J-A07026-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

ANTHONY TARLI, AS ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR THE ESTATE OF DOLLY I. TARLI, 

DECEASED 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

GRANE HEALTHCARE COMPANY, 

RIVERSIDE CARE CENTER, LLC D/B/A 

RIVERSIDE CARE CENTER, AND 

RIVERSIDE NURSING CENTERS, INC. 

 Appellants No. 1434 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order August 20, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-003221 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J. 

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

 We affirm the order overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections in the 

nature of a petition to compel arbitration based on our recent decision in 

Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 113 A.3d 317 (Pa. Super. 

2015). 

 As we originally set forth in Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 

A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013), non-signatory wrongful death beneficiaries are 

not bound by arbitration agreements signed by or on behalf of a decedent.1 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Riverside attempts to distinguish Pisano on the basis that here, the 

individual who signed the arbitration agreement as an agent under a power 

of attorney, Anthony Tarli, is also a wrongful death beneficiary. Riverside 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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In Taylor, we further held that Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) and the wrongful death 

statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8301(a), require that a survival act claim otherwise 

subject to the terms of an arbitration agreement be consolidated with a 

wrongful death claim where the wrongful death beneficiaries are not bound 

by the arbitration agreement and do not consent to arbitration.2 In doing 

so, we stated as follows: 

The issues are identical in the two actions. Litigation in two 

forums increases the potential for inconsistent liability findings 

between the wrongful death and survival actions. Furthermore, 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

asserts that “[i]t would be inequitable to enforce a legal fiction allowing 

[Tarli] to claim [he]could bind [his] mother but not [him]self. Brief of 

Appellant, at 10. This argument ignores the distinction between fiduciary 

and individual capacities. Tarli clearly executed the agreement in his 

fiduciary capacity as agent for his mother and not in his individual capacity. 

See Agreement to Arbitrate, 3/24/11, at 2. Thus, Tarli, individually, was not 

a party to the agreement and, as such, is not bound by its terms. 

2

 Appellants also argue that appellant Grane Healthcare, although not a 

signatory to the arbitration agreement, was nonetheless a third-party 

beneficiary of the agreement and, thus, may compel arbitration. However, 

a party becomes a third party beneficiary only where both 

parties to the contract express an intention to benefit the third 

party in the contract itself, unless, the circumstances are so 

compelling that recognition of the beneficiary’s right is 

appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties, and the 

performance satisfies an obligation of the promisee to pay 

money to the beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that the 

promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the 

promised performance. 

Scarpitti v. Weborg, 609 A.2d 147, 150-51 (Pa. 1992). Here, the 

agreement itself evidences no intention that Grane be included within its 

scope and Appellants have offered no other evidence of such intent. 
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the damages overlap. Although lost earnings are generally 

recoverable in the survival action, they may take the form of lost 

contributions to the decedent’s family, which are wrongful death 

damages. Lost earnings includes loss of retirement and social 

security income. Generally, hospital, nursing, and medical 

expenses are recoverable under either the wrongful death or 

survival act. 

Taylor, 113 A.3d at 327 (citation omitted). 

 We also considered the application of the Federal Arbitration Act 

(“FAA”) and the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet 

Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct 1201 (2012), concluding: 

The [wrongful death] statute and rule at issue are not aimed at 

destroying arbitration and do not demand procedures

incompatible with arbitration. Nor are they so incompatible with 

arbitration as to wholly eviscerate arbitration agreements. On 

the facts herein, the wrongful death beneficiaries’ constitutional 

right to a jury trial and the state’s interest in litigating wrongful 

death and survival claims together require that they all proceed 

in court rather than arbitration. In so holding, we are promoting 

one of the two primary objectives of arbitration, which is to 

achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results. 

Taylor, 113 A.3d at 327-28 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

 In sum, the consolidation of the wrongful death and survival claims 

does not offend the stated goals of the FAA. Moreover, it promotes judicial 

economy and public policy interests, which are best served by allowing for 

the resolution of all claims with all parties present and avoiding inconsistent 

verdicts and duplicative damages. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

declining to compel arbitration of either the wrongful death or survival act 

claims and requiring the two actions to proceed together in court. 

 Order affirmed; motion to quash denied. 
J-A07026-15 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/16/2015