COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-02-426-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.R.C., M.A.C., 

C.S.C., AND A.A.C., THE CHILDREN	

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	FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I.  INTRODUCTION

	This is a parental rights termination case.  Following a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment on the verdict that appellant T.L.C.’s parental rights be terminated from her four children, S.R.C., M.A.C, C.S.C., and A.A.C.  In nine points of error, appellant contends that she has been harmed by an incomplete reporter’s record, that the trial court erred in submitting broad-form jury questions inquiring as to termination with respect to each child with instructions constituting a disjunctive submission of all grounds asserted, and, alternatively, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because her attorney did not preserve the alleged jury charge error.  We affirm.

II.  INCOMPLETE RECORD

	In point one, appellant alleges that a reading of the record establishes that a “significant” pre-trial hearing was held that was not transcribed.  Statements made by trial counsel during the charge conference seem to refer to a July hearing that was held to consider the State’s motion to strike appellant’s petition in intervention.2  The court granted the motion.  Appellant filed a motion to reconsider her petition as intervenor and, on this basis, requested special issues be presented to the jury in which the jury would answer whether appellant, the mother of the children, should be named as a non-parent joint- managing conservator or a non-parent possessory conservator upon termination of her parental rights.  Without a record of this hearing, appellant reasons, this court cannot review the entire record to determine harmful error.  She asserts that it was impossible to brief a point of error complaining of the trial court’s rulings on the proposed jury charge without the missing part of the record and requests relief in the form of an order for new trial under Rule 34.6(f) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.3  

	Appellant argues that our previous rulings denying appellant additional time to complete the appeal or to abate the appeal “essentially makes the record lost or destroyed as it is not available to the Appellant.”  Appellant, however, cites no authority for this proposition, and we have found none.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the alleged missing record was ever created, much less lost or destroyed.  Finally, Rule 34.6(f)(3) specifies that a new trial may be granted only if the missing portion of the record “is necessary to the appeal’s resolution.”  Id.Tex. R. App. P. 334.16(af); see Issac v. State, 989 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (pointing out the limitations of granting a new trial under Rule 34.6(f)).  The appellant has the burden of establishing that the missing portion of the record is “necessary to the appeal's resolution.”  Gaston v. State, 63 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).  

	In the present case, appellant fails to show that the missing reporter's record is necessary to resolve the points of error she asserts.  While appellant does argue it is impossible to brief a point of error regarding the denial of the trial counsel’s request for a jury charge without the alleged missing record, appellant failed to raise a point of error regarding the denial of the proposed charge in this appeal.  See Doubrava v. State, 28 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that a similar speculative statement regarding a proposed issue was not enough to establish “necessity”).  Appellant also claims that her right of appeal and right to counsel on appeal were essentially denied without a complete record.  Appellant, however, cities no authority for this proposition, and we have found none.  Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first point.       

III.  JURY CHARGE 

	In points two, three, four, and five, appellant contends that the broad-form jury question for each child submitted to the jury allowed for a verdict of less than ten jurors thus violating due process.  To preserve an error in the jury charge for our review, the complaining party must timely and plainly make the court aware of the complaint and get a ruling.  Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003).  If a party fails to do this, error is not preserved, and the complaint is waived. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Civ. P. 274; B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 349. Therefore, since appellant made no objection to the jury charge on a basis that comports with her points of error, her jury charge points have been waived.4  B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 355.  We overrule appellant’s second, third, fourth, and fifth points.

IV.  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

	Alternatively, in points six, seven, eight, and nine, appellant contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court because her attorney did not preserve the jury charge error.  The Texas Supreme Court has recently held that “the statutory right to counsel5 in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to effective counsel.”  In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003).  The court also held that the two pronged Strickland test used for determining counsel effectiveness in criminal proceedings should also be used to determine counsel effectiveness in civil parental termination proceedings.  Id. at 545; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,  104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).  Under the two prong test, appellant must first show that her counsel's performance was deficient; second, appellant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.   

	In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.  Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  The issue is whether counsel's assistance was reasonable under all the circumstances and prevailing professional norms at the time of the alleged error.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.  “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”  Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.  An allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.  Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814.  Our scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and every effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

	Considering the controlling authority,6 which approves submitting disjunctive alternative grounds of termination accompanied with a broad-from jury question as to the controlling issue, a counsel’s failure to object to broad- form submission of the termination issue in a jury charge was not “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”  In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 283 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Stickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.  Appellant, therefore, failed to show her counsel's performance was deficient. Id.7  We overrule appellant’s sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth issuepoints. 

V.  CONCLUSION 

	Having overruled each of appellant’s issuepoints, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.  

							sSaAM J. DAY

PER CURIAM								JUSTICE

PANEL B:	DAUPHINOT ANand HOLMAN, JJ.; and SAM J. DAY, J. 9r(rrRRetired, 

Sitting by Assignment).SAM J. DAY, J. (Retired, Sitting by Assignment); and

DAUPHINOT and HOLMAN, JJ.

DELIVERED:  December 18, 2003