CLD-020 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 20-2259 

___________ 

DARREN L. MILLER, 

 Appellant 

v. 

AMANDA HARTWELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; 

PAUL ENNIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; 

JERRI SMOCK, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; 

UNIT MANAGER SANTOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-00339) 

District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

October 29, 2020 

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: December 1, 2020) 

_________ 

OPINION*

 _________ 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

PER CURIAM 

Appellant Darren Miller, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order refusing 

him a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. We will summarily affirm. 

Miller initiated this action in November 2019, when he was an inmate at the 

Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). Miller’s complaint 

alleged that the four named defendants, all employees at SCI-Albion, displayed deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and 

violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to the law 

library and shower facilities. At the root of his claim is the SCI-Albion medical staff’s 

treatment of a back injury he suffered from a fall in his cell. He sought monetary 

damages along with injunctive and declaratory relief to address his alleged medical 

needs. Relevant to this appeal, he also moved for a temporary restraining order or 

preliminary injunction directing the named employees of SCI-Albion to provide him 

with: medical treatment, including further testing and pain medication; devices to assist 

him in walking; and access both to shower facilities and the law library. 

Despite Miller not yet having filed his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP 

motion”), the District Court held a telephonic hearing on Miller’s request for preliminary 

injunctive relief on December 3, 2019. The court heard testimony from Miller, defendantappellee Nurse Jerri Smock, and Dr. Lisa Baird. At the end of the hearing, the court 

denied the request for injunctive relief on the record, followed by a memorandum order 
3 

to the same effect entered on December 10, 2019. Because Miller still had not filed his 

IFP motion, the court also ordered the case to be statistically closed. 

In April 2020, Miller filed a completed IFP motion, which the District Court 

granted. When the District Court granted his IFP application, Miller’s complaint was 

deemed filed and entered on the docket, along with his original motion for a temporary 

restraining order or preliminary injunction. Initially, the District Court did not realize that 

the docket entry of the motion was duplicative and scheduled a hearing, which it quickly 

cancelled after reviewing the motion. On May 18, 2020, the court issued a memorandum 

order dismissing the motion for injunctive relief as moot, based on the previous ruling. 

The court also noted that Miller has since been transferred to the State Correctional 

Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”), and therefore any request for prospective 

injunctive relief against the named defendants was moot. The same day, Miller filed a 

motion to reconsider the denial of injunctive relief. The District Court denied his motion 

the next day in a text order, concluding that he had failed to provide a substantial basis 

for reconsideration. Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal of an interlocutory order to the extent it 

refused an injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We may take summary action 

where an appeal presents “no substantial question.” 3d Cir. LAR 27.4. 

A timely appeal from a denial of a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend “brings up the 

underlying judgment for review.” Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 

675 F.2d 77, 78 (3d Cir. 1982). “Therefore, the standard of review for a denial of a 

motion for reconsideration varies with the nature of the underlying judicial decision.” 
4 

Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1986). “We generally 

review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but 

review the underlying factual findings for clear error and examine legal conclusions de 

novo.” Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Here, the District Court denied Miller’s motion for reconsideration because it did 

not establish a proper basis on which to reconsider the prior order. Construing Miller’s 

motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),1

 the District Court determined 

that Miller failed to satisfy any of the appropriate grounds for such a motion: “(1) an 

intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the 

need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 

591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 

F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). 

Because this denial “brings up the underlying judgment for review,” our task is to 

examine the District Court’s decision that the refiled motion for preliminary injunctive 

1

 The District Court construed this motion under Rule 59(e), but Miller was explicit that 

he was seeking relief under Rule 60(b). While it is true that for certain purposes, this 

Court “regards a motion labeled only as a motion for reconsideration as the functional 

equivalent of a Rule 59 motion,” Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1985) 

(emphasis added), “it is the relief desired, not the title of the motion, that dictates how 

this Court should view a particular filing,” Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 

187, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, Miller’s “motion to reconsider” cited Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) as grounds for relief, alleging fraud and 

misrepresentation by the witnesses at the December motion hearing. Rule 60(b)(3) 

specifically provides for relief due to fraud or misrepresentation, but Rule 59(e) does not. 

Therefore, although titled a “motion to reconsider,” Miller’s motion would have been 

better considered under Rule 60(b), as he intended. However, because of the mootness 

issue, any error in the District Court’s treatment of the motion was harmless. 
5 

relief was moot. The District Court concluded on May 19, 2020, that the refiled motion 

for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order was moot by virtue of its 

earlier ruling on the same motion.2

 In the same order, the District Court dismissed 

Miller’s claims for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief contained within his 

complaint, on the ground that his transfer from SCI-Albion to SCI-Fayette rendered these 

claims moot. Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer 

from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.” 

(citing Abdul–Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993))). While that latter 

decision is not a final judgment and therefore is not before us, it guides our review of the 

District Court’s denial of Miller’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. 

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success 

on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that 

granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; 

and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 

F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). Because Miller has been transferred from the facility at 

which the named defendants oversaw his medical care, he can demonstrate neither 

2

 It is reasonably clear from the record that the refiling of the motion occurred because it 

was attached to Miller’s complaint; thereby the clerk refiled the entirety of Miller’s 

original submission once the District Court granted his IFP motion. In other words, 

Miller himself did not refile a duplicative motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 

Although the District Court initially scheduled a hearing on the refiled motion, it 

immediately cancelled the hearing once it understood the clerical refiling. However, 

because Miller’s transfer alone renders his request for injunctive relief moot, as described 

below, we need not examine the District Court’s determination of mootness based on the 

prior order. 
6 

likelihood of success on the merits of his claim for prospective injunctive relief nor 

irreparable injury from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and therefore both are 

equally moot. 

 Accordingly, Miller’s appeal does not present a substantial question, and we will 

summarily affirm. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.