Hipolito S oto’s notice of a ppeal is sty led State of Tex as v. David J
. Martinez. On the line 1 indicated f

or sig nature by

“De fenda

nt,” the sig nature of “da

vid martines” a

pp ea rs . Despite the dis c re pa nc y in t he name us e d b y

a pp e lla nt at tr ial and on a

pp e a l, h ow e ve r, the tr ia l c ourt c a us e number—D- 1- DC

- 06- 9071 72 —is c on sis te nt t hr ou g ho ut t

he re c or d. B a se d o n th e dis c re pa nc y in appellant’ s name, the State f iled a motion to dismiss for failure to pr operly perf ect the a ppeal. The State’s motion to dis miss, however, shows no c onfusion as to which c onvictions are be ing a ppeale d and by whom. Se e Fe w v . S

tate , 230 S.W .3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holdingthat, even in light of cause number discrepanc y , notice of appea l was suffic ient wher e “it is appa rent fr om the rec ord that all par

ties knew that a

ppellant timely

expressed his desire to a ppeal his conviction for solicitation to commit capital murder ”). A s Soto “file[d] an instrument in a bona f ide attempt to invoke [our] jurisdiction,” we ove rruled the State’s m o t i o n t o dismiss and will addre ss Soto’s point of err or. See id. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 099 -CR NO. 03-08-00100- CR
Hipo lit o So to , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. D-1-D C-06 -9071 72 & D-1 -DC -07-20 1386 HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . BAI RD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt H ipo lit o So to pleade d g uilty to two c harg es of driving while intox icated 1 and wa s sentence d to eig ht y ear s in prison. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04 (W es t 2003), § 49.09(b) ( West S upp . 2008). Soto contends that the district cour t committed fundamental e rror2

by convicting him of driving while i n tox icated in the a bsence of a guilty

plea. We af

firm the judgme nt of conviction.

Soto was indicted for two c ounts of felony dri v i n g wh i le intox icated. See id. §§ 49.04, .09(b). O n J u n e 1 4 , 2007, Soto entered a plea of g uilty in open cour

t. On J anuar

y 15, 2008, based on his guilty plea, the district c ourt found Soto guilty of the off

enses a s char g ed and asse ssed punishme n t at ei gh t y ear s in prison for ea ch off ense. The sentenc es we re to run
concur rently . Soto appeals, ar g uing in a single p o i n t o f er ror that the district c ourt committed fundame ntal err or by

convicting him of the offe nse in the abse nce of a prope r g uilty

plea. Article 27.13 of the code of criminal proce dure provides that “[a] plea of ‘guilty ’ or a plea of ‘nolo contende re’ in a felony case must be made in open court by the def endant in per son.” Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 27.13 (West 2006)
. The purpose of ar ticle 27.13 is “to establish that the ac cused voluntar ily

desires to plea d g uilty .” Ma tc he tt v . S tate , 9 41 S.W. 2d

92 2, 93 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Whe re the c ir c ums tanc e s of the ple a ind ic a te the de fe nd ant k

no wi ng ly and vo lun tari ly inten d ed to plead guilty , substantial compliance w ith the statute is shown. Se e Sh ie lds v . S tate , 608 S.W .2d 924, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

Rely ing on two court of appea ls decisions, Soto arg ues that nothing in the rec ord “c an fairly be construe d as a ple a in open c ourt related t o t h e i n d i ctm ent upon which [Soto] stands convicted.” Se e Me nd

e z v . S tate , 892 S.W .2d 81, 82-85 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1994), rev’d on other grounds , 9 14 S.W. 2d 57 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); W ill iam s v . S

tate , 770 S.W .2d 81, 82-84 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 98 9, no pe t.) . I n th e a bs e nc e of e ith e r a ple a or a jur y ve rd ic t, S oto c on te nd s, the trial cour

t had no power

to rende r judg ment, and the judg ment is, theref ore, void.3 I n W ill iam s v . S

tate , the court of appea ls r ever sed the trial cour t’s conviction, holding that the defendant had not enter ed his g uilty plea f ree ly and voluntarily . 770 S.W .2d at 84. I n that
c a se , h ow e ve r, the dis c us sio n a bo ut t he de fe nd ant’ s guil ty

ple a wa s c on du c te d a lmo st e nti re ly betwee n the def

ense at t o rn ey

and the tria l judge
. Id. Th e on ly state me nt b y

the de fe nd ant w a s a “[y ]es sir” in response to the t rial j udg e’s inquiring “[ d]o y ou plead guilty ? ” Id
. Be cau s e t h e j u d ge

“ c omp le te ly

fa ile d to a sc e rt a in w he the r Wi lli a ms’ s p le a wa s fr e e and vo luntary ,” the c ourt of a pp e a ls held that the trial court did not substantially comply with either a

rticle 26.13 or a

rticle 27.13. Id. ;
see Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 26.13 (West 2009), a rt. 27.13. I n Me nd e z v . S tate , in r esponse to the trial judge ’s questioning as to his unde rstanding of the ra ng e of punishment and the consequence of a finding that a deadly wea pon was used, Me ndez
an s we re d “[ y ] es m a’ am ”— t h at h e u n d er s t o o d
. 8 9 2 S
. W
. 2 d at 8 3
. Ho we v er , wh en t h e t ri al j u d ge asked Me ndez whether

he under stood his right to a jury trial, he responde d in the neg ative: “No, Idon’t understa

nd that, ma’am.” Id. Def ense c o u n s el then stated: “A t this t ime, J udg e, the Def endant wa ives the re ading of the Indictment and he enters a plea of no contest and he does know and understand he has a rig ht to have a jur

y trial and sig ns a jury

waiver .” Id. B a se d o n th is
ex ch an ge, t h e c o u rt o f ap p ea l s re v er s edt h e j u d gm en to f c o n v i ct i o n , ex p l ai n i n g:
The mer e fa ct of Mende z’s p re s en ce while his attorney stated a ple a is insufficient to c o mp ly w it

h th e r e qu ir e me n ts o f th e Co d e . H e ma d e n o r e s p o n s e th at could be int e rp re te d a s ac c e pti ng the ple a or a g re e ing wi th the state me nt b y his c ouns e l. T his does not c onstitut e substantial c ompliance. There fore , unless some other factor would support a diffe rent re sult, the cause must be r ever sed.
Id.4 The c ircumstance s in this case ar e substantially differ ent from the f

acts unde rlying the dec isions in W

ill iam s and Mende

z . Some releva

nt portions of the exchang e betwe en Soto and t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i n cl u d e t h e f o l l o wi n g:
Court : An d wa ivi ng his ri g hts , do y ou be lie ve he un de rstan ds all

those? Def ense c ounsel: Yes, Your Honor. Court : Yo u h a ve e xpla ine d a ll that to him ? Def ense c ounsel: Yes, Your Honor. Court: I s that rig ht, Mr. Soto? Soto: Yea h. Court: Has he explained all that to y ou? Sot o: Ye s. Court : You are c ha rg e d in e a c h o f t he se c a se s w ithdr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d. I n e a c h c a se thi s is a thi rd -d e g re e fe lony

of fe ns e which means y ou could g o to pr ison for as little as two y ear s all the way up to te n y ear s and a f ine not to exceed $10,000. Do y ou understand that’s the full rang e of punishment in ea ch of the se c a se s? Soto: Yea h. Court: Speak up. Soto: Iunderstand.
Th e c ourt the n a sk e d So to a

nd his c ouns e l qu e sti on s a

bo ut Sot o’ s wr itt e n guil ty ple a . A c c or din g to S o t o , Soto’s wife, and de fense counsel, Soto understood the substanc e and the conseque nce ofOn appea l, Soto also seems to sug g est that his diff iculty in rea ding a

nd writing Eng lish may 2 have aff ecte d whether his ple a of g uilty was voluntarily g iven. Howe ver, Soto made no r equest for a tra nslator at trial a

nd makes no a

rg ument on appea l that a translator should have be en provided. 5 the g uilty plea. On the written plea, Soto had indicated that he “ understand[s] spoken English but “re ad[s] with difficulty .” In open cour t, Soto s tated that def

ense c ounsel had re ad the doc ument aloud and e x plained its eff ect. The discussion betwee n the cour t and Soto continued:
Court : Do y ou kn ow that y ou have a ri g ht to b ri ngin t we lve pe op le and sit over ther e and he ar your ca se? Sot o: Ye p, bu t I do n’ t w ant t

hat. Court : Yo u d on ’t wa nt t ha t? Sot o: Ido n’ t. I do n’ t w ant t

hat. Court: I ’m g oing to f ind, sir, that y our plea

of g uilt y i s fr ee ly

and vol u n t ar i l y

gi v en an d t h at y o uar e k n o wi n gl y , i n t el lige ntly and vo lun tari ly

wa ivi ngand

g ivi ng up all th e ri g hts a c c or de d to y ou un de r o ur

laws . I nMende z , the cour

t’s decision wa s based on the f act that v i rt u all y

no interac tion
occur red be tween the trial judg e and Me ndez, and t h e p l ea o f “no c ontest” wa s actua lly enter ed by defe nse counse l, not Mendez. 892 S.W .2d at 83. Simil arly , in W illiams , defe nse counse l, not Wil liams, responded to the tria l court’s que stions. 770 S .W.2d at 84. The rec ord her e, howev er, shows that the district court e ng ag ed i n an extensive dialog ue with Soto. During the discussion, Soto personally

acknow ledg ed his plea of g uilty
. The rec ord also shows that Soto entered his plea voluntarily
. There fore , the district c ourt complied with both the spirit a nd the letter of

article 27.13. See Shie lds , 608 S.W .2d at 927. 2Fur

ther, the recor d befor e us indicates that Soto persona lly participated i n an ex tensive discussion with the district c ourt, in w hich he compre hended and responde d appropr iately t o t h e court’s qu es t i o n i n g. 6

Soto’s point of error is ove rruled, a nd the judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson Affir med Filed: Apr il 23, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh