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STATE v. GILL

Cite as 297 Neb. 852

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Joseph A. Gill, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 22, 2017. No. S-16-1063.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s 

determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial 

grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower 

court’s determination.

3. Pleadings: Limitations of Actions: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. 

A ruling on a motion to quash on the ground that the charges of the 

information are allegedly outside the statute of limitations is not a final, 

appealable order as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 

2016), no matter how the motion was denominated.

4. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An appeal from a final 

order may raise every issue presented by the order that is the subject of 

the appeal, but appellate jurisdiction does not extend to issues not presented by the final order.

5. ____: ____: ____. An appellate court cannot address on appeal issues 

that do not bear on the correctness of the final order upon which its 

appellate jurisdiction is based.

6. Pleadings: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A litigant cannot gain 

interlocutory review of an issue that does not affect a substantial right 

by surreptitiously joining it to a motion that otherwise results in a 

final order.

7. Speedy Trial: Motions for Continuance: Waiver. The definite or 

indefinite nature of a requested continuance is irrelevant to the applicability of the waiver set forth in the amended language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 2016).

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

11/03/2017 12:12 AM CDT
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STATE v. GILL

Cite as 297 Neb. 852

Appeal from the District Court for Saunders County: Mary

C. Gilbride, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark A. Steele, of Steele Law Office, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E. 

Duffy for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, 

Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

Wright, J.

NATURE OF CASE

This case presents an appeal from the denial of the defendant’s motion for absolute discharge. The defendant and the 

State dispute whether defendant’s motion to continue the trial 

date outside the statutory 6-month period constituted a permanent waiver, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 

2016), of the statutory speedy trial right. Alternatively, they 

dispute what periods of delay were attributable to the State or 

to the defendant.

BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2015, Joseph A. Gill was charged with 

seven counts of first degree sexual assault, see Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-319(1)(a) (Reissue 2016), and two counts of incest, see 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-703 (Reissue 2016). Counts I through 

III alleged sexual assault on or about September 21, 1996, 

to June 10, 2002, on T.H., born in 1989. Count IV alleged 

sexual assault on T.H. on or about September 21, 1997, to 

September 20, 1998. Count V alleged sexual assault on T.H. 

on or about September 21, 1998, to September 2, 2002, and 

count VI alleged sexual assault on T.H. on or about June 3 to 

10, 2002.

Count VII alleged incest with T.H. on or about September 

21, 1996, to June 10, 2002.

Count VIII alleged sexual assault on K.A., born in 1998, 

on or about January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2006. Lastly, 
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count IX alleged incest with K.S., born in 1998, on or about 

January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2006.

On November 16, 2015, Gill moved to quash the information on the ground that the charges were time barred under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-110 (Reissue 2016).

Section 29-110(8) currently provides that there is no statute of limitations for charges of incest and first degree sexual 

assault of a child. Prior to an amendment in 2005, however, the 

statute of limitations for first degree sexual assault of a child 

was 7 years from the date of the offense or within 7 years after 

the victim’s 16th birthday, whichever was later.1 The 2005 

amendment explicitly applies to offenses committed before 

September 4, 2005, for which the statute of limitations had not 

expired as of September 4, 2005, as well as to offenses committed on or after that date.2

And it was not until 2009 that the Legislature added the 

crime of incest to its list of crimes in § 29-110(8) that are 

without any time limitations for prosecution or punishment.3

This 2009 amendment applies to offenses committed before 

May 21, 2009, for which the statute of limitations had not 

expired as of that date, as well as to offenses committed on 

or after May 21, 2009.4 Before the effective date of the 2009 

amendment, incest was governed by the general 3-year statute 

of limitations.5

The court ruled on the motion to quash on February 4, 

2016. The court concluded that the charges of sexual assault 

in counts I through V were timely brought because the statute of limitations on these charges had not yet expired as of 

September 4, 2005. Likewise, the court found that count VIII 

1 2005 Neb. Laws, L.B. 713.

2 See § 29-110(14).

3 2009 Neb. Laws, L.B. 97.

4 See § 29-110(15).

5 § 29-110(1) (Reissue 2008).
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was timely brought. The court sustained Gill’s motion to 

quash as to count VII. The court also partially sustained Gill’s 

motion to quash as to count IX, to the extent the crime was 

alleged to have occurred before May 21, 2006.

Gill was rearraigned on the first eight charges on March 

21, 2016, with the incest charge that was previously count IX 

described as count VIII. Apparently, no amended information 

had been filed. Trial was set for July 13.

On June 20, 2016, Gill orally moved to continue trial for 

the reason that he had not completed taking depositions. The 

court granted the motion. As a result of the continuance, trial 

was set for September 14. Gill did not object to the new 

trial date.

On July 6, 2016, the State obtained a continuance because 

the victim for counts VII and VIII was pregnant, with a due 

date of September 13. The State conceded in its motion that 

Gill would not consent to the continuance. At the hearing 

on the motion, defense counsel stated that he understood the 

situation and “would just ask the Court . . . if [it’s] going to 

grant the State’s motion to continue, that it be a short one.” 

The court granted the continuance and set a new trial date for 

October 12.

On October 11, 2016, the State applied for and was given 

leave to amend the information, over Gill’s objection. The 

amended information omitted the ninth charge, that the court 

had previously ordered quashed and which was omitted in the 

description of the charges when Gill was rearraigned. And the 

amended information corrected the date of what was newly 

designated as “count VIII,” in order to conform to the court’s 

prior order finding that the charge was timely brought only 

to the extent it alleged acts occurring before May 21, 2006. 

The principal purpose of the amended information, however, was to add facts supporting habitual criminal enhancement of the potential sentences. Except for changes made to 

conform to the court’s prior order partially granting Gill’s 

motion to quash and the addition of the habitual criminal 
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allegations, the amended information was the same as the 

original information.

At the hearing on the State’s motion to amend the information, defense counsel stated that he would not be ready to 

proceed the next day for the scheduled trial on the amended 

information; he needed a reasonable opportunity to look it over 

and discuss the enhanced penalties with Gill. The court granted 

defense counsel what the court characterized as a request for 

additional time and it set a new trial date for November 16, 

2016. Defense counsel did not object at the hearing to the new 

trial date.

On November 4, 2016, Gill again filed a motion to quash,6

on the ground that counts I through VI stated in the information 

were time-barred. At the hearing, defense counsel explained 

that he was renewing his motion on the statute of limitations 

in order to preserve the issue for trial. Also on November 4, 

Gill filed a separate motion for absolute discharge based on 

the alleged violations of both his statutory7 and constitutional 

rights to a speedy trial.

The court issued an order on November 14, 2016. The court 

stated in its order that the matters to be addressed were Gill’s 

two motions, but it ultimately explicitly ruled only on the 

motion for absolute discharge. There appears in the record no 

ruling on the November 4 motion to quash, and nothing in the 

record demonstrates that Gill insisted on a ruling.

Relying on our interpretation of § 29-1207(4)(b) in State v. 

Hettle8 and State v. Mortensen,

9

 the district court found that 

Gill had made a permanent and unequivocal waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance that 

6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1808 (Reissue 2016). See, also, e.g., State v. 

Loyd, 269 Neb. 762, 696 N.W.2d 860 (2005).

7 § 29-1207.

8 State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (2014).

9 State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (2014).
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extended the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. 

Section 29-1207(4)(b) states in relevant part that “[a] defendant 

is deemed to have waived his or her right to speedy trial when 

the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the 

request of the defendant or his or her counsel extends the trial 

date beyond the statutory six-month period.”

Alternatively, the court found that without such a permanent waiver, the total period of delay attributable to the State 

was still only 168 days. The court did not explicitly address 

Gill’s constitutional speedy trial right, but generally denied the 

motion for absolute discharge. Gill filed this appeal within 30 

days of the November 14, 2016, order.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Gill assigns that the district court erred in (1) denying his 

motion for absolute discharge insofar as it alleged that he was 

not brought to trial within the statutory time period under 

§ 29-1207, (2) denying his motion for absolute discharge 

insofar as it alleged that he was denied his constitutional right 

to a speedy trial, and (3) failing to consider Gill’s motion 

to quash due to the failure of the State to file the information within the statutory time period from the date of the 

alleged offenses.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether 

charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly 

erroneous.10

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which 

an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s 

determination.11

10 State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747, 884 N.W.2d 696 (2016).

11 Id.
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ANALYSIS

Appellate Jurisdiction

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) limits appellate 

jurisdiction to a judgment rendered or final order. Without a 

conviction and sentence, there has not yet been a judgment 

rendered below12; thus, we consider the extent to which we are 

presented with a final order.

The only type of final order potentially present here is 

“an order affecting a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding.”13 We have held many times that a ruling on a 

motion for absolute discharge based upon an accused criminal’s nonfrivolous claim that his or her speedy trial rights 

were violated is a ruling affecting a substantial right made 

during a special proceeding and is therefore final and appealable.14 Absolute discharge provided for by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1208 (Reissue 2016) bestows a right not to be tried 

equivalent to that of the Double Jeopardy Clause.15 Such a 

right would not be effectively vindicated in an appeal after 

the trial has taken place.16 The parties do not dispute the 

applicability of these propositions to the court’s order denying absolute discharge.

[3] But the State correctly points out that a ruling on a 

motion to quash on the ground that the charges of the information are allegedly outside the statute of limitations is not 

a final, appealable order as defined by § 25-1902, no matter 

how the motion was denominated.17 As explained in State v. 

12 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Reissue 2016); In re Interest of 

Wolkow, 206 Neb. 512, 293 N.W.2d 851 (1980); State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 

169, 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974).

13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016).

14 State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 570 N.W.2d 326 (1997).

15 See State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133, 761 N.W.2d 514 (2009).

16 See id.

17 See State v. Loyd, supra note 6.
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Loyd,

18 the statutes of limitations do not set forth a remedy 

of absolute discharge. We have concluded that, in contrast to 

speedy trial or double jeopardy claims,19 a ruling on the statute 

of limitations does not affect a substantial right.20

Also, the order presently being appealed does not actually 

contain a ruling on Gill’s motion to quash. The court implicitly 

rejected Gill’s constitutional speedy trial argument in denying 

his motion for absolute discharge that raised both statutory 

and constitutional speedy trial arguments. But in its November 

15, 2016, order concluding that Gill was not entitled to absolute discharge, the court did not implicitly reject Gill’s statute 

of limitations argument that was raised in a separate motion 

to quash.

While Gill alternatively asserts it was error for the court to 

fail to address his second motion to quash, the onus is on the 

movant to insist upon a ruling below before bringing the issue 

to the appellate courts.21 Moreover, even if, in the face of a 

defendant’s insistence, a court refuses to rule on the merits of a 

motion, the court’s refusal to rule would be no more final than 

a ruling on the motion would have been.

[4-6] An appeal from a final order may raise every issue 

presented by the order that is the subject of the appeal, but 

our appellate jurisdiction does not extend to issues not presented by the final order.22 We cannot address on appeal issues 

that do not bear on the correctness of the final order upon 

which our appellate jurisdiction is based.23 A litigant cannot 

gain interlocutory review of an issue that does not affect a 

substantial right by surreptitiously joining it to a motion that 

18 Id.

19 See State v. Gibbs, supra note 14.

20 Id.

21 See, e.g., State v. Dean, 270 Neb. 972, 708 N.W.2d 640 (2006).

22 See id.

23 See id.
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otherwise results in a final order.24 A determination of the 

statute of limitations has no bearing on the correctness of a 

speedy trial determination.

The November 15, 2016, order upon which our appellate 

jurisdiction is based did not dispose of the statute of limitations issue, and even if it had, the portion of the order addressing the statute of limitations would not be final for purposes 

of this interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Gill’s assignment of error pertaining to his 

motion to quash.

Statutory Right to

Speedy Trial

We turn first to Gill’s statutory right to a speedy trial. The 

trial court’s primary reason for rejecting Gill’s motion for discharge based on his statutory right to a speedy trial was that 

pursuant to § 29-1207(4)(b), Gill had permanently waived his 

statutory right to a speedy trial by asking for a continuance 

that resulted in extending a trial date beyond the statutory 

6-month period. Although the order does not specify, it is clear 

from the record it refers to Gill’s June 20, 2016, motion.

Section 29-1207(4) generally sets forth the periods to be 

excluded in computing the time for trial. Section 29-1207(4)(b) 

concerns continuances granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant. That subsection has long provided that 

the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the 

request of the defendant is excluded in computing the time 

for trial.

But before 2010, the delay caused by a continuance was 

never a permanent waiver of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, 

the delay caused by the continuance granted for the defendant 

was simply excluded from the 6-month period and counted 

against the defendant.25

24 State v. Loyd, supra note 6.

25 See State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476, 763 N.W.2d 380 (2009).
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In 2010, the Legislature added the following language to 

§ 29-1207(4)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2010):

A defendant who has sought and obtained a continuance 

which is indefinite has an affirmative duty to end the continuance by giving notice of request for trial or the court 

can end the continuance by setting a trial date. When the 

court ends an indefinite continuance by setting a trial 

date, the excludable period resulting from the indefinite 

continuance ends on the date for which trial commences. 

A defendant is deemed to have waived his or her right 

to speedy trial when the period of delay resulting from a 

continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his 

or her counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory 

six-month period.

This language, particularly the language pertaining to continuances that extend the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month 

period, was added in direct response to concerns about the 

statutory scheme expressed by the concurring opinion in State 

v. Williams.

26

In Williams, we affirmed the denial of absolute discharge 

after a complicated analysis of motions by the State and the 

defendant that delayed trial for nearly 4 years.27 Defense 

motions, many of them motions for continuances, resulted 

in 1,242 days of excludable time. The concurring opinion 

pointed out the flaw of a statutory scheme that allows for multiple lengthy delays by the defense, which can be strategically 

made in the hopes that the State will lose sight of the speedy 

trial calculations.28

26 State v. Williams, supra note 15 (Wright, J., concurring; Heavican, C.J., 

and Connolly, J., join). See, also, State v. Mortensen, supra note 9; 

Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 1046, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. 15-16 (Feb. 

19, 2010).

27 See State v. Williams, supra note 15.

28 Id. (Wright, J. concurring; Heavican, C.J., and Connolly, J., join).
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If the State lost sight of the speedy trial clock, then the 

defendant was entitled under the statutory scheme to absolute 

discharge based on a simple mathematical computation and no 

showing of actual prejudice. The concurring opinion explained, 

“Similar to the crocodile that followed ‘Captain Hook,’ time 

keeps following the State, and the accused hopes the State will 

slip and fall victim to the 6-month trial clock.”29

The concurring opinion in Williams suggested that this 

abuse could be prevented through an amendment to the speedy 

trial statutes providing that once a defendant extends the 

trial date beyond the required 6 months, he or she shall be 

deemed to have waived the statutory 6-month trial requirement.30 The concurrence explained that in such circumstances, 

the defendant would still be protected by the constitutional 

right to a speedy trial, with its four-part balancing test that 

includes a determination of whether the defendant was actually prejudiced.31

Thus, § 29-1207(4)(b) (Reissue 2016) now states that 

“[a] defendant is deemed to have waived his or her right to 

speedy trial when the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her 

counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory six-month 

period.” We explained the meaning of this amended language 

in Mortensen.

32 We said that it provides for a “permanent 

waiver of the statutory right to a speedy trial.”33 “[R]eading 

§ 29-1207(4)(b) as a whole, if a defendant requests a continuance that moves a trial date which has been set within the 

29 Id. at 148, 761 N.W.2d at 527 (Wright, J., concurring; Heavican, C.J., and 

Connolly, J., join).

30 See State v. Williams, supra note 15 (Wright, J. concurring; Heavican, C.J., 

and Connolly, J., join).

31 See, id.; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S. Ct. 1547, 56 L. 

Ed. 2d 18 (1978).

32 State v. Mortensen, supra note 9.

33 Id. at 165, 841 N.W.2d at 400.
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statutory 6-month period to a date that is outside the 6-month 

period,” that request “constitutes a permanent waiver of the 

statutory speedy trial right.”34 We further said that the “broad 

language” of § 29-1207(4)(b) “does not specify the reasons 

for which a continuance must be granted in order to result in a 

waiver of the statutory right to a speedy trial.”35

We reasoned, “There is no language in the statute that 

indicates an intent to limit the scope of the waiver provided 

therein, and ‘an appellate court will not “read into a statute a 

meaning that is not there.”’”36 We approved of such a broad 

and permanent waiver as a means of curtailing the abuse by 

defense motions for continuance criticized in Williams.

37 In this 

regard, we noted that the speedy trial statutes do not protect the 

interests of just the defendant. They also protect the government and the public’s interest in bringing the accused to trial at 

an early date. “A primary purpose of the statutes is to promote 

a speedy trial, not to delay it.”38

Much of our opinion in Mortensen addressed our conclusion that defense motions to discharge, which must be 

addressed by the trial court and necessitate an adjournment 

while being resolved by an interlocutory appeal, are requests 

for continuances even though not denominated as such.39

Applying this holding to the facts in Mortensen, we found that 

the defendant’s motion to discharge resulted in continuing the 

trial beyond the statutory 6-month period. Thus, the defendant 

had permanently waived his statutory right to a speedy trial 

and the exact calculation of days remaining on the speedy trial 

clock was no longer required.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 167, 841 N.W.2d at 401.

36 Id. at 165, 841 N.W.2d at 400.

37 See State v. Williams, supra note 15 (Wright, J., concurring; Heavican, 

C.J., and Connolly, J., join).

38 State v. Mortensen, supra note 9, 287 Neb. at 169, 841 N.W.2d at 402.

39 See State v. Mortensen, supra note 9.
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In State v. Vela-Montes,

40 we were again confronted with the 

waiver language of § 29-1207(4)(b) in the context of a delay 

due to a motion for absolute discharge resulting in a trial date 

outside of the 6-month period. The motion for discharge, which 

under Mortensen was considered a motion to continue, was 

filed when there were only 17 days remaining on the speedy 

trial clock, as calculated up to that point with excludable 

periods under § 29-1207. We found that as of the time of our 

opinion, the continuance was still in effect pending resolution 

of the appeal and had moved the trial well beyond the 17 days 

remaining when the defendant filed the motion. Because the 

motion to continue resulted in extending the trial beyond the 

statutory 6-month period, as calculated on the date the motion 

was filed, the defendant had waived the statutory speedy trial 

right and no further examination of days on the speedy trial 

clock was required.

Gill argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he 

had permanently waived his statutory right to a speedy trial 

because his request for a continuance was for a definite period 

rather than indefinite. Further, Gill asserts that the trial court’s 

ruling has the absurd result that “any affirmative action or 

filing by a criminal defendant would constitute a permanent 

waiver.”41 We find no merit to these arguments.

Gill filed a motion to continue, not just any motion. The 

period of delay resulting from other proceedings such as hearings on competency, motions to quash, motions to suppress 

evidence, motions for change of venue, demurrers or pleas in 

abatement is described in § 29-1207(4)(a), not § 29-1207(4)(b). 

There is no language in § 29-1207(4)(a) regarding a permanent 

waiver of the right to a speedy trial.

Furthermore, permanent waiver occurs only when the 

6-month period, as calculated up to that date with excludable periods, has been exceeded by virtue of the motion. The 

40 State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (2014).

41 Brief for appellant at 14.
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court’s ruling that Gill waived his right to a speedy trial in no 

way implies that any filing by a defendant would permanently 

waive the statutory right to a speedy trial.

There is nothing in the language of § 29-1207(4)(b) that 

would suggest that only indefinite continuances extending the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period permanently waive the statutory right to a speedy trial. While 

§ 29-1207(4)(b) was amended to add language pertaining to 

indefinite continuances at the same time that it was amended 

to add the language pertaining to permanent waiver, the two 

sentences are not directly related.

By its plain language, the sentence pertaining to indefinite 

continuances clarifies when the excludable period resulting 

from the indefinite continuance ends. In contrast, the permanent waiver set forth in the last sentence of § 29-1207(4)(b) 

does not concern excludable periods except to the extent they 

are implicitly part of the 6-month trial date calculated at the 

time of a motion to continue.42 The waiver sentence at issue in 

this case refers to “a continuance granted at the request of the 

defendant or his or her counsel.”43 There is no modifier limiting the waiver to indefinite continuances as opposed to definite 

continuances. As we have said many times, we will not read 

into a statute a meaning that is not there.44

Likewise, our opinions in Williams, Mortensen, and VelaMontes do not suggest that only indefinite continuances 

extending the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period 

permanently waive the statutory right to a speedy trial.45

We can find no logical reason why indefinite continuances 

would be treated differently from definite continuances for 

this purpose. The defendant waives the statutory 6-month 

42 See State v. Vela-Montes, supra note 40.

43 § 29-1207(4)(b).

44 See, e.g., State v. Mortensen, supra note 9.

45 See, State v. Vela-Montes, supra note 40; State v. Mortensen, supra note 9; 

State v. Williams, supra note 15.
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period when he or she requests a continuance that extends 

the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. Once the 

defendant does that, the statutory clock is gone. This permanent waiver is designed to prevent the abuse illustrated 

in Williams, where the State remained bound to vigilance 

of the strictly mathematical speedy trial clock during years 

of repeated motions by the defendant to continue. That kind 

of abuse occurred no less through definite than through indefinite continuances.

[7] We held in Mortensen that the reason for the continuance is irrelevant to whether the defendant has waived the 

statutory right to a speedy trial under the amended language 

of § 29-1207(4)(b). We now hold that the definite or indefinite 

nature of a requested continuance is irrelevant to the applicability of the waiver set forth in the amended language of 

§ 29-1207(4)(b).

When Gill moved to continue trial on June 20, 2016, the 

6-month speedy trial clock was set to have run on July 27. 

To calculate the 6-month clock, a court must exclude the day 

the information was filed, count forward 6 months, back up 

1 day, and then add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4).46

Excludable periods attributable to a motion begin on the day 

immediately after the filing and end on the date of final disposition.47 Absent any excludable periods, the 6-month clock 

would have run on May 9, 2016. Seventy-nine excludable days 

attributable to Gill’s motion to quash on November 16, 2015, 

are added to this date.

Gill agreed pursuant to his motion that trial would be 

rescheduled to September 14, 2016, 49 days beyond the statutory 6-month period ending July 27, as calculated on the date 

Gill filed the motion to continue. Thus, Gill permanently 

waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.

46 See State v. Williams, supra note 15.

47 State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002); State v. Long, 206 

Neb. 446, 293 N.W.2d 391 (1980).
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We find no error in the trial court’s factual calculation 

that Gill requested a continuance that extended the trial date 

beyond the statutory 6-month period. And we agree with 

the trial court’s legal conclusion that under § 29-1207(4)(b), 

Gill thereby permanently waived his statutory right to a 

speedy trial.

Constitutional Right to

Speedy Trial

We consider Gill’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. As 

we said in Williams, a defendant who has permanently waived 

his or her statutory right to a speedy trial is still protected by 

the constitutional right to a speedy trial.48 However, we find 

no merit to Gill’s constitutional speedy trial claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial 

court denying Gill’s motion for absolute discharge.

Affirmed.

48 See State v. Williams, supra note 15.