Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

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volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-CV-1002

MORPHOTRUST USA, INC., APPELLANT,

 V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONTRACT APPEALS BOARD, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia

(12-CAP-9430)

(Hon. Brian F. Holeman, Trial Judge)

(Argued October 23, 2014 Decided May 28, 2015)

Jessica Ring Amunson, with whom Daniel E. Chudd and Damien C. Specht 

were on the brief, for appellant.

James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Irvin 

B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was 

filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor 

General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and

FARRELL, Senior Judge.

Opinion for the court by Associate Judge EASTERLY. 

Concurring opinion by Senior Judge FARRELL at page 38.

Dissenting opinion by Associate Judge BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY at page 39.
2

EASTERLY, Associate Judge: This case requires us to interpret the 

Procurement Practices Reform Act of 2010 (the “PPRA”), D.C. Code § 2-351.01 et 

seq., legislation which the Council of the District of Columbia passed to promote 

competition, fairness, and public confidence in the District government‟s 

contracting process. Specifically, we consider the work an agency must do before 

including limiting specifications in a request for proposals (“RFP”) and, relatedly, 

the role that the statutorily created Contract Appeals Board (“Board”) must play in 

reviewing pre-award protests to RFPs to ensure that limiting specifications are 

justified under the PPRA and corresponding regulations. 

The RFP in question sought proposals for a contract to produce driver‟s 

licenses for issuance by the District of Columbia‟s Department of Motor Vehicles 

(“DMV”). MorphoTrust USA, Inc. (“MorphoTrust”) filed a protest with the 

Board, asserting that a number of the specifications in the RFP were overly 

restrictive and needlessly chilled competition. After the Board denied the protest 

and the Superior Court affirmed the Board, MorphoTrust filed this appeal. 

MorphoTrust argues that the Board improperly deferred to the judgments of the 

DMV regarding the challenged specifications, failed to resolve important disputed 

facts, and made findings that were unsupported by the record. 
3

We agree that the Board‟s review of MorphoTrust‟s protest to the DMV‟s 

RFP was inadequate, and neither complied with the PPRA‟s text and its 

corresponding regulations nor fulfilled their goals. Particularly at the initial stage 

of the procurement process, when the issue is who will be eligible even to submit a 

proposal, the Board may not defer broadly to agency decision-making. Rather, the 

Board has a duty to assess “de novo”—the statutory term—whether challenged

specifications that limit competition only do so because they reflect the District‟s 

stated minimum needs. We question whether the information currently in the 

record would have permitted the Board to make such a de novo determination, but 

the point is that this determination is the Board‟s to make in the first instance. 

Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand for 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. Overview of the Relevant Procurement Law and Regulations 

The procurement of goods and services by the District of Columbia 

government is generally governed by the PPRA and corresponding regulations.1

 

1

 See 27 DCMR § 100 et seq. Notably, the bulk of these regulations were 

promulgated in connection with the D.C. Procurement Practices Act of 1985 (“the 

PPA”), which was repealed when the PPRA became law. The PPRA provides, 

(continued...)
4

Among the Act‟s central purposes are “foster[ing] effective and equitably broadbased competition in the District,” “obtain[ing] full and open competition by 

providing that contractors are given adequate opportunities to bid,” and 

“increas[ing] public confidence in the procedures followed in public 

procurement.”2 The Act itself provides that it shall be “liberally construed and 

applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.”

3

One means by which a District agency may procure goods and services

under the PPRA is through a request for “competitive sealed proposals,” which are 

solicited by the Office of Contracting and Procurement on the agency‟s behalf.4 

 

(...continued)

however, that “existing procurement rules, to the degree they are consistent with 

this chapter, shall remain in effect until they are superseded by rules issued in 

accordance with subsection (a) of this section” which authorizes the Chief 

Procurement Officer “to issue rules.” D.C. Code § 2-361.06 (b) (2012 Repl.). 

Both the Board and the Office of Contracting and Procurement identify these 

regulations on their respective websites as the regulations currently in force. The 

District has never argued that these regulations are defunct and instead has relied 

on these regulations throughout this litigation; we will do the same.

2

 D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (b)(2), (3), (5) (2012 Repl.).

3

 D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (a).

4

 See D.C. Code § 2-354.03 (2012 Repl.). The agency itself develops the 

RFP‟s contents, including a “statement of work or other description of the 

District‟s specific needs”; the Office of Contracting and Procurement then 

publicizes the RFP and receives the proposals. Id. at § 2-354.03 (d), (e).
5

Consistent with the statute‟s general focus on fostering competition, such proposals 

must be “solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources.”5

The District‟s procurement regulations specify steps that agencies must take 

to ensure “full and open competition”

6

from the outset of the solicitation. An 

agency with a need for a particular good or service must first, before it actually 

drafts an RFP, “perform procurement planning and conduct market surveys,”

7

gathering information about the “entire available market.”

8

 The agency must then 

use this market research to “develop [the] specifications and purchase 

descriptions” to be included in the RFP, “in a manner designed to promote 

competition to the maximum extent possible, with due regard to the nature of the 

 

5

 D.C. Code § 2-354.03 (b) (2012 Repl.); 27 DCMR § 1600.1, -.2 (2013). 

See 27 DCMR § 2500.1 (1988) (“The District shall specify procurement needs in a 

manner designed to promote competition to the maximum extent possible.”).

6

 27 DCMR § 1009.1 (2011).

7

 Id.; see id. at § 1009.4 (“Procurement planning shall begin as soon as an 

agency need is identified and preferably well in advance of the fiscal year in which 

the contract award is necessary.”). 

8

 27 DCMR § 2599.1 (1988) (defining “market research” as “the process 

used for collecting and analyzing information about the entire available market that 

will satisfy the minimum agency need[,] used to arrive at the most suitable 

approach for acquiring, distributing, and supporting goods and services”).
6

goods or services to be procured.”9 Any specifications that the agency ultimately 

decides to include in its RFP “shall state only the District‟s actual minimum 

needs,”10 must “reflect . . . the market available to meet those needs,”11 and may 

include “restrictive provisions and conditions only to the extent necessary to satisfy 

the minimum needs of the District, or as authorized or required by law.”12

If a prospective offeror believes that an agency has failed to adhere to the 

above-described statutory and regulatory provisions promoting competition, and 

wishes to challenge the specifications of an RFP as unduly restrictive, the PPRA 

directs the offeror to seek relief from the Contract Appeals Board.13 The Board is 

an independent, neutral, executive-branch entity, comprised of administrative law 

 

9

 27 DCMR § 2500.2 (1988) (“The District shall develop specifications and 

purchase descriptions using market research in a manner designed to promote 

competition to the maximum extent possible, with due regard to the nature of the 

goods or services to be procured.”); see supra note 8.

10

 27 DCMR § 2500.4.

11

 Id. at § 2500.5.

12

 Id. at § 2500.3. 

13 See D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) (2012 Repl.) (designating the Board as the 

“exclusive hearing tribunal for . . . [a]ny protest of a solicitation”); 27 DCMR 

§ 3800.1 (2012) (“[A]ll protests shall be filed with the District of Columbia 

Contract Appeals Board in accordance with the CAB‟s rules. The CAB has 

original jurisdiction to decide all protests of solicitations or awards.”).
7

judges who are licensed attorneys with, inter alia, “no less than 5 years experience 

in public contract law.”14 

The PPRA authorizes the Board, after hearing from both the protestor and 

the District,15 to resolve disputed issues of fact.16 The PPRA also directs that “the 

Board shall decide whether the solicitation . . . was in accordance with the 

applicable law, rules, and terms and conditions of the solicitation.”17 The statute 

provides that the Board‟s review “shall be de novo,” and “[a]ny prior 

determinations by administrative officials shall not be final or conclusive.”18 If the 

 

14 D.C. Code §§ 2-360.01 (a)(2); -360.02 (2012 Repl.).

15 After a protest is submitted to the Board, the agency must submit a report 

which includes the agency‟s “position and defense for each ground of the protest, 

including facts, legal principles, and precedents supporting its position.” 27 

DCMR § 305.1 (e) (2002).

16 See D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (e) (2012 Repl.) (“A determination of an issue

of fact by the Board under subsection (d) of this section shall be final and 

conclusive unless arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or clearly erroneous.”). See 

also 27 DCMR § 120.1 (2002) (specifying that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

law, the burden of persuasion by a party to establish a fact or facts in dispute shall 

be met by a preponderance of the evidence”); 27 DCMR § 307.4 (2002) 

(discussing when the Board may treat facts as conceded); 27 DCMR § 311.1 

(2002) (“If the Board determines that there is a genuine issue of material fact 

which cannot be resolved on the written record, the Board may order an 

evidentiary hearing.”). 

17 D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d). 

18 Id.; see D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) (“The Board shall be the exclusive 

hearing tribunal for, and shall review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a 

(continued...)
8

Board sustains the protest, it has broad remedial power, including the power to 

order the District to terminate any contract awarded under the challenged 

solicitation and to issue a new RFP.19

II. Facts and Procedural History

In 2012, the Office of Contracting and Procurement issued an RFP on behalf 

of the DMV, RFP No. Doc62682, for a “Centralized Security Credentialing 

System” to produce driver‟s licenses and ID cards equipped with “the most secure 

credentialing features.” In order to “improve and increase card security to deter 

fraud and deter attempts to illegally duplicate identity credentials,” the RFP called 

for the system to “use the latest technology” and to manufacture cards that would 

“be tamper proof to the highest extent possible.”

 

(...continued)

solicitation.”); 27 DCMR § 101.7 (2002) (“The Board shall hear and decide, de 

novo, all cases under its jurisdiction.”). 

19 D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (f) (authorizing the Board, when it sustains a 

protest, to terminate any contract awarded under the solicitation or to grant any 

“other relief” as it deems appropriate); 27 DCMR § 314.1 (d) (2002) (listing 

remedies available to the Board, including ordering the contracting agency to

“[i]ssue a new solicitation”).
9

The RFP set forth numerous specifications. Particularly with respect to the 

driver‟s licenses that would be manufactured under the contract, the RFP listed 

seventeen particular features that would, “at minimum,” be required, including a 

solid polycarbonate card base and four laser-engraved details.20 In addition, the 

RFP listed particular security requirements for the facility where the cards would 

be manufactured, among them “outside security to include fences, distance from 

entrance to parking[,] etc.” The District made clear that these specifications were 

nonnegotiable.21

Before a contract was awarded, MorphoTrust filed a formal protest with the 

Board, challenging the specifications of a solid polycarbonate card base, the four 

laser-engraved details, and outdoor fencing.22 MorphoTrust produces driver‟s 

 

20

 The laser-engraved features required by the RFP were: (1) a primary 

photo, (2) a clear tactile feature, (3) a tactile data feature, and (4) a ghost window 

with image.

21 After the Office of Contracting and Procurement issued the RFP, the 

District responded to questions from potential offerors and made some minor 

amendments to the RFP based on those questions. Among these questions, the 

District was asked whether it would consider proposals that did not comply with 

one or more of the specifications, and, specifically, whether it would “consider and 

award on a proposal of a non-polycarbonate card construction.” The District 

responded that “[o]fferors are welcome to provide other options. However, the 

District will only evaluate the primary (required) proposal.”

22

 MorphoTrust also asserted that the RFP was improperly tailored to reflect 

the specifications of a card produced for the Commonwealth of Virginia by a 

(continued...)
10

licenses and ID cards for 41 states and, prior to this litigation, the District of 

Columbia. MorphoTrust‟s ID cards, however, are made from Teslin, as opposed to 

polycarbonate, and they are not laser-engraved.23 MorphoTrust‟s production 

facility is also not secured by outdoor fencing. MorphoTrust asserted that the 

challenged specifications in the RFP far exceeded the “actual minimum needs of 

the District” for secure digitized driver‟s licenses and facility security, and that 

they were therefore unduly restrictive, improperly narrowed competition, and 

violated the District‟s procurement regulations. MorphoTrust further claimed its 

Teslin cards were just as durable and tamper-proof as laser-engraved cards made 

from polycarbonate, and its production facilities had security comparable (if not 

superior) to outdoor fencing. MorphoTrust asked the Board to recommend that the 

District amend the RFP and eliminate these requirements.

In response to MorphoTrust‟s protest, the District filed an Agency Report, 

defending the contents of the RFP. Repeatedly asserting without explanation the 

District‟s “singular security needs” as the nation‟s capital, the District argued that 

 

(...continued)

competitor company, CBN-STI, and was likely to result in a sole-source 

procurement. MorphoTrust has not pursued this claim on appeal.

23 Laser engraving is only possible on a polycarbonate card base.
11

the “DMV [had] established a minimum need for the most secure credentials 

possible.”

The District preliminarily claimed that “DMV experts” had “engaged in an 

extensive three-year market study to develop specifications that met the need.” To 

support this latter assertion, the District cited to a single-page declaration 

submitted by DMV‟s Chief Information Officer, Mr. Amit Vora. Mr. Vora‟s 

declaration in turn adopted as “accurate” a four-page, undated, anonymous 

“summary of steps taken by the Department of Motor Vehicles to Develop Secure 

Credentialing RFP” (“summary attachment”). 

The undated, anonymous summary attachment briefly addressed the actions 

taken by the DMV prior to issuing the RFP. It stated that unidentified individuals 

at unidentified times had “[a]ttend[ed] [c]onferences and research[ed] new 

technology and trends surrounding secure identification cards,” but did not state 

what the DMV had learned. The summary stated that “DMV also gathered 

information by visiting and contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles in other 

jurisdictions,” but likewise failed to detail any information the DMV had 
12

acquired.24 The summary also listed “[r]ecent network opportunities that the 

Director of DMV and DMV‟s Driver‟s Services have attended for the past three 

years,” but it did not identify with whom the DMV had “networked”; nor did it 

explain how these efforts related to its ultimate decision to include the challenged 

specifications in the RFP. 

This was the “market research” on which the District relied in the Agency 

Report when it asserted that the “DMV [had] justified the minimum need for a 

polycarbonate card.”25 Specifically, the District claimed that “[i]n the Declaration 

of Amit Vora, DMV set forth the reasons why no other material has the security of 

polycarbonate.” In fact, the Vora Declaration said nothing about the minimum 

need for a polycarbonate card and the District‟s citation was to the summary 

 

24

 Indeed, there was some indication that the DMV had been unable to 

provide more detail, given its explanation that “many of our network and research 

opportunities for a more secure credential occurred several years ago as we have 

been planning for some time now to implement a new secured credential.” The 

DMV identified only “some of the states/territories we visited,” which included 

“AL, DE, MD, NY, VA, WVA, [and] Ottawa, CN.‟” The District did not submit 

to the Board any notes, records, or memoranda documenting these visits.

25 The District made no argument in the Agency Report in support of the 

four laser-engraved features challenged by MorphoTrust; it simply noted that laserengraving was a concomitant feature of a polycarbonate card. The summary 

attachment to the Vora Declaration similarly noted that laser-engraving can only be 

done on polycarbonate cards and asserted that a “laser-engraved ghost window is a 

security feature that cannot be duplicated.” 
13

attachment to the Vora Declaration. The summary attachment in turn did not 

explain why “no other material” would suffice. It contained no mention of 

potential alternatives to polycarbonate. It simply provided a description of the 

features of polycarbonate cards, repeating almost verbatim—but without 

attribution—portions of a 2008 marketing brochure of a polycarbonate 

manufacturer, Gemalto.26 The summary attachment and the Agency report 

specifically touted the fact that polycarbonate cards are non-delaminable (i.e., the 

layers of the card are fused together and cannot be peeled apart), and thus tamperproof, and that the card “has over a ten year durability.”

The District also asserted that the DMV had “justified the minimum need for 

additional facility security.” The District asserted that, given the sensitivity of the 

information gathered from individuals seeking identification, the offeror needed to 

have a production facility “at least as secure as the District‟s own DMV facilities.” 

The District did not detail DMV‟s security features, but it asserted that they met 

the “standards of the American Society of Industrial Security („ASIS‟).” The 

 

26 The District attached this brochure (entitled a “white paper” on 

“Polycarbonate and Identity Documents”) as an exhibit to the Agency Report even 

though neither Mr. Vora, nor anyone else from the DMV, acknowledged reviewing 

it prior to drafting the specifications of the RFP, much less relying on it in doing 

so.
14

District claimed that the security specifications were likewise prepared in 

accordance with ASIS standards, but it supplied no supporting documentation for 

this assertion, not even the standards themselves. The District did, however, list in 

the Agency Report a number of the standards it represented as ASIS standards; 

none of these mentioned fencing.27

Following submission of the Agency Report, MorphoTrust filed Comments 

on the Agency Report in which it observed that the District had failed to provide a 

credible justification for the challenged specifications. Asserting that the District 

had “confused” its minimum needs with “design preferences,” MorphoTrust

argued that the District had failed to rebut MorphoTrust‟s evidence that its cards 

and production facility would fully satisfy the District‟s security needs at a better 

price. More particularly, MorphoTrust argued that it had presented evidence that 

there was “no consensus among the states on whether polycarbonate or another 

material are more secure or durable,” and it argued that certain features of a 

polycarbonate card, including laser-engraving (which the Agency Report made no 

 

27 The same list (again with no mention of fencing) appears in the summary 

attachment to Mr. Vora‟s Declaration, but there the list is identified as security 

“features [that] are currently in place at all DMV facilities,” not as ASIS security 

standards. The District did not attach any additional evidence of the DMV 

facilities‟ security features.
15

attempt to defend as a specification), “do not automatically make it a more secure 

card.”28 On the issue of the use of fencing to ensure security of an offeror‟s

production facility, MorphoTrust similarly argued that the fencing requirement was 

not compelled by any industry standards that the District purported to follow and 

that the District had not shown that its DMV facilities were protected by fencing, 

even as it had claimed that it needed the offeror‟s facility to be as secure as DMV 

facilities.

In response, the District moved for and received leave to file a Reply along 

with additional exhibits. The exhibits were submitted to buttress the District‟s 

selection of polycarbonate as the material from which an offeror must make 

 

28 For example, MorphoTrust argued that the fact that a polycarbonate card 

is non-delaminable was immaterial because efforts to separate the layers of a 

Teslin card would be “readily discernable,” making it equally tamper proof. 

MorphoTrust also proffered evidence that its Teslin cards were highly durable.

MorphoTrust further noted that Teslin cards had other security features that 

polycarbonate cards did not—among them, the ability to reproduce more life-like 

color photographs, which is not currently possible with laser engraving. On the 

subject of laser engraving, MorphoTrust, citing attached exhibits, argued that laser 

engraved ghost windows could be counterfeited and laser engraved clear tactile 

features were no better than dark tactile features (which need not be laser 

engraved).

Ultimately, MorphoTrust argued that what was important was “layering and 

integrating of a variety of security features on and within the ID card,” rather than 

“adherence to one or a few specific security factors.”
16

identification cards,29 but the District made no representation that anyone had 

consulted these documents or was aware of the information contained therein prior 

to the issuance of the RFP. The Reply, like the Agency Report, did not separately 

defend the four laser-engraved details and did not respond to MorphoTrust‟s 

challenge to the agency‟s fencing requirement.

In a brief order that was long on background facts and recitation of the 

parties‟ arguments, and short on analysis of the merits, the Board denied 

MorphoTrust‟s protest. It preliminarily accepted without question the District‟s 

assertion that it had undertaken three years of market research before selecting the 

specifications for the manufacture of the identification card. Then, without any 

acknowledgement of disputes of fact, much less any fact-finding, the Board 

“deferred” to the District‟s assessment that the challenged specifications reflected 

its minimum needs. The Board thus concluded that MorphoTrust had failed to 

 

29 These documents consisted of: another “white paper,” authored by Jan 

Kremer & Associates, a security consulting firm which MorphoTrust alleged had 

ties to Gemalto; a document indicating that the European Union had selected 

polycarbonate for its identification cards; and a 2010 Government Accountability 

Office report criticizing the State Department for declining to follow a 

recommendation to use polycarbonate as the base for its passport cards without 

first performing a full assessment of polycarbonate‟s benefits.
17

carry what the Board understood to be the challenger‟s “heavy burden” to show 

that the challenged specifications were “unreasonable.”

MorphoTrust unsuccessfully sought to overturn the Board‟s decision in the 

Superior Court of the District of Columbia, arguing that the Board had employed 

the wrong standard of review and substantive standard in evaluating its protest, that 

the Board‟s decision lacked substantial support in the agency record, and that the 

decision was clearly erroneous as a matter of law. This appeal followed.

III. This Court’s Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Before we identify our standard of review, we must first clarify our 

jurisdiction.30 This case comes to us from the Superior Court, where MorphoTrust 

sought review of the Board‟s decision denying its pre-award protest of the DMV‟s 

 

30

 Although neither party has raised a jurisdictional challenge, this court has 

an independent obligation to consider the source of our jurisdiction where it is 

subject to question. See Nunnally v. District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 80 

A.3d 1004, 1006 n.4 (D.C. 2013) (citing Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 203 

n.4 (D.C. 1994)).
18

RFP.31 We have jurisdiction to review a Superior Court order only so long as the 

Superior Court had jurisdiction to issue it.32

Nothing in the PPRA directed MorphoTrust to proceed first to Superior 

Court, but our cases interpreting the predecessor procurement statute and its 

regulations have required protesting parties to seek relief in the first instance in 

Superior Court. See, e.g., Abadie v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 

916 A.2d 913, 918 (D.C. 2007); Jones & Artis Const. Co. v. District of Columbia 

Contract Appeals Bd., 549 A.2d 315, 317-18 (D.C. 1988). Reviewing the 

predecessor statute in Jones & Artis, we concluded that protests were not 

“contested cases” within the meaning of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act 

(“DCAPA”) and therefore were properly routed through Superior Court before we 

could review them. See Jones & Artis, 549 A.2d at 317-18. Our analysis turned 

on both the absence of statutory language indicating that protest proceedings 

required a hearing,33 as well as the failure of the Board to adopt any “regulations 

 

31

 Indicating some confusion about the proper route for seeking appellate 

relief, MorphoTrust initially appealed directly to this court, but voluntarily 

dismissed its appeal upon “learning” that it was required to first make its case to 

Superior Court.

32

 Nunnally, 80 A.3d at 1006-10.

33 Although the predecessor statute did not require a hearing to resolve a 

protest, it designated the Board as a “hearing tribunal for . . . any protest of a 

(continued...)
19

whatsoever . . . that would suggest the Board might use a trial-type hearing to 

resolve a protest.” Id. at 317. We distinguished the absence of such provisions for 

“protests” from the provisions addressing contractor appeals, which provided for 

“hearings,” “oaths, discovery, and subpoena power.” See id.

In 2002, however, the Board enacted regulations that allow it to use a trialtype hearing to resolve a protest.

34

 Following the analysis of Jones & Artis, one

might conclude that bid protests litigated pursuant to these regulations are, in fact, 

“contested cases.” Nevertheless, this court has continued to hold that protests are 

not contested within the meaning of DCAPA. See Abadie, 916 A.2d at 918 (citing 

 

(...continued)

solicitation.” D.C. Code § 1-1189.8 (1988) (repealed 2010). The PPRA contains 

the same “protest of a solicitation” language. D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (a).

34

 See 27 DCMR § 311.1, -311.2 (permitting the Board to use an 

“evidentiary hearing,” including taking “testimony under oath” and “direct and 

cross-examination of witnesses,” to resolve “genuine issue[s] of material fact” that 

arise during a protest). At the same time, the Board promulgated regulations which 

“govern all proceedings in all cases,” including protests, see 27 DCMR § 100, and 

which envision trial-type proceedings. See, e.g., 27 DCMR § 110.7 (2002) 

(permitting the Board to order a hearing on a motion); 27 DCMR § 114 (2002)

(authorizing the presiding judge to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to appear 

at a hearing to testify); 27 DCMR § 112 (2002) (“Discovery”). These regulations 

additionally direct the parties to seek judicial review of the Board‟s decision on a 

protest in Superior Court. 27 DCMR § 312.2 (2002). We do not consider § 312.2 

dispositive of the jurisdictional question, however, because nothing in the PPRA 

authorizes the Office of Contracting and Procurement or the Board to override 

DCAPA‟s contested-case review in the event this court determines that protests are 

contested cases. 
20

Jones & Artis). See also Eagle Maint. Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Contract 

Appeals Bd., 893 A.2d 569, 572 n.1 (D.C. 2006). As we see no means of 

distinguishing this prior precedent,35 we conclude it was proper for MorphoTrust to 

petition the Superior Court for review before appealing to this court.

We review the “Superior Court‟s affirmance of the [Board‟s] decision in the 

same manner as if the ruling came to us directly from the agency.” Abadie, 916 

A.2d at 918 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, „it is the decision 

of the [Board] that this court reviews.‟” Id. at 918 (quoting Eagle Maint. Servs., 

893 A.2d at 572 n.1). In so doing, we accept the Board‟s decisions on questions of 

fact as “final and conclusive” unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or 

clearly erroneous.” D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (e).36 We review questions of law de 

novo, however, and our de novo review encompasses issues of statutory 

construction, on which “the judiciary is the final authority.” Abadie v. District of 

 

35 See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (no division of this 

court will overrule a prior decision of this court).

36

 Both the District and MorphoTrust cited D.C. Code § 2-360.07 (2012 

Repl.) to explain the standard of review this court should apply. By its terms, 

however, § 2-360.07 applies to appeals by contractors (i.e. persons who have 

already entered into a contract with the District, see D.C. Code § 2-351.04 (17)

(2012 Repl.)) who come directly to this court, pursuant to D.C. Code § 2-360.05 

(2012 Repl.) (“Appeal of Board Decisions”). Section 2-360.07 (2012 Repl.) has 

no application to pre-solicitation protests like this one, which are governed by § 2-

360.08 (“Protest procedures”).
21

Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 843 A.2d 738, 741 (D.C. 2004). See also Abadie, 

916 A.2d at 919; Eagle Maint. Servs., 893 A.2d at 576.37

IV. Analysis

MorphoTrust argues that the Board erred as a matter of law in reviewing its 

pre-award protest by deferring to the DMV‟s decisions in drafting the RFP and 

considering only whether the limiting specifications therein were “reasonably 

related” to the District‟s minimum needs. We agree that the Board appeared to 

misunderstand its role as defined by the PPRA and corresponding regulations, and 

thus failed to review MorphoTrust‟s protest with the requisite rigor.

 

37 This court‟s decision in Urban Development Solutions, LLC v. District of 

Columbia, 992 A.2d 1255, 1266-67 (D.C. 2010), does not compel more deferential 

review of the Board‟s actions, as the District argues. Urban Development 

Solutions did not present an issue of statutory construction. Instead, the central 

issue in the case was whether the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to 

substantiate its claims that the District had acted improperly in a bid selection 

process regarding surplus property (which is not overseen by the Board in any 

event, id. at 1259 n.3). Urban Development Solutions thus in no way undermines 

the proposition that, vis a vis all District agencies, this court is “presumed to have 

the greater expertise when an agency‟s decision rests on a question of law and . . . 

therefore remain[s] „the final authority on issues of statutory construction.‟” E.C.

v. RCM of Wash., Inc., 92 A.3d 305, 313 (D.C. 2014).
22

A. Clarifying the Board’s Function

We turn first to the standard of review that the Board is to employ in its 

analysis of pre-award protests. Relying exclusively on its own common law, i.e., a 

body of its own decisions dating back to the 1980s, the Board stated that it would 

“defer” to the agency‟s determination of its needs and of the best methods of 

accommodating them, and assess only whether challenged specifications were 

“reasonably related to achieving the government‟s actual minimum needs,” 

imposing on the protestor the “heavy burden” to prove otherwise. The Board‟s 

understanding of its standard of review as requiring broad deference in assessing

reasonableness cannot be reconciled with its unambiguous statutory and regulatory 

obligations vis a vis protests of a solicitation or an award of a contract. 

As discussed above, the PPRA identifies the promotion of competition as a 

central goal and confers upon the Board the ultimate authority and responsibility to 

“decide whether [a challenged] solicitation . . . was in accordance with the 

applicable law.”38 More to the point, the statute explicitly provides that the 

 

38 D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d).
23

Board‟s review “shall be de novo.”39 The corresponding regulations reiterate that 

“[t]he Board shall hear and decide, de novo, all cases under its jurisdiction.”40

In legal parlance, “de novo” means “anew,” and to conduct a “de novo

judicial review” means to conduct “a nondeferential review” of a preceding

decision.

41

 The PPRA‟s specification that the Board‟s review be “de novo” aligns 

perfectly with the PPRA‟s express directive that the Board‟s determinations are 

controlling and that “[a]ny prior determinations by administrative officials shall 

not be final or conclusive.”42 Looking beyond the provisions that plainly spell out 

the Board‟s review obligations, we note that the PPRA establishes the Board as an 

entity outside and independent of the agency, comprised of a select group of 

 

39 Id. See D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) (“The Board shall be the exclusive 

hearing tribunal for, and shall review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a 

solicitation.”); 27 DCMR § 101.7 (“The Board shall hear and decide, de novo, all 

cases under its jurisdiction.”). 

40 27 DCMR § 101.7.

41 BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (10th ed. 2010). By contrast, “deferential 

review” is defined as authorizing relief “only when [the] earlier proceeding 

entailed an unreasonable application of clearly established law or clearly 

unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. (defining “deferential review”).

42 D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d).
24

attorneys with expertise in procurement law.43 This institutional structure supports 

our conclusion that the Board exists to review agency decisions searchingly, not 

defer to them broadly unless they are deemed unreasonable.44

Unable to disregard the plain language of the PPRA and corresponding 

regulations, the District argues that the Board‟s “de novo” review relates only to its 

ability to receive “new” evidence and is still “consistent with according deference 

to” a procuring agency. But this interpretation of “de novo,” as broadly 

deferential, cannot be squared with the commonly understood definition of de novo

review discussed above. Nor are we persuaded by the District‟s argument that “de 

novo” must have special meaning in the procurement context because federal 

agencies like the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the General 

Services Agency Board of Contract Appeals (“GSBCA”) have employed a 

deferential standard of review. Where “District contracting practice parallels 

 

43

 Among other things, the PPRA heightened the qualifications for Board 

members. See D.C. Code § 360.02 (b); D.C. Council, Comm. on Gov‟t Operations 

& the Environ., Report on Bill 18-610 at 19 (Oct. 21, 2010).

44 The Board did state that it would “more closely scrutinize the agency‟s 

determination of its minimum needs,” if a protestor could “show that the 

specifications will result in a sole source award.” But not only do we fail to see 

any support in the PPRA for this more limited scrutiny, the concern of the PPRA 

and its corresponding regulations is plainly to maximize competition, not simply to 

ensure that there are at least two offerors.
25

federal government contract law,” this court has obtained guidance from “relevant 

decisions of federal tribunals with „particular expertise in this area.‟” Abadie, 916 

A.2d at 919 (quoting Dano Res. Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 620 A.2d 

1346, 1351 (D.C. 1993)). But regarding standards of review, the PPRA does not 

resemble the federal law under which the GAO operates, or the GSBCA used to 

operate, because the latter does not specify that the standard of review of agency 

decision-making is de novo.

45

 In light of these differences, we adhere to the plain 

language of our own law.

 

45

 The GAO applies a different statutory scheme when it evaluates whether 

the terms of an RFP comply with the law: The federal statute and regulations do 

not specify the standard of review that the GAO must use, and, in any event, unlike 

the decisions of the Board, the GAO‟s recommendations are not binding. See 31 

U.S.C. §§ 3552-54; 4 C.F.R. § 21.0 (2008); 4 C.F.R. § 21.9 (2005). See also 

Kingdomware Tech., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(“Although agencies often follow GAO recommendations in bid protest decisions 

. . . these recommendations are not binding on an agency.”).

Like the GAO, the GSBCA (which ceased to exist in 2007) operated under a 

distinct statutory scheme that did not define its standard of review as de novo. See

40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988). Although at one point in time the GSBCA described its 

standard of review as de novo, see e.g., Protest of Lanier Bus. Prods., GSBCA No. 

7702-P, 985 WL 6487 (Apr. 2, 1985), it later endorsed review merely for 

“reasonableness.” See, e.g., Protest of Computer Sciences Corp., GSBCA No. 

1497-P, 1991 WL 286233 (Dec. 30, 1991). Similarly, although the Federal Circuit 

referred to the GSBCA‟s standard of review as de novo in Grumman Data Sys. 

Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1994), it subsequently eschewed 

that standard and explained that the GSBCA‟s “task on review is to determine if an 

agency‟s procurement decision is grounded in reason. Once the Board determines 

that the agency‟s selection is so grounded, it then defers to the agency‟s decision.” 

Widnall v. B3H Corp., 75 F.3d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

(continued...)
26

Alternatively, the District argues that because the PPRA does not 

“unambiguously forbid” the Board from employing a deferential standard of 

review, this court should defer to the Board‟s “reasonable interpretation of the 

statute and rules it administers.” As our discussion has shown, however, the PPRA 

and its corresponding regulations do not countenance the essentially hands-off 

deference to “reasonable” RFP specifications that the District urges, but instead 

require the Board‟s careful scrutiny of those terms for conformity to the agency‟s

minimum procurement needs as shaped by the pro-competition bent of the statute. 

