UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Carrie N. RIDDLE, Private 

U.S. Army, Appellant 

No. 08-0739 

Crim. App. No. 20070756 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Argued February 10, 2009 

Decided May 12, 2009 

STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER 

and RYAN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate 

dissenting opinion, in which ERDMANN, J., joined. 

Counsel

For Appellant: William M. Fischbach III, Esq. (argued); 

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew M. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel Mark 

Tellitocci, and Captain Pamela Perillo (on brief); Major Grace 

M. Gallagher. 

For Appellee: Captain James M. Hudson (argued); Colonel Denise 

R. Lind, Lieutenant Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, and Major 

Christopher B. Burgess (on brief). 

Military Judge: Richard Gordon 

THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION. 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

2 

 Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Appellant asserts that her guilty pleas were improvident 

because the military judge did not explain or discuss the 

defense of lack of mental responsibility during the plea 

inquiry. We hold that Appellant’s pleas were provident and that 

under the facts of this case the military judge was not 

obligated to explicitly explain or discuss that defense with 

Appellant. 

I. Background 

 Appellant, Private (PVT) Carrie N. Riddle, pled guilty 

before a general court-martial to four specifications of use of 

marijuana and one specification of being absent without leave 

(AWOL). Articles 112a and 86, Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 912a, 886 (2000). The military judge, 

sitting alone, sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge 

and ten days of confinement. As Appellant had ten days of 

pretrial confinement credit, she served no confinement following 

her court-martial. The United States Army Court of Criminal 

Appeals summarily affirmed the findings and sentence on May 28, 

2008. United States v. Riddle, No. ARMY 20070756 (A. Ct. Crim. 

App. May 28, 2008). 

Appellant entered active duty on May 31, 2006, and at the 

time of these offenses was assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia. 

According to the stipulation of fact admitted at trial, 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

3 

Appellant used marijuana on several occasions throughout her 

period of active duty. On March 1, 2007, Appellant left her 

unit for over a month and traveled to South Carolina with 

another soldier, PVT Renee Kunsman, remaining there until her 

April 16, 2007, voluntary return to her unit. During this trip 

Appellant used marijuana with PVT Kunsman. Appellant advised 

the pregnant PVT Kunsman that marijuana could be good for her 

nerves and appetite. In a stipulation of fact, the parties 

agreed that Appellant had chronic alcohol and marijuana 

dependence as well as bipolar and borderline personality 

disorder, conditions which pre-dated her enlistment. 

 The military judge was aware of Appellant’s mental 

condition. He knew that before her unauthorized absence she was 

scheduled to be administratively discharged for her mental 

condition, and that she was then receiving treatment at an “offpost installation that specializes in mental issues, mental and 

behavioral issues.” The military judge was also aware that 

Appellant arrived at trial directly from the mental health 

facility and would return there at the conclusion of trial. In 

addition, the military judge’s questions indicate that 

Appellant’s mental state was of concern to him, inquiring “Are 

you feeling okay?” when Appellant nonchalantly referred to 

throwing the butt of a marijuana cigarette into a lake as 

“getting the fishes high.” 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

4 

At trial, the military judge asked Appellant a series of 

questions regarding her mental health and her competency to 

stand trial: 

MJ: Now, I understand you are currently receiving 

treatment at the Bradley Center in Columbus, Georgia. 

Is that true? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

MJ: How long have you been down at the Bradley 

Center? 

ACC: Since the 12th of June, this time, sir. 

MJ: Okay. And what are you being treated for? 

ACC: Bipolar and borderline personality disorder with 

severe depression, sir. 

MJ: Okay. I understand that at the conclusion of 

this trial today you are going to return to the 

Bradley Center for continued treatment? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

MJ: All right. . . . The question is whether or not 

you are -- you believe that you are competent to stand 

trial. 

Do you think you are? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

MJ: Do you believe that you fully understand not only 

the ramifications of this court-martial but what is 

going to happen today? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

MJ: Okay. Are you currently taking any drugs or 

medications? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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MJ: What drugs or medications are you taking? 

