J-S26008-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.X.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.X.P.

No. 1256 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Dispositional Order June 2, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-JV-0000222-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015

D.X.P. appeals from the dispositional order entered following an 

adjudication of delinquency for the offenses of possession of a firearm 

prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of a firearm 

by a minor, flight to avoid apprehension, and disorderly conduct.1 The sole 

issue raised on appeal is a challenge to the court’s suppression ruling. Based 

upon the following, we affirm, albeit on other grounds.

The facts adduced at the suppression hearing and accepted by the 

court are set out on the record, as follows:

The Court has heard testimony and has accepted into evidence a 

number of items. In addition there was a stipulation that was 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6110.1(a), 5126(a), and 

5503(a)(4), respectively.
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made between the parties. That stipulation involves the minor’s 

age, the ballistics report, which indicates that the gun in 

question was functional, and a report from the State Police 

indicating that [D.X.P.] did not have a license to carry a firearm.

The Commonwealth’s first witness was Officer [Daniel] Kling with 

York City Police Department. He has been with York City Police 

Department three and a half years. He stated that on May 1, 

2014, he was on duty with two other officers. All three were on 

bikes and in uniform. It was approximately 5:50 p.m. when he 

received the report from County Control that there were multiple 

calls for an active fight at 26 West South Street. No descriptions 

were given of the individuals involved. At the time of the call 

they were approximately a block away. They could actually see 

the vicinity of the area, and it did not appear that there was a 

fight going on, although there was a large group of people. 

He stated they got to the area within 30 seconds. He testified 

that the area in question is a high crime area, that fights occur 

every day in the park which is adjacent to this area. There are a 

number of drug and firearm arrests as well. He stated that when 

he came upon the scene there were a group of people yelling 

around the corner that the police were coming. 

As they came around the corner there were a group of three 

young males, one of which was [D.X.P.]. The officer stated that 

the individuals were tracking the police, looking at them, turning 

around and walking faster and then constantly looking back at 

them. 

The officer stated as he got behind them he asked them to stop. 

[D.X.P.], who was in the middle of the group, then started to 

flee. He stated that as he was running he was grabbing his pants 

with his left hand. They pursued on bike. The pursuit lasted 

approximately 30 seconds to a minute. They went through 

traffic, almost getting hit by a van. 

During the course of the pursuit one of the officers had come 

around and approached the Juvenile from a different direction. 

The Juvenile was coming down an alleyway and was confronted 

by this officer who attempted to tase him. As the Juvenile was 

coming at her she yelled that he had a gun. At that time it 

became evident to Officer Kling that [D.X.P.] had a firearm in his 

right hand. He was again told to stop. He observed [D.X.P.] 
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switch the gun into his other hand. He ran into a group of 30 

people and went through the middle of the group. 

[D.X.P.] then came up to a trash can, put his hand out, and 

dropped the gun into the trash can. [D.X.P.] went an additional 

15 feet, stopped, and put his hands in the air where he was 

apprehended. 

The firearm was retrieved by the other officer. It had six live 

rounds in it. ... Officer Glatfelter testified, in essence, to the 

same information as Officer Kling. 

Admitted into evidence were four exhibits. Exhibit 1 is the 

firearm in question; Exhibit 2 is the six rounds; Exhibit 3 is the 

Pennsylvania State Police report; and Exhibit 4 is the report 

indicating that [D.X.P.] does not have a license to carry a 

firearm.

Order, dated 6/2/2014, filed 6/6/2014, at 2–5. See also N.T., 6/2/2014, at 

38–40. The juvenile court determined that the officers had reasonable 

suspicion to pursue D.X.P., and denied the suppression motion. Thereafter, 

the court adjudicated D.X.P. delinquent, and entered a dispositional order 

placing him on formal probation and into the Juvenile Drug Court Program, if 

accepted, and if not, he was to be placed at the Forestry Camp #3 First Step 

Program. This appeal followed.2

D.X.P. challenges the order denying his motion to suppress physical 

evidence. In reviewing such claims, we apply a well-established standard of 

review:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is

____________________________________________

2 D.X.P. timely complied with the order of the juvenile court to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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limited to determining whether the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether 

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. 

Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of 

the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression 

court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we 

are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the 

court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression 

court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate 

court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. May 13, 2015).

D.X.P. contends “the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of 

D.X.P. being involved in criminal activity when they ordered D.X.P. to stop” 

and, therefore “the gun should have been suppressed as fruit of the 

poisonous tree as the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to order 

D.X.P. to stop and the gun was abandoned by coercion.” D.X.P.’s Brief at 

10. D.X.P. argues further: “If this Honorable Court finds that the initial 

order for D.X.P. to stop created a mere encounter as opposed to an 

investigative detention, D.X.P. asserts that the officers did not have the 

reasonable suspicion to seize D.X.P. by pursuing him and the abandoned gun 

should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 16. 

The principles that guide our review are as follows:
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“‘Interaction’ between citizens and police officers, under search 

and seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of 

justification depending upon the nature of the interaction and 

whether or not the citizen is detained.” Commonwealth v. 

DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 2000). The three levels 

of interaction are: mere encounter, investigative detention, and 

custodial detention. Id.

A mere encounter can be any formal or informal 

interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will 

normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The 

hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official 

compulsion to stop or respond.

In contrast, an investigative detention, by implication, 

carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the 

detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation 

of probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the

coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since 

this interaction has elements of official compulsion it 

requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. In 

further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the 

nature, duration and conditions of an investigative 

detention become so coercive as to be, practically 

speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able 

to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction 

with reasonable inferences derived from those 

observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of 

his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that 

the person he stopped was involved in that activity. 

Therefore, this Court must make an objective inquiry, 

namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of the [intrusion] warrant a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Plante, 2006 PA Super 376, 914 A.2d 916, 

922 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).
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“To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an 

investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of 

law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved." 

Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa. Super. 

2002).

To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must 

consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter 

to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the 

police would have communicated to a reasonable person 

that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s request 

or otherwise terminate the encounter. Thus, the focal 

point of our inquiry must be whether, considering the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 

[person] innocent of any crime, would have thought he 

was being restrained had he been in the defendant's 

shoes.

Id. at 1201-1202 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ngyuen, ___ A.3d ___, ___ [2015 PA Super 98] (Pa. 

Super. April 27, 2015) (quotations and citations omitted).

At the hearing, Officer Kling testified regarding his interaction with 

D.X.P. as follows:

At approximately 5:50 p.m. on May 1st [2014] myself, Officer 

Glatfelter, and Officer Vogel were working in the South End 

Neighborhood Enforcement Unit. We were in full bike uniform 

and riding bikes that day.

At that time we were dispatched to a fight in the first block of 

West South Street, specific address was 26 West South Street, 

and at that time we were in the first block of East South Street, 

so we were only about a block away.

From our location we could see a small group of people in front 

of that residence, but I did not see anybody actively fighting at 

that time. As we came into the area we approached a small 

group of people standing on the corner. At that time I could see 
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them telling everybody else around the corner that the police 

were coming.

As I rounded the corner, I [saw] a group of people, I can’t tell 

you how many, but there was a group of people there, and they 

were all walking away from me. They were walking southbound 

on Lindberg Avenue, and at the front of this group I saw a 

group of three young male juveniles that were walking at 

a faster gait than everybody else. They were turning their 

heads to look at us. They would turn their heads back and 

look forward and increase their pace and then they would 

look back at us and watch where myself and Officer 

Glatfelter were.

At that time I observed that they were the only ones that 

were looking at us and watching every move that we 

made. So I got behind them, the group of three. They 

were on the sidewalk on the east side of Lindberg Avenue.

I got behind this group. Officer Glatfelter went out 

around. He was on Lindberg Avenue and attempted to get 

in front of the group of three as he knew I was going to 

attempt to stop them.

As I got behind them I told all three individuals to stop, 

police. I told them that I wanted to talk to them, to stop. 

One juvenile in particular, [D.X.P.], wh[o] is seated at the 

defense table wearing all black, he was standing in the 

middle of the group of three. He weaved in between the 

two and began to run south on Lindberg Avenue. The 

other two males stayed there, but [D.X.P.] began to run. 

I saw him grab ahold of his pants with his left hand, and 

he took off running.

He ran south on Lindberg Avenue until he got to Charles Street. 

At that time he ran east on Charles Street to George Street, and 

at that time myself and Officer Glatfelter pursued him on bikes. 

Officer Vogel, she also pursued on bike, but she took a different 

route. I was calling the pursuit out on the radio as we were 

chasing him.

****

When [D.X.P.] turned left onto Snyder Place he met with Officer 

Vogel. She was coming the opposite direction in an attempt to 
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meet with him. When [D.X.P.] turned the corner, Officer Vogel 

did dismount her bike, she drew her Taser, and she attempted to 

Tase him. She missed with the Taser.

At this point myself and Officer Gla[t]felter were only 20 feet 

behind [D.X.P.], I would say just an estimate. We were in close 

proximity. When she Tased him she yelled out, Gun, and at that 

point I noticed that [D.X.P.] was holding a firearm with his right 

hand by the barrel. With his left hand he was holding up his 

pants and with the right hand he was holding the barrel of this 

revolver, it was a long barrel revolver, and he was still running.

 

At that point myself and Officer Gla[t]felter both dr[e]w our 

firearms on him, and we continued to pursue him on bikes. ... 

[D.X.P.] switched hands or switched the gun in his hands to his 

left hand, and at that time he grabbed the gun by the grip and 

he turned towards me. When he turned towards me I could see 

his face. I was telling him, Put it down, put it down, put it 

down, drop the gun. And at that point he turned back around, 

turned the bend onto Lindberg Avenue to the exact location 

where he began to run in the first place.

** **

When he goes through this crowd of people ... it was probably 20 

feet I’m behind him. I see his, with his left hand he holds it out, 

and in front of this residence, right past this group of people 

there’s like a big trash can, like a 55-gallon trash can. He holds 

the gun out and drops it in the trash can, goes about 15 more 

feet, throws his hands up in the air and slows his gait, he slows 

down to a slow walk. He turns to me. I yell at Officer Glatfelter 

that there’s a gun in the trash can, and I point at the trash can, 

and I go directly towards [D.X.P.] I dismount my bike, ... and I 

took [D.X.P.] into custody.

N.T., 6/2/2014, at 4–10 (emphasis supplied). Officer Kling further testified 

that the area was a high crime area where “[t]here are multiple drug deals 

that occur” and “fights that occur in the park.” Id. at 11–12. He stated, 
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“We make multiple arrests in the park with firearms, with drugs, [and] with 

disorderly people.” Id. at 12. 

Here, the court reasoned: 

The first issue the Court needs to address is whether the request 

to stop and subsequent pursuit by the police officers constitutes 

a seizure. If it was not a seizure then the weapon would be 

properly lawfully seized by the police officer. If it does constitute 

a seizure, then the seizure is considered to be coerced and the 

officer must demonstrate either probable cause to make the 

seizure or have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk.

****

... Our Supreme Court has determined that due to heightened 

privacy considerations in Pennsylvania, a police officer’s pursuit 

of a person fleeing is a seizure for purposes of Article 1, Section 

8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [Commonwealth v. Matos, 

672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996)].

Thus, pursuant to Matos, any contraband discarded during a 

pursuit is abandoned by coercion and the officer must 

demonstrate either probable cause to make the seizure or 

reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk. Therefore, based upon 

Matos the inquiry in this case becomes whether the police 

officers demonstrated reasonable suspicion at the time they 

began pursuit of [D.X.P.].

In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, the police officer 

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts and 

reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the 

officer’s experience. Caselaw has also established that certain 

facts taken alone do not establish reasonable suspicion. For 

instance, in Matos, it was determined that flight alone does not 

constitute reasonable suspicion; in Commonwealth [v.] 

Kearney[, 601 A.2d 346 (Pa. Super. 1992),] mere presence in a 

high crime area did not constitute reasonable suspicion; and 

under Commonwealth [v.] Hawkins[, 692 A.2d 1068 (Pa. 

1997),] an anonymous tip alone did not constitute reasonable 

suspicion. 
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[That] being stated, the determination of reasonable suspicion 

requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, with a 

lesser showing needed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion in 

both terms of quality and content and reliability than probable 

cause. 

In the instant matter there is a combination of factors present 

which would warrant reasonable suspicion by the officer. As 

stated, there was an anonymous tip, in fact several anonymous 

tips made to police regarding a fight in the area; the fact that 

this was a high crime area; the actions taken by the juveniles in 

tracking the police officers; and then finally the flight by the 

Juvenile. All of these factors taken collectively constitute 

reasonable suspicion for the officer to pursue the Juvenile. 

Order, dated 6/2/2014, filed 6/6/2014, at 5–8. See also N.T., 6/2/2014, at 

40–43. Contrary to the juvenile court, we conclude police lacked reasonable 

suspicion to stop and pursue D.X.P. 

In this case, the facts show that D.X.P.’s detention commenced when 

Officer Kling issued the command to stop. That is, when Officer Kling 

approached the three males from behind on bike, and told them “to stop, 

police ... I want[] to talk ..., to stop,”3a reasonable person in D.X.P.’s 

position would not have felt free to depart. Commonwealth v. Ranson, 

103 A.3d 73, 77 (Pa. Super. 2014) (appellant subjected to investigative 

detention when uniformed officers commanded appellant to stop); 

Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 288 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“When an 

officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the 

liberty of an individual, a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”). In fact, the other two 

____________________________________________

3 N.T., 6/2/2014, at 6. 
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individuals with D.X.P. did stop. Therefore, we conclude an investigative 

detention occurred at that moment. 

The next part of the inquiry is whether police had reasonable suspicion 

to support the detention. Here, the officers were on bike patrol when they 

received a county control report that there were multiple calls regarding a 

fight at 26 West South Street. At that time, police were a block away and 

they could see people outside the residence, but did not see a fight. When 

they arrived at the scene 30 seconds later, people at the corner were yelling 

to others around the corner that police were coming. The officers rounded 

the corner and saw a group of people walking away. Officer Kling spotted 

three young males, including D.X.P., at the front of the group, watching 

police over their shoulders and walking at a faster gait. We conclude these 

facts do not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of D.X.P.

Although police received the report of the fight from county control, no 

descriptions of individuals were provided, and police saw no evidence of a 

fight. The only pertinent factors in this case were the high crime area, the 

three males’ actions in looking back at police, and their fast paced gait as 

they walked away from police and the reported scene of a fight. However, 

walking away from police officers in a high crime area is not sufficient to 

justify an investigative detention of that individual. See In the Interest of 

J.G., 860 A.2d 185, 187 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“[P]olice did not establish a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop and 
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search of Appellant, where the only evidence of criminal wrongdoing was 

Appellant’s presence in a high crime area combined with his decision to ‘walk 

away’ from the police officers upon seeing their approach”). Further, while 

Officer Kling testified the three males were turning their heads to watch 

police, we cannot conclude that this conduct, along with walking away 

quickly from police in a high crime area, were sufficient to provide Officer 

Kling with a reasonable belief that D.X.P. was engaged in illegal behavior.4 

Therefore, we conclude that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 

justify the stop and pursuit of D.X.P.

Our inquiry, however, does not end here. The Commonwealth argues 

that “even if the police had no cause to chase [D.X.P.], [D.X.P.’s] actions of 

running through heavy traffic causing vehicles to swerve, and the juvenile 

possessing a handgun constitute two intervening acts by the juvenile 

____________________________________________

4 We note that this court has found reasonable suspicion where, in addition 

to evasive behavior and a high crime area, there is other indication of 

criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 774 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. June 17, 2015) 

(police had reasonable suspicion where defendant “was in a high-crime area, 

at night, with a weighted and angled bulge in his coat,” “alerted to the 

officers’ presence intentionally turned his body away from them, at least 

three times, to conceal the bulge,” and “walk[ed] away from the known drug 

corner whenever the officer[s] passed by it”). See also Commonwealth v. 

Foglia, 979 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc), appeal denied, 990 A.2d 

727 (Pa. 2010) (reasonable suspicion found where there was an anonymous 

tip, evasive behavior in looking back and walking away, high crime area, and 

hand movements that police recognize as associated with the secreting of a 

weapon).
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defendant which granted the police probable cause to seize the weapon.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11, citing Commonwealth v. Hall, 929 A.2d 1202 

(Pa. Super. 2007).

As the Commonwealth asserts, this Court, in Hall, expressly stated 

that “[e]ven when a police officer’s initial stop or pursuit of an individual is 

not based upon either a reasonable suspicion of crime or probable cause, 

subsequent actions by the detainee during the encounter may be the basis 

for a lawful arrest and the subsequent denial of a suppression motion 

regarding evidence seized after the arrest.” Id. at 1207.5 Applying Hall, we 

find that D.X.P.’s behavior subsequent to the stop and pursuit supplied 

probable cause which allowed the officers to seize the handgun in question. 

____________________________________________

5 Citing Commonwealth v. Lynch, 773 A.2d 1240, 1246–48 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (holding that although the police lacked reasonable suspicion to 

initially pursue the appellant, the appellant’s pointing a weapon at the police 

and subsequent abandonment of the weapon during the pursuit gave police 

probable cause to arrest the appellant, and the suppression court 

accordingly did not err by permitting testimony regarding the appellant’s 

abandonment and the police officers’ recovery of the weapon, even though 

the initial pursuit was without a reasonable basis or suspicion); 

Commonwealth v. Britt, 691 A.2d 494, 496–98 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding 

that although the police lacked probable cause to initially detain the 

appellant, the appellant’s subsequent flight, resisting arrest, and causing 

injury to one of the officers provided the police with probable cause to arrest 

the appellant, and, thus, the suppression court accordingly erred by 

suppressing evidence seized, even though the initial detention was made 

without probable cause).

We note that Lynch has been overruled on other grounds, as stated in 

Commonwealth v. Foglia, supra, 979 A.2d at 361 n.2.
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Here, during the chase, D.X.P., a juvenile, brandished a firearm in 

violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1 (“Possession of firearm by minor”).6 

Because police observed him committing this offense, the officers had 

probable cause to arrest D.X.P. and seize the firearm.7 Accordingly, the 

juvenile court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the firearm.8 

Dispositional order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2015

____________________________________________

6 D.X.P. was 16 years of age at the time of the offense.

7 We agree with the Commonwealth that “[h]ad the juvenile merely fled, or 

abandoned the clothing or bag containing a handgun without displaying its 

criminal nature, he may have avoided giving police additional probable 

cause.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. 

8

“This Court is not bound by the rationale of the trial court, and we may 

affirm the trial court on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 

609, 617 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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