IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 57PA17

Filed 21 December 2018

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

BOBBY JOHNSON

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E.2d 625 (2017), finding no 

prejudicial error after appeal from a judgment entered on 6 October 2015 by Judge 

Eric L. Levinson in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 3 May 2017, the 

Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional petition for discretionary review as 

to an additional issue. Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 January 2018.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy 

Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.

Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant-appellant/appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s inculpatory statements to law 

enforcement were given under the influence of fear or hope caused by the 

interrogating officers’ statements and actions and were therefore involuntarily made. 

State v. Johnson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 795 S.E.2d 625, 639-40 (2017). The 

unanimous Court of Appeals panel held that the confession should have been 
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suppressed but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to 

the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 641. For 

the reasons stated below, we uphold the trial court’s conclusion that, under the 

totality of the circumstances, defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntary. 

Therefore, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Background

In the early morning hours of 2 May 2007, three men robbed a Charlotte motel

where the victim, Anita Jean Rychlik, worked as manager and her husband worked 

as a security guard. After pistol whipping and robbing the security guard in the 

parking lot, two of the men entered the victim’s room, where the victim was shot once 

in the back of her neck and killed. The men escaped, and no one was charged in the 

murder until October 2011. DNA evidence collected from beneath the victim’s 

fingernails and analyzed in 2009 indicated defendant was the likely contributor. 

Defendant voluntarily met with detectives on 24 October 2011 at the police 

station, where he was questioned in an interview room for just under five hours before 

being placed under arrest and warned of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). After being advised of his rights, defendant 

signed a written waiver of those rights and made inculpatory statements. Defendant 

was indicted on 7 November 2011 for first-degree murder for the killing of Rychlik. 

Defendant was tried before Judge Eric L. Levinson at the 28 September 2015 

criminal session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 6 October 2015, a jury 
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found defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule with 

armed robbery as the underlying felony. That same day, the trial court sentenced 

defendant to life imprisonment without parole. 

Defendant made a number of pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress 

statements he made to law enforcement while being interrogated on 24 October 2011. 

Defendant argued that he was subjected to custodial interrogation before being

informed of his rights as required by Miranda, and that his inculpatory statements

were made in response to improper statements by detectives inducing a hope that his 

confession would benefit him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, 

concluding that “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances during the entirety of 

the interview, the statements made by Defendant were voluntary.” 

Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the 

trial court’s findings of fact “seem[ed] to intentionally downplay the influence of hope 

and fear” during his interrogation and were insufficient to support its conclusion that 

the Miranda warnings in this case were effective under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 

600, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004). The Court of Appeals panel determined that defendant 

was subject to custodial interrogation before being Mirandized and then analyzed

whether the entirety of the interrogation, from the time defendant first should have 

been advised of his rights under Miranda until the time defendant made inculpatory 

statements, rendered those statements involuntary. Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 

795 S.E.2d at 638-39.
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The Court of Appeals concluded that the detectives used the “question first, 

warn later” technique held invalid in Seibert, but that defendant did not make 

inculpatory statements prior to being advised of his rights as required by Miranda. 

Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. Because of that distinction, the Court of Appeals did 

not determine whether the postwarning statement should have been suppressed 

under Miranda and Seibert, and instead analyzed the overall voluntariness of the 

statements. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. The Court of Appeals held that the 

circumstances under which defendant made inculpatory statements were at least as 

coercive as those at issue in State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975), and 

therefore, any statements given were involuntary and inadmissible. Johnson, ___ 

N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 638. Despite its conclusion that the statements should 

have been suppressed, the panel determined that admission of defendant’s 

statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming 

additional evidence of defendant’s guilt, including DNA evidence, eyewitness 

testimony, and accomplice testimony. Id. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 640-41. This Court 

allowed both the State’s and defendant’s petitions for discretionary review on 3 May 

2017. 

