alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WILLIAMS v. POWERS.

No. 4613.

District Court, N. D. Ohio, W. D.

Nov. 21, 1941.

*363Herman A. Stockstill, of Toledo, Ohio, and C. C. & R. M. Spencer, of Chicago, 111., for plaintiff.

Yager, Bebout & Stecher and Jos. A. Yager, all of Toledo, Ohio, for defendant.

Wayne Stichter, of Toledo, Ohio, for intervener.

FREED, District Judge.

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover for injuries sustained as the result of an automobile collision. It appears from the answers to interrogatories that the plaintiff was paid in part for the damages he sustained by the Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company, of Wisconsin, his insurers; that the Insurance Company claims to be subrogated to the extent of the payment to part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant.

The defendant filed a motion to compel the Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin to be made a party plaintiff. The Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin likewise filed a motion to become a party plaintiff.

The Insurance Company attached to its motion to intervene as a party plaintiff, a pleading entitled: “Intervening Complaint,” in which the prayer asked for, reads as follows: “Wherefor intervenor demands that if plaintiff recovers a judgment herein from the defendant, this court order that the sum of $971.25 thereof be paid directly to intervenor, together with intervenor’s costs herein expended.”

Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c provides in part (a) Real Party In Interest “ * * * Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest;” etc.

In a case where an insurance company pays part of the damages sustained by its insured because of the tort of a third party and it claims to be subrogated to the insured’s rights to the extent of such payment, both the insured and the insurance company are the real parties in interest in the suit against the party guilty of the tort.

Such being the case here, both motions will be granted and the Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin will become a new party plaintiff in the action.

Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the rules “ * * * Shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of_ every action.”

Although the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of the action would require all the issues to be adjudicated in one trial, the court is of the opinion that a just determination may not be reached because of the possible prejudice that might arise under the circumstances recited in this case, were there a joint trial in this case.

For that reason, under Rule 42, Paragraph (b) providing for “Separate Trials, * * *”*jt ¿s ordereci that the issues between the plaintiff, Keith T. Williams, and the new party plaintiff, The Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin; as well as the issues between the Employer’s Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin and the defendant, David B. Powers, be tried separately.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 10, 2015

NO. 03-14-00155-CR

Jeron Deangelo Neal, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 390TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court. Having reviewed the record and 

the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the trial court’s

judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. Because appellant is indigent 

and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Applied
Bioscience International Inc. Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statement of
Operations included within this Form 10-K and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                          11,304
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   57,745
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,319)
<INVENTORY>                                        231
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                77,087
<PP&E>                                          45,672
<DEPRECIATION>                                (24,157)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 115,157
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           43,696
<BONDS>                                            894
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           297
<OTHER-SE>                                      67,582
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   115,157
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               183,253
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  201,899
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,816
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,689
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,054    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (21,462)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (16,134)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,328)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (1,716)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  (897)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,941)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.28)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32

 

ITRONICS INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Itronics Inc. (the Company") on Form10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on May 27, 2005 (the "Report") each of the undersigned, in thecapacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thatto his knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Date: May 27, 2005                                 /S/JOHN W. WHITNEY
                                                   JohnW. Whitney

                                                   ChiefExecutive Officer

                                                   ChiefFinancial Officer

34
This opinion is subject to administrative correction before fi nal disposition.

Before TANG , LAWRENCE , and GEIS , Appellate Military Judges

_________________________ 

### UNITED STATES Appellee

v. Preston J. BURKE Private First Class (E

- 2 ), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant
No. 201900 146
Decided: 31 October 2019. Appeal from the United Sta tes Navy

- Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

. Sentence adjudged 1 2 February 2019 by a special court

- martial convened at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton , California , consisting of a military judge sitting alone

. Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Munoz , USMC

. Sentence approved by the convening authority :
r eduction to E

- 1, confinement for 4 days , and a bad

- conduct discharge

. 1 For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Derek C. Hampton, JAGC, USN

. For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

_________________________

1 The c onvening a uthority suspended the bad

- conduct discharge pursuant to a pretrial agreement.U nited States v. Burke , No. 201 9 00 146

2 This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but may be cited as persuasive authority under

NMCCA Rule of Appellate P rocedure 30.2.

_________________________ PER CURIAM : After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of error, we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Article s 59 and 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866. T he findings and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

FOR THE COURT:

RODGER A. DREW, JR. Clerk of Court
#### Anthony P. LaTorre et al., Respondents, v New York City Transit Authority, Appellant, and City of New York et al., Respondents.

[823 NYS2d 509]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant New York City Transit Authority appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated January 18, 2005, which denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The plaintiff Anthony E LaTorre allegedly was injured when *971he tripped and fell on a portion of public sidewalk that was broken and uneven and that had a subway grate that was raised two to three inches. The defendant-appellant, New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA), installed the subway grate, inspected it, and was responsible for its maintenance and repair. The NYCTA cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that it either created or had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous and defective condition. The plaintiffs-respondents and the defendants-respondents argued, inter alia, that the NYCTA could be held liable because it made “special use” of the sidewalk. The Supreme Court denied the NYCTA’s cross motion. We affirm.

As the movant, the burden was on the NYCTA to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc.,*12 AD3d 409 [2004]). Here, the NYCTA demonstrated, prima facie, that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous and defective condition. However, it failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged condition *(see Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc., supra).*Contrary to the NYCTA’s contention, the plaintiffs did not concede that the NYCTA did not create the alleged condition. Further, the NYCTA failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it did not make “special use” of the sidewalk *(see Posner v New York City Tr. Auth.,*27 AD3d 542 [2006]). Thus, the NYCTA’s motion was properly denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851 [1985]; *Joachim v 1824 Church Ave., Inc., supra).*Ritter, J.P., Luciano, Fisher and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Edward Koehl, Appellant, v Brian S. Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

Submitted October 1, 2012;

decided November 27, 2012

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no appeal lies as of right from the unanimous order of the Appellate Division absent the direct involvement of a substantial constitutional question (see CPLR 5601). Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lynell LAWS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-4060.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2006.

Decided: June 28, 2006.

Sol Z. Rosen, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lynell Laws pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846 (2000). The district court sentenced Laws to 179 months imprisonment. He now seeks to appeal, asserting that the district court did not expressly consider all the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) factors and that his sentence is unreasonable. The Government asserts that, in his plea agreement, Laws validly waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. We agree with the Government and dismiss the appeal.

In his plea agreement, Laws “waive[d] the right to appeal the conviction and any sentence within the statutory maximum ... on any ground whatsoever.” A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and intelligent. *See United States v. Blick,*408 F.3d 162, 169-73 (4th Cir.2005); *United States v. Brown,*232 F.3d 399, 402-03 (4th Cir.2000). Laws does not challenge the validity of his plea or the voluntariness of his appeal waiver. Rather, he challenges his sentence. These issues fall squarely within the waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
[Cite as State ex rel. Rose v. McGinty, 123 Ohio St.3d 86, 2009-Ohio-4050.] 

THE STATE EX REL. ROSE, APPELLANT, v. MCGINTY, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Rose v. McGinty, 123 Ohio St.3d 86, 2009-Ohio-4050.] 

Procedendo and mandamus — Judgment denying writ affirmed — Appellant fails 

to contest all independent reasons given by appellate court for denying the 

writs. 

(No. 2009-0464 — Submitted August 11, 2009 — Decided August 18, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 92578, 

2009-Ohio-458. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of appeals denying 

a petition filed by appellant, Floyd Rose, for writs of procedendo and mandamus. 

{¶ 2} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because Rose does 

not challenge all of the independent reasons given by that court to deny the writs. 

State ex rel. Schmidt v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 100 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-

Ohio-6086, 798 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5; Stewart v. Corrigan, 97 Ohio St.3d 80, 2002-

Ohio-5316, 776 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 4. That is, Rose does not contest the propriety of 

the court of appeals’ denial of the writs based on his failure to comply with 

Loc.App.R. 45(B)(1) of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Moreover, Judge 

McGinty has now ruled on Rose’s August 8, 2008 motion in Cuyahoga C.P. case 

No. CR-07-492008-B. “Neither procedendo nor mandamus will compel the 

performance of a duty that has already been performed.” State ex rel. Kreps v. 

Christiansen (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 318, 725 N.E.2d 663. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

__________________ 

 Floyd Rose, pro se. 

 William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. 

Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

______________________
December 18, 2003

Mr.     Michael B. Allen
433 South Lincoln Street Hinsdale, IL 60521

Dear Mike:

I am so excited!!

The purpose of this letter is to set
forth the terms of your employment with Banta Corporation as President of the Print
Sector. As we discussed, your first day of employment will be January 5, 2004. This offer
is contingent upon your successful completion of a reference check and an
employment-related physical including drug screen.

Your base salary will be $350,000 per
year, with a next annual merit review in January 2005. You will participate in Banta
Economic Profit Incentive Award Plan, and be eligible for a target bonus of 50% of your
base salary, subject to Bantas financial results. You will also participate in
Bantas Economic Profit Long-Term Incentive Award Plan and be eligible for an annual
target bonus of 25% of your base salary, payable over a three-year period.

Upon joining Banta, you will be
granted a non-statutory option to purchase 30,000 shares of Banta common stock under
Bantas 1995 Equity Incentive Plan. This exercise price for the option will be
Bantas closing price on the business day before your first day of employment. You
will be eligible to participate in future option grants to executives as determined by
Bantas Compensation Committee.

To provide you security in the event
of a change of control, you will be offered a three (3) year Key Executive
Employment and Severance Agreement (KEESA). It is understood that prior to any
change in control, as defined in the KEESA, either you or Banta may terminate
your employment at any time. However, in the event that Banta

---

Letter to Mr. Michael B.
AllenDecember 18, 2003Page Two

should terminate your employment
other than by reason of disability or for cause (as defined in the KEESA)
prior to a change in control, you will be entitled to a severance payment equal to one (1)
year salary and Banta will continue to provide health insurance for one (1) year.

In addition to the above, you will be
entitled to participate in Bantas Pension Plan, Supplemental Pension Plan (SERP),
Incentive Savings Plan, and Deferred Compensation Plans, as well as the medical, dental,
disability, and life insurance programs of the Corporation. You will be entitled to a
company car (level 4), four weeks vacation, and financial counseling, some portion of
which will be taxable income to you under present laws.

Mike, I cant tell you how
excited and enthusiastic I am about your joining Banta as our new President of the Print
Sector. This is a particularly exciting time for our company. I know you will make a
terrific business and strategic partner for me, will be a wonderful addition to our team,
and will contribute significantly to shaping Bantas future growth and success.

I look forward to your positive
response.

Best regards,

/s/ Stephanie A. Streeter

Stephanie A.
StreeterPresident and Chief Executive Officer

SAS/als

Enclosure

The forgoing is agreed to this
_______ day of ____________, 2003.

/s/ Michael B. Allen Michael B. Allen
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3592 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        S.3592

                      One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
             the fifth day of January, two thousand and ten

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
100 Commerce Drive in Tyrone, Georgia, as the ``First Lieutenant Robert 
                 Wilson Collins Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT WILSON COLLINS POST OFFICE BUILDING.
    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 100 Commerce Drive in Tyrone, Georgia, shall be known and 
designated as the ``First Lieutenant Robert Wilson Collins Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``First 
Lieutenant Robert Wilson Collins Post Office Building''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
#### Bruce S. Simon, Respondent, v Amy E. Simon, Appellant.

Submitted May 29, 2012;

decided August 30, 2012

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Chief Judge Lippman taking no part.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo ZUNIGA-ENRIQUEZ, also known as Florencio Zuniga-Enriquez, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-41784.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided June 21, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Michael L. Herman, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Lorenzo Zuniga-Enriquez (Zuniga) appeals his illegal reentry conviction and sentence, challenging the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2). Zuniga’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 *492U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Zuniga contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *AlmendarezTorres*in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Zuniga properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *AlmendarezTorres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 6, 2014

No. 04-14-00554-CV

IN RE LIFECELL CORPORATION

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

On August 5, 2014, relator LifeCell Corporation filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

and an emergency motion for temporary relief. The court has considered the petition for writ of 

mandamus and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the 

petition for writ of mandamus and emergency motion for temporary relief are DENIED. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). The court’s opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on August 6th, 2014.

_____________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of August, 2014.

_____________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014CI10718, styled LifeCell Corporation v. Novadaq Technologies, Inc. 

and Novadaq Corp., pending in the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Peter A. 

Sakai presiding.