NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4427

___________

THOMAS M. BOLICK,

 Appellant

v.

HONORABLE ROBERT B. SACAVAGE;

HONORABLE ANNE E. THOMPSON

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-00320)

District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 6, 2015

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 13, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Thomas Bolick appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s (“the District Court”) September 2014 order 

dismissing his civil rights complaint, and from that court’s October 2014 order denying 

his motions for reconsideration and recusal. For the reasons that follow, we will modify 

the September 2014 order in part, affirm that order as modified, and affirm the October 

2014 order. 

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 

of this case, we discuss that background only to the extent necessary to resolve this 

appeal. In 1981, the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, 

sentenced Bolick to 2.5 to 10 years in prison after he pleaded guilty to robbery. In March 

2007 (long after the expiration of his sentence), Bolick filed a pro se civil motion with the 

trial court, seeking to vacate/strike the 1981 judgment. The motion was assigned to 

Judge Robert B. Sacavage, who denied it in May 2007. Bolick then reiterated his request 

for relief on that motion, and submitted a proposed order that would vacate/strike the 

1981 judgment “for lack of jurisdiction due to fraud upon the court.” Judge Sacavage 

signed this proposed order in June 2007, but he vacated it in November 2007, stating that 

the proposed order had been inadvertently signed and that he had intended to deny it.

Bolick appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which concluded that Judge 

Sacavage’s June 2007 and November 2007 orders were legal nullities because the time in 
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which to modify the May 2007 order denying Bolick’s motion to vacate/strike had 

expired before the June 2007 order was entered. As a result, the Superior Court quashed 

the appeal and remanded with instructions that the trial court vacate the June 2007 and 

November 2007 orders and reinstate the May 2007 order. After the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied Bolick’s petition for allowance of appeal, Judge Sacavage, in 

October 2009, entered an order reinstating the May 2007 order.

In 2010, Bolick filed a civil action in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas 

against a host of Commonwealth defendants. The case, which was removed to the 

District Court and assigned to the Honorable Anne E. Thompson (who was sitting by 

designation), concerned Bolick’s 1981 judgment and the proceedings before Judge 

Sacavage. Judge Thompson ultimately granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss 

Bolick’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

and she subsequently denied Bolick’s motion for reconsideration. We later affirmed 

Judge Thompson’s rulings. See Bolick v. Pennsylvania, 473 F. App’x 136, 137 (3d Cir. 

2012) (per curiam).

In January 2014, Bolick commenced the instant lawsuit by filing a pro se civil 

rights complaint in the District Court against Judge Sacavage and Judge Thompson. The 

complaint, which was assigned to the Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, revolved around 

Bolick’s contention that the June 2007 order remains valid and that Judge Sacavage 

“illegally reinstate[d]” Bolick’s “fraudulent” 1981 conviction. Bolick argued that the 
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Superior Court’s decision and Judge Sacavage’s October 2009 order reinstating the May 

2007 order should be deemed void.

Judge Sacavage moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Bolick’s complaint 

was barred by, inter alia, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh Amendment sovereign 

immunity, the applicable statute of limitations, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), 

and the doctrine of judicial immunity. In September 2014, Judge Jones granted Judge 

Sacavage’s motion to dismiss, and also sua sponte dismissed the complaint as to Judge 

Thompson. In doing so, Judge Jones concluded that Bolick’s complaint was barred by 

the statute of limitations, Heck, and the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judge Jones’s 

opinion did not discuss whether the complaint was also barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and/or the Eleventh Amendment.

Bolick timely moved for reconsideration of Judge Jones’s order and also sought 

Judge Jones’s recusal. In October 2014, Judge Jones denied both of those motions. 

Bolick then filed this timely appeal, seeking review of Judge Jones’s two orders.1

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of 

Judge Jones’s order dismissing Bolick’s complaint is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 

 

1 Bolick’s one-page, typed notice of appeal includes a handwritten note that reads 

“AND/OR PETITION FOR MANDAMUS.” Because the two orders that he seeks to 

challenge may be reviewed in this appeal, mandamus relief is not warranted here. See

Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that mandamus is not a 

substitute for an appeal, and that “a writ of mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can 

obtain relief by appeal”).
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229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). As for Judge Jones’s order denying Bolick’s motions 

for reconsideration and recusal, we review both of those denials for abuse of discretion. 

See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012) (motion for 

reconsideration); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 

Cir. 2000) (motion to recuse). We may affirm Judge Jones’s orders on any basis 

supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that “a federal court generally 

may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction.” 

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007); see

Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (noting that a 

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a judgment on 

the merits). As noted above, Judge Sacavage’s motion to dismiss argued that Bolick’s 

complaint was barred by, inter alia, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh 

Amendment. Both of those grounds are jurisdictional in nature. See Taliaferro v. Darby 

Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman); Blanciak v. 

Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (Eleventh Amendment). 

Judge Jones did not consider either of these grounds, instead disposing of Bolick’s 

complaint on three non-jurisdictional grounds: Heck, the statute of limitations, and the 

doctrine of judicial immunity. See Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (stating that Heck doctrine is not jurisdictional); Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 
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F.3d 410, 413 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 

2009) (discussing equitable tolling of statute of limitations in civil rights actions); 

Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1466 (3d Cir. 

1990) (en banc) (explaining that equitable tolling “is not available when there are 

jurisdictional limitations”); Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1994) (indicating 

that judicial immunity defense is properly raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted). Remand is not necessary, however, because, 

as explained below, the question of whether the District Court had jurisdiction in this 

case is straightforward and can be answered based on the current record.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction 

over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Four requirements must be met for the doctrine 

to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of 

injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before 

the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 

reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 

F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 

U.S. at 284). All of those requirements are satisfied here. Bolick lost in state court, he 

complains of injuries brought about by the Superior Court’s decision and Judge 
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Sacavage’s subsequent order reinstating the May 2007 order, those decisions preceded 

this federal lawsuit, and he has asked the District Court to deem those state court 

decisions void. Accordingly, it was appropriate to grant Judge Sacavage’s motion to 

dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds.2

To the extent that Bolick’s complaint sought to assert separate claims against 

Judge Thompson, such claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Nor 

were they barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as that bar applies only to state actors. 

See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2010). 

However, for substantially the reasons given by Judge Jones, we agree that any claims 

against Judge Thompson were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.3

In light of the above, we will (1) modify Judge Jones’s September 2014 order so 

that the grant of Judge Sacavage’s motion to dismiss is based on the jurisdictional ground 

of Rooker-Feldman, and (2) affirm that order as modified. As for Judge Jones’s October 

2014 order denying Bolick’s motions for reconsideration and recusal, we will affirm that 

order without any modifications. Bolick’s motion for reconsideration did not provide any 

viable basis to disturb Judge Jones’s dismissal of the complaint. See Max’s Seafood Café 

ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, to 

 

2 Given this conclusion, we need not decide whether dismissal of the complaint as to 

Judge Sacavage was also warranted on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Ruhrgas AG 

v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 584 (1999) (explaining that “there is no 

unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy” or mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues”). 

3 We need not consider whether the claims against Judge Thompson were untimely 

and/or barred by Heck. 
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prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the movant must show “(1) an intervening 

change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available 

when the court [decided] the motion [in question]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error 

of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice”). Nor has Bolick demonstrated that Judge 

Jones abused his discretion in denying the motion to recuse. Although Bolick claimed 

that Judge Jones was biased, those allegations were wholly unsupported and, it appears, 

amounted to nothing more than dissatisfaction with Judge Jones’s September 2014 

decision. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc., 224 F.3d at 278 (“We have repeatedly stated 

that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal, 

and we reiterate that principal here.”) (citation omitted).