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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

STEVEN EDWARDS, 

 PLAINTIFF, 

V. 

CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION, 

 DEFENDANT. 

Civ. Action No. 19-3614 

(EGS/RMM) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Mr. Edwards, proceeding pro se, brings this action against 

Charles Schwab Corporation (“Charles Schwab”), alleging damages 

as a result of Charles Schwab’s alleged “fraudulent association 

with the assignment of a loan with [Mr. Edwards] to PHH Mortgage 

(“PHH”) that resulted in the foreclosure of his property.” 

Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 25. 

On October 11, 2022, the Court referred this case to 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather for full case management up to but 

excluding trial, including, with respect to any dispositive 

motions, the preparation of a report and recommendation pursuant 

to Local Civil Rule 72.3. On September 8, 2023, Magistrate Judge 

Meriweather issued a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) 

recommending that the Court dismiss the case with prejudice and 

deny without prejudice the then-pending motions. See R. & R., 

ECF No. 66. 
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Pending before the Court are Mr. Edwards’ objections to the 

R. & R. See Pl.’s Obj., ECF No. 67. Upon careful consideration 

of the R. & R., the objections, the applicable law, and the 

entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R. & R., ECF 

No. 66. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party 

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has 

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A 

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended 

disposition.” Id. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) 

(“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge.”). 

A district court “must determine de novo any part of the 

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected 

to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however, the party makes 

only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his 

original arguments, the Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for 

clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 

2013) (citation omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous standard, 

the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great deference” 

and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire evidence the 

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
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mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia, No. CV 

16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2019) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the 

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made 

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections 

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the 

magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore 

not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 F. Supp. 

2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

II. Discussion 

On April 19, 2023, Magistrate Judge Meriweather issued an 

Order to Show Cause, stating as follows: 

Plaintiff Stephen S. Edwards (“Mr. Edwards”) 

brought suit against Charles Schwab 

Corporation (“Schwab”) for damages resulting 

from Schwab’s allegedly fraudulent behavior 

related to the mortgage of a home that Mr. 

Edwards owned. See generally Compl., ECF No. 

1. Although the Complaint does not identify 

the address of the home at issue, Defendant 

asserts that Mr. Edwards’s allegations pertain 

to a property located at 1765 N. Lemon Street 

in Mesa, Arizona. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. 

for Entry of Default at 1, ECF No. 47. It 

appears that Mr. Edwards has brought numerous 

lawsuits in other federal courts based on the 

same facts. See Super Trust Fund u/t/d 

06/15/01 v. Charles Schwab Bank, et al., No. 

2:13-cv-735 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. Charles 

Schwab Bank et al., No. 2:14-cv-66 (D. Ariz); 

Stephen S. Edwards Inc. v. PHH Mortgage Corp. 
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et al., No. 2:15-cv-919 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. 

Experian Info. Solutions Inc. et al., 2:15-

cv-2640 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. PPH Corp. et 

al., 2:16-cv-1842 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. PHH 

Mortgage Corp. et al., 2:18-cv-4040 (D. 

Ariz.); Edwards v. PHH Mortgage Corp. et al., 

1:22-cv-3926 (D. N.J.). 

In Mr. Edwards’s most recent lawsuit in the 

District of Arizona, the court found that Mr. 

Edwards’s claims were barred by res judicata, 

dismissed his claims with prejudice, declared 

him a vexatious litigant, and ordered that Mr. 

Edwards must obtain permission before bringing 

any further litigation related to same facts. 

See Edwards, 2:18-cv-4040 (D. Ariz.), ECF Nos. 

99, 100. Specifically, that Court ordered that 

Mr. Edwards and entities he wholly owned “must 

obtain this Court’s approval before seeking to 

commence any new action against Defendant PHH 

Mortgage Corporation or any of its affiliates, 

including officers, directors, employees, 

agents, attorneys, predecessors, successors, 

insurers, affiliates, subsidiaries or 

parents, or arising out of the purchase, 

mortgage, financing or refinancing of the 

property located at 1765 N. Lemon Street, 

Mesa, Arizona.” Edwards, 2:18-cv-4040 (D. 

Ariz.), ECF No. 100 at 10. Mr. Edwards then 

brought related litigation in the District of 

New Jersey, and that court, finding that Mr. 

Edwards had not presented any evidence that he 

received permission from the District of 

Arizona court to bring the lawsuit, ordered 

Mr. Edwards to show cause as to why the court 

should not dismiss his complaint with 

prejudice. Edwards, 1:22-cv-3926 (D. N.J.), 

ECF No. 20. After Mr. Edwards responded to the 

order to show cause, the court dismissed the 

case with prejudice. Edwards, 1:22-cv-3926 (D. 

N.J.), ECF Nos. 22, 23. 

Given that this lawsuit appears to be within 

the scope of the District of Arizona’s 

vexatious litigant order, and Mr. Edwards has 

not presented any evidence that he received 

permission from that court to bring the 
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present lawsuit, it is hereby ORDERED that Mr. 

Edwards shall SHOW CAUSE no later than May 10, 

2023 as to why the Court should not dismiss 

his complaint with prejudice in accordance 

with the District of Arizona court’s orders. 

The Court further advises Mr. Edwards that if 

he fails to timely respond to this Order the 

Court may dismiss this case with prejudice. 

Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 60. 

On May 12, 2023, Mr. Edwards responded to the Order to Show 

Cause on by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that 

the orders from the District of Arizona pertain only to 

litigation in Arizona. See generally Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 

62. Magistrate Judge Meriweather explained that she was 

unpersuaded by his argument because “[t]he portion of the 

District of Arizona order that requires Mr. Edwards to obtain 

permission before bringing a new action is not limited that 

jurisdiction.” R. & R., ECF No. 66 at 3 (citing Edwards, 2:18-

cv-4040 (D. Ariz.), ECF No. 100 at 10). Magistrate Judge 

Meriweather further explained that 

The only portion of the order that expressly 

limits itself to matters “pending or closed in 

the District of Arizona” concerns Mr. Edwards’ 

obligation to obtain permission before filing 

“further motion or pleadings” in those cases. 

See id. The subject of the present litigation—

the Property at 1765 N. Lemon St.—is squarely 

within the scope of the District of Arizona’s 

order. See id. As noted, the order encompasses 

“any new action . . . arising out of the 

purchase, mortgage, financing or refinancing 

of the property located at 1765 N. Lemon 

Street, Mesa, Arizona.” Id. This case concerns 
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alleged fraudulent behavior regarding the 

mortgage for that property. See Compl. 

R. &. R., ECF No. 66 at 3-4. Magistrate Judge Meriweather 

recommends dismissing the instant case because Mr. Edwards did 

not receive permission from the District of Arizona to bring the 

litigation. Id. at 4. 

 Mr. Edwards’ objections fail to address Magistrate Judge 

Meriweather’s determination that the instant case should be 

dismissed because Mr. Edwards did not receive permission from 

the District of Arizona to bring the litigation. See generally

Pl.’s Obj., ECF No. 67. Rather, Mr. Edwards casts aspersions on 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather and others and claims that the 

Arizona Order is frivolous because the case should not have been 

removed from state to federal court. See generally id.

“A court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint with 

prejudice when a plaintiff fails to prosecute the complaint, 

fails to follow the federal rules, or fails to follow court 

orders.” O-J-R v. Ashcroft, 216 F.R.D. 150, 151 (D.D.C. 2003) 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); LCvR 83.23). “It is well settled 

that a court may dismiss a complaint filed by a vexatious 

litigant that violates an injunctive order entered by another 

court.” Justice v. Koskinen, 109 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147 

(D.D.C. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

As Magistrate Judge Meriweather stated, “Mr. Edwards has not 
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received permission from the District of Arizona to bring this 

litigation and is thus in violation of that court’s orders.” R. 

&. R., ECF No. 66 at 4. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this 

action. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate 

Judge Meriweather’s R. &. R., see ECF No. 66; DISMISSES this 

action with prejudice; and DENIES without prejudice Mr. Edwards’ 

pending Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 44; Motion for 

Default Judgment, ECF No. 55; Motion to Strike, ECF No. 

55; Motion for Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 59; and Motion for 

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 62. An appropriate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 September 21, 2023