Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1406-CR-237 | July 13, 2015 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David Reyes-Valdes,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A01-1406-CR-237

Appeal from the 

Dearborn Superior Court

The Honorable Sally A. 

Blankenship, Judge

Cause No. 15D02-1310-FA-23

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial, David Reyes-Valdes (“Reyes-Valdes”) was convicted of 

one count of dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony and one count of conspiracy 
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to commit dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him 

to fifty executed years on each count, to be served concurrently. 

[2] Reyes-Valdes appeals his conviction and sentence, raising the following issues: 

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his 

convictions;

II. Whether his convictions for both dealing in cocaine and conspiracy 

to commit dealing in cocaine violate Indiana’s constitutional 

prohibition against double jeopardy; and

III. Whether his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character.

 

[3] The State concedes that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 

for dealing in cocaine. We therefore vacate Reyes-Valdes’s conviction and 

sentence for dealing in cocaine. Concluding that the State presented evidence 

sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, 

we affirm as to that conviction but revise the sentence to forty years executed in 

the Indiana Department of Correction and remand with instructions.
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Facts and Procedural History1

[4] Reyes-Valdes met Adalberto Raygoza (“Raygoza”) in a bar in Cicero, Illinois. 

At a later date, they set up a large cocaine transaction. Reyes-Valdes agreed to 

pay Raygoza $70,000 to transport two kilos of cocaine from Chicago, Illinois to 

Cincinnati, Ohio. Raygoza’s source in Chicago supplied the cocaine for 

$65,000.2 Raygoza paid Chicota $15,000 up front and expected $70,000 from 

Reyes-Valdes upon delivery in Cincinnati. 

[5] Raygoza offered Manuel Maldonado (“Maldonado”) $2,000 to drive the 

cocaine from Chicago to Cincinnati. Maldonado agreed but did not know who 

the recipient would be in Cincinnati. Maldonado testified that he had never 

met Reyes-Valdes and that Raygoza was “just paying [him] to take the kilos to 

Cincinnati.” Tr. at 311. Raygoza and Maldonado, both residents of Chicago,

agreed to deliver the cocaine to Reyes-Valdes on October 18, 2013. 

[6] On October 15, 2013, three days before the intended delivery, Reyes-Valdes and 

Raygoza exchanged text messages in Spanish, translated by Raygoza at trial as 

follows:

[5:01 PM, Raygoza:] [W]hat’s up dude . . . .

[5:02 PM, Reyes-Valdes:] [H]ere waiting to work . . . . 

 

1 We heard oral argument on April 8, 2015, at Paoli High School in Paoli, Indiana. We thank counsel for 

their capable advocacy, and extend our gratitude to Paoli’s students, faculty, and administration for their 

hospitality.

2 The street value for that amount of cocaine is “at least two hundred thousand dollars.” Transcript at 499.
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[5:37 PM, Raygoza:] [W]hat’s going on . . . . 

[5:41 PM, Reyes-Valdes:] [Y]ou got gym shoes or what. . . .

[6:54 PM, Raygoza:] Yes.

Tr. at 331-32; State’s Ex. 46. Raygoza testified that “waiting to work” meant 

“waiting for the coke,” and that “gym shoes” was code for cocaine. Tr. at 331. 

[7] On the morning of October 18, 2013, Maldonado drove to Raygoza’s house. 

When Maldonado arrived, Raygoza emerged from the house, placed two kilos 

of cocaine in Maldonado’s trunk, and gave Maldonado an address for delivery. 

They left immediately, riding in separate vehicles. Maldonado drove in front, 

and Raygoza followed. 

[8] Later that day, Maldonado and Raygoza were intercepted by Trooper James 

Wells of the Indiana State Police Drug Enforcement Section (“Trooper Wells”). 

Trooper Wells was patrolling I-74 in Dearborn County when he observed a 

gold Chevy Malibu and a black Nissan Maxima traveling together. The 

vehicles were “bumper to bumper” and made lane changes together. Tr. at 43. 

Both vehicles had Illinois license plates. Based on his training and experience 

as a highway interdiction officer, Trooper Wells suspected drug trafficking. 

