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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,499

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

JAQUELINN D. HOLLAND,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sumner District Court; WILLIAM R. MOTT, judge. Opinion filed May 6, 2022. 

Affirmed.

Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. 

Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for 

appellee.

Before WARNER, P.J., CLINE,J., and RACHEL L. PICKERING, District Judge, 

assigned.

PER CURIAM: Jaquelinn D. Holland appeals the district court's order extending his 

probation for a 12-month term. Holland argues the State's delay of almost 10 months 

between the issuance and execution of his arrest warrant for violating his probation terms 

was unreasonable, resulting in the State waiving its right to prosecute.

 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At a September 12, 2019 plea hearing in Sumner County District Court, Jaquelinn 

D. Holland pled guilty to one count of counterfeiting currency under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 

21-5840(a)(2). At the following hearing, held on October 10, 2019, the district court 

sentenced Holland to probation for 18 months with an underlying prison sentence of 16 

months. When Holland initially spoke with his intensive supervision officer (ISO) after 

the sentencing hearing, he told the ISO his Wichita residence address. However, Holland 

failed to report on October 16, 2019, and again on October 23, 2019. The ISO attempted 

to contact Holland but was unable to reach him by phone. On November 4, 2019, the 

State filed a motion to revoke Holland's probation for failing to report or contact his ISO 

several times. Holland's ISO requested an absconder warrant and stated Holland's 

whereabouts were unknown.

That same day, the district court issued an arrest warrant for Holland. The ISO 

then contacted law enforcement and notified them of the warrant. The arrest warrant 

provided Holland's last known address in Wichita, which was the same Wichita address 

that Holland had provided the ISO the month prior. The Sumner County Sheriff 

presumably had forwarded the warrant to Sedgwick County, where Holland was living. 

On August 24, 2020, less than 10 months from when the district court had issued 

the arrest warrant, Holland was arrested. During a traffic stop, a Wichita officer ran 

Holland's name for a warrants check. The officer discovered the pending arrest warrant 

from Sumner County and arrested Holland. Law enforcement then transferred Holland to 

the Sumner County Jail, where he was released and began reporting to his ISO. After 

Holland's arrest, the district court scheduled a probation revocation hearing. 

Before the probation revocation hearing, Holland filed a motion essentially to 

dismiss the proceedings. He asserted the State had waived its right to prosecute his 
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probation violations because it had failed to timely execute his arrest warrant. At the 

hearing, the court heard arguments on Holland's motion and the State's motion to revoke. 

The State called Holland's ISO to testify. He testified that he initially met Holland, who 

provided him with a Wichita address. He stated Holland failed to appear at least twice in 

October 2019, namely October 16 and 23. He then recalled calling Holland at least twice, 

possibly three times, but he was unsuccessful. The ISO also testified he did not leave 

Sumner County to travel to Wichita and conduct a home visit. His means of 

communication with Holland was by phone and email. The ISO also testified that 

typically, after two to three failed attempts at contacting a probationer who had failed to 

report, he would file an affidavit with the county attorney's office and recommend 

issuance of an absconder warrant. He explained how after filing the affidavit, he notified 

law enforcement of the court's order. 

The defense counsel then called Holland to testify. Holland explained he did not 

have a working phone or any internet services during the probation period, but he had 

lived at the same residential address the entire time. He testified he had started working at 

Subway for a while, but then temporarily left that position. Holland did not recall police 

coming to his home to try to execute an arrest warrant or contacting any of his family to 

find him. 

After the presentation of evidence, Holland's counsel argued that despite having 

Holland's address in Wichita, the State had failed to explain why the authorities had not 

properly and timely executed the warrant. In response, the State pointed out that Holland 

was still serving his original 18-month probation term when he was arrested, and he had 

the burden to show he was prejudiced by the delay. The district court denied Holland's 

motion, explaining that 10 months was not an unreasonable time for the State to execute 

Holland's arrest warrant, especially considering Holland was living in Wichita, a large 

jurisdiction, and was still on probation when the warrant was executed.
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After the district court denied Holland's motion, the court addressed the State's 

motion to revoke Holland's probation. Holland stipulated that he had failed to report for 

several months. The State moved to extend Holland's probation. The district court found 

Holland had violated his probation, imposed a 3-day quick dip jail sanction, and extended 

his probation for a term of 12 months. Holland timely appeals.

 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Holland continues his argument that the State's failure to conduct a 

reasonable investigation to locate him after it issued the probation violation warrant 

constituted a waiver of its request for probation revocation. Specifically, Holland claims 

the State failed to present evidence of its attempt to serve the arrest warrant, despite 

knowing of his Wichita address. In response, the State outlines the efforts done to locate 

Holland and execute the warrant and notes that the State executed the warrant while 

Holland's probation was still pending. 

Standard of Review 

This court typically reviews probation revocations for an abuse of discretion. State 

v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020). This court applies de novo review 

to determine "whether the district court complied with due process requirements in 

revoking a defendant's probation." State v. Hurley, 303 Kan. 575, 580, 363 P.3d 1095 

(2016). 

Discussion

The district court's initial decision to grant probation "is an act of grace." 303 Kan. 

at 581. However, "once the privilege of probation has been bestowed upon a defendant, 

he or she acquires a conditional liberty interest which is subject to substantive and 
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procedural due process limits on its revocation." 303 Kan. at 581. Consequently, the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes 

certain requirements when the State deprives someone of his or her liberty through 

probation revocation. See State v. Hall, 287 Kan. 139, 144-45, 195 P.3d 220 (2008). 

In Hall, our Supreme Court noted that the controlling statute, K.S.A. 22-3716 

provides that "'[a]t any time during probation . . . the court may issue a warrant for the 

arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of release or assignment.'" 287 

Kan. at 143. "The determination of whether inaction constitutes an 'unnecessary delay 

depends upon the circumstances of each case.'" (Emphasis added.) 287 Kan. at 145 

(quoting Toman v. State, 213 Kan. 857, 860, 518 P.2d 501 [1974]).

This court in State v. Curtis, 42 Kan. App. 2d 132, 142, 209 P.3d 753 (2009),

articulated the following legal rules about the State's waiver of the right to pursue a 

probation revocation and a probationer's entitlement to due process:

"(a) Due process demands that revocation proceedings be instituted during the term of the 

probation and that revocation occur within a reasonable time thereafter; (b) the failure to 

act in a timely and reasonable manner to pursue adjudication divests the district court of 

jurisdiction to revoke probation; (c) delay is unreasonable where it prejudices the 

defendant or if there is an indication that the State has waived its right to pursue the 

violation; and (d) if the violation is found to be waived, the probationer is not required to 

establish prejudice."

Kansas courts have found due process violations if there is an indication that the 

State has waived its right to prosecute a probation violation or the delay is unreasonable 

where it prejudices the defendant. 
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A leading case is State v. Haines, 30 Kan. App. 2d 110, 39 P.3d 95 (2002). In that 

case, the court considered whether the State waived its right to pursue the probation 

violation due to a 16-year delay between the issuance and execution of the arrest warrant. 

In 1982, after being placed on probation for two years with a $1,000 fine, Haines 

moved to Ohio to continue his probation through out-of-state supervision. Haines 

understood that if he paid off his fines and court costs, he would no longer be required to 

report, thereby ending his supervision. According to Haines, he gave his wife the money 

needed to pay the fines and costs. Haines' wife, however, did not make the necessary 

payment, and Haines' fine and costs remained unpaid. 

On October 3, 1983, the State issued a warrant for Haines due to the outstanding 

fines and failure to report. The State sent two letters to Haines at two different Kansas 

addresses: the first letter to his wife's address despite knowing that Haines' wife had left 

him, and the second letter was sent to his mother's address, which was returned due to an 

insufficient address. For the next 16 years, Haines lived openly in Ohio and was 

employed as an over-the-road truck driver. In 1999, Ohio law enforcement discovered the 

outstanding Kansas warrant and Haines was brought back to Kansas. The district court 

revoked Haines' probation and Haines appealed, arguing the 16-year delay violated his 

due process rights. 

The Haines court agreed, finding the only attempt made by the State to locate 

Haines was limited to the two letters and "[m]ore than 16 years have gone by since the 

State acted." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 113. The court noted how "several other states have held 

that an unreasonable delay by the State in the issuance and execution of a warrant for the 

arrest of a probationer whose whereabouts are either known or ascertainable with 

reasonable diligence may result in the State's waiver of the violation." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 

112-13 (citing State v. Williams, 20 Kan. App. 2d 142, 146, 884 P.2d 743 [1994]). The 

court thereby ruled that the "State's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation to 
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ascertain Haines' whereabouts constitutes a waiver of the violation." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 

113.

And in State v. Myers, 39 Kan. App. 2d 250, 253, 178 P.3d 74 (2008), a panel of 

this court considered whether the State had waived prosecution due to the State's twoyear delay in executing the arrest warrant for probation violations. The probationer, 

Myers, had moved to another state without telling his ISO, and the State later moved the 

court to issue an arrest warrant for Myers. Two years after the court had issued the arrest 

warrant, the State arrested Myers. At his probation revocation hearing, Myers asserted 

that due to the two-year delay, the State had not made a timely and reasonable effort to 

serve the arrest warrant. The district court denied his motion and revoked his probation. 

Myers appealed. 

On appeal, Myers continued his argument that the State had waived its alleged 

probation violations asserted in its motion to revoke probation. He asserted that the only 

evidence of the State's actions in the two-year period was that the State had entered 

Myers' warrant into an online database. There was no additional evidence of the State's 

efforts to locate Myers, including sending the warrant to the local out-of-state police 

department, assigning a deputy for service, or any attempts by law enforcement in the 

two-year period to serve the warrant. The Myers court agreed with Myers, finding the 

district court had erred because the State had failed to show additional actions taken in 

the two-year period. 39 Kan. App. 2d at 255. 

In comparison, there have been Kansas cases where the State has shown efforts to 

timely execute an arrest warrant and courts have properly denied probationers' motions to 

dismiss probation revocation proceedings.

For example, in Hall, 287 Kan. at 140, our Supreme Court considered whether the 

execution of an arrest warrant six years after the warrant was issued was unreasonable 
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delay and thus a due process violation. There, the defendant had violated his probation in 

McPherson County when he was convicted of a new crime in Saline County. For the new 

crime, Hall was ordered to serve a lengthy prison sentence. While in prison, McPherson 

County placed a detainer on Hall with prison officials, ensuring Hall's return to 

McPherson County to address his outstanding probation violations once he finished his 

prison term. During the six-year period, Hall twice wrote to the McPherson County 

District Court, asking to be transported for a probation violation hearing to address his 

violations and lift the detainer. He argued that the six-year delay was a due process 

violation. 

In considering this argument, the Hall court looked to Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 

78, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976). There, the United States Supreme Court held 

that due process does not require the execution of a parole or probation violation warrant 

when the defendant is imprisoned on an intervening sentence. 429 U.S. at 89. 

Considering Moody and finding Hall did not have any potential liberty interests from this 

delay, the Hall court held that a six-year delay while the defendant was in prison on an 

unrelated felony conviction in a different county was not a due process violation. 287 

Kan. at 156.

Additionally, this court in State v. Alexander, 43 Kan. App. 2d 339, 344, 225 P.3d 

1195 (2010), held that a two-year delay in executing an arrest warrant for probation 

violation not unreasonable. Alexander had been placed on probation in Finney County. 

Alexander had advised his ISO that he was moving residences and possibly leaving 

Finney County or the state altogether, but he never provided a new address. Alexander 

stopped reporting and in November 2005 the State moved for his arrest for violating his 

probation. In October 2007, close to two years from the date of the district court's 

issuance of the arrest warrant, Alexander was arrested in Arkansas. Alexander moved to 

dismiss the probation violation due to the State's two-year delay in issuing and executing 

the arrest warrant. 
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In response, the State presented evidence of action taken in the two-year period to 

locate Alexander, including: entering the warrant into the national law enforcement 

computer database system, publishing Alexander's photo in the local newspaper, seeking 

help from the public, investigating each tip received from the public, attempting to 

execute the warrant at Alexander's last known address, and forwarding information about 

Alexander to the sheriff in Ulysses and in Arkansas, a possible state of residence. 

Despite the steps, Alexander argued that law enforcement failed to arrest him 

months earlier, in April 2007. Six months before Alexander's October 2007 arrest, law 

enforcement was called out to Alexander's residence to investigate a domestic 

disturbance that Alexander had witnessed. Neither a Ulysses detective who spoke with 

Alexander nor a second officer had conducted warrants check for any outstanding 

warrants on Alexander. The second officer, however, claimed that another officer had 

done a warrants check. At the time, Alexander was not arrested. The district court found 

that the State's efforts to locate Alexander for a probation violation were reasonable and 

denied Alexander's motion.

On appeal, court in Alexander did not think that a failure by police checking on a 

domestic-disturbance call to run a warrant check was by itself "so unreasonable that 

Alexander's due-process rights in the probation-violation case were violated by that 

failure." 43 Kan. App. 2d at 344. The court in Alexander held that even though the State 

did not serve the defendant with the arrest warrant for two years, the State's many efforts 

to locate Alexander for a probation violation arrest warrant were reasonable. 43 Kan. 

App. 2d at 344. The district court thereby properly denied Alexander's motion to dismiss 

the probation revocation proceeding. 

While Hall and Alexander are factually distinguishable from the present case, their 

recognition of reasonable delay in prosecuting a probation violation is fully applicable in 
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this case. To begin, in determining whether the State's inaction constitutes an unnecessary 

delay depends upon the circumstances of each case. Hall, 287 Kan. at 145. Given the 

circumstances in this case, the district court did not err when it denied Holland's motion.

Here, there was evidence in the record to support the district court's findings that 

the State's efforts were reasonable. The ISO discussed how he sent the arrest warrant to 

law enforcement and previously attempted to call Holland without success. The next step 

was alerting law enforcement of Holland's arrest warrant. As Holland was later arrested 

in Sedgwick County, law enforcement in Sumner County had undoubtedly taken the next 

step by alerting Sedgwick County. While there was no evidence that the State had 

personally gone to Holland's residence, the State had taken steps to locate him. Indeed, 

the State's efforts resulted in Holland's arrest while his 18-month probation term was 

pending.

During an August 24, 2020 traffic stop, a Wichita police officer conducted 

warrants check on all occupants, including Holland. When the officer ran Holland's name 

for outstanding warrants, the officer learned of Holland's Sumner County arrest warrant 

and proceeded to arrest him. Wichita law enforcement did act upon the arrest warrant 

from Sumner County. In Alexander, the defense argued that law enforcement had not 

taken enough steps to investigate Alexander's whereabouts by failing to check for any 

outstanding warrants during a domestic-disturbance call. This argument regarding police 

investigating whether a person has outstanding warrants should be considered in this 

case. At the August 24, 2019 traffic stop, a Wichita officer did run warrants check on 

Holland and learned of his arrest warrant. In other words, the officer's actions at a traffic 

stop are further evidence that the State did not unreasonable delay in acting on Holland's 

warrant. The record supports the district court's finding that the State made a sufficient

effort to execute the arrest warrant less than 10 months from the Sumner County District 

Court's November 4, 2020 order. 
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Unlike in Myers, law enforcement was able to arrest Holland less than 10 months 

after the arrest warrant issued. The district court in fact ruled that this case was 

distinguishable from Myers, noting the delay in Myers was 2 years, while in this case, the 

State had executed the arrest warrant in a 10-month period. Myers, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 

251. Also, the district court noted that the length itself did not strike the court as 

unreasonable delay. 

And the district court did not err when it considered the sheer size of Sedgwick 

County along with the other circumstances of this case. The district court noted that 

Holland had lived in another jurisdiction, Sedgwick County: "Well, honestly, ten months 

to me, especially given the fact that there would have to be some coordination with a 

rather large jurisdiction that works its own pace, I'm not sure what influence probation 

officer here in Sumner County is going to have on what police departments do and how 

they operate in Sedgwick County." In denying Holland's motion, the district court did 

consider the workload of law enforcement officers and the lower priority to probation 

violation warrants. As noted in Judge Malone's concurrence from Myers:

"Law enforcement officers throughout Kansas are assigned the task of executing 

thousands of probation violation warrants in misdemeanor and felony cases. They have 

limited resources to accomplish this task. Courts should not impose a duty on law 

enforcement officers, including probation officers, to 'investigate' the whereabout of 

probation absconders in addition to their many other duties." 39 Kan. App. 2d at 257 

(Malone, J., concurring). 

Lastly, probation is an act of grace. Hurley, 303 Kan. at 581. As such, it should 

generally take an "unusual set of circumstances" to determine that a violator's due process 

rights have been violated. Myers, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 257 (Malone, J. concurring). 

Holland only spoke once with his ISO after the October 10, 2019 initial meeting and 

never reported again until after his August 2020 arrest and subsequent return to Sumner 

County. Holland had a continuing duty to report to his ISO and to notify him of his 
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change in circumstances. After failing to report for several months, Holland should have 

been aware he had violated his probation and the district court would likely issue a 

warrant for his arrest. This case does not involve an unusual set of circumstances such as 

in Haines. 

In sum, we conclude the district court did not err when it concluded that the State's 

efforts to execute the warrant were not unreasonable and the delay between issuance and 

execution of the warrant did not violate Holland's due process rights. The State did not 

waive its request to revoke Holland's probation, and the district court did not lose 

jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Holland's 

motion to dismiss and committed no error extending the probation period for an 

additional 12 months. 

Affirmed.