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MIRANDA VARLEY v. FIRST

STUDENT, INC., ET AL.

(AC 36826)

Gruendel, Alvord and Flynn, Js.

Argued February 19—officially released July 14, 2015
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Aurigemma, J.)

Theodore W. Heiser, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Peter J. Murphy, forthe appellee (defendant Regional

School District 4).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The plaintiff, Miranda Varley, appeals

from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the defendant, Regional School District 4.1

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as

to whether (1) the defendant was her employer for

purposes of analyzing her wrongful discipline and discharge claim under General Statutes § 31-51q, and (2)

the defendant tortiously interfered with her contractual

employment relationship. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

Mindful of the procedural posture of the case, we set

forth the following facts as gleaned from the pleadings,

affidavits and other proof submitted, viewed in a light

most favorable to the plaintiff. See Martinelli v. Fusi,

290 Conn. 347, 350, 963 A.2d 640 (2009). The defendant

is a regional school district organized under General

Statutes § 10-39 et seq. It encompasses the towns of

Chester, Deep River and Essex. Those towns retain

individual boards of education that oversee their

respective pre-kindergarten through sixth grade educational programs. The Region 4 Board of Education oversees educational programs for grades seven through

twelve. The defendant’s supervision district committee

(committee) is comprised of members from those four

boards of education. The committee oversees the

shared services of those entities, including school

bus services.

In June, 2006, the committee entered into a contract

with First Student Transportation, Inc. (First Student),

to secure transportation services for the defendant

(contract). That contract details certain responsibilities

of ‘‘bus drivers employed by’’ First Student. In addition,

the contract provides that First Student will ‘‘discontinue the utilization under this contract of operators

considered unsatisfactory by the Superintendent of

Schools upon written notice thereof.’’ In March, 2010,

an amendment was executed that extended the contract

through the 2014–2015 school year and increased compensation rates. That amendment further specified that

‘‘[e]xcept as expressly modified, amended or supplemented herein, the [c]ontract is hereby reaffirmed and

ratified by the parties in its entirety.’’

First Student hired the plaintiff as a school bus driver

in 2008. During the 2009–2010 school year, she was

assigned to certain routes in Clinton, and occasionally

provided ‘‘fill in’’ coverage for routes with the defendant. At the start of the 2010–2011 school year, First

Student assigned the plaintiff to route four with the

defendant, which consisted of a kindergarten run in

Essex and an elementary school run in Chester. The

plaintiff encountered ‘‘a lot of problems’’ on that elementary school run. As she explained in her deposition
testimony: ‘‘I got this run from a prior bus driver who

had no control over the kids, so they were free to think

it was okay to walk up and down the aisles, scream

out the window, throw things out the window.’’ In an

effort to ameliorate that behavior, the plaintiff established assigned seats for each student, which led to

complaints from a parent whose special education child

was forced to sit by himself.

On one afternoon, the plaintiff encountered unruly

behavior by students while driving them home from

Chester Elementary School. After checking with Frank

Kulick, her supervisor at First Student, she turned the

bus around and returned to the school. Once at the

school, the plaintiff was met by Principal Mike Barile,

who was ‘‘infuriated’’ with her for doing so because a

child with a known medical issue needed to get home

immediately. The plaintiff testified that Barile thought

her conduct in bringing the bus back to the school was

a danger to the student. On another occasion, Barile

confronted the plaintiff on the school sidewalk after

receiving a complaint from someone who had walked

by her bus and overheard her screaming at the children inside.

In light of the foregoing, the defendant’s representatives met with Kulick. In a letter dated November 10,

2010, Kulick informed the plaintiff that she ‘‘needed to

be removed from your route [in Chester] and receive

additional training regarding certain aspects of your job

as a school bus driver.’’2 Kulick reassigned the plaintiff

to a route in Clinton and assured her that ‘‘you are

not losing your employment with First Student or any

standard hours.’’ He further asked the plaintiff to

‘‘[p]lease keep this district matter confidential.’’

Days later, the plaintiff went to the office of Ruth I.

Levy, the defendant’s superintendent of schools. The

plaintiff inquired as to why she had been removed from

her route in Chester. That confrontation upset Kulick,

who prepared anotherletterthat concerned her encounter with Levy, which the plaintiff acknowledged in writing on November 19, 2010. Kulick’s letter stated in

relevant part: ‘‘I . . . counseled you directly and told

you not to go to [Levy] over this matter. At that time

you agreed and assured me that you would not. On

November 16 you went to [Levy’s] [o]ffice unannounced

in direct conflict with what I had directed you on

[November] 10. . . . In [my prior letter] I requested

that you keep this matter confidential due to its sensitivity. You have not and I have had many employees

approach me regarding this matter and your discussions

of it. This letter is a written warning that you are not

to go to [Levy] over a work related matter. Further

instances of this type of behavior will result in further

progressive discipline up to and including termination.

. . . I strongly encourage you to conduct yourself professionally over this matter and not have unsolicited
meetings with our customers.’’

The following school year, First Student assigned the

plaintiff to route fourteen with the defendant, which

involved the Essex Elementary School. Soon after the

school year commenced, the plaintiff experienced problems with one child in particular, identified as John

Doe in her complaint, who engaged in bullying behavior

through name-calling and physical contact with other

children on the bus.3 When the plaintiff issued a verbal

warning to John Doe, the child responded by swearing

at her, and telling her to shut up and mind her own

business. In response, the plaintiff, in accordance with

the defendant’s policies, thereafter filed written incident reports with First Student on approximately six

to twelve occasions. Copies of those reports were furnished to the defendant, as well as the child’s guardian,

who voiced objection thereto.4

Joanne Beekley, the principal of Essex Elementary

School, did not consider the reports of John Doe’s

behavior to constitute reports of bullying ‘‘[d]ue to the

child’s disability.’’ In light of that undisclosed disability,

the defendant’s representatives decided to have the

child’s planning and placement team (team) handle

those reports. Despite the defendant’s policy requiring

bus drivers to submit written reports when a student

strikes another student, the team nonetheless decided

that it would be preferable to have any future reports

of physical contact involving John Doe made verbally.

The purpose of that directive was to avoid ‘‘escalating

the relationship between the child’s guardian, the

school, and the [plaintiff],’’ which impaired the team’s

ability to ‘‘work with the family to deescalate the behaviors . . . .’’5 Levy testified at her deposition that ‘‘when

there is a special education child who has a specific

[individualized educational program], that [program]

would be superseding’’ to any district policy regarding

written incident reports on its buses.

Accordingly, Assistant Principal Deborah O’Donnell

thereafter advised the plaintiff to stop preparing written

reports on John Doe’s behavior. Instead, O’Donnell

requested that the plaintiff verbally notify her when he

exhibited such behavior. When the plaintiff informed

her supervisor of that request, Kulick responded,

‘‘[a]bsolutely not, that’s not protocol and you know

that.’’ As a result, when John Doe later exhibited such

behavior on her bus, the plaintiff again prepared a written report.

Two days later, Kulick received a copy of a memorandum from Beekley to Levy dated November 16, 2011,

regarding Beekley’s concerns about the plaintiff’s ‘‘judgment and appropriateness with students.’’ That memorandum identified four areas of concern. With respect

to her handling of John Doe, Beekley wrote that the

plaintiff’s ‘‘reliability in reporting events that happen

on the bus is questionable, as one child in particular
seemed to be the target of her bus referrals. When

investigating we found that other children admitted

their involvement yet they never were reported to

administration.’’ Beekley also noted that ‘‘several students . . . needed to meet with the school counselor

and administration because they were distraught and

felt they needed to help’’ the plaintiff ‘‘in response to

comments made by [the plaintiff] regarding her employment.’’6 The memorandum further stated that because

the plaintiff had provided candy to students on Halloween, Beekley was ‘‘concerned as there might be students

with allergies, it violates our Wellness Policy, and could

be a choking hazard.’’7 The memorandum also noted

that the plaintiff had asked ‘‘at least two students what

she could purchase for their mother as a Christmas

gift,’’ which led Beekley to ‘‘question the reason’’ she

would do so.8 Beekley then stated that those concerns

had been communicated to Kulick, who assured her

that the plaintiff ‘‘will be reassigned as soon as possible

to another school district.’’ In concluding, Beekley

stated that ‘‘I am not sure that we want [the plaintiff]

to drive any bus for [our] schools now or in the future.’’

After receiving that memorandum, Levy spoke with

Kulick and, pursuant to her authority under the terms

of the contract, requested that the plaintiff be removed

from her Essex Elementary School run.9

In her deposition testimony, Levy stated that her request was motivated by concerns about the plaintiff’s judgment and

communication, as outlined in Beekley’s memorandum.

In particular, Levy’s decision was informed by ‘‘the concerns that were brought up regarding a special education student in Chester and then a special education

student in Essex in regard to overall behavior management on the bus,’’ as well as various complaints from

parents. Those concerns, as well as the defendant’s

experience with the plaintiff during the prior school

year and the plaintiff’s refusal to follow the directive

not to file written reports on John Doe, collectively

gave rise to ‘‘a more serious concern’’ about her fitness

as a bus driver. Levy acknowledged in her deposition

that she simply informed Kulick of that concern; she

did not ask him to look into the merits thereof. Levy

also stated that, in her tenure both as assistant superintendent and superintendent of schools for the defendant, she did not recall making any other requests to

First Student to remove a bus driver.

On December 1, 2011, the plaintiff attended a meeting

of the committee. The minutes of that meeting indicate

that, during the public comment session, the plaintiff

‘‘noted that she lives in Ivoryton10 and is a bus driver

for First Student. She complained that she was let go

from driving for Chester, and now in Essex. She feels

that she has been treated unfairly and asked the [c]ommittee to review her case and reinstate her.’’ (Footnote

added.) The plaintiff explained that she ‘‘went to see if

they can look into [the] allegations against me and if
they can do an actual investigation . . . . I went there

looking for [the committee to] please look into this;

I’m doing my due diligence, I’m abiding by state laws,

federal laws, school district laws.’’ When she concluded,

Committee Chair Linda Hall thanked the plaintiff for

her comments and stated that those comments ‘‘will be

looked into.’’

Levy was in attendance at the committee’s December

1, 2011 meeting. The next day, she contacted Kulick

and requested that the plaintiff be removed from all

routes with the defendant, including her kindergarten

run in Essex. The plaintiff subsequently received a letter

from Kulick informing her that the defendant had

‘‘requested that you no longer drive home to school

routes. This is in part due to your inappropriate behavior at [the committee] meeting, and primarily for handing out presents and candy to student passengers. Both

of these behaviors are unacceptable, by First Student

standards. Rather than termination, due to a good and

safe driving history, you are being transferred to the

Clinton District, with the clear understanding that these

behaviors will not be repeated. This is to be considered

yourfinal written warning. Any further student management violations, or violation of any other company policy, at any time in the future, will be considered cause

for immediate termination . . . .’’

The plaintiff thereafter telephoned Hall on approximately three occasions to inquire whether the committee had reviewed the concerns she raised at the

December 1, 2011 meeting. When Hall returned the

plaintiff’s call, she informed the plaintiff that the committee ‘‘still hadn’t had a special meeting yet’’ to address

those concerns.

On February 28, 2012, the plaintiff again attended a

meeting of the committee. Before that meeting began,

Hall approached the plaintiff and informed her that

‘‘there was nothing [the committee] could do’’ and that

she would be hearing from the defendant’s attorney.

The minutes of that meeting provide in relevant part:

‘‘Public Comment—[The plaintiff] from Ivoryton spoke

regarding her concern over safety for students on the

buses. She said she has removed her own child from

the bus due to fears for their safety. She also again

voiced her displeasure over no longer being allowed to

drive a bus in the district due to disciplinary action

against her by First Student.’’ The next day, Levy contacted Kulick and informed him that the plaintiff again

had appeared at a committee meeting to voice her displeasure ‘‘with the employment situation.’’11 An upset

Kulick then telephoned the plaintiff and notified her

that First Student was terminating her employment due

to her appearance atthe committee meeting. After calming down, Kulick telephoned the plaintiff again later

that day and asked her to report to work in Clinton.

The plaintiff complied, and thereafter continued her
employment with First Student.

One week later, the defendant’s legal counsel contacted the plaintiff by letter dated March 7, 2012. That

letter stated in relevant part: ‘‘It recently has come to

my attention that you have been contacting [Hall] and

the [defendant’s] [a]dministration on a regular and persistent basis regarding the status of your employment

as a bus driver. Please be advised the Chester, Deep

River, Essex, and [defendant’s] Boards of Education

are not your employers. Rather, you are employed by

First Student. Hence, any inquiries or concerns with

respect to your employment with First Student should

be directed to the attention of First Student and not

the members of the Chester, Deep River, Essex, or

[defendant’s] Boards of Education or their agents. To

that end, please cease and desist from any such future

regular and persistent communication in this regard.’’

The plaintiff continued her employment with First

Student after being reassigned to routes in Clinton.

Sometime between January and April, 2012, a student

on one of her Clinton routes filed a complaint against

the plaintiff, alleging favoritism. Although she was not

disciplined by First Student, the plaintiff testified that

she voluntarily resigned from that route. In April, 2012,

the plaintiff voluntarily quit her employment by submitting a resignation letter to First Student.12 In her deposition testimony, the plaintiff testified that she resigned

due to her own concerns about her ability to properly

comply with First Student policies.13

This civil action followed. The plaintiff’s operative

complaint contains two counts. The first count alleges

wrongful discipline and discharge on the part of the

defendant in violation of § 31-51q. The second count

alleges that the defendant tortiously interfered with her

contractual employment relationship with First Student. Following discovery, the defendant moved for

summary judgment on both counts, which the court

granted. This appeal followed.

Before considering the particular claims advanced

by the plaintiff in this appeal, we note that ‘‘[o]ur standard of review governing a court’s grant of summary

judgment is well established. Summary judgment is

appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and any

other proof submitted show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . As the

court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment is

a legal determination, our review on appeal is plenary.

. . . Because litigants ordinarily have a constitutional

right to have issues of fact decided by the finder of

fact, the party moving for summary judgment is held

to a strict standard. [The moving party] must make a

showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that

excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any

genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact is
a fact that will make a difference in the result of the

case. . . . [T]he burden of showing the nonexistence

of any material fact is on the party seeking summary

judgment . . . . It is not enough for the moving party

merely to assert the absence of any disputed factual

issue; the moving party is required to bring forward

. . . evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside

the pleadings to show the absence of any material dispute. . . . The party opposing summary judgment

must present a factual predicate for his argument to

raise a genuine issue of fact. . . . Once raised, if it is

not conclusively refuted by the moving party, a genuine

issue of fact exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate. The court is required to view the facts presented

in a motion for summary judgment in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion. . . .

[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the

key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not

sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. . . . [I]ts function is not to decide

issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether

any such issues exist.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103

Conn. App. 188, 192–93, 928 A.2d 586 (2007), aff’d, 289

Conn. 57, 956 A.2d 579 (2008). ‘‘The test is whether the

party moving for summary judgment would be entitled

to a directed verdict on the same facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287, 294, 977 A.2d 189 (2009).

I

The plaintiff contends that the court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact exists as

to whether the defendant was her employer for purposes of analyzing her wrongful discipline and discharge claim under § 31-51q. In her principal appellate

brief, the plaintiff concedes that ‘‘[s]he was directly

employed by First Student.’’ She nevertheless submits

that application of § 31-51q to the facts of this case

compels the conclusion that the defendant also was her

employer. We disagree.

The proper interpretation of § 31-51q presents a question of statutory construction, over which our review

is plenary. Plato Associates, LLC v. Environmental

Compliance Services, Inc., 298 Conn. 852, 862, 9 A.3d

698 (2010). ‘‘The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied

to the facts of [the] case, including the question of

whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General Statutes]

§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute

itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,

the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not

be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is

whetherthe statute, when read in context, is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v.

Fonfara, 303 Conn. 292, 297, 33 A.3d 185 (2012).

We thus begin our analysis with the text of the statute.

Section 31-51q provides: ‘‘Any employer, including the

state and any instrumentality or political subdivision

thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or

discharge on account of the exercise by such employee

of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the

United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article

first of the Constitution of the state, provided such

activity does not substantially or materially interfere

with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the

working relationship between the employee and the

employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages

caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part

of the costs of any such action for damages. If the court

determines that such action for damages was brought

without substantial justification, the court may award

costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the employer.’’

As this court has recognized, ‘‘an employer-employee

relationship is required to establish standing’’ thereunder. Young v. Bridgeport, 135 Conn. App. 699, 706, 42

A.3d 514 (2012). Nevertheless, the term ‘‘employer’’ is

not defined by that statute.

‘‘It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that

statutory words and phrases are to be given their ordinary meaning in accordance with the commonly

approved usage of the language. See General Statutes

§ 1-1 (a) (‘[i]n the construction of the statutes, words

and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language’). As our

Supreme Court held almost one century ago, ‘[t]he

words of a statute are to be interpreted in their natural

and usual meaning unless the context indicates that a

different meaning was intended. By our statute words

and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly plain usage of language.’ Brown v. New Haven

Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102A. 573 (1917); accord

State v. Grullon, 212 Conn. 195, 200, 562 A.2d 481 (1989)

(words of statute to be given their ordinary meaning

unless context dictates otherwise); Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 570, 440 A.2d 767 (1981) (statutory term must be ‘interpreted in its natural and usual

meaning unless the context indicates that a different

one was intended’); Gural v. Fazzino, 45 Conn. App.

586, 588, 696 A.2d 1307 (1997) (in interpreting language

of statute, words must be given plain and ordinary

meaning and natural and usual sense). ‘To ascertain
the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to

the dictionary definition of the term.’ . . . Stone-Krete

Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911

A.2d 300 (2006); see also Hartford/Windsor Healthcare

Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 200–201,

3 A.3d 56 (2010) (appropriate to look to common understanding of term as expressed in dictionary if statute

does not sufficiently define term).’’ Lane v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 136 Conn. App.

135, 148, 43 A.3d 821 (2012), aff’d, 314 Conn. 1, 100 A.3d

384 (2014).

In its memorandum of decision, the court did precisely that, noting that the term ‘‘employer’’ is defined

as ‘‘[o]ne who employs the services of others; one for

whom employees work and who pays their wages or

salaries.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Recourse

to various dictionaries confirms the accuracy of that

ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (9th

Ed. 2009) p. 604 (defining ‘‘employer’’ as ‘‘[a] person

who controls and directs a worker under an express

or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker’s

salary or wages’’); Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary (2002) p. 743 (defining ‘‘employer’’ in relevant part as ‘‘the owner of an enterprise . . . that

employs personnel for wages or salaries’’); Random

House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d Ed. 2001)

p. 638 (defining ‘‘employer’’ as ‘‘a person or business

that employs one or more people, esp. for wages or

salaries’’); American Heritage Dictionary (2d College

Ed. 1985) p. 428 (defining ‘‘employer’’ as ‘‘a person or

concern that employs persons for wages or salary’’).

The definition applied by the court is consistent with

that set forth in several related statutes in title 31, chapter 557, part II of the General Statutes, all of which

pertain to regulations concerning the protection of

employees, and which specifically define ‘‘employer’’

as ‘‘a person engaged in business who has employees

. . . .’’ See General Statutes §§ 31-40c (a) (2); 31-40j

(2); 31-40q (a) (2); 31-40t (a) (2); and 31-51m (a) (2);

see also General Statutes §§ 31-51r(a)(1)(‘‘‘[e]mployer’

means any person engaged in business who has twentysix or more employees’’) and 31-51tt (a) (2)

(‘‘‘[e]mployer’ means any person engaged in business

who has one or more employees’’). It is a well established canon of statutory construction that ‘‘[a]n identical term used in [statutory provisions] pertaining to the

same subject matter should not be read to have differing

meanings unless there is some indication from the legislature that it intended such a result.’’(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 78, 836

A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct.

1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004). There is no indication

that the legislature intended the term ‘‘employer,’’ as it

is used in § 31-51q, to have a meaning different from

its ordinary usage, as embodied in the aforementioned

statutes. When the legislature wants to depart from that
ordinary meaning, it certainly knows how to do so. See,

e.g., General Statutes § 31-51kk (4) (defining

‘‘employer’’ as ‘‘a person engaged in any activity, enterprise or business who employs seventy-five or more

employees, and includes any person who acts, directly

or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of

the employees of such employer and any successor in

interest of an employer, but shall not include the state,

a municipality, a local or regional board of education,

or a private or parochial elementary or secondary

school’’).

In this case, the plaintiff admits that she was directly

employed by First Student—indeed, the second count

of her complaint alleges that the defendant tortiously

interfered with her contractual employment relationship with First Student. The plaintiff also admits that

she was paid by First Student; that her hours of employment and bus route assignments were set by First Student; and that her supervisor was Kulick, a contract

manager for First Student. The plaintiff likewise does

not dispute that she never received a paycheck, tax

forms, health insurance or other benefits from the

defendant. She further has not alleged that she was

the defendant’s employee under an express or implied

contract of hire. Accordingly, under the commonly

approved usage of the term, the defendant plainly does

not qualify as the plaintiff’s employer.

Nonetheless, because the defendant exercised its

right under the contract to communicate its concerns

to First Student regarding the plaintiff’s performance,

and ultimately requested the discontinuation of her services on certain routes, the plaintiff submits that it is

reasonable to construe § 31-51q as conferring employer

status on the defendant. We disagree with that strained

reading of the term ‘‘employer,’’ which suggests that

whenever two parties contract for certain services, the

customer also becomes the employer of the vendor’s

employees that perform services therefor. The legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.14

See State v. Spears, 234 Conn. 78, 92, 662 A.2d 80 (principles of statutory construction require that we not construe a statute in a manner that will lead to absurd

consequences or bizarre results), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1009, 116 S. Ct. 565, 133 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). Moreover,

as evidenced by other statutory provisions in which it

has carved out a more expansive definition of the term

‘‘employer’’; see, e.g., General Statutes § 31-51kk (4);

we presume that if the legislature intended § 31-51q to

encompass such a scenario, it would have said so. See

Lucarelli v. State, 16 Conn. App. 65, 70, 546 A.2d 940

(1988) (‘‘[c]ourts must interpret statutes as they are

written . . . and cannot, by judicial construction, read

into them provisions which are not clearly stated’’ [citation omitted]).

We conclude that the term ‘‘employer,’’ as it is used
in § 31-51q and as applied to the facts of this case, is not

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

The court properly construed that statute in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact as

to whether an employer-employee relationship existed

between the parties, a necessary prerequisite to an

action under § 31-51q.15 See Young v. Bridgeport, supra,

135 Conn. App. 706. Forthatreason, summary judgment

properly was rendered in favor of the defendant on the

first count of the plaintiff’s complaint.

II

The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly

determined that no genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether the defendant tortiously interfered with

her contractual employment relationship with First Student. We do not agree.

‘‘A claim for tortious interference with contractual

relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2)

the defendants’ knowledge of that relationship, (3) the

defendants’ intent to interfere with the relationship, (4)

the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered

by the plaintiff was caused by the defendants’ tortious

conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton

v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 212–13, 757 A.2d

1059 (2000). ‘‘The plaintiff must satisfy [her] burden of

proving each and every element of the claim.’’ Loiselle

v. Browning & Browning Real Estate, LLC, 147 Conn.

App. 246, 259–60, 83 A.3d 608 (2013). In its answer to

the operative complaint, the defendant admitted that,

at all relevant times, it had actual knowledge of the

plaintiff’s employment relationship with First Student.

The record further indicates that the defendant exercised its right under the contract to request that First

Student ‘‘discontinue the utilization . . . of operators

considered unsatisfactory by the Superintendent of

Schools . . . .’’ We therefore focus our analysis on

whether the communication of those requests was tortious in nature.

As our Supreme Court has explained, while it ‘‘has

long recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights or other business relations

. . . [n]ot every act that disturbs a contract or business

expectancy is actionable.’’ (Citations omitted.) Blake v.

Levy, 191 Conn. 257, 260, 464 A.2d 52 (1983). ‘‘[A] claim

is made out [only] when interference resulting in injury

to anotheris wrongful by some measure beyond the fact

of the interference itself.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)Id., 262. Accordingly, ‘‘[f]or a plaintiff successfully to prosecute such an action it must prove that the

defendant’s conduct was in fact tortious. This element

may be satisfied by proof that the defendant was guilty

of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation

. . . or that the defendant acted maliciously. . . . [A]n

action for intentional interference with business rela-
tions . . . requires the plaintiff to plead and prove at

least some improper motive or improper means. . . .

The plaintiff in a tortious interference claim must demonstrate malice on the part of the defendant, not in the

sense of ill will, but intentional interference without

justification.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aetna

Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 805–806, 734 A.2d

112 (1999).

In Blake v. Levy, supra, 191 Conn. 257, our Supreme

Court expressly rejected a claim that, in actions alleging

tortious interference, the defendant bears the burden

of proving some justification. As it stated: ‘‘[T]his

approach incorrectly relegates the central determination of whether the defendant’s behavior was improper

to an affirmative defense. In an action for intentional

interference with business relations we think the better

reasoned approach requires the plaintiff to plead and

prove at least some improper motive or improper

means.’’ Id., 262. For that reason, under Connecticut

law, ‘‘the employee bears the burden of alleging and

proving lack of justification’’ on the part of the defendant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 249 Conn. 806.

Our inquiry into whether the defendant tortiously

interfered with the plaintiff’s employment relationship

without justification is aided by 4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 767 (1979), which delineates certain factors relevant thereto, namely: ‘‘(a) the nature of the

actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests

of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes,

(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,

(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of

action of the actor and the contractual interests of the

other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s

conduct to the interference and (g) the relations

between the parties.’’ See Blake v. Levy, supra, 191

Conn. 263 n.3; Reyes v. Chetta, 143 Conn. App. 758,

764, 71 A.3d 1255 (2013). Certain factors are closely

interwoven with other enumerated factors, and thus

‘‘cannot be easily separated.’’ 4 Restatement (Second),

supra, § 767, comment (d), p. 33.

The present case is unique, in that the communications by the defendant to First Student were made as

part of the exercise of a contractual right to express

dissatisfaction to First Student regarding its employee

and, ultimately, request the removal thereof. This is,

thus, the atypical case in which the actor’s conduct

arises in the context of a contractual relationship

between the actor and the plaintiff’s employer. In considering both the actor’s motive and the interests in

protecting the actor’s freedom of action, we note the

significant societal interests here implicated. This case

concerns the transportation of children to and from

school on a daily basis, a quintessential matter of public
safety. Society demands no less than the utmost attention and diligence on the part of public institutions, like

the defendant, to properly care for those young citizens

in their custody. First Student, in turn, has an interest

in maintaining good business relations with customers

such as the defendant. First Student also has an interest

in obtaining feedback when one of its clients believes

that its employees are not performing in a satisfactory

manner. By contrast, the plaintiff’s contractual interest

simply was to continue her employment with First Student. It is undisputed that, subsequent to the defendant’s communications with her employer, and its

ultimate request that the plaintiff no longer drive routes

for its schools, the plaintiff’s employment continued

with First Student. The plaintiff’s employment was neither terminated nor suspended; she merely was reassigned to routes in another municipality and, ultimately,

resigned her employment.

The defendant maintains that the affidavits, deposition transcripts and other proof submitted demonstrate

that its communications with First Student were justified. Apart from the exclusive prerogative of its superintendent of schools to demand that First Student

‘‘discontinue the utilization underthis contract of operators considered unsatisfactory’’ thereby, it remains that

those communications were predicated on complaints

from parents of the students it serves regarding the

plaintiff’s conduct as a bus driver. The defendant submits, and the plaintiff does not dispute, that it received

complaints that the plaintiff (1) alienated a special education student when assigning seats on her bus, (2)

retaliated against another student with a disability, (3)

was observed screaming at students on her bus, (4)

provided candy to students without their parents’ permission, and (5) inquired about providing Christmas

gifts to certain parents. It also is undisputed that the

plaintiff’s conduct with respect to John Doe caused

multiple students to become distraught and require

counseling with school officials. On another occasion,

the plaintiff, while driving students home from Chester

Elementary School, may have imperiled the health of

a student with a known medical issue by turning the

bus around and returning to the school.

The plaintiff’s allegation of improper motive on the

part of the defendant further is undermined by the

undisputed fact that when Levy requested the plaintiff’s

removal from the Chester Elementary Schoolroute during the 2010–2011 school year, she did not request her

removal from her kindergarten run in Essex, which the

plaintiff continued to drive for the remainder of the

school year. Similarly, when Levy requested the plaintiff’s removal from the Essex Elementary School route

in November of the 2011–2012 school year, she did not

request her removal from a kindergarten run in Essex.

Rather, the plaintiff continued to drive her kindergarten

run with the defendant until December, 2011, at which
time the plaintiff, contrary to the admonitions of her

employer, appeared at the committee meeting and

requested an investigation into Levy’s decision to exercise the defendant’s contractual right to remove her

from the elementary school route.

Our appellate courts have affirmed decisions granting

summary judgment or directing a verdict on claims

alleging tortious interference with an employment contract when the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding that the defendant engaged in intentional and

wrongful conduct without justification. See, e.g., Daley

v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 249 Conn. 807–808

(court properly directed verdict on tortious interference

claim when evidence substantiated ‘‘legitimate justification for the adverse employment action’’ and defendant’s actions ‘‘can be justified . . . as a matter of

employer prerogative’’); Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191

Conn. 276, 280, 464 A.2d 57 (1983) (summary judgment

proper when ‘‘[t]he affidavits which are the basis for

the summary judgment . . . indicate no wrongful conduct on the part of either defendant’’); Downes-Patterson Corp. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 64

Conn. App. 417, 430, 780 A.2d 967 (court properly set

aside verdict when ‘‘the evidence submitted by the

plaintiffs to prove the defendant’s tortious interference

. . . was lacking’’), cert. granted, 258 Conn. 917, 782

A.2d 1242 (2001) (appeal dismissed June 25, 2002); PAR

Painting, Inc. v. Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc., 61 Conn.

App. 317, 326, 763 A.2d 1078 (court properly set aside

verdict when evidence insufficient ‘‘to show that the

defendants acted with improper motive, an essential

element of proving tortious interference with a business

relationship’’), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 951, 770 A.2d 31

(2001); Rotophone, Inc. v. Danbury Hospital, 13 Conn.

App. 230, 235, 535 A.2d 830 (1988) (summary judgment

proper because ‘‘the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate in

their affidavits or evidence that there was a genuine

issue of material fact to be decided or that, as a matter

of law, the defendant had used any improper means

or motive’’).

The plaintiff’s action in the present case suffers a

similar infirmity. As in Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty

Co., supra, 249 Conn. 807, the defendant’s communications to First Student regarding the plaintiff’s conduct

were justified as a matter of employer prerogative. First

Student chose to enter into a contract with the defendant that afforded the defendant the right to inform

First Student whenever the performance of one of its

bus drivers was deemed unsatisfactory by the defendant’s schools superintendent. The scope of that contractual right conferred on the defendant is sweeping,

as it permits the defendant to demand the removal of

bus drivers ‘‘considered unsatisfactory by the Superintendent of Schools . . . .’’ The broad nature of that

contractualright is understandable in light of the significant societal interests already addressed in this deci-
sion, and furnishes a legitimate justification for the

defendant’s communications to First Student.

In her operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that

the defendant provided an ‘‘explicit direction’’ to First

Student to threaten ‘‘disciplinary action, including termination’’ against the plaintiff. In opposing the motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiff has provided no

evidence to substantiate that allegation. Rather, the affidavits, deposition transcripts and other proof submitted

establish merely that the defendant informed First Student of its concerns regarding the plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance. As Levy stated during her deposition

testimony, although the defendant possessed a contractual right ‘‘to say that it’s not working, and we would

like to have [a] driver removed,’’ that ‘‘is in no way

saying that [the driver] would be reprimanded or lose

their job in any way whatsoever because First Student

has other districts that they drive for.’’ Furthermore,

the record before us indicates that Levy simply articulated the defendant’s dissatisfaction with the plaintiff’s

performance as a bus driver; she did not discuss any

action that First Student should take with respect to

the plaintiff’s employment apart from her removal from

routes with the defendant. As Levy admitted in her

deposition, ‘‘that certainly [would not] be my place to

do so.’’

In the context of tortious interference claims, ‘‘[c]onclusory allegations of improper motivation are not sufficient . . . .’’ Metcoff v. Lebovics, 123 Conn. App. 512,

523, 2 A.3d 942 (2010). The affidavits, deposition transcripts and other proof submitted demonstrate that the

defendant possessed a legitimate justification for its

communications with First Student regarding the plaintiff’s conduct. It was concerned about the plaintiff’s

fitness as a bus driver due to, inter alia, multiple issues

involving special education students, numerous complaints from parents on a variety of issues, the plaintiff’s

conduct in screaming at children on her bus, the fact

that some students on her bus required counseling after

becoming distraught over the plaintiff’s employment

status, and the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the

team’s request to make verbal, rather than written,

reports of incidents involving a special education student. Moreover, the decision to communicate such concerns—as well as the exercise of the contractual right

of removal from routes—remained the exclusive prerogative of the defendant under the contract.

Construing the record before us in a light most favorable thereto, the plaintiff cannot establish that the

defendant’s communications with First Student constituted ‘‘intentional interference without justification.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Daley v. Aetna

Life & Casualty Co., supra, 249 Conn. 806. We therefore

agree with the court that no genuine issue of material

fact exists as to whether the defendant’s communica-
tions with First Student were tortious in nature.16

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In her original complaint, the plaintiff also named First Student, Inc.,

and First Student Management, LLC, as defendants. Following a settlement,

the action against those entities was withdrawn, and they are not parties

to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion to Regional School District

4 as the defendant.

2 Kulick subsequently received a written request from Ruth I. Levy, the

defendant’s superintendent of schools, asking that the plaintiff ‘‘be removed

from [herroute] in Chester due to ‘unsatisfactory performance of bus driving

duties,’ per the contract between [the defendant] and First Student.’’ Levy

did not request the plaintiff’s removal from her kindergarten run in Essex,

which the plaintiff continued to drive without incident during the 2010–2011

school year.

3

In her deposition testimony, Joanne Beekley, the principal of Essex

Elementary School, averred that at least one-half dozen parents contacted

the school in the fall of 2011 regarding John Doe’s behavior on the plaintiff’s

bus route.

4 The guardian believed that the plaintiff’s written reports were retaliatory

against the child due to their frequency. Beekley testified at her deposition

that she believed ‘‘the reports were accurate of what was happening on the

bus but detrimental to trying to solve the problem.’’

5 Beekley testified that she spoke with John Doe’s guardian ‘‘[o]n a weekly

basis, minimum.’’ She and the team ‘‘had a scheduled meeting on a weekly

basis, and [they] would call in between with issues.’’

6 Some students on the plaintiff’s bus route were ‘‘concerned and worried’’

that the plaintiff ‘‘was going to be fired from her job because of John Doe

. . . .’’ As a result, those students wrote letters and met with school counselors because they ‘‘felt they needed to help’’ her. Beekley testified at her

deposition that she ‘‘felt it was an unsafe situation for students to be part

of, emotionally.’’

7 Beekley received complaints from three parents about the plaintiff providing candy to their children without the parents’ permission.

8 Beekley received a complaint from a parent who was ‘‘upset’’ and ‘‘concerned’’ about the plaintiff’s inquiry regarding Christmas gifts.

9 The plaintiff thereafter continued to drive a kindergarten run in Essex.

10 Ivoryton is a village in Connecticut. The villages of Ivoryton, Essex

and Centerbrook together constitute the municipality of Essex. See http://

www.essexhistory.org/history-of-essex-ct.htm (last visited July 1, 2015).

11 As Levy recounted during her deposition testimony:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Did you speak to [Kulick] after the February

28, 2012 [committee] meeting about [the plaintiff] attending the meeting?

‘‘[Levy]: I did once again let him know that she attended the meeting and

was still uncomfortable with the employment situation.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: What did [Kulick] say?

‘‘[Levy]: That he would handle it [as] her supervisor.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: And did you discuss with him any action that

should or would be taken with respect to [the plaintiff] because of her

attendance at that meeting?

‘‘[Levy]: No. And that wouldn’t certainly be my place to do so.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Why did you feel obligated to call [Kulick]

about her attendance at the meeting?

‘‘[Levy]: Simply to just let him know that his employee was unhappy and

maybe he can address that with her.’’

12 The following colloquy transpired during the plaintiff’s deposition:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Attorney]: And so you just quit?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Yes.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Attorney]: Voluntarily?

‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Correct.’’

13 The plaintiff testified: ‘‘By April [of 2012], they are asking me to assign

seats or to write up a student, and it just got to the point where I couldn’t

do my job anymore because I never knew what was right or what was

wrong. And I was just, like, I’m just going to get fired at some point because

someone is going to be unhappy with what I do. So, I just couldn’t do the

job anymore. And I didn’t feel like I could do it correctly anymore. . . . If

they told me to assign seats, I would say, well, I was told it was illegal, and

they would look at me like I had eight heads. Or if they told me that they

need me to write up a student, I would be, like, well, I’m not sure what to

do, let me talk to my supervisor. And they would be, like, no, it’s mandated
you have to report incidents on the bus. So, I would talk to Madeline [Tucker,

a First Student employee who supervised the plaintiff’s work in Clinton]

about my concerns, and she’s, like, well, you have to, that’s part of First

Student; you know what the rules are.’’

14 It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which an employee, under the

plaintiff’s proposed construction of § 31-51q, is subject to countless employers. As but one example, consider the employee who is employed by a

residential landscaping company that contracts to mow dozens of lawns on

a weekly basis.

15 Because we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as

to whether the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer under § 31-51q, we

need not consider whether such an issue exists as to whether the plaintiff

engaged in constitutionally protected speech.

16 In moving for summary judgment, the defendant also argued that no

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether its communications with

First Student affected the plaintiff’s employment status. ‘‘Unlike other torts

in which liability gives rise to nominal damages even in the absence of proof

of actual loss . . . it is an essential element of the tort of unlawful interference with business relations that the plaintiff suffers actual loss. . . . Therefore, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff must

allege an actual loss resulting from the improper interference with her

contract.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v.

Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 213. Because we conclude that no

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant’s communications with First Student were tortious, we need not consider the question

of whetherthose communications caused the plaintiff to suffer an actual loss.