[Cite as State v. Hair, 2016-Ohio-2679.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 CASE NO. CA2015-08-158 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 O P I N I O N 

 : 4/25/2016 

 - vs - 

 : 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAIR, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2015-02-0217 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Willa Concannon, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee 

Michael R. Haas, 404 East 12th Street, 2nd Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendantappellant 

 

 M. POWELL, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher Hair, appeals a decision of the Butler County 

Court of Common Pleas convicting him of obstructing official business, resisting arrest, illegal 

use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under a suspension. 

{¶ 2} Appellant was charged with a number of offenses as a result of his actions 

during a traffic stop by a Butler County Sheriff's deputy. Appellant challenged the propriety of 
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the initial stop in a motion to suppress. After a hearing, the trial court found the deputy's stop 

was proper and denied the motion to suppress. A jury found appellant guilty as charged and 

he was sentenced accordingly. 

{¶ 3} On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court's decision to deny his motion to 

suppress and raises one assignment of error for our review: 

{¶ 4} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT[']S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 

{¶ 5} The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government 

searches and seizures. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct 675 (1985). It is 

well-established that a police officer may stop motorists in order to investigate a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999). To justify 

an intrusion, an officer must demonstrate "specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). This determination involves consideration of "the 

totality of the circumstances." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 

(1981). The stop must be "viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police 

officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training." State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio 

St.2d 291, 295 (1980). 

{¶ 6} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question 

of law and fact. State v. Cochran, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-10-023, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶ 

12. As the trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position to resolve factual questions and 

evaluate witness credibility and a reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings 

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Oatis, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2005-03-074, 2005-Ohio-6038, ¶ 10. "An appellate court, however, independently 

reviews the trial court's legal conclusions, based on those facts and determines, without 
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deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the 

appropriate legal standard." Cochran at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 7} The sole witness at the suppression hearing was the deputy who stopped 

appellant's vehicle. The deputy testified that on the night of the traffic stop, he was in uniform 

and in a marked police cruiser. He further testified that he was on special assignment in the 

area along Cincinnati-Dayton Road, in the Route 129 area, due to a recent spate of break-ins 

to area businesses. He indicated that the description given to law enforcement in one of the 

break-ins involved a small, four-door car occupied by a male and a female. 

{¶ 8} On the night of the stop, the deputy was parked in a shopping area near Hot 

Head Burritos and Caravelle Nail Salon, two businesses which had been broken into 

recently. He indicated that from where his cruiser was parked, he had a good view of the 

back of the building. The deputy observed appellant drive a smaller four-door vehicle into the 

rear area of the building. Appellant parked near a dumpster and right behind the employee 

entrance, in an area not visible from the street. It was midnight and none of the businesses 

in the area were open. 

{¶ 9} The deputy turned on his headlights and appellant immediately put his vehicle 

in reverse and exited the parking lot onto the street. When appellant pulled out, the deputy 

observed that a male and female occupied the vehicle. The deputy pulled behind appellant, 

turned on the cruiser's lights and sirens, and stopped the vehicle. Appellant refused to get 

out of the car or to give the deputy his identification. Appellant's actions and refusal to 

cooperate after the initial stop of his vehicle led to his arrest and the filing of charges. 

{¶ 10} The trial court considered the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 

and found the deputy's testimony was credible. The court determined that the deputy had 

reasonable articulable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle. On appeal, appellant argues that 

the deputy did not observe any criminal acts or traffic violations and was not aware of any 
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warrants associated with appellant's vehicle. Appellant further contends that the deputy did 

not provide any specific information, including the dates or locations of break-ins, 

documentation or reports of the break-ins, an age of the suspects, or the make and model of 

the car. 

{¶ 11} However, we find no merit to appellant's arguments. A Terry stop is 

investigatory, and therefore reasonable suspicion may be based on behavior that is not 

illegal. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989). After reviewing the 

facts presented at the suppression hearing, we find the deputy had reasonable, articulable 

suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle. Although, as appellant argues, none of his actions were 

illegal, taken together they amount to reasonable articulable suspicion. 

{¶ 12} Appellant was observed pulling into a shopping area at midnight when none of 

the businesses were open, in an area where numerous break-ins had recently occurred. 

Appellant pulled around to the back of the building and parked in an area obscured from the 

road, near a dumpster and the employee entrance. When the deputy turned on his 

headlights, appellant immediately backed out of the parking space and began to leave. The 

deputy observed a man and woman in a small, four-door vehicle, matching the description 

given to police. These facts provided a basis for the deputy to perform an investigatory stop 

in order to confirm or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity. 

{¶ 13} Although appellant argues the deputy did not provide specific information, such 

as the dates and locations of all of the break-ins, age of the suspects, and make and model 

of the car, these facts were not necessary in order to establish reasonable, articulable 

suspicion. The deputy testified that he was on special assignment to the area because of 

numerous break-ins, and that two of the businesses in the area of where he was parked had 

been broken into recently. 
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{¶ 14} The state admitted an aerial photograph of the area, and the deputy pointed out 

where he was located, the two businesses near where he was parked, and the location of a 

Penn Station which had been broken into. He also indicated another area nearby where 

multiple break-ins had occurred and indicated that he was concentrating on those areas that 

evening. The deputy further testified that he was working the night of another break-in in the 

area, at Ely's bar. These facts, along with appellant's actions, were sufficient to establish 

reasonable articulable suspicion to stop appellant's vehicle. 

{¶ 15} Because the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress, the 

sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 16} Judgment Affirmed. 

RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.