NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-841

RICHARD ZIEHL, petitioner.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial in the Superior Court on his petition for

release pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, a jury found that the

petitioner, Richard Ziehl, was still a sexually dangerous person 

(SDP) and should remain civilly committed at the Massachusetts 

Treatment Center (treatment center). On appeal, the petitioner 

argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a 

finding that he is likely to reoffend unless he remains 

committed. We affirm.

Background. On September 23, 2015, the petitioner was 

adjudicated an SDP and committed to the treatment center for a 

duration of one day to life. G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). On 

October 1, 2015, he filed his first "Petition for Examination 

and Discharge" (§ 9 petition) arguing that he no longer 

qualified as an SDP. A Superior Court jury in 2019 found that 
2

he remained an SDP, which judgment a panel of this Court

affirmed.1 The petitioner submitted his second § 9 petition, the 

subject of this appeal, in March of 2019. In 2022, a Superior 

Court jury concluded that he remained an SDP and should not be 

released from the treatment center. The petitioner appealed the

judgment to this court.

Discussion, sufficiency of the evidence. For a jury to 

find that a petitioner remains an SDP pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, 

§ 9, the jury must conclude that the petitioner satisfies the 

same criteria required for an original SDP adjudication. Dutil, 

petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 11 (2002). A petitioner "may be 

committed as a sexually dangerous person if he has been 

convicted of a sexual offense, suffers from a mental abnormality 

or personality disorder that renders him a menace to the health 

and safety of others, and is likely to engage in sexual offenses 

if not confined." Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 580, 

cert. denied, 574 U.S. 858 (2014). This requires that the jury 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner "is likely to 

attack or otherwise inflict injury on . . . victims because of 

his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires." G. L. c. 123A, § 1

"Sexually dangerous person." In this circumstance, "likely"

means "reasonably to be expected in the context of the 

1 Ziehl, petitioner, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1131 (2021).
3

particular facts and circumstances at hand." Commonwealth v. 

Boucher, 438 Mass. 274, 276 (2002). The jury "c[an] and should 

consider the evidence of the petitioner's past sexual misconduct 

and . . . draw inferences based on that misconduct" to arrive at 

this finding. Wyatt, petitioner, 428 Mass. 347, 354 (1998). 

The jury may not, however, rely on "past misconduct alone . . . 

to support a finding of sexual dangerousness." Commonwealth v. 

Walsh, 376 Mass. 53, 58 (1978).

The petitioner's criminal record includes convictions for 

violent and sexual offenses, including armed assault, assault 

and battery, home invasion, and failure to register as a sex 

offender. Several of the offenses occurred when the petitioner 

was an adolescent; the most recent offenses occurred in 2003. 

Since that time, the petitioner had until 2015 been confined in 

state prison, after which he civilly was committed at the 

treatment center, where he remains.

In addition to his past misconduct, the petitioner has been 

diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), a 

conclusion unanimously agreed to by the members of the Community 

Access Board (CAB) in their October 2021 report. The Supreme 

Judicial Court has emphasized that "[Massachusetts] law does not 

permit the indefinite and indiscriminate commitment of persons 

solely because of an ASPD diagnosis." Commonwealth v. George, 

477 Mass. 331, 336 (2017). The Commonwealth must also prove 
4

that the ASPD "result[s] in an inability to control sexual 

impulses." Id. at 338.

Here, while the CAB concluded that the petitioner's ASPD

does not constitute a "defined mental abnormality" rendering him

congenitally predisposed to the commission of criminal sexual 

acts, the board members did unanimously agree that the 

petitioner's "sexual offenses were repetitive and compulsive." 

This was a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the 

petitioner's ASPD made him unable to control his sexual 

impulses.

The jury's finding that the petitioner still meets the SDP 

criteria was also supported by the opinions of the two qualified 

examiners who reviewed the petitioner's case and testified at 

trial. In their written reports, and during their testimony at 

trial, both qualified examiners opined that the petitioner is 

likely to reoffend if released and that he continued to satisfy 

the statutory definition of an SDP.

The petitioner, while committed at the treatment center, 

incurred fourteen "Observation of Behavior Reports" (OBRs)

between 2015 and 2020. None of the reported incidents involved 

sexual offenses. Both qualified examiners did, however,

emphasize an incident in September 2019 when the petitioner

received an OBR for "repeatedly calling Committee for Public 

Counsel Services (CPCS) and reportedly whispering comments such 
5

as 'pussy cat' into the phone." While the nonsexual nature of

his OBRs is less suggestive of his continued inability to 

control his sexual urges than sexual offense OBRs would be, the 

jury was permitted to consider his continued rule violations 

when determining whether he satisfied the SDP criteria.

Further contributing to the petitioner's risk of 

reoffending is his unwillingness to fully engage in 

rehabilitative sex offender treatment. The petitioner's 2021 

annual treatment review noted that he has declined to fully 

participate in the sex offender treatment program because the 

petitioner believed that his most recent conviction was not for 

a sexual offense. As a panel of this court explained in the 

petitioner's previous § 9 appeal, the 2003 incident had been 

characterized as a sexual offense because his conduct there 

"largely mirrored the conduct in other sexual offenses." Ziehl, 

petitioner, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1131, slip op. at 4 n.3 (2021). 

And during the introductory portion of the program, which he did 

complete, several treatment assignments were "completed . . . in 

a superficial manner." This refusal to fully engage with the 

treatment program is especially relevant in light of the 

petitioner's 2020 CAB report, which emphasized full engagement 

with the program as an important goal for the following year.

The petitioner's failure to engage in the treatment program 

following these recommendations, along with his diagnosed ASPD
6

and record of violent and sexual offenses provided a sufficient 

basis from which a reasonable jury could find that the 

petitioner has not progressed in treatment to the extent that he 

no longer satisfies the SDP criteria.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, 

Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: November 30, 2023.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.