This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 vs. No. 34,686 4 JOSEPH BERSANE, 5 6 Defendant-Appellant 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 8 Kea W. Riggs, District Judge 9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 13 J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assi stant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 HANISEE, Judge. 18 {1} Defendant appeals from the district c ourt’s judgment and sentence, convicting 19 him following a bench trial on one count of trafficking controlled substances 202 (possession with intent to distribute), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 1 (2006). This Court issued a calendar notice proposing summary affirmance. Defendant 2 filed a memorandum in opposition to this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, 3 which we have duly considered . Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1 ) that the district court erred in not 5 requiring disclosure of the confidential informant; and (2) that the district court erred 6 in denying his motion to dismiss for violati on of his speedy trial rights. [DS 5] In our 7 calendar notice, we proposed to hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 8 in not requiring disclosure of the confiden tial informant’s identity. [CN 4, 6] We then 9 undertook an examination of the fourspeedy trial factors set forth inBarker v. Wingo , 10 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [ See generally CN 7-12] Ultimately, we proposed to hold that 11 the length of delay in this case weighs at most moderately in Defendant’s favor, and 12 the reasons for delay and the assertion of speedy trial rights weigh slightly in 13 Defendant’s favor. [CN 12-13] We we nt on to suggest that under these 14 circumstances—where there has been no demonstration of actual prejudice by 15 Defendant—we were not convinced that De fendant’s constitutional right to speedy 16 trial was violated. [CN 12-13] See State v. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 40, 146 N.M. 17 499, 212 P.3d 387 (holding that because the defendant failed to show prejudice, and 18 the other factors did not weigh heavily inthe defendant’s favor, the Court could not 193 conclude that the defendant’s rightto a speedy trial was violated). 1 {3} Defendant’s memorandum in opposition doe s not point to any specific errors 2 in fact or in law in our calendar notice. See Hennessy v. Duryea , 1998-NMCA-036, 3 ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“ Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary 4 calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly 5 point out errors in fact or law.”). In f act, Defendant makes no mention whatsoever of 6 this Court’s proposed disposition in his memorandum in opposition; instead, he 7 simply recites the facts that had already b een placed before this Court in his docketing 8 statement and presents us with a watere d-down version of the same arguments he 9 made before the district court and in his docketing statement. [ See generally MIO 3-8] 10 {4} We conclude that Defendant has not met his burden on appeal. Accordingly, for 11 the reasons stated above, as well as those provided in our calendar notice, we affirm. 12

{5} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

_____________________________ 14 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

__________________________________ 17 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 18

__________________________________ 194 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 1