtain 

judicial authorization to foreclose on a mortgaged property." 

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 645-646 (2011)

(Ibanez). Accordingly, a mortgagee may conduct a foreclosure 

by exercise of the statutory power of sale set out in § 21, 

where, as here, the mortgage itself gives the mortgagee a power 

of sale and includes by reference the statutory power. See

Ibanez, supra at 646. Under the terms of the statutory power of 

sale, the power may be exercised "upon any default in the 

performance" of a condition of the mortgage, such as the 

mortgagor's failure to pay the note underlying the mortgage. 

G. L. c. 183, § 21. Exercise of the power entitles a mortgagee

to sell the mortgaged property at public auction, convey the 

property to the purchaser in fee simple, "and such sale shall 

forever bar the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him 
12

from all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, whether 

at law or in equity." Id. See Ibanez, supra. Section 21 

expressly requires, however, that to effectuate a valid 

foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale, the mortgagee must 

"first comply[] with the terms of the mortgage and with the 

statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 

exercise of a power of sale."

This court has recently reemphasized the point that in 

light of "the substantial power that the statutory scheme 

affords to a [mortgagee] to foreclose without immediate judicial 

oversight, we adhere to the familiar rule that 'one who sells 

under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms'"; the 

failure to do so results in "no valid execution of the power, 

and the sale is wholly void." Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 646, quoting 

Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905). See Pryor v. Baker, 

133 Mass. 459, 460 (1882) ("The exercise of a power to sell by a 

mortgagee is always carefully watched, and is to be exercised 

with careful regard to the interests of the mortgagor"). This 

is true with respect to terms that are connected to the power of

sale contained in the mortgage instrument itself,10 and to terms 

 

10 Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 210-212 (1905), quoted in 

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011)

(Ibanez), was such a case. Others include, e.g., McGreevey v. 

Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 483-484 (1936); 

Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen 516, 518 (1862); Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 

Gray 243, 244 (1856).
13

contained in § 21, the statutory power of sale, or in one of 

"the statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 

exercise of a power of sale" to which § 21 refers.11

Wilion asserts, correctly, that in a number of our 

foreclosure cases requiring strict compliance with mortgage

terms relating to a power of sale, the terms at issue were 

connected to the foreclosure sale itself. See McGreevey v. 

Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 481, 484 (1936)

(although mortgaged property was located in Medford, in 

Middlesex County, mortgage required foreclosure sale to be 

advertised and held in Suffolk County; advertisement in Medford 

newspaper complied with statutory requirement in G. L. [Ter. 

Ed.] c. 244, § 14, but did not comply with terms of mortgage, 

rendering foreclosure sale void); Moore, 187 Mass. at 210-212

(noncompliance with mortgage term identifying newspaper in which 

foreclosure sale was to be advertised rendered foreclosure sale 

void). But none of these cases indicates or even suggests that 

the court's holding turned on the fact that the terms of the 

mortgage with which the mortgagee failed to comply related 

 

11 See, e.g., Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 

569, 580-581 (2012); Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-648. See also 

Tamburello v. Monahan, 321 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1947) (power of 

sale referenced in mortgage was statutory power of sale; lack of 

compliance with requirement in G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 183, § 21, 

that sale be on or near mortgaged premises rendered foreclosure 

sale void).
14

directly to the foreclosure sale. Rather, the point was the 

more general one that the terms of the power of sale, whatever 

they might be, demanded strict compliance. Indeed, our cases 

have indicated consistently that the mortgagee, to effect a 

valid foreclosure sale, must strictly comply not only with the 

terms of the actual power of sale in the mortgage, but also with 

any conditions precedent to the exercise of the power that the 

mortgage might contain. See Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 Gray 243, 

243-244 (1856) (where mortgage provided that upon default of 

payment by mortgagor, mortgagee "may enter and take possession 

of said premises immediately, and may sell and dispose of the 

same, on giving two weeks' notice thereof publicly," entry and 

possession by mortgagee were conditions precedent to exercise of 

power of sale; absence of entry and possession by mortgagee 

prior to foreclosure sale rendered it void); Smith v. Provin, 4 

Allen 516, 516, 518 (1862) (mortgage contained power of sale to 

be exercised upon default by mortgagor, plus certain "conditions 

annexed to the power of sale," including requirement that within 

one year following foreclosure sale, mortgagee was to make and 

record affidavit of compliance with requirements of deed; 

mortgagee's failure to comply with this "annexed" condition 

rendered foreclosure sale void); Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 

179, 184 (1897) ("Still the general rule is that conditions 

precedent to the execution of a power of sale must be strictly 
15

complied with"); McGreevey, 294 Mass. at 484 ("This court has 

said that the general rule is that conditions precedent to the 

execution of a power of sale must be strictly complied with"

[quotation and citation omitted]). See also Foster, Hall & 

Adams Co. v. Sayles, 213 Mass. 319, 321-324 (1913).

12

Emigrant contends that cases such as Foster, Hall & Adams 

Co., supra; Moore, supra; and Smith, supra, are inapplicable

here because they predate the enactment of the statutory power 

of sale set forth in § 21, which was enacted in 1912. See St.

