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*********************************************** 
ROBERT BELEVICH v. RENAISSANCE I, LLC

(AC 43085)

Moll, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, B and Y Co., sought to recover damages from the defendants,

certain companies possessing, controlling, managing and maintaining

certain premises, for personal injuries B sustained in connection with

an alleged slip and fall as a result of untreated ice on the premises. The

trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine, and the plaintiffs appealed to

this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants’

motion for summary judgment because the defendants met their initial

burden to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact

that there was an ongoing storm at the time of B’s fall, and the plaintiffs

thereafter failed to sustain their burden: as the movants for summary

judgment, the defendants met their initial burden by submitting admissible evidence showing it was undisputed that there was an ongoing storm

at the time of B’s alleged fall, and the burden subsequently shifted to

the plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as

to whether B’s fall was caused by a slippery condition that existed

prior to the ongoing storm and whether the defendants had actual or

constructive notice of the allegedly preexisting condition, and the plaintiffs failed to do so, as their evidentiary submission contained no evidence to suggest that the allegedly icy condition at the location where

B fell had existed prior to the ongoing storm or that the defendants had

actual or constructive notice of any preexisting icy conditions; moreover,

this court expressly adopted the burden-shifting approach used by the

state of New York in addressing this issue of first impression to determine precisely what a movant for summary judgment must demonstrate

to satisfy its initial burden when relying on the ongoing storm doctrine

and any burden shifting that may follow.

Argued October 7, 2020—officially released August 31, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the defendant’s alleged negligence,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,

Markle, J., granted a motion to intervene as a party

plaintiff filed by Yale University; thereafter, the court

granted the named plaintiff’s motions to cite in B & W

Paving & Landscaping, LLC, and Winstanley Property

Management, LLC, as party defendants; thereafter, the

court, Abrams, J., granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Russell J. Bonin, with whom was Phyllis M. Pari,

for the appellants (plaintiffs).

David M. Houf, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Robert Belevich, and the

intervening plaintiff, Yale University (Yale) (collectively, plaintiffs), appeal from the summary judgment

rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants,

Renaissance I, LLC (Renaissance), B & W Paving &

Landscaping, LLC (B & W), and Winstanley Property

Management, LLC (Winstanley) (collectively, defendants), on Belevich’s one count complaint sounding in

premises liability arising out of his alleged slip and fall.1

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants

on the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine because

(1) the defendants did not establish the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability

of the doctrine, and (2) the court improperly, albeit

implicitly, shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to negate

the applicability of the doctrine, contending that the

defendants should have been required to demonstrate

that the ongoing storm produced the black ice on which

Belevich allegedly fell.2 We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court.

Belevich alleged, inter alia, the following facts in the

operative complaint. On January 31, 2017, Belevich was

caused to slip and fall as a result of untreated ice on

premises possessed, controlled, managed, and maintained by the defendants. Such occurrence was alleged

to have resulted from the negligence of the defendants

in one or more of seven ways specified in the complaint.

As a result of such fall, Belevich suffered various physical injuries and has incurred, and may continue to incur,

medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment

of life’s activities, and a loss of wages and earning capacity.

On November 1, 2017, Belevich commenced the present action against Renaissance. On November 29, 2017,

pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293, Yale filed a

motion to intervene as a party plaintiff, alleging that,

on or about January 31, 2017, Belevich was an employee

of Yale, and claiming that any damages recovered by

him shall be paid and apportioned such that Yale would

be reimbursed for all workers’ compensation benefits

it paid to or on behalf of Belevich pursuant to the

Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275

et seq. The court granted Yale’s motion to intervene on

January 17, 2018. Thereafter, B & W and Winstanley

were cited in as party defendants.

On July 11, 2018, Belevich filed his second amended

complaint, which became the operative complaint,

sounding in one count of premises liability.3

In the operative complaint, Belevich alleged that on January 31,

2017, he was caused to slip and fall as a result of

untreated ice stemming from the negligence of the

defendants. The defendants answered the complaint
and asserted a special defense alleging that Belevich’s

alleged injuries and damages were caused, in whole or

in part, by his own negligence.