Analysis

I. – Standard of Review

We evaluate a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence to determine 

“whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether 
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-

68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 

S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)). If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent 

evidence, they “are conclusive on appeal, . . . even if the evidence is conflicting.” State 

v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 161, 804 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2017) (quoting State v. 

Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001)). Conclusions of law, 

however, “are fully reviewable on appeal” and “must be legally correct, reflecting a 

correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.” Id. at 161, 804 

S.E.2d at 441 (first citing State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 

(1992); then quoting Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826). 

Determinations regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of his 

Miranda rights or the voluntariness of incriminating statements made during the 

course of interrogation are conclusions of law, which we review de novo. State v. 

Knight, 369 N.C. 640, 646, 799 S.E.2d 603, 608 (2017) (citation omitted); State v. 

Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994) (citation omitted). 

II. – Voluntariness and Miranda

At common law a confession obtained through inducements, promises, or 

threats of violence lacked the presumption of reliability ordinarily afforded such 

statements, and therefore, was not admissible at trial. State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 

Dev.) 259, 260 (1827) (per curiam) (declining to allow admission of a confession when 

“the defendant ha[d] been influenced by any threat or promise”); cf. Hopt v. Utah, 110 
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U.S. 574, 585, 28 L. Ed. 262, 267 (1884) (holding a confession admissible when not 

made as a result of inducements, threats, or promises preying on the “fears or hopes 

of the accused”). In short, “coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy.” 

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405, 412 (2000) (citations 

omitted). 

Compliance with Miranda is a threshold requirement for admissibility of such 

statements when made as a result of custodial interrogation and does not abrogate 

the need for confessions to be obtained in compliance with traditional notions of due 

process under both the federal and state constitutions. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 n.8, 

159 L. Ed. 2d at 658 n.8 (plurality opinion) (declining to “assess the actual 

voluntariness of the statement” where Miranda warnings were inadequate); New 

York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 556 n.5 (1984) (noting that 

“failure to provide Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession 

involuntary” and suggesting the defendant was “free on remand to argue that his 

statement was coerced under traditional due process standards”). “ ‘[T]he mere fact 

that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of 

compulsion’ as to any subsequent, warned statement.” United States v. Mashburn, 

406 F.3d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 84 L. 

Ed. 2d 222, 235 (1985)). And conversely, compliance with Miranda does not 

necessarily raise a presumption of voluntariness. Consequently, even when a 

defendant’s Miranda rights are respected, and even when those rights are 
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voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived, the confession itself must also be 

voluntary under traditional notions of due process. “If, looking to the totality of the 

circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 

choice by its maker,’ then ‘he has willed to confess [and] it may be used against him;’

where, however ‘his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination 

critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.’ ” Hardy, 339 N.C. 

at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (alteration in original) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)). 

Whether the defendant’s rights under Miranda and its progeny have been 

respected is a factor to be considered when assessing the overall voluntariness of a 

defendant’s confession. See, e.g., id. at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (listing compliance with 

Miranda as a factor to be considered in the voluntariness inquiry). Consequently, 

assessing the admissibility of a statement given in response to police questioning 

requires an assessment of both compliance with Miranda and the overall 

voluntariness of the statement. We agree with the State that the Court of Appeals 

erred by compressing these steps to analyze voluntariness alone. Johnson, ___ N.C. 

App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 634. Compliance with Miranda is a factor to be considered 

when evaluating voluntariness in light of the totality of the circumstances under 

which the statement was given. Whether the State has complied with Miranda 

necessarily involves a determination whether the person being interviewed was 

subjected to custodial interrogation, which is itself a totality of the circumstances 
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analysis. While these two analyses will require the Court to examine interrelated 

and overlapping facts, one is not a replacement for the other. Likewise, determining 

whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda does not 

abrogate the need to evaluate the voluntariness of the statement itself. 

III. – Compliance with Miranda in light of Seibert

“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction 

on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 

492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977) (per curiam). There is no question that 

defendant was read the Miranda warnings when he was formally placed under arrest 

and that he signed a form acknowledging his waiver of those rights. The parties 

disagree, however, as to whether those warnings, when given, were sufficient to 

comply with Miranda in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 643. Defendant relies on Seibert to argue 

that the officers’ use of the “question first, warn later” method of interrogation 

violated Miranda. The State argues that there is no evidence that officers 

intentionally used the “question first, warn later” technique at issue in Seibert, and 

therefore, this case is distinguishable and should be analyzed instead under the 

rationale of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985). We do not find 

the reasoning of Elstad distinguishable from Seibert in this way. Rather, the two 

cases stand for the same proposition: Miranda warnings must be given in a manner 

that meaningfully apprises the interviewee of his choice to give an admissible 
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statement or stop talking before he is taken into custody and questioned. 

In Seibert, the officer testified that he purposefully did not place the defendant 

under arrest until after he had questioned her for some time and she had fully 

confessed. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604-07, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 650-51. By doing so, he was 

able to secure a confession without apprising the defendant of her constitutional 

rights as required by Miranda. Id. at 604-07, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 651. He then gave the 

obligatory warnings, confronted her with her prewarning statements, and repeated 

the questions to confirm what had already been said. Id. at 605, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 650-

51. According to the Court, the manifest purpose of this interrogation technique was 

to obtain “a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at the 

outset,” thereby intentionally circumventing Miranda and undermining the purposes 

it sought to serve—combatting interrogation tactics designed to trick, pressure, or 

coerce a suspect into incriminating himself without knowing or understanding he had 

the right not to do so. Id. at 613, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 655. The Court explained that the 

practice of administering Miranda warnings in the midst of coordinated and 

continuing interrogation undermines the defendant’s ability to knowingly and 

intelligently waive the right to remain silent by placing him in a state of confusion as 

to why his rights are being discussed after he has been interrogated. Id. at 613-14, 

159 L. Ed. 2d at 656. Doing so is “likely to mislead and ‘depriv[e] a defendant of 

knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the 

consequences of abandoning them.’ ” Id. at 613-14, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 656 (alteration in 
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original) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424, 89 L. Ed. 410, 422 (1986)). 

The prewarning statement at issue in Elstad, on the other hand, was not made 

in a station house interrogation but rather in the defendant’s home where officers 

had come to execute an arrest warrant. Id. at 300-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 226-27. The 

officers allowed the defendant to get dressed before placing him under arrest and 

taking him to the sheriff’s department for interrogation, where the defendant was 

read the Miranda warnings before being questioned. Id. at 300-01, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 

226-27. The defendant’s initial statements were made in casual conversation with 

an officer in the defendant’s own home, while his subsequent statements were made 

after being transported to the police station in a patrol car and placed in an 

interrogation room for questioning. The Court concluded that, under such 

circumstances, “a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings . . . should suffice 

to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement,” id. at 

314, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 235; those “conditions” being his lack of information essential to 

understanding the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. 

Consequently, under both Elstad and Seibert, the question for a reviewing court 

remains whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the warnings so given could 

function effectively to apprise the suspect that he had a real choice to either give an 

admissible statement or stop talking.

The Court of Appeals here “agree[d] that the detectives in the present case 

used the same objectionable technique considered in Seibert,” but held that because 
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defendant “did not confess until after he was given his Miranda warnings,” the court 

needed only to determine whether his statements were involuntary. Johnson, ___ 

N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 637-38. This was error. When a defendant asserts 

that his or her Miranda rights have been violated as a result of successive rounds of 

custodial interrogation, some portion of which was unwarned, the question for the 

court is whether the warnings effectively apprised him of his rights and whether he 

made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. 

Whether a defendant made prewarning inculpatory statements may be a factor that 

affects that analysis, but it does not change the nature of the question to be asked.

While defendant has argued vigorously on appeal that his Miranda rights were 

violated by the officers’ use of the “question first” technique, he did not make that 

argument to the trial court. He did not assert to the trial court that his postwarning 

statements suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as any prewarning 

statements, because there were no such inadmissible prewarning statements upon 

which he could base such an argument. Rather, he argued that the totality of his 

interaction with officers was involuntary because of the substance of his unwarned 

conversations with officers that morning. Although his motion to suppress includes 

an assertion that the officers “initially . . . did not ascertain that he knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent,” he did not argue that the waiver of 

his rights under Miranda in the afternoon was not voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent, nor that he did not understand his right to remain silent at the time he 
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was Mirandized; only that officers should have obtained the waiver earlier in the 

day.1 In fact, he conceded to the trial court that “the technical requirements of 

Miranda may have been met,” but contended that his statement should have been 

suppressed nonetheless because it was involuntary. 

The trial court found as fact that the waiver forms introduced into evidence by 

the State “accurately reflect[ed] the required Miranda warnings.” This 

determination is supported by competent evidence in the record and has not been 

challenged by defendant. Consequently, it is binding on appeal. Having made an 

appropriate waiver of his rights under Miranda, the finding supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that “[t]he requirements of Miranda were satisfied.” We therefore proceed 

to defendant’s claim that his statements were involuntary.

IV. - Voluntariness

Although defendant does not argue that his postwarning statements failed to 

comply with Miranda, he does argue that they were involuntarily procured as a result 

of the statements made by officers during the first “round” of interrogation before he 

was Mirandized. Defendant contends that the officers’ statements improperly 

 

1 Because defendant did not seek to suppress any statements made to officers during 

the first several hours of his interrogation, before he was formally arrested and Mirandized, 

and in light of defendant’s concession that “the technical requirements of Miranda may have 

been met,” we do not find it necessary to determine whether he was “in custody” for purposes 

of Miranda before he was formally arrested. This position, taken at the hearing on the motion 

to suppress, appears to conflict with the motion itself which stated that “[u]se of Defendant’s 

statement would be in violation of Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights . . . under 

case law of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, and its progeny.”
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induced hope that his confession would benefit him. His motion to suppress cites 

State v. Pruitt for the proposition that “a confession obtained by the slightest emotions 

of hope or fear ought to be rejected.” 286 N.C. at 455, 212 S.E.2d at 101. The State 

argues that both defendant’s and the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Pruitt is misplaced 

because, in the State’s view, the “per se” voluntariness analysis in that case and its 

predecessors has been circumscribed by our more recent decisions that favor a totality 

of the circumstances analysis of the voluntariness of a confession. The Court of 

Appeals quoted Pruitt extensively and ultimately determined that “the circumstances 

in the present case were at least as coercive as those in Pruitt” and therefore held 

“that Defendant’s inculpatory statements ‘were made under the influence of fear or 

hope, or both, growing out of the language and acts of those who held him in 

custody.’ ” Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 639-40 (quoting Pruitt, 286 

N.C. at 458, 212 S.E.2d at 103). We hold that the trial court’s conclusion that 

defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made was adequately supported 

by its findings of fact and that those findings are supported by competent evidence in 

the record. We therefore modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

We assess the voluntariness of a confession by determining whether, under the 

“totality of the circumstances, the confession is ‘the product of an essentially free and 

unconstrained choice by its maker,’ ” in which case it is admissible against him, or 

conversely, whether “ ‘his will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired,’ ” in which case “ ‘the use of his confession offends 
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due process.’ ” Hardy, 339 N.C. at 222, 451 S.E.2d at 608 (quoting Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)). In addition to 

considering whether the defendant’s rights under Miranda have been heeded, when 

conducting this review of the totality of the circumstances, the Court should also 

consider: (1) circumstances under which the interrogation was conducted, for 

example the location, the presence or absence of restraints, and the suspect’s 

opportunity to communicate with family or an attorney; (2) treatment of the suspect, 

for example the duration of the session or consecutive sessions, availability of food 

and drink, opportunity to take breaks or use restroom facilities, and the use of actual 

physical violence or psychologically strenuous interrogation tactics; (3) appearance 

and demeanor of the officers, for example whether they were uniformed, whether 

weapons were displayed, and whether they used raised voices or made shows of 

violence; (4) statements made by the officers, including threats or promises or 

attempts to coerce a confession through trickery or deception; and (5) characteristics 

of the defendant himself, including his age, mental condition, familiarity with the 

criminal justice system, and demeanor during questioning.2 None of these factors 

 

2 See, e.g., State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002) (citing, 

inter alia, State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 

1114, 148 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2001)) (listing factors, including “whether defendant was in custody, 

whether her Miranda rights were violated, whether she was held incommunicado, whether 

there were threats of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the age 

and mental condition of defendant, and whether defendant had been deprived of food,” as 

well as the “defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system, length of interrogation, 

and amount of time without sleep”); Hardy, 339 N.C. at 221-22, 451 S.E.2d at 607-08 (listing 

same factors and additionally considering the environment and duration of the interview; 
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standing alone will necessarily be dispositive, State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 

573 S.E.2d 870, 881 (2002) (citing State v. Barlow, 330 N.C. 133, 141, 409 S.E.2d 906, 

911 (1991)), and the court is certainly free to look to a host of other facts and 

circumstances surrounding the act of confessing to determine whether, under the 

totality of the circumstances, the defendant was truly capable of making, and did in 

fact make, a free and rational decision to confess his guilt.

In this case the trial court’s findings of fact indicate that defendant came to the 

police department headquarters on his own without police escort, was not shackled 

or handcuffed,3 and retained possession of his personal cell phone while inside the 

interview room. Defendant was placed in an interview room with two plainclothes 

police officers on the second floor of a secure law enforcement facility. At one point, 

his cell phone rang and it appears from the record that officers would have allowed 

him to answer had he chosen to do so. Officers made no threats of physical violence 

but did interrogate defendant rigorously and raised their voices. Defendant was told, 

 

demeanor and characteristics of the interviewee; officers’ civilian dress, lack of weapons, and 

demeanor; and subjective belief of the defendant, including whether he asked to leave, 

requested an attorney, felt he was free to leave, and believed what officers were telling him); 

State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 573-74, 304 S.E.2d 134, 147-48 (1983) (finding the defendant’s 

statement voluntary even though officers fabricated evidence because the defendant: was 

not in custody; was Mirandized; was not threatened, touched, or intimidated; was driven by 

officers to his chosen destination at the conclusion of the first interview; and had extensive 

experience with interrogation), overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Abbott, 320 

N.C. 475, 481, 358 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1987). 

3 The Court of Appeals recited as fact that defendant was made to shackle himself to 

the floor of the interrogation room after he was placed under arrest, four and one-half hours 

after questioning began. Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s finding that he was 

not shackled or handcuffed and that finding is therefore binding on appeal. 
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contradictorily and repeatedly, that officers both could not promise him anything and 

that the district attorney would “work with him” and would “go easier on him” if he 

cooperated and gave them truthful information. After a lengthy interrogation, 

officers asked whether defendant believed he would be able to go home that day and 

defendant responded, “No.” The following conversation ensued:

Officer 1: Then you’re under arrest for murder.

Officer 2: If you don’t believe you can get up and 

walk out of here, then I have no choice. 

You just told me you believe you’re 

going to jail.

Officer 1: Did you just say that, yes or no?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

Officer 1: Then I’m going to have to place you

under arrest and then I’ve got some 

stuff to do before I continue. Because to 

be voluntary, you’ve got to believe you 

can walk out of here.

. . . .

Officer 1: If you feel like you can leave, then we’re 

good. But if not, then we’ll have to do 

something different. Do you think you 

can get up and walk out of here any 

time?

Defendant: Not at any time, only after you free me 

to go.

Officer 2: That’s different, Bobby. Do you think 

you can walk out of here right now?

Defendant: Yes.

The unwarned portion of the interrogation lasted about five hours. When 

defendant was formally arrested, officers Mirandized him and secured a written 

waiver of his rights. Questioning continued for another four hours. During the 
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unwarned portion of the interrogation defendant was given coffee and cigarettes and 

was offered food. He had access to the restroom if needed and was offered a 

wastebasket when he began to feel ill. Defendant was, at times, left alone in the 

interview room. There was no guard or police officer stationed at the door. Defendant 

was in his mid-thirties, had obtained his GED, and was articulate, intelligent, 

literate, and knowledgeable about the criminal justice system and its processes. As 

the trial court found, defendant at times appeared eager to assist the officers in their 

investigation and offered to help, offered to wear a wire, and offered to do whatever 

else he could to help with the investigation. 

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that, “[b]ased on the totality of the 

circumstances during the entirety of the interview, the statements made by 

Defendant were voluntary,” and that “[t]he confession was not obtained as a result of 

hope or fear instilled by the detectives.” Defendant argues that the trial court’s 

findings of fact failed to disclose material circumstances regarding the giving of his 

confession and therefore do not support the trial court’s conclusion of law. Defendant 

has challenged five of the trial court’s findings of fact:

5 The Defendant was not told he was under arrest[.]

19[ ] The Defendant was emotional at times[.]

20 The Defendant cried at times[.]

21 The defendant expressed concern with his ability to 

“keep food down[.]”

26[ ] While there were no specific promises or threats 

made by law enforcement, the detectives conducting 

the interview did represent to the Defendant that 

the District Attorney “might look favorably” at the 
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Defendant if he made a confession[.]

Defendant asserts that finding of fact 5 is “at best an incomplete finding,” as 

he was told he would be arrested if he did not state that he was there voluntarily. 

While we agree that a more detailed finding may have preserved for the record a more 

nuanced understanding of the exchanges that took place between defendant and the 

interviewing officers, there is competent evidence in the record to support the finding 

as written. Consequently, the finding is conclusive on appeal. 

Defendant similarly asserts that findings of fact 19, 20 and 21 “downplay” the 

actual circumstances of the encounter. Again, while it may be true that a more 

detailed set of findings would have more thoroughly described defendant’s physical 

and emotional state, the findings as written are not erroneous. Instead, these 

findings are supported by the evidence in the record and it is not the duty of this 

Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court. Consequently, we are also 

bound by these findings.

Finally, defendant challenges finding of fact 26 as inaccurate. Defendant 

argues that detectives threatened him when they told him that they had sufficient 

evidence to convict him of capital murder and that he would “wear” the whole charge 

himself unless he provided them the names of his accomplices. However, we have 

held that informing a defendant of the charge he is facing does not constitute a threat. 

See State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 602, 342 S.E.2d 823, 829-30 (1986). We find 

sufficient evidence in the record to support finding of fact 26 as written, and we are 
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consequently bound by it for purposes of appellate review.

In addition to challenging several of the trial court’s findings of fact, defendant

also argues that his statements were involuntary as a result of statements made by 

officers before he was Mirandized that “improperly induced hope that his confession 

would benefit him.” Defendant’s arguments incorporate the division of the 

interrogation into “rounds” as in the United State Supreme Court’s analysis in

Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 658, and defendant asks that this Court 

evaluate the voluntariness of the statement he gave after receiving the Miranda 

warnings in the second “round” of questioning through the lens of the statements by 

officers in the first “round.” To do as defendant asks is unnecessary given the trial 

court’s totality of the circumstances analysis which requires that the entire encounter 

be evaluated to determine whether defendant freely and voluntarily chose to make a 

confession. The question is not simply whether the officers made a promise or made 

a threat, no matter when such statements were made during the encounter, but 

whether any such statements made by the officers resulted in defendant’s will being 

overborne such that his capacity for self-determination was so impaired that the 

giving of his confession cannot be thought to be voluntary. 

