COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued by teleconference 

ANTOINE ANDRE WOODHOUSE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1707-00-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 NOVEMBER 13, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Robert W. Duling, Judge 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public 

Defender; Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Antoine Andre Woodhouse was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession of heroin and possession of cocaine, both in violation 

of Code § 18.2-250. On appeal, he contends that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. For the 

following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

order the charges dismissed. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On January 20, 2000, Richmond Police Officer John Cary 

observed Woodhouse standing in front of 1979 Raven Street. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
Posted on the property and above Woodhouse's head were "no 

trespassing" signs. For approximately one to two minutes 

Officer Cary observed Woodhouse standing by himself on the 

stoop. When other officers approached the stoop, Woodhouse 

walked away. 

 Because Woodhouse made no contact with any occupant of the 

residence and stood on the apartment stoop without going to the 

door, Officer Cary approached and asked to speak with him. 

Woodhouse replied, "What about?" Officer Cary informed 

Woodhouse that the property was posted "no trespassing," 

indicating the signs, and stated that he was investigating a 

possible "no trespassing" violation. 

 Woodhouse stated that he was visiting a man named J.J., who 

lived in the apartment where he had been standing. He stated 

that he did not know any more of J.J.'s name. When asked where 

J.J. lived, Woodhouse pointed to the door in front of which he 

had been standing. Officer Cary had another officer knock on 

the door. No one answered. The officers were unable to 

determine whether J.J. lived there. At that point, Officer Cary 

arrested Woodhouse for trespassing. Searching Woodhouse 

incident to the arrest, Officer Cary recovered heroin and 

cocaine. 

 Woodhouse moved to suppress as evidence the drugs found on 

his person, arguing that he had been unlawfully seized. The 

motion was denied. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's 

- 2 -
case, Woodhouse moved to strike the evidence as insufficient to 

prove trespass or intent to distribute heroin or cocaine. The 

trial court granted the motion. It convicted Woodhouse of 

simple possession of heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250 and 

simple possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

It dismissed the trespass charge. 

II. UNLAWFUL DETENTION

 Woodhouse contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress the drugs found on his person. 

He argues that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Cary 

detained him to investigate a trespass and that the discovery of 

the drugs flowed from that seizure. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Upon a Fourth Amendment challenge on appeal, "[u]ltimate 

questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a 

warrantless search" involve questions of both law and fact and 

are reviewed de novo. McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 

197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)). The reviewing court 

is bound by "the trial court's findings of historical fact 

unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them and 

we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by 

resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. at 

198, 487 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699). 

- 3 -
B. CONSENSUAL STOP

 A law enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment "merely by approaching an individual on the street, 

identifying [himself], and asking the individual questions." 

Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 301-02 (1995) (citing 

Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 196, 413 S.E.2d 645, 

647-48 (1992)). 

 Officer Cary's initial encounter with Woodhouse was 

consensual. A consensual encounter need not be predicated on 

suspicion of criminal activity and remains consensual so long as 

the encountered citizen voluntarily cooperates with the police. 

Payne v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 86, 88, 414 S.E.2d 869, 870 

(1992) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 121 (4th 

Cir. 1991)). Officer Cary approached Woodhouse and asked to 

speak with him. Woodhouse stopped and asked, "what about?" 

Officer Cary explained that he was investigating a possible 

trespass and asked Woodhouse whether he had seen the "no 

trespassing" signs. Woodhouse replied that he was visiting J.J. 

and pointed to the door in front of which he had been standing. 

At no time during this questioning did Woodhouse attempt to 

break off his contact with Officer Cary or decline to answer his 

questions. To that point, his encounter with Officer Cary was 

consensual. 

- 4 -
C. ARREST

 The evidence that Woodhouse sought to have suppressed and 

upon which his convictions were based was discovered upon his 

arrest for trespass. The information gained by Officer Cary 

from observation and from his conversation with Woodhouse was 

insufficient to provide probable cause supporting that arrest. 

Woodhouse's presence on the stoop was consistent with his 

explanation that he was there for the legitimate purpose of 

calling on a friend. The officer did not see Woodhouse go onto 

the stoop. No evidence disclosed that Woodhouse had not knocked 

on the door. His remaining on the stoop for a minute or two 

suggested no more than indecision. His departure upon the 

approach of the police officers could well have been 

coincidental and, at most, suggested no more than a 

disinclination to encounter the police, a motive not necessarily 

criminal. In sum, the totality of the circumstances afforded 

Officer Cary no more than a hunch that Woodhouse was 

trespassing. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 407, 551 

S.E.2d 606 (2001); Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 491 

S.E.2d 721 (1997). 

 The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the 

charges are ordered dismissed. 

 Reversed and dismissed.

- 5 -