Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-479 | October 9, 2019 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Troy R. Ashley

Anderson, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Troy R. Ashley,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Janet Christie,

Appellee-Defendant.

October 9, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-SC-479

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David L. McCord, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C03-1811-SC-880

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Troy R. Ashley appeals the small claims court’s judgment for Janet Christie 

following an evidentiary hearing. Ashley raises three issues for our review, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-479 | October 9, 2019 Page 2 of 5

which we consolidate and restate as the following dispositive issue: whether the 

court erred when it entered judgment for Christie. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around late summer or early fall of 2018, Ashley met Christie on an online 

dating site. At the time, Ashley owned a 1990 Chevrolet truck with more than

235,000 miles on it. After Ashley and Christie had dated for a few weeks, 

Ashley agreed to title the truck in Christie’s name. Thereafter, he wrote a letter 

to his insurance company stating that he no longer owned the truck because he 

had sold it to Christie.

[3] After the two had ceased dating, Ashley filed a notice of claim with the small 

claims court. In his notice, Ashley alleged that he was the rightful owner of the 

truck. Ashley demanded either that Christie return the truck to him or that she 

pay him $2,700 for the truck. 

[4] The court held an evidentiary hearing on Ashley’s claim, at which both Ashley 

and Christie appeared. Ashley testified that he and Christie had an oral 

agreement for her to have the truck for a little while to assist her in getting to 

and from work but that she would then return the truck to him. According to 

Ashley, he titled the truck in Christie’s name pursuant to that agreement. 

[5] Christie, however, testified that Ashley had given the truck to her as a gift. 

And, when the court asked Ashley if he had written a letter to his insurance 

company stating that he had transferred the truck to Christie, Ashley 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-479 | October 9, 2019 Page 3 of 5

responded, “Yeah.” Tr. Vol. II at 11. The court then entered judgment for 

Christie, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Ashley appeals the trial court’s judgment for Christie. As our Supreme Court 

has explained:

We review the facts determined in a bench trial with due regard 

given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess witness 

credibility under the clearly erroneous standard. This deferential 

standard of review is particularly important in small claims 

actions, where trials are informal, with the sole objective of 

dispensing speedy justice between parties according to the rules 

of substantive law. . . .

As a preliminary matter, we observe that [the appellee] has not 

filed a brief. Under that circumstance, we do not undertake to 

develop an argument on the appellee’s behalf, but rather may 

reverse upon an appellant’s prima facie showing of reversible 

error. Prima facie error in this context is defined as, “at first sight, 

on first appearance, or on the face it.”

Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1198-99 (Ind. 2008) (cleaned up). Under our 

clearly erroneous standard of review, we consider whether the evidence 

supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. See, e.g., 

Town of Brownsburg v. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597, 601 

(Ind. 2019). We will not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of 

the witnesses. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-SC-479 | October 9, 2019 Page 4 of 5

[7] As an initial matter, we note that Ashley frames his appeal around Indiana 

Trial Rule 60(B). But Ashley did not file a post-judgment, Rule 60(B) motion 

for relief from judgment in the trial court. Instead, he immediately pursued this 

appeal. As there was no motion or judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) in the trial 

court, we disregard Ashley’s incorrect characterization of this appeal.

[8] On the merits of his appeal, Ashley asserts that the trial court erred in the 

admission of evidence. Our trial courts have broad discretion in the admission 

of evidence, and we review those decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. 

See, e.g., Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). An abuse of 

discretion occurs “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances” before the trial court. Id.

[9] First, Ashley asserts that the trial court erroneously refused to admit vehiclemaintenance records he had submitted to show that he had maintained the 

truck. But the only page of those records that is included in the record on 

appeal shows that Ashley paid for maintenance on the truck in early September 

of 2018.1

 There was no dispute that Ashley owned the truck around the time of 

that maintenance, and so there was no relevance to that record. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err in refusing to consider it.

1

 In his brief, Ashley asserts that there are other maintenance records. However, having not included those 

records in the record on appeal, we have no way of determining their prejudicial value, if any, assuming for 

the sake of argument that the trial court even erred in excluding those records. Accordingly, Ashley has not 

met his burden on appeal to demonstrate any error based on those additional records.
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[10] Second, Ashley asserts that the trial court erred when it accepted into evidence 

submissions offered by Christie. But Ashley did not object to the admission of 

that evidence in the trial court. Instead, he conceded that Christie’s evidence at 

least in part correctly showed that he had, in writing, informed his insurance 

company that he had transferred ownership of the truck to Christie. There is no 

error on this issue.

[11] Third, Ashley asserts that the trial court erroneously entered judgment for 

Christie because Ashley’s submitted evidence and testimony is “sufficient” to 

support judgment for him. Appellant’s Br. at 7. Be that as it may, Ashley’s 

request is for this Court to reweigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, 

which we will not do. The trial court’s judgment is supported by Christie’s 

testimony and Ashley’s concession regarding his writing to the insurance 

company, and we cannot say the court erred when it gave controlling weight to 

that evidence instead of the evidence Ashley prefers.

[12] Finally, Ashley asserts that Christie has been unjustly enriched by being 

allowed to keep the truck. But this argument is derivative of his above 

arguments. That is, having concluded that the trial court did not err in entering 

judgment for Christie, we likewise cannot say that Christie has been unjustly 

enriched. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment for Christie.

[13] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.