alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
July 2, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

STEVEN PAUL WORKS, Appellant

NO. 14-12-00917-CR V.

NO. 14-12-00918-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. 

Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the 

judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-15-2015

In Re: James Sporish

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University

School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of

Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"In Re: James Sporish" (2015). 2015 Decisions. Paper 734.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/734
AMENDED HLD-007 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 15-1575

____________

IN RE: JAMES DANIEL SPORISH,

Petitioner

__________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from 

the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-04142) 

__________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21

April 23, 2015

 

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, GARTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: July 15, 2015)

____________

OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

Petitioner James Sporish, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 19, 2012. The case was referred 

to a Magistrate Judge. The District Attorney’s Office of Delaware County filed a 

response on September 13, 2012. In early 2013, Sporish amended his petition, and filed 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

several motions, including a motion for discovery. The state promptly responded to these 

filings. In October 2013, the case was marked closed and placed in civil suspense 

pending a report from the Magistrate Judge. 

On March 10, 2015, Sporish filed a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1651 with this Court, alleging extraordinary delay in the adjudication of his 

petition below. Subsequently, on May 7, 2015, the Magistrate Judge denied all of 

Sporish’s outstanding motions and entered a Report & Recommendation recommending 

that Sporish’s habeas petition be denied with prejudice. Accordingly, because Sporish 

has obtained the relief he requested, the mandamus petition will be dismissed as moot. 

See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
#### County of Suffolk, Appellant, v Long Island Power Authority et al., Respondents.

Submitted January 14, 2013;

decided February 12, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Judge Rivera taking no part.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13-A-14 OR 15D-14 OFTHE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Quentin T. Kelly, certify that:

1.     I havereviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of WorldWater Corp.;

2.     Based onmy knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3.     Based myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a.      designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to ensure the material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this annual report is being prepared;

b.      evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures as ofa date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual report (the “EvaluationDate”); and

c.      presentedin this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date.

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):

a.      allsignificant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls whichcould adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarizeand report financial data and have identified for the registrant’s auditors anymaterial weaknesses in internal controls; and

b.      anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and

6.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have indicated in this annualreport whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or inother factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent tothe date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions withregard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
|        | By:    | /s/ QUENTIN T.  KELLY                             |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------|
|   | NAME:  | QUENTIN T. KELLY                                  |
|   | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board |

 

Dated: March 30, 2005

----
FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 7/14/2015 9:01:13 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

**Certification of CEOPursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Charles A. Sorrentino,Chief Executive Officer of Houston Wire & Cable Company, certify that:

1.                                       I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 of Houston Wire & CableCompany;

2.                                       Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

3.                                       Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; and

4.                                       The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) andinternal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:

(a)                                  Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

(b)                                 Designed such internal control over financialreporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to bedesigned under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statementsfor external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accountingprinciples;

(c)                                  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d)                                 Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the caseof an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| Date:  August 14, 2006 | /s/ Charles A. Sorrentino |   |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------|
|                        | Charles A. Sorrentino     |
|                        | Chief Executive Officer   |

 

----
# Court of Appeals

**First District of Texas**

BILL OF COSTS

No. 01

- 14

- 00138

- CV

Rolando Acevedo, et al.

v

.

The O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Associates, LLP, and T. Gerald Treece, as Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, deceased

NO. 392,247

- 416 IN THE PROBATE COURT NO 2 OF HARRIS C OUNTY

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID/DUE STATUS PAID BY

SUPP CLK RECORD

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

CLK RECORD

MT FEE

RPT RECORD

MT FEE

MT FEE

RPT RECORD

FILING

STATEWIDE EF ILING UNKNOWN
$10.00

$10.00

$10.00

$10.00
$13,806.00

$10.00

$161.00

$10.00

$10.00

$792.00

$175.00

$20.00 07/23/2015

06/19/2015

03/17/2015

12/17/2014

09/04/2014

08/06/2014

07/18/2014

05/05/2014

03/ 26/2014

02/26/2014

02/19/2014

02/18/2014

02/18/2014 UNKNOWN

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

PAID

E

- PAID

PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID UNK

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT



### The costs i ncurred on appeal to the First Court of Appeals Houston, Texas are $ 15

, 0 24 .00.

