J-S39034-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

SHAMONE F. WOODS, :

:

Appellant : No. 198 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on December 12, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-15-CR-0000807-2009

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

Shamone F. Woods (“Woods”) appeals from the dismissal of his first 

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

On September 12, 2006, Curtis Self (“Self”) was driving home from a 

local bar when a vehicle approached him from behind and flashed its high 

beams. Self pulled his vehicle to the side of the road, and a green Acura 

pulled along the driver’s side of his vehicle. Self rolled down the driver’s 

side window, and Woods, sitting in the passenger seat of the Acura, fired 

multiple shots at Self’s vehicle. A bullet struck Self on the left side of his 

arm. Self drove to the police station, but was followed by the Acura, and 

Woods again shot at Self. Eventually, Self was transported by ambulance to 

a local hospital. Self reported that he was unable to identify the shooter 
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after his initial interview with police. However, on January 24, 2008, Self 

identified Woods as the shooter. 

On October 23, 2009, a jury convicted Woods of numerous crimes, 

including criminal attempt to commit murder of the first degree and two 

counts of aggravated assault. On February 17, 2010, the trial court imposed 

an aggregate sentence of 22 to 46 years in prison. This Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence on May 16, 2011. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 

30 A.3d 538 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). 

On January 13, 2012, Woods filed a pro se PCRA Petition. The PCRA 

court appointed Woods counsel, who filed an amended PCRA Petition. 

Following a hearing, the PCRA court dismissed the Petition. Woods filed a 

timely Notice of Appeal.

On appeal, Woods raises the following question for our review: 

“Whether the [PCRA] court committed error by dismissing [Woods’s] PCRA 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by [Woods’s] trial attorney[?]” 

Brief for Appellant at 4 (capitalization omitted). 

This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s 

order is whether the determination of the PCRA court is

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and 

these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support 

in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).
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Woods contends that his trial counsel, Joseph Green, Esquire 

(“Attorney Green”), was ineffective because he did not call Dante Carter 

(“Carter”) as a trial witness. Brief for Appellant at 11, 12. Woods asserts 

that Carter previously told investigators that Duron Peoples (“Peoples”) shot 

Self, that Attorney Green knew of this evidence prior to trial, and that 

Attorney Green had no reasonable basis for failing to call Carter as a 

witness. Id. at 12, 13-14. Specifically, Woods asserts that the jury would 

have heard testimony that Peoples shot Self; witnesses saw Peoples in 

possession of the firearm used to shoot Self; and police recovered a box of 

bullets in Peoples’s home that matched the bullets used to shoot Self. Id. at 

12-13; see also id. at 14-17 (wherein Woods argues that the rule against 

hearsay would not prevent Carter’s testimony because it establishes a thirdparty defense). Woods argues that Carter’s statement, along with Self’s 

inconsistent trial testimony, demonstrates the outcome of the trial would 

have been different. Id. at 12-13. 

To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Woods must demonstrate by 

the preponderance of evidence that

(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular 

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some 

reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but 

for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010). A failure to satisfy 

any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. 
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Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). Counsel is 

presumed to be effective and the burden is on the appellant to prove 

otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hannible, 30 A.3d 426, 439 (Pa. 2011). 

When raising a failure to call a potential witness claim, the PCRA 

petitioner must establish that: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, 

the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to 

testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of 

the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a 

fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009). 

Woods failed to establish that Carter was available and willing to 

testify that Peoples shot Self. Indeed, Woods never alleged that Carter was 

available or willing to testify in his PCRA Petition, at the evidentiary hearing, 

or in his appellate brief.1 See Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 

758 (Pa. 2014) (stating that appellant’s failure to establish the availability 

and willingness of a witness to testify on his behalf was fatal to his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim); see also Commonwealth v. 

Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 748 (Pa. 2004) (stating that counsel was not 

ineffective where appellant made no proffer that the uncalled witnesses were 

willing and able to testify). Thus, Woods failed to meet the necessary 

 

1 We note that Woods did not attach to his PCRA Petition “a signed 

certification as to each intended witness stating the witness’s name, 

address, date of birth and substance of testimony....” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(d)(1); see also Pa. R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15). 
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requirements of Johnson, supra, and the underlying claim is not of 

arguable merit.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015