alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SMITH v. CUDAHY PACKING CO.

Civil Action No. 935.

District Court, D. Minnesota, ' Third Division.

March 14, 1946.

*299George W. Colburn, of Minneapolis, Minn., and John Edmund Burke, of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff.

Loring M. Staples and John S. Pillsbury, Jr., both of Minneapolis, Minn. (Faegre & Benson, of Minneapolis, Minn., of counsel), for defendant.

DONOVAN, District Judge.

This action was commenced by plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., to recover $5,000,000. It is a companion case to the suit entitled Schempf, Plaintiff, v. Armour & Co., Defendant, D.C., 5 F.R.D. 294.

The complaint in this case is identical to that in the case of Schempf v. Armour & Co., except as to the parties, employees named and amount of recovery sought. Preliminary proceedings similar to those in the Schempf case were initiated by defendant for the purpose of discovery and production by plaintiff of written authority to act as agent for the employees named in paragraph V of the complaint.

It is difficult for the plaintiff to proceed other than as approved and outlined in the Schempf case. Plaintiff cannot be expected to do more than state a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and furnish his written authority for the employees named in paragraph V of the complaint, and the deposition certified to by United States Commissioner William T. Goddard.

In accordance with the views expressed by the Court in the Schempf case, all unnamed employees will be allowed twenty (20) days from the filing date hereof to intervene or have the record show that plaintiff has been designated by them as their agent or representative to maintain this action in their behalf.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,148,522
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,540,104
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</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aquileo AYALA-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-40741.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided June 20, 2006.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Philip G. Gallagher, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Aquileo Ayala-Flores appeals from his guilty plea conviction and sentence for illegal reentry of a deported alien. Ayala-Flores argues that the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines by characterizing his state felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance as an “aggravated felony” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C). Ayala-Flores’s argument is unavailing in light of circuit precedent. *See United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez,*130 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1997). Ayala-Flores also argues that this circuit’s precedent is inconsistent with *Jerome v. United States,*318 U.S. 101, 63 S.Ct. 483, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1943). Having preceded *Hinojosa-Lopez, Jerome*is not “an intervening Supreme Court case explicitly or implicitly overruling that prior precedent.” *See United States v. Short,*181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999).

Ayala-Flores also challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). His constitutional challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Ayala-Flores contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Ayala-Flores properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here solely to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### ALLEN V. SMITH, Inc., v. PHILADELPHIA BREWING CO.

Civil Action No. 5774.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 31, 1946.

Wexler & Weisman, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Rutledge Slattery, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

KALODNER, District Judge.

This is a civil action for the recovery of $6,855 brought by the plaintiff, a New York corporation, against the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation. The complaint avers:

> “Par. 2. Under the terms of a written contract between the parties dated June 25, 1943, plaintiff sold and defendant bought 3,000 one hundred pound bags of Victory Barley Grits at $4.98 per cwt. F.O.B, mill, Marcellus Falls, New York, for shipment during the months of July, August and September, 1943, in accordance with defendant’s shipping instructions.”

> And

> “Par. 3. Although plaintiff was ready, able and willing to make delivery, defendant refused to take delivery, causing plaintiff to sustain damages in the sum of $6,-855.00.”

The defendant moved that the plaintiff be required to file a bill of particulars with respect to the damages claimed.

The motion must be denied. The complaint here states a complete cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The cause of action is averred with sufficient definiteness to enable the defendants to prepare their responsive pleading and to prepare for trial as set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(e), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

As I stated in Sun Valley Manufacturing Co. v. Mylish and Drucker, D.C., 4 F.R.D. 170:

> “Where a complaint is sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare the required responsive pleading and where it adequately states the issue which the defendant must meet at the trial, a motion for a bill of particulars must be denied.”

See also Raudenbush v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., D.C.E.D.Pa.1944, 4 F.R.D. 171.

 What the defendant seeks to require the plaintiff to plead constitutes evi*323dentiary matter, and it is well-settled that it is not the province of a bill of particulars to furnish evidence, nor may a party be required to furnish, by way of a bill of particulars, evidence necessary to prove the moving party’s prima facie case. See Egyes v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1940, 1 F.R.D. 498, 499. In Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Pearl Assurance Co., D.C.N.D.Ohio 1945, 5 F.R.D. 332, where the complaint set up a claim on an insurance policy amounting to over $70,-000 for losses resulting from an explosion, a bill of particulars itemizing the claim was refused, the Court stating that:

> *“A*party may utilize a bill of particulars to ascertain the ultimate facts so as to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading, but in securing information as to evidentiary matters which is obtainable by interrogatories, depositions or discovery he is left to those remedies.”

To the same effect see Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co., Inc., D.C.W.D.N.Y.1942, 47 F.Supp. 290, 294, where it was held that a bill of particulars requiring an itemization of damages should not be ordered.

The motion is denied and an order may be entered accordingly.
ex10a-ipvanew-consent-preeff2






Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
We consent to the references to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information and to the use of our reports: (1) dated April 25, 2013 with respect to the financial statements of Principal Life Insurance Company Separate Account B, (2) dated March 20, 2013 with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Principal Life Insurance Company, and (3) dated 
March 20, 2013 with respect to the financial statement schedules of Principal Life Insurance Company, in Pre-Effective Amendment No. 2 to the Registration Statement (Form N-4, 
No. 333-188293) of Principal Life Insurance Company Separate Account B and the related prospectus of the Principal Investment Plus Variable AnnuitySM Contract.
/s/Ernst & Young LLP
Des Moines, Iowa
July 23, 2013
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAOLA FIDELIA GUTIERREZGONZALES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-71400

Agency No. A070-808-758

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 16, 2013** 

Before: CANBY, IKUTA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Paola Fidelia Gutierrez-Gonzales, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to

reconsider and to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for an abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a

FILED

APR 22 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-71400

motion to reconsider or to reopen. Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th

Cir. 2008). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez-Gonzales’s

motion to reconsider where she failed to allege any error of law or fact in the BIA’s

underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Gutierrez-Gonzales’s

contention that the BIA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision is

not persuasive. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“[t]he [BIA] does not have to write an exegesis on every contention.”) (internal

quotations omitted).

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez-Gonzales’s

motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the

BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gutierrez-Gonzales failed to

present sufficient evidence to qualify for any of the regulatory exceptions to the

time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). 

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen

proceedings sua sponte. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24

(9th Cir. 2011). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yf i nds thi s c a s e s ui t abl e f

orde c i s i on w i thout ** o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). K S/ R es ear ch NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON

UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T LUZ M ARI A M ARTINEZ- M ARTINEZ, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 07- 71873 A ge nc yN o. A 077- 062- 204 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o a r do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d J anua ry11, 2010 ** B e f o r e : B E E Z E R , T R O T T , a n dB Y B E E , C ir c u it Ju d g e s . L uz M a r i aM a rt i ne z - M a rt i ne z , ana t i ve a nd c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i ons f

or r e v ie w o f

th e B o a r do f

I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls ’ ( “B I A ” ) o r d e rd e n y in g h e rm o tio n to r e ope n. W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on pur s uantt o 8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w f orabus e of 

# FI LED JAN 21 2 010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALSK S/ Res ea r ch 07- 71873 2 d is c r e tio n th e d e n ia l o f

am o tio n to r e o p e n , I

tu rr i b a rr i a v . I

NS , 321 F . 3d 889, 894 ( 9 th C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) , a n dwe d e n yth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. T he B IA prov i ded adequ at e c on si dera t i on of the supp ort i ng evi dence M art i nez- M art i nez s ub m i tt ed w i th h erm ot i on , i ncl ud i ng the psyc ho l og i ca l e v a lu a tio n o f

h e rU .S . c itiz e n s o n , an da c te dw ith in its b r o a dd is c r e tio n in d e te rm in in g th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t to w arr an t r e o p e n in g . See L op ezv. A s h c r o ft , 366 F . 3d 799, 807 n. 6 ( 9th C i r . 2004) ( B I A i s r e qui r e d t o “ c ons i de rthe i s s ue s r a i s e d, a nd a nnounc e i t s de c i s i on i n t e rm s s uf f i c i e ntt o e nabl e ar e vi e w i ng c ourtt o pe r c e i ve tha ti tha s he a r d and thoughta nd notm e r e l yr e a c t e d” ) ( c i t a t i on om i tt ed). P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 25, 2020

No. 04-19-00705-CR

Ernesto Esquivel GARCIA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR7806

Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On February 21, 2020, Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders

brief and a motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); High v. 

State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). In counsel’s certification to 

this court, Appellant’s counsel explained that he took the following steps:

• notified Appellant that counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to 

withdraw, and provided Appellant with a copy of the documents;

• advised Appellant of his right to review the appellate record and file a pro se 

brief;

• provided Appellant with a pro se motion for access to the appellate record, 

addressed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, that lacked only Appellant’s dated 

signature; and

• advised Appellant of his right to seek discretionary review in the Court of 

Criminal Appeals if this court determines his appeal is frivolous. 

See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Owens, 206 

S.W.3d 670, 674 n.28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 688–89 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). 

The State filed a letter conditionally waiving its right to file a brief. 
If Appellant desires to file a pro se brief, we ORDER Appellant to do so within thirty 

days of the date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a). If Appellant files a pro se brief, the 

State may file a responsive brief not later than thirty days after the date Appellant’s pro se brief 

is filed in this court. See id. R. 38.6(b).

If this court determines Appellant’s appeal is frivolous, Appellant may file a petition for 

discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 

Appellant must file the petition with the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals within thirty 

days after this court issues its judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(a). The petition should be 

addressed to Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, P.O. Box 12308, Austin, Texas 78711. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is held in abeyance pending further order of this court.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of February, 2020.

___________________________________

Michael A. Cruz,

Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATIONS  I, Patrick M. Flynn, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2007 of Blue Ridge Real Estate Company and Big Boulder Corporation (together , the Registrants);  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b) [paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];  (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants boards of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  Date: January 28, 2008  /s/ Patrick M. Flynn Patrick M. Flynn Chief Executive Officer and President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
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<SECURITIES>                                     24081
<RECEIVABLES>                                   147560
<ALLOWANCES>                                      4446
<INVENTORY>                                     139139
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                380710
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1087072
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           360870
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1087072
<SALES>                                         863057
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                888939
<CGS>                                           281475
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               13894
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  69611
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              51792
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<NET-INCOME>                                     51792
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.34
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</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 22, 2019

p0515 

# Order

Clerk May 22, 2019

158263

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 158263

COA: 343601

Lenawee CC: 16

- 017919

- FH

MARK DOUGLAS SWANK, JR.,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 20, 2018 order

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.