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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS TO A.Q.M. AND A.A.M., 

MINOR CHIDREN

APPEAL OF: M.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 194 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree December 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): A2018-0034, 

A2018-0035

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS TO A.A.M. AND A.Q.M., 

MINOR CHILDREN

APPEAL OF: S.P.M. SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 196 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree December 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): A2018-0034, 

A2018-0035

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 24, 2019

M.M. (“Mother”) and S.P.M., Sr. (“Father”), (collectively, “the Parents”) 

appeal from the decrees entered December 14, 2018, which involuntarily 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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terminated their parental rights to their minor daughters, A.A.M., born in April 

2004, and A.Q.M., born in February 2008 (collectively, “the Sisters”).1 After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The orphans’ court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

matter as follows. 

. . . . [Lehigh County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)] 

received its fifteenth referral regarding this family in August of 

2015 as a result of injuries sustained by then-eight-year-old 

M.M.,[2] who left the home without his parents’ knowledge and was 

struck by a car while riding a scooter. Prior referrals were for a 

variety of issues including truancy, inappropriate housing, medical 

neglect of the children by the [P]arents, questions over the mental 

health of the children, domestic violence between the [P]arents, 

the [P]arents’ inappropriate discipline of the children, and 

inadequate parenting skills.

Pursuant to a stipulated agreement, all six children, 

including the [S]isters who are the subjects of this termination 

proceeding, were adjudicated dependent on August 27, 2015, 

pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §[]6302(1) based on lack of “proper care 

or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other 

care or control necessary for [the child’s] physical, mental, or 

emotional health, or morals.” Some of the concerns existing at 

the time of the adjudication hearing in August of 2015 were the 

children’s truancy and frequent tardiness at school, hygiene 

issues, and lack of appropriate well-child check-ups and follow-up 

care, including mental health treatment. As a result of the 

adjudication of the children as dependent, numerous services 

were court-ordered to assist the children to remain in their 

parents’ care. The children were ordered to attend school 

regularly or provide verification of compliance with cyber-

____________________________________________

1 Because these appeals arise from the same set of facts and involve identical

issues, we have consolidated them for disposition.

2 The Sisters are only two of the Parents’ six children. The Sisters have four 

brothers, S.M.1, E.M., S.M.2, and M.M. The brothers are not involved in this 

appeal.
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schooling; cooperate with all necessary medical appointments; 

maintain proper personal hygiene; and cooperate with any 

recommended mental health treatment. The [P]arents were to 

cooperate with [CYS]; permit [CYS] access to the home on a 

weekly basis; maintain a safe and sanitary home for the children; 

provide verification of legal source of income; ensure that the 

children attend school regularly or verify their compliance with 

cyber-school; cooperate with any in-home services recommended 

by [CYS]; and ensure that the children attend all medical 

appointments and maintain proper personal hygiene. At that 

time, the [S]isters and three siblings remained in the [P]arents’

home under an Order of Protective Supervision. M.M. was placed 

in the home of the children’s maternal grandparents out of 

concern for his safety and supervision. A Child Protective Services 

([“]CPS[”]) Investigation related to M.M. was underway, but not 

yet completed.

Between August of 2015 and January of 2016, [the Parents]

did not comply with most of the court-ordered services. Additional 

court-ordered services were imposed on the [P]arents. By Order 

dated January 28, 2016, pursuant to a Change of Disposition 

hearing and Stipulation, both parents were ordered to undergo 

mental health evaluations, to follow any and all recommendations 

resulting from the evaluations, to enroll the children in school 

immediately, and to have the children seen by their pediatrician 

within 30 days.

On or about January 28, 2016, [CYS] received another 

referral that the children’s oldest brother, who was over the age 

of 12 at the time, was performing oral sex on himself in front of 

the other children. The [S]isters were taken into emergency 

custody on or around that date. The Court determined at a shelter 

care hearing on February 1, 2016 that it was not in the children’s 

best interests to remain in the home with their parents. The five 

children, including the [S]isters, were placed with their maternal 

grandparents and were reunited with M.M., who had already been 

placed there in August of 2015. However, toward the end of June, 

2016, the [S]isters had to be moved from the maternal 

grandparents’ home after the grandparents reported to [CYS] that 

three of the children were acting out sexually with one another.