ACC: My medications are, Zoloft, 100 milligrams, with 

Topamax three times a day; Ibuprofen, 800 milligrams 

three times a day; Zyrtec; Atarox [sic], Sereoquel; 

and -- 

MJ: Are most of those anti-depressants? 

ACC: Sleep aids, mood suppressants, and a couple of 

anti-depressants. 

MJ: Okay. But Major Grills [defense counsel] assures 

me that, in her opinion, she believes you are 

competent to understand the nature of these 

proceedings. Do you agree with that? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

 The military judge also questioned Appellant as to her 

mental capacity and responsibility at the time of the offenses: 

MJ: Okay. Did you understand what you were doing 

when you went AWOL? 

ACC: Yes, Sir. 

MJ: Okay. Now I realize that you have had some 

psychiatric issues, I guess apparently in AIT and that 

continued apparently to now, although, I have to say 

for the record, you appear to be extremely articulate 

and very alert today. But my question to you is, as a 

Soldier, did you understand that when you went AWOL . 

. . that what you were doing was wrong, that you were 

not authorized to do that? 

ACC: Yes, Sir. 

 . . . . 

MJ: And you knew that smoking marijuana during all of 

these four specifications was wrongful, correct? 

ACC: Yes, sir. 

 . . . . 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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MJ: And do you agree and do you admit that during 

this period of time from early December through April 

2007, that your use of marijuana was wrongful? 

ACC: Yes, Sir. 

 Trial defense counsel expanded upon this line of 

questioning during Appellant’s unsworn sentencing statement in 

an apparent effort to display Appellant’s understanding and 

remorse for her crimes: 

DC: And we have already talked about the different 

conditions that you suffer from, but -- and the 

military judge has already asked you this, but the 

offenses that you plead guilty to, you understand what 

you were doing at those times? 

ACC: Yes, ma’am. 

DC: And you understood right from wrong? 

ACC: Yes, ma’am. 

During the sentencing proceeding the military judge 

accepted into evidence a mental health evaluation of Appellant 

detailing her condition. The “Report of Mental Status 

Evaluation” was created on May 14, 2007, and updated on May 17, 

2007, by Major Long P. Huynh, the Chief of Inpatient Psychiatry 

at Martin Army Community Hospital. The report stated that 

Appellant “has the mental capacity to understand and participate 

in the proceedings” and that she “was mentally responsible.” 

Major Huynh notes Appellant’s two suicide attempts and states 

that Appellant would remain an inpatient for the next week. He 

further states that Appellant is “medically and psychologically 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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stable enough for 1-2 weeks of confinement”; periods longer than 

that “may cause her clinical conditions to deteriorate and 

possibly lead to readmission to psychiatry.” It is unclear why 

the report was created; however Major Huynh states in the 

comments section that Appellant was “unsuited for further 

military service. Her company commander has agreed to pursue to 

[sic] the most rapid separation possible.” Although this form 

references “proceedings” for which Appellant was determined to 

be “mentally responsible,” the form was completed nine days 

prior to the preferral of charges. 

After handing down the sentence knowing that Appellant was 

going to be returned directly to the Bradley Center, the 

military judge made one final statement regarding Appellant’s 

mental state: 

I just want to say one more time for the record, my 

personal observations in this courtroom today are 

that, although Private Riddle indicated she was taking 

a number of drugs at the Bradley Center . . . she 

appeared to the court to be fully cognizant of 

everything that happened today. She was alert. She 

was articulate, and she appeared to the court to 

completely understand the nature and quality of these 

proceedings. 

II. Discussion

 Appellant now argues that the military judge abused his 

discretion when he accepted her guilty pleas. Appellant asserts 

that, given her mental health history, the military judge was 

required to explain or discuss the defense of lack of mental 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

8 

responsibility, and furthermore the military judge was required 

to ensure that trial defense counsel had evaluated the viability 

of the defense and/or elicit facts from her that would 

negate the defense. Appellant contends that, as none of these 

things occurred, her pleas were improvident. 

 “[W]e review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty 

plea for an abuse of discretion and questions of law arising 

from the guilty plea de novo.” United States v. Inabinette, 

66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008); United States v. Shaw, 

64 M.J. 460, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2007). If, during the proceedings, 

the accused sets up matter inconsistent with the plea, it is the 

responsibility of the military judge to either resolve the 

inconsistency or reject the plea. Article 45(a), UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. § 845(a) (2000); Shaw, 64 M.J. at 462. Once the military 

judge has accepted the pleas and entered findings based upon 

them, this Court will not set them aside unless we find a 

substantial conflict between the pleas and the accused’s 

statements or other evidence of record. Shaw, 64 M.J. at 462. 

More than a “mere possibility” of conflict is required. Id.

(citations and quotation marks omitted). Instead, this Court 

must find “something in the record of trial, with regard to the 

factual basis or the law, that would raise a substantial 

question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea.” Inabinette, 66 

M.J. at 322. 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

9 

In military law, lack of mental responsibility is an 

affirmative defense that an accused must establish by clear and 

convincing evidence. Article 50a(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 850a(a) 

(2000); Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 916(b)(2). If “there 

is reason to believe that the accused lacked mental 

responsibility for any offense charged or lacks capacity to 

stand trial” the military judge and other officers of the court 

each has the independent responsibility to inquire into the 

accused’s mental condition. R.C.M. 706(a). An accused cannot 

“make an informed plea without knowledge that he suffered a 

severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offense.” 

United States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 391, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2005). 

Similarly, the military judge cannot conduct the necessary 

providence inquiry into the accused’s pleas “without exploring 

the impact of any potential mental health issues on those 

pleas.” Id. 

We have addressed the question of an accused’s mental 

disease or defect and the providence of a guilty plea in the 

recent cases of Inabinette, United States v. Glenn, 66 M.J. 64 

(C.A.A.F. 2008), Shaw, and Harris. A military judge can 

presume, in the absence of contrary circumstances, that the 

accused is sane and, furthermore, that counsel is competent. 

Shaw, 64 M.J. at 463. Should the accused’s statements or 

material in the record indicate a history of mental disease or 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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defect on the part of the accused, the military judge must 

determine whether that information raises either a conflict with 

the plea and thus the possibility of a defense or only the “mere 

possibility” of conflict. Id. at 462 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). The former requires further inquiry on the part 

of the military judge, the latter does not. Id. This is a 

contextual determination by the military judge. Id. at 464. 

However, we have additionally indicated that it is prudent, but 

we emphasize not always required, to conduct further inquiry 

when a significant mental health issue is raised, regardless of 

whether a conflict has actually arisen. Id. 

The question in Shaw was whether sufficient evidence of a 

mental disease or disorder was before the military judge so as 

to raise an inconsistency with Shaw’s plea and thus require the 

military judge to inquire further into Shaw’s mental state and 

advise him of the defense of lack of mental responsibility. 

Shaw provided an unsworn statement during sentencing stating 

that he had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder 

following a head injury. Id. at 461. Aside from responding to 

defense counsel’s questions on the issue, Shaw provided no 

further evidence that his condition affected his mental 

responsibility for his actions. Id. We determined that Shaw’s 

reference to his history of bipolar disorder “at most raised 

only the ‘mere possibility’ of a conflict with the plea,” and 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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that therefore it was not an abuse of discretion for the 

military judge to accept Shaw’s plea without conducting further 

inquiry into his mental health. Id. at 464. In reaching that 

decision we considered Shaw’s history of bipolar disorder, his 

conduct during the plea inquiry and whether that reflected on 

his capacity to plead guilty, and if Shaw’s statements indicated 

an inability to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of his 

acts as a result of his mental health issues. Id. at 462-63; 

see also Glenn, 66 M.J. at 66. 

In Harris, which sits at the other end of the spectrum from 

Shaw, we found that there was sufficient basis in law and fact 

to question Harris’s guilty plea. 61 M.J. at 398. Harris had 

been convicted for passing bad checks, unauthorized absence, and 

larceny. Id. at 392. At trial, the military judge found that 

Harris understood the nature and quality and/or wrongfulness of 

his actions. Id. at 393. However, this Court found that, as 

Harris’s mental disease or defect was diagnosed only after the 

trial, his plea was not informed and the trial court could not 

have performed the necessary providence inquiry. Id. at 398-99. 

 While there is more here than a mere unsworn assertion, the 

facts of this case are still closer to Shaw than to Harris. The 

record of trial makes clear that neither Appellant’s conduct nor 

her mental health history created more than the mere possibility 

of conflict with her pleas. Admittedly, this case differs from 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

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Shaw in that the record reflects a diagnosis of bipolar disorder 

for which Appellant was being treated at the time of trial. In 

addition, Appellant arrived at the court-martial from the mental 

health facility and would return there at its conclusion. 

However, the record does not reflect that her bipolar disorder 

affected the providence of her plea. See Shaw, 64 M.J. at 462. 

In the instant case, the military judge was aware of 

Appellant’s mental health history and made sure, as set out 

above, that Appellant’s mental condition, current treatment, and 

competency to stand trial did not put the providence of her plea 

at issue. He specifically asked her about her mental 

responsibility at the time the offenses were committed, ensuring 

that at the time of her offenses she understood both what she 

was doing and the difference between right and wrong. In 

addition, during Appellant’s unsworn statement trial defense 

counsel repeated the inquiry into Appellant’s mental 

responsibility for her acts. The military judge placed his 

impressions of Appellant’s behavior at trial on the record and 

repeated those observations as to Appellant’s mental acuity 

following sentencing. He found that she was “fully cognizant of 

everything that happened today,” as well as “alert,” 

“articulate,” and that she appeared to “completely understand 

the nature and quality of these proceedings.” Finally, the 

“Report of Mental Status Evaluation” found Appellant “mentally 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

13 

responsible.” Unlike Harris, or United States v. Martin, 56 

M.J. 97 (C.A.A.F. 2001), this is not a case in which there were 

conflicting evaluations of Appellant’s mental responsibility. 

There was no evidence of record that Appellant lacked mental 

responsibility at the time the offenses were committed. 

Given these facts, we cannot say that the military judge 

was required to explain or discuss the defense of lack of mental 

responsibility with Appellant. Appellant appeared competent and 

responsible before the military judge, she claimed she was 

competent and responsible at the time of the offenses, her 

counsel agreed that she was competent and responsible at that 

time, and the mental status evaluation stated that she “was 

responsible.” Moreover, no evidence exists to suggest that 

Appellant did not understand the nature and quality or the 

wrongfulness of her actions when committing the offenses. The 

evidence before the military judge presented only the mere 

possibility of conflict with Appellant’s guilty plea and did not 

raise a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning the 

providence of that plea. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of United 

States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. 
United States v. Riddle, No. 08-0739/AR 

EFFRON, Chief Judge, with whom ERDMANN, Judge, joins 

(dissenting): 

The plea colloquy in this case between Appellant and the 

military judge raised a possible defense of lack of mental 

responsibility under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 916(k). 

These circumstances required the military judge to engage in a 

further inquiry to resolve the apparent inconsistency raised by 

the plea colloquy. See United States v. Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307, 

309 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The military judge did not do so. 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the 

majority opinion that the military judge did not err in the 

conduct of the plea inquiry. 

I. RESPONSIBILIITIES OF THE MILITARY JUDGE 

DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY 

When a military accused offers to plead guilty, the 

military judge must engage in a detailed colloquy to ensure 

protection of the rights of the accused under applicable law. 

See United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 541-42, 40 C.M.R. 247, 

253-54 (1969). The military judge must personally address the 

accused, explain the elements of each charged offense, and ask 

questions about the accused’s actions and intentions to ensure 

that the accused’s conduct meets all elements of the charges to 

which the accused is pleading guilty. Id. at 541, 40 C.M.R. at 

253. The military judge must personally advise the accused of 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

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the rights forfeited by pleading guilty and make appropriate 

inquiries to ensure that the accused’s waiver of these rights is 

voluntary. Id. The military judge must make findings on the 

record that there is “a knowing, intelligent, and conscious 

waiver” of rights before a guilty plea may be accepted. Id. at 

542, 40 C.M.R. at 254. 

 A guilty plea may not be accepted unless the military judge 

is fully satisfied as to the providence of the plea. “If an 

accused ‘sets up matter inconsistent with the plea’ at any time 

during the proceeding, the military judge must either resolve 

the apparent inconsistency or reject the plea.” United States 

v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (quoting Article 

45(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 845 

(2000)). A potential defense to the charged crime constitutes 

“matter inconsistent with the plea” under Article 45(a), UCMJ. 

If, at any time during the proceeding, “circumstances raise a 

possible defense,” the military judge must consider whether the 

defense applies before accepting the plea as provident. 

Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 310-11. Although the “mere possibility” 

of a defense is not enough to create an inconsistency with the 

plea, United States v. Shaw, 64 M.J. 460, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2007) 

(quoting Garcia, 44 M.J. at 498) (quotation marks omitted), the 

circumstances need not constitute a complete defense in order to 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

3

trigger the military judge’s duty to make a further inquiry into 

a possible defense. Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 310. 

 If evidence raises a possible defense, the military judge 

must explore that defense by inquiring further into the evidence 

that supports it before accepting the plea as provident. Id. at 

310-11. When these inquiries establish that the defense does 

not apply, the military judge may accept the plea without 

explaining the defense. See id.; United States v. Inabinette, 

66 M.J. 320, 322-23 (C.A.A.F. 2008). If, however, the military 

judge’s inquiries do not bring forth evidence demonstrating that 

the defense is inapplicable, the military judge must explain the 

defense to the accused. See United States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 

391, 398 n.13 (C.A.A.F. 2005). The requirement for an 

explanation ensures that the accused’s waiver of the right to 

present the defense is knowing and voluntary. See Phillippe, 63 

M.J. at 310. When the military judge fails to address the issue 

of a possible defense through further inquiry or explanation of 

the defense to the accused, an appellate court will reverse for 

an abuse of discretion. See Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 309-10. 

II. THE PLEA COLLOQUY AND MENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 

Under R.C.M. 916(k), “[i]t is an affirmative defense to any 

offense that, at the time of the commission of the acts 

constituting the offense, the accused, as a result of a severe 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

4

mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature 

and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts.” A military 

judge’s duty to inquire into an accused’s mental condition 

before accepting the accused’s guilty plea depends on whether 

the “circumstances raise a possible defense” of lack of mental 

responsibility. See Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 310-11. 

 In a line of cases involving bipolar disorder, we have 

distinguished between cases that suggested a possible defense of 

lack of mental responsibility and cases that raised the “mere 

possibility” of a defense. Compare Harris, 61 M.J. at 398, with

Shaw, 64 M.J. at 464; United States v. Glenn, 66 M.J. 64, 66 

(C.A.A.F. 2008). An accused’s unsupported claim of bipolar 

disorder does not raise a possible defense. See Shaw, 64 M.J. 

at 462-64; Glenn, 66 M.J. at 65-66. In Glenn and Shaw, each 

accused’s claim of bipolar disorder was unsupported by any 

“factual record developed during or after the trial 

substantiating Appellant’s statement or indicating whether and 

how bipolar disorder may have influenced his plea,” the 

accused’s conduct during the inquiry did not raise concerns of 

lack of capacity, and there was no assertion or other evidence 

suggesting that the accused was “unable to appreciate the nature 

and quality or wrongfulness of his acts as a result of a mental 

disease or defect.” Shaw, 64 M.J. at 462-63; Glenn, 66 M.J. at 

66. In each of these cases, the claims were insufficient to 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

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create an inconsistency with the plea that required further 

inquiry from the military judge. See Shaw, 64 M.J. at 462-64; 

Glenn, 66 M.J. at 65-66. 

 By contrast, we have found that a possible defense was 

raised, and an inconsistency with the plea created, in cases 

where there was record evidence of a medical diagnosis of 

bipolar disorder. In Harris, a psychiatrist diagnosed the 

accused while he was in confinement with bipolar disorder and 

found that he was unable to appreciate the nature of his actions 

at the time of the offenses. 61 M.J. at 393. Although two 

sanity boards had found the accused mentally responsible, we 

found that the contrary diagnosis in confinement raised a 

possible defense, and we granted a new trial. Id. at 398-99. 

