Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC2022-0735

____________

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

REVIVAL CHIROPRACTIC, LLC,

Appellee.

April 25, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Once again, we address a dispute over the amount of 

reimbursements for medical expenses that an insurer was required 

to pay under a personal injury protection (PIP) policy. This dispute 

comes to us by way of a certified question posed by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Revival 

Chiropractic LLC ex rel. Padin v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 21-

10559, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1 (11th Cir. June 2, 2022), which we 

consider under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(6) 

of the Florida Constitution to review questions of Florida law 
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certified by federal appellate courts that are “determinative of the 

cause and for which there is no controlling precedent” of our Court.

Like our recent decision in MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. v. 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 334 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 

2021), this case involves the interaction of the PIP statute’s 

foundational requirement that insurers pay 80% of “all reasonable 

expenses” for medically necessary services with the statutory 

authorization for an insurer to pay 80% of expenses based on the 

statutory schedule of maximum charges if the insurer gives notice 

that it may limit reimbursement pursuant to that schedule. 

Reduced to its bare bones, the question for decision is whether the 

insurer here may pay 80% of a charge submitted by a provider even 

when that reimbursement amount is less than the amount that 

would be reimbursable under the limitations of the statutory 

schedule of maximum charges. We conclude that the terms of the 

PIP policy in this case expressly authorize such a payment and that 

nothing in the statutory scheme stands in the way of that policy 

provision.

In analyzing the case, we first briefly review the relevant 

statutory provisions before setting forth the pertinent policy 
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provisions. With that groundwork laid, we discuss the opinion of 

the Eleventh Circuit, which describes the controversy and the 

arguments of the parties, and we examine the decision of the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida that is on 

review in the Eleventh Circuit. We then discuss Florida case law, 

focusing on our decision in MRI Associates. Finally, we rephrase 

the certified question to more carefully track the facts of the case 

after we have analyzed the relevant statutory and policy provisions 

and explained our conclusion that Allstate was entitled to pay 80% 

of the billed charges at issue here.

I.

The statutory requirements governing PIP benefits are set forth 

in section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2017). Section 627.736(1)(a) 

provides generally that PIP medical benefits must cover “[e]ighty 

percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary medical, 

surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitative services.” Comprehensive 

provisions regarding “charges for treatment of injured persons” are 

laid out in section 627.736(5). Subsection (5)(a) requires that 

medical providers “rendering treatment to an injured person for a 

bodily injury covered by personal injury protection insurance may 
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charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable amount 

pursuant to this section for the services and supplies rendered” and 

then enumerates various factors relevant to ascertaining the 

reasonableness of charges. Subsection (5)(a) moves on to set forth 

provisions creating and governing the schedule of maximum 

charges that may be used to limit reimbursement.

Subsection (5)(a) states that reasonable charges “may not 

exceed the amount the [provider] customarily charges for like 

services or supplies.” Subsection (5)(a) then sets forth various 

factors that may be used in determining the reasonableness of 

charges, including “evidence of usual and customary charges and 

payments accepted by the provider involved in the dispute.” 

Provisions related to the schedule of maximum charges are 

contained in section 627.736(5)(a)1. Under this provision, “[t]he 

insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed] schedule 

of maximum charges” set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.a.-f. (Emphasis 

added.)

Various requirements concerning the application of the 

schedule of maximum charges are detailed in subsection (5)(a)2.-5. 

Of particular relevance to the issue in this case, subsection (5)(a)5. 
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requires that an insurer provide notice of its election to use the 

schedule of maximum charges:

An insurer may limit payment as authorized by this 

paragraph only if the insurance policy includes a notice 

at the time of issuance or renewal that the insurer may 

limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges 

specified in this paragraph. . . . If a provider submits a 

charge for an amount less than the amount allowed 

under subparagraph 1., the insurer may pay the amount 

of the charge submitted.

(Emphasis added.)

II.

Under the PIP policy provisions at issue in this case, Allstate 

agreed—subject to various conditions—to pay “eighty percent of 

reasonable expenses” for “medically necessary” services. Allstate’s 

policy further states that “[t]he methodology for determining the 

amount” to be paid “shall, pursuant to the fee schedule limitations

under Section 627.736(5)(a)1. . . . or any other limitations 

established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the 

Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or 

otherwise continued in the law, be limited to eighty percent of [a 

listed] schedule of maximum charges” that parallels the statutory 

schedule “(or any other fee schedule limitation which may be 
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enacted, amended or otherwise continued in the law).” (Emphasis 

added.)

The policy goes on to provide: “If a provider submits a charge 

for an amount less than the amount determined by the fee schedule 

or other limitations established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other 

provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law . . . [Allstate] 

will pay eighty percent of the charge that was submitted.” 

(Emphasis added.)

III.

As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Allstate issued separate 

auto insurance policies—both containing the PIP provisions set 

forth above—to Natalie Rivera and Jazmine Padin. Revival 

Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1. The circuit 

court detailed the genesis of this litigation:

Padin and Rivera were both involved in car 

accidents, and they sought treatment from Revival. They 

also assigned to Revival any rights and benefits that they 

had under their respective policies.

After rendering services to these insureds, Revival 

submitted a charge of $100. The services corresponded 

to a maximum charge of $149.92 under the statutory 

schedule. So 80% of the maximum charge under the 

schedule was $119.94, which was higher than the 

submitted charge. See Fla. Stat. § 627.736(5)(a)1. 

Because the charge of $100 was less than $119.94, the 
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statute expressly allowed Allstate to pay the amount 

billed. Id. § 627.736(5)(a)5. Instead of paying the 

scheduled amount or amount billed, Allstate chose to pay 

80% of the amount billed—$80.

Revival also submitted a charge of $75 for a service 

corresponding to a maximum charge of $81.70 under the 

schedule. Again, instead of paying 80% of the maximum 

charge under the schedule ($65.36) or the amount billed 

($75), Allstate paid 80% of the amount billed ($60).

Neither Padin nor Rivera paid the remaining 20% of 

the charges submitted to Allstate.

Revival filed a putative class action against Allstate 

in Florida state court, seeking a judgment “[d]eclaring 

that [Allstate] violated Florida law by paying only 80% of 

the charges submitted where the charges submitted were 

for less than the amounts allowed” under Section 

627.736(5)(a)1.

Id. at *1-2 (alterations in original).

Allstate removed the case from state court to the Middle 

District Court, where Allstate and Revival filed dueling motions for 

summary judgment. Id. at *2. Allstate contended that it had 

complied with the express provisions of its policy, which authorized 

paying 80% of the amount billed, and that its policy provisions were 

consistent with the PIP statute’s “overarching requirement” that PIP 

insurers pay 80% of reasonable medical expenses. Id. Allstate 

argued that the provision of subsection (5)(a)5. that an “insurer may

pay the amount of the charge submitted” was purely permissive. 

Id. (emphasis added). Revival focused on Allstate’s policy notice 
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that it would use the schedule of maximum charges. Revival 

asserted that Allstate’s election of the schedule of maximum 

charges required it to proceed exclusively under the provisions 

related to that schedule and thus bound it either to pay 80% of the 

charge specified by the schedule or to pay pursuant to subsection 

(5)(a)5.’s provision for full payment of “the amount of the charge 

submitted” when the charge is for “an amount less than the amount 

allowed under” subsection (5)(a)1., governing reimbursement 

pursuant to the schedule of maximum charges. Id.

The district court agreed with Revival’s argument, granted 

Revival’s motion, and denied Allstate’s. Id. Relying on the canon 

against surplusage,1 the district court reasoned that “Allstate’s 

argument would render § 627.736(5)(a)[5.] unnecessary and 

meaningless because common sense dictates that no insurer would 

ever pay the full amount of [the charge submitted] as provided 

1. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and 

every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt 

accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be 

given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision 

or to have no consequence.” (footnote omitted)).
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under [that provision], if it could, as Allstate argues, pay only 80 

percent of the [charge submitted].” Revival Chiropractic LLC v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-445-PGB-LRH, 2020 WL 2483583, at 

*5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020).

In reaching its conclusion that “there are no clear controlling 

precedents” from our Court on the issue in this case, the Eleventh 

Circuit began by taking note of two decisions from Florida District 

Courts of Appeal that it found to provide support for Revival’s 

position—Hands On Chiropractic PL v. GEICO General Insurance Co., 

327 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), and Geico Indemnity Co. v. 

Muransky Chiropractic P.A., 323 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

Revival Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *3. The 

Eleventh Circuit observed that these cases determined that “when 

an insurer gives notice that it will reimburse according to the 

scheduled rates, it must either pay 80% of the applicable fee 

schedule or 100% of the bill.” Id. The circuit court went on to point 

out that the reasoning of these cases has been “undermined” but 

“not directly repudiate[d],” id., by our decision in MRI Associates, 

which held that “the schedule of maximum charges” is not “an 

exclusive method” of establishing reimbursement rates but “an 
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optional method” of limiting reimbursements that is available to 

insurers that give notice that they may use it and that it therefore

“establishes a ceiling but not a floor,” id. (quoting MRI Assocs., 334 

So. 3d at 585).

Based on its understanding of the “substantial uncertainty” in 

Florida law, the circuit court certified the following question to us:

When a personal injury protection insurance policy 

provides notice that it will limit payment pursuant to the 

statutory schedule of maximum charges, may an insurer 

pay 80% of the charge submitted, even when the charge 

submitted is less than 80% of the statutory schedule of 

maximum charges?

Id. at *4.

IV.

In MRI Associates, we considered whether an insurer’s election 

to use the schedule of maximum charges was required to be an 

exclusive choice for determining the amount of reasonable charges. 

334 So. 3d at 579, 585. The provider contended “that section 

627.736(5)(a) contains two mutually exclusive methods of 

calculating the amount of reasonable reimbursement—namely, (1) 

the method set forth in subsection (5)(a) ’s enumeration of factors 

for determining reasonableness, and (2) the maximum schedule of 
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charges set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.” Id. at 582-83. Because the 

insurer’s policy allowed the use of both the schedule of maximum 

charges and the other enumerated factors for determining 

reasonableness, the provider argued that the election of the 

schedule was ineffective. Id. at 583. We categorically rejected this 

argument that a “hybrid-payment methodology” was prohibited. Id.

at 585.

In explaining our conclusion that the PIP statute does not 

“preclude an insurer that elects to limit PIP reimbursements based 

on the schedule of maximum charges from also using the separate 

statutory factors for determining the reasonableness of charges,” we 

focused on the nature of the notice required by the statute 

concerning use of the schedule of maximum charges. Id. at 584-85.

We reasoned that subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision “that ‘an insurer 

may limit payment’ if the policy contains notice that ‘the insurer 

may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges’ . . . cannot 

be reconciled with the argument that an election to use the 

limitations of the schedule of maximum charges” must be an 

exclusive election. Id. at 584. We noted that the “permissive nature 

of the statutory notice language . . . signals that the insurer is given 
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an option that may be used in addition to other options that are 

authorized.” Id. We also pointed out that the statutory “notice 

language echoes the underlying authorization to limit 

reimbursements under the schedule of maximum charges: ‘The 

insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed]

schedule of maximum charges.’ § 627.736(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. 

(emphasis added).” Id. (alteration in original). 

Based on “the full context of these provisions,” we concluded 

that “a reasonable reading of the statutory text requires that 

reimbursement limitations based on the schedule of maximum 

charges be understood . . . simply as an optional method of capping 

reimbursements rather than an exclusive method for determining 

reimbursement rates”—that is, as “a ceiling but not a floor.” Id. at 

584-85.

The two Florida district court decisions mentioned by the 

Eleventh Circuit—Hands On and Muransky—dealt with policy 

provisions materially different from the provisions in Allstate’s 

policy. See Hands On, 327 So. 3d at 442 n.3 (“Geico contractually 

elected to always pay the billed amount in full where the billed 

amount was less than 80 percent of the 200 percent of the 
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applicable fee schedule.”); Muransky, 323 So. 3d at 748 (policy 

provision “indicate[d] Geico’s promise to pay certain charges ‘in the 

amount of the charge submitted’ ”). In any event, both cases were 

decided before and without the benefit of our decision in MRI 

Associates. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that those decisions 

of our district courts have been undermined by MRI Associates. 

Indeed, we conclude that they have been undermined to the extent 

that whatever they might have to say relevant to the issue in this 

case has been superseded by our analysis in MRI Associates. We 

therefore do not find them useful in our consideration of the issue 

presented by the certified question.

Unlike the courts deciding Hands On and Muransky, the 

Second District Court of Appeal had the benefit of our decision in 

MRI Associates when it reviewed a trial court ruling that an insurer 

“could not pay [a provider] 80 percent of the amounts [the provider] 

charged, and instead was required to pay either 100 percent of [the 

provider’s] charges or 80 percent of the amount allowed under the 

statutory schedule of maximum charges.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. 

v. Back on Track, LLC, 342 So. 3d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). 

Based largely on our reasoning in MRI Associates, the Second 
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District reversed the trial court. Id. at 780, 783. The court held 

“that a PIP insurer whose policy includes a notice that it will limit 

medical provider reimbursements” under the schedule of maximum 

charges “is not required to calculate all provider reimbursements in 

accordance with the statutory schedule of maximum charges” but 

may pay a provider 80% of the amount of the provider’s charges. 

Id. at 793. This decision of the Second District issued after the 

Eleventh Circuit certified the question we now consider.

V.

“Because the question presented requires this Court to 

interpret provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law—

specifically, the PIP statute—as well as to interpret the insurance 

policy, our standard of review is de novo.” Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. 

Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc., 141 So. 3d 147, 152 (Fla. 2013).

As we stated in MRI Associates, “[w]hen ‘interpreting an 

insurance contract,’ this Court is ‘bound by the plain meaning of 

the contract’s text,’ ” 334 So. 3d at 583 (quoting State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011)), and 

“[w]e are similarly bound by the plain meaning of the text of the 

provisions of the PIP statute,” id. We have also recognized the 
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fundamental principle that “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of 

meaning.” Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 

2022) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 167). Provisions in 

the texts of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation 

from the full textual context of which they are a part. “Under the 

whole-text canon, proper interpretation requires consideration of 

‘the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and 

logical relation of its many parts.’ ” Id. (quoting Scalia & 

Garner, supra note 1, at 167).

Applying these basic principles, we conclude that the 

provisions of both the statute and the policy support Allstate’s 

payment of 80% of the amount of the charges submitted.

We begin with “the heart of the PIP statute’s coverage 

requirements”—that is, the provision of section 627.736(1)(a) 

requiring PIP insurers to “reimburse eighty percent of reasonable 

expenses for medically necessary services.” Virtual Imaging, 141 So. 

3d at 155. Allstate correctly characterizes this 80% of reasonable 

expenses requirement as the “overarching mandate” of the PIP 

statute. Nothing in the PIP statute can be properly understood in 

isolation from this foundational provision. And the provision cuts 
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strongly against Revival’s argument that Allstate was required to 

pay 100% of the amount of charges submitted. The point is 

reinforced by the requirement of subsection (5)(a) that providers 

“may charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable 

amount.” § 627.736(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Revival is in no position to 

contend that the charges it submitted were other than for a 

reasonable amount. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 862 So. 

2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]here is simply no basis for 

complaining that a payment rate a provider has agreed to accept is 

inadequate and therefore not reasonable.”), approved by Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 961 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 2007).

