Filed 8/1/14 In re C.A. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re C.A., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 H039846

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. JV39486)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Carlos A., then 13 years old, admitted breaking the arm of a six-year old boy by 

pushing him to the ground, a battery involving serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242-

243, subd. (d)). The juvenile court determined that Carlos was not suitable for the 

deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program, declared him to come within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 602,1and imposed a number of probation conditions, including 

that he have no contact with the named victim. On appeal, Carlos contends that 

excluding him from DEJ was an abuse of discretion, the no-contact probation condition

must be modified to add a scienter element, and the court erred by failing to state whether

 

1

 Unspecified section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

his offense was a felony or misdemeanor. The Attorney General disputes the first two

contentions, arguing that the probation condition was effectively clarified by an earlier 

restraining order, while conceding the matter should be remanded to characterize the 

offense. We will reverse the dispositional order so that the court may properly 

characterize the offense and clarify the no contact condition.

II. JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS

A. PETITION AND RESTRAINING ORDER

A petition under section 602 charged Carlos, born in 1999, with felony battery 

causing serious bodily injury to six-year-old Adrian R. The police report described 

Carlos as bullying younger children in his Morgan Hill neighborhood. Adrian broke his 

right arm when Carlos pushed him to the ground outside their neighboring apartments. 

Adrian said he was playing with a friend, not with Carlos because Carlos is older and 

hurts him. Carlos was seven inches taller than Adrian and twice his weight. 

Carlos first appeared in court with legal representation in September 2012. There 

were several continuances to allow defense counsel to investigate. At a hearing on 

January 15, 2013, defense counsel announced that her investigation was complete and 

that Carlos had been behaving well. She proposed continuing the case until he turned 14, 

at which time he could be considered for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). The 

prosecutor was agreeable pending further investigation. The court expressed interest in 

obtaining school transcripts and ordered probation to submit a DEJ suitability report, 

though Carlos was still 13. 

A DEJ suitability report was filed two weeks later. Carlos described the incident 

as involving “‘play wrestling’” when he pushed Adrian, Adrian fell to the ground, cried, 

and went home. Carlos said he was not aware Adrian was injured, he had not intended to 

injure him, and he was remorseful. Adrian’s father said Carlos was a bully who had

acted intentionally. According to Carlos’s mother, he was performing well in seventh 

grade except for one difficult class. The probation officer considered Carlos suitable for 
3

the DEJ program, stating he had “demonstrated motivation and a positive educational 

background by his level of participation at school and counseling services,” as well as his 

mother’s support and his remorse.

The court received the report at a hearing in February 2013. Using Judicial 

Council Form JV-250, the court issued a one-year restraining order to keep Carlos away 

from Adrian R. The court described the restraining order as follows: “[Y]ou may not be 

around Adrian R[]. You cannot molest, attack, strike, threaten, sexually assault, batter, 

harass, destroy the personal property of, contact or disturb his peace. You must not 

contact him directly or indirectly. So no e-mail. No mail. No Facebook. None of that.” 

When Carlos said he understood, the court continued, “You’re to stay 300 yards away 

from the protected person, his home, his school and his daycare if there is any.” Carlos 

acknowledged that they did not attend the same school and that he cannot go to Adrian’s 

school. 

B. JURISDICTION HEARING

A Probation Department memo filed in April 2013 attached a list of disciplinary 

incidents from Carlos’s elementary and middle schools, which included him causing a 

physical injury in May 2012 at the elementary school, plus two instances of bullying in

September 2012 and defiant disruption in March 2013, all at the middle school. 

According to Carlos, the other “‘bullying’” incidents were not his fault. He was simply 

defending himself after being teased about his appearance. 

The jurisdictional hearing was held in April 2013. Carlos and his attorney 

initialed and signed a four-page “waiver form with advisements, stipulations, 

declarations, findings, and orders.” The court reviewed the waivers with Carlos, who

said he understood the requirements of the DEJ program as explained by his attorney and 

that the court would decide whether he could participate in the program. Carlos admitted 

a battery causing serious injury by breaking Adrian’s arm. The court found that Carlos 

knew the wrongfulness of his offense at the time, even though he was under 14. Boxes 
4

on the form addressing the court’s discretion to treat the offense as either a felony or a 

misdemeanor were unchecked. 

Carlos’s attorney argued in favor of placing him in the DEJ program. The 

probation officer also favored DEJ, while the prosecutor opposed it. The court recessed 

to review the records and then ruled: 

“I have reviewed the police report, especially the statement of the 

victim Adrian []. [¶] I also reviewed the disciplinary record and attendance 

records that were attached to the court memorandum of April 23rd, 2013 

and I also reread the DEJ report submitted by the Probation Officer 

previously.

“I think this is a very serious offense and I do have to look at the 

seriousness of the offense. It is not just the age difference, but the fact that 

the victim said that he doesn’t like to play with Carlos because Carlos hurt 

him and there was no warning. [¶] There was no “playing” with Carlos 

according to the victim’s statement, which is different from what Carlos 

indicates happened and how Adrian’s arm was broken.

“It was also very significant to the Court that in looking at the 

disciplinary incident that was provided, the incident that brings Carlos here 

today occurred on July l0th i[n] 2012. It appears from the record that on 

May 25th, 2012 on the playground at school Carlos also caused physical 

injury. [¶] Then on September 5th, 2012 there was [a] bullying incident 

and another bullying incident on September 28th, 2012. In between those 

two dates of bull[ying], Carlos has made his first appearance in court 

September 17th while this incident was pending. [¶] He continued to bully 

the other minors at school and I can’t overlook that he apparently caused

some physical injury previously at school. Then recently there has been 

some truancy and cuttings, also some defiance and disruption.

“In the suitability report, the Probation Officer either didn’t have 

these records or didn’t have this information or didn’t know about it. [¶] I

find this report incomplete and to have not given me the true situation. 

“I don’t really see an improvement in his record in terms of absences 

and tardies. I believe there are two F’s now instead of just one as 

previously reported.

“Given all of this information at this time, I believe the minor’s 

needs exceed the DEJ program and given the seriousness of the offense, 

I’m not going to allow him to participate in the DEJ program.”

The court sustained the petition, saying that Carlos should get all the services he needs. 
5

On the “Jurisdiction Hearing-Juvenile Delinquency” Form JV-644 are boxes for 

recording admissions by count number. A column of five boxes is provided under the 

heading “misdemeanor,” with five more under the heading “felony” and five more “to be 

specified at disposition.” (Capitalization omitted.) Next to “PC243/243(d)” the box for 

“felony” is checked. On the next page, a form statement that the child is described in 

section 602 was checked. The court signed the form on that page, but made no statement 

on the record or on the form characterizing the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor.

C. DISPOSITION HEARING

A probation report filed at the May 2013 disposition hearing recommended a 

number of conditions of probation, including “that said minor have no contact of any type 

with Adrian R.” The probation officer’s opinion was that “Carlos is an immature young 

boy [who] may not fully understand the consequences of his actions. Although Carlos’ 

behavior may not have been intentional, the injuries sustained to the victim are serious. 

Given that Carlos has been disciplined twice this year for similar behavior demonstrates 

he may require additional supervision other than what the DEJ program could have 

provided him.” 

Carlos’s counsel submitted the matter at the hearing. A representative of a social 

services agency explained that they were in the process of connecting Carlos to the 

YMCA for social activity, they monitor him at school, and follow up with him and his 

mother. They did not arrange counseling for Carlos, as that would be done through his 

school. 

A probation officer recommended adding one condition to provide that Carlos be 

returned to his parents’ custody. After modifying a community service condition, the 

court found “that the recommendations of Probation as modified on the record are in the 

minor’s best interest. They shall become orders of disposition effective immediately.” A 

restitution hearing was scheduled for a later date.
6

The court did not announce a determination that the offense was a felony or a 

misdemeanor. The court on the same day signed Judicial Council Form JV-665 entitled 

“Disposition-Juvenile Delinquency.” In a section for findings and orders is a checked 

box followed by the preprinted text: “The court previously sustained the following 

counts. Any charges which may be considered a misdemeanor or a felony for which the 

court has not previously specified the level of offense are now determined to be as 

follows.” Below this text are two columns of six boxes, the first labeled “Misdemeanor” 

and the second “Felony.” Other headings in the same row are “Enhancement [],”

“Count,” and “Statutory violation” separated by spaces. Typed below “Count” is “1,” 

below “Statutory violation” is “PC 242/243(d),” and in the same row the box for felony is 

checked, not the box for misdemeanor. Immediately above the court’s signature on the 

following page is a checked box next to text providing that “[a]ll prior orders not in 

conflict ... remain in full force and effect.” Attached to the disposition form are the 

recommended probation conditions. 

The court also signed an order of probation to which were attached the probation 

conditions, including “that said minor have no contact of any type with Adrian R.” 

III. ANALYSIS

A. DENIAL OF DEFERRED ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

1. DEJ Statutes

Both the Penal Code (§§ 1000-1000.6) and the Welfare and Institutions Code (§§

790-795) provide for the deferred entry of judgment in certain situations. In the juvenile 

context, DEJ is one of two rehabilitative options short of declaring a minor who has 

committed an offense to be a ward of the court. A more structured alternative than a 

program of supervision is to evaluate a minor’s performance on probation while deferring 

entry of judgment without finding the minor to be a ward under section 602. 

Only certain minors are eligible for a DEJ program. The statutory criteria are: the 

minor has committed a felony offense that is not among the 30 offenses listed in section
7

707, subdivision (b) or the 17 probation-disqualifying offenses listed in Penal Code 

section 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1); the minor has not had probation revoked without 

completion nor been declared a ward for committing a felony offense nor committed to 

the Youth Authority; and the minor is at least 14 years old at the time of the hearing. (§

790, subd. (a)(5).) If the minor meets these criteria, the prosecutor shall so declare to the 

court. (§ 790, subd. (b).) The prosecutor’s declaration of eligibility is the first step of the 

process. (In re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 (C.W.).)

The second step of the process is the court’s determination of suitability. (C.W.,

supra, at p. 660.) “[I]f the minor admits the charges in the petition and waives time” to 

pronounce judgment, “the court may summarily grant” DEJ or “may refer the case to the 

probation department” (§ 791, subd. (b)) and “may set the hearing for” DEJ (§ 790, subd.

(b)). “When directed by the court, the probation department shall” investigate “whether 

the minor is a person who would be benefited by education, treatment, or rehabilitation.” 

(§ 791, subd. (b).) “[T]he court may grant” DEJ “[u]pon a finding that the minor is ...

suitable” for DEJ and “would benefit from education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts

... .” (§ 790, subd. (b).) Upon granting DEJ, the juvenile court “may ... impose any 

other term of probation authorized by this code that the judge believes would assist in the 

education, treatment, and rehabilitation of the minor and the prevention of criminal 

activity.” (§ 794.) 

After one to three years of successful performance on probation, the charges may 

be dismissed. (§ 791, subd. (a)(3); cf. § 793, subd. (c).) “The DEJ provisions of section

790 et seq. were enacted as part of Proposition 21, The Gang Violence and Juvenile 

Crime Prevention Act of 1998, in March 2000.” (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 

108 Cal.App.4th 556, 558 (Martha C.).)

2. Discretion to Deny Deferred Entry of Judgment

The above statutes make a clear distinction between the prosecutor’s mandatory 

duty to inform the court that a minor is eligible for DEJ under the statutory criteria and
8

the juvenile court’s discretionary authority to find the minor suitable for DEJ. (In re

Sergio R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597, 603-607 (Sergio R.).) Meeting the statutory 

criteria does not compel a suitability finding. (Id. at p. 605.) A juvenile court’s 

suitability finding is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (In re Damian M.

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (Damian M.).)

Martha C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 556 quoted uncodified findings of Proposition

21 and concluded that they “express not only a strong preference for rehabilitation of 

first-time nonviolent juvenile offenders but suggest that under appropriate circumstances 

DEJ is required.” (Id. at p. 561.) The Martha C. court found nothing in section 791 

“suggesting that any consideration other than the minor’s nonamenability to rehabilitation 

is a proper basis for denying deferred entry of judgment” (ibid.) and concluded that 

“denial is proper only when the trial court finds the minor would not benefit from 

education, treatment and rehabilitation.” (Ibid.) In that case, the trial court “denied DEJ 

because it wished to send a message to other potential juvenile drug smugglers that there 

would be permanent consequences flowing from such criminal activity. This was not an 

appropriate basis for denying DEJ since it had nothing to do with Martha’s potential for 

rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 562.)

Carlos relies on Martha C. and its progeny to argue that the juvenile court “relied 

upon improper factors” in denying DEJ including “the seriousness of the offense, the age 

difference between Carlos and Adrian,” and other incidents of Carlos bullying Adrian 

and others. 

If a minor’s crime is serious enough to be listed in either section 707, subdivision

(b), or Penal Code section 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1), the minor is simply ineligible for 

DEJ. However, the fact that the committed offense does not preclude eligibility does not 

require the juvenile court to ignore either the seriousness of the offense or the criminal 

sophistication of the minor in evaluating DEJ suitability. Damian M., supra, 185

Cal.App.4th 1 upheld a DEJ denial based partly on trial court findings that “Damian had 
9

engaged in sophisticated organized criminal activity” and “would more likely benefit 

from formal probation ... .” (Id. at p. 5.) Sergio R. found no abuse of discretion in 

denying DEJ to a minor who was “an entrenched Norteño gang member with a history of 

drug abuse and admitted addiction to methamphetamine.” (Sergio R., supra, 106

Cal.App.4th. at p. 608.) His charged crimes involved possessing and using 

methamphetamine and committing a residential burglary with other gang members that 

involved taking property including a .22 caliber rifle. (Ibid.) Citing Sergio R., Martha 

C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 556 acknowledged that “a court might find that the 

circumstances of a crime indicate a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation ... .” (Id. at p.

562.)

We reject any suggestion that the seriousness of a minor’s criminal behavior is 

irrelevant to the minor’s ability to benefit from less formal treatment and rehabilitation 

efforts. In reply, Carlos concedes that the nature of the offense is relevant, but contends 

it is not dispositive. It is similarly relevant that the behavior appears to be chronic and 

ingrained. The juvenile court is not required to grant DEJ to every eligible minor who 

would benefit from any education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts. The real question 

in many cases is whether the minor would derive greater benefit from more formal and 

longer-term probation supervision than is available on a DEJ program. 

Here, what the juvenile court said was serious about the offense was not the 

severity of the broken arm or simply the age difference between Carlos and Adrian, but 

that the victim said Carlos had hurt him before and they were not playing, contrary to 

what Carlos said. The juvenile court also found significant that it was not an isolated 

incident. There was evidence that Carlos continued to act like a bully after this incident 

and even after being brought to court for it. 

We believe that the trial court’s authority was not as limited as Carlos contends 

and that these considerations were relevant to his suitability for DEJ. We recognize that

the probation officer in initially recommending DEJ noted the existence of some factors 
10

favorable to Carlos (remorse, school grades, participation in counseling), but we find no 

abuse of discretion in the juvenile court deciding otherwise. The juvenile court pointed 

out that the probation officer was apparently not then aware of the other factors the court 

found more significant. Carlos does not establish that the juvenile court struck an 

irrational or arbitrary balance by either ignoring factors cited in the suitability report or 

relying on improper factors. 

