3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates QCourt of jf eberal QClaims 

CHELSEA L. DA VIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

Defendant. 

No. 15-608C 

(Filed: July 10, 2015) 

FILED 

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JUL 1 0 2015 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

Pro Se; Rule 12(h)(3); Lack of SubjectMatter Jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(l); 

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; 28 U.S.C. § 

1500. 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ) 

Chelsea L. Davis, Dallas, Texas, Plaintiff pro se. 

Michael D. Austin, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United 

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Pro se plaintiff, Chelsea L. Davis, brought this action seeking monetary damages and 

equitable relief in connection with a challenge to the suspension of her law license in the State of 

Texas. For the reasons set forth below, the Court must DISMISS plaintiff's complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 

Plaintiff is an attorney who has practiced law in the State of Texas. See generally, 

Complaint. On May 13, 2015, the Board of Disciplinary Appeals Appointed by the Supreme 

Court of Texas entered a Judgement oflndefinite Disability Suspension, suspending plaintiff's 

law license. See In the Matter of Chelsea L. Davis, Case No. 54202, (May 13, 2015) (Board of 

Disciplinary Appeals, Judgment oflndefinite Disability Suspension). Subsequently, on June 15, 

2015, plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims against "the State of Texas, the State Bar of 

1 Unless otherwise noted herein, the facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are 

taken from plaintiff's complaint ("Compl. at_"). 
Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas, Board of Disciplinary Appeals and Commission for 

Lawyers Discipline," challenging the suspension of her law license. Compl. at 1. 

Plaintiff's complaint is difficult to follow. But, the complaint appears to seek monetary 

damages and other relief from the State Bar of Texas stemming from the suspension of plaintiff's 

law license. Compl. at 12-14. In particular, plaintiff requests "an order compelling the State Bar 

of Texas and United States Patent and Trademark Office ["USPTO"] to prosecute me in a state 

and a United States district court for suspension, disbarment, disciplinary or other action, compel 

it to answer me in district court for disciplinary action, ... or else remove me from the list of 

attorneys licensed to practice law in Texas and/or before the USPT0."2 Compl. at 10. Plaintiff 

also seeks monetary damages in excess of $10,000 for "injuries to my business," "damages for 

personal injuries in excess of $10, 000," as well as attorney's fees and other costs. Compl. at 16-

17. 

On April 29, 2015, plaintiff filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware against her former employer, the State Bar of Texas, and numerous other 

individuals and entities alleging, among other things, sexual harassment, human trafficking, and 

employment discrimination. See generally Complaint filed in Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith 

P.C., et al., No. 15-00341-SLR (D. Del.). In that case, plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the State 

Bar of Texas from initiating or proceeding with any disciplinary or disability matter against her. 

Id at 15. In this regard, plaintiff's district court complaint states that: "I seek to keep my law 

licenses in active status and in good standing, and, most importantly, I seek to prevent the State 

Bar of Texas from having me arrested again without a valid warrant and without probable cause, 

from destroying my evidence, including my medical records, and from conditioning my ability to 

keep my law license on my speech about the corruption in the State Bar that I have witnessed ... 

"Id. at 4. 

2 It is not clear what claims, if any, plaintiff asserts against the USPTO. Nonetheless, plaintiff 

represents that she is a patent attorney in good standing with the USPTO. See Complaint filed in 

Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P.C., et al, No. 15-01907-N-BK at 3. Plaintiff also states in 

the complaint that she is alleging a constitutional challenge to the "Manual of Patent Examining 

Procedure" and to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's rule regarding pro 

se representation. Compl. at 19. 

2 
On June 2, 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware transferred 

plaintiffs case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. See 

Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P.C., et al, No. 15-01907-N-BK (Transfer Order dated June 2, 

2015). Plaintiffs case in the Northern District of Texas was pending at the time that she 

commenced this action on June 15, 2015. Id. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Pro Se Litigants 

The Court recognizes that plaintiff filed this action pro se, without the benefit of counsel, 

and so she is "not expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading." 

Roche v. US. Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). When determining whether a 

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, such plaintiffs are 

entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings. Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 

1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But, there '"is no duty for the trial court to create a claim which 

[plaintiff] has not spelled out in his or her pleading."' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 

328 (2011) (citations omitted). Although "a prose plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard 

than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, ... the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the 

burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. " Riles v. 

United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citations omitted). And so, while the Court may 

excuse ambiguities in the plaintiffs complaint, the Court does not excuse the complaint's 

failures. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Demes v. 

United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) ("[T]he leniency afforded prose litigants with respect 

to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements.") (citations omitted). 

B. Jurisdiction 

It is well established that '"subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's 

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived."' Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

514 (2006) (citations omitted). "[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that 

they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 

jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Henderson ex rel. 

Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (citations omitted). "[A] court has a duty to 

inquire into its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." Special Devices, Inc., v. OEA Inc., 269 

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F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Under the Rules of the United States Court 

of Federal Claims ("RCFC") Rule 12(h)(3), ifthe Court determines at any stage during litigation 

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3). 

In addition, "[a] court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at 

any time it appears in doubt." Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 

1988). Therefore, this Court reviews the complaint to determine whether it has jurisdiction to 

prevent unnecessary waste of judicial and government resources. This Court should not allow 

any matter to proceed that alleges a basis for jurisdiction '"so attenuated and unsubstantial as to 

be absolutely devoid of merit."' Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)) Although this Court will make reasonable 

inferences in favor of pro se plaintiffs, the burden of establishing this Court's jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence still falls on plaintiff. Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 

F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747-

48 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 

C. Tucker Act 

The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for "money damages 

claims against the federal government founded upon the Constitution, an act of Congress, a 

regulation promulgated by an executive department, any express or implied contract with the 

United States, or any claim for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort" 

and defines this Court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011). However, the equitable powers 

of this Court are limited to matters where such relief is "an incident of and collateral to [a money 

judgment]." See id. § 1491 (a)(2)-(b) (defining this Court's jurisdiction and not granting 

equitable powers). In that regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited 

jurisdiction and the Court "possess[ es] only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and 

statute .... " Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucker 

Act, however, is "a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable 

against the United States for money damages .... [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon 

[the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the substantive right exists." United States 

v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 

To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a 

claim founded upon an independent contractual relationship, Constitutional provision, federal 

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statute, and/or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. 

See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J)urisdiction under the 

Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the 

United States separate from the Tucker Act itself."); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 

1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) ("The Tucker Act ... does not create a substantive cause 

of action; ... a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right 

to money damages."). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the source of substantive 

law upon which he relies "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 

Governrnent[.)'"3 Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (citation omitted). 

D. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 

Pursuant to title 28, United States Code, section 1500, the United States Court of Federal 

Claims does not have jurisdiction over a claim "if the plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to 

that claim pending against the United States or its agents." United States v. Toho no 0 'Odham 

Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1727 (2011). "[T)he purpose of§ 1500 is to prevent the United States 

from facing liability involving the same subject matter at the same time in separate fora." Nextec 

Applications, Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 532, 538 (2014). To determine whether section 

1500 applies to two suits brought by the same plaintiff, the Court must determine whether: (1) 

there is an earlier-filed suit pending in another court; and if so, (2) whether the claims alleged in 

the earlier filed suit are "for or in respect to" the same claims now being brought in the United 

States Court of Federal Claims. See Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). An earlier filed suit is considered "pending" within the meaning of§ 1500 based on the 

time the complaint is filed with the United States Court of Federal Claims. Brandt, 710 F.3d at. 

1375. In addition, two claims are "for or in respect to the same claim" under section 1500 "if 

they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each 

3 In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit identified three types of monetary claims that could provide Tucker Act 

jurisdiction: (1) "claims alleging the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the 

government"; (2) "claims where 'the plaintiff has paid money over to the Government, directly 

or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum'"; and (3) claims where money has not 

been paid, but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a payment from the treasury. 

369 F.3d 1298, 1301(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

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suit." Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1731. If section 1500 applies, the Court must invoke RCFC 

l 2(h)(3) and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. The Court Does Not Possess Jurisdiction to Consider Plaintiff's Claims 

Against State Entities 

To the extent that plaintiff is asserting claims against the State Bar of Texas and/or any 

other state or private entities, this Court does not possess jurisdiction to consider her claims. 

The United States Supreme Court has held, that for suits filed in the United States Court of 

Federal Claims and its predecessor, that "if the relief sought is against others than the United 

States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court." United States 

v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (citation omitted). And so, "the only proper defendant 

for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." 

Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003); see also Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. 

In her complaint, plaintiff appears to seek monetary damages and other relief from the 

State Bar of Texas for an alleged breach of contract involving her law practice and the 

suspension of her law license. Compl. at 12-14. Plaintiff does not assert any claims against the 

United States in her complaint. See generally, Complaint. This Court does not have jurisdiction 

over plaintiffs grievances against the State Bar of Texas. See Souders v. SC Pub. Serv. Auth., 

497 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Reid v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 243, 248 

(2010) (The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims naming 

states, localities, state government agencies, local government agencies, and private individuals 

and entities as defendants.); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 640, 649 (2009) (citing 

Shaihoub v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 584, 585 (2007)). And so, the Court must dismiss 

plaintiffs claims. 

B. Plaintiff's Claims are Precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1500 

To the extent that plaintiffs complaint can be construed to assert claims against the 

United States or its agents, her claims are also jurisdictionally barred, because plaintiff had a 

similar action pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas at the 

time that she commenced this action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1500, this Court is jurisdictionally 

barred from considering any matter that a plaintiff also has pending in another case against the 

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United States or its agents when the claims are for, or in respect to, the same claims. 28 U.S.C. § 

1500. There are two inquiries required to determine the applicability of section 1500: First, 

"whether there is an earlier-filed 'suit or process' pending in another court against either the 

United States or any person acting or professing to act on behalf of the United States with respect 

to the 'cause of action alleged' in that earlier-filed suit or process." Ensign-Biciford v. United 

States, 118 Fed.Cl 363, 368 (2014) (quoting Brandt, 710 F.3d at 1374). Second, if there is such 

a pending suit or process, "whether the claims asserted in the earlier case are 'for or in respect to' 

the same claims(s) asserted in the later-filed Court of federal claims action." Brandt, 710 F.3d at 

1374. For these purposes, the "pending" requirement is determined at the time the complaint is 

filed with this Court. Id at 1375. And so, a plaintiffs complaints are considered "for or in 

respect to the same claim," if they are both based upon substantially the same operative facts 

regardless of the relief sought in each case. Tohono, 131 S. Ct. at 1731. 

Here, plaintiff had an earlier-filed suit pending in the Northern District of Texas when 

she commenced this action. On April 29, 2015, plaintiff filed a civil action in the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware challenging, among other things, the suspension of her 

law license. See Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P.C., et al., No. 15-00341-(SLR (D. Del.). 

On June 2, 2015, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware transferred that 

case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where it is currently 

pending. Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P.C., et al, No. 15-01907-N-BK (Transfer Order, 

dated June 2, 2015.). 

The claims alleged in plaintiffs earlier-filed Texas case are "for or in respect to" the 

same claims now being brought in this Court. Specifically, in both cases, plaintiff seeks to 

challenge the suspension of her law license in the State of Texas. Moreover, while plaintiffs 

Texas case involves different legal theories, the operative factual allegations in that case are the 

same as the factual allegations alleged here. In particular, plaintiffs complaint in this matter 

expressly incorporates the "background summary," "standing and open records," "theories of 

liability, including liability of common employer," and "causes of action," sections from her 

Texas complaint. See Complaint at 4, 11-12. In her complaint here and in Texas, plaintiff is 

"alleging that the same conduct gave rise to different claims based upon purportedly distinct 

legal theories." Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Because the facts alleged here are identical to the facts alleged in plaintiffs case currently 

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pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, this Court 

does not have jurisdiction to consider her claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1500. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's claims against the 

State of Texas, the Court must dismiss her complaint. Dismissal of plaintiff's claims is also 

warranted because plaintiff had a similar action to this matter pending in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Texas at the time that she commenced this action. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint. 

The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of defendant 

DISMISSING the complaint. No costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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