J-S35016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M.T., JR., AND 

N.C.T., MINORS

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.T., GRANDMOTHER No. 2972 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered August 13, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Domestic 

Relations, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000145-2012, 

CP-51-AP-0000146-2012

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2015

Appellant, D.T., (“Paternal Grandmother”) appeals from the order 

dated and entered on August 13, 2014, granting the petitions for adoption 

filed by Y.C., the foster mother (“Foster Mother”) of T.M.T., Jr., a male born 

August of 2007, and N.C.T., a female born in June of 2009 (collectively, the 

“Children”), and denying the petitions for adoption filed by Paternal 

Grandmother, under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701-2742.1 We 

affirm.

On July 20, 2012, the trial court granted the petitions to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of the Children’s mother, J.J., (“Mother”), and 

 

* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court’s orders serve as its adoption decree, as the court granted 

Foster Mother’s petitions for adoption of the Children. We will not remand 

this matter for the entry of an adoption decree.
J-S35016-15

- 2 -

father, T.M.T., Sr., (“Father”), filed by the Philadelphia Department of 

Human Services (“DHS”).

On July 31, 2012, Paternal Grandmother filed petitions for adoption of 

the Children.2 The trial court scheduled a finalization hearing to take place 

on October 12, 2012. On August 8, 2012, the trial court canceled the 

scheduled hearing, however. On April 8, 2013, this Court affirmed the order 

terminating Father’s parental rights. In re T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). On August 9, 2013, Paternal Grandmother filed certificates of 

service for her petitions for adoption.

On April 15, 2014, Foster Mother filed petitions for adoption of the 

Children, along with reports of intention to adopt, and reports of 

intermediary for each child. On July 14, 2014, the trial court held a hearing 

on the competing adoption petitions.

At the adoption hearing, both Paternal Grandmother and Foster Mother 

were present, represented by counsel, and testified on their own behalf. 

DHS presented the testimony of Audrina Redguard, the ongoing service 

worker at DHS. N.T., 7/14/14, at 22-23. DHS also presented the testimony 

of Benita Riley, the DHS adoption social worker. Id. at 47. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that she began raising the Children in 

2009, when they were removed from the care of their biological parents 

 

2 As the blood-related grandmother of the Children, Paternal Grandmother 

was exempted from filing a report of intention to adopt and a report of 

intermediary. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2531(c) and 2533(a). 
J-S35016-15

- 3 -

because of unsafe housing. N.T., 7/14/14, at 4, 6. She is currently 

employed by the City of Philadelphia, and previously was employed with the 

school district, working with children. Id. at 5. Paternal Grandmother 

testified that she has no record of committing child abuse. Id. at 5. 

Paternal Grandmother stated that the Children lived with her, and that she 

took sole responsibility for caring for them. Id. at 7. She testified that, at 

times, Father or her sister, R., assisted her in caring for the Children. Id. at 

7.

Paternal Grandmother explained that the Children were under DHS 

supervision while they lived with her. Id. at 8. She stated that a social 

worker, Ms. Noelle, would come to her home on a weekly basis, and Ms. 

Redguard would come to her home once a month. Id. Paternal 

Grandmother testified that she did not receive any negative feedback from 

the DHS supervisors while the Children lived with her, and that they 

indicated everything was fine. Id. 

Paternal Grandmother stated that, on one occasion, Ms. Redguard told 

her that Mother was complaining about the appearance of the Children’s 

clothes, and, another time, Ms. Redguard told her to get the Children to the 

doctor sooner. Id. at 8-9. Paternal Grandmother testified that she, Father, 

or her brother would take the Children to their supervised and unsupervised 

visits with Mother. Id. at 9-10. Paternal Grandmother stated that, when

Father and her brother began taking the Children to visits with Mother, 
J-S35016-15

- 4 -

Mother began complaining about the appearance of the Children. Id. at 10. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that she had taken the Children to the doctor 

six or seven days prior to their removal from her care on July 8, 2011. Id. 

Paternal Grandmother testified that Ms. Redguard visited her on July 

6, 2011, informed her of a status review hearing scheduled for the following 

day, at which Paternal Grandmother need not be present. Id. at 10, 12. 

Paternal Grandmother stated that Ms. Redguard observed the Children 

sitting at a table and eating, and did not complain about their appearance. 

Id. at 11. Paternal Grandmother testified that Ms. Redguard told her that 

she would ask the court to grant Paternal Grandmother permanent legal 

custody at the hearing. Id. 

Paternal Grandmother stated that she did not attend the hearing on 

July 7, 2011, because she had a staff development meeting at work. Id. at 

10-11.3 Paternal Grandmother testified that Ms. Redguard came to her 

home after the hearing on July 7, 2011, and informed her that Mother 

brought photographs depicting something spilled on the floor, which came as 

a surprise to Ms. Redguard and Ms. Noelle. Id. at 12. Paternal 

Grandmother testified that Ms. Redguard stated she and Ms. Noelle would be 

removing the Children. Id. Paternal Grandmother explained that Ms. 

Redguard showed her a photograph that depicted spaghetti sauce spilled on 

the floor, and the appearance of vomit on the floor, but Paternal 

 

3 The trial court admitted as evidence the notes of testimony from the 

hearing on July 7, 2011. Id. at 22-23.
J-S35016-15

- 5 -

Grandmother denied that anyone in her home ate spaghetti. Id. at 13. 

Paternal Grandmother told the Children that they were being removed and 

needed to cooperate, which upset them and made them cry. Id. at 12-13. 

Paternal Grandmother is seeking to adopt the Children because they are her 

family. Id.

Paternal Grandmother testified that, after the Children were removed 

from her care, N.C.T. sustained a concussion, and Paternal Grandmother and 

Father went to the hospital to see her. Id. at 16. Paternal Grandmother 

explained that, after the Children were removed from her care, she was 

permitted to visit them, and did visit them, at the Children’s Services, Inc. 

(“CSI”) building for approximately one month, but stopped because of her 

work. Id. Paternal Grandmother testified that she has a close, loving 

family, and teaches giving, caring, and loving each other. Id. Paternal 

Grandmother takes the children in her family to family gatherings and 

playgrounds. Id. at 20. Paternal Grandmother believes it is in the best 

interest of the Children for her to adopt them because she kept them 

healthy, has fun with them, and loves them. Id.

Ms. Redguard testified that, as an ongoing service worker at DHS, it is 

her responsibility to make certain that children are safe after intake until 

adoption. Id. at 23-24. She became responsible for this case in 2010. Id.

at 24. Ms. Redguard testified that, prior to July 7, 2011, a former CSI 

worker brought to her attention that Paternal Grandmother failed to follow-
J-S35016-15

- 6 -

up on the ophthalmology appointments for T.M.T., Jr. Id. at 24, 26. The 

former CSI worker, Ms. Noelle, brought to her attention that Mother was 

complaining about the Children’s appearance at visits. Id. at 24-25. 

Additionally, CSI was concerned that Father was bringing the Children to 

visit Mother, as the parents had a contentious relationship. Id. at 25-26. 

Paternal Grandmother, as the kinship care parent, was expected to bring the 

Children to the visits. Id. at 25.

Ms. Redguard explained that DHS subcontracted CSI to provide 

services. Id. at 26. CSI was responsible for the supervised visits at CSI, 

and for conducting weekly visits with Paternal Grandmother to ensure that 

the Children were safe while in her care. Id. Ms. Redguard testified that 

CSI sent a letter, dated June 20, 2011, to Paternal Grandmother at her 

address, and copied DHS. Id. at 27-28. In the letter, CSI stated concerns 

about the Children’s unwashed appearance and their musty body odor. Id.

at 28. Further, in the letter, CSI stated that, if the hygiene and personal 

care issues continued to be an issue, the Children would be removed from 

the home. Id. 

Ms. Redguard testified that, in February or March of 2011, she had a 

conversation with Paternal Grandmother concerning the need to ensure that 

T.M.T., Jr. was taken to medical appointments, about Father bringing the 

Children to their visits with Mother, and the appearance of the Children. Id.

at 30. Ms. Redguard stated that, when she went to the home once a month, 
J-S35016-15

- 7 -

the Children appeared to be happy and thriving, and they were eating. Id.

at 30-31. However, there were concerns about the Children’s appearance 

and body odor when they left the home. Id.

On the morning of the status hearing on July 7, 2011, Mother showed 

Ms. Redguard twelve photographs that depicted the Children with bite marks 

on their bodies. Id. at 31-33. The photographs alarmed Ms. Redguard, 

because she saw the Children at Paternal Grandmother’s home on the day 

prior the hearing, but they were dressed with clothing that covered their 

backs and arms. Id. at 32-33. After the hearing, Ms. Redguard proceeded 

to Paternal Grandmother’s home, showed Paternal Grandmother one of the 

photographs, and explained that the Children were being removed from 

Paternal Grandmother’s care. Id. at 34-35. Paternal Grandmother stated 

that the marks were mosquito bites. Id. at 32, 36. Paternal Grandmother 

packed the Children’s belongings in two trash bags, which they took to the 

foster care home. Id. at 35. 

When Ms. Redguard arrived with the Children at their foster care 

home, she examined both of the Children. Id. She found that N.C.T. had 

bruises or some type of marks on her back and her arms, consistent with the 

photographs, some of which had cleared up. Id. The bruises were on 

N.C.T.’s upper back, arm, and under both eyes. Id. at 35-36. She also had 

scratches on her face. Id. Ms. Redguard later discovered the marks on 

both Children were scabies bites. Id. at 36. Ms. Redguard further testified 
J-S35016-15

- 8 -

that she examined T.M.T., Jr. without his clothing. Id. at 37. He did not 

have as many bite marks as N.C.T., but he was wearing blue plastic 

underpants. Id. T.M.T., Jr, explained that Paternal Grandmother dressed 

him in the blue plastic underwear when he urinated in his underwear. Id. 

Ms. Redguard was concerned as the temperature was 90 degrees Fahrenheit 

and she was uncertain as to how long T.M.T., Jr. had been wearing the blue 

plastic underpants after he soiled his pants. Id. Ms. Redguard stated that 

T.M.T., Jr. had been properly bathed, for the most part, but N.C.T. was filthy 

around her neck. Id. at 38.

Ms. Redguard testified that, prior to July 7, 2011, Mother had one or 

two one-hour visits with the Children at CSI. Id. at 38. At the time of the 

July 7, 2011 hearing, Mother had one other child living with her. Id. DHS 

had no concerns about that child, who was approximately one year old, and 

did not have scabies. Id. After the Children were removed from Paternal 

Grandmother’s care, Foster Mother took the Children to the pediatrician, 

where they received treatment for their scabies. Id. at 39. Ms. Redguard 

remained involved with the case until July or August of 2012. Id. at 39. 

She is unaware of the Children having scabies between July of 2011 and July 

of 2012, and she had no other concerns about the Children after their 

removal from Paternal Grandmother’s home. Id. 

On cross-examination by counsel for Foster Mother, Ms. Redguard 

testified that she had a conversation with Paternal Grandmother about the 
J-S35016-15

- 9 -

two ophthalmology appointments which T.M.T., Jr. missed. Id. at 40. She 

explained to Paternal Grandmother that the ophthalmology appointments 

were important so that T.M.T., Jr.’s vision could be monitored.4 Id. at 40-

41.

On cross-examination by counsel for Paternal Grandmother, Ms. 

Redguard testified that she received a medical document regarding the 

Children’s scabies. Id. at 41-42. She believed that T.M.T., Jr. would have 

been three years old and would have had pediatrician appointments once a 

year, while N.C.T. would have been under two years old and would have 

been seen by a physician every six months. Id. at 42. Ms. Redguard told 

Paternal Grandmother about the missed ophthalmology appointments and 

Father taking the Children to CSI for visits with Mother, but she did not know 

about the scabies bites during her visits. Id. at 43. When she saw the 

Children prior to the status hearing on July 7, 2011, they seemed fine, and 

she told Paternal Grandmother that she would request the court to award 

Paternal Grandmother permanent legal custodianship of the Children. Id. at 

43.

Ms. Redguard was assigned to the case for approximately two years 

and, when she visited the home of Paternal Grandmother on a monthly 

basis, the residence seemed to be a fine home for the Children. Id. at 

42-43. Ms. Redguard told Paternal Grandmother that she was not required 

 

4 T.M.T., Jr. suffers from congenital glaucoma and is blind in one eye. If left 

unchecked, the condition could lead to total blindness.
J-S35016-15

- 10 -

to be present at the status hearing scheduled for July 7, 2011, but she was 

welcome to attend. Id. at 43-44. Ms. Redguard explained that Mother 

presented the photographs at the status hearing, but did not testify under 

oath. Id. at 44. The July 7, 2011 status hearing was the first hearing that 

Mother attended. Id. at 45-46.

Ms. Redguard was concerned about Father transporting the Children to 

their visits with Mother because the parents had a contentious relationship. 

Id. at 45. The Children were removed from Mother’s custody because of the 

deplorable living conditions in her home, including a lack of utilities, holes in 

the ceiling, and decay causing unsafe conditions. Id. at 46. Ms. Redguard 

also took the Children to their foster care home on July 7, 2011. Id. 

On cross-examination by the Child Advocate’s counsel, Ms. Redguard 

testified that she harbored a concern about Father transporting the Children 

to their visits with Mother because he has drug and alcohol issues. Id. The 

court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children because he never 

remedied those issues. Id. Nevertheless, Paternal Grandmother allowed 

Father to transport the Children. Id. at 46-47. 

Next, DHS presented the testimony of Ms. Riley, who became 

responsible for the case in August of 2012, after it was transferred to the 

adoption unit of DHS. Id. at 47. She was responsible for ensuring that the 

Children were in a safe environment and that the adoption papers were 

timely processed. Id. at 47-48. Ms. Riley testified that the Children were 
J-S35016-15

- 11 -

currently in the pre-adoptive Delta Community support home of Foster 

Mother, where they lived since February 1, 2013. Id. at 48. She visited 

the Children on a monthly basis from the time of placement in the home 

until March of 2014, for thirteen visits. Id. Her visits lasted for forty-five 

minutes to an hour. Id. at 48-49. 

Ms. Riley testified that T.M.T., Jr. has a happy, healthy, content 

relationship with Foster Mother and moves freely in her home. Id. at 49. 

He seeks out Foster Mother for comfort. Id. Ms. Riley opined that there is a 

bond between T.M.T., Jr. and Foster Mother. Id. She is aware that he has 

congenital glaucoma, is blind in his left eye, and receives ophthalmology 

services through Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia. Id. T.M.T., Jr. 

receives bi-weekly counseling to address his aggression and receives 

medications for that condition. Id. 

Ms. Riley testified that Foster Mother is consistently aware of the 

Children’s appointments and the services they are receiving. Id. at 50. Ms. 

Riley considers Foster Mother capable of caring for T.M.T., Jr.’s medical and 

behavioral needs. Id. Ms. Riley observed that Foster Mother is nurturing 

toward T.M.T., Jr., re-directs him as necessary, is loving and attentive 

toward him, and ensures that all of his needs are met. Id. Ms. Riley 

testified that, on behalf of DHS, she consented to Foster Mother’s petition to 

adopt T.M.T., Jr. because the Children seem bonded to Foster Mother, Foster 

Mother addresses their needs, and she requested to adopt them. Id. at 50-
J-S35016-15

- 12 -

51. Ms. Riley believes it is in T.M.T., Jr.’s best interest for Foster Mother to 

adopt him, and that it is contrary to his best interest to be adopted by 

anyone else. Id. at 51.

Ms. Riley observed that N.C.T. is younger and more “needy” than 

T.M.T., Jr. Id. N.C.T. interrupts Ms. Riley’s conversations with Foster 

Mother, but Foster Mother re-directs her. Id. Foster Mother is nurturing 

toward N.C.T., and ensures that all of N.C.T.’s needs are met, including 

enrolling her in pre-school. Id. N.C.T. receives preventative ophthalmology 

appointments and receives preventative medication for the glaucoma 

condition, for which she has not been diagnosed. Id. at 51-52. Foster 

Mother ensures that N.C.T. attends her medical appointments and takes her 

medicine. Id. at 52. Foster Mother had N.C.T. evaluated a few months 

prior to the July 14, 2014 hearing. Id. The evaluation recommended that 

no services were necessary for N.C.T. Id. 

Ms. Riley described Foster Mother’s interactions with N.C.T. as loving, 

kind, and attentive. Id. Ms. Riley explained that DHS consented to Foster 

Mother’s adoption of N.C.T. because Foster Mother has been a stable 

provider for both of the Children. Id. at 53. Foster Mother ensures that the 

Children are safe, and that their medical, educational, and daily needs are 

met. Id. Ms. Riley believes that it is in N.C.T.’s best interest to be adopted 

by Foster Mother. Id. 
J-S35016-15

- 13 -

On cross-examination by counsel for Foster Mother, Ms. Riley 

responded that she believes Foster Mother will be able to maintain the 

Children’s services and keep up with their medical appointments. Id. Ms. 

Riley stated that she understands the importance of continuing the 

Children’s medical care and meeting T.M.T., Jr.’s behavioral and emotional 

needs. Id. 

Finally, Foster Mother testified that she has lived at her current 

address for thirteen years, and plans to continue residing there. Id. at 54. 

Foster Mother stated that she has biological children, a male who is 35 years 

old and has three children and a daughter who is 26 years old and is a 

nurse, and has two children. Id. at 54-56. Neither of these grown children 

resides with her, but her daughter brings her children to Foster Mother’s 

home to play with N.C.T. Id. Foster Mother also has a 22-year-old 

biological daughter, who resides at home and is studying to be a licensed 

practical nurse. Id. at 54-55. Foster Mother’s younger daughter helps her 

with feeding and watching the Children. Id. at 55. Foster Mother also can 

depend on her friends and family. Id. Foster Mother has had more than 

forty children in her home, and she treats them all as family. Id. In 2008, 

Foster Mother adopted two children who are brothers, one of whom has 

autism and mild retardation, which she has to manage. Id. Foster Mother 

also has permanent legal custody of a third male child, who has been living 

with her since 2010. Id. 
J-S35016-15

- 14 -

Foster Mother testified that, at first, T.M.T., Jr. was leery of her home, 

but now realizes that he is part of a family and enjoys interacting with the 

older boys. Id. The older boys help watch N.C.T. Id. at 57. Foster Mother 

stated that she wants to adopt the Children because she loves them and 

they are part of her family. Id. 

Foster Mother ensures that T.M.T., Jr. receives his eye drops and 

medication before he eats in the morning. Id. at 58. She stated that 

T.M.T., Jr.’s ophthalmologist believes the child’s eye is stable and that it will 

not worsen. Id. She also ensures that T.M.T., Jr. sees his behavioral 

therapist every two weeks. Id. Foster Mother stated that T.M.T., Jr. is 

doing well and is opening up and speaking with the therapist. Id. She 

explained that T.M.T., Jr.’s behavioral specialist has her phone number and 

they communicate via text messages to ensure that T.M.T., Jr. is 

well-behaved. Id. T.M.T., Jr. also has a Therapeutic Staff Support (“TSS”) 

worker for twenty hours in the school for the blind, where he is entering first 

grade. Id. at 59. Foster Mother stated that T.M.T., Jr. has been doing 

better in school with the TSS worker. Id. at 58-59. Foster Mother testified 

that some of T.M.T., Jr.’s test results show that he is functioning at a third 

grade level. Id. at 59. 

Foster Mother explained that N.C.T. is in pre-school and will enter 

kindergarten. Id. There were no concerns for N.C.T. in pre-school. Id. 

Foster Mother also had no concerns for the behavior of the Children in her 
J-S35016-15

- 15 -

home. Id. She testified that she would be able to continue to handle the 

medical and behavioral needs of the Children, and would speak with their 

physicians. Id.

On cross-examination by counsel for Paternal Grandmother, Foster 

Mother stated that she intends to change the last name of the Children in 

order to give them her last name. Id. at 60. She also stated that she 

permitted her adopted sons to continue to have contact with their biological 

family. Id. 

On August 13, 2014, the trial court entered its order, granting Foster 

Mother’s petitions for adoption, finding adoption by Foster Mother to be in 

the best interests of the Children, and denying Paternal Grandmother’s 

petitions for adoption. Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence, 

the trial court found the following.

* * *

6. Petitioner [Foster Mother] has had continuous custody and 

care of the [C]hildren since February 1, 2013. (N.T. 7/14/2014, 

pg. 48, lines 9-12).

7. Petitioner [Paternal Grandmother] has not had significant 

contact with the [C]hildren for over one year. (N.T. 7/14/2014, 

pgs. 19, 23, 24).

8. D.H.S. has given its consent to . . . [Foster Mother] to adopt 

the [C]hildren. (N.T. 7/14/2014, pgs. 50, 52-53).

9. The record developed at trial clearly establishes that there is a 

strong bond between the [Children] and [Foster Mother]. (N.T. 

7/14/2014, pgs. 49-53, 57).
J-S35016-15

- 16 -

10. There is no evidence in the record that establishes any 

current bond between the [Children] and Petitioner [Paternal 

Grandmother]. The record, arguably, shows that there is clearly 

a lack of such an existing bond.

11. The record is replete with testimony as to unsafe conditions 

and/or descriptions of injuries, health issues and untreated 

medical conditions of the [C]hildren during the period that they 

were in the care of Petitioner [Paternal Grandmother]. (N.T. 

7/14/2014, pgs. 28, 32, 35-38).

12. The trial court had the benefit of live testimony and the 

ability to see the demeanor of the witnesses. Accordingly, the 

trial court had the ability to evaluate and measure the sincerity 

of their responses of all witnesses who testified. The trial court 

finds:

a. Petitioner [Foster Mother] consistently testified credibly.

b. Petitioner [Paternal Grandmother] provided testimony 

which was either questionable, contradictory, or conflicting. 

Accordingly, her testimony is less reliable as it lacks 

consistent credence with respect to material issues.

Trial Court Opinion 1/13/15, at 2-3. 

Thereafter, Paternal Grandmother retained her present counsel, who 

entered an appearance on September 24, 2014. On September 24, 2014, 

Paternal Grandmother filed a petition in the trial court seeking permission to 

file an appeal nunc pro tunc. The trial court granted the petition on October 

1, 2014. On October 10, 2014, Paternal Grandmother filed a notice of 

appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).5 

 

5 As this is an appeal designated as a Children’s Fast Track Case, we have 

made every effort to decide it expeditiously. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 

251, 261 n.21 (Pa. 2013). However, the certified record was not 
J-S35016-15

- 17 -

In her brief on appeal, Paternal Grandmother raises three issues, as 

follows.

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in making a 

finding that it is in the best interest of the [C]hildren to deny the 

adoption petition filed by [Paternal Grandmother]?

B. Whether the trial committed reversible error in making a 

finding that there is no evidence that established any current 

bond between the [C]hildren and [Paternal Grandmother]?

C. Whether the trial court’s determinations as set forth in [A-B] 

above were clearly supported by the preponderance of the 

evidence?

Paternal Grandmother’s Brief, at 1.

Initially, in their brief, the Children complain that Paternal 

Grandmother’s brief does not contain a statement of the facts necessary to 

determine the points in controversy, nor does it reference any place in the 

record to show that she raised or preserved a question for appeal. The 

Children suggest that we should quash the appeal for failure of Paternal 

Grandmother’s brief to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) and (c)(4). The 

Children also complain that Paternal Grandmother’s brief fails to provide a 

statement of the facts with references to the record necessary for 

substantive review, and fails to cite to the record in the Argument section, in 

violation of and 2119(c), (d), and (e). The Children ask us to deem Paternal 

Grandmother’s issues waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

 

transmitted to this Court until January 23, 2015. As a result, the briefing 

schedule was delayed. Moreover, both parties requested extensions of time 

to file their briefs. Accordingly, the extensions resulted in another month of 

delay in listing this case for disposition by a merits panel. 
J-S35016-15

- 18 -

This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to 

conform to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Laird v. Ely & Bernard, 528 A.2d 1379 (Pa. 

Super. 1987). “[A]s a practical matter, this Court quashes appeals for 

failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure only where the failure 

to conform to the Rules results in the inability of this Court to discern the 

issues argues on appeal.” Kern v. Kern, 892 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citation omitted). While we cannot condone Paternal Grandmother’s failure 

to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure in her brief, the 

failure has not hampered our review. We are able to discern the issues that 

Paternal Grandmother raises on appeal. Thus, we will not quash or dismiss 

the appeal.

We will address Paternal Grandmother’s issues together. Paternal 

Grandmother asserts that she has been a primary family resource for the 

Children since their birth, and that she and the Children have an established, 

maternal, loving and caring family bond. She explains that she cared for the 

Children between 2009 and July of 2011, when DHS removed them from her 

care, and placed them in foster care. Citing Peters v. Costello, 891 A.2d 

705 (Pa. 2005), she asserts that she stood in loco parentis, and established 

a loving relationship with the Children during the two-year period that she 

cared for them. She claims that, as the Children’s grandmother and 

caregiver, she clearly bonded with the Children. She contends that the 
J-S35016-15

- 19 -

removal of the Children from her care and placement in the care of another 

person had a negative effect on the Children’s emotional needs. Paternal 

Grandmother urges that her adoption of the Children will serve the 

Children’s best interests, as she is their paternal grandmother.

On appeal from a decree of adoption, our standard of review is an 

abuse of discretion. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Thus, an adoption decree will be vacated only if the challenging party 

demonstrates the invalidity of the decree by clear and convincing evidence. 

Id. “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in 

reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the 

judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly 

unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion 

has been abused.” Bulgarelli v. Bulgarelli, 934 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (quotation omitted). 

A decree of adoption is entered upon presentation of competent 

evidence that the adoption is in the child’s best interest. In re B.L.L., 787 

A.2d at 1015. “The proceedings in an adoption hearing are unique and 

involve parties, experts, investigators and non-parties to a greater extent 

than in custody hearings, but ultimately are subject to the same standard, 

that being the best interest of the child.” Id. citing In re Adoption of 

A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698 (Pa. Super. 1996).
J-S35016-15

- 20 -

Further, the best interest determination in adoption matters is made 

on a case-by-case basis, and requires a weighing of the factors set forth in 

section 2724 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2724. In re B.L.L., 787 

A.2d at 1015 citing In re Adoption of A.S.H., supra. 

Section 2724 of the Adoption Act provides in pertinent part:

(b) Investigation.—The court may request that an 

investigation be made by a person or public agency or, with its 

consent, a voluntary agency, specifically designated by the court 

to verify the statements of the petition and such other facts that 

will give the court full knowledge of the desirability of the 

proposed adoption, or the court may rely in whole or in part 

upon a report earlier made under section 2535 (relating to 

investigation). In any case, the age, sex, health, social and 

economic status or racial, ethnic or religious background of the 

child or adopting parents shall not preclude an adoption but the 

court shall decide its desirability on the basis of the physical, 

mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2724.

The trial court found that Foster Mother had continuous custody and 

care of the Children since February 1, 2013. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 

2 (citing N.T. 7/14/2014, pg. 48, lines 9-12). The trial court also found that 

Paternal Grandmother had no significant contact with the Children for over 

one year. Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 2 (citing N.T. 7/14/2014, pgs. 19, 

23, 24). Paternal Grandmother testified that she visited the Children for 

approximately one month after they were removed from her care on July 7, 

2011, but she could not take more time from work to continue visiting them. 

N.T., 7/14/14, at 19.

The trial court stated the following.
J-S35016-15

- 21 -

This court, in assessing what is in the best interest of the 

[C]hildren in the instant contested adoption, is called upon to 

choose the more appropriate party or parties. The trial court 

gives great weight to [Foster Mother,] as she has been involved 

in the day[-]to[-]day parenting of the [C]hildren[,] and has 

provided them continuous care for well over a year. The court, 

in making its best interest analysis, must also consider bonding. 

Scholarly research suggests[,] “Bonding is a significant 

reciprocal attachment which both parties want and expect to 

continue, and which is interrupted or terminated at considerable 

peril to the parties involved.” Bonding is a Vital Issue: Appellate 

Courts Agree, by James Kenny[,] PhD [sic] and Mask Bontrager, 

MSW [sic], JD. [sic], pg. 1. This same research reveals that 

relationships arising out of bonding outweigh relationships based 

merely on kinship. See [i]d. at 2. In the instant case, the 

record provides more than clear and convincing evidence of the 

existence of a strong mutual bond between the [C]hildren and 

[Foster Mother]. 

* * *

In the instant case, the [C]hildren have been in the 

continuous care of [Foster Mother] for over one year without 

interruption or incident. Thus[, Foster Mother] has provided a 

stable environment best suited for the continued long-term 

growth and development of the [C]hildren. Accordingly, the 

court finds the welfare of the children is best safeguarded in the 

stability they have become accustom [sic] to with [Foster 

Mother].

* * *

It would be destructive and certainly not in the best 

interest of the [C]hildren to remove them from their existing, 

stable environment.

* * *

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, applicable law and 

legal analysis, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence support 

the granting of the petitions of [Foster Mother]. The trial court’s 

decision is supported by the record developed at trial and is 

supported by the established law of the Commonwealth. The 

trial court’s ruling is in the “best interest” of the [C]hildren.
J-S35016-15

- 22 -

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/15, at 4-5.

The trial court’s determination that the Children’s best interests are 

served by being adopted by Foster Mother is supported by ample, competent 

evidence in the certified record. The trial court found that Foster Mother 

provided a stable environment best suited for the continued long-term 

growth and development of the Children. The court found that the welfare 

of the Children is best safeguarded in the stability provided by Foster 

Mother. Ms. Riley testified that Foster Mother ensures that the Children are 

safe, and that their medical, educational, and daily needs are met. N.T., 

7/14/14, at 53. Ms. Riley opined that there is a bond between T.M.T., Jr. 

and Foster Mother. Id. at 49. Ms. Riley testified that, on behalf of DHS, she 

consented to Foster Mother’s petition to adopt T.M.T., Jr. because the 

Children seem bonded to Foster Mother, Foster Mother addresses the 

Children’s needs, and she has requested to adopt them. Id. at 50-51. Ms. 

Riley also testified that Foster Mother’s interactions with N.C.T. are loving, 

kind, and attentive. Id. at 52. Ms. Riley believes that it is in the Children’s 

best interest to be adopted by Foster Mother. Id. at 51, 53.

Paternal Grandmother offered the only testimony concerning what she 

does to support the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the 

Children, and the bond between her and the Children. Paternal 

Grandmother testified that it is in the best interest of the Children for her to 

adopt them because they are a family, and she kept them healthy, has fun 
J-S35016-15

- 23 -

with them, and loves them. Id. at 20. Paternal Grandmother relies on 

Peters to support her argument that she stood in loco parentis to the 

Children when they lived with her between 2009 and 2011, and, therefore, 

has a bond with them. 

In Peters, our Supreme Court outlined the relevant principles as 

follows: 

The term in loco parentis literally means “in the place of a 

parent.” Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1991), 791.

The phrase “in loco parentis” refers to a person who puts 

oneself [sic] in the situation of a lawful parent by 

assuming the obligations incident to the parental 

relationship without going through the formality of a legal 

adoption. The status of in loco parentis embodies two 

ideas; first, the assumption of a parental status, and, 

second, the discharge of parental duties. . . . The rights 

and liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis

relationship are, as the words imply, exactly the same as 

between parent and child.

Peters, 891 A.2d at 710 (citation and footnote omitted). 

Paternal Grandmother did not act in loco parentis when the Children 

were placed in foster care. Rather, she was a kinship care provider, and 

DHS had legal custody of the Children. Thus, her in loco parentis argument 

is misplaced. See In re N.S., 845 A.2d 884, 887 (Pa. Super. 2004) (former 

foster parent who had physical possession and provided day-to-day care to 

children lacked standing to pursue adoption, visitation, or custody where 

county children and youth agency held legal custody of children); see also 

In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 480 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Super. 1984) (foster 
J-S35016-15

- 24 -

parents who petitioned to terminate parental rights of natural parents did 

not stand in loco parentis to children because state agency had responsibility 

for actual care and physical custody of the children and had legal custody of 

minors).

Paternal Grandmother also cites Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. 

Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. 1982), to support her argument that, in 

a best interest analysis, courts examine the primary caregiver factor, 

recognizing that the children become strongly attached to those who parent 

and tenderly care for them. See Paternal Grandmother’s Brief, at 4. Based 

on the primary caretaker doctrine, Paternal Grandmother asserts that she 

established a bond long before the Children were removed from her home by 

caring for them and tending to their physical and emotional needs.

Paternal Grandmother’s contention lacks merit as this Court has ruled 

that the primary caretaker doctrine is no longer viable in light of the 

statutory factors enumerated in the Child Custody Act. See W.C.F. v. M.G., 

2015 PA Super 102 (Pa. Super. 2015); M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 338 

(Pa. Super. 2013). 

Even if the primary caretaker doctrine were applicable to the instant 

adoption case, the facts would not support a finding that Paternal 

Grandmother’s adoption of the Children is in their best interest. The 

testimony of Ms. Redguard established that, when the Children were in the 

care of Paternal Grandmother, she failed to take T.M.T., Jr. to 
J-S35016-15

- 25 -

ophthalmology appointments for his special needs glaucoma condition. Ms. 

Redguard’s testimony also established that Paternal Grandmother allowed 

both of the Children to develop scabies and suffer bites. Paternal 

Grandmother allowed N.C.T. to be filthy, T.M.T., Jr. to wear his soiled 

underpants in hot weather, and both Children to smell of a foul odor. 

Notably, while Paternal Grandmother had the Children in kinship care, she 

allowed Father to transport them to visit Mother, although he had a 

contentious relationship with Mother. These matters resulted in the 

Children’s removal from Paternal Grandmother’s care on July 7, 2011. 

The record also supports the trial court’s determination that Paternal 

Grandmother did not have significant contact with the Children for over one 

year after the agency removed them from her home. Although Paternal 

Grandmother continued to visit the Children for approximately one month 

after they were removed from her care, she no longer pursued visitation 

after that time, as she believed her work obligations were more important. 

We find it significant that Paternal Grandmother allowed the Children to 

remain in foster care without pursuing visitation through the time of the July 

14, 2014 hearing on the adoption petitions. 

In the context of a termination of parental rights matter, this Court 

observed that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child and a 

natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the child’s 

life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In re 
J-S35016-15

- 26 -

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Although Paternal 

Grandmother is not a natural parent of the Children, she is their blood 

relative for purposes of the adoption petition. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2531(c). 

T.M.T., Jr. and N.C.T. have been in foster care, and out of Paternal 

Grandmother’s care, since July of 2011. They were approximately four 

years old and two years old, respectively, at the time of their removal from 

her care and placement in foster care. She has not visited them since 

August, 2011. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in concluding that the Children’s bond with Paternal Grandmother, who did 

not visit the Children in nearly three years, is attenuated, at best.

Likewise, Paternal Grandmother testified that she loves the Children. 

N.T., 7/14/14, at 20. In the context of termination of parental rights, this 

Court stated that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We find no abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion in concluding that Paternal Grandmother’s professed love for the 

Children is not sufficient for the court to grant her adoption petition and 

deny Foster Mother’s adoption petition where she has failed to demonstrate 

her love for the Children through her actions. 

In the context of termination proceedings, this Court also held that it is 

appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her foster parents. See In 
J-S35016-15

- 27 -

re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). Regarding the bond analysis, in 

In re: T.S.M., our Supreme Court instructed as follows.

The “utmost attention should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not 

always an easy task.

The Superior Court has emphasized that the mere 

existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not 

necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. “[E]ven 

the most abused of children will often harbor some positive 

emotion towards the abusive parent.” “The continued 

attachment to the natural parent, despite serious parental 

rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to correct 

parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the children 

cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” 

Common sense dictates that courts considering 

termination must also consider whether the children are in a preadoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents. 

* * *

[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether 

termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has 

a strong but unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially 

considering the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a preadoptive family. As with dependency determinations, we 

emphasize that the law regarding termination of parental rights 

should not be applied mechanically, but instead always with an 

eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the 

particular children involved. . . . Obviously, attention must be 

paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s 

bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and 

we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may 

cause if left intact. Similarly, while termination of parental rights 

generally should not be granted unless adoptive parents are 

waiting to take a child into a safe and loving home, termination 

may be necessary for the child’s needs and welfare in cases 

where the child’s parental bond is impeding the search and 

placement with a permanent adoptive home.
J-S35016-15

- 28 -

In weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts 

must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children 

are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When 

courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically 

maladjusted children. 

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267-269 (citations omitted).

In view of our Supreme Court’s instruction in In re: T.S.M., we find 

that the trial court properly focused on the existence of a positive bond 

between the Children and Foster Mother. There was ample, competent 

testimony in the record from Ms. Riley to support the trial court in finding 

that the Children have a stronger bond with Foster Mother than with 

Paternal Grandmother, and that Foster Mother, who is anxious to adopt the 

Children, provides them with a stable home and provides for all of their 

needs and welfare. We, therefore, affirm the orders granting Foster 

Mother’s adoption petitions, and denying Paternal Grandmother’s adoption 

petitions.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2015