1

05 -28 56 -cr U. S. v . Va sque z & Ca st

ro U

N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: August 30, 2007 Decide d: October 6, 2008) Docke t Nos. 05-2856-c r, 05-6683- cr( CON), 06-1744- cr( CON)

_____________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee ,

- v. - L EONEL MEJ I A, a/k/a L I TTL E CHI NO, Defendant , DAVI D VASQUEZ , a/k/a GI GANTE, A ND L EDWI

N CASTRO, a/k/a HUESO, De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts .

_____________________ BEF ORE: J ACOBS, B .D. PARKER, and HAL L , Circuit Judges
.

_____________________ Appea l from judg ment of convic tion entere d in the District Court for the Ea stern District of Ne w York ( Wex ler, J

.) for conspirac y

to commit assaults with a dang erous we apon in aid of
ra c ke te e ri nga c tiv ity , 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 59 (a )( 6) , thre e c ounts of a ssa ult wi th a da ng e ro us we a

po n in aid of ra ckete eringactivity , id. § 1 9 5 9 (a )( 3 ), an d th re e c o un t s o f d i s ch ar ge o f afi re armd uri n g a2

crime of violence, id. § 924(c) (1). We vac ate the judg ment afte r findingthat the admission of
e xpe rt wi tne ss H e c tor

Al ic e a ’s te sti mony

vio late d th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f E vid e nc e and the Sixth Am e ndme nt C on fr on tatio n Cl a us e , a nd tha t th e e rr or wa s n ot h arm le ss. We r e mand fo r r e tr ia l.

_____________________ Richard P. Donog hue, Assistant United States Attorney (Rosly nn R. Mauskopf, Un ite d St ate s A tto rn e y

fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k, and Da vid C. Jame s, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), B rookly

n, New Y ork, for Appellee
. Peter J. Tomao, Garde n City , New Y ork, for De fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt L e dwi n Ca stro . Charles S. Hochba

um, Brookly

n, New Y ork, for Defendant-Appe llant David Vasquez
.

_____________________ HAL L , Circuit Judge : Appea l from judg ment of convic tion entere d in the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Ne w York ( Wex ler, J .) for conspirac y

to commit assaults with a dang erous
wea pon in aid of ra ckete eringactivity , 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6) , three counts of assa ult with a dang erous we apon in aid of r acke teer ing a ctivity , id. § 1 9 5 9 (a )( 3 ), an d th re e c o un t s o f d i s ch ar ge of a f irea rm duringa cr ime of violence , id. § 924(c) (1). We vac ate the judg ment afte r finding that the admission of expert witness Hec tor Alicea ’s testimony violated the F eder al Rules of Evidence and the Six th Amendment Confrontation Clause, a nd that the er

ror wa s not harmless. We r e mand

fo r r e tr ia l.

BACK GR OUND

I. The Drive-By ShootingsMS-13 has also appe are d in case s in the Fourth, F ifth, Six th, and Eleve nth Circuits. See 1 United States v. Calles , No. 07-10104, 2007 U.S. App. L EXI S 24171 (11th Cir. Oct. 11, 2007); United States v. Fune

s , No. 06-20532, 2007 U.S. App. L EXI S 22786 (5th Cir. S ept. 26, 2007); United States v. He rnandez-Villanueva , 4 73 F .3 d 1 18 (4 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Cas te lla no -C ha c on v . I NS , 341 F.3d 533 ( 6th Cir. 2003). 3 On J une 18, 2003, L edwin Castro a nd David Va squez (collectively , “Appe llants”), along with severa l others, par

ticipated in two drive- by

shootings on L ongI sland, NewYork. At the time, Appellants wer e member s of the MS-13 g ang . MS-13 is a nationwide cr iminal ga ng 1
or g anize d into l oc a l su

bunit s k no wn a s “ c liq ue s. ” At the tim e , to be c ome a

fu ll m e mbe r o f M S13, an individual was re quired to “make his quota,” which meant to eng ag e in ac ts of violence ag ainst members of r ival g ang s, such as the SWP and the Bloods. MS-13 had loca l cliques on L ongI sland, and Castro wa s the leade r of the F ree port clique (the “F ree port L ocos Salvatruc has,” or “F L S”). On the day

of the shooting s, Vasquez, Castro, Ralph Admettre (a me mber of MS-13) , and Nieves Argueta, a

new initiate into MS-13, met at the apa rtment of B onerje Menjivar ( also a member of

MS-13). Ther e, the group discussed their plan to shoot members of r ival g ang s. They had bee n prepa

ringto car

ry out the shootings for

quite some time. A few

wee ks ear lier, A dm e t tr e , a c t i n gatC a s tr o ’ s d i r e c t i o n , h a d s t o l e nth e v anth atth e y w o u l d u s e . E ar l i e r

th atd ay, Vasque z had informed Admettre that he—Va squez—had procur ed a ha ndgun belong ing to the Fr eepor t clique. While the gr oup was at Menjivar’s a partment, Menjivar

g ave Ca stro ammunition for the handgun. Admettre, Castro, V asquez, and Ar g ueta put the plan into ac tion that night. At about 9:40 p.m., Admettre drove the others to a la undromat in Hempstea d, New Y ork. Afte r Va squez and Ca str o r e c onno ite re d th e sc e ne , atte mpt ingto d e te rm ine wh e the r a nyon e in t he pa rk inglot wa s a4

me mbe r o f S WP, a

ri va l g ang , A dme ttr e le ft the la un dr omat pa

rk inglot and statio ne d th e va

n in a g as station parkinglot across the stre et. Once the van wa s in positi on, Vasque z fired at the
crow d in the laundromat pa rkinglot from inside the van. Two individuals we re hit. Ricar do R am i re z , age fi ft ee n , wa s h i tb y th re e s h o t s i nth e c h es t , arm , an d l eg. Do u gl as S o rt o , age sixte e n, wa s h it o nc e in t

he le g . B oth

vic tim s su

rv ive d th e sh oo tin g . A ft e r V a sq ue z fi re d th e se shots, Admettre drove awa y . Castro then ca lled Menjivar a nd informed him that more ammunition would be neede d. Admettre dr ove eve ryone bac k to Menjivar’s a partment, a

nd Menjivar g ave V asquez additional ammunition. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, at a

pp ro ximate ly

10 :20 p. m., Ad

me ttr e , Ca str o, Va sq

ue z, a nd Ar g ue ta trave led to a delicatessen par king lot in Fr eepor

t, New Yor

k. Upon ar

riving , they

saw a g roup of y oungblack men who they believed w ere members of the B loods, a rival g ang . Vasque z handed the handgun to Argueta, who pr ocee ded to shoot one of the youngmen, Carlton Alexander, se ven t i m es i nth e b ac k
. De s p i t e b ei n g h i tb y mu l t i p l e s h o t s , Al ex an d er s urv i v ed
. Af

t er th e s h o o t i n g, the four me n immediately abandone d the van. About one month later, loca l law enf orce ment
arr ested Castro, Va squez, Admettre, and Argueta.

II. Ind ictm ent and Trial In Fe bruar

y 2004, a fe dera l gr and jury indicted Vasque z, C astro, and twe lve others f or
va ri ou s o ff e ns e s st e mmi ngfr om a

se ri e s o f v iol e nt i nc ide nts on L on gI sla

nd be tw e e n Augus t 2000 and September

13, 2003. A superse ding indictment ( “the Indictment”) w as re turned on J une 23, 2005. The Indictment descr ibed MS-13, or “L a Mar a Salvatruc ha,” a s a g angthat orig inated in El Salvador but had me mbers throug hout the United States. I t acc used all of theThe Gove rnment’s theor y was that the a

mmuniti on that was used to c ommit t he drive -by 2 shootings constituted an “ explos ive” unde r fe dera l law. 5 de fe nd ants of

be ing me mbe rs of

MS- 13 , a nd it a lle g e d th at MS- 13 me mbe rs “ e ng a g e d in criminal ac tivity ” in orde r to incre ase the ir position withi n the org anization. Accor ding to the Indictment, MS-13 constituted an “e nterprise ” under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) be cause it was an ong oing or g anization the activities of which a ffe cted inter state commer ce. T he Indictment further more stated that MS-13 eng ag ed in two forms of r acke teer ing a ctivity under 18 U .S.C. § 1961(1): (1) acts a

nd threats involvi ngmurder a s defined by New Y ork State law, a

nd (2)
narc otics traff

ickingas def

ined by fede ral law
. Th e Ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d b oth Ap pe lla nts wi th t e n c ou

nts . Co un t O ne c ha

rg e d th e m w ith
c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it a ssa

ult s w itha

da ng e ro us we a

po n in or de r t o ma int a in a

nd inc re a se the ir position wit hin the MS-13 rac ketee ringenter prise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)( 6). Counts S ix , Seven, and E ight c harg ed Appe llants with assaulting Ramire z, S orto, and Ale x ander , re sp e c tiv e ly , w itha

da ng e ro us we a

po n in or de r t o ma int a in o r i nc re a se the ir po sit ion s in

the MS13 rac ketee ringenter

prise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)( 3). Counts Twelve, Thirte en, and Four teen a ccuse d Appellants of discha rg ing a firea rm duringa cr ime of violence , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A)( iii). The Indictment identified the re levant cr imes of violence as the assaults cha

rg ed in Counts Si x , Seven, and E ight. F inally , Counts S evente en, Eig hteen, a nd Ninetee n char g ed Appe llants with using an e x plosive to commit a felony —the fe lonies beingthe assaults cha

rg ed in Counts Si x , Seven, and E ight—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1)
. 2 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

se ve re d th e c ha

rg e s a g a ins t App e lla

nts fr om t he c ha rg e s a g a ins t so me of their c o-def

endants. Appe llants’ rema ining c o-def endants plea ded guilty

to assault, and6

Admettre ple aded guilty

to the conspirac y

char g e and to usinga fire arm during a cr ime of vio le nc e . App e lla

nts pr oc e e de d to tr ia l be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt . D ur ingthe c ours e of the tr ia l, which took place betwee n J uly 19 and Jul y

26, 2005, the Gover

nment called H ector

Alicea , an office r with the Ne w York State Police, a s an expert witness. The G overnme nt also called the three shooting victims and co- defe ndants Admettre a nd Menjivar. In addition, the Gover nment int ro du c e d into e vid e nc e te le ph on e re c or ds , th e fi re arm us e d in the sh oo tin g s, ba lli sti c s r e c or ds , and Ap pe lla nts ’ p os t- arr e st c on fe ssi on s. Admettre te stified to his membership in MS-13 and about the g ang ’s structure and operations. He stated that MS-13 was in “ an all out war with rival g ang s”—a w ar that included shootings, stabbing s, fig hting, a nd murder—a

nd that MS-13 had a policy to murder the me mbers of ri va l g ang s. Ad

me ttr e we nt o n to ide nti fy Ap pe lla nts a s me mbe rs of

MS- 13 . H e a lso descr ibed an unc harg ed shooting involving both Appellants that took plac e in Fe bruar y 2003: David Va squez identified [an] SW P member and ope ned fire . And Castro jumped out alongwith Vasquez to chase the SWP member down the block and both of them fired. L ater , Menjivar a lso testified about his membership in MS-13 and about the g ang ’s structure and op e ratio ns . M e nji va

r f ur the r t e sti fi e d th at th e F re e po rt c liq ue se nt m on e y

to E l Sa lva do r t o h e lp members who ha d been de ported fr om the United States. Alicea testified about MS-13’s history and structur e, and he also explained MS-13’s activities on L ongI sland. Be cause the nature of Alicea ’s testimony

is an important and disputed issue on appe al, the subjec ts about which he te sti fi e d a re dis c us se d f

ur the r i n o ur

ana ly sis of

Ap pe lla nts ’ c ha lle ng e to t

he a dmi ssi on

of his t e s t i m o n y.7 III . The Jur y V e r dic t a nd Se nt e nc ing On July 26 , 2 00 5, the jur

y fo un d App e lla

nts g uil ty on a ll t e n c ounts . In a

sp e c ia l ve rd ic t, the jur y fu rt he r f ou nd that MS- 13 wa s an e nte rp ri se tha t a ff e c te d inte rs tate c omm e rc e ; th at MS13 eng ag ed in ac ts and threats of murder; that Appe llants were members of the MS-13 enter

prise;
and that App e lla

nts ha d p art ic ipate d in

the c on sp ir a c y

to a ssa ult and in t he c ha rg e d a ssa ult s in order to maintain or incre ase the ir positions wit hin MS-13. The jury failed to find, howe ver, that M S -1 3 en gage d

i nth e r ac k et ee ri n g ac t i v i ty o f n ar co t i cs tra ff

i ck i n g. One we ek later , Appellants aske d the district court to set aside the ver dict and ente r a jud g me nt o f n ot guil ty

purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 29 , o r i n th e a lte rn ativ e to
vacate the judg ment and orde r a ne w trial pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Criminal Proce dure 33. They claimed multiple err ors. Fir st, they claimed that the jur

y ’s fa ilure to find that MS-13 eng ag ed in nar cotics traf

fickingwas fatal to the verdic t beca use the Indictment had not pleade d the two ra ckete eringactivities (murde r and na rcotics tra fficking ) in the alter native. Second, the y argued that the pr oof of MS-13’s involvement in murde r wa s insufficient. Third, they asser ted that the Gover

nment had fa iled to prove that the MS-13 e nterprise had an e x istence se parate from the cha rg ed off enses. The district court docke t does not indicate whe n or how the district c ourt d en i edth e m o t i o n , b u tth ati td i d s o i s cl ea r f

