J. S30021/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

RENALDO A. ROBICHAW, : No. 2746 EDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, August 14, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0005784-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. AND JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 16, 2015

Appellant appeals his conviction for third degree murder and 

possession of an instrument of crime.1 Finding no error below, we affirm.

On January 28, 2013, appellant killed a roommate at their apartment 

in Philadelphia with a single stab wound through the heart. Appellant was 

convicted by bench trial on June 5, 2013, and sentenced to 18 to 36 years’ 

imprisonment plus 5 years’ probation on August 14, 2014.

On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support a conviction for third degree murder in that the evidence of malice 

was insufficient or that the Commonwealth failed to adequately disprove 

self-defense. Appellant also challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 907(b), respectively.
J. S30021/15

- 2 -

sentence, arguing that the court failed to give adequate weight to appellant’s 

age and physical and mental disabilities.

We find no error with the trial court’s holding. After a thorough review 

of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the 

well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, it is our determination that there is 

no merit to the questions raised on appeal. Judge Rose Marie 

DeFino-Nastasi’s meticulous, 15-page opinion, filed on January 26, 2015, 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. We will adopt it as our own and affirm on that basis.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/16/2015
on Appeal, pursuant to an order of the court directing counsel to file a 1925(b) statement. 

On November l 8, 2014, Defendant's counsel filed a Statement of Matters Complained of 

Pennsylvania. 

On September 30, 20 l 4, the Defendant filed the instant appeal to the Superior Court of 

hearing. 

On September 3, 2014, the court denied the Defendant's Post Trial Motion without a 

conviction, to run consecutively. N.T. 8/14/14 at 23:4-10. 

years for the Third Degree Murder conviction, and five (5) years probation for the PIC 

On August 14, 2014, the Defendant was sentenced to eighteen ( 18) to thirty-six (36) 

as a misdemeanor of the first degree. Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 4/24/14 at p. 44. 

felony of the first degree; and Possession ofan Instrument of Crime (PIC), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b), 

On June 5, 2013, the Defendant was found guilty after a bench trial, presided over by the 

Honorable Rose Marie Defino-Nastasi, ofThird DeJee Murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c), as a 

PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 

Rose Marie Defino-Nastasi, J. 

OPINION 

FILED 

JAN 2 6 2015 

Criminal t\ppeals Unit 

First Judicial District of PA 

11111111 I 11/1 / IIII Ill Ill 

7249967091 

RENALDO ROBICHA W 

CP·Sl~R-00057..,_2013 Coo,m •· ~Nc/lNI, Reooldo~ 

V. 0po,,... 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0005784-2013 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

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Monday, January 28, 20 I J. id at pp. 31-32. She also testified that the next time she saw the 

Mrs. McDonald testified that the last time she saw the decedent was the morning of 

yow- fuckin' ass before you bleed to death." Id at 28:20-23. 

walked outside, unchained his bicycle, and exclaimed loudly: "You better hope somebody finds 

Defendant's home. id at p. 28. Mrs. McDonald testified that after the thump, the Defendant 

boom. Id at p. 26. The thump sounded like it came from the second-floor, front room of the 

Mrs. McDonald beard a thump against the wall between the Defendant's home and hers, then a 

and 11 :00 P.M. on January 28, 2013. After approximately six (6) to ten (l 0) minutes of arguing, 

Mrs. McDonald heard the Defendant and another person arguing loudly between I 0:00 

testified that she constantly heard arguing from the Defendant's residence. Id. at p. 30, 34. 

voice and sounded like a female wben he yelled. N.T. 4/23/14 at pp. 22-24. Mrs. McDonald 

murder. Mrs. McDonald referred to the Defendant as "Squeaky," because he had a high pitched 

Deaitra McDonald testified that sbe lived next door to the Defendant at the time of the 

and three quarter (5 ~) inches deep. Id at p. 95. The manner of death was homicide. Id at p. 94. 

. " 

was a stab wound to the chest. N.T. 4/23/14 at p. 93-94. The stab wound was approximately five 

The Medical Examiner, Dr. Aaron Rosen, determined that the decedent's cause of death 

decedent's room. 

Defendant and cousin of the decedent) discovered the decedent's body on the floor of the 

(roommate of the Defendant and the decedent) and Timothy Robichaw (nephew of the 

The decedent was found dead in his room on Wednesday, January 30, 20J3. Kevin Parker 

roommate, Albert Benjamin Smith, inside their home in the Carroll Park section of Philadelphia 

On Monday, January 28, 2013, Defendant Renaldo Robichaw stabbed and killed his 

FACTS 

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I Mr. Parker incorrectly testified that Tim Robicbaw is the Defendant's uncle. Id at p. 56, 127. 

Defendant was on Wednesday, January 30, 2013, when the police came to the Defendant's 

home. Mrs. McDonald spoke to police that evening and conveyed everything that she had heard. 

Id. atpp. 34-35. 

Ann McDonald, the daughter of Deaitra, testified that she also Ii ves next door to the 

Defendant. Sometime before midnight on January 28, 2013, Ms. McDonald heard the Defendant 

arguing with someone, but did not recognize the other voice. Id. at p. 45. She testified that she 

heard the Defendant say, "You all better stop f'ing with me or they are going to find you dead in 

here." N.T. 4/23/14 at pp. 43-44. 

Kevin Parker testified that he lived at 165 l North 60th Street with the Defendant and the 

decedent for approximately a year-and-a-half. N.T. 4/23/14 at p. 55. He paid rent to the 

Defendant's nephew, Tim Robichaw.1 Id. at p. 56. Mr. Parker testified that the Defendant and the 

decedent argued off-and-on. The Defendant would tell the decedent that the decedent was getting 

on the Defendant's nerves. Id. at pp. 57-58. 

Mr. Parker testified that he was in his room when he beard the Defendant and the 

decedent arguing and yeJling around 12 A.M. on Monday, January 28, 2013. Mr. Parker testified 

that the decedent said to the Defendant, "If you don't leave me alone, I'm going to go back in my 

room." The Defendant responded, "If you don't get out ofmy room, 1 will hurt you." Id. at p. 59. 

Mr. Parker gave two statements to homicide detectives. Mr: Parker testified that he did 

not tell homicide detectives that he had heard the Defendant arid the decedent arguing when he 

gave his initial statement on Wednesday, January 30, 2013. Id. at p. 78-80. Nor did he tell 

detectives about finding the decedent's body on the floor of the decedent's room. Id. at p. 80. Mr. 

Parker was afraid the detectives might think that he had some involvement in the decedent's 

death. Id at pp. 80-81. 

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Detectives took a second statement from Mr. Parker on Thursday, January 31, 2013. /d. 

at p. 81. Mr. Parker then told detectives that when the Defendant retumed home.Monday 

evening, the Defendant.started yelling and went "on a rampage.'.' Id. at p. 112 .. The Defendant 

was yelling comments like, "I'm sick of y'all mother fuckers" and "i°'m really sick of you, Al 

[the decedent], you crack-head mother fucker." Id: at p. 82. 

The decedent came out of his room and walked to the Defendant's room. Mr. Parker 

could hear the decedent tell the Defendant that he was tired of being called names, and that the 

Defendant had to stop yelling and screaming. The Defendant then yelled at the decedent, "If you 

don't leave my room, I will hurt you, you mother fucker." The decedent responded to the 

Defendant, "Well do what you got to do." Id. at pp. 111. 

Mr. Parker heard the decedent walk back to his room. Id. at pp. 110-12; Commonwealth 

Exhibit 5. He-then heard the Defendant call 911. Minutes later, Mr. Parker heard the Defendant 

call the police again and tell them not to come. Id. at pp. 61-63, 87-91. Mr. Parker testified that 

the Defendant and the decedent continued to argue between the first 911 call and the second 911 

call. Id at p. 89. 

Mr. Parker left the house to tell Tim Robichaw that the Defendant and the decedent were 

yelling at each other. Id. at pp. 60-61. He testified that he did so because he did not want to get in 

the middle of their argument. Tim told Mr. Parker not to worry about it. id at pp. 66-67. 