1912, c. 502, § 6. The argument is unavailing. "Mortgages 

containing a power of sale existed at least as early as one 

hundred years before enactment of the statutory power." Eaton

 

12 The court's decision in Foster, Hall & Adams Co. v. 

Sayles, 213 Mass. 319 (1913), illustrates the principle 

articulated in the cases cited in this paragraph. The defendant 

in Foster, Hall & Adams obtained title to the mortgage property 

at issue through a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a 

power of sale in the mortgage. Id. at 321-322. The question 

before the court was whether the defendant's title could be 

proved valid where the provisions of the mortgage properly could 

be read to permit the power of sale to be exercised only after 

thirty days' notice of default had been given to the mortgagor, 

and there was no evidence presented that such notice had been 

given. See id. at 322-323. The court answered that the failure 

to provide the notice of default -- a requirement that was 

actually set out in an article of the mortgage separate from the 

article defining the power of sale -- provided a sufficient 

basis on which to conclude that the foreclosure sale probably 

was invalid. Id. at 322-324. In other words, although the 

court did not use the term "condition precedent," the court 

essentially treated the particular mortgage's provision for 

thirty days' notice of default to be given as such a condition -

- that is, a prerequisite to a valid exercise of the power of 

sale.
16

v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 580 n.16 (2012). 

As reflected in the title of the act that established the 

statutory power of sale, "An Act to shorten the forms of deeds, 

mortgages and other instruments relating to real property,"

13

§ 21 was enacted to give the power of sale "statutory form to 

shorten the length of mortgage instruments." Eaton, supra. 

Nothing in the language or history of § 21 suggests that the 

Legislature intended the statute to disavow or alter this 

court's rulings that mortgage terms associated with the power of 

sale must be followed strictly. Indeed, § 21 by its terms 

offers explicit support for this conclusion, in expressly 

directing that one who seeks to conduct a foreclosure sale 

pursuant to the statutory power of sale must first comply with

"the terms of the mortgage" and "the statutes relating to the 

foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale,"

and taking care to list these two requirements separately. See 

note 9, supra.

In advancing their argument, the plaintiffs correctly do 

not contend that to effectuate a valid exercise of a power of 

sale contained in a mortgage, a mortgagee must demonstrate 

punctilious performance of every single mortgage term. As 

illustrated by the cases previously discussed, our decisions 

 

13 See St. 1912, c. 502.
17

suggest that the mortgage terms requiring strict compliance are

limited to (1) terms directly concerned with the foreclosure 

sale authorized by the power of sale in the mortgage, and (2)

those prescribing actions the mortgagee must take in connection 

with the foreclosure sale -- whether before or after the sale 

takes place.14 Insofar as the plaintiffs' mortgage is concerned, 

paragraph 22 begins by requiring notice of default to be given 

prior to any acceleration of the sums secured by the mortgage;

then specifically prescribes the contents of the notice of 

default; and then provides that, if the default is not cured 

before the date specified in the notice, the mortgagee may 

invoke the statutory power of sale (as well as pursue other 

remedies). As the paragraph is written, therefore, the sending 

of the prescribed notice of default is essentially a 

prerequisite to use of the mortgage's power of sale, because the 

 

14 As indicated previously in the text, this court in Rogers

v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 184 (1897), used the phrase, 

"conditions precedent to the execution of a power of sale" to 

describe the type of mortgage provision with which strict 

compliance is required, and the cases cited in support of that 

phrase included conditions that were not directly related to the 

foreclosure sale itself, but were to be performed by the 

mortgagee either before or after the sale. See id., citing

Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen 516 (1862) ("condition" requiring 

strict compliance was recording of affidavit of sale within one 

year after foreclosure sale); Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 Gray 243 

(1856) (strict compliance required by "condition" that mortgagee 

enter and take possession of land before foreclosure sale); and 

Foster v. Boston, 133 Mass. 143 (1882) (similar to Roarty v. 

Mitchell, supra).
18

power of sale may be invoked only if the default is not cured 

within the time specified in the notice of default. In this 

regard, we agree with the plaintiffs that the "terms of the 

mortgage" with which strict compliance is required -- both as a 

matter of common law under this court's decisions and under 

§ 2115 -- include not only the provisions in paragraph 22 

relating to the foreclosure sale itself, but also the provisions 

requiring and prescribing the preforeclosure notice of default. 

See Foster, Hall & Adams Co., 213 Mass. at 322-324.

16

 

15 Wilion argues that the plaintiffs waived any claim that

§ 21 requires strict compliance with certain terms of a mortgage 

as a condition precedent to a valid foreclosure sale by failing 

to raise this issue in their opening appellate brief. We 

disagree. The defendants themselves put § 21 in play through 

their contention that the court's reading of § 21 in U.S. Bank 

Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421 (2014) (Schumacher), 

signifies that strict compliance by Emigrant with the notice of 

default provision in paragraph 22 was unnecessary. At the very 

least, the plaintiffs were entitled to respond to this argument. 

We discuss the Schumacher case, infra.

16 Strict compliance with paragraph 22 is especially 

important given the origins of the paragraph's provisions and 

the fact that Massachusetts is a nonjudicial foreclosure State. 

The plaintiffs' mortgage with Emigrant is documented by the 

standard form mortgage provided by the Federal National Mortgage 

Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 

Corporation (Freddie Mac). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 

government-sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize 

residential mortgage loans, see Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie 

Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to 

Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077, 1078, 1082 (2007), and 

"together [they] provide the largest source of home mortgage 

financing in the nation." Id. at 1082. Because both 

enterprises "require that loans they purchase be documented on 

their forms," the use of their standard mortgage form is 

"widespread." Id. at 1085-1086. The standard form mortgage 
19

Because the plaintiffs entered into their mortgage with 

Emigrant in Massachusetts, a nonjudicial foreclosure State, the 

default provision in paragraph 22 of their mortgage provided 

that Emigrant's notice regarding the plaintiffs' default and 

right to cure had to inform the plaintiffs of "the right to 

bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or 

any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale"

(emphasis added). See Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 392-

393 (1975) (discussing mortgagor's avenues of relief from 

foreclosure through court actions). The language that Emigrant 

used in the default notice that it actually sent to the 

plaintiffs -- that the plaintiffs "have the right to assert in 

any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale the nonexistence of a 

default or any other defense [they] may have to acceleration and 

 

contains several uniform covenants that are applicable in every 

State, as well as nonuniform covenants "designed to fit the 

requirements and procedure in each of the [S]tates." See 

Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of 

Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. 

