NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZHIWEI YU; HONG DING, 

 Petitioners, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

 Respondent.

No. 15-72121 

Agency Nos. A201-210-902 

 A201-210-903 

MEMORANDUM* 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 16, 2022**

 

Pasadena, California

Before: BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,*** District 

Judge.

Hong Ding and Zhiwei Yu, citizens of China, petition for review of a Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

 

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

 

 *** The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, Chief United States District Judge 

for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 3 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

denial of Ding’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review credibility determinations and 

denials of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief for substantial evidence and may 

grant relief only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 

1007 (9th Cir. 2017); Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005). When, 

as here, the BIA’s decision on some issues is “confined to a ‘simple statement of a 

conclusion’” or accords significance deference to the IJ’s findings, the court also 

looks to the IJ’s decision when reviewing the BIA’s conclusions. Shrestha v. 

Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 

F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000); Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2010). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s 

adverse credibility determination. The IJ determined that Ding, the lead petitioner,

was not credible based on her demeanor, numerous inconsistencies and 

implausibilities in her testimony, and discrepancies between her testimony and other 

evidence, all of which are permissible considerations under the REAL ID Act. See 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse 

credibility determination, noting that the IJ “provided a well-reasoned explanation 

for his decision detailing specific and cogent reasons for the adverse credibility 
 3 

determination.” See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044. The IJ’s demeanor finding properly 

referred to specific examples of Ding’s demeanor, see id., and the BIA’s decision 

highlighted several inconsistencies in Ding’s testimony, which the Board noted Ding

failed to explain after being given an opportunity to do so, see Zhi v. Holder, 751 

F.3d 1088, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2014).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s 

denial of asylum and withholding of removal. To establish eligibility for asylum, 

Ding needed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a 

protected ground, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b), and to obtain withholding, Ding needed to 

demonstrate that such persecution was more likely than not, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). 

Ding’s claim of persecution centered on a February 2011 incident in which Chinese 

authorities allegedly arrested several of her family members for practicing the IQuan Tao religion after discovering I-Quan Tao literature that Ding and Yu had 

shipped to their home. However, Ding’s testimony regarding this incident was found 

not credible, and she provided little corroborating evidence of the arrests. Further, 

Ding provided scant documentary evidence regarding the persecution of I-Quan Tao 

practitioners in China. Thus, the record does not compel the conclusion that Ding 

demonstrated the requisite likelihood of persecution for either asylum or 

withholding. 

3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s decision to uphold the IJ’s 
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denial of CAT relief. To obtain CAT relief, Ding needed to demonstrate that it was 

more likely than not that she would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a 

public official if repatriated. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(1), 208.18(a)(1). Here, the IJ 

found that Ding’s CAT claim failed because the claim was based “almost entirely” 

upon incredible testimony and the other evidence of record did not establish the 

requisite likelihood of torture. Because Ding’s testimony was permissibly 

discredited and she provided little documentary evidence establishing that I-Quan 

Tao practitioners face persecution, let alone torture, in China, substantial evidence 

supports the denial of CAT relief.

PETITION DENIED.