Mr. Parker testified that he did not return to the house until Wednesday afternoon, 

January 30, 2013. Jd. at pp. 66-68. Mr. Parker saw the Defendant, but did not ask the Defendant 

where the decedent was. Id. at p. 7 J. Mr. Parker saw that the decedent's door was. open a crack; 

the decedent's door was usually kept shut. Id. at pp. 73-74. Mr. Parker peeked in the decedent's 

room, looked down, and saw a foot and part of a leg. Id at p. 86. Mr. Parker knew something 

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was wrong, so he went to speak with Tim. He. did not tell Timwhat he saw. Mr. Parker and Tim 

went back to the house, walked upstairs, and found the decedent's body. Id. at pp. 69-70. Tim 

called the police. Id at pp. 77-79. 

Mr. Parker testified that the Defendant had. a backpack on and was getting ready to leave 

the house on bis bike as the police arrived. Id.. 

Crime scene photos taken of the scene showed a mark on the decedent' s door. Mr. Parker 

testified that the mark was the result of an argument between the Defendant an.~ the decedent that 

occurred one month prior to the stabbing. The Defendant was chasing the decedent with 

nunchucks./d atp. 108-09. 

Timothy Robichaw testified that the Defendant is his uncle and the decedent was his 

cousin. N.T. 4/23/14 at p. 127. Tim saw the decedent every day because the decedent would 

sometimes work with him. The decedent worked with him on Monday, January 28, 2013. Id. at . 

p. 130. Mr. Parker came to Tim's house that Monday evening and told him that the Defendant 

and the decedent were arguing. Mr. Parker would come to Tim when there were problems 

between the Defendant and the decedent. id. at p. 128-30. Tim told Mr. Parker not to worry 

about it because they were always fighting. Id. 

Tim did not see the d~cedent on Tuesday, January 29, 2013. Id at p. 130. 

Tim testified that Mr. Parker came to his house on Wednesday, January 30, 2013, and 

asked if Tim had seen the decedent. Tim rep Lied that he had not and told Mr. Parker to knock on 

the decedent's door. Mr. Parker left and when he.returned, Mr. Parker told Tim that the decedent 

did not answer. id. at p. 131. Mr. Parker and Tim went back to the house together. When they 

arrived, Mr. Parker stopped at the door and told Tim to go upstairs. Tim went to the decedent's 

room and saw that the door to the decedent's room was open a crack. Tim tried to push the door 

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open, but it was blocked; he looked down and saw a foot. Tim called the decedent's name and 

when the decedent did not respond, Tim called 911. Id. at pp. 131-32. 

Firemen arrived and went to the decedent's room. Id at p. 133-34. Tim stayed on the 

front porch. While the firemen were upstairs, the Defendant came out of the house with a 

backpack on and grabbed his bicycle from the front porch. Id. at p. 134-35. Tim .told the 

Defendant that Mr. Parker had told him about the fight between the Defendant and the decedent. 

The Defendant replied that everything was cool, and that the decedent and he had squashed it. Id. 

at p. 135-36. 

Tim immediately told Sergeant Francis Kelly that the Defendant lives there, that the 

Defendant had just come from upstairs, and not to let the Defendant leave. Id. at pp. 136, 152. 

The Defendant and Tim were taken to the police station at 8th and Race Street. Before 

they left, Tim asked the Defendant why he was taking his backpack. Id. at p. I 37. Sergeant Kelly 

told the Defendant that he did not have to bring his backpack.to the station. Since the Defendant 

was not permitted to go back into the house, Tim put the Defendant's backpack in his truck. Id 

The Defendant and Tim were transported to the police station and gave statements to detectives. 

After Tim gave his statement, he went home and realized that the Defendant's backpack 

was still in his trunk. Tim looked inside the backpack and saw that there was a knife in it. Id at 

p. 138. Tim called homicide detectives to let them know about the backpack and the knife. Tim 

brought the backpack and the knife to the police station; he did not touch the knife at any point. 

Id. at p. 140. Tim testified that upon his arrival at the police station, one of the officers told him 

that the Defendant had confessed. Id at pp. 137-40. 

Detective John Harkins read the Defendant's statement at trial. Id. at pp. 165-73. 

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Toe Defendant yelled back at the decedent that there was something wrong with the decedent; 

decedent came lo the top of the steps inside the house and yelled something at the Defendant. 

The Defendant got his bicycle and went outside. As the Defendant was leaving, the 

could not be cancelled. Id. 

not to come. Id. at p. 176. Toe 911 operator stated to the Defendant that his call to the police 

Defendant that he bad been stabbed. Id. at p. 176. Tue· Defendant called 911 and told the police 

down and walked back to his room. Id at pp. 175-76. The decedent did not state to the 

and poked the decedent. When the Defendant pushed the decedent back, the decedent calmed 

Defendant put his hands up and blocked the decedent. The Defendant had the knife in his hand 

When the Defendant picked up the knife, the decedent lunged at him. Jd. at p. 175. The 

The Defendant picked up a steak knife to cut oranges while he waited for the police. 

decedent was smoking crack and drinking beer. Id at p. 175. 

that the decedent was screaming and jumping back and forth, and that it seemed like the 

. . . 

and closed. The decedent was getting angry, so the Defendant called 911. The Defendant stated 

screamed at the Defendant, because the Defendant would slam his (the Defendant's) door open 

The decedent came out of his room and went to the Defendant's room. The decedent 

lights. 

stabbing. Id. at p. 174. The Defendant went upstairs and started yelling at the decedent about the 

The lights were off when the Defendant returned home around 9:00 P.M. on the night of the 

the lights in the house off at night, and the Defendant could not see when he would return home. 

Defendant stated that he would argue with Mr. Parker and the decedent because they would tum 

The Defendant recounted the events prior to the stabbing in his statement to police. The 

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Issue I 

In his Rule 1925(b) statement, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to sustain his conviction for third degree murder, "given the fact that [the] incident in 

question occurred in the course of a heated argument in which the victim was both belligerent 

and the aggressor." 

The Defendant is essentially arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove the element 

of malice necessary for third-degree murder, or alternatively, that the Commonwealth failed to 

ANALYSIS 

that the decedenl needed medical treatment; and told the decedent "fuck you." Id. at. p. 176. The 

Defendant did not return to the house until 5 :30 A.M. on Tuesday morning. Id. at p. 177. 

On Wednesday morning, the Defendant was awoken by his nephew, Tim Robichaw and 

his roommate, Kevin Parker. Tim asked the Defendant if he had seen the decedent; the 

Defendant responded that he had not seen the decedent since Monday night. Tim and Mr. Parker 

knocked on the decedent's door; when the decedent did not answer, they pushed the door open. 

The Defendant stated to police that the decedent was lying there, not moving, and thatthere was. 

blood on the wall. Id. at p. 177-78. 

The Defendant "assumed it was the crack that killed" the decedent. Id at p. 178. The 

Defendant stated that he did not deliberately stab the decedent; the decedent was acting crazy 

and ran into the Defendant's knife. He also stated that if he intentionally stabbed the decedent, he 

would not have waited for the police to- come, but he did. The Defendant told detectives: ",I 

stayed outside on my bike the whole time the cops were there. Is that. what killersdo? NO'. The 

cops brought me down here and tried to say that this was intentional. I'm telling you it wasn't 

That is the truth." Id at p. 178. 

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disprove the Defendant's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Evident from the trial 

record, this contention is without merit. 

"It is well established that the test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all proper inferences 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could reasonably have determined all elements 

of the crime to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt." Com. v. Keblitis, 456 A.2d 

149, 150 (Pa 1983); Com. v, Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa Super. 2005). "The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime. beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Jones, 874 A.2d at 120 (quoting 

Com. v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa Super. 2003)). 

Third-degree murder is defined in the Crimes Code as "All other kinds of murder" other 

than first-degree murder or second-degree murder. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c). "Third-degree murder · 

occurs when a person commits a killing which is neither intentional nor committed during the 

perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite malice." Com. v. Kling, 73 l A. 2d 145, 14 7 

(Pa. Super.), app. denied. 745 A.2d 1219 (Pa 1999) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c)). The elements 

of third-degree murder, as developed by case law, are a killing done with legal malice, but 

without the specific intent to kill required in first-degree murder. Com. v. Hill, 629 A.2d 949, 951 

(Pa. Super. 1993) (citing Com. v. Pitts, 404 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1979)). Malice is established where 

the defendant's intentional act indicates that the defendant consciously disregarded an unjustified 

and extremely high risk that his action might cause death or serious bodily harm. Com. v. Siebert, 

622 A.2d 36 l (Pa. Super. 1993). Malice may be inferred from all the attending circumstances 

surrounding defendant's conduct, such as the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the 

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victim's body. Com. v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 493 (Pa. 2009); Com. v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 

I 128, l 142 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

The Defendant contends that the element of malice was negated because his actions were 

necessary to defend himself from the decedent. Malice and self-defense "are mutually 

exclusive." Com. v. Fowlin, 710 A.2d 1130, l l 32 (Pa 1998). In a prosecution for murder, 

evidence of provocation or self-defense tends to negate the malice required to prove murder. 

Com. v, Heatherington, 385 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa. 1978). 

The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that 

such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of 

unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. 18 Pa.C.S. § 505;' Ventura, 915 

A.2d at 1143. When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the 

burden to disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 

824 (Pa. Super. 2008). The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at least one of 

the following: (1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or 

serious bodily injury; (2) the accused provoked or continued the use of force; or (3) the accused 

had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety. Com. v, Hammond, 953 

A.2d 544, 559 (Pa. Super. 2008), app. denied, 964 A.2d 894 (Pa. 2009) (citing Com. v. 

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa Super. 2005)). The Commonwealth need only prove one 

of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt to sufficiently disprove a self-defense claim. Com. 

v. Burns. 765 A.2d t 144, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2000). In Com. v. Light, 326 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1974), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 

[T]he requirement that the defendant be operating under a reasonable belief that 

he is in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony, involves 

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two elements. First, lhe defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide 

belief that he was in imminent danger. Second, the belief must be reasonable in 

light of the facts as they appeared to him. The first element is entirely subjective; 

the second element is entirely objective. 

Com. v. Perez, 698 A.2d 640, 646 (Pa. Super. 1997) ( citing Light, 326 A.2d at 292). Whether a 

defendant acts out of an honest, bona fide belief and whether such a belief was reasonable are 

issues properly resolved by the trier of fact. Perez, 698 A.2d at 646: 

The record supports this Court's finding that at the time of the stabbing, the Defendant 

did not believe that he was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from the 

decedent. The Court listened carefully to all of the-evidence, reviewed the exhibits, the 

Defendant's statement, and Mr. Parker's testimony, in particular. The Defendant's actions, in 

light of the evidence, were not indicative of a person trying to defend himself, but rather prove 

that the Defendant was the initial aggressor and provocateur. 

The Defendant escalated an oral argument into physical violence by stabbing an unarmed 

individual, The Defendant was heard yelling and "going on a rampage" just before the stabbing. 

In fact, the Defendant, by his own admission, came home and started yelling at the decedent. The 

decedent came out of his room to ask the Defendant to stop yelling, screaming, and calling the 

decedent names. The decedent went back to his room; the Defendant called 911. "The police 

radio call did not indicate in any way that the Defendant was in fear so much as annoyed by the 

decedent." N.T. 4/24114 at p. 41. Further, the Defendant's actions in calling off the police were 

contradictory to any kind of fear he may have had, and more indicative of a person trying to 

conceal a criminal act. 

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The Defendant alleged that the decedent lunged at him and that he "just poked" the 

decedent. A five-and-three-quarter (5 ~) inch stab wound which penetrated through the 

decedent's heart and out its back wall cannot by any stretch of the imagination be described as a 

"poke." N.T. 4/23/14 at pp. 93-95. The decedent was unarmed; the Defendant used a deadly 

weapon on a vital pan of the decedent's body. This Court, as the fact-finder, simply did not 

believe the Defendant's assertion that the decedent lunged at the Defendant and ran into the 

Defendant's knife. Although the Defendant claimed to have asswned that thedecedent died from 

crack, witnesses heard the Defendant yell to the decedent, "You better hope somebody finds your 

fuckin' ass before you bleed to death." N.T. 4123/14 at p. 28. 

The Court also considered voluntary manslaughter in its deliberations. N.T. 4/24/14 at pp. 

42-43. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing committed without malice, whereas 

malice is an essential element of murder. Heatherington, 385 A.2d at 341 (citing Com. v. · 

O'Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 38, n. 6 (Pa 1976)). Voluntary manslaughter is defined as follows: 

(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter 

if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious 

provocation by the individual killed; or (b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable-A person 

who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time 

of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the 

killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles of justification), but his belief 

is unreasonable. 18 PaC.S. § 2503(a), (b); Com. v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 979 (Pa. 2013) 

(citations omitted). 

In explaining what elements are necessary to establish unreasonable belief voluntary 

manslaughter, which is sometimes referred to as "imperfect self-defense," the Pennsylvania 

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Issue II 

Defendant lastly asserts that this Court abused its sentencing discretion by. imposing an 

aggregate sentence of eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) years, plus five (5) years probation. The 

Defendant contends that the sentencing court failed to give adequate weight to Defendant's age 

and physical and mental disabilities. 

This is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Defendant's sentence. Sentencing is a 

"matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Com. v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 739 

(Pa Super. 2006) (citing Com. v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2005)). "An abuse of 

discretion involves a sentence which was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from 

Supreme Court has stated: "This self-defense claim is imperfect in only one respect-an 

unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that deadly force was required to save the actor's 

life. All other principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S. § SQS must still be met in·order to 

establish unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter. Com. v. Bracey, .795 A.2d 935, 947 (Pa. 

2001) (citing Com. v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 5.82 (Pa. 1991)); Com. v. Arce) 416 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 

Super. 1979) (use of knife not reasonablewhere no weapon directed at defendant), A successful 

claim of imperfect self-defense reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. Com. v. Truong, 36 

A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super.2012) (citing Tilley, 595 A.2d at 582. 

The Court found that the Defendant was the provocateur, not the decedent; thus, the 

circwnstances required to reduce a killing to voluntary manslaughter were not present. The 

physical evidence and testimony of the witnesses, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, plainly established that the Defendant possessed the requisite malice for thirddegree murder. 

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partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." Com v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 275 (Pa. Super. 2004). It is 

more than just an error in judgment. Id 

A defendant's right to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal is not 

absolute. Com. v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798 (Pa. Super. 2013). "It is only where an aggrieved party can 

articulate clear reasons why the sentence imposed by the trial court compromises the sentencing 

scheme as a whole that we will find a substantial question and review the decision of the trial 

court." Com. v, Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003). The defendant must present a 

"substantial question" as to whether the sentence was inappropriate under a .specific provision of 

the Sentencing Code or was contrary to fundamental norms of the sentencing process. Com. v. 

Titus, 816 A.2d 251, 255 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The Defendant's sentence was imposed after express consideration of the general 

standards applicable to sentencing and review of the pre-sentence report'. N. T. 8/14/14 at pp. 21- 

23. The offense gravity score (OGS) for Third-Degree Murder is fourteen (14). The Defendant's 

prior record score (PRS) was a five (5). Under the Deadly Weapon Enhancement/Used Matrix, 

the sentencing guidelines are 210 months to the statutory limit, plus or minus twelve (12) 

months. Defense counsel concurred with the sentencing courtthat this was the recommended 

range. Id. at pp. 3-4. If a sentence is within the statutory limits. an allegation thatthe sentencing 

court "failed to consider or did not adequately consider certain factors does not raise a substantial 

question that the sentence imposed was inappropriate." Com. v. Wagner, 702 A.2d 1084, l 085 

(Pa. Super. 1997) {citing Com. v, Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa. Super. 1995), app. denied, 

676 A.2d 1195 {Pa. J 996)). 

The sentencing court listened closely to counsels' arguments, victim impact statements, 

and the Defendant's testimony when he exercised his right of al locution. The Defendant was age 

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By the Court: 

fifty-five (55) at the time of sentencing. N.T. 4/23/14 at pp. 2-3. He indicated to the court that he 

takes Paxil for memory loss. Id. The Defendant had a substantial criminal history, indicating a 

need for incarceration to protect the public; and his mental and physical impairments did not 

make him unable to understand the wrongfulness of his acts or unable to control his behavior. 

N.T. 8/14/14 at p. 16-22; Commonwealth Exhibit 9. 

The sentencing court imposed a sentence "consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Com. v. Frazier, 500 A.2d 158, l 59 (Pa. 1985). The 

sentence the court imposed was neither unreasonable nor the result of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will. The Defendant's sentence did not violate sentencing norms nor was it excessively 

harsh. Therefore, the Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence of the trial court should be affirmed. 

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