Defendant did not argue to the trial court that officers made specific promises 

to him or threatened him. He simply argued that their statements “improperly 

induced hope that his confession would benefit him.” We note that the presiding 

judge watched the entirety of the interrogation interview and concluded that 
STATE V. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

– 20 –

defendant’s statements were voluntarily made. The trial court had the benefit of 

observing the testifying witnesses and heard extensive arguments from counsel. The 

trial court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient competent evidence and 

support the conclusion that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was 

not coerced or induced through hope or fear into giving his confession and that his 

confession was in fact voluntarily given. 

V. – Conclusion

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in condensing the Miranda and 

voluntariness inquiries into one. We also hold that defendant did not preserve the 

argument that officers employed the “question first, warn later” technique to obtain 

his confession in violation of Miranda and Seibert. The trial court’s conclusion that 

the requirements of Miranda were met is adequately supported by its findings of fact, 

as is its conclusion that defendant’s statements to officers were voluntarily made. We 

therefore modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Justice HUDSON concurring in result.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. Here the Court of Appeals 

determined that although defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by the trial 

court’s failure to suppress his inculpatory statements, this error was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. State v. 

Johnson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 795 S.E.2d 625, 640-41 (2017); see also State v. Autry, 

321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988) (“Significantly, this Court has held that 

the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render error of constitutional 

dimension harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 

164, 293 S.E.2d 569, 578, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080, 103 S. Ct. 503, 74 L. Ed. 2d 642 

(1982))). Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated:

[W]e hold that the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s 

guilt of first-degree murder, based upon the evidence that 

Anita was murdered in the course of a robbery in which 

Defendant played an essential part, renders this error 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both Josh and Tony, whose testimony Defendant did 

not move to suppress, identified Defendant as the third 

man involved in the robbery and shooting, and both stated 

Defendant was wearing a mask that covered his face. They 

both testified that Defendant and Tony entered the motel 

while Josh remained outside, and both claimed Defendant 

was carrying a gun. Brandy testified that there were two 

younger men without their faces covered, and an older, 

larger man whose face was covered by a mask. Brandy 

testified it was the older, larger man who held the gun, and 

who entered the motel with one of the younger men. Most 

importantly, Defendant’s DNA was recovered from under 

Anita’s fingernails. Although Defendant’s admission of 

participation in the crime, which we have held was 
STATE V. JOHNSON

Hudson, J., concurring in result

-2-

involuntary, clearly prejudiced Defendant, in light of the 

overwhelming evidence presented pointing to Defendant as 

one of the three men involved in the robbery and murder,

we hold the prejudice to Defendant was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We reach this holding on these 

particular facts, and because the jury was instructed on 

acting in concert and felony murder based upon killing in 

the course of a robbery. The State did not have to prove 

that Defendant shot Anita, only that he was one of the 

three men involved in the robberies and murder. The 

evidence that Defendant was one of the three men involved 

was overwhelming, and the State has shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Defendant would have been 

convicted even had his motion to suppress his inculpatory 

statements been granted.

Johnson, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 795 S.E.2d at 640-41 (footnote omitted). In my opinion, 

the Court of Appeals properly concluded that there was overwhelming evidence of 

defendant’s guilt of felony murder, particularly in light of the evidence of defendant’s 

DNA recovered from under the victim’s fingernails.

Accordingly, this Court’s analysis and determination regarding defendant’s 

constitutional rights is unnecessary, in my view. See James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 

266, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (2005) (“However, appellate courts must ‘avoid 

constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on 

other grounds.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 

102 (2002) (per curiam))); see, e.g., State v. Powell, 340 N.C. 674, 686, 459 S.E.2d 219, 

224 (1995) (“Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by admitting the 

statements defendant made after [the police officer] destroyed the [Miranda] waiver 

form, we hold that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing N.C.G.S. 
STATE V. JOHNSON

Hudson, J., concurring in result

-3-

§ 15A-1443(b) (1988))), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060, 116 S. Ct. 739, 133 L. Ed. 2d 688 

(1996). Because I conclude that any error by the trial court was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on that basis alone. Therefore, 

I respectfully concur in the result.