STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0073

A16-0258

U. S. Bank National Association, as trustee, successor-in-interest to 

Bank of America, N.A., as trustee, successor to 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee for the 

Registered Holders of Wachovia Bank Commercial Mortgage Trust, 

Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C30, 

acting by and through its special servicer CWCapital Asset Management, LLC, 

Respondent (A16-0073), 

Appellant (A16-0258), 

vs. 

RBP Realty, LLC, 

Appellant (A16-0073), 

Respondent (A16-0258).

Filed December 27, 2016

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CV-14-2199 

Thomas F. De Vincke, Kathleen M. Martin, Patrick B. Steinhoff, Malkerson Gunn Martin 

LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for U.S. Bank National Association)

Edward P. Sheu, Bradley F. Williams, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for 

RBP Realty, LLC)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Johnson, 

Judge.

S Y L L A B U S

A borrower’s waiver of the statutory right to redeem foreclosed property in a 

foreclosure by advertisement is unenforceable.
2

O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

A company borrowed $7,500,000 and executed a mortgage on commercial real 

property in favor of the lender. The company later defaulted on the loan. After the default, 

the borrower and the lender entered into a written pre-negotiation agreement, in which the 

borrower agreed to, among other things, waive its statutory right to redeem the mortgaged 

property in the event of a foreclosure sale. The lender later initiated a foreclosure by 

advertisement and then purchased the mortgaged property in the foreclosure sale for 

$4,250,000. The borrower sought to redeem the property, but the lender objected, relying 

on the borrower’s waiver of its right to redeem. The district court ruled that, as a matter of 

law, the borrower’s waiver of its right to redeem is unenforceable. We conclude that the 

district court was correct in that ruling. We also conclude that the district court did not err 

in deciding the other issues that have been raised on appeal. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In December 2006, RBP Realty, LLC, borrowed $7,500,000.00 from Wachovia 

Bank. In connection with the loan, RBP granted Wachovia a mortgage on commercial 

property in St. Paul known as Riverview Business Plaza. At the time of the loan, RBP also 

executed an assignment agreement, which gave Wachovia the right to receive rental

income from the mortgaged property in the event of a default. Wachovia later assigned all 

of its interests in the note, the mortgage, and the assignment to a trust. U.S. Bank now is 

the trustee of that trust and, thus, is acting on behalf of the lender. 
3

In June 2013, RBP defaulted on the loan. In September 2013, U.S. Bank and RBP 

entered into a five-page letter agreement, which they describe as a pre-negotiation 

agreement, to establish terms by which they would discuss a possible resolution of RBP’s 

default. Paragraph 16 of the pre-negotiation agreement states, “Borrower waives its right 

of redemption . . . .” The parties proceeded to negotiate but did not reach a resolution. In 

March 2014, U.S. Bank initiated a foreclosure by advertisement. The notice of foreclosure 

sale states, “The time allowed by law for redemption by Mortgagor or Mortgagor’s 

personal representatives or assigns is six (6) months after the date of sale.”

U.S. Bank also pursued other means of recovering loan principal and interest. In 

April 2014, U.S. Bank commenced this action in district court, seeking the appointment of 

a limited receiver pursuant to section 576.25, subdivision 5(a), of the Minnesota Statutes. 

In June 2014, the district court appointed a limited receiver, with “all powers necessary 

and usual in such cases for the protection, possession, control, management, maintenance, 

and operation of the Property during the pendency of this action,” and “all of the powers 

and authority usually of a limited receiver under Chapter 576 of the Minnesota Statutes 

and reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes” of the receivership. 

The sheriff conducted a foreclosure sale on July 23, 2014. At the time of the 

foreclosure sale, RBP owed U.S. Bank approximately $8,900,000. U.S. Bank, on behalf 

of the trust, submitted the highest bid of $4,250,000. In November 2014, RBP asked the 

sheriff for information about the amount needed to redeem the property. U.S. Bank refused 

to provide the sheriff with the redemption amount on the ground that RBP had waived its 

right to redeem. RBP brought a motion in which it argued that the district court’s June 
4

2014 order appointing the receiver had authorized RBP to redeem the property after a 

foreclosure sale. U.S. Bank moved to amend its complaint to add a request for a declaratory 

judgment that RBP’s waiver of its right to redeem is enforceable. On December 29, 2014, 

the district court heard oral arguments on RBP’s motion. Two days later, the district court 

ruled that RBP’s waiver is unenforceable and granted RBP’s motion, thereby allowing RBP 

to redeem the foreclosed property. 

In early February 2015, RBP exercised its statutory right to redeem by paying 

$4,764,771.29 to the sheriff. The sheriff issued a certificate of redemption, which was 

recorded with the registrar of titles. In late February 2015, the district court denied U.S. 

Bank’s motion to amend the complaint. On the same day, the district court issued an order 

terminating the receiver’s possession and management of the property pending a final 

report and the discharge of the receiver. 

In March 2015, the receiver submitted a final report to the district court and asked 

to be discharged. See Minn. Stat. § 576.38, subd. 2 (2016). RBP objected to three items 

in the final report that reflected disbursements to U.S. Bank. In November 2015, the district 

court overruled RBP’s objections to the first and second items and sustained RBP’s 

objection to the third item. In December 2015, the district court issued an order discharging 

the receiver and ordering the entry of final judgment. 

U.S. Bank appeals from the December 2014 order, the February 2015 order, and 

part of the November 2015 order. RBP appeals from parts of the November 2015 order. 

We consolidated the appeals.
5

ISSUES

I. Is RBP’s waiver of its statutory right to redeem the mortgaged property 

enforceable?

II. Did the district court err by denying U.S. Bank’s motion to amend the 

complaint?

III. Did the district court err in its rulings on RBP’s objections to the receiver’s 

disbursement of certain funds to U.S. Bank?

ANALYSIS

I.

In appeal A16-0258, U.S. Bank argues that the district court erred by ruling that 

RBP’s waiver of its statutory right to redeem the mortgaged property in a foreclosure by 

advertisement is unenforceable.1

Foreclosure by advertisement is governed by chapter 580 of the Minnesota Statutes. 

The parties agree that no provision in chapter 580 speaks directly to the question whether 

 

1U.S. Bank initially argues that we should reverse on the ground that this issue was 

not properly before the district court at the time of its ruling. Specifically, U.S. Bank argues 

that the enforceability of RBP’s waiver cannot be determined in a receivership action. U.S.

Bank did not preserve this argument by arguing to the district court that the issue was not 

properly before it, either in its motion papers or at the motion hearing. Rather, U.S. Bank 

addressed the issue on the merits. At oral argument in this court, U.S. Bank’s attorney 

explained that U.S. Bank did not make such an argument to the district court because U.S. 

Bank had a motion pending in which it was seeking leave to amend its complaint to put the 

issue before the district court. We reject U.S. Bank’s threshold argument on the grounds 

that the issue was presented to the district court without objection and that U.S. Bank was 

not prejudiced by the district court’s consideration of an issue that U.S. Bank itself sought 

to put before the district court.
6

a mortgagor may waive the statutory right to redeem mortgaged property.2 U.S. Bank

contends that, in the absence of any such statutory provision, a lender and a borrower are 

free to enter into a contract that includes a waiver of the borrower’s statutory right to 

redeem mortgaged property. U.S. Bank contends that the district court erred by “us[ing] 

the absence of any reference in Minnesota’s foreclosure statute to post-default waivers of 

a mortgagor’s redemption rights as an opportunity to effectively amend the foreclosure 

statute to affirmatively prohibit such waivers.” In response, RBP contends that the absence 

of a statutory provision on the subject indicates that a borrower’s statutory right to redeem 

is unqualified and may not be altered by contract. 

The parties’ arguments raise an issue of statutory interpretation. We begin the task 

of interpreting a statute by asking “whether the statute’s language, on its face, is 

 

2We note that a law on this specific issue was in force during the period shortly after 

statehood but no longer is in force. In the 1860 legislative session, a bill was enacted that 

provided, in relevant part, “Any person may, in writing executed and recorded in the same 

manner as mortgages are now executed and recorded, waive his right of redemption as 

allowed by this Act or any portion of said time of redemption.” 1860 Minn. Laws ch. 87, 

§ 3, at 276. The following year, the legislature amended the 1860 act so that it provided, 

“Any person may in writing, executed and recorded in the same manner as mortgages are 

now executed and recorded, waive (with the exception of one year’s time) his right of 

redemption, as allowed by this Act, or any portion of said time of redemption. Any waiver 

of the right of redemption or any part thereof may be included in the instrument by which 

the mortgage is created.” 1861 Minn. Laws ch. 20, § 1, at 181. Neither session law was 

intended to be codified. See 1861 Minn. Laws ch. 20, § 1, at 181; 1860 Minn. Laws ch. 

87, § 3, at 276. The 1861 session law did not appear in the next codification of the statutes

two years later. See 1863 Minn. Stat., ch. 81, §§ 1-22, at 692-97. The language of the 

1861 session law also did not appear in the 1905 codification of the statutes, which was the 

result of a comprehensive revision of the state’s statutes. See Molde v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 

781 N.W.2d 36, 40-43 & nn.1-2 (Minn. App. 2010) (describing history of 1905 revision 

with respect to chapter 580). Furthermore, the language of the 1861 session law does not 

appear in the current version of chapter 580 of the Minnesota Statutes. Thus, we presume 

that the 1861 session law is not presently in force.
7

ambiguous.” American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). 

A statute is unambiguous if it “is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation.” Nelson 

v. Schlerer, 859 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. 2015). If a statute is unambiguous, we “interpret 

the words and phrases in the statute according to their plain and ordinary meanings.” 

Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 798 (Minn. 2015). A statute is ambiguous, however, 

if it has “more than one interpretation.” Lietz v. Northern States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 

865, 870 (Minn. 2006). If a statute is ambiguous, we apply “the canons of statutory 

construction to determine its meaning.” County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 

705 (Minn. 2013). We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s interpretation 

of a statute. Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 

2012).

Even though chapter 580 does not expressly answer the specific issue at the core of 

this appeal, the statute does contain some provisions that inform our analysis. A 

mortgagor’s statutory right to redeem foreclosed property after a foreclosure sale is 

expressly stated in the following provision:

When lands have been sold in conformity with the 

preceding sections of this chapter, the mortgagor, the 

mortgagor’s personal representatives or assigns, within six 

months after such sale, except as otherwise provided in 

subdivision 2 or section 582.032 or 582.32, may redeem such 

lands, as hereinafter provided, by paying the sum of money for 

which the same were sold, with interest from the time of sale 

at the rate provided to be paid on the mortgage debt as stated 

in the certificate of sale and, if no rate be provided in the 

certificate of sale, at the rate of six percent per annum, together 

with any further sums which may be payable as provided in 

sections 582.03 and 582.031.
8

Minn. Stat. § 580.23, subd. 1(a) (2016) (emphasis added). Restated in simple terms, the 

statute provides that, if no exceptions apply, a mortgagor may redeem foreclosed property 

within six months of a foreclosure sale. Id. Consistent with that principle, a certificate of 

foreclosure sale “must not contain a time allowed for redemption that is less than the time 

specified by section 580.23.” Minn. Stat. § 580.12 (2016).

The above-stated general rule is altered in only a few specified circumstances. For 

example, a 12-month redemption period (rather than a 6-month period) applies in several 

specified situations, such as if a mortgage was executed before July 1, 1967; if the amount 

due at the time of the foreclosure sale is less than two-thirds of the original principal amount 

of the loan; or if the mortgaged property is in agricultural use and is between 10 and 40 

acres in size. See Minn. Stat. § 580.23, subd. 2(1), (2), (6) (2016); see also id., subd. 2. As 

another example, the redemption period may be shortened to as few as 2 months (but not 

eliminated) in the event of a voluntary foreclosure, so long as the mortgagee and mortgagor 

waive certain rights, the voluntary foreclosure agreement is recorded, and interested parties 

receive notice. Minn. Stat. § 582.32, subds. 3(b), (c), 4a, 5 (2016). Furthermore, a 5-week 

redemption period applies if the foreclosed property is 10 acres in size or smaller, contains 

a residential dwelling of fewer than 5 units, is not used in agricultural production, and is 

abandoned. Minn. Stat. § 582.032, subd. 4 (2016).

Both parties urge us to interpret the statute based on its silence, but in different ways. 

Generally, if “a statute is ‘completely silent on a contested issue,’” a court should “not look 

beyond the statutory text to discern its meaning unless there is an ‘ambiguity of expression’ 

— rather than a ‘failure of expression.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson, 
9

872 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 

(Minn. 2012)). A statute’s silence leads to an ambiguity of expression “if its ‘silence 

renders the statute susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’” Id. (quoting 

Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590). In this case, however, no ambiguity arises from the 

absence of a statement that a mortgagor may or may not waive the statutory right to redeem 

foreclosed property. No ambiguity arises on that particular issue because the statute 

expressly recognizes a mortgagor’s general right to redeem. As stated above, chapter 580 

generally provides that a mortgagor may redeem foreclosed property within six months of 

a foreclosure sale. Minn. Stat. § 580.23, subd. 1(a). Chapter 580 contains a limited number 

of exceptions to that general rule, but a private agreement between a mortgagor and a 

mortgagee is not among them. Because the statute expressly makes certain exceptions, 

“there is an implied exclusion of other[]” exceptions. See City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 

800 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 2011). Thus, there is no exception that would defeat RBP’s 

general right to redeem the foreclosed property in the circumstances of this case. U.S. 

Bank essentially asks this court to add language to chapter 580 that would create an 

exception to a mortgagor’s statutory right to redeem. “Because ambiguity is not created 

by the statute’s silence, we ‘are not free to substitute amendment for construction and 

thereby supply the omissions of the Legislature.’” Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d at 533 (quoting 

Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 590).

U.S. Bank also contends that we should follow caselaw from other states that has 

enforced a borrower’s post-default waiver of the right to redeem mortgaged property. RBP 

contends in response that the foreign caselaw on which U.S. Bank relies is concerned with 
10

the equitable right to redeem mortgaged property before a foreclosure sale, not the 

statutory right to redeem property after a foreclosure sale. RBP is correct that there is a 

meaningful distinction between the equitable right to redeem before a foreclosure sale and 

the statutory right to redeem after a foreclosure sale. See Thomas W. Bigley, Comment,

The Equity of Redemption: Who Decides When It Ends?, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 315, 

315-27 (1995). The leading legal dictionary defines “equity of redemption” to mean the 

“right of a mortgagor in default to recover property before a foreclosure sale by paying the 

principal, interest, and other costs that are due,” which stands in contrast to “a statutory 

right to redeem within six months after the foreclosure sale.” Black’s Law Dictionary 657 

(10th ed. 2014). RBP also is correct that U.S. Bank’s foreign caselaw is concerned solely 

with the equitable right of redemption.3 The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that 

a borrower’s equitable right of redemption may be waived or bargained away. See, e.g., 

O’Connor v. Schwan, 190 Minn. 177, 179, 251 N.W. 180, 181 (1933); De Lancey v. 

Finnegan, 86 Minn. 255, 261, 90 N.W. 387, 390 (1902). But there is no such caselaw in 

Minnesota concerning the statutory right of redemption. For that reason, the foreign 

caselaw cited by U.S. Bank is inapplicable to this case.

Thus, the district court did not err by ruling that RBP’s waiver of its statutory right 

to redeem is unenforceable.

 

3See Hamud v. Hawthorne, 338 P.2d 387, 390 (Cal. 1959); Ringling Joint Venture 

II v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 595 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Russo v. 

Wolbers, 323 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Doerr, 

303 A.2d 898, 908 (N.J. 1973); Skeels v. Blanchard, 81 A. 913, 915 (Vt. 1911); Batten v. 

Fallgren, 467 P.2d 882, 884 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
11

II.

In appeal A16-0258, U.S. Bank argues that the district court erred by denying its 

motion to amend the complaint.

After a responsive pleading has been served, a plaintiff may amend the complaint 

“only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party,” and “leave shall be 

freely given when justice so requires.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. A plaintiff may not amend 

the complaint if the proposed amendment would be futile because it would serve no useful 

purpose. Bridgewater Tel. Co. v. City of Monticello, 765 N.W.2d 905, 915 (Minn. App. 

2009); Envall v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 704, 399 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. App. 1987), 

review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). If a district court denies a motion to amend on the 

ground of futility, our review of the district court’s ruling “may turn on whether it was 

correct in an underlying legal ruling.” Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 500-01 (Minn. App. 

2003), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). This court generally applies an abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review to a district court’s denial of a motion to amend the complaint. 

Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

U.S. Bank requested leave to amend the complaint by pleading a request for a 

declaratory judgment that RBP’s waiver of its statutory right to redeem is enforceable. The 

district court denied the motion on the ground that U.S. Bank’s proposed amendment would 

be futile because the district court previously had ruled that RBP’s waiver is unenforceable. 

On appeal, U.S. Bank asserts only one reason why the district court erred in denying its 

motion to amend: because RBP’s waiver is not unenforceable. But U.S. Bank’s sole 
12

asserted reason is incorrect in light of our conclusion that the district court correctly 

determined that RBP’s waiver is unenforceable. See supra part I.

Thus, the district court did not err by denying U.S. Bank’s motion to amend the 

complaint.

III.

In their respective appeals, both U.S. Bank and RBP argue that the district court 

erred in part in its November 2015 order, which ruled on RBP’s objections to the receiver’s 

final report, which sought approval of the receiver’s distribution of funds held by the 

receiver at the termination of the receivership. 

In January 2015, after the district court had ruled that RBP could redeem but before 

RBP had completed the redemption, the receiver made a disbursement of approximately 

$362,000 to U.S. Bank. That amount consisted of all funds held by the receiver at that time 

except $10,000, which was withheld. After the receiver filed the final report, RBP asserted 

objections to the January 2015 distribution, including three objections concerning a total 

of approximately $159,000. The district court overruled RBP’s objection concerning a 

refund of an insurance premium in the amount of approximately $41,000. The district 

court also overruled RBP’s objection concerning approximately $67,000 in rental income 

that was received by the receiver before the foreclosure sale. But the district court agreed 

with RBP that, after accounting for rental income that is allocated to expenses, the receiver 

should have disbursed the remaining funds of approximately $50,000 to RBP. The parties

challenge these three rulings on appeal.
13

A.

In appeal A16-0258, U.S. Bank argues that the district court erred by ruling that the 

receiver improperly disbursed the remaining funds in the receivership estate, $49,943.68,

to U.S. Bank and by ruling that those funds should be returned to the receivership estate 

for distribution to RBP. 

The issue is governed by the following statute:

Any sums collected that remain in the possession of the 

receiver at the termination of the receivership shall, in the 

event the termination of the receivership is due to the 

reinstatement of the mortgage debt or redemption of the 

mortgaged property by the mortgagor, be paid to the 

mortgagor; and in the event termination of the receivership 

occurs at the end of the period of redemption without 

redemption by the mortgagor or any other party entitled to 

redeem, interest accrued upon the sale price pursuant to section 

580.23 or 581.10 shall be paid to the purchaser at the 

foreclosure sale. Any net sum remaining shall be paid to the 

mortgagor, except if the receiver was enforcing an assignment 

of rents that complies with section 559.17, subdivision 2, in 

which case any net sum remaining shall be paid pursuant to the 

terms of the assignment.

Minn. Stat. § 576.25, subd. 5(f) (2016) (emphasis added).

U.S. Bank asserts two reasons why the district court erred. First, U.S. Bank argues 

that RBP is not entitled to the funds held by the receiver at the termination of the 

receivership because RBP waived its statutory right to redeem the mortgaged property. 

That argument is without merit because we have concluded that RBP’s waiver is 

unenforceable. See supra part I.

Second, U.S. Bank argues that it is entitled to the funds held by the receiver at the 

termination of the receivership because of RBP’s assignment of its rental income to U.S. 
14

Bank. The assignment agreement states, “Lender may apply the Rents received by Lender 

from the Property . . . [1] against amounts expended for . . . expenses as Lender incurs in 

connection with the operation of the Property and [2] against interest, principal, required 

escrow deposits and other sums which have or which may become due . . . .” In response, 

RBP argues that, notwithstanding the language of the assignment agreement, U.S. Bank 

was entitled to utilize rental income from the property only to the extent that expenses were 

incurred, i.e., only for the first purpose specified in the provision quoted here. 

As a matter of law, RBP’s debt to U.S. Bank was extinguished by the foreclosure 

sale in July 2014. See Minn. Stat. § 580.225 (2016). “[A]n assignment of rents will 

continue in effect after foreclosure, even if the foreclosure has fully extinguished the 

underlying mortgage debt, but only to the extent necessary to pay the ongoing expenses 

associated with maintaining the property, such as taxes, insurance, and repair costs, during 

the redemption period.” In re Brewery Ltd. P’ship, 113 B.R. 992, 1002 (Bankr. D. Minn. 

1990), aff’d sub nom., Page v. City of Duluth, 945 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1991). This is so 

notwithstanding section 559.17, subdivision 2, which is cross-referenced in section 576.25, 

subdivision 5(f). See id. at 1001-02. Section 559.17, subdivision 2, is consistent with In 

re Brewery Limited Partnership and with the district court’s ruling because it provides that 

a receiver “shall apply the excess cash in the manner set out herein from the date of 

appointment through the entire redemption period from any foreclosure sale.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 559.17, subd. 2(a) (2016). See In re Brewery Ltd. P’ship, 113 B.R. at 1001-02. 

Furthermore, the supreme court has recognized a lender’s right to an assignment of rental 

income after a foreclosure sale only to the extent of the expenses incurred by the lender but 
15

not to reduce the borrower’s debt or any deficiency. See, e.g., G.G.C. Co. v. First Nat’l 

Bank, 287 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1979); Cross Cos. v. Citizens Mortg. Inv. Trust, 305 

Minn. 111, 116-17, 232 N.W.2d 114, 117-18 (1975).

Thus, the district court did not err by ordering U.S. Bank to return $49,943.68 to the 

receivership estate.

B.

In appeal A16-0073, RBP argues that the district court erred by ruling that the 

receiver properly disbursed $67,639.01 to U.S. Bank to reflect rental income received 

between the appointment of the receiver in June 2014 and the foreclosure sale in July 2014. 

The district court’s order appointing the receiver provided that the receiver should 

remit rental income to U.S. Bank on a monthly basis. The receiver did not do so, and U.S. 

Bank did not request monthly remittances. The receiver did not remit any rental income 

to U.S. Bank until January 2015, when U.S. Bank so requested. The district court reasoned 

that, even though U.S. Bank was not entitled to rental income received after the foreclosure 

sale, it was entitled to rental income that had been received before the foreclosure sale:

If the Receiver made the monthly excess cash 

disbursement for June as contemplated by the Receivership 

Order, Plaintiff could have received $67,639.01 to apply 

against the Indebtedness. This would have reduced the loss it 

took on the undersecured debt at the time of the foreclosure 

sale, and although there was no remaining Indebtedness in 

January, the Court believes it equitable for Plaintiff to retain 

that sum and reduce that loss as originally envisioned. 

(Footnote omitted.)
16

RBP argues that the district court erred in its ruling on the ground that U.S. Bank is 

not entitled to any remittance of rental income after the foreclosure sale, even if the 

remittance is for rental income received before the foreclosure sale. In response, U.S. Bank

argues that the district court did not err because its ruling merely enforced the June 2014 

order appointing the receiver, which obligated the receiver to remit rental income on a 

monthly basis. The district court approved of the receiver’s untimely remittance of 

$67,639.01 on the ground that it restored U.S. Bank and RBP to the positions they would 

have occupied if the receiver had made a timely remittance of rental payments received 

before the foreclosure sale. RBP has not demonstrated that the district court’s ruling 

violated any applicable statute or caselaw.

Thus, the district court did not err by overruling RBP’s objection to the receiver’s 

disbursement of $67,639.01 in rents to U.S. Bank.

C.

In appeal A16-0073, RBP argues that the district court erred by ruling that the 

receiver properly declined to seek to recover an insurance premium refund in the amount 

of $40,851.

Because of the cancellation of an insurance policy, an insurance company issued a 

refund of an insurance premium in December 2014. The insurer sent the refund to a 

servicing agent of U.S. Bank. The receiver believed that the refund belonged to U.S. Bank 

and, accordingly, determined that attempting to collect the refund from U.S. Bank’s agent 

for purposes of paying the refund to U.S. Bank would not be a worthwhile use of 
17

receivership resources. The district court overruled RBP’s objection on the ground that the 

receiver was not grossly negligent.

RBP argues that the district court erred on the ground that U.S. Bank is not entitled 

to the insurance refund because the insurance premium itself was paid with RBP’s funds. 

In response, U.S. Bank initially argues that the insurance premium was paid from an escrow 

account funded by both parties. U.S. Bank argues further that the receiver is not 

responsible for the disposition of the insurance refund because the receiver did not direct 

the insurer to send the refund to U.S. Bank’s servicing agent and because the refund never 

was part of the receivership estate. U.S. Bank’s second argument is consistent with the 

governing statute, which obligates the receiver, after a redemption, to pay to the mortgagor 

“sums collected that remain in the possession of the receiver at the termination of the 

receivership.” See Minn. Stat. § 576.25, subd. 5(f) (2016). Because the funds at issue were 

neither “collected” by the receiver nor “remain[ing] in the possession of the receiver at the 

termination of the receivership,” see id., the receiver was not obligated to make such a 

payment to RBP.

Thus, the district court did not err by overruling RBP’s objection concerning the 

$40,851 insurance premium refund.
18

D E C I S I O N

The district court did not err by ruling that RBP’s waiver of its statutory right to 

redeem the mortgaged property is unenforceable. The district court did not err by denying 

U.S. Bank’s motion to amend the complaint. The district court did not err in its rulings on 

RBP’s objections to the receiver’s final report.

Affirmed.