Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC17-824

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QUAWN M. FRANKLIN,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

[February 15, 2018]

PER CURIAM.

Quawn M. Franklin appeals an order of the circuit court summarily denying 

a motion to vacate his sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of Franklin’s 

postconviction motion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Franklin was convicted of attempted robbery and first-degree murder in the 

shooting death of Jerry Lawley. Franklin v. State (Franklin I), 965 So. 2d 79, 84-

86 (Fla. 2007). After the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended death. 
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Id. at 87. At Franklin’s request, the jury returned a special interrogatory verdict 

form indicating that it unanimously found each of the four proposed aggravators.

Id. at 102.1 The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed a 

death sentence. In doing so, the trial court found the same four aggravating factors 

and concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. at 88.2 

 

1. The jury found the following four aggravators:

(1) the murder was committed while Franklin was serving a prison 

sentence because he was on conditional release at the time of 

Lawley’s shooting; (2) Franklin had previous violent felony 

convictions, including another capital felony for the murder of Horan; 

(3) Lawley’s murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the 

murder was cold, calculated, and premediated (CCP).

Id. at 87-88.

2. The trial court found the following ten nonstatutory mitigators:

(1) there were deficiencies in Franklin’s upbringing which included 

being forcibly removed by his biological mother from the only mother 

and father he had known for eight years (given some weight); (2) 

Franklin had been sentenced to adult prison at a young age and served 

eight years of a ten-year sentence, which was a severe sentence in 

light of his prior record (given little weight); (3) Franklin had 

cooperated with law enforcement after his arrest (given some weight); 

(4) Franklin took responsibility for his crimes by confessing to the 

police and a newspaper reporter (given some weight); (5) Franklin had 

offered to plead guilty in return for a life sentence without possibility 

of parole that would run consecutive to his other life sentences (given 

little weight); (6) Franklin apologized to the victim’s family, showed 

remorse, and confessed to other offenses which were used as 

aggravating circumstances (given some weight); (7) Franklin 

apologized and showed remorse for his other crimes (given little 

weight); (8) Franklin had entered pleas in his related cases and had 
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This Court affirmed Franklin’s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Id.

at 102.3 

On November 7, 2008, Franklin filed his first rule 3.851 motion in the 

circuit court and moved for a competency determination. Franklin v. State

(Franklin II), 137 So. 3d 969, 977 (Fla. 2014). On June 3, 2010, the trial court 

 

been sentenced to life (given some weight); (9) there was no one 

available to testify on Franklin’s behalf in the penalty phase (given 

some weight); and (10) codefendant McCoy received a thirty-fiveyear sentence for her role in the crimes (given little weight).

Id. at 88 n.4.

3. Franklin raised the following claims on direct appeal: 

(1) the admission of hearsay statements relating to his prior violent 

felony convictions during the penalty phase violated his constitutional 

right to confront witnesses in light of the United States Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 

(2004); (2) the trial court erred in admitting the objected-to portions of 

Franklin’s taped interview with the newspaper reporter; (3) the guilt 

phase admission of hearsay statements made by the victim also 

constituted a Crawford violation; (4) the trial court erred by refusing 

to accept Franklin’s stipulation to his prior violent felony convictions 

in lieu of testimony regarding the crimes; (5) improper victim impact 

evidence was presented to the jury; (6) the CCP aggravating factor 

was not properly found; (7) the pecuniary gain aggravating factor was 

not properly found; and (8) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 

facially unconstitutional under Ring[v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),]

because the judge rather than the jury determines the sentence to be 

imposed.

Id. at 88.
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found Franklin competent to proceed. Id. Franklin then amended his 

postconviction motion, raising eleven claims. Id.4 The postconviction court 

summarily denied claims three through eight, as well as claim ten. Id. at 977-78. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied claims one, two, 

nine, and eleven. Id. at 978. Franklin sought relief in this Court, raising three 

 

4. Franklin raised the following eleven claims before the postconviction 

court: 

(1) ineffective assistance of penalty phase trial counsel; (2) ineffective 

assistance of penalty phase trial counsel by failing to call Dr. Douglas 

Mason; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel during voir dire; (4) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel by failing to file a motion for a 

change of venue; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to 

inform the jury of Franklin’s ineligibility for parole; (6) Florida’s 

method of execution by lethal injection violates both the Florida and 

United States Constitutions; (7) Franklin is prohibited from knowing 

the identity of the execution team members in violation of his rights 

under the Florida and United States Constitutions; (8) ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel pertaining to Franklin’s competency; (9) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel by failing to investigate and 

present an insanity defense; (10) Franklin’s right against cruel and 

unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent 

at the time of execution; and (11) cumulative error deprived Franklin 

of a fundamentally fair trial.

Id. at 978 n.5. 
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claims, and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus that raised two claims.

5

 This 

Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order. Id. at 987. 

Franklin filed a successive postconviction motion on January 9, 2017, 

raising two claims: (1) his death sentence is unconstitutional under Hurst v. 

Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and (2) his death sentence stands in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment under Hurst v. Florida. The postconviction court denied the 

motion, finding that “the Hurst error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as 

the jury returned an interrogatory verdict unanimously agreeing that each of the 

four aggravating factors were present and unanimously recommending that death 

was the appropriate sentence given the substantial aggravation and slight 

 

5. On appeal, Franklin raised the following five claims: 

(1) the postconviction court erred in finding him competent to proceed 

in his postconviction proceedings; (2) the postconviction court erred 

in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during 

the penalty phase; (3) the postconviction court erred in summarily 

denying his claim that trial counsel were ineffective during voir dire 

and for failing to file a motion for a change of venue; (4) Florida’s 

method of execution for lethal injection is cruel and unusual 

punishment and would deprive him of his due process and equal 

protection rights under the United States Constitution (habeas claim); 

and (5) his right against cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution will be violated 

because he may be incompetent at the time of execution (habeas

claim).

Id. at 978.
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mitigation presented.” Franklin appealed the postconviction court’s order on April 

28, 2017. On June 20, 2017, this Court issued an order directing the parties to file 

briefs addressing why the ruling should not be affirmed in light of this Court’s 

precedent in Hurst. 

ANALYSIS

Franklin argues that his death sentence violates the Sixth Amendment under 

Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 57 (Fla. 

2016), we explained that Hurst v. Florida requires “the jury in a capital case [to] 

unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are 

sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh 

the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death.” 

We also determined that Hurst error is capable of harmless error review. Id. at 67. 

Therefore, the issue in this case is whether any Hurst error during Franklin’s 

penalty phase proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 68.

Franklin’s penalty phase jury found the existence of each aggravator 

unanimously and made a unanimous recommendation of death using an 

interrogatory verdict form. Such a recommendation “allow[s] us to conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found that 

there were sufficient aggravators to outweigh the mitigating factors.” Davis v.
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State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174 (Fla. 2016). Although the jury was not properly 

instructed under Hurst, and despite the mitigation presented, the jury still 

unanimously recommended that Franklin be sentenced to death for the murder of 

Lawley. Therefore, any Hurst error in Franklin’s penalty phase was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt and the postconviction court properly denied relief on 

this claim.

Franklin also contends that a unanimous jury recommendation violates the 

Eighth Amendment pursuant to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), 

when a jury is repeatedly told that its role is advisory. Franklin further claims that 

his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment under Hurst because the 

standard jury instructions improperly diminished the jury’s role. Franklin’s 

Caldwell claim is procedurally barred because he did not raise it on direct appeal. 

See Jones v. State, 928 So. 2d 1178, 1182 n.5 (Fla. 2006). To the extent that 

Franklin’s claim about the standard jury instructions is a Hurst claim, he is not 

entitled to relief because of the jury’s unanimous recommendation of death and 

unanimous finding of all four aggravating factors. See Davis, 207 So. 3d at 174.

Procedural bar notwithstanding, prior to Hurst, we repeatedly rejected 

Caldwell challenges to the standard jury instructions used during Franklin’s trial. 

See Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866, 897 (Fla. 2011); Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 

663, 673-74 (Fla. 2004). We have also rejected Caldwell-related Hurst claims like 
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Franklin’s pursuant to Davis. See Oliver v. State, 214 So. 3d 606 (Fla. 2017); 

Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930 (Fla 2017). Recently, the defendants in Oliver

and Truehill petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to 

review their Caldwell claims, which the Court denied. Truehill v. Florida, 138 S. 

Ct. 3 (2017). Franklin, whose sentence was final post-Ring and who received a 

unanimous jury recommendation, is not entitled to Hurst relief. See Davis, 207 So. 

3d at 174. Accordingly, Franklin is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the postconviction court 

and deny relief on Franklin’s claims.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County, 

Mark J. Hill, Judge - Case No. 352002CF000217AXXXXX

James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Maria Christine 

Perinetti, Raheela Ahmed, Reuben Andrew Neff, and Lisa Marie Bort, Assistant 

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee