NO. 04-15-00268-CV 

 

IN THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS 

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 

 

AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., PAUL 

CAMPBELL, ROD SEAFORD, AND CHARLES OLIVER, 

Appellants 

v. 

 AUGUSTUS BRAY 

 Appellee 

Original Proceeding from the 57th Judicial District Court

in Bexar County, Texas, The Honorable David A. Canales, Presiding

 

 

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF 

 

 DANNICK VILLASEÑOR-HERNANDEZ 

 Texas Bar No. 24072713 

 RUTH G. MALINAS 

 Texas Bar No. 08399350

 Plunkett & Griesenbeck, Inc. 

 Catholic Life Building, Suite 900

 1635 N.E. Loop 410 

 San Antonio, Texas 78209 

 (210) 734-7092 (telephone) 

 (210) 734-0379 (facsimile) 

dhernandez@pg-law.com

 rmalinas@pg-law.com 

 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 

 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

04-15-00268-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

7/14/2015 8:05:30 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 7/14/2015 8:05:30 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................2

I. Introduction.............................................................................4

II. Reply to Appellee’s Enforceability Argument ........................5

A. The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Illusory...................5

B. The Arbitration Agreement to which Bray Agreed To Is 

Valid. ..............................................................................9

C. Campbell, Seaford, and Oliver Can Seek Enforcement 

of the Arbitration Agreement Contained in AAU 

National Policies. .........................................................10

III. Bray’s Claims are Within the Scope of the Broad Arbitration 

Agreement. ............................................................................11

IV. Reply to Bray’s Claim that the Arbitration Agreement is 

Unconscionable......................................................................13

A. Bray Cannot Rely on Limitations Provision and 

Punitive Damages Provision to Render the Entire 

Arbitration Agreement Unconscionable......................13

B. Bray Failed to Show The Arbitration Forum Is Cost 

Prohibitive....................................................................16

C. Bray Did Not Prove the Arbitration Agreement Was 

Substantively Unconscionable.....................................18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................................21
2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

CASES

Aspen Technology v. Shasha, 

253 S.W.3d 857 (Tex.App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).................. 8

Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 

280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002)........................................................................ 13

Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 

344 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2003).................................................................... 13, 14

In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 

172 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2005) ......................................................................... 5, 9

In re C&H News Co., 

133 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App – Corpus Christi 2003, orig. proceeding) ............ 7

In re Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 

186 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2006) ........................................................................... 12

In re Halliburton Co., 

80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002). .............................................................................. 6

In re Olshan Foundation Repair Co., LLC, 

328 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. 2010) ........................................................................... 19

In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 

195 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. 2006) ............................................................................. 5

In re Poly-Am., L.P., 

262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008). .................................................................... 14, 15

In re Polyamerica, 

296 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2009) ............................................................................... 9

Long v. BDP Intern., Inc.,

919 F.Supp.2d 832 (S.D.Tex. 2013)........................................................ 13, 14

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 

49 F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D. Tex.1998)................................................................. 18

Quinn v. EMC Corp., 

109 F.Supp.2d, 681 (S.D. Tx. 2000)............................................................... 18

Security Service Federal Credit Union v. Sanders, 

264 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2008, no pet.)....................... 14, 15

Tenet Healthcare, Ltd. v. Cooper, 

960 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, review dismissed 

w.o.j.)................................................................................................................. 5

Vandeventer v. All American Life & Cas. Co.,

101 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) ............................... 5

Wade v. Austin, 

524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1975, no writ) ................................. 17
3

Webb v. Investacorp., Inc., 

89 F.3d 252 (5th Cir.1996)............................................................................. 17

 

STATUTES

9 U.S.C. §3............................................................................................................ 9

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §171.001(a) ......................................................... 9
4

I. Introduction 

The trial court erred in denying Appellants’ Motion to Compel 

Arbitration because Appellee failed to establish that the arbitration 

agreement contained in AAU’s National Policies was illusory or 

unconscionable. There was a mutual promise to arbitrate all civil 

disputes, and as such, Bray cannot refuse to submit his claims in the 

arbitral forum. As officers and/or directors of the AAU, Appellants 

Campbell, Oliver and Seaford can invoke the arbitration agreement 

with regard to Bray’s claims against them. The broad arbitration 

agreement contained in the AAU National Policies encompasses Bray’s 

causes of actions made the basis of his suit even if they were not

specifically described in the provision. 

Although Bray includes numerous reasons to find the arbitration 

agreement unconscionable, he failed to bring forth any evidence in 

support of his defense. The severability clause contained in the 

arbitration agreement prohibits Appellee from relying on the 

limitations and punitive damages provisions to render the entire 

arbitration agreement unconscionable.
5

II. Reply to Appellee’s Enforceability Argument 

 

A. The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Illusory. 

In determining the validity of arbitration agreements subject to 

the Federal Arbitration Act, state law principles governing the 

formation of contracts apply. In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 

S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2006). Arbitration agreements, like other 

contracts, must be supported by consideration. Id. An illusory promise 

is a promise that fails to bind the promisor, who retains the option of 

discontinuing performance. Vandeventer v. All American Life & Cas. 

Co., 101 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). When 

illusory promises are all that support a purported bilateral contract, 

there is no consideration to support the contract. Tenet Healthcare, Ltd. 

v. Cooper, 960 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, rev

dismissed w.o.j.). Consideration can be the bilateral promise to 

arbitrate. In re Palm Harbor Homes at 676. When an arbitration 

agreement is part of an underlying contract, the rest of the parties’ 

agreement provides the consideration required to form a valid contract. 

In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex. 2005). 
6

Appellee claims that AAU’s arbitration agreement is illusory 

because it did not contain a “savings clause” requiring notification of 

modifications or termination. In Halliburton, an at-will employee 

brought an action alleging discrimination. In re Halliburton Co., 80 

S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002). Halliburton, the employer, was denied their 

motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement 

contained in their dispute resolution program. Id. The employer sent 

notice to the employee advising him that continuing employment would 

constitute acceptance of the new plan. Id. at 567. The Texas Supreme 

Court determined the arbitration agreement in an employer-employee 

relationship was not illusory, in part because the employee had notice of 

the proposed changes to his at-will employment contract and accepted

them by continuing to work after a specified date. Id. at 573. Here, 

although amendments were made to the arbitration agreement in 2006 

and 2009, Bray agreed to be bound to the revised language year after 

year with the renewal of his membership. Bray did not offer any 

contrary evidence. There is no evidence for this Court to consider that 

supports his allegation that AAU’s amendments and addition were done 

absent any notice or prospective-only requirements. (Appellee’s Brief at 
7

p.11). Further, AAU is a volunteer organization. This fact distinguishes 

the instant case from Halliburton which involved an employer-employee 

relationship. If Bray did not agree to any revisions to the arbitration 

agreement, Bray could have chosen to not participate in any further 

AAU events and terminate his membership. However, Bray chose to 

continue his involvement with the AAU as a member and District 

Officer. 

In C&H News Co., the Court concluded the arbitration agreement 

was illusory because the employee handbook contained a provision in 

which the company expressly reserved the right to unilaterally amend 

the handbook, and in essence, could unilaterally change the scope of the 

arbitration agreement. In re C&H News Co., 133 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. 

App – Corpus Christi 2003, orig. proceeding). AAU’s arbitration 

agreement does not contain such a reservation. (CR:41-42). There was

no evidence before the trial court supporting Appellee’s contention that 

AAU could avoid its promise to arbitrate. 

In fact, in Aspen Technology, the Court was faced with 

interpreting the following provision:
8

The incentive compensation plan administrator (Vice 

President of Worldwide Sales Operations) is responsible 

for the interpretation of the plan. If the meaning or 

interpretation of the plan wording requires clarification 

after consideration of all the facts, the Senior Vice 

President, Worldwide Sales, and Business Development 

(SVP Sales) or his/her designee, will issue a written ruling, 

which will be final. In addition, the SVP Sales will be 

responsible for periodic review of the plan and may make 

revisions from time to time.

Aspen Technology v. Shasha, 253 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex.App. – Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)(emphasis added). Despite the last sentence, 

the court concluded that Aspen did not retain a unilateral, unrestricted 

right to modify or terminate the arbitration provision in that 

agreement. Id. at 863. As a matter of law, the arbitration agreement 

was not illusory. Id.

AAU’s arbitration agreement unambiguously binds both the AAU 

and its members be bound by the promise to arbitrate. Further, the 

arbitration agreement does not contain any language indicating that 

AAU retains the unilateral right to modify or terminate the arbitration 

agreement. Therefore, the arbitration agreement is not illusory and 

should be enforced.
9

B. The Arbitration Agreement to which Bray Agreed To Is 

Valid. 

Appellee argues he only signed documents in his capacity as 

Governor of the AAU South District, and thus cannot not be bound to 

the arbitration agreement individually. Neither the FAA nor Texas law 

requires that arbitration clauses be signed as long as it is written and 

agreed to by the parties. See 9 U.S.C. §3; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§171.001(a); see In re Polyamerica, 296 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2009); In re 

AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex. 2005). The first 

sentence of the AAU arbitration agreement states that “[b]y applying 

for AAU membership [...] or entering any AAU event,” the member or 

participant has agreed to submit any civil disputes to arbitration. 

(CR:41). Even though Appellee claims he did not sign anything in his 

individual capacity, Bray agreed to be bound by the AAU Code, which 

includes the National Policies and arbitration agreement, when he 

applied and renewed his membership and paid his annual membership 

dues. (CR:44). Appellee cannot deny that he received notice and agreed

to the terms each year when he renewed his membership. 

Further, at the time of the incident, Bray was acting in his official 

capacity on the AAU’s Jury of Appeals. (CR:3). Although the arbitration 
10

agreement applies to applicants, members, and entrants, at all times 

relevant to the claims made in the lawsuit, Bray was much more than 

an AAU member – he was an elected officer for the AAU. As such, Bray 

had sufficient notice of the arbitration agreement, agreed to be bound 

by it, and under Texas law cannot refuse to abide by it.

C. Campbell, Seaford, and Oliver Can Seek Enforcement of the 

Arbitration Agreement Contained in AAU National Policies. 

Appellee seeks to avoid arbitration by claiming Campbell, Seaford 

and Oliver are not agents of AAU, and thus cannot invoke the AAU 

arbitration provision. Appellee’s argument is defeated, however, by his 

own petition in which Bray predicates AAU’s liability on allegations 

that the individual appellants were acting in the course and scope of 

employment by AAU and in furtherance of AAU’s business when they 

committed the alleged acts leading to Bray’s lawsuit. (CR:7). Appellee 

cannot have it both ways. 

At the time of the incident made the basis of the Bray’s lawsuit, 

Appellants Campbell, Oliver, and Seaford were all officers and/or 

directors of the AAU fulfilling the duties of their respective positions.

(CR:3) The alleged acts Bray complains of took place during an AAUsponsored event. (CR:3). Contrary to Appellee’s argument, Campbell, 
11

Oliver and Seaford did not expressly agree that they are not agents of 

the AAU. (Appellee’s Brief at p.20). The “Agency” provision in the 

National Policies simply states that “membership” itself does not create 

an agency relationship. (CR:45). The AAU does not want members 

across the country representing themselves to be agents of the AAU 

without their written authorization. In this case, all three individual 

Appellants were acting as officers and/or directors rather than merely 

an AAU member present at an AAU-sponsored event. 

Moreover, Appellants Campbell, Seaford and Oliver seek 

enforcement of the arbitration agreement contained in the AAU 

National Policies based on their AAU membership. They agreed to be 

bound by the same arbitration agreement as Appellee did. Further, the 

arbitration agreement states “[t]he parties agree that the binding 

arbitration shall be in lieu of any litigation by and between all of the 

parties related to the dispute.” (CR:41). 

III. Bray’s Claims are Within the Scope of the Broad Arbitration 

Agreement. 

In In re Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., Andrea Martinez, an employee 

of Dillard for almost twenty years, filed a lawsuit against Dillard 

alleging defamation after being terminated. In re Dillard Dept. Stores, 
12

Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006). Martinez filed a lawsuit against 

Dillard, its district manager, and two unnamed employees. Id. Dillard 

moved to compel arbitration. Martinez argued her defamation claim 

was not within the scope of the agreement, which specifically listed 

claims subject to arbitration. Id. at 516. However, the Texas Supreme 

Court found that defamation was covered under the arbitration 

agreement because defamation is a personal injury (one of the specific 

claims subject to arbitration), and directed the trial court to order all 

claims proceed to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.

The AAU arbitration agreement was purposefully drafted to 

include a broad range of claims, and thus “civil disputes” was used to 

identify the claims that would be subject to arbitration. (CR:41). By 

applying for membership with AAU, an applicant agrees to comply with 

all provisions contained in the AAU Code, including the arbitration 

agreement. (CR:43). Further, when Bray submitted his annual 

membership dues, he agreed to be bound by the AAU Code, including 

all AAU Policies, including the arbitration agreement. (CR:44). 

Therefore, Bray should be bound and compelled to arbitrate his claims 
13

filed against AAU and the individual Appellants, Campbell, Oliver, and 

Seaford. 

IV. Reply to Bray’s Claim that the Arbitration Agreement is 

Unconscionable 

A. Bray Cannot Rely on Limitations Provision and Punitive 

Damages Provision to Render the Entire Arbitration 

Agreement Unconscionable. 

When determining if an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, 

the Court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the formation of the agreement. The “only cases under Texas law in 

which an agreement was found procedurally unconscionable involve 

situations in which one of the parties appears to have been incapable of 

understanding the agreement.” Long v. BDP Intern., Inc., 919 

F.Supp.2d 832, 845 (S.D.Tex. 2013)(quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. 

Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir.2002).

Bray argues the arbitration agreement is substantively 

unconscionable because it imposes a one-year limitations period and 

prohibits an award of punitive or exemplary damages. Even if these 

provisions were “unconscionable”, the agreement’s severance clause

(CR:41) would allow those provisions to be severed without invalidating 

the entire argument. Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2003); 
14

Security Service Federal Credit Union v. Sanders, 264 S.W.3d 292, 300 

(Tex. App. – San Antonio 2008, no pet.).

In Hadnot, the arbitration agreement precluded the arbitrator 

from awarding any punitive or exemplary damages. See Id. at 478. The 

Fifth Circuit held that the punitive damage provision did not render the 

arbitration agreement unconscionable. Id. Even though the agreement 

at issue did not have a severance clause, the Court held that the 

unenforceable provision could be severed because doing so still allowed 

the arbitration clause to remain capable of achieving its purpose. Id.

The relevant inquiry is “whether or not the parties would have entered 

into the agreement absent the unenforceable provisions.” Long at 846

(quoting In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 360 (Tex. 2008). In Long, 

the Court found that severance of a one-year limitations period 

provision was appropriate. Id. In any event, here Appellants have not 

asserted limitations. 

In In re Poly-Am., the arbitration agreement contained the 

following severability clause:

“Should any term of this Agreement be declared illegal, 

unenforceable, or unconscionable, the remaining terms of the 

Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. To the extent 

possible, both Employee and Company desire that the 
15

Arbitrator modify the term(s) declared to be illegal, 

unenforceable, or unconscionable in such a way as to retain 

the intended meaning of the terms as closely as possible.”

In re Poly-Am. at 860. 

With regard to Bray and AAU, there is no evidence that the 

parties would not have entered into the agreement absent the one-year 

limitations period and provision prohibiting punitive or exemplary 

damages. AAU’s arbitration agreement contains a severability clause 

similar to the one found in In re Poly-Am., which expressly states: 

If any portion of the arbitration agreement shall be 

declared invalid or unenforceable, the rest of the 

agreement (to so arbitrate) shall remain in full force 

and effect. 

(CR:41). By seeking enforcement of the entire general arbitration 

agreement, AAU did not waive its right to have the punitive damages or 

statute of limitations clause severed. As a result, Appellee cannot rely 

on the limitations or punitive damage provision to render the entire 

arbitration agreement unconscionable. In order to promote public policy 

favoring arbitration, Bray should be compelled to arbitrate his claims 

against all Appellants. See Security Service Federal Credit Union v. 

Sanders, 264 S.W.3d 292, 301 (Tex.App – San Antonio 2008, no pet.)
16

B. Bray Failed to Show The Arbitration Forum Is Cost 

Prohibitive. 

Bray argues that arbitration agreement is substantively 

unconscionable because the costs imposed are excessive and would 

prevent Bray from asserting his rights in an arbitration proceeding. 

(Appellee’s Brief at p.34). However, he failed to bring forth any evidence 

to show that arbitration of his claims would be unconscionable on the 

ground that the arbitral forum was cost prohibitive. Appellee claims the 

costs are excessive because he is unable to pay the arbitration fees and 

costs and cannot afford to travel to Florida for arbitration. (Appellee’s 

Brief at p.34). However, there is no evidence in the record regarding his 

financial position which prohibits him from paying the arbitration fees.

Bray’s conclusory affidavit states he cannot afford it, but no evidence to 

support that statement was included. In addition, Bray claims this 

litigation is of no cost to him because the contingency fee agreement 

does not obligate him to pay for litigation expenses unless a recovery is 

made on his behalf. (CR:111). 

Bray also argues that being forced to arbitrate in Florida would be 

a “serious financial burden on Appellee and would effectively prevent 
17

[him] from asserting his rights in an arbitration proceeding.” (Appellee’s 

Brief at p. 35-36). 

In Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., the court upheld an arbitration 

provision that called for the Texas-based plaintiff to proceed with 

arbitration in the county where the Florida defendant maintained its 

executive offices. Webb v. Investacorp., Inc., 89 F.3d 252 (5th Cir.1996)

The court held that “while the venue and cost provisions may be 

disfavorable to the Webbs, the fact that a bargain is a hard one does not 

entitle a party to be relieved therefrom if he assumed if fairly and 

voluntarily.” Webb at 259 (5th Cir.1996)(quoting Wade v. Austin, 524 

S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1975, no writ)). As in Webb, Bray, 

a Texas resident, agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement that 

had a Florida venue provision, should be compelled to arbitrate his 

claim in Florida. 

The argument that Bray would have to seek new counsel in 

Florida, which may involve an hourly-fee arrangement instead of a 

contingency fee arrangement, is insufficient to render the arbitration 

agreement unconscionable. Further, Appellee has failed to cite a single 
18

case to support his position with regard to the forum selection contained 

in the arbitration agreement.

C. Bray Did Not Prove the Arbitration Agreement Was 

Substantively Unconscionable. 

Bray has also failed to show that the terms of the arbitration 

agreement were so “one-sided or oppressive” they constitute substantive 

unconscionability. Quinn v. EMC Corp., 109 F.Supp.2d, 681, 686 (S.D. 

Tx. 2000). Bray failed to offer any evidence showing that “no man in his 

senses and not under a delusion would enter into and ... no honest and 

fair person would accept a contract on such terms.” Id.(quoting 

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 49 F.Supp.2d 529,534 (S.D. Tex.1998)). 

Under the terms of AAU’s arbitration agreement, both parties agree to 

forego civil litigation and submit all civil disputes to arbitration. 

Nothing in the agreement is so one-sided or oppressive that it is 

unconscionable. Bray has cited no case in which the provisions about 

which he complains of invalidated an entire arbitration agreement.

Although Bray argues various reasons he claims should justify 

finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable, he did not present 

any evidence for the trial court to make that determination. The 

affidavits contained in the record (Bray’s and his attorney’s affidavit) 
19

are conclusory and speculative, and do not meet the standard required 

to show that Bray will incur excessive costs in arbitrating his claims. 

Bray submitted no evidence with regard to the expected cost differential 

between arbitration and litigation, which the most important of three

factors the Texas Supreme Court considered when determining if an 

arbitration agreement was unconscionable. In re Olshan Foundation 

Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 893-894 (Tex. 2010). As such, this 

Court should disregard Bray’s reasons as, without evidence, they cannot 

support his substantive unconscionability argument.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 

For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that 

this Court reverse or vacate the trial court’s April 14, 2015 Order 

Denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Abate 

Proceedings Pending Arbitration and order the trial Court to abate the 

proceedings so that the Parties may proceed with arbitration in Orange 

County, Florida. Appellants pray for such other and further relief as 

they may be entitled. 
20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the 

undersigned certifies this Appellants’ Reply Brief complies with the 

type-volume limitations of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 

9.4(i)(2)(C). The undersigned prepared the Appellants’ Brief using 

Microsoft Word 2013 and is relying on that software’s word-count 

function.

Exclusive of the exempted portions listed in Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(C), the brief contains 2,999 words. 

 Respectfully submitted,

 

 LEWIN PLUNKETT 

Texas Bar No. 16079000

DANNICK VILLASEÑOR-HERNANDEZ 

Texas Bar No. 24072713

 Plunkett & Griesenbeck, Inc. 

Catholic Life Building, Suite 900

1635 N.E. Loop 410 

San Antonio, Texas 78209

(210) 734-7092 (telephone)

(210) 734-0379 (facsimile)

lplunkett@pg-law.com

dhernandez@pg-law.com

/s/ Dannick Villaseñor-Hernandez 

DANNICK VILLASEÑOR-HERNANDEZ 

 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS 
21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

This will certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

Appellants’ Brief has been forwarded this 14th day of July, 2015, to the 

following attorneys of record via the method stated:

Jerry Galow Via E-Mail

Justin Studdard Via E-Mail

Galow & Smith, P.C.

1204 Nueces

Austin, Texas 78701

 /s/ Dannick Villaseñor-Hernandez 

 DANNICK VILLASEÑOR-HERNANDEZ