FILED

August 5, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JULY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9710-CR-00446

Appellee, )

) SUMNER COUNTY

VS. ) (No. 9862 Below)

)

STEVE WAYDE BONNER, ) The Hon. Jane Wheatcraft

)

Appellant. ) (Revocation of Probation)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

DANA L. SCOTT JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Assistant Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter

18th Judicial District

117 East Main Street GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER

Gallatin, TN 37066 Assistant Attorney General

Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

LAWRENCE RAY WHITLEY

District Attorney General

THOMAS B. DEAN

Assistant District Attorney General

18th Judicial District

113 West Main Street

Gallatin, TN 37066 

OPINION FILED _______________________

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

The appellant, Steve Wayde Bonner, appeals as of right from the trial court’s

revocation of his probation sentence. He contends that the trial court failed to exercise a

conscientious and intelligent judgment in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that

he violated the terms and conditions of probation. The appellant also contends that the trial

court failed to give him credit for time served. Based on our review of the briefs and of the

entire record in this cause, we conclude that this is an appropriate case for affirmance under

Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rules.

On April 15, 1997, the appellant pled guilty to driving under the influence and

was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, all of which was suspended after service of 60

days in jail with work release. The appellant’s driver’s license was suspended for a period

of two years, and he was also ordered to pay restitution and court costs. On May 20, 1997,

a probation violation warrant was filed, alleging failure to pay costs and restitution as

ordered by the trial court and driving while on work release without a valid license. After a

hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and imposed his original sentence.

The trial court further ordered that the appellant be given credit for jail time from May 24,

1996, to May 25, 1996, and from April 15, 1997, to June 13, 1997.

At the revocation hearing, the appellant’s probation officer testified that the

violation warrant was signed on May 20, 1997, alleging that the appellant violated a

condition of probation by failing to pay costs and restitution as ordered by the Court and by

losing work release privileges for driving on work release without a valid license. A deputy

sheriff testified that he watched as the appellant left the jail one morning. The deputy sheriff

saw the appellant walk to the parking lot, get in a truck, and drive to the edge of the parking

lot. When two of the wheels were on the street, the deputy sheriff stopped the appellant

and told him to get out of the truck. The jail administrator testified that the appellant was

removed from work release because he had driven without a valid license while on work

release. The appellant presented the testimony of two witnesses who received telephone

calls from the appellant on the sam e day the deputy sheriff saw him driving the truc k. Both

witnesses testified that the appellant had called regarding a ride to work. Based on the
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proof, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation.

The revocation of probation is committed to the sound discretion of the trial

court. State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). If the trial court

finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a probation violation has occurred, it has the

right to revoke probation and cause the probationer to commence the execution of judgment

as originally entered. T.C.A. § 40-35-310, -311(d). This Court will not find that a trial court

has abused its discretion unless the record contains no substantial evidence to support the

trial court's conclusion that the probation should be revoked. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d

79, 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The evidence at the revocation hearing need only show

that the trial court exercised a cons cientious and intelligent judgm ent in making the decision

to revoke probation. State v. Leach, 914 S.W .2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

Based on the record before us, the trial court was jus tified in revoking the

appellant’s probation, and the proof that the appellant violated the conditions of his release

was sufficient to allow the trial court to make a conscientious and intelligent decision.

Finally, it appears from a review of the trial court’s order, that the appellant was given credit

for jail time served. Accordingly, based upon a reading of the entire record, the briefs of the

parties, and the applicable law, this Court finds that the judgment of the trial court should

be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rules.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed

pursuant to Rule 20. 

________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

CONCUR:

________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE