UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4036

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

THOMAS RAY HOUSTON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big 

Stone Gap. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (2:21-cr-00021-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: August 31, 2023 Decided: October 13, 2023

Before THACKER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia, Matthew 

Hill, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States 

Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, S. Cagle Juhan, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Thomas Ray Houston appeals from his sentence imposed pursuant to his revocation 

of supervised release. The district court sentenced Houston to the statutory maximum 24 

months in prison followed by 12 months of supervised release. On appeal, Houston 

challenges the Sentencing Guidelines policy statements on supervised release and avers 

that his sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.

Congress enacted a supervised release revocation regime that directs consideration 

of a limited set of sentencing factors, which did not include the seriousness of the offense, 

promotion of respect for the law, or just punishment. See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 

638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that a court may not impose a revocation sentence “based 

predominately” on factors not referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). Congress directed the 

Sentencing Commission to implement that policy in setting guidelines for revocations of 

supervise release. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3). However, Houston avers that the Sentencing 

Commission went beyond its mandate and, in Chapter Seven, reintroduced those forbidden 

factors under the guise of sanctioning a breach of trust. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641 

(explaining that “Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the 

court should sanction primarily the defendant's breach of trust, while taking into account, 

to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of 

the violator.’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). Because imposing a sanction for a breach of 

trust is not an enumerated factor, and is similar to the forbidden factors, Houston contends 

that Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines is void. 

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Below, Houston did not challenge Chapter Seven or the court’s consideration of 

allegedly inapplicable sentencing factors in determining his sentence. Accordingly, we

review these claims for plain error. United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that plain error is proper standard of review for claim, raised for the 

first time on appeal, that the district court committed substantive error by considering an 

improper sentencing factor). Under the plain error standard, Houston must show: (1) there 

was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). When these conditions are satisfied, this court 

may exercise its discretion to notice the error only if the error “seriously affect[s] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 732 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We have repeatedly held that revocation sentences are intended to sanction the 

abuse of the court’s trust. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 

2012) (noting that “egregious breach of trust” was “perfectly appropriate basis” for 

sentence); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that 

revocation sentence punishes defendant for failing to abide by conditions of supervision). 

Moreover, Houston does not cite to any other case ruling that Chapter Seven is void or 

otherwise inappropriate. While we have not addressed the argument raised by Houston,

given the lack of legal support, any error regarding the validity of Chapter Seven could not 

be considered “plain.” See United States v. Seignious, 757 F.3d 155, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(holding that, for error to be plain, error must be “clear” or “obvious”). Houston does not 

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dispute this conclusion and, in fact, does not address the plain error standard. As such, 

Houston has not made a sufficient showing for relief.

“A district court has broad, though not unlimited, discretion in fashioning a 

sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. 

Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we “will affirm a revocation 

sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207 

(internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly 

unreasonable, we “first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable.” Id. In doing so, we apply the same general considerations 

used in evaluating original criminal sentences, “with some necessary modifications to take 

into account the unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Only if we conclude that a revocation sentence is procedurally 

or substantively unreasonable will we consider whether the sentence “is plainly so.” Id. at 

208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 

207 (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing § 3553(a) factors relevant to 

revocation sentences). Although the sentencing court “need not be as detailed or specific 

when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction 

sentence,” “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 

872 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a revocation sentence “need 

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not always be accompanied by a fulsome explanation for [the court’s] acceptance or 

rejection of the parties’ arguments in favor of a particular sentence because, in many 

circumstances, a court’s acknowledgment of its consideration of the arguments will 

suffice.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 2020). “[A] revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its 

conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 

207 (cleaned up). 

Houston argues that the district court did not provide an adequate explanation for 

his sentence. In rejecting Houston’s only argument in mitigation, the district court was 

required to “explain why [it did so] in a detailed-enough manner that this [c]ourt can 

meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the revocation sentence imposed.” 

Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208. Here, the district court acknowledged Houston’s argument related 

to his good behavior while on supervision and explained that it was rejecting the argument 

because Houston’s prior good behavior did not excuse his breach of trust. In addition, the 

court found that two and a half years of good behavior was relatively short and that the 

nature of the breach was very serious. Thus, while the court’s explanation was brief, we 

find that it “satisfies the more relaxed standard for revocation sentencing,” United States v. 

Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 2018), and is sufficient for us to determine that the 

district court adequately considered Houston’s simple, straightforward argument. See 

Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209 (noting that even “relaxed requirements for revocation sentences 

are not satisfied” if district court “entirely fails to mention a party’s nonfrivolous arguments 

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in favor of a particular sentence, or where the court fails to provide at least some reason 

why those arguments are unpersuasive”). 

Turning to the substantive reasonableness of Houston’s sentence, his argument is 

conclusory, and he presents no basis to conclude that his sentence was not substantively 

reasonable. Essentially, Houston avers that it was unreasonable to sentence him to the 

maximum prison term followed by the maximum term of supervised release. 

“A sentence within the policy statement range is presumed reasonable.” United 

States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“That presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when 

measured against the [relevant sentencing] factors.” United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 

357-58 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the court retains 

“broad discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” 

Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373 (cleaned up). 

Here, the court found that Houston’s criminal conduct involving drugs and firearms 

was a serious breach of trust. This is a proper basis for a revocation sentence, and Houston 

makes no argument rebutting the presumption of reasonableness. Accordingly, Houston’s 

revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable. 

As such, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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