## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 17 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

SENECA-CAYUGA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA; FORT SILL APACHE TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA; NORTHERN ARAPAHO TRIBE OF WYOMING; DIAMOND GAME ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION; JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; THOMAS SCOTT WOODWARD, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma,

Defendants - Appellants. No. 01-5066

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(No. 00-CV-609-BU)

Edward P. Lazarus (Sandra M. Lee and L. Rachel Hely ar with him on the briefs), Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles, California for PlaintiffAppellee, Diamond Game Enterprises, Inc. Jess Green, Ada, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming and Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma; (Andre w W. Baldwin, Lander, Wyoming for Plaintiff-Appellee Northern Arapaho Tri be of Wyoming; Robert E. Prince, Lawton, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee Fo rt Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, with him on the briefs). Vincent J. Falvo, Jr., United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Frank J. Marine, Senior Litigation Counsel, Washin gton, D.C., David E. O’Meila, United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, and Catherine Depew, Assistant United States Attorney, Northern D istrict of Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellants.- 2 -

Stephen P. Collette, Long Beach, California, for Am ici Curiae National Coalition Against Gambling Expansion, Stand Up For Kansas, an d New Mexico Coalition Against Gambling. Stephen B. Otto, Newport Beach, California, and Ric hard J. Wilson, Houston, Texas, for Amicus Curiae Cheyenne-Arapaho Gaming Co mmission.

Before HENRY , McWILLIAMS , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

HENRY , Circuit Judge.

This case requires us to interpret the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U .S.C. §§ 2701-2719. Appellants are the federal agencies and officials w ho threatened to prosecute
three Native American tribes for use of a device ca lled the Magical Irish Instant Bingo Dispenser System, which we will call “the Mac hine.” Appellees are the three tribes, as well as the corporation that manuf actured and supplied the
Machine. In response to the threat of prosecution, the appel lees filed a complaint in federal district court. Subsequently, the district court granted the appellees’ motion for a declaratory judgment stating that the Machine (1) is notan illegal “gambling device” under the Johnson Act; and (2) is a permissible technologic aid to Class II gaming under IGRA. This appeal followe d. Our opinion proceeds in four steps. Part I summari zes the applicable statutory framework. Part II summarizes the backgr ound of this dispute. Part III assesses, and rejects, the two threshold arguments raised by appellees: mootness and collateral estoppel. Part IV evaluates the dis trict court’s judgment on the1 “Indian country” is a term of art. The United States Code defines “Indian country” as: (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights- of-way running through the reservation; (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 18 U.S.C. § 1151. In contrast, “[t]here is no single statute that defines ‘Indian’ for all federal purposes.” Felix H. Cohen’s Handbook of Indian Law23 (1982 ed.). Moreover, that term has been somewhat supplanted in recent years by the term “‘Native American,’ which has “become a part of the common parlance.” Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist. , 154 F.3d 1117, 1118 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). We therefore strike a balance by using the statutory term “Indian country” to avoid confusion, but using the - 3 - merits in two sections. The first section analyzes the relationship between IGRA
and the Johnson Act and concludes that if the Machi ne is properly classified as an IGRA Class II technologic aid, then the Machine is necessarily both authorized by IGRA and protected from Johnson Act scrutiny. The second section, following the D.C. Circuit, concludes that the Machine is ind eed an IGRA Class II technologic aid. Accordingly, although our reasoni ng differs somewhat from the district court, we affirm the district court’s deci sion.

I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK We begin by summarizing the applicable statutory fr amework. We discuss
the Johnson Act and then IGRA.

The Johnson Act The Johnson Act, as amended in 1962, makes criminal , both outside and inside “Indian country,” 1 the possession, use, sale, or transportation of an yterm “Native American” elsewhere in this opinion.

- 4 - “gambling device.” 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a). The Johns on Act defines a “gambling device” as any

slot machine . . . and other machine or mechanical device (including but not limited to, roulette wheels and similar devices) designed and manufactured primarily for us e in connection with gambling, and (A) which when operat ed may deliver, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property, or (B) by the operat ion of which a person may become entitled to receive, as t he result of the application of an element of chance, any mon ey or property. Id. § 1171(a)(1), (2). Courts have construed the John son Act broadly, concluding that the statute’s “gambling device” language was e nacted to “anticipate the ingeniousness of gambling machine designers” in “se parating the public from its money on a large scale,” Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Kennedy , 330 F.2d 833, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and therefore to cover a wide var iety of machines. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., What Constitutes Gambling Device W ithin Meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1171(a) So as to be Subject to Forfei ture Under Gambling Devices Act of 1962 (15 U.S.C.A. secs. 1171-1178) , 83 A.L.R Fed. 177 (1987 & Supp. 2000) (collecting cases).

The Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA) Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Californi a v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians , 480 U.S. 202 (1987), which “authorized gaming on federally recognized Indian country, Congress enacted the Ind ian Gaming Regulatory Act . . . also known as IGRA.” United States v. 162 Meg aMania Gambling Devices ,2Edward P. Sullivan, Reshuffling the Deck: Proposed Amendments to the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act , 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 1107, 1126 (1995). - 5 - 231 F.3d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 2000) (additional inte rnal citations omitted). IGRA “provides a comprehensive regulatory framework for gaming activities on Indian country which seeks to balance the interests of tri bal governments, the states, and the federal government.” Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Ke lly , 104 F.3d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) . Towards that end, IGRA
authorized the creation within the United States In terior Department of a three member National Indian Gaming Commission. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704. The NIGC’s broad powers include inspecting tribes’ book s and records, approving tribal-state pacts, levying and collecting civil fi nes, monitoring and shutting down unauthorized tribal games, and promulgating regulat ions and guidelines to implement IGRA. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2705-06, 2713. IGRA divides Native American gaming into three mutually exclusive categ ories: Classes I, II, and III. 25 U.S.C. § 2703. The three classes differ as to t he extent of federal, tribal, and state oversight. See United States Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v

. Oklahoma , 927 F.2d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991).

Class I Class I gaming includes traditional Native American “social games played
in connection with ‘tribal ceremonies or celebratio ns.’” Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)). These traditional games include “‘stick or bone’ games, rodeos, and horse races played in conjunction with tribal celeb rations, ceremonies, pow wows,
or feasts.” 2 Tribes possess “exclusive jurisdiction” to regulate Class I gaming.- 6 -

Keetoowah , 927 F.2d at 1177 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)) (emphasis supplied).

Class II Class II gaming includes “the game of chance common ly known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer or other techn ologic aids are used in connection therewith) . . . including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and o ther games similar to bingo . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A). IGRA excludes from the def inition of Class II gaming “electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind.” Id. at § 2703(7)(B)(ii). Class II gaming may be conducted in Indian country without a tribal-state compact. See id. §§ 2703(7) & 2710(b)(1). Tribes may engage in, or license and r egulate, Class II gaming on land within a given tribe’s territorial boundaries if three conditions are met: (1) “such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity,” (2) “such gaming is not otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian country by Federa l law,” and (3) “the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or res olution which is approved by the [Chairman of the NIGC].” Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A)-(B). Class II games are

“ regulated by the [NIGC] .” MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)) (emphasis supplied). Congress made no ref erence in IGRA to the relationship between the Johnson Act’s strictures a nd IGRA’s authorization of the use of technologic aids to Class II gaming. Nor ha s Congress amended the Johnson Act to clarify this relationship.3 The factual background is drawn primarily from paragraphs 16-23 of “Plaintiffs’

Proposed Findings of Fact” as adopted by the district court, seeAplts’ App. at 220, and from undisputed facts established at the preliminary injunction hearing, see Aplts’ App. at - 7 - Class III Class III is a residual category: under IGRA, all g aming activity other than Class I and II gaming is Class III gaming. Id. § 2703(8). Examples of Class III gaming include “any banking card games, including b accarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack (21),” and “electronic or electromechanic al facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind.” Id. § 2703(7)(B)(i)-(ii). IGRA provides that the Johnson Act’s prohibitions “shall not appl y to any gaming conducted under a [t]ribal-[s]tate compact that” is entered i nto between “[a]ny Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon whic h a Class III gaming activity is being conducted” in “a state in which gambling devi ces are legal.” Id. § 2710(d)(3), (6). Class III gaming authorized by a tribal-state compact is regulated by the given compact. However, Class III gaming no t duly authorized may be subject to federal criminal prosecution under the J ohnson Act. Thus, regulation of Class III gaming is shared by the tribes, the states, the NIGC, and th e Department of Justice

.

II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background At the heart of this dispute is whether the game pl ayed with the Machine qualifies as the IGRA Class II game of pull-tabs. Therefore, we first describe the game of pull-tabs as played in its traditional, man ual form. We then describe the game that is played with the Machine. 315-209 (Hr’g on Plaintiffs’ Mot. for Prelim. Injunction August 30, 2001). Both parties

failed to satisfy the requirement that they designate the adopted findings of fact as part of the appellate record. SeeFed. R. App. P. 30(a)(1)(B)-(C); 10th Cir. R. 30.1(A)(1) and 30.2(A)(1). Nonetheless, because the adopted findings of fact are part of the ruling before us, we sua sponte designate them as part of the record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C). - 8 - 1. Pull-tabs In the game of pull-tabs as it is typically played, players compete against one another to obtain winning cards from a set of c ards, known as a “deal.” A typical deal contains up to 100,000 cards and a pre determined number of winning cards. Each individual pull-tab within a deal is a small, two-ply paper card. When the top layer of an individual card is removed , the bottom layer reveals a pattern of symbols indicating whether the player ha s won a prize. Winning cards are randomly spaced within preprinted, prearranged deals which are stored in
boxes or divided into rolls. One deal consists of all of the pull-tabs in a given game that could possibly be purchased. A single ga me of pull-tabs is complete only when all pull-tabs within a given deal have be en sold. To participate in the game of pull-tabs, a player m ust purchase an individual tab from a clerk or dispenser. The cler k or dispenser gives the next tab in the preprinted roll to the player. The player m ust then open the tab to see if it contains a winning combination and present any winn ing tabs to a gaming hall clerk to obtain the corresponding prize.

2. The Magical Irish Instant Bingo Dispenser System (The Machine) The Machine is an electro-magnetic dispenser manufa ctured by plaintiffappellee Diamond Game Enterprises. Three physicall y separate components- 9 -

constitute the Machine – the dispenser, the base, a nd the verifier. The Machine dispenses paper pull-tabs from a roll of a maximum of 7,500 tabs that are part of a larger pull-tab deal. Other rolls within the sam e deal may be dispensed by another dispenser or a gaming hall clerk.
The Machine is mounted in front of fluore scent lights that illuminate the Machine. When a player inserts money into the Mach ine and presses the button marked “DISPENSE,” the Machine cuts the next pull-t ab card from the preprinted roll within its dispenser compartment and d rops the tab into a tray for the player to receive. The Machine has a “verify” feature that allows play ers to see the results for a given pull-tab posted on a video display. When t his feature is enabled, the Machine’s display screen scans a bar code that has been previously printed on the back of a paper tab. After the tab is dispensed, t he screen displays the contents of the paper tab on a video screen approximately six s econds later. The video screen depicts a grid that is similar in appearance to tha t of a slot machine. Whether or not the “verify” function is enabled, an y winning tabs dispensed by the Machine must be presented for in-person insp ection by a gaming hall clerk before the player receives payment. The clerk must confirm that the paper pulltab contains a winning prize, and only then may the clerk award the appropriate (pecuniary) prize. The game played with the Machine can be a high-stak es, high-speed affair. A winning ticket pays up to $1,199.00 per one-dolla r play. When working properly, the Machine completes one play every seve n seconds.- 10 -

3. The Tribes’ Use of the Machine Each of the three appellee tribes – the Seneca-Cayu ga Tribe of Oklahoma, the Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, and the Nor thern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming – is authorized by the NIGC to conduct gami ng operations on its reservation. Each tribe entered into leasing agree ments with Diamond Game for use of the Machine, and at least one of the tribes, the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, used the Machine as part of its gaming operations.

B. Procedural Background 1. The NIGC Advisory Opinion Letter and the Decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia in the Diamond G ame case In January 2000, the three tribes requested an admi nistrative opinion from the NIGC regarding the classification of the Machin e under IGRA. The resulting advisory opinion concluded that the game played wit h the Machine constitutes unauthorized Class III gaming. In the advisory opinion, the NIGC relied heavily on a decision by the
United States District Court for the District of Co lumbia involving another dispenser made by Diamond Game, the “Lucky Tab II.” Like the Machine, the Lucky Tab II dispenses paper pull-tabs from a prepr inted roll and displays the contents of the pull-tab on a video screen. Howeve r, unlike the Machine, the Lucky Tab II does not permit the user to disable th e “verify” feature and is one integrated physical unit. On June 23, 1998, the Un ited States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Lucky Tab II is an IGRA Class III game not authorized for use by tribes in their gaming operat ions without specific compacts4Diamond Game Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno , 9 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 1998).

5 Aplts’ App. at 11 (Letter from NIGC General Counsel Kevin Washburn, dated Feb. 29, 2000). - 11 - between the tribes and the states in which their op erations are located. 4 The NIGC’s advisory opinion reasoned that the Lucky Tab II “closely parallels [the Machine],” and that the district court’s opinion re garding the Lucky Tab II “provides clear guidance to determine the classific ation for the [Machine].” 5

2. The Complaint Following the issuance of the NIGC’s opinion, the U nited States Attorney
for the Northern District of Oklahoma threatened to bring an enforcement action against the three tribes for conducting unauthorize d use of gambling devices in violation of the Johnson Act. In response to this threat of prosecution and the NIGC’s advisory opinion, the tribes, joined by Diam ond Game, filed the federal district court complaint in this case. The complai nt sought two forms of relief: a declaratory judgment stating that the pull-tabs gam e as played with the Machine constitutes Class II gaming under IGRA and is not a “gambling device” proscribed by the Johnson Act; and an injunction pr eventing the federal authorities from taking the threatened enforcement action against the three tribes.

3. The District Court Hearing On August 30, 2000, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which each side presented testimony from exp ert witnesses. During the hearing, the Machine and the Lucky Tab II were disp layed. The government6Aples’ Br. at 9 (quoting Defendants’ Response to Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, at 10). - 12 - argued that the Machine is virtually identical to t he Lucky Tab II and that both
devices should be classified as Class III devices. In so arguing, the government asserted that “there is no[] . . . legal distinctio n or difference to be drawn” between the Machine and the Lucky Tab II, and that “fundamentally, the Machine and Lucky Tab II games are the same.” 6

4. The District Court’s Rulings The district court issued three rulings relevant to this appeal: an oral ruling on August 30, 2000, and two rulings on February 20, 2001, one oral, and one in writing.

a. August 30, 2000 Oral Ruling At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the distri ct court made the following oral findings regarding the classificatio n of the Machine under IGRA:

The [Machine] is simply a dispenser of Pull-Tabs. It’s not a Class II gaming device, nor a Johnson Ac t device. The [Machine] simply takes a deal, which is a roll of PullTabs, which may be put in several rolls, and dispen ses them at various locations. This deal could be played witho ut the dispenser. In other words, somebody could sit at a ticket window and sell the Pull-Tabs individually. It wou ldn’t change the outcome of the game, whether they were s old over-the-counter or put out by the dispenser. The Pull-Tab tickets are predetermined at the time they are printed, outside the player’s presence. W hen the Pull-Tab is purchased, the person purchasing the Pu ll-Tab is competing with all other persons in the deal. T he PullTab is printed before the game is ever played. The dispenser does not select the order of dispensi ng the Pull-Tab tickets, that is determined by where t hey are on the roll. The dispenser does not determine what is printed on the tickets. The dispenser does not accu mulate7Aplts’ App. at 176-77 (Evidentiary Hr’g dated August 30, 2000) (emphasis supplied).

8Aplts’ App. at 221 (Evidentiary Hr’g dated Feb. 20, 2001).