Prob. & Tr. J. 397, 400 (1972). Paragraph 22 qualifies as a 

nonuniform covenant because some States have judicial 

foreclosure systems while others, including Massachusetts, offer 

a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure. Paragraph 22 was added to 

the standard form mortgage at the urging of consumer advocates 

for borrowers. See id. at 410, 414. Its provisions were 

intended specifically to give homeowners increased protection 

from acceleration and foreclosure sale without prior notice in 

both judicial foreclosure and nonjudicial foreclosure States. 

See id. at 402-403, 409, 414. Declining to require strict 

compliance with paragraph 22 would weaken if not defeat the 

consumer protection purpose of the paragraph's provisions.
20

foreclosure and sale" (emphasis added) -- presumably would 

comply with the requirements of paragraph 22 in a judicial 

foreclosure State,

17 but not in Massachusetts. If, as the 

defendants argue, "substantial compliance" with paragraph 22 

were sufficient, and if the erroneous information sent to the 

plaintiffs constituted substantial compliance, it is obvious 

that Massachusetts mortgagors, including the plaintiffs, could 

be misled into thinking that they had no need to initiate a 

preforeclosure action against the mortgagee but could wait to 

advance a challenge or defense to foreclosure as a response to a 

lawsuit initiated by the mortgagee -- even though, as a 

practical matter, such a lawsuit would never be brought.

18,19 It 

 

17 For example, the nonuniform covenant in paragraph 22 of 

the standard form mortgage for mortgages executed in Florida, a 

judicial foreclosure State, provides that a lender's right-tocure notice must inform the borrower of "the right to assert in 

the foreclosure proceeding the non-existence of a default or any 

other defense of Borrower to acceleration and foreclosure" 

(emphasis added). Florida -- Single Family -- Fannie 

Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument, Form 3010. See Orlando 

Hyatt Assocs., Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 629 So. 2d 

975, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

18 Under this court's decisions to date, the action that a 

mortgagee in Massachusetts must file to determine whether the 

mortgagor is protected by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is 

not considered part of mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and a 

mortgagor has no right to challenge the validity of a 

foreclosure sale as a response to such an action. See, e.g., 

Eaton, 462 Mass. at 580 n.14; Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 

385, 390 (1975).

19 See Sullivan vs. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., U.S. 

Dist. Ct., No. 14-14074-MGM (D. Mass. Mar. 19, 2015), in which 
21

is hardly unfair or burdensome to require a mortgagee such as 

Emigrant to comply with the provisions of paragraph 22 in one of 

its own mortgages by sending a notice that conforms to the 

language of the paragraph. Given this, we find no compelling 

reason to bless a notice of default that fails accurately to 

notify Massachusetts mortgagors of their right, and need, to 

initiate a legal action if they seek to challenge the validity 

of the foreclosure.20

Nevertheless, the defendants argue that our decision in 

Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, controls the result in this case and 

signifies that strict compliance with paragraph 22 is not 

 

the court concluded, for essentially the same reasons as just 

stated in the text, that a notice of default stating that a 

Massachusetts mortgagor "will have an opportunity to assert a 

defense to acceleration or foreclosure 'in the foreclosure 

proceeding'" did not constitute substantial compliance with 

paragraph 22.

20 The defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs in this 

case were not prejudiced by any failure to comply with the 

provisions of paragraph 22 misses the point. Paragraph 22 

demands strict compliance, regardless of the existence, or not, 

of prejudice to a particular mortgagor. See Foster, Hall & 

Adams Co., 213 Mass. at 323 ("The fact, if it was a fact, that 

the written notice which by the terms of the power of sale had 

to be given, would not have served any useful purpose is not an 

answer to the objection that the power [of sale] was not duly 

complied with"). Cf. Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 655 (Cordy, J., 

concurring) (lack of "actual unfairness" to mortgagors resulting 

from foreclosing banks' failure to establish status as assignee 

of mortgages "is not the point," because "[f]oreclosure is a 

powerful act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts 

law has always required that it proceed strictly in accord with 

the statutes that govern it").
22

required as a condition of a valid foreclosure sale.21 In 

Schumacher, the mortgagor, who was in default, received a notice 

of default from a mortgage servicer that inaccurately identified 

the current mortgagee, id. at 423-424; the mortgagor argued that 

this false identification resulted in a failure to satisfy the 

requirements of G. L. c. 244, § 35A, and invalidated the 

subsequent foreclosure sale of his property.

22 Id. at 427-428. 

The legal issue presented on appeal was "whether § 35A is part 

of the foreclosure process itself and, if so, whether a 

mortgagee's failure to comply strictly with its provisions, 

particularly the notice requirements, renders a foreclosure sale 

void." Id. at 422. Resolution of this issue required 

consideration of § 35A in relation to the statutory power of 

sale in § 21, and in particular § 21's provision that upon 

 

21 The dissent agrees with the defendants that Schumacher

controls the outcome here, but for reasons different from those 

that the defendants advance. Post at , . We discuss the 

points raised by the dissent, infra.

22 General Laws c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A), enacted by St. 2007, 

c. 206, § 11, prohibited acceleration of a residential property 

mortgage obligation or enforcement of such a mortgage due to a 

default "until at least [ninety] days after the date a written 

notice is given by the mortgagee to the mortgagor." G. L. 

c. 244, § 35A (b). The statute was amended and substantially 

rewritten in 2010, at which time the notice period before 

acceleration could occur was enlarged to 150 days, and a 

provision was added requiring, among other things, that the 

mortgagee (creditor) "engage[] in a good faith effort to 

negotiate a commercially reasonable alternative to foreclosure." 

G. L. c. 244, § 35A (b), (g), as amended by St. 2010, c. 258, 

§ 7.
23

default a mortgagee may sell the mortgaged premises, but only 

after first complying "with the terms of the mortgage and with 

the statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 

exercise of a power of sale" (emphasis in original).

Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 430, quoting G. L. c. 183, § 21. The 

mortgagor in Schumacher contended that § 35A was such a statute 

and, accordingly, that the mortgagee was obligated to comply 

fully with § 35A's provisions as a condition of a valid 

foreclosure sale. Schumacher, supra. We disagreed. We noted 

the statutes that have been identified as governing the power of 

sale, see id. at 429, but concluded that § 35A had a different 

purpose. Id. at 431. In particular, § 35A was specifically 

designed to protect existing and new homeowners by giving them a 

reasonably generous period of time to cure a default without 

loan acceleration and the threat of foreclosure. See id. at 

430-431. As such, we held, § 35A was "not one of the statutes 

'relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a 

power of sale.'" Id. at 431, quoting G. L. c. 183, § 21. We 

concluded, therefore, that strict or exact compliance with all 

the provisions of § 35A was not a prerequisite of a valid 

foreclosure. Schumacher, supra at 430-431.

We recognize, as the defendants argue, that there are 

substantive similarities between § 35A and paragraph 22: both 

require notice of default, of the right to cure, of the deadline 
24

by which the default must be cured, and that failure to cure the 

default may result in acceleration and foreclosure by sale. But 

we disagree that Schumacher controls in this case, and signifies 

that a mortgagee need not comply strictly with paragraph 22.

This is so because the notice provisions in paragraph 22 are 

"terms of the mortgage," not terms of a statute "relating to the 

foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale." 

G. L. c. 183, § 21. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 87

Mass. App. Ct. 382, 389-390 (2015) (Schumacher does not control 

where issue is whether mortgagee must comply with certain terms 

of mortgage as opposed to statute relating to foreclosure).

As Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 429, suggests, there is a wellestablished set of statutes relating to mortgage foreclosures

effected pursuant to a power of sale: § 21 and G. L. c. 244, 

§§ 11–17C. See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 581 ("In addition to G. L. 

c. 183, § 21, itself, the 'statutes relating to the foreclosure 

of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale,' id., are set 

out in G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C"); Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 646 

(power of sale in mortgage includes reference to G. L. c. 183, 

§ 21, and is "further regulated by G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C"). 

Each of the statutes included within G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C,

pertains to the process and mechanics of the foreclosure sale 

itself. But as the discussion supra reflects, our cases 

concerned with mortgage terms requiring strict compliance have 
25

never identified a specific set of such terms, and have not 

limited the need for strict compliance to terms concerned 

directly with the foreclosure sale itself. Rather, they have 

taken a more flexible approach. Accordingly, although § 21 

requires in the same sentence a foreclosing mortgagee to comply 

with both "the terms of the mortgage" and with "the statutes 

relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a 

power of sale," we read each of these requirements as being 

separately grounded and having an independent meaning. The fact 

that § 21 does not incorporate § 35A into the fixed set of

foreclosure sale statutes demanding strict compliance does not 

mean that strict compliance with the notice provisions in 

paragraph 22 is not required. In sum, Schumacher does not alter 

our conclusion that, in the Emigrant mortgage instrument 

executed by the plaintiffs, the provisions of paragraph 22 

constitute "terms of the mortgage" governing the power of sale, 

and that, in order to conduct a valid foreclosure, Emigrant was 

obligated to comply strictly with paragraph 22's notice of 

default provisions.

Given our conclusion, the question presents itself whether 

Emigrant's failure to comply strictly with the default notice 

provisions of paragraph 22 renders the title obtained by Wilion 

as a result of the subsequent foreclosure sale voidable rather 
26

than void.23 See Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559, 561-562 (1905), 

and cases cited. As the court observed in Chace, this is not 

always an easy question to answer:

"The distinction between the two classes of cases 

[void and voidable] has not been very clearly defined, and 

the decisions in the different jurisdictions do not 

entirely agree. It has repeatedly been said that in order 

to make a valid sale under a power in a mortgage, the terms 

of the power must be strictly complied with. Roarty v. 

Mitchell, 7 Gray, 243 [(1856)]; Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen, 

516 [(1862]) . . . . Where the sale is to foreclose a 

mortgage for a breach of the condition, there is no 

authority to sell unless there is a breach, and an 

attempted sale would be without effect upon the right of 

redemption. So, where a certain notice is prescribed, a 

sale without any notice, or upon a notice, lacking the 

essential requirements of the written power, would be void 

as a proceeding for foreclosure. Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 

207 [(1905)]. But if everything is done upon which 

jurisdiction and authority to make a sale depend, 

irregularities in the manner of doing it, or in the 

subsequent proceedings, which may affect injuriously the 

rights of the mortgagor, do not necessarily render the sale 

a nullity. The sale will be invalid so far as to enable 

the mortgagor, or perhaps the purchaser, to avoid it, and 

still be effectual if all the parties interested desire to 

have it stand."

Id. See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 778 (2011) 

("Generally, the key question in this regard is whether the 

transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity such that 

title never left possession of the original owner, or merely 

 

23 The defendants do not address the question, presumably 

because their position is that the foreclosure sale was not 

flawed in any respect, and that therefore Wilion holds valid 

title to the property. The question, however, is the focus of 

the dissent.
27

voidable, in which case a bona fide purchaser may take good 

title").

