J-A11039-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SEAN PATRICK SELLERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1122 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 3, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000339-2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 31, 2017

Appellant, Sean Patrick Sellers, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County after a jury 

convicted him of Criminal Attempt, First Degree Murder, and other offenses 

occurring on the day the 16 year-old stole a firearm, a vehicle, and later 

fired multiple gunshots at a Pennsylvania State Trooper during a routine 

traffic stop. Appellant challenges the court’s order denying his pretrial 

motion to decertify the case to the juvenile system and its exercise of 

discretion in imposing standard range sentences, run consecutively, to form 

a 14-year aggregate sentence. We affirm.

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The trial court aptly summarizes the procedural history of the present 

matter as follows:

The instant matter stems from a routine traffic stop that 

occurred on January 26, 2014. On that date, Trooper Donn Reid 

of the Pennsylvania State Police filed a Police Criminal Complaint 

alleging the Defendant [hereinafter “Appellant”] committed a 

number of offenses, including Attempt Murder of the First 

Degree.

On March 24, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an Information 

charging Appellant with nine counts. These counts included 

Criminal Attempt Murder of the First Degree, Criminal Attempt—

Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer, Aggravated Assault—

Attempted Serious Bodily Injury, Aggravated Assault—Attempt 

to Put Enumerated Officials in Fear, Simple Assault—Bodily 

Injury Attempted, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 

Firearms Not to Be Carried Without a License, and two counts of 

Theft.[fn]

[fn] 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a) to 2502(a), 901(a) to 2507(a), 

2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(6), 2701(a), 2705, 6106(a)(1), and 

3921(a), respectively.

On October 6, 2014, Appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion 

to Transfer Case to Juvenile Division. On October 8, 2014, the 

court[] entered an Order directing the Commonwealth to respond 

within 14 days. On October 20, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a 

Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, which the court 

granted on October 24, 2014. On November 5, 2014, the 

Commonwealth filed its Answer to Defendant’s Motion to 

Transfer Case to Juvenile Division. . . . On December 10, 2014, 

the court entered an Order setting a hearing on Appellant’s 

Motion to Transfer Case to Juvenile Division for January 29, 

2015.

On January 21, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion for Pre-Hearing 

Conference on Transfer Motion, which the court granted on 

January 22, 2015; a Pre-Hearing Conference was held on 

January 29, 2015. The court held the Pre-Hearing Conference as 

scheduled and rescheduled the transfer hearing for Friday, March 
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13, 2015. On March 11, 2015, Appellant filed a Joint Motion for 

Pre-Hearing Review of Exhibits which the court granted on March 

12, 2015. The court held the hearing on the Transfer Motion as 

scheduled on March 13, 2015. On March 16, 2015, the court 

entered an Order denying Appellant’s Motion to Transfer Case to 

Juvenile Division.

After a number of continuances and other collateral motions, this 

matter was scheduled for trial by jury. The trial was held as 

scheduled on Wednesday, January 20, 2016. On January 21, 

2016, during the second day of the trial, Appellant ple[d] guilty 

to [Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License and two counts 

of Theft]. At the conclusion of the evidence on January 21, 

2016, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the remaining six 

counts.

On March 3, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate 

period of incarceration of 168 to 344 months in a state 

correctional institute. On the same date, the court granted 

Steve Rice, Esq., leave to withdraw from the matter and 

appointed the Franklin County Public Defender’s Office to 

represent Appellant. On March 8, 2016, Appellant, through 

counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Deadline to File PostSentence Motions, which the court granted on March 9, 2016.

On April 4, 2016, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion for 

Modification of Sentence[, which the court denied on June 15, 

2016.]

On July 11, 2016, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. On July 12, 

2016, the court entered an Order directing Appellant to file a 

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

...

On July 26, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal[, and, on August 22, 2016, 

filed a court-approved amended concise statement raising the 

two issues presented here on appeal.]

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/25/15, at 2-6.

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
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I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO AN AGGREGATE 

SENTENCE OF 168 TO 344 MONTHS IN A STATE 

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, WHICH IS AT THE 

TOP OF THE STANDARD RANGE OF SENTENCES FOR 

EACH CRIME AND FAILS TO CONSIDER THE 

MITIGATING FACTORS PRESENT IN THIS CASE SUCH 

AS APPELLANT’S AGE AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE 

AND APPELLANT’S LACK OF A PRIOR CRIMINAL 

RECORD?

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO 

TRANSFER CASE TO JUVENILE DIVISION BECAUSE 

APPELLANT PROVIDED THE COURT WITH 

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 

PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 

THAT TRANSFER IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE HE 

WOULD BE AMENABLE TO TREATMENT, 

SUPERVISION OR REHABILITATION AS A JUVENILE?

Appellant’s brief at 18.

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by including in his brief a 

separate concise statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the 

appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing Code. 

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 
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the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912–13 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa.Super. 1999) 

(en banc). A bald allegation of excessiveness does not present a substantial 

question. Mouzon, supra. Additionally, a court's refusal to weigh proposed 

mitigating factors as the defendant wishes, absent more, does not raise a 

substantial question. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.Super. 

2010).

Moreover: 

Long standing precedent of this Court recognizes that 42 

Pa.C.S.A. section 9721 affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other 

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences 

already imposed. Commonwealth v. Graham, 541 Pa. 173, 

184, 661 A.2d 1367, 1373 (1995).... Any challenge to the 

exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial 

question. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 873 A.2d 704, 709 n. 2 

(Pa.Super. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 

A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa.Super. 1995) (explaining that a defendant 

is not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ for his or her crimes).

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa.Super. 

2010).

Appellant received top-end standard range sentences, which the court 

ran consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 168 to 344 months’ 

incarceration. He was 18 years, 4 months old at the time of sentencing. He 

will be 32 when he is first eligible for release from prison.

In Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, he challenges the court’s 

exercise of discretion where he had no prior history of violent offenses, his 

victim escaped serious injury, a medical expert opined that he was amenable 
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to rehabilitation, and the pre-sentence investigation report recommended an 

aggregate sentence of 105 to 210 months. He maintains, further, that the 

court’s significant departure from the PSI recommendation, which 

considered various mitigating factors, reflected the court’s failure to consider 

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, such that the sentence runs contrary to 

fundamental sentencing norms. 

We hold that, under the circumstances, Appellant has presented a 

substantial question for review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parlante,

823 A.2d 927, 929–930 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding allegations that court 

imposed disproportionate sentence and did not consider proper sentencing 

factors raised substantial question). Therefore, we consider the merits of 

Appellant's appeal of the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Though adequate to raise a threshold-level substantial question for our 

review, Appellant fails to show that the trial court’s standard range 

sentences were inconsistent with the gravity of the offense, the protection of 

the public, or Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. With respect to the last 

sentencing consideration, Appellant argues that the court altogether 

disregarded Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. 

The record, however, belies Appellant’s claim. At sentencing, the 

court’s observations, stated on the record, reflected a consideration of 

Appellant’s individual circumstances, both aggravating and mitigating, before 

it imposed sentence. See N.T., Sentencing Hearing, pp. 31-36. The court 
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acknowledged having the benefit of the PSI report and listened to 

Appellant’s statement to the victim and to the court. It noted his difficult 

childhood and his commendable efforts to improve himself during his lengthy 

pre-trial incarceration. 

On balance of all considerations, the court determined that a fourteenyear sentence comprising consecutively run sentences was fair and 

reasonable, and we discern no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. We 

note, further, that the imposition of consecutive, standard range sentences 

do not amount to a virtual life sentence, as Appellant will be eligible for 

parole at age 32.1

Next, Appellant assails the court’s order denying his motion for 

decertification to juvenile court. We observe that trial courts have broad 

discretion in determining whether to grant decertification, and this Court will 

not reverse that determination absent a “gross abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 10 A.3d 336, 338 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

____________________________________________

1 To the extent Appellant’s discretionary aspects argument focuses 

exclusively on the imposition of consecutive sentences, we refer to our wellsettled jurisprudence, cited supra, that a sentencing court has discretion to 

impose consecutive sentences, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, and that “the 

imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a 

substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where 

the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes 

and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 

365, 372 (Pa.Super. 2012). Moreover, the imposition of an aggregate 

minimum sentence of 14 years is not manifestly excessive given the totality 

of circumstances present in the instant case. 
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Although the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court 

consider all of the amenability factors, it is silent as to the 

weight that should be assessed to each factor. The ultimate 

decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is 

within the sole discretion of a decertification court. A 

decertification court must consider all the facts set forth in § 

6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address, seriatim, the 

applicability and importance of each factor and fact in reaching 

its final determination.

Id.

[A] juvenile seeking decertification has the burden of proving by 

the preponderance of the evidence that the transfer to juvenile 

court is warranted. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322; Commonwealth v. 

Cotto, 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217 (2000) (the Juvenile Act 

provides a mechanism for a minor to prove to the court that he 

does not belong in criminal court via § 6322). “The propriety of 

whether charges should be prosecuted in the juvenile court or 

adult court system implicates jurisdictional concerns.” Hughes,

supra, 865 A.2d at 776. Nonetheless, when the crime involved 

is one excluded from the Juvenile Act's definition of a delinquent 

crime, the charge is automatically within the jurisdiction of the 

criminal court and jurisdiction is presumptively proper. Id. at 

777, citing Commonwealth v. Kocher, 529 Pa. 303, 602 A.2d 

1308, 1310 (1992) and Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 

342 A.2d 101, 106–107 (1975), superseded by statute.

Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 842 (Pa.Super. 2016), 

reargument denied (Nov. 23, 2016).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act excludes attempted murder and 

aggravated assault from the definition of delinquent act where, as in this 

case, a deadly weapon was used. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, “Delinquent Act” 

(2)(ii)(C) and (2)(iii)(I). Pursuant to § 6322 of the Juvenile Act, therefore, it 

was presumptively proper to commence prosecution of Appellant’s offenses 
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in the court of common pleas criminal division rather than in juvenile court. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. 6322(a). 

Section 6322(a) provides, however, that such a prosecution can be 

transferred from criminal court to juvenile court in some circumstances:

In determining whether to transfer a case charging murder or 

any of the offenses excluded from the definition of ‘delinquent 

act’ in section 6302, the child shall be required to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the 

public interest. In determining whether the child has so 

established that the transfer will serve the public interest, the 

court shall consider the factors contained in section 

6355(a)(4)(iii) (relating to transfer to criminal proceedings).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). 

In turn, § 6355(a)(4)(iii) provides numerous factors a court must 

consider in deciding a decertification motion. These factors are:

(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

(B) the impact of the offense on the community;

(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual 

posed by the child;

(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly 

committed by the child;

(E) the degree of the child's culpability;

(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives 

available under this chapter and in the adult criminal 

justice system; and

(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or 

rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following 

factors:

(I) age;

(II) mental capacity;

(III) maturity;

(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited 

by the child;

(V) previous records, if any;
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(VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent 

history, including the success or failure of any 

previous attempts by the juvenile court to 

rehabilitate the child;

(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to 

the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;

(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;

(IX) any other relevant factors; and

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A-G).

Simply citing some factors which, standing alone, could support 

decertification does not establish the gross abuse of discretion required to 

reverse a court's order refusing to decertify a case. Cf Commonwealth v. 

Potts, 449 Pa.Super. 306, 673 A.2d 956, 958 (1996) (recognizing a gross 

abuse of discretion is not demonstrated by merely reciting facts of record 

that would support a result contrary to the court's actual decision.”) (citation 

omitted). “When evaluating the propriety of a certification decision, absent 

evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must presume that the juvenile 

court carefully considered the entire record.” Commonwealth v. Jackson,

722 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Pa. 1999).

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion contains a thoughtful and 

cogent discussion of the Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) considerations it made in 

reaching its decision to deny decertification. As we discern no gross abuse 

of discretion in the court’s determination, which finds support in the record,2

we reject Appellant’s claim. 

____________________________________________

2 The decertification hearing took place 14 months after the attempted 

shooting. Regarding Factor A, concerning the impact on the victim, Trooper 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Quinn described being in a state of shock for a few days after the attempted 

shooting. After that, he testified, he was in “a continued state of shock [for 

some time]. Kind of not scared mentality to work but just a fear, a different 

fear that I’d never felt before....just fearing that happening again on a traffic 

stop.” N.T., Decertification Hearing, at p.8. He also felt isolated from 

others, a condition he says contributed to his break-up with his fiancee’ and 

caused difficulties with more veteran co-workers. N.T. at 10. He had 

frequent nightmares, which still occur, but less frequently, 14 months later 

at the time of his testimony. It affected how he approached vehicles, but he 

claimed he was getting progressively better to the point now that he no 

longer experienced fear on the job. N.T. at 20-22.

Regarding Factor E, the Degree of the Child’s Culpability, the patrol car video 

shows that Appellant conduct of firing multiple shots at the uniformed 

Trooper was unprovoked.

Regarding Factor F, Adequacy and Duration of Dispositional Alternatives in 

Juvenile and in the Adult Criminal System, the court found “little evidence” 

that treatment options afforded in the juvenile justice system were 

unavailable in criminal justice system.

Regarding Factor G, Amenability to Treatment Efforts, the court noted that 

Appellant’s remaining eligibility for juvenile system treatment amounted to 

only 3 years before he aged out at 21 years old. Dr. Taylor said treatment 

for that short span of time may be effective. She said he would benefit from 

a lengthy period of time in a “caring, consistent program.” 

The trial court concedes that Factor G weighed slightly in favor of granting

Appellant’s petition for decertification. However, given the short time 

available for juvenile system treatment and the severity of Appellant’s 

offenses—“some of the most severe in the law”—the court found Appellant 

could not meet his burden of proving that decertification was appropriate 

when all factors were considered. Trial Court Opinion at 16.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/2017