In accordance with the Supreme Court‟s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), before we afford some 

deference to an agency‟s interpretation of the statute that it administers at least two 

conditions must be met: (1) the statutory language in question must be ambiguous, 

and (2) the agency‟s interpretation must be reasonable. Id. at 842-43; Timus v. 

District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 758 (D.C. 1993) (en 

banc) (acknowledging the by now “familiar” two-part Chevron test and noting that 

 

(...continued)

The dissent relies heavily on GAO and GSBCA precedent to support its 

argument that the Board should “defer” to “reasonable” agency decision-making in 

procurement decisions, notwithstanding the “de novo” review directive of the 

PPRA; but the dissent seemingly fails to appreciate that the GAO‟s and GSBCA‟s 

standard of review could be constructed (and altered) by those entities and the 

courts in the absence of an express statutory directive defining the standard of 

review, such as the standard contained in the PPRA.
27

“[t]his court employs the same analysis”). In our view, neither prerequisite has 

been satisfied in this case.

46

 

46

 The dissent argues that it is “wholly unclear” what sort of review the 

Council of the District of Columbia intended the Board to exercise when it adopted 

a “de novo” review standard in the PPA and then reaffirmed that standard in the 

PPRA. Dissent at 45. But we see no reason to question the Council‟s 

understanding of this well-established term. “Where a legislature borrows terms of 

art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meanings of centuries of 

practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to 

each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” Dobyns v. 

United States, 30 A.3d 155, 159-60 (D.C. 2011) (quoting 1618 Twenty-First St.

Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C. 2003)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if we were to agree that there were some measure of ambiguity in the 

term “de novo” review, we see no foundation for re-interpreting that term to mean 

the opposite of its dictionary definition. The dissent asserts that such a foundation 

lies in the Council‟s Report on the PPRA. Dissent at 46-47. But there is no 

discussion of the Board‟s standard of review in the Council‟s Report, nor is there 

anything that can fairly be interpreted to call into question the Council‟s intent to 

reaffirm that the Board must review agency procurement decisions “de novo,” as 

that term is commonly understood. To the contrary, the Council Report notes at 

the outset that the impetus for the PPRA was the recognition that there were 

“significant flaws in the procurement system,” flaws that were attributable not to 

particular deficits in the law then in place, the PPA, but rather to problems with its 

“implementation.” D.C. Council, Comm. on Gov‟t Operations & the Environ., 

Report on Bill 18-610 at 3. The Council Report then elaborated that, according to 

a report by the 2006 Procurement and Contracting Reform Task Force,

[T]en years of experience under the PPA have shown that agencies are 

not cooperating [with the law] and do not make effective, efficient 

procurement a priority. The authors found that a substantial portion of 

[District procurements are] known to be in violation of procurement 

procedures, indicating a lack of controls to insure compliance with the 

procurement laws and regulations. The experts concluded that the 

problems were not with the procurement law, but rather with the 

application of rules and the culture of compliance: [T]here are no 

(continued...)
28

All of this is not to say that in exercising its review authority, the Board may 

give no recognition or weight to agency expertise reflected in an RFP‟s articulation 

of minimum needs. Bid solicitations may involve (to borrow Supreme Court 

language from another context) “factual dispute[s], the resolution of which 

implicates substantial agency expertise,” sometimes “a high level of technical 

expertise,” Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1989) (quoting 

in part Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)), and the Board need not 

turn a blind eye to such specialized knowledge embodied in particular RFP 

specifications. What remains indisputable, however, is the Board‟s obligation to 

conduct a searching and careful evaluation of both the process the agency has 

 

(...continued)

significant deficiencies in the District‟s procurement framework 

which would cause the procurement system, if its requirements were 

followed, to be dysfunctional. The critical problem . . . is the failure 

to establish a culture of compliance and enforcement of controls that 

insure compliance with the existing procurement regulation system.

Id. at 6-7 (internal quotations omitted). Among the recommendations made were 

“developing a more robust system of acquisition planning,” increasing accessibility 

of procurement rules and regulations, and developing a more professional, bettertrained workforce of procurement personnel. Id. at 7. See also id. at 8 (again 

noting the “failure to follow existing rules”); id. at 10 (discussing the need for 

more transparency and for “maintaining a written record of key decisions,” and 

“accessible protest procedures to challenge potential violations of the law.”). In 

light of these concerns and objectives, we are hardpressed to conclude that the 

Council intended “de novo review” to mean “deferential review.” Rather, one 

could readily infer that the Council retained the de novo review standard from the 

PPA because, as that standard of review is generally understood, it advanced the 

stated goal of better implementation of the District‟s procurement law.
29

followed in determining minimum needs and the evidence proffered to support its 

judgment of what its needs are.

Having clarified the Board‟s standard of review, we turn to the intimately 

connected issue of the substantive standard that the Board must employ when 

assessing a pre-solicitation protest of specifications within an RFP. To determine, 

as it must, if a District agency is following the law,47 the Board must examine 

whether the challenged specifications “state only the District‟s actual minimum 

needs”48 and whether any “restrictive provisions” are “necessary to satisfy the 

minimum needs of the District.”49 

We presume that an agency has the best understanding of what it requires in 

the way of goods and services. But to ensure that an agency does not develop 

tunnel vision or worse, the PPRA requires that an agency draft RFPs with an eye to 

maximizing competition. This means that if an agency wants to include a limiting 

specification in an RFP, the agency must be able to justify this specification as a 

minimum need. The agency may do so with the fruits of its pre-solicitation market 

 

47

 D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d).

48

 27 DCMR § 2500.4.

49 Id. at § 2500.3.
30

research. It is the Board‟s essential function to ensure that the agency has done its 

homework. Where a desired specification is highly restrictive or narrowly drawn, 

the agency‟s market research must reflect some acknowledgement and actual 

comparison of the qualities of competing products as well as some sort of costbenefit analysis. On the other hand, where a specification is set forth in more 

general terms, less detailed market research may be necessary to support its 

inclusion. There will be no formula for what level of record evidence is necessary 

to establish whether the RFP articulates the agency‟s minimum needs; but the 

Board‟s review in each case must reflect its duty to ensure that the RFP embodies 

the District‟s “actual minimum needs.”50 27 DCMR § 2500.4.

 

50

 The dissent expresses concern that this court is conferring on the Board 

policy-making authority to define an agency‟s minimum needs. Dissent at 55-56. 

But we merely hold that when agencies identify their minimum needs, they must 

be able to justify them before the Board. The dissent also asserts that we must 

distinguish between what it sees as the Board‟s obligation to “vigorously” enforce 

the “procedural protections” of the PPRA, such as the market research 

requirement, and the Board‟s obligation to defer to an agency‟s ultimate 

assessment, in an RFP, of its minimum needs. Dissent at 68. The dissent does not 

endeavor to explain how the Board vigorously enforced the market research 

requirement in this case. But in any event, if, as the dissent seemingly posits, the 

Board were constrained to defer to an agency that “reasonably” disregarded the 

results of such research, these procedural protections would have little force or 

effect. 
31

Here, the Board seemed to think that its obligation was only to undertake a 

free-floating “reasonableness” assessment of the challenged specifications, and that

MorphoTrust, as protestor, bore the “heavy burden of demonstrating by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the agency has impermissibly narrowed 

competition,” which, according to the Board “in other words” meant that the 

protestor had to show that the challenged restrictions were “unreasonable.” These 

observations are part and parcel of the Board‟s erroneous understanding of its 

review authority as broadly deferential to the agency. Indeed, just as there is 

nothing in the PPRA that authorizes such self-abnegatory deference to the agency 

in resolving a pre-solicitation protest of an RFP, the PPRA and its corresponding 

regulations nowhere direct the Board merely to confirm that a challenged 

specification is not unreasonable.51

 

51

 We also take issue with the Board‟s explanation of the weight of the 

protestor‟s burden. (Its allocation on the protestor, although not addressed in the 

statute, appears proper; it is the norm in litigation generally that a 

plaintiff/challenger bears the burden to prove her case, and MorphoTrust concedes 

in its Reply that it bore the burden to prove that the DMV violated the PPRA by 

including the challenged limiting specifications.) The Board in this case correctly 

acknowledged that the protestor‟s burden was proof “by a preponderance” of the 

evidence. 27 DCMR § 120.1 (defining the “burden of proof” in all Board 

proceedings, and stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the burden of 

persuasion by a party to establish a fact or facts in dispute shall be met by a 

preponderance of the evidence”). But such a burden is not “heavy.” See In re 

E.D.R., 772 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. 2001) (holding that preponderance of the 

evidence is merely that which “shows that the fact sought to be proved is more 

probable than not” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32

We stress that we are clarifying the Board‟s reviewing authority (and 

responsibility) in the early stages of the procurement, when the agency is best 

positioned to structure an impending procurement either to promote or stifle 

competition. Although the Board‟s standard of review is at every stage de novo, as 

a procurement moves forward, more agency discretion is built into the process. 

For example, once a bid has opened, the Board may accept agency judgments 

incorporated into the initial solicitation because challenges to the contents of a 

solicitation are prohibited after bid opening.

52

 Similarly, the fact that the Chief 

Procurement Officer (presumably with the input of the agency) may select the 

proposal that is “advantageous to the District” builds in some measure of 

discretion, particularly when technical expertise has come into play.

53

 But at the 

outset of the procurement process, when the District seeks goods by means of 

“competitive sealed proposals,” the Board must confirm, de novo, that challenged 

specifications reflect the District‟s minimum needs.

 

52

 See 27 DCMR § 302.2 (a) (2002)

53

 See D.C. Code § 2-354.03 (e), (g)(2); 27 DCMR § 1613.5 (2013) (“While 

the lowest price or lowest total cost . . . may be an important or even a deciding 

factor in most source selections, the District may select the source whose proposal 

is more advantageous to the District in terms of technical merit and other 

factors.”).
33

B. The Board’s Resolution of MorphoTrust’s Protest

Having thus clarified the Board‟s role and reviewing obligations, we 

conclude that the Board‟s resolution of MorphoTrust‟s protest was inadequate. 

1. Card Specifications 

We first examine the Board‟s assessment of the challenged card 

specifications: That the card be made of polycarbonate and, relatedly, that it have 

at least four specific laser-engraved features. The Board stated that “the District is 

allowed to determine at the outset which security card features will best meet its 

minimum needs” and that the District “may specify certain required specifications 

as long as they are reasonable.” As explained above, however, it was the Board‟s 

obligation to determine whether the challenged card specifications in fact reflected 

the District‟s minimum needs, even allowing for the specialized knowledge DMV 

may bring to bear on the issues.

The Board‟s first critical misstep was to conclude that the District had 

undertaken “the requisite market research to determine that this particular type of 

secure card” reflected the District‟s minimum needs. At least based on the 
34

information provided by the District, the Board had no foundation for this 

determination. The record reflects little more than that, prior to drafting the RFP at 

issue, the DMV gathered some product information, i.e., it took some action to 

educate itself about polycarbonate cards and laser engraving, but even the details 

of this effort were murky. References were made to conferences attended, contacts 

made with other jurisdictions, and “networking,” but zero detail was provided 

about what the DMV had learned. It is unclear when the DMV acquired the 

information about polycarbonate contained in the summary attachment, or when it 

came by the 2008 Gemalto marketing brochure or the Jan Kremer & Associates 

white paper, or whether it possessed any of this information when it drafted the 

RFP. But assuming it did, gathering product information is not the same thing as 

“market research.” Market research requires an assessment of the “entire available 

market.” See supra note 8 (citing 27 DCMR § 2599.1). In this case, one might 

reasonably expect market research to include materials from competitor producers 

of polycarbonate cards and non-polycarbonate cards, a survey of materials used by 

other states or government entities for their identification cards, a cost/benefit 

analysis of using different materials, or any other material that would support the 

conclusion that the DMV, selecting from a menu of known options, made an 

informed decision that it was necessary to manufacture the District‟s identification 

cards from polycarbonate as opposed to other materials.
35

Without true market research, the Board had no basis to evaluate, much less 

accept, the District‟s conclusory assertion (1) that polycarbonate cards with laser 

engraving are the “gold standard,” or (2) even assuming such cards enjoy specific 

features superior to other materials (e.g., nondelaminability or durability), that 

these features should be controlling when others might also meet the District‟s 

minimal needs.54 This was a problem, particularly where MorphoTrust argued 

(and presented evidence to support its argument) that its product was comparable 

in quality and more affordable. See supra note 28.55 It was the Board‟s job to 

evaluate the evidence presented by the parties, make findings to resolve the factual 

disputes raised, and, while giving due regard to the DMV‟s technical expertise,

ultimately to determine if MorphoTrust had proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that a laser-engraved polycarbonate card did not reflect the District‟s 

minimum needs. This court‟s function in this appeal, in turn, is not to prejudge the 

answer to that question. The defect we identify is the Board‟s failure to conduct 

 

54 In the agency report, the District repeatedly and conclusorily referred to 

the District‟s “singular security needs as the nation‟s capital,” a catchphrase it 

repeats on appeal. But the District never explained what those “singular” needs 

are, and it is far from obvious to this court why the District‟s security needs vis a 

vis driver‟s licenses and other non-driver identity cards are appreciably different 

from the needs of other states. On remand, the District will have to explain those 

security needs to the Board in a way it has not done so far.

55 Indeed, the District concedes in its brief to this court that, as to the 

justification for the specification of polycarbonate, there was “evidence supporting 

both sides” before the Board.
36

the necessary comprehensive evaluation of the RFP, one that it must rectify on 

remand.

2. Fencing

We likewise determine that the Board‟s review of the fencing requirement in 

the RFP was inadequate. The Board concluded that this requirement was 

“reasonable particularly because the manufacturing facilities will contain 

confidential information and the District may rationally require the same level of 

security at the proposed manufacturing facility as exists currently at its DMV 

facilities.” Once again, the question before the Board was not whether the DMV‟s 

decision was “rational,” or reasonable, but whether the decision to include a 

fencing requirement reflected a minimum need—i.e., whether there was no other 

equally effective methods to assure security. And once again, there were factual 

issues that the Board never considered or resolved. MorphoTrust challenged the 

assertions in the Agency Report that the DMV used fencing at all its facilities and

that industry standards required outdoor fencing. (Although the District filed a 

Reply with the Board, it never responded to MorphoTrust‟s arguments.) It was 

error for the Board simply to accept the District‟s unsubstantiated representations 

that fencing was a necessary security feature. Rather, it was the Board‟s job to 
37

evaluate the evidence proffered, require any testimony or additional documentary 

proof it deemed necessary, and determine whether DMV properly or improperly 

included fencing as a limiting specification in the RFP.

* * *

As detailed above, the Board did not fulfill its statutory and regulatory 

obligations (1) to review the challenged specifications in the DMV‟s RFP de novo, 

(2) to assess the market research and other materials proffered as evidence by the 

parties and resolve any disputes of fact, and (3) in this manner, to determine if the 

challenged specifications reflected the agency‟s minimum needs and thus were 

justified under the statute. We therefore reverse the order of the Superior Court, 

with orders to vacate the opinion of the Board and remand for proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.56

 

56

 If the Board in fact determines that the DMV did not draft the RFP in 

accordance with the statutory and regulatory requirements, the Board is authorized 

not merely to recommend that the DMV redraft the RFP, as MorphoTrust 

requested in its initial protest, but to order it to do so. See 27 DCMR § 314.1 (c), 

(d), (f) (setting forth the remedies that the Board may “order” a contracting agency 

to take following a successful protest, including “[i]ssu[ing] a new solicitation,” 

“[r]ecompet[ing] the contract,” and “[t]ak[ing] other such action . . . as the Board 

may direct”). See also D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (f) (permitting the Board to “order,” 

(continued...)
38

So ordered.

FARRELL, Senior Judge, concurring: I join Judge Easterly‟s opinion and, 

in particular, its interpretation of the Board‟s statutory “de novo” review obligation 

because, far from being unusual, that reading comports with the meaning of 

administrative review in analogous settings where the underlying statute provides 

“clear and specific directives” to govern agency action. Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971). Here, the PPRA and its 

implementing regulations clearly enjoin District agencies to formulate minimum 

procurement needs “in a manner designed to promote competition to the maximum 

extent possible.” 27 DCMR § 2500.2 (1988). The Board‟s review obligation, 

therefore, is “to conduct . . . a searching and careful evaluation of both the process 

the agency has followed in determining [its] minimum needs and the evidence 

proffered to support its judgment of what the needs are.” Ante at 28-29.

This level of scrutiny does not require, or even allow, the Board to disregard 

“subjective decisionmaking” by agency officials, post at 54 (dissenting opinion), 

that rests on technical or scientific expertise which the Board does not possess. 

 

(...continued)

“[i]n addition to other relief,” that a contract be terminated if a protest is 

sustained).
39

Specialized knowledge will underlie RFP specifications in many of the cases 

coming before the Board on bid protest, and the Board‟s review must inevitably 

give recognition, even deference, to minimum need requirements reflecting that 

kind of knowledge. But awareness of the superior vantagepoint of agencies on 

technical and specialized procurement matters does not license the inertia — “the 

essentially hands-off deference to „reasonable‟ RFP specifications,” ante at 26 —

that marks the Board‟s review in this case so far. In remanding for the Board “to 

conduct the necessary comprehensive evaluation of the RFP,” ante at 35-36, we do 

not prejudge the outcome, but give the Board‟s statutorily defined 

review function its natural meaning. 

BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judge, dissenting: While it may well be 

that the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) failed to conduct an adequate 

market survey in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Procurement 

Practices Reform Act of 2010 (“PPRA”)1to support the challenged “minimum 

needs” itemized in its solicitation for new driver‟s licenses, thereby warranting a 

remand, I cannot agree with the majority‟s legal analysis and proposed framework 

for the Contract Appeals Board‟s (“Board”) review of agency solicitations going 

 

1

See D.C. Code §§ 2-351.01 to -362.02 (2012 Repl.).
40

forward.2 The majority‟s opinion departs not only from the Council of the District 

of Columbia‟s (“D.C. Council” or “Council”) legislative intent, but also from the 

Board‟s own interpretation of its standard of review, and, as the majority readily 

concedes, from government procurement norms in the federal context.3 A full 

reading of the legislative history of the PPRA does not support such a rigid 

interpretation of “de novo” review. Rather, as explained more fully below, a 

“dual-inquiry,” whereby an agency is accorded deference to its discretionary 

decision-making, but where the Board reviews “anew” the agency‟s adherence to 

the procedural safeguards of the PPRA, is a more reasonable interpretation of “de 

novo” review in this administrative context. Such a “dual-inquiry” review is 

 

2

 Whether the DMV in this case complied with the procedural requirement 

to conduct adequate market research, and whether the Board vigorously enforced 

that and other procedural requirements, are issues that must be decided under the

appropriate legal framework. I do not answer these questions here; rather, I dissent 

from the proposed legal framework on which the majority relies to conclude that a 

remand in this case is necessary. Contra ante at 30 n.50. 

3

 See Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Widnall, 15 F.3d 1044, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 

1994) (“Government agencies are entrusted with a good deal of discretion in 

making procurement decisions . . . . Therefore, in reviewing procurement 

decisions, a board may not second guess an agency‟s procurement decision and/or 

substitute its own judgment for that of the government.”); Impresa Construzioni

Geom. Demenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“[C]ourts have recognized that contracting officers are entitled to exercise 

discretion upon a broad range of issues confronting them in the procurement 

process.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)) (“Impresa”).
41

“searching and careful,”4 and not toothless, and is consistent with how some 

courts have previously interpreted “de novo” review in similar administrative 

contexts. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 

Relying primarily upon Black‟s Law Dictionary, the majority adopts a 

rigidly literal interpretation of the Board‟s “de novo” review in the context of preaward bid protests under the PPRA. See D.C. Code §§ 2-360.03 (a), -360.08 (d); 

27 DCMR § 101.7. Such a rigid reading of “de novo” review, which authorizes 

the Board to reject specifications within a solicitation as not reflective of the 

agency‟s “actual minimum needs,” even if the agency presented a reasonable basis 

for their inclusion,5is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the statute. The 

 

4

 Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 

(1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), where the Supreme 

Court referenced the nature of its review as “searching and careful” in the context 

of explaining a deferential standard where “[t]he [reviewing body] is not 

empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”

5

 Although the majority attempts to blunt its definition of “de novo” review 

by later explaining that “this is not to say” that the Board may give no

“recognition” or “weight” to agency expertise reflected in its articulation of its own 

minimum needs, this “recognition” or “weight” is not equivalent to according 

legally-binding “deference” to an agency‟s decision-making. Ante at 28. The 

majority‟s opinion argues that the “Board‟s obligation [is] to determine whether 

the challenged card specifications in fact reflected the District‟s minimum needs,” 

regardless of whether the challenged specifications were reasonable. Id. at 33 

(emphasis added). In contrast, according “deference” to the agency requires that 

the Board, upon conducting a “searching and careful” review, must affirm the 

(continued...)
42

D.C. Council recognized in adopting the PPRA that agencies have subjective 

discretion in making procurement decisions. Further, one of the fundamental goals 

the Council had in revising the District‟s procurement statute was to promote 

increased efficiency, along with maximizing competition, in the procurement 

process. See D.C. Council, Report on Bill 18-610, the “Procurement Practices 

Reform Act of 2010” at 5 (Oct. 21, 2010) (stating that in order for procurement 

officials to make the most strategic purchasing decisions, procurement rules must 

remain flexible). For these reasons, and others, I disagree with the majority that 

“de novo” review in this context should be so narrowly and rigidly construed. An 

alternative interpretation of the “de novo” review language in the PPRA, 

recognizing the nature of the dual-inquiry that the Board must undertake, is more 

 

(...continued)

agency‟s determinations of its own “minimum needs,” so long as there is a rational 

or reasonable basis for their inclusion, and so long as the agency complies with the 

procedural requirements and safeguards in the Act. See, e.g., Advanced Data 

Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that 

the court must sustain an agency action unless the action does not “evince[] 

rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors”). For this reason, merely

giving “recognition” or “weight” to the agency‟s expertise and discretion in 

interpreting “de novo” review amounts to a nondeferential standard of review. 

The majority also asserts that while the Board‟s review “is at every stage de 

novo, as a procurement moves forward, more agency discretion is built into the 

process.” Ante at 32. This assertion seemingly contradicts the majority‟s 

interpretation of “de novo” review, and lends support to a dual-inquiry approach, 

and a less rigid interpretation of the “de novo” review standard in the context of the 

procurement process.
43

reasonable, based on a holistic, full reading of the legislative purposes of the 

District‟s procurement statute.

I. Standard of Review

To begin, there is no dispute that the issue in this case is the appropriate 

interpretation of the term “de novo” as it pertains to the Board‟s review of agency 

procurement decisions under the PPRA and associated regulations. See D.C. Code 

§§ 2-360.03 (a), -360.08 (d); 27 DCMR § 101.7. However, I must disagree with 

the majority‟s conclusion that the Board‟s review must be nondeferential, and I 

further disagree with the majority‟s presumption that a rigidly literal interpretation 

of “de novo” review is the only way to accomplish the PPRA‟s “pro-competition 

bent.” Given the importance of the Board‟s standard of review in effectuating the 

legislative intent of the PPRA, I believe our analysis must necessarily go further.

Although it is well-established that this court will look first to the “plain 

meaning” of a statute in determining whether the language is “clear and 

unambiguous,” we have likewise cautioned that we “must not make a fetish out of 

plain meaning nor should [we] make a fortress of the dictionary.” District of 
44

Columbia v. Place, 892 A.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C. 2006) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, we “may refuse to adhere strictly to the plain 

language of a statute in order to effectuate the legislative purpose as determined by 

a reading of the legislative history or by an examination of the statute as a whole.” 

Id. (quoting Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 

(D.C. 1983) (en banc)). Consequently, as this court has previously cautioned, 

“even where words of a statute have a „superficial clarity,‟ a review of the 

legislative history or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that 

could be ascribed to statutory language may reveal ambiguities that the court must 

resolve.” Peoples Drug Stores, supra, 470 A.2d at 754 (emphasis added). A 

review of the PPRA as a whole, along with its legislative history, reveals several 

concerns with maintaining a rigid, dictionary definition of “de novo” review in the 

context of bid protests that the majority has failed to address or consider.

II. The PPRA and its Legislative History

To clarify, the present statutory language describing the Board‟s standard of 

review as “de novo” originated in the PPRA‟s predecessor, the District of 

Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985 (“1985 Act”), and was not new 

language added to the revised PPRA to support — what the majority characterizes 
45

as — its inherently “pro-competition” bent. Specifically, the 1985 Act established 

the current Board and stated that, under Section 903 (Jurisdiction of the Board), 

“[t]he Board shall be the exclusive hearing tribunal for, and shall have jurisdiction 

to review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a solicitation or award[,]” 

and, under Section 908 (Protest of solicitations or awards to the Board), “the Board 

shall promptly decide whether the solicitation or award was in accordance with the 

applicable law, regulations, and terms and conditions of the solicitation. The 

proceeding shall be de novo.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 6-191, “District of 

Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1985” at 56, 60 (Oct. 10 1985). These two 

sections of the 1985 Act track almost verbatim with the current statutory language 

found in D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) and D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d), respectively, and 

which forms the basis for the majority‟s holding.6 Rather than the “de novo” 

review language being inextricably linked to the statutory goal of promoting 

competition, as the majority contends, it is wholly unclear from reading the nearly 

thirty-year old statutory provisions just what extent of “de novo” review authority 

 

6

 See D.C. Code § 2-360.03 (a) (“The Board shall be the exclusive hearing 

tribunal for, and shall review and determine de novo . . . [a]ny protest of a 

solicitation . . . .”); D.C. Code § 2-360.08 (d) (“[T]he Board shall decide whether 

the solicitation . . . was in accordance with the applicable law, rules, and terms and 

conditions of the solicitation. The proceeding shall be de novo . . . .”); see also 27 

DCMR § 101.7 (“The Board shall hear and decide, de novo, all cases under its 

jurisdiction.”).
46

the legislature actually intended the Board to have in reviewing bid protests.7 In 

fact, nowhere in the 1985 Act legislative report does the D.C. Council explain its 

“de novo” word choice. Rather, on the issue of establishing the Board, the Council 

observed that the Board‟s predecessor was “established by executive order, and the 

functions for the Board as provided in the bill are similar to the current functions 

and authority of the [predecessor] Board . . .” Id. at 5.

The current PPRA was proposed in 2010 as a direct response to significant 

flaws identified in the District‟s procurement system.8 See Report on Bill 18-610, 

supra, at 3. Although one of the systematic flaws recognized was the need for 

improved fairness and “accountability and oversight,” as indicated by the majority, 

the D.C. Council also identified a second, equally fundamental interest: the need 

 

7

 Nor am I persuaded by the majority‟s argument that the Council must have 

inherently understood the meaning of the “well-established” term “de novo,” 

apparently meaning nondeferential review, when it adopted the language in the 

1985 Act. Ante at 27 n.46. This is because “de novo” has been interpreted 

differently by courts in the past, especially in the context of reviewing agency 

decisions. See infra at 60.

8

 Areas requiring improvement that the PPRA intended to address included, 

among others: (1) developing a professional acquisition workforce; (2) enhancing 

transparency through an open and transparent process; (3) uniformity of 

procurement policies; and (4) source selection integrity. See Report on Bill 18-

610, supra, at 8-23. These specific areas of improvement were intended to support 

the twin fundamental goals of the PPRA: fairness and efficiency. Id. at 5. 
47

to improve government efficiency in the procurement process. Id. at 4.9 The 

Council noted that “fairness and efficiency are not inherently opposing interests,” 

but conceded that “an ever-increasing number of procedural steps to ensure 

fairness imposes limits on the push towards greater efficiency . . .” Id. at 5. 

Accordingly, the Council sought to balance, in the PPRA, increased procedural 

steps to guarantee a “fair” procurement process with “flexible” procurement rules 

that “allow procurement officials to make the most strategic purchasing decisions

— i.e., those that are in the best interest of the government as a purchaser[,]” 

recognizing that “[d]ifferent goods and services require different procurement 

structures, methods, and timeframes.” Id. (emphasis added). The Council further 

acknowledged and, in fact, endorsed the notion that “most procurement decisions 

involve a significant degree of subjective decision-making, either in the description 

of goods or services needed, the nature of a contract vehicle to be used, or the 

weight given to various ranking criteria.” Id. (emphasis added). The Council 

explained that “[t]he need for subjective decision-making should not be cause for 

concern [as] [i]ndependent decision making is part of all procurements and a 

 

9

 Specifically, the Council stated that: “The ability to procure goods and 

services in a timely and cost-efficient manner ensures that organizations have the 

resources they need to fulfill their institutional missions. Delays impede 

performance and often lead to increased costs, limiting the ability of an 

organization to achieve its mission.” Id. at 4. 
48

fundamental tenet of the most successful procurement organizations[,]” referring to 

the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the federal procurement 

system. Id. at 5 n.2 (emphasis added).

In fact, in revising the District‟s procurement law, the D.C. Council looked 

to the findings of the GAO on the District‟s procurement system, see id. at 7, an 

agency whose expertise the majority perfunctorily discarded as irrelevant to 

construing the District‟s statute.10 The Council further endorsed the GAO‟s 

statement that “one of the fundamental challenges to the federal procurement 

system” is that “[g]overnment contracting officials [are] confronted with numerous 

mandates that left little room for the exercise of sound business judgment, 

initiative, and creativity in satisfying the needs of their agency customers.” Id. at 5 

n.2 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Council concluded that “[a] good 

procurement system will rely on well-qualified decision-makers and empowers 

those individuals to make strategic buying decisions.” Id. (emphasis added). In 

this regard, the majority‟s rigidly literal interpretation of “de novo” review 

 

10

 Given that the Council looked to the GAO‟s findings on the shortcomings 

within the District‟s then-existing procurement statute, the majority perhaps too 

hastily brushed aside the District‟s attempt to argue for an alternative reading of 

“de novo,” based on the standard of review adopted by the GAO and the former 

General Services Agency Board of Contract Appeals (“GSBCA”), by asserting 

simply that the federal frameworks were inapplicable.
49

eliminates deferential consideration of the discretionary decisions that agency 

officials have the expertise and authority to make. Further, the majority decision 

ignores the reality that most procurement actions involve some discretionary and 

subjective decision-making, which is within the purview and responsibility of 

agency officials.11

Illustrating the D.C. Council‟s goal in seeking to improve procurement 

efficiency through recognition of agency discretion, the PPRA legislative report 

actually recommended that the D.C. Council, which then may have been the only 

“state-level legislature authorized to routinely disapprove contracts[,]” limit its 

own power to review and reject contracts, because, while such a review clearly 

increases oversight over the agencies, it “place[d] an increased burden on the 

[District agencies] by adding a potentially lengthy step to the procurement 

process.” Id. at 20.

 

11

 The majority contends that the statutory language “[a]ny prior 

determinations by administrative officials shall not be final or conclusive,” D.C. 

Code § 2-360.08 (d), supports a rigid definition of “de novo” review by the Board. 

Ante at 23. However, this statutory language is not in conflict with according 

deference to the agency‟s determination of its minimum needs because the Board 

clearly retains the authority to reject an agency‟s “minimum needs” if there is no 

rational basis for their inclusion. See infra at 66-67.
50

Thus, in addition to the “central purposes” of the PPRA identified by the 

majority,12 there are also competing “central purposes” within the PPRA intended 

to “maximize efficiency.” For example: (1) “promot[ing] efficiency and 

eliminat[ing] duplication in the District government procurement organization and 

operation to reduce costs;”13 (2) “provid[ing] increased economy in procurement 

activities and maximiz[ing], to the fullest extent practicable, the purchasing power 

of the District government;”14 and (3) “provid[ing] for timely, effective, and 

efficient service to District agencies and individuals doing business with the 

District government[.]”15

 

12

 Including: (1) “foster[ing] effective and equitably broad-based 

competition in the District[,]” D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (b)(2), (2) “obtain[ing] full 

and open competition by providing that contractors are given adequate 

opportunities to bid[,]” id. at (3), (3) “increase[ing] public confidence in the 

procedures followed in public procurement[,]” id. at (5), and (4) specifying 

procurement needs “in a manner designed to promote competition to the maximum 

extent possible[,]” 27 DCMR § 2500.3.

13

 D.C. Code § 2-351.01 (b)(6).

14

 Id. at (7).

15

 Id. at (9).
51

III. Discussion

Based on the legislative history of the PPRA, the majority‟s rigid 

interpretation of “de novo” review is in conflict with a holistic reading of the full

legislative intent of the PPRA for two reasons.

A. The Agency’s Right to Make “Subjective” Procurement Decisions

First, an interpretation of “de novo” review that rejects according deference 

to the agency‟s discretionary procurement decisions made within its expertise is 

incongruent with the D.C. Council‟s recognition that “most procurement decisions 

involve a significant degree of subjective decision-making,” and the Council‟s 

further endorsement that “[i]ndependent decision making” by a procuring agency 

is a “fundamental tenet of the most successful procurement organizations.” Report 

on Bill 18-610, supra, at 5 & n.2. This is consistent with federal procurement case 

law, which recognizes that “[c]ontracting officers are entitled to exercise discretion 

upon a broad range of issues confronting them in the procurement process . . . 

[and] [f]or that reason, procurement decisions invoke highly deferential rational 

basis review.” Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 595 F.3d at 1282, 1286 
52

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations, internal quotation marks, and original brackets 

omitted). 

Given the D.C. Council‟s expressed legislative intent in enacting the PPRA, 

we must do a more probing analysis, which goes beyond Black‟s Law Dictionary, 

and examine whether conferring a nondeferential review to the Board is 

functionally appropriate in the context of bid protests. In doing so, it is helpful to 

consider, fundamentally, the types of issues typically reviewed under a “de novo” 

versus an “abuse of discretion” standard.16 

By way of analogy, in the criminal context, we review sufficiency of the 

evidence challenges “de novo” because the evidence “objectively speaking” lends 

itself to a specific result. The evidence is enough to convict or it is not; there is no 

 

16

 This court‟s cases regarding government immunity also provide us with 

some guidance. In Casco Marina Dev., L.L.C. v. District of Columbia 

Redevelopment Land Agency, 834 A.2d 77, 81 (D.C. 2003) (“Casco Marina”), we 

explained why government officials‟ discretionary actions were conferred 

immunity, whereas “ministerial” actions by government officials were not. We 

defined “discretionary acts” as involving the formulation of “policy;” choices that 

require “personal deliberation, decision, and judgment,” amongst many 

alternatives. See id. at 81 & n.7. In contrast, ministerial actions, as explained by 

the Supreme Court in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988), are 

those where a statute or regulation “specifically prescribes a course of action for an 

employee to follow.” 
53

room for discretion on the legal question of whether the evidence was enough to 

convict the individual of the charged offense.17 On the other hand, admissibility of 

evidence determinations are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 

because we acknowledge and respect the discretionary aspect of assessing whether 

something is more probative than prejudicial under the circumstances of each case, 

and we allow the trial court the flexibility to make that choice, within certain 

parameters. Likewise in the civil context, we review motions to dismiss and 

motions for summary judgment “de novo” because the party has either pleaded all 

of the elements of the claim or raised an issue of material fact, or has not; there is 

no in-between.18

 

17

 Of note, even within the sufficiency of the evidence context, it is wellestablished that we “defer” to the trial court‟s factual findings. See, e.g., Lewis v. 

United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C. 2001) (“Deference must be given to the 

factfinder‟s duty to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable 

inferences of fact.” (emphasis added)). 

18

 In fact, this concept of deference being accorded to discretionary acts was 

explained and clarified by this court over thirty-years ago, where we expounded 

that “[d]iscretion signifies choice.[,]” and that “[t]he concept of „exercise of 

discretion‟ [therefore] is a review-restraining one.” Johnson v. United States, 398 

A.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. 1979). We explained that a review of discretionary 

decisions must be “supervisory in nature and deferential in attitude.” Id. (emphasis 

added). 
54

Simply put, the flaw in the majority‟s interpretation of “de novo” review in 

this context is that it permits the Board to attempt to “objectively” determine the 

“actual minimum needs” of the DMV‟s solicitation for new driver‟s licenses. The 

underlying assumption is that there is only one correct answer as to what 

constitutes an agency‟s “actual minimum needs” for any given solicitation. Yet, in 

reality, the agency must utilize its expertise and discretion, and make policy 

determinations in identifying and developing its “minimum needs.” The legislative 

history of the PPRA recognizes that agencies have subjective decision-making 

authority over procurement matters. See Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 5.

Moreover, the D.C. Council‟s characterization of an agency‟s procurement 

decisions as “discretionary” in nature is reasonable. The agency — not the Board 

— has the expertise and the subjective decision-making authority on behalf of the 

District government to determine, within reason, the District‟s “minimum needs” 

for any given procurement solicitation. Thus, it is not for the Board to second 

guess such determinations unless the agency‟s decision was lacking in rationale.19 

See Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc., supra, 595 F.3d at 1286. For essentially the same 

 

19

 Of course, the agency must adhere to the procedural procurement 

guidelines as outlined by the PPRA, such as conducting adequate market research. 

See 17 DCMR § 2500.2.
55

reason, “competitors do not dictate an agency‟s minimum needs, the agency does 

. . . . And determining an agency‟s minimum needs is a matter within the broad 

discretion of agency officials . . . .” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Under the majority‟s proposed legal framework, will the Board be allowed 

to reject an agency‟s procurement specification for a new asphalt road because the 

Board determines that asphalt is not an “actual minimum need” when a brick road 

would do just as well? Or, could the Board reverse a solicitation embodying the 

District‟s policy preference to power District government buildings via solar 

panels because the Board determines it is not a “minimum need” when clean coal 

would do just as well? 

In the case at hand, putting aside for the moment the sufficiency of the 

market research study conducted by the DMV in this case, had the DMV 

determined, following required procurement procedures, that it “preferred” to 

move the District toward polycarbonate cards, is the Board free to discard the 

DMV‟s requirement as unnecessary and not an “actual” minimum need? Does the 

majority‟s opinion mean that the DMV cannot make a policy choice regarding 
56

driver‟s licenses? This result seems to run counter to one of the essential policy 

making functions of the government.20 Cf. Casco Marina, supra note 16, 834 A.2d 

at 81 (conferring immunity onto government actions exhibiting a discretionary 

function because it is a matter of making a policy choice). 

B. The PPRA was Intended to Promote Competition AND Increase 

Efficiency in the District of Columbia’s Procurement Process 

Second, the majority‟s interpretation of “de novo” review undercuts one of 

the PPRA‟s “central” goals of increasing efficiency in the procurement process. 

The legislative history underscores this point by noting that the D.C. Council 

 

20

 The majority attempts to downplay the impact of its holding by stating 

that it “merely” intends to hold that “when agencies identify their minimum needs, 

they must be able to justify them before the Board.” Ante at 30 n.50. Yet, the 

opinion later seemingly contradicts this statement by explaining that “the question 

before the Board was not whether the DMV‟s decision was „rational,‟ or 

reasonable, but whether the decision . . . reflected a minimum need — i.e., whether 

there was no other equally effective methods . . . .” See id. at 36 (emphasis added). 

Consequently, it is evident that the majority‟s opinion requires the agency to do 

more than “merely” “justify” its minimum needs to the Board. Instead, the 

majority imposes on the agency the burden of presenting definitive evidence that 

there were no equally effective alternatives. However, there are many instances 

where there may be multiple options, none of which are inherently superior to the 

other. Accordingly, when an agency decides to choose one of those options as a 

“minimum need,” and presents a reasonable basis for its inclusion, such as, for 

example, the desire to utilize solar energy over coal or gas, the agency is 

essentially making a policy decision for the District of Columbia, which is not for 

the Board to second guess. Cf. Casco Marina, supra note 16, 834 A.2d at 81.
57

sought to remove or limit its own authority to review certain contracts due to the 

hindrance on efficiency. See Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 20-21. As the 

majority notes, the GSBCA had a “de novo”-like standard of review, see ante at 25 

n.45, (although the GSBCA still accorded some deference to the agency), but this 

standard was modified into a more explicit deferential standard by 1996, the year 

the GSCBA‟s authority was terminated. See Nat’l Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (Feb. 1996). What the majority does not 

note, however, is that, in large part, the reason for this change in review standard 

was because the GSBCA‟s “de novo”-like review caused higher instances of 

excessive litigation and sustain rates than the GAO,21 and that this contributed 

greatly to Congress‟s decision to revoke the GSBCA‟s jurisdiction. See Keyes, 

supra note 21, at 754 n.2; Jonathan R. Cantor, Note, Bid Protests and Procurement 

Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 171 

(1997) (“The . . . Committee‟s . . . proposal, to eliminate the GSBCA‟s de novo 

review, contributed to Congress‟s decision to revoke the GSBCA‟s bid protest 

jurisdiction . . . .”). The majority‟s adoption of an even more rigid standard of 

 

21

 According to Government Contracts by W. Noel Keyes, historically, 

protest sustain rates were fifteen-percent higher for cases going before the GSBCA 

than the GAO because of the GSBCA‟s “de novo” standard of review. W. Noel 

Keyes, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 753 (3d ed. 2003). This “de novo” standard also 

contributed to an “unacceptable” forty five-percent protest rate in all information 

technology procurements over $25 million. Id. at 754 n.2. 
58

review than the GSBCA undercuts the D.C. Council‟s intent to promote efficiency 

within the procurement process.

Although the D.C. Council, in enacting the PPRA, found fault with many 

issues pertaining to the District‟s previous procurement statute, concern about the 

strength of the Board‟s reviewing power was not one of them. In the PPRA 

legislative report, the D.C. Council conducted a systematic assessment of the 

weaknesses within the 1985 procurement act. When it came to the Board, 

however, the D.C. Council explicitly stated that it believed “the current protest 

procedures in the PPA [i.e., 1985 Act] are sufficient to handle cases deemed 

frivolous.” Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 19. In fact, reading the report, it 

appears that the D.C. Council‟s main concern with the Board was not that its 

review lacked bite, as the majority has opined, but rather the complete opposite —

the D.C. Council sought to place more measures in place to restrict vendors from 

bringing forth “frivolous” claims that would hamper the procurement process. 

Id.22 

 

22

 In fact, a bill was introduced to require vendors wishing to challenge a 

contract determination before the Board to place a “protest bond” equivalent to 

five-percent of the protested contract‟s value. See Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 

19. Such a bond would then be forfeited if the protest was deemed to be found 

without merit. Id. This proposal failed, however, because the Board‟s Chief 

(continued...)
59

This legislative history rebuts the majority‟s assertion that the PPRA 

intended for the Board to have a rigid and wholly nondeferential standard of 

review, and that the Board‟s current review practices, which give deference to 

agencies are erroneous. Instead, the D.C. Council explicitly stated that it found the 

current protest procedures (and therefore the Board‟s interpretation of its own 

standard of review, which gives deference to the agency) to be adequate, and that 

— if anything — the D.C. Council sought to prevent more vendors from 

challenging agency solicitations. The majority‟s holding, which overrides the 

Board‟s interpretation of its own standard of review and instead requires it to 

review agency solicitations without conferring deference to the agency, contradicts 

the Council‟s expressed intent and hinders the goal of preventing vendors from 

bringing “frivolous” protests.23

 

(...continued)

Administrative Judge indicated that it had “not ruled a large number of cases to be 

frivolous and thus saw the provision as unnecessary.” Id.

23

 During the public hearing on the PPRA, some Council members 

“questioned the necessity of the Contract Appeals Board” because “a [B]oard is 

unusual and that in most states[,] protests are adjudicated by the procurement 

office.” Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 32. Again, this contradicts the majority‟s 

conclusion that the so-called “plain meaning” of the PPRA‟s “de novo” language 

denoted that the Act intended to grant the Board more review authority over

agency procurement decisions. 
60

C. Historical Acceptance of an Alternative Interpretation of “De Novo”

Review

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that we should read the statute as if the 

words “de novo” do not exist. “Each provision of the statute should be given 

effect, so as not to read any language out of a statute whenever a reasonable 

interpretation is available that can give meaning to each word in the statute.” 

Providence Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 855 A.2d 1108, 

1114 (D.C. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). What I am 

suggesting, however, is an alternative interpretation of “de novo” review, which 

gives effect to the statutory purpose by deferring to an agency‟s exercise of its 

discretion while ensuring that procedural safeguards are enforced, is reasonable 

here. Federal courts have interpreted federal administrative statutes requiring “de 

novo” review, or an equivalent type of review, to require a reviewing body to give 

deference to an agency‟s reasonable discretionary decision, while requiring 

adherence to procedural safeguards.

In Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. 

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the 

appropriate standard for reviewing challenges arising under The Education of the 

Handicapped Act (“Education Act” or “Act”), then-20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 
61

ed. and Supp. IV). The Act provided federal assistance for educating children with 

disabilities, and required state education boards receiving assistance to craft an 

“individualized educational program” (“IEP”) for each disabled child, consisting of 

programming and teaching goals specific to the unique characteristics of the child. 

Id. at 181-82. Complaints pertaining to an IEP must be filed with the state‟s 

educational agency but can be appealed to any state or federal court, whereby the 

reviewing court shall, pursuant to the Act, “receive the record of the state 

administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, 

and basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such 

relief as the court determines is appropriate.” Id. at 183, 204-05 (citation, internal 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). On petition for writ of certiorari, the 

Supreme Court concluded that the statutory language, although not specified as a 

“de novo” review, nonetheless was more in line with the de novo standard. Id. at 

205-06. However, the Court explained that this was, by “no means[,] an invitation 

to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those 

of the school authorities which they review.” Id. at 206. Rather, given the 

“elaborate and highly specific” procedural safeguards of the Act, id. at 205, the 

Court reasoned that “the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the 

procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress 

wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.” Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
62

Subsequently, some federal courts have characterized this review articulated 

by the Supreme Court as a “modified de novo” standard, see Karawia v. United 

States Dep’t of Labor, 627 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), whereby the 

review, while “de novo, [] is tinged with a significant degree of deference to the 

state educational agency, as [the courts] are essentially acting in an administrative 

law-style capacity.” Id. In practice, this “modified de novo” standard means that 

the reviewing court shall assess two questions: “(1) whether the state complied 

with the procedural requirements of the [Act], and (2) whether the challenged IEP 

was „reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.‟” P. 

Ex. Rel. Mr. & Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d. Cir. 

2008) (emphasis added); see also Rawley, supra, 458 U.S. at 206-07. The first 

question is an objective one pertaining to procedural safeguards (much like a 

“ministerial act” in the context of government immunity, see supra note 16), and 

therefore obviously can be reviewed “de novo” by a reviewing tribunal. See, e.g.,

Rawley, supra, 458 U.S. at 206 n.27. However, the second question — e.g., 

whether the state board “reasonably calculated” the IEP to enable the child to be 

educated in “the least restrictive environment” — is essentially a fact-specific, and 

therefore deferential, inquiry. P. Ex. Rel. Mr. & Mrs. P., supra, 546 F.3d at 119-

20. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court held, “once a court determines that the 

requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution 
63

by the States.” Rawley, supra, 458 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added). This approach is 

essentially consistent with the District of Columbia‟s Contract Appeals Board‟s 

current approach, as specified in Protest of Koba Associates, Inc. DCCAB No. P325-A (Mar. 12, 1993), where the Board characterized its own standard of review 

as the following:

[I]n applying the de novo standard of review, [the Board] 

do[es] not presume that the agency‟s actions were 

correct. . . the substantive standards which [the Board] 

will apply are that [it] will not take issue with an 

agency‟s narrowing of competition in pursuit of 

legitimate agency needs, but . . . will overturn those 

requirements that improperly limit competition. . . . Of 

course, [the Board] will accord deference to the agency‟s 

technical judgment but will not slavishly follow it where 

the result is lacking in justification.

Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

The second example is even more analogous, even though it is in the postcontract award stage, pertaining to the Contract Dispute Act (“CDA”) of the 

federal government. In Todd Construction, L.P. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 235 

(2009), the Court of Federal Claims was asked to interpret the then-CDA 

provision, 41 U.S.C. § 609 (a)(3) (1994 Supp.), regarding the appropriate judicial 

review of challenged performance evaluations of vendors who have a contract with 

the United States government. Id. at 245. Section 609 (a)(3) explicitly stated that 

the court was to review such evaluations “de novo.” However, the Federal Claims 
64

court did not read the language so literally and instead created two distinct sets of 

requirements. Id. at 246. The court explained that:

One [set of inquiries related to performance evaluations] 

is strictly procedural: there are a number of acts that are 

not within the discretion of the contracting officer. She 

must prepare an evaluation, using a particular form, at a 

particular time. Where an unsatisfactory evaluation is 

contemplated, she must confer with the contractor, send a 

notice of intent to issue an unsatisfactory interim rating, 

allow written comments by the contractor, include them 

in the report, et cetera. The Court is fully capable of 

reviewing whether these requirements were satisfied or 

not on a de novo basis. The Court possesses the capacity 

to determine whether a conference was held or whether a 

notice of intent to issue an unsatisfactory rating was sent 

in a timely fashion.

But the second issue is a different matter. The 

regulations contemplate that the contracting officer and 

the reviewing officer will produce a performance 

evaluation that is “accurate” and “fair.” That is, although 

the issuance of a performance evaluation that is “accurate 

and fair” can be expected “as a matter of right” by the 

contractor, the determination of the proper rating (i.e.,

what is “accurate and fair”) is a matter for the agency to 

decide within broad parameters. 

The choice of a particular rating to assign is necessarily 

subjective and is within the sole purview of the 

Government. Thus, the production of an accurate and 

fair performance evaluation rating requires the exercise 

of the contracting officer‟s judgment[.]

Id. at 246-47 (italics in original). 
65

These two examples of an alternative interpretation of “de novo” review 

within the context of administrative statutes are consistent with a holistic reading 

of the full legislative intent underlying the PPRA.24 See Report on Bill 18-610, 

supra, at 5. Accordingly, the PPRA‟s “de novo” review should be interpreted as 

requiring a “dual-inquiry,” balancing the need for maximizing competition and 

fairness and transparency, with efficiency and the due recognition that government 

agencies are qualified, authorized, and required to make certain discretionary and 

subjective choices in the context of procurement decisions. 

 

24

 In fact, this “dual-inquiry” is also present in the federal bid protest 

context notwithstanding that, as the majority notes, there is no statutorily 

established “de novo” review. As the Federal Circuit explained, “a bid award may 

be set aside if either: (1) the procurement official‟s decision lacked a rational 

basis; or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or 

procedure.” Impresa, supra note 3, 238 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added). 

“Accordingly, [in analyzing the first question] the test for reviewing courts is to 

determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable 

explanation of its exercise of discretion . . . and the disappointed bidder bears a 

heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Id. at 

1332-33 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “When a challenge is 

brought on the second ground, [however,] the disappointed bidder must show a 

clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Id. at 1333 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
66

IV. The “Dual-Inquiry” Interpretation of “De Novo” Review

Under a “dual-inquiry” interpretation of the “de novo” language found in the 

PPRA, the determination of whether a District agency has satisfactorily engaged in 

the mandated procurement procedures under the PPRA and associated regulations 

is an objective question, which is appropriate for the Board to analyze on a “de 

novo,” or nondeferential, basis. These mandated procedural requirements include, 

among many others: (1) the agency shall conduct market research, (2) its 

solicitations shall contain specifications and purchase descriptions, see 27 DCMR 

§§ 2500.2, 2500.3, and (3) each purchase description shall include characteristics 

such as “common nomenclature;” “kind of material;” “dimensions, size, or 

capacity;” etc. 27 DCMR § 2501.5. In reviewing a challenge to the agency‟s 

compliance with the procedural safeguards of the PPRA, the Board shall remand 

the solicitation if the bidder demonstrates a “prejudicial violation” of the PPRA or 

associated regulations. Impresa, supra note 3, 238 F.3d at 1333. 

The determination of whether an agency has satisfactorily articulated the 

“minimum needs” for a solicitation, however, is a deferential and subjective 

inquiry because the agency has broad discretion within a range of acceptable, 
67

reasonable discretionary choices. Therefore, in applying this dual-inquiry, the 

Board must affirm an agency‟s determination of its “minimum needs” stipulated 

within a solicitation, so long as there is a rational basis supporting the minimum 

needs, along with supporting evidence, and the agency has satisfactorily complied 

with the mandated procurement procedures. This approach is consistent with the 

Board‟s own interpretation of its review standard, see Koba Assocs., Inc., supra, at 

*6, and with established practices within the federal procurement system. See, 

e.g., Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc., supra, 595 F.3d at 1286. This dual-inquiry better 

balances the competing policy goals of the PPRA, and recognizes the importance 

of giving agencies discretion over procurement decisions while also requiring 

compliance with procedural requirements designed to foster fairness, efficiency, 

and competition. 

The majority‟s observation that the Council identified “implementation” of 

the previous 1985 Act to be one of the most significant flaws in the District‟s 

procurement system, see Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 3,25 reinforces, rather 

 

25

 Implementation issues identified included: (1) “a substantial portion of 

[procurements] known to be in violation of procurement procedures[;]” (2) “failure 

to establish a culture of compliance and enforcement of controls that insure 

compliance[;]” and (3) the need to develop a “more robust system of acquisition 

planning,” increased “accessibility of procurement rules and regulations,” and “a 

(continued...)
68

than detracts, from the “dual-inquiry” framework. As noted, under a dual-inquiry 

framework, the Board reviews “anew” whether the agency‟s solicitation followed 

all of the procedural safeguards put into place by the PPRA, and the Board on 

review must ensure that those procedural requirements are vigorously enforced. 

As the Council itself explained, the failure to follow the procurement procedures

presented the biggest challenge to successful implementation of the District‟s 

procurement statute. See Report on Bill 18-610, supra, at 6-7. Absent from its 

critique of the District‟s procurement system, however, is any indication that the 

Council sought to curtail the subjective decision-making authority of the agencies 

in crafting procurement solicitations. On the contrary, the Council specifically 

endorsed the need for independent decision-making on the part of agencies in 

fashioning the most flexible and beneficial procurement solicitations. A “dualinquiry” interpretation of “de novo” review gives the Board the authority to review 

questions of procedural compliance “searchingly,” yet accords flexibility and 

deference to an agency‟s subjective decision-making on what constitutes its own 

“minimum needs.”

 

(...continued)

more professional, better trained workforce of procurement personnel.” Id. at 6-7 

(emphasis added). 
69

Therefore, I do not agree with the majority‟s interpretation of “de novo” 

review in coming to its conclusion that a remand is necessary here. I must 

respectfully dissent.