As the quoted passage from Chace, supra, suggests, a bona 

fide purchaser's "title is not to be affected by mere 

irregularities in executing a power of sale contained in a 

mortgage, of which irregularities he has no knowledge, actual or 

constructive." Rogers, 169 Mass. at 183-184. As applied to 

this case, therefore, the question of void versus voidable may 

be reframed to ask whether the failure of Emigrant, as the 

mortgagee, to send the plaintiffs a notice of default providing 

the actual information required by the terms of the mortgage 

concerning the plaintiffs' right "to bring a court action" in 

order to raise any defense to the foreclosure sale is a "mere 

irregularity" that does not affect the validity of the 

property's title. As previously discussed, in a nonjudicial 

foreclosure jurisdiction like Massachusetts, misstating this 

information in a way to suggest that a mortgagor with a defense 

does not need to initiate a lawsuit but may wait to respond to a 

foreclosure lawsuit filed by the mortgagee can have disastrous 

consequences for the mortgagor: if the mortgagor has a valid 

defense to the foreclosure sale going forward, but is not made 

aware that he or she must initiate an action in court against 

the mortgagee to raise that defense, the sale may well proceed 

and result in title passing to a bona fide purchaser without 
28

knowledge of the issue -- at which point, and depending on the 

nature of the defense, the mortgagor's right to redeem his or 

her home may well be lost. See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 777-

778.24 Emigrant's failure to provide the required and correct 

information on this point in the notice of default cannot fairly 

be described as a "mere irregularit[y] in executing a power of 

sale contained in a mortgage." Rogers, supra. Contrast Chace, 

189 Mass. at 562. The failure renders the subsequent 

foreclosure sale to Wilion void.

 

24 The statutory requirement that the mortgagee provide 

advance notice of default and the right to cure to the 

mortgagor, and include in the notice the offer to negotiate and 

agree "upon a commercially reasonable alternative to 

foreclosure," see G. L. c. 244, § 35A, as amended by St. 2010, 

c. 258, § 7, offers a good example of this point. This court's 

decision in Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, establishes that § 35A is 

not one of the foreclosure statutes "relating to the foreclosure 

of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale," G. L. c. 183, 

§ 21, and therefore something other than strict compliance with 

§ 35A will not render a foreclosure sale void, but merely 

voidable. See Schumacher, supra at 422, 430-431. If a 

mortgagor were not aware that he or she was required to bring an 

independent equity action in court before a foreclosure sale in 

order to challenge a mortgagee's compliance with § 35A and 

thereby stop the sale, the mortgagor might wait to assert the 

defense. In such a case, however, if the foreclosure sale 

proceeds and the property is purchased in good faith by another 

person, as the dissent in this case explains, see post at , 

, the mortgagor would be limited to a contract action against 

the mortgagee, but will have completely lost the ability to keep 

his or her home, no matter how egregious the noncompliance with 

§ 35A might have been; even if the mortgagee itself purchased 

the mortgage property at the foreclosure sale, the mortgagor's 

ability to "unwind" the sale is very limited. See Schumacher, 

supra at 433 (Gants, J., concurring).
29

The position taken by the dissent is that strict compliance 

by Emigrant with the notice of default provisions in paragraph 

22 was required, but that Emigrant's failure to do so did not 

render the foreclosure sale void. See post at . In the 

dissent's view, the result in this case is essentially 

controlled by our decision in Schumacher. See post at . The 

dissent reasons that § 35A, the subject of Schumacher, and the 

notice of default provisions in paragraph 22 are birds of a 

feather in terms of purpose and operation; that for the same 

reasons Schumacher concludes § 35A was not a statute relating to 

the foreclosure by sale, so paragraph 22 is not a term of the 

mortgage concerned with foreclosure by sale; and, consequently, 

as was the case in Schumacher, Emigrant's defective notice of 

default rendered the foreclosure sale only voidable, not void.

We disagree. The dissent fails to take into account the 

distinction –- reflected in our cases and in the language of 

§ 21 -- between the "terms of the mortgage" instrument relating 

to foreclosure by exercise of the power of sale, and "statutes"

relating to foreclosure by the power of sale. But this 

distinction is a critical one. As discussed previously, that 

§ 35A is not one of the statutes relating to foreclosure by the 

power of sale to which § 21 refers does not answer whether the 

provisions of paragraph 22 qualify as "terms of the mortgage"

relating and integrally connected to the power of sale under 
30

§ 21. And as to that question, this court's decisions about 

mortgage terms indicate that by structure and content, the 

notice of default required to be given under paragraph 22 is 

integrally connected, and operates as a prerequisite, to the 

proper exercise of the mortgage instrument's power of sale. 

Emigrant's strict compliance with the notice of default required 

by paragraph 22 was necessary in order for the foreclosure sale 

to be valid; Emigrant's failure to strictly comply rendered the 

sale void.

We turn to the question whether our decision in this case 

should be given prospective effect only, because the failure of 

a mortgagee to provide the mortgagor with the notice of default 

required by the mortgage is not a matter of record and,

therefore, where there is a foreclosure sale in a title chain, 

ascertaining whether clear record title exists may not be 

possible. We confronted the same issue in Eaton, 462 Mass. at 

586-587. As Eaton also indicates, in the property law context, 

we have been more willing to apply our decisions prospectively 

than in other contexts. See id. at 588. We conclude that in 

this case, because of the possible impact that our decision may 

have on the validity of titles, it is appropriate to give our 

decision prospective effect only: it will apply to mortgage 

foreclosure sales of properties that are the subject of a 

mortgage containing paragraph 22 or its equivalent and for which 
31

the notice of default required by paragraph 22 is sent after the 

date of this opinion. As in Eaton, however, and for the reasons 

stated there, we will apply our ruling to the parties in the 

present case. See id. at 589, and cases cited.25

The dissent questions the efficacy of prospective relief to 

alleviate the consequences of this decision for future 

purchasers because there is no requirement that in the case of a 

standard mortgage instrument containing paragraph 22 (see note 

16, supra), a foreclosing mortgagee record the notice of default 

sent to the mortgagor pursuant to that paragraph. Post at . 

