NO. 07-11-00258-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL A 

MAY 22, 2012 

JACOB RAMIREZ, APPELLANT 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; 

NO. 20,742-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, JUDGE 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Appellant Jacob Ramirez appeals from the trial court's adjudication of his guilt for 

the offense of manslaughter with a deadly weapon1 and the resulting sentence of twelve 

years of imprisonment. Appellant's attorney has filed a brief in compliance with Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and In re Schulman, 

252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Agreeing with appointed counsel's conclusion 

the record fails to show any arguably meritorious issue that could support the appeal, 

we affirm the trial court's judgment. 

 1 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). 
2 

In April 2009, appellant allowed a fifteen-year-old girl to drive his car, which 

crashed, causing her death. Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon and manslaughter with a deadly weapon. Appellant plead 

guilty to manslaughter with a deadly weapon. The trial court deferred adjudication of 

guilt and placed appellant on community supervision for a period of seven years. 

Appellant's community supervision was conditioned on his compliance with specified 

terms and conditions. In December 2010, the State filed a motion to proceed with an 

adjudication of guilt and the court heard the motion in May 2011. 

At the outset of the hearing, the State waived one of its allegations. Appellant 

plead "true" to each of the State's remaining allegations. The record also contains 

documents signed by appellant, including a stipulation of evidence and judicial 

confession. Appellant testified at the hearing, admitting each violation, and explaining 

his reasons for each violation. The trial court, based on appellant's plea of "true" and the 

evidence presented, revoked his community supervision and adjudicated appellant 

guilty. The trial court assessed punishment against appellant at twelve years of 

imprisonment. This appeal followed. 

Thereafter, appellant's appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

and a brief in support pursuant to Anders in which he certifies that he has diligently 

reviewed the record and, in his professional opinion, under the controlling authorities 

and facts of this case, there is no reversible error or legitimate grounds on which a nonfrivolous appeal arguably can be predicated. The brief discusses the procedural history 

of the case and the proceedings in connection with the motion to adjudicate guilt. 

Counsel discusses the applicable law and sets forth the reasons he concludes there are 
3 

no arguably meritorious issues on which to base an appeal. Counsel has certified that a 

copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw have been served on appellant, and 

that counsel has advised appellant of his right to review the record and file a pro se

response. Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.App.--Waco 1994, pet. ref'd). 

By letter, this Court also notified appellant of his opportunity to submit a response to the 

Anders brief and motion to withdraw filed by his counsel. Appellant has filed a response, 

raising several issues. 

In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we 

will not rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record. 

Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). If this Court 

determines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment of 

new counsel. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim. App.1991). 

In his brief, counsel concludes no arguably meritorious issues are presented 

here. We agree. Appellant entered a plea of "true" to each of the State's allegations the 

trial court considered. These admissions alone warranted the trial court's decision to 

adjudicate guilt. See Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 

2006, no pet.) (holding that one's probation can be revoked on any ground supported by 

the evidence). 

We note also appellant's punishment was within the permissible range for a 

second degree felony. Appellant originally plead guilty to manslaughter with a deadly 

weapon, an offense with an applicable punishment range of not more than 20 years or 

less than 2 years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (West 2011). The trial court 

sentenced appellant to twelve years of imprisonment, a term well within the applicable 
4 

range. It is the general rule that as long as a sentence is within the proper range of 

punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Rodriguez v. State, 917 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1996, 

pet. ref'd) (Texas courts have traditionally held that as long as the sentence is within the 

range of punishment established by the Legislature in a valid statute, it does not violate 

state or federal prohibitions). 

We have also considered each of the issues raised by appellant in his response. 

We do not find any raising arguably meritorious grounds for appeal. 

Our review convinces us that appellate counsel conducted a complete review of 

the record. We have also made an independent examination of the record to determine 

whether there are any arguable grounds which might support the appeal from the 

adjudication, revocation and sentence. We agree it presents no arguably meritorious 

grounds for review. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw.2

 

We do note there is an ambiguity in the judgment. A $1000 fine was assessed at 

the time of the deferred adjudication. At the revocation, however, there was no mention 

of the fine and it was not part of the oral rendition of appellant’s sentence. The front of 

the judgment shows “Fine N/A,” while the body of the judgment shows the original fine 

of $1000. When there is a variance between the oral pronouncement of sentence and 

the written memorialization of the sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. Coffey v. 

State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Young v. State, No. 06-10-00137-

 2 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send his client 

a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with notification of the defendant’s right to file 

a pro se petition for discretionary review. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4.
5 

CR, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1491 (Tex.App.—Texarkana March 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (applying same to revocation proceeding). An 

intermediate appellate court may reform a trial court's judgment to make the record 

speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. Tex. R. App. 

P. 43.2(b); see, e.g., Tamez v. State, 620 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (panel 

op.) (reforming judgment to show $500 fine imposed but not stated in judgment); Nolan 

v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 2001, no pet.) (reforming 

judgment to reflect longer sentence). Similar errors have been corrected in other Anders

cases. See, e.g., Brasfield v. State, No. 13-08-00699-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6641, 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (deleting a fine from the judgment). 

It is clear to us here the trial court did not render the fine so it is not part of the 

sentence. We correct the ambiguity and strike the conflicting language appearing to 

impose the fine against appellant. As reformed, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 James T. Campbell 

 Justice 

Do not publish.