Filed 7/10/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE PERSONNEL BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

JOSEPH McCAULEY,

Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

F069100

(Super. Ct. No. 12CECG01622)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Debra J. 

Kazanjian, Judge.

Law Office of Michael A. Morguess and Michael A. Morguess for Real Party in 

Interest and Appellant.

Stephen A. Jennings, Clayton A. Mack and Christopher D. Howard, Staff Counsel, 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Office of Legal Affairs, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

No appearance for Respondent California State Personnel Board.

-ooOoo-
2.

Appellant Joseph McCauley (McCauley) was promoted to the position of 

Correctional Sergeant at Avenal State Prison by his employer, the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The new position began on December 2, 

2008, and was subject to a 12-month probationary period before it became permanent. 

On December 1, 2009, CDCR served a notice of rejection on McCauley to remove him 

from the position of Correctional Sergeant effective on December 8, 2009. On 

December 2, 2009, another document was served on McCauley, this one purporting to 

extend his probationary period until December 8, 2009. McCauley maintained that 

CDCR’s notice of rejection and other papers were invalid due to failure to comply with 

certain timing and notice requirements relating directly to the duration of the 

probationary period. In an administrative appeal to the California State Personnel Board 

(the Board), the Board agreed with McCauley and revoked CDCR’s notice of rejection. 

CDCR challenged the Board’s ruling by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the trial 

court. The trial court granted the petition and reversed the Board. McCauley now appeals 

from the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate.

We hold that McCauley is correct that the notice of rejection was fatally deficient 

under applicable law because the effective date of the rejection (i.e., Dec. 8, 2009) was 

after the completion of his probationary period. In so holding, we also conclude that the 

proper way to calculate a civil service probationary period is to include the first day, 

notwithstanding the general rule for calculating time limits in Government Code 

section 68001 and Code of Civil Procedure section 12. Here, then, the first day of 

McCauley’s probationary period was December 2, 2008, and the last day was December 

1, 2009. Thus, CDCR’s effort on December 2, 2009, to extend the probationary period 

was too late, no extension was accomplished thereby, and the effective date of the 

rejection was not within the probationary period as required. For all of these reasons, we 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Government Code.
3.

reverse the trial court’s judgment and direct the trial court to enter a new order denying 

the petition for writ of mandate.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

McCauley was employed by CDCR as a correctional officer starting in 2003. In 

mid-2008, he was given a temporary term promotion to Correctional Sergeant. In late 

2008, he was appointed to the permanent position of Correctional Sergeant at Avenal 

State Prison beginning on December 2, 2008, and subject to a probationary period of 

12 months. The position would become permanent only after the successful completion 

of the probationary period.

On December 1, 2009, CDCR served a “NOTICE OF REJECTION DURING 

PROBATIONARY PERIOD” (notice of rejection) and attached documents on McCauley by 

mail. The notice of rejection stated, among other things, that “pursuant to ... Section 

19173,” McCauley was being “rejected” from his “position of Correctional Sergeant with 

[CDCR] at Avenal State Prison.” It also stated that “[t]his rejection ... shall be effective 

at the close of business on December 8, 2009.” (Italics added.) The notice of rejection 

articulated numerous grounds for the rejection decision by CDCR, including McCauley’s 

failure to meet certain standards expected of persons serving as a Correctional Sergeant 

and supervisor.2 Although the rejection was said to be effective on December 8, 2009, no 

provision was made in the notice of rejection to extend McCauley’s probationary period. 

A proof of service listed the documents that were attached to the notice of rejection, but 

that list did not include a written notification that CDCR was extending McCauley’s 

probationary period.

On December 2, 2009, McCauley was personally served with a second copy of the 

notice of rejection and attached documents. The papers personally served on 

 

2 One week after CDCR’s notice of rejection, CDCR informed McCauley that as a result of 

being rejected from the position of Correctional Sergeant, he would be returning to his former 

position as a regular correctional officer.
4.

December 2, 2009, also included a letter (dated “December 1, 2009”) signed by 

Employee Relations Officer Kimberly Thornton, informing McCauley that “‘[p]ursuant 

to Government Code Section 19173 and California Code of Regulations ... Section 321 

[his] probationary period [was] being extended to December 8, 2009 ....’” The fact that 

this letter was served on December 2, 2009, is highly significant in this case because 

CDCR’s notice extending the probationary period had to be given “[p]rior to the 

completion of the probationary period ....” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 321, subd. (e).) 

According to McCauley, the last day of the 12-month probationary period was 

December 1, 2009, and, therefore, the letter attempting to extend the probationary period 

was served one day too late and had no effect. That is, by December 2, 2009, the 

probationary period was already over and, from McCauley’s perspective, he “woke up 

that morning (the 366th day) as a permanent correctional sergeant.”

McCauley filed an administrative appeal to the Board, claiming that the notice of 

rejection was not timely or effective under the circumstances. An Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) was assigned to hear the matter. McCauley submitted a motion to the ALJ 

to revoke the notice of rejection. In that motion, McCauley argued the notice of rejection 

was invalid because the written notice of rejection must set forth an “effective date” for 

the rejection that “shall not be later than the last day of the probationary period.” (See 

§ 19173, subd. (b).) The notice of rejection also had to comply with California Code of 

Regulations, title 2, section 52.6, subdivision (a), which provides that such notice “shall” 

be given “[a]t least five working days before the effective date of [the] proposed 

action ....” McCauley further argued that no extension of the 12-month probationary 

period was accomplished by CDCR because notice thereof was not given “[p]rior to the 

completion of the probationary period ....” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 321, subd. (e).) 

According to McCauley’s motion, since the probationary period was not extended, the 

effective date of the rejection (i.e., Dec. 8, 2009) was well after the final day of the 

probationary period on December 1, 2009.
5.

On January 26, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision. The ALJ agreed with 

McCauley that the 12-month probationary period ended on December 1, 2009. The ALJ 

also found that CDCR’s letter purporting to extend the probationary period was not 

served until December 2, 2009, one day after the probationary period had already ended.

The ALJ concluded: “Due to [CDCR’s] failure to meet the requirements of California 

Code of Regulations, title 2, section 321, [McCauley’s] probationary period ended 

December 1, 2009, and therefore the [notice of rejection] is revoked as being untimely.”

On February 7, 2012, the Board adopted the ALJ’s decision as its own, including 

the findings of fact, determination of issues, and the decision to revoke CDCR’s notice of 

rejection.

On May 15, 2012, CDCR filed its petition for writ of mandate in the trial court. In 

support of its petition, CDCR argued for the first time that the probationary period 

actually ended on December 2, 2009, not on December 1, 2009, based on generally 

applicable statutes providing a method of computing time (i.e., Gov. Code, § 6800 &

Code Civ. Proc., § 12), under which method the first day of the period would be 

excluded. The trial court agreed with CDCR’s position and, on November 15, 2013, the 

court granted the writ of mandate and directed the Board to set aside its decision revoking 

the notice of rejection. Notice of entry of the trial court’s judgment was served and filed 

on January 30, 2014.

McCauley’s timely notice of appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The scope of our review from a judgment on a petition for writ of mandate is the 

same as that of the trial court. (Cate v. State Personnel Bd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 270, 

282.) To the extent factual questions are involved, the Board’s findings of fact are 

reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (Id. at pp. 281–282; Gonzalez v. State 

Personnel Bd. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 422, 428; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).) If 
6.

a question of law is presented, we undertake a de novo review of the Board’s ruling 

(Pollak v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404), including where (as 

here) the question involves the interpretation of statutory or regulatory provisions 

(Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 20, 28; Riveros 

v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349–1350).

We also recognize that courts show deference to an administrative body’s 

reasonable construction of relevant statutory provisions within its field of expertise. As 

summarized by our Supreme Court: “Ultimately, the interpretation of a statute is a legal 

question for the courts to decide, and an administrative agency’s interpretation is not 

binding. [Citation.] ... But we have also said that when a statute is susceptible of more 

than one interpretation, we will consider an administrative interpretation of the statute 

that is reasonably contemporaneous with its adoption. [Citation.]” (Sara M. v. Superior 

Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 101.) Although not necessarily controlling, “‘“[c]onsistent 

administrative construction over many years, particularly when it originated with those 

charged with putting the statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to great weight and 

will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1012; accord, 

People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 309; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. 

Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1388–1389.)

Here, however, it does not appear that the Board has addressed and determined the 

precise issue before us in its precedents. That is, the Board has not directly considered the 

legal question of whether, in light of the general rule of Government Code section 6800 

and Code of Civil Procedure section 12, the first day is to be excluded in the calculation 

of a civil service probationary period. In the one Board precedent referenced by 

McCauley, the Board apparently included the first day of the probationary period, but did 

not provide any discussion or explanation for doing so. (See In re Dorri (2002) SPB 

Dec. No. 02-05 (Dorri).) In any event, the specific statutory issue before us was not 

raised in that case. Under the circumstances, we shall consider the Board’s prior action 
7.

under a respectful but nondeferential standard of review. (See Kuhn v. Department of 

General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1639.)

II. Relevant Statutes and Regulations

We begin with a brief summary of the pertinent statutory and administrative 

provisions relating to probationary periods in the employment of state civil service 

employees.

Pursuant to section 19170, subdivision (a), the Board is required to establish for 

each class of civil service employee “the length of the probationary period.” The section 

further states, “[t]he probationary period that shall be served upon appointment shall be 

six months unless the board establishes a longer period of not more than one year.” 

(Ibid.) During the probationary period, the appointing power is required to “evaluate the 

work and efficiency” of a probationer. (§ 19172.) Section 19173, subdivision (a), 

provides that “[a]ny probationer may be rejected by the appointing power during the 

probationary period for reasons relating to the probationer’s qualifications, the good of 

the service, or failure to demonstrate merit, efficiency, fitness, and moral 

responsibility ....” (Italics added.)

Section 19173, subdivision (b), specifies the process that must be followed by the 

appointing power to effectuate the employee’s rejection during the probationary period. 

It provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“A rejection during [the] probationary period is effected by the 

service upon the probationer of a written notice of rejection which shall 

include: (A) an effective date for the rejection that shall not be later than 

the last day of the probationary period; and (B) a statement of the reasons 

for the rejection. Service of the notice shall be made prior to the effective 

date of the rejection, as defined by board rule for service of notices of 

adverse actions. Notice of rejection shall be served prior to the conclusion 

of the prescribed probationary period. The probationary period may be 

extended when necessary to provide the full notice period required by 

board rule ....” (Italics added.)
8.

California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 52.6, subdivision (a) (formerly 

§ 52.3) sets forth the minimum notice period required by the Board. It states that “[a]t 

least five working days before the effective date of a proposed ... rejection during the 

probationary period, ... the appointing power ... or an authorized representative of the 

appointing power shall give the employee written notice of the proposed action....”

The Board’s rules also implement the language of Government Code

section 19173, subdivision (b), relating to extension of the probationary period. 

California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 321, subdivision (c), states: “The 

probationary period may be extended for a maximum of five working days in order to 

comply with notice requirements as set forth in Section 52.6 for rejection during 

probation.” California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 321, subdivision (e), then 

specifies the method for accomplishing such an extension: “Prior to the completion of 

the probationary period, the appointing power shall notify the employee in writing that 

the probationary period is being extended under this rule and of the length of the 

extension....” (Italics added.)

As concisely summarized in Santillano v. State Personnel Bd. (1981) 117 

Cal.App.3d 620 (Santillano): “‘A civil service probationer is entitled to have the 

statutory procedure for dismissal strictly followed.’ [Citations.] Among other things the 

requisite written notice of rejection must be made effective not ‘later than the last day of 

the probationary period’ and must be served on or before its effective date. [Citations.] 

If these time limits are not met, no rejection is effected. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 623.)

III. Calculating the Probationary Period: First Day is Included

There is no dispute that McCauley commenced his 12-month probationary period 

on December 2, 2008. The key question before us is whether, in calculating the 12-

month period, the first day is to be counted. In the present appeal, McCauley’s position 

is that the proper method of calculating an employment probationary period is to include

the first day of the probationary period. CDCR’s position—which was adopted by the 
9.

trial court—is that the first day of the probationary period must be excluded from the 

calculation under the general rule set forth in Government Code section 6800 and Code 

of Civil Procedure section 12, which method would make December 2, 2009, the last day 

of McCauley’s probationary period. As explained below, we conclude that McCauley’s 

position is correct: The first day is to be included in the calculation of the probationary 

period. Therefore, the last day of McCauley’s probation was, as the Board specifically 

found, December 1, 2009.3

We begin our discussion of this issue by summarizing CDCR’s argument for the 

exclusion of the first day in calculating the 12-month period. Government Code 

section 6800 and Code of Civil Procedure section 12 state as follows: “The time in 

which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and 

including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.” (See Civ. 

Code, § 10 [same].) This is the ordinary or general rule of computation of time. (Ley v. 

Dominguez (1931) 212 Cal. 587, 594.) “‘Before a given case will be deemed to come 

under an exception to the general rule the intention must be clearly expressed that a 

different method of computation was provided for.’ [Citation.]” (Latinos Unidos de 

Napa v. City of Napa (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) “Absent a compelling reason 

for a departure, this rule governs the calculation of all statutorily prescribed time periods. 

Our Supreme Court has encouraged the use of uniform rules so that the method of 

computing time not be a source of doubt or confusion. ‘“The gravest considerations of 

public order and security require that the method of computing time be definite and 

certain.”’” (In re Anthony B. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 677, 682.)

 

3 The Board found, without expressly articulating its methodology, that the last day of 

McCauley’s 12-month probationary period was December 1, 2009. It would seem that the Board 

implicitly assumed it was appropriate to count the first day. However, the Board did not address 

the issue of whether the general rule for calculating time (i.e., Code Civ. Proc., § 12; Gov. Code, 

§ 6800) applied, because that issue was not raised by CDCR until it filed its petition for writ of 

mandate in the trial court.
10.

According to CDCR, nothing in the relevant statutory provisions (§§ 19170–

19173) or the regulations adopted by the Board (e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 321) 

clearly express an intention to depart from the general rule for computation of time and,

therefore, the general rule must be applied—that is, the first day of the probationary 

period must be excluded. If one were to apply this method of calculation, the last day of 

McCauley’s probationary period would be December 2, 2009, in which case all of the 

essential notices were served by CDCR on McCauley during the probationary period as 

required.

McCauley contends that CDCR’s position is unreasonable in light of the nature of 

a civil service employment probationary period. We agree. As stated by our Supreme 

Court in Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1973) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly), with reference to the 

language of section 19170, “[t]he ‘probationary period’ is the initial period of 

employment and generally lasts for six months unless the Board establishes a longer 

period not exceeding one year.” (Skelly, supra, at p. 197, fn. 3, italics added.) Since the 

probationary period is identified with the initial period of employment in the appointed 

position,4it logically follows that the first day on which the subject employment 

commences or takes effect is also the first day of the probationary period. (See § 19170, 

subd. (a) [the “probationary period [is] ... served upon appointment”].) This direct 

correlation to the employment itself is a strong indicator that the Legislature intended to 

include the first day thereof in the calculation of an employee’s service of his or her 

probationary period. That is, just as the first day on the job is an actual day of 

employment, it is also an actual day served of the probationary period and should be 

counted as such. This basic understanding of an employment probationary period is also 

in keeping with the primary purpose for having such a probationary phase, which is to 

 

4 There are some occasions in which the employee is absent from the job so often the 

initial period will be extended. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 321, subds. (a), (b).) We are not 

dealing with that situation here.
11.

give the appointing power “the opportunity to observe the conduct and capacity of the 

probationer” before he or she acquires permanent civil service status. (Wiles v. State 

Personnel Board (1942) 19 Cal.2d 344, 347 (Wiles); see § 19172.) In practical terms, 

that “opportunity to observe” an employee’s work conduct begins on the first day of his 

or her service in the appointed position. Since that is so, one would reasonably expect the 

first day to be counted toward the probationary period.

Further, as explained by McCauley in his opening brief, excluding the first day 

would lead to absurdity: “CDCR’s application ... doesn’t make factual sense: it suggests 

that on December 2, 2008, the first day McCauley served probation, he didn’t work or he 

hadn’t even started his probation, or doesn’t get credit for it, as if he was in some sort of 

pre-probationary period for one day.” Along the same lines, we would add the following 

observation of our own: Hypothetically, if McCauley had been rejected by CDCR on 

December 2, 2008, the first day of his new position, that action would obviously be a 

rejection during probation. That being the case, consistency and common sense lead to 

the conclusion that December 2, 2008, should be counted as day one of the probationary 

period.

Moreover, contrary to CDCR’s argument, the relevant statutory language supports 

the inclusion of the first day in calculating the probationary period. Section 19170, 

subdivision (a), states that “[t]he probationary period that shall be served upon 

appointment shall be six months unless the board establishes a longer period of not more 

than one year.” (Italics added.) By providing that the probationary period shall be 

“served” by the employee “upon appointment,” the statute reflects that the probationary 

period (1) is the initial period of employment (see Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 197, fn. 3 

[“[t]he ‘probationary period’ is the initial period of employment”]) and (2) begins upon 

appointment or when the appointment takes effect.5 In short, the language of the statute 

 

5 Also, since one year is defined as 365 days (see § 6803), excluding the first day arguably 

conflicts with the legislative mandate that the probationary period established by the Board not 
12.

conveys the idea that when employment effectively commences for the subject position, 

the probationary period commences as well, and this correlation is such that day one of 

employment is day one of the probationary period for purposes of calculation. We are 

satisfied that section 19170 adequately reflects the Legislature’s intention to include the 

first day of the probationary period when calculating the employee’s service, and this is 

particularly the case in light of the fact that we are to ascribe to the statute a construction 

that is both reasonable and avoids absurdity. (See DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 

147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18 [a statutory provision should be given a reasonable and common 

sense interpretation consistent with its apparent purpose while avoiding absurdity].)

A number of prior cases generally support the conclusion we have adopted herein. 

Although the prior cases do not address the specific issue raised by CDCR (regarding 

Gov. Code, § 6800 & Code Civ. Proc., § 12), they do take a consistent approach of 

counting the first day of the subject appointment when computing a civil service 

probationary period. For example, in Anderson, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d 242, the 

appellant argued based on the administrative record that her employment starting date 

was March 15, 1976, and, therefore, her one-year probationary period concluded on 

March 14, 1977, with the result that a notice of rejection served on her on March 15, 

1977, was not timely. The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument because 

substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the appellant’s employment 

actually started on March 17, 1976, and, therefore, the notice of rejection served on 

March 15, 1977, was timely. In so holding, the Court of Appeal noted that on March 15, 

1977, it was still “the day before” the end of her probationary period. (Id. at pp. 245–

246.) In Currieri v. City of Roseville (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 997, the Court of Appeal held 

 

exceed “one year.” (§ 19170, subd. (a); see Anderson v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 103 

Cal.App.3d 242, 245-246 (Anderson) [first day included in calculation, noting § 6803]; Davis v.

Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 902 [in ordinary usage, one year is equivalent of twelve 

months].) We find it unnecessary to reach this argument.
13.

that two police officers who began their employment on September 1, 1966, subject to a 

one-year probationary period, became permanent employees on September 1, 1967. 

From this holding, it is clear that the last day of their probationary period was August 31, 

1967. (Id. at pp. 999, 1001.) In Santillano, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 620, the employee’s 

six-month probationary period began with her appointment on August 15, 1977, and the 

last day of that period was February 14, 1978, subject to extension only as provided by 

Board rule. (Id. at pp. 622, 624–625.) Finally, in Wiles, the employee was appointed to a 

permanent civil service position on August 13, 1938, subject to a six-month probationary 

period. The probationary period began on August 13, 1938, and ended on February 12, 

1939. (Wiles, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 346–347, 350–352.)

In addition to the above cases, McCauley has referred us to the Board’s own 

precedent, Dorri, supra, SPB Dec. No. 02-05. In that case, the employee was appointed 

to a civil service position on September 21, 1998, subject to a one-year probationary 

period. On September 20, 1999, he was rejected during his probationary period. The 

employee appealed the rejection. The appeal was subsequently resolved by a stipulated 

settlement agreement whereby the notice of rejection was withdrawn and the employee 

agreed to serve a new one-year probationary period. The new probationary period began 

on September 1, 1999, and concluded on August 31, 2000. As with the appellate cases 

highlighted above, the Board appears to have included the first day of the probationary 

period, but did not explain its methodology or address the issue of whether the general 

rule of Government Code section 6800 and Code of Civil Procedure section 12 was 

potentially applicable. Nevertheless, although we do not accord deference to the Board 

in this circumstance, we believe it is significant that the Board assumed in Dorri, as well 

as in McCauley’s case below, that it was appropriate to include the first day of the 

probationary period in the calculation of the time period. We say this because the Board 

is the agency charged with establishing probationary periods and their duration under the 

civil service law. (§ 19170.)
14.

Based on all of the foregoing discussion and analysis, we conclude that in 

calculating an employee’s probationary period, the first day is to be included in that 

calculation. This means that the general rule of Government Code section 6800 and 

Code of Civil Procedure section 12 is not applicable to the situation of computing civil 

service probationary periods. As a result, the last day of McCauley’s probationary period 

in this case was December 1, 2009.

IV. The Notice of Rejection Was Properly Set Aside

Because the last day of McCauley’s probationary period was December 1, 2009, 

CDCR’s written notice served on December 2, 2009 purporting to extend his 

probationary period was too late and of no effect. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 321, 

subd. (e); Santillano, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 623 [a civil service probationer is 

entitled to have the statutory procedure for dismissal strictly followed].) Furthermore, 

because the probationary period was not extended and the last day thereof was 

December 1, 2009, the effective date of the notice of rejection (i.e., Dec. 8, 2009) was 

after the completion of the probationary period. As a result, the notice of rejection was 

invalid6 and was properly revoked by the Board. (§ 19173; see Wiles, supra, 19 Cal.2d at 

p. 352.) Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the writ petition.

 

6 To avoid confusion in the context of our discussion of the calculation issue, we have been 

reluctant to label the notice of rejection as untimely. It was timely in one sense and untimely in 

another. The notice of rejection served on December 1, 2009, was timely in the sense that it was 

served on the last day of the probationary period. However, other provisions of law applicable to 

the facts of this case rendered the same notice of rejection untimely for other reasons. Namely: 

(1) the notice had to be given five working days before the effective date of the proposed action 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 52.6, subd. (a)), (2) the effective date for the rejection could not be 

later than the last day of the probationary period (Gov. Code, § 19173, subd. (b)), and 

(3) CDCR’s attempt to extend the probationary period under California Code of Regulations, 

title 2, section 321, subdivision (c), was too late and, thus, ineffective.
15.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to enter a new order 

denying the petition for writ of mandate. Costs on appeal are awarded to McCauley.

_________________________

KANE, J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________

LEVY, ACTING P.J.

_______________________________

POOCHIGIAN, J.