[Cite as Stapleton v. Stapleton, 2022-Ohio-3018.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

KRISSANN STAPLETON,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 VS.

SCOTT STAPLETON, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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APPEAL NO. C-210329

TRIAL NO. DR-1901257

 O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 31, 2022

Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Stephen W. Funk and Emily K. Anglewicz, for PlaintiffAppellant, 

Barbara J. Howard Co., L.P.A., Barbara J. Howard and Rachel H. Myers, for 

Defendant-Appellee.
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WINKLER, Judge.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Krissann Stapleton appeals a divorce decree entered 

by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. She 

advances two assignments of error for our review that challenge the trial court’s 

decision on property and spousal support. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgment. 

I. Procedural and Factual History

{¶2} Krissann and defendant-appellee Scott Stapleton married in 1987 and 

had three children, all of whom are now emancipated. Over the course of the 

approximately 34-year marriage, the parties owned and operated three related 

businesses: Miami Athletic Club, Inc., (“MAC”) a fitness center; Fitness Xpress, LLC,

(“Fitness Express”) a CrossFit gym operated out of MAC; and NTM Enterprises, LLC,

(“NTM”) a company that owns the real estate where MAC and Fitness Express are 

located. We collectively refer to as these entities as the “marital businesses” or the 

“health club.” The main source of income for the parties during much of the marriage 

was the operation of the health club that afforded them a “high standard of living.”

{¶3} In 2019, Krissann filed for divorce and sought spousal support. Scott 

counterclaimed. The trial court issued various temporary orders, including support 

orders and orders that became necessary for operating the health club due to the 

parties’ antagonistic relationship.

{¶4} Although the parties agreed that they should be granted a divorce on 

grounds of incompatibility, they could not agree on an equitable property division or 

spousal support. The parties had substantial assets in addition to the health club that 

the trial court needed to divide and value, such as the marital home in Cincinnati, cars, 
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a boat and related equipment, bank accounts, insurance policies, and retirement 

accounts. The parties also had mortgages and loans related to the health club.

{¶5} During their negotiations to resolve the property issues, the parties 

contemplated selling the health club. To inform their decision, they hired business 

consultant Robert Caro to evaluate and value the health club. Caro had been involved 

in the industry for 47 years, and he had valued over 400 health clubs.

{¶6} The purpose of Caro’s study was to determine the fair market value for

the combined assets of the real estate (land and building), 

furniture/fixtures/equipment, and business. Caro issued a comprehensive 97-page 

report concerning a valuation date of June 20, 2020, under an income approach. He 

used a net stabilized income value that took into consideration the health club’s 

financials for the preceding 12 months, along with other relevant data, including the 

impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and assigned a capitalization rate of four. Notably, 

Caro concluded that the fair market value of the health club after considering liabilities 

was zero. And he advised the parties that it was a very bad time to sell, with a 

“minimal” “likelihood of a near-term viable transaction.”

{¶7} As the divorce case proceeded in the domestic relations court, hearings 

occurred on seven dates between September 28, 2020, and February 24, 2021. Part 

of the extensive evidence presented included Caro’s testimony and report. 

{¶8} During Caro’s December 15, 2020 testimony, he opined, in accordance 

with his report, that MAC, Express Fitness, and NTM had to be valued as one

“package” due to limitations of the real estate. Moreover, he maintained the only 

appropriate approach for valuation was the income approach, and that approach

demonstrated there was no net equity in the health club. Caro indicated that his 
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analysis considered the actual financials of the health club and property-specific issues 

such as much-needed-but-deferred maintenance. His simplified analysis was that 

there were “too many liabilities and not enough assets,” resulting in “shareholder 

equity of zero,” at best. He added that more recent data on the “real fragility” of the 

health club industry due to COVID-19 supported an even lower fair market value than 

he had calculated in his report. He expected approximately one quarter of all fitness 

clubs to be closed by the end of 2020. Further, he told the court that, “in his view, it 

would be a long time before a proper third-party sale can occur.”

{¶9} Caro additionally said his assessment showed the health club could not 

afford to pay two owner salaries, and he suggested one party take on running the 

business. He warned that running the health club would be a “challenge,” requiring 

an owner “who’s willing to be on-site, focused, [and] put all their efforts in.” Even with 

those parameters, Caro could not say with confidence that the health club would 

survive. 

{¶10} Although Scott presented Caro as his expert, Krissann stipulated to 

Caro’s qualifications as an expert, told the court she “did not dispute his zero-value 

conclusion,” and did not present a competing expert. Her counsel cross-examined 

Caro on various aspects of his assumptions and calculations, including his inclusion of 

a shareholder loan as a long-term liability without knowing the terms and conditions 

of repayment. Caro later confirmed that nothing brought out during his crossexamination changed his opinions.

{¶11} While Krissann was consistent in her position that the marital 

businesses should be sold and the net profits, if any, split equally, she was inconsistent 

in her position with respect to whether the marital businesses had to be sold as a 
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package and the timing for the sale. She seemed to agree that an immediate sale of 

the marital businesses was not economically feasible because it would result in a loss. 

She testified, however, to having a broker ready to list MAC and Fitness Express, but 

not NTM, for almost $800,000. She did not support this representation with any 

documentation or details. She also cited 2018 valuation information for NTM, which 

was mortgaged for approximately $650,000, but not a valuation reflecting the current 

market condition. Krissann clearly articulated, however, that no matter when the 

marital businesses were sold, in the interim she sought equal ownership and decisionmaking authority, and equal compensation from the money streaming through the

health club.

{¶12} Other evidence presented for the trial court’s consideration on the 

issues of property and support showed that for much of the marriage, Krissann was 

physically present and heavily involved in operating the health club, developing 

marketable experience in the management and ownership of a successful, modern

business. Her role and time commitment diminished significantly when she moved 

to Florida in May 2018 to reside in a condominium owned by the parties but sold 

during the divorce proceedings. Krissann maintained responsibility at the health club 

for items such as payroll, updating social media sites, and swim lessons, 

responsibilities performed remotely a few hours a week. Despite her physical absence

from the health club facility, Krissann continued to draw her full salary from the health 

club and did not seek employment elsewhere. 

{¶13} When Krissann moved to Florida in 2018, Scott was working for the 

health club and as a travelling representative with a company known as Keiser, selling 

equipment to gyms and colleges for a commission. Scott’s involvement with the health 
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club increased with Krissann’s relocation. He became responsible for much of the dayto-day managing of the health club such as paying bills and working with vendors. He 

indicated that to fulfill his onsite and after-hours responsibilities, he contributed about 

80 work hours per week. This took a toll on his Keiser commissions.

{¶14} According to the evidence, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the 

spring of 2020 caused Scott’s Keiser commissions to further shrink and the finances 

of the health club to suffer. The health club’s revenue stream from customers 

decreased significantly due to the loss of MAC members and additional lost Fitness 

Express memberships. Scott obtained three loans totaling about $400,000 from the 

Small Business Association (“SBA”) for the health club, including a loan for $124,700 

provided through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) that was eligible for 

forgiveness in the future if certain requirements were met. Scott took the position that 

MAC, Fitness Express, and NTM lacked equity when all associated liabilities, including 

the almost $65o,000 NTM mortgage, were taken into consideration. Supporting 

financial records were admitted into evidence.

{¶15} Throughout the financial turmoil, Krissann and Scott continued to 

receive salaries and large “dividends” from the health club. In 2020, they were 

cumulatively paid $144,000 in salaries and received $104,599.60 in dividends. Scott 

explained, however, that this money was not reflective of a healthy revenue stream 

from customers and was related to a subsidization by loaned funds. Scott’s testimony 

was consistent with Caro’s testimony that the health club could not sustain the salaries

to both parties.

{¶16} Notwithstanding Caro’s gloomy predictions related to the health club

industry in general, and his specific evaluation of the parties’ health club, Scott
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requested the opportunity to wholly own and run the health club. He accepted that his 

request would require him to take on the outstanding mortgage and loans alone, 

resulting, in his opinion, in a situation where Krissann would not be deprived of any 

equity.

{¶17} On the issue of support, Krissann sought lifetime spousal support from 

Scott to “equalize” the income of the parties. She speculated that establishing a career

after the sale of the health club was “unrealistic” due to her age and the COVID-19

pandemic. Conversely, Scott sought the termination of support effective May 2021

with no ongoing obligation. 

{¶18} In April 2021, the domestic relations court issued a detailed, 30-page 

decision on property and spousal support. The court set a de facto marriage 

termination date of September 31, 2020. 

{¶19} With respect to property, the court awarded both parties substantial 

assets not related to the health club, and the appropriateness of that part of the award 

is not in dispute. The court treated the health club as a zero-value asset that was 

awarded to Scott, who was made solely responsible for all health club liabilities. 

{¶20} With respect to spousal support, the court determined that an award of 

spousal support was not appropriate or reasonable based on consideration of the 

express statutory factors, even though as result of the property division Krissann 

would no longer derive any income from the health club. In a subsequent entry 

denying a motion for reconsideration filed by Krissann, the court further elaborated 

on the rationale supporting the property and spousal-support decision.
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{¶21} On May 21, 2021, the trial court entered the decree of divorce. The 

decree incorporated the previously issued decision and entry on property and spousal 

support. This appeal by Krissann ensued.

II. Analysis

A. Division of Property

{¶22} Krissann’s first assignment of error challenges the award of full 

ownership of the health club, undisputedly marital property, to Scott. She contends 

that the trial court violated the statutory requirements in R.C. 3105.171 for the division 

of property and “abused its discretion” when concluding that such a division was 

equitable. 

{¶23} Whether the trial court’s decision on property conformed to the 

applicable statutory procedure is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo. See, 

e.g., Hornbeck v. Hornbeck, 2019-Ohio-2035, 136 N.E.3d 966, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). In 

divorce proceedings, the domestic relations court is directed to “divide” marital 

property “equitably between spouses” and in accordance with R.C. 3105.171. R.C. 

3105.171.(B). An “equal” division of property is the court’s starting point. R.C. 

3105.171(C)(1); Franklin v. Franklin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-713, 2012-Ohio1814, ¶ 3.

{¶24} To carry out its responsibility, the trial court must select a valuation date 

and determine a value for property found to be a marital asset. See R.C. 

3105.171(A)(2). Further, in making a division of marital property, the court must 

consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in R.C. 3105.171(F), and make 

written findings, in accordance with R.C. 3105.171(G), that support the determination 

that the marital property has been equitably divided. See Franklin at ¶ 4.
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{¶25} Krissann first contends that the language of R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) 

providing that “the division of property shall be equal” unless “an equal division of 

marital property would be inequitable” directs the domestic relations court to split 

each marital asset in half unless the court finds and explains that such a division would 

be inequitable. Scott argues Krissann misconstrues the court’s responsibility under 

R.C. 3105.171(C)(1). He takes the position that the domestic relations court is directed 

to allocate the value of assets between parties, and that a marital business, like a 

marital car or marital home, need not be literally split in half. 

{¶26} We agree with Scott that R.C. 3105.171(C) speaks to the overall division 

of the value of all assets, not an equal division of each asset. And here, the trial court 

complied with all the requirements of R.C. 3105.171 when dividing the marital assets, 

including the health club. The court valued and divided the marital assets, including 

the health club, which it valued as having “no net equity,” and ordered Scott to pay 

Krissann an additional amount of about $230,000 “to equalize the overall division of 

property.” The court also set forth written findings supporting its conclusion that, 

based on the relevant factors, the marital property had been divided “relatively 

equally” and equitably. Krissann’s assertion that the trial court failed to comply with 

the statute when dividing the marital property is not substantiated on this record.

{¶27} Krissann also challenges the way the trial court “exercised its discretion”

when dividing the marital businesses. As Krissann’s argument recognizes, the way the 

trial court satisfies its obligation to equitably divide marital property implicates a 

deferential standard of review. See Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 319, 432 

N.E.2d 183 (1982); Thomas v. Thomas, 171 Ohio App.3d 272, 2007-Ohio-2016, 870 

N.E.2d 263, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.); McKenna v. McKenna, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180475, 
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2019-Ohio-3807, ¶ 9. This deference affords the domestic relations court the 

necessary flexibility to fulfill its weighty responsibility resolving the property issues 

based on the relevant facts and circumstances of each unique case. See Berish at 321. 

An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. See, e.g., AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban 

Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990); Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶28} Factual issues, however, such as those arising in the classification and 

valuation of property, are reviewed under the distinct sufficiency and weight-of-theevidence standards. See McKenna at ¶ 9-10, cited in Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton Nos. C-200111 and C-200120, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9.