ro mth e p ro gre s s i o no f t h e c as e t o s en t en ci n g. On Dec ember

5, 2005, the district court sente nced V asquez principally to a total of 63 y ear s’ imprisonment. The sentenc e consisted of 3 y ear s’ conc urre nt imprisonment for the conspirac y

count (Count One) and ea ch of the three assault cha rg es (Counts Six , Seven, and Eig ht), as we ll as a conse cutive 10-year term for the first fire arm c ount (Count Twelve) a nd two additional consec utive 25-y ear terms for e ach of

the other two f

irea rm counts (Counts Thirteen8

and F ourtee n). The district c ourt imposed longe r sentenc es for Counts Thirteen and F ourtee n beca use it considere d them to be sec ond or subseque nt firea rm offe nses. The c ourt, ac ting sua sponte, dismissed the three e x plosive counts (Counts Seventeen, Eighteen, a nd Ninetee n), ostensibly on the theory

that those counts wer e in the natur e of le sser-inc luded offe nses of the firea rm counts. J udg ment enter ed on De cembe r 13, 2005. On J anuar

y 6, 2006, the district court sente nced Ca stro principally to 60 y ear s plus 1 day of imprisonment. The 1 day consisted of c oncurr ent 1-da y sentenc es for

the conspira cy

count (C ount O ne ) a

nd the thr e e a ssa

ult c ha rg e s ( Counts Six, Se ve n, and Ei g ht) . A s h a d b e e n th e c a se for Va squez, the total of 60 y ear s’ imprisonment was imposed for the three firea rm offe nses. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso dis mis se d th e thr e e e xplos ive c ounts , f or the same re a so ns it d id s o in Vasque z’s case. IV. Argum ents on Appeal On appe al, Appellants c halleng e their c onvictions and sentenc es on multiple gr ounds. Withon e e xce pti on , App e lla nts br ingthe se c ha lle ng e s jo int ly . T he y de vo te the bu lk o f t

he ir argument to their claim that the district cour t erre d in allowing the Gover nment to call Alicea

as an expert witness and to their f urther c laim that Alicea’ s testimony violated the F eder al Rules of Evidence and Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). B eyond their cha lleng e to Alicea ’s testimony , Appellants ar g ue that the district cour t erre d in admitting evidenc e of na rcotics tr a ff ic kin gand

an unc ha rg e d s ho oti ng , th at th e Go ve rnme nt f a ile d to pr ov e that MS- 13 wa s a
ra c ke te e ri nge nte rp ri se , a nd that th e thr e e fi re arm

c ounts we re du

pli c ativ e . T he y

a lso ob je c t to their sentenc es on the sec ond and third fire arm off enses ( Counts Thirteen and F ourtee n), which the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e re d to be se c on d o r s ub se qu e nt o ff e ns e s, be c a

us e the Ind ic tme nt f

a ile d to9

ch ar ge t h o s e o ff

en s es as s ec o n d

o r s u b s equ en to ff

en s es . C as tro ra i s es o n e a d d i t i o n al ch al l en ge on his own, arguing that the two assault cha rg es stemming f

rom the He mpstead shootings w ere mul tip lic ito us be c a

us e the Go ve rnme nt f

a ile d to int

ro du c e e vid e nc e that V a sq ue z int e nd e d to shoot more than one vic tim. Bec ause the parties f ocused both at trial and on appe al on questions reg ardingAlicea ’s testimony , we be g in with that issue.

DI SCU SSIO N I. He c to r Al ic e a’ s Te st im onyas an Ex pe r t W it ne ss A. The Subst anc e of A lic e a’ s Te st im ony Th e Go ve rnme nt c a lle d H e c tor Al ic e a , a n inve sti g ator

wi th t he Ne w Y or

k St ate Pol ic e , to testify reg ardingMS-13’s “ente rprise struc ture a nd the der ivation, background and mig ration of the MS- 13 or g anizatio n, its his tor y and c on fl ic ts, ” a s w e ll a s MS -1 3’ s “ hie ra rc hy , c liq ue s, methods and ac tiviti es, modes of c ommunication and slang .” Alice a had be en an of fice r of the New Y ork State Police for eig hteen year s, and he ha d been a n investigator since 1992. In J une 20 00 , f ive y e ars be fo re the tr ia l, A lic e a ha d b e e n a ssi g ne d to the F B I L on gI sla

nd Ga ngTa sk For ce. H e wa s also the Chair of the Intellige nce Committee of the E ast Coast GangInvestig ators Association. Prior to trial, Appellants objecte d to the Gover nment’s stated plan to c all Alicea on the g round that Alice a would re ly on “impermissible hea

rsay” to re ach his c onclusions. The
acc ompanying me morandum of law cited to this Court’s opinion i n United States v. Duk agjini , 326 F.3d 45 ( 2d Cir. 2003). The pa rties ar g ued the motion befor e the district cour t, and the district court re serve d its decision. Defe nse counse l continued to press the issue at trial, and10

Vasque z’s attorney

was pe rmitted to conduct a voir dir e examination of Alicea prior to direc t examination by

the Gover

nment. In response to defe nse counse l’s questioning, A licea stated that he had pa rticipated in somewhe re be tween f ifteen a nd fifty custodial interrog ations of MS-13 members. When aske d whether he could disting uish betwee n information he ha d lear ned during
c us tod ia l inte rr og atio ns a nd inf or matio n h e ha d le arn e d e lse wh e re , A lic e a re sp on de d th at hi s kn ow le dg e wa s b a se d o n “ a c omb inatio n o f b oth .” At the c on c lus ion

of the vo ir dir e , d e fe ns e
c ouns e l a g a in a

rgue d th at A lic e a

wa s n ot q

ua lif ie d a s a n e xpe rt and that hi s te sti mony

wo uld introduce te stimoni al evidenc e in violation of Cra wfo rd
. See 541 U.S. 36. The district court then denied the motion. Much of Alice a’s testimony conce rned MS-13’s ba ckg round. He testified about MS-13’s history , its presenc e on L ongI sland, and its national and inter national pre sence ; about the g ang ’s
c olo rs , h and

signs , g ra ff

iti us e , n amin gpr a c tic e s, a nd tatto os ; and

a bo ut i ts l oc a l su

bunit structure , leade rship structure , division of responsibilit ies, and membe rship rules. In addition, Alicea testified to more spec ific deta ils about MS-13’s operations. He stated that whe n MS-13
me mbe rs fl e d f

ro m pr os e c uti on

or ne e de d to tr ave l f

or “ g angbu sin e ss r e a so ns ,” su c h a s “ to transport na

rcotics,” “to transpor

t weapons,” or “to c ommit crimes in other are as,” the y trave led “on a G rey

hound bus” or by

car . Acc ordingto Alicea, MS-13 membe rs from Vir g inia, California, a

nd El Salvador had a

ttended org anizational meeting s in New Yor k State, and MS-13 le a de rs thr ou g ho ut t

he natio n c omm

un ic ate d w ithe a c h o the r b y te le ph on e . H e te sti fi e d th at MS13 tr e a sury

mon e y “ [wa s] us e d to buy

g un s, ” to h e lp m e mbe rs in p ri so n o r i n o the r s tate s, or to buy narc otics. Significa

ntly , Alicea

also asser

ted that MS-13 neede d g uns “to do what MS 13After initially char acte rizing how he lear ned about the dr

ugtax as a casua l conver sation 3 wi than M S -1 3 m em b er , Al i ce a l at er cl ar i fi edth ath e l ea rn edab o u tth e d ru g t ax d uri n g a 11 d o e s , w h i c hi s , yo ukn o w , s h o o tatr i v a l g an gm e mb e r s , an d s o m e t i m e s i nth e p r o c e s s , o b v i o u s l y, some people g et hit.” Wit h respe ct to MS-13’s activities on L ongI sland, Alicea testified that since he had joined the Task F orce in J une 2000, the Ta sk Forc e had se ized “[p] robably betwee n 15 and 25” firea rms from MS-13 member s. He fur ther testified that Task For ce me mbers had se ized ammunition, manufacture d outside of New York State, fr om MS-13 members on L ongI sland. Moving on to MS-13’s na rcotics- related oper ations, Alicea told the jury

that MS-13 members on L on gI sla nd ha d b e e n a

rr e ste d f or de a lin gna

rc oti c s, pr ima

ri ly c oc a ine , a

nd tha t th e g anga lso
occa sionally

dealt mar ijuana. Alice a also stated that MS-13 “tax[ ed]” non-g angdrugdeale rs who wished to dea l drug s in bars controlled by MS-13. Most im portantly , Alicea attested that MS-13 had committed “betwe en 18 and 22, 23” murders on L ongI sland betwe en June 2000 and the tr ia l. On cr oss-examination, defense counsel probe d the source s of Alicea ’s information. Be cause of the importanc e of A licea’ s answer s, we quote f rom his testimony

at leng th: Q.
. . . . Itho ug ht you me nti on e d F L S . . . f

un de d it se lf

at th e be g inn ingfr om t

he sa le of marijuana ? A. No. I

was re fer ringto the MS-13 ga

ngas a whole. Q. Is it f

air to s ay tha t so me bo dy

tol d y ou tha t? A. I had read that from some of the articles that I had rese arched. Q. Ne wsp ap e r a rti c le s? A. Re po rts fro m o the r la w e nfo rc e me nt p e rso nn e l.

. . . Q. Yo u a lso tol d u s th at MS m e mbe rs . . . p ut a tax on n arc oti c s sa le s in

c e rt a in b ars ; is that c or re c t?

. . . A. I w as tol

d th at b ya g an g m e mb e r, y es. 3c us tod ia l inte rr og atio n o f a n M S- 13 me mbe r. Up on fu rt he r q ue sti on ing , A lic e a

state d th at th is “conve rsation” ha d taken plac e “a t the United States Attorney ’s Off ice.” The MS-13 member wi th who m A lic e a

ha d b e e n “ c onve rs ing ” ha d b e e n in dic te d a nd ha d n ot b e e n r e le a se d o n b a il, and he ha d been e scorted to the “ conver sation” by “the U.S. mar shals.” When aske d why that MS- 13 me mbe r h a d b e e n a rr e ste d, Al ic e a

ans we re d th at th e ind ivi du a l w a s “ [p]art of thi s investigation as well, y es.” In other wor ds, Alicea

lear ned about the dr

ugtax from an MS-13 member in custody duringthe cour se of this very investigation. The interrog ation took place at the U.S. Attorney ’s Of fi c e . T he re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t w he the r t he As sis tant Unit e d St ate s A tto rn e y in c ha rg e of thi s c a se wa s p re se nt. 12

. . . Q. An d I

be lie ve y ou

tol d u s th at so me of

tho se [me mbe rs hip ] due s w e re us e d to purc ha se na

rc oti c s? A. Th at’ s c or

re c t. Q. Is it fair t o say that that was told to you also by somebody who was in custody? A. In c us tod

yan d s om e tha t we reno t. Q. W ell, can you te ll me . . . how many pe ople in custody told you in substance that mo nie s c olle c te d we reus e d fo r n arc oti cs? A. Probably like a doze n.

. . . A. . . . . Isaid Iam awa re that there ha s been c ontact betwe en California and Ne w York. Q. An d h ow d

id y ou be c om e awa reof i t? A. Liste ning to re c or dings .

. . . Q. An d you

state d th at you

g ot i nf or matio n w ithre g ard

to M S- 13 s invo lve d w ith Me xica n d ru gc art e ls; is that c or

re c t? A. Ye s. Q. And where did you ge t that inf ormation from? A. From re

se arc h o n th e In te rn e t. Q. Do y ou

kn owthe so ur c e of

tha t in fo rm atio n o n th e Inte rn e t? A. No t of

f t he top of my he a d. B ut I

did re tr ie ve tha

t. Q. I s it

law e nf or c e me nt o r r e po rt e rs ? A. I think it is a combination of a reporter doing a stor y and having a c onversation with lawe nfo rc e me nt.