9SeeAplts’ App. at 221-22.
- 13 -

any winnings, it does not make change of any kind, it doesn’t contain a random number generator; in other words, there is nothing inside the machine that determines who wins. It’s just a technologic aid to dispensing Pull-Tabs

. The winner is determined by the ticket being taken to a person, the person looking at the ticket, and then paying if the ticket is a winner. There is no application of an element of chance in the machine, the dispenser doesn’t do that at all. The dispenser doesn’t determine who the winner is. Tha t is predetermined when the Pull-Tabs are printed at som e other location before the game is ever played. 7

b. February 20, 2001 Oral Ruling On February 20, 2001, the district court made the f ollowing oral finding regarding the Johnson Act’s applicability to the Ma chine:

[T]he Court finds that the [Machine] is not a Johns on Act [gambling] device. While the game of pull-tabs its elf, by its nature contains an element of chance, no additional element of chance is applied by the [Machine]. The [Machine ] merely dispenses preprinted prearranged pull-tabs a nd contains an additional optional monitor to help mak e the play of the game more enjoyable. The device cannot change the outcome of the game and a participant cannot wi n anything without first taking it to a cashier. 8 However, in its oral ruling, the district court re fused to issue a permanent injunction. 9

c. February 20, 2001 Judgment Order On the same day, the district court entered its dec laratory judgment that10Aplts’ App. at 8 (Judgment of the District Court entered February 20, 2001).

11 SeeDiamond Game Enterprises, Inc. v. Reno , 230 F.3d 365, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 2000). - 14 - “[t]he [Machine] is a permissible Class II aid unde r [IGRA] and that it is not a gam[bl]ing device under the Johnson Act.” 10 The instant appeal by the government ensued. In the meantime, however, event s relevant to this appeal had
continued to unfold.

5. The D.C. Circuit Decision in the Diamond Game cas e and the Switch to Lucky Tab II On November 3, 2000, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appe als held that the Lucky Tab II is an authorized IGRA Class II technol ogic aid, reversing the ruling by the United States District Court for the Distric t of Columbia. 11 In the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s holding and the legal uncertaint y surrounding this appeal, appellees stopped using the Machine and transitione d towards exclusive reliance on the Lucky Tab II. By February 2002, none of the tribes were either using, or even still in possession of, a single Machine. The tribes state that they have no present intention to use the Machine in the future, and that they have turned their attention from the Machine to the Lucky Tab II and other pull-tab devices.
Diamond Game states that it has ceased both manufac turing and providing the Machine to any tribes, and that, save one Machine i t has retained for historical purposes, it no longer possesses any Machines. The government does not dispute
these statements.

III. THRESHOLD ISSUES Before turning to our evaluation of the merits of d istrict court’s rulings, we12Aples’ Mot. to Dismiss Appeal as Moot and Vacate District Court Decision, at 4 (filed

Feb. 7, 2002). - 15 - must first resolve two threshold issues raised by t he appellees.

A. Mootness Having secured a victory in the D.C. Circuit, the a ppellees have moved to dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the district court’s declaratory judgment. The appellees argue that the case is moot because t hey “cannot be prosecuted” by the government. 12 The appellees’ advocacy on this point may be some what halfhearted; at oral argument, counsel for two of the t hree appellee tribes urged us to reach the merits of this appeal. Nonetheless, beca use questions of mootness go to our jurisdiction, we are required to address this i ssue at the outset. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. , 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000). We review mootness questions de novo . Faustin v. City & County of
Denver , 268 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 2001). “Constitutio nal mootness doctrine is grounded in the Article III requirement that federa l courts [may] only decide actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Building and Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp. , 7 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal cita tions and quotation marks omitted). However, “the conditions under whi ch a suit will be found constitutionally moot are stringent.” Id. The current status of this appeal does not meet tho se stringent conditions. Because appellees retain a “legally cognizable inte rest in the outcome,” id. , the case is not moot. The appellees assert that their cessation of use of the Machine necessarily means that they can no longer be prosec uted under the Johnson Act.
This assertion is incorrect. Affidavits submitted by the appellees establish that- 16 -

the Machines were being supplied by Diamond Game to Native American tribes through at least November 2000, and were being used on certain of the appellee tribes’ properties as recently as December 2001. T he Johnson Act prohibits the possession, sale, transportation, or use of any gam bling device in Indian country. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1175-76. The statute of limitations f or Johnson Act prosecutions is five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Therefore, but for the legal im pediment presented by the district court’s February 20, 2001 declaratory judgment, the government would appear to have until at least 2006 to initiate a prosecution against the tribes, and until at least 2005 to pros ecute Diamond Game. Two additional factors counsel against dismissing t he appeal as moot. First, it is not “ absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could no t reasonably be expected to recur.” S. Utah Wilderne ss Alliance v. Norton , 301 F.3d 1217, 1236 n.17 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Adar and Constructors, Inc. v.
Slater , 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000) (emphasis in original, i nternal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the plaintiffs / appellees should er the “heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct ca nnot reasonably be expected to start up again.” Adarand , 528 U.S. at 222; see also City of Erie , 529 U.S at 287- 88 (imposing this burden on the party that was the plaintiff below). As appellees concede, it is “technically possible” for the tribe s to resume usage of the Machines. Aples’ Mot. to Dismiss at 15. Indeed, D iamond Game nowhere represents that it would be unable to resume manufa cturing and marketing the Machine; it is thus far from “absolutely clear” tha t the use, sale, possession, or transportation of the Machines under Diamond Game’s proprietary control cannot be reasonably expected to recur. Accord United States v. Generix Drug Corp. , 460 U.S. 453, 456 n.6 (1983) (“Respondent has argue d that the case is moot- 17 -

because almost its entire store of products contain ing the disputed active ingredients is no longer saleable, and in the futur e it intends only to sell [authorized] drugs . . . . The possibility that res pondent may change its mind in the future is sufficient to preclude a finding of m ootness.”). Second, we perceive a degree of strategic manipulat ion of the federal appellate courts by the appellees, who conceded in their supplemental briefs and at oral argument that the decision to reallocate re sources from the Machine to the Lucky Tab II was driven by the D.C. Circuit decisio n issued during the pendency of this case. In City of Erie , the Supreme Court based its refusal to dismiss fo r mootness in part on a concern over strategic manipu lation, concluding that the “interest in preventing litigants from attempting t o manipulate [appellate] jurisdiction to insulate a favorable decision from review further counsels against a finding of mootness.” 529 U.S. at 288. Appellees argue that City of Erie is distinguishable because the Supreme Court there, in declining to find mootness, specifically applied its reasoning to the Court’s c ustom of leaving intact state court rulings that on appeal become moot. Appellee s therefore urge us to follow the federal appellate court custom, for cases that become moot on appeal, of vacating the district court’s judgment. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship , 513 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1994). We, however, read Cit y of Erie as expressing a generalized concern about manipulation of an appellate court’s jurisdiction to seal a favorable decision from revi ew. Here, appellees’ conduct, while presumably not in bad faith, nonetheless impl icates the concern over posttrial manipulation. We thus conclude that the appeal is not moot.- 18 -

B. Collateral Estoppel The second threshold issue we must resolve is wheth er, in the wake of the
D.C. Circuit’s Diamond Game decision, the government is barred by the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel from arguing that the Machine is not an IGRA Class II technologic aid. See Aples’ Br. at 21-24 (citing Diamond Game , 270 F.3d at 370). Offensive collateral estoppel descri bes claims such as those raised by the appellees, in which “‘a plaintiff is seeking to [prevent] a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previou sly litigated and lost against another plaintiff.’” Harvey v. United Transp. Unio n , 878 F.2d 1235, 1243 n.13 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. S hore , 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979)). An argument that the opposing party is estopped fro m litigating an issue must be timely raised. Arizona v. California , 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000). We have previously applied this rule to bar a party from ra ising an estoppel argument on appeal where that party was a victorious plaintiff in the district court and failed to timely raise its estoppel claim below. See Harvey , 878 F.2d at 1243 (“We hold that plaintiffs waived this issue preclusion claim by failing to invoke it timely.”).
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in favor of Diamond Gam e, a named plaintiff in both this and the D.C. Circuit case, was filed on N ovember 3, 2000. See
Diamond Game , 230 F.3d at 365. Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s decisi on was issued well before the final hearing and February 20, 2001 judgment of the district court in this case. Nonetheless, appellees never raised their estoppel claim in the district court, first raising the issue in their op ening appellate brief filed April 30,
2002. As we said in Harvey , “[t]his simply is too late.” 878 F.2d at 1243.- 19 -

Permitting such belated assertion of collateral est oppel arguments would “do[] nothing to vindicate two primary policies behind th e doctrine, conserving judicial resources and protecting parties from ‘the expense and vexation’ of relitigating issues that another party previously has litigated and lost.” Harvey , 878 F.2d at 1243 (quoting Montana v. United States , 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). Accordingly, we hold that appellees have waived the ir estoppel argument. Although we do not reach the “merits” of the appell ees’ collateral estoppel argument, we note that nonmutual offensive collater al estoppel is generally not available against the federal government. See United States v. Mendoza , 464 U.S. 154, 159-62 (1984). We turn now to the merits of the government’s appeal.