[9] Trooper Wells pulled over both vehicles two miles from the Indiana-Ohio 

border for following too closely and unsafe lane movement. Raygoza was 

driving the Maxima, and Maldonado was driving the Malibu. Raygoza denied

that he was traveling with the driver of the Malibu, but Maldonado confirmed 

they were traveling together. Trooper Wells immediately contacted the 
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Regional Enforcement Narcotics Unit (“RENU”)3 and requested a canine unit 

to assist with the stop. The RENU canine handler, Deputy Anthony Lange

(“Deputy Lange”) responded to the call, but Trooper Wells obtained consent to 

search the vehicles and did not utilize Deputy Lange’s canine partner. Pursuant 

to that consent, Deputy Lange and Trooper Wells searched the vehicles and 

discovered the two kilos of cocaine in the trunk of the Malibu. 

[10] The officers arrested both men for dealing in cocaine and arranged for a 

controlled delivery to ascertain the final recipient of the cocaine.4 Raygoza 

agreed to cooperate with the investigation and identified Reyes-Valdes as the 

final recipient.5 Raygoza told officers that Reyes-Valdes initially instructed him 

to deliver the cocaine to a Residence Inn6 but subsequently changed the delivery 

location to a private residence at 2215 Washington Avenue. RENU agents set 

up surveillance around the Washington Avenue residence and observed Reyes-

 

3 RENU is a multi-jurisdictional task force charged with investigating large-scale narcotics operations and 

trafficking in the Greater Cincinnati area. RENU closely monitors I-74 because it is a “major thoroughfare” 

connecting Cincinnati to Indianapolis and Chicago. Tr. at 94. 

4 Raygoza and Maldonado were arrested in Indiana, but the cocaine was destined for Ohio. Because RENU 

policy did not permit the officers to bring the traffickers (or the cocaine) across state lines to finish the 

delivery, RENU never intended to actually deliver the cocaine to Reyes-Valdes.

5 Raygoza told police that he was delivering the cocaine to someone who went by the name “Cocho.” Tr. at 

342. At trial, Raygoza testified: “At that point I knew him as Cocho. Now I know him as Reyes.” Id. at 

341. 

6 Reyes-Valdes sent Raygoza the following text messages on October 17, 2013: 

[9:22 PM:] Residence Inn Cincinnati North/Sharonville http://goo.gl/maps/1ju65

[9:24 PM:] 11689 chester rd cincinati oh 45246 [sic]

State’s Ex. 46, 47.
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Valdes park a silver Volkswagen Passat with an Illinois license plate outside the 

residence. 

[11] At the request of RENU agents, Raygoza called Reyes-Valdes to change the 

delivery location to a public place. After Reyes-Valdes agreed to meet Raygoza 

at a White Castle restaurant instead, RENU agents observed Reyes-Valdes walk 

from the Washington Avenue residence to a white Chevy Equinox in a nearby 

parking lot. Reyes-Valdes got in, and the Equinox proceeded to a gas station 

adjacent to the White Castle. RENU agents immediately converged on the 

Equinox, removed Reyes-Valdes from the backseat, and placed Reyes-Valdes 

under arrest. Officers located a set of car keys in his pocket and a cell phone in 

the backseat. The car keys were for the Passat parked at 2215 Washington 

Avenue, and the cell phone had been used to contact Raygoza’s phone number.

[12] RENU agents obtained a search warrant for the Passat parked at the

Washington Avenue residence after an exterior canine sniff of the vehicle 

resulted in a positive indication for narcotics. The Passat was registered to 

Javier Contreras Martinez (“Contreras”) at 2216 St. Louis Avenue in Chicago. 

During the search officers located a bill for the Residence Inn, several other sale 

receipts, and what appeared to be Reyes-Valdes’s wallet, which contained a 

fake ID, a Residence Inn key card, and an Extended Stay America key card. 

The bill for the Residence Inn showed a “Martinez Contreras” registered, with 

a check-in date of October 12, 2013, and it listed the same address that ReyesValdes sent in a text message to Raygoza on October 17, 2013. Tr. at 275. The 

Illinois identification card recovered from the wallet had a picture of Reyes-
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Valdes but listed the name “Alvera Gonzales.” Id. at 272. The address on the 

identification card was the same address listed on the vehicle registration – 2216 

St. Louis Avenue, Chicago. The police also located two sale receipts that 

referenced the name “Alvera Gonzales.” Id. at 279-80. No drugs were found. 