In Inabinette, a testifying psychiatrist’s statement that the 

accused had bipolar disorder with psychotic features created an 

inconsistency with the accused’s plea. 66 M.J. at 323. We held 

in these cases that the military judge was required to either 

elicit information to disprove the defense of lack of mental 

responsibility, see id. at 322-23, or to explain the defense to 

the accused, see Harris, 61 M.J. at 398 n.13, before accepting 

the guilty plea as provident. 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

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III. THE PLEA INQUIRY AT APPELLANT’S COURT-MARTIAL 

A. THE INFORMATION RAISING THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INQUIRY 

For the reasons set forth below, the plea inquiry at 

Appellant’s trial developed information that presented more than 

a “mere possibility” of a defense, see Shaw, 64 M.J. at 464, 

raising “a possible defense” of lack of mental responsibility 

requiring further inquiry by the military judge. See Phillippe, 

63 M.J. at 310. 

First, the parties stipulated that Appellant was medically 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and borderline personality 

disorder that pre-existed her military service, and thus also 

pre-existed her offenses. 

Second, Appellant was confined in a private inpatient 

mental health treatment facility, the Bradley Center, from June 

12, 2007, until the time of her court-martial on July 2, 2007, 

and was returned for further treatment at the conclusion of her 

court-martial. The record indicates that after Appellant 

terminated her unauthorized absence on April 16, 2007, by 

surrendering to the psychiatric ward of Martin Army Community 

Hospital, Appellant spent most of the time leading up to the 

court-martial as an inpatient at either the Martin Army 

Community Hospital or the Bradley Center, with the exception of 

ten days of pretrial confinement. The fact that Appellant’s 

mental condition was serious enough to warrant continued 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

7

hospitalization underscored the possibility that her bipolar 

disorder was a “severe mental disease or defect” that could have 

influenced her ability to “appreciate the nature and quality or 

the wrongfulness of . . . her acts.” See R.C.M. 916(k). 

Third, Appellant testified to the military judge that she 

was taking at least six types of medication, including mood 

suppressants and anti-depressants, at the time of her trial. 

Appellant’s extensive medication also suggested the potential 

severity of her mental condition. 

Fourth, the mental health report submitted in sentencing 

noted that Appellant had attempted suicide twice. While the 

mental health report also noted that her mood “ha[d] been 

stabilized” through treatment and that her thought process 

appeared normal at the time of the report, Appellant had not 

been treated at the time of her offenses. Further, the report 

stated that, although Appellant was stable enough for one to two 

weeks of confinement, longer confinement could result in mental 

deterioration. These segments of the report suggest that when 

she was not receiving treatment -- at the time of the offenses 

-- Appellant’s mental conditions were worse, and that Appellant 

needed continued mental treatment. 

Finally, the military judge, in light of comments by 

defense counsel, appeared to tailor the sentence with a view 

towards mental health treatment as the appropriate remedy for 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

8

Appellant. At sentencing, after questioning Appellant about her 

treatment, defense counsel asked the military judge to “[t]ake 

into consideration . . . the strides she is willing to take now 

to go forward with proper counseling, with proper medication” 

and that “[t]he plan is for her to go back to the Bradley Center 

until they are satisfied that she be released and she should be 

discharged from the Army.” The military judge sentenced 

Appellant to time served, with accompanying commentary that 

Appellant would be returned to the mental health facility for 

further treatment. 

In combination, the foregoing circumstances should have 

alerted the military judge that, at the time of her offenses, 

Appellant may have suffered from “a severe mental disease or 

defect” that left her “unable to appreciate the nature and 

quality or wrongfulness of . . . her acts.” R.C.M. 916(k). The 

military judge was required to inquire into this evidence, and 

to either determine that a defense of lack of mental 

responsibility would not apply or explain the defense to 

Appellant, to ensure that her pleas were provident. See supra

Part I; Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 310. 

B. THE INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE MILITARY JUDGE 

During the providence inquiry, the military judge addressed 

Appellant’s mental state on the day of the court-martial. The 

military judge asked Appellant whether she was competent to 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

9

stand trial, whether she understood what was happening, and 

whether she was feeling okay. The military judge commented that 

defense counsel had assured the military judge that she believed 

that Appellant was competent to stand trial and to understand 

the proceedings -- statements with which Appellant agreed. The 

military judge also remarked on the record that Appellant 

appeared “extremely articulate and very alert” and that “she 

appeared to the court to be fully cognizant of everything that 

happened today.” 

The military judge asked a few questions about Appellant’s 

mental disorders. He asked Appellant how long she had been in 

treatment at the Bradley Center, and he affirmed that she would 

be returning to the Bradley Center after the court-martial. He 

asked Appellant why she was receiving treatment and what drugs 

she was taking. 

In the most relevant inquiries, the military judge asked 

Appellant about her understanding of her offenses at the time 

they were committed. The military judge asked, “Did you 

understand what you were doing when you went AWOL?” and “did you 

understand when you went AWOL . . . that what you were doing was 

wrong, that you were not authorized to do it?” The military 

judge also asked whether Appellant “knew that smoking marijuana 

during all of these four specifications was wrongful.” Defense 

counsel asked at sentencing whether, despite Appellant’s mental 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

10

conditions, she “understood what [she] was doing at those 

times?” and “understood right from wrong?” Appellant replied 

“Yes” to all of these questions. 

Based on this record, the military judge’s questions about 

Appellant’s mental condition did not elicit facts that disproved 

the possible defense of lack of mental responsibility raised by 

the evidence. See Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 322-23. Appellant’s 

answers to the military judge’s few questions about why she was 

being treated and what drugs she was taking supported, rather 

than contradicted, the defense. Further, the military judge did 

not inquire into the most detailed mental health information he 

possessed -– the mental health report submitted at sentencing. 

The report was prepared while Appellant was in treatment, and it 

is unclear to what extent the report was intended to address her 

mental state at the time of the offenses. The military judge 

could have determined through questioning whether the report was 

a psychiatric evaluation of Appellant’s mental responsibility at 

the time of her offenses, and the issue of timing might have 

disproved the defense, but the military judge did not ask any 

questions about the report. 

The military judge’s questions about Appellant’s competence 

to stand trial and the military judge’s personal observations of 

Appellant’s conduct at the court-martial did not negate the 

defense. Appellant’s mental state and conduct at the court-
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

11

martial, while she was in treatment and on numerous medications, 

did not demonstrate that Appellant was mentally responsible at 

the time of her offenses, which occurred before she received 

mental health treatment. 

Although the military judge touched upon the issue of 

mental responsibility when inquiring about whether Appellant 

understood her actions, the colloquy did not resolve the 

applicability of the mental responsibility defense. If 

Appellant had a severe mental disease or defect, her selfassessment of her understanding might have been flawed. In any 

case, Appellant’s personal answers did not represent a knowing 

waiver of the defense in the absence of information provided by 

the military judge about the defense. See Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 

310-11. 

The interchange between the military judge and defense 

counsel did not lessen the military judge’s duty to explain the 

defense to Appellant. Nothing in the record demonstrates that 

defense counsel considered the defense of lack of mental 

responsibility; and in any case, defense counsel’s obligation to 

consider possible defenses did not satisfy the military judge’s 

duty to conduct a proper providence inquiry directly with the 

accused. See Care, 18 C.M.A. at 541, 40 C.M.R. at 253. The 

providence inquiry centers on the special relationship between 

the accused and the military judge, not between the accused and 
United States v. Riddle, 08-0739/AR 

12

counsel. See id. This relationship requires the military judge 

to ensure that an accused’s pleas are provident before they may 

be accepted. See Phillippe, 63 M.J. at 309. 

Under these circumstances, the military judge abused his 

discretion by not completing the required plea inquiry in light 

of the possible defense raised during the plea colloquy. 

Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of 

Criminal Appeals.