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w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012/4771 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 11

- 3938

_____________ EARL STANLEY COLEMAN, JR.,

Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

_____________ On Appeal from the Unite d States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 10

- CV

- 1842 ) District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

_____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

July 13, 2012 Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH Circuit Judge s

(Opinion Filed: September 5, 2012 )

_____________ OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________ FUENTES, Circuit Judge : Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision that he is not e ntitled to2

supplemental security income benefits because h e is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. We will affirm.
I
Because w e write primarily for the parties , who are well acquainted with th is case,

we recite only the fac ts ess en tial to our disposition of this appeal. Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., was born in 1952 and was self

- employed as a painter of residential and commercial buildings for many years . In 1993, he sustained a workplace back injury when he fell from stilts, and he underwen t surgery to his lumbar spine. Following his surgery, Coleman received no further medical care for his injury until he began treatment in 2007. Coleman’s treating physician, Dr. Stuart Hartman, reported that Coleman had a limp ; restricted range of motion; and decreased pinprick sensation in his left leg, which

was slightly smaller in circumference than his right. Dr. Hartman’s examination also showed that Coleman had tender muscles with spas ms in his back and hips, but that his general muscular st rength was +4/5 on the left and +5/5 on the right. Dr. Hartman prescribed pain medication, a muscle relaxer, a medication for spasms, a back brace, and home exercises, and he opined that Coleman could occasionally lift twenty pounds and could carry ten po unds, sit for six hours, and stand for thirty to sixty minutes. A n examining physician, Dr. Brian D’Eramo, reported that Coleman had a tight paraspinal muscle area with tenderness but normal strength in all four extremities, normal reflexes, and no ambula tory problems. Despite these minimal findings, Dr. D’Eramo opined that Coleman could lift only two or three pounds frequently and ten pounds occasionally and could stand and walk for only five hours per workday. Finally, a non - examining medical3

advisor, Dr. Haddon Alexander, observed that Coleman’s medical record s did not establish a displaced di sc or any nerve impingement. Dr. Alexander opined that the functional limitation assessments of the treating and examining physicians were too restrictive and th at Coleman could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty

five pounds frequently, could sit for six hours, and could stand and walk for six hours. Coleman applied for supp lemental security income benefits in April 2007. After an initial round o f proceedings not directly relevant to this appeal, the Administrative Law Judge (the “ ALJ ”) denied Coleman’s claim on the ground that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act

. In relevant part, the ALJ based t his conclusion on a finding that Coleman had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of medium work. In so finding , the ALJ made two d eterminations that are central to this appeal. First, the ALJ discounted the opinion of Coleman’s treating physician. S econd, the ALJ determined that Coleman’s own testimony concerning his symptoms was not credible to the extent that it conflicted with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. The ALJ discounted Coleman’s allegations of severe pain on the basis o f the objective medical evidence and Coleman’s limited treatment, ability to do simple errands, and poor work history even before his injury. The Appeals Co uncil denied Coleman’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on July 26, 2010, making it the fin al decision of the Commissioner on that date. Coleman sought review of the Commissioner’s final decision in the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) . By opinion and order dated September 2, 2011, the4

District Court affirmed the decision of t he Commissioner. Coleman timely appealed to this Court. 1
II On appeal, Coleman argues primarily that the ALJ erred by failing to accept the medical opinions of his treating and examining physicians and by not appropriately assessing his credibility. More generally, he argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The District Court rejected these arguments in a thorough and well reasoned opinion. Having carefully review ed the record and the submissions of the parties, we discern no reason to disturb the District Court ’s decision. First, as the District Court determined , the ALJ appropriately considered the conflicting medical evidence in this case. “Where, as here, the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with th at of a non

- treating, non

- examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Morales v. Apfel , 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotatio n marks omitted)

. Here, the ALJ determined tha t Dr. Hartman’s opinion (like, also, Dr. D’Eramo’s opinion) about the extent of Coleman’s exertional limitations was not adequately supported by objecti ve medical examination findings, and she chose instead to credit Dr. Alexander’s opinion on this issue

. See Brown v. Astrue , 649 F.3d 193, 196 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (“ The law is clear

. . . that the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Like the District Court, we review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo and his factual findings for “substant ial evidence.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).5

functional capacity. ”). We agree with the District Court that the ALJ gave an adequate expla nation for her decision

. Second, similarly, the ALJ “was not required to accept Coleman’s claims of completely debilitating pain.” (App. 20). We “ ordinarily defer to an ALJ’ s credibility determination because he or she has the opportunity a t a hearing to assess a witness’ s demeanor. ” Reefer v. Barnhart , 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). We see no reason not to do so in this case. Finally, the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ less t han a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart , 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir.2004) (quotation marks omitted)

. “In the process of reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we may not weigh evidence or substitute o ur own conclusions for those of the fact

- finder.” Rutherford v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that this standard is met.
III Accordingly, we will affirm the order of th e District Court substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion.