NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 15-1125

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTHONY JEFFERSON,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for theDistrict of New Jersey

(D.C. Criminal No. 2-13-cr-00137-002)

District Judge: Hon. Kevin McNulty

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 8, 2016

BEFORE: FISHER, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 27, 2016)

______________

OPINION*

_____________

COWEN, Circuit Judge

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Anthony Jefferson appeals from the conviction and sentence entered by the United 

States District Court for the District of New Jersey. We will affirm.

I.

Jefferson was indicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to 

commit a carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and to brandish a firearm in 

furtherance of the carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); (2) carjacking 

(and aiding and abetting the carjacking) in violation of § 2119(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 

(3) brandishing (and aiding and abetting brandishing) of a firearm in furtherance of the 

carjacking in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and § 2. On March 3, 2014, the jury found 

Jefferson guilty on all counts and also made a specific finding that he brandished a 

firearm in furtherance of the carjacking. 

On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. 

Ct. 1240 (2014). The Rosemond Court addressed what the government “must show when 

it accuses a defendant of aiding or abetting” a § 924(c) offense. Id. at 1243. The District 

Court notified the parties that any post-trial motions relating to the § 924(c) firearms 

component should include a discussion of the effect, if any, of Rosemond. Emphasizing 

this recent Supreme Court decision, Jefferson moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 33. The District Court heard oral argument. For the reasons it set 

forth in a comprehensive written opinion, it denied Jefferson’s motions. Jefferson was 

then sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment on Counts One and Two, to be served 
3

concurrently, and 84 months of imprisonment on Count Three, to be served 

consecutively—for a total term of imprisonment of 104 months. 

II.

According to Jefferson, the District Court improperly instructed the jury “as to the 

intent element of the weapons, i.e. brandishing offense.”1 (Appellant’s Brief at 4.) Even 

if we were to assume for purposes of this appeal that the jury instruction was inconsistent 

with Rosemond, Jefferson cannot show that any such error affected either the outcome of 

the trial or the fairness, integrity, or reputation of this proceeding. In short, there was 

ample evidence that Jefferson had “advance knowledge that a confederate would use or 

carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243. For

instance, John Cinardo testified that, at approximately 3:00 a.m., he saw Jefferson and 

Sharod Culp (Jefferson’s childhood friend) conversing and walking together down the 

middle of Patterson Street towards his car. “Immediately their paths diverged (they 

 

1 The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291. It is uncontested that we 

must apply a plain error standard of review with respect to Jefferson’s challenge to the 

District Court’s jury instructions. Under this standard, the appellant must show: (1) there 

is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious; (3) the error “‘affected the appellant’s 

substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the 

district court proceedings;’” and (4) the error “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 

(2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). We review the 

sentence for procedural error, ensuring that the district court, inter alia, correctly 

calculated the advisory Guidelines range and gave meaningful consideration to the 

sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Freeman,

763 F.3d 322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1189 (2015), and cert. denied,

135 S. Ct. 1467 (2015). We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

See, e.g., id. 
4

formed a ‘V,’ said [the other victim, Leandra] Semedo). Culp went to the driver’s side of 

the car, Jefferson to the passenger’s side. Culp immediately displayed a gun and ordered 

Cinardo out of the car.” United States v. Jefferson, Crim. No. 13-137 (KM), 2014 WL 

1745027, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014). Culp then took the victims into the alleyway at 

gunpoint. Jefferson, for his part, did not express any shock or otherwise attempt to 

withdraw after the gun was brandished. On the contrary, he drove away with his friend—

after he had “taunted the victims and urged Culp to shoot Cinardo.”2 Id. at *12.

Furthermore, the District Court did not commit any reversible error with respect to 

Jefferson’s sentencing. While he contends that the government failed to provide proper 

documentation for one of his two juvenile dispositions, his trial counsel informed the 

District Court that “further research shows that Probation was accurate that the Defendant 

has two juvenile convictions for burglary and eluding both third-degree crimes which 

both occurred within three months of each other in 2009” and even included the orders of 

disposition as exhibits. (SA237.) Jefferson argues that the District Court “failed to 

properly consider facts as to the nature and the circumstances of the offenses.” 

 

2

 Jefferson takes particular issue with the District Court’s determination that he 

enthusiastically continued to participate in the carjacking after learning that Culp was 

using a gun. According to him, Cinardo’s testimony about Jefferson goading or 

antagonizing Culp was “effectively negated” on cross-examination “when the victim 

essentially acknowledged that he either intentionally or otherwise made misstatements to 

the police, perhaps out of desire to see defendant prosecuted for a bias crime.” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 9.) However, he still told the police that “‘I forgot exactly what, but 

he just said like, “shoot them”’ basically.” (A162.) We further note that the jury simply 

asked to review the instructions (without specifying any particular claim or issue) and that 

the District Court’s failure to require the jury to resolve the issue of foreknowledge on the 

verdict sheet (before Rosemond was even decided) did not constitute reversible error. 
5

(Appellant’s Brief at 12.) The District Court, however, meaningfully considered the 

specific nature and particular circumstances of the criminal conduct at issue here, noting, 

among other things, that the victims were taken into the alley and “put in fear of their 

lives, probably feeling this moment could be their last.” (A439.) Imposing a sentence 

two years below the bottom of the Guidelines range, the District Court acknowledged that 

“there is much good in” Jefferson and took into account the “impressive sheath of letters 

from ordinary people, friends, associates, and family members, speaking of his good 

character and his helpfulness, and likeability and responsibility.” (A440.) Finally, we do 

not believe that, under these circumstances, the below-guidelines sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 

2012) (“State-federal disparities are simply irrelevant under § 3553(a)(6), and the District 

Court was not required to address them.”). 

III.

We will affirm Jefferson’s criminal conviction and sentence.