IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF: THE LENK 

FAMILY TRUST. 

No. 85457 

ROBERT R. PILKINGTON; AND 

DENISE L. PILKINGTON, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

THE LENK FAMILY TRUST; HUNTER 

LIGGETT; JILL RENE STYNDA; 

JANET E. LENK COHEN; CARIN 

LENK SLOAN; KRISTIN NOEL LENK 

PFEIFER; AND GINGER STUMNE, 

NYE COUNTY PUBLIC 

ADMINISTRATOR, 

Respondents. 

F" d 

NOV 0 2022 

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ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is a pro se appeal from district court orders in a probate 

case dated August 27, 2021;1 September 27, 2021; and August 2, 2022. Fifth 

Judicial District Court, Nye County; Kimberly A. Wanker, Judge. 

The notice of appeal was filed in the district court on September 

30, 2022. Appellants thereafter filed an emergency motion for stay in this 

court, and respondents opposed the stay motion and countermoved to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Respondents contend, among 

other things, that the notice of appeal was untimely filed more than 30 days 

1No order was entered on August 27, 2021, but the district court 

clerk's case appeal statement assumes and appellants' docketing statement 

confirms that the notice of appeal contains a typo, such that the appealed 

order is actually dated August 26, 2021. 

zz-
from service of notice of entry of each appealed order.2 Appellants have filed 

a reply/opposition to the countermotion, and respondents have filed a reply 

in support of their countermotion. 

Appeals from orders entered in probate and trust cases are 

generally governed by NRS 155.190. See also NRS 164.005. That statute 

allows for immediate appeal, within 30 days from service of notice of entry, 

from orders instructing personal representatives and trustees and from 

orders that grant an order for conveyance directing that persons in 

possession of estate property transfer or deliver it to those entitled thereto. 

NRS 155.190(1)(h), (p); see also NRS 164.033 (governing conveyance orders 

in trust cases and allowing an appeal therefrom within 30 days of notice of 

entry). Failure to timely appeal under NRS 155.190 precludes any 

challenge to an order listed therein in an appeal from a later-entered 

judgment. In re Estate of Herrmann, 100 Nev. 1, 21, 677 P.2d 594, 607 

(1984) ("[T]his court has specifically held that unless appeal is taken within 

30 days, an order of the kinds mentioned in NRS 155.190 is not thereafter 

subject to attack."). 

Here, the August 2021 order appears to have been appealable 

under NRS 155.190(1)(h) and (p) because it directed the public 

2Respondents also contend that appellant Denise Pilkington lacks 

standing to challenge the 2021 orders, as she was not a party to the action 

when those orders were entered. In light of this order, we need not address 

this contention. Respondents further assert that appellants waived their 

right to appeal in the parties' settlement agreement below and are not 

aggrieved by the court's order confirming that settlement. From what is 

currently before this court, it appears that appellants contest, in part, the 

district court's failure to fully resolve their claims to, and to unfreeze, funds 

in two Wells Fargo bank accounts that the court had previously found 

contained at least some funds belonging to the estate, and while we do not 

now decide the matter, it is not clear that the settlement agreement 

precludes appellants from seeking relief as to this issue. 

2 

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administrator/trustee to take various actions and also directed appellant 

Robert Pilkington to return estate and trust property. Notice of entry of the 

August 2021 order was served on August 26, 2021. The September 2021 

order further directed Robert Pilkington to return estate and trust property 

and thus likewise appears appealable under NRS 155.190(1)(p); notice of 

the September 2021 order's entry was served on September 27, 2021. 

Finally, the August 2022 order, notice of entry of which was served on 

August 4, 2022, confirmed a settlement agreement among the parties 

acknowledging that certain trusts and a pour-over will were invalid, 

providing that appellants had no authority to transfer estate or trust assets, 

directing the court-appointed fiduciary to transfer such assets to the estate 

for further administration, and closing the case upon such transfer. That 

order appears to fall under NRS 155.190(1)(i); see also NRS 155.190(1)(b) 

(refusing to admit a will to probate). The notice of appeal was filed more 

than 30 days after notice of entry of each appealed order was served and is 

thus untimely. Moreover, to the extent that appellants assert jurisdiction 

over the orders pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1) (final judgment) and (5) (orders 

refusing to dissolve an attachment), the notice of appeal is likewise 

untimely. NRAP 4(a)(1) (providing that notices of appeal must be filed 

within 30 days from when notice of the appealed order's entry is served). 

In their docketing statement, appellants suggest that the 

appeal is timely under NRAP 4(a)(6) (premature notice of appeal) because 

the district court denied an NRCP 60(b) motion on October 12, 2022.3 But 

the NRCP 60(b) motion was filed on February 18, 2022, which was not 

within the tirneframe in which tolling motions must be filed, and thus the 

motion could not toll the appeal period. NRAP 4(a)(4); see NRCP 50(b); 

3This court has not received any notice of appeal from the October 12 

order. 

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NRCP 52(b); NRCP 59(b), (e). And in their response to the countermotion 

to dismiss, appellants assert that the appeal is timely because the appealed 

orders are void. However, allegations that an order is void does not waive 

the time period to appeal, which is jurisdictional. Zugel v. Miller, 99 Nev. 

100, 101, 659 P.2d 296, 297 (1983) ("Filing a timely notice of appeal is 

jurisdictional and an untimely appeal may not be considered."); State ex rel. 

Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 63 Nev. 249, 256, 167 P.2d 648, 651 

(1946) (distinguishing between direct attacks, like an appeal in an original 

action to have an order vacated or reversed, and collateral attacks through 

other proceedings), overruled on other grounds by Poirier v. Bd. of Dental 

Exam'rs, 81 Nev. 384, 404 P.2d 1 (1965). Accordingly, as we lack 

jurisdiction, we grant the countermotion and 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.4

• 17, —67.

Hardesty 

Stiglich Herndon 

41n light of this order, appellants' emergency motion for stay is denied 

as moot. Nevertheless, we note that appellants' failure to first seek relief 

in the district court per NRAP 8(a)(1) would preclude relief. See TRP Fund 

VI, LLC v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 21, 506 P.3d 1056, 1058 

(2022) (explaining that a belief that the district court will not grant a stay 

motion does not excuse the requirement that such relief first be sought in 

the district court, as lilmpracticable' requires the movant to show that it 

was 'not capable' of first seeking relief in the district court or that such an 

act could not be done"). 

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cc: Hon. Kimberly A. Wanker, District Judge 

Denise L. Pilkington 

Robert R. Pilkington 

Anthony L. Barney, Ltd. 

Roland Law Firm 

Law Office of Sean M. Tanko, Ltd. 

Nye County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

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