[13] The search warrant also covered Room 221 of the Extended Stay motel. The 

room was rented to Contreras, but officers used the Extended Stay key card 

found in Reyes-Valdes’s wallet to open the door. Inside, officers found items 

commonly used to package narcotics for redistribution: a FoodSaver vacuum 

sealer, bags for the vacuum sealer, gallon size freezer bags, and a digital scale. 

Officers also found a ledger. The ledger reflected “very, very large” amounts, 

including two entries for over $300,000. Id. at 497-98. At trial, Reyes-Valdes 

admitted that he knew Contreras and that he had been in Room 221. He 

testified that he had been to the motel room because he and Contreras had 

“gone out to eat” on October 17, 2013. Id. at 404. 

[14] The State of Indiana charged7 Reyes-Valdes, Raygoza, and Maldonado in 

relevant part as follows:

Count 1: . . . On or about October 18, 2013, . . . David Reyes-Valdes,

Adalberto Raygoza, and Manuel I. Maldonado did knowingly possess, 

with intent to deliver, cocaine, pure or adulterated, in an amount three 

(3) grams or more. . . .

 

7 Reyes-Valdes also faced charges in Ohio, but those charges were dismissed so that Reyes-Valdes, Raygoza, 

and Maldonado could be tried together as codefendants in Indiana.
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Count 2: . . . On or about October 18, 2013, . . . David Reyes-Valdes, 

Adalberto Raygoza, and Manuel I. Maldonado, with intent to commit 

the felony of Dealing in Cocaine in an Amount Three Grams or More, 

did agree with each other to commit said crime, and Manuel I. 

Maldonado did perform an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, 

to-wit: did operate a motor vehicle with approximately two kilos of 

cocaine in said vehicle.

Appendix of Appellant at 20-21. 

[15] Prior to trial, Raygoza and Maldonado each pled guilty to one count of

conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine as a Class B felony, and both testified 

for the State at trial. Raygoza admitted at trial that he had been involved in 

dealing drugs for several years prior to his arrest in this case. As to the dealing 

count, the State maintained that it did not have to prove that Reyes-Valdes 

possessed cocaine in Dearborn County on the dates alleged, only that he aided, 

induced, or caused another person to do so, and the jury was instructed on 

accomplice liability. 

[16] After the presentation of evidence the jury found Reyes-Valdes guilty on both 

counts. The trial court sentenced him to fifty executed years on each count, to 

be served concurrently in the Indiana Department of Correction. Reyes-Valdes 

now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[17] Reyes-Valdes contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support his convictions for dealing in cocaine and conspiracy to commit dealing 
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in cocaine, both Class A felonies. When reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

witness credibility. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 905-06 (Ind. 2005). “We 

consider the evidence favorable to the jury’s verdict and all reasonable 

inferences which can be drawn from it.” Jenkins v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 

(Ind. 1997). The conviction will be affirmed unless no reasonable trier of fact 

could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Drane 

v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).

[18] To convict Reyes-Valdes of conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, the State 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Reyes-Valdes agreed 

with another person to commit the felony of dealing in cocaine; and (2) either 

Reyes-Valdes or the persons with whom he made the agreement “performed an 

overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2. 

[19] Reyes-Valdes does not dispute the “overt act” of Maldonado transporting two 

kilos of cocaine in the trunk of the Malibu. Rather, Reyes-Valdes challenges 

the agreement element, arguing that “this case boils down to . . . Raygoza’s 

word that he intended to sell drugs to Reyes-Valdes.” Brief of Appellant at 19. 

Reyes-Valdes denies that “gym shoes” really meant cocaine, tr. at 331, and 

emphasizes the fact that he was never found to possess the large amount of cash 

Raygoza was expecting to receive. He claims that Raygoza was supposed to 

deliver a pair of Jordan 11 shoes during the visit to Cincinnati, not cocaine. 
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[20] Reyes-Valdes essentially argues that Raygoza’s testimony was not credible 

because he had a motive to lie. See Br. of Appellant at 19 (“Caught by the side 

of the interstate in Indiana with police offering to help him if he cooperated, 

Raygoza offered up Reyes-Valdes. . . . He had a motive to lie.”). In the 

absence of incredibly dubious testimony, however, we will not encroach upon 

the jury’s responsibility to judge witness credibility. Baber v. State, 870 N.E.2d 

486, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 

[21] The “incredible dubiosity” rule “is applicable only when a lone witness offers 

inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion 

and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.” 

Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001). Application of this rule is rare 

and limited to cases in which a sole witness presents inherently improbable 

testimony that no reasonable person could believe. Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 

398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 

[22] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply in this case because the evidence 

was not from a single witness, and there was circumstantial evidence of ReyesValdes’s guilt. Maldonado testified that Raygoza was paying him to transport 

the cocaine to a particular address in Cincinnati. The text messages and phone 

calls between Reyes-Valdes and Raygoza confirm that Reyes-Valdes was 

communicating with Raygoza in the days leading up to the delivery and as the 

cocaine was being transported. Raygoza testified that the delivery location 

changed several times, and the State admitted text messages in which ReyesValdes sent Raygoza two of the three addresses. When Raygoza called Reyes-
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Valdes to change the location to White Castle, the call was monitored and 

recorded.8 Officers testified to Reyes-Valdes’s movements and presence at two 

of the delivery locations. Reyes-Valdes also had a key card for a motel room in 

which officers found a ledger with very large dollar amounts and items 

commonly used to package narcotics for redistribution. Reyes-Valdes admitted 

at trial that he had been to the motel room rented to Contreras, and he was seen 

driving Contreras’s car alone, just prior to his arrest. 

[23] In addition, Raygoza’s testimony was not inherently contradictory or 

equivocal, notwithstanding the fact that certain details contradicted his prior 

statements to police. In his first statement to police, made on the shoulder of I74, Raygoza did lie about traveling with Maldonado. In a subsequent 

interview, he denied knowing his supplier in Chicago and told police that

Reyes-Valdes offered to sell cocaine to him. Raygoza later revealed the name of 

his supplier and admitted at trial that he lied when he told police that ReyesValdes offered to sell him cocaine. Once Raygoza decided to cooperate, he 

assisted the police by making phone calls to Reyes-Valdes. As our supreme 

court has stated, “witness testimony that contradicts witness’s earlier statements 

does not make such testimony incredibly dubious.” Stephenson v. State, 742 

N.E.2d 463, 498 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1105 (2002). Nor does a 

motive to fabricate testimony. See Jenkins v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Ind.

 

8 Reyes-Valdes argues that the communications between himself and Raygoza are “innocent on the surface 

with no mention of cocaine or any drug transactions.” Br. of Appellant at 15. It is true that cocaine is never 

explicitly mentioned, but this is hardly surprising given the possibility of interception. 
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1997) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that testimony was incredibly dubious 

because the witnesses had motives to lie). 

[24] In short, Reyes-Valdes fails to demonstrate that no reasonable person could 

believe Raygoza’s testimony. Raygoza unequivocally and consistently 

identified Reyes-Valdes as the intended recipient of the cocaine, and there is 

circumstantial evidence to support Reyes-Valdes’s guilt. We, therefore, cannot 

say that Raygoza’s testimony was so inherently improbable as to require a 

reversal of the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, as to the broader question of 

sufficiency, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find ReyesValdes guilty of conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony. 

Reyes-Valdes merely asks us to reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility 

of witnesses, which we will not do. See Wright, 828 N.E.2d at 905-06. 

[25] As to the dealing in cocaine conviction, the State rightly concedes that the 

evidence was insufficient. We agree that there was insufficient evidence to 

establish that Reyes-Valdes knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to deliver, 

even as an accomplice. See In re J.L., 599 N.E.2d 208, 212–13 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1992), trans. denied (reversing the defendant’s conviction for dealing in cocaine 

as an accomplice where the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support a finding that the defendant ever possessed cocaine, either actually or 

constructively). We, therefore, vacate Reyes-Valdes’s conviction and sentence 

for dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony.
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II. Double Jeopardy

[26] Because we vacate Reyes-Valdes’s conviction for dealing in cocaine on 

sufficiency grounds, the issue of double jeopardy is moot and need not be 

addressed.

III. Appropriateness of the Sentence

[27] Reyes-Valdes also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of his offense and his character and asks this court to reduce his 

sentence. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides: “The Court may revise a 

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender.” Whether we regard a sentence 

as appropriate turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light 

in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). 

[28] We agree that Reyes-Valdes’s sentence is inappropriate. A person who 

commits a Class A felony is subject to a sentence of twenty to fifty years, with 

the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a) (2013). The 

trial court sentenced Reyes-Valdes to the maximum sentence of fifty years, all 

executed at the Indiana Department of Correction. When imposing the 

sentence, the trial court found:

[T]he Defendant poses a risk to society in his activities involving multistate, high level organized drug dealing activity. The large amount of 

cocaine involved – in excess of two thousand (2,000) grams of the 
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element of the crime which required the amount of three (3) grams or 

more is an additional aggravating circumstance. Further the Court 

finds that the Defendant has shown a prior disregard of the laws of the 

United States by going back and forth from the United States to 

Mexico illegally and prior criminal history is considered.

App. of Appellant at 163-64. 

[29] Reyes-Valdes was twenty-two years old at the time of the offense, and his prior 

“criminal history” consists of driving without a license and disobeying a traffic 

control device. He has no prior criminal convictions. See Rosenbaum v. State, 

930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that “traffic infractions are civil, 

rather than criminal, in nature”), trans. denied. Yet he received the maximum 

sentence permitted by statute. Our supreme court has stated that “the 

maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst 

offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (citation 

omitted). 

[30] In Evans v. State, 725 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ind. 2000), our supreme court reduced a 

fifty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine to the presumptive thirty years. Evans 

was nineteen years old and on probation at the time of the offense. He

delivered 6.55 grams of cocaine and had a criminal record including three 

juvenile adjudications for offenses that would be felonies if committed by an 

adult. In Love v. State, 741 N.E.2d 789, 793-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), this court, 

citing Evans, likewise reduced a fifty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine to the 

presumptive thirty years. The nineteen-year-old defendant possessed 11.3 

grams of cocaine and had a lengthy juvenile history, including an acquittal for 
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felony murder. The State attempted to distinguish Evans by pointing to the

murder acquittal and the larger quantity of cocaine in Love’s possession. We

disagreed and reduced the sentence because “the trial court ha[d] effectively 

determined that Love is beyond rehabilitation at age nineteen.” Id. at 795. 

[31] As this court stated in Love, “[t]he primary consideration of the trial court 

during sentencing is rehabilitation of the defendant.” Id. at 794-95 (citation 

omitted). By sentencing Reyes-Valdes to the maximum possible sentence, the 

trial court has effectively determined that he is beyond rehabilitation at age 

twenty-two, notwithstanding his complete lack of criminal history. But ReyesValdes is not within the class of offenders for whom the maximum possible 

sentence is appropriate. See, e.g., Valle v. State, 550 N.E.2d 746, 747 (Ind. 1990) 

(fifty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine where defendant possessed 112.3 

grams of cocaine and shot two potential witnesses before trial, killing one); 

Danner v. State, 900 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (fifty-year sentence for 

possession of cocaine where the defendant possessed more than twenty-four 

grams of cocaine within twenty to fifty feet of a day care and had an 

“extensive” criminal history, including dealing in cocaine, possession of 

cocaine, and robbery); Hale v. State, 875 N.E.2d 438, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), 

(fifty-year sentence for dealing in cocaine for defendant with four felony 

convictions who was on parole for dealing in cocaine at the time of the offense), 

trans. denied. 

[32] Reyes-Valdes is not beyond rehabilitation and is not “the worst of the worst.” 

Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011). Nevertheless, the 
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extraordinarily large amount of cocaine involved indicates that this was not an 

ordinary drug transaction and that the advisory sentence would also be 

inappropriate. We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court with 

instructions that his sentence be reduced to forty years executed in the Indiana 

Department of Correction.

[33] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.