. . . Q. . . . [W

] ith regard to the involveme nt of MS-13 [with] the Me xican c artels or Colombian cartels, you nev er interviewe d anybody who told you that, it was str ic tly fro m t heIn te rn e t; is t

ha t c or re c t? A. Tha t is c orre c t.13 B. Th e Em erge nce of the Of fi cerExpert Under Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 702, in those situations where “ scientific, tec hnical, or oth e r s pe c ia lize d k

no wl e dg e wi ll a ssi st the tr ie r o f f a c t to un de rs tand

the e vid e nc e or

to de te rm ine a

fa c t in iss ue ,” te sti mony

by “ a wi tne ss q

ua lif ie d a s a n e xpe rt by kn ow le dg e , s kil l, experience , training , or educ ation” is permissible so long as “( 1) the testimony is based upon sufficie nt fac ts or data, ( 2) the testimony is the product of r eliable pr inciples and methods, and (3 ) t he wi tne ss h a s a

pp lie d th e pr inc ipl e s a

nd me tho ds re lia

bly to t he fa c ts o f t

he c a se .” F e d. R. Evid. 702. The broa d phrasingof the de scription “scie ntific, technic al, or other specia liz ed knowledg e” br ings w ithin the scope of the Rule both “ experts in the strict sense of the word,” such as sc ientists, and “the lar g e g roup sometimes ca lled ‘skilled’ witnesses, suc h as banke rs or landowner s testifying to land va lues.” Id. advisory committee’s note. On the question of when expert testimony

is appropriate, the Advisory Commi ttee Notes r efe r to the traditional common law r ule tha t e xpe rt te sti mony

is c a lle d f

or wh e n th e “ un tr a ine d la

y man” wo uld

be un a ble intelligently

to determine “ the par

ticular issue” in the absenc e of guidance from an e x pert. Id. advisory committee’s note ( quoting Ma son L add, Expe rt Testimony , 5 Vand. L . Rev. 414, 418 (1952)) (interna l quotation marks omitted). In the 1980s, a ne w ty

pe of “ skilled witness” beg an eme rg ing: the la w enf orce ment office r. In criminal ca ses, the Gove rnment beg an ca lling law e nforc ement off icer s to testify

as experts on what we r efe rre d to as “the nature a nd structure of org anized crime f amilies.” United Sta te s v . D aly , 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 ( 2d Cir. 1988). This Court first review ed a c halleng e to the use of suc h an expert in Un ite d S tates v . A rd

ito , 782 F.2d 358 ( 2d Cir. 1986). The Gove rnment14

had ca lled an F BI

ag ent to testify

as an e x pert a

bout terms such as “ capta in,” “c apo,” “ reg ime,” and “c rew .” Id. at 363. We upheld the admission of that expert testimony beca use it “aide d the jury in its understanding of” r ecor ded conve rsations betwe en the two de fenda nts. Id. Fur thermore , we noted, the district court had r eminded the jury that the def

endants ther e had not been c harg ed with any

conduct r elatingto org anized crime. Id. One year later, w e upheld the a dmission of ex pert testimony by a law e nforc ement off

icer on the re lated matter

of the mea

ning of messag es written in code
. United States v. Lev asseur , 816 F.2d 37, 45 ( 2d Cir. 1987). Upholding such testimony was c onsistent with pre-

Ar dito case s wher e we and other

Circuits had allowed la

w enf orce ment office rs to testify as experts about the meaningof jarg on relating to nar cotics traf ficking
. E.g. , United States v. Borrone- Iglar , 468 F.2d 419, 421 ( 2d Cir. 1972) (upholdinga law e nforc ement off icer ’s testimony

“conc erningthe
na rc oti c s v e rn a c ula

r u se d in [re c or de d] te le ph on e c onve rs atio ns ” ); se e als o United States v. Theodoropoulos , 866 F.2d 587, 590- 91 (3d Cir. 1989) (de scribingtestimony “conc erningthe
me anin gof

. . . c od e d c onve rs atio ns ” a s “ the pa ra digm si tuatio n f

or e xpe rt te sti mony

un de r R ule 702”) ( overr

uled on other grounds). In subsequent y ear s, we have enc ountere d novel uses of the se “of fice r experts” a

nd approve d of their testify

ing on a broade r ra

ng e of issues. F or example, in Un ite d S tates v . D aly , 842 F.2d 1380 ( 2d Cir. 1988), wher e the de fenda nts were char g ed with “va rious crimes a

rising out of ac tiviti es of the G ambino crime f amily ,” we upheld the expert testimony of an F BI

ag ent who “identifie d the five or g anized crime f amilies that operate in the New York a rea ” and “desc ribed their r equire ments for membe rship, their rules of conduct a

nd code of

silence, a nd the meaningof ce rtain jarg on.” Id. at 1383, 1388. Afte r the Gove rnment had pla y ed surve illance15

tapes for the jury , the ag ent interpre ted the jar g on the speakers ha d used. Id. at 1384. This Court upheld the district cour

t’s decision to admit the ag ent’s testimony , finding that the ag ent had testified about “muc h that was outside the e x pecta ble re alm of knowledg e of the aver ag e juror.” Id. at 1388. The district c ourt’s judg ment that the ag ent’s testimony would be helpf

ul to the juror “wa s not unreasona

ble.” Id. Finally , the ag ent had not testified a bout the defe ndants or any of the cha rg ed off enses. Id. The only

offe nse ele ment to which the ag ent had testified “ was the
e xiste nc e of

a RI CO e nte rp ri se , a s h e g ave his un de rs tand ingof the e xiste nc e of

or g anize d c ri me and the Ga

mbino family .” Id. Since Da ly , we ha

ve re peate dly

upheld the admission of similar testimony
. See, e .g. , Un ite d S tates v . Lo c as c io , 6 F.3d 924, 936 ( 2d Cir. 1993) (upholdingan F BI ag ent’s expert testimony about the interna l operating r ules of org anized crime f amilies, the meaningof re corde d
c onve rs atio ns , a

nd the ide nti fi c atio n o f m e mbe rs of the Ga mbi no c ri me fa

mil y ); United States v. Feliciano , 223 F.3d 102, 109 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (upholdingan F BI ag ent’s expert testimony about “the struc ture, lea dership, pra ctices, te rminology , and oper ations of [a street g ang , L os Sol ido s]” ); Un ite d S

tates v . M ate ra , 489 F.3d 115, 121 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (upholdingthe admission of an of fice r’s e x pert testimony

“about the c ompositi on and structur e of N ew Yor k org anized crime f amilies” and obse rvingthat the district court ha d limit ed the e x pert’s te stimony to ge nera l inf or matio n r athe r t

ha n in fo rm atio n a

bo ut t he de fe nd ants the mse lve s) . O ur de c isi on to p e rm it such expert testimony

ref lects our unde rstandingthat, just as an anthropolog ist mi g ht be equipped by

education and fieldwork to testify to the cultural more s of a pa rticular soc ial g roup,
see Dang Vang v. Toye d , 944 F.2d 476, 481- 82 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholdingthe district court’s admission of expert testimony on Hmongculture) , law enf orce ment office rs may

be equippe d by16

experience and tra ining to spea k to the operation, sy

mbols, jarg on, and interna l structure of
c ri min a l or g anizatio ns . O ff ic e rs int e ra c t w ithme mbe rs of the or g anizatio n, stu dy

its op e ra tio ns , and exchang e information with other office rs. As a r esult, they are able to bre ak throug h the g roup’s a ntipathy toward outsider s and g ain valuable knowledg e about its paroc hial prac tices and ins ula r l e xico n. Al low inglaw e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs to a c t a s e xpe rt s in

c a se s invo lvi ngthe se of

timpenetra ble cr iminal org anizations thus responds to the same conc erns that a nimated the
enac tment of the cr iminal laws that such org anizations (and their membe rs) a re ty pically char g ed with violating, such a s the Racke eter Influenc ed and Corr

upt Org anizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, and the more re cent Violent Crimes in Aid of Rac ketee ringAct, id. § 1959. See Org anized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L . 91-452 pmbl., 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (“[O]rga nized crime continues to g row be cause of def ects in the e vidence -g ather ing pr ocess of the law inhibiting the de velopment of the le g ally admissible evidence nece ssary to bring criminal . . . sanctions . . . to bear

on the unlawf

ul activities of those eng ag ed in org anized crime . . ..” ). Ye t de sp ite the uti lity

of , a nd ne e d f or , e xpe rt ise of

thi s so rt , it s u se mus t be lim ite d to those issues wher e sociolog ical knowledg e is appropr iate. An incr easing ly thinning line
se pa rate s th e le g iti mate us e of an o ff ic e r e xpe rt

to t ra ns late e so te ri c te rm ino logy or to e xplic ate an org anization’s hierar chica l structure f rom the illeg itimate and impermissible substit ution of expert opinion for fac tual evidenc e. I f the off icer expert stray s beyond the bounds of appropr iately

“expert” matters, that offic er be comes, rather than a sociolog ist describingthe inner working s of a c losed community , a chr onicler of the re cent pa st whose pronounc ements on elements of the char g ed off ense se rve a s shortcuts to proving g uilt. As the office r’s purpor ted expertise narr ows from “ org anized crime” to “this particular g ang ,” fr om the meaningof “c apo”17

to the criminality

of the de fenda

nt, the office r’s testimony become s more ce ntral to the ca se,
more c orrobor ative of the fac t witnesses, and thus more like a summary of the fa cts than an a ide in understandingthem. The off icer expert transfor

ms into t he hub of the case , displacingthe jury by c onne c tin gand

c omb ini nga ll o the r t e sti mony and phy sic a l e vid e nc e int o a

c oh e re nt, dis c e rn ibl e , inte rn a lly

c on sis te nt p ic tur e of

the de fe nd ant’ s guil t. In such instance s, it is a lit tle too convenient that the G overnme nt has found an individual wh o is e xpe rt

on pr e c ise ly tho se fa c ts that th e Go ve rnme nt m us t pr ov e to s e c ur e a

g uil ty verdic t—even more so when that e x pert ha ppens to be one of the Gove rnment’s own investigators. Any

eff ective la w enf orce ment ag ency

will necessa

rily develop e x pertise on the criminal org anizations itinvestigates, but the primary value of that expertise is in facilitating the ag ency ’s g ather ing of

evidenc e, identification of targ ets for pr osecution, and pr oving guilt at the subsequent trial. When the Gove rnment skips the intermediate steps and proc eeds dire ctly from int e rn a l e xpe rt ise to t

ri a l, a nd wh e n th os e of

fi c e r e xpe rt s c ome to c ourt and sim ply dis g or g e the ir fac tual knowledg e to the jury , the experts are no longe r aidingthe jury in its factfinding ; they

are instructing the jury

on the exist ence of the fa cts nee ded to satisfy the eleme nts of the cha

rg ed offe nse. See United States v. Nersesian , 824 F.2d 1294, 1308 ( 2d Cir. 1987) (“I n the past, we have uphe ld the admission of expert testimony to expl ain the use of

narc otics codes a

nd jarg on . . .. We acknowle dg e some de g ree of discomfiture [when] this practice is employ ed, since , un c on tr oll e d, su c h u se of e xpe rt te sti mony

may have the e ff

e c t of pr ov idi ngthe g ov e rnme nt w ith an additional summation by havingthe expert interpre t the evidenc e.”) . I t is as though the la w enfor ceme nt ag ency

in question is a standing ma ster for the cr iminal court, and the of fice r expert its repr e se ntativ e c ha

rg e d w ithre po rt ingthat ma ste r’ s f ind ing s o f f

a c t. N ot o nly

are ma ste rs a18

cre ature of civil rathe r than c riminal courts, seeAmalia D. Ke ssler, Our Inquisitorial T radition: Equity Proce dure, DueProcess, and the Se arch for an Alternative to the Adv ersarial , 9 0 Co rn e ll L . Re v. 11 81 , 1 20 0, 12 04 (2 00 5) (d e sc ri bin gthe a dv e nt o f m a ste rs in f if te e nth -c e ntu

ry En g lis h
c ourt s o f e qu ity

), that so rt

of us ur patio n o f t

he jur y ’s ro le is una c c e pta

ble e ve n in

the c ivi l context, seeJ ames Wm. Moore, 9 Moore’ s Federal Prac tice § 53.13[1] , at 53-78 (3d e d. 2005) (“The 2003 amendments [to the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure ] abolish t he author ity of trial courts to appoint trial master s respe ctingmatters to be de cided by a jury unless a statute provide s otherwise.” ). The G overnme nt cannot satisfy its burden of proof

by takingthe ea sy

route of callingan “e x pert” whose e x pertise ha ppens to be the de fenda

nt. Our occ asional use of abstrac t languag e to desc ribe the subjec ts of permissible offic er e x pert testimony , e.g. , Loc as c io , 6 F.3d at 936 (“We have . . . pre viously upheld the use of

expert testimony

to help explain the operation, str uc tur e , me mbe rs hip , a

nd te rm ino logy

of or g anize d c ri me fa

mil ie s. ” ); United States v. Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d 61, 78 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (“T his Court has also permitted expert testimony reg ardingthe org anization and structure of org anized crime f amilies in [ RI CO] prosecutions . . ..”), c annot be r ead to sug g est otherwise
. This Court has not been blind to these risks. More than fiftee n y ear s ag o, we obse rved that althoug h “the ope rations of na rcotics de aler s are a prope r subject f or expert testimony

under Fe d. R. Evid. 702, we have car efully circ umscribed the use of such testimony to occa sions where the subject matter

of the testimony

is bey ond the ken of

the ave rag e juror.” United States v. Cas til lo , 9 24 F .2 d 1 22 7, 12 32 (2 d Ci r. 19 91 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o United States v. Tap ia- Or tiz , 23 F.3d 738, 740 ( 2d Cir. 1994) (ca utioning that expert testimony relating to “the op e ratio ns of

na rc oti c s d e a le rs . . . s ho uld no rm a lly be us e d o nly

fo r s ub je c ts that ha

ve e so te ri c19

aspec ts reasona

bly perc eived a s beyond the ken of the jury” (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)). Two y ear s later, in Loc as c io , afte r appr oving of an F BI ag ent’s expert testimony on the structure of the Ga mbino family , we none theless “r emind[ed] the district courts . . . that they are not
re qu ir e d to a dmi t su c h te sti mony , a nd wh e n th e y

do the te sti mony

sh ou ld b e c are fu lly circ umscribed to ensur e that the e x pert doe s not usurp either the r ole of the judg e in instructing on the law, or

the role of

the jury in applying the law to the fa cts befor e it.” Loc as c io , 6 F.3d at 939. In most cases, of c ourse, no r eminder w as nee ded, ofte n beca use the district cour

t had taken aff irmative steps on its own to preve nt such usurpation. See, e .g. , Ar dito , 782 F.2d at 363 (noting that the district court ha d “spec ifically cautioned the jury

as to the limited purpose of the a g ent’s te sti mony ” ); Da ly , 842 F.2d at 1389 (“[T]he final [j ury ] i nstructions made c lear that it was the jury ’s province to determine whether or not the individuals named in the indictment func tioned
a s an ‘ e nte rp ri se ’ .
. . .” ); Ma te ra , 4 89 F .3 d at 12 1 ( “ I mme diate ly a ft e r [the of

fi c e r e xpe rt ’s ] testimony , the district court g ave a limit ing instruc tion . . ..”). We more re cently

cautioned the Gover

nment of our c oncer

n about these r isks in United States v. Duk

agjini , 326 F.3d 45 ( 2d Cir. 2003), and Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d 61. In Dukagjini , the Gover nment called the case ag ent, a DE A offic er, a s an expert witness for the purpose of int e rp re tin gre c or de d c onve rs atio ns . 3 26 F .3 d at 49 -5 0. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a llo we d th e a g e nt t o testify , but it “cautioned the pr osecutor to limit [ the ag ent’s] testimony to ‘words of the trade , jarg on,’ and g ener al pra ctices of drugdeale rs.” Id. at 50. Duringhis testimony , the ag ent interpre ted var ious terms, such as “ dry” and “ cooked.” Id. Th e a g e nt a lso a dd re sse d s pe c if

ic exchang es in rec orded c onversations and expl ained their meaningto the jury
. Id. In doing so, the ag ent re lied on both his ex perie nce a nd his knowledg e of the case . Id.20