There may not be a statutory requirement at this time, but a 

mortgagee remains free to execute and then record an affidavit 

of compliance with the notice provisions of paragraph 22 that 

includes a copy of the notice that was sent to the mortgagor 

pursuant to that paragraph, and we presume that going forward, 

as a general matter, mortgagees will do so. See G. L. c. 183, 

§ 5B.26

 

25 The parties have not argued, and we do not reach, the 

question whether our holding in this case should be applied to 

any other class of cases pending on appeal. See Galiastro v.

Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 167-170 

(2014).

26 General Laws c. 183, § 5B, provides in relevant part:

"[A]n affidavit made by a person claiming to have personal 

knowledge of the facts therein stated and containing a 

certificate by an attorney at law that the facts stated in 

the affidavit are relevant to the title to certain land and 
32

3. Mortgage and note. Given our conclusion that the 

foreclosure sale was void, we need not decide the plaintiffs' 

alternative claim that the motion judge erred in allowing 

Wilion's motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine 

issue of material fact in dispute concerning whether Emigrant

was actually the mortgagee at the time of the foreclosure sale

or had previously assigned the mortgage to ESB-MH.

Conclusion. The declaratory judgment of the Superior Court

and the orders allowing Wilion's motion for summary judgment and 

dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint are reversed. The case is 

remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

So ordered.

 

will be of benefit and assistance in clarifying the chain 

of title may be filed for record and shall be recorded in 

the registry of deeds where the land or any part thereof 

lies."

It bears noting that G. L. c. 244, § 35A, has required since 

2010 that a foreclosing creditor in certain circumstances file 

an affidavit of compliance with that section in the Land Court, 

see § 35A (f), as inserted by St. 2010, c. 258, § 7; and that as

of January 1, 2016, § 35A will require a foreclosing mortgagee

to file a copy of the notice mandated by § 35A and "an affidavit 

demonstrating compliance" with § 35A, and also file a copy of 

the § 35A notice with the Commissioner of Banks. See G. L. 

c. 244, § 35A (e) & (f), as amended by St. 2010, c. 258, § 8.
CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Gants, C.J., and Spina, 

J., join). In U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 

421, 431 (2014) (Schumacher), we explained that the fact "[t]hat 

a mortgagee is prohibited from accelerating the maturity of the 

unpaid balance of the mortgage during the ninety-day cure period 

is a clear indication that foreclosure proceedings do not 

commence with the issuance of the written notice [required by 

G. L. c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A)]." Today the court reaches the 

opposite conclusion regarding a substantially similar notice 

required by a mortgage instrument. Because there is no sound 

basis for this distinction, which will have disruptive and 

unfair consequences for innocent third-party purchasers for 

years to come, I would conclude that the notice required by 

paragraph 22 of the mortgage instrument was not a component of 

the power of sale and, as a result, the defect therein rendered 

the foreclosure sale voidable rather than void.

The distinction between void and voidable foreclosure sales 

is one of profound significance for mortgagors, mortgagees, and 

subsequent purchasers of foreclosed property. Where a 

foreclosure sale is void, no title passes to the purchaser or 

the purchaser's successors. Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 

184 (1897). Such a result is particularly concerning where, as 

here, the defect is contained in a notice that is not required 
2

to be recorded. Practically speaking, this means that a 

mortgagor may successfully unwind sales to innocent third 

parties years after the foreclosure, when the property has been 

conveyed to bona fide purchasers two, three, or four times 

removed from the foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Moore v. Dick, 

187 Mass. 207, 212-213 (1905) (mortgagor redeemed property 

nineteen years after void foreclosure sale).

Conversely, where a foreclosure sale is voidable, legal 

title passes to the purchaser, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 

Mass. 762, 777-778 (2011), and a mortgagor may unwind the sale

only by showing that the defect "rendered the foreclosure so 

fundamentally unfair that she is entitled to affirmative 

equitable relief." Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 433 (Gants, J., 

concurring). The mortgagor may obtain such relief against the 

mortgagee and purchasers having notice of the defect, but she 

will not prevail in equity against a bona fide purchaser. See 

Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 3.2 comment g

(1997) ("a bona fide purchaser of legal title terminates 

equitable rights"). "The question in such cases [involving bona 

fide purchasers] is which of two innocent persons should suffer 

a loss which must be borne by one of them. The principle which 

is applied in courts of equity is that they will not throw the 

loss upon a person who has innocently acquired title to property 

for value. The bona fide purchaser is not only entitled to 
3

retain the property free of trust, but he is under no personal 

liability for its value." Restatement (First) of Restitution 

§ 172 comment a (1937).

In discerning whether a foreclosure sale is void or 

voidable, "we adhere to the familiar rule that 'one who sells 

under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he 

fails to do so, there is no valid execution of the power, and 

the sale is wholly void.'" U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 

Mass. 637, 646 (2011) (Ibanez), quoting Moore, 187 Mass. at 211. 

The terms integral to the power of sale include the existence of 

a default or breach of the mortgage, Rogers, 169 Mass. at 184; 

assignment of the mortgage at the time of foreclosure, Ibanez, 

supra at 648; assignment of the note or authority to act on 

behalf of the note holder at the time of foreclosure, Eaton v. 

Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 584-586 (2012); proper 

advertisement of the foreclosure sale, McGreevey v. Charlestown 

Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 483-484 (1936); and 

execution of the foreclosure sale on or near the premises, 

Tamburello v. Monahan, 321 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1947).

