### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 17 , 200 4 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . WEL THA W OMACK Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 69868 Richard Baumgar tner, Judge

No. E2003-02332-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Janu ary 4, 2005

The Appe llant, Weltha W omack, wa s convicted by a Knox Count y jury of one count of ag g ravated rape , a cla ss A felony , and two counts of misdemeanor assault, re sulting in an e ffe ctive fifte en-y ear sentenc e. On appea l, Womack raises the following issues for our r eview: ( 1) the voluntarine ss of his statements to the police; (2) w hether the trial court erre d by

permitting the State to amend the pr e se ntm e nt o n th e mornin g of tria l; ( 3) whether

thetria l c ou rt

pr op e rl y ins truc te d th e jury

wi th re g ard to the re qu isi te me nta l st a te fo r a g g ra vate d ra pe ; a nd(4 ) w he the r the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts c on sti tut e d prosec uto ri a l mi sc on du c t in its c los ing arg ume nt. Af te r r e vie w, we fi ndme ri t w ith r e g ar d t o i s s u e s ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) w i th r e s p e c t t o W o m a c k ’ s c o n v i c t i o n f o r a g g r a v a t e d r ap e . A c c o r d i n g l y, the judg ment of convic tion for ag g ravated rape is rever sed, and this ca se is rema nded for a new trial consistent with this opi nion.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt R ever sed and Rem anded

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined. Mark E. Stephens, District Public De fende r; and J ohn Halstea d, Assistant Public D efender, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee. Paul G . Su mmers, At torne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; B re nt C

. Cherry , Assi s t an tAt t o rn eyGe n er al ; R an d al l E

. Ni ch o l s , Di s tri ctAt t o rn eyGe n er al ; an d L el and Price , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.In o rder t o pro t ect t he i d ent i t y of m i no r vi ct i m s o f s exual ab use, i t is the p o l i cy o f t hi s co urt t o ref

er t o t he 1

v ic tim s b y the ir initials. St at e v. Sc hi m pf , 78 2 S.W

. 2 d 18 6 , 18 8 n. 1 (T enn. C ri m . A p p . 19 8 9 ).

-2- OP IN ION
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
Ar ou ndJuly

19 99 , th e vic tim, A .W. , re po rt e d to theDe pa rt me nt o f C hil dr e n Se rv ic e s in 1 Mo ntg ome ry

Cou nty that sh e ha d re c e ntl y be e n sexua lly mol e ste d by he r g rand fathe r, theAp pe llant, while visiting him in Knox ville. The victim further reported that her

g randf ather had first molested her w hen she w as four

y ear s old. At the time the report was filed, the sixteen-y ear -old victim lived with her pa

rents in Clarksville whereher f ather was stationed at Fort Campbell. The seventy -y ear oldAp pe llant is the fr a te rn a l gr a nd fathe r of the vic tim . The vic tim ’s c omp laint wa s f or wa rd e d to the Knoxvil le Police Depa rtment for inve stigation. The Appe llant was contacted by I nvestig ator Ron Nea l of t he Knox ville Poli ce D epartment and voluntarily

came in for questioning . During the first interview , condu ct ed o n S eptember 9, 1999, the Appellant init ially denied any wrong doing. H oweve r, during the cour se of the interview, he did admit touching the victim’s brea st in J une of 1999 w hile she wa s in the bathroom. The Appellant stated that the victim had had a bla dder pr oblem when she was a y oung child and that he had touched her i n the vaginal area to chec k for wetness. The Appe llant returne d on September 24, 1999, for a second interview. During this interview, the Appellant admitt ed that he “may have . . . tickled her

on her . . . [vag ina] once, m ay be twice .” Howe ver, during both interviews, he consistently

denied that any

of his actions we re done for a sexual purpose. OnJanu ary

27 , 2 00 0, a Kn ox Cou nty g randjury re turne d a

fi ve -c ou nt p re se ntm e nt a g a ins t theAp pe llant c ha

rg ing him a s f oll ow s: Cou nt O ne : r ape of

a c hil d, a lle g ing se xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f the vic tim on “ div e rs e [si c] day s” betw e e n “ the

__ _ d a y of July 19 86 a ndthe

__

_ d a y of July 19 90 ,” in violation of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-522; Cou nt T wo : r ape of

a c hil d, a lle g ing se xual pen etr ation o f the vic tim on “ div e rs e [sic ] da y s” be tw e e n “ the

__ _ d a y of July 19 86 a ndthe

__

_ d a y of July 19 90 ," in vio latio n o f T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -5 22 ; Count Three: a g g ravated sexual battery , occur ring on “diver se [si c] day s” betwe en “the ___ day of J uly 1994 and the ___ day of Jul y 1995,” in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-504;-3-

Count Four: sexual battery , occur ring on “diver se [sic] day s” between “the ___ day of January

1996 and the ___ day

of De cembe r 1996," in violation of TennesseeCode Annotated se ction 39-13-505; and Cou nt F ive : se xua l batte ry , th a t oc c ur re d o n o r abo ut the

__

_ d a y of June 19 99 , in violation of Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-505. Onthemornin g of

tria l, the State or a lly

mov e d to a me ndc ou nts on e a ndtw o, wh ic h b oth alleg ed ra pe of a child in violation of TennesseeCode Annotated se ction 39-13-522, to the crime of a g g ra vate d r ape . Ov e r obj e c tio n, thetria l c ou rt g rante d th e mot ionpe rm itt ing a me nd me nt o f c ou nts one and two to r efle ct cha

rg es of a g g ravated ra

pe in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ctions 39-2-603 and 39-13-502. At trial, the proof

established that the victim, A.W., whose date of b i rt h i s J u l y27, 1982, liv ed with h e r p are nts a ndold e r s ist e r i n Kno xvill e a s a sma ll c hil d. Whil e the re , th e vic tim reg ularly stay ed at the home of her g randpa rents while he r par ents worke d. Oftentimes the victim’s g rand fathe r, theAp pe llant, wo uldtake thevic tim to s c ho ol. Th e vic tim

re late d th a t du ri ng he r v isi ts to the Appellant’s house, he would play with her c litoris and insert his finge r into her va g ina. She state d th is f

ir st o c c ur re d w he n s he w as fou r y e ars olda ndc on tin ue d u nti l th e famil y mov e d to Germany when she was e ight. The victim specifica lly reme mbere d two occa sions on which she w as sexuallyabused:
A.