After revie wingthe ag ent’s testimony , we c oncluded that the a g ent had “ stray [ed] from his proper e x pert func tion” by “ac t[ ing] at times as a summar y prosec ution witness.” Id. at 55. The Gove rnment’s de cision to call the ca se ag ent as a n expert witness, we obser ved, had “incr ease [d] the likelihood that inadmissibl e and pr ejudicial testimony [would] be prof

fer ed.” Id. at 53. The of

fice r expert’s status, we sug g ested, wa s likely to give his factua l testimony an “unmer ited cre dibilit y ” bef ore the jury
. Id. ; se e als o United States v. Alvare z , 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1988) (“ When the expert is a g overnme nt law enf orce ment ag ent testifying on behalf of the prose cution about par ticipation in prior and similar ca ses, the possibility that the jury will give undue weig ht to the expert’s testimony is gr eatly incre ased.” ). The de fense ’s inability to meaning fully

challeng e the c ase a g ent’s expert opinions inadverte ntly reinfor ces the ag ent’s cr edibility

on questions of fac t. Dukagjini , 3 26 F .3 d at 53 -5 4. In a dd iti on , c a se a g e nts testifying a s experts are pa rticularly vulnera ble to making“swe epingconclusions” a bout the defe ndants’ ac tiviti es. Id. at 54. We have identifie d two distinct way s in which the off icer expert might “stra

y from the scope of his ex pertise.” Id. at 55. The e x pert mig ht, as did the ag ent in Dukagjini , “ t e s t i f [ y] about the mea

ning of conver sations in ge nera l, beyond the interpre tation of code words.” Id. ; see als o United States v. Fre eman , 488 F.3d 1217, 1227 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (“The fac t that [ the offic er expert] pos sessed spec ialized knowledg e of the particula r languag e of dr

ugtraff icker s did not g ive him c art e bla nc he to t e sti fy

a s to the me anin gof

oth e r w or ds in r e c or de d te le ph on e c a lls
w it h o u t r e g ar d

to r e li a b il it y o r r e le v an c e . ” )
. O r , w e n o te d , th e e xp e rt m igh t “ inte r p r e t[ ] ambig uous slangterms” ba sed on knowledg e g ained through involvement in the case , rathe r than21

by re fe re nc e to t

he “ fi xed me anin g ” of

tho se te rm s “ e ith e r w ith in t he na rc oti c s w or ld o r w ith in this particular c onspiracy .” Dukagjini , 326 F.3d at 55. We went on to find that, bec ause the office r expert had r elied on hea rsay and custodial int e rr og atio ns wh e n f

or min ghis op ini on s, his te sti mony that w e nt o uts ide the sc op e of his
e xpe rt ise vio late d th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f E vid e nc e and the Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 58-59. When the a g ent “de parte d from the bounds of Rules 702 a nd 703” by “re peate dly

deviat[ing] from his expertise on drugjarg on,” he the reby “cr ossed [the] line” betwee n “per

missibl e and imper

missibl e re liance on he arsa y .” Id. at 58-59. We held that the ag ent’s testimony

violated the rule s g overningexpert witnesses, id. at 55, the hea rsay rules, id. at 59, and the Confr ontation Clause, id. We affir med the convic tions nonetheless bec ause the Confrontation Clause violation had not bee n plain err or, id. at 61, and the he arsa y violation had been ha rmless, id. at 62. Simi lar c oncer

ns arose in Lom ba rd

oz zi , 491 F.3d 61. The re, the defe ndant had be en char g ed with loan shar

king, a nd the Gover

nment called a

n investigator with the U.S. Attorney ’s Offic e for the Southern District of Ne w York “ as an e x pert who te stified as to, inter alia, the g ener al structure of L a Cosa Nostra in New Yor

k and L ombardozzi ’s af

filiation with orga

nized crime.” Id. at 72 . In a dd iti on to t e sti fy inga bo ut t he str uc tur e of L a Cos a No str a , th e of

fi c e r t old the jury that the def

endant wa s “a soldier

in the Gambino cr ime family .” Id. When questioned by defe nse counse l as to his basis for that opinion, the witness testified that his knowledg e of the defe ndant’s position in the Gambino family “wa s based on c onversations with cooperating witnesses and c onfidential informa nts.” Id. He a dded that “he persona lly observe d L ombardozzi ’s ac tiviti es appr ox imately two dozen times since 1985.” Id. Be cause the def endant22

had fa iled to raise a

Confrontation Clause cha lleng e to the off icer expert’s testimony , we revie wed that testimony

for plain e rror

and found that it did not aff ect the de fenda

nt’s substantial rig hts. Id. We commented, howe ver, that “the re cord indicate[d] that” the e x pert may have “communicated out-of- court testimonial statements of c ooperating witnesse s and conf idential informants direc tly

to the jury

in the g uise of an e x pert opinion.” Id. I t is in l ig ht o f t

he se c on c e rn s th at w e no w t ur n to Ap pe lla

nts ’ s pe c if

ic c ha lle ng e s to Alicea ’s testimony . In doing so, w e re view the district cour t’s admission of expert testimony for
a bu se of dis c re tio n, and

we wi ll n ot f

ind e rr or un le ss t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin gwa s “ manif e stl y
err oneous.” Dukagjini , 3 2 6 F. 3 d at5 2 (qu o t i n g Loc as c io , 6 F.3d at 936).

C. Alicea’ s Qual if

ications as an E xpert Ap pe lla nts ’ f ir st c ha lle ng e to A lic e a ’s te sti mony is a c la im that he wa s unq

ua lif ie d to testify as an e x pert. The y

argue that bec ause muc h of Alice a’s ba ckg round is in the are a of
narc otics rather

than g ang s, he is not qualified to testify about the oper ations and structure of MS-13. Under

Rule 702, the district court may admit expert testimony

if the witness is “qualifie d
a s an e xpe rt

by kn ow le dg e , s kil l, e xpe ri e nc e , tr a ini ng , o r e du c atio n. ” F e d. R. E vid . 7 02 . A t tr ia l, Alicea testified that he ha d been a n office r with the Ne w York State Police f or eig hteen year s and that he had be en an inve stigator since 1992. He had bee n trained at the New Y ork State Police
a c a d e m y , an d

h e h a d r e c e i v e d a d d i t i o n a l tr a i n i n gi nth e f i e l d an d th r o u g hr e f

r e s h e r c o ur s e s . In addition, he had be en a me mber of the FB IGangTask F orce on L ongI sland since 2000 a nd
serve d as Chair of the Intellige nce Committee of the E ast Coast GangInvestig ators’ A ssociation.23

Alicea also had e x tensive experienc e re lating to MS-13 in par ticular. He testified that he ha d “listened to many

conver sations on tape,” pe rfor med surveillanc e in the cour se of investig ations of MS-13, executed sea

rch w arr ants, debrie fed MS-13 membe rs, and tra ined other police depar tments on MS-13. S ince joiningthe Task F orce , he had a rre sted “be tween 50 a

nd a hundred” and intervie wed “ [o] ver a hundred” MS-13 members. He said that he ha d also “re ad a lot of documents re lated to MS, either on the inter net or the me dia or fr om our instructors or oth e r p e op le fr om t

he c on fe re nc e s I

have g on e to, ” and

that he re a d “ a

we b s ite ” de a lin gwi th MS- 13 on

a da ily ba sis
. Alicea ’s qualifications are quite similar to those of e x perts whose qualifications we have upheld in the past. In Loc as c io , for e x ample, the of fice r expert “ha d been a

n FB Iag ent for sevente en y ear s, and for

five year s had bee n on the FB I ’s Org anized Crime Prog ram, a squad that investigated only

org anized crime c ases.” 6 F.3d at 937. Sim ilarly , Alicea had bee n an investigator with the NewYork State Police for thirteen year s and a me mber of the Task F orce for f ive. L ikewise, in Ma te ra , the offic er e x pert ha d “extensive experience investigating org anized crime a s a Ne w York Police D epar tment Detec tive and later as an I nvestig ator for

the United States Attorney ’s Off ice.” 489 F.3d at 122. And in Feliciano , we de scribed a n office r expert as having“extensive experience ” with a pa rticular c riminal g angbased on the office r’s pa rt ic ipatio n in

a joi nt t a sk fo rc e fo r a

pp ro ximate ly

fi ve y e ars , “ e xec uti on

of fe de ra l and

state
sear ch wa rra nts at [gang ] l ocations,” pa rticipation in elec tronic surve illance, a nd revie w of
re po rt s b y oth e r a g e nts . 2 23 F .3 d at 10 9. Al ic e a ’s wo rk e xpe ri e nc e , tr a ini ng , a

nd inv olv e me nt i n investigations of MS-13 are at least as “e x tensive.” The district court did not err in finding that Al ic e a wa s q ua lif ie d to te sti fy

a s an e xpe rt .24

The proble m was not Alicea ’s qualifications. I t was the subjec ts about which he te stified and the sourc es on which he relied. We a ddress those c oncer ns below.
D. The Appropriate Boun daries of Alicea’s Expertise U nder Rule 702 Appellants ar g ue that some of the matters about whic h Alicea testified wer e outside the scope of his ex pertise. Rule 702 re quires that expert testimony conce rn “sc ientific, tec hnical, or other spec ialized knowledg e.” F ed. R. Evid. 702. Testimony is properly

char acte rized as

“ e xpe rt ” on ly

if it c on c e rn s matte rs that th e ave ra g e jur or is n ot c a pa ble of un de rs tand ingon

his or her own. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . A mu so , 21 F.3d 1251, 1263 ( 2d Cir. 1994) (“Adistrict court
may c omm it m anif

e st e rr or by a dmi tti nge xpe rt

te sti mony

wh e re the e vid e nc e imp e rm iss ibl y mir ro rs the te sti mony

of fe re d b y fa c t w itn e sse s, or

the su bje c t matte r o f t

he e xpe rt ’s te sti mony

is
no t be y on d th e ke n o f t

he ave ra g e jur or .” ); Loc as c io , 6 F.3d at 936 (applying the “untra ined lay man” standa

rd ar ticulated in the Advisory

Commi ttee Notes to Rule 702). Much of Alice a’s testimony conce rned material we ll within t he g rasp of the ave rag e juror. A fe w examples are particula rly striking: Alice a’s testimony that the FB Ig angtask forc e had
se ize d “ [p]r ob a

bly be tw e e n 1 5 a

nd 25 ” fi re arm s, a s w e ll a s ammunit ion , f ro m MS- 13 me mbe rs ; his statement that MS-13 members on L ongI sland had be en ar rested f or dea ling na

rcotics; and his statement that MS-13 had committed “betwe en 18 and 22, 23” murders on L ongI sland betwee n J une 2000 and the trial. No expertise is require d to understand a ny of these f acts. Ha d the Gover nment introduced la

y witness testimony , arr est rec ords, death cer tificates, a

nd other competent e vidence of these highly specific fac ts, the jury

could have “intellige ntly ” interpr eted and under stood it. For example, in Un ite d S tates v . F e liz , 467 F.3d 227 ( 2d Cir. 2006), wher e the25

de fe nd ant w a s c ha

rg e d w ithRI CO mur de r, “ [i]n o rd e r t o e sta bli shthe mann e r a

nd c a us e of de ath for e ach of

[t he def endant’ s] vi ctims in the charg ed homicides, the G overnme nt offer ed nine autopsy repor ts through the testimony

of [a medical e x aminer],” id. at 229. The G overnme nt could have done the same her e. Expert testimony might have been he lpful in establishing the
re latio ns hip be tw e e n th e se fa c ts a nd MS- 13 , b ut i t w a s n ot h e lpf ul i n e sta bli sh ingthe fa c ts the mse lve s. In a dd iti on

to t he se sta rk e xamp le s, muc h o f t

he re ma ind e r o f A lic e a ’s te sti mony a lso addre ssed matters that the a vera g e juror c ould have unde rstood had such f actua l evidence been introduced. A licea’ s testimony about the wa

y s that MS-13 members trave led when f leeingfrom prosec ution or when tra

nsporting c ontraba

nd, his assertion that MS-13 members f rom Virg inia, Ca lif or nia , a nd El Sa lva do r h a d atte nd e d o rg anizatio na l me e tin g s in Ne w Y or k St ate , a nd his state me nt t

hat MS- 13 le a de rs c omm un ic ate d b y

te le ph on e a ll f

a ll i nto thi s c ate g or

y . So , to o, did his testimony

about the use of

MS-13 treasur

y funds to buy

firea rms and nar cotics, his statement that the g angocca sionally dealt nar cotics, and his stateme nt that MS-13 tax ed non-me mber drug de a le rs . This testimony , which ra ng ed fr om MS-13’s activities on L ongI sland to aspec ts of the g ang ’s oper ations more g ener ally , went fa r beyond interpre ting jar g on or code d messag es, Ar dito , 78 2 F .2 d at 36 3; Levasseur , 816 F.2d at 45, describingmembership rule s, Da ly , 842 F.2d at 1388, or explaining org anizational hierar chy , Loc as c io , 6 F .3 d at 93 6. We f ind e sp e c ia lly dis tur bin gthe po rt ion

of Al ic e a ’s te sti mony

that e sse nti a lly

summa ri zed the re su lts of

the Ta sk For ce inve stigation on L ongI sland, and in par ticular Alice a’s testimony that MS-13 had committed betwee n eig hteen a nd twenty -three murders since 2000.26

We r e c og nize that e xpe rt ise may have be e n n e c e ssa

ry to c onne c t sp e c if

ic mur de rs to M S13. An appr opriate ( admissible) example of such e x pertise would have bee n an expert’s explanation of how the g raf fiti near a body indicated that the mur dere r wa s a member of MS-13,
or an e xpe rt ’s te sti mony

that th e g angus e d a

pa rt ic ula r m e tho d to kil l e ne mie s a nd tha t a s a re su lt of his revie w of the a

utopsy repor ts (which would have been in e vidence befor e the jury ), he ha d
c on c lud e d th at MS- 13 c omm itt e d th os e mur de rs . T he a c c e pta ble us e of e xpe rt te sti mony

fo r t his limit ed purpose , howeve r, does not make it acce ptable to substitute ex pert testimony for f actua l evidenc e of murde r in the first instance (a f act, a s we must reme mber, that is an e lement of the char g ed off

ense) . I f the Gove rnment is g oing to use the fa ct of murde rs as a way of provingthat the g angeng ag ed in a pattern of r acke teer ing a ctivity involving murde r, that an individual wa s murdere d rema ins a fact

that mu st b e pr ov e n b y

c omp e te nt evide nce . Only then does e x pertise of the sort proff

ere d by Alicea become nece ssary

to help the jury

understand the particula

r evide nce and to show a c onnection betwe en MS-13 and the mur der. The Gover nment cannot take a shortcut ar ound its obli g ation to prove murde r beyond a re asonable doubt just by havingan expert pronounce that unspecifie d deaths of e ighte en to twenty -three persons have bee n homicides committed by

members of

MS-13. Alicea’ s testimony in this reg ard w ent beyond those issues on which his “e x pert” testimony would have be en helpf

ul and appr opriate. In Feliciano , th e on e c a se wh e re we have a pp ro ve d o f t e sti mony

that e ve n a

rgua bly
a pp ro a c he d th e sc op e of

Al ic e a ’s te sti mony

he re , th e of

fi c e r w a s te sti fy

inga s b oth

a fa c t w itn e ss and an e x pert witness. 223 F .3d at 121. L ike Appellants, the de fenda nts in Feliciano had bee n char g ed with offe nses under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racke teer ing A ct. Id. at 107. The
rac ketee ringenter

prise of which those def

endants we re me mbers wa s the L os Soli dos g ang . Id.27

At trial, the Gove rnment ca lled the coor dinator of a joint task force on g angactivity in Hartfor d, Connecticut as both an e x pert witness a nd a fa ct witness. Id. at 109-10. As a n expert, the ag ent testified about “the structure , leade rship, prac tices, terminolog y , and oper ations of L os Soli dos.” Id. at 109. As a f

act witness, he testified about his involvement in the task forc e investig ation of L os Soli dos. Id. at 109-10. On a ppeal, the de fenda

nts argued that the a g ent had testified to leg al conclusions. Id. at 120-21. The y did not challeng e the a g ent’s testimony as outside the scope of his ex pertise. We upheld the district c ourt’s admission of the testimony afte r findingthat the ag ent had not testified to any leg al conc lusions. Id. at 12 1. Ev e n a s w e a ff ir me d th e c onvic tio ns , ho we ve r, we e xpre sse d c on c e rn that “ the lin e be tw e e n [th e a g e nt’ s] op ini on and fa c t w itn e ss testimony [was] often ha

rd to discer

n, and the ‘ fac ts’ testified to are often stated ve ry broadly and g ener ally .” Id. Nonethele ss, beca use the de fense had had a mple opportunity

to cross-e x amine the ag ent as to the ba sis for those broa dly stated fa cts, we f

ound that the district court ha d not
m an i f e s t l y e r r e d i na dm i t t i n gth e t e s t i m o n y. Feliciano thu s r e inf

or c e s o ur c on c lus ion

that it wo uld be imp ro pe r f

or the Go ve rnme nt t o
re ly on an o ff ic e r e xpe rt ’s te sti mony

a bo ut m atte rs outsi de the sc op e of any c on c e iva ble e xpe rt ise and that the district cour

t errs in a llowing it to do so. There , the Gover nment corr ectly

rea liz ed that it could not call the task for ce c oordinator to testify as an e x pert a

bout the prec ise operations of the ra c ke te e ri nge nte rp ri se c ha rg e d in the ind ic tme nt, and

it h a d th e a g e nt t e sti fy

in d ua l r ole s: as a f act witness a

nd as an e x pert witness. Alice a, in contra st, was proff ere d and testified in the
case befor e us only

as an e x pert. Those parts of his testimony that involved purely

fac tual matters, as w ell as those in which Alice a simply summarized the results of the Ta sk Forc e investigation, fell far

beyond the prope r bounds of e x pert testimony . Alicea was a ctingas a de28

fac to “ca se ag ent” in providingthis summ ary information to the jury

(the c ase be ing the ong oing investigation into M S-13’s ac tiviti es on L ongI sland). Testifying a s he did, Alicea ’s evidenc e runs a foul of our a dmonition i n Dukagjini . When
case ag ents testify

as experts, they

g ain “unmer ited cre dibilit y when testify

ing a bout fac tual matters fr om first-hand knowle dg e.” Dukagjini , 326 F.3d at 53. The testimony loses its ex pert char acte r and the entire pr ocess tra nsforms into “the g rand jury prac tice, improper

at trial, of a single ag ent simply

summarizing an investig ation by others that is not part of the rec ord.” Id. at 54 . A lic e a ’s fa c tua l te sti mony a bo ut m atte rs that r e qu ir e d n o s pe c ia lize d k no wl e dg e c le arl y implicates these c oncer

ns, and the district cour

t erre d in allowing him to testify beyond the bounds for whic h expert testimony would have a ssisted the jury in understandingthe evidenc e.

E. Alicea’s Re liance on In adm issib le Evidence Under Rule 703 At trial and on a

ppeal, Appe llants also claim that Alicea impermissibly

relied on ina dmi ssi ble he ars ay

in f or min ghis c on c lus ion s. Under Rule 703, experts can testify to opinions based on inadmissible evidence , including hear say , if “e x perts in the fie ld rea sonably rely on such evide nce in f

orming their opinions.” Loc as c io , 6 F .3 d at 93 8; ac c or d Fe d. R. Evid. 703. Alicea unque stionably relied on he arsa

y evidenc e in forminghis opinions. Thi s hear say evidenc e took the for

m of statements by

MS-13 members g iven in interviews, both custodial a nd noncustodial, as we ll as statements made by oth e r l aw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs , s tate me nts fr om i nte rc e pte d te le ph on e c onve rs atio ns amon gMS13 members ( which may

or may not have be en hea

rsay , dependingon whether the conve rsations
wer e in the cour se of a

nd in further ance of the c harg ed conspira cies, seeFe d. R. Evid.29

801(d)( 2)(E) ), and pr inted and online mater ials. Alicea ’s re liance on suc h materia ls was
c on sis te nt w iththe or din ary pr a c tic e s o f l aw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs , who “ ro uti ne ly

and re a so na bly rely upon hear say

in rea chingtheir conc lusions,” Dukagjini , 326 F.3d at 57. The e x pert may

not, however , simply

transmit that hear say

to the jury
. Id. at 54 (“ When an expert is no longe r applying his e x tensive experienc e and a reliable methodology , Da ub e rt teac hes that the testimony should be excluded.”). I nstead, the e x pert must form his own opinions by “apply ing his e x tensive experienc e and a reliable methodology” to the inadmissible materia ls. Id. at 58. Other

wise, the e x pert is simply “re peatinghear say

evidenc e without applying a ny expertise whatsoeve r,” a

prac tice that allows the G overnme nt “to circ umvent the rules prohibiting he arsa

y .” Id. at 58-59. At tr ia l, A lic e a

wa s una ble to s e pa

ra te the so ur c e s o f h is i nf

or matio n, statin gtha

t hi s testimony was ba sed on “a

combination of both” c ustodial interrog ations and other sour ces. O n
cross-e x amination, howeve r, Alice a identified he arsa y as the sourc e of muc h of his information. For example, his testim ony

that the Fr eepor

t clique initially

funded itself through drugsales wa s based on “ some of the a

rticles that [he] had resea rche d” and “ [r] eports fr om law enf orce ment personne l.” His testimony about MS-13’s taxation of drugsales by non-member s was base d on a g angmember ha

ving told him so duringa custodial interr og ation in this case. Alice a had le arne d about MS-13 trea sury

funds from a

bout a dozen MS-13 members both in and out of c ustody
. Additionally , Alicea

discovere d his information about MS-13’s involvement in Mexi can imm ig ra nt s mug g lin gthr ou g h “ re se arc h o n th e Inte rn e t,” and mor e sp e c if

ic a lly fr om a we bs ite containinga media r eport a nd an intervie w with a law e nforc ement off icial. And althoug h Alicea did not identify

the source of his statements about the number of fire arms the Ta sk Forc e had30

seized and the number

of murder s on L ongI sland that MS-13 members ha d committed, we cannot imag ine any

source for that infor

mation other than he arsa

y (likely consisting of

police repor ts, Task For ce me eting s, conver sations with other offic ers, or conver sations with members of MS-13). No t a ll o f A lic e a ’s te sti mony wa s f lawe d, and

so me of the inf or matio n th at he pr ov ide d to the jury resulted f rom his sy

nthesis of various sourc e mater ials. As a re view of his testimony shows, howeve r, at lea st some of his testimony involved mere ly

repe atinginformation he ha d
re a d o r h e ard

—in fo rm atio n h e le arn e d f ro m w itn e sse s thro ug h c us tod ia l inte rr og atio ns , newspa per a rticles, police r eports, and ta pe re cording s. When asked how he lear ned par ticular fac ts, Alicea did not explain how he had pie ced tog ether bits of information from diffe rent
source s and re ache d a studied conc lusion that he then g ave to the jur y . Instead, he testified that he had r ead a

n article , or had ta lked to g angmembers in custody (including , on at least one
occa sion, a g angmember a rre sted as par

t of this investigation), or listened to a re cording (e vid e nc e tha

t c ou ld h ave be e n p lay e d to the jur y in i ts o ri g ina l f

or m, n otw ith sta

nd ingtha t so me informants may

have be en identified in the pr ocess) . This testimony strong ly sug g ests that Al ic e a wa s a c tin gno t a s an e xpe rt but in ste a d a s a

c a se a g e nt, the re by

imp lic atin gour w arn ingin Dukagjini

—a wa rningthe Gover

nment appea

rs not to have he ard or

heede d. Alicea

did not
ana ly ze h is s ourc e mate ri a ls s o mu c h a s r e pe at th e ir c on te nts . A lic e a

thu s p ro vid e d e vid e nc e to the jury without also givingthe jury the information it neede d “to fa ctor into its deliberations the reliability (or unr eliability) of the pa rticular sour ce,” Dukagjini , 3 26 F .3 d at 57 n. 7. Th e se statements there fore violated Rule 703.We have not bee n alone in fa cingquestions about the collision betwee n Cra wfo rd and 4 te sti mony by po lic e of fi c e rs . A s th e F ir st C ir c uit ha s n ote d, “ [p]os t- Cra wfo rd , the admission of non-testifying inf

ormants’ out-of

-cour t testimoni al statements, throug h the testimony of police office rs, is a re curr ing issue in the c ourts of appe als.” United States v. Mahe r , 454 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2006). 31

F . A lic e a’ s R e lia nc e on Te st im oni al S ta te m e nt s a nd Cra wf ord For simil ar r easons, some of