Of course, Revival’s position is that Allstate’s election to limit 

reimbursements based on the schedule of maximum charges 

effectively provided an exception to the statutory provision limiting 

reimbursements to 80% of reasonable charges. But Revival’s 

understanding is based on a misreading of the provisions of both 

section 627.736 and Allstate’s PIP policy. Revival errs in 

misunderstanding the nature of the statutory authorization to limit 

reimbursements under the schedule when an insurer has given 

statutory notice that it may limit reimbursements under the 
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schedule. It further errs in reading the purely permissive provisions 

of subsection (5)(a)5. as entailing a conditional requirement to pay 

100% of the amount of “the charge submitted” when that amount is 

less than the amount reimbursable under the schedule of 

maximum charges. Reading Allstate’s policy through the same 

distorted interpretive lens, Revival contends that the policy reflects 

an election to exclusively proceed pursuant to the statutory 

provisions governing the schedule of maximum charges. Revival’s 

approach subverts the manifest purpose of both the PIP statute and 

Allstate’s PIP policy by ignoring the clear terms of both texts.

As MRI Associates makes clear, the PIP statute contemplates 

that an insurer providing notice that it may use the schedule of 

maximum charges will not thereby be precluded from paying 80% of 

reasonable charges as otherwise determined under the provisions of 

subsection (5)(a). 334 So. 3d at 585. The PIP statute thus sets up 

the framework for an insurer to opt into a “hybrid-payment 

methodology.” Id. This flows from the permissive language used in 

the notice provisions of subsection (5)(a)5.: “An insurer may limit 

payment” if the insurer gives notice in its policy that it “may limit 

payment” under the schedule of maximum charges. And it flows 
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from the permissive language used in subsection (5)(a)1. that 

establishes the underlying authorization for the schedule of 

maximum charges: an insurer “may limit reimbursement to 80 

percent” of the schedule of maximum charges. All this language 

denoting permissive limitation establishes that the schedule 

constitutes an optional limitation that may be invoked by an 

insurer—if the insurer’s policy contains the necessary notice—in 

determining reasonableness under the overarching mandate to pay 

80% of reasonable charges.

Revival in effect contends that Allstate stepped out of this 

statutory framework in which a hybrid-payment methodology is the 

norm and through its policy made an exclusive election of the 

schedule of maximum charges. But the policy’s terms belie that 

contention. The policy expressly provides that Allstate will pay 

“eighty percent of reasonable expenses.” Most pertinent to the 

dispute here, the policy also contains a backstop provision that 

specifically provides for a divergence from the amount reimbursable 

under the schedule of maximum charges when the charge 

submitted is for an amount less than the amount reimbursable 

under the schedule or otherwise under the statute. In such 
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circumstances, Allstate’s policy provides that it “will pay eighty 

percent of the charge that was submitted.” That provision is 

consistent with the mandate of section 627.736(1)(a) to pay “[e]ighty 

percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary” services. 

And it transgresses no other provision of the statute. Moreover, in 

addition to giving notice that payments will be limited by the 

schedule of maximum charges, the policy in describing the 

“methodology” for determining the amount to be paid specifically 

makes that determination subject to “any other limitations

established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the 

Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or 

otherwise continued in the law.” (Emphasis added.) This is in line 

with the permissive language of subsection (5)(a)5.’s notice 

provision and subsection(5)(a)1.’s authorization of the schedule, 

which both signal that the schedule is designed as a non-exclusive 

option. It is, of course, possible that an insurer could employ policy 

language making an exclusive election of the schedule of maximum 

charges. But Allstate certainly has not done so.

We reject the view urged by Revival and adopted by the Middle 

District Court that the provisions of subsection (5)(a)5. require 
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payment of no less than the full amount of the charge submitted 

when that amount is below the reimbursement payable under the 

schedule. This view is logically predicated on understanding

Allstate’s policy notice that it may use the schedule as an exclusive 

election. Our rejection of that understanding of Allstate’s policy is a 

sufficient basis for rejecting the derivative understanding of the 

application of subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision regarding payment of

“the amount of the charge submitted,” which would be 

irreconcilable with an insurer’s options under a policy permitting a 

hybrid-payment methodology. 

But the understanding of that provision as a requirement 

binding on Allstate involves another fundamental problem. As with 

the misinterpretation of Allstate’s policy notice, it attempts to 

transform permissive language into mandatory language. The

pertinent language of subsection (5)(a)5. is entirely permissive: “If a 

provider submits a charge for an amount less than the amount 

allowed under [the schedule of maximum charges], the insurer may 

pay the amount of the charge submitted.” (Emphasis added.) 

There is no basis for understanding “may pay” as a conditional

“must pay” or as otherwise displacing the statutory provision—
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which is mirrored in Allstate’s policy—limiting reimbursements to 

80% of reasonable charges. If the legislature wishes to mandate 

something, it is perfectly capable of saying so. Indeed, few words 

are more common in the language of legislation than “shall” and 

“must.” Cf. Jewell, 862 So. 2d at 85 (“If the legislature wishes to 

prohibit something, it is perfectly capable of saying so. Indeed, few 

words are more common in the language of legislation than the 

phrases ‘may not’ and ‘shall not.’ ”).

And the canon against surplusage does not justify substituting

“must pay” for “may pay.” We have recognized that it “is an 

elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and 

effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the 

statute if possible.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 

2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). But the “if possible” condition concluding 

our statement of the principle is quite significant. Accordingly, we 

have acknowledged that the canon against surplusage is “not ‘an 

absolute rule,’ ” nor “a license for the judiciary to rewrite language 

enacted by the legislature.” Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1030 

(Fla. 2023) (first quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 

385 (2013); and then quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 
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675, 680 (1985)). An effort to find applicable meaning for a 

provision does not warrant distortion of the plain import of the text 

by converting a permissive provision into a mandatory provision.2

Based on the policy language involved in this case, we reframe 

the certified question as follows:

Under a PIP policy providing notice that the insurer (a) 

will pay 80% of reasonable expenses for medically 

necessary services, (b) may limit payment pursuant to 

the statutory schedule of maximum charges and other 

statutory limitations, and (c) will pay 80% of a submitted 

charge if that charge is less than the amount 

reimbursable under the schedule or other statutory 

provisions, may the insurer pay 80% of the charge 

submitted by a medical provider, even if the charge 

submitted is for less than the amount reimbursable

under the schedule?

We answer this question in the affirmative.

VI.

Allstate’s policy specifically addresses the circumstances at 

issue in this case. The policy provides that Allstate will pay 80% of 

reasonable expenses and it expressly permits Allstate to pay 80% of 

2. We also note that although there is no apparent likely 

application of the last sentence of subsection (5)(a)5. under the 

terms of Allstate’s policy, that might not be the case under some 

other policy terms.
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the charges submitted. Nothing in the PIP statute invalidates the 

policy provisions authorizing such payments. On the contrary, 

those provisions faithfully carry out the statutory mandate to pay 

80% of reasonable expenses for medical services. Having answered 

the rephrased certified question, we return this case to the Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 

and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

SASSO, J., did not participate.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 21-10559

Richard C. Godfrey of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 

Chicago, Illinois; Peter J. Valeta of Cozen O’Connor, Chicago, 

Illinois; and Alexandra J. Schultz of Cozen O’Connor, West Palm 

Beach, Florida,

for Appellants

Chad A. Barr of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, Florida; Alyson 

M. Laderman of Akylade, LLC, Longwood, Florida; and Lawrence M. 

Kopelman of Lawrence M. Kopelman, P.A., Plantation, Florida,

for Appellee

Marcy Levine Aldrich and Nancy A. Copperthwaite of Akerman LLP, 

Miami, Florida,
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for Amicus Curiae Personal Insurance Federation of Florida