Filed 7/15/15 Everett v. Mountains Recreation & Conservancy Authority CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DANNY EVERETT et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MOUNTAINS RECREATION AND 

CONSERVANCY AUTHORITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B254753

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC466880)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Anthony J. Mohr and James C. Chalfant, Judges. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of David R. Greifinger, David R. Greifinger; Goldstein Legal 

Services, Howard A. Goldstein; Arias, Ozzello & Gignac, Mark A. Ozzello, Mike Arias 

and Arnold Wang for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

Gilchrist & Rutter, Thomas W. Casparian and Yen N. Hope for Defendant and 

Respondent. 

___________________________________
2

Plaintiff, putative class representative and appellant Danny Everett, appeals from 

a judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer to a class action complaint. 

The paramount issue on appeal is whether the Mountains Recreation and Conservancy 

Authority (MRCA) is unlawfully imposing administrative penalties –– in substantive 

effect fines for moving traffic violations –– on motor vehicle owners. Everett alleges the 

monetary penalties are being imposed on vehicle owners based on evidence obtained 

from an automated video camera traffic enforcement system that is operating in violation 

of the Vehicle Code. He alleges that the evidence supporting MRCA’s penalties consists 

of no more than an image of a license plate, and does not show the actual driver who 

committed the moving traffic violation as required by the Vehicle Code. We hold that 

the MRCA’s automated video camera traffic enforcement system is not operating in 

violation of the Vehicle Code. 

FACTS

As always in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer, we accept as true all properly 

pleaded facts, as well as facts which are subject to judicial notice, but not deductions or 

conclusions of law or fact. (See, e.g., Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 

1112, 1126.) In accord with these principles, the facts in Everett’s case, as settled in the 

context of his pleading and MRCA’s demurrer, are as follows.

Background

The Conservancy is a public entity formed by a “joint exercise of powers 

agreement” (see Gov. Code, § 6502) between the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, 

a public agency within the state’s Natural Resources Agency (see Pub. Res. Code, 

§ 33200 et seq.), and two local recreation and park districts (see Pub. Res. Code, § 5780 

et seq.), the Conejo Recreation and Park District, and the Rancho Simi Recreation and 

Park District. Under the terms of the joint exercise of powers agreement, MRCA has 

been given designated powers to manage a number of parkland properties for the three 
3

contracting agencies. In short, three public agencies which own parkland property 

created a fourth public agency to manage their properties.

1

In 2003, MRCA adopted an ordinance establishing rules, regulations and 

punishments for the parklands under its control. During the following years, MRCA

regularly amended its ordinance. In 2010, MRCA adopted the form of its ordinance 

which is at issue in Everett’s current case and which is known as the “Mountains 

Recreation and Conservancy Authority Park Ordinance” (hereafter the MRCA 

Ordinance). The MRCA Ordinance governs such matters as park hours, smoking and 

fire restrictions, and the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. 

Chapter 4 of the MRCA Ordinance governs “Vehicle Use.” Section 4.0 of the 

MRCA Ordinance provides: 

“Traffic control. (a) No person shall drive any vehicle, as defined in 

the California Vehicle Code, upon any MRCA owned or managed 

parkland, roadway or parking areas except upon, and subject to, any posted 

traffic control signs and/or pavement markings. Traffic control signs 

include, but are not limited to, stop signs, speed limit signs, directional 

signs, turning signs, road closure signs, road hours of operation sign, 

commercial truck restrictions, and signs limiting vehicle use on trails. . . .

“(b) No currently registered owner of a motor vehicle shall allow or 

permit his or her vehicle to be operated in violation of § 4.0(a).” 

MRCA Ordinance Section 4.2 authorizes MRCA to use “automated” photographic 

or video equipment to enforce section 4.0 of the ordinance. Section 4.2.1 of the MRCA

Ordinance provides: 

 

1

For a general review of joint power agreements in California, see the Senate Local 

Government Committee’s publication, Governments Working Together –– A Citizen’s 

Guide to Joint Powers Agreements (August 2007). 

http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/committee/standing/GOVERNANCE/GWTFinalversion2.

pdf (accessed March 18, 2015). 
4

“Enforcement. (a) The only penalty for a violation of § 4.0 that is 

enforced by means of automated motor vehicle enforcement shall be by 

imposition of an administrative penalty pursuant to § 5.4, as authorized by 

Government Code § 53069.4.

“(b) The only means of enforcement of § 4.0(b) shall be by the 

imposition of an administrative penalty pursuant to § 5.4, as authorized 

pursuant to Government Code § 53069.4.” 

Section 5.4 of the MRCA Ordinance provides: 

“Automated motor vehicle enforcement. Any violation of § 4.0 

which is enforced by means of automated motor vehicle enforcement 

pursuant to § 4.2 shall be deemed a noncriminal violation for which no 

points authorized by the California Vehicle Code (‘Point System for 

License Suspension’) shall be assigned to the owner or driver of the 

vehicle. The only penalty for a violation of § 4.0 that is enforced by means 

of automated motor vehicle enforcement shall be by imposition of an 

administrative penalty pursuant to § 5.4, as authorized pursuant to 

Government Code § 53069.4.” 

Under Government Code section 53069.4, subdivision (a), a local agency may 

make a violation of any ordinance adopted by the agency “subject to an administrative 

fine or penalty.” When a local agency elects to do so, Government Code section 

53069.4, subdivision (a), commands that the local agency “shall set forth by ordinance 

the administrative procedures that shall govern the imposition, enforcement, collection, 

and administrative review by the local agency of those administrative fines or penalties.” 

At the same time, however, Government Code section 53069.4, subdivision (a), does not 

specifically dictate any particular procedure which must be afforded a person in 

connection with an agency’s administrative procedures for imposing, enforcing and 

administratively reviewing the agency’s administrative fines or penalties.
5

In accord with the provisions of the MRCA Ordinance noted above, MRCA has 

erected stop signs on certain publicly travelled roadways in the parklands that it controls, 

and has installed automated video camera traffic enforcement systems at certain of those 

stop sign locations. MRCA’s automated video camera traffic enforcement systems do 

not record an image of a driver; the automated systems only records a video image of the 

license plates of a vehicle. At a stop sign where a MRCA automated video camera traffic 

enforcement system is installed, an in-ground sensor detects when an approaching vehicle 

is not slowing at the stop sign and triggers a video camera which is saved to a computer 

system. Later, a park ranger reviews the video. When the ranger visually observes a 

failure to stop, he prepares an “administrative citation” and mails it to the vehicle’s 

registered owner.

MRCA Ordinance section 4.2.3(a) grants a registered owner of a vehicle the right 

to contest a MRCA administrative citation at a MRCA “administrative appeal hearing.” 

At such a hearing, “the image that served as a basis of the [administrative] citation shall 

be prima facie evidence” of a violation MRCA Ordinance section 4.0. (Ibid.) Under 

MRCA Ordinance section 4.2.3(b), the following affirmative defenses are available to a 

registered vehicle owner: 

“(b) If a prima facie case has been established, the hearing officer may 

consider the following affirmative defenses, as to which the registered 

owner [of a vehicle] identified in the citation will have the burden of proof:

“(1) That the automated motor vehicle enforcement system was not 

operating properly at the time of the offense.

“(2) That the license plate number or other source of identification of the 

vehicle cannot be determined.

“(3) That the motor vehicle or registration plates of the motor vehicle were 

stolen before the violation occurred. 

“(4) That the vehicle was operated without the consent of the registered 

vehicle owner.
6

“(5) That other extenuating circumstances were present during the incident 

which, in the interest of justice, require dismissal.” 

Fairly construed, the MRCA Ordinance provides that, upon MRCA’s collection of 

a video of a license plate, a registered owner of a vehicle is liable for a stop sign violation 

under section 4.0 of the ordinance, and its resulting administrative penalty, without proof 

that the vehicle owner was driving the vehicle. As the trial court accurately stated in 

ruling on a MRCA demurrer to one of Everett’s earlier pleadings, “the driver’s identity is 

not an element of the offense” under section 4.0 of the MRCA Ordinance. Thus, unless a 

vehicle owner can prove (by an unspecified burden) that another person was driving his 

or her vehicle, and that the other person did not have the owner’s consent to be driving 

the vehicle, then the vehicle owner pays. 

On January 16, 2011, one of MRCA’s automated video camera system recorded a 

vehicle registered to plaintiff and appellant Everett failing to stop at a stop sign on a 

roadway in a parkland property under MRCA’s control. On a date not ascertainable from 

the record, a MRCA park ranger issued and mailed an administrative citation to Everett. 

Everett paid the administrative penalty of $175 indicated on the administrative 

citation, and requested an administrative hearing before MRCA to contest the citation. 

On April 7, 2011, a MRCA administrative officer denied Everett’s contest of the citation. 

Everett did not appeal the administrative officer’s decision to the superior court for a trial 

de novo as allowed pursuant to Government Code section 53069.4, subdivision (b). 

On August 18, 2011, the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles County Superior 

issued its opinion in Mountains Recreation Conservation Authority v. Kaufman (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 (Kaufman). In Kaufman, the court addressed a citee’s appeal 

from a judgment of the superior court on a trial de novo affirming a decision by a MRCA

administrative hearing officer decision finding a violation of the MRCA Ordinance for 

failing to stop at a stop sign on property under MRCA’s control. The citee in Kaufman

did not defend the administrative citation by directly challenging the legality of MRCA’s 

automated video camera traffic enforcement system. Rather, on a factual front, the citee
7

testified that he was not “‘the driver of the vehicle cited for the moving violation.’” On a 

legal front, the citee argued that the video taken by MRCA’s system did not show that he 

was the driver. (Kaufman, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 4.) The trial court found 

the citee guilty of the moving violation. On his appeal to the Appellate Division, the 

citee argued that sections 4.0 and 4.2.1 of the MRCA Ordinance were preempted by the 

Vehicle Code. (Id. at p. 5.) The citee argued that he could not be cited under the MRCA

Ordinance at all, but only under the Vehicle Code. The Kaufman court rejected the 

citee’s argument on appeal, finding there was “nothing in the record” before the court to 

support the citee’s contention that the MRCA Ordinance “was enforced on a highway 

within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 360.” (Id. at p. 7.) 

The Current Lawsuit

In August 2011, Everett filed a class action complaint against MRCA. In August 

2013, Everett filed his operative fifth amended complaint. It alleged three causes of 

action, listed respectively, as follows: declaratory relief; injunctive relief; and petition for 

writ of mandate. Everett’s complaint alleged that the stop sign violation for which 

MRCA cited him (as well as the other members of the putative class) occurred on a 

“highway” as defined by Vehicle Code section 360, that Vehicle Code section 21 makes 

the provision of the Vehicle Code uniformly applicable to all “highways” located in 

California, that Vehicle Code section 21455.5 governs automated traffic enforcement 

systems, and that MRCA failed to comply with the requirements of Vehicle Code section 

21455.5 in establishing its automated video camera traffic enforcement system. 

MRCA filed a demurrer to Everett’s complaint arguing, among other legal issues, 

that the Public Resources Code, not the Vehicle Code, gives MRCA the authority to 

regulate vehicle traffic within the parklands under its control. 

On November 26, 2013, the court entered a minute order sustaining MRCA’s 

demurrer to Everett’s complaint without leave to amend. On January 9, 2014, the court 

signed and entered an order of dismissal of Everett’s action. Everett filed a timely notice 

of appeal. 
8

DISCUSSION

I. The Statutory Issue

Everett contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erred in 

ruling that MRCA’s automated video camera traffic enforcement system does not have to 

comply with the Vehicle Code. Everett argues that the roadway in the MRCA-controlled 

parkland where he was ticketed is a “highway” as defined in Vehicle Code section 360. 

It necessarily follows, argues Everett, that the Vehicle Code applies to and establishes the 

law governing the “highway” pursuant to Vehicle Code section 21. We find no error. 

The Vehicle Code

Effective July 1, 2011, six months after MRCA issued its administrative citation to 

Everett, Vehicle Code section 21 was amended to read as follows: 

“(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are 

applicable and uniform throughout the state and in all counties and 

municipalities therein, and a local authority shall not enact or enforce any 

ordinance or resolution on the matters covered by this code, including 

ordinances or resolutions that establish regulations or procedures for, or 

assess a fine, penalty, assessment, or fee for a violation of, matters covered 

by this code, unless expressly authorized by this code. 

“(b) To the extent permitted by current state law, this section does not 

impair the current lawful authority of [MRCA], a joint powers authority, or 

any member agency constituted therein as of July 1, 2010, to enforce an 

ordinance or resolution relating to the management of public lands within 

its jurisdiction.” (Italics added; Stats. 2010, ch. 616, § 1.)2

 

2

Everett’s arguments on appeal are based upon the language of the current version 

of Vehicle Code section 21 quoted above. Further, Everett’s arguments include a 

significant discussion of the legislative history of the current version of Vehicle Code 

section 21. Accordingly, we ignore the fact that a different version of Vehicle Code 

section 21 existed in January 2011, when MRCA ticketed Everett. 
9

Vehicle Code section 21’s language favoring uniformity of state vehicle laws, and 

generally prohibiting local agencies from enacting vehicle ordinances, speaks in terms of 

“matters covered by” the Vehicle Code; the section is not strictly limited to the subject of 

“highways.”3This said, Vehicle Code section 21 makes the Vehicle Code applicable to 

matters covered by the Code, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided . . . .” Further, a 

local ordinance is prohibited “unless expressly authorized by [the Vehicle Code].” 

The Public Resources Code

As a so-called “joint powers authority,” MRCA possesses the “common power” of 

its creating agencies as specified in the joint exercise of power agreement which created 

MRCA. (See Gov. Code, § 6500 et seq.) In other words, MRCA’s powers are derived 

from the powers possessed by its creating agencies and given to MRCA by its creating 

agencies, or as otherwise granted by law. 

Under Public Resources Code section 33211, subdivision (c), the Santa Monica 

Mountains Conservancy has the power to “[d]o any and all . . . things necessary to carry 

out the purposes of the [conservancy].” Under Public Resources Code section 33211.5, 

subdivision (a), certain prescribed “conditions of use” apply to property owned or subject 

to the management of the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, including that “[a]ll 

vehicle use . . . shall conform to posted signs.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Read together, Public 

Resources Code sections 33211, subdivision (c), and 33211.5, subdivision (a), mean that 

the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy has the power to do any and all things 

necessary to carry out the condition of land use in the conservancy, including the power 

to assure that all vehicle use shall conform to posted signs. There is no language in the 

noted Public Resources Code sections which refers to compliance with the requirements 

of the Vehicle Code. Under Public Resources Code section 5786.1, subdivision (i), 

recreation and park districts such as the Conejo Recreation and Park District and the 

 

3 Vehicle Code section 360 defines a highway to be “a way or place of whatever 

nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular 

travel. Highway includes street.” Under this definition, the allegation in Everett’s 5AC 

that the roadways in MRCA’s parklands are “highways” as defined by Vehicle Code 

section 360 cannot be rejected as a matter of law. 
10

Rancho Simi Recreation and Park District are given the power “[t]o adopt ordinances 

following the procedures of [Government Code sections 25120 through 25132].” There 

is no allegation in Everett’s current case that MRCA failed to follow the requirements of 

the Government Code when it adopted the MRCA Ordinance. 

Analysis

The trial court correctly ruled that it is “immaterial” whether or not the roadway in 

the MRCA-controlled parkland where Everett was administratively cited is a “highway” 

as defined in Vehicle Code section 360. Highway or not in Everett’s case, we find that 

the MRCA Ordinance does not conflict with Vehicle Code section 21’s general 

prohibition against local vehicle ordinances in favor of uniform state vehicle laws. There 

is no conflict between the MRCA Ordinance and the Vehicle Code in Everett’s case, and 

thus no state law supremacy, for the following reasons. 

MRCA’s authority to adopt vehicle ordinances for the parklands under its control 

is derived from the provisions of the Public Resources Code discussed above. MRCA’s 

power is not derived from the Vehicle Code’s authorizations to local agencies to adopt 

rules and regulations for official traffic control devices such as stop signs. (See generally 

Veh. Code, § 21100, subd. (d).) As the court in Kaufman, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th Supp. 

1 recognized, the Public Resources Code provisions involved in Everett’s current case, 

which underpin the MRCA Ordinance, are intended to regulate different subject matters 

than the Vehicle Code, namely, public parklands on the one hand, and state highways on 

the other hand. (Id. at p. 7.) While there may be room for some overlaying control in an 

abstract examination, we agree with MRCA’s position that the Vehicle Code defers to the 

Public Resources Code in the circumstances presented in Everett’s current case. 

Vehicle Code section 21, subdivision (b), expressly states that the section “does 

not impair” MRCA’s authority “to enforce an ordinance . . . relating to the management 

of public lands within its jurisdiction.” We find this language plain on its face. The 

language means that the uniform governance of the Vehicle Code on matters covered by 

the code is controlling, with the exception that this control “does not impair” MRCA’s 

authority to enforce an ordinance relating to its “management” of public parklands. 
11

The implicit implication is that MRCA’s management is to be abided even where 

enforcement of a MRCA ordinance may not align with or may be different from, the 

Vehicle Code. 

In adopting and enforcing the MRCA Ordinance, MRCA undoubtedly was acting 

in a “management” capacity over the parkland properties under its control. To “impair” 

means to “make worse; diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; do harm to.” 

(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1131.) Application of the Vehicle Code’s

provisions governing automated traffic enforcement systems, in particular Vehicle Code 

section 210,4plainly would diminish the value of, and or do harm to, MRCA’s automated 

video camera traffic enforcement systems because the Vehicle Code requires automated 

traffic enforcement systems to have the capability of imaging the driver of a vehicle, and 

MRCA’s system does not have that capability. 

Everett proffers an argument based on legislative history in support of a contrary 

conclusion. Focusing on the first sentence segment of Vehicle Code 21, subdivision (b), 

i.e. –– “To the extent permitted by current state law, . . . ” –– Everett argues that Vehicle 

Code section 21 reflects the Legislature’s intent that MRCA may enforce traffic rules on 

its lands, but only “to the extent permitted by current state law,” which includes abiding 

the Vehicle Code’s requirements uniformly governing our state’s highways, which would 

include the Vehicle Code’s requirements for automated traffic enforcement systems. 

We are not persuaded. 

The legislative history of Vehicle Code section 21, subdivision (b), shows that it 

was enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 949 (SB 949) during the 2010 legislative session. 

SB 949 amended Vehicle Code sections 21 and 21100. The bill’s author introduced the 

legislation to address a then-existing problem with several local governments which had 

 

4 Vehicle Code section 210 provides: “An ‘automated enforcement system’ is any 

system operated by a governmental agency, in cooperation with a law enforcement 

agency, that phographically records a driver’s responses to a rail or rail transit signal or 

crossing gate, or both, or to an official traffic control signal described in Section 21450, 

and is designed to obtain a clear photograph of a vehicle’s license plate and the driver of 

the vehicle.”
12

“elected to make it their official policy to ignore certain moving violations and penalties 

in the [Vehicle Code] and punish these offenses under their own local ordinances.” 

(See Assem. Com. on Transportation, Bill Analysis on Sen. Bill No. 949 (2009-2010 

Reg. Sess.) June 28, 2010.) The local governments had established ordinances covering 

violations identical to ones contained in the Vehicle Code; had imposed their own fines; 

had failed to charge state-mandated fees, surcharges, and penalty assessments; and, thus, 

had retained all of the revenues for themselves. (Ibid.) SB 949 addressed this situation 

by amending Vehicle Code section 21100 to include subdivision which would disallow 

local governments from pursuing the practice of enacting alternate traffic ordinances to 

keep their own money while depriving the state of its money. (See Stats. 2010, ch. 616, 

§ 2 et seq.) 

In conjunction with amending Vehicle Code section 21100, SB 949 also amended 

Vehicle Code section 21 to add subdivision (b) noted above. The addition of subdivision 

(b) to Vehicle Code section 21 was intended by the bill’s author to address a “concern” 

that the bill’s provisions concerning Vehicle Code section 21100 might be construed to 

“preclude park districts from enforcing traffic restrictions they are authorized to enact.” 

(Assem. Com. on Transportation, Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 949, supra.) As more 

fully explained in the bill analysis: “[T]here is some concern that [SB 949] might 

preclude park districts from enforcing traffic restrictions they are authorized to enact by

the Public Resources Code. This bill should therefore be amended to provide that 

‘Nothing in this article shall impair or be construed to impair the authority of any local 

park authority or district whose authority is established pursuant to a separate state code 

to enact or enforce any ordinance relating to the management of public lands and 

parklands or to establish a fine, penalty, assessment, or fee for violation thereof.”’

Everett argues that the legislative history shows that MRCA’s authority to control 

traffic within its parklands extends only to the point that it has such authority under the 

Public Resources Code, and that this does not include the authority to ignore the Vehicle 

Code. In short, Everett argues that MRCA’s authority to regulate traffic as given by the 

Public Resources Codes is not independent from, but is subject to, the requirements of the 
13

Vehicle Code. In support of this proposition, Everett further cites a number of published 

cases which hold that the state legislature has preempted the field of motor vehicle traffic

regulation and that any authority delegated to local authorities to regulate traffic is strictly 

construed. In this regard, Everett cites such cases as Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982) 

31 Cal.3d 545, 548–550, Save the Sunset Strip Coalition v. City of West Hollywood 

(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177, and City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa 

(1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749, 755. Everett argues that any delegation of power to prescribe 

traffic rules must be expressly, not impliedly, authorized by the Legislature. (Citing 

Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 550.) 

We reject Everett’s arguments because, while correctly citing the law concerning 

the supremacy of state law, he errs in the application of the law. His case is an example 

where the Legislature has expressly authorized a particular local authority, namely parks 

and recreation districts, to exercise power to prescribe traffic rules through Vehicle Code 

section 21, subdivision (b). In other words, the situation which SB 949 did not want to 

be practiced –– a local county or city government enacting ordinances to circumvent the 

Vehicle Code and deny the state certain monies it would otherwise receive –– is allowed 

for park and recreation districts, and, specifically, is allowed to be practiced by MRCA. 

Finally, Everett argues that divorcing the Public Resources Code from the Vehicle 

Code means that MRCA has “carte blanche to ignore the Vehicle Code” when it comes to 

adopting vehicle regulations on public roadways in the parklands under MRCA’s control. 

This may or may not be true, but it is an issue not presented by Everett’s case. Here, we 

hold only that MRCA’s automated video camera traffic enforcement system is not subject 

to the Vehicle Code’s provisions governing automated traffic enforcement systems, and, 

thus, MRCA is not operating such a system in violation of the Vehicle Code. 

II. The Cause of Action Labeled “Unjust Enrichment”

Everett contends the judgment of dismissal must be reversed because the trial 

court erred when it sustained MRCA’s demurrer to his cause of action labeled “unjust 

enrichment” in his first amended complaint. We find no error. 
14

The only issue argued in the parties’ briefs on appeal regarding the issue of 

Everett’s cause of action for “unjust enrichment” is whether California pleading law

recognizes a “cause of action for unjust enrichment.” We find “there is no cause of 

action in California for unjust enrichment.” (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. 

(2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.) Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in Everett’s 

current case. 

III. The Statute of Limitations Issue

Having determined that the trial court correctly sustained MRCA’s demurrer for 

the reasons discussed above, we need not and do not address Everett’s contentions and 

arguments concerning the trial court’s ruling on statute of limitations issues. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.

BIGELOW, P. J.

We concur:

FLIER, J.

GRIMES, J.