B. CHARACTERIZATION OF OFFENSE AS FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR

Carlos faults the juvenile court for failing to specify whether his offense was a 

felony or a misdemeanor. The Attorney General concedes the merit of this contention

without suggesting that the juvenile court’s completion of Judicial Council Form JV-655 

after the disposition hearing satisfied the court’s obligations. 

Section 702 states in part, “If the minor is found to have committed an offense 

which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a 

misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.” 

California Rules of Court, rule 5.778 provides that the juvenile court, after an 

admission or plea of no contest, must make findings on several topics, including “(9) In a 

section 602 matter, the degree of the offense and whether it would be a misdemeanor or 

felony had the offense been committed by an adult. If any offense may be found to be 

either a felony or misdemeanor, the court must consider which description applies and 

expressly declare on the record that it has made such consideration and must state its 

determination as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. These 

determinations may be deferred until the disposition hearing.” (Italics added.) The same 

express declaration is required by rule 5.780(5) after a contested jurisdictional hearing

and at the disposition hearing “[u]nless determined previously ... .” (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.795(a); cf. rule 5.790(a)(1).)

In In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199 (Manzy W.), the California Supreme 

Court observed that the express declaration requirement of section 702 serves at least two 
11

purposes. It provides “a record from which the maximum term of physical confinement 

for an offense can be determined, particularly in the event of future adjudications.” 

(Manzy W., supra, at p. 1205.) It “also serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile 

court is aware of, and actually exercises, its [statutory] discretion ... .” (Id. at p. 1207.)

The court summarized its earlier decision in In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d

616 (Kenneth H.) with approval as reiterating “that neither the pleading, the minute order, 

nor the setting of a felony-level period of physical confinement may substitute for a 

declaration by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or felony.” 

(Manzy W., supra,. at p. 1208.) It also quoted, “‘the crucial fact is that the court did not 

state at any of the hearings that it found the [offense] to be a felony.’” (Ibid., quoting 

Kenneth H., supra, at p. 620.) 

Nowhere in this record do we find an oral statement by the juvenile court 

acknowledging its statutory obligation to classify the wobbler charge of battery with 

serious bodily injury as a felony or misdemeanor. The crime is designated a felony on 

Form JV-655, but the judge’s signature on a form order does not assure us that the 

juvenile court itself “was aware of, and exercised its discretion to determine the felony or 

misdemeanor nature of a wobbler.” (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.) We accept 

the Attorney General’s concession that the matter must be remanded for the court to 

exercise that discretion on the record.

C. NO CONTACT CONDITION

Carlos contends that the probation condition stating he is to “have no contact of 

any type” with Adrian is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad “because it lacks an 

explicit requirement that there is only a violation if contact with the victim is knowingly 

made.” Carlos relies on this court’s decision in People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

1341. However the condition at issue there prohibited access to the Internet or any other 

on-line service by a person who had possessed child pornography. (Id. at p. 1344.) That 

condition was not designed to restrict association or contact with another person.
12

The Attorney General argues that the restraining order has sufficiently clarified the 

meaning of contact, while Carlos notes that the restraining order also lacks a knowledge 

element. We recognize that a trial court’s clarifying remarks may eliminate potential 

ambiguity and vagueness in a probation condition. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40

Cal.4th 875, 891-892.) But we disagree with the Attorney General’s contention that there 

were such remarks in this case. We do not regard the restraining order issued on 

February 11, 2013, as a clarification of the probation condition imposed almost three 

months later on May 7, 2013. In imposing the probation condition, the court made no 

reference to the prior order. The court adopted many of the probation report’s 

recommendations, but that report also made no reference to the restraining order. We

therefore review the language of the condition standing alone.

In People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578 (Rodriguez), this court 

addressed probation conditions restricting association in general and a “stay-away” 

condition in particular. We understand a no-contact probation condition as typically 

prohibiting two kinds of contact, physical proximity and communication. A stay-away 

condition more narrowly targets physical proximity. Carlos’s contentions focus on the 

proximity restraints of the condition prohibiting contact, thus Rodriguez is apposite.

Probation conditions restricting association “based on some status that may not be 

readily apparent (e.g., probationer, parolee, gang member, drug user, minor) ...” must 

include a mental element. (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 587.) Naming the individual to avoid 

is one way of conveying the requisite knowledge to the probationer. (Id. at p. 595.)2

 

2

 The challenged condition in Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 578, had a “fatal 

ambiguity” because it instructed the defendant to stay at least 100 yards away from “‘the 

victim’” when there were two victims. (Id. at pp. 594-595.) We acknowledged that an 

alternative clarification to naming the victims was to prohibit the defendant from 

“knowingly” coming near “a known or identified victim.” (Id. at p. 595.)
13

Carlos does not seek clarification of whom he must not contact, as the condition 

names the victim who is known to him. He is concerned about unintentionally and 

unknowingly walking down the same street or into the same grocery store as Adrian, or

Adrian riding by in a car Carlos does not recognize. 

Addressing similar concerns, Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 578 observed, “It 

is well established that a probation violation must be willful to justify revocation of 

probation.” (Id. at p. 594). Also, “a probation condition ‘should be given “the meaning 

that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.”’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Olguin

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.) 

“No reasonable law enforcement officer or judge can expect 

probationers to know where their victims are at all times. The challenged 

condition does not require defendant to stay away from all locations where 

the victim might conceivably be. It requires defendant to remove himself 

(‘Stay away at least 100 yards ... .’) when he knows or learns of a victim's 

presence.” (Ibid.)

Without reaching the issue of whether it is constitutionally necessary to reference 

scienter in the no-contact condition, we observe that including “knowingly” would help 

ensure that Carlos would not be penalized if he unknowingly comes into contact with the 

victim. We acknowledge that a trial court does not err by expressly including a 

knowledge element in a probation condition, since violations must be willful. Our 

remand for the juvenile court to characterize the offense as a felony or misdemeanor will 

also allow the court to modify the condition to specify that Carlos not knowingly have 

contact with Adrian R.

IV. DISPOSITION

The dispositional order is reversed. The case is remanded for the juvenile court to 

characterize the offense as a felony or misdemeanor and to allow the juvenile court to 

modify the no-contact probation condition to specify that Carlos not knowingly have 

contact with Adrian R.
____________________________________

Grover, J.

I CONCUR:

____________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J. 

In re C.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

The People v C.A.

H039846
Mihara, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

I disagree with my colleagues’ disposition of this appeal with regard to the nocontact probation condition. Carlos contends that this condition is constitutionally 

vague and overbroad because it does not contain a knowledge requirement. My 

colleagues assert that they are not reaching this issue, but they also decline to grant 

Carlos the relief that he seeks. That is not correct. 

We have only three available options for disposing of this appeal. First, if we 

conclude that the Constitution does not require the inclusion of a knowledge 

requirement, we reject Carlos’s contention and refuse to modify the no-contact 

condition. Second, if we conclude that the Constitution does require a knowledge 

requirement, we credit Carlos’s contention and require the juvenile court to modify the 

condition to add a knowledge requirement. Third, if we choose not to resolve whether 

a knowledge requirement is constitutionally required because we believe that one 

should be included regardless, we must grant Carlos the relief he seeks and order the 

juvenile court to modify the condition to add a knowledge requirement. 

I believe that a knowledge requirement is constitutionally mandated. Thus, I 

cannot concur in a disposition that does not require the juvenile court to modify the 

condition to add a knowledge requirement. I could have concurred if my colleagues 

had chosen either the second option or the third option. However, they choose a fourth 

option that is not available. They decline to reach Carlos’s contention and also decline 

to grant him the relief he seeks. As a Court of Appeal, we should resolve the 

contentions raised by appellants unless they do not affect our disposition of the appeal. 

Here, unless we require the juvenile court to add a knowledge requirement to the nocontact condition, we must resolve Carlos’s contention. Because my colleagues fail to 

do so, I dissent.
2

_____________________________

Mihara, J.

In re Carlos A.

H039846