Upon their removal from the maternal grandparents’ home, the 

[S]isters were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle, where 

they remain to this day.
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 3-5 (footnotes and citations to the record 

omitted).3

On May 16, 2018, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the 

Parents’ rights to the Sisters. The orphans’ court held a hearing on August 3, 

2018. On December 14, 2018, the court entered decrees terminating the 

Parents’ rights. Father filed a notice of appeal on January 11, 2019, while 

Mother filed a notice of appeal on January 14, 2019.

4, 5 The Parents included 

____________________________________________

3 After the juvenile court removed the Sisters from the Parents’ care, CYS 

learned that the Sisters had been the victims of sexual abuse by their brothers 

while in the Parents’ home. N.T., 8/3/18, at 89, 92-93, 112, 132-34, 138. 

4 Generally, a party must file his or her notice of appeal within thirty days after 

entry of the order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by 

this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry 

of the order from which the appeal is taken.”). Thirty days after December 

14, 2018, was Sunday, January 13, 2019. Thus, Mother timely filed her notice 

of appeal on Monday, January 14, 2019. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (“Whenever 

the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, . . . such day 

shall be omitted from the computation.”).

5 By filing single notices of appeal from the separate decrees terminating their 

parental rights, the Parents violated our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note (“Where . . . one or more orders resolves issues arising 

on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate 

notices of appeal must be filed.”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 

977 (Pa. 2018) (holding that the failure to file separate notices of appeal from 

an order resolving issues on more than one docket “requires the appellate 

court to quash the appeal”). On January 30, 2019, this Court issued rules to 

show cause why these appeals should not be quashed. The Parents’ respective 

counsels then filed four additional notices of appeal at Superior Court docket 

numbers 518 EDA 2019, 519 EDA 2019, 730 EDA 2019, and 733 EDA 2019. 

This Court later quashed those appeals as untimely. 
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concise statements of errors complained of on appeal with their notices of 

appeal. 

On appeal, the Parents present identical claims for our review:

A. Did the [orphans’] court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in finding that [CYS] met the requirements of 23 Pa. 

C.S.[] §[]2511 (a)(1), (2), (5)[,] and (8) by clear and convincing 

evidence?

B. Did the [orphans’] court err as a matter of law and/or abuse 

it’s [sic] discretion in finding that [CYS] sustained their burden of 

proof by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of 

[the] Parents[’] parental rights to [the Sisters] best meet[s] the 

needs and welfare of the [Sisters] as required by 23 Pa. C.S.[] 

§[]2511 (b)?

Mother’s brief at 4; Father’s brief at 4 (suggested answers and unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

We address these claims mindful of the following standard of review: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

____________________________________________

In a recent case, a panel of this Court declined to quash an involuntary 

termination appeal based on noncompliance with Rule 341, recognizing the 

possibility that “decisional law may have been unclear to this point[.]” In the 

Matter of: M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019). However, the panel 

announced that this Court would quash any noncompliant appeals filed after 

the date of its decision on February 22, 2019. Id. at 986. Because the Parents 

filed their initial notices of appeal well in advance of our Court’s decision in 

M.P., we likewise decline to quash the instant appeals.
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emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis:

. . . . Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the orphans’ court terminated the Parents’ rights 

to the Sisters pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need 

only agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze 

the court’s decision pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides

as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:
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***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

***

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first consider whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of its

discretion by terminating the Parents’ rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). 

. . . . In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 
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be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted).

In the instant matter, the Parents’ contentions on appeal are almost 

identical.6 They assert that the orphans’ court failed to consider the totality 

of the circumstances in this case as well as their explanation for their conduct. 

