16-2695 Yang v. Sessions BIA Loprest, IJ A205 511 039 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 26 th**  **day of March, two thousand eighteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **PIERRE N. LEVAL,** 7 **GERARD E. LYNCH,** 8 **DENNY CHIN,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **NENG-MENG YANG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 16-2695** 16 **NAC** 17 **JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,** 18 **UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Lee Ratner, Law Office of Michael 23 Brown, New York, NY. 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Greg D. Mack, 27 Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation 28 Counsel, Office of Immigration 29 Litigation, United States 30 Department of Justice, Washington, 31 DC. 322 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 3 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 4 Petitioner Neng-Meng Yang, a native and citizen of the 5 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 13, 2016, 6 decision of the BIA affirming a June 16, 2015, decision of an 7 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Yang’s application for 8 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 9 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Neng-Meng Yang, 10 No. A205 511 039 (B.I.A. July 13, 2016), aff’g No. A205 511 11 039 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 16, 2015). We assume the 12 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 13 history in this case. 14 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the 15 BIA, i.e., minus the adverse credibility determination on 16 which the BIA declined to rely. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. 17 Dep’t of Justice , 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 18 Accordingly, we have assumed Yang’s credibility as to past 19 events and his subjective fear of harm. Yan Chen v. Gonzales , 20 417 F.3d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005). 21 Family Planning Claim 22 We remand to the BIA as to Yang’s claim based on his 233 resistance to China’s coercive family planning policy. We 1 have reviewed the agency’s factual findings for substantial 2 evidence, and “[q]uestions of law, as well as the 3 application of legal principles to undisputed facts . . . 4

de novo .” Paloka v. Holder , 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 5 2014). An applicant seeking asylum and withholding of 6 removal must establish that his past persecution or fear of 7 future persecution is “ on account of race, religion, 8 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 9 political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (emphasis 10 added),i.e., that the protected ground is “one central 11 reason” for the persecution. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 12

Castro v. Holder , 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010) 13 (explaining that the burden is on the alien “to establish a 14 sufficiently strong nexus to . . . [a] protected 15 ground[]”). 16 The IJ reasonably determined that Yang was arrested and 17 detained for disorderly conduct rather than resistance to 18 China’s family planning policy. Yang testified that he was 19 arrested after complaining about not being allowed to have 20 a second child and kicking over a chair in the family 21 planning office. The IJ found that the chair-kicking, 22 rather than Yang’s complaining, was the cause of the 234 arrest. Given Yang’s testimony that he was not arrested 1 until he kicked over the chair, that determination was 2 supported by substantial evidence. Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 3 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (deferring to agency inference 4 “[s]o long as an inferential leap is tethered to the 5 evidentiary record”); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 6 546 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (according substantial 7 deference to the agency’s findings of fact and “assessment 8 of competing evidence”). 9 However, the agency overlooked significant evidence in 10 determining that Yang failed to demonstrate a nexus between 11 his opposition to the family planning policy and the 12 altercation with family planning officials when they came to 13 Yang’s house to take his wife for her family planning checkup. 14 The agency focused only on Yang’s concern over his wife’s 15 health and ignored his assertion that he also resisted the 16 officials while expressing his disagreement with the family 17 planning policy. 18 The BIA’s rejection of the adverse credibility 19 determination undermines the IJ’s finding on that point 20 because we must credit Yang’s statements about past events. 21

See Yan Chen , 417 F.3d at 271 (holding that we may not rely 22 on an adverse credibility determination where the BIA 235 explicitly assumed credibility). Assuming Yang’s 1 credibility, it appears that the agency failed to take into 2 account evidence that Yang angered the family planning 3 officials not just by arguing that his wife was not feeling 4 well, but also by insisting that he and his wife were 5 entitled to have a second child and that therefore his wife 6 would no longer attend pregnancy checkups. It was only 7 after he made these statements that he had a physical 8 altercation with the officials. Given this sequence of 9 events, the agency either overlooked Yang’s comments or 10 failed to explain its conclusion that Yang scuffled with 11 officials because of his wife’s health rather than his 12 opposition to the family planning policy. Xiao Ji Chen v. 13 U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) 14 (holding that we cannot make a substantial evidence 15 determination where the agency decision omits facts that 16 are “fundamental to the claim”). 17 The agency further overlooked evidence that the family 18 planning officials considered Yang to be resisting the 19 family planning policy. The officials accused him of 20 openly violating the family planning policy and returned to 21 his home on more than one occasion seeking to arrest him 22 for the violation. See Chun Gao v. Gonzales , 424 F.3d 122, 236 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n imputed political opinion, 1 whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute 2 a ground of political persecution.” (internal quotation 3 marks omitted)). Because we must assume credibility, as 4 the BIA did, we credit Yang’s assertions that these events 5 took place. Yan Chen , 417 F.3d at 271. A failure to 6 consider such evidence warrants remand. Id. at 272 7 (finding “significant error” where the agency “failed to 8 consider relevant evidence”). 9 In addition to overlooking evidence of nexus, the 10 agency overlooked potentially significant evidence relating 11 to Yang’s fear of future persecution on account of his 12 resistance to the family planning policy. Yang asserted 13 that family planning officials still frequently visit his 14 home in an effort to arrest him for violating the policy. 15 As noted above, the fact of those visits must be assumed 16 absent an adverse credibility determination. See id. at 17 271-72. In finding that Yang failed to meet his burden, 18 the agency credited Yang’s wife’s assertion that the family 19 planning officials sought to arrest Yang for smuggling, 20 which it determined was unrelated to the alleged violation 21 of the family planning policy. But Yang’s wife wrote that 22 family planning officials repeatedly came to her home to 237 punish Yang for violating the policy, and only sought to 1 arrest him for smuggling after she told them that he had 2 left for the United States. Remand to the agency is 3 therefore appropriate for further consideration of Yang’s 4 claims based on his resistance to the family planning 5 policy. Id . at 272, 275 (remanding where the agency 6 “failed to consider relevant evidence”); see also Uwais v. 7 U.S. Att’y Gen. , 478 F.3d 513, 519 (2d Cir. 2007) 8 (remanding where we could not “predict with confidence 9 that, applying the correct legal standards and addressing 10 the complete factual record, the agency would again deny 11 [petitioner’s] claim.”). 12 Christianity Claim 13 The agency did not err in denying Yang’s claim for 14 relief based on religious persecution. Yang had to 15 demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution 16 because he did not allege past persecution on that basis. 17 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). A fear of future persecution 18 must be “objectively reasonable,” Ramsameachire v. 19

Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004), and requires 20 “solid support in the record” to demonstrate that the fear 21 is more than “speculative,” Jian Xing Huang v. INS , 421 22 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). An applicant can either 238 “provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility 1 []he will be singled out for persecution” or show “that 2 there is a pattern or practice in his . . . country of 3 nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons 4 similarly situated to the applicant.” Lianping Li v. 5 Lynch , 839 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 6 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)). 7 The agency reasonably found that Yang failed to show 8 that he would be singled out for persecution. Yang 9 admitted that he never experienced any problems practicing 10 his religion while he was in China. The agency also 11 reasonably determined that there is no pattern or practice 12 of persecuting persons similarly situated to Yang. The 13 State Department report on Religious Freedom in China notes 14 that some local authorities let unregistered religious 15 groups practice their beliefs in peace. It also notes 16 that, since 2005, China’s State Administration for 17 Religious Affairs has permitted individuals to hold 18 religious gatherings without registering with the 19 government. Though the report also contains instances of 20 government officials harassing members of underground 21 churches, these instances do not vitiate the agency’s 22 conclusion that Yang failed to demonstrate that his fear of 239 future persecution is objectively reasonable. Siewe , 480 1 F.3d at 167-68 (holding that we defer to the IJ as the 2 finder of fact “[w]here there are two permissible views of 3 the evidence”). 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5 GRANTED IN PART and the case is REMANDED for further 6 consideration of Yang’s fear of persecution on account of 7 his resistance to China’s coercive family planning policy, 8 but DENIED IN REMAINING PART as to Yang’s claim of 9 religious persecution. As we have completed our review, 10 and the pending motion for a stay of removal in this 11 petition is DENIED as moot. 12

FOR THE COURT: 13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 14