COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Russell, Malveaux and Athey

Argued by videoconference

SPENCER KELLY DIXON

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1609-19-3 JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.

MARCH 9, 2021

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY

Edward K. Stein, Judge

Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone and Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for 

appellant.

Rachel L. Yates, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, Spencer Kelly Dixon (“Dixon”) was convicted of possession of a 

motor vehicle with an altered vehicle identification number (“VIN”), in violation of Code 

§ 46.2-1075, and of obtaining property by false pretense, in violation of Code § 18.2-178. The 

trial court sentenced Dixon to six months of incarceration, with six months suspended, on each 

charge. On appeal, Dixon argues that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that he (1) transferred a motor vehicle with an improper VIN under Code 

§ 46.2-1075, and (2) obtained property by false pretenses under Code § 18.2-178.

1 For the 

reasons stated below, we disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1 Dixon withdrew a collateral estoppel argument during oral argument, but regardless, he 

does not cite any authority in support of this argument and thus waives appellate review of that 

issue. See Rule 5A:20.

UNPUBLISHED
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

In the fall of 2018, Norman Knox (“Knox”) created a listing on Craigslist to sell his 

Dodge Neon car. He indicated on the listing that he was willing to accept a trade for a different 

vehicle, to which Dixon responded via text message. Dixon indicated that he would be willing to 

trade his 2008 GSSR-750 Suzuki motorcycle for the Dodge Neon.3 In the correspondence that 

followed, Knox asked Dixon: “Anything done to it.” Dixon responded: “Quick shifter.....new 

chain with Vortex sprockets and clip ons....Yoshie exhaust with cat delete.” Dixon did not 

mention the vehicle’s VIN or any further work done to the motorcycle.

Dixon and Knox met multiple times in person to discuss the motorcycle, as well as gear 

and stands contemplated in the trade. There was a sticker on the motorcycle indicating that it 

was a “2009 Suzuki GSSR.” Negotiations finally ended with Knox agreeing to trade Dixon his 

car and title for Dixon’s motorcycle and title. Dixon did not indicate at any time that the 

motorcycle’s VIN had been altered, removed, or replaced. After acquiring the motorcycle and 

seeking to insure it, Knox was denied insurance based upon the title to the motorcycle received 

from Dixon. In fact, Knox had received from Dixon a title for a DL 650 motorcycle, which did 

not match the 750 motorcycle he purportedly received from Dixon. Although the motorcycle he 

received was functional, due to the title not corresponding with the motorcycle, Knox was denied 

insurance.

Knox then went to the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) to report the issue and 

subsequently filed a claim with Agent Michael Vineyard (“Vineyard”), an investigator with the 

2 Pursuant to familiar appellate principles, the evidence is summarized in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 

469, 472 (2018).

3 At trial, Knox stated that Dixon offered a “2008” motorcycle but later stated that the 

sticker on the motorcycle was a “2009.”
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DMV. In order to commence his investigation, Vineyard required that Knox apply for a title to 

the motorcycle. In order to comply with Vineyard’s request, Knox was issued a title using the 

VIN off of the title he erroneously received from Dixon. Vineyard then examined the 

motorcycle Dixon had exchanged with Knox and noticed a “VIN number that looked too 

perfect.” He further noticed that the VIN was on an engraved plate instead of pin stamped on the 

motorcycle’s frame, which is how factories typically apply the VIN to each motorcycle. When 

Vineyard removed the engraved plate, he observed a flat surface where the original VIN should 

have been, and it appeared as if the original VIN had been “ground down.”

Vineyard then questioned Dixon, who stated that he had purchased the motorcycle two 

years prior near Raleigh, North Carolina. Dixon went on to state that the motorcycle could not 

be titled in Virginia because it was a racing motorcycle and was not “street legal.” Dixon also 

admitted that he removed the original VIN and attached a VIN from a Suzuki DL 650 

motorcycle. Next, Vineyard reviewed the records for the title Knox actually received from 

Dixon and found no indication that Dixon had received permission to alter the VIN of the 

motorcycle.4 As a result, Vineyard concluded that even though the title for the Suzuki DL 650 

given to Knox was valid, the VIN on the motorcycle matched the title only because Dixon had 

altered it by removing the original VIN and placing a plate with a new VIN on it himself.

At trial, Dixon admitted to purchasing the motorcycle in North Carolina and claimed that 

the motorcycle did not come with a VIN. He further testified that he then purchased a second 

motorcycle from eBay and used that frame to construct the motorcycle he traded to Knox. Dixon 

also admitted to creating a plate and placing the VIN of the motorcycle thereon without 

obtaining permission from the DMV. Finally, he admitted that he did not tell Knox that he had 

4 The DMV may issue a new title and plates for reconstructed vehicles, but the applicant

must satisfy statutory requirements. See Code § 46.2-734.
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placed a different VIN on the motorcycle but denied ever telling Vineyard that he had removed a 

VIN from the original motorcycle frame.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, Dixon moved to strike the evidence, arguing that 

the evidence was insufficient to convict him on either charge. The trial court denied his motion, 

and opined that, with respect to the first charge of possession of a motor vehicle with an altered 

VIN:

He took the VIN number off one vehicle and put it on another 

vehicle in order to be able to title it because he knew he could not 

otherwise title it, whether it had . . . a VIN number on when he 

bought it or it had no VIN number is not particularly relevant. He 

put a VIN number on . . . a vehicle that didn’t belong there. That’s 

a violation of the statute.

Regarding the second charge of obtaining property by false pretense, the trial court 

further opined that:

[I]t is clear that he sold what he intended to be a 750 that could be 

titled to DMV as a 750. Did Mr. Knox actually get a 750 

motorcycle? Yes. It had a 750 engine. Apparently it had a 750 

frame but as everybody knows, part of buying a motor vehicle is 

the ability to title it, not to get some title, but to get the title that 

goes with that motor vehicle. And the problem was, because it had 

a, an [sic] improper VIN number on it, he cannot title it for what it 

is. And that was a false pretense because Mr. Dixon had already 

been through that and knew he . . . had a false VIN number and 

that was the only reason he was able to title it.

This appeal follows.

II. ANALYSIS

With respect to assignments of error relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

review that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party 

below, and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “This 

familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts 
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in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to 

ultimate facts.” Id. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are 

matters solely for the [trial court] who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is 

presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138 (1995). “Furthermore, we 

‘accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.’” 

Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 95 (2011) (quoting Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 

123, 130 (2008)). In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “examine the 

evidence that supports the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly wrong 

or without evidence to support it.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20 (2011) (quoting 

Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652 (2008)).

POSSESSION OF A VEHICLE WITH AN ALTERED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

Dixon first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction of 

possession of a vehicle with an altered VIN under Code § 46.2-1075. He specifically contends 

that the Commonwealth’s evidence was not sufficient to prove that he either transferred the 

motorcycle to Knox with an improper VIN or that his conduct in this case requires the consent of 

DMV as enumerated in the statute.

Code § 46.2-1075 provides that: “Any person who shall knowingly have in his 

possession a motor vehicle . . . whose motor number, serial number, identification number, decal 

or device as required by federal law has been removed, changed, or altered without the consent 

of the Department shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”

Dixon admits that he modified the motorcycle, but he argues that changing the parts and 

affixing a Suzuki 650 VIN on it does not require him to get permission from the DMV because 

the VIN on the motorcycle matches the title. However, the trial court heard competent testimony 

that Dixon took the VIN from one motorcycle and placed it on another because he knew that the 
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original would be unable to be titled otherwise. Additionally, Vineyard testified that Dixon 

admitted to removing the VIN in order to make the vehicle “street legal” in Virginia. While 

Dixon claims otherwise, “[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to 

disbelieve self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to 

conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable 

v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)). Given the evidence presented at trial, there 

was sufficient evidence to prove Dixon violated Code § 46.2-1075 because he affixed a VIN 

from another motorcycle onto the motorcycle he traded to Knox without the permission of the 

DMV. Accordingly, Dixon’s conviction was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.

OBTAINING PROPERTY BY FALSE PRETENSES

Dixon also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for 

obtaining property by false pretenses in violation of Code § 18.2-178. He contends that there 

was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud Knox and that his conduct in this case did not 

rise to the level of an actual fraudulent transaction.

Code § 18.2-178, which states in pertinent part: “If any person obtain, by any false 

pretense or token, from any person, with intent to defraud, money, a gift certificate or other 

property that may be the subject of larceny, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof . . . .” 

“This statute requires the Commonwealth to prove the following elements: ‘an intent to defraud, 

an actual fraud, use of false pretenses for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud, and 

accomplishment of the fraud by means of the false pretenses used for that purpose.’” Gardner v. 

Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 595, 598 (2000) (quoting Quidley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 963, 

965 (1981)). “In determining whether the intent has been proven, the factfinder may consider 

the conduct of the person involved and all the circumstances revealed by the evidence.” Cuffee 

v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 353, 369 (2013) (quoting Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 
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283, 292 (1987)). “[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question for the trier of 

fact.” Id. (quoting Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 548, 551 (1977)).

Here, Dixon admitted that he attached a DL 650 Suzuki VIN to the motorcycle he traded 

to Knox, which was purported to be a GSSR-750. When Knox asked Dixon if there had been 

any alterations to the motorcycle, Dixon did not inform Knox that the VIN had been changed. 

Knox could not legally operate a motorcycle that had a VIN changed without DMV permission, 

which became clear when Knox wasn’t able to insure the motorcycle. Additionally, Dixon 

admitted to Vineyard that he knowingly replaced the VIN because the GSSR-750 was not “street 

legal,” and a title could not be obtained otherwise. Given this evidence, the trial court could 

have reasonably concluded that Dixon had the requisite intent to defraud Knox. Accordingly, 

Dixon’s conviction for violating Code § 18.2-178 was neither plainly wrong nor without 

evidence to support it.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Affirmed.