Mother’s brief at 17; Father’s brief at 14. They note that they moved to 

Schuylkill County, an hour away from Lehigh County, which hindered their 

ability to participate in necessary services. Mother’s brief at 18; Father’s brief 

at 14-15. However, they suggest that this move has been a positive 

development overall, because it has allowed them to “stabilize[.]” Mother’s 

brief at 18; Father’s brief at 15. Finally, the Parents blame their failure to 

provide parental care on the juvenile court and the fact that they did not have 

custody of the Sisters. Mother’s brief at 19-21; Father’s brief at 15-17. 

In its opinion, the orphans’ court summarized the evidence presented 

during the hearing in detail. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 3-17. Ultimately, 

the court found that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination 

____________________________________________

6

Initially, Father’s counsel filed a letter in this Court seeking to join Mother’s 

appellate brief. This Court entered an order on June 6, 2019, which denied 

counsel’s request and directed her to file her own appellate brief. It appears 

that Father’s counsel complied with our directive by simply copying Mother’s 

brief and making some minor wording changes. 
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of the Parents’ rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Id. at 19 n.29. The 

court explained as follows:

At the time of the hearing, the [S]isters had been in care for 

over 30 months. Both parents are still in some form of denial 

about the sexual abuse their daughters endured while in their 

parents’ care. Father does not acknowledge the abuse occurred, 

preferring to believe his parents-in-law lied about it. Mother is in 

denial about the seriousness of her son S.M.1 performing sexual 

acts on himself in front of her daughters. In over two years, 

neither parent has made any progress with the most important 

court-ordered goal, which is to attend and successfully complete 

protective parenting treatment. Protective parenting treatment 

could have taught [the Parents] to help their daughters deal with 

the trauma of sexual abuse perpetrated on them by family 

members while in their parents’ care. In the 30 months their 

daughters have been in care, neither parent has completed this 

court-ordered service. The evidence presented at the termination 

hearing in August of 2018 clearly and convincingly demonstrated 

that [the Parents] are not any closer to being resources for the 

[S]isters than they were at the time the [S]isters were removed 

from the care of their parents on January 28, 2016, over two and 

a half years ago. 

Id. at 17-18 (footnote omitted).

Our review of the record supports the findings and conclusions of the 

orphans’ court. During the termination hearing, CYS caseworker Jennifer Sell 

testified at length regarding the Parents’ failure to comply with reunification 

services after CYS obtained custody of the Sisters in January 2016. Ms. Sell 

explained that the juvenile court ordered the Parents to obtain mental health 

evaluations, cooperate with in-home reunification services, maintain a safe 

and sanitary home, and visit with the Sisters. N.T., 8/3/18, at 71-72. 

Subsequently, the juvenile court held a permanency review hearing on 

May 23, 2016. Id. at 74. Ms. Sell testified that the Parents had completed 
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their mental health evaluations by the time of the hearing. Id. However, the 

Parents were failing to comply with in-home reunification services. Id. at 75.

Ms. Sell explained that JusticeWorks was providing the reunification services. 

Id. at 73. While “[Mother] met inconsistently with JusticeWorks, . . . [Father] 

had not met with them at all.” Id. at 75. Following the hearing, the court 

directed the Parents to undergo protective parenting treatment.7 Exhibits P1A 

and P1B (dependency court orders). As detailed above, while the Sisters had 

been residing with their grandparents, CYS removed the Sisters in June 2016, 

due to the sexual behaviors of the Sisters’ siblings, and placed them in the 

care of their maternal aunt and uncle, who are their current pre-adoptive 

foster parents. N.T., 8/3/18, at 76, 97.

Ms. Sell testified that an additional permanency review hearing occurred 

on August 22, 2016. Id. at 75. By the time of that hearing, JusticeWorks 

had closed out reunification services unsuccessfully. Id. at 78-79. Further, 

Father was failing to attend visits with the Sisters on a consistent basis. Id.

at 79. During the visits that Father did attend, he “would tend to stand off to 

the back and not engage with the children.” Id. After a hearing on January 

6, 2017, the Parents agreed to suspend visits with the Sisters entirely. Id. at 

80. Ms. Sell explained that the Sisters’ treatment team believed “that it would 

be best . . . to stop having contact with parents and siblings at that time to 

help process the trauma and the abuse they had been through. There were 

____________________________________________

7 The record refers to this treatment interchangeably as “protective parenting 

treatment” and “non-offending parenting treatment.”
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concerns that there were signals being given at visits that were continu[ing] 

to trigger the trauma.” Id. The Parents have not visited with the Sisters since 

December 19, 2016. Id. at 96. 

Ms. Sell testified that the next permanency review hearings took place 

on February 13, 2017, and May 15, 2017. Id. at 81. She reported that, at 

that point, the Parents were participating in protective parenting treatment. 

Id. at 81-82. However, by the May permanency review hearing, Mother was 

attending individual treatment sessions only. Id. at 82-83. Ms. Sell explained 

that Mother’s treatment provider asked her not to return to group treatment 

sessions “because she was aggressive with other group members[.]” Id. at 

82. Ms. Sell recalled that Father’s non-offending parenting treatment provider 

discharged him unsuccessfully at approximately the same time. Id. at 85. 

Ms. Sell testified that another permanency review hearing took place on 

August 14, 2017. Id. at 87. By the time of that hearing, Mother’s protective 

parenting treatment provider had discharged her unsuccessfully as well. Id.

at 87-88. Nonetheless, CYS arranged for the Parents to attend protective 

parenting treatment at a new provider. Id. at 86, 88. While the Parents were 

reporting to CYS that they were attending mental health treatment, CYS was 

unable to obtain documentation confirming their claims. Id. at 88-89. 
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The next permanency review hearing took place on February 5, 2018.8

Id. at 90. Ms. Sell testified that Mother had completed a protective parenting 

treatment evaluation at a new provider, but that the provider discharged her 

unsuccessfully in December 2017. Id. Mother had been “argumentative and 

aggressive” toward the treatment provider. Id. at 105. The new protective 

parenting treatment provider also discharged Father unsuccessfully around 

the same time. Id. at 91. Finally, Ms. Sell recounted that the most recent 

permanency review hearing took place on May 7, 2018. Id. at 94. By that 

time, the Parents had left Lehigh County, following an eviction from their prior 

residence, and moved to Schuylkill County. Id. at 91, 95, 128. Ms. Sell was 

not aware of the Parents reengaging with protective parenting treatment, nor 

had the Parents verified their attendance at mental health treatment.

9 Id. at 

95-96. 

Thus, the record confirms that the Parents are incapable of parenting 

the Sisters, in that they have been either unable or unwilling to comply with 

the services necessary to regain custody of the Sisters for over thirty months. 

Most notably, the Parents failed to comply with in-home reunification services 

____________________________________________

8

In the interim, CYS began a child protective services investigation regarding 

the Parents’ conduct while the Sisters remained in their care. N.T., 8/3/18, 

at 92. The Parents are now indicated perpetrators of abuse by omission, due 

to the sexual abuse that occurred in the home. Id. at 92-93. 

9 Mother testified that the Parents had been attending treatment, but that 

they stopped when they moved to Schuylkill County. N.T., 8/3/18, at 254-

55, 268-69, 298. 
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and failed to comply on two occasions with protective parenting treatment. 

The record further confirms that the Parents cannot or will not remedy their 

parental capacity within the foreseeable future, due to their refusal to accept 

responsibility for their circumstances, as well as their refusal to acknowledge 

that their protective parenting skills are in need of improvement. In addition 

to Ms. Sell, CYS presented the testimony of Vickie Moyer, Mother’s protective 

parenting treatment counselor. Ms. Moyer authored a letter to CYS, in which 

she reported that Mother “refused to consider even a small amount of personal 

accountability for her and her children’s present situation.” Exhibit P5 at 2. 

Similarly, Father’s protective parenting treatment counselor, Toby Nicolosi, 

testified that he discharged Father from treatment due to Father’s refusal to 

acknowledge that he had anything to work on.

10 N.T., 8/3/18, at 206-07. In 

light of this evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the 

orphans’ court in terminating the Parents’ rights to the Sisters involuntarily 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). As this Court has emphasized, “a child’s life 

____________________________________________

10 CYS also presented the testimony of psychologist, Bradley Beckwith, Ph.D., 

who conducted a psychological evaluation of Father in May 2016. N.T., 

8/3/18, at 147. Doctor Beckwith diagnosed Father with paranoid personality 

disorder and opined that he was unlikely to be a suitable caretaker for the 

Sisters. Id. at 167. Dr. Beckwith explained that Father “had some of the 

highest hallmarks for a paranoid personality disorder I’ve seen. . . . [o]utside 

of an inpatient setting[,]” including lack of empathy, aggression, an egocentric 

worldview, a distorted perception of himself, and a distorted perception of 

others. Id. at 174. He estimated that Father would need to attend “anywhere 

from eighteen months to two years [of] consistent therapy in regular 

intervals” in order to manage his condition. Id. at 191. 
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cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

We next consider whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of its 

discretion pursuant to Section 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the [S]ection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).
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Here, the Parents contend that the orphans’ court abused its discretion 

by concluding that termination would best serve the Sisters’ needs and welfare 

without the benefit of expert testimony. Mother’s brief at 22; Father’s brief 

at 18. They further argue that they maintain a bond with the Sisters and that 

they continued to work toward reunification despite facing adversity. Mother’s 

brief at 22-23; Father’s brief at 18-19.11

The orphans’ court found that involuntary termination of the Parents’ 

rights would best serve the Sisters’ needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b), reasoning as follows:

With respect to the analysis required under 23 Pa. C.S. 

§[]2511(b), the last time [the Parents] saw [] their daughters was 

on December 18, 2016. Both parents had the opportunity to write 

the children in care of the caseworker with the understanding the 

writings would be reviewed and provided to the children when 

therapeutically recommended. Neither parent availed themselves 

of this opportunity to communicate their love to their daughters.

____________________________________________

11 As part of this claim, the Parents also assert that the orphans’ court violated 

Section 2511(b) by terminating their parental rights based on factors beyond 

their control, such as “housing, mental health issues, and [their] children’s 

‘sexually reactive’ behavior amongst themselves.” Mother’s brief at 22; 

Father’s brief at 18. This contention is meritless, it is apparent from the court’s 

opinion that its sole focus was not on environmental factors such as the 

Parents’ housing. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (“The rights of a parent shall not 

be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond 

the control of the parent.”) (emphasis added). Rather, the court focused on 

the Parents’ failure and/or refusal to cooperate with services, as well as the 

Sisters’ needs and welfare. We further note that the Parents’ “mental health 

issues, and [their] children’s ‘sexually reactive’ behavior amongst themselves” 

are not environmental factors within the meaning of Section 2511(b).
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Father has seen his children only four times since February 

of 2016. He has never called [CYS] to ask how his children are 

doing. He has never contacted the caseworker about anything 

regarding the children. According to [a letter prepared by Mr. 

Nicolosi, Father’s protective parenting treatment counselor,] the 

children did better after they stopped having contact with 

Father.[12]

Mother has not contacted the caseworker about the children 

for more than a year. Although the caseworker believed that 

Mother loves [the Sisters], she felt the girls deserve a chance to 

have a normal upbringing. Even though Mother may love her

daughters and feel a bond with them, “a parent’s own feelings of 

love and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of 

parental rights.” In re T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119, 1128 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (internal citations omitted).

Since June of 2016, these sisters have been placed together 

in a loving kinship foster home where they are well[]cared for and 

happy. Truancy was no longer an issue after the [S]isters were 

removed from their parents’ care. In the kinship[] home the 

[S]isters have two parents, they attend school daily, attend dance 

classes and church, and go on family vacations. The kinship 

mother successfully completed protective parenting treatment, 

which was not required of her. The kinship parents intend to adopt 

the [S]isters if parental rights are terminated. At this point, the 

bond that is worth preserving is the bond the two sisters have with 

one another and with their kinship foster parents. 

Given that there is no reasonable prospect that [the 

Parents] will be able to reunite with their children in the 

reasonably foreseeable future, we find that [the Sisters’] needs 

and welfare require that we terminate the parental rights of [the 

Parents] and allow [the Sisters] to achieve stability and 

permanence with trusted adults who will protect them. 23 Pa. 

C.S. §[]2511(b).

____________________________________________

12 See Exhibit P4 at 3 (“On April 13, 2017[,] a team meeting was held to 

address the family’s progress. The treatment team was in agreement in 

continuing with no visits between the family. The children are responding 

positively to [having] no contact with their parents/grandparents.”)
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 19-20 (footnote omitted).

Once again, the record supports the findings and conclusions of the 

orphans’ court. As detailed above, the Sisters entered foster care in January 

2016, when A.A.M. was nearly twelve years old, and A.Q.M. was nearly eight.

By the time of the termination hearing on August 3, 2018, A.A.M. was nearly 

fourteen and a half years old, while A.Q.M. was ten and a half years old. The 

Parents have not visited with the Sisters at all since December 2016 at the 

recommendation of the Sisters’ treatment team, based on concerns that visits 

were only “continu[ing] to trigger the trauma.” N.T., 8/3/18, at 80, 96.

Moreover, although the Parents agreed to suspend their visits with the Sisters, 

Ms. Sell explained that they had the opportunity to send the Sisters letters, 

cards, or gifts “that would be kept in the file until the [Sister’s] therapists

deemed it appropriate that they receive them.” Id. at 98. Ms. Sell confirmed 

that CYS never received a letter, card, or anything else from the Parents for 

the Sisters. Id.

While it is likely that the Sisters maintain some sort of emotional 

attachment to the Parents, that attachment has surely weakened due to the 

length of time that the Sisters have spent in kinship foster care without contact 

from the Parents. The Parents alone are responsible for the damage that their 

relationship with the Sisters has suffered, due to their failure to protect the 

Sisters from the sexual abuse occurring in their own home. Further, contrary 

to the Parents’ assertions, the orphans’ court was under no obligation to obtain 
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expert testimony in order to assess the Sisters’ needs and welfare. See In 

re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010), reargument denied (May 28, 2018) 

(citations omitted) (“When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer 

evaluations as well.”). The court was free to rely on the testimony of Ms. Sell, 

who opined that termination would best serve the Sisters’ needs and welfare, 

as follows:

[A.A.M.] is 14 years old now. She should be able to go to a 

birthday party that has four-wheelers without having to check with 

the County first. . . . [A.Q.M.] should be able to go to a sleepover 

without having to call the County and making sure that that’s 

okay. These girls deserve a normal family that loves and nurtures 

them and not having [CYS] watch over everything they do. They 

deserve the permanency at this point in time. 

N.T., 8/3/18, at 98-99. Ms. Sell further testified that the Sisters are doing 

very well in their pre-adoptive kinship foster home. Id. at 94.

Accordingly, the record confirms that the Sisters’ need for permanency, 

and the opportunity to achieve permanency through adoption by their kinship 

foster parents, outweighs whatever relationship the Sisters might maintain 

with the Parents. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920–23 (Pa. Super. 2008), 

appeal denied, 970 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2009) (affirming the termination of 

parental rights where “obvious emotional ties” existed between the child and 

his parents, but where preserving the parents’ rights would prevent the child 

from being adopted and attaining permanency). We discern no abuse of 

discretion or error of law with respect to Section 2511(b). 
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Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the orphans’ court 

did not commit an abuse of its discretion or an error of law by involuntarily

terminating the Parents’ rights to the Sisters. We therefore affirm the court’s 

December 14, 2018 decrees. 

Decrees affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/24/19