Court costs in this case have been taxed in this Court’s judgmentI, Christopher A. Prine

, Clerk o f the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, do hereby certify tha t this is a true statement of the costs of appeal in this case.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my

hand and the seal of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, this September 1 1 , 2015

.
## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 18

- 00168

- CR

RANDALL SHANE SABELLA, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 354th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial Court No. 28512

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.2 

### O RDER
Our review of the clerk’s record in this case indicates that it contains “sensitive data” as that phrase is defined in Rule 9.10 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.10(a). Sensitive data includes “a driver’s license number, passp ort number, social security number, tax identification number or similar government

- issued personal identification number.”
T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.10(a)(1). The clerk’s record includes a social security number. Rule 9.10(b) states, “Unless a court orders oth erwise, an electronic or paper filing with the court, including the contents of any appendices, must not contain sensitive data.” T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.10(b). Rule 9.10(g) provides, “A court may also order that a document be filed under seal in paper
form or electronic form, without redaction.” T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.10(g). Therefore, because the clerk’s record contains sensitive data, we order the clerk of this Court or her appointee, in accordance with Rule 9.10(g), to seal the electronically filed clerk’s rec ord in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT
Date: April 1, 2019
Exhibit 32








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the “Report”) of Sterling Banks, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, we, Robert H King, President and Chief Executive Officer, and R. Scott Horner, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/ Robert H. King
/s/ R. Scott HornerRobert H. King
R. Scott HornerPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer








Date: May 17, 2010
RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
                              OF BANTA CORPORATION


     WHEREAS, the Corporation has in effect the Banta Corporation Deferred
Compensation Plan for Key Employees (the "Deferral Plan"); and

     WHEREAS, Participants in the Deferral Plan have entered into Deferred
Compensation Agreements ("Agreements"), specifying Deferred Amounts and Deferral
Periods, as well as Benefit Periods and Benefit Amounts to be paid to the
Participants during their Benefit Periods; and

     WHEREAS, the Board of Directors accelerated the timing of its normal 2000
stock option grants, but did not provide such accelerated grants to Messrs.
Gerald A. Henseler and John E. Tiffany (the "Excluded Participants"); and

     WHEREAS, the Compensation Committee has recommended an amendment be made to
the Deferral Plan for the benefit of Excluded Participants; and

     WHEREAS, the Board of Directors desires to adopt such amendment.

     NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that definition 9 (Normal Retirement) in
Article I of the Deferral Plan be amended, effective November 1, 2000, to add
the following sentence at the end of such definition:

     "Solely with respect to Messrs. Gerald A. Henseler and John E. Tiffany,
"Normal Retirement" shall mean termination of employment by the Participant at a
date no earlier than Participant's reaching age 62."

     FURTHER RESOLVED, that the appropriate officers of the Corporation be and
they hereby are authorized to take or cause to be taken all such action and to
execute or cause to be executed such certificates, instruments, agreements and
other documents as may be deemed by them necessary or desirable to carry out the
provisions of the foregoing resolutions; the taking of any such action shall
constitute conclusive evidence of the authority of the officer or officers
hereunder.

     FURTHER RESOLVED, that any and all actions heretofore taken or caused to be
taken by the officers of the Corporation, consistent with the tenor and purport
of the foregoing resolutions, are hereby ratified, confirmed and approved in all
respects for and on behalf of the Corporation.


                                      * * *
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0644

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

MATTHEW ROBERTS,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

FIDELA ROBERTS,

Respondent and Appellant.

GRANT OF EXTENSION

Pursuant to authority granted under M. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until January 15, 2024 to 

prepare, file, and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

December 11 2023

12/11/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0644
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ROBERTO ANTONIO SANDOVAL, a.k.a. 

Robert Antonio Sandoval, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-50335 

D.C. No. 3:16-cr-01694-JLS

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Robert Antonio Sandoval appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 97-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for 

receipt of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As Sandoval 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-50335 

did not object to his sentence on procedural grounds before the district court, we 

review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 

1108 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

Sandoval claims the district court procedurally erred by failing to appreciate 

its discretion to vary downward on the basis of a policy disagreement with the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines, pursuant to Kimbrough v. United States, 552 

U.S. 85 (2007). Sandoval also argues that the district court procedurally erred by 

not considering various arguments he tailored to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors. Because the district court recognized its ability to impose a 

below-Guidelines sentence, yet indicated it “[did] not have, in fact, a policy 

disagreement with [the Guidelines],” United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 

964 (9th Cir. 2011), it did not err. See United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 

744, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2011) (no procedural error where a sentencing court noted 

the advisory nature of the Guidelines and considered a policy-based challenge 

thereto).

The record reflects that the district court considered Sandoval’s § 3553(a) 

arguments and adequately explained its decision to reduce his total offense level by 

one point and to impose a 97-month sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 

984, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (no procedural error where a sentencing judge 

“stated that he reviewed the [sentencing] papers [and] the papers discussed the 
3 17-50335 

applicability of the § 3553(a) factors”); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 922 

(9th Cir. 2008) (no procedural error where the presentence investigation report and 

the record as a whole demonstrated that the district court heard and rejected a 

defendant’s § 3553(a) arguments).

AFFIRMED.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

 

In connection with the quarterly report of Pet Express Supply, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Renea Yamada, acting in the capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Diane Egger, acting in the capacity as the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

/s/ Renea Yamada

     Renea Yamada

     Chief Executive Officer 

     July 17, 2008

 

 

/s/ Diane Egger

     Diane Egger

     Chief Financial Officer 

     July 17, 2008
#### In the Matter of Yary, an Infant. Carol W., Petitioner; Leake & Watts Services, Inc., et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Yary, an Infant. Leake & Watts Services, Inc., Respondent; Carmen A., Appellant, et al., Respondent.

Submitted January 7, 2013;

decided January 15, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal denied. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic. Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.
The Honorable Edwin Powell, Jr. OpinionNo. Ii- 898 CountyAttorney Coryell County Re: Taxation of Farm 711Main Street Products. Gatesville,Texas 76528 Dear Mr. Powell: You have requested our opinion regarding the construction of article 8, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. That sectionprovides:

Farm products in the hands of the producer, and family supplies for home and farm use, are exempt from all taxationuntil otherwise directed by a two-thirdsvote of all the members elected to both houses of the Legislature. We have been advised by the Comptroller'soffice that, in 1879,when article 8, section 19was added to the Constitution, livestockand poultrywere taxed, and that the practice has never ceased. This raises the question as to whether the Committee on ConstitutionalAmendments of the 16th Legislature, which proposed the amendment, intended to include livestock and poultrywithin the ambit of “farm products," and this is the issuewhich you raise. In Court v. O'Connor, 65 Tex. 334 (Tex.Sup. 18861, the Supreme Court Gs called on to determine the situs for tax purposes of cattle which grazed on land located in two counties. The Court reached a result thatwas later enacted as article 7155,V.T.C.S. Never did the Court express the slightestdoubt-that the cattlewere taxable at &me location. 9.W. 153 (Tex.Civ. App. -- rv. Johnson, 42 S.W. 866 (Tex.Civ.

letherefore that livestock and poultry are not.considered to be includedwithin the p. 3772The Honorable

definitionof 8, section 19 Edwin Powell, Jr. - page 2 (H-898)

"farmproducts" as that term is used of the Texas Constitution. in article

You also ask us to specifywhat is includedwithin the meaning of "family supplies for home and farm use" under article 8, section 19. This questionwas addressed in Attorney General Opinion WW-1025 (19611,inwhich theAttorney General held that "family supplies for home and farm use" means consumable articles reasonablynecessary

for day-to-day use in operating or maintaining a farm or home. We have been pointed to no reason not to concurwith the definition suggested in Attorney General OpinionWW-1025, andwe are unable to supply a more definitive guideline. SUMMARY Livestock and poultry are not “farm products" under article 8, section 19 of the Texas Constitution and thus are not exempt from taxation thereunder. "Family supplies for home and farm use" means consumable articles reasonably necessary for day-to-day use in operating or maintaining a farm or home.

APPROVED: Very truly yours,

Attorney General of Texas

Opinion Committee jwb p. 3773
*Friday, April 25, 1997*

MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS

95-2576.

#### Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.

Public Utilities Commission, No. 94-1695-TP-ACE. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Upon consideration of appellant’s application for dismissal,

IT IS ORDERED by the court that the application for dismissal be, and hereby is, granted.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the court that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.