MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	9

Docket: Aro-19-110

Submitted

On	Briefs: December	17,	2019

Decided: January	23,	2020

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.1

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

P.S.

MEAD,	J.

[¶1]		In	this	consolidated	appeal,	P.S. challenges	the	disposition imposed	

by	the	District	Court	(Fort	Kent,	Soucy,	J.) in	three	juvenile	matters.		Specifically,	

P.S.	argues that	the	court	abused	its	discretion or	otherwise	erred in	ordering	

that	he	be	committed to	Long	Creek	Youth	Development	Center	(Long	Creek)	

for	an	indeterminate	period	up	to	age	eighteen.		See	15	M.R.S.	§§	3313(1)-(2),	

3314(1),	3316(2),	3402(1)(B)	 (2018).2		Because	 our	language	in	State	v.	J.R.,	

2018 ME 117, ¶¶	24,	27, 191	A.3d	1157,	could	be	read	to	suggest	that	a	court	

imposing	 an	 indeterminate	 commitment	 of	 a	 juvenile	 to	 a	 Department	 of	

 1		Although	Justice	Hjelm	participated	in	the	appeal,	he	retired	before	this	opinion	was	certified.

2		Title	15	§§	3313(1)-(2),	3314(1) (2018)	have	since	been	amended,	though	not	in	any	ways that	

affect	this	case.		See,	e.g., P.L.	2019,	ch.	474,	§§	1-2	(effective	Sept.	19,	2019)	(to	be	codified	at	15	M.R.S.	

§§ 3313(2)(F),	3314(1)(E)).
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Corrections	facility	must	specify	a	commitment	no	shorter	in	duration	than	up	

to	the	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday,	and	the	trial	court	may	have	proceeded	

under	 such	 a	 belief,	 we	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 clarify	 the	 law, vacate the	

dispositional	 orders, and	 remand	 for	 the	 court	 to revisit	 the	 disposition	

pursuant	to 15	M.R.S.	§§	3314(1), 3316(2).

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	“record	of	the	proceedings	

in	juvenile	court.”		15	M.R.S.	§	3405(2) (2018).		On	June	4,	2018, when	P.S.	was	

fourteen, he was	 adjudged	 to	 have	 committed	 criminal	 trespass	 (Class	 E),	

17-A M.R.S.	§ 402(1)(B)(2018). The court	imposed	a	disposition	of	a	thirty-day	

confinement,	all	suspended; a	one-year	 term	of	probation; and	forty	hours	of	

community	service	to	be	completed	within	two	months.		Soon	after,	the	State	

filed	its	 first	motion	 for	 probation	 revocation,	 alleging	that P.S.	 had violated	

probation	conditions	by	possessing	alcohol,	failing	to	complete	the	forty	hours	

of	community	service,	and	refusing	to	comply	with	a	curfew.	 P.S.	admitted	to	

violating	the	 conditions	 of	 his	 probation,	 at	which	 time	 the	 court (Nelson, J.)	

partially	 revoked	his	probation	 and	 ordered	 that	 he	 complete	 forty hours	 of	

community	service	within	thirty	days.
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[¶3]		The	State	filed	second	and	third	motions	for	probation	revocation	

on	November	15	and	December	11,	2018.		In	addition	to the	allegations	that	P.S.	

violated	 the	 conditions	 of	 his	 probation,	 the	 State charged	 four	 new	

misdemeanors:	criminal	mischief	(Class	D),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	806(1)(A) (2018),	for	

destroying	 his	 mother’s	 artwork;	 domestic	 violence	 assault	 (Class D),	

17-A M.R.S.	 §	 207-A(1)(A) (2018),	 for	 assaulting	his	 sister;	 assault	 (Class	D),	

17-A	M.R.S.	§	207(1)(A) (2018),	for	assaulting	a	student	at	school;	and	criminal	

mischief	(Class D),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	806(1)(A),	for	damaging	a	school	laptop.

[¶4]		On	March 4, 2019,	the	court (Soucy,	J.) held	a	hearing to	consider	the	

State’s	 motions for probation	 revocation	 and	 the	 four	 new	 charges.	 	 At	 the	

hearing,	 P.S.—who	 was	 not	 yet	 fifteen	 years	 old—admitted	 to	 all	 four	 new	

offenses	 and	 the	 probation	 violations. The	 State	 advocated	 for	 the	 court	 to	

impose	 a	 disposition of	 indeterminate	 commitment	 until	 age	 eighteen.

P.S. argued	for	 a	 thirty-day	 confinement.	 	The	 court revoked	 P.S.’s	 probation	

and	imposed	a	disposition	of	commitment	to	Long	Creek	for	an	indeterminate	

period	up	to	age	eighteen.		The	court	stated,	

[T]ypically	 I	 think	 we could	 set	 you	 up	 with	 really	 intensive	

services	in	the	community	.	.	.	and	I	think,	in	fact,	we’ve	tried	to	do	

some	of	that.	.	.	.		But	ideally	we’d	have	other	services	available	as	

well	that	are	perhaps	a	bit	more	assertive	and	are	a	bit	more	local.		

We	 don’t	 have	 those	 services,	 and I’m	 satisfied	 there	 is	 no	
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alternative	but	 to	commit	 you	 to	 Long	 Creek,	and	 I	 don’t	 think	 a	

shock	sentence	is	going	to	do	it.	 It’s	going	to	be	[until] age	18.	

[¶5]		P.S.	timely	appealed the	disposition.	 See	15	M.R.S.	§ 3402(1)(B).

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II.		DISCUSSION

[¶6]	 	 In	 a comprehensive list,	 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 3314(1) outlines	 the	

dispositional	 alternatives	 available	 to	 the	 juvenile	 court,	 including	 home	

supervision	 under court-imposed	 conditions, participation	 in	 a	 supervised	

work	or	service	program, a	period	of	confinement	not	to	exceed	thirty	days, and

commitment	to	a	juvenile	correctional	facility. 15	M.R.S.	§	3314(1)(A),	(B), (F),	

(H). Section 3316(2)(A) expounds on juvenile	commitments	to	the	Department	

of	 Corrections that	 are	 ordered	 under	 section	 3314(1)(F) and	 provides	 in	

relevant	part,	

A	commitment	of	a	juvenile	to	a	Department	of	Corrections	juvenile	

corrections	 facility	 pursuant	 to	 section	 3314 must	 be	 for	 an	

indeterminate	 period	 not	 to	 extend	 beyond	 the	 juvenile’s	

18th birthday	unless	the	court expressly	further	limits or	extends	the	

indeterminate	commitment,	as	long	as	the	court	does	not	limit	the	

commitment	 to	 less	 than	 one	 year nor	 extend	 the	 commitment	

beyond	a	juvenile’s	21st	birthday	and	as	long	as	an	order	does	not	

result	 in	 a	 commitment	 of	 less	 than	 one	 year,	 unless	 the	

commitment	is	for	an	indeterminate	period	not	to	extend	beyond	

the	juvenile’s	21st	birthday.

 3	 	 In	 addition	 to	 briefs	 from	 the	 parties,	 we	 were	 provided	 a	 joint	 brief	 from	 a	 group	 of	

organizations	serving	as	amici	curiae	pursuant	to	M.R.	App.	P.	7A(e).		The	organizations	that	signed	

onto	the	amicus	brief	in	support	of	P.S.	include	the	ACLU	of	Maine	Foundation,	Maine	Association	of	

Criminal	Defense	Lawyers,	Disability	Rights	Maine,	and	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocates	and	Defenders.
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15	M.R.S.	§	3316(2)(A)	(emphases	added).

[¶7]	 	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 the	 juvenile	 court	 decides	 to	 order	 the	

commitment	of	a	juvenile to	a	Department	of	Corrections	facility pursuant	to	

section	3314(1)(F),	that	indeterminate	commitment	will be	for	a period	up	to	

the	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday,	unless	the	court	decides	 to	limit	or	extend	

the	 commitment	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 section	 3316(2)(A).	 Relevant to	 the	

present	matter,	the	court	could	not	have	limited	P.S.’s	commitment	to	a	period	

of	“less	than	one	year.”		15 M.R.S.	§ 3316(2)(A).		In	sum,	the	statute	provides	

the court	 a	 range	 of	 discretion	 for calculating	 a	 juvenile’s	 period	 of	

commitment.

[¶8]	 Although	 we	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 the	 court’s	 understanding,	the	

record gives	us	reason	to	believe	that,	once	the	court	decided	to	commit	P.S.	to	

Long	 Creek, it may	 have	 felt	 compelled	 to	 order	 him committed	 up	 to his	

eighteenth	birthday.		At	the	hearing,	the	court	stated	that	it	believed	there	was	

“no	 alternative	 but	 to	 commit	 [P.S.]	 to	 Long Creek”	 until	 he	 reached	 age	

eighteen.		Further,	P.S.	advocated	for	a	thirty-day	confinement at	the	hearing,	

and	it	appears	that	his	attorney	may	have misunderstood the	court’s	ability	to	

limit	 a	 commitment to	 somewhere	 between	 at	 least	 one	 year	 and	 P.S.’s	
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eighteenth	birthday.4		Given these	observations,	the	court	may	have	operated	

under	 the	 belief	 that	 its	 indeterminate	 sentence	 must	 extend	 until	 P.S.’s	

eighteenth	birthday and	that	it was	without	discretion	to	impose	a	lesser	period	

of	commitment.

[¶9]	 	 We	 acknowledge	 that	 our	 language	 in	 State	 v.	 J.R.	 may	 have	

contributed	to	such	a	belief—one	that,	if	held	by	the	juvenile	court,	would	have	

resulted	in	an	incorrect	application	of	the	law.		In	J.R.,	we	stated,	“The	length	of	

the	institutional	disposition	ordered	by	the	court	was	mandated	by	statute	as	

an	 indeterminate	 period	 not	 to	 exceed	 J.R.’s	 eighteenth	 birthday.”		

2018 ME 117,	 ¶¶ 24, 27, 191	 A.3d	 1157 (“By imposing	 the	 minimum	 term	

permissible for	an	indeterminate	commitment	 to	Long	Creek,	 the	court	acted	

within	its	discretion	and	did	not	err	in	applying	the	mandates	of	section 3313	

to	 J.R.’s	 specific	 needs.”	 (emphasis	 added)).	 	 We	 recognize	 that	 the	 two	

quotations above,	 when	 removed	 from	 the	 context	 of	 J.R.,	 could	 lead	 to	 the	

 4 At	the	hearing,	P.S.’s	attorney requested	a	thirty-day	confinement,	stating,	“[P]art	of	the	reason	

why	we	picked	30	days	is	because	that’s	the	only	alternative	we	have	short	of	indeterminate	18[.]		

[I]f	there	was	a	two-month,	three-month	thing,	we	might	be	talking	that.		But	this	is	what	we	have,	so	

it—I	blame	the	[L]egislature	for	that	drafting	decision.”		Similarly,	P.S.’s	initial	brief	mentioned	only	

the	option	of	a	thirty-day	confinement	and	did	not	argue	in	the	alternative that the	court	should	have	

limited	the	indeterminate-up-to-age-eighteen	disposition to	a	commitment of somewhere	between	

at	least	one	year	and	P.S.’s	eighteenth	birthday.		Following	the	State’s	failure	to	submit	a	brief,	we	

ordered	further	briefing	and	invited	amici curiae	briefs.		After	that order,	P.S.	and	the	amici	curiae	

advanced	the	argument	that	the	court	had	the	prerogative to	expressly	limit	P.S.’s	commitment	to	a	

period	of	one	year.		See 15 M.R.S.	§	3316(2)(A) (2018).
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conclusion	 that	 the	 juvenile	 court	 lacks	 the	 discretion	 to	 impose	 an	

indeterminate	 commitment	 of	 between	 at	 least	 one	 year	 and	 a	 juvenile’s	

eighteenth	birthday.

[¶10]		Because	the	issue	was	not	raised	by	the	parties	in	J.R.,	we	did	not	

discuss	section	3316’s	language	allowing	the	court	to	“expressly	further	limit[]	

or	extend[]”	a	juvenile’s	indeterminate	commitment.		15	M.R.S.	§	3316(2)(A).		

Further,	J.R.’s	age	rendered	the	issue	of	judicial	discretion	less	meaningful	than	

in	 this	case.		J.R.’s indeterminate	disposition up	 to	 the	age	of	eighteen meant	

that	 he	 would	 spend	 up	 to	 eighteen	 months at	 a	 juvenile	 facility.		

J.R., 2018 ME 117,	¶	24,	191	A.3d	1157.		In	contrast,	given	P.S.’s	relative	youth	

at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 hearing,	 P.S.’s	 commitment	 could	 last almost	 thirty-nine	

months,	 more	 than	 three	 years.	 	 Thus,	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 shorter	 period	 of	

commitment	is	a	more	pertinent	issue here	than	it	was	in	J.R.

[¶11]	 	 We	 clarify	 today	 that	 the	 language	 of	 J.R.	 does	 not	 constrain	 a	

juvenile	 court’s	 discretion	 to	 impose	 a	 shorter	 period	 of	 indeterminate	

commitment	than	up	to	a	juvenile’s	eighteenth	birthday pursuant	to	15	M.R.S.	

§	3316(2)(A),	so	long	as	that	commitment	is	for	at	least	one	year.		We	cannot	

determine	on	this	record	whether	the	District	Court	believed	it	was	compelled	

to	 impose	 a	 commitment	 extending	 until	 P.S.’s	 eighteenth	 birthday.		
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Accordingly,	we	 vacate	the	judgment	and	remand	 the	matter	 for	 the	court to	

readdress the	 disposition	 pursuant	 to 15	 M.R.S.	 §§ 3314(1),	 3316(2),	

specifically	acknowledging the full	range	of discretion	provided	to	the	court	in

section 3316(2)(A) and the	 Legislature’s	 directive	 to	 prioritize	 the	 least	

restrictive	juvenile	disposition	that	is	appropriate,	see	J.R.,	2018	ME	117,	¶	12,	

191	 A.3d	 1157 (citing	 15	M.R.S.A.	 § 3002 (2003) Commentary	 1979).	 	In	its	

review,	 the	 court	 may	 decide	 to	 reimpose P.S.’s	 up-to-age-eighteen	

commitment,	 or	 it	 may	 exercise	 its	 discretion	 to	 limit	 his	 indeterminate	

commitment	 within	 the	 direction of	 the	 statute.	 	 See	 15	 M.R.S.	 §§ 3002,	

3313(1)-(2),	3314(1),	3316(2) (2018).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 District	

Court	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with	

this	opinion.

John	W.	Tebbetts,	Esq.,	Tebbetts	Law	Office,	LLC,	Presque	Isle,	for	appellant	P.S.

Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and James G. Mitchell, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., 8th 

Prosecutorial District, Caibou, for appellee State of Maine

Emma	E.	Bond,	Esq.,	Zachary	L.	Heiden,	Esq.,	and	Meagan	Sway,	Esq.,	ACLU	of	

Maine	Foundation,	Portland,	for	amicus	curiae	ACLU	of	Maine	Foundation

Peter	Rice,	Esq.,	and	Jeffrey	M.	Skakalski,	Esq.,	Disability	Rights	Maine,	Augusta,	

for	amicus	curiae	Disability	Rights	Maine
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Mary	Bonauto,	Esq.,	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocates	&	Defenders,	Portland,	for	amicus	

curiae	GLBTQ	Legal	Advocates	&	Defenders

Tina	 Heather	 Nadeau,	 Esq.,	 Maine	 Association	 of	 Criminal	 Defense	 Lawyers,	

Portland,	for	amicus	curiae	Maine	Association	of	Criminal	Defense	Lawyers

Fort	Kent	District	Court	docket	numbers	JV-2018-12,	JV-2018-20,	and	JV-2018-21

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY