J-S34026-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RONALD W. BONEY

Appellant No. 100 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-SA-0000006-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2015

Ronald W. Boney appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on 

October 16, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County, following a 

summary appeal. Boney was convicted of driving while operating privilege 

was suspended.1 The trial court sentenced Boney to 75 days’ incarceration. 

In this appeal, Boney contends the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, and (2) denying his motion to 

dismiss pursuant to constitutional due process rights.2 Boney’s Brief at 4. 

Based upon the following, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1).

2 Although it appears from the trial court docket that Boney timely complied 

with the order of the trial court to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal, Boney’s Rule 1925 statement is not 

included in the certified record. The trial court, however, reiterates the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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This case arose as a result of a February 5, 2011, incident, for which 

Boney was issued a traffic citation for driving under suspension. Thereafter,

[o]n February 3, 2012, [Boney] was convicted of violating 75 

Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1), Driving Under Suspension—DUI related, 

which is a summary offense. [Boney] then filed an appeal to 

[the trial court] on February 17, 2012. By letter dated July 17, 

2014, [Boney] was notified to appear for the purpose of a 

hearing on appeal from summary conviction on August 11, 2014. 

On August 7, 2014, [Boney] filed a Petition to Dismiss Pursuant 

to Rule 600. On August 11, 2014, [the trial court] issued an 

order stating that it was considering the petition, and that upon 

reaching a decision [the court] would grant the relief requested 

or would continue the matter upon motion of [Boney]. On 

August 27, 2014, [the trial court] denied [Boney’s] Petition to 

Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 600, and the matter was then 

continued upon motion of [Boney] until October 16, 2014, so 

that [Boney] could subpoena witnesses. On October 16, 2014, 

at the summary appeal, [Boney] was again convicted of violating 

section 1543(b)(1).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/2015, at 1.

At the outset, we note:

Our standard of review from an appeal of a summary conviction 

heard de novo by the trial court is limited to a determination of 

whether an error of law has been committed and whether the 

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence. The 

adjudication of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion 

may not be found merely because an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

issues raised in Boney’s concise statement in its opinions. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/30/2015, at 2; Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/2015, at 2.
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Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 105–106 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(quotations and citations omitted), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 1238 (Pa. 2014).

As background to the issues raised in this appeal, Boney states:

Ronald W. Boney was convicted on February 3, 2012 of 

Driving Under Suspension 75 section 1543(b)(1) in the 

Magisterial District Court in Newport, Pennsylvania. On February 

17, 2012, [Boney] filed a timely appeal and request for De Novo

trial in the Court of Common Pleas of the 41st Judicial District. 

On March 2, 2012, [Boney] was prosecuted on an unrelated 

charge through the same prosecutor’s office and sentenced to 16 

months to 36 months in a state correctional institution. The 

prosecutor subsequently sent notice to [Boney] that his 

summary appeal would be heard on August 11, 2014.

****

The facts of the present case show that nearly 2 and [one-half] 

years passed between [Boney] filing his notice of appeal and his 

opportunity for hearing. This is a substantial delay. The reason 

for the delay involved the prosecutor not wanting to transport 

[Boney] from a state correctional institution. Prisoners are 

transported every day for hearings from state correctional 

institutions. There is no justifiable excuse for delay based on 

transportation. ... [Boney] was actually prejudiced by the 

trooper’s inability to recall the events of the day aside from using 

whatever notes were taken and [Boney’s] inability to recall 

certain events.

Boney’s Brief at 5, 7. 

Boney first contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 Motion. Boney argues his de 

novo summary appeal was not tried in the trial court within 365 days as 

required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. This argument, however, is meritless, as our 

Court has stated that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, which is now Rule 600, is not 

applicable to de novo trials involving summary violations as the Rule 
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excludes summary proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Koch, 431 A.2d 

1052, 1054 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1981) (en banc) (noting that Criminal Rule 1100 

[predecessor to Criminal Rule 600] is inapplicable to summary proceedings 

as the rule specifically excludes such proceedings by its language). Indeed, 

Chapter 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is titled as the “Trial Procedures 

in Court Cases.” Further, Rule 600(A)(2)(a) requires that “[t]rial in a court 

case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the 

defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later than 365 days from 

the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a) 

(emphasis added). A “court case” is defined as “a case in which one or more 

of the offenses charged is a misdemeanor, felony, or murder of the first, 

second, or third degree.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 103. By contrast, a “summary case” 

is defined as “a case in which the only offense or offenses charged are 

summary offenses.” Id.

In this case, Boney was charged with a single summary offense of 

driving while his operating privilege was suspended, in violation of 75 

Pa.C.S. 1543(b). As such, this case is a “summary case” and cannot be 

considered a “court case.” Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Rule 

600 is inapplicable to this proceeding involving only a summary offense. See 

Koch, supra; see also Constantino v. Forest Hills Borough, 563 A.2d 

953, 957 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (concluding that appellant’s right to a speedy 

trial has not been violated because Rule 1100(d)(1) does not apply “to 

appeals from summary convictions, but rather to the granting of a new trial 
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by the trial court.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Kujas, 435 A.2d 1293, 1294 

(Pa. Super. 1981) (concluding that summary offenses charged in the same 

complaint as misdemeanors are part of a “court case” for the purposes of 

Criminal Rule 1100).

Next, Boney argues that the proceedings were not completed in a 

timely fashion and as such, violated his constitutional due process rights. 

While not mentioned by the parties, Section 5553(e) of Title 42 provides 

that “No proceedings shall be held or action taken pursuant to a summary 

offense under Title 75 subsequent to three years after commission of the 

offense.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553(e) (emphasis added).3 Under Section 5553(e), 

any summary proceedings initiated under Title 75 must be disposed of “at 

the trial level” within three years or not at all. Commonwealth v. Ristau, 

666 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted). However, our case 

law makes clear that the limitation period is tolled during those periods of 

delay that are directly attributable to the defendant. Commonwealth v. 

Quinn, 592 A.2d 1316, 1317 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding “any period of 

delay directly attributable to the accused tolls the limitation period of § 

5553(e)”).

____________________________________________

3

Prior to January 28, 2005, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553(e) provided that summary 

prosecution for a vehicle violation must be completed within two years from 

commission of the offense.
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Here, the time span between the issuance of the commission of the 

offense on February 5, 2011, and the date scheduled for the de novo trial, 

August 11, 2014, is a little more than three years and six months. Boney 

argues the delay was due to the Commonwealth’s failure to transport him 

from state prison where he was serving a 16-to-36 month sentence, 

following his March 2, 2012 prosecution on unrelated charges by the same 

prosecutor. We find this argument unpersuasive.

Initially, delay in this case occurred in the magisterial district court 

where Boney was not convicted by the district judge until February 3, 2012, 

almost a year after the February 5, 2011 traffic offense. The docket 

transcript from the magisterial district court, which is included in the 

certified record, reflects that a summary trial was scheduled for June 30, 

2011, but was continued because “Defendant Failed to Appear – Good 

Cause.” Boney has offered no evidence that he objected to the continuance. 

The docket transcript also shows a summary trial was scheduled for January 

31, 2012, and continued for the reason stated as “Other.” As mentioned 

above, Boney was convicted on February 3, 2011.

On this record, we conclude that the delay between the June 30, 2011, 

and January 31, 2012 scheduled summary trials, was “directly attributable”4

to Boney’s conduct — i.e., his failure to appear for the June 30, 2011 

____________________________________________

4 Quinn, supra, 592 A.2d at 1317.
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summary trial. Therefore, given that the approximately three-year-sixmonth time period between February 5, 2011, and August 11, 2014, was 

tolled by this six-month-plus delay, we conclude Boney’s summary 

proceeding was completed within the three year limitation period of Section 

5553(e). Consequently, we reject Boney’s claim that his due process rights 

were violated in this case.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2015