alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40948

BERNHARD GUBSER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; JOHN KOSKINEN, in his official 

capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service; UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:15-CV-298

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bernhard Gubser failed to report his overseas bank account to the IRS

as required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314. Gubser 

received a Letter 3709 from the IRS stating that he had not filed the required 

report for the 2008 reporting year. The IRS proposed a penalty of $1,363,336—

half of the undisclosed account balance at the time of the violation—for 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 13, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-40948 Document: 00513908418 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
No. 16-40948

2

Gubser’s willful failure to file the report. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5). The letter 

gave Gubser the following options: (1) agree to the proposed penalty and make 

payment; (2) disagree and request a conference with the IRS Appeals Office; or 

(3) do nothing and the IRS “will assess the penalty and begin collection 

procedures.”

Gubser chose the second option. He alleges that he met with an IRS 

Appeals officer who told him that the IRS likely could prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence—but not by clear and convincing evidence—

that he willfully failed to report the overseas account. Gubser brought a 

complaint seeking a declaration that the IRS must prove a willful failure to 

report by clear and convincing evidence. Gubser is still in the Appeals process 

and a penalty has not been assessed. 

The government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that 

Gubser lacks standing, the case is not ripe, and the government has not waived 

sovereign immunity. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding 

that Gubser lacks standing for failure to show redressability. In particular, the 

district court found it was “highly speculative” and “far from likely” that 

Gubser’s requested declaration would prevent the IRS from assessing a 

penalty. It did not reach the government’s ripeness and sovereign immunity 

arguments. 

For the reasons essentially given by the district court, we agree that 

Gubser fails to establish standing. 

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-40948 Document: 00513908418 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2017
#### Nassau County, Appellant, v Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al., Respondents.

Submitted March 25, 2013;

decided May 2, 2013

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from that part of the Appellate Division order that affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of appellant’s motion for renewal, dismissed upon the ground that such portion of the order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution; motion for leave to appeal otherwise denied.
No. 07-14-00335-CR

Raul Constancio

 Appellant

v.

The State of Texas

 Appellee

§

§

§

§

From the County Court at Law No. 2

 of Lubbock County

July 10, 2015

Opinion by Justice Pirtle

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated July 10, 2015, it is ordered, adjudged

and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis, no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o

FILE COPY
Exhibit 32.1



Certification



Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned hereby certifies that:



(1) I have reviewed the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P. (the "Report") to which this statement is an Exhibit;



(2) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(3) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P.



|By:    | Inland Real Estate Investment Corporation                        
|------ | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|       | General Partner                                                  
|       |                                                                  
|       |                                                                  
|By:    | /S/ Brenda G. Gujral                                             
|       |                                                                  
|Name:  | Brenda G. Gujral                                                 
|Title: | President of the General Partner and                             
|       | principal executive officer of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P
|Date:  | November 10, 2005
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42276

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM CONRAD VALENTINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 547

Filed: July 9, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified twenty-year sentence with a minimum period 

of confinement of eight years for lewd conduct with a child under 

sixteen, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

William Conrad Valentine pled guilty to lewd conduct with a child under sixteen, Idaho 

Code § 18-1508. In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district 

court imposed a unified twenty-year sentence with an eight-year determinate term. Valentine

appeals, contending that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Valentine’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Scott VV., Respondent, v Joy VV., Appellant.

Submitted March 4, 2013;

decided April 30, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal denied. Motion for poor person relief and a stay dismissed as academic.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00516-CR

Troy Don Yates

v.

The State of Texas

§

§

§

§

§

From the 355th District Court

of Hood County (CR12682)

July 9, 2015

Opinion by Justice Walker

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Sue Walker________________

 Justice Sue Walker
RE: Case No. 15-0339 DATE

COA #: 12-14-00256-CV TC#: 2014-933

STYLE: TROY W. SIMMONS, D.D.S., P.C. AND TROY 

SIMMONS, D.D.S.

v. TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMIS

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied 

petition for review in the above-referenced 

MS. CATHY S. LUSK

CLERK, TWELFTH COURT OF 

1517 WEST FRONT, SUITE 

TYLER, TX 75702
Exhibit 10.2



		

			 

		




		
			Exhibit 10.2
		

		
			 
		

		
			AMENDMENT NO. 1
		

		
			TO THE
		

		
			WOODWARD GOVERNOR COMPANY EXECUTIVE BENEFIT PLAN
		

		
			The Woodward Governor Company Executive Benefit Plan (Amended and Restated
		

		
			November 18, 2010) (the "Plan"), is hereby amended, effective as of January 26, 2011, as
		

		
			follows:
		

			
			
				 1.
			

			
			
			Section 1.1 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:




		
			 
		

		
			“1.1     Purpose. The Woodward Executive Benefit Plan has been established by Woodward, Inc. to attract and retain certain key members by:
		

		
			 
		

			
			
				 (a)
			

			
			
			providing a tax-deferred capital accumulation vehicle to supplement such members' individual retirement contributions, thereby encouraging savings for retirement, and




		
			 
		

			
			
				 (b)
			

			
			
			supplementing such members' retirement income available under the Woodward Retirement Savings Plan (the "RSP"), which is otherwise limited pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code")."




		
			 
		

			
			
				 2.
			

			
			
			 Section 1.3 of the Plan is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following:




		
			 
		

		
			"As of January 26, 2011, the Company changed its name to 'Woodward, Inc.' In connection with the change of the Company's name, on and after January 26, 2011, this Plan shall be known as 'Woodward Executive Benefit Plan. '"
		

		
			 
		

			
			
				 3.
			

			
			
			Section 2.7 of the Plan is hereby amended by substituting the word "Woodward" for the phrase "Woodward Governor Company'' each instance that this phrase appears therein, whether or not as part of a plan name or term.




		
			 
		

			
			
				 4.
			

			
			
			Section 2.23 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:




		
			 
		

		
			"2.23   'Plan' means the Woodward Executive Benefit Plan, as amended from time to time."
		

		
			 
		

			
			
				 5.
			

			
			
			Sections 2.10, 2.20, 6.2 and 6.3 of the Plan are hereby amended by substituting the phrase Woodward, Inc." for the phrase "Woodward Governor Company" each instances that this phrase appears therein, whether or not as part of another phrase.




		
			 
		

			
			
				 6.
			

			
			
			Except as set forth herein, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect.




		
			 
		

		
			Executed as of the 14th day of April, 2011,
		

			
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						WOODWARD, INC.

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						By:  /s/ Rick W. Holm

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Corporate Director, Global HR

				
	
					
						 

					
					
						Support Services and Risk Management
Dismissed and Opinion Filed November 19, 2015 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-15-00068-CV COLETTE FERRELL, Appellant V. MIDFIRST BANK, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-00014-E



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright, Justi ce Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart Opinion by Chief Justice Wright Appellant’s brief in this case is overdue. By electronically-delivered postcard dated September 2, 2015, we notified appellant the time for filing her brief had expired. We directed appellant to file both her brief and an extensi on motion within ten days . We cautioned appellant that failure to file her brief and an extension mo tion would result in the di smissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, appellant has not filed her brief, an extension motion, or otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of her brief. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b), (c).

150068F.P05 /Carolyn Wright/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE–2– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
COLETTE FERRELL, Appellant
No. 05-15-00068-CV V. MIDFIRST BANK, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-00014-E. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart participating. In accordance with this Court’s opi nion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellee MIDFIRST BANK recove r its costs of this appeal from appellant COLETTE FERRELL.
Judgment entered November 19, 2015.
**Exhibit
      99.4**








CERTIFICATE
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Quarterly Report”) on the Form
      10-QSBA of Loma Verde Inc. (“Loma”) for the six months ended December 31, 2006,
      as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I,
      Virgilio Santana, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and
      Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge
      and belief:





1.
      The
      Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
      15
      (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2.
      The
      information contained in this Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of Loma.
















VIRGILIO
      SANTANA  Virgilio
      Santana


Chief
      Accounting Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director






-1-
# Milestones for Translational Device Cooperative Agreements

Milestones are not decision points to continue in either “this-direction” or “that-direction”; they are metric driven, quantifiable and verifiable, *minimum-success criteria* for each year of the project.   If these minimum criteria are not met by the end of the year, completion of the overall project goals by the end of the project term will be in doubt.  Consequently, these milestones are used to determine whether support for a study will continue after the end of the year, or if funding will be substantially reduced or discontinued (i.e., go/no go decision metrics).  Applicants are strongly encouraged to consult with the approriate NIH program staff  early in the application preparation phase. ***The initial contact with NIH program staff should happen at least 12 weeks before the application due date.***

Each milestone should be constructed to succinctly include: (a) the goals and timeline for completion, (b) the criteria for success, including the quantitative values and scales that will be used to asses success, and (c) the rationale for the choices of *in vitro* or *in vivo* models, parameters to be tested, and quantitative values that will drive the go/no go decisions. Note that not all planned activities necessitate milestones; general progress will be documented in progress reports, and should not be the basis for a go/no go milestone. The rationale section should be used to clearly state the logic behind your choices and make it clear why success (or failure) of each milestone indicates that further support for the program is justified (or not).  If consensus guidelines have been established for device testing within a research field, citing these guidelines or standards is helpful in establishing the rationale behind your milestones.

The adequacy of the proposed project milestones and the feasibility of achieving them are considered by peer reviewers in determining the scientific merit and score for the application. Final project milestones will be negotiated with NIH program staff prior to funding the application and may be changed based on suggestions from reviewers or NIH program staff. The final agreed upon and approved milestones will be specified in the Notice of Award (NoA).

----

## Examples:

***Disclaimer:****The milestones below are presented in the format preferred. The stepwise approaches and in vitro and in vivo models, parameters, and quantitative values for the go/no go milestones shown below are for illustrative purposes only, and are not intended to be prescriptive nor exhaustive. NINDS is not endorsing particular device development plans or models, parameters, or cut-off values. ISO and MIL standards, along with FDA regulations, specified herein are illustrative examples and may be out of date; the investigator is responsible for citing current regulations and associated standards.  Investigators should make these selections based upon their experience level, the stage of their project, and the appropriateness of testing paradigms, timing, and quantitative cut-off values for each device development effort.*
Page 1 

Copyright 1995 Federal Information Systems Corporation 

Federal News Service 

JUNE 19, 1995, MONDAY 

SECTION: IN THE NEWS 

LENGTH: 348 words 

HEADLINE: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF HAROLD A. MONTEAU CHAIRMAN 

NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION 

BODY: 

My name is Harold Monteau. I am Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission. With me 

today is Associate Commissioner Jana McKeag. 

If enacted, S. 487 would supersede Public Law 100-497, The Indian Gaming Regulatossion reviews 

and approves Class II and III tribal gaming ordinances and management contracts. In addition, it has 

the authority to impose civil penalties or to close a gaming establishment for substantial violations 

of the 1988 Act, reg2 06/22/95 interest in, or management responsibility for Class II management 

contracts,unless the contracts combines Class II and Class III activities. The Commission does not 

have the authority to conduct background investigatied in S. 487 provide for: the establishment of a 
Page 2 

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF HAROLD A. MONTEAU CHAIRMAN NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING 

COMMISSION Federal News Service JUNE 19, 1995, MONDAY 

new Federal Indian Regulatory Gaming Commission (FIRGC), the regulation of gaming activities 

by tribes, the establishment of Federal minimum standards, the compacting of Class III gaming, for 

regulating Class II gaming activities over Indian lands. The Commission supports this overall approach. The amendments also enhance and strengthen the Federal, tribal and state involvement in 

the overall gaming regulatory process. T Indian tribes. It is respectful of Tribal sovereignty. 

The compacting provisions for Class III gaming, likewise, would provide a non-compulsory 

mechanism for tribes and states to establish procedures for the conduct of such gaming actse have 

been contentious issues for the tribes and the states, and have delayed the benefits of tribal economic development envisioned in the 1988 Act, through gaming. 

S. 487 proposes to change the way Commissioners are appointed. It altive officer of the Commission. Certain powers that were conferred under the 1988 Act on the Chairman would be exercised 

by the full Commission with the enactment of these amendments. 

The fundamental nature of the operation and scope ors are appointed and the minimum standards 

are established, the existing regulatory framework is to be followed. Also, the existing Commissioners serve until they are replaced or nominated through the new process. 

LOAD-DATE: July 1, 1995
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-20321

Summary Calendar

 

DAVID LEE COOK, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA-H-93-2421

- - - - - - - - - -

September 26, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Lee Cook, Texas prisoner #435179, appeals the district

court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Cook argues that he was

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses

against him at trial and that the prosecutor’s comments

constituted misconduct that rendered his trial fundamentally

unfair in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have
No. 96-20321

- 2 -

reviewed the record and the brief and have found no reversible

error. We affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. 

Cook v. Johnson, No. CA-H-93-2421 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1996).

AFFIRMED.
#### American Building Supply Corp., Appellant, v Petrocelli Group, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Submitted January 7, 2013;

decided February 14, 2013

Motion for reargument denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements [see 19 NY3d 730 (2012)].

Judge Rivera taking no part.
II 

Calendar No. 489 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3567 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, as the ‘‘Navy Corpsman Jeffrey 

L. Wiener Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 12, 2010 

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself and Mrs. GILLIBRAND) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs 

JULY 28, 2010 

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN, without amendment 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, as 

the ‘‘Navy Corpsman Jeffrey L. Wiener Post Office 

Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3567 RS

1 SECTION 1. NAVY CORPSMAN JEFFREY L. WIENER POST 

2 OFFICE BUILDING. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

4 Postal Service located at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New 

5 York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Navy Corps6 man Jeffrey L. Wiener Post Office Building’’. 

7 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg8 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

9 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

10 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Navy Corpsman Jef11 frey L. Wiener Post Office Building’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS

jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 489 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3567 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States PostWiener Post Office Building’’. New York, as the ‘‘Navy Corpsman Jeffrey L. al Service located at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, 

JULY 28, 2010 

Reported without amendment 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the Fifth Circuit

_____________________________________

No. 97-40251

_____________________________________

JAMES D. ROBBINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS JOHN DALTON, Secretary of the Navy, Defendant-Appellee

______________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(C-95-CV-635)

______________________________________________________ December 10, 1997 Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
After reviewing the record in this case, we are satisfied that the district court committed no legal error and that its judgment should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.