NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SUSAN M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, E.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0005 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD528945

The Honorable Jennifer E. Green, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Thomas Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-28-2020
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Susan M. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to E.M. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016). 

Mother has four children, none of whom are in Mother’s physical custody, 

but only the youngest, 3-year-old E.M., is subject to the termination order 

on appeal. Mother has a history of over ten years of alcohol abuse that 

includes a conviction for extreme DUI in 2014 and two previous 

dependency petitions involving Mother’s three older children based on 

Mother’s substance abuse and neglect.

¶3 In November 2017, Mother’s older children called their 

paternal grandmother because Mother was passed out and they were 

unable to wake her. The grandmother took the older children to school and 

removed E.M. from Mother’s home. After Mother woke up, she drove to 

the grandmother’s home and the grandmother called the police. The police 

did not allow Mother to take E.M., and E.M. stayed with the older children’s 

grandmother. The police reported that Mother had answered questions 

slowly and with slurred speech, appeared intoxicated, and faintly smelled 

of alcohol. Mother self-referred to a residential treatment center to address 

substance abuse.

¶4 The police notified the Department of Child Safety 

(“Department”) who petitioned for dependency in November while 

Mother was at the residential treatment center. The Department alleged 

that E.M. was dependent due to Mother’s substance abuse and neglect.1

1 The petition included two of her older children, who were then 

placed with those children’s father and dismissed from the case.
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

3

Mother plead no contest to the dependency petition and the juvenile court 

adjudicated E.M. dependent in January 2018. The court implemented a case 

plan of reunification and offered individual and family therapy, substance 

abuse treatment and counseling, parent-aide services, drug testing, inhome services, parenting classes, and case management. Mother completed 

a psychological examination with Dr. James Thal, who diagnosed her with 

severe alcohol abuse disorder.

¶5 Beginning early 2018, Mother participated in counseling with 

Jewish Family and Children’s Services and TERROS. TERROS did not 

diagnose her with a severe substance-abuse disorder that would benefit 

from treatment, however, because Mother minimized her drinking to the 

counselors and did not detail the events leading to the dependency action. 

Instead, the counselor at TERROS diagnosed Mother with major depressive 

disorder. Mother’s Department case manager disagreed with this 

assessment based on her knowledge of Mother’s excessive drinking within 

the last eighteen months. 

¶6 Mother began parent-aide services and drug testing with

Physician Services, Inc in February 2018. Mother missed seven tests in 

March and April 2018 that the Department excused because she was 

receiving medical treatment. The Department remained concerned, 

however, when it received reports that Mother had been seeking illegal

prescription drugs. Because Mother participated in services and showed 

temporary sobriety through negative tests, the court authorized E.M.’s 

return to Mother’s physical custody.

¶7 In April 2018, E.M. fell into Mother’s pool when Mother left 

her unattended. Two months later, two of her older children reported that 

Mother continued to drink alcohol in front of them and were worried about 

E.M.’s well-being. The Department asked Mother to submit to a drug test,

but she failed to do so and then skipped her next two required tests. Based 

on these events, the Department reinstated supervised visitation for the 

older children and assigned a “24/7 safety monitor” for E.M. Mother 

suggested her long-time friend, Joel M., to be a safety monitor. The 

Department also required that Mother submit to more frequent urinalysis 

tests. Mother subsequently missed another drug test the day Joel M. was 

assigned as a safety monitor. Despite Mother’s missed drug tests, however, 

she completed the first part of her TERROS services and “graduated to 

recovery maintenance around[] July 2018.” Joel M. nevertheless deemed her 

a “functional alcoholic.”
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 In July 2018, Mother absconded with E.M. Police found her 

“very drunk and very uncooperative” in a hotel parking lot with E.M., who

had two black eyes, but Mother refused to seek medical attention for her or 

hand her over to the paramedics. Mother almost dropped E.M. but a 

paramedic caught E.M. and brought her to an ambulance, which took E.M. 

to a hospital. The examining doctor found E.M. had linear bruises on her 

back that looked like she had been struck with a stick. During her interview 

with police, Mother poured wine into a Gatorade bottle, which the 

interviewer confiscated. Police concluded that E.M. was injured in Mother’s 

care and Mother later pled guilty to felony child abuse.

¶9 The Department removed E.M. from Mother’s custody in 

August, and E.M. was placed with her maternal grandmother. That same 

month, Mother missed another drug test. In September 2018, the maternal 

grandmother left for Utah, leaving E.M. with the safety monitor, Joel M.

Mother found Joel M., A.M.—Mother’s eldest daughter—and E.M.

together. Mother was reportedly intoxicated and wanted to take E.M. with 

her, but A.M. and Joel M. tried to keep her from doing so, which led to a 

fight between Mother and A.M. After the fight, Mother left with E.M. 

Chandler Police alerted other police departments that Mother had 

kidnapped E.M. and Phoenix Police found Mother and E.M. at a motel. The 

Department removed E.M. and placed her in foster care and in October 2018 

moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

¶10 From October 2018 through July 2019, Mother increased her 

participation in services and searched out independent programs, 

including individual therapy with Dr. Christopher Boyd. Dr. Boyd reported 

that Mother had successfully completed her individual therapy in January 

2019. Mother, however, was not fully forthcoming with Dr. Boyd. In 

November 2018, during the time Mother saw Dr. Boyd, she had submitted 

a diluted drug test. That same month, Mother engaged in domestic violence 

with a young man residing in her home while they were intoxicated.

¶11 In March 2019, Mother again submitted a diluted drug test 

and missed another test, claiming that she missed it because of 

“appointments” and a blown tire. The Department did not excuse the 

missed test because Mother had had ample time and opportunity to test 

before her tire blew out. In May 2019, Mother refused another drug test, 

claiming again that she was unable to do so because of a tire blowout even 

though the Department had arranged for her transportation. After Mother’s 

refusal, the Department observed Mother walk to her car and drive away.
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 In August 2019, the Department moved to amend its 

termination grounds to include 15 months’ out-of-home placement under 

A.R.S. § 8–533(8)(c). The court held a three-day trial in September 2019. 

¶13 A TERROS clinician testified that by May 2019, Mother was 

in sustained full remission, meaning twelve months of sobriety. The 

clinician admitted, however, that TERROS would need to reassess Mother’s 

services if she had been abusing alcohol daily for a period of months. Dr. 

Boyd testified that it “wouldn’t be okay” that Mother relapsed in July 2018, 

after finishing substance-abuse treatment in May, Mother not having 

shared that information. Given the information, Dr. Boyd qualified his 

report that Mother had successfully completed therapy within “specifically 

that window” of time from October 2018 to January 2019.

¶14 Dr. Thal testified that although Mother seemed to understand 

the consequences of her drinking, she lacked insight into the underlying 

causes of her ten-year struggle with alcohol. When asked his opinion on 

Mother’s relapse two months after he had performed the psychological 

evaluation, Dr. Thal pointed to the high stakes of the case and said that for 

Mother “to relapse in view of that . . . gives you a lens into how serious the 

issue [of substance abuse] is for [Mother].” Dr. Thal testified that a patient 

diagnosed with alcohol use disorder must demonstrate a period of sobriety 

of approximately five years to be considered “cured.”

¶15 The Department’s case manager testified that Mother had not 

disclosed any alcohol use after July 2018, despite police documenting her 

intoxication during the November 2018, domestic violence incident, and 

her failure to drug test when the Department suspected she had relapsed. 

Ongoing missed and diluted tests showed that although Mother had 

engaged in services, she was not benefitting from them or making the 

necessary behavioral changes. Finally, Mother’s case manager testified that 

adoption was in E.M.’s best interest and that her placement was willing to 

adopt her. 

¶16 Mother testified that she did not bruise E.M.’s face and back,

but Joel M. must have. She acknowledged, however, that she had failed to 

get E.M. proper medical care during the July 2018 incident, when upon

reassessing the situation, she purchased and drank wine instead of getting 

E.M. to a hospital. She claimed that she had not consumed alcohol since that

July 2018 incident, had made the appropriate behavioral changes, had 

created a safe place for E.M., and that reunification was in E.M.’s best 

interest. Mother blamed Joel M. for the termination proceeding and said

that she would still have her children but for him.
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

6

¶17 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on all 

four grounds of abuse, neglect, substance abuse, and 15 months in out-ofhome placement. The court concluded that “evidence as a whole shows 

Mother neglected [E.M.] by exposing her to ‘situations in which [Mother] 

reasonably should know that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.’” 

For termination under neglect, the court found that Mother had failed to 

phone paramedics after E.M. fell into her pool in April and had failed to 

obtain medical care for E.M. on July 19, 2018, thereby neglecting to provide

E.M. “supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care.”

¶18 The court found that the Department presented clear and 

convincing evidence of Mother’s chronic substance abuse under A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(B)(3). While the court recognized Mother’s extensive treatment plan 

and work, it found that Mother was impaired during the July 2018 motel 

incident, the November 2018 domestic violence incident, and considered 

Mother’s refusal to take a drug test in May 2019 to be a positive test. 

Considering the “high stakes” of the dependency and severance 

proceeding, the court found that Mother’s substance abuse will likely 

continue for a “prolonged and indeterminate period of time.” Last, the 

court found that Mother’s improvements were “too little, too late” and that 

the Department met its burden on the 15 months in out-of-home placement 

ground. The court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in E.M.’s best interests. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶19 Mother argues that reasonable evidence did not support the 

juvenile court’s termination order. She also argues that Dr. Thal’s five-year 

timeline would constitute a per se grounds for severance of her rights based 

on a diagnosis of severe alcohol abuse disorder because no dependency 

action would last five years. 

¶20 Although a parent’s right to care, custody, and control of her 

child is fundamental, it is not absolute. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

211 Ariz. 76, 78 ¶ 6 (App. 2005). To terminate parental rights, the juvenile 

court must find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least 

one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8−533 and by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 

Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). We review a juvenile court’s termination 

order for an abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 

¶ 9 (App. 2015). We accept the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them and will affirm a severance order unless 
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

7

clearly erroneous. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1 

(App. 2008). Even if the juvenile court could have decided either way on an 

issue based on fact and testimony, this Court “does not sit to second-guess 

the tough discretionary calls of front-line decision makers in the trial 

courts.” State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 339, 343 (App. 1991). 

Furthermore, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences 

from it “in favor of supporting the findings of the [juvenile] court.” Maricopa 

Cty. Juv. Action J-75482, 111 Ariz. 588, 591 (1975).

¶21 To terminate parental rights for 15 months in an out-of-home 

placement, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that 

(1) the Department made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services, (2) the child has been in an out-of-home placement 

for a cumulative total period of 15 months or longer pursuant to court 

order, (3) the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the child to be in an out-of-home placement, and (4) a substantial 

likelihood exists that the parent will be incapable of exercising proper and 

effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c). 

For purposes of this section, “circumstances” means those circumstances 

existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able 

to appropriately provide for her child, which are abuse, neglect, and 

substance abuse. See Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330 

(App. 2007). 

¶22 Reasonable evidence supports the court’s order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. The Department removed E.M from Mother’s 

home in November of 2017 due to neglect and substance abuse when 

Mother entered a rehabilitation facility. By the time of the termination 

hearing in September of 2019, E.M had been in out-of-home placement for 

all but four months. Although E.M. was briefly returned to Mother’s care 

after she complied with the case plan in April 2018, the Department again 

removed E.M. in August 2018, after police found that E.M. had suffered 

abuse while in Mother’s care. After the second removal, Mother absconded 

with E.M. while intoxicated. Two months later, Mother submitted a diluted 

drug test and police reported that she was intoxicated while engaging in 

domestic violence. Mother then missed tests in March and May 2019. The 

juvenile court considered Mother’s missed test in May as a positive test.

These facts provide reasonable evidence that Mother had not remedied the 

circumstances that caused E.M.’s out-of-home placement and that there 

was a substantial likelihood that Mother’s substance abuse would prevent

her from effecting proper parental care and control over E.M. in the near 

future.
SUSAN M. v. DCS, E.M.

Decision of the Court

8

¶23 Mother’s arguments primarily ask the court to reweigh the 

evidence on issues of fact, which we will not do. See Williams v. King, 248 

Ariz. 311, 317 (App. 2020). While the record may include conflicting 

evidence, the juvenile court has the duty as fact finder to resolve any 

conflicts. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 

2004). Mother also argues that Dr. Thal’s five-year timeline provides a per 

se grounds for termination contrary to established law. But as described 

above, the juvenile court found that Mother failed to comply with all testing 

requirements and did not rely exclusively on Dr. Thal’s five-year timeline. 

While Dr. Thal testified regarding when Mother might be “cured” of her 

alcohol dependence, his opinion did not preclude that Mother could have 

safely parented E.M. during her recovery had she complied with testing 

and other requirements. Rather, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s

findings that Mother failed to remedy her substance abuse and that her 

substance abuse will likely prevent her from effecting proper parental care 

and control in the near future just as it had in the near past. Thus, Mother’s 

legal argument is inapplicable to the findings of fact. Because we find that 

the court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental 

rights under the 15 months’ out-of-home placement ground, we need not 

address the other grounds for termination. Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 15.

¶24 We need not consider the juvenile court’s best interests

findings because Mother does not challenge them on appeal. 

CONCLUSION

¶25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.