The Honor able Joseph M
. Ho od, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0247n.06 No. 08-1922 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
J EROME EDWARD BRAY, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. J OHN CASON, Warde n, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : COOK and McKEAGUE, Circ uit J udg es; and HO OD, District Judge. * COOK, Circuit J udg e. Petitioner-Appe llant Jerome B ray , curr ently servinga life se ntence , app e a ls th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f h is p e ti ti o n f o r h a b e a s r e li e f p u r s u an t to 2 8 U .S.C. § 2254, alleg ing violations of his Fifth Amendment rig ht a g ainst self-incr imination and Six th Amendment rig ht to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. We aff irm the judg ment and deny the petition.
I.
After rec eiving information from jailhouse infor mant Ned Da

vis about coca ine dea lers in the
are a, Westland police off icer s watch ed t he re sidence at 515 Tobin Street in I nkster, Michig an for three day s: Febr

uary 27, Fe bruar

y 28, an d M ar ch 3, 1997. On Fe bruar y 27 and 28, the of

fice rs observe d Br ay

make f reque nt, brief stops at the apar tment. O n Marc h 3, office rs ag ain watc hed B rayNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-2- arri v e at the apar

tment and, shortly

there afte r, exit carry

ing a knapsac k. This time, the police pursued B ray

as he dr ove aw ay , appre hended him, and f ound approximately

1,400 g rams of c rac k
coca ine and 1,975 g rams of pow dere d coca ine in his car. Alater se arc h of the Tobin Stree t residenc e pr od uc e d d ru g s, dr ugpa ra ph e rn a lia , a

nd fi re arm s. Following his arre st, police advised Br ay of his constitutional rights and he acknow ledg ed t h at h e u n d er s t o o d
. Br ay

t h en ad m i t t edt h at : h e s o m et i m es s o l d dru gs , h e i n t en d edt o s el l t h e d ru gs found in his c ar when g iven instructions to do so, and the g uns in the residenc e belong ed to him. He
a lso wr ote a

state me nt a dmi tti ngwr on g do ingand e xpre ssi ngthe ho pe that hi s coope ra tio n w ith police mig ht lessen his punishment. Thoug h Br ay contested the voluntariness of these admissions in the state trial cour

t, an evidentiar

y hear ing c onvinced the c ourt to deny suppression, finding the statements voluntarily

g iven. At trial, the def

ense a rg ued that Br ay was in Ca lifornia during the last two wee ks of Fe bruar y and that the pe rson the p o l i ce s aw g oing in a nd out of the re sidence on those dates wa s Br ay ’s
co u s i n , De o nBr o wn . Br ay ’s au n t , s i s t er , an d fr i en d t es t i fi edt o co rr o b o ra t e t h e s t o ry . Bu tt h o u gh B ra y ’s sis te r p ro du c e d d ocu me nts purp or tin g to s ho w h is a

bs e nc e fr om w or

k d ur ingthe pe ri od

in question, prosec ution witness Valerie Sovinski , the custodian of rec ords wher e B ray worke d, impeache d the sister’s testimony . Acc ording to Sovinski, the rec ords produce d by Br ay ’s sister at tr ia l w e re no t c omp any re c or ds
. I nd e e d, the c omp any ’s re c or ds un de rm ine d th e de fe ns e ’s a c c ount, showing that Br ay

worke d during the per iod in question.No. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-3- The jury convicted B ray

of possessing 650 g rams or more of coc aine with intent to deliver, Mich. Comp. L aws §333.7401(2)(a) (i), possessing less than five kilogr ams of mar ijuana with intent to d e liv e r, Mi ch. Co mp . L aws §3 33 .7 40 1( 2) (d )( iii ), and be inga fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re a rm , Mich. Comp. L aws §750.224f. The trial cour t sentence d Br ay

to concur

rent ter ms of life imp ri so nme nt f

or the c oc a ine c on vic tio n, tw o to fo ur y e ars fo r t he mari jua na c on vic tio n, and

tw o to five y ear s for the firea

rm conviction. After exhausting his state re medies, B ray soug ht habea s relief in the district c ourt. The district c ourt held an e videntiary hear ing on se vera l of Br ay ’s claims, but de nie d r e l i e f

. W e g r an t e d

a c e rt i f i c a t e o f a p p e a l a b i l i t y t o c o n s i d e r

B r ay ’ s F i f

t h an d S ixth Am e ndme nt c la ims
. II.
We reviewthe district court’s leg al deter minations de novo and its fa ctual finding s for c lear
err or. Ege v . Y

ukins , 485 F.3d 364, 371 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Under the An t iterror ism and Effe ctive Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ( AEDPA), we may not g rant a writ of habea s corpus unless the state-c ourt adjudication “w as contra

ry to, or involved an unre asona b le a p p li c a ti o n o f , c le arly established F eder al law, a s d e te rm ine d b y

the Sup re me Court of the Un ite d State s; or . . . w a s b a se d o n a n unr e a so na

ble det e r mi n a ti o n o f th e f

a c ts in li g h t o f th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d in th e St a te c o u rt p r o c e e d in g . ” 28 U. S.C. § 22 54 (d )( 1) –( 2)
. AE DPA c on fi ne s our inq uir y to t he la st s ta te -c ourt

de c isi on on the me ri ts. J os e ph v . Co y le , 4 69 F .3 d 4 41 , 4 50 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6). W e app ly AE DPAde fe re nc e to B ra y ’s F if thNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

Br ay prese nted these c laims in a pro se motion to supple ment his a ppeal. The district cour

t 1 found the c laims “fa irly prese nted” for purposes of AEDPA’s exhaustion require ment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)( 1)(A) , an issue the State does not r aise on appea l and that we ne ed not re solve bec ause w e deny relief on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“A n application for a wr it of habea s corpus may be denie d o n t h e mer its, notwit hstanding the fa ilure of the a pplicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). -4- Amendment cla im and to those Six th Amendment claims the state c ourts “adjudicated on the
me ri ts, ” wh ile re vie wi ngde no vo tho se ine ff e c tiv e ne ss c la ims the state c ourt s r e fu se d to a dd re ss. 1
A. Adm iss ion of C onfe ssi on
Br ay first alleg es that the state tr ial court violated his F ifth Amendment rig ht ag ainst selfincrimination when it admitted into evidence h i s custodial statements to the police, whic h he contends we re involuntarily gi v en in re liance on a

promise of lenie ncy . Specifica lly , Br ay argues that the police led him to believe that if he provided a st atement and cooper ated with police, he mig ht be prose cuted in fe dera l court rathe r than state court (whe re he fac ed a pe nalty of life imprisonment wi tho ut t he po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le ). Ac c or din g to B ray , th e in du c e me nt o f a fe de ra l pr os e c uti on

in return f or his statement re ndere d his confession involuntary
. B ra y c ite s Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532 (1897), for the proposition th at “to be admissible, [ a conf

ession] m ust be fre e and voluntary ; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direc t or implied pr omises, how ever slight, nor b y t he exertion of any

improper influe nce.” Id . at 542–43 (quotation marks a nd citation o m i t t ed). B ut Bram does not supply the s tandar d for e valuating voluntariness. Ar izo na v . F ulm ina nte , 4 99 U. S.No. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-5- 2 7 9 , 2 8 5 –86 (1991). Instead, whe n deter mining whe ther police coer cion re ndere d a def endant’ s statement involuntary , we inquire wh et h er, considering the totality of the c ircumstance s, law enfor ceme nt overbore the will of the ac cused. M in c e yv . A rizona , 437 U.S. 385, 401–02 (1978). Thus, althoug h police promises of l enienc y can be obj ectively coer cive in cer tain circ umstances, a state me nt a

bo ut p os sib le le nie nc y

up on c oo pe ratio n d oe s not re nd e r a c on fe ssi on

un c on sti tut ion a l. Un ite d S tat es v . Craft , 495 F.3d 259, 263–64 (6th Cir. 2007).
Th e state tr ia l c ourt

he ld a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngon

the a dmi ssi bil ity of B ra

y ’s state me nts
. At the he ari ng , O ff

ic e r S c ott Mur r a y —w ho qu e sti on e d B ra

y fo llo wi nghis arr e st—

te sti fi e d; B ra

y did not. Cit ing Mur

ray ’s testimony

that Br ay provided a statement befor e they discussed any potential deal and that Murra

y informed B ray

that only the prosec utor had the pow er to make a dea l, the trial
c ourt ru le d th a t B ra

y g a ve his state me nt “ vo lun tari ly .” Th e Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls l ike wi se fo un d “ no e vid e nc e ” that of fi c e rs pr omi se d B ra

y le nie nc y in e xch ang e fo r h is s ta te me nt a nd up he ld t h e trial c ourt’s conc lusion that Bra y ’s conf ession was “ the produc t of fre e and de liberate choice rathe r than police coer cion.” People v . Bray , No. 229481, 2003 WL 1387141, *at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003)
. Our re view of the rec ord conf irms this conclusion. Although B ray cites Officer

Murra y ’s
wave ri n g t es t i m o n y

re gar d i n g wh et h er

h e c o n t ac t ed

t h e F ed er al Dru g Enforc ement Ag ency on Br ay ’s behalf , he off ers no evidenc e demonstrating coerc ive pol ice conduct or that his will was overborne
. I nd e e d, B ra

y ’ s w r i t t e ns t a t e m e n ti n d i c a t e d t h a t a u t h o r i t i e s d i d

n o tp r o m i s e h i m an y

t h i n g f o r h isNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-6- answe rs. Thus, we f

ind that in affirming the tri al court’s de nial of B ray ’s motion to suppress, the Michig an Court of Appe als did not unreasona bly apply clea rly established federa l law or
un re a so na

bly de te rm ine the fa c ts.
B. Ineff

ect ive Assistance
Br ay also catalog ues numerous a lleg ed violations of his Six th Amendment ri g ht to the eff ective assistance of counsel. The two-pr ong framework se t forth in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which r equire s a showing of def icient p er fo rmanc e and pr ejudice, g overns our revie w of these claims.
F ail ur e to M ov e to Suppr e ss
Br ay argues that his pre- trial counsel r ender ed constitutionally in ef fe ctive assistanc e by failing to move to su p p re s s t he evide nce police seized from the Tobin Stree t residenc e. At the fe de ra l e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , B ra

y ’s lawy e r t e sti fi e d th a t he op ted to no t fi le a mot ion to s up pr e ss beca use he “ doubt[ ed] [ Br ay ] would have standing ” to cha lleng e the se arc h war rant.
“Where defe nse counse l’s failure to liti g ate a Four th Amendment claim compe tently is the principal a lleg ation of ineff ectivene ss, the defe ndant must also prove that h i s Fo u rth Amendment claim is me ritorious
. . . .” Kimmelman v. M orrison , 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). F ourth Amendment protec tions apply

when a person possesse s a leg itimate expectation of privac y in the invaded plac e. Ra k as v . I lli no is , 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). B ray , who mere ly cites testimony t h at he visited theNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

Th e state c ourts add res sed on ly so me of the se e rr or s. F or

e a se (a nd be c a us e AE DPA 2 d e f e r e n c e i s n o to u t c o m e - d e t e r m i n a t i v e ) , w e u n i f

o r m l y a p p l y Strickland

de novo. -7- residenc e and that documents with his name wer e found in the residenc e, fails to demonstrate that he possessed a

rea sonable e x pectation of privacy in the pl ace sear ched a nd, there fore , cannot pr ove the me ri t of

his un de rl y ingF ourt

h A me ndme nt c la im.
Moreove r, eve n presuming defic ient perf ormanc e and a

meritorious Fo u rt h Amendment claim, B ray

cannot establish prejudice . Under Strickland , B ra y mus t sh ow“ a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counsel’s unprofe ssional err ors, t he result of the proc eedingwould have be en diffe rent.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 (1984). Ex cluding the drug s, drug para pherna lia, and fire arms re cover ed from the a partment, the e vidence ag ainst Br ay rema ins insurmountable
. The office rs’ testimony that the y ob se rv e d B ra

y le a ve the a

pa rtme nt w itha

kn a ps a c k late r f

ound to c on ta in o ve r t

hr e e kil og ra

ms of c oc a ine , in

c on jun c tio n w ithB ra

y ’s c on fe ssi on , c on sti tut e ov e rw he lmi nge vid e nc e of g uil t.
Trial Errors
Br ay offe rs a litany

of alleg ed er

rors committed by

his trial counsel, including counsel’s 2 fa ilure to i nv e sti g a te his sis te r’ s te sti mony and to d isc e rn

the fa lsi ty

of the e mploy

me nt r e c or ds ; failure to object to “bad acts” testimony ; improper questioning of witnesses; failure to prese nt the defe nse that the coca ine belong ed to D eon Br own; failure to investigate alibi witnesses; and re fusal to a llo w B ra

y to t e sti fy

on his ow n b e ha lf

. E ve n if B ra y c ou ld demo ns tr a te that hi s la wy e rs ’ pe rf or manc e fe ll be low

an o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na ble ne ss w ithre sp e c t to so me —o r a ll— of hisNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-8- claims, the alleg ed er

rors did not pr ejudice his c ase. Given the streng th of the state’s unc ontradicte d and over whelming evidenc e—name ly , that Br ay possessed thre e-a

nd-a- half kil o gra m s of coc aine when a rre sted by police on Marc h 3 and conf essed to police that he sold drug s, intended to sell the drug s he poss es sed whe n arr ested, a nd owned the f

irea rms in the residenc e, we rema in convinced that any e rr or s ma de by

c ouns e l di d n ot a ff

e c t th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l.
Co nflic t o f Int e r e st Finally , Br ay

argues that his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest by repr esenting Ned D a v is , th e c o n f

id e n ti a l i n f

o r ma n t, an d D e o nB r o w n , h is c o u s in , an d th a t t h e s e p u r p o rted conflicts re ndere d counsel’s a ssistance inef fec tive. We apply

a slig htly -altered Strickland te st t o conflict-of

-intere st ineffe ctiveness c laims. W hen an ac tual conflict e x ists, we presume pr ejudice, Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980), but “only if the de fe n d an t demonstrates that
c ouns e l ‘a c tiv e ly re pr e se nte d co nf lic tin g int e re sts ’ an d tha t ‘an ac tua l c on fl ic t of int e re st a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d his lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e.’” Strickland , 4 6 6 U. S
. at 6 8 7 (q u o t i n g Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 348).
Ne d D a vis Although the rig ht to counsel enc ompasses a “cor relative rig ht to repr esentation that is free from conf licts of interest,” W

oo d v . G e or

gia , 4 5 0 U
. S
. 2 6 1 , 2 7 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , a d e f e n d an tm ay kn o w i n g l y, intelligently , and voluntarily waive his rig ht to conflict-fr ee c ounsel. United St ates v. Straughter , 950 F.2d 1223, 1234 ( 6th Cir. 1991). A waive r’s va lidity d ep en d s u p o n the par ticular fa cts andNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-9- circ umstances of a case . Edwards v. Arizona , 4 5 1 U. S
. 4 7 7 , 4 8 2 (1 9 8 1 ) ( q u o t i n g J oh ns on v . Ze rb st , 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The state appellate court held t hat Bray waived his rig ht to conflict-fr ee counsel with re g ard to Ne d Davis.
Att h e b e g i n n i n g o f

t h e t r i a l , t h e p r o s e c u t o r

i n qu i r e d a b o u ta p o s s i b l e c o n f

l i c to f i n t e r e st implicated by

the def ense’ s repr esentation of both Ned Davis and Bray . Specifica lly , the prosec utor i n f o r m e d t h e c o u rtt h a t , a tt h e p r e t r i a l e v i d e n t i ar y h e ar i n g o nt h e c o n f

e s s i o n , B r ay’ s c u r

r e n ta t t o r n e ys repr esente d Davis, while a differ ent attorne y

repr esente d Br ay . Counsel for B ray responde d that “no conflict a ffe cted the a dequac y of re prese ntation
. ” Defense counsel then c ontinued: “The inf or ma tio n th a t w e wo uld

se e k to ob ta in f

ro m Mr . D a vis g oe s to e sta bl ishin g the po lic e of

fi c e rs ’ interest, bias a

nd prejudice in this case. I t in no way compromises Mr. Da

vis.” Despite these assura

nces that no conflict exis ted, the prosec utor persisted, asking the cour t to inform Br ay

of the c onflict on the re cord. This c olloquy followed:
PROS ECUTOR: That’s why I ask t hat the Court inquire of the defe ndant. They don’t waive his rights. He ’s go t to ge t up and the Court’s g ot to inform him there may be a c onflict of interest and doe s he re cog nize that and does he w ant to g o forwa rd.
CO UR T: Mr . B ra

y , y ou un de rs tand

that?
B RA Y: Ye s.
CO UR T: Al l r ig ht [s ic ]. Yo u und e rs tand that w hat [th e pr os e c uto r] i s sa y ingis that be c a

us e y our attorne y s also repr esent or r epre sented Mr. — w hat’s his name a g ain?No. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-10- . . . PROS ECUTOR: Ned Da vis, Your Honor.
CO UR T: Mr . N e d D a vis ; th at if th e y c a ll h im a s a

wi tne ss t he re may be so me c on fl ic t in the ir re pr e se ntation of

y ou , th a t pe rh a

ps the y may no t be loo kin g ou t f

or y our b e st i nte re st beca use they may be looking at the intere st of Mr. Davis ve rsus y ours. Now, have y ou dis c us se d th is w ithy our l awy e rs ?
B RA Y: Ye s.
COURT: You think there is a conflict at all? You think that in any way y ou’re being

—y ou w o u l d b e h ar m e d o r yo u w o u l d g e t l e s s t h an o n e h u n dr e d p e r c e n t l o ya l t y f r o m yo u r a t t o r n e ys on thi s matte r b e c a

us e of that? BRAY: No, sir.
The c olloquy

reve als that the cour

t informed B ray

of the possibility

of a conflict of interest and that he had disc ussed the matter with counsel. T h o u gh t h e trial judg e could have conduc ted a more thoroug h inquiry , the state c ourt did not unreasona bly hold “that [Bra

y ] was awar e of the alleg ed conflict of inter est and that he waived it.” Bray , 2003 WL 1387141, *at 4.
Moreove r, eve n if we ag ree d with Br ay ’s arg ument that the waive r wa s somehow def ective, his claim would still fail. Br ay speculates that a c onflict of intere st prevente d defe nse counse l from calling Davis as a

witness, but provides no information substant iating the exis tence of an a ctualNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-11- conflict by , for ex ample, identify ing inconsistent defe nses or privileg ed communications. Bra y not
on ly fa ils to i de nti fy

an a c tua l c on fl ic t, h e als o fai ls to s ho w h owhis lawy e rs ’ d e c isi on no t to c a ll Da vis c on sti tut e d de fi c ie nt pe rf or manc e . Da

vis ’s te sti mony bo re no re le va nc e to the c ru x o f t

he c a se ag ainst him: his actua l possession of t hree -and- a-ha lf kilogr ams of cocaine. Bra y ’s inability

to show that “an a ctual conf

lict of interest a dverse ly af fected his lawy er’ s perf

ormanc e” pr events us fr om presuming prejudice . Given the ove rwhe lming evide nce of g uilt aga inst him , Br ay ca n not satisfy Strickland ’s pre

judice standa

rd without this presumption.
Deon B rown
Br ay reg isters a similar conf

lict-of-inter est claim re g ardingdefe nse counse l's r epre sentation of his cousin, Deo n Br own. The State a nd Br ay dispute whether

this claim involves concurr ent repr esentation, which would trig g er a presumption of prejudice, or succe ssive repr esentation, which would not. Be cause we hold that B ray cannot pr evail eve n with the benef it of the presumption of prejudice , we de cline to re solve the issue.
Br ay can a void an ana ly sis of prejudice , which he w ould lose, only if he de monstrates that
an actua l c onflict of interest adver sely aff ecte d his repre sentation. Cuyler , 4 4 6 U
. S
. a t 3 4 9

– 5 0
. In support of his claim, B ray urg es us to consider a November 2001 aff idavit in which Br own stated that he wi sh e d to te sti fy

on B ra y ’s be ha lf , bu t c ouns e l inf

or me d h im that it

wo uld be “ de tr ime nta l” to his own case. T he mag istrate judg e cor rec tly found the a ffidavit inadmis sible as hea rsay for purposes of e valuating the alleg ed conf lict. Without the aff

idavit, B ray prese nts only “hy potheticalNo. 08-1922

Bray v. Cason

-12- conflicts”—c onflicts our pre cede nt expl icitly reje cts. United States v. May s , 77 F. 3d 90 6, 90 8 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 6) . B e c a

us e B ra y c ann ot e sta

bli shan a c tua l c on fl ic t, t

his c la im, too , la c ks me ri t.
III
. We deny Br ay ’s petition.