OMER v STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC

Docket No. 161658. Decided July 21, 2021. 

Ahmed Omer filed an action with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, 

seeking compensation from Steel Technologies, Inc., and New Hampshire Insurance Company for 

a work-related lower-back injury. After trial, the magistrate issued an opinion finding that Omer

sustained an injury on January 3, 2011, arising out of and in the course of his employment and that 

he was totally disabled and entitled to weekly wage benefits for a closed period from April 12, 

2011 through December 29, 2011. The magistrate found that Omer was a credible witness, that a 

physical-therapy report noting Omer’s back-pain complaint was credible, and that the testimony 

of Dr. Nabil Suliman, an internal-medicine specialist who testified that Omer was “totally 

disabled,” was credible. The magistrate also found credible the deposition testimony of Barbara 

Feldman, a vocational-rehabilitation counselor who testified that Omer would not be capable of 

returning to a job at which he earned his highest wages. Defendants appealed the magistrate’s 

decision to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (the MCAC), contending that the 

magistrate erred by concluding that Omer had proved he was disabled as a result of a work-related 

incident and that Omer was totally disabled during the identified period. The MCAC reversed the 

magistrate’s decision, denying Omer’s claim for wage-loss benefits on two grounds. First, the 

MCAC reasoned that the magistrate’s finding of total disability was unsupported by competent 

evidence because it was based solely on a physician’s—here, Dr. Suliman’s—conclusory 

declarations of total disability, rather than on a quantification of limitations described through 

physical restrictions that may lead to wage loss. Second, the MCAC concluded that Omer had

failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to total disability benefits. Omer 

appealed by leave granted. The Court of Appeals, JANSEN and GLEICHER, JJ. (O’BRIEN, P.J., 

concurring), reversed the MCAC’s opinion and order and remanded for entry of an order in Omer’s 

favor. The Court reasoned that (1) there was no legal basis for the MCAC’s legal conclusion that, 

standing alone, a treating physician cannot provide competent evidence (or a competent opinion) 

regarding a claimant’s disability and (2) the MCAC erred by determining that the evidence 

underlying the magistrate’s decision was incompetent and, in turn, by holding that Omer had failed 

to establish that he had a “disability” as defined by MCL 418.301(4)(a) of the Worker’s Disability 

Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. 332 Mich 120 (2020). Defendants sought 

leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice:

Bridget M. McCormack

Justices:

Brian K. Zahra 

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

Reporter of Decisions:

Kathryn L. Loomis 
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal 

and without hearing oral argument, held:

Under MCL 418.301(4)(a), the term “disability” means a limitation of an employee’s wage 

earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal 

injury or work-related disease. In light of this definition, establishing a disability requires more 

than a medical diagnosis or a physician’s testimony that the claimant can no longer perform their 

existing job duties. Even though there are no absolute requirements in proving entitlement to 

workers’ compensation benefits and a claimant may prove entitlement to those benefits using any

method the claimant chooses, given the WDCA’s definition of “disability”—i.e., the necessity of 

establishing that there is a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to 

his or her qualifications—claimants typically offer additional evidence about employment 

opportunities and suitability. In this case, Omer offered more than a minimal medical diagnosis 

to support a finding of disability under MCL 418.301(4)(a); specifically, the magistrate’s 

determination was based on the credible testimony of Omer, Suliman, and Feldman and on 

supporting medical records establishing how Omer’s injuries prevented him from performing the 

jobs for which he was qualified and trained. Feldman’s testimony was significant and credible, 

and there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s findings. 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the MCAC should have affirmed the 

magistrate’s finding of disability for the closed period. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals

speculated about whether a magistrate’s disability finding could be supported solely on medical 

testimony; because that speculation was not necessary to its holding, Part IV of the Court of 

Appeals’ opinion was vacated. 

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
FILED July 21, 2021

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

AHMED OMER,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 161658

STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

and NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

PER CURIAM.

The defendant-employer, Steel Technologies, Inc., asks this Court to consider 

whether a medical professional’s conclusory declaration of a claimant’s total disability, 

without more, can provide competent, material, and substantial evidence of “disability,” as 

defined by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. We 

decline to do so because under the facts of this case, it is unnecessary to reach that issue. 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice:

Bridget M. McCormack

Justices:

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch
2

We instead vacate Part IV of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing the issue,

1 but we 

affirm its result: the magistrate relied on competent, material, and substantial evidence to 

find that the plaintiff-claimant, Ahmed Omer, had established a disability and was entitled 

to wage-loss benefits.

The WDCA defines the term “disability” as a “limitation of an employee’s wage 

earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a 

personal injury or work-related disease.” MCL 418.301(4)(a). Establishing a disability, 

then, requires more than a medical diagnosis or a physician’s testimony that the claimant 

can no longer perform their existing job duties. See Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich 266, 

281; 750 NW2d 129 (2008). Though “there are no absolute requirements, and a claimant 

may choose whatever method he sees fit to prove an entitlement to workers’ compensation 

benefits,” id. at 282, the statutory definition of “disability”—i.e., the requirement of 

establishing that there is a “limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work 

suitable to his or her qualifications and training”2

—explains why claimants typically offer 

additional evidence about employment opportunities and suitability. And, contrary to the 

findings of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC),

3 that is precisely 

what the claimant did in this case. The claimant offered more than a mere medical 

diagnosis to support a finding of a compensable disability.

 1 Omer v Steel Technologies, Inc, 332 Mich App 120, 135-142; 955 NW2d 575 (2021).

2 MCL 418.301(4)(a).

3 The MCAC has been replaced, in part, by the Workers’ Disability Compensation Appeals 

Commission. Executive Reorganization Order No. 2019-13.
3

The claimant suffered a workplace lower-back injury in January 2011. He 

aggravated the injury at work two months later and did not work from April 4, 2011 until 

January 2012. After a trial that featured testimony from the claimant, vocational experts, 

and various doctors, the magistrate ruled in the claimant’s favor. He concluded that the 

injury arose out of and was in the course of employment, that the claimant was totally 

disabled, and that he was entitled to weekly wage benefits from April 12 through December 

29, 2011. The magistrate cited, among other evidence: (1) a statement from the deposition 

testimony of the claimant’s doctor, Dr. Nabil Suliman, asserting that the claimant was 

unable to perform his work and was “totally disabled,” and (2) disability slips from the 

claimant’s chiropractor, Dr. Mohamed Saleh, indicating that the claimant was unable to 

work. 

On appeal, the MCAC seized on the magistrate’s reliance on Dr. Suliman’s 

testimony and Dr. Saleh’s disability slips to reverse the wage-loss benefit award. “[W]here 

a magistrate’s finding of total disability is based upon [a] physician[’s] conclusory 

declarations of total disability, rather than quantification of limitations, described through 

physical restrictions, which may lead to wage loss, that finding is unsupported by 

competent evidence.” Omer v Steel Technologies, Inc, 2018 Mich ACO 15, p 6. But the 

magistrate’s determination was based on more than the conclusory declarations of medical 

professionals. Indeed, the magistrate’s opinion expressly relied on the credible testimonies 

of the claimant, Dr. Suliman, vocational expert Barbara Feldman, and medical records that

spoke to how the claimant’s injury prevented him from performing all the jobs within his 

qualifications and training.
4

We find the deposition testimony of the claimant’s vocational expert particularly

significant. The MCAC downplayed the significance of this testimony, noting that 

Feldman admitted that she did not perform a labor-market survey. But Feldman also 

testified that the restrictions medical professionals placed on the claimant meant he was 

capable of performing only sedentary work. Given that restriction, she opined that the 

claimant would not be capable of returning to a job at which he earned his highest wages,

and she “was not able to find a job that pays his maximum pre-injury rate of pay.” Indeed, 

Feldman’s testimony traced, step-by-step, the multifactor test required to establish 

disability that this Court laid out in Stokes. Stokes, 481 Mich at 281-284. The magistrate 

deemed this expert’s testimony credible, and we won’t second-guess that credibility 

determination. The claimant’s own testimony, in which he stated that he did not think he 

could perform any job, because of the severity of pain, further supported the magistrate’s 

total-disability finding. There is competent, material, and substantial evidence to support 

the magistrate’s findings.4

The Court of Appeals’ speculation about whether a magistrate’s disability finding 

could be based exclusively on medical testimony was not necessary to its holding. Because 

this case does not present that question, we vacate Part IV of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, 

though we agree with its ultimate result: the claimant’s evidence—which included medical 

testimony, medical records, and testimony from a vocational expert and the claimant

 4 See Omer, 332 Mich App at 133 (explaining that the MCAC must consider as conclusive 

the findings of fact made by a workers’ compensation magistrate as long as those facts are 

supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record).
5

himself—satisfied the substantial-and-competent-evidence requirement and should have 

been affirmed by the MCAC. 

Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

Bridget M. McCormack

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch