alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
---

Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS



> 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of mPhase
>   Technologies, Inc.;
>   2. Based on my knowledge, this report
>   does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
>   material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
>   circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
>   respect to the period covered by this report;
>   3. Based on my knowledge, the
>   financial statements, and other financial information included in this report,
>   fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
>   operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
>   presented in this report;
>   4. The registrant's other certifying
>   officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
>   controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
>   15d-15(e)) for the registrant's and have:
>   1. Designed such disclosure
>     controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures
>     to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
>     relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
>     known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period
>     in which this report is being prepared;
>     2. Evaluated the effectiveness of
>     eth registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
>     report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
>     and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
>     such evaluation; and
>     3. Disclosed in this report any
>     change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that
>     occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the
>     registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
>     materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
>     registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and
>   5. The registrant's other certifying
>   officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
>   control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
>   committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
>   equivalent functions):
>   1. All significant deficiencies and
>     material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
>     financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
>     registrants' ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
>     information; and
>     2. Any fraud, whether or not
>     material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
>     role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

/s/ Ronald A. Durando 
Ronald A. Durando 
Chief Executive Officer 
May 19, 2005

---
#### Maria Auqui et al., Respondents, v Seven Thirty One Limited Partnership et al., Appellants.

Submitted July 30, 2012;

decided August 28, 2012

Motion by New York State Trial Lawyers Association for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed.
H. Res. 46 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

January 16, 2019. 

Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are 

hereby, elected to the following standing committee of the 

House of Representatives: 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: Ms. Lofgren, Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Deutch, 

Ms. Bass, Mr. Richmond, Mr. Jeffries, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. 

Swalwell of California, Mr. Ted Lieu of California, Mr. 

Raskin, Ms. Jayapal, Mrs. Demings, Mr. Correa, Ms. Scanlon, Ms. Garcia of Texas, Mr. Neguse, Mrs. McBath, Mr. 

Stanton, Ms. Dean, Ms. Mucarsel-Powell, and Ms. Escobar. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 121 (Thursday, June 25, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 30328]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-14974]



[[Page 30328]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration


Notice of a Change in Status of an Extended Benefit (EB) Period 
for Kentucky

AGENCY: Employment and Training Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces a change in benefit period eligibility 
under the EB program for Kentucky.
    The following change has occurred since the publication of the last 
notice regarding Kentucky's EB status:
    <bullet> Kentucky has modified its law by adding a total 
unemployment rate (TUR) trigger retroactive to February 1, 2009. As a 
result, Kentucky has retroactively triggered ``on'' to an extended 
benefit period for weeks of unemployment beginning February 22, 2009, 
and ``on'' to a high unemployment period (HUP) for weeks of 
unemployment beginning April 12, 2009. Eligible unemployed workers will 
be able to collect up to an additional 20 weeks of unemployment 
insurance benefits.

Information for Claimants

    The duration of benefits payable in the EB program, and the terms 
and conditions on which they are payable, are governed by the Federal-
State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, as amended, and 
the operating instructions issued to the states by the U.S. Department 
of Labor. In the case of a state beginning an HUP, the State Workforce 
Agency will furnish a written notice of potential entitlement to each 
individual who has exhausted all rights to regular benefits and is 
potentially eligible for EB (20 CFR 615.13(c)(1)). Persons who believe 
they may be entitled to EB or who wish to inquire about their rights 
under the program should contact their State Workforce Agency.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Gibbons, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Workforce 
Security, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Frances Perkins Bldg. Room S-
4231, Washington, DC 20210, telephone number (202) 693-3008 (this is 
not a toll-free number) or by e-mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#482f212a2a27263b663b2b273c3c082c2724662f273e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="56313f34343938257825353922221632393a78313920">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Signed in Washington, DC, this 19th day of June 2009.
Douglas F. Small,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Employment and Training Administration.
[FR Doc. E9-14974 Filed 6-24-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FW-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### LIEBERMAN et al. v. MERKIN et al.

No. 454.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania,

Feb. 6, 1940.

Leonard L. Kalish, of Philadelphia, for plaintiffs.

Harold T. Stowell and William H. Finckel, Jr., both of Washington, D.C., and Bernard Eskin, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

It seems clear that the real objective of the intervener’s counterclaim, as well as his motion to strike the plaintiff’s demand for jury trial and his opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, is to maneuver the plaintiff out of his right to the jury trial which he has demanded.

I can see no reason at all why the complaint cannot be amended so as to eliminate the payer for relief by way of injunction and profits, nor can I find any authority for the proposition that asking for an injunction as well as damages amounts to a waiver of a request for jury trial. Certainly it is not an irrevocable waiver, and, if it could be held to be a waiver at all, I would permit the plaintiff to reinstate his demand under Rule 6(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

I fully agree with the plaintiff that the whole basis for allowing counterclaims for declaratory judgments in patent cases has been removed by the new Rules, which provide that a plaintiff cannot withdraw his complaint without prejudice, except upon allowance by the Court. Adoption of declaratory judgment procedure is discretionary with the Court, and where there is nothing to be gained by it, and it can determine nothing which cannot be determined in a pending suit it should not be allowed.

The part of the intervener’s counterclaim which may have been intended to state a case of unfair competition does not actually do so. All that is averred is that the plaintiffs have charged the intervener with infringement and threatened *316to bring suit against him. There is no allegation that the plaintiff is interfering with his customers or business.

The allowance of the intervention brings the matter to the point where the rights of all parties can be determined in this suit, and the plaintiff is entitled to have a jury trial if he insists upon it.

The motion to strike the counterclaim is granted.

The motion to amend the complaint is granted.

The motion to strike the demand for jury trial is denied.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00740-CR

IN RE Marcus A. COOPER

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 11, 2013

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

Relator Marcus Cooper filed this pro se petition for writ of mandamus on October 24, 2013, 

complaining of the trial court’s failure to rule on a pending motion for speedy trial. Relator has 

been appointed trial counsel to represent him in connection with his pending criminal charges. We 

conclude that any original proceeding on the issue presented should be presented by relator’s trial 

counsel. Relator is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The absence of a right to hybrid representation means relator’s pro se

mandamus petition will be treated as presenting nothing for this court’s review. See id.; see also 

Gray v. Shipley, 877 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding). 

Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2013CR6596, styled The State of Texas v. Marcus A. Cooper, pending in 

the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Maria Teresa Herr presiding.

 
04-13-00740-CR

Additionally, relator filed a request for leave to file his petition for writ of mandamus. No 

leave is required to file a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. TEX. R. APP. P. 52. Therefore, 

relator’s motion for leave to file is denied as moot.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2 -
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________ ________________
No. 16

- 15386

________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:13

- cv

- 00670

- SPC

- CM

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs

- Appellees,

RSUI INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Intervenor Plaint iff,

versus

ATTORNEY’ S TITLE INSURANCE FUND, INC., SECTION 10 JOINT VENTURE, LLP, SKY PROPERTY VENTURE, LLC, CAS GROUP, INC.,

Defendants

- Appellants,

FLORIDA TITLE, CO., e t al.,

Defendants,

STEPHAN, COLE & ASSOCIATES, LLC., et al.,

Case: 16-15386 Date Filed: 08/01/2018 Page: 1 of 2Respondents.

_________________ _______ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (August 1, 2018)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge

, BRANCH

, Circuit Judge, and GAYLES, * District Judge

.

PER CURIAM:

For the reasons we explained at oral argumen t, the judgment of the district

court is due to be affirmed under our recent Zucker decision , which establishes that

the financial services exclusion provisions apply to exclude coverage. See Zucker

for BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co.

, 856 F.3d 1343 , 1350

– 51

(11th Cir. 2017). Although we appreciate counsel’s effort s to di stinguish Zucker

, we are not persuaded

. Given our decision that coverage does not apply, we need

not address the other issues.

To the extent that the argument of Att orney’s Title Insurance Fund and

Florida Title Company that they should not have been in the lawsuit has any

remaining relevance for costs or other reasons, we reject that argument.

AFFIRMED.

* Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida

, sitting by designation.

Case: 16-15386 Date Filed: 08/01/2018 Page: 2 of 2
**APPLICABLE ONLY TO ISSUERS INVOLVED IN BANKRUPTCYPROCEEDINGS DURING THE PRECEDING FIVE YEARS**

Check whether the registrant filed all documents and reports required to be filed by Section l2, 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act after the distribution of securities under a plan confirmed by a court. Yes o No o

**APPLICABLE ONLY TO CORPORATE ISSUERS**

State the number of shares outstanding of each of the issuer’s classes of common equity, as of the latest practicable date: Common Stock, 3,250,000 shares issued and outstanding as of September 30, 2006.

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act): Yes x No o

Transitional Small Business Disclosure Format (Check one): Yes o No x
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 9                          
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000                   
                                     
<S>                             <C>  
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         108,327
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          84,155
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                57,530
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    755,314
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         489,872
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           492,737
<LOANS>                                      3,496,666
<ALLOWANCE>                                     38,132
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,194,475
<DEPOSITS>                                   3,859,134
<SHORT-TERM>                                   532,397
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             57,467
<LONG-TERM>                                    269,444
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              415
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     475,619
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               5,194,475
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                193,888
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               17,203
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                58,509
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               269,600
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             121,655
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             152,436
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          117,164
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      180
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 570
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 94,299
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 63,240
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      42,086
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                   (403)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    41,683
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.01
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.22
<LOANS-NON>                                      9,196
<LOANS-PAST>                                     6,307
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   857
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 23,226
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                39,985
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    2,990
<RECOVERIES>                                       957
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               38,132
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                            38,132
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
                                     
                                     

</TABLE>
96-2006 and 96-2025.

#### Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.

Montgomery App. No. 14949. On motion for admission *pro hac vice*of Kenneth S. Geller. Motion granted.
97-675.

#### Canter v. Anderson.

In Habeas Corpus. *Sua sponte,*cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
# Treatment for Adolescents with Depression Study (TADS)

The NIMH-funded Treatment for Adolescents with Depression Study (TADS) is a multi-site clinical research study examining the short- and long-term effectiveness of an antidepressant medication and psychotherapy alone and in combination for treating depression in adolescents ages 12 to 17. This page provides information about the study.

### Questions and Answers

                  - Questions and Answers about TADS

### News about TADS

                  - Science Update (November 18, 2009): Long-term Depression Treatment Leads to Sustained Recovery for Most Teens
                  - Science Update (May 29, 2009): Searching for Risk Factors of Suicidal Events During Antidepressant Treatment
                  - Science Update (Jan 15, 2009): Adolescents with Depression Not Harmed in Studies Using Placebo
                  - Science Update (April 8, 2008): Maintenance Treatment Crucial for Teens' Recovery from Depression
                  - Press Release (October 1, 2007): Depressed Adolescents Respond Best to Combination Treatment
                  - Press Release (Aug 17, 2004): Combination Treatment Most Effective in Adolescents with Depression

### Related Information

                  - Child and Adolescent Mental Health
                  - Depression in Children and Adolescents
                  - Depression
                  - Antidepressant Medications for Children and Adolescents: Information for Parents and Caregivers
                  - Clinical trial information about the Treatment for Adolescents with Depression Study (TADS) from ClinicalTrials.gov **
                  - Limited Access Dataset from TADS

### Surgeon General Reports

                  - “Children and Mental Health” **  — Chapter Three from Mental Health: Report of the Surgeon General
                  - Report of the Surgeon General’s Conference on Children's Mental Health: A National Action Agenda **
#### Office of Disciplinary Counsel *v.*Bustamante.

[Cite as *Disciplinary Counsel v. Bustamante*(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 74.]

(No. 96-1977

Submitted December 11, 1996

Decided March 26, 1997.)

*Geoffrey Stem,*Disciplinary Counsel, and *Sally Ann Steuk,*Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

*75
      *Donald, C. Brey,*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4) states that when an attorney is disciplined in another jurisdiction, this court “shall impose the identical or comparable discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction, unless the attorney proves * * * (b) [t]hat the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in Ohio.”

As both respondent’s former counsel and present counsel point out in their respective filings, a disbarment under Florida State Bar Rule 3 — 5.1(f) permits the respondent to apply for readmission at any time after November 18, 1998, five years from the effective date of his Florida disbarment. In contrast, disbarment under Ohio’s Gov.Bar R. V(6)(C) would bar respondent from ever being readmitted to the practice of law in Ohio. Thus, a Florida “disbarment” is comparable to an Ohio “indefinite suspension.”

Therefore, respondent is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio with permission to apply for readmission after November 18, 1998, if he has been readmitted to the practice of law in Florida. Costs taxed to respondent.

*Judgment accordingly.*

Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.

Moyer, C.J., not participating.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40756

Summary Calendar

DREAGLEN SYLVESTER DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE; BRAD LIVINGSTON,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:08-CV-237

Before KING, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dreaglen Sylvester Davis, Texas prisoner # 1271774, appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint wherein Davis complained

that he was forced to work without compensation, he was subject to illegal strip

searches, and his property was illegally confiscated. The district court dismissed

Davis’s claim that he was forced to work without compensation and granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Davis argues that he timely filed

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 8, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 09-40756 Document: 00511074550 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/08/2010
No. 09-40756

 The events in question took place prior to the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636 which 1

changed the relevant time period to fourteen days effective December 1, 2009.

2

objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. He contends

that the district court failed to conduct a de novo review because it improperly

found that objections were not timely filed.

Because Davis forwarded his written objections to prison officials within

ten days of receiving the magistrate judge’s report, the objections were timely 1

filed. See Thompson v. Rasberry, 993 F.2d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1993).

Consequently, Davis should have been afforded de novo review by the district

court, and our review on appeal is de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc). 

The district court denied Davis’s FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion wherein

Davis complained that the court failed to address his objections to the

magistrate judge’s report. In denying the motion, the court found that Davis

failed to show the dismissal of his suit was erroneous and also denied all

outstanding motions. The district court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion

indicates that a de novo review was conducted. Thus, any error in failing to

consider Davis’s objections is harmless. See Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 485

(5th Cir. 1992).

Davis does not renew any of the substantive claims raised in the district

court. By failing to brief any argument challenging the district court’s reasons

for dismissal, Davis has abandoned the only grounds for appeal. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas County

Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

AFFIRMED.

Case: 09-40756 Document: 00511074550 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/08/2010
#### Israel Grossman et al., Appellants, v New York Life Insurance Company, Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

Submitted June 4, 2012;

decided August 30, 2012

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.