{¶29} Scott contends that the trial court’s decision was not unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. He asserts the valuation and division of property was 

based on the evidence presented and the unique circumstances of the case, which 

involved the unprecedented effects of a pandemic. He emphasizes that Krissann’s 

challenge fails to consider the “snapshot in time” valuation that domestic relations 

courts are required to compute, and that a revenue stream does not equate to profit. 

Moreover, he asserts her challenge is not based upon competent contrary evidence of 

value.

{¶30} Upon our review, we conclude that Krissann has failed to demonstrate 

the trial court abused its discretion when valuing and effecting the equitable 

distribution of property. This court does not require the trial court to adopt any 

particular method of valuation or division of marital property. See Meeks v. Meeks, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-315, 2006-Ohio-642, ¶ 8. 
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{¶31} Contrary to Krissann’s arguments, the trial court’s decision evinces a 

sound reasoning process. The trial court explained that it valued the businesses 

comprising the health club as one asset with a net-zero valuation, a finding consistent 

with the evidence, including Caro’s persuasive testimony. The court assigned Scott 

both the health club assets and liabilities, requiring him to indemnify and hold 

Krissann harmless on all those liabilities. In practical terms, Krissann was awarded 

one half of zero, which is zero. 

{¶32} Krissann emphasizes that the fitness equipment owned by the health 

club and necessarily awarded to Scott as part of the property division skewed the 

valuation in Scott’s favor. We are not persuaded, however, as the record shows the 

equipment she values at over $1,000,000 had been almost fully depreciated. Further, 

Caro testified he considered the equipment in doing his appraisal as a component of 

fair market value, a valuation he defined at “zero.”

{¶33} The trial court in its findings also addressed why it disposed of the 

health club by awarding it to Scott, who advocated for that result and embraced 

assuming all the related debt. The court explained this disposition was more beneficial 

to both parties than the less desirable option of selling the health club at a loss, or the 

worst option of providing each spouse with half of a negative value asset and 

indefinitely prolonging an acrimonious personal and business relationship until a sale 

could occur. We note the court’s resolution was most consistent with R.C. 3105.171(B), 

which directs the trial courts in divorce proceedings to “divide” marital property 

between the parties, as opposed to placing the parties in joint ownership after the 

marriage has been terminated. 
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{¶34} Notably, Krissann did not hire another expert after she received Caro’s 

report, did not object to his presence as an expert, and did not present an alternative 

valuation of the collective marital business assets. Moreover, the parties never 

presented an “agreement” on the issue for the court’s consideration, see R.C. 

3105.171(F)(8), and there is no evidence that Scott acted deceptively with respect to 

the disposition of the marital businesses.

{¶35} The domestic relations court is vested with flexibility to exercise its 

discretion in making an equitable award based on the facts and circumstances of the 

case. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d at 319, 432 N.E.2d 183. Upon a careful review of the 

facts and circumstances of this case, we hold the division of property was in 

accordance with the law and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

{¶36} Therefore, we overrule Krissann’s first assignment of error.

B. Spousal Support

{¶37} In her second assignment of error, Krissann challenges the trial court’s 

failure to award her any spousal support. An award of spousal support is governed by 

R.C. 3105.18, and the ultimate inquiry hinges on whether spousal support is 

“appropriate and reasonable” under the circumstances. See R.C. 3105.18(C). 

{¶38} When determining whether spousal support is appropriate and 

reasonable, the trial court must consider all the following factors:

(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, 

income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 

3105.171 of the Revised Code;

(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;
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(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

(e) The duration of the marriage;

(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party 

will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside 

the home;

(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to 

any court-ordered payments by the parties;

(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability 

of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s contribution to the 

acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;

(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal 

support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will 

be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, 

training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;

(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;

(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that 

party’s marital responsibilities;

(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.

{¶39} Krissann advances two main arguments in her challenge to the denial of 

the requested spousal support. First, she argues the trial court erred by failing to 

consider all the income that Scott will derive from the marital businesses. Second, she 

argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied spousal support because, 
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she contends, the factors of R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) strongly weighed in her favor. We 

address these arguments in turn. 

{¶40} Among the R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors the court must consider are “[t]he 

income of the parties, from all sources” and “the relative earning abilities of the 

parties.” See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (b). Thus, the trial court, when determining 

the issue of spousal support, was required to consider the income generated by the 

business interests retained by Scott, and the trial court’s failure to do so would 

constitute error. See Hutta v. Hutta, 177 Ohio App.3d 414, 2008-Ohio-3756, 894 

N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 34-36 (5th Dist.). Importantly, however, unlike when the trial court 

considers the imputation of income for child support, the court’s objective with respect 

to determining the income of the parties and the relative earning abilities of the parties 

is not to ascertain a precise income figure that can be employed in a “worksheet” for 

calculating support. See Valentine v. Valentine, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0088-M, 

2012-Ohio-4202, ¶ 4-5. The objective is to determine whether spousal support is 

reasonable and appropriate considering all the statutory factors. Id.

{¶41} Krissann claims the trial court did not appreciate the full extent of 

income inuring to Scott’s benefit as a result of the decision to award 100 percent of the 

marital businesses to him, and that this affected the court’s ability to properly consider 

the disparity in income between the parties. She asserts the court overlooked that the 

parties during the marriage received income from the health club in the form of both 

salaries and dividends that paid personal expenses, and that the income and dividends 

she previously received would now be going exclusively to Scott. 

{¶42} Our review demonstrates that the trial court’s decision on spousal 

support fully considered all of Scott’s income as statutorily required. Krissann raised 
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this same argument in her motion for reconsideration. The trial court rejected 

Krissann’s argument, explaining that when considering the income of the parties with 

respect to the revenue and profit of the health club it had “recognized the [monetary] 

benefit each [party] received from the businesses in the form of salaries and dividends 

for personal expenses.” The court further explained that this historical information, 

and the award of the health club to Scott, had to be considered with “the extensive 

testimony relating to the market for health club and fitness clubs in general and, more 

specifically, to the precarious financial state of the parties’ businesses.” 

{¶43} Although Krissann may disagree with the trial court’s conclusions with 

respect to Scott’s income, the court’s comments sufficiently demonstrate the court 

took into account all the income that Scott would derive due to his full ownership of 

the health club, as required by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). 

{¶44} Next we address Krissann’s argument that the factors of R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1) strongly weighed in her favor, and therefore, the trial court’s denial of 

support amounted to an abuse of discretion. She maintains that lifetime support of 

$6000 a month was warranted under the facts, especially due to the “great disparity 

of income” between the parties, “the long duration of the marriage,” and the parties’ 

“very high standard of living during the marriage.” 

{¶45} We begin our review of this argument accepting that a trial court has 

“broad discretion” in determining whether to award spousal based on the facts and 

circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Morrison v. Walter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C210398, 2022-Ohio-1740, ¶ 3; Reddy v. Reddy, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-140609 and 

C-140678, 2015-Ohio-3368, ¶ 23-24, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 
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554 N.E.2d 83 (1990); Coors v. Maceachen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100013, 2010-

Ohio-4470, ¶ 13. 

{¶46} In exercising its discretion in this case, the trial court set forth specific,

meaningful findings under each statutory factor, including that both parties were in 

good health, Krissann was 56 years old, Scott was 61 years old, and the parties had 

been married for approximately 34 years. The court then explained its decision:

Equity requires the court to consider all of the relevant factors both 

individually and as a whole. Based on the Court’s analysis of the 

foregoing factors, the Court finds that an award of spousal support is 

not appropriate or reasonable. Since leaving Ohio for Florida in 201[8], 

Wife attempted to continue as a decision maker for MAC. The distance 

appears to have hampered her functionality; she has not been able to 

participate in the same manner as when she was physically present at 

the club. However, wife continued to receive a salary. She did not 

attempt to find any work in Florida to supplement her income. Without 

MAC, wife is without a current source of income. A lack of current 

income, however, does not fully portray Wife’s financial situation. Wife 

is leaving the marriage with a significant amount of assets and little to 

no debt. Wife is poised with substantial work experience and skill. She 

has a college degree and is well equipped to find comparable 

employment. Wife’s retirement accounts are completely intact, and she 

no longer has minor children to care for. Husband is taking on all of the 

related business debt, approximately $1,000,000. Due to the Covid-19 

pandemic and Husband’s age, his ability to sustain the income of both 
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Wife and himself will be drastically reduced. While Wife may need to 

seek new employment, the Court feels strongly that Wife will be able to 

do so successfully. Due to the historical and unprecedented results of 

COVID to the fitness industry, Husband’s income for the next 1-5 years 

is precarious and unpredictable. Wife’s acquired skills, work history, 

and management experience would suggest that she can gain steady 

employment that will likely exceed Husband’s potential yearly income. 

After very careful consideration, the Court cannot award spousal 

support to either party in an attempt to equalize their incomes. 

Therefore, the Court finds that an award of spousal support would be 

neither appropriate or reasonable. 

{¶47} In support of her argument that the court abused its discretion by 

denying the requested support, Krissann cites Lepowsky v. Lepowsky, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 06CO23, 2007-Ohio-4994. Lepowsky involved a “homemaker” 

spouse who challenged the adequacy of a support award considering there was a 

significant disparity in social security benefits and income ability after a long-duration 

marriage involving a high standard of living. Id. at ¶ 3 and 67. The appellate court 

found the spousal support unreasonable and inappropriate in amount and duration 

considering the facts of the case and set it aside as an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 94. 

{¶48} Scott argues this case is easily distinguishable from Lepowsky because 

the spouse seeking support in that case at the end of a long-duration marriage lacked 

the skills and education necessary for employment at that time and had not been 

awarded substantial assets. He contends Krissann had the skills, experience, and 
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education to obtain appropriate employment and, additionally, she was awarded 

investable assets of more than $2,168,000. 

{¶49} We are persuaded by Scott’s argument. Although Krissann claims the 

trial court’s treatment of her earning capacity was speculative and flawed, she relies 

on her conclusory assumption that she did not have viable, marketable skills and that 

she would be unable to earn income, even if she desired. 

{¶50} This court recently reviewed a case challenging the denial of spousal 

support requested by a voluntarily unemployed spouse who surmised that he lacked 

marketable skills to earn substantial income despite a significant work history.

Morrison, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210398, 2022-Ohio-1740. In Morrison, we noted 

that the party seeking support has a burden to establish that such support is 

reasonable and appropriate and cannot rely on conclusory statements. See Morrison

at ¶ 6 and 8.

{¶51} In this case, when discussing the relative earning abilities of the parties, 

the trial court cited testimony from Krissann and former employees of the health club

that demonstrated Krissann’s strong skills and employment experience were very 

valuable. The court concluded that the value of Krissann’s employment at the health 

club was reflected in the salary and dividends she received before the separation, and 

that her position that she was unable to earn income was untenable and 

unsubstantiated, as she had not tried to find new employment. 

{¶52} Like in Morrison, Krissann’s position on her earning ability is merely 

based on an assumption and conflicts with the evidence. Thus, we are unable to 

conclude that the trial court’s analysis with respect to her income earning ability was 

speculative and flawed. 
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{¶53} Finally, citing Lepowsky and the cases cited therein, Krissann takes the 

position “that case law confirms that a marriage that lasts longer than 30 years not 

only supports an award of spousal support, but often justifies indefinite spousal 

support to ensure the wife maintains the ‘same standard of living’ as the husband.” See

Lepowsky, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 06CO23, 2007-Ohio-4994, at ¶ 44-57. This

authority provides limited support for Krissann’s position because of the differing 

facts. In this case, the trial court found that the high standard of living enjoyed during 

the marriage was no longer feasible, that Scott’s future finances were tied to the health 

club and its financial difficulties, and that Krissann’s “acquired skills, work history, 

and management experience would suggest that she can gain steady employment that 

will likely exceed [Scott’s] potential yearly income.” 

{¶54} Ultimately, our review demonstrates that the trial court carefully 

considered the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Evidence was presented to 

substantiate the articulated findings and conclusions of the trial court. Considering

the precarious state of the health club, Krissann’s strong work history, and the 

substantial investable assets awarded to Krissann, among other things, we are unable 

to say the trial court abused its discretion when, after weighing all the factors, it found 

the requested support was not appropriate or reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Krissann spousal support and we overrule the 

second assignment of error.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

20

III. Conclusion

{¶55} Upon our review of the record, and considering the foregoing analysis, 

we conclude that Krissann has not demonstrated error in the trial court’s decision on 

property and spousal support. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.