. . . I be lie ve he wa s ta

kin g me to school a ndhe , a g a in, y ou kn ow , r e a c he d h is hand down into my

pants and fondled my vag ina and just — I reme mber we wer e at theg a s st a tio n, a ndwe we reon — I thi nk on theway

to drop me off a t sc ho ol, beca use we ’re — we’ re g oing [sic] that area

. Q. Do y ou re me mbe r w hic h s c ho ol?
A

. Itw a s P o n d G ap E l e m e n t ar y. Q. Do y ou reme mber what gr ade y ou wer e in?
A. I believe I was proba

bly in the second g rade , second or third. Q. And y ou say

he touche d y ou? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can y ou describe spec ifically what happe ned?T hes e fact s form t he bas i s for c ount one w hi ch was amended t o cha r ge agg r ava t ed r ape. 2

T hes e fact s form t he bas i s for c ount t wo whi ch was amended t o cha r ge agg r ava t ed r ape. 3

T hes e fact s form t he bas i s for c ount f i ve. 4
-4- A. He place d his hand on my vag ina and continued to play with my clitoris, and he inserted his fing er into my vag ina. 2
Wit h reg ard to the se cond occ asion, the victim rec alled:
A. I reme mber sitting on his lap in his house, close to the kitche n. My g randmother had just g one out to take out the cl o t h i n g t h at s h e had w ashed . . . She hungher c lothe s o ut o n th e c lothe sli ne ou tsi de , a ndsh e wo ul d go ou t thedo or tow ard s — around the kitchen and he— he waited for he r to leave , and he told me to sit on . . . his lap . . . And he plac ed his hands in my pants ag ain. . . . Q. He a sked if y ou liked it, asked y ou to come sit on his lap. Then what happene d? A. He — heput his hand inside of my pants and — Q. Oncehe did that what did he do? A. And he — he— I ’m s o rr y . He p lay ed with my clitoris and inserted his fing er into myvag ina. 3
Th e vic tim

fu rthe r s tate d th a t in 19 99 sh e a ndhe r f a mil y re turne d to Kn oxvil le fo r a famil y me mbe r’ s we dd ing

. Du ri ng thi s vis it sh e stay e d a t the Ap pe llant’ s ho me . She re late d th at, while she wa s in the bathroom, the Appe llant came up be hi n d h er , fondl ed her brea sts for three to four seconds, and told her that her breasts were becoming develope d and we re nic e. The victim pushed the Appellant a way

and told him “no.” 4
The victim verif

ied that she ha d a pronounc ed bladde r control pr oblem as a y outh and that it was not unusual for he r familyto bring her c lean c lothes to school. This problem wa s confirme d by the vi ctim’s mo th e r

w h o te s ti f

ie d a t t r ia l. T h e St a tea ls o c a ll e dD e te c ti v e Ro n N e a l w ho int ro du c e d th e Ap pe llant’ s st a te me nts fr om the tw o in te rv ie ws . At the close of

the S tate’s proof, t he trial court g rante d the Appellant’ s motion for a judg ment of ac quittal with reg ard to co u n t three, w hich alleg ed ag g ravated sexual battery , and count f our, alleg ing se x ual battery . Ba sed upon the proof p re s en t ed , t h e juryreturne d a ver dict finding the Appellant g uilty of misdemeanor assault under

count one, g uiltyof ag g ravated ra pe under count two, and g uilty of misdemeanor assault under count five. The Appellant was later sentenc ed to f ifteen y ear s for the a g g ravated ra pe convic tion, to be served concurre ntly with the t wo six -month sentence s-5-

for the a ssault convictions. The Appe llant’s motion for new trial was de nied, with this appeal following

. Ana lys is I. Adm iss ibil it y o f Sta te m e nt As his first issue, the Appellant contends that portions of his second state ment to the police we reob ta ine d in vo lun tari ly a nd , th us , s ho uldno t ha ve be e n a dmi tte d at tria l. The finding s of fa ct made by the trial court at a hea

ring on a motion to suppress are binding upon this c ourt unless the evidenc e contained in the rec ord preponde rate s aga i n s t them. State v. Ro ss , 49 S.W .3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001). The trial court, as the trier of fac t, is best able to assess the cre dibilit y

of witnesses, de termine the w eig ht and value to be aff orded the evidenc e, and r esolve a ny conflicts in the evide nce. Id

. (c i t i n g State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) ). Howe ver, this court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law

. State v. Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998) . The a

pplication of the law to the fac ts f ound by the trial court is a question of law that th is c ou rt

re vie ws de novo

. Sta te v . D an ie ls , 12 S.W .3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000)

. The proof on this iss ue esta

blished that the Appellant a g ree d to m ee t with Detec tive Ron Nea l of the Knoxvil le Police Depa rtment at the poli ce station to di scuss the De partment of Children Service s complaint that had been fil ed by the victim. The first intervie w lasted a pproxi mately

one hour. At this meeting , the Appellant was advised of his rights a nd was told that he c ould leave at any time he wished. He was further a dvised that his statements and responses would be g iven to the Child P rotec tion I nvestig ative Te am and that the district attorney g ener al would then make the decision of whe ther to prose cute the c ase. Thefirst interview w as not r ecor ded. At this interview, t h e A p p el l an td en i ed an y

cr i m i n al wr o n gd o i n g. J ust prior to the second interview, the Appe llant was g iven a poly g raph te st. After completion of the test, th e Appellant was advised by Detec tive Nea l that he had f ailed. The Appellant, howe ver, pe rsisted in his denial of any criminal conduct. He rea dily admitted that he had touched the victim on many occa sions but onlybeca

use she ha d a serious bladder c ontrol problem and that she would never tell him or hi s wife when she had “w et” on he rself. A pproxi mately midway into this thirty -five- minute interview, the f ollowing c olloquy

transpire d: [De te c tiv e ]: Ou r j ob is t o ta ke [the c omp la int ] to c ou rt

. [ A p p e l l a n t ] : O k a y. [ D e t e c t i v e ] : It ’ s [ A

. W

. ’ s ] j o b t o g e t

. . . t ak e i tt o c o u n s e l i n g , o k a y? [ A p p e l l a n t ] : O k a y.T he A p p ell an t also co m p l ains o f ce rtai n so - ca l l ed m i nim i za t i o n tech niq ue s uti l i ze d b y t he D etec t i ve such as: 5 (1) ass ert i ng t he rel i ab i l i t y of t he p o l y graph t est and t he si m i l ari t y in h is s t at em ent s t o t he vi ct i m t o co nvi nce t he Appel l an t h e wou l d be c on v i ct ed; ( 2) i n for mi n g t h e Appel l an t h e wou l d n ot be ar r es t ed t h at da y n o ma t t er w h at w as s ai d; (3) dis cuss i ng t he avai l ab i l i t y of co unsel i ng; (4) aski ng t he A p p el l ant ’ s o p i ni o n o n a second chance f o r s o m eo ne who com mi t t ed a c r i me of

t hi s na t ur e; an d (5) t el l i ng t he A pp el l ant t hat what he d i d may have been t ot al l y i nn ocent

. W e a gr ee w ith the trial c o u rt tha t t h e se tec h n iq u e s e m p lo ye d b y the D e te c tive w e re no t i n e rr o r. -6- [De te c tiv e ]: Uh

. . . I

. . . w hat I ’m

ho pin g we c a n do .

. . uh

. . . is put a clo su reto this for [A.W.] and y ou. [Appellant] : Do what, sir? [D e te c ti v e ]: T o c lo s e it

o u t f o r y o u a n d [A

. W. ]. [ A p p e l l a n t ] : O k a y. [Detective]: And . . . it would be nice if we could do it without a lawy er . . . a court battle. Almost im mediately

there afte r, the Appe llant responded: [Appellant] : . . . I

may have uh . .

. tickled her on her .

. . upper part t here

. . . uh . . . that . . . [ D e t e c t i v e ] : W h a td o y o u m e a n b y “ t i c k l e d h e r ?” [Appellant] : May

be just rub my

fing er on it, y ou know. . . . [ De t ec t i ve]: Iunderstand that. Uh . . . so y ou’re saying now that y ou might have tickled the top of he r vag ina . . . on her pants . . . just not ins ide. [Appellant] : May

be to her that was pe netration. . . . The Appe llant arg ues that the stateme nt by Detect i v e Neal, in addition to t he prior

“ min imi zat iontechn iq ues ” e mpl oy e d b y theDe te c tiv e , le d to theabo ve inc ulp a tin g state me nts

. 5 He c ontends that the De tective’ s statement “to clo s e i t o u t for y ou and [A.W.] ” can only be interpre ted as a n implied promise to keep the c ase out of c ourt

. As s u ch, he contends that the inculpating statements which f ollowed wer e improperly induced. We ag ree . Co n f e s s io n s th a t a

r e in v o lu n ta

ry , i

. e., the produc t of coe rcion, whe ther it be phy sical or psy cholog ical, ar e not admissible. Rogers v. Ric hmond , 365 U.S. 534, 540, 8 1 S

. Ct. 735, 739 (1961). The test for voluntariness under the Tenne ssee Constitution i s broade r and moreprotec tive of individual rig hts than the test of voluntariness unde r the United States Cons t i t ution. State v. Stephenson , 878 S.W .2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). For a confe ssion to be a dmissibl e, it must be “fr eeW e n ot e t hat t wo T enn es s ee Supre me C our t j us t i ces f i l ed s epar at e di s s ent i ng op i ni ons i n t hi s cas e f i ndi ng t hat 6 the c o n fes sio n w a s n o t vo lun ta rily giv e n . -7- and voluntary ; that is, [ it] must not be ex trac ted by any sort of t hreats or vi olence , nor obtained by any direc t or implied promises, howeve r sl ight, nor by the exertion of any

improper influe nce . . . .” Sta te v . S mi th , 9 3 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 0 , 4 5 5 (T en n . 1 9 9 6 ) ( q u o t i n g Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S. Ct. 183, 187 (1897)).
I n d e te rm ini ng thea dmi ssi bil ity of a c on fe ssi on , th e pa

rt ic ula r ci rcu mst a nc e s o f e a c h c a se must be ex amined as a

whole. Sm ith , 933 S.W .2d at 45 5; see also State v. P hillips , 30 S.W .3d 372, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). A def endant’ s subjective per ception alone is not sufficient to justify a conc lu s i o n o f i n voluntariness in the constitutional sense. Sm ith , 933 S.W .2d at 455 (c itations omitted). Rather, “ coer cive police activity is a nece ssary predic ate to f inding that a

confe ssion is not voluntary . . . .” Id. (citations omitted).
Howeve r, an of

fice r’s promise of

lenien cy d o es not rende r a subse quent conf ession i n v o l u n t ar y pe r se , for “ [t ]he critical question is ‘whe ther the be havior of the state’s law enfor ceme nt officia ls was such as to ove rbea r petitioner’s will to re sist and bring about conf essions not free ly

selfdetermined. . . .’” Id. at 455-56. Acc ording ly , we must determine whether the Appellant’ s statement was “ compelled” or induce d by a promise of

leniency under the totalityof the c ircumstances surrounding the statement.
I n Sm ith , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court conclude d that a soc i al wo rker ’s statement to the defe ndant, that the district attorne y might for eg o prosec ution if t h e d ef endant we re truthf

ul and rec eived c ounseling , was e quivocal and c ould not reasona bly be interp re t ed as a promise that no prosec ution would follow. Id

. at 456. The court further conclude d that a sta t em en t t h at the de fe nd a nt w ou ld b e pr os e c ute d if he c ho se no t to a dmi t to un law ful con du ct w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o rende r his subsequent stateme nt involuntary

. Id

. Under all the circ umstances, the c ourt conc luded that the def

endant’ s statements wer e not “c ompelled” in violation of the state or fede ral c onstitut ion. Id . Howeve r, the c ourt noted that the interrog ator’s rema rks wer e “on the line, but did not cross it.” Id . at 45 8. Th e c ou rt

e xpre sse d “ thestr on g e st d isa pp ro va l of

a ny pr a c tic e wh e re by

state a g e nts e nc ou ra g e su sp e c ts t o s e e k c ou ns e lin g fo r the pu rp os e of e lic iti ng inc ri min a tin g state me nts fo r u se in a subsequent pr osecution.” Id

. 6
I n Phillips , the def

endant dr ove himself to the De partmen t o f Hu m an S ervic es for an interview r eg arding the alleg ed sexual abuse of his stepdaug hters. Phillips , 30 S.W .3d at 374. The investigators interrog ated the de fenda n t fo r about one hour, and, a lthough he repe atedly and steadfa stlydenied any sexual misconduct f or much of the interview, the defe ndant finally admitted to sex ually abusing one of his stepda ug hters. Id . This court re viewed a thirty -six pag e tra nscript of the interrog ati on of the de fendant which re veale d: (1) misrepr esentations byan investig ator; (2) numerous stea dfast denia ls by the def endant; (3) state ments that law enf orce ment officia ls would be involved if the def

endant did not confe ss to sexually abusing his stepdaug hter; and ( 4) promises for treatment for the de fendant and his stepdaug hter only if he fullyconfe ssed to the crimes. Id . at 377.-8-

The promises and inducements we re ma de re peate dly by the investig ators prior to the de fendant’s conf es s ions. Id . The c ourt conc luded that “[t] he ac tions of the interrog ators we re muc h more coer cive than those found in Sm ith , and unlike Sm ith , crosse d the line.” Id

. I n th is c a se , th e re c or d e sta bli sh e s tha t the Ap pe llant vol un tari ly app e are d for bo th r e lativ e ly leng thy interviews. Detective Neal testified that, on both occa sions, he explained to the Appellant that he wa s fre e to le ave at any time and that no matter w hat was said, the Appellant would not be arr ested. Ne al also testified that he explained the proce ss of these types of investig ations, including that no arr ests would be made until after the c ase w as pre sented to the Child Prote ction I nvestig ative Tea m and the district attorne y , who would then make the dec ision whether to pr o s ec u t e t he ca se. Ad dit ion a lly , N e a l st a te d th a t heinf orme d th e Ap pe llant o f h is Miranda rig hts, w hich the Appellant acknow ledg ed.
Du ri ng arg ume nt a t the motion to su pp re ss he ari ng , theStatea dmi tte d th a t th e state me nt i n question “is approa ching the line of saying, ‘ W el l , we’ re not – we ’re not going to prosecute ,’ . . . You know, honestly , to be quiet candid, I ’d rather them no t t alk about kee ping la wy ers out and e ve rythi ng lik e that. I ’drathe r that no t ha ve be e n s a id, bu t i t was sai d . . . .” Ho we ve r, theState arg ue d that De te c tiv e Ne a l’ s state me nt wa s n ot an u na mbi g uo us pr omi se no t to pr os e c ute . T he State contends that the A ppellant knew tha t Ne al could not fulfill such a promise be cause the entire proce ss, including the f

act that De tective Ne al did not make the de cision to pr osecute , was e x plained to the Appellant. The trial court c oncluded t h at, althoug h it would have pre fer red that Neal’ s s t a t e m e n tn o th a v e b e e n m a d e , i tw a s n o ta n u n a mb i g u ou s q u i d p r o quo offe r which r ender ed the statement involuntary

. Af ter re vie w of th e chal len ged st ate men t, we fi nd th at, un der t he t ot ali tyof t he ci rcum st ances, the state me nt by De te c tiv e Ne a l cou ld onl y be re a so na bly int e rp re te d by the Ap pe llant as a pr omi se to avoid prosec ution in ex chang e for his confession. While both the State and the trial c ourt relied upon the explanation Neal ga ve to the Appellant at t he start of the interview , that the district attorney made the de cision to prosecute the case, certain st atements made during the cour se of the interview tend to contra dict this position. On page 13 of t he int ervie w, Neal states: “This i s g oing to be a uh

. . . lo n g d r a w n o u t p r o c e d u r e . Be cause I h av e en o ug h to go to c ourt with it.” (emphasis adde d). On pag e 15 of the interview, immediate ly prior to the stat em en t s in question, when the Appe llant raised the possibili t yof counse ling, Ne al re sponded: “Our job is to t ake it to court.” Thus, in the context of the statement by Nea l a bout a voiding a court battle, these state ments, spoken only a fe w moments earlier , could clea rly reinfor ce the belief that Nea l had the authority to keep the c ase f

rom a courtroom. Additionally , we would note that almost immediately afte r this statement was made by Nea l, the Appellant cease d his repeated denials of touc hing the victim for sexual purposes and admitted he mig ht have tickled he r vag ina once or twice

. There is no issue of credibility in this case, a s it on ly inv olv e s app lic a tio n of the fa c ts to the la w. Al tho ug h w e be lie ve thepo lic e c on du c t f a lls betwee n Phillips and Smi th , we fi nd that the improper induc ement is more a ligne d with the circ umstances in Phillips than in Sm ith

. We c on c lud e that th e Ap pe llant’ s in c ulp a tory state me nts wh ic h fo llo we d we re se c ur e d b y a n impli e d p ro mis e a nd , a s su c h, we reinv olu nta ri ly g ive n. Th us ,R u le 7 (b ), T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C rim ina l P ro c e d u re , p ro v id e s tha t n o a m e n d m e n t m a y b e m a d e to a n ind ic tm e n t, 7

w itho u t t h e d e fe n d a n t’ s c o n se n t, if a n a d d iti o n a l o ff e n se is ch a rg e d a n d if

a n y su b sta n tial rig h t o f t h e d e fen d a n t i s pr ej u di ce d.

T h e pr es en t men t c h ar g es t h at t h e Appel l an t “ r ec k l es s l y ” s ex u al l y pe n et r at ed t h e v i ct i m. As di s cu s s ed i n f ra , 8 this is e rr o r. N o n e the le ss, the e rr o r d o e s n o t re q u ire inv a lid a tio n o f t h e instr u m e n t. S e e S ta te v . H ill , 954 S. W

. 2d 725, 7 2 9 (T enn. 19 9 7 ).

As n ot e d a bo v e , t h e t w o o pe n - da t e d c ou n t s of t h e pr e s e n t me n t c h a r g e t h e s a me offe n s e an d a l l e g e t h e s a me 9 tim e fra m e fo r t h e c o m m issio n o f the o ff e n se s. A t the c lo se o f the p ro o f in t h e c a se , the S ta te e le c te d tw o s e p a r a te occur r enc es of

ag gr ava t ed r ape, wh i ch i t s ubmi t t ed t o t he j ur y un der t hes e r es pe ct i ve count s . Al t houg h n ot r ai s ed as e rr o r, w e kn o w o f no a u tho rity w h ic h w o u ld a llo w th is p ro c e d u re . In d e e d , th is p ra c tice in c e rta in c a se s w o u ld e ff e c tive ly ci rcum vent T en n es s ee Rul es of Cr i mi n al Pr oce du r e 8( b) a n d 13( a) , a n d T en n es s ee Rul es of Evi den ce 404( b)

. O ur su p re m e c o u rt h a s c h a ra c te riz e d the p ra c tice o f p e rm itt ing the a d m issio n o f m u lti p le a c ts o f sex u a l m isc o n d u c t i n to evi dence f

r om a s i ng l e open- dat ed i ndi ct ment as a “ s peci al r ul e. ” St at e v. Ri ck m an , 87 6 S.W

. 2 d 82 4 , 82 8 (T enn. 19 9 4 ). T h e ru le furth e r p ro v id e s, “the S ta te m u st e le c t a t t h e c lo se o f i ts p ro o f- in-c h ie f a s to th e p a rticu la r in c id e n t for w hi ch a c onvi cti o n i s b eing s ough t

. ” Id

. ( emp has i s added). W e woul d ack nowl edge t he us e of mul t i

- count , open- dat ed i n di ct men t s for s epa r at e s t at u t or y c r i mes or for s epa r at e def en dan t s . Ag ai n , b ecause t h i s i s s u e h as n ot be en r ai s ed or b rie fed , w e lea v e it s re so lutio n fo r a n o the r d a y. -9- a ny inc ulp a tory

state me nts ma de by

the Ap pe llant a ft e r D e te c tiv e Ne a l’ s st a te me nt that heho pe d “ to close it out for y ou and [A.W.] ” we re imprope rly admitted.
II. Am e ndm e nt

of t he P r e se nt m e nt Se c on d, theAp pe llant a sse rt s th a t th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d ing ranti ng th e S tate’ s r e qu e st t o amendc ou nts on e a ndtw o o f the pr e se ntm e nt o n th e mornin g of tria l f ro m r ape of

a c hil d to ag g ravated ra

pe, to re flec t the statute which wa s in e ffe ct at the time the offe nses wer e committed. The Appe llant asserts that it was e rror to permit the amendme nt because it resulted in the charg ing of a diff ere nt offense due to diffe rent a pplicable menta l states, a violation of Rule 7 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure

. 7
Counts one and two of t he presentment contain identical lang uag e with ea ch alleg ing: “ On or about the ____ day

of Jul y , 1986, and on diverse [ sic] day s betwee n that date, and the ____ day of July , 1 99 0, [the Ap pe llant]

. . . d id u nla wf ull y a ndre c kle ssl y se xua lly

pe ne tr a te [A. W.], a

c hil d 8 less than thirteen ( 13) y ear s of ag e, by placing his finge r in th e v agi n a o f [ A.W.] , in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-522. . . .” On the morning of trial, the State appa rently rea liz ed that ra

pe of a child, 9 as def ined by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-522, was not e nacte d until 1992, well af ter thedate s a lle g e d in the pr e se ntm e nt. Th e State the n mov e d to a me nd the of fe ns e in e a c h c ou nt t o that of ag g ravated ra

pe. The State posit ed t h at b ecause the e lements of ra pe of a child and ag g ravated ra

pe of a victim less than thirte en y ear s of ag e, as define d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-13- 502, wer e the sa me, no pre judice would o ccur. The State, howe ver, a cknowledg ed that during the four- y ear

time frame alleg ed in counts one and two, two differ ent statutory offe nses of ag g ravated ra

pe we re in e ffe ct. Fir st, from J uly 1986 until November 1, 1989, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-2-603 g overne d the cha rg e of a g g ravated ra

pe, which w as d ef

i n ed as an “unlawf ul sex ual pene tration of anothe r ac companied by any of the following circ umstances: .

. . (4)W e no te tha t t h e S e n te n c ing C o m m issio n C o m m e n ts to T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d s e c tio n 3 9 -1 3 -5 0 2 sta te 10 t h at t h e for mer “ s u bdi v i s i on (a ) ( 4) , c on ce r n i n g r ape of a c h i l d l es s t h an t h i r t ee n y ea r s of a g e, h as be en mov ed t o § 39- 13- 5 2 2 .”
T hi s i ss ue i s f urt her com p o und ed by t he d i l em m a o f de t erm i ni ng whi ch st at ut e was op erat i ve o n t he d at e t he 11

cr i me of aggr ava t ed r ape was co mm i t t ed. T he vi ct i m t es t i f i ed t hat s he was “ approxi mat el y s eve n” on t he dat e s he was se x u a lly p e n e tra te d . T h e vic tim w o u ld ha v e tur n e d se v e n o n J u ly 2 7 , 1 9 8 9 , an d a c c o rd ing ly, re m a ine d se v e n un til J u ly 26, 1990. B as ed u pon t h i s pr oof , t h e cr i me cou l d h av e bee n commi t t ed u n der T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed s ec t i on s 39- 2- 603 or 39- 13- 502. -10- The victim is less than thirteen y ear s old.” Fr om November 1989 until the end of t he period cover ed in the prese ntment, Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-502 def ined ag g ravated ra

pe as the

“ un la wf ul s e xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f a vic tim by thede fe nd a nt o r the de fe nd a nt b y thevic tim acc ompanied by

any of the following circ umstances: . . . (4) The victim is less t h an t h i rt ee n (13) y ear s of ag e.” T h e cu rr en t s ection of the code, w hich was e nacte d in 1992, Tennesse e Code

10 Annotated se ction 39-13-522, de fines the of fense of ra

pe of a child as “the unlawful sexual penetr ation of a vic tim bythe def endant or t h e d efe ndant by a victim, if such victim is less than thirteen (13) y ear s of ag e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-522 (2003)

. It is uncontested that ea ch of the three statutes in ques t i o n p rohi bited the unlawf ul sex ual pe ne tr a tio n o f a

vic tim le ss tha n th irte e n y e ars of a g e . Th e Ap pe llant d oe s n ot q ue sti on thesim ila ri ty of these e lements. Rather, he arg ues that the pre -1989 ag g ravated ra pe off ense, Te nnessee Code An no tat e d s e c t i o n 3 9

- 2

- 6 0 3 , w a s a g e n e r a l i n t e n tc r i m e , w h e r e a s t h e m e n t a l s t a t e s o f i n t e n t ion a l, knowing , or re ckless applied to the c rime of a g g ravated ra pe af ter Nove mber 1, 1989. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301( c) ( 2003). The trial court instructe d the jury only under the provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-502. The A ppellant contends that unde r this charg e, the jury wa s in str uc te d th a t th e me nta l st a te s o f i nte nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly , o r re c kle ssl y we reapp lic able to the elements of a g g ravated rape . Thus, the Appellant arg ues that under this instruction, the jury wa s p e rm itt e d to fi ndhim g uil ty of a g g ra vate d r ape bas e d u po n a fi nd ing that here c kle ssl y pe ne tr a te d th e vic tim

. As su c h, he arg ue s th a t th e tw o crim es of agg rav a te d r ape c on sti tut e 11 differ ent offe nses, as the pre- 1989 common law crime did not pe rmit a conviction base d upon the me nta l st a te of

re c kle ssn e ss. We w ou ld a g re e that th e pre- Nov emb er 1, 19 89 of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d r ape wa s a

c ri me orig inating f

rom common law. State v. W ilkins , 655 S.W .2d 914, 916 (Tenn. 1983). Although the crime be fore us is aggra v at ed ra p e, our supr eme c ourt has re cog nized that this offe nse is but an ag g ravated form of

the common law of

fense of ra

pe. Id. Rape wa s a g ener al intent crim e at common law for

which a c ulpable mental state was ne cessa ry but e asily infera

ble from the conduc t which comprised the off

ense. Dykes v. Compton , 978 S.W .2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1998) . The Model Penal Code, fr om wh i ch our cur rent statutory

culpable me ntal states ar e derived, discar ded the lang uag e of g ener al and spe cific intent in favor of “intentionally ,” “knowing ly ,” “r eckle ssly ,” and

“ c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e . ” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9

- 1 1

- 3 0 1 , S e n t e n c i n g C o m m i s s i o n C o m m e n t s . In g e ne ra l, h ow e ve r, “ int e nti on a l” c or re sp on ds loo se ly

wi th the c omm on law c o n c e p t o f s p e c if ic int e nt, while “knowing ly ” corr esponds loosely with the conce pt of g ener al intent. State v. James Dison , No.-11-

0 3 C 0 1 -9 6 0 2 -C C -0 0 0 5 1 ( T e n n . C ri m . Ap p . atKn o x v i l l e, J an . 3 1 , 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Bailey , 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S. C t. 624, 632 (1980)).
Ac c or din g ly , w e a g re e wi th the Ap pe llant that prior to No ve mbe r 1, 1 98 9, a

de fe nd a nt c ou ld no t bec on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d r ape ba se d up on a “ re c kle ss” se xua l pe ne tr a tio n of the vic tim

. Th is, howeve r, is prec isely

the rule today

as under our cur rent c ri m i n al co d e that no defe ndant may be convicted of

ag g ravated ra

pe base d upon a “r eckle ss” sexual penetration of the victim. Thus, the e rr or in this c a se is n ot attribu ta bleto an im pro pe r ame nd me nt o f the pr e se ntm e nt, rathe r i t st e ms from an imprope r cha

rg e to the jury

. III . I m pr ope rIns tr uc ti on with Re ga r d t o M e nt al S ta teof “R e c kle ssn e ss” This appropriately

rais e s th eA p p e ll an t’ s th ird issue of whe ther the tria l court committed err or “wh e n th e ju r y w a s in s tr

u c te d th a t th e y c o u ld f

in d A p p e ll a n t g u il ty o f a g g r a v a te d r ape if he acte d rec klessly .” We beg in our analy sis with a revie w of the statutory provisions relevant to this issue.
B e c aus e thede fi nition s o f a ll s e xua l of fe ns e s u nd e r p art

5 o f o ur c ri min a l c od e do no t c on ta in a me nta l e le me nt, theme nta l e le me nts of int e nt, kn ow le dg e , o r r e c kle ssn e ss wi ll s uf fi c e to e sta

bli sh the culpable mental state. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 301(c)

. Howeve r, sex offense s may have mor e than one menta l state. See State v . Parker , 887 S.W .2d 825, 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). It is the obligation of the t ri al j u d ge to instruct the jury with reg ard to the a

pplicable menta l state “a s the definition of the off

ense r equire s, with re sp e c t to e ac h e le me nt o f th e off e ns e .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301( a)( 1) (e mphasis added)

. F urthe rm or e , o ur

c ri min a l c od e dir e c ts that no pe rs on ma y be c on vic te d of

a c ri min a l of

fe ns e unless “[t] he conduc t, circumstanc es surrounding the conduct, or a re sult of the conduct de scribed in the definition of the offense[ ]” be proven be y ond a re asonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11- 201(a) (1) ( 2003). Thus, our c ode spec ifically define s three ty

pes of possible e lements of which one or mor e ma y

be fo un d inthede fi nit ionof a ny c ri min a l of

fe ns e . T he ty

pe or ty pe s o f eleme nts define d in the offe nse dete rmines which a pplicable portion of the m en t al s t ate definitions of “intentional,” “ knowing ,” “r eckle ss,” or “ criminal neg lige nce” should be char g ed to the j ury . The first element, conduct, i nvolves the nature of t he proscribed a ct or the ma nner in whic h the def endant acts, e.g. , the phy sical ac t of committing an a ssault, or the phy sical res t ra i n t o f another person (kidnapping ). The se cond ele ment, circ umstances surr ounding the conduct, r efe rs to a situation which relates to t he ac tor’s culpa bility , e.g. , lack of victim’s c onsent or stolen status of property . The result of the de fendant’s conduct c onstitut es the fina l element; in other wor ds, the ac cused’ s conduct must at least be a phy sical ca use of t h e h ar m ful result, e.g. , causing the death of another

. State v. Jennie Bain Ducker, No. 01C01-9704-CC-00143 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 25, 1999), aff’d on other grounds , 27 S.W.3 d 889 (T e nn . 200 0)

. Ge ne ra lly , an of fe ns e ma y be c la ssi fi e d a s a result-of- conduct of

fense when the re sult of the conduct is the only element c ontained in the off ense. Ducker , 27 S.W .3d at 896. An example of a result-of- conduct offe n s e i s second de g ree murder, which is define d as a “ k n o wing killing of a nother.” Id . The “ nature of the c onduct” that c auses-12-

death or the manner

in which one is killed is inconseque ntial under the second deg ree murder statute. Id. As previously

noted the trial judg e instructed the jury that to find the defe ndant g u i l ty of ag g ravated ra

pe, they we re required to find in relevant part “( 1) that the de fendant had unlawf ul s e x u a l p e n e tr a t i o n o f

[ t h e v i c t i m ]

. . . ” a n d “ ( 3 ) t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n ta c t e d e i t h e r

i n t e n t i o n a l l y, knowing ly , or re cklessly .” The Appe llant arg ues that this instruction wa s err or beca use ag g ravated rape is a

nature of c on du c t c ri me , a ndthec ha rg e a s g ive n w ou ld perm it con vic tio n u po n a fi nd ing of

re c kle ss pe ne tr a tio n. Th e c ri me of a g g ra vate d ra pe re qu ir e s by de fi nit ion se xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f the vic tim

. Thus, it is t he natur e of the proscribed conduc t, i.e. sexual penetration, which constitutes the crime. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that a g g ravated ra pe as charg ed is a natur e of c onduct crime. See Sta te v . Ch e ste r W

ay ne W alte rs , No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App. at N ashville, J uly 20, 20 04 ) (hol di ng that un la wf ul s e xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f the vic tim is b othnatur e of

c on du c t a ndre su lt of conduc t); State v. Je

f f r ey L. Marc us , No. W2000-02698-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Jan. 23, 2002), rev’ d on other g rounds, 109 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2003) (holding the offe nses of ag g ravated sexual battery and rape of a child are nature -of- conduct of fense s, in that the offe nses se e k p ri nc ipa lly

to p ro s c ri b ethe natur e of

thede fe nd a nt’ s c on du c t) ; Ducker , 01C01-9704-CC-00143 (noting t h at n at u re o f the conduc t involves the phy sical ac t and that re sult of the conduct is the harmful r esult).
Ba sed upon the statu t o ry d ef i n itions of the following me ntal states, it is appare nt that “intentional” r efe rs to the nature of t he conduct or t o a result of the c onduct, “knowing ” re fer s to the nature of th e c o n d u c t, c ir c u ms tan c e s s u rr o u n d in g th e c o n d u c t, a n d th e r e s u lt o f th e c o n d u c t, a nd “re ckless” r efe rs to the re sult of the conduct or to the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302( a),( b) and (c)

