SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4149-19

U.S. BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE

IN TRUST FOR THE

REGISTERED HOLDERS OF 

CHASE FUNDING MORTGAGE

LOAN, ASSET-BACKED 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-2,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JUSTO SANTOS, 

Defendant-Appellant,

and

ELVA SANTOS, her heirs, 

devisees and personal

representatives and his, hers, their 

or any of their successors in right, 

title and interest, RONALD

SANTOS, MRS. SANTOS, 

spouse of RONALD SANTOS, 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4149-19

_______________________________

Submitted April 12, 2021 – Decided May 5, 2021

Before Judges Currier and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. 

F-020056-17.

Justo Santos, appellant pro se.

Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Richard Nalbandian, III, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this foreclosure action, defendant Justo Santos appeals from the April 

20, 2020 Chancery Division order denying his motion to vacate final judgment 

entered on April 4, 2019. After reviewing the contentions in light of the record 

and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

We glean these facts from the record. On March 11, 2004, Elva Santos, 

defendant's late wife, executed a promissory note to Chase Manhattan Mortgage 

Corporation (Chase) for $288,000. To secure the note, defendant and his wife 

executed a non-purchase money mortgage to Chase on the same day against 

property located on Grove Avenue in Verona. Defendants defaulted on the loan 

on May 1, 2007. 
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On June 26, 2007, Chase assigned the mortgage to Wachovia Bank, N.A., 

which assignment was recorded on July 9, 2007. On February 24, 2017, Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A. S/B/M1 Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) assigned the 

mortgage to plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee In Trust For 

The Registered Holders Of Chase Funding Mortgage Loan, Asset-Backed 

Certificate, Series 2004-2, which assignment was recorded on March 20, 2017.

On August 25, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure. 2 After 

default was entered, plaintiff moved for final judgment, which was entered on 

April 4, 2019. Plaintiff's motion was accompanied by a February 21, 2019 

certification of an officer of its mortgage servicer, averring that "[p]laintiff, 

directly or through an agent, has possession of the [n]ote . . . ." 

On March 2, 2020, eleven months after the entry of final judgment, 

defendant moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 4:50-1, arguing plaintiff 

lacked standing to foreclose because it failed to demonstrate ownership or 

control of the original note. In an order entered on April 20, 2020, the Chancery 

judge denied the motion. In an accompanying statement of reasons, the judge 

1 S/B/M refers to successor by merger.

2

 It is unclear from the record exactly when Elva Santos passed away. However, 

plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include defendant as heir to Elva Santos. 

The amended complaint is not included in the record. 
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determined plaintiff established and demonstrated standing based on its

possession of the note and assignment of the mortgage prior to the filing of the 

complaint.

On appeal, defendant renews his argument that plaintiff lacked standing 

to foreclose on the mortgage and asserts the judge "erroneously denied his 

[m]otion to [v]acate [f]inal [j]udgment." We disagree.

Under Rule 4:50-1,

the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment 

. . . for the following reasons: (a) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly 

discovered evidence which would probably alter the 

judgment or order and which by due diligence could not 

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or 

other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment 

or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been 

satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or 

order upon which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment or order should have prospective application; 

or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the 

operation of the judgment or order.

Motions made under Rule 4:50-1 must be filed within a reasonable time, 

and motions based on subsections (a), (b), and (c) must be filed within a year of 

the judgment. R. 4:50-2; see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 

428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012) (citation omitted). However, the 
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one-year limitation for subsections (a), (b), and (c) does not mean that filing 

within one year automatically qualifies as "within a reasonable time." Orner v. 

Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011).

A motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 should be granted sparingly and is 

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not 

be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 

Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). "[A]buse of discretion only arises on 

demonstration of 'manifest error or injustice,'" Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 

20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005)), and occurs when 

the trial court's decision "is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." 

Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467 (citation omitted). 

Here, we discern no abuse of discretion. In order to have standing, the 

"party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt." 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 2011) 

(quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 327-28 (Ch. Div. 

2010)). Standing is conferred by "either possession of the note or an assignment 

of the mortgage that predated the original complaint." Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 

at 318 (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 216 
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(App. Div. 2011)). "Thus, a plaintiff need not actually possess the original note 

at the time of filing in order to have standing to file a foreclosure complaint." 

Capital One, N.A. v. Peck, 455 N.J. Super. 254, 258 (App. Div. 2018).

Moreover, "[s]tanding is not a jurisdictional issue in New Jersey." Id. at 

259 (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 101 (App. 

Div. 2012)). Thus, "[d]epending on the equities of the particular proceeding, a 

foreclosure judgment may not be reversed, even if some irregularities in the 

foreclosure process are demonstrated by the defendant." Ibid. As a result, "a 

foreclosure judgment obtained by a party that lacked standing is not 'void' within 

the meaning of Rule 4:50-1(d)." Ibid. 

Here, we are satisfied plaintiff had standing to foreclose based on the 

assignment of the mortgage from Wells Fargo prior to the filing of the 

foreclosure complaint. That fact is undisputed in the record. Accordingly, the 

final judgment was properly entered. 

Affirmed.