alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gilbert Violate, Appellant.

[977 NYS2d 357]

*900Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Guzman, J.), dated September 22, 2011, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A downward departure from a sex offender’s presumptive risk level generally is only warranted where there exists a mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise adequately taken into account by the Sex Offender Registration Act *(see*Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006]; *People v Guzman,*110 AD3d 863 [2013]; *People v Fryer,*101 AD3d 835, 836 [2012]; *People v Fernandez,*91 AD3d 737 [2012]). A sex offender seeking a downward departure has the initial burden of showing the existence of an appropriate mitigating factor in order to “establish the threshold condition for the SORA court’s exercise of its discretion” to grant or deny the application *(People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]). “[T]he sex offender meets this threshold condition by satisfying a twofold showing: (1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence” *(id.*at 128; *see People v Guzman,*110 AD3d 863 [2013]; *People v Fryer,*101 AD3d at 836). Here, the defendant failed to make the requisite twofold showing *(see People v Benjamin,*105 AD3d 926, 927 [2013]; *People v Fryer,*101 AD3d at 836; *People v Harris,*93 AD3d 704, 706 [2012]; *People v Wyatt,*89 AD3d at 129-130; *People v Modica,*80 AD3d 590, 592 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court lacked the discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level *(see People v Henry,*106 AD3d 796 [2013]; *People v Arroyo,*105 AD3d 926 [2013]; *People v Shephard,*101 AD3d 978, 979 [2012]). Eng, EJ., Skelos, Dillon and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
July 9, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

DEBRA V. JENNINGS, ESQ. AND DEBRA V. JENNINGS, P.L.L.C., Appellant

NO. 14-14-00860-CV V.

AMERICAN ASSET FINANCE, L.L.C., Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard the parties joint motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

judgment signed by the court below on September 17, 2014. Having considered the 

motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that each party shall pay its costs by reason of this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-15-0000355

14-JUL-2015

08:02 AM
RECONSIDERATION DOCKET

95-2279.

#### Feichtner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

Franklin App. No. 95API01-47. Reported at 78 Ohio St.3d 1207, 676 N.E.2d 1182. On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.
Exhibit 10.2


 


AGREEMENT


 


This Agreement is entered into as of July 22,
2013 between Silverstar Mining Corp., a Nevada corporation (“Silverstar” or the “Company”) and Tina Bressert
(“Lender”).


 


WHEREAS, on or about
September 30, 2010 Lender executed an Assignment of Debt from Lawrence Sccia and was assigned the Demand Loan which on or about
May 14, 2010 loaned Silverstar $2,500; and


 


WHEREAS, the loan
agreement has been memorialized in a demand note dated May 14, 2010; and


 


WHEREAS, Silverstar
does not have sufficient funds to satisfy the loan obligations; and


 


WHEREAS, on July
22, 2013 the Company’s Board of Directors approved a plan whereby debt holders could convert their loan into shares of common
stock at a conversion rate of $0.35 per share; and


 


WHEREAS, Lender
has agreed to exchange the loan obligation(s) for the convertible debenture;


 


NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
it is mutually agreed that:


 


1. SilverStar shall execute
the attached convertible debenture solely in exchange for the $2,500 loan plus accrued interest made by Lender to Silverstar.


 


2. Upon execution of the
convertible debenture, all sums otherwise due and payable by Silverstar are hereby incorporated in the convertible debenture. In
case of default, Lender’s sole remedy shall be pursuant to the Convertible Debenture.


 


3. This Agreement shall
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada. Jurisdiction for any dispute shall be in the state
of Nevada. In the event of any litigation, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs including attorney fees.


 


4. Each party acknowledges
and represents that each party has either retained independent legal counsel or had sufficient time to retain independent legal
counsel to review this Agreement and the Convertible Debenture.


 




    	 



    	 



    


 


This Agreement is executed this 22nd
day of July, 2013


 


	Silverstar Mining Corp.	 
	 	 	 
	BY:	/s/ Neil Kleinman	 
	 	Neil Kleinman	 
	ITS:	CEO	 
	 	 	 
	Lender 	 
	 	 	 
	BY:	/s/ Tina Bressert	 
	 	Tina Bressert
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3669 

To increase criminal penalties for certain knowing violations relating to food 

that is misbranded or adulterated. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 29, 2010 

Mr. LEAHY (for himself and Mr. FRANKEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To increase criminal penalties for certain knowing violations 

relating to food that is misbranded or adulterated. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Food Safety Enforce5 ment Act of 2010’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CRIMINAL PENALTIES. 

7 Section 303(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos8 metic Act (21 U.S.C. 333(a)) is amended— 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3669 IS

1 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘Any’’ and in2 serting ‘‘Except as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), 

3 any’’; 

4 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘Notwith5 standing the provisions of paragraph (1) of this sec6 tion, if’’ and inserting ‘‘If’’; and 

7 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

8 ‘‘(3) Any person who knowingly violates subsection 

9 (a), (b), (c), (k), or (v) of section 301 with respect to any 

10 food that is misbranded or adulterated shall be fined 

11 under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not 

12 more than 10 years, or both.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean Thomas MORTON, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-40694.

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided June 20, 2006.

Michelle S. Englade, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frank Warren Henderson, Amy R. Blalock, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Federal Public Defender’s Office Eastern District of Texas, Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Dean Thomas Morton, Jr., appeals following his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of a mixture containing a detectible amount of phencyclidine. The Government has waived Morton’s appeal waiver in the plea agreement by not seeking to enforce it. *See United States v. Story,*439 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.2006).

Morton argues that his sentence is invalid in light of *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines as if they were mandatory. We review for plain error. *See United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo,*407 F.3d 728, 732 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 267, 163 L.Ed.2d 240 (2005). To prevail under a plain-error analysis, Morton must show, among other things, that the error prejudiced him by adversely affecting his substantial rights. *See id.*at 733.

Morton fails to identify anything in the record to suggest that his sentence would have been lower had the court applied the Sentencing Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory. *See id.*He thus fails to establish prejudice to his substantial *448rights. *See id.*The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Klaus Thymann, Respondent, v AFG Management, Appellant.

[975 NYS2d 879]

*456Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered December 18, 2012, which, insofar as appealed from, granted plaintiff’s application to resettle the court’s order dated August 29, 2012 to reinstate his conversion claim against additional parties, Pier 59 Studios, LP and Frederico Pignatelli, unanimously dismissed, without costs.

Defendant is not “[a]n aggrieved party” within the meaning of CPLR 5511 by the order it now challenges. Defendant does not stand to be affected by the court’s permission to grant plaintiff leave to add a conversion claim against Pignatelli and Pier 59, which had separate definable interests. If the order were reversed, defendant, as an entity, would not have its right to a full judgment in its favor directly affected *(see Boyle v City of New York,*237 AD2d 230 [1st Dept 1997]; *see also Midland Ins. Co. v Lewis,*178 AD2d 146, 147 [1st Dept 1991]). “That the adjudication may remotely or contingently affect interests which the party represents does not give it a right to appeal” *(State of New York v Philip Morris Inc.,*61 AD3d 575, 578 [1st Dept 2009], *appeal dismissed*15 NY3d 898 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P, Sweeny, DeGrasse, Freedman and Gische, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2








CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL
OFFICER PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AND EXCHANGE
ACT RULES 13a-14(b) AND 15d-14(b)


(Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002)







In connection with the Quarterly Report
of Neuralstem, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31,
2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the “Report”), I,John
Conron, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:





(1)
            The Report fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934; and





(2)
            The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of the operation of the
  Company.





/s/John
      ConronJohn ConronChief Financial
      Officer
              (Principal Financial
      Officer)
              Neuralstem,
      Inc.




This certification accompanies the
Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-11366 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RYAN MAZEY, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:00-CR-15-ALL-L

-------------------- December 11, 2001 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Ryan Mazey appeals his conviction for conspiracy to commit theft and to transport, and the transportation of, stolen property in interstate commerce. He argues that the district court erred when it refused to grant him a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and when it did not voir dire the jury to assess the severity of any tainting that may have occurred when juror Brown stated that he believed Mazey was guilty. To obtain a new trial based upon the discovery of new evidence, Mazey must establish that (1) the evidence was newlyNo. 00-11366 -2- discovered and unknown to him at the time of the trial; (2) failure to detect the evidence was not a result of his lack of due diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence will likely produce an acquittal. United States v. Ardoin , 19 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 1994). We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial based upon new evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Freeman , 77 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 1996). Mazey has failed to establish that the evidence was newly discovered and unknown to him at the time of trial, and he has not shown that the alleged failure to detect the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence. The record establishes that Mazey was notified that the date of November 28, 1998, was at issue from both the superseding indictment and the Government’s motion for reciprocal discovery. Mazey’s contention that the November 28 date first became an issue during trial is therefore meritless. Furthermore, the fact that Mazey did not have in his possession at the time of trial the time-stamped copy of the credit card receipt does not render that evidence “unknown.” Mazey was clearly placed on notice regarding the possibility of interposing an alibi defense for the night of November 28, 1998, and, therefore, the fact that he did not have the relevant evidence in his possession at the time of trial reflects a lack of diligence. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.No. 00-11366 -3- After the court questioned a juror about his pretrial opinion of Mazey’s guilt, Mazey did not request the district court to voir dire the remaining jurors. A defendant implicitly waives objections to juror misconduct when counsel fails to act, before verdict, upon information known to defendant or counsel. United States v. O’Keefe , 722 F.2d 1175, 1178 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification



Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned hereby certifies that:

> (1) I have reviewed the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P. (the "Report") to which this statement is an Exhibit;
> 
> (2) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
> 
> (3) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P.

|By:    | Inland Real Estate Investment Corporation                        
|------ | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|       | General Partner                                                  
|       |                                                                  
|       |                                                                  
|       | /S/ Brenda G. Gujral                                             
|       |                                                                  
|Name:  | Brenda G. Gujral                                                 
|Title: | President of the General Partner and                             
|       | principal executive officer of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P
|Date:  | May 10, 2005
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 31 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 31

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                       January 9, 2019.
    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and are hereby, elected to 
the following standing committees of the House of Representatives:
    Committee on Ethics: Mr. Deutch, Chair.
    Committee on House Administration: Ms. Lofgren, Chair.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
Gross Gaming Revenue Trending

1

GGR broke the $30 billion mark for the first time and hit a 

record high of $31.2 billion in FY16!

($B)
#### Nadia Dos Santos et al., Appellants, v Power Authority of the State of New York, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Submitted March 4, 2013;

decided April 25, 2013

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied *[see*20 NY3d 856 (2013)].

Judge Rivera taking no part.
Exhibit 32.1 Certification Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lexington Energy Services Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended May 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Brent Nimeck, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1 The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2 The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. By: /s/  Brent Nimeck Brent Nimeck
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer July 20, 2007
^IJer^S § IN THE COURT OF

v. § CRIMINAL APPEALS RECEIVED IM

§ COURT OF CRIMINAL APPFAl THE STATE OF TEXAS § • OF TEXAS mmiNMLAHHEAL

JUL O9 2015

Pro Se Motion for Extension of Time

To File Petition for Discretionary Review ^®' "GOSta, ulQfk

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

COMES NOW the Appellant/Petitioner in the above-styled and numbered cause and pp. .

respectfully moves this Honorable Court to extend the time for filing the Appellant^TetmottToY'NAL APPEALS

Discretionary Review in this cause and in support thereof would show to the Court the

following: Abel Acosta, Cierk

1. The style and number ofthis case in the Court ofAppeals, is: fcjc\(o<_r&4 v..

The State ofTexas, Appeal No. 0^-\\~O\Q ff I -CR.

2. The style and number ofthe case in the trial court is: The State ofTexas v.

Wvffl<g.>f-QvS ;Cause No. F-ll^llffiV; from the ^Q^rd District Court of

Dallas County, Texas.

3. The Appellant was convicted ofthe felony offense of ^ rr<X(\ S T\

4. Judgment was entered onffi-\fl-~V-3 and punishment was assessed at MQ

years confinement and a fine in the amount of ~~*C/?"*' •

5. The conviction was affirmed in the Court ofAppeals on -JWne. \Qf (kQ *5

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 1
6. The deadline for filing the Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review in this

cause is qufVi IQ*^Q^

7. An extension oftime for a period of sixty (60) days is requested that would make

the due date ^j)4-e/H Uf [$, &Q ^ •

8. No prior request for an extension oftime has been made.

9. The facts relied upon to show good cause for the requested extension are, as

follows: The Appellant/Petitioner,was representedby court appointed.counsel during the appeal

of this case to the Court of Appeals. After the conviction was affirmed, the trial court refused to

appoint counsel to file a Petition for Discretionary Review. Therefore, additional time is needed

for the Appellant/Petitionerto either prepare and file the Petition pro se or to seek legal

assistance in filing the Petition.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Appellant /Petitioner respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court extend time for filing the Petition for Discretionary Review in

this cause to pn?^r£ Pe,f(''cn/hg/Jc fp^<k( qS^^T^^c^.

Respectfully submitted,

[Name]

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The Appellant/Petitionerhereby certifies that a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing

Motion has been mailed to the Office ofthe Criminal District Attorney for U&l^ County,

, and mailed via U.S. mail, to the Office ofthe State Prosecuting Attorney,

THaV/1'! 3 Cqua fy ,on the ®j day of JVty- .20_\S_.

RtckarJ (WdgjnO

[Name]

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 3
EXHIBIT 32.2
------------


                  SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Landauer, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, James M. O'Connell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section  1350, as adopted pursuant to Section  906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     i.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
          13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     ii.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of
          operations of the Company.




                              /s/  James M. O'Connell
                              ------------------------------
                              Chief Financial Officer



May 7, 2004




[Signed originals of these written statements required by Section 906 have
been provided to Landauer, Inc. and will be retained by Landauer, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.]
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

FRENEL CAJILUS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-1862

[August 29, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Ernest A. Kollra, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-18555 CF10A.

Frenel Cajilus, Sneads, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.