On October 31, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment directed to the operative complaint,

accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law and

appended exhibits. The defendants argued therein that

they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

the grounds that they owed no duty to Belevich (1) on

the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine and (2) because

they lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged

defect. As evidentiary support for their motion, the

defendants submitted transcript excerpts from the September 20, 2018 deposition of Belevich.

Those excerpts reflected Belevich’s testimony to the

following facts. On January 31, 2017, Belevich was an

HVAC controls mechanic employed by Yale. It was

snowing when he arrived at work. Belevich did not

know when it started to snow that morning. As far as

he knew, from the time he arrived at work until his fall

at 2:30 p.m., it continued to snow. He was sure that

while he was working, he looked out windows and

saw that it was continuing to snow. At 2:30 p.m., while

walking toward the garage where he had parked his

car, he slipped and fell in a parking lot in front of 344

Winchester Avenue in New Haven. Belevich testified

unequivocally that it was snowing at the time of his

fall. In addition, there were a couple of inches of snow

on the ground, and at least one snowplow was in the

process of plowing the parking lot. Belevich testified

that he walked from the part of the parking lot that

was covered in snow to the area that had been cleared;

he ‘‘walk[ed] a little bit faster . . . picked up speed

and . . . fell.’’ He thought he fell on black ice. He had

no idea how thick the ice was, and he did not know

how long it had been there.

On March 6, 2019, Belevich filed a memorandum of

law in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with appended exhibits, including additional transcript excerpts from his deposition, as well

as his March 6, 2019 affidavit.4

In his affidavit, Belevich

stated, among other things, that, on January 31, 2017,

during the 11 a.m. hour while he was waiting for a Yale

van to transport him from a job assignment, he did not

see any snow falling and that he did not remember

seeing snow falling during a fifteen minute ride when

his lunch break was over at 12:30 p.m. He also stated

that, on January 31, 2017, at approximately 2:30 p.m.,

around the time of his afternoon break, he noticed that

it was snowing.

On May 17, 2019, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of

the ongoing storm doctrine.5 The court reasoned:

‘‘While the only evidence before the court regarding the

ongoing storm issue is [Belevich’s] deposition testi-
mony indicating that it was snowing when he fell, that

testimony is uncontroverted and, as a result, sufficient

to allow the defendant[s] to meet [their] factual burden

on the ongoing storm issue. Clearly, had [Belevich] presented the court with certified climatological data, testimony or any other evidence to the contrary, it would

give rise to a genuine issue of material fact, but no such

evidence is before the court. As a result, the defendant[s’] motion for summary judgment is hereby

granted.’’6 This appeal followed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

Before turning to the plaintiffs’ claims on appeal, we

set forth the relevant standard of review. ‘‘Practice

Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any

other proof submitted show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party

moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make

a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and

that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any

genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of

proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When

documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence

of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met

its burden, however, the opposing party must present

evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for

the opposing party merely to assert the existence of

such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are

insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact

and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . .

Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a]

motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Capasso v.

Christmann, 163 Conn. App. 248, 257, 135 A.3d 733

(2016).

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine

because (1) the defendants did not establish the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the

applicability of the doctrine, and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to negate the

applicability of the doctrine because the defendants

provided no evidence that an ongoing storm produced

the black ice on which Belevich allegedly fell. We disagree and address these interrelated claims together.

This appeal requires us to consider the application
of the ongoing storm doctrine in the context of summary

judgment and its attendant burden-shifting. In Kraus

v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197–98, 558 A.2d 240 (1989),

our Supreme Court adopted the ongoing storm doctrine

relating to the duty to protect invitees upon one’s property when a snowstorm is in progress at the time of

the plaintiff’s alleged injury. The court defined the doctrine as follows: ‘‘[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed

to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable

diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of

snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a

reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and

snow from outside walks and steps.7 To require a landlord or other inviter to keep walks and steps clear of

dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to

spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical. Our decision, however, does not

foreclose submission to the jury, on a proper evidentiary foundation, of the factual determinations of

whether a storm has ended or whether a plaintiff’s

injury has resulted from new ice or old ice when the

effects of separate storms begin to converge.’’ (Footnote added; footnote omitted.) Id.; see also Umsteadt

v. G. R. Realty, 123 Conn. App. 73, 82–83, 1 A.3d 243

(2010) (addressing accuracy of jury charge in light of

Kraus); Cooks v. O’Brien Properties, Inc., 48 Conn.

App. 339, 342–47, 710 A.2d 788 (1998) (same).

In Leon v. DeJesus, 123 Conn. App. 574, 575, 2 A.3d

956 (2010), a negligence action, this court affirmed the

summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor

of the defendant on the ground that, pursuant to the

ongoing storm doctrine, the defendant owed no legal

duty to the plaintiff. This court reasoned that, pursuant

to our Supreme Court’s decision in Kraus, because it

was undisputed that there was an ongoing storm at the

time of the plaintiff’s alleged fall, the defendant was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., 578. In

Leon, we did not expressly opine on (1) precisely what

a movant for summary judgment must demonstrate to

satisfy its initial burden when relying on the doctrine

and (2) any burden-shifting that may follow. This appeal

provides such an opportunity.

We initially observe that the appellate authority from

other jurisdictions that have adopted the ongoing storm

doctrine in which courts have addressed the doctrine

in the context of summary judgment is relatively scant.

Nevertheless, the doctrine has been the subject of frequent application in New York,8 and we turn to that

body of law for guidance. See Squeo v. Norwalk Hospital Assn., 316 Conn. 558, 573, 113 A.3d 932 (2015)

(‘‘[w]hen contemplating issues of first impression with

regard to Connecticut’s common law, we often have

sought to benefit from the collective wisdom and experience of our sister states’’).
We find the New York Appellate Division’s decision

in Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., 85 App. Div. 3d 877,

925 N.Y.S.2d 607 (2011), to be particularly helpful. In

Meyers, the court stated the following with respect to

burden-shifting in the context of the ongoing storm

doctrine, often referred to as the ‘‘storm in progress’’

doctrine under New York law: ‘‘As the proponent of

the motion for summary judgment, the defendant ha[s]

to establish, prima facie, that it neither created the snow

and ice condition nor had actual or constructive notice

of the condition . . . . [T]he defendant [may sustain]

this burden by presenting evidence that there was a

storm in progress when the plaintiff fell . . . . [Upon

the defendant meeting its burden], the burden shift[s]

to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to

whether the precipitation from the storm in progress

was not the cause of his accident . . . . To do so, the

plaintiff [is] required to raise a triable issue of fact

as to whether the accident was caused by a slippery

condition at the location where the plaintiff fell that

existed prior to the storm, as opposed to precipitation

from the storm in progress, and that the defendant

had actual or constructive notice of the preexisting

condition . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 877–78. We

are persuaded by the foregoing burden-shifting

approach as it has been articulated under New York

law, we note that it is consistent with Leon v. DeJesus,

supra, 123 Conn. App. 574, and we expressly adopt it

as a matter of Connecticut common law.

We now turn to an application of such principles to

the present case. As the movants for summary judgment, the defendants bore the initial burden to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact

that there was an ongoing storm when Belevich allegedly fell. See Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., supra,

85 App. Div. 3d 877. Here, the defendants submitted

admissible evidence in the form of Belevich’s deposition

testimony. Specifically, during his deposition, Belevich

testified that it was snowing when he fell, and that it

had been snowing all day. More specifically, Belevich

was asked if ‘‘it continue[d] to snow all day until 2:30

[p.m.],’’ to which he answered, ‘‘[y]es.’’ Additionally,

when asked if it was snowing ‘‘on [his] head’’ ‘‘[a]s

[he] walk[ed] toward the garage,’’ Belevich answered,

‘‘[y]es.’’ The evidence submitted in opposition to the

defendants’ motion did not create a triable issue of fact

in this regard. Most notably, Belevich’s affidavit left

the fact of an ongoing storm uncontroverted. Instead,

Belevich reaffirmed that fact by stating that ‘‘[a]t

approximately 2:30 p.m., around the time of my afternoon break, I noticed that it was snowing.’’ Thus, it

remained undisputed that there was an ongoing storm at

the time of Belevich’s alleged fall.9 Thus, the defendants

satisfied their initial burden to demonstrate that there

was no genuine issue of material fact that there was

an ongoing storm when Belevich allegedly fell. See, e.g.,
id. (defendant sustained burden by presenting evidence

of storm in progress when plaintiff fell); see also Ryan

v. Beacon Hill Estates Cooperative, Inc., 170 App. Div.

3d 1215, 1216, 96 N.Y.S.3d 630 (2019) (defendants sustained burden where it was undisputed that storm was

in progress at time of plaintiff’s accident).

Accordingly, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to

demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as

to whether Belevich’s fall was caused by a slippery

condition that existed prior to the ongoing storm and

whether the defendants had actual or constructive

notice of the allegedly preexisting condition. See Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., supra, 85 App. Div. 3d

877–78. The plaintiffs failed to show that there existed

a genuine issue of fact ‘‘as to whether the accident was

caused by a slippery condition at the location where

[Belevich] fell that existed prior to the storm, as

opposed to precipitation from the storm in progress,

and that the defendant[s] had actual or constructive

notice of the preexisting condition . . . .’’ Id., 878.

Belevich’s evidentiary submission, which included additional deposition excerpts and his affidavit, contained

no evidence to suggest that the allegedly icy condition

at the location where he fell had existed prior to the

ongoing storm or that the defendants had actual or

constructive notice of any preexisting icy conditions.

Indeed, Belevich’s deposition excerpts reflected his testimony that he did not know how long the black ice

had been there and had no idea how thick it was. His

affidavit was silent on these issues. See footnote 9 of

this opinion. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to sustain their

burden. See, e.g., Campanella v. St. John’s University,

176 App. Div. 3d 913, 913, 112 N.Y.S.3d 153 (2019) (The

plaintiff’s ‘‘opposition papers failed to raise a triable

issue of fact as to whether the accident was caused

by ice that existed prior to the storm, as opposed to

precipitation from the storm in progress, and whether

the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the

alleged preexisting condition . . . . In particular, the

opinions contained in an affidavit of the plaintiff’s meteorologist as to when and how the alleged ice patch was

formed were based on speculation and conjecture

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)), appeal denied, 35 N.Y.3d

914, 153 N.E.2d 447, 130 N.Y.S.3d 2 (2020); Battaglia

v. MDC Concourse Center, LLC, 175 App. Div. 3d 1026,

1028, 108 N.Y.S.3d 607 (2019) (notwithstanding plaintiff’s deposition testimony and statement of plaintiff’s

expert, court concluded that ‘‘[t]o say that old ice

caused the subject ice patch opposed to the storm in

progress would require a jury to resort to conjecture

and speculation in order to determine the cause of the

incident’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 34

N.Y.3d 1164, 144 N.E.3d 367, 121 N.Y.S.3d 757 (2020);

Ryan v. Beacon Hill Estates Cooperative, Inc., supra,

170 App. Div. 3d 1216 (‘‘The plaintiff’s opposition papers

failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the
accident was caused by ice that existed prior to the

storm, as opposed to precipitation from the storm in

progress, and whether the defendants had constructive

notice of the alleged preexisting condition . . . . The

opinions contained in the affidavit of the plaintiff’s

meteorological expert as to when and how the ice was

formed were based on speculation and conjecture

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)); Powell v. Cedar Manor

Mutual Housing Corp., 45 App. Div. 3d 749, 749–50,

844 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2007) (‘‘In opposition, the plaintiff

failed to raise a triable issue of fact . . . . The plaintiff’s contention that she fell on ‘old’ ice from a prior

storm which was hidden under the new snowfall is mere

speculation and insufficient to defeat the defendants’

motion for summary judgment . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)); DeVito v. Harrison House Associates, 41 App.

Div. 3d 420, 421, 837 N.Y.S.2d 726 (2007) (‘‘Here the

injured plaintiff’s allegations that the ice which allegedly caused her accident had been present for ‘a day

or two,’ or that it was ‘from another time,’ were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she

fell on ‘old’ ice . . . . The plaintiffs also did not submit

any evidence to substantiate their claim that the

weather conditions prior to the accident date could

have resulted in the creation of icy patches in the area

where the accident occurred, or any proof that the

respondents had notice of such a condition . . . .’’

(Citations omitted.)); Martin v. Wagner, 30 App. Div.

3d 733, 735, 816 N.Y.S.2d 243 (2006) (concluding that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have

been granted because plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden, upon proper burden-shifting, as he produced no

proof indicating that ‘‘ ‘snow-ice’ ’’ condition that he

claimed caused his fall was anything other than result

of fresh accumulation).

Notably, under the New York burden-shifting

approach that we expressly adopt today, even ‘‘[e]vidence that there was ice in the general vicinity of the

accident prior to the storm is insufficient to raise a

triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had

actual or constructive notice of the condition of the

specific area within the parking lot where the plaintiff

fell . . . .’’ Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., supra, 85

App. Div. 3d 878, citing Alers v. La Bonne Vie Organization, 54 App. Div. 3d 698, 863 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2008), Powell

v. Cedar Manor Mutual Housing Corp., supra, 45 App.

Div. 3d 749, DeVito v. Harrison House Associates,

supra, 41 App. Div. 3d 420, Robinson v. Trade Link

America, 39 App. Div. 3d 616, 833 N.Y.S.2d 243 (2007),

Small v. Coney Island Site 4A-1 Houses, Inc., 28 App.

Div. 3d 741, 814 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2006), Regan v. Hartsdale

Tenants Corp., 27 App. Div. 3d 716, 813 N.Y.S.2d 153

(2006), Dowden v. Long Island Railroad, 305 App. Div.

2d 631, 759 N.Y.S.2d 544 (2003), and Zoutman v. Goshen

Central School District, 300 App. Div. 2d 656, 752

N.Y.S.2d 711 (2002). The plaintiffs’ evidence missed
even this mark by failing to present any evidence of icy

conditions prior to the ongoing storm in the vicinity of

the location of his fall.

The plaintiffs argue that ‘‘the court erred in shifting

[the] burden because the defendants provided zero evidence that the storm which caused snow to fall on

[Belevich] at 2:30 p.m. also produced the black ice on

which [Belevich] fell.’’ They additionally argue that ‘‘it

was not incumbent on [Belevich] to prove that the storm

which caused snow to fall on him at 2:30 p.m. also

produced the black ice on which he fell. The defendants

provided no evidence of freezing rain, temperature, or,

critically, when the black ice was formed. That was

their burden, they did not even attempt to meet it,

and the court, instead of holding them to their burden,

shifted it to the plaintiff[s]. The court erred when it so

shifted the burden.’’ We disagree. As previously stated,

the burden was on the defendants to show that there

was an ongoing storm at the time of Belevich’s alleged

fall. Upon the defendants’ meeting their burden, the

burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate

the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether

Belevich’s fall was caused by a slippery condition that

existed prior to the ongoing storm and whether the

defendants had actual or constructive notice of the

allegedly preexisting condition. We note that the plaintiffs presented even less evidence—e.g., no expert testimony, no weather reports—than what was deemed

insufficient in the New York cases cited previously in

this opinion.

Finally, we note that the plaintiffs have cited no

authority—and we are not aware of any—to support

their suggestion that there exists a ‘‘black ice’’ or icy

condition exception to the ongoing storm doctrine.

Indeed, the conditions at issue in Kraus and Umsteadt,

among others, involved icy conditions.

In sum, the defendants met their initial burden to

demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material

fact that there was an ongoing storm at the time of

Belevich’s fall. The plaintiffs thereafter failed to sustain

their burden. Therefore, we conclude that the court

properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiffs’ joint appeal form indicates that the plaintiffs also

appeal from the trial court’s June 19, 2019 denial of Belevich’s motion to

reargue, they have not provided any analysis in their appellate briefs with

respect to that ruling. Accordingly, we deem any such claim to be abandoned.

See, e.g., Corrarino v. Corrarino, 121 Conn. App. 22, 23 n.1, 993 A.2d

486 (2010).

2 The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that—to the extent that the court’s

rendering of summary judgment was based on the defendants’ second argument in support of their motion for summary judgment—namely, that the

defendants did not owe a duty to Belevich because they lacked actual

or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect—the defendants did not

establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact that they did not
have actual or constructive notice of the alleged black ice. Because the trial

court did not reach the defendants’ second argument, however, we need

not address this claim.

3 On July 13, 2018, in light of Belevich’s second amended complaint, Yale

filed a request for leave to file an amended intervening complaint and

appended the proposed amendment, which was deemed to have been filed

by consent, absent objection.

4 Yale filed an objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

incorporating and adopting Belevich’s opposition thereto.

5 The court set forth its decision in a JDNO notice, which we treat as the

court’s memorandum of decision.

6 Belevich and Yale filed separate motions to reargue. Belevich’s motion

to reargue was denied; Yale’s motion to reargue was marked off after the

plaintiffs filed their appeal.

7 We previously have held that a defendant’s status as a commercial property owner does not constitute an unusual circumstance under Kraus. See

Sinert v. Olympia & York Development Co., 38 Conn. App. 844, 848–50, 664

A.2d 791, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 927, 667 A.2d 553 (1995).

8 Cf. Solazzo v. New York City Transit Authority, 6 N.Y.3d 734, 735, 843

N.E.2d 748, 810 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2005) (applying New York law) (‘‘A property

owner will not be held liable in negligence for a plaintiff’s injuries sustained

as the result of an icy condition occurring during an ongoing storm or for

a reasonable time thereafter . . . . Here, it had been snowing, sleeting and

raining on and off all day and the steps down into the subway were exposed

to those weather conditions. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted

in [the] defendants’ favor.’’ (Citation omitted.)); see also, e.g., Sherman v.

New York State Thruway Authority, 27 N.Y.3d 1019, 1020, 52 N.E.3d 231,

32 N.Y.S.3d 568 (2016) (affirming reversal of denial of defendant’s motion

for summary judgment on basis of storm in progress doctrine); Baker v. St.

Christopher’s Inn, Inc. 138 App. Div. 3d 652, 653–54, 29 N.Y.S.3d 439 (2016)

(affirming granting of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on basis

of storm in progress doctrine); Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., 85 App. Div.

3d 877, 877–78, 925 N.Y.S.2d 607 (2011) (reversing denial of defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on basis of storm in progress doctrine);

Sfakionas v. Big Six Towers, Inc., 46 App. Div. 3d 665, 665–66, 846 N.Y.S.2d

584 (2007) (affirming granting of defendant’s motion for summary judgment

on basis of storm in progress doctrine).

9 Because Belevich’s affidavit does not contradict his prior deposition

testimony on this point, we need not address the applicability of the ‘‘sham

affidavit’’ rule, which ‘‘refers to the trial court practice of disregarding an

offsetting affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that

contradicts the affiant’s prior deposition testimony. . . . Connecticut appellate courts have yet to expressly adopt this rule.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Kenneson v. Eggert, 176 Conn. App. 296, 310,

170 A.3d 14 (2017).