IV. THE MERITS
Standard of Review We review the district court’s interpretation of fe deral statutes and regulations de novo , MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718, and its findings of fact for
clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In addition, although the district court’s order did not distinguish between gaming in Indian country and non-Indian country, we construe the order to apply only to use , sale, possession, or transportation of devices used in Indian country be cause the threatened prosecution at issue in this case only involved dev ices possessed or used by, or sold or transported to, the appellee tribes.

Discussion Our merits analysis divides into two sections. The first section analyzes the relationship between IGRA and the Johnson Act, spec ifically whether users of- 20 -

IGRA Class II technologic aids in Indian country may be subject to Johnson Act liability. The second section analyzes whether the Machine is an IGRA Class II technologic aid.

A. Whether Users of IGRA Class II Technologic Aids o n Indian Country May be Subject to Johnson Act Liabi lity 1. Lack of Controlling Precedent Appellees contend that it is “settled law” under t his court’s decision in MegaMania , 231 F.3d 713, that IGRA Class II technologic aids are insulated from the Johnson Act’s ban on gambling devices. Aples’ Br. at 16; Am. for Affirmance Br. at 7. That characterization is temp ting because if accurate, it would considerably simplify our task. However, it overstates the case. In MegaMania , we concluded that the “162 MegaMania” bingo game
machine did not violate the Johnson Act. See 231 F.3d at 715. In reaching that conclusion, we first analyzed the question of how t o classify the 162 MegaMania machine under IGRA and held that “MegaMania is not an electronic facsimile of, but is an aid to, the game of bingo.” Id. at 725. “Accordingly,” we stated, “MegaMania is not excluded from [IGRA]’s definition of a Class II game.” Id. (emphasis supplied). We then stated in the sentenc e immediately following that “Congress did not intend the Johnson Act to apply i f the game at issue fits within the definition of a Class II game [under IGRA], and is played with the use of an
electronic aid.” Id. The footnote accompanying that text stated that “ our holding in this case . . . is limited to the MegaMania form of bingo currently at issue.” Id.
at 725 n.9. The appellees argue that under MegaMania , technologic aids to all13 NIGC, Comments , Commissioners Elizabeth L. Homer and Teresa E. Poust, 67 Fed.

Reg. 41,169 (June 17, 2002) (quoting Letter from the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to the NIGC (dated July 10, 2000)).
- 21 - enumerated Class II games beyond just bingo are ins ulated from the Johnson Act. However, as we have explained, we did not squarely reach that issue in MegaMania , nor have we done so in any subsequent decision. The lack of clear legislative or judicial resolution of the relations hip between the Johnson Act and IGRA Class II technologic aids has engendered “‘unc ertainty . . . among the [] tribes, states, and regulatory bodies as to which g ames are properly classified as Class II under [IGRA] . . . . where tribes offer C lass II games that utilize ‘technologic aids’ as IGRA expressly permits [ and] . . . some of these games fall under the definition of ‘gambling devices’ under th e Johnson Act.’” 13 This case, though, squarely presents the question of whether a ids to those non-bingo games such as pull-tabs that are enumerated in 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) are protected from Johnson Act scrutiny, and we will address it.

2. Reading the Johnson Act in Light of IGRA Our task is to interpret Congress’s silence in the statutory text regarding the relationship between the Johnson Act and IGRA Class II technological aids. The prohibitions enacted in the 1962 amendments to the Johnson Act apply to all United States territories, including those in India n country. See 15 U.S.C. § 1575. IGRA, enacted a quarter-century later, speci fically excludes the Johnson Act from application to authorized Class III gaming , see 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3), (6), but makes no statement one way or the other in the statutory text concerning the application of the Johnson Act to Class II tech nologic aids. Congress did not14See, e.g. , Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Dept. of the Interior , 252 F.3d 473, 478

(D.C. Cir. 2001).

15CompareComments of NIGC Commissioners Homer and Poust, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,166- 72, withComments of NIGC Commissioner Montie E. Deer, id. at 41,172-74.
- 22 - amend the Johnson Act at the time of the enactment of IGRA to clarify the extent to which the Johnson Act covers Class II gaming, no r has Congress done so since IGRA’s enactment. Neither the parties’ briefs nor our research have revealed any authority pre-dating the passage of IGRA that speci fically addresses how the Johnson Act applied to the types of devices deemed by IGRA as Class II technologic aids. In addition, no NIGC regulations exist on this issu e to which we would owe any deference. Because the Johnson Act is a federa l criminal statute enforced by the United States Department of Justice, we owe no deference to the NIGC’s
construction. 14 Moreover, even if we did defer to the NIGC on thi s issue, the NIGC has provided only limited guidance, issuing no amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations that address the relationship b etween the Johnson Act and IGRA Class II technologic aids. Although the indiv idual commissioners did discuss the relationship between the Johnson Act an d IGRA Class II aids in comments that accompanied amendments to the federal code of regulations, those comments were not included in the amended regulatio ns, and they revealed that
the commissioners remain divided on the issue. 15 The government urges us to analyze whether, in the absence of IGRA,
devices that fit within the ambit of authorized IGRA Class II technologic aids would violate the Johnson Act. However, contrary t o the government’s argument (and, apparently, to the district court’s approach) , the key inquiry is not how the16 United States v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices , 223 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir.

2000).

17AccordComments by NIGC Commissioners Homer and Poust, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,170 (June 17, 2002) (“[T]he Johnson Act has proven remarkably troublesome as a starting point in a game classification analysis.”); id. at 41,168 (“The ingenuity of gaming designers, which was designed to be constrained by the Johnson Act, is arguably intended to be given freer reign by IGRA in the context of Class II gaming.”). Cf. United Keetoowah , 927 F.2d at 1176 (“IGRA is a comprehensive and pervasive piece of legislation that in many respects preempts other federal laws that might apply to gaming.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
- 23 - Johnson Act would have applied to Class II gaming i n Indian country independently of IGRA; instead, our view is that “[ w]hat matters now is how the two are to be read together – that is, how two enac tments by Congress over thirty-five years apart most comfortably coexist, g iving each enacting Congress’s legislation the greatest continuing effect.” 16 With that aspiration in mind, we note that under IG RA, Class II games include “the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer or other technologic aids are used in connection therewith) . . . including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs , lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) (emphasis supplied). IGRA further provi des that “electronic, computer, or other technologic aids” to such games are Class II gaming, and therefore permitted in Indian country. Id. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, we will not ascribe to Congress the intent both to carefully craft through IGRA this pr otection afforded to users of Class II technologic aids and to simultaneously evi scerate those protections by exposing users of Class II technologic aids to John son Act liability for the very conduct authorized by IGRA. 17 A better reading of the statutory scheme is that18SeeFCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. , 123 S. Ct. 832, 840 (2003)

(“When two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 24 - through IGRA, Congress specifically and affirmative ly authorized the use of Class II technologic aids, subject to compliance wi th the other IGRA provisions that govern Class II gaming. Moreover, by shielding Indian country users of IGRA Class II technologic aids from Johnson Act liability, this construction gives meaning to both statutes, rather than neutering one of legal import. 18 This understanding of the two statutes recognizes that the Johnson Act may remain a tool f or criminal prosecution of conduct outside Indian country or conduct within In dian country not authorized by federal law, but that through IGRA, Congress spoke specifically to the federal government’s regulatory scheme over certain forms o f authorized gambling within Indian country. This common-sense reading of the two statutes is di rectly supported by legislative history. The sole congressional commit tee report accompanying the passage of IGRA stated that

[it] is the Committee’s intent that with the passag e of this act, no other Federal statute, such as those listed below [including “15 U.S.C. [§§] 1171-78,” the Johnson Ac t] will preclude the use of otherwise legal devices used so lely in aid of or in conjunction with bingo or lotto or oth er such gaming on or off Indian lands. Indian Affairs Committee Report , S. Rep. No. 100-446 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3082 (“Committee Report”) (empha sis supplied). Read in conjunction with Congress’s inclusion in 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A) of “pull-tabs” in a list of games “similar to bingo,” this statement in the Committee Report is19See alsoUnited States v. Nelson , 277 F.3d 164, 186 (2d Cir. 2002) (“In making this

inquiry, we rely principally on the reports of the legislative Committees involved in drafting the statute and in steering it through Congress [and] . . . . eschew reliance on the passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor debates”), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 145; In re Kelly841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[O]fficial committee reports [] provide the authoritative expression of legislative intent.”); Mills v. United States , 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Committee reports represent the most persuasive indicia of Congressional intent (with the exception, of course, of the [statute’s] language.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy947 (3d ed. 2001) (“Most judges and scholars agree that committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and should be given great weight.”).
- 25 - direct evidence that Congress did not intend the Jo hnson Act to apply to the use of Class II technologic aids in Indian country. Se e Garcia v. United States , 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“[T]he authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, w hich represent the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen i nvolved in drafting and studying the proposed legislation.”) (internal quot ation marks omitted). 19 This reading of Congress’s intent is also supported by the goal identified in the enacted statutory text of providing a “a statut ory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tri bal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1); see also Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3079 (declar ing the legislative aim of fostering tribes’ use of modern technology in branc hing out their Class II gaming operations, “thereby enhanc[ing] the[ir] potential of increasing revenues”); cf.
Cabazon , 480 U.S. at 216 (“The inquiry is to proceed in li ght of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian selfgovernance, including its overriding goal of encour aging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development”) (internal quotation mark s omitted).20 See alsoUnited States v. Burns , 725 F. Supp. 116, 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (concluding

that “Congress intended that no federal statute should prohibit the use of gambling devices for bingo or lotto, which are legal class II games,” that “IGRA makes 15 U.S.C. § 1175, and other statutes . . . inapplicable to class II bingo,” and that IGRA’s legislative history “indicates not that [such statutes are] preempted by the IGRA, but in fact that [they] remain in effect, except for [] potential application to class II gaming”), aff’d sub nom , United States v. Cook , 922 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1991). Cf. United States v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices , 223 F.3d at 1101 (the Ninth Circuit concluding that “IGRA quite explicitly indicates that Congress did not intend to allow the Johnson Act to reach [Class II] bingo aids.”). But seeUnited States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of NebraskaNo. 02- 1503, 2003 WL 1339280, at *3 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2003) (stating that “the argument that the IGRA implicitly repeals the Johnson Act with respect to class II devices is not well taken, even though some version of this view has been expressed by several courts,” and concluding that “the Tribe must not violate either act”); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n , 14 F.3d 633, 635 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that besides express repeal of Johnson Act for Class III gaming in IGRA section 2710(d)(6), “‘[t]here is no other repeal of the Johnson Act, either expressed or by implication,”’ for Class III gaming) (internal quotation omitted); Cabazon Band Mission Indians v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n , 827 F.Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1993) (same).

21 NIGC, Comments by NIGC Commissioners Homer and Poust, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,169 (June 17, 2002) (“Congress did not intend the Johnson Act to apply if the game at issue fits within the definition of a Class II game, and is played with the use of an electronic aid.”) (quoting MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 725); NIGC, Comments , 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,170 (“Because Congress intended to permit the use of electronic technology in Class II gaming (even if the device might otherwise fall within the ambit of the Johnson Act), the important factor in a game classification analysis is whether the technology is assisting a player or the play of the game.”); id. at 41,168 (“The traditional broad construction of the - 26 - The understanding that Congress intended to insul ate Class II technologic aids from Johnson Act liability is consistent with our statement in MegaMania that “Congress did not intend the Johnson Act to ap ply if the game at issue fits within the definition of a Class II game [under IGRA], and is played with the use of an electronic aid,” 231 F.3d at 725, and with th e D.C. Circuit’s statement in
Diamond Game that IGRA limits “the Johnson Act prohibition to d evices that are neither Class II games approved by the [NIGC] nor C lass III games covered by tribal-state compacts.” 230 F.3d at 367. 20 Further, and somewhat ironically, this understanding is also consistent with the most recently expressed view of the NIGC, 21 and even with that of certain attorneys in the Dep artment of Justice. 22Johnson Act encompasses numerous devices manufactured that the Commission now

believes Congress presumed to constitute acceptable technologic aids.”).

22See, e.g. , Memorandumfrom Richard Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Seth P. Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General (June 13, 1996) (reviewing IGRA’s legislative history and concluding that “Congress did not intend for [the Johnson Act] to bar the use of [certain] technologic [gaming] aids on Indian lands when operated in compliance with the Class II provisions of IGRA”) (taking a position since disavowed by the Department of Justice) (cited with approval in Diamond Game , 230 F.3d at 368).

23 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, supra n.19, at 824.

24 Id.

25Aplts’ Br. at 24. See alsoAm. for Reversal Br. at 30 (“It is difficult to conceive of a situation that would more clearly call for the application of expressio unius . This Court - 27 - Against these authorities, the government advances essentially two related arguments, neither of which is convincing. The gov ernment’s first and more forceful argument draws on the maxim of statutory c onstruction expressio unius est exclusio alteriu s , which “means inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion o f
the other.” 23 In this context, “the notion is one of negative i mplication: the enumeration of certain things in a statute suggests that the legislature had no intent of including things not listed or embraced.” 24 The government points to the
statement in IGRA that the Johnson Act “shall not apply to any gaming conducted under a Tribal-State compact” that is entered into between “any Indian Tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian country upon wh ich a Class III gaming activity is being conducted” and “a state in which gambling devices are illegal,” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3), (6) (emphasis supplied). Beca use the quoted language is the only express exception provided for in IGRA to the general applicability of the Johnson Act, contends the government, “[t]he necess ary corollary to that express exception . . . is that, where there is no such com pact, ‘gambling devices’ may not be used in Indian country.” 25must presume that Congress did not intend to exempt Class II gambling from the

strictures of the Johnson Act.”).

26SeeNLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan , 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“While [expressio unius] may find application in other types of cases, in matters of Indian law expressio unius must often be set aside.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Martini v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n , 178 F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A non-binding rule of statutory interpretation, not a binding rule of law, the expressio uniusmaxim is often misused. . . . the expressio uniusmaxim, unsupported by arguments based on the statute’s structure or legislative history is simply too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has clearly resolved the issue.”) (italics supplied); cf. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews , 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

27Aplts’ Br. at 28 (quoting Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)).
- 28 - We disagree. The persuasive evidence from IGRA’s l egislative history seriously undermines the government’s rather bald expressio unius argument. Recall the statement in the key committee report th at “[i]t is the Committee’s intent that with the passage of this act, no other Federal Statute, such as [the Johnson Act] will preclude the use of otherwise leg al devices used solely in aid of or in conjunction with bingo or lotto or other such gaming on . . . Indian lands.” Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3082. Relia nce on the expressio unius canon is unwarranted in such a situation. Because the canon’s purpose is to resolve a question not answered by the statute, the canon is not particularly useful where legislative history clearly evinces congressi onal intent, especially in this context of construing statutes governing Native Ame rican affairs. 26 Second, argues the government, to adopt the appelle es’ construction of the two statutes, we must first find an implied partial repeal of the Johnson Act by IGRA, a construction of statutes disfavored unless there is “some affirmative showing of [congressional] intention to repeal.” 27 The government argues that our language in Citizens Band Potawatoma Indian Tri be of Oklahoma v. Green ,- 29 -

995 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1993) – that the “IGRA prov ides for limited waiver of Johnson Act in certain circumstances,” id. at 181, forecloses the appellees’ argument that Class II aids are shielded from Johns on Act liability. Again, we disagree: our task, as we have explained, is to rea d the Johnson Act and IGRA together giving each Congress’s enacted text the gr eatest continuing effect. Accordingly, consistent with our holding in MegaMan ia , we hold that if a piece of equipment is a technologic aid to an IGRA Class II game, its use, sale, possession or transportation within Indian country is then necessarily not proscribed as a gambling device under the Johnson A ct. If a piece of equipment is an IGRA Class II technologic aid, a court need n ot assess whether, independently of IGRA, that piece of equipment is a “gambling device” proscribed by the Johnson Act. Our holding sharpen s the issues in this dispute: we now analyze whether the Machine is indeed a Clas s II technologic aid.

B. Whether the Machine is an IGRA Class II Technolog ic Aid The government and supporting amici advance two arg uments as to why the Machine is not an IGRA Class II technologic aid: th at (1) IGRA’s authorization of “technologic aids” does not extend to pull-tabs, and that (2) even if it does, the Machine is not a Class II technologic aid but, rath er, an unauthorized Class III
electronic facsimile of a slot machine. We take ea ch argument in turn.

1. Does IGRA’s authorization of Class II “technologi c aids” extend to pull-tabs? We first detail the NIGC’s construction of IGRA in its recently revised regulations of IGRA, which would extend Class II pr otection to technologic aids- 30 -

to pull-tabs. We then explain why that definition is controlling in this case.

a. The NIGC Regulations Extending Class II Protec tion for

“technologic aids” to Pull-Tabs The government’s argument that IGRA does not autho rize technologic aids for pull-tabs is directly contrary to the NIGC’s mo st recent amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations. On July 17, 2002, the NIGC issued revised regulations stating that “pull tab dispensers and/o r readers” are among the games included as IGRA Class II “electronic, computer, or other technologic aids.” 25 C.F.R. § 502.7(a), (c). These revised regulations are applicable because rather than being newly promulgated regulations, they are merely amendments, and do not operate retroactively since they do not “attach new legal consequences to events completed before enactment.” Landgraf v. US I Film Prods. , 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). The government has conceded that the Machine is “an electromechanical dispenser and reader of paper pull-tabs.” Aplts’ B r. at 3. Thus, if we adopt the NIGC’s construction of IGRA, we need only decide wh ether the Machine constitutes an “electronic, computer, or other tech nologic aid[]” to pull-tabs. Unless the government can show why we should not de fer to the NIGC’s construction of 25 U.S.C. § 2703, appellees prevail on this point. As detailed below, we conclude that the NIGC’s construction is entitled to deference.

b. Chevron Deference In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resou rces Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that28 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena , 44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (en

banc)

. - 31 -

considerable weight should be accorded to an execut ive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principles of defe rence to administrative interpretations . . . consistently f ollowed . . . whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a s tatute [] involve[s] reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation [] depend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agenc y regulations. Underlying this judicial deference to administrativ e agencies is the notion that the “rule-making process bears some resemblance to the legislative process and serves to temper the resultant rules such that they are likely to withstand vigorous scrutiny.” 28 With regard to classifying devices under IGRA, the NIGC’s specialization
warrants such deference. As the D.C. Circuit has n oted, “Congress created the NIGC, headed by a Chair appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate presumably for his or her expertise on Indian gamin g.” Diamond Game , 230 F.3d at 369. Congress intended that the NIGC would reso lve difficult policy questions such as how to further the “objective of allowing I ndian tribes to use gaming as a means of ‘promoting tribal economic development, se lf-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,’” id. at 368 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-02) (alterations in original), while at the same time “‘shield[ing] [tr ibes] from organized crime and other corrupting influences,’” id. , and from the “risk of corruption or excessive gambling losses.” 230 F.3d at 368. Indeed, our ci rcuit has held that we “afford the regulations promulgated by the [NIGC] and publi shed in the Code of Federal Regulations the deference prescribed in Chevron .” MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718- 32 -

(citing Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43). In reviewing the NIGC’s interpretation of IGRA unde r Chevron , we ask two questions:

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the in tent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; f or the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to t he unambiguously expressed intent of Congress [Chevron step 1]. But if the statute is silent or ambiguous with r espect to the specific issue, the question for the court is w hether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construct ion of the statute. If Congress has explicitly or implici tly delegated authority to an agency, legislative regul ations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute [ Chevron step 2]. MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718 (quoting Maier v. EPA , 114 F.3d 1032, 1040 (10th Cir. 1997) (in turn quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-44)) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (bracketed parentheticals suppli ed). Accordingly, we proceed to apply Chevron ’s two-step analytic framework.

Chevron Step One To determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” id. , i.e., whether IGRA authorizes the use of technolo gic aids to pulltabs, we employ “traditional tools of statutory con struction.” Arco Oil & Gas Co.
v. EPA , 14 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quo tation marks omitted).
We turn to Chevron ’s second step only if “nothing in the statute dire cts” a clear
answer. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt , 167 F.3d 1287, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). We begin with the statutory text. IGRA defines “Cl ass II gaming” as:29United States v. Bedonie , 913 F.2d 782, 790 n.7 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation

marks omitted and italics supplied). See alsoNorfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n , 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (applying the ejusdem generiscanon).
- 33 - (i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whe ther or not electronic, computer, or other technologic a ids are used in connection therewith)-- (I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with cards bearing numbers or other designations, (II) in which the holder of the card covers such nu mbers or designations when objects, similarly numbered or designated, are drawn or electronically determined, and (III) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previously designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards, including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo . .

. . 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A). Whether the authorization of the use of technologic aids extends to pull-tabs is not clearly resolved by the text of § 2703(7)(A)(i), which leaves ambiguous whether “technologic aids” parenth etical refers only to bingo, or also refers to the other games of chance authori zed as Class II gaming in subsection (i)(III). There is no mention in any of the seven merits briefs filed in this appeal of, nor have we discovered, any legisla tive history pre-dating IGRA that speaks directly to the permissibility of Class II technologic aids for games other than bingo, or, for that matter, to the class ification of pull-tab aids or dispensers in general. Moreover, application of tr aditional canons of statutory construction leaves us in equipoise. For example, on the one hand, “[t]he doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when there are general words following particu lar and specific words, the former [are] confined to things of the same kind.” 29 Accordingly, the authorization in subsection (7)(A)(I) of the use of aids for bingo could be30Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supran.19, at 826. See alsoUnited States v. Telluride

Co. , 146 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The last antecedent rule [] applies modifying words or phrases to the immediately preceding word or phrase.”).

31 As we have discussed, the NIGC regulations construe the ambiguity in IGRA in favor of the position advocated by the tribes in this case. This construction is consistent with the Blackfeetcanon, under which “federal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan , 112 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe , 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). Both parties in this case extensively briefed the Chevronissue, and, perhaps because the agency view points in favor of the tribes’ position, no party has argued that the Blackfeetcanon is implicated. In Ramah , 112 F.3d at 1461-62, this court, construing regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to implement the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act that were opposedby the tribes, stated that “for purposes of this case, [] the canon of construction favoring Native Americans controls over the more general rule of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.” See alsoAlbuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan , 930 F.2d 49, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting the proposition that Chevrondeference trumps the Blackfeetcanon). Subsequently, in MegaMania , this court cited the Blackfeetcanon with approval, see231 F.3d at 718, but proceeded to resolve the question in favor of the tribes based in part upon Chevrondeference. See id. at 720-25; cf. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. Hope , 16 F.3d 261, 264 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Commission has satisfied the requirement that statutes be interpreted in favor of the Indian Tribes.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But cf. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d - 34 - reasonably read as authorizing the use of technolog ic aids for all Class II bingo and bingo-like gaming authorized in that subsection

. On the other hand, as several amici anti-gambling o rganizations counter, the “last antecedent rule” of statutory constructio n arguably points the other way.
See Am. for Reversal Br. at 7-9. Under this rule of c onstruction, “[r]eferential and qualifying words or phrases refer only to the l ast antecedent, unless contrary to the apparent legislative intent.” 30 Because “technologic aids” is a qualifying phrase, goes the argument, this clause therefore mo difies only the immediately preceding phrase (“the game of chance commonly know n as bingo”), but does not modify “pull-tabs.” Accordingly, because “nothing in the statute directs” a clear answer, Public Lands Council , 167 F.3d at 1302, we turn to Chevron ’s second step. 31657, 663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (deferring to the Secretary of Interior’s regulations of the

Reindeer Industry Act under Chevronnotwithstanding that the Blackfeetcanon cut the other way). In any event, the Blackfeetcanon supports our conclusion, and we need not further address the issue. 32SeeCommittee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3079 (“The Committee specifically rejects any inference that tribes should restrict [C]lass II games to existing game sizes, levels of participation, or current technology. The Committee intends that tribes be given the opportunity to take advantage of modern methods of conducting Class II games and the language regarding technology is designed to provide maximum flexibility. ” ) (emphasis supplied).

33 See25 U.S.C. § 2702 (stating that one of the purposes of IGRA was “to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue”); see also, e.g ., Kathryn R. L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming , 5 Chap. L. Rev. 47, 53 (2002) (surveying recent studies of tribal economic trends, and noting “marked improvements for many Native American communities, largely due to gaming revenue”). But cf, e.g. , Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic Diversity? , 11 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 441, 441 (2002) (“[F]or most tribes, these corporate - 35 - Chevron Step Two This step requires that we determine whether the NI GC’s regulation stating that “pull tab dispensers and/or readers” are IGRA Class II “electronic, computer or other technologic aids,” 25 C.F.R. § 502.7, is a “permissible construction of the statute,” Maier , 114 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43), or, instead, is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly c ontrary to the statute.” Id. At least six factors support the reasonableness of the NIGC’s construction as consistent with IGRA. First, the regulation rep resents a plausible reading of 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(I)’s text. Second, as discusse d above, the ejusdem generis canon supports such a construction. Third, the NIG C’s relatively inclusive reading of § 2703 has some support in IGRA’s legisl ative history. 32 Fourth, the
NIGC’s construction is not an unreasonable choice i n the sense that the NIGC has adopted the reading of an ambiguous statute that is ostensibly more likely to expand the pool of tribal revenue through greater g aming variety and offerings. 33business ventures’ profits . . . in the gaming [] industry[] have been marginal”); Frank R.

Wolf, United States Representative, Press Release, Wolf Measure Would Allow State Legislatures to Have Voice in Creation of Gambling Operation on Indian Reservations (June 19, 2001), at <www.house.gov/wolf/2001619wolfindianleg.htm> (“Nearly 80 percent of Native Americans don’t receive anything from gambling revenues. . . . Most tribes, living in areas that are not economically viable for a casino, continue to live in awful poverty, plagued by disease, infant mortality, unemployment and a lack of educational opportunities.”).

34See, e.g. , Statement of Harold A. Monteau, Chairman, NIGC, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments Acts of 1995: Hearings on S. 487 Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies , 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1995), 1995 WL 293541 (urging that fulfillment of the NIGC obligations cannot be met within the statutory limitation on appropriations and assessments for the NIGC); Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview , 7 St. Thomas L. Rev. 769, 770 (1995) (commenting that “[t]he NIGC, charged with monitoring over 210 gaming operations . . . is underfunded and understaffed”).

35See, e.g. , Diamond Game , 230 F.3d at 367 (“[T]he Act allows the use of ‘electronic, computer, or other technologic aids’ in connection with Class II games.”) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i)); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm’n , 827 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting that § 2703(7)(A) authorizes “the use of ‘aids’ for certain Class II games ” (emphasis supplied), aff’d , 14 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But seeSantee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska , 2003 WL 1339280, at *5 (stating in dicta that “we believe that the phrase ‘whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in connection therewith’ applies only to bingo”). - 36 - Fifth, the NIGC may also wish to interpret ambiguit ies in IGRA so as to narrow its demanding oversight mandate. 34 Finally, perhaps the best evidence of the
reasonableness of the NIGC’s construction is the fa vorable reception it has already received in the federal courts. 35 For these reasons, we hold that the NIGC’s determin ation in 25 C.F.R. § 507.2 that IGRA authorizes Class II technologic aid s for pull-tabs is a “permissible construction of the statute,” and we t herefore accord it “controlling weight.” MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718 (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43).

2. Is the Machine a Class II Technologic Aid? As noted above, IGRA defines Class II games to incl ude “bingo (whether36SeeDefinitions Under the Indian Gaming Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,382-83 (April 9, 1992)

(providing no definition and stating that the NIGC will rely on the common law definition of pull-tabs). - 37 - or not electronic, computer or other technologic ai ds are used in connection
therewith ) . . . including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs . . . and other games similar to bingo . . . 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A ) (emphasis supplied). The government does not dispute that the game played wi th the Machine was, or would have been, played in the same location as bin go. Rather, the government’s two arguments are that (1) the game played with the Machine is not pull-tabs, but, rather, an electromechanical facsimile version of s lots; and (2) that the Machine
does not fall within IGRA’s definition of an “aid.” As detailed below, we reject these arguments and hold the Machine is a Class II technologic aid to the game of pull-tabs.

A. The Machine is Used “in connection” with pull-ta bs Contrary to the government’s assertion, the game pl ayed with the Machine falls within the definition of pull-tabs. IGRA doe s not define pull-tabs. Nor do the NIGC’s regulations. 36 This court, though, has provided a definition. I n Chickasaw Nation v. United States , 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000), aff’d , 534 U.S. 84 (2001), we stated that pull-tabs is a “scheme by which prizes are randomly distributed to the winners among the persons who ha ve paid for a chance to win them, i.e. by purchasing one or more pull-tab ticke ts in a series.” Id. at 877. We noted that in pull-tabs, after players purchase a t ab from a clerk or from the given dispensing machine, they must peel back the top lay er to determine whether the tab contains a winning combination of symbols, and that if players purchase a- 38 -

winning tab, they must present it to the cashier. See id. at 874. The Machine meets this definition. It dispenses pa per pull-tabs from a roll that is part of a larger deal, and the deal contain s a predetermined number of randomly distributed winning tabs. Although a pull -tabs player may opt to view the video display regarding the contents of the pap er pull-tabs, players of the Machine must still manually peel back the top layer of the pull-tab to confirm victory, and it is that tab presented for visual in spection to a gaming hall clerk that entitles players to winnings. We thus reject the argument that the game played with the Machine is slots: although we ackno wledge some superficial similarities between the two, pull-tabs, even when sped up, placed under lights, and depicted with a spinning machine on the side, i s still pull-tabs. We hold that the Machine is used in connection with the playing of pull-tabs.

B. Whether the Machine is an Aid to the Game of Pull-Tabs We first detail the NIGC’s definition of “aid”, and then explain why we accord it controlling weight. Finally, we explain why the Machine meets that
definition.

i. The Definition by the NIGC’s Regulations of “Aid ” IGRA does not define “ technologic aids.” The NIGC , however, recently issued regulations, which state (a) Electronic, computer or other technologic aid means any machine or device that: (1) Assists a player or the playing of a game; (2) Is not an electronic or electromechanical facsim ile; and- 39 - (3) Is operated in accordance with applicable Federa l communications law.

(b) Electronic, computer or other technologic aids i nclude, but are not limited to, machines, or devices that: (1) Broaden the participation levels in a common gam e; (2) Facilitate communication between and among gamin g sites; (3) Allow a player to play with or against other pla yers rather than with or against a machine.

(c) Examples of electronic, computer or other t echnologic aids include pull tab dispensers and/or readers, telephones, cables, televisions, screens, satellites, bingo blowers, electronic player stati ons, or electronic cards for participants in bingo games. 25 C.F.R. § 502.7.

ii. The NIGC’s Definition in 25 C.F.R. § 502.7 is C ontrolling The government does not dispute that the three requ irements identified in 25 C.F.R. § 502.7(a) must be met for a device to qu alify as a Class II technologic aid; rather, the government argues that we should i mpose an additional requirement. According to the government, the Mach ine is not a Class II technologic aid because Class II aids must “broaden participation” in the games.
See Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3079 (stati ng that use of an aid that “would merely broaden the participation levels is r eadily distinguishable from the use of electronic facsimiles in which a single part icipant plays a game with or against a machine rather than with or against other players”). The government argues that in MegaMania , we endorsed the “broaden participation” requireme nt, Aplts’ Reply Br. at 13, and also points to the Nint h Circuit’s statement that “the passage from the Committee report also reinforces t he notion that electronic aids are essentially aimed at communications to enable b roader participation in a37 Sycuan Band of Missions Indians v. Roache , 54 F.3d 535, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1995). - 40 - common game.” 37 For several reasons, we are unpersuaded that the “b roaden participation” requirement suggested by the government should be g rafted onto IGRA. First, we reject the government’s characterization of our hol ding in MegaMania . In MegaMania , we held that the device at issue was a technologi c aid in part because it broadened participation in the underlyin g game of bingo. See 231 F.3d at 724-25 (identifying the broadening of participat ion as one of at least four reasons supporting the holding). We did not hold t hat broadening participation was a requirement, nor did we endorse any such cate gorical rule. Rather, like the subsequently published NIGC regulations, we identif ied the broadening of participation as a factor favoring a finding that a device is a Class II aid. Second, we conclude that the NIGC’s definition of “ aid,” which does not include the “broaden participation” requirement, is entitled to full Chevron deference. Applying Chevron ’s first step, nothing in either IGRA’s text or legislative history points towards a requirementthat a technologic aid broaden participation. Indeed, the Committee Report uses t he term “for example” to describe how a device might qualify as a Class II a id by broadening participation in the given game. Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C. A.N. at 3079. And the NIGC’s regulation closely tracks the legislative hi story, stating that “[e]lectronic, computer or other technologic aids include, but are not limited to , machines or devices.” 25 C.F.R. § 502.7(b) (emphasis supplied) . Moreover, adopting the government’s strict proposed definition of “aid” wo uld run counter to the Committee Report’s exhortation that “tribes be give n the opportunity to take38Diamond Game , 230 F.3d at 270 (quoting Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary44 (1993))

. - 41 - advantage of modern methods of conducting Class II games and the language regarding technology is designed to provide maximum flexibility.” 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3079. Accordingly, we adopt the st andard articulated by the NIGC’s regulation, and express no opinion concernin g whether the Machine broadens participation in the playing of pull-tabs.
As to Chevron ’s second step, we conclude that the NIGC’s regulat ion is based on a permissible construction of IGRA. As no ted, the NIGC’s regulations provides a three-part test for determining whether a machine or device is a Class II aid, requiring that the device

(1) Assists a player or the playing of a game; (2) Is not an electronic or electromechanical facsim ile; and (3) Is operated in accordance with applicable Federa l communications law. 25 C.F.R. § 502.7.
In Diamond Game , Judge Tatel’s unanimous panel opinion concluded t hat the Lucky Tab II functions as an aid to the game of pull-tabs because the Lucky Tab II is not an electromechanical facsimile, and b ecause the Lucky Tab II literally “helps or supports” or “assists” the play ing of pull-tabs. 38 The opinion emphasized that Lucky Tab II physically cuts tabs f rom paper rolls and dispenses them to players, and merely displays the contents o f the paper tab on its video screen for view by players, who must still peel and display any winning tabs to a clerk to obtain a prize. See 230 F.3d at 270. Concluding that the Lucky Tab is “little more than a high-tech dealer,” and that the pull-tabs game with the Lucky Tab II is in the paper rolls, not the device, id ., the D.C. Circuit held that the39SeeAplts’ App. at 9 (Letter from NIGC General Counsel Kevin Washburn dated Feb.

29, 2000) (stating that “Lucky Tab closely parallels [the Machine] and that “the [district] court opinion in [Diamond Game] provides clear guidance to determine the classification for the Magic Irish”). - 42 - Lucky Tab II is a Class II technologic aid. See id. We are persuaded that the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of “aid” as the term is used in IGRA is correct. The government would have us distinguish Diamond G ame on two grounds. First, argues the government, Diamond Gam e is distinguishable because in that case, the NIGC never issued an advisory cla ssification on Lucky Tab II, as
it did with the Machine in this case. See Aplts’ Br. at 38. It is true that an administrative agency’s opinion letter is “entitled to respect.” MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 719 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). However, an agency’s opinion letter is not binding, nor, unlike an NIGC regulation enacted pursuant to the rigors of the Ad ministrative Procedure Act, is it entitled to any deference. Instead, the NIGC’s opinion letter is at most persuasive authority; it is entitled only to that w eight that its power to persuade compels. See 231 F.3d at 719. Significantly, the NIGC’s opinio n letter regarding the Machine was predicated on a district court opin ion that was subsequently reversed by the D.C. Circuit. 39 The reversal of that opinion in a persuasively reasoned decision by the D.C. Circuit confirms that the NIGC letter lacks much persuasive force here. Second, argues the government, Diamond Game is distinguishable because the D.C. Circuit did not address whether the Lucky Tab II was a Johnson Act “gambling device.” Aplts’ Br. at 38. However, whe ther the D.C. Circuit completed the IGRA-Johnson Act syllogism is immater ial to our IGRA classification analysis. Accordingly, we reject th e government’s attempts to- 43 -

distinguish Diamond Game . The NIGC’s regulations’ straightforward construction of “technologic aid,” in essence adopt ing the D.C. Circuit’s standard, is at least a permissible construction of the statu te; indeed, were we required to reach the question on a blank slate, we might well adopt that standard. We
therefore accord the NIGC’s definition of “technolo gic aid” controlling weight.
See MegaMania , 231 F.3d at 718.

iii. The Machine Meets the Controlling NIGC’s Defi nition of Aid Because the NIGC’s definition controls, the Machin e is a Class II aid if it “(1) [a]ssists a player or the playing of a game; ( 2) [i]s not an electronic or electromechanical facsimile; and (3) [i]s operated in accordance with applicable Federal communications law.” 25 C.F.R. § 502.7. W ith its last gasp, the government contends that the Machine fails the seco nd and third of these requirements. We disagree. Like the Lucky Tab II, the Machine (1 ) cuts tabs from paper rolls and dispenses them to players, and when its “ verify” feature is enabled, displays the contents of the paper pull-tab on the video screen; (2) does not use a computer to select the patterns of the pull-tabs it dispenses; and (3) requires players to peel each pull-tab to confirm the result and provide the pull-tab to a clerk for inspection prior to receiving any prize. As with the Lucky Tab II, with the Machine, the Machine is not the game of pull-ta bs; rather, the Machine facilitates the playing of pull-tabs, “the game is in the paper rolls.” Diamond
Game , 230 F.3d at 269-70. As such, the Machine is not a “computerized version” of pull-tabs. See id. ; see also Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb. , 2003 WL 1339280, at *7 (in holding that the Lucky Tab device at issue w as not a computerized version- 44 -

of pull-tabs, emphasizing “the fundamental fact tha t the player receives a traditional paper pull-tab from a machine, and whet her he or she decides to pull the tab or not, must present that card to the cashi er to redeem winnings.”). Nor, put in terms of the NIGC’s regulations implementing IGRA, is the Machine an
“electronic or electromechanical facsimile.” 25 C. F.R. § 502.7. Thus, contrary to the government’s suggestion, the Machine does not “ change[] the fundamental characteristics” of pull-tabs as played by the user . Aplts’ Br. at 33 (citing Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3079). Accordingly, we follow the reasoning of the D.C. Ci rcuit, and, applying the NIGC’s definition, hold that the Machine is a Class II technologic aid. Under our holding in Part IV(A), the appellees’ use of the Ma chine in Indian country is therefore insulated from liability based on the Joh nson Act’s ban on gambling
devices.40In addition, appellees’ motions to dismiss the appeal as moot and to file supplemental

briefing are denied. - 45 - CONCLUSION For the reasons detailed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s declaratory judgment that the Machine is (1) not an illegal “ga mbling device” under the Johnson Act and (2) a permissible technologic aid t o Class II gaming under
IGRA. 40