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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41397/41398

A.T. "SANDY" PODSAID,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO OUTFITTERS AND 

GUIDES LICENSING BOARD, a State 

agency,

 Respondent.

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Lewiston, April 2015 Term

2015 Opinion No. 66

Filed: July 14, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Shoshone County. Hon. Fred M. Gibler, District Judge.

District court ruling in Idaho Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board decision, 

dismissed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Alene, for appellant. Susan P. Weeks 

argued. 

Michael Kane & Associates, Boise, for respondent. Michael J. Kane argued.

__________________________________

BURDICK, Chief Justice

This case consolidates two appeals from the Shoshone County district court. The first 

case arose from the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board’s decision to terminate A.T. 

“Sandy” Podsaid’s guide license on December 31, 2008, under the terms of a settlement 

agreement between Podsaid and the Board. The second case arose from the Board’s decision to 

treat Podsaid’s 2009 guide license renewal application as a new license application. Podsaid 

appealed both of the Board’s decisions to the Shoshone County district court, which affirmed 

both decisions, remanding the second case back to the Board. 

In the first appeal, the district court entered an order affirming the Board’s decision to 

terminate Podsaid’s 2008 license on December 31, 2008. In the second appeal, the district court 

determined that the Board properly treated Podsaid’s application as a new license application but 

remanded the case to the Board because the Board had not yet issued a final decision. Podsaid 

appeals both of the district court’s decisions to this Court. We dismiss the first case as moot. As 

to the second case, we affirm the district court’s decision that the Board properly treated the 
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2009–10 license application as a new application and remand to the Board for final agency 

action.

BACKGROUND

The Board first issued Podsaid a guide license in August 1986. Podsaid later obtained an 

outfitter license for his business, AW-Outfitters. In December 2005, Podsaid contracted to sell 

AW-Outfitters to Randall Parks. In conjunction with that transaction, both Podsaid and Parks 

applied to be outfitters in the area. After a February 2006 hearing, the Board decided to license 

Parks as the outfitter for that area and conducted an outfitter denial hearing for Podsaid. Over the 

next year, a number of administrative complaints were filed against Podsaid, he was issued a 

probationary guide license, the sale of Podsaid’s outfitter business to Parks fell through, and 

Podsaid sought a sole proprietor outfitter license. Podsaid and the Board ultimately entered into 

a settlement agreement to resolve all these issues in August 2007. Among the settlement’s terms 

was the following agreement as to Podsaid’s request for a sole-proprietor outfitter license for 

AW-Outfitters:

Upon signature by the parties on this Settlement Agreement, Respondent Podsaid 

shall be issued a restricted probationary sole proprietorship outfitter license (a 

sole proprietor outfitter license is also a guide license), as set forth below. 

The probation period for the outfitter license ran through March 31, 2008. The agreement further 

provided:

[Podsaid] may seek licensure as an outfitter from April 1, 2008 through December 

31, 2008. Upon receipt of a complete and valid license renewal application, the 

Board shall issue an Outfitters license effective from April 1, 2008 through 

December 31, 2008, subject to [the same probationary restrictions]. 

The next paragraph set forth the future of AW-Outfitters:

 It is the intent of the Board that if AW-Outfitters is not sold on or before 

December 31, 2008, the license shall terminate and the Board shall treat the area 

as a vacated area and shall open said area for a prospectus in accordance with all 

applicable statutes, rules, and regulations. If Respondent seeks an extension of the 

Outfitter license beyond December 31, 2008, the Board will only grant said 

extension if it is for the sole purpose of selling the Outfitter business and if 

Respondent has provided good cause for said extension. 

The Board adopted the settlement agreement in August 2007. 

Podsaid then entered into a contract to sell AW-Outfitters to Darren Thorne and

subsequently applied to amend his guide license to allow him to guide for Thorne. The Board 

held a regular meeting on June 26, 2008, at which it approved the sale of Podsaid’s outfitter 
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business, explained it would terminate Podsaid’s outfitter license upon the sale of the business, 

and permitted an amendment to Podsaid’s guide license to allow him to guide for Thorne, with 

the license to expire on December 31, 2008 as previously agreed in the August 2007 settlement. 

In April 2008, the Board issued Podsaid a paper copy of his guide license that listed the 

expiration date as March 31, 2009.

After Podsaid learned that the Board claimed his guide license expired on December 31, 

2008, he requested reconsideration, and the Board again affirmed his license would terminate on 

December 31, 2008. Podsaid appealed that decision and filed a motion to stay the Board’s order. 

The district court granted Podsaid’s motion for temporary stay. That stay was lifted in May of 

2011.

While Podsaid was contesting his guide license’s expiration date, he applied, in 

December 2008, to renew his guide license for the 2009–10 license year; he amended this 

application March 30, 2009. The Board sent Podsaid notice of a June 17, 2009, hearing regarding 

the application. Podsaid did not participate in that hearing. On June 24, the Board’s attorneys

sent Podsaid a letter informing him of the results of that hearing: that the Board decided to treat 

the application as a new license application and that the Board had voted to deny the application. 

The letter also informed Podsaid that he had 21 days in which to request a hearing on the 

decision. Podsaid did timely request such a hearing but shortly thereafter filed the petition for 

judicial review.

Ultimately, the district court held a hearing in April 2013, concluding that “the Board’s 

interpretation as to Podsaid’s guide license expiring on December 31st of 2008 was correct.” The 

court also upheld the Board’s decision that Podsaid’s 2009 application was for a new license but 

remanded the matter to the Board for a hearing on the denial of the application. Podsaid timely 

appealed both cases. 

The issues on this appeal are 1) whether the Board properly terminated Podsaid’s guide 

license on December 31, 2008 and 2) whether the Board properly treated Podsaid’s application 

as a new license application. Each party also seeks attorney fees on appeal.

ANALYSIS

Podsaid argues first that the district court erred in ruling that the Board properly 

terminated his guide license on December 31, 2008, and second that the district court erred in 

finding that the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in treating his 2009 license renewal 
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request as a new license application. We dismiss the first issue as moot and affirm the district 

court’s decision and remand to the agency as to the second issue.

Judicial review of the Board’s action is governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure 

Act (“IDAPA”). I.C. §§ 67–5270(1), 36-2115. On an appeal of agency action from the district 

court, we review the district court’s decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues 

presented to it. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 

(2011) (quoting Wright v. Board of Psychological Examiners, 148 Idaho 542, 544–45, 224 P.3d 

1131, 1133–34 (2010)). We review the Board record “to determine whether there is substantial 

and competent evidence to support the [Board]'s findings of fact and whether the [Board]'s 

conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the 

conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the [Board]'s decision, we affirm 

the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 

Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho 584, 587, 237 P.3d 1210, 1213 (2010) 

(quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). This Court 

exercises free review over questions of law. Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate 

Appraisers, 157 Idaho 496, 502, 337 P.3d 655, 661 (2014). Statutory interpretation is a question 

of law subject to free review. Id.

A. Whether the district court properly affirmed the Board’s termination of Podsaid’s 

guide license on December 31, 2008.

Podsaid argues that his guide license was valid until March 31, 2009, as indicated on the 

paper copy he received. The Board argues this issue is moot because Podsaid was, in fact, able to 

guide through March 31, 2009. 

Whether an appeal is moot is a question of jurisdiction and may be raised at any time. 

Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012). A case is moot if the 

party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or “if it does not present a real and 

substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific 

relief.” Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 96, 320 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2014).

In June 2008, when the Board approved the sale of Podsaid’s outfitter business, it also 

noted his guide license would expire on December 31, 2008. After the Board reconsidered and 

reaffirmed that decision, Podsaid appealed to the district court and moved for a stay of the 

Board’s order. The court granted the stay. The court did not issue an order lifting that stay until 
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May 3, 2011. It is clear that what Podsaid wanted from his district court appeal—that his guide 

license be valid through March 31, 2009—is exactly what happened here. When the court 

granted the stay of his appeal, Podsaid received the remedy he sought. As a result, he no longer 

had a cognizable interest in the outcome of the proceeding, and this Court cannot provide him 

any further relief than the district court’s stay already gave him. Therefore, Podsaid’s first case is 

dismissed as moot.

B. Whether the district court properly affirmed the Board’s treatment of Podsaid’s 

2009 application as a new license application.

Podsaid filed an application to renew his guide license in December 2008, applying to 

guide for Scott Boulanger, who withdrew the application on February 23, 2009. On March 30, 

2009, Podsaid reapplied to guide for Boulanger, listing snowmobiling and hunting as his 

activities. The Board had terminated Podsaid’s license December 31, 2008, having properly 

interpreted the plain terms of its settlement agreement with Podsaid outlining that Podsaid’s 

license would expire when he sold his outfitter license or, if he did not sell it, on December 31, 

2008.1 The Board thus decided to treat Podsaid’s 2009 application as a new license application. 

The Board argues that Podsaid failed to exhaust his administrative remedies following the 

denial of his application and therefore judicial review is improper. While admitting the agency’s 

action was not final, Podsaid argues that the Board took an appealable action when it approved a 

motion to deny his guide license application at a June 17, 2009, meeting and informed him of the 

action through a statutorily required letter. The Board argues the letter is not agency action.

Idaho Code defines “agency action” as: “(a) The whole or part of a rule or order; (b) The 

failure to issue a rule or order; or (c) An agency’s performance of, or failure to perform, any duty 

placed on it by law.” I. C. § 67-5201(3). The Board had a statutory duty to inform Podsaid in 

writing of his license denial: 

 1 The legislature has provided as follows:

[t]he Board is expressly vested with the power and the authority to enforce the provisions of this 

chapter including obtaining injunctive relief and to make and enforce any and all reasonable rules 

which shall by it be deemed necessary and which are not in conflict with the provisions of this 

chapter....

I.C. § 36-2107(d). The language “expressly vested with the power and authority to enforce the provisions of this 

chapter” is a broad grant of power that plainly gives the Board the ability to interpret restrictions in a probationary 

license so as to enforce those restrictions. Enforcing restrictions would necessarily include determining what the 

settlement agreement’s terms were. Therefore, the Board had the power to interpret the terms of its own settlement 

agreement.
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If the application is denied, the board shall notify the applicant, in writing, of the 

reasons for such denial within ten (10) days and if the applicant shall correct, to 

the satisfaction of the board, such reasons within thirty (30) days of receipt of 

such notice and if, thereafter, a majority of the board concur, the board may issue 

a license to the applicant.

I.C. § 36-2109(c). The Board acted according to a duty placed on it by law when it denied 

Podsaid’s license application and it informed him of that denial by letter, so the letter was agency 

action. 

Idaho Code section 67-5270, however, limits judicial review to final agency action and 

an agency’s final orders in a contested case. I.C. § 67-5270 (2), (3). A person is not entitled to 

judicial review of an agency action until he has exhausted all administrative remedies. I.C. § 67-

5271(1). In this case, the Board did not take final agency action because Podsaid still has an 

appeal process available within the agency regarding the denial of his license application. Idaho 

Code section 36-2114(b) allows a guide license applicant 21 days after he receives notice of 

Board denial to request a hearing. Podsaid requested this hearing, but appealed before the Board 

conducted the hearing. Thus, Podsaid did not exhaust his administrative remedies. 

This Court has recognized two exceptions allowing judicial review despite the failure to 

exhaust remedies: “(a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when the agency acted 

outside its authority.” Wanner v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 150 Idaho 164, 169, 244 P.3d 1250, 

1255 (2011). Podsaid’s argument that the interests of justice require a review seems to generally 

be an argument that the Board acted beyond its authority, so we will examine whether the Board 

acted outside its authority to determine whether judicial review is appropriate.

Podsaid argues that his guide license was a continuing license governed by IDAPA’s 

procedures. He argues that because it was a continuing license and he had a pending appeal on 

the license’s expiration, Idaho Code section 67-5254 required the Board to process his license 

renewal application as a contested case, not as a licensing examination, and thus the Board acted 

outside its authority. 

A new license application does not require a contested case proceeding. I.C. § 36-2108. 

However, a license that is suspended or non-renewed must go through contested case 

proceedings. I.C. § § 36-2115, 67-5254. Section 67-5254(2) provides that when a licensee timely 

and sufficiently applies to renew a license for any activity of a continuing nature, the existing 

license does not expire until the agency finally determines the application.
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To determine whether the district court properly found that the Board had not exceeded 

its authority, then, this Court must determine whether the legislature provided that guide licenses 

were continuing licenses. “Continuing” means “uninterrupted; persisting” and “not requiring 

renewal; enduring.” Black’s Law Dictionary 388 (10th ed. 2014). One section of the statute 

provides: 

No license shall be issued by the board until a majority thereof has reported 

favorably thereon; except, an application for a license identical to a license held 

during the previous year may be issued on approval by one (1) board member 

providing there is not adverse information on file regarding the applicant.

I.C. § 36-2109(d). 

However, other statutory provisions indicate that a guide’s license is not a continuing 

license. The statute defines “license year” as the “period of time beginning on the date an 

outfitter’s or guide’s license is issued and ending on the anniversary of the date of issuance in the 

following year.” I.C. § 36-2102(g). Further, the section titled “Form and Term of license” 

provides that a majority of the Board may issue a license to an applicant “in the form prescribed 

by the board,” which “shall be valid for the year issued from the date issued and shall expire on 

March 31 of the following year.” I.C. 36-2109(a). This language expressly contemplates that the 

license will expire each year, and thus the applicant may reapply.

In this case, the license is not uninterrupted. Podsaid was guiding for a different outfitter, 

in a different area, with one new activity added, so it was not an identical license as 

contemplated by Idaho Code section 36-2019(d). While the hunting activity was consistent with 

Podsaid’s prior license, nothing else in the 2009 application continued. Therefore, Podsaid’s 

guide license was not a license of a continuing nature. As such, the Board was not required to 

provide contested case procedures. The 2009 application was properly treated as one for a new 

license, and we affirm the district court on this ruling. Because Podsaid did not complete his 

appeal process within the agency on the denial of that application, we remand to the agency so 

that Podsaid may pursue those remedies if he chooses. 

C. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

The district court did not address Podsaid’s attorney fees request because Podsaid was 

not the prevailing party in the district court. Podsaid argues that he was entitled to an attorney 

fees award in the district court in both cases under Idaho Code section 12-117 because the Board 

did not properly process his renewal application:
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Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 

parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 

political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 

shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and other 

reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a 

reasonable basis in fact or law.

I.C. § 12-117(1). Podsaid was not the prevailing party in the district court, so he was not entitled 

to attorney fees. Podsaid also argues he is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because the Board 

acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact, and the Board also requests attorney fees on 

appeal. Podsaid did not prevail but we are unable to conclude that he unreasonably pursued this 

appeal, so neither party is entitled to attorney fees. Costs are awarded to the State.

CONCLUSION

Podsaid’s first case, regarding the termination in 2008 of his guide license, is dismissed 

as moot. As to his second case, the district court’s decision affirming the Board’s decision to 

treat Podsaid’s 2009 guide license application as a new license application is affirmed, and the

case is remanded to the Board. Costs are awarded to Respondent.

Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.