. Acc ording ly , in this case , which involves a nature of c onduct crime, it wa s err or to cha

rg e the menta l state definition of “re ckless” with r espec t to the eleme nt of sexual penetration. Ge nera lly , only the culpable mental states of “ intentional” and “ knowing ” ar e applicable to nature of

conduct c rimes. State v. De ji A. Ogundiya , N o. M2 00 2- 03 09 9- CCA -R 3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Fe b. 19, 2004).
I n in str uc tin g thejury , th e tria l ju dg e mus t limit its ch arg e of the app lic able me nta l st a te to thee le me nt o r e le me nts of the of fe ns e c ha rg e d. As de mon str a te d in thi s c a se , thesu bmi ssi on of a ll three mental st at es t o ea ch of the elements of the crime a ltered the State’s burde n of proof , thus permitting a

conviction base d upon rec kless sexual penetration. The de fendant has a c onstitut i o n al ri gh t to a cor rec t and complete c harg e of the law. A c ha rg e sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d pr e jud ic ia lly e rr on e ou s if

it f a ils to f a ir ly su bmi t th e le g a l is su e s o r i f it mis leads the jury

as to the applica

ble law. State v. Hodge s , 944 S.W .2d 3 4 6 , 3 5 2 (T en n. 1997) (c i t i n g State v. Forbes , 918 S.W .2d 431, 447 (Tenn. C rim. App. 1995)). A n err oneous jury instruction, which mis s t ates the applicable c onduct eleme nt of an off ense and lessens the State’s burden of proof, is subject to constituti onal harmless error analy sis. State v. Page , 81 S.W .3d 781,-13-

789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). As in Page , the mens rea of t he Appellant was, in larg e part, a ce ntral is s u e a t tria l. Id

. at 7 8 9. The Appe llant does not deny that he touche d the victim’s g enital ar ea, rathe r he de nies that the touching was for any sexual purpose. I n view of this fa ct and the e rrone ous admission of the Appellant’s involuntary statements, we a

re una ble to conclude that t he jury i n s tru c t i o n e rr o r

w a s h ar m l e s s b e yo n d a r e a s o n ab l e d o u b t

. T e n n . R

. C r i m . P

. 5 2 ( a )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we re ve rs e a ndre ma ndfo r a ne w t ri a l. IV. P rosec utorial Misconduct
L ast, the Appe llant asserts that the State c ommitt ed re versible e rror in their closing arg uments. Specifica lly , he asse rts that the State “laude d the victim’s coura g e in coming forwa rd with the char g es, thus bolstering her integrity and credibility , and the State sa id the jury had to show the same c ourag e as the victim by convicting Appellant,” resulting in violations of his rig hts to due proce ss and a f

air trial. Se e Sta te v . G olt z , 111 S.W. 3d 1, 6 (T e nn . Crim . App . 2 00 3) (s e tti ng fo rth cate g ories of imprope r ar g ument). The State c orre ctly

arg ues that the Appe llant has waive d this iss ue by his failure to lodge a c on te mpo rane ou s o bje c tio n at tria l or to r a ise theiss ue in h is m oti on fo r n e w t ri a l. T ypic a lly

the se omi ssi on s r e su lt i n a

waive r o n a

pp e a l of a ny c omp la int

c on c e rn ing the pro se c uto r’ s c omm e nts

. Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 3 7( e ) and36 (a ); State v. Thornton , 10 S.W .3d 229, 234 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) ; State v. Gre en , 94 7 S.W. 2d 18 6, 18 8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Sta te v . Li ttl e , 854 S.W .2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) . Thus, if this court is to review the Appellant’s c laim of pros ec u torial misconduct, we must do so utiliz ing plain error revie w pursuant to Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b) whic h provides: “An e rror

which has a ffected the substantial rights of an acc used may be noticed at any time, even thoug h not raised in the motion fo r new trial or assig ned as e rror on appea l, in the discretion of the appellate court whe re ne cessa ry to do substantial just ice.” This c ourt has, in its discretion, from time to time reviewe d alleg atio n s o f p rosecutorial misconduct as “plain error ” eve n in the abs en ce o f a contemporaneous objec tion. See State v

. Ma rsh all , 8 70 S.W. 2d53 2 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 93 ); State v. Butler , 7 95 S.W. 2d68 0 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ); An gli n v . S tate , 553 S.W .2d 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) . I n this case, howe ver, w e do not elect to exerc ise our discre tion to review unde r pl ain error a s it is not nece ssary to do substantial justi ce a s the ca se is being reve rsed on other g rounds.B ec au s e n o i s s u e wa s ra i s ed wi t h r eg ar d t o t h e Appel l an t ’ s t wo mi s deme an or c on v i ct i on s i n t h e mot i on for 12

a n ew t r i al nor s peci f

i cal l y addres s ed i n h i s bri ef , we concl ude t hat t he mi s dem ean or convi ct i ons ar e n ot en com pas s ed wi t h i n t h e Appel l an t ’ s c h al l en g es on a ppea l

. M or eov er , w e c on cl u de t h at t h e t r i al er r or s w er e ei t h er h ar ml es s or di d n ot i m p l i ca t e these co nv i cti o ns. -14- CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the case is remande d to the Knox C ounty Cri m i n al Court for a ne w t ri a l w ithre sp e c t to theAp pe llant’ s c on vic tio n f or a g g ra vate d rap e consis te nt w iththi s opinion. 12

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE