2011 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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# K eys t one Redevelpme nt P ar tne rs v . J eff rey C o y

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 10-1054

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### PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 10

- 1054

_______________ KEYSTONE REDEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LLC

v. THOMAS DECKER, MARY DIGIACOMO COLINS; RAYMOND S. ANGELI, JEFFREY W. COY, JOSEPH W. MARSHALL, III, KENNETH T. MCCABE, and SANFORD RIVERS, all named in their individual capacities as members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board in December, 2006; and GREGORY C. FAJT; RAYMOND S. ANGELI; JEFFREY W. COY; JAMES B. GINTY; KENNETH T. MCC ABE; SANFORD RIVERS and GARY A. SOJKA, all named in their official capacities as current members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board

v. HSP GAMING, L.P. (Intervenor in District Court) Thomas Decker, Mary DiGiacomo Colins, Raymond S. Angeli, Jeffrey W. Coy, Joseph W. Marshall III,

Kenneth T. McCabe and Sanford Rivers, Appellants

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 08

- CV

- 2265)2 

### District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

_______________ Argued November 16, 2010
Before: AMBRO, FISHER, and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : January 7, 2011) David R. Overstreet, Esq. (Argued) John P. Krill, Jr., Esq. Abram D. Burnett, III, Esq. Anthony R. Holtzman, Esq. K&L Gate s LLP 17 North Second Street, 18th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellee James J. Kutz, Esq. Barbara A. Zemlock, Esq. John W. Dornberger, Esq. Post & Schell, P.C. 17 North 2th Street, 12th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101 R. Douglas Sherman, Esq. Pe nnsylvania Gaming Control Board 303 Walnut Street/Strawberry Square Verizon Tower, 5th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17101 Ralph G. Wellington, Esq. (Argued) Nancy Winkleman, Esq. Joseph Anclien, Esq. Joseph J. Langkamer, Esq. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, LLP 1600 Market Street, Suite 36003 

### Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellants William H. Lamb, Esq. Scot R. Withers, Esq. Lamb McErlane, PC 24 East Market Street P.O. Box 565 West Chester, PA 19381 Stephen A. Cozen, Esq. F. Warren Jacoby, Esq. Jennifer M . McHugh, Esq. Cozen O‟Connor 1900 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Thomas E. Groshens, Esq. (Argued) Richard A. Sprague, Esq. Thomas A. Sprague, Esq. Charles J. Hardy, Esq. Sprague & Sprague Wellington Building. 135 South 19th Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Intervenor

- Appellant HSP Gaming, L.P. Barbara Adams, Esq. Gregory Dunlap, Esq. 33 Market Street, 17th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Counsel for Amicus Edward G. Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________4 

### GARTH, Circuit Judge In this appeal, we consider whether the former members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board are immune from suits brought against them in their individual capacities based on their decisions to grant gaming licenses to certain applicants other than appellee Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC (Keystone). We conclude that they are entitled to absolute, quasi

- judicial immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse the decision of the District Court.
I. In 2004, the Pennsyl vania General Assembly enacted the Pennsylvania Race Horse and Gaming Act, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101

- 1906, which created the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“Gaming Board” or “Board”) to license a limited number of gaming entities within the Commonwealt h. 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1201, 1202. The Gaming Board is comprised of seven voting members, 1 three of whom are appointed by the Governor and four of whom are appointed by four different members of the General Assembly. Id. § 1201(b). The voting members serve fixed terms of office

-- three years for gubernatorial appointees, two years for legislative appointees

-- and may only be removed for “misconduct in office, willful neglect of duty or conduct evidencing unfitness for office or incompetence,” or a

1 

### Three ex officio members

-- the Secretary of Revenue, Secretary of Agriculture, and the State Treasurer

-- also sit on the B oard, but are not permitted to vote. Id. § 1201(e).5 

### co nviction for certain criminal offenses. Id. § 1201(b.1), (d). They are prohibited from political activity and from making or soliciting political contributions. Id. § 1202.1(c)(5). The Gaming Board‟s procedure for considering license applications is go verned by express statutory and regulatory guidelines, which include the following: Before conducting a licensing hearing, the Board must hold at least one public input hearing at which witnesses may testify and the opportunity for public comment is affor ded. Id. § 1205(b). A licensing hearing is held for each of the applicants. The Board must give notice of the hearing to the parties, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 504, and make a schedule of the hearings available to the public, 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(a).
The Bur eau of Investigations and Enforcement (BIE), an agency created by, but independent from, the Board, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1202(b)(25), performs background checks on each applicant and delivers a report to the Board “relating to the applicant‟s suitability fo r licensure,” id. § 1517(a.1)(2). A member of the Board must “[d]isclose and recuse himself from any hearing or other proceeding in which the member‟s objectivity, impartiality, integrity or independence of judgment may be reasonably questioned due to the member‟s relationship or association with a party connected to any hearing or proceeding or a person appearing before the board.” 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1202.1(c)(3). In addition, no member may engage in ex parte communication regarding a pending matter. Id. § 1202.1(c.1). However, § 1202.1(e) defines “ ex parte communication” to exclude “off

- the

- record communications by or6 

### between a member or hearing officer of the board . . . prior to the beginning of the proceeding solely for the purpose of seeking clarification or correction to evidentiary materials intended for use in the proceedings,” as well as “communications between the board or a member and the office of chief counsel” of the BIE. At least thirty days before the initial license hearing, each ap plicant must file with the Board, and serve on all other applicants for the same license, “a memorandum identifying all evidence it intends to use in support of its presentation before the Board,” 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(i), including any materials about whic h an expert witness will testify, id. § 441a.7(i)(4). Evidence that has not been identified in that manner may only be admitted later: 1) in response to a request from the Board, id. § 441a.7(m)(1); 2) “if the issue could not have been reasonably anticipa ted by the applicant,” id. § 441a.7(m)(2); or 3) to “present evidence which sets forth a comparison between the applicant and other applicants within the same category with respect to the standards and criteria” for receiving a license, id. § 441a.7 (n). At the licensing hearing,

o the applicant has a right to counsel, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 502;

o the Board may subpoena documents and witnesses, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1202(b)(7);

o the applicant may present documentary and testimonial evidence, 58 Pa. Code § 44 1a.7(i);

o all witnesses must be sworn, id. at § 441a.7(q);7 

### o the Board or Chief Enforcement Counsel, an agent of the BIE, may examine or question the applicant or applicant‟s witnesses, id. § 441a.7(p); and

o the record must be transcribed, id. § 441a.7(v). Although there is no opportunity to cross

- examine competitors‟ witnesses, an applicant may raise objections to competitors‟ hearings, id. § 441a.7(t), and, after filing notice with the Board and on the competitors, present evidence comparing its application to those of competitors, id. § 441a.7(n). In addition, after submitting their applications, applicants are given the opportunity to make final oral remarks before the Board, id. § 441a.7(w), and file a post

hearing brief addressing competitors‟ applic ations for the license, id. § 441a.7(u). The Board must grant licenses to the applicants who best demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, their suitability for licensure based on certain enumerated factors, id. § 441a.7(d), which relate general ly to: (a) the location and quality of the proposed facility; (b) the potential for economic development and new job creation, especially for Pennsylvania residents; (c) a plan for diversity in employment and contracting, (d) the history of the applicant i n developing tourism facilities, meeting commitments to local agencies and community

- based organizations, dealing with its employees, and complying with the law; and (e) the degree to which potential adverse effects on the public resulting from the project will be mitigated. 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1325(c).
The Board must issue a final order and written decision, 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(x), which contains8 

### factual findings and the reasons for the Board‟s determination, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 507. Unsuccessful ap plicants have the right to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1204; 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(y).
II. In December 2005, appellee Keystone was one of five entities to apply for one of two Category 2 slot

- machine licenses available for the City of Philadelphia. After holding public and licensing hearings for each applicant, at a December 20, 2006, public meeting, the Gaming Board unanimously voted to grant licenses to Foxwoods and to intervenor HSP Gaming, and to deny the other three e ntities‟ applications, including Keystone‟s. The Board detailed its factual findings and offered the reasons for its votes in a 113

- page written decision. In discussing one of the multiple factors weighing against Keystone‟s application, the Board expla ined as follows: The evidentiary record

establishes that Keystone‟s parent company, Trump Resorts, owns three Atlantic City casinos . . . . [Competitors] HSP/Sugarhouse, Riverwalk and Philadelphia Entertainment/Foxwoods do not own or control any Atlantic City properties. The Board has considered the fact of competing Atlantic City properties as a negative factor for licensure in Philadelphia. While the Board believes that each applicant desires to make a profit in9 

### Philadelphia if granted a license, the B oard also is cognizant of its duty to license casinos in Philadelphia which are in the best interests of the Commonwealth and Philadelphia. The Board finds it credible that owners of casinos in both locations may attempt to use the Philadelphia property a s a gambling

- incubator to gain new customers who will then be lured to its Atlantic City properties where it can earn a much higher profit on every dollar gambled [due to the lower tax rate]. Likewise, the Board finds applicants without Atlantic City
conn ections are more strongly motivated to compete directly against the Atlantic City competition because they have no interest in diverting patrons to the casino which has a better tax structure for the casino. Additionally, evidence has been introduced that the Trump Entertainment properties in Atlantic City have undergone bankruptcy organizations in order to rebuild and revitalize them. The Board believes this further supports its decision to choose other applicants who do not have other facilities so clos e to Philadelphia which may lure patrons to Atlantic City to assist in the rebuilding and revitalization of properties there. Therefore, the10 

### Board finds that licensing casinos in Philadelphia which do not have common ownership with Atlantic City facilitie s are more likely to further the interests of the Commonwealth and the public which stands to benefit through increased revenues obtained by the Pennsylvania properties. (App. 194

- 95.) Ultimately, while the Board found that each of the applicants was “eli gible and suitable for licensure under the terms of the [Race Horse and Gaming] Act,” it concluded that Foxwoods and HSP Gaming “were the applicants which possessed the projects which the Board evaluated, in its discretion, to be the best projects for lice nsure under the criteria of the Act.” (App. 101.) Only one of the unsuccessful applicants, Riverwalk Casino, LP, exercised its statutory right to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the order of the Gaming Board, holding, among o ther things, that the Board “serves as a quasi

- judicial body with fact

- finding and deliberative responsibilities.” Riverwalk Casino, LP v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd. , 926 A.2d 926, 935 (Pa. 2007). On March 18, 2009, Keystone filed an amended complaint in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the members of the Gaming Board

-- those currently serving, in their official capacities, in addition to those serving on December 2006, in their individual capacities

-- seeking relief under 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of its constitutional rights under the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Keystone asserted that the Gaming Board had reached it s licensing determination based on an illegally discriminatory consideration, namely, that Keystone, due to its operation of11 

### gaming facilities in Atlantic City, might divert commerce to New Jersey rather than foster local economic interests. Keystone dema nded relief in the form of declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief and attorneys‟ fees. On March 27, 2009, the Gaming Board defendants and intervenor HSP Gaming moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that, in ter alia, the Board members were entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity (absolute immunity) or, in the alternative, qualified immunity. In a December 16, 2009, Memorandum and Order, the District Court dismissed Keystone‟s claims against the current Gaming Bo ard members on ripeness grounds, but denied the motions to dismiss with respect to Keystone‟s claims against the former Board members. 2 Keystone Redev. Partners, LLC v. Decker , 674 F. Supp. 2d 629, 668 (M.D. Pa. 2009). In first addressing the Board Defen dants‟ invocation of quasi

- judicial immunity, the District Court declined to defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s determination in Riverwalk Casino that, based on state case law, the Gaming Board is a quasi

-

judicial body. Id. at 657. Instead, the Di strict Court found that, based on the factual averments contained in Keystone‟s complaint, the Board‟s hearings, while akin to judicial proceedings in certain respects, appeared to lack some indicia of adversarial contests

-- in particular, prohibitions on ex parte communications, opportunities for cross

- examination, and the ability to challenge proffered evidence. Id. at 659. Therefore, the Court held that without development of an evidentiary record,

2 

### Throughout this opinion, for ease of reference, we collectively refer to the members of the former Board and intervenor HSP Gaming as “Board Defendants.”12 

### it could not resolve the question of quasi

- judicial i mmunity. Id. Turning to the issue of qualified immunity, the Court concluded that Keystone, by alleging that the Board Defendants had deliberately favored local interests at the expense of out

- of

- state competitors, had sufficiently pled violations of “cle arly established rights” protected under the Constitution‟s Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause for which relief could be granted. Id. at 660

- 67. Accordingly, the Court held that the Board Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, a nd denied their motions to dismiss Keystone‟s complaint on those grounds. Id. at 667

- 68. The Board Defendants appealed to this Court for review of the District Court‟s denial of their motion to dismiss on the basis of quasi

- judicial and/or qualified immu nity.
III. We have jurisdiction over the order denying official immunity under the collateral order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Dotzel v. Ashbridge , 438 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526

- 27 (1985), among others)

. When considering an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss, this Court exercises plenary review, accepting as true “[t]he facts alleged in the complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Farber v. City of Paterson , 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006). In considering the propriety of the District Court‟s ruling, this Court “may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levi n, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman , 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994).13 

### A. Quasi

- judicial immunity attaches to public officials whose roles are “„functionally comparable‟ to that of a judge.” Hamilton v. Leavy , 322 F.3d 776, 785 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting But z v. Economou , 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). Such immunity “flows not from rank or title or location within the Government, but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.” Cleavinger v. Saxner , 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in evaluating whether quasi

- judicial immunity grants immunity to a particular official, a court inquires into “the official‟s job function, as opposed to the particular act of which the plaintiff complains.” Dotz el , 438 F.3d at 325; Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa. , 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[O]ur analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such „specifics‟ as the [official‟s] motive or the correctness of his or her decision.” (citing Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991))).
In Cleavinger , the Supreme Court offered a non

exhaustive list of six factors “characteristic of the judicial process” that it had identified in Butz as relevant to a determination of whether an official enjoys quasi

- judicial, and thus absolute, immunity:

(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary14 

### nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal. 474 U.S. at 202 (citing Butz , 438 U.S. at 512) . This Court has accordingly adopted the Butz factors outlined in Cleavinger as the touchstones of its quasi

- judicial immunity inquiry. Dotzel , 438 F.3d at 325

- 37 (holding that members of a municipal board of supervisors were immune from suit brought aga inst them in their official capacities).
Dotzel ‟s analysis, which is informed by the instructions of Butz and Cleavinger , as we are, has the same application to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board as it did to the Dotzel zoning officials. There can be no distinction among them when applying the Butz factors. 3 We therefore

3 

### The disti nction that Judge Fisher, our dissenting colleague, draws between adjudicating rights and adjudicating privileges is untenable for two reasons. First, the zoning board in Dotzel was sued for its decision to deny a conditional

- use permit, which, if grante d, confers on the grantee a license , not a right , to use her land in a particular fashion. The denial of that license in Dotzel , a determination that we believed warranted quasi

- judicial immunity, is no different from the denial of a license to operate sl ot machines that gives rise to this case. Second, federal courts have uniformly concluded that state licensing bodies charged with deciding whether to award discretionary licenses are entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity. Burnett v. McNabb , 565 F.2d 398, 400 (8th Cir. 1977) (County Beer Board granting conditional beer license); Kraft v. Jacka , 669 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D. Nev. 1987) (State Gaming Commission denying gaming license); Hamm v. Yeatts , 479 F. Supp. 267, 271

- 72 (W.D. Va. 1979) (State Alcoholic Beve rage Commission denying beer license); Brown v. DeBruhl , 468 F. Supp. 513, 519 (D.S.C. 1979)15 

### analyze the quasi

-

judicial immunity question in this case by applying the Butz factors.
1. The need to assure that the function can be performed without harassment or intimidation
In Butz , the Supreme Court recognized that administrative law judges, like other judges, must be extended quasi

-

judicial immunity so that they “can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation” from dissatisfied parties, such as “an i ndividual targeted by an administrative proceeding [who] will act angrily and may seek vengeance in the courts,” or a “corportation [that] will muster all of its financial and legal resources in an effort to prevent administrative sanctions.” 438 U.S. at 512, 515. In Dotzel , we concluded that members of a municipal board of governors, as arbiters of local zoning disputes, would be subject to those same risks of harassment and intimidation. As we explained,

zoning disputes can be among the most fractious issues faced by municipalities, and the risk of threats and harassment is great. The monetary stakes are often quite high, especially in commercial cases like this one, making the possibility of liability an especially potent adversary of objectivity. . . . “[T]he public interest requires that persons serving on planning boards considering applications for (State Alcohol Beverage Control Commission denying liquor license).16 

### development act with independence and without fear that developers, who will frequently have significant financial resources and the ability to litigate , not bring them to court. The possibility of facing expensive litigation as a result of making a decision on an application for development may in a subtle way impact on the decision making process.”
438 F.3d at 325

- 26 (quoting Bass v. Attardi , 868 F.2d 45, 50 n.11 (3d Cir. 1989)). Keystone argues that the Board Defendants are not subject to a significant risk of harassment and intimidation because they can only deprive applicants of financial opportunities, not liberty or property interests, and they c an only award a limited number of licenses, which reduces the number of potentially vindictive, disappointed applicants. The Board Defendants, pointing to the four suits that have been brought against the Gaming Board arising from its December 2006 licensi ng decision, assert that gaming license applicants‟ extensive financial resources make them more likely to initiate subsequent litigation to hold Board members liable for an adverse licensing ruling. We conclude that this factor weighs in favor of immunit y for the Board Defendants. The financial interests at stake are extremely large: all applicants must be able to afford a $50 million license fee, 4 Pa. Const. Ann. § 1209(a), and each of the December 2006 applicants had annual revenues in excess of $300 million. Keystone itself spent $10 million alone on its application, and in its presentation to the Gaming Board, it unveiled plans for a $444.8 million gaming project. After Keystone lost out on the license, it initiated three17 

### separate lawsuits, includi ng this one. “„When millions may turn on regulatory decisions [as in this case], there is a strong incentive to counter

- attack.‟” Butz , 438 U.S. at 515 (quoting Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst. , 566 F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir . 1977)). It is plain that, much as in Dotzel , “the monetary stakes are . . . high,” the applicants “have significant financial resources and the ability to litigate,” and thus “[t]he possibility of facing expensive litigation as a result of making a deci sion on an application . . . may in a subtle way impact on the decision making process.” 438 F.3d at 325

- 26. Our conclusion regarding this factor is buttressed by the reasoning of the District Court of Nevada, which, in holding that absolute immunity e xtended to members of the Nevada Gaming Control Board against claims arising from their licensing decisions, aptly described the unique concerns of retaliation facing members of a gaming licensing commission: In this important area of public

interest wher e the decisions made by these individuals often involve millions of dollars and the reputation of a whole state, there is a danger that a person who receives an adverse decision will retaliate and seek vengeance in the courts. The discretion and judgment of these officials in initiating administrative proceedings and in deciding matters of great public importance might be affected if their immunity from damages arising from those decisions was less than complete.18 

### Kraft v. Jacka , 669 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D. N ev. 1987) (quoting Rosenthal v. State of Nevada , 514 F. Supp. 907, 914 (D. Nev. 1981)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Those concerns are equally applicable to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, and we are satisfied that the Board De fendants cannot exercise their judgment without fear of intimidation if their immunity from personal liability is not assured.
2. The presence of institutional safeguards against improper conduct In fashioning the prevalence of the factors pronounced by Butz , the more the activity looks judicial, the more weight is to be given to officials‟ freedom from personal liability.
In Butz , the Supreme Court opined that a finding of immunity for administrative judges was supported by the fact that “agency adjudication contain[s] many of the same safeguards as are available in the judicial process,” noting in particular that “[t]he proceedings are adversary in nature”; “they are conducted by a trier of fact insulated from political influence”; “[a] party is entit led to present his case by oral or documentary evidence”; “the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision”; “[t]he parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the is sues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record”; and the administrative judge “may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.” 438 U.S. at 513. These safeguards were found to be present in Dotzel , just as they are relevant here. In particular, in Dotzel there were requirements for (1) notice to the parties and the public, (2) public hearings, (3) specific procedures for conducting hearings, (4) the right to counsel, (5) the use of subpoenas and oaths, (6) the issuance of written decision, and (7) the preparation of transcripts. 438 F.3d at 326.19 

### Here, consistent with Butz and Dotzel , the Gaming Board must (1) give notice to the parties, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 504, and the publ ic, 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(a); (2) hold public

input hearings, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1205(b); and (3) abide by specific procedures for conducting hearings, 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7; (4) the applicants are entitled to counsel, 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 502; (5) the Board m ay subpoena witnesses and documents, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1202(b)(7), and accept only sworn testimony, 58 Pa. Code § 447(q); (6) the Board must issue a written decision, id. § 441a.7(x); and (7) the record must be transcribed, id. § 447(v). This factor w eighs in favor of immunity for the Board Defendants, just as it did for the public officials in Dotzel

. 3. The degree of insulation from political influence
The Butz Court deemed probative to the question of immunity whether the process of adjudication at issue “is structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency.” 438 U.S. at 513. Voting members of the Gaming Board se rve fixed terms, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1201(d); may only be removed for “misconduct in office, willful neglect of duty or conduct evidencing unfitness for office or incompetence,” or a criminal conviction, id. § 1201(b.1); are prohibited from political invol vement, id. § 1202.1(c)(5); and must recuse themselves if their impartiality is called into question, id. § 1202.1(c)(3). Keystone points out that the ex officio members of the Gaming Board (the Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue, Secretary of Agriculture, and Treasurer) are by definition not barred from political activity. The statutory scheme, however, mitigates any impropriety by denying those members

-- as distinct from the voting members

-- the ability to vote in licensing decisions. Id. § 1201(e). Accordingly, we conclude that the Board is adequately insulated from20 

### political pressures, thereby satisfying this element of quasi

judicial immunity. 4
4. The use of precedent in resolving controversies Although the Butz Court did not expound on the application of this factor, this Court in Dotzel inferred “the relevant question . . . to be whether the Board's decisions are purely discretionary, or are constrained by outside law.” 438 F.3d at 326

- 27. Since it was “not clear to what extent the Board refers t o its own prior determinations in reaching decisions,” the Dotzel Court instead considered the fact that “the Board is required by statute to consider in its deliberations the land

- use standards set out in the relevant zoning ordinance, and to explain its reasoning in written opinions,” as decisive of this factor. Id. at 327. The Board Defendants‟ brief recognizes that the Board Defendants did not rely on past precedents because there was no past precedent

-- the December 2006 licensing decision represent ed the Board‟s first written opinion on a license application. Because the licensing decision of the nascent Gaming Board was the first of its kind, we instead view as probative of this factor the existence of requirements that the record be transcribed, that the Board issue a written decision and final order, and that the Board employ “a cognizable burden of proof.” Cleavinger , 474 U.S. at 206.

4 

### Judge Fisher, our dissenting colleague, suggests that even though the Board members ser ve for a set term of years, they are still subject to political pressure to decide licensing applications in a particular way if they wish to ensure their reappointment. That line of reasoning would similarly deny elected state judges absolute immunity, a proposition that we cannot, and do not, endorse. See Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections , 268 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Griesenauer , 970 F.2d 431, 439 (8th Cir. 1992).21 

### Here, the Gaming Board is required by law to reach its decisions based on certain statutorily delineated cr iteria relating to each applicant‟s eligibility and suitability for licensing. 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1302

- 1305, 1325(c); 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(e)

- (h). As we have noted, in determining whether each applicant has satisfied those criteria, the Board is r equired to employ a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(d). As is evident in the Board‟s written decision in this case, fulfillment of those criteria serves as a basis of comparison for deciding between the applicants. The Board also is mandated to issue a written decision accompanying its final order. We are satisfied that this factor also supports quasi

- judicial immunity.
5. The adversarial nature of the process
The Butz Court recognized that certain facets of the adversarial process “enhance the reliability of information and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process”: (1) “[a]dvocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversar ies in open court,” (2) “jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias,” and (3) witnesses are . . . subject to the rigors of cross

- examination and the penalty of perjury.” 438 U.S. at 512. In Dotzel , which we read as applying here, we found that the proceedings at issue were “adversarial as a matter of law” because (1) “all interested parties [must] be given notice and an opportunity to attend,” (2) ex parte contacts were prohibited, (3) witnesses could be cross

- examined, and (4) the parties could challenge proffered evidence. 438 F.3d at 327. The District Court here denied immunity to the Board Defendants because Keystone‟s averments, which alleged that ex parte communication was permitted at the licensing hearings, among other averme nts, “cast substantial doubt as to the adversarial nature of the proceedings.” Keystone , 674 F. Supp. 2d at 629.22 

### We observe that in applying for a license to the Gaming Board, almost all of the adversarial elements this Court identified in Dotzel are met at Gaming Board licensing hearings. The applicants must be given “reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard,” 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 504; are entitled to object to rulings made by the Board in competitors‟ hearings as well as their own , 58 Pa. Code § 441a7(t); and may challenge competitors‟ evidence and applications by presenting comparative evidence, briefs, and oral argument, id. § 441a7(n), (u), (w). In addition, Gaming Board members are largely proscribed from ex parte communicatio ns, participation in which is usually grounds for recusal, 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1202.1(c), (c.1), (c.2), although such communications are permitted 1) between the Board and certain executive officers to the extent necessary to clarify or correct evidentiar y materials or 2) between the Board and the office of chief counsel of the BIE. Id. § 1202.1(e). Contrary to the District Court‟s determination, those limited exceptions to the blanket ban on ex parte contacts do not affect the Board members‟ eligibili ty for quasi

- judicial immunity. See, e.g. , Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty. , 235 F.3d 1000, 1015

- 16 (7th Cir. 2000); J.R. v. Wash. Cnty. , 127 F.3d 919, 925

- 26 (10th Cir. 1997). Keystone also identifies two hallmarks of the adjudicatory process that are absent f rom licensing proceedings before the Gaming Board. First, Keystone claims that an applicant is not entitled to test the veracity of background information relating to each applicant, which the Board may consider in reaching its determination. 58 Pa. Code § 441a7(r). That concern, however, is tempered by the requirements that the Board must give notice of the contents of any non

- confidential information, 4 Pa. Const. Stat. § 1206(g); “[t]he Board may request that an applicant respond to inquiries related t o confidential information during a licensing hearing to promote transparency in the regulation of gaming in this Commonwealth,” 58 Pa. Code § 441a7(r); and23 

### the applicant may object to any ruling by the Board, id. § 441a.7(t). It is undisputed that appl icants here have no right to
cross
- examination. Some courts have concluded that while the absence of a right to cross

- examination may support a finding that a given proceeding is non

- adversarial, see Cleavinger , 474 U.S. at 206, this does not determine th e issue. In considering the requirement for permitting cross

examination in order to immunize officials under the quasi

judicial status asserted here by the Board Defendants, our sister circuits have held that the other factors of weighing evidence, issui ng written decisions, administering oaths, and the like, are sufficient. See Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam‟rs , 204 F.3d 629, 636 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that state dental board disciplinary proceedings were adversarial, thus supporting finding of quasi

- judicial immunity for board members, because dentist had rights to present evidence and to counsel, and board administered oaths to witnesses and made evidentiary rulings); Dunham v. Wadley , 195 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that membe rs of veterinary licensing board were entitled to immunity, without mentioning whether right of cross

- examination existed at licensing hearings, because “board weighed evidence, made factual determinations, determined sanctions, and issued written decision s”); see also Franklin v. Shields , 569 F.2d 784, 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1977) (deciding pre

- Butz that members of parole board were entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity even though prisoners did not have rights to call or
cross
- examine witnesses at parole hearin gs). Moreover, not every Butz factor must be satisfied for an official to be entitled to quasi

- judicial, absolute immunity. Miller v. Davis , 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008); Beck , 204 F.3d at 635 (noting that when analyzing Butz factors, “[n]o one factor is controlling”). It follows that the District Court erred by denying the Board members immunity on the24 

### basis of considerations related to the adversariness factor alone. See Keystone , 674 F. Supp. 2d at 659,
6. The availability of appellate review
In Dotzel , this Court recognized that “[a] formal appellate procedure is probably the single most court

- like feature a government body can have,” explaining that many of the procedural safeguards integral to the quasi

- judicial immunity analysis “exist lar gely to facilitate appellate review,” and noting that “it is a hallmark of courts, unlike legislature and executives, that (with one exception) they do not consider themselves to be either final or infallible.” 438 F.3d at 327. We agree.
Under 4 Pa. Con s. Ann. § 1204, unsuccessful gaming license applicants may appeal as of right to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; that Court, in turn, “shall affirm all final orders, determinations or decisions of the board . . . unless it shall find that the board committ ed an error of law or that the order determination or decision of the board was arbitrary and there was capricious disregard of the evidence.” To facilitate any appeal, the Board must transcribe the hearings, 58 Pa. Code § 441a.7(v), and issue a written d ecision, id. § 441a.7(x). It is clear that Keystone had a right to appeal the Gaming Board‟s decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which it chose not to exercise. Therefore, as the District Court similarly concluded, Keystone , 674 F. Supp. 2d at 65 9, this factor also supports immunity for the Board Defendants. 5

5 

### In Riverwalk Casino, LP v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd. , 9 26 A.2d 926, 935 (Pa. 2007), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, as we have noted earlier, that the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (the Board Defendants here) is a quasi

-

judicial body. Therefore, under the authority of Butz , 438 U.S. 478, the membe rs of that body would be entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability.25 

### In sum, we hold that the Butz factors, on balance, clearly support quasi

-

judicial immunity for members of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.
B. Finally, we disagree with the District C ourt‟s conclusion that additional factual development is necessary. As we acknowledged in Dotzel , deciding whether to extend quasi

- judicial immunity to an official involves a “legal determination” that focuses on “the legal and structural components of the job function, as opposed to detailed facts about specific acts and mental states.” 438 F.3d at 325. Here, as in Dotzel , it is evident that, based on the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions governing Gaming Board hearings, the Board serves a q uasi

- judicial function, which entitles a Board member to “ immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 526.
We conclude that an overall consideration and weighing of the factors required by Butz to establish quasi

j udicial, absolute immunity for the licensing decisions of the Board Defendants have been more than met. In light of our conclusion, we need not reach or address the parties‟ arguments concerning qualified immunity.
IV.
We will reverse the decision of the District Court and direct that the District Court on remand enter an order dismissing all counts against the Board Defendants.F IS H E R , C i r cui tJudge , concurr i ng and di s s ent i ng.
T hough I agr ee w i th the j udgm entt o r ever s e and
r e ma n d t h e Di s t r i c tCo u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n , I d i s a g r e e wi t h my c o lle a g u e s ’ b r o a d i n te rp re ta tio n o f q u a s i- ju d ic ia l im m u n ity. I t h e r e f o r e w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y.
T he m aj or i t yhol ds t hatt he Penns y l vani a G ami ng C o n t r o l B o a r d ’ s ( “ B o a r d ” ) d e c i s i o n t o g r a n tt w o C a t e g o r y 2 g a m in g lic e n se s w a s a ju d icia l ac t su b jec t to a b so lu te i m m uni t y
. T hi s expands t h e n ot i on of “j udi ci al

. ” The Supr eme C our thas “bee n qui t e s par i ng i n [i t s ] r ecogni t i on of abs ol ut e i m m uni t y , . . . and h[a s ] r efus ed t o ext end i tany f u r th e r t h a n i t s j u s t i f

i c a t i o n wou l d warr ant

. ” B ur ns v. R eed , 500 U

. S. 478, 486- 87 (19 9 1) ( quot at i on m ar ks and ci t at i ons om i t t ed)

. T oday ’ s deci s i on exce eds t he t r adi t i onal l i m i t at i ons of abs ol ut e i m m uni t y , cr eat i ng anot herbar ri ert o t he r emedi es s ecur ed bySect i on 1983 fordepr i vat i ons of cons t i tut i onal ri gh t s.
I w oul d i ns t ead de ci de t h is cas e on t he gr ound of qual i fi ed i m m uni t yand hol d t hatthe B oar d m ember s di d not d e p riv e K e ysto n e o f

a w e ll-es tab lish e d c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t. For t hi s r eas on, I agr ee w i t h ourdeci s i on t o r ever s e t he D istri ct C o u rt

. B u t w e ne ed n o t ex p an d the na rr o w c o n tou rs o f a b so lu te im m u n ityto re a c h th is re su lt. “ A b so lu te i m m uni t y
. . . i s s t r ong m edi ci ne, j us t i fi ed onl yw hen t he danger of [off

i ci al s ’ bei ng] defl ect [ed fr om t he e ff ect i ve p erf o rm ance of t hei rdut i es ] i s ver ygr eat

. ” Fo r r e s t e rv. W h ite , 4 8 4 U

. S. 219, 230 ( 1988) ( quot at i on m ar ks and
c itatio n o m itt e d ) (m o d if ica tio n s in o rig in a l). T h e re is litt le
r eas o n to h ol d t hatt he B oar d m ember s , and s i m i l ar l y - s i tuat ed
exec ut i ve off

i ci al s , “may w i t h i m puni t ydi s char ge t hei rdut i es i n a w ay t hat i s know n t o t hem t o vi ol at e t he U n it ed S tat es2 C on sti tut i on ori n a mannert hatt heys houl d know t r ans gr es s es a cl ear l yes tablis hed cons t i tut i onal rul e. ” B ut z v. E conom ou , 4 3 8 U .S . 4 7 8 , 5 0 7 (1 9 7 8 ).
I.
K ey s t one br i ngs t hi s act i on under42 U

. S

. C

. § 1983,
w hi ch i s w r i t t en i n br oad t er m s
. A deci s i on t o gr antt he B o ard ab so lute im m u n itym u s t c o m p o rtw ith S ec ti o n 1 9 8 3

. It appl i es t o “[e ] ver yper s on” ac t i n g u n d er c ol orof s t at e l aw w ho dep ri ves any otherperson i n the U nite d S t at es of “ri gh t s, pr ivil eges , ori m m uni t i es s ecur ed byt he C ons t i tut i on and law s. ” 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 8 3

. A b so lute im m u n ityis no w h ere m ent i oned i n t he s t atut e, buti tw as “s ol i dl yes t abli sh ed at
c o m m o n la w ” a t th e tim e o f p a s s a g e
. P i ers on v. R ay , 386 U

. S. 547, 553- 54 ( 1967)

. T h e “l egi s l at i ve r ecor d gi ves no c lea r i n d ica tio n th a t C o n g re ss m e a n t to a b o lish w h o le s a le a ll
comm on- l aw i m m uni t i es
. ” Id . at 5 5 4 . A b so lu te im m u n ity th e re f o re re sts u p o n a f

in d in g th a t C o n g re ss d id n o t in ten d to abro g at e t he comm on- l aw t r adi t i ons
. I n deci di ng w het her i m m uni t yappl i es , “ourr ol e i s t o i nt erpret the i nt entof C ongr ess in enac t i ng § 1983, nott o m ake a fr eew heel i ng pol i cychoi ce. ” Ma l l e

y v

. Br ig gs , 4 7 5 U

. S

. 3 3 5 , 3 4 2 (19 8 6 );
s e e also B u r ns , 500 U

. S. at497 ( Scal i a, J

. , concurr i ng and di s s ent i ng) (st at i ng t hat“w e have

. . . thoughta comm on- l aw t ra d itio n (a s o f

1 8 7 1 ) t o b e a
. . . nece s s ar y on e” fo r absolu te jud ici al i m m u n ityu n d er § 1 9 8 3 (em p h asis in o ri g inal)); To we rv

. Gl o v er , 4 6 7 U

. S. 914, 920 ( 1984) ( “I f an of fi ci al
w as a ccor ded i m m uni t yfr om t or tact i ons atcomm on l aw w h en the C ivil R ig h ts A ct w as e n ac ted in 1 8 7 1 , the C o u rt nextcons i der s w h et her§ 1983’ s hi s t or yorpurpos es3 n o n e th e les s c o u n se l ag a in st re c o g n izin g th e sa m e im m u n ityin § 1983 act i ons
. ”)

. A tt he t i m e of pa s s age, “the t ouchs t one for [abs ol ut e i m m uni t y ’ s ] appl i cabi l i t yw as per for m ance of t he funct i on of reso lvi ng di s put es bet w een pa r t i es , orof aut hor i t at i vel yadj udi cati n g pr i vat e r i ght s
. ” B ur ns , 50 0 U. S. at500 ( Scal i a, J

. , concurr i ng and di s s ent i ng) ( ci t i ng St eel e v. D unham , 2 6 W is. 3 9 3 , 3 9 6 -97 (18 7 0 ); W a ll v. T ru m b u ll , 16 M ich . 2 2 8 , 2 3 5 -3 7 (1 8 6 7 ); B arhyte v. Sh eph erd , 35 N

. Y

. 238, 2 4 1 -4 2 (1 8 6 6 )); s ee al

s o A nt oi ne v. B

yer s & Anders on, I

nc. , 5 0 8 U

. S

. 4 2 9 , 4 3 5 -36 (19 9 3 ).
A b so lu te ju d icia l im m u n ity w a s e x ten d e d to admi nist rati v e bodi es i n B u tz , 4 3 8 U .S . 4 7 8 . B u t itw a s o n ly ext ended t o admi ni s t r at i ve bodi es t hat ful fi l l a j u d ici al funct i on. T h e C o u r tes t abl i s hed an e xcept i on t o t he “ge ner al
rul e [of qual i fi ed i m m uni t y ] forexec ut i ve off i ci al s char ged wi t h c o n s t i tu t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s ” i n h o l d i n g “ t h a t t h e r e a r e s o me offi ci al s w h o se speci al funct i ons r equi r e a f ul l exempt i on fr om l i abi l i t y
. ” B u tz , 4 3 8 U .S . at 5 0 8 ; For r es t er , 484 U

. S. at 227 ( “[I ] m m uni t yi s j us ti fied and defi ned byt he f unct i ons it p ro te c ts a n d s e rv e s , n o t b y th e p e rs o n to w h o m i t a t ta c h e s .” (em p h asis in o ri g inal)).

T h e B o a rd ’s d e c is io n to iss u e g a m b lin g lice n se s is fundament al l ydi ffe r entfrom a j udi ci al deci s i on. T hough
s t eepe d i n for m al i t y , t he di s cr et i onar yactof i s s ui ng a gambl i ng l i cens e t o s om e of s ever al appl i cant s i s nott he f u lf ill m e n t o f

a ju d icia l f

u n c tio n . T h e f

u n c tio n a l ap p ro a c h to qua s i

- j u d i c i a l i mmun i t yr e q u i r e s t h a t“ [ w] h e n j u d i c i al im m u n ityis e x ten d e d to o f f icia ls o th e r th a n ju d g e s, it is b e c a u se th e ir ju d g m e n ts a re ‘f u n c tio n a l[ ly ] c o m p a ra b [ le] ’ to4 tho s e of j udges

. ” A nt oi ne , 5 0 8 U .S . at 4 3 6 (m o d if ica tio n s in
or i gi nal ) ( quot i ng I

m bl erv. P achtm an , 424 U

. S. 40 9 , 4 23
n
. 2 0 ( 1 9 7 6 ) )

. T o d e t e r mi n e wh e t h e ra n a c ti s “ j u d i c i a l , ” we m u s t lo o k to th e “ n a tu re o f th e a c t its e lf

, i

. e. , w hetheri ti s a fu n cti on nor m al l yper for m ed bya j udge, and t o t he
e x p e c ta tio n s o f

th e p a rt i e s , i

. e. , w het hert heydeal tw i t h t he [body ] i n [i t s ] j udi ci al capa ci t y
. ” St um p v. Spar km an , 435 U

. S

. 34 9, 36 2 (1978 ). T he B oard i s di rect ed b yst at ute t o b ase its d e c isio n u p o n “ w h e th e r th e iss u a n c e o f a lice n se w ill enhanc e t our i s m , econom ic d evel opm entorj ob cr eat i on [and] i s i n the besti nter est s of t h e C om m on w eal t h. ” 4 P a. C on s. St at

. A nn. § 1325( a)

. E xer ci s i ng di s cr et i on t o choos e t w o of f iv e a p p lica n ts f

o r a lice n s e , b a se d o n th e se p o licyre a so n s, is
no t a fu n ct i on “nor m al l yper for m ed bya j udge. ” J udges do notaw ar d li ce n ses t o compet i ng appl i cant s bas ed on pol i cy pr efe r ence s
. T heydo noti nvi t e publ i c comm ent s and conduc t open m eet i ngs w i t h m ember s of t he publ i c. In h o ldi ng o th e rw ise , m yc o llea g u e s’ c o n stru c tio n o f a b so lu te q u a sij udi ci al i m m uni t yfai l s t o confor m t o t he comm on l aw t r a d i t i o n s o f

a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y.
M or eover , t he deci s i on fai l s t o m eet t h e “ touchs t one” of servi ng “t he fu ncti on of resol ving dis pu t es betw e e n p art i es, orof author i t at i vel yadj udi cat i ng p r i vat e r i ght s
. ” A nt oi ne , 508 U

. S. at435- 36 ( quot i ng B ur ns , 500 U

. S. at500 ( Scal i a, J

. , concurr i ng and di s s ent i ng) )

. T he maj or i t y g losses overt he fac t t hatt he pr ocee di ngs befor e t he B oar d w er e not adver s ari al

. I n pr evi ous cas es fi ndi ng quas i

- j udi ci al i m m u n i t y , admi ni s t r at i ve bodi es s er ved a j udi ci al funct i on: t heyei t herr es ol ved a di s put e oraut hor i t at i vel y adj udi cat ed1 T he m aj or i t y opi ni on r efe r s t o t w o di s t r i ctcour tcas es fr om t he N i nt h C i r cui tt hati nvol ve a ga m i ng comm i s s i on butar e not ent i r el yon poi nt

. I n a ca s e s i m i l ari n name but noti n s ubs t ance , t he N ev ad a G ami ng C om m i s s i on i ni t i at ed s us pens i on p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s ta g a mi n g e mp l o y e e a n d d e n i e d hi m a l i cens e, r evoki ng hi s w or k per m i tand frus t r at i ng “t he r i ghtt o be empl oy ed bya l i cens ed es t abli sh m ent

. ” R os enthalv. N evada , 5 1 4 F . S u p p . 9 0 7 , 9 1 1 (D . N e v . 1 9 8 1 ); see al so R o m a n o v. B ib le , 169 F. 3d 1182, 1187 ( 9t h C i r
. 1 9 9 9 ) (hol di ng t hatt he N e v a d a G a m in g C o m m iss io n w a s su b jec t to a b so lu te im m u n ity beca us e i t w as s uffi ci ent l y adver s ar i al i n natur e and a dj udi cat ed di s ci pl i nar ypr ocee di ngs agai ns tl i cens ees )

. T he N evada G a m in g C o m m iss io n p ro c e e d in g is a c lea r c a se o f a d isp u te bet w een pa r t i es and an aut hor i t at i ve adj udi cat i on of a r i ght

. T he
o n lyca s e w h ich c an b e c o n stru ed to su p p o rtthe m ajorit y ’s ho l ding i s Kr af

tv. Jacka , 6 6 9 F

. S u p p
. 3 3 3 (D

. N ev
. 1 9 8 7 ),
w her e t he di s t r i ctcour thel d t hatt he N evada G ami ng C om m i s s i on’ s deci s i on t o deny a gam i ng l i cens e w as pr ot ect ed b y a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y and q u ali fied im m u n ity
. T h e c o u rt
a p p lied b o th a b so lu te a n d q u a lifie d im m u n ity , the re b y f a ili n g to
re so lv e w h e th e r d e n y in g a lice n se to o p e ra te a g a m in g f a c ili ty i s pr oper l ycons i der ed a j udi ci al funct i on.
5 pr i vat e r i ght s
. For exampl e, i n B u tz , t he D epar t m en t of 1 A gr i cul tur e s oughtt o r evoke ors us pend a bus i nes s l i cens e by al l egi n g that it fa il ed to m ee t m inim u m fin anci al
r equi r ement s
. 4 3 8 U

. S

. at481. I tw as an adj udi cat i on bet w een a n agenc yand a pr i vat e companyi n w h ic h t he r i ght t o conductbus i nes s w as in d ispu t e. T he cl os es tcas e on poi nt6 from ou r C i rcui ti s D o tzelv. A s hbr i dge , 4 3 8 F

. 3 d 3 2 0 (3d C ir

. 200 6 ), w her e a boa r d of s uper vi s or s deni ed an a ppl i cat i on for a zoni ng per m i tbyappl y i ng a di s cr et e s etof l egal
r equi r ement s
. W e he ld thatt he boar d of s uper vi s or s w as s uffi ci ent l yj udi ci al and gr ant ed i tabs ol ut e quas i

- j udi ci al i m m u n it y
. W hat , i n par t , di s t i ngui s hes t he boar d of
s uper vi s or s i n D o tze lfr om t he B oar d i n t hi s cas e i s t hatt he boar d of s uper vi s o r s adj udi cat ed a pr i vat e r i ght , namel y , t he
r i ghtt o us e one’ s l and. D o tzel h ad a l egal r i ghtt o hi s l and and soug ht t o ex erci se hi s r i gh tt o u se i tfor m i ning pu rposes.
T h e B o a rd , b y c o n tra st, d id n o t a d ju d ica te a n y p riv a te
r i ght s. U nl i ke t he boar d of s uper vi s or s i n D ot z el , the B o ard di d notau tho ri t at i vel ydet er m i ne w hatK ey s t one oranyof t he ot herfour ap p li cant s coul d do w i t h t hei rpr oper t y
. I ns t ead, t he fi ve appl i cant s s ough t a pr i vi l ege. M ul t i pl e bus i nes s es appl i ed fort w o ca si no l i cens es , and t he B oar d m ade a d isc re tio n a r yd e c isio n , b a se d o n p o licyd e ter m in a tio n s, to i s s ue t he pr i vi l ege t o s om e and nott o ot her s
. I tw as aki n t o a governmentagenc yaw ar di ng cont r act s aft era form al bi ddi ng p ro c e ss . T h e d istin c tio n b e tw e e n th e b o a rd p ro c e e d in g s in D o tze l a n d th e B o a rd p ro c e e d in g s in th is c a se is f u n d a m e n tal. I n fai l i ng t o t ak e n o te o f i t , t he maj or i t yr i s ks an expa ns i on of abs ol ut e i m m uni t yt o gover nm entfunct i ons t hatare not pr oper l yr egar ded as j udi ci al i n natur e.
I d i s a g r e e wi t h t h e ma j o r i t y ’ s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t wo a d d iti o n a l B utz fac t or s : t he B oar d’ s i ns ul at i on fr om pol i t i cal i n f l u e n c e a n d i t s u s e o f

p r e c e d e n ti n ma k i n g d e c i s i o n s
. An ad m inistrati v e b o d ysh are s the ch ara cterist ics o f th e jud ici ary if it is in s u la te d f

ro m p o litic a l in f

lu e n c e
. See , e. g. , B u tz , 4387 U .S . at 5 1 2 . T h e m a jo rity c o n c lu d e s th a t “th e B o a rd is adequa t el yi ns ul at ed fr om pol i t i cal pr es s ur es
. ” M aj

. O p. at 22. I n D o t

z el , w e s t at ed t hat“t he keyques t i on forouri nqui ry i s
. . . w het hert he B oar d m ember s her e ca n be r emoved fr om offi ce bas ed on t he s ubs t ance of t hei r offi ci al w o rk.” 4 38 F. 3d at326. B uti n t hi s cas e, t he “f orcaus e” pr ovi s i on i s not th e k e yq u e stio n b e c a u se th e sh o rt a p p o in tm e n t term s f a il t o i ns ul at e t h e B oar d m ember s fr om pol i t i cal i nfl uence
. T he ap p o inti n g au tho ri ti es m ay d e cide n o t t o rea p p o int B o ard
m ember s bas ed on t he subs t ance of t hei rw or k. T he guber nat or i al appoi nt ees s erv e t er m s of t hr ee y ear s , and t he l egis l at i ve ap po i ntees ser ve term s of t w o y ears
. 4 P a. C on s. S tat

. A n n
. § 1 2 0 1 (d). T h is m ea n s tha t B o ard m em b ers a re l i kel yt o m ol d t he s ubs t an ce of t hei rw or k t o fi tt he pol i t i cal view s of t he ap po i nti ng authori t i es.
W e mustal s o l ook t o how t he B oar d’ s deci s i onm a k in g p ro c e d u re s a re stru c tu re d to d e ter m in e if it i s insu lat ed fro m p o li ti ca l i n flu en ce
. A n y a c tio n b ythe B o ard i nvol vi ng t he “a ppr oval , i s s uance , deni al o r condi t i oni ng of anyl i cens e .
. . r equi r e[s] a q ual i fi ed maj or i t yvot e cons i s t i ng of atl eas tone gubernat or i al appoi n tee an d t he fourl egi s l at i ve appoi nt ees
. ” Id

. § 1 201( f) ( 1)

. T hi s m eans t hatt he

“ leg isla tiv e a p p o in tee s w e re g r a n te d w h a t am o u n ts to a v e to pow eron t he B oar d. ” R i ver w alk C as i nos , LP v. P a. G am i ng C ont r olB d. , 9 2 6 A .2 d 9 2 6 , 9 5 3 (P a . 2 0 0 7 ) ( C a s t i lle , J ., di s s ent i ng)

. T he combi nat i on of the l egi slat ur e’ s vet o pow er on t he Bo a r d a n d t h e t wo- y e a ra p p o i n t me n tt e r m r e v e a l s t hat the leg isl ature ex erts i n d ir e c t co n tr o l ov er the B o ard ’s decis i on s.8 F inally , the B o ard ac ts i n an en ti relyd iscretio n a ry m a n n e r a n d is n o t su f

f icie n tly b o u n d b yp re c e d e n t o r la w to be r egar ded as j udi ci al i n natur e. I n D ot z el , w e under s t ood t he ques t i on o f w het herpr ece denti s us ed i n r es ol vi ng c o n tro v e rsi e s to “ b e w h e th e r th e B o a rd ’s d e c isio n s a re p u re ly di s cr et i onar y , orar e cons t r ai ned by o u tsi d e l aw
. ” 438 F. 3d at 3 2 6 -27

. W e pai d not i ce thatt he boar d of s uper vi s or s w as “r equi r ed bys t atut e t o cons i derin it s del i ber at i ons t he l andu se sta n d a rd s s e t o u t in th e r e le v a n t zo n in g o rd in a n c e , an d to expl ai n i t s r eas oni ng in w ri tt en opi ni ons
. ” Id

. at327. T he B o a rd is re q u ire d to iss u e w r it te n o p in io n s, 4 P a . C o n s. S tat. A nn. § 441a. 7( u) , and t o considert he bas i c el i gi bi l i t yof ea ch
a p p lic a n t. Id

. § 1 3 2 5 (b). B ey o n d this, tho u g h , the B o ard ’s deci s i on i s ent i r el ydi s cr et i onar y
. T he A cts t at es t hatt he B oard “m ay ” base i t s deci si on on several fact ors: ( 1) T he l ocat i on and qual i t yof t he pr opos ed fac i l i t y , i ncl udi ng, butnotl i m i t ed t o, r oad and t r ans i tacc es s , par ki ng and cent r al i t yt o m ar ket
s e rv ic e a re a
. ( 2 ) Th e p o t e n t i a l f

o rn e w j o b c r e a t i o n a nd economi c deve l opm entw hi ch w i l l r es ul tfr om g ra n tin g a lic e n s e to a n a p p lic a n t. (3 ) T h e a p p lic a n t' s g o o d f a ith p lan to re c ru it, t r ai n and upgr ade di ver s it yi n al l empl oy m ent
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e f

a c i l i t y.9 ( 4) T h e appl i cant ' s good fai t h pl an for
e n h a n c in g th e re p re s e n ta tio n o f d iv e rs e g ro u p s
. .

. . (5) T h e a p p li ca n t' s g o o d fa ith ef fo rt to as su re t hat al l per s ons ar e acc or ded equal i t y of
o p p o rt u n ity in e m p lo y m e n t a n d c o n tr a c tin g
. . . . (6 ) T h e h isto rya n d su c c e ss o f th e a p p lica n t in d e v e lo p in g to u r is m f a c il it ie s a n c il lar yto gami ng devel opm entif appl i cabl e t o t he
a p p lica n t. (7) T he d egree t o w hich t he ap pli cant pr esent s a pl an fort he pr oj ect w h ich w i l l l i kel yl ead t o t he
c re a tio n o f

q u a lity , li v in g -w a g e jo b s a n d f u lltim e p e rm a n e n t jo b s f o r re sid e n ts o f

th is C om m onw eal t h gener al l yand forr es i dent s of the h o st po li ti ca l sub d ivisi o n in p arti cu lar. ( 8) T he r ecor d of th e appl i cantand i t s devel oper i n m eet i ng com m i t m ents t o loca l agen ci es, comm uni t y - bas ed or gani zat i ons and empl oy ees i n o t her l ocati on s. (9) T he d egree t o w hich potent i al adv ers e e f f e c ts w h ich m ig h t r e su lt fro m th e p rojec t, incl udi ng cos t s of m eet i ng t he i ncr eas ed d e m a n d f

o r p u b lic h e a lth c a re , ch ild c a r e , p u b lic t r ans por t at i on, aff

or dabl e hous i ng and s oci al
s er vi ces , w i l l be mi t i gat ed.10 (10) T he r ecord of the appli cant and its d e v e lo p e r re g a rd in g c o m p lian c e w ith [ F e d e ra l, S tat e, an d loca l l ab o r l aw s. ] (1 1 ) T h e a p p lica n t' s re c o rd in d e a lin g w ith its empl oy ees and t hei rr epr es ent at i ves atot her l ocati on s.
Id . § 1 3 2 5 (c ). In its so le d isc re tio n , the B o a rd c a n b a se its deci s i on on al l , s om e, or none of t he fa ctors. In D ot z el , t he b o a rd o f su p e rv iso rs w a s “ re q u ire d b ysta tu te to c o n sid e r in its del i ber at i ons t he l and- us e s t andar ds s eto u t in t he r el evant zoni ng or di nance
. ” 438 F. 3 d at 327. B utt he G ami ng A ct sta tes th a t “[ t]h e b o a rd sh a ll i n i t s s ol e dis cr et i on i s s u e , r e n e w, c o n d iti o n o r d e n ya slo t m a c h in e lice n se .” 4 P a . C o n s. S tat. A n n . § 1 3 2 5 (a ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d )

. F u rth e rm o re , the re is
no t hing dir ect i ng t he B oard t o co ns id e r i t s previ ou s deci si on s. T h o u g h there w ere n o p ri o r de cisi o n s fo r t h e B o a rd m em b ers to c ite in th e B o a rd ’s P h ilad e lp h ia lic e n sin g d e c isio n , the re is not hi ng t o i ndi cat e t hatt he B oar d oper at es byu se of p re c e d e n t in m a k in g d e c isio n s. In f a c t, th e h ig h ly di s cr et i onar ynatur e of the pr ocee di ngs i ndi ca t es t hat d e c is io n s a re to b e m a d e o n a c a se -b y -c a se b a sis . A n d th is
m akes s ens e, gi ven t hatt he B oar d i s notful fi ll ing a j udi ci al funct i on, bu t i s appl y i ng pol i cypr efe r ence s t o det er m i ne t he best app l i cants for casi no l i censes.
T h e g e n e ra l ru le is to lim it th e a p p lica tio n o f a b so lu te i m m uni t yt o nar r ow ci r cumst anc es and t o appl yqual i fi ed im m u n ity to e x e c u tiv e o f f ic ia ls

. H

a rlo w v . F itzg e ra ld , 457 U .S . 8 0 0 , 8 0 7 (1 9 8 2 ) ( “ F o r e x e c u tiv e o f f ic ia ls in g e n e r a l

. . .11 ourcas es m ake pl ai n t hat qual i fi ed i m m uni t yr epr es ent s t he
n o rm .” ). B u tz re p re se n ts a n e x c e p tio n f o r e x e c u tiv e o f

f icia ls
w ho ful fi l l a j udi ci al funct i on. T he maj or i t yfocus es on t he for m al i t i es s ur r oundi ng the B oar d’ s deci s i on and fa i l s t o t ake not e of the natur e of the dec i s ion it s el f. D eci di ng t he
w or t hi es tcandi dat es forbus i nes s l i cens es bas ed on pol i cy pr efe r ence s i s cat egor i cal l ynota j udi ci al funct i on. Fol l ow i ng the m ajorit y ’s l o g ic , as lo n g as a n ex ec u ti v e o ff icer’s deci s i on, w het heri t b e i s s ui ng bus i nes s l i cens es orgr ant i ng c o n tra c ts f

o r p a p e r su p p lies , is e m b e d d e d in a su f f icie n tly f o rm a l p ro c e d u re , w e m u st g ra n t th a t o f f ice r a b so lu te im m u n ity . T h is is c o n tr a ryto S u p re m e C o u rt p re c e d e n t,
w h ic h re q u ir e s u s to lo o k to “ th e n a t u re o f th e a c t its e lf.” S t u mp , 435 U

. S. at362. T he B oar d m embe rs’ p o si t i on i s t hat t heyar e abs ol ut el yi m m une fr om anyl i abi l i t y , even i f t hey
v io late o n e ’s c o n stitu tio n a l rig h ts a n d th e yd o so k n o w in g ly and del i ber at el y
. B ut i n hol di ng t hat t he B oar d m embe rs are i m m une, t he maj or i t yr i s ks ups et t i ng t he pro t ect i ons embodi ed i n Sect i on 198 3

. “U ndert he cr i t er i a deve l oped by p r e c e d e n t s o f

t h [ e Su p r e me ] Cou r t , § 1 9 8 3 wou l d b e d r ai ned of m eani ng w er e w e t o hol d t hatthe act s of a gove r noror o t h e rh i g h e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e rh a v e ‘ t h e q u a l i t yo f a s u p r e me and uncha ngeabl e edi ct

. ’ ” Scheue rv. R hodes , 416 U

. S. 232, 248 ( 1974) ( quot i ng S ter lin gv . C o n sta n tin , 287 U

. S. 378, 397 (19 3 2 )).
O urs y s t em of jur i s prudence r es t s on t he
a ss u m p tio n th a t all in d iv id u a ls , w h a tev e r th e ir pos i t i o n i n gover nm ent , ar e s ubj ectt o fede r al l aw : ‘ N o m an i n t hi s count r yi s s o hi gh t hathe i s above the law

. ’ .

. . I n l i ghtof t hi s pr i nci pl e,12 . . . offi ci al s w h o seek a bs ol ut e exe m pt i on fr om per s onal l i abi l i t yforuncons t i tut i onal conduct
m u st be ar the b urden o f show i ng t hat public pol i cyr equi r es an exe m pt i on of t hats cope.
B u tz , 438 U

. S. at506 ( quot i ng Uni t e d S t a t e s v

. Le e , 106 U. S. 196, 220 ( 1882) )

. T he B oar d m ember s fai l t o m eett he bur den of s how i ng t hat“publ i c pol i cyr equi r es an e x em pt i on” fr om s u c h a f o u n d a tio n a l p ri n c ip le o f g o v e rn a n c e
. Id

. For t hese
r eas ons , I r es pect ful l ydi s agr ee w i t h t he maj or i t y ’ s deci s i on. T he Boa r d i s n o ta n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e ru l e o f q u a l i fi ed i m m u n i t y.
II.
I bel ieve t hatw e s houl d have de ci ded t hi s cas e on t he g ro u n d o f q u ali fied im m u n ityan d h eld th at t h e B o ard
m ember s di d notdepr i ve K ey s t one of a cl earl y -es t abl i s hed
c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t. W h e th e r th e B o a rd m e m b e rs s h o u ld
re c e iv e q u a lifie d im m u n ityis s u b jec t to a tw o -p ro n g e d tes t: a
cou rtevaluat i ng a cl ai m of q uali fi ed im m un i t y “m ustfi rs t det er m i ne w het hert he p la i nt i ff ha s al l eged the depr i vat i on of
a n a c tu a l c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t at a ll, a n d if so , p ro c e e d to det er m i ne w het hert hatr i ghtw as cl ear l y estab l i s hed att he t i m e of the al l eged vi o lat i on. ” C on n v. G ab bert , 52 6 U. S. 286, 290 ( 1999)

. T he t es tr efl ec ts “t he bal ance t hat[t he C our t ’ s ] cas es s t r i ke bet w een t he i nt er es t s i n vi ndi ca ti o n of ci t i zens ’ cons t i tut i onal r i ght s and i n publ i c offi ci al s ’ eff ect i ve p e r f o r ma n c e o f t h e i r d u t i es
. ” D avis v. Scher er , 468 U

. S. 183, 1 9 5 (19 8 4 ). K ey ston e claim s tha t th e B o ard m em b ers vi ol at ed i t s r i ght s pr ot ect ed byt he C om m erce C l aus e and the2 T he t w o pr ongs of t he qual i fi ed i m m uni t y t es t m ay be handl ed i n anyor der

. “The j udges of t he di s t r i ctcour t s and t he cour t s of
a p p e a ls s h o u ld b e p e rm itt e d to e x e rc ise th e ir so u n d d isc re tio n in d e c id in g w h ich o f

th e tw o p ro n g s o f

th e q u a lifie d im m u n ity anal y s i s s houl d be addr es s ed fi r s t i n l i ght of t he ci r cumst ance s i n t he par t i cul ar cas e athand. ” P ears on v. C al l ahan , 1 2 9 S . C t. 8 0 8 , 8 1 8 (20 0 9 ).

13 E qual Pr ot ect i on C l aus e. N ei t hercl ai m of a c ons t i tut i onal depr i vat i on w as cl ear l yes t abl i s hed. 2

G over nm entoffi ci al s w ho per for m di s cr et i onar ydut i es a re “ sh ield e d f

r o m li a b ili tyf

o r c iv il d a m a g e s in so f

a r a s th e ir conductdoes notvi ol ate c l ear l yes t abl i s hed s t atut or yor cons t i tut i onal r i ght s of w hi ch a r eas onabl e per s on w o u ld h ave k n o w n .” H

ar l ow , 457 U

. S. at818. T hi s “generall ytur ns on t he ‘ obj ect i ve l egal r eas onab lene ss’ of t he ac t i on .
. . as s es s ed i n l i ghtof t he l egal rul es t hatw ere ‘clear l yes t abl i s hed’ att he t i m e [the ac t i on] w as t aken. ” A nders on v. C r ei ght on , 483 U

. S. 635, 639 ( 1987) ( quot i ng H ar l ow , 4 5 7 U

. S

. at 81 9 ).
A.
U ndert he C om m er ce Cl aus e, C ongr es s has th e pow er t o “ r e gu l a t e Com mer c e
. . . a mong the s evera l St a t e s
. ” U

. S. C ons t

. art

. I, § 8, cl

. 3. T hi s cl aus e has an i m pl i ed
r equi r ement

— t he D or m ant C om m er ce C l aus e— that t he st at es n o t “m a n d a te d if

f e re n tial tre a tm e n t o f

in -sta te a n d o u t-o f

-sta te economi c i nt er es t s t hatbenef i t s t he form erand bur dens t he l a t t e r
. ” G r a n h o lm v . H e a ld , 544 U

. S. 460, 472 ( 2005)14 ( quot at i on m ar ks and cit at i on om i t t ed)

. I n D ennis v. Higgi ns , t he C o u rthel d t hat“i ndi vi dual s i nj ur ed bys t at e ac t i on t hat vi ol at es t hi s [nega t i ve] as pectof t he C om m er ce Cl aus e may su e a n d o b tain in

ju n c tiv e a n d d e c lar a to r y relie f ” a n d th a t th is “amount s t o a ‘ r i ght , pr i vi l ege, ori m m uni t y ’ under[Sect i on 1 9 8 3 ]. ” 4 9 8 U

. S

. 4 3 9 , 4 4 7 (19 9 1 ).
Dor ma n tCo mm e r c e Cl a u s e a n a l y s i s c o n s i s t s o f t wo s t eps : “w het her‘hei ght ened s crut i ny ’ appl i es , and, i f not , t hen

. . . w h ethe r th e l aw i s i nval i d undert he P i ke [ v. B r uce C hur ch, I

nc. , 3 9 7 U .S . 1 3 7 , 1 4 2 (1 9 7 0 ),] b a la n c in g te s t.” C l over lan d -G r een Spr i ng D ai r i es , I nc. v. P a. Mi lk M

kt g. B d. , 462 F. 3d 249, 261 ( 3d C i r
. 20 0 6 )

. H ei ght ened s crut i ny a p p lies w h e n a law “ d isc rim in a tes a g a in s t in ter sta te
c o m m e rc e ” in p u rp o s e o r e f f e c t. C& A C a rb o n e, Inc. v. T o wn o f Cl a r k s t o wn , 511 U

. S

. 383, 390 ( 1994)

. I f hei ght ened
s crut i nydoes notappl y , t hen w e cons i dert he P i ke bal anci ng tes t: “w h e th e r th e o rd in a n c e im p o se s a b u rd e n o n in ter sta te
comm er ce thati s ‘ cl ear l yexce s s i ve i n r el at i on t o t he pu t at i ve l ocal benef

i t s
. ’ ” C& A C ar bone, I nc. , 5 1 1 U. S. a t 3 9 0 ( ci t i ng P i ke , 3 7 9 U

. S

. at 14 2 ).

T h e B o a r d sta ted in its w ritten d e c isio n th a t it “cons i dered t he fa ctof compet i ng A t l ant i c C i t ypr oper t i es as a nega t i ve factor f

orl i cens ur e i n Phi l adel phi a. ” ( A pp. at A 1 9 4 .)

T he B oar d fi nds i tcr edi bl e t hatow ner s of [A t l anti c C i t y ] cas i no s
. . . m ayat t em pt t o u se t he Phi l adel phi a prop ertyas a gambl i ngi ncubat ort o gai n new cus t om ers w ho w i l l t hen15 b e lu re d to it s A tlan tic C ityp ro p e rties w h e re it
ca n earn a much l ar gerpr ofi ton everydol l ar g a m b led . L ik e w ise , the B o a rd f in d s a p p lica n ts
w ith o u t A tlan tic C ityc o n n e c tio n s m o re stro n g ly
m ot i vat ed t o compet e di r ect l yagai ns tt he A t l ant i c C i t ycompeti t i on beca us e t heyhave no i nt er es ti n di ver t i ng p at r ons t o t he ca s i no w hi ch has a bet t ert ax s t ructur e fort he ca s i no. ( Id

. atA 194. ) A nd i tgoes on t o not e w hyK ey ston e’s
ow nership of a c as i no i n A t l ant i c C i t ys er ves as a nega t i ve fa ctor.
A d d i t i onal l y , evi dence has been i nt r oduced that th e T ru m p E n ter tain m e n t p ro p e rties in A tlan tic C i t y [, t he par entcompanyof K ey s t one, ] have under gone bankrupt cy reor gani zat i ons i n or der to reb u il d an d rev it ali ze them

. T h e B o a rd b e liev e s th is f

u rth e r su p p o r ts its d e c isio n to choos e ot herappl i cant s w ho do no t ha ve ot her fac i l i t i es s o cl os e t o P h i l adel phi a w hi ch may l ur e patr ons t o A t l ant i c C i t yto a s s i s ti n t he
r ebui l di ng and r evi t al i zat i on of pr oper t i es t her e. (Id

. atA 194. ) T h e B oar d concl udes bys t at i ng t hati t“fi nds t h a tl i c e n s i n g c a s i n o s i n Ph i l a d e l p h i a whi c h d o n o thave
c o m m o n o w n ersh ip w ith A tl an ti c C ityfa cil it ies are m o re l i kel yt o fur t hert he i nt er es t s of t he C om m onw eal t h and t he publ i c w hi ch s t ands t o benef i tt hr ough i ncrease d r evenue s obt ai ned byt he Penns y l vani a pr oper t i es
. ” (Id . a t A 1 9 4 -9 5 .)16 T he B oar d’ s deci s ion m eet s bot h s t eps of D or m ant C o m m erc e C laus e an aly sis. F irs t , t he B oar d di d not di s cr i m i nat e aga i ns ti nt er s t at e comm erc e bec aus e i tdi d not i m po se an ab sol ute bar ri er t o entry of any ou t -of- st at e casi no s. C f. L ew is v

. B T I

nv. Managers , I

nc. , 4 4 7 U

. S

. 2 7 , 4 0 (19 8 0 ). I n D ean Mi lk C o. v. C i t y of Madis on , the C o u rt h e ld th a t a d e n ial o f a lice n se to se ll m ilk in c o n f o r m it yw ith a sc h e m e to excl ude out

- of- s t at e mi l k “er ect [ed] an ec onom i c barr i er pr ot ect i ng a maj orl ocal i ndus tr yagai ns tcompet i t i on fr om w i t ho ut t he Stat e” and “pl ai nly dis cri m i nate[d] a gainst interst ate c o m m erc e.” 3 4 0 U

. S . 3 4 9 , 3 5 4 (19 5 1 ). H er e, t he B o ard d id n o t erect a b arrie r to o u t- o f-state co m p eti ti o n
. It
m erel ycon si dered K ey st on e’s t i es t o A tlan t i c C i t yas a negat i ve fa ct or

— one of manyfac tors i tcons i der ed i n t he
cour s e of i t s deci s i on. I n fac t , t he t w o com pani es t hat
r e c e i ve d l i c e ns e s ha d e xt e ns i ve ou t

- of

- s t a t e t i e s
. H SP G a m in g is h e a d q u a rte re d in D e law a re , an d F o x w o o d s is
a f f ili a ted w ith a c o m p a n yth a t o w n s a lar g e g a m in g f a c ili tyin C onnect i cut

. T her efor e, t he B oar d’ s dec isi on w as unl i ke p r e v i o u s f

i n d i n g s o f

d i s c r i mi n a t o r yi n t e n t , whe r e s t at es es t abl i s hed abs ol ut e barr i er s t o i nt er s t at e comm er ce.
S e c ond , the B o a rd ’s d e c isio n f u rth e rs im p o rta n t sta te in ter e sts th a t o u tw e ig h a n yin c id e n tal b u rd e n s o n in ter sta te
com m erce. T he d eci si on adv anced fou r s t at e i nter est s: ( 1) t he procur ement of “a s i gni fi cants our ce of r evenue t o t he C o m m o n w e a lt h ” ; ( 2 ) “ p r o v id [ in g ] b r o a d e c o n o m ic oppor tuni t i es t o t he ci t i zens of t h[e] C om m onw eal t h”; ( 3) “pr event [ i n g ] p o s s i b l e mon o p o l i z a t i o n”; and (4) “enh anc[ i ng ] the fu rther dev el op m e n t o f t he touri sm m ar ket

. ” 4 Pa. C ons
. St at

. A nn. § 1102. St at es have a17 legiti m at e i nt er es t“i n m axi m i zi ng t he fi nanci al r etur n t o an i ndus t r yw i t hi n i t

. ” P i ke , 397 U

. S. at143. C ons i der i ng a p p lic a n ts ’ ties to A tlan tic C itya s a n e g a tiv e f a c to r d u e to
co n c e r n s t h a t i t ma y d r a w c u s t o me r s a way f r o m th e s t a t e does
n o t co n stitu te a “ c lea rlye x c e ss iv e ” b u r d e n o n in ter sta te
c o m m e rc e
. C& A C ar bone, I nc. , 5 1 1 U. S. a t 3 9 0

. T he B oard’s d eci s i on does noti nhi bi tK ey s t one oranyot her A t l anti c C i t y c a si no from at t ract i ng P enn sy l van i a cust om ers
. A n d it d o e s n o t im p o se a h e a v yb u rd e n o n o u t-o f -sta te appl i cant s forcas i no l i cens es , especi al l ycons i der i ng t hatt he t w o succe ssful app l i cants had si gn i fi cant out -of- st at e t i es. H en ce , t he B oar d di d notvi ol at e t he D or m antC om m er ce C l a u s e a n d d i d n o td e p r i v e K e ys t o n e o f a c o n s t i tu t i o n a l l yp ro tec ted rig h t.
T he B oar d m ember s s houl d als o be hel d i m m une beca u se t her e w as not“s uffi ci entpr ece dentatt he t i m e of the act i on, fac tual l ys i m i l art o t he pl ai nt i ff’ s al l ega ti o ns , t o put [ th e ] d e f

e n d a n t o n n o tice th a t h is o r h e r c o n d u c t is
cons ti tut i onal l ypr ohi bi t ed. ” McK ee v. H art , 436 F. 3d 165, 1 7 1 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 6 ) (qu o tat ion m ark s a n d c itati o n o m it ted). T her e i s i ns uffi ci entpr ece dentt hatt he mer e cons i der at i on of
a c o m p a n y’s o u t-o f

-sta te tie s a s a n e g a tiv e f a c to r— n o t a bar r i er

— byan admi ni str at i ve age ncyvi ol at es t he D or m ant C o m m e rc e C lau se , es p e c iallyw h e re th e f a c to rs o f

site lo c a tio n a n d p re v io u s e x p e rie n c e c a rrie d d isp o sitiv e w e ig h t in d eterm ining the B o ard ’s de cisi o n
. H en ce , ev en if t h e B o ard ’s act i on di d cons t i tut e a depr i vat i on of a cons t i tut i onal r i ght , t he l ack of cl ar i t yi n D or m ant C o m m erc e C l aus e j ur i s prudence pr ohi bi t e d t h e Boa r d me mbe r s f r o m be i n g o n n o t i c e t h a tt he
us e of a negat i ve fa ctor i n r eac hi ng a di s cr et i onar ypol i cy18 det er m i nat i on depr i ved K ey ston e of i t s r i ght s undert he C om m er ce Cl aus e.
B.
T h e E q u a l P ro tec tio n C lau se o f th e F o u rte e n th A m endmen t, § 1, di r ect s t hatno s t at e s hal l “denyt o any p e rs o n w ith in its ju ri s d ic tio n th e e q u a l p ro te c tio n o f th e la w s .” U .S . C o n st. a m e n d . X IV , § 1 . T h is “ d o e s n o t f o rb id a ll classifica ti o n s” but “s i m pl y keeps gover nm ent al d e c isio n m a k e rs f

ro m tre a tin g d if

f e re n tlyp e rso n s w h o a re in al l r el evantr es pect s al i ke. ” N or dl i nger v. H

ahn , 505 U

. S. 1, 1 0 (1 9 9 2 ). T h e D istric t C o u rt h e ld th a t K e y sto n e “ su f f icie n tly al l eged thatt he [Boar d] appl i ed t he G ami ng A ct i n a w ayt hat
w as des i gned t o benef

i ti n- s t at e bus i nes s t o t he d etri m entof out

- of- s t at e compet i t or s
. ” K eyst on e R edeve l op m ent Pa rtners, LLC v. D ecker , 6 7 4 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 6 2 9 , 6 6 7 (M

. D

. P a. 20 0 9 ). T he cl as s o f casi nos w i t h out

- of- s t at e t i es i s nota s us pect
c las s, a n d b o th p a rties a g re e th a t r a tio n a l b a sis re v iew sh o u ld be appl i ed.

R at i onal bas i s r evi ew r equi r es us t o cons i derw het her

“ th e re is a p la u s ib le p o lic yre a s o n f o r t h e c la s s if

ic a tio n .” N or dl i nger , 505 U

. S. at 11 ( ci t at i on om i t t ed)

. T w o ques t i ons m us tbe addr es s ed: “fi r s t , w hetheratl eas tone of the purpos es of t he cl as s i fi cat i on i nvol ves a l egi ti m at e publ i c i nt er es tand,
s econd, w het hert he cl as s i fi cat i on i s r at i onal l yr el at ed t o t he achi evem en t of

t hatpurpos e. ” H

ancock I ndus

. v. Schaef

f er , 81 1 F

. 2d 22 5, 2 3 7 (3 d C i r. 19 87 ). In m aking t hese d e te rm in a tio n s, w e e x e rc ise d e f e re n c e a n d g ra n t d isc re tio n to3 T he cl as s i fi cat i on bet w een A t l ant i c C i t y cas i nos an d nonA tlan tic C ityc a sin o s d o e s n o t d e ri v e f r o m leg isla tio n b u t is
c re a ted b yth e B o a rd in re a c h in g its d e c isio n . R a tio n a l b a sis
re v iew is u su a llyc o n d u c ted o n leg isla tiv e c a teg o rie s. B u t itis
n ev erthe less p rop er h ere
. In a sli g h tl yan alog o u s ca se, a b o ard
w a s alle g e d to h a v e “ u til ize d a n im p licit c las sif ica tio n in admi ni s t er i ng i t s zoni ng or di nance
. ” Sylvia D ev. C or p. v. C al ver tC nt

y. , 48 F. 3d 810, 8 2 1 ( 4t h C i r
. 1995)

. T her e, t he
cour tcondu ct ed r at i onal bas i s r evi ew of t he ca t egor y , w hi ch w as cr eat ed byt he boar d.

19 th e s ta te s
. See P ers

. A d m ’rof Mas s

. v. Feene

y , 442 U

. S. 256, 2 7 2 (19 7 9 ).

K e y sto n e c h a llen g e s th e B o a rd ’s u se o f th e A tlan tic C i t y fa ctor

. A s s t at ed above , t he B oar d advanc ed four

3 purpos es fort he cl as s i fi cat i on: (1) “t he pr ocur ement of a
s i gni fi cants our ce of r evenue t o t he C om m onw eal t h”; (2) “ pr ovi di ng br oad ec onom i c oppor tuni t i es t o t he ci t i zens of th [ e ] C o m m o n w e a lth ” ; (3 ) “ p re v e n tin g p o ss ib le
mon o p o l i z a t i o n ” ; a n d ( 4 ) “ e n h a n c i n g t h e f u r t h e rd e v e l o p me nt of the t ou ri sm m arket

. ” A pp el l ant’ s B r. at50 -51. T hese pu rpose s d e riv e from t he P enn sy l van i a R ace H orse D e v e lo p m e n t a n d G a m in g A c t. See 4 Pa. C ons
. St at

. A nn. § 1102.
Purp o ses ( 1) , ( 2) , and ( 4) can be boi l ed dow n t o t he purpo se of pr om ot i ng dom es t i c i ndus t r yand t he s t at e r evenue and t our i s m t hatw i l l be der i ved t her efr om
. T h o u g h s t at es have a n undoubt edl yl egi t i m at e i nt er es ti n r ai s i ng r evenue and20 pr om ot i ng dom es t i c comm erc e, i ti s nota “ge ner al rul e t hat prom oti on of d om est i c i nd ust ryi s a l egit i m at e st at e pu rpose underequal pr ot ect i on ana ly s i s
. ” Metr o. Li f e I ns

. C o. v. W ard , 470 U

. S. 869, 876 ( 1985)

. T he B oar d’ s ai m of p ro m o tin g d o m e stic in d u stryc a n n o t b e leg iti m a te if it i s “pur el yand co m p le t el ydi s cr i m i nat or y , des i gned onl yt o favor dom es t i c i ndus t r yw i t hi n t he St at e. ” I d. at878.

B u t th e B o a rd ’s a im w a s n o t s o le lyto f a v o r d o m e stic i n d u str yw i t hi n t he St at e. O ne of the C at egor y2 l i cens es w entt o an out

- of- s t at e ca s i no, and t he ot herw entt o a ca s i no w i t h exten si ve out

- of- s t at e t i es
. I n Me tro p o lita n L ife , t he C our tw as co ncerned w i t h a di ffe r entfor m of di s cr i m i nat i on: a st a te tax th a t w a s c a teg o ric a llyh ig h e r f o r a ll o u t-o f

-sta te bus i nes s es
. A nd s i nce Me tro p o lita n L ife , t he dec i s i on has been “s harpl yl i m i t ed t o it s fac t s
. ” Troj an Techs

. , I nc. v. P e n n s y lv a n ia , 916 F. 2d 903, 915 ( 3d C i r
. 1990)

. H er e, t he B oar d w as m ot i vat ed byan i nt er es tin pr om ot i ng l ocal
comm er ce, r even u e, and t our i s m
. M or eover , t he B oar d had t he l eg it imat e purpos e of r educi ng t he pos s i bi l i t yof l ocal
m onopol izati o n. U nl i ke Me tro p o lita n L ife w h e re th e sta te i m pos ed a bl anketim pedi m entagai ns ti nt er s t at e comm er ce, t he B oar d w ei ghed a f act oraga i ns tcas i nos l ocat ed nea rby b as ed on conc er ns of l ocal comm er ce. T he B oar d’ s us e of the A t l ant i c C i t yfac t ori s rati o n all yr el at ed t o t he ac hi evementof l e g i t i ma t e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s , a n d i tp a s s e s r a t i o n a l b a s i s r e v i e w.
III
. I bel i eve thatt he ma jori ty ’ s br oad cons t ruct i on of abs ol ut e quas i

-

j udi ci al i m m uni t yi s i n confli ct w i t h Sect i on21 1 9 8 3 an d S u p rem e C o u rtjuri sp rud en ce
. T h e B o ard m em b ers ar e exe cut i ve off

i ci al s , and w e s h o u ld appl yqual i fi ed im m u n ityto th e ir a c tio n s. F o r th is r e a s o n , I re sp e c tf u lly d isa g re e w it h m yc o llea g u e s. B u t I c o n c u r in th e ju d g m e n t to
r ever s e and r emand the D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s deci s i on, b eli evi ng t h a tt h e B o a r d m e m b e r s d i d n o td e p r i v e K e ys t o n e o f c l e a r l yest abli shed co nst i tuti on al ri gh t s.