NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

SKYLAR IVAN WILENCHIK, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0455

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-006756-001

The Honorable Robert L. Gottsfield, Retired Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler

Counsel for Appellant

Skylar Wilenchik, Florence

Appellant
STATE v. WILENCHIK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Counsel for defendant 

Skylar Ivan Wilenchik has advised the court that, after searching the entire 

record, she has found no arguable question of law and asks this court to 

conduct an Anders review of the record. Wilenchik was given the 

opportunity to file a supplemental brief pro se, and has done so. This court 

has reviewed the record and has found no reversible error. Accordingly, 

Wilenchik’s convictions and resulting sentences are affirmed. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 10, 2011, Wilenchik’s sister J.W.2 returned to her 

condominium from a trip and discovered several items of jewelry were 

missing. Wilenchik, who had been staying at the condominium, denied any 

involvement. J.W., however, asked Wilenchik to move out, suspecting he 

was involved. J.W. reported the missing jewelry to the police. The police 

discovered the jewelry had been pawned. The tickets from the pawn shop 

listed Wilenchik as the person who pawned the jewelry. In April 2012, 

Wilenchik was charged by Indictment with seven counts of trafficking in 

stolen property in the first degree, each a Class 2 felony, with dates of 

offense on August 20, 2011 and various dates in October 2011. 

Before trial, the State alleged aggravating circumstances and

that Wilenchik had six historical non-dangerous felony convictions. On the 

State’s motion, the court held an Arizona Rule of Evidence 609 hearing and 

 

1 This court views the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict, and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” 

State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588–89, 951 P.2d 454, 463–64 (1997) (citation 

omitted).

2 Initials are used to protect the victims’ privacy. State v. Maldonado, 206 

Ariz. 339, 341 n.1 ¶ 2, 78 P.3d 1060, 1062 n.1 (App. 2003).
STATE v. WILENCHIK

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3

allowed the use of four of Wilenchik’s sanitized prior felony convictions for 

impeachment if he elected to testify. Although the State offered Wilenchik 

a plea agreement, after a proper advisement pursuant to State v. Donald, 198 

Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (App. 2000), Wilenchik rejected the plea.

On the second day of trial, Juror 10 told the bailiff she worked 

with the judge’s wife and had not realized it during voir dire. The court 

promptly addressed the issue with counsel and, in open court but outside 

the presence of the other jurors, Juror 10 stated that the relationship would 

have no bearing on her opinion in the case and would not prejudice her in 

any way. After counsel was given an opportunity to ask her questions, the 

parties had no objections to Juror 10 continuing and she was one of the 

jurors that deliberated at the close of the evidence.

During the seven-day jury trial, the State called as witnesses 

J.W., investigating officers, a pawnshop employee and the pawnshop 

owner. After the State rested, Wilenchik unsuccessfully moved for a 

judgment of acquittal, arguing a lack of substantial evidence. Wilenchik 

then called as a witness J.K., a friend who was with Wilenchik during some 

of October 2011. Wilenchik also elected to testify on his own behalf, 

admitting during his testimony that he had four prior felony convictions.

Wilenchik did not dispute his signature on the pawn receipts, 

the jewelry listed or dates in question. Nor did Wilenchik deny pawning 

the jewelry. Instead, Wilenchik’s defense was that he did not know the 

jewelry he pawned belonged to his sister. Wilenchik testified he believed 

the jewelry belong to his girlfriend, K.M., who asked Wilenchik to sell the 

jewelry because she lost her identification. Wilenchik also testified the 

diamond that was the subject of Count 1 had been given to him by his father 

and did not belong to J.W.

After the close of the evidence, the superior court properly 

instructed the jury; the jury heard closing arguments and, after 

deliberations, found Wilenchik guilty as charged. The jury was then 

discharged without making any determination regarding the aggravating 

circumstances alleged by the State.

At sentencing, based on his trial testimony, the court found 

Wilenchik had two prior historical felony offenses and sentenced Wilenchik 

as a repeat offender. After considering argument and information 

provided, the court sentenced Wilenchik to a mitigated term of 12 years in 

prison for each count, with each sentence to run concurrently. The court 
STATE v. WILENCHIK

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also properly gave Wilenchik 806 days of presentence incarceration credit

and ordered him to pay $15,000 in stipulated restitution. 

This court has jurisdiction over Wilenchik’s timely appeal 

pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1) 

(2015).3

DISCUSSION

This court has reviewed and considered counsel’s brief and 

appellant’s pro se supplemental brief, and has searched the entire record 

for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 

(App. 1999). Searching the record and briefs reveals no reversible error. The 

record shows Wilenchik was represented by counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings and counsel was present at all critical stages. The evidence 

admitted at trial constitutes substantial evidence supporting Wilenchik’s 

convictions. From the record, all proceedings were conducted in 

compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The sentences 

imposed were within the statutory limits and permissible ranges.

Wilenchik raises three categories of arguments in his pro se 

supplemental brief that merit further discussion. 

I. Sufficiency Of The Evidence.

Wilenchik challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing 

(1) he is not guilty because he did not know the jewelry was stolen; (2) the 

diamond in Count 1 was given to him by his father; (3) the diamond was 

not two carats; (4) the diamond could not have been removed without 

special tools, which the pawn shop did not have; (5) the State did not prove 

the diamond was removed from the engagement ring; (6) the State never 

showed the stone alleged to have been replaced in the engagement ring was 

fake; and (7) J.W. “was caught multiple times lying [and] fabricating 

stories.”

This court will not reverse a conviction “for insufficiency of 

the evidence unless there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s 

verdict.” State v. Scott, 187 Ariz. 474, 477, 930 P.2d 551, 554 (App. 1996) 

(citing State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 38, 668 P.2d 874, 881 (1983)). Substantial 

evidence is “‘[m]ore than a scintilla and is such proof as a reasonable mind 

 

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
STATE v. WILENCHIK

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would employ to support the conclusion reached.’” State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 

289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989) (citation omitted).

Wilenchik never denied selling the jewelry to the pawn shop.

The pawn shop receipts were admitted as evidence and showed Wilenchik 

sold the jewelry to the pawn shop. Wilenchik, J.W. and the other witnesses

each testified at trial and were each subject to cross-examination. When the 

evidence conflicted, the role of the jury was to resolve those conflicts by 

weighing and assessing the evidence received, including the credibility of 

the witnesses. This court does not re-weigh the evidence considered by the 

jury. State v. Long, 121 Ariz. 280, 281, 589 P.2d 1312, 1313 (1979). Having 

considered the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict, Wilenchik has not shown the evidence was insufficient to 

support his convictions. See State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588–89, 951 P.2d 

454, 463–64 (1997).

II. Wilenchik’s Father As A Possible Trial Witness.

Wilenchik argues his father was “always in touch with my 

lawyer” and that his father “said he would testify to him giving me the 

diamond in Count 1.” Wilenchik, however, did not call his father as a 

witness. Wilenchik could have invoked the court’s subpoena power to do 

so, see A.R.S. § 13-4071, and Wilenchik does not claim he was prevented 

from doing so. In a post-verdict letter to the court, Wilenchik’s father wrote

that, when Wilenchik “asked me about going to trial, I told him there were 

facts that showed innocence. Those facts didn’t prevail.” Moreover, 

Wilenchik’s claims about what his father may have said if called as a trial 

witness do not involve charges other than Count 1 and would have been 

cumulative to Wilenchik’s trial testimony as to Count 1. Finally, to the 

extent this argument seeks to implicate the effectiveness of his trial counsel, 

such a claim can only be raised in post-conviction proceedings, not on direct 

appeal. State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 415 ¶ 20, 153 P.3d 1040, 

1044 (2007). Wilenchik has shown no reversible error regarding the 

possibility of his father being called as a trial witness.

III. Testimony Wilenchik Had Seen J.W. Wearing The Jewelry.

Wilenchik argues J.W. lied in court by 

tell[ing] the jury how I knew the jewelry was 

hers because I had seen her wear it at family 

functions. These family functions I couldn’t 

have been at because I was incarcerated on a 

prior case. We (my lawyer) couldn’t tell the jury 
STATE v. WILENCHIK

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the victim was lying because the jury was not 

allowed to know I had been incarcerated before. 

This issue arose at trial when J.W. was asked, during cross-examination,

when Wilenchik would have seen her wearing certain items of jewelry, 

including when they “lived together” as well as at “family affairs” or 

“family occasions” where Wilenchik and J.W. were present over a nearly 

20-year period. The superior court discussed the matter with the parties 

outside of the presence of the jury in significant detail and took appropriate 

measures to allow cross-examination of J.W. to ensure the jury did not learn 

of Wilenchik’s incarceration, including providing direction to J.W. herself. 

The court allowed counsel to cross-examine J.W. about whether Wilenchik 

attended certain family functions, and when she was again asked whether 

he attended a specific event she had previously testified about, she said “I 

don’t remember now. I can’t remember if he was there or not.” Wilenchik 

has not shown how the superior court improperly handled the issue, or 

how this answer resulted in reversible error.

CONCLUSION

This court has read and considered counsel’s brief and 

Wilenchik’s pro se supplemental brief, and has searched the record 

provided for reversible error and has found none. State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 

297, 300, 451 P.2d 878, 881 (1969); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30, 2 

P.3d 89, 96 (App. 1999). Accordingly, Wilenchik’s convictions and resulting 

sentences are affirmed.

Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel is directed to 

inform Wilenchik of the status of his appeal and of his future options. 

Defense counsel has no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel 

finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by 

petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85, 684 P.2d 154, 

156–57 (1984). Wilenchik shall have 30 days from the date of this decision 

to proceed, if he desires, with a pro se motion for reconsideration or petition 

for review.