IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50844

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

SYLVIA CASTILLO CHAIREZ,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:09-CR-58-1

Before WIENER, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Sylvia Castillo Chairez appeals the sentence imposed following her guilty

plea to accepting a bribe by a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 201(b)(2)(C). Chairez challenges the district court’s imposition of a four-level

enhancement to her base offense level pursuant to United States Sentencing

Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2C1.1(b)(3) on the ground that her offense involved a

“public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” She argues

that the record evidence does not support a finding that as a correctional officer

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 18, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-50844 Document: 00511448407 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2011
No. 09-50844

at the Reeves County Detention Center, she occupied a “sensitive position” for

purposes of the Guideline. We AFFIRM on that issue but REMAND in order

that clerical errors in the written judgment can be corrected.

The question whether an official holds “a high-level decision-making or

sensitive position, because it depends primarily upon interpretation of the

sentencing guidelines, is a question of law that we review de novo.” United

States v. Snell, 152 F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1998). We examine for clear error

“[f]actual questions, such as the discretion, supervisory authority, and other

indicia of responsibility of [the] official.” Id.

Chairez did not challenge at sentencing the district court’s description of

the role of a correctional officer and did not offer any rebuttal evidence to

demonstrate that she did not perform the duties of a correctional officer as

described by the district court. The district court was permitted to make

reasonable inferences as to Chairez’s duties and responsibilities from the fact

that Chairez was a correctional officer at a facility that housed federal inmates.

See United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1326 (5th Cir. 1990). The

“district court’s factual findings about [the officer’s] duties and responsibilities

are plausible in light of the record as a whole and are not clearly erroneous.”

United States v. McCowan, No. 09-50846, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2010)

(unpublished) (per curiam); see United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d

751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).

We have held that “[a] prison guard has the authority and the ability to

directly and significantly influence inmates’ lives and the entire facility’s safety

with the decisions he or she makes. Such power within the judicial system

makes the position of prison guard a sensitive position under the sentencing

guidelines.” United States v. Guzman, 383 F. App’x 493, 494-95 (5th Cir. 2010)

(unpublished) (per curiam). The guidelines commentary provides that

“[e]xamples of a public official who holds a sensitive position include a juror, a

law enforcement officer, an election official, and any other similarly situated

2

Case: 09-50844 Document: 00511448407 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/18/2011
No. 09-50844

individual.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 cmt. n.4(B). The

district court did not err in applying a four-level enhancement to Chairez’s base

offense level on the ground that as a correctional officer, she was a public official

in a sensitive position for purposes of § 2C1.1(b)(3). See McCowan, slip op. at 6;

Guzman, 383 F. App’x at 494-95; Snell, 152 F.3d at 346.

The written judgment states that Chairez was convicted of bribery of a

public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C), but Chairez pleaded guilty

to accepting a bribe by a public official in violation of § 201(b)(2)(C). The case is

therefore remanded for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical errors in the

judgment pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 36. See United States v. Johnson, 588

F.2d 961, 964 (5th Cir. 1979).

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS

IN JUDGMENT.

3

Case: 09-50844 Document: 00511448407 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/18/2011