2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-5-2010

USA v. Kenneth Goenaga

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-1071

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"USA v. Kenneth Goenaga" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1927.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1927
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 09-1071

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

KENNETH GOENAGA, 

a/k/a Kenny

KENNETH GOENAGA,

Appellant.

______________

On Appeal From the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Crim. No. 05-cr-275)

District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 14, 2010.

______________

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 5, 2010 )

__________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________________
2

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

 Kenneth Goenaga appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to reduce his

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We will affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly

summarize the essential facts.

Goenaga pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the

intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base (known as “crack cocaine”), in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At sentencing, the District Court found Goenaga’s offense level to be

34, with a criminal history category of VI, yielding a Sentencing Guidelines range of 262

to 327 months of imprisonment. However, the offense contained a statutory maximum of

20 years, or 240 months.

Goenaga provided substantial assistance with the Government’s investigation, and

the Government submitted a motion for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

5K1.1, recommending Goenaga receive a sentence of no more than 120 months. The

District Court granted the Government’s motion and adopted a downward departure to

offense level 26, providing for a range of 120 to 150 months. The District Court then

sentenced Goenaga to 120 months of imprisonment, finding that this sentence satisfied the

statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

After Goenaga’s sentence was imposed, the Sentencing Commission enacted
3

Amendment 706, which reduced the offense level for offenses involving crack cocaine by

two levels. Goenaga submitted a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2). The District Court calculated that his adjusted offense level would be 32,

yielding a Guidelines range of 210 to 240 months’ imprisonment. Applying an equivalent

§ 5K1.1 downward departure yielded a range of 105-120 months. Goenaga argued that his

sentence should be reduced to the bottom end of this range, 105 months, but the District

Court declined to reduce Goenaga’s sentence below the original sentence of 120 months.

In explaining its decision, the District Court first noted that the 120-month sentence

fell within the newly calculated Guidelines range. It further explained that the “offense

conduct described at the sentencing hearing . . . was particularly troubling.” Appendix

(“App.” 3). The court noted that Goenaga was “intimately involved in trafficking heroin

and cocaine” in two different states, that a “number of individuals trafficked heroin on

[his] behalf,” and that “[s]everal victims overdosed and suffered serious injury after

ingesting heroin attributed to [his] organization.” App. 6-7. “Pursuant to § 1B1.10(b)(1)”

and considering “the nature and seriousness of the offense” and “the danger defendant

poses to the community,” the District Court concluded that Goenaga’s sentence did not

warrant a reduction. App. 6.

Goenaga timely appealed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c). We have
4

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s legal

interpretation of relevant statutes and Guidelines, and we review for abuse of discretion

the District Court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to reduce a sentence pursuant to §

3582(c)(2). See United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).

Section 3582(c)(2) grants a sentencing court discretion to reduce the prison term of

a defendant who “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2). Such a reduction, however, must be “consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. Relevant to this case, the

Sentencing Commission has stated that in considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the

sentencing court “shall consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to . . . the

community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment,”

along with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b),

cmt. n.1(b)(i)-(ii).

The District Court properly evaluated the seriousness of Goenaga’s offense and the

potential risk to the community before determining that Goenaga’s sentence should not be

reduced any further. See App. 6-7. Goenaga contends that every aspect of the Sentencing

Guidelines must be treated as purely advisory in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005), and its progeny. However, we have held that Booker does not apply to a §

3582(c)(2) re-sentencing. United States v. Dillon, 572 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
5

granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3334, 3340 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2009) (No. 09-6338). Unlike in Dillon,

the District Court in this case did not deny Goenaga’s motion because it felt “bound by the

guidelines range.” Id. Rather, the District Court exercised its discretion and determined

that Goenaga’s sentence appropriately accomplished the goals of sentencing. The District

Court did not misapply the law or abuse its discretion in denying Goenaga’s motion for a

reduction in sentence.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.