J-S37014-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLIP QUINN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 968 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007262-1996

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED MARCH 11, 2022

Phillip Quinn appeals from the order entered in the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas on March 19, 2021, dismissing his serial petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546 as untimely. Because we agree Quinn’s petition was untimely filed, we 

affirm. 

As this is Quinn’s fourth attempt at post-conviction relief, we reiterate 

the procedural procedure from a previous panel of this Court. 

On May 3, 2001, a jury found Quinn guilty of second-degree 

murder, robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, possession of 

an instrument of crime [], conspiracy to commit robbery, and 

conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. On July 7, 2001, the 

trial court sentenced Quinn to life imprisonment as to his 

conviction of murder in the second degree and an additional [five 

and one half] to 11 years' imprisonment as to his aggravated 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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assault conviction. Quinn timely appealed his judgment of 

sentence, and on June 20, 2003, this Court affirmed. On January 

28, 2004, our Supreme Court denied Quinn's petition for 

allowance of appeal. Quinn did not appeal our Supreme Court's 

decision to the United States Supreme Court, and thus, his 

judgment of sentence became final on April 28, 2004.

Sometime in 2004, Quinn suffered a heart attack and was 

temporarily hospitalized; however, he was able to file his first 

PCRA petition on September 3, 2004, which the PCRA court denied 

on August 25, 2005. On October 24, 2005, Quinn filed a second 

PCRA petition, which the PCRA court dismissed on September 12, 

2007. On October 9, 2014, Quinn filed [his third] pro se PCRA 

petition, and on January 27, 2015, the court appointed as counsel 

Stephen F. Molineaux, Esquire. On June 10, 2015, counsel filed a 

Turner/Finley no-merit letter and a motion to withdraw his 

appearance. The court granted counsel's motion and a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing was 

served on Quinn. Quinn filed a written objection on July 31, 2016, 

and the PCRA court dismissed his petition on November 1, 2016. 

Commonwealth v. Quinn, 3823 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. filed February 6, 

2018) (unpublished memorandum). Quinn filed an appeal, arguing he met the 

government interference and newly discovered fact exceptions to the PCRA 

time-bar. However, his whole argument in this regard boiled down to a claim 

that a “Heart Attack in 2004-2014” inhibited him from raising claims that 

government officials interfered with his collateral relief litigation. See id. at 

*5, fn.8. Quinn failed to advance any newly discovered facts, nor did he plead 

and prove any errors of a state or federal nature or explain why he was unable 

to raise a PCRA claim. The PCRA Court dismissed the petition as untimely. We 

affirmed the dismissal. See id. at *7. 
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On February 10, 2021, Quinn filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his 

fourth, which the PCRA court again dismissed as untimely. This timely appeal 

followed. 

Prior to reaching the merits of Quinn’s claims on appeal, we must first 

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 

petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised 

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted). 

Quinn’s judgment of sentence became final on April 28, 2004, ninety 

days after his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the 

United States Supreme Court expired. The instant petition – filed more than 

16 years later – is patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review Quinn’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead 
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and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in 

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further, 

although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must 

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if 

an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 
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Even liberally construed, Quinn has failed to plead and prove that any 

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. Quinn attempts 

to invoke the governmental interference exception, Section 9545(b)(1)(i), 

based on his assertion that the PCRA court interfered with the presentation of 

his current claims. See Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 2/10/2021, 

at 3. As far as we can decipher Quinn’s argument, he appears to claim the 

PCRA court’s actions pursuant to the disposition of his first and second PCRA 

petitions interfered with the presentation of his claims over a decade later. 

We reject Quinn’s argument that the governmental interference 

exception applies because the PCRA court's rejection of his first PCRA petition

somehow amounted to interference by government officials with the 

presentation of his current claims. We do not agree that the 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(i) exception regarding governmental interference with the 

presentation of claims applies here. 

Quinn had the opportunity to challenge the actions of the PCRA court on 

appeal from the denial of his first PCRA petition, and did so in numerous claims 

over the years, which this Court has addressed. See Commonwealth v. 

Quinn, 2534 EDA 2007 (Pa. Super. filed January 6, 2009) (unpublished 

memorandum); see also Commonwealth v. Quinn, 3823 EDA 2016 (Pa. 

Super. filed February 6, 2018) (unpublished memorandum). In proceeding pro 

se, Quinn was never denied the opportunity to challenge the PCRA court's 

denial of his claims raised in his first PCRA petition, nor the opportunity to 
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raise all claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel that concern facts 

he has known about since trial. We cannot say that Quinn’s failure to properly 

raise, in his prior pro se petitions and appeals, all issues concerning ineffective 

assistance of counsel and all issues concerning the PCRA court’s handling of 

his first PCRA petition resulted from governmental interference as 

contemplated by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

Quinn fails to explain how alleged governmental interference occurring 

in 2004-2007 prevented him from filing his current petition until 2021, 

especially considering the fact that he was able to file multiple intervening 

PCRA petitions in 2005 and 2014. As the Commonwealth aptly notes, Quinn 

has failed to explain how he raised these claims within 60 days of discovering 

them, as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).1 Quinn simply has not pled 

or proven that the previous PCRA court proceedings were in any way improper. 

While Quinn may disagree with the outcome, this simply does not constitute 

governmental interference under the PCRA. 

Further, Quinn’s substantive claims of his various counsels’ 

ineffectiveness cannot support an exception to the time-bar. See 

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1 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended in 2018 to expand the discovery period 

from 60 days to one year. The amendment applied to any claims arising on or 

after December 24, 2017. Quinn’s claims of governmental interference 

reference actions taken by the PCRA court no later than 2007, so the previous 

version of the statute applies to his claims. Even if we were to apply the 

amended statute, Quinn has completely failed to plead that he filed the instant 

petition within one year of his discovery of the facts underlying it. 
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Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1284-85 (Pa. 2016). Even if it 

could, it is clear from the record that Quinn believed his counsel was ineffective 

as early as trial. Notwithstanding the fact that he knew about these 

ineffectiveness claims long before the PCRA time-bar, Quinn failed to raise the 

issue during trial, or during any of his previous PCRA petitions. 

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Quinn’s petition 

as untimely.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/11/2022