The Honor able Richa rd J. S ullivan, United States District J udg e for the Southern * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 08-6091-c r USA v. Spivack U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT AM EN DE D SU M M AR Y O RD ER R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y O R D E R D O N O T H A V E P R E C E D E N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A S UM M ARY ORDE R F I L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 2 0 0 7 , I S PE RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY FED ERA L RU LE O F AP PELLA TE P R O C EDU R E 32. 1 A N D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L R U LE 32. 1. 1. W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER I N A D O C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T , A P A R TY M U ST C I TE E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L AP PE N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OT A T I ON “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY ORDER M US T S E RVE A COPY OF I T ON ANY PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 12 day th of May , two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: ROBERT D. SACK,

ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , RI CHARD J . SUL L IVAN,

District Judge
. *

________________________________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appellee , v. No. 08-6091-c r WARR EN SPI VACK,

Defendant-

Appellant
.

________________________________________________ F or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt: S US AN G. KEL L MAN , Br ookly n, NY (Andre a G. Hir sch, Ne w York, NY on the brief

)-2-

For Appellee : P A T RI CK S EA N S IN C LA IR , As sis tant Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y (Jo Ann M. Navicka s, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ) for B e n t o nJ. Campbell, United States Attorney for the E astern D istrict of NewYork, Br ookly n, NY Appea l from the United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Ne w York (Korma n, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

be and he re by is AF F IRM ED
. Def endant Warr en Spivack a ppeals fr om a judg ment of convic tion entere d on October 23, 2008, followinga jury

trial, convictinghim of two counts of distribution and five counts of possession of child pornography . We assume the par ties’ familiarity

with the fac ts and proce dural history

of the c ase. Spivack ar gues on appe al that he wa s denied a fair tr ial due to the misconduct of the prosec utor. Specifica lly , Spivack ar gues that (1) the prosec utor allowed one of the g overnme nt’s witnesses to testify

falsely in a hig hly

prejudicia l way ; (2) the pr osecutor’ s openingand summation statements to the jury wer e improper ly

calc ulated to appe al to the jury ’s emotions and inflame the jury ’s pre

judices; and (3) the prosec utor violated the g overnme nt’s discovery ob lig atio ns . “A de fenda

nt’s conviction may

be vac ated if pr osecutoria l misconduct cause d substantial prejudice implicating the r ight to due pr ocess.” Un ite d S tates v . F e ll , 531 F.3d 197, 209 ( 2d Cir. 2008). A prose cutor ha s a funda mental obligation to ensure that the testimony he elicits is true. Shih W ei Su v. Filion , 335 F.3d 119, 126- 27 (2d Cir. 2003). F urther, a “prose cutor should not
us e argume nts c a lc ulate d to inf lame the pa ssi on s o r p re

jud ic e s o f t

he jur y ,” and wh e re “ the on ly-3-

conce ivable purpose of the prose cutor’s [rema rks] was to prejudice the jury ,” a pr osecutor’ s
rema rks ar e improper
. United States v. Modic a , 663 F.2d 1173, 1180- 81 (2d Cir. 1981) (inter nal qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . T o w arr ant r e ve rs a l, h ow e ve r, the pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t mu st “ so infec t[ ] t he trial with unfa irness as to make the re sulting convic tion a denial of due proce ss.” United States v. Elias , 2 8 5 F
. 3 d 1 8 3 , 1 9 0 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( i n t e r

n a l qu o t at i o nm ar

k s o m i tt e d )
. In assessingwhether

prosec utorial misconduct ca used “substantial pre

judice,” w e conside r “the
sever ity of the misconduct, the me asure s adopted to cur e it, and the c erta inty of convic tion in the absenc e of the misconduct.” United States v. Me lendez , 57 F.3d 238, 241 ( 2d Cir. 1995). W e c o n c l u d e th ata l l o w i n gth e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s w i tn e s s t o t e s t i f

y f a l s e l y i na m at e r i a l w ay, albeit unknowing ly , constituted sever e misconduct. See Shih W ei Su , 335 F.3d at 126 (“The prosec utor is an offic er of the cour t whose duty

is to present a f

orce ful and truthful c ase to the jury . . . .”). Elicitingfalse te stimony that Spivack was a

pedophile wa s outrag eous. “[E]ven when a prosec utor elicits testimony that he or she knows or should know to be fa lse,” howe ver, “a show ing of

prejudice is require d.” Id . at 12 6- 27 . Co ns ide ri ngthe se ve ri ty of the mis c on du c t, the me a sure s a do pte d to c ur e it, and the c e rt a int

y of c onvic tio n in

the a bs e nc e of the mis c on du c t, see M elende z , 57 F.3d at 241, we conc lude that there was no pre judice her e. F ir st, wh ile a llo wi nga

g ov e rnme nt w itn e ss t o te sti fy fa lse ly is s e ve re mis c on du c t, i ts
sever ity is mit igated by

the fa ct that there is no evidence that the prosec utor knew that the witness’s testimony

was fa lse, see M

odica , 663 F.2d at 1181 (“[a]mong the e lements weighed . . .
are the e xtent to wh ic h th e mis c on du c t w a s inte nti on a l” ), and the fa c t th at de fe ns e c ouns e l a lso did not init ially

notice that the testimony was fa lse. In addition, the district court adopte d a strongmeasure to cure the misconduct. The district c ourt instructed the jury that the witness’s-4-

“testimony

was untrue and does not c omport with the ag ent’s re port of his interview w ith Mr. Spivack,” a

nd direc ted the jury

“to disreg ard it complete ly except inasmuch as it af

fec ts y our evaluation of the cre dibilit y of the witness.” “[T] he re cord,” thus, “disclose[s] emphatic c urative instructions by

the trial judg e.” United States v. Friedm an , 909 F.2d 705, 710 ( 2d Cir. 1990). Finally , conviction was highly cer tain absent this false te stimony . The g overnme nt presente d evidenc e that Spivack state d that he wa s awa re that he was sha

ringhis files. It also introduced evidenc e that Spivack wa s savvy about computer s and had c hang ed his softwar e setting s, making it w a s h ighly

un lik e ly that he ha d in a dv e rt e ntl y sh are d f ile s. By contra st, we do not find the prose cutor’s somewhat lurid description of the photogr aphs at issue duringthe cour se of its openingstatements to constitute misconduct. The g overnme nt was entitled to inform the jury about the photographs Spivack a lleg edly possessed and distributed, and to under score the moral implications of his crime. See U nited States v. Simmons , 923 F.2d 934, 955 ( 2d Cir. 1991) (holdingthat, in heroin possession and distribution
case , the fa ct that the prose cutor’s r efe renc es to the “c ollapsed veins of junkies” and “sw ollen arms,” w ere “blunt and to the point” wa s “not a ba sis to find them improper ”). While it is true that Spivack was not on trial f or molesting or

photogr aphingchildren, a principal re ason po sse ssi on

and dis tr ibutio n o f c hil d p or

no g ra phy are ill e g a l is that c hil dr e n w e re se xua lly assaulted or

otherwise a

bused in the cour se of its production, and be cause such beha vior helps maintain a mar

ket for material de pendent on the inf liction of such har

m. See A shcroft v. Free Sp e e c h Co al. , 535 U.S. 234, 240, 249 (2002). Although the se re marks may not have c onstitut ed misconduct standingalone, howe ver, we f ind them troubling in lig ht of the fa lse testimony elicited in this case r eg ardingSpivack’sThe pa nel agree s that the prosec utor’s openingrema rks did not constitute misconduct. 1 J udg e Sullivan, seeinglittl e link betwee n the openingrema rks and the f

alse testimony , also does not find them inappropriate nor doe s he conc lude that they take on a dditional significa nce in lig ht o f th att e s t i m o ny. -5- status as a “ pedophile” who “eng ag ed in sexual activity with a child.” Tr . Trans., Ma rch 6, 2008, 54 1. B e c a

us e of the natur e of

thi s f a lse te sti mony , th e re pe ate d r e mark s li nk ingthe de fe nd ant t o 1 “childre n’s pain and tor

ture” and to “r eal little g irls . . . beingtortured a nd sodomiz ed, being rape d,” and be ing “ subject to the violent experience s,” Gov’t Ope ning Stateme nt, 63, 66, take on additional signific ance . Havingcar efully considere d the trial re cord, how ever , we c onclude that the se state me nts , in

c onte xt, di d n ot c on sti tut e mis c on du c t, n or did the y “ so inf e c t[] the tr ia l w ith unfairne ss as to make the r esulting c onviction a denial of due proc ess.” Elias , 285 F.3d at 190.

Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s r e fe re nc e s to L oli ta in c los ingwe re mor e pr ob le matic . It is dif fi c ult to perc eive a

ny purpose f

or them other tha

n to inflame the jury
. See M odica , 663 F.2d at 1180-81. Th e pr os e c uto r’ s L oli ta

re mark s w e re ob

je c te d to , h ow e ve r, the ob je c tio n w a s su sta ine d, and thi s line of commenta

ry , which appe ars to us to have been la rg ely unintelligible, ende d. The prosec utor’s summation was otherw ise proper and this single la

pse did not result in substantial prejudice
. See Elias , 285 F.3d at 190 (“[R] emar ks of the prose cutor in summation do not amount to a denial of

due proc ess unless they

constitute egreg ious misconduct.”) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Althoug h regrettable , we do not think any of the prose cutor’s r emar ks, or all of the m in the a g g re g ate , w e re su ff

ic ie ntl y e g re g iou s to amou

nt t o a de nia l of Spi va c k’ s d

ue pr oc e ss ri g hts
. We thus conclude that Spivack w as not denied a fair tr ial due to the fa lse testimony of-6-

one of the g overnme nt’s witness or the prose cutor’s ope ning a nd closingrema

rks. We have considere d the re mainder of Spivack’s ar guments conce rningprosec utorial misconduct and f ind the m a lso to b e wi tho ut m e ri t. Spi va c k a lso a lle g e s o n a

pp e a l th at hi s tr ia l w a s unf a ir du e to t he ine ff e c tiv e ne ss o f h is
c ouns e l. We de c lin e to h e ar t his c la im i n th e fi rs t in sta nc e , e sp e c ia lly

be c a us e Spi va c k me re ly challeng es his trial counsel’ s overa ll strategy and we are not in a position t o evaluate his trial counsel’s ove rall per formanc e throughout the case
. See U nited States v. Stearns , 479 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (pe r cur iam) (“ Since claims of inef fec tive assistance should be made in the first instance to the district c ourt, we g ener ally decline to he ar suc h claims on direc t appea l.”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Spivack may raise this cla im in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 m otion. Acc ording ly , for the f

oreg oing r easons, the judgment of the district cour t is hereby AF F IRM ED
.

FOR THE COURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK