[Cite as Norris v. Elyria, 195 Ohio App.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-4169.] 

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

NORRIS ET AL., 

 Appellees, 

 v. 

CITY OF ELYRIA, 

 Appellant. 

C.A. No. 10CA009900 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 09CV164758 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 22, 2011

 Patrick D. Riley and Audrey P. Forrest, for appellees. 

 Michael E. Szekely, for appellants. 

 DICKINSON, Judge. 

INTRODUCTION 

{¶ 1} The city of Elyria fire department eliminated one captain and eight lieutenant 

positions for budgetary reasons, demoting the employees in those positions to regular 

firefighters. The city chose which employees to demote based on overall length of service in the 

department. The affected employees appealed to the Elyria Civil Service Commission, arguing 

that the city should have based the demotions on length of service within a particular rank, not 
2 

 

overall length of service in the department. The commission determined that the city had 

properly decided who should be demoted. The affected employees appealed the commission’s 

decision to the Lorain County Common Pleas Court, which reversed, concluding that the city 

should have based the demotions on seniority at each rank. The city has appealed, assigning as 

error that the common pleas court incorrectly applied Ohio law regarding the demotion of 

firefighters. We affirm, because in deciding which members of a rank should be demoted under 

R.C. 124.37, the city must base its decision on the employees’ length of service at that particular 

rank. 

BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} In April 2009, the city abolished one captain and eight lieutenant positions from the 

rank structure of its fire department to save money on salaries and benefits. The city did not lay 

off any employees, but demoted the persons who held the abolished positions to regular 

firefighters. To determine which of its seven captains would be demoted to lieutenant, the city 

looked at the date that each had begun working for the department. The captain with the least 

departmental seniority was Jamison Norris. He was also the most recent appointee to that 

position. 

{¶ 3} Regarding which of the 15 lieutenants it would demote to firefighter, the city again 

looked at departmental start dates. Because some lieutenants had been promoted from regular 

firefighter more slowly than others, this caused employees with more experience at the lieutenant 

position to be demoted instead of those with less experience at that position. For example, the 

city demoted Lieutenant Weber instead of Lieutenant Thrasher because it had hired Thrasher as a 

firefighter one month before it had hired Weber. It made that decision even though Weber had 

been a lieutenant for 11 years longer than Thrasher had. 
3 

 

{¶ 4} Another thing the city did when it determined which of the lieutenants to demote 

was to include Norris in its calculation, even though he had become a lieutenant by virtue of the 

same job-elimination action. Because the department had hired Norris as a firefighter more 

recently than several of the other lieutenants, the city determined that he was one of the 

lieutenants who had to be demoted to regular firefighter. Norris, therefore, ended up being 

demoted from captain down to firefighter, making him subordinate to employees he had 

outranked before the action. 

{¶ 5} The demoted employees appealed the city’s decision to the Elyria Civil Service 

Commission, which upheld it. The employees appealed to the common pleas court, which 

reversed, concluding that the city had to base its demotion decisions on seniority in rank instead 

of overall departmental seniority. 

FIREFIGHTER DEMOTIONS 

{¶ 6} The city’s assignment of error is that the common pleas court incorrectly applied 

Ohio law as it relates to the demotion and layoff of city firefighters. Under R.C. 2506.04, a 

common pleas court reviews a decision of a political-subdivision agency to determine if it was 

“unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the 

preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.” A common 

pleas court’s decision is appealable to an appellate court on “questions of law.” R.C. 2506.04. 

“An appeal to the court of appeals, pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, is more limited in scope and 

requires [the appellate court] to affirm the common pleas court, unless [it] finds, as a matter of 

law, that the decision of the common pleas court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, 

probative and substantial evidence.” Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34. That “does 

not include the same extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable and 
4 

 

probative evidence,’ as is granted to the common pleas court.” Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals (2000), 90 Ohio St. 3d 142, 147, quoting Kisil, at 34, fn.4. 

{¶ 7} The city has argued that it was required under R.C. 124.37 to base its demotions on 

overall departmental seniority, regardless of rank. Under R.C. 124.37, “[w]hen it becomes 

necessary in a police or fire department, through lack of work or funds * * * to reduce the force 

in such department, the youngest employee in point of service shall be first laid off. * * * When 

a position above the rank of patrolman in the police department and above the rank of regular 

fireman in the fire department is abolished, and the incumbent has been permanently appointed, 

he shall be demoted to the next lower rank and the youngest officer in point of service in the next 

lower rank shall be demoted, and so on down until the youngest person in point of service has 

been reached, who shall be laid off.” This provision was originally enacted in 1927 and codified 

at G.C. 486-17b. Its language has remained substantially similar since 1931. 112 Ohio Laws 

114 (1927); 114 Ohio Laws 224 (1931). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that if a city fails to 

comply with R.C. 124.37 when it abolishes a position above the rank of patrolman or regular 

firefighter, its attempted elimination of the position is “void.” Hungler v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 

Ohio St.3d 338, 344. 

{¶ 8} The city’s argument hinges on the meaning of the phrases “youngest employee in 

point of service” and “youngest officer in point of service in the next lower rank.” If those 

phrases refer to the employee at a given rank who has the shortest length of service in the 

department overall, the city correctly applied the statute. If they refer, instead, to the employee 

who has the shortest length of service at a particular rank, then the common pleas court correctly 

applied the statute. Despite the statute’s 80-year history, there is only one Ohio appellate case 

interpreting that language, In re Petrak (1984), 18 Ohio App.3d 75. Petrak is not helpful, 
5 

 

however, because the only question before the Twelfth District was whether an employee’s point 

of service included his time with a municipal water department. The court concluded that only 

time employed with a police or fire department is to be considered in determining an employee’s 

point of service under R.C. 124.37. Id. at 76. It did not address how seniority within a police or 

fire department is determined. 

{¶ 9} “If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, 

may consider among other matters: (A) [t]he object sought to be attained; (B) [t]he 

circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (C) [t]he legislative history; (D) [t]he 

common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects; 

(E) [t]he consequences of a particular construction; [and] (F) [t]he administrative construction of 

the statute.” R.C. 1.49. Regarding the first factor, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that 

“[t]he purpose of the civil service system is to provide a ‘stable framework of public offices upon 

which a workable civil service system may be constructed’ while ‘avoiding the traditional spoils 

system * * * and * * * providing a method of fair employee selection and promotion based upon 

merit and fitness.’” Hungler, 25 Ohio St.3d at 344, quoting McCarter v. Cincinnati (1981), 3 

Ohio App.3d 244, 248. Regarding the second and third factors, we note that there is little 

legislative history regarding R.C. 124.37, except that a sentence was added later regarding laidoff employees who enter the armed forces. The added sentence has no relevance to this case. 

{¶ 10} Regarding the fourth factor, we can compare R.C. 124.37 to the layoff process 

when civil-service positions are abolished in departments other than police or fire. Under R.C. 

124.321(D)(3), “[i]f an abolishment results in a reduction of the work force, * * * [t]he employee 

whose position has been abolished shall have the right to fill an available vacancy within the 

employee’s classification.” It further provides that “[i]f the employee whose position has been 
6 

 

abolished has more retention points than any other employee serving in the same classification, 

the employee with the fewest retention points shall be displaced[,] * * * [and] [i]f the employee 

whose position has been abolished has the fewest retention points in the classification, the 

employee shall displace the employee with the fewest retention points in the next or successively 

lower classification in the classification series.” R.C. 124.321 was enacted in 1982. In its 

decision, the common pleas court concluded that R.C. 124.37 should be construed to produce the 

same result as R.C. 124.321, which specifically explains that it is the employee with the least 

seniority at a particular classification who is subject to displacement, not the employee with the 

overall least amount of time in the department. R.C. 124.321(D)(3). 

{¶ 11} Regarding the consequences of the two constructions of R.C. 124.37, we note that 

the city’s interpretation of the statute resulted in the demotion of some lieutenants who had 

served in that capacity for several years longer than those who were retained as lieutenants. The 

fact that those firefighters had been promoted to lieutenant sooner than their colleagues was not 

by chance. Rather, the Ohio Revised Code provides that all fire-department promotions must 

occur by competitive examination. R.C. 124.45. Although examination takers are given some 

credit for seniority, whoever scores highest on the exam is placed first on an eligibility list, from 

which all promotions occur. See R.C. 124.46 (“The person having the highest position on the list 

shall be appointed in the case of a vacancy”); R.C. 124.48. The city, therefore, not only demoted 

lieutenants who were more experienced at that position than others, it demoted those who had 

reached that rank faster by outscoring their colleagues on a competitive examination despite their 

disadvantage of lack of overall departmental seniority. 

{¶ 12} Upon consideration of all of the factors listed in R.C. 1.49, we conclude that the 

common pleas court correctly applied R.C. 124.37. As the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, 
7 

 

the statute is intended to provide “ ‘a method of fair employee selection and promotion based 

upon merit and fitness.’ ” Hungler, 25 Ohio St.3d at 344, quoting McCarter v. Cincinnati 

(1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 244, 248. The trial court’s interpretation recognizes the fact that cities 

should want to retain their most capable and experienced employees. This approach is also 

consistent with the process the legislature enacted for civil-service workers in other departments. 

R.C. 124.321. The city has not persuaded us that the legislature would insist that more seasoned 

lieutenants be demoted rather than less experienced lieutenants just because they had worked for 

the department a few days longer overall. Under the city’s logic, it would be forced to demote a 

ten-year veteran in a position in favor of someone who had been appointed to the rank only a day 

before the demotions, just because the more recent appointee had been hired by the department 

as a regular firefighter one week earlier. Such a result is not only illogical, but would undermine 

the purpose of the civil-service system. 

{¶ 13} We also conclude that the city improperly included Norris in its calculation of 

which lieutenants should be demoted to regular firefighter. The Ohio Supreme Court has 

explained that R.C. 124.37 “make[s] clear that where a city decides to abolish a higher ranking 

police position because of lack of [funds], there shall be a demotion of the incumbent 

accompanied by a series of additional demotions in the lower ranks ultimately resulting in the 

layoff of the least senior member of the police department.” Hungler at 343-344. We believe 

that as more clearly explained in R.C. 124.321, when a police or fire department employee is 

demoted to the next lower rank because his position has been abolished, and there is not a 

vacancy at that next lower rank, he bumps the least senior member at that lower rank, who must 

be demoted to the next lower rank. This interpretation is logical, consistent with R.C. 124.321, 

and prevents what happened to Norris in this case. It is unfathomable that the legislature would 
8 

 

intend for a fire captain, who had achieved that rank because he demonstrated through a 

competitive examination that he was more suited for the position than other lieutenants, to go 

from a position of superiority to one of inferiority relative to those he had outscored. The city’s 

assignment of error is overruled. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 14} The common pleas court correctly concluded that the city improperly applied R.C. 

124.37 when it determined which employees had to be demoted to reduce costs. The judgment 

of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 BELFANCE, P.J., and WHITMORE, J., concur.