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IN RE PETER L.*

(AC 37231)

Beach, Mullins and Bishop, Js.

Argued May 21—officially released June 30, 2015**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford, Driscoll, J.)

Percy L., self-represented, the appellant

(respondent).

Lindsay M. Savona-Donka, for the appellee (petitioner).

Don M. Hodgdon with whom was Jammie L. Middleton, for the minor child.
Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this appeal from the judgment of

the trial court terminating the parental rights of the

respondent, Percy L., as to his minor son, Peter L., the

respondent claims that the evidence adduced at trial

was insufficient to justify the termination of his parental

rights and that he was denied the effective assistance

of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.1

The following factual summary is pertinent to our

resolution of the issues on appeal. Peter L. was born

in 2008. He is the biological son of the respondent and

the petitioner, Elizabeth E., who were married in 2008

and divorced in 2010. During Peter L.’s. infancy, violence erupted between his parents, resulting in the

imposition of restraining orders and protective orders

in favor of the petitioner, including a no contact order

restraining the respondent from engaging in various

unwanted behaviors. In 2010, while such orders were

in place, the respondent kidnapped the petitioner at

gunpoint while she had been operating a motor vehicle,

took over her vehicle, and drove a distance until the

police intercepted the vehicle after she was able to

obtain help at a highway stop. During this episode,

the respondent, while pointing what appeared to be a

handgun at the petitioner, threatened to kill her and to

take his own life.2 This criminal conduct resulted in the

respondent’s arrest and subsequent conviction, on his

guilty plea, of kidnapping in the first degree with a

firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92a, and

criminal violation of a restraining order in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-223b. On November 9, 2012, the

respondent was given a total effective sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after

eight years. The court also imposed a standing protective order in favor of the petitioner to continue in effect

until 2052.3

When the respondent and the petitioner separated,

Peter L. was approximately eleven months old. Before

his incarceration and while the marital dissolution was

pending, the respondent exercised visitation rights with

Peter L. on fifteen occasions but, on many of them,

Peter L. was left with others and not cared for by the

respondent. In its decision, the trial court commented

that the respondent exercised visitation rights approximately fifteen times, despite opportunities for more,

and that he often exercised this visitation as a matter

of right but not interest. During Peter L.’s infancy, the

respondent failed to provide adequate support for him

as well, resulting in the finding of a child support arrearage at the time of the divorce.

For the first two years of his incarceration, the

respondent made minimal efforts to have contact with

Peter L. by correspondence and made no efforts to have
his son brought to him. Also, the respondent made no

efforts to obtain any of Peter L.’s medical records or

to learn of his progress in school. Beginning in 2012,

the respondent did make several unsuccessful efforts

to see Peter L. Peter L. was approximately eighteen

months old when he last saw the respondent.

During the separation of the respondent and the petitioner, she met another man whom she subsequently

married in 2013. They now have a biological child

together. She, her husband, their child, and Peter L. all

reside together as a family unit. Peter L., who is now

called by a different name, has no recollection of the

respondent and no understanding that the respondent

is his biological father. His stepfather desires to

adopt him.4

On March 21, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition in

the New London Children’s Probate Court to terminate

the parental rights of the respondent to Peter L. pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-717. That petition was

subsequently transferred to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in the New London Judicial District. In her

petition, the petitioner alleged, as grounds for termination, that the respondent had abandoned Peter L. pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (A), that Peter L. had been

denied the care necessary for his well-being as a result

of the respondent’s acts of omission or commission

pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B), and that there was

no ongoing relationship between the respondent and

Peter L. pursuant to § 45a-717 (g) (2) (C). After a three

day hearing, the court found that the petitioner had

proven, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the

grounds alleged in the petition and that termination of

the respondent’s parental rights would be in Peter L.’s

best interest. This appeal followed.

‘‘We begin by setting forth the statutory requirements

for granting a petition for the termination of parental

rights. A hearing on a petition to terminate parental

rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . If the trial court determines that a statutory

ground for termination exists [by clear and convincing

evidence], it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the

dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether

termination is in the best interest of the child. . . .

‘‘Our standard ofreview on appeal from a termination

of parental rights is limited to whether the challenged

findings are clearly erroneous. . . . A finding is clearly

erroneous when eitherthere is no evidence in the record

to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made. . . . [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of

the trial court because of [the trial court’s] opportunity

to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine the record to determine

whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every
reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial

court’s ruling.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Oreoluwa O., 157 Conn. App. 490,

496–97, A.3d (2015).

The respondent claims that the evidence adduced at

trial was insufficient to warrant the termination of his

parental rights to Peter L. We are not persuaded. It is

apparent from the record that the court heard ample

evidence that would support the termination of the

respondent’s parental rights on the basis of any of the

grounds alleged.

With respect to the ground of abandonment, the court

heard and credited evidence that during Peter L.’s

infancy, while his parents were separated, the respondent asserted his rights to visitation with Peter L., but

on many of those occasions he actually left the child

in the care of others. The court also heard evidence

that in the first two years of his incarceration, the

respondent made scant effort to be in communication

with the child and made no effort to have the child

brought to him. To be sure, incarceration alone does

not constitute abandonment. See In re Juvenile Appeal

(Docket No. 10155), 187 Conn. 431, 443, 446 A.2d 808

(1982). The court reasonably could consider, however,

the respondent’s lack of genuine interest in Peter L.

during his infancy and the respondent’s failure to make

any meaningful efforts to be in communication with

Peter L. during the first two years of his incarceration.

In this regard, the court could also assess, from the

evidence adduced at trial, the respondent’s level of

apparent interest in the child before his incarceration

both in regard to the number of times he actually sought

to care for him and his failure to adequately support the

child during his period of separation from the petitioner

until his incarceration.

As to the ground concerning the denial of care as a

result of the respondent’s acts of commission or omission, the court heard and was entitled to credit testimony regarding the respondent’s abduction of the

petitioner, his threats to kill her and himself, as well

as the imposition and subsequent violation by the

respondent ofrestraining and protective orders necessitated by his abusive behavior toward the petitioner. Cf.

In re Sean H., 24 Conn. App. 135, 144–45, 586 A.2d 1171,

cert. denied, 218 Conn. 904, 588 A.2d 1087 (1991).

In regard to the third ground for termination, that

there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between

the respondent and Peter L., this ground is essentially

uncontested. Evidence adduced at trial made it clear

that Peter L. does not know the respondent as his father

and has no recollection of him.

Finally, in regard to the dispositional phase of a petition to terminate parental rights, the record amply supports the court’s determination that termination of the
respondent’s rights is in Peter L.’s best interest. The

court heard and was entitled to credit evidence that

Peter L. is living in a stable family environment with

his mother, a sibling, and a stepfather who wishes to

adopt him. In sum, the evidence adduced at trial was

more than adequate to justify, by the applicable standard of proof, the termination of the respondent’s

parental rights.

The respondent also claims on appeal to this court

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

at trial. ‘‘In Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination of his or her parental rights is entitled, by statute,

to the assistance of counsel. . . . Because of the substantial interests involved, a parent in a termination of

parental rights hearing has the right not only to counsel

but to the effective assistance of counsel.’’ (Citation

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 569, 613

A.2d 780 (1992). Moreover, a parent whose rights have

been terminated may assert, on direct appeal, that he

or she was deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. See In re Jonathan M., 255

Conn. 208, 235, 764 A.2d 739 (2001). ‘‘In determining

whether counsel has been ineffective in a termination

proceeding, [this court has] enunciated the following

standard: The range of competence . . . requires not

errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective

by hindsight, but counsel whose performance is reasonably competent, or within the range of competence

displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill

in [that particular area of the] law. . . . The respondent

must prove that [counsel’s performance] fell below this

standard of competency and also thatthe lack of competency contributed to the termination of parental rights.

. . . A showing of incompetency without a showing of

resulting prejudice . . . does not amount to ineffective

assistance of counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71, 91, 10 A.3d

100 (2011).

As noted, it is the responsibility of the respondent to

demonstrate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness by reference

to the record and not merely by allegation. In the case

at hand, the respondent’s claim that his trial lawyer

was ineffective is unsupported by any reference to the

record. Indeed, when asked by the trial judge whether

he was satisfied with his trial counsel, the respondent

answered: ‘‘One hundred percent.’’ The circumstances

we confront are like those found by this court in the

case of In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn. App. 71,

although that case involved a termination of parental

rights granted on a different ground. In In re Dylan C.,

this court held: ‘‘[W]e need not decide whether the

respondent’s counsel provided assistance that fell

below that of lawyers with ordinary training in termination of parental rights cases because the respondent

has not demonstrated that her counsel’s representation
resulted in prejudice to her.’’ Id., 91–92. This court further stated: ‘‘Here, the respondent has not identified

where in the record, and we found nowhere in the

record, that she alerted the court to her dissatisfaction

with counsel and asked the court to appoint new counsel. Nowhere in its memorandum of decision or in the

transcript of the trial did the trial court give any indication that the respondent was not receiving effective

assistance of counsel. The record discloses that the

respondent’s parental rights were terminated on the

strength of the petitioner’s case [on the ground alleged

in the petition].’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 93. Just as in

the case of In re Dylan C., where the respondent

pointed to nothing in the record to support her claim

that trial counsel was ineffective, here, as well, the

respondent has not supported his allegation by reference to any supporting part of the record. Mere allegations of ineffectiveness, unsubstantiated by the record,

are inadequate to support a finding of ineffectiveness.

The respondent has failed to demonstrate that trial

counsel was ineffective.

The judgment is affirmed.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** June 30, 2015, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1

In his brief, the respondent asserts, as well, that ‘‘color’’ was a factor in

the court’s decision. We assume, from this claim, that the respondent claims

that race or culture, in some manner, influenced the trial’s outcome. Other

than this incendiary assertion, however, the respondent points to no

instances in the record that relate to the race or culture of any of the

interested parties. Nor does he, in his brief, provide any factual underlayment

or legal support for the reviewability of this assertion newly minted for

appeal. As this court has often stated, we are not required to review, on

appeal, issues improperly presented on appeal through an inadequate brief.

See In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn. App. 455, 469, 780 A.2d 944 (2001).

2

In its decision terminating the respondent’s parental rights, the court,

Driscoll, J., stated that what may have appeared to be a handgun was later

determined to have been a pellet pistol.

3 While the respondent’s legal status in the United States is not clear from

the record,the record reflects that he was born in Peru and that he anticipates

that, upon release from the custody of the Commissioner of Correction,

there is the likelihood that he may be deported from the United States.

4 At trial, a counselor from the Department of Children and Families

(department) testified in support of the termination petition and also offered

the department’s support for stepparent adoption.