If, on the other hand, "there has been a literal compliance 

with the power, so that the legal title to the land passed to 

the purchaser, but for some reason as, for instance, a failure 

to act with due fidelity to the trust imposed by the power, 

there are equitable reasons why the sale should be set aside[,]
4

. . . the sale, being in law valid, is voidable only in equity, 

and the owner of the right to redeem must apply for relief in 

equity within a reasonable time." Moore, 187 Mass. at 212. 

Another circumstance in which a foreclosure sale may be deemed 

voidable in equity, rather than void ab initio, arises where a 

mortgagee fails to comply with a term of the mortgage that is 

not part of the power of sale. See Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 

350 Mass. 775, 775 (1966) ("Legal title is established in 

summary process by proof that the title was acquired strictly 

according to the power of sale provided in the mortgage; and 

that alone is subject to challenge. If there are other grounds 

to set aside the foreclosure the defendants must seek 

affirmative relief in equity"). One such term is a 

preacceleration notice of default. Cf. Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 

432-433 (Gants, J., concurring) (defect in statutory notice of 

default not related to exercise of power of sale rendered 

foreclosure sale voidable in equity).

In Schumacher, we explained that a "homeowner's right to 

cure a default is a preforeclosure undertaking that, when 

satisfied, eliminates the default and wholly precludes the 

initiation of foreclosure proceedings in the first instance, 

thereby protecting and preserving home ownership." Id. at 431. 

Accordingly, we observed that the notice required by § 35A was 

"designed to give a mortgagor a fair opportunity to cure a 
5

default before the debt is accelerated and before the 

foreclosure process is commenced through invocation of the power 

of sale." Id. In light of this purpose, we concluded that 

§ 35A was "not one of the statutes 'relating to the foreclosure 

of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale,'" id., quoting 

G. L. c. 183, § 21, and, thus, the failure to strictly comply 

with § 35A rendered the foreclosure sale voidable rather than 

void. Schumacher, supra at 433 (Gants, J., concurring).

Here, paragraph 22 fulfils the same purpose and operates in 

the same manner as § 35A. As the court recognizes, the purpose 

of paragraph 22 is to give homeowners increased protection from 

acceleration and foreclosure without prior notice. See 

generally Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage 

Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. 

Rev. 1077, 1090 (2007); Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: 

History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism and 

Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 397, 409, 414 

(1972). In view of the similarities in purpose and effect, it 

would defy logic to hold that, on the one hand, the notice 

required by § 35A is not related to the exercise of the power of 

sale, but, on the other hand, the notice required by paragraph 
6

22 is related to the exercise of the power of sale.1 Yet, that 

is precisely what the court holds in this case.

The court reaches this holding by advancing a new and 

expansive interpretation of our decision in Foster, Hall & Adams 

Co. v. Sayles, 213 Mass. 319 (1913). The question in Foster, 

Hall & Adams Co. was not, however, whether the foreclosure sale 

was void, but whether there was reasonable doubt as to the title 

offered by the defendant. Id. at 322. A doubt as to title is 

reasonable if it "would cause a prudent man to pause and 

 

1 The court suggests that this observation fails to grapple 

with the distinction between the terms of the mortgage 

instrument and the statutes relating to foreclosure by the power 

of sale. That is simply not true. On the one hand, the court 

recognizes that the valid exercise of the power of sale does not 

depend on the mortgagee's "punctilious performance of every 

single mortgage term," but only those "integrally connected" to 

the power of sale. See ante at , . On the other hand, 

however, the court explains that the proof that the paragraph 22 

notice is integrally connected to the power of sale is that --

unlike the notice required by G. L. c. 244, § 35A, as amended by 

St. 2010, c. 258, § 7 (§ 35A) -- it is contained in the mortgage 

instrument. See ante at . These positions cannot be 

squared. A notice of default and the right to cure is either 

connected to the power of sale or it is not. If placement in 

the mortgage is not dispositive of this connection, see ante at 

, treating these notices differently requires some other 

rationale. The inquiry into the purpose and operation of each 

notice confirms that such a rationale does not exist. Section 

35A provides, in relevant part, that the "mortgagee, or anyone 

holding thereunder, shall not . . . enforce the mortgage because 

of a default . . . until at least 150 days after the date a 

written notice is given by the mortgagee to the mortgagor." If 

that language does not create a condition precedent or integral 

connection to the valid exercise of the power of sale -- and it 

does not, see U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 

421, 431 (2014) (Schumacher) -- the substantially similar 

language of paragraph 22 does not either.
7

hesitate before investing his money." Id. at 321, quoting First 

African Methodist Episcopal Soc'y v. Brown, 147 Mass. 296, 298 

(1888). The court concluded that the mortgagee's complete 

failure to provide a notice of default created such a doubt. 

Foster, Hall & Adams Co., supra at 324.

It is important to appreciate the context in which the 

Foster, Hall & Adams Co. case arose, particularly the fact that 

the plaintiff was a buyer with notice of a potential title 

defect. Id. at 321-322. We have long said that "[t]he law goes 

a great way in protecting the title of a purchaser for value 

without notice or knowledge of any defect in the power of the 

vendor to sell." Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 777, quoting Rogers, 

169 Mass. at 183. The law does not go a great way, however, in 

protecting the title of those who do have notice of defects in 

the seller's title. See Bevilacqua, supra at 778 ("a factual 

prerequisite -- purchase by [the plaintiff] without notice of 

the defects in [the mortgagee's] title -- does not exist").

The upshot is that, had the plaintiff in Foster, Hall & 

Adams Co. gone forward with the transaction, it would have been 

unprotected by bona fide status had the foreclosure sale later 

been set aside as a result of the defect. It was unnecessary to 

decide whether the foreclosure sale was void or voidable 

because, in either circumstance, the complete failure to provide 

a notice of default and the right to cure would have created a 
8

reasonable doubt as to the title being taken by the plaintiff. 

We have never interpreted this century-old case to mean that any 

defect in a notice of default required by a mortgage instrument 

renders a foreclosure sale void ab initio, cf. Costello v. 

Tasker, 227 Mass. 220, 223 (1917), citing Foster, Hall & Adams 

Co., supra at 321 ("plaintiffs having failed to prove that the 

title tendered by the bill will not expose the defendants to 

litigation, the decree dismissing the bill should be affirmed"), 

and in light of the harsh consequences that such an 

interpretation would have for bona fide purchasers, the court

should decline to do so here.

The prospective character of the court's ruling does little 

to alleviate these consequences for future purchasers because 

the paragraph 22 notice is not required to be recorded. 

Consequently, the notice ordinarily will not be discovered 

during an examination of the record title. Although some 

prospective purchasers may be able to obtain copies of the 

notice by scouring the documents filed in the Land Court in 

connection with Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) 

proceedings, an SCRA action is not part of the mortgage 

foreclosure proceedings and does not create a basis for a 

mortgagor to challenge the validity of foreclosure sale. See

Eaton, 462 Mass. at 580 n.14. See also Beaton v. Land Court, 

367 Mass. 385, 390 (1975). Moreover, requiring purchasers to 
9

engage in such a treasure hunt is contrary to the purposes of 

the recording system, which was intended to be "self-operative 

and to notify purchasers of existing claims . . . [through] a 

public record from which prospective purchasers of interests in 

real property may ascertain the existence of prior claims that 

might affect their interests." Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 

444 Mass. 502, 507 (2005), quoting 14 R. Powell, Real Property 

§ 82.01[3], at 82–14 (M. Wolf ed. 2000).

Although holding that a paragraph 22 notice defect renders 

the sale voidable would mean that a mortgagor could not defeat a 

bona fide purchaser by virtue of the defect, the mortgagor would 

nonetheless retain the ability to defeat a bona fide purchaser 

(and the mortgagee) on any of the substantive grounds relating 

to the exercise of the power of sale. For example, in this 

case, the plaintiffs argue that Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. 

(Emigrant), transferred the mortgage and note prior to the 

foreclosure and therefore lacked the authority to foreclose. 

The court does not reach this argument, but if the plaintiffs 

were to prevail on it, they would defeat Harold Wilion's summary 

process action because the foreclosure sale would be void as a 

matter of law -- irrespective of the paragraph 22 issue.2 See 

 

2 Indeed, the plaintiffs' delay in asserting their claims is 

better attributed to the five bankruptcy petitions they filed 

between September, 2010, and July, 2012, the most recent of 

which was dismissed after a judge in the United States 
10

Eaton, 462 Mass. at 584-586; Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-648. In 

other words, the fact that the plaintiffs did not receive notice 

that they had to initiate an action to assert this substantive 

claim did not undermine their ability to do so successfully.3

This is not to say, however, that the notice sent by 

Emigrant in this case was sufficient to fulfil its obligations 

under the mortgage instrument. Our cases have required strict 

compliance with contractual provisions that call for notice of 

important rights adverse to the person required to provide the 

notice. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Morey & Co., 279 Mass. 495, 500 

(1932) ("There must be strict compliance with requirements . . . 

[that] relate to matters where the essential facts to be 

embodied in the notice are known to the person required to give 

the notice, and the notice is designed to draw the attention of 

 

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded 

that it was filed as "part of a scheme by [one of the plaintiffs 

in the instant action] to delay Emigrant and was filed without a 

reasonable prospect of saving the property from foreclosure." 

In re Leslie Phillips, U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 12-15749-FJB, slip 

op. at 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2012).

3 The court suggests that mortgagors would be prejudiced if, 

for example, the underlying substantive claim were a failure to 

give notice pursuant to § 35A. The court reasons that if the 

mortgagor is not aware that she has to initiate an independent 

action to assert the § 35A defect, the sale to a bona fide 

purchaser would forever foreclose her from doing so because a 

§ 35A defect renders the sale voidable rather than void. Under 

this reasoning, however, holding that the paragraph 22 notice 

renders the sale void essentially creates a backdoor for the 

mortgagor to a defeat bona fide purchaser on § 35A grounds -- a 

result that is plainly at odds with the Schumacher case.
11

his adversary to those facts"). As the court points out, 

because the plaintiffs entered into their mortgage with Emigrant 

in Massachusetts, a nonjudicial foreclosure State, the language 

in paragraph 22 requiring Emigrant to inform the plaintiffs of 

"the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence 

of a default or any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to 

acceleration and sale" was particularly important. Therefore, I 

agree with the court that Emigrant was required to strictly 

comply with the provisions of paragraph 22.

Nonetheless, because, in my view, the notice required by 

paragraph 22 -- like the notice required by § 35A -- is not a 

component of the power of sale, a mortgagor who has received a 

defective notice should be required to establish that he or she 

was prejudiced by the defect. Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 433 

(Gants, J., concurring). Once the property has been conveyed to 

a bona fide purchaser, however, the mortgagor is limited to 

either an action for breach of contract against the mortgagee or 

an action establishing that the foreclosure sale is void on some 

ground actually related to the exercise of the power of sale. 

See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 778. See also Beaton, 367 Mass. at 

392-393 (discussing mortgagor's avenues of relief from 

foreclosure through court actions). Because Wilion was a bona 

fide purchaser insulated from the voidable character of the 

foreclosure sale, I would conclude that the defect in the 
12

paragraph 22 notice was insufficient to defeat his interest in 

the property. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.