Alicea ’s testimony

also violated Cra wfo rd . In Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. 36, the Supreme Court held that the Confr ontation Clause of the Six th Amendment prohibits the introduction into evidence of the out-of- court testimonial statements made by an absent witness unless that witness is unava ilable and the de fenda nt had a pr ior opportunity for
cross-e x amination. Id. at 54. While the Court did not provide a compre hensive de finition for the te rm “ te sti mon ia l,” it p la c e d c us tod ia l inte rr og atio ns wi thi n th e “ c or e c la ss” c ov e re d b y the ru le it had just announce d. Id. at 51 ; se e als o Davis v. W ashington , 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. C t. 2266, 2273 (2006) ( explaining that a c ustodial police interrog ation afte r a Miranda war ning “ ‘qualifies
un d er an y co n ce i v ab l e d ef

i n i t i o n ’ o f a n‘i n t erro gat i o n ’” (qu o t i n g Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 53)). When fac ed with the interse ction of the Cra wfo rd rule a nd office r experts, we have 4 de te rm ine d th at an o ff

ic e r e xpe rt ’s te sti mony

vio late s Cra wfo rd

“if [the expert] communi cate d
out- of -c ourt te sti mon ia l st ate me nts of c oo pe ra tin gwi tne sse s a

nd c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ants dir e c tly to the jury

in the g uise of an e x pert opinion.” Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d at 72. As with a Rule 703 challeng e to the expert’s re liance on he arsa y , the question under Cra wfo rd is whether the expert “applied his e x pertise to those stateme nts but did notdirec tly convey the substance of the statements to the jury ,” id. at 73. In fac t, when the inadmissible hea rsay at issue is a testimonial state me nt, the Sup re me Court ha s r e c og nize d th at Ru le 70 3 h e ars ay c la ims and

Sixth Am e ndme nt Cra wfo rd

claims are “ar e g ener ally desig ned to protec t simi lar va lues.” Dukagjini ,32

3 2 6 F. 3 d at5 6 n . 6 (c i t i n g Idaho v. W right , 4 97 U. S. 8 05 , 8 14 (1 99 0) ) ( re mark ingtha t “ [i]n th is
case , the appe llants’ hear say and Confrontation Cl ause c laims are c oextensive,” but noting that the Sup re me Court

ha s “ be e n c are fu l no t to e qu ate ” the tw o ty pe s o f c la ims ). B e c a

us e it i s a question of law whe ther a n expert witness’s testimony violated Cra wfo rd , our re view is de novo. United States v. W

allace , 447 F.3d 184, 186 ( 2d Cir. 2006). Al ic e a ’s re lia

nc e on he ars ay is b e y on d d ou

bt; a mor e dif fi c ult qu e sti on is the e xtent to which that hea

rsay took the form of c ustodial statements and wa s thus testim onial. At trial, he testified that he ha d participated in betwee n fiftee n and fifty custodial interrog ations of L ong I sland MS-13 members. He also testified that he ha d lear ned throug h a custodial interr og ation that MS-13 tax ed non-me mber drugdeale rs. The inter rog ation was one that he conduc ted as pa rt of the same investigation that resulted in the convictions beingappea led her e. Amongthe other fac ts that he lear

ned at lea st partially

from custodial interr og ations were that MS-13 treasur y fu nd s w e re us e d to purc ha se na rc oti c s and

that MS- 13 me mbe rs us e d inte rs tate te le ph on e c a lls to
c oo rd inate a c tiv iti e s. We a re at a los s in un de rs tand ingho w A lic e a might h ave “ a

pp lie d h is e xpe rt ise ” to t

he se statements bef

ore c onveying the m to the jury , such that he c ould have avoided “c onvey [i ng ] t he substance of

[t hose] statements to the jury .” Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d at 73. Although the e x act
source of much of his infor mation remains uncle ar, the re w as at lea st one fac t to which Alicea te sti fi e d– the dr ugtax–tha

t w a s b a se d d ir e c tly

on state me nts ma de by

an M S- 13 me mbe r i n
c u s t o dy ( during the course of this very investigation ). Th is i mpu g ns the le g iti ma c y of a ll o f h is testimony and strong ly

sug g ests to us that Alicea w as “simply summarizing an investig ation by others that [was] not part of the re cord,” Dukagjini , 3 26 F .3 d at 54 , a nd pr e se nti ngit “ in t

he g uis eAlthough ha rmless err or ana ly sis origina lly focuse d on whether

the er ror ha d aff

ecte d 5 the jury , see Cha

pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 3 86 U. S. 1 8, 23 -2 4 ( 19 67 ) ( de fi nin gan e rr or a s h arm le ss only wher e ther e wa s no “re asonable possibili ty that the evidenc e complaine d of mig ht have contributed to the c onviction”), ove r the year s our foc us has shifted fr om the impact of the e rror on the jury ’s ana ly sis to an assessment of the stre ng th of the re maining e vidence of guilt, see Stephen Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 2 Fede ral Standards of Rev iew§ 7.03 (3rd e d. 2004) (identifying this shift in Ha rri ng ton v . Ca lif or nia , 3 95 U. S. 2 50 , 2 54 (1 96 9) , whe re the Sup re me Court determined the harmlessne ss of an e rror by evaluating whe ther the pr operly admitted e vid e nc e of

g uil t w a s “ ov e rwhe lmi ng ” ); Schneblev. Florida , 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (holding e rr or ha rm le ss b e c a

us e “ the min ds of

an ave ra g e jur

y wo uld no t ha ve fo un d th e State ’s c a se signific antly

less persua sive” in the a

bsence of the e rrone ously admitted evidenc e (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)). That shift, away from a r etrospec tive rec onstruction of the a ctual jury ’s dec isionmaking proc ess and towa rd a me tajuridical e valuation of the importanc e the e rror should reasona

bly have ha d, has g iven rise to multiple ty pes and le vels of unce rtainty . On the g ener al level of

the structure of our r eview, the shift cre ates “ uncer tainty . . . [as to] whether

the 33 of an e x pert opinion,” Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d at 72. We hold, therefor e, that Alice a’s r eliance on and re petition of out-of-c ourt testimonial statements made by individuals during the c ourse of
c us tod ia l inte rr og atio ns vio late d App e lla nts ’s ri g hts un de r t

he Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e of the Sixth Am e ndme nt.

G. Har m less Error Havingfound er

ror in much of

Alicea ’s testimony , vacatur is require d unless we a re “convinc ed that the e rror

was ha rmless beyond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Re ifler , 446 F .3 d 6 5, 87 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Se ve ra l f a c tor s a re re le va nt whe n e va luatin gthe e rr or ’s lik e ly impact: (1) the stre ng th of the Gove rnment’s c ase; (2) the degree to which the stateme nt was materia l to a critica l issue; (3) the extent to which the statement wa s cumulative; and (4) the de g re e to whic h th e Go ve rnme nt e mph a size d th e ina dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e in i ts p re se ntatio n o f i ts
case . Id. Thoug h all of these f actor s are rele vant, we ha ve stated that the streng th of the Gover nment’s ca se is “proba

bly the sing le most critical fa ctor.” Id. 5re vie wi ngc ourt is t o c on sid e r t

he e ff e c t of the e rr or on the jur y or pr e dic t w hat ve rd ic t w ou ld have be en re ndere d in the absenc e of the err or.” Pec k v. U nited States , 102 F.3d 1319, 1326 ( 2d Cir. 1996) (en ba

nc) (Newma

n, J ., concur ring ). On the more specific level of a dminist eringthe multifactore d balanc ing te sts that we have de ve lop e d in

thi s c on te xt, th e qu e sti on ari se s w he the r t

he re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t c on du c t it s revie w havingdrawn all rea sonable infe renc es fr om the rema ining e vidence in favor of the defe ndant. Se e Sc hn e ble , 405 U.S. at 435 (Mar shall, J ., dissenting) (“[A]ll rea sonable infe renc es that might be dr awn f

rom the evide nce must be dr awn in fa vor of the de fenda

nt, since the jury may ve ry we ll h ave ma de jus t th e se inf e re nc e s. ” ); United States v. Santos , 449 F.3d 93, 100 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) (r e vie wi ngg ov e rnme nt’ s p ri nc ipa l e vid e nc e in l ig ht o f what “ re a so na ble jur or s c ou ld have de termined” ). We have never held that dra

wingthose infer ence s is part of har mless error revie w, howeve r, and pr evailingprec edent dictates that it is not. See Ro sev . Clar k, 4 78 U. S. 57 0, 57 9 ( 19 86 ) ( “ Whe re a re vie wi ngc ourt can find that the re cord de veloped at trial establishes g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt, the interest in fa irness has be en satisfied a nd the judg ment sh ou ld b e a ff

ir me d. ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); United States v. Re ifler , 446 F.3d 65, 88- 90 (2d Cir. 20 06 ) ( omi tti ngany

me nti on of re a so na ble inf e re nc e s w he n a

rt ic ulatin gthe fa c tor s r e le va nt t o ha rm le ss e rr or

re vie w) ; Zap

pu lla v . Ne w York, 391 F.3d 462, 468 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (same ). Be cause the re sult in t his case is the same whethe r or not we drawinfere nces in fa vor of the def endants, we need not r esolve a ny such conf

lict here . We take this opportunity , howeve r, to flagfor the Court our

conce rn that our a

pproac h to harmless er

ror a naly sis procee d c o n s i s t e n t l y. 34 Alicea ’s er

roneously admitted statements wer e re levant to seve ral issues in the ca se, including whether

MS-13 was an e nterprise , whether MS-13 “had a

n eff ect on inter state or fore ign c ommerce ”, whe ther MS-13 eng ag ed in nar cotics traf ficking , and whe ther MS-13
e ng a g e d in

a c ts a nd thr e ats o f m

ur de r. Al l of

the se iss ue s w e re highly

mate ri a l to the c a se , s o much so that the district judg e aske d the jury for spe cial finding s with reg ard to e ach of them. Be cause the jury

found that the Gove rnment had f ailed to show that MS-13 eng ag ed in nar cotics traff icking , howeve r, we will not address whe ther the e rrone ous admission of expert testimony would have be en har

mless with respec t to that issue.

1. MS-13’s Ent

erprise Statu s and Effect on Interstat e Com m erce35

In addition to that portion of Alicea’ s testimony that violated either

Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 703 or Cra wfo rd , th e Go ve rnme nt i ntr od uc e d a g re at de a l of

oth e r e vid e nc e re le va

nt t o p r o v e M S- 1 3 ’ s s tatu s a s ane n te r p r is e an d th e o r g an iz ati o n ’ s e f

f e c t o ninte r s tate c o mm e r c e . We
are satisfied that Alice a’s e rrone ously admitted testimony

on these issues wa s harmless beyond a
re a so na ble do ub t. F or

e xamp le , o n th e e le me nt o f e nte rp ri se status , A lic e a , in the po rt ion

of his te sti mony a dd re ssi ngMS- 13 ’s ba c kg ro un d, te sti fi e d a bo ut t he g ang ’s str

uc tur e , me mbe rs hip rules, sy mbols, and history ; both Appellants, in their confe ssions, identified themselves as “member s” and de scribed MS-13’ s membership rules; a nd the coope ratingwitnesses testified about MS-13’s nar cotics oper ations, treasur y , and member ship rules. Wit h respe ct to the int e rs tate c omm e rc e e le me nt, Al ic e a , in his ba c kg ro un d te sti mony , te sti fi e d th at MS- 13 wa s a national and inter

national org anization with local subunits; Vasque z confessed that the van used duringthe shootings ha d been stolen; the c ooperating witnesse s testified about MS-13’s nar cotics op e ratio ns , th e tax impo se d o n n on -m e mbe r d ru gde a le rs , th e us e of

tr e a sury mon e y to p ur c ha se firea rms, and the g ang ’s national and inter national member ship, and the use of stolen car s for drive-by shootings; and e vidence showed that the f irea rm used in the shooting had bee n manufa cture d outside of New York State. On both e lements, Alicea ’s er roneously admitted te sti mony wa s c umu lativ e , a

nd its a dmi ssi on

wa s h arm le ss.

2. Acts and Th reats of Murder As for pr oof that the e nterprise eng ag ed in ac ts and threats of murder, how ever , the Gover nment’s ca se wa s weaker a nd Alicea ’s testimony

was more materia l. Thoug h the Gover nment did introduce e vidence other than A licea’ s testimony tendingto prove that MS-1336

e ng a g e d in

a c ts a nd thr e ats o f m

ur de r, the e vid e nc e te nd ingto p ro ve that e le me nt w a s le ss extensive. Vasquez stated in his confe ssion that “we a re at war w ith the SW P ga ng .” He further stated that he w as threa

tened with murde r duringthe Hempstea d shooting: “The y told me to do it, and if Ididn’t do that, they would rub me out, mea

ning kill me . . ..” Ca stro made similar statements in his oral conf ession, as re counted by

a police de tective: Q. Did [C astro] say

who the tar g ets of that shooting wer e? A. Ye s, he sa id S WP wa s th e targ e t. Q. Di d h e say

why the y we re sh oo tin gat SWP? A. He sa id t

hat th e y we re the e ne my , a

nd MS w a s at w ar w iththe m. Q. What if any

thing did he sa

y about the re lationship between MS-13 a nd the B loo ds ? A. He a lso sa id M S wa s at w ar w iththe B loo ds , a nd that th e y , me anin gMS, ha d to pr ote c t th e mse lve s. When asked to explain what it means to “make a quota,” Castro stated that it meant “[t]o s tab,
s h o o t , b e at , k i l l th e e n e m y , w h i c hh e d e s c r i b e d a s S W P , th e B l o o d s an d

1 8 S tr e e tg an g s . ” In addition, Admettre testified that MS-13 had a policy “to shoot and kill rival g angmembers” and

“ to atta c k a

nd de fe nd .” He a lso te sti fi e d a bo ut a se pa rate F e br ua ry 20 03 sh oo tin ginv olv ingbo th Ap pe lla nts : David Va squez identified [an] SW P member and ope ned fire . And Castro jumped out alongwith Vasquez to chase the SWP member down the block and both of them fired. Menjivar testified that “MS-13 eng ag ed in violent acts such a s ‘fig hts, shootings, beating someone up.’” Despite the volume of

evidenc e that the Gove rnment introduce d on this element, the question of whethe r it was har mless to admit Alicea’s testimony —including his stateme nt that MS- 13 ha d c omm itt e d b e tw e e n e ig hte e n a nd tw e nty -t hr e e mur de rs on

L on gI sla

nd and his state me nt t

hat th e purp os e of

MS- 13 wa s to c omm it mur de rs —r e ma ins . O n f ir st i mpr e ssi on , it

is37

difficult to imag ine how a la w enf orce ment office r’s testimony that the g anghad killed eig hteen to twenty -three people would f ail to affe ct the jury ’s findingthat the g angeng ag ed in ac ts and thr e ats o f m

ur de r. Al ic e a

wa s a lon e in t e sti fy

ingtha t MS- 13 ha d a c tua lly

c omm itt e d e ig hte e n to twenty -two or twe nty -three murders in the pr ece ding f ive y ear s. Not consideringAlicea ’s testimony , much of the r emainingevidenc e consists of what is essentially “toug h talk,” and none of the re maining e vidence shows that MS-13 had committed any murders. Eve n more so than the evidenc e of the drive-by

shootings and the Fe bruar y 2003 incident, Alicea ’s testimony provided proof that this toug h talk ref lected the g ang ’s ac tual prac tices rather than me re posturing . And while the Gove rnment did not spend a great deal of time in its closing a rgument emphasizing Alicea ’s testimony

on that point, his t estimony is virtually

the first thing that the Gover nment
me nti on e d whe n d ir e c tin gthe jur y ’s atte nti on

to t he pr oo f t hat MS- 13 e ng a g e d in

a c ts a nd thr e ats of murder : You hea rd fr om I nvestig ator Alice a, our f irst witness, that in the five y ear s that he’s be en on the task f

orce , the last five year s, there ha ve bee n at least 18 murde rs here on L ongI sland, committed by MS 13 members in further ance of their g ang wa rs .
After car efully consideringthe evidenc e introduce d at trial, we conclude that the introduction of Alicea ’s inadmissible testimony was not har

mless beyond a re asonable doubt. Th e Go ve rnme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e a c ts a nd thr e ats o f m

ur de r a s a n e le me nt o f e ve ry

of fe ns e with which Appellants we re c harg ed. Apa rt from Alice a’s testimony , the Gover nment i n tro d u ce d o n l y ci rc u m s t an t i al ev i d en ce t en d i n g t o p ro v e t h atel em en t ; ev i d en ce th at , th o u gh capa ble of supportinga jury ’s findingof guilt, does not compel such a de termination. The38

Gover nment appea

rs to have r ecognized this possible weakne ss in its case , as it invoked Alicea ’s testimony at the start of

its summ ation discussion, ex pecting , we a ssume, that Alicea ’s testimonial assertion of eig hteen murde rs would color the jury ’s interpre tation of the other evidenc e on this issue. Only in the rar est of ca ses will we find ha rmless the admission of the only direc t evidence of murder , all other e vidence of murder ous conduct be ing pa rtial and inexact. Where, as he re, the Gover nment must demonstrate ac ts and threats of murder, yet the Gover nment introduces no a dmissibl e evide nce of murder a nd only circ umstantial evidence of threats, we ca

nnot find the admission of direc t evidence of multiple murders to have been ha rm le ss. Be cause proof of

the ra ckete eringelement, whic h was ba sed on ac ts and threats of
mur de r, wa s e sse nti a l to se c ur ingAp pe lla nts ’ c onvic tio ns fo r c on sp ir a c y and a ssa ult , a nd be c a us e the assault counts we re the predic ate of fense s for the f

irea rm offe nses, our findingof nonha rm le ss e rr or

is f ata l to the Ap pe lla

nts ’ c onvic tio ns on

a ll c ounts .

II. Rem ainin g Issues We have r eviewe d Appellants’ r emainingclaims, and we find them to be without merit. Be cause some of the a

rguments they

raise w ould arise a g ain in any possible retrial, howe ver, w e will address them he re.

A. Suf fi ciency Ap pe lla nts argue that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w that MS- 13 wa s a n e nte rp ri se eng ag ed in ra ckete eringactivity . More spe cifica lly , they argue a f ailure to show that MS-13 wa s39

an e nti ty that e xiste d s e pa

rate ly fr om t he c on du c t of

its me mbe rs , th at MS- 13 a ff e c te d inte rs tate
c omm e rc e , a

nd that MS- 13 e ng a g e d in

a c ts a nd thr e ats o f m

ur de r. Ca str o a lso a

pp e ars to
c ha lle ng e the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e on

the e le me nt o f i nte nt. On re view of a

claim of insuffic iency

of the e vidence , we “ view the e vidence . . . in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he g ov e rnme nt a

nd c re dit e ve ry inf e re nc e that c ou ld h ave be e n d ra wn in its favor.” United States v. Diaz , 176 F.3d 52, 89 ( 2d Cir. 1999). “[T]he convictions must be aff irmed, so longas, fr om the infere nces r easona bly drawn, the jury

might fa irly

have c oncluded g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Id. (c i t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Be cause “whe re some g overnme nt evidence was e rrone ously admitted, we must make our deter mination concer

ning suf ficienc y takinginto consideration eve n the improperly admitted evidenc e,” United States v. Cruz , 363 F.3d 187, 197 ( 2d Cir. 2004), we c onsider the e ntirety of A l i c e a ’ s t e s t i m o ny w h e n

e v a l u at i n gs u f

f i c i e n c y. An enter prise is “a g roup of pe rsons associated tog ether for a common purpose of eng ag ing in a

course of conduc t.” Un ite d S tates v . Tu rk

e tte , 4 52 U. S. 5 76 , 5 83 (1 98 1) ; se e als o 18 U. S.C. § 1 95 9( b) (2 ) ( de fi nin g“ e nte rp ri se ” ). Th is e nte rp ri se mus t ha ve an e xiste nc e se pa

rate from the se ries of c riminal acts that constitute its rac ketee ringactivity
. Tur k e tte , 452 U.S. at 583. We h ave no dif

fi c ult y fi nd ingthat th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w that MS- 13 satis fi e d th is definition. Multipl e witnesses de scribed MS-13’ s membership rules, or g anizational treasur y , and sy mbols. I n addition, Alicea te stified about MS-13’s history , national and inter national
me mbe rs hip , a

nd le a de rs hip str

uc tur e , a nd Ad me ttr e te sti fi e d th at MS- 13 ha d a “ po lic y . . . to
atta c k a nd de fe nd ” and

that Ca str o w a s th e le a de r o f t he F re e po rt

c liq ue . D ra wi nga ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in fa

vor of the G overnme nt, this t estimony shows MS-13 to be a national40

or g anizatio n, or g anize d into l oc a l su bunit s, wi th i ts o wn

le a de rs hip str

uc tur e , me mbe rs hip ru le s, sy mbols, poli cies, a

nd financ ial operations. S uch an or g anization constitut es an e nterprise as define d in Tur

k e tte . Withre g a rd to t he int e rs tate c omm e rc e e le me nt, Ap pe lla nts a pp e ar t o a rgue that be c a

us e the Gover nment relied on na

rcotics tra ffickingto show an ef fec t on interstate commer ce, the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat th e Go ve rnme nt f a ile d to pr ov e na

rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin ga s a

ra c ke te e ri nga c tiv ity
nece ssarily

means that the G overnme nt also failed to show a n eff ect on inter state commer ce. T he
c on sp ir a c y

and the a ssa ult of fe ns e s o f whic h App e lla

nts we re c onvic te d r e qu ir e tha t th e of fe ns e be in furthe ranc e of a

n enter prise “e ng ag ed in, or the a ctivities of which af fec t, interstate or fore ign c ommerce .” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b). Tr ansportingg oods, such as fir ear ms or stolen vehicles, a cross state lines is a c lassic example of eng ag ing in inter state commer ce. Cf. United States v. Robertson , 5 14 U. S. 6 69 , 6 72 (1 99 5) (“ [A] c or po ratio n is g e ne ra lly

‘e ng a g e d in
commerc e’ when it is itself ‘direc tly eng ag ed in the produc tion, dist ribution, or acquisition of go o d s o r s erv i ce s i ni n t er s t at e c o m m er ce . ’” (qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . A m. Bl

dg. M ain t. I nd us . , 42 2 U .S. 27 1, 28 3 ( 19 75 )) ). Us e of an in str ume nta lity

of c omm e rc e , s uc h a s te le ph on e lin e s, is also g ener ally

viewed a s an ac tivity

that aff ects interstate commer ce. Cf. United States v. Atcheson , 9 4 F .3 d 1 23 7, 12 43 (9 th C ir . 1 99 6) (f ind ingde fe nd ants ’ “ pla c e me nt o f o ut- of -s tate ph on e c a lls ” to b e a

“ c onne c tio n w ithint e rs tate c omm e rc e ” un de r H ob bs Ac t) ; United States v. Muskov sky , 863 F.2d 1319, 1325 ( 7th Cir. 1988) (findingeff ect on inter state commer ce ba sed on the use of inter state telephone calls to verif y cre dit card tra

nsactions). B eyond these tra ditional examples, any

other c onduct havingeven a demi nim is eff ect on inter state commer ce suf fice s. Un ite d S tates v . D av ila , 461 F.3d 298, 306 ( 2d Cir. 2006).41

At trial, Alicea

testified that out-of- state member s had trave led to New Y ork State for MS-13 meeting s; that MS-13 treasury funds wer e used to purc hase f irea rms manufa cture d outside New Y ork State; that Mexican MS-13 cliques ac t as smugg lers; that MS-13 leade rs make interstate tele phone ca lls to coordinate their a ctivities; and that MS-13 is enga g ed in international
narc otics smugg ling a

nd the interstate tr ansportation of stolen ve hicles. B oth Menjivar and Admettre te stified that individuals traveled a cross state lines to attend MS-13 meeting s in New York State. Menjivar

also testified that MS-13 sent money to individuals l ocate d in El Salvador. B a se d o n th is e vid e nc e , th e jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly have fo un d th at MS- 13 e ng a g e s in or a ff e c ts interstate c ommerce . Appellants’ f

inal argument is that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to show that MS-13 eng ag ed in ac ts and threats of murder. I n their conf

essions, both Appellants stated that MS-13 was “ at war ” with rival g ang s. Castro define d makinga quota a s “[t] o stab, shoot, beat, kill the enemy .” In his confession, Va squez stated that duringthe Hempstea d shooting, the othe r individuals in t he van “ told me to do it, and if Ididn’t do that, they would rub me out, mea

ning kill me.” Moreove r, Admettre testified that MS-13 had a policy “to shoot and kill rival g ang
me mbe rs .” Me nji va

r s imi larl y

te sti fi e d th at “ MS- 13 e ng a g e d in vio le nt a c ts s uc h a s ‘ fi g hts , shootings, bea

ting someone up’”, while Alicea —over de fense objection—testified that “[t]hey need guns to do what MS-13 does, which is, you know, shoot at rival g angmembers, a nd sometimes in the proce ss, obviously , some people g et hit.” Fina lly , Admettre de scribed a F e br ua ry 20 03 inc ide nt i n whic h App e lla nts c ha se d a

nd sh ot at an SWP m e mbe r. Dr awi nga ll
rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the Gove rnment, and w ith Alicea’ s err oneously admitted42

te sti mony take n into c on sid e ratio n, the jur y fa ir ly c ou ld h ave fo un d th e e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o find that MS-13 eng ag ed in ac ts and threats of murder. Castro alone f

urther c laims that the two assault counts stemming f rom the He mpstead shootings ar e multiplicitous beca use the Gove rnment fa iled to show that either Va squez (the shooter) or

Castro intended to targ et more tha n one per son. He c hara cter izes the Hempstead shooting a s “a sing le shooting of 4 or 5 shots by

another person” that resulted in injuries to two individuals. Bec ause Castro’ s challeng e hing es on his claim that the Gove rnment fa iled to satisfy the eleme nt of intent, we will construe it as a cha lleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence on that issue. We find that the evidenc e wa s more than suff icient to find that Castro intended to injure multipl e victims. At trial, a police de tective de scribed Ca stro’s conf ession to the Hempstea d sh oo tin g s: Q: Did [C astro] say

who the tar g ets of that shooting wer e? A: Yes, he said SW

P was the target
. Q: Di d h e say

why the y we re sh oo tin gat SWP? A: He sa id t

hat they wer e the e nemy , and MS was at wa r with them
. This testimony

tends to show that Castro knew that the purpose of the Hempstea d shooting wa s to shoot at mult iple people. F urthermor e, Menjivar testified that he g ave the bullets to Castro,
and fr om t hat te sti mony , o ne c an e a sil y inf e r t hat Ca str o k

ne w that th e we a

po n w a s lo a de d w ith mul tip le bu lle ts. Th e jur

y re a so na bly c ou ld h ave fo un d th at Ca str o inte nd e d to ha rm mul tip le ind ivi du a ls.

B. M ult ipli c it y o f the Indi c tm e nt43

Appellants also cla im that the district court should have se ntence d them to concur rent sentenc es for

eac h of the thre e counts of use of a f irea rm in further ance of a c rime of violenc e, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) , beca

use the fir ear

ms were all used in furthe ranc e of the same c onspiracy
. Be cause § 924(c) (1)( D)(ii) e x pressly prohibits concurr ent sentenc ing unde r § 924(c )(1) , we construe the ir cha lleng e as a claim that Appellants’ thr ee § 924( c)( 1) convic tions were multipl icitous. There fore , the issue is whether the three underly

ing shooting s constituted separ ate pr edicate cr imes under § 924( c)( 1). B eca use that issue is a question of law , our re view is de novo. United States v. W allace , 447 F.3d 184, 186 ( 2d Cir. 2006). In United States v. Lindsay , 9 85 F .2 d 6 66 (2 d Ci r. 19 93 ), we he ld t hat th e a pp ro pr iate un it of prose cution under § 924( c)( 1) is the pre dicate of fense (i.e., the “ crime of

violence” ) rather than the number of

firea rms. Id. at 67 4. De sp ite that g e ne ra l r ule , w e have tw ic e fo un d th at mu lti ple predic ate of

fense s g ave r ise to only

a sing le § 924(c )(1) offe nse. In the first, United States v. Finley , 245 F.3d 199 ( 2d Cir. 2001), the def endant ha d been c onvicted of two § 924( c)( 1) counts. Id. at 201. The pr edicate cr imes were (1) dr ugpossession and (2) dr

ugdistribution. Id. B oth pr e dic ate c ri me s st e mme d f ro m a sin g le tr ans a c tio n in

wh ic h F inl e y

ha d ( 1) po sse sse d mu lti ple packe ts of coca ine and ( 2) sold two of those pac kets to an under cover office r. Id. at 2 0 1
- 0 2
. We
reve rsed F inley ’s sec ond § 924(c) (1) c onviction, id. at 208, findingthat “[t] he statute doe s not clea rly manifest an intention to punish a def endant twice for c ontinuous possession of a firea rm in further ance of simultaneous predic ate of fense s consisting of vir

tually the same c onduct.” Id. at 207. We rea ched a

simil ar c onclusion in United States v. W allace , 447 F.3d 184, whe re two de fe nd ants ha d e a c h b e e n c onvic te d o f t wo § 9 24 (c )( 1) c ounts in c onne c tio n w itha na rc oti c s-44

related drive- by

shooting. Id. at 18 5- 86 . T he § 9 24 (c )( 1) of fe ns e s w e re ba se d o n tw o s e pa rate predic ate c rimes: (1) c onspiracy to traff ic in narc otics, and (2) firingof a w eapon into a c rowd of two or more pe rsons in further ance of a ma jor drugoffe nse (i.e, the conspirac y ). Id. at 187. Despite the e x istence of

two separ ate pr edicate cr imes, we found that “[t] he re levant conduc t underlying the offe nses pre dicatingCounts Thirteen and F ourtee n consists of the same shooting .” Id. at 189. B oth offense s involved one def endant’ s use of a

firea rm in connec tion with a drug offe nse, and both involved the murde r of a single victim during the drive-by shooting. Id. We disti ng uished Finleyin United States v. Salame h , 261 F.3d 271 ( 2d Cir. 2001), wher e the def endants ha d eac h been c onvicted of multiple crimes in c onnection with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Id. at 274. The de fenda nts had ea ch bee n convicted of two § 924(c) (1) c ounts. Id. at2 7 5
. O n e c o un th a d b e e nb a s e d

o nth e p r e d i c at e c r i m e o f c o n s p i r a c y, and the other

count had be en base d on the pre dicate c rime of a ssaulting Sec ret Servic e off icer s duringthe bombing. Id. The de fenda nts there r elied on Finleyto argue that their two § 924( c)( 1) convictions wer e duplicative. Id. at 277. We found, howe ver, that while the two § 924(c )(1) convictions in Finleywe re ba se d o n a sin g le us e of

a sin g le fi re arm , th e tw o § 92 4( c )( 1) c ounts in Salameh wer e base d on two separ ate use s of the bomb: transportation and detonation. Id. at 279. The instant ca se ra ises none of the conce rns pre sent in Finleyand W allace . We hold, there fore , that the rule in Lindsay , which esta blishes that the appropriate unit of prose cution under § 924( c)( 1) is the pre dicate of fense , applies her e. In Finleyand W allace , th e de fe nd ants had bee n convicted of

various substantive nar cotics-r elated of fense s based on sing le cr iminal acts. On the other ha

nd, Appellants her e we re c onvicted of thre e counts of the same c riminal vio latio n, a ssa

ult , b ut t he a ssa ult s w e re ba se d o n tw o s e pa ra te dr ive -b y

sh oo tin g s th at r e su lte d in45

the shooting of

three separ ate victims. As in Salameh , the exist ence of a sing le conspira cy
connec ting the thr ee a ssaults does not prec lude treating them a s separ ate pr edicate offe nses. 261 F.3d at 278-79. And althoug h Appellants now de scribe the shootings as a “sing le incident,” the j ury fo un d b o thAp p el l an t s cu l p ab l e o f t h e s h o o t i n g o f t h re e s ep ar at e i n d i v i d u al s . Al th o u gh th o s e s ep ar at e s h o o t i n gs ar e c l u s t er edi nt i m e a n d s p ac e, th atcl u s t er i n g d o es n o ts o m eh o w m er ge them into one predic ate c rime. This case does not raise the conc erns that led us in Finleyand W allace to depar

t from the g ener al rule in Lindsay . In Finley , we obse rved that it would be absurd to find multiple § 924(c) (1) of

fense s when a

drugdeale r possesses dr

ug s and sells only

a portion (thus committing the pre dicate of

fense s of possession and distribution) but then to find only a sing le § 924(c )(1) offe nse whe n the same de aler , in possession of the same dr ug s, sells all of them. 245 F.3d at 208. There , we we re r espondingto the unique manner in which a sing le cour se of c onduct involving contr olled substances, suc h as continuingpossession of a lar g e quantity of contra band, g ives rise to multiple possibl e off enses, suc h as possession, possession with intent, and so forth. Th e a ssa ult s invo lve d h e re ra ise no c on c e rn s o f t hat so rt , a nd thu s Finleyand W

allace do not control the outcome
.

C. P rior Ac t Evidence Appellants also objec t to the district court’s admission of evidenc e re lating to a n
un c ha rg e d s ho oti ngand

of e vid e nc e that MS- 13 e ng a g e d in na rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin g . T he y

c la im that th is e vid e nc e wa s o ff e re d to sh owthe ir

pr op e ns ity

fo r c ri min a lity

and tha t it wa s o ve rl y46

prejudicia l. Wi th respec t to the evidence of nar cotics traf ficking , they

argue that it should have been e x cluded be cause it was likely to cause the jury

to rea ch a ve rdict on an imprope r basis. Ev ide nc e of

un c ha rg e d c ri me s is ina dmi ssi ble wh e n o ff e re d to sh owa

pe rs on ’s pr op e ns ity to act in a pa

rticular w ay . Fe d. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidenc e is admissible, howeve r, whe n offe red to show “ motive, opportunity , intent, prepa ration, plan, knowle dg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or a ccide nt.” Id. Gi ve n o ur “ inc lus ion ary

a pp ro a c h, ” pr ior

a c t e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble if offe red “ for a

ny purpose other

than to show a de fenda

nt’s criminal prope nsity .” United States
v . G arc ia , 291 F.3d 127, 136 ( 2d Cir. 2002) (interna l quotation marks omitted). We review the district court’s a dmission of prior act e vidence for a buse of discr etion, and the district cour t’s ruling stands unless it was arbitra ry and irrational. Un ite d S

tates v . Lo mb ar

dozzi , 491 F.3d 61, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2007). First, Appe llants’ arguments reg ardingevidenc e of na rcotics tra ffickinghave little merit. MS- 13 ’s inv olv e me nt i n n arc oti c s tr a ff ic kin gwa s a

n e le me nt o f t

he c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s, and

a s a result, evidenc e of na

rcotics tra ffickingis not prior act e vidence , but rather direc t evidence of the char g ed off

ense. Sec ond, with reg ard to e vidence of the F ebrua ry 2003 shooting, we find no
err or. The district c ourt admitted the evide nce to show the exis tence of the ra ckete ering enter prise, and it expressly

instructed the jury

as to the limited use it could make of that evidence
. Even the de fense counsel stated that “I don’t dispute that one could c onceive the testimony that the g overnme nt wants to adduce as beingbackground proof of the e x istence of

a conspira cy

and 404(b).” Where, a s here , the exist ence of a r acke teer ing e nterprise is at issue, evidenc e of unchar g ed crimes committed by members of

that enter prise, includingevidenc e of unc harg ed crimes c ommitt ed by

the def endants themselve s, is admissibl e “to pr ove an e ssential element ofThe district cour t’s failure to balance the probative value of the evidenc e with the 6 possibili ty

of pre judice on the r ecor d does not cha ng e this conclusion. Def

ense c ounsel objecte d to admission of the evidenc e bec ause “ the probative value he re [does not] outweigh[] t he pr e jud ic e to t

his jur y .” Whe n th e dis tr ic t c ourt a dmi ts e vid e nc e a ft e r h e ari ngsu c h a n o bje c tio n, it is “not require d to make mec hanica l rec itation that it balanced pr obative value ag ainst prejudicial eff ect” ; the balanc ing is pre sumed. Un ite d S tates v . P itr e , 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 ( 2d Cir. 1992). 47 the RI CO c ri me s c ha

rg e d— the e xiste nc e of

a c ri min a l e nte rp ri se in whic h th e de fe nd ants participated.” Ma te ra , 489 F.3d at 120 (upholding a dmission of evidence of uncha rg ed murde rs). Th e e vid e nc e wa s a lso a dmi ssi ble to s ho w the e xiste nc e of the c on sp ir a c y

wi th whic h b oth Appellants we re c harg ed. United States v. Diaz , 176 F.3d 52, 79 ( 2d Cir. 1999) (“Wher e . . . the indictment contains a c onspiracy char g e, uncha

rg ed ac ts may

be admissible as dire ct evidenc e of the c on sp ir a c y

its e lf .” (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ). Al tho ug h App e lla nts are c or

re c t in noting that e vidence of a pr ior shooting pr esents a sig nificant risk of pr ejudice, “ [w] hen a de fe nd ant e ng a g e s in

a c ri min a l e nte rp ri se wh ic h in vo lve s v e ry

se ri ou s c ri me s, the re is a likelihood that evidence provingthe exist ence of the e nterprise throug h its acts will involve a considera ble degree of pre

judice. None theless, the evide nce ma y be of important pr obative value in proving the enter

prise.” Ma te ra , 489 F.3d at 121. Under the se circ umstances, the district court did not abuse its discre tion when it admitted the evidenc e. 6

D. Co nst r uc ti ve Am e ndm e ntof t he Indi c tm e nt Appellants also ar g ue that bec ause the Indictment alleg ed that MS-13 eng ag ed in two fo rm s o f r a c ke te e ri nga c tiv ity (a c ts a nd thr e ats o f m

ur de r, and

na rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin g ), and

be c a us e the jury did not find that MS-13 eng ag ed in nar cotics traf ficking , “the spe cific e nterprise set out in t he ind ic tme nt w a s n ot p ro ve n. ” Th is c la im i s e nti re ly wi tho ut m e ri t and

re qu ir e s li ttl e48

discussion: “Where ther e ar e seve ral wa y s to violate a cr iminal statute . . . feder al pleading require s . . . that an indictment cha rg e [be] in t he conjunc tive to inform the ac cused f ully of the char g es. A c onviction under such a n indictment will be sustained if the evide nce indicates that the statute wa s violated in any of the wa y s char g ed.” United States v. Mc Donough , 56 F.3d 381, 3 9 0 (2 d C i r. 1 9 9 5 ) ( i n t ern al qu o t at i o nm ark s , ci t at i o n s , an d al t er at i o n s o m i t t ed ). T hu s , al th o u gh the Indictment alleg ed that MS-13 eng ag ed in both acts a nd threats of murder and

narc otics traff icking , Appellants’ “ conviction under [t hat] indi ctment” wa s proper beca use the jury

found that “the e vidence indicate[d] t hat the statute wa s violated in [t he other ] way [] char g ed.” Id.

E. Sentencing Und er § 924( c)( 1) Appellants’ f

inal claim is that the district court er red when it imposed 25-y ear sentenc es for their second a nd third § 924(c) (1) of

fense s based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( C)(i), which require s a 25-year

sentenc e for

eac h “sec ond or subseque nt conviction” under § 924(c) (1). The y argue that bec ause the Indictment did not charg e that any of the fir ear

m counts were “sec ond or subsequent” c onvictions, the jury did not find Appellants g uilty of havingcommitted any second or subseque nt firea

rm offe nses, and its verdic t theref ore did not support such a finding by

the district court. This claim is fore closed by United States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202 ( 2d Cir. 2002), whe re w e held that be cause the fa ct of a prior convic tion is notan ele ment of § 924(c ), and bec ause Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 (2 00 0) e xclu de d p ri or c onvic tio ns fr om i ts require ments, “there was no re quirement that the e x istence of prior convic tions be alleg ed in the indictment or that any

of the multiple firea

rms convictions retur

ned by the jury be desc ribed byDespite the strikingpara llels betwee n Cam pb e ll and the f acts he re, ne ither Appe llant 7 cited to or a cknowledg ed Cam pb e ll when makingtheir Apprendic la ims
.

49 the jury as sec ond or subseque nt.” Cam pb e ll , 300 F.3d a

t 212-213. Cam

pb e ll is directly

on 7 po int and c on tr ols our r e vie w h e re ; th e se nte nc e s im po se d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t vi olate Apprendi
.
CO NC LU SION Be cause the testimony

of the Gove rnment expert witness violated the F eder al Rules of Evidence and the Confr ontation Clause of the Six th Amendment, and be cause that err or wa s not harmless, we VACATE Appe llants’ convictions on all counts and REMAND to the district court in the event that the G overnme nt chooses to re try the ca se.