If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JONATHAN M. VIRGILIO and DEIRDRE M. 

VIRGILIO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

January 11, 2024

v No. 364346

Kent Circuit Court

PEGGY A. KASUL and BRUCE P. KASUL, LC No. 19-010824-NI

Defendants-Appellees

and

PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and YATES and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs Jonathan and Deirdre Virgilio appeal by right from the judgment entered by the 

trial court on November 10, 2022, and more specifically the court’s denial of their motion for a 

directed verdict as to causation. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Friday, September 8, 2017, defendant, Peggy Kasul, drove into the intersection of 

Buchanan Avenue and 32nd Street in Wyoming, Michigan as her traffic light turned red and struck

the rear driver’s side of Jonathan’s vehicle as he drove southbound on Buchanan Avenue. They 

each drove their vehicle to a nearby parking lot. Jonathan exited his vehicle and called his wife 

Deirdre to inform her of the accident. Police and paramedics were dispatched to the scene. 

Paramedics evaluated Jonathan and noted that he told them that he did not lose consciousness. 

They administered the Glasgow Coma Scale test and did not notice any type of problems. An

ambulance transported Jonathan to a local hospital’s emergency department where the attending 
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emergency room physician, Dr. Trihn Le, examined him and reported that Jonathan appeared 

appropriately alert and oriented to person, place, time, and surroundings. Dr. Le found no visible 

signs of injury to his head. Dr. Le examined his pupils and found them equal, round, reactive to 

light, and his eye movements were intact. Dr. Le found no neurological deficits or problems with 

spinal cord or brain function. The hospital discharged Jonathan and he went home. The next two 

days he did not complain of any problems. He went to Las Vegas on a business trip on Monday, 

September 11, 2017. He testified that the next day, after exercising and using the hotel pool, he 

attended a breakfast with his colleagues and began experiencing a headache and nausea. He went 

to his room and remained there until he flew home on Thursday, September 14, 2017. 

The next day he went to the hospital emergency room where another emergency medicine 

doctor treated him for headaches, nausea and vision issues. Jonathan admitted at trial that, 

although he did not think he hit his head during the accident, he told this doctor that he had. The 

doctor referred Jonathan to the Mary Free Bed head and concussion clinic where he began treating 

with Dr. Jeffrey Kramer who placed him on work restrictions and prescribed Jonathan physical, 

speech, and occupational therapies, and referred him for counseling with a psychologist. Jonathan 

also struggled with depression and anxiety. Dr. Kramer released Jonathan from work restrictions 

in February 2018 because he determined that no medical reasons existed to restrict Jonathan any 

longer. He concluded that Jonathan had the ability to perform his job related duties and 

responsibilities. Dr. Kramer last saw Jonathan in August 2019. A month later, plaintiffs filed suit 

alleging that Peggy breached duties of care owed plaintiffs by negligently operating her motor 

vehicle causing the accident and Jonathan’s injuries, and that Bruce Kasul, her husband, had 

vicarious liability for her negligent actions under MCL 257.401 as the owner of the vehicle that 

Peggy drove.

The case went to trial, and at the close of the parties’ proofs, plaintiffs moved for a directed 

verdict on the issue of causation and the issue of no-fault threshold injury. Defendants opposed 

the motion. The trial court denied the motion regarding both issues plaintiffs raised. After hearing 

closing arguments, final instructions and deliberating, the jury returned a unanimous verdict that 

required them to first answer the question: “Was Peggy A. Kasul’s negligence a proximate cause 

of Jonathan M. Virgilio’s injuries?” The jury answered: “No.” The trial court, therefore, entered 

judgment for Peggy.1 This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict.” Aroma 

Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distribution Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 345; 871 NW2d 136 

(2015) (citation omitted). “A party is entitled to a directed verdict if the evidence, when viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, fails to establish a claim as a matter of law.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

 

1 The trial court granted Bruce’s motion for directed verdict and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims 

against him with prejudice. The trial court also dismissed Defendant Pioneer State Mutual 

Insurance Company with prejudice upon plaintiffs’ and Pioneer’s stipulation.
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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a directed verdict as 

to causation because they contend that the evidence established that the collision caused Jonathan’s 

injuries and defendants failed to present evidence that established a question of fact in that regard. 

We disagree.

A party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing 

party. MCR 2.516; Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 59; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). 

The moving party must state the specific grounds supporting the motion. MCR 2.516. In Anaya 

v Betten Chevrolet, Inc, 330 Mich App 210, 215-216; 946 NW2d 560 (2019), this Court explained:

A directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which 

reasonable minds could differ. In reviewing a directed verdict, we review all the 

evidence presented up to the time of the motion to determine whether a question of 

fact existed. In deciding whether a directed verdict is appropriate, the trial court 

must view the testimony and all legitimate inferences from the testimony in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party; we review the evidence in the same 

manner. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury when 

the evidence could lead reasonable jurors to disagree. Directed verdicts are viewed 

with disfavor, particularly in negligence cases. [Citations omitted.]

When reviewing a motion for directed verdict, “it is the factfinder’s responsibility to determine the 

credibility and weight of trial testimony.” King v Reed, 278 Mich App 504, 522; 751 NW2d 525 

(2008) (quotation omitted). It is the jury’s prerogative to resolve issues of fact which include 

inherent credibility questions. Moore v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 279 Mich App 195, 229; 755 

NW2d 686 (2008). “If reasonable jurors could reach conclusions different than this Court, then 

this Court’s judgment should not be substituted for the judgment of the jury.” Cacevic v 

Simplimatic Engineering Co (On Remand), 248 Mich App 670, 680; 645 NW2d 287 (2001).

To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the 

legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a 

proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages. [Powell-Murphy v Revitalizing Auto 

Communities Environmental Response Trust, 333 Mich App 234, 243; 964 NW2d 

50 (2020) (citation omitted).]

“Tort liability is limited under the Michigan no-fault insurance act.” Patrick v Turkelson, 

322 Mich App 595, 606; 913 NW2d 369 (2018). Under MCL 500.3135(1), a “person remains 

subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use 

of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body 

function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1). “A ‘serious impairment of 

body function’ is defined by MCL 500.3135[(5)] as ‘an objectively manifested impairment of an 

important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.’ ” 

Chouman v Home Owners Ins Co, 293 Mich App 434, 441; 810 NW2d 88 (2011), citing MCL 

500.3135(5). “Whether a plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function is a 
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threshold question that the trial court should decide as a matter of law unless there is a material 

factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the person’s injuries . . . .” Chouman, 293 Mich 

App at 441 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Whether someone has suffered a serious impairment is inherently fact-and circumstancespecific and [the analysis] must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Therefore, the evidence must establish (1) an objectively manifested 

impairment of a body function, (2) that is significant or important to the specific injured person, 

and (3) that affects that specific person’s general ability to lead his or her particular normal life.” 

Id. “However, there is no bright-line rule or checklist to follow in making that evaluation.” Id. 

An objectively manifested impairment is “evidenced by actual symptoms or conditions that 

someone other than the injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body function.” 

McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 196; 795 NW2d 517 (2010). While mere subjective 

complaints of pain and suffering are insufficient to establish an impairment, evidence of a physical 

basis for that pain and suffering may be introduced to show that the impairment is objectively 

manifested. Id. at 198. The second requirement for a serious impairment is “an inherently 

subjective” one. Id. at 199. The focus is on whether the body function “has great value, 

significance, or consequence,” and the relationship of that function to the person’s life must be 

considered. Id. Lastly, the impairment affects the person’s ability to lead a normal life if it has 

“an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living.” Id. 

at 202. This is a subjective inquiry, and does not require a “quantitative minimum as to the 

percentage of a person’s normal manner of living that must be affected.” Id. at 202-203.

“In a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish both factual causation, i.e., the 

defendant’s conduct in fact caused harm to the plaintiff, and legal causation, i.e., the harm caused 

to the plaintiff was the general kind of harm the defendant negligently risked.” Ray v Swager, 501 

Mich 52, 63; 903 NW2d 366 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The cause in fact 

element generally requires showing that ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff’s injury 

would not have occurred.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994) 

(citation omitted); Kroll v DeMorrow, 505 Mich 954, 954 (2020). “To be adequate, a plaintiff’s 

circumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation.” 

Skinner, 445 Mich at 164. “[A]t a minimum, a causation theory must have some basis in 

established fact.” Id. “However, a basis in only slight evidence is not enough.” Id. “Nor is it 

sufficient to submit a causation theory that, while factually supported, is, at best, just as possible 

as another theory.” Id. “Rather, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence from which a jury 

may conclude that more likely than not, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries 

would not have occurred. Id. at 164-165. “If factual causation cannot be established, then 

proximate cause, that is, legal causation, is no longer a relevant issue.” Ray, 501 Mich at 64.

In this case, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the issue of causation and relied on 

the evidence favorable to their argument that the accident caused Jonathan’s alleged injuries. 

Defendants opposed the motion by pointing to the evidence that they contended indicated that 

Jonathan did not suffer an injury proximately caused by the accident and they argued that a 

question of fact existed requiring the jury to decide the issue. The trial court considered all of the 

evidence the parties presented at trial and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact required 

the jury’s determination regarding the issue of causation. The trial court did not err in this regard.
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The evidence established that the accident involved Peggy’s vehicle striking Jonathan’s 

vehicle in the driver’s side by the rear wheel and bumper. Jonathan’s car’s airbags did not deploy. 

The paramedics who attended the scene indicated that Jonathan reported that he did not lose 

consciousness. At the scene after the accident, Jonathan walked around and telephoned Deirdre. 

Deirdre testified that he did not tell her that he lost consciousness or struck his head. A paramedic 

treating Jonathan at the accident scene reported that Jonathan did not report any injury to his head. 

Nothing demonstrated that he suffered any head trauma. The paramedic performed the standard 

Glasgow Coma Scale test and Jonathan received the highest possible score of 15 signifying no 

traumatic brain injury. The paramedic noted that Jonathan presented as properly oriented to his 

surroundings, his person, place, and time. Jonathan reported to the paramedic that he had not hit 

his head during the accident.

The evidence also established that Dr. Le, the emergency medicine physician with 20 

years’ experience who examined Jonathan at the hospital, found no objectively manifested head 

trauma. Jonathan complained of neck pain and blurry vision but otherwise presented nothing 

suggesting that he sustained a concussion or traumatic brain injury. Dr. Le reported that Jonathan 

was aware of his person, place, time, and situation. Dr. Le reported that Jonathan had no visible 

injury and he spoke appropriately. Dr. Le examined Jonathan’s pupils and noted that they 

responded normally which indicated no brain injury. The hospital records indicated that Jonathan 

had not sustained any significant injury or concussion and the hospital discharged him.

Evidence also established that, for the next few days after the accident, Jonathan remained 

asymptomatic. Deirdre observed no symptoms and Jonathan complained of none.

Jonathan testified that he experienced headache, nausea, and vision issues while in Las 

Vegas on his business trip the day after he arrived there. He sought no medical treatment, however, 

until after he returned home. The record indicates that he went to the hospital emergency 

department the day after he got home and treated with a different physician who, based upon 

Jonathan’s description of the accident and statement that he hit his head, referred him to Mary Free 

Bed’s concussion clinic for possible post-concussion syndrome. Jonathan admitted that he told 

the doctor he hit his head despite not believing that happened. Jonathan began treating with Dr. 

Kramer of Mary Free Bed and disclosed to him that he had sustained up to 12 concussions 

previously from his participation in kickboxing and wakeboarding. Dr. Kramer testified that 

Jonathan submitted to a CT scan and MRI, but both of those tests were negative for any closed 

head injury. Dr. Kramer admitted that no objective tests confirmed any brain injury. Dr. Kramer

placed Jonathan on work restrictions but by February 2018 he had improved significantly so that 

he released the work restrictions because Jonathan demonstrated that he could resume fulltime 

employment and perform the duties and responsibilities of his job.

Witnesses at trial testified regarding Jonathan’s post-accident life including his work 

performance, family time, extensive vacation travel, and involvement in physical activities like 

rigorous exercise, surfing, and skiing. Some evidence indicated that Jonathan’s work performance 

was impacted by his headaches and vision issues, but over time those diminished significantly and 

he had extensive periods of no headaches. The record established that he resumed fulltime 

employment and handled the rigors of his sales job and duties as a sales manager and worked 12-

14 hour days.
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Evidence also indicated that Jonathan experienced anxiety and depression. Jonathan 

attributed these to his accident. His treating psychologist’s records, however, indicated that 

Jonathan reported significant physical improvement and successful resumption of work. The 

psychologist’s records indicated that Jonathan reevaluated his work and personal life and 

expressed a desire to balance them. Testimony indicated that the psychologist’s records also 

revealed that Jonathan experienced significant life stressors unrelated to his accident that caused 

his anxiety and stress. He also told the psychologist that stress from work caused his headaches.

“A directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which 

reasonable minds could differ.” Anaya, 330 Mich App at 215. The factfinders bear responsibility 

to determine the credibility and weight of trial testimony. King, 278 Mich App at 522. The 

evidence presented at trial in this case establishes that a genuine issue of material fact existed 

regarding causation because reasonable minds could differ on whether the accident served as the 

cause in fact and proximate cause of Jonathan’s alleged injuries. The record indicates that the trial 

court applied the correct legal analysis and appropriately determined that the jury should decide 

the issue of causation. Based on the record evidence, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred 

when it denied plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Christopher P. Yates

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney