alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

June 4, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 135722 & (3)(4)(8)(9) Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff, Justices
v SC: 135722 MTT: 0301679 MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL, Defendant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The complaint for superintending control is considered, and it is DISMISSED. Const 1963, art 6, § 4 grants this Court general s uperintending control over “courts,” not over administrative agencies of th e executive branch of government. The motion for stay is DENIED. The motions for misc ellaneous relief are GRANTED.

t0528 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 4, 2008

Clerk
<PAGE>
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 906 AND 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Darwin R. Payton, Jr.

And I, Michael Williams certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of BROADBAND WIRELESS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, INC. for the year ended March 31, 2004;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods the periods presented in this annual
report.


Date:  August 19, 2004




/s/ Darwin Payton
---------------------------------------
    Darwin Payton
    President


/s/ Michael Williams
---------------------------------------
    Michael Williams
    Chief Financial Officer
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03- 07 -00 499 -CV Jo se F e r nande z G ala n P ala u , A ppe lla nt

v. F lor De M aria Navarr o Sanchez , Appellee F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 06- 0022 34 , HO NORAB LE LORA J. LIVI NGSTON , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D UM O P I N I O N Appellant has f

iled a motion to dism iss his appea l, stating that the t rial court’s later rulingrendere d t h e ap peal moot. Appellee , who ea rlier f iled a motion seekingto have the a ppeal dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction, ha s filed a motion opposi ngthe dismissal of the appea l until we a sse ss s anc tio ns a g a ins t a pp e lla nt. We ove rr

ule a pp e lle e ’s mot ion

fo r s anc tio ns , b ut w ill a sse ss a ll c os ts o n a pp e a l a g a ins t a

pp e lla nt. We g ra

nt a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n a

nd dis mis s th e a

pp e a l. T e x. R. App. P. 42.1(a)( 2). We further g rant Susan Nor

man’s eme rg ency

motion to wit hdrawas appe llant’s c ouns e l, l e avin ga

pp e lla nt’ s a dd iti on a l r e ta ine d atto rn e y , And re s P. Cha

umo nt, a s c ouns e l.

___________________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________________ David Puryear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Puryear and Pember

ton Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: Nove mber 16, 2007
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED OR INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO BADGER PAPER
MILLS, INC.'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                             835
<SECURITIES>                                     3,138
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,955
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      7,314
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,034
<PP&E>                                          76,495
<DEPRECIATION>                                  46,155
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  52,578
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,575
<BONDS>                                          9,351
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,700
<OTHER-SE>                                      18,743
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    52,578
<SALES>                                         92,648
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                           83,890
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,305
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,060
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,312
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,748
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6093

LAWRENCE LEO HAWKINS, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNKNOWN,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief

District Judge. (2:13-cv-00027-RBS-DEM)

Submitted: May 22, 2014 Decided: May 29, 2014

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior

Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Jr., seeks to appeal the 

district court’s order dismissing his action for failure to 

comply with its order to particularize his claims. We remand 

for consideration of whether reopening of the appeal period is 

merited.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of 

the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends 

the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the 

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). When the United 

States or its officer or agency is a party, and unless the 

district court extends or reopens the appeal period, the notice 

of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry 

of the district court’s final judgment or order. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a)(1)(B). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a 

civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 

551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket 

on July 31, 2013. Hawkins filed his notice of appeal on

December 10, 2013.1

 Regardless of which appellate period applies 

 1

 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
3

to this appeal,2 Hawkins’ notice of appeal is clearly untimely. 

However, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), the district court may 

reopen the time to file an appeal if: (1) the moving party did 

not receive notice of entry of judgment within twenty-one days 

after entry; (2) the motion is filed within 180 days of entry of 

judgment or within fourteen days of receiving notice from the 

court, whichever is earlier; and (3) no party would be 

prejudiced. 

In his notice of appeal, Hawkins stated that he did 

not receive notice of the district court’s order dismissing his 

action, and he suggests he has had difficulty receiving his mail 

while incarcerated. Moreover, the district court’s docket 

indicates that the district court’s dismissal order was returned 

to the district court as undeliverable. Accordingly, we remand 

for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to 

determine whether Hawkins’ notice of appeal should be construed 

as a motion to reopen the appeal period, and if so, whether 

reopening is merited. The record, as supplemented, will then be 

returned to this court for further consideration.

REMANDED

 2 It is unclear whether the United States or its officer or 

agency is a party to Hawkins’ action.
CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      The  undersigned  hereby certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
undersigned's  best knowledge and belief,  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for
the Geodyne  Energy Income  Limited Partnership  II-C  ("Issuer") for the period
ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"):

      (a)   fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
            the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
      (b)   the  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Issuer.

      Dated this 14th day of November, 2002.

                                   GEODYNE ENERGY INCOME LIMITED
                                   PARTNERSHIP II-C
                                   ("Issuer")

                                    //s// Dennis R. Neill
                                    -----------------------------------
                                    Dennis R. Neill
                                    President (Chief Executive Officer)

                                    //s// Craig D. Loseke
                                    -----------------------------------
                                    Craig D. Loseke
                                    Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2201

TOMAS MULUGHETA MAHARI,

 Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: June 17, 2015 Decided: July 9, 2015

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Hudaidah Bhimdi Ahmed, FAYAD LAW P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for 

Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, Sara J. Bayram, OFFICE OF 

IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Tomas Mulugheta Mahari, a native of Saudi Arabia and a citizen 

of Eritrea, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the 

Immigration Judge’s denial of his requests for asylum and 

withholding of removal. We have thoroughly reviewed the 

administrative record and Mahari’s contentions on appeal, and 

conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision. 

See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). We 

accordingly deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by 

the Board. See In re: Mahari (B.I.A. Oct. 3, 2014). We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7063

JAMIE NEIL CAPALBO,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

B. M. ANTONELLI,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. 

Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (1:19-cv-01946-TMC)

Submitted: December 18, 2020 Decided: December 31, 2020

Before THACKER, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jamie Neil Capalbo, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jamie Neil Capalbo, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting 

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Capalbo’s 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 petition in which Capalbo sought to challenge his sentence and one of his 

convictions by way of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pursuant to § 2255(e), a 

prisoner may challenge his conviction and sentence in a traditional writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to § 2241 if a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 

of his detention. 

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence 

when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme 

Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s 

direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive 

law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; 

(3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) 

for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the 

sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental 

defect.

United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018). In addition, 

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a 

conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or 

the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent 

to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law 

changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed 

not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping 

provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000). 

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the district court. Capalbo v. Antonelli, No. 1:19-cv-01946-TMC 

(D.S.C. June 29, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 5416

_____________________________
J EFFREY M OSLEY , Petitioner,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Belated Appeal

– Origi nal Jurisdiction.

February 21, 2018

P ER C URIAM

. The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

W ETHERELL , R OWE , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R . App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Jeffrey Mosley, pro se
, Petitioner

.2 Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Respondent.
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 35 

To provide a permanent deduction for State and local general sales taxes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 6, 2009 

Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. CORNYN, 

and Mr. MARTINEZ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice 

and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To provide a permanent deduction for State and local general 

sales taxes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF DEDUCTION OF 

4 STATE AND LOCAL GENERAL SALES TAXES. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (I) of section 

6 164(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 

7 amended by section 201 of the Tax Extenders and Min8 imum Tax Relief Act of 2008, is amended by striking ‘‘, 

9 and before January 1, 2010’’. 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
2 

•S 35 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

3 December 31, 2009. 

Æ 


wwoods2 on PRODPC68 with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
<CIK>                              0000826345     
<NAME>                             GEODYNE ENERGY INCOME LTD PARTNERSHIP II-B
                                    
<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                     JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                   414,671
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                            571,841
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         986,512
<PP&E>                                21,638,363
<DEPRECIATION>                        18,717,561
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         4,077,125
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                    134,447
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                             3,854,159
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           4,077,125
<SALES>                                  795,456
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         858,726
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            525,098
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          333,628
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      333,628
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                             333,628
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               0.87
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        
 

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of People of State of New York, Respondent, v Mircea Veleanu, Doing Business as Objets D’Art Uniques, Appellant.

Submitted March 12, 2012;

decided May 3, 2012

Motion for leave to appeal denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements. Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.
96-2623.

#### Rupert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Wood App. No. WD-95-103. Reported at 78 Ohio St.3d 1428, 676 N.E.2d 533. On motion for reconsideration. The motion fails for want of four votes on the following vote:

Douglas, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., vote to deny.

Moyer, C.J., Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., vote to grant.

Resnick, J., not participating.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS ARMANDO OSORIOGUTIERREZ, AKA Luis Armando

Osorio,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-70800

Agency No. A095-730-180

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 9, 2014** 

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

Luis Armando Osorio-Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for

FILED

DEC 16 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part

and grant in part the petition for review, and we remand.

Osorio-Gutierrez does not challenge the BIA’s finding that he abandoned

any challenge to the IJ’s denial of asylum as time-barred. See Martinez-Serrano v.

INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not supported by argument are

deemed waived). 

In denying Osorio-Gutierrez’s withholding of removal claim, the agency

found Osorio-Gutierrez failed to establish past persecution or a likelihood of future

persecution on account of a protected ground. When the IJ and BIA issued their

decisions in this case they did not have the benefit of this court’s decisions in

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), Cordoba v.

Holder, 726 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013), and Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077

(9th Cir. 2014), or the BIA’s decisions in Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227

(BIA 2014), and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). Thus, we

remand Osorio-Gutierrez’s withholding of removal claim to determine the impact,

if any, of these decisions. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per

curiam). 

2 12-70800
Finally, in denying Osorio-Gutierrez’s CAT claim, the agency did not

consider the police’s reaction to Osorio-Gutierrez’s experience or the risk to

Osorio-Gutierrez in light of the subsequent harm to his nephews. See Eneh v.

Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency erred by failing to analyze

potentially dispositive evidence). Thus, we remand Osorio-Gutierrez’s CAT claim

for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at

16-18. 

The parties shall bear their own costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;

REMANDED.

3 12-70800
[995 NE2d 845, 972 NYS2d 530]

#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Terrence McFarlane, Respondent.

Decided August 29, 2013

*1035APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney,*Bronx *(Stanley R. Kaplan*of counsel), for appellant.

Respondent precluded.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. The determination as to whether a defendant has consented to a search involves a mixed question of law and fact *(People v Valerio,*95 NY2d 924, 925 [2000]). Where, as here, there exists record support for the Appellate Division’s resolution of this question, the issue is beyond this Court’s further review *(id.).*

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott, Rivera and Abdus-Salaam concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, in a memorandum.