* After examining the briefs and appellate record, t his panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o f law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 29, 2005 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RICK DEAN PETRICK, Petitioner - Appellant, v. SAM CALBONE; DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney General, Respondents - Appellees. No. 04-6373 (D.C. No. CIV-04-957-C) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before EBEL , McKAY and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

On June 27, 2005, this court granted Petitioner-App ellant Rick Dean Petrick a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on t he following two issues related to his appeal from the district court’s denial of h is petition for habeas relief:1 Petrick originally filed the petition at issue in this case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Noting that in the petition Petrickchallenges the execution of his sentence, rather than the validity of his convictio ns and the sentences he is serving, the magistrate judge to whom the case was assigned construed the petition to assert a cause of action under 28 U.S.C . § 2241. To prevent confusion, in this opinion we refer to the petition as a “habe as petition.” - 2 - 1. Whether Petrick’s due process rights were violate d when he was disciplined for using a prison law library typewrit er for non-legal
purposes. 2. Whether Petrick’s due process rights were violate d when he was disciplined for possessing another inmate’s legal p apers. For the reasons discussed below, we answer each of these questions in the negative. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Petrick’s habeas petition. 1 I. Using a Prison Law Library Typewriter for Non-Leg al Purposes In a November 2003 prison disciplinary proceeding, Petrick was found guilty of disobeying the orders of prison staff bec ause he used a prison law library typewriter for non-legal work, in violation of pris on rules. As a result, Petrick lost 180 days of earned credits. Petrick admits th at he used the prison law library typewriter for non-legal work. However, Petrick co ntends that at the time he typed a non-legal letter using the prison law libra ry typewriter, there was no adequately promulgated prison rule in place prohibi ting such conduct. Petrick- 3 -

argues that because there was no rule in place proh ibiting such conduct, there was insufficient evidence to support the prison discipl inary decision, thereby rendering that finding of guilt a violation of his due process rights. The district court rejected this argument, and Petrick appealed. In reviewing the denial of a petition for habeas co rpus, we examine the district court's legal conclusions de novo . See Patterson v. Knowles , 162 F.3d 574, 575 (10th Cir. 1998). When determining whethe r a prison disciplinary decision should be upheld upon a challenge to the s ufficiency of the evidence, we do not examine the entire record or weigh the evide nce; we simply determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that c ould support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent , Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). This is because “th e requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits.” I d. at 455. When viewed under this standard, Petrick’s contenti on is without merit. Attached to Respondents’ response to Petrick’s habe as petition was an affidavit of Richard Barger, the staff member in charge of the p rison law library, and an August 2003 memorandum from library technician Melo dy Davis to the inmate population. The memorandum provides: Typewriters in the law library are for legal use on ly. This rule was in place before my position as librarian and will cont inue to be- 4 -

enforced. Any one caught typing anything other tha n legal material will be written up. Barger’s affidavit states that the memorandum was p osted in the prison law library. Following this discussion of the rules fo r law library typewriter usage, Barger’s affidavit states that all rules have been posted and enforced consistently during the entire time that the Oklahoma Departmentof Corrections has housed inmates at the prison. Although he has had an oppo rtunity to do so, Petrick has never disputed the validity of Barger’s affidavit o r the August 2003 memorandum. The existence of the August 2003 memorandum makes c lear that the prison had a rule against using the law library typewriter s for non-legal purposes before Petrick’s October 2003 use of a typewriter to write a non-legal letter. This prison rule promised disciplinary sanctions to those who v iolated it. Prison staff members were clearly responsible for the rule, as the memorandum was signed by library technician Melody Davis. Petrick was or sh ould have been aware of the policy because the memorandum was posted in the pri son law library. Indeed, even if we were to ignore the Barger affidavit and the August 2003 memorandum, Petrick admits that he was aware of a w ritten notice posted in the prison law library stating that “Typewriters Are to Be Used For Legal Work Only!” Petrick claims that the notice was not a di rect written order by prison staff because the notice was not typed, signed, or dated by staff; does not state that it is a direct written order; and does not war n that violators would face- 5 -

disciplinary proceedings. However, the fact that t he notice was posted—and continued to be posted over an extended period of t ime—was sufficient to put Petrick on notice of the prison rule regarding type writer usage, even without the additional formalities that Petrick now asserts wer e necessary. Thus, Petrick’s due process rights were not violate d when he was disciplined for using a prison law library typewrit er for non-legal purposes because there was some evidence supporting the pris on disciplinary decision that Petrick had broken an adequately promulgated prisonrule in place at the time of his actions. II. Possessing Another Inmate’s Legal Papers In a continuation of the same November 2003 prison disciplinary proceeding, Petrick was found guilty of possessing contraband because he had another inmate’s legal papers in his prison cell. As a result, Petrick lost ninety days of earned credits. Petrick implies that he wa s deprived of his due process rights because he was disciplined even though he di d not violate any prison rule. Specifically, Petrick contends that he was not guil ty of possessing contraband because he had another inmate’s legal papers in ord er to provide legal assistance to the other inmate, as is permitted by prison rule s. Thus, Petrick’s second claim, like his first claim, asserts that there was insuff icient evidence of any rule violation to support the prison disciplinary decisi on finding him guilty, thereby- 6 -

rendering that finding a violation of his due proce ss rights. The district court rejected this second claim, and Petrick raises it a gain on appeal. Under the “some evidence” standard that we must app ly in reviewing such claims, see Hill , 472 U.S. at 455-56, Petrick’s contentions are without merit. Rule 09-5 of the Great Plains Correctional Facility ’s Inmate Handbook prohibits possessing property belonging to another person. L egal papers are property. See Black’s Law Dictionary(8th ed. 2004) (defining “property” as, inter alia , “[a]ny external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised”). Petrick admits that he possessed lega l papers belonging to another inmate. Therefore, Petrick possessed property belo nging to another person in violation of Rule 09-5. Another prison policy allows Petrick to provide leg al assistance to other inmates. The policy states that prison staff may a ssign inmates to “typ[e] and handl[e] legal documents for [other] inmates, and a ssist[] other inmates to research legal issues.” However, this policy does not abrogate Rule 09-5. Thus, while prison staff may assign Petrick to type and h andle legal documents for other inmates or assist other inmates in researching lega l issues, Petrick may not possess other inmates’ legal papers in his own cell —especially where, as here, there is no indication that Petrick did so pursuantto receiving an assignment from2 Petrick asserts that he “was asked by [another inm ate] to assist him in

preparing and filing his federal habeas petition” a nd that he was “authorized” by the other inmate to use the other inmate’s legal papers. Petrick makes no mention of being assigned or authorized by prison staff to provide such assistance. - 7 - prison staff. 2 When Petrick took another inmate’s legal papers i nto his own cell, where the other inmate was not present, Petrick kne w or should have known that he was taking a risk that he would be disciplined f or a violation of Rule 09-5. Therefore, Petrick’s due process rights were not vi olated when he was disciplined for possessing another inmate’s legal p apers because there was some evidence supporting the prison disciplinary decisio n that Petrick had broken an adequately promulgated prison rule in place at the time of his actions.
III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment o f the district court denying Petrick’s petition for habeas relief.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge