SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

357 

CA 14-00962 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF RITE AID CORPORATION, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TERIE HUSEBY, ASSESSOR, AND BOARD OF ASSESSMENT 

REVIEW OF TOWN OF IRONDEQUOIT, 

RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 2.) 

 

DAVIDSON FINK LLP, ROCHESTER (THOMAS A. FINK OF COUNSEL), FOR

RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS. 

ROBERT L. JACOBSON, PITTSFORD, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

 

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme

Court, Monroe County (Matthew A. Rosenbaum, J.), entered May 28, 2014

in proceedings pursuant to RPTL article 7. The order and judgment,

among other things, adjudged that the assessment of petitioner’s

property, upon the rolls of assessment of the Town of Irondequoit for

the years at issue, be reduced. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from

is reversed on the law without costs, and the petitions challenging

the assessments for the 2008/2009 through 2012/2013 tax years are

dismissed. 

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced these RPTL article 7

proceedings seeking review of the real property tax assessments for a

commercial property located in the Town of Irondequoit for the tax

years 2008/2009 through 2012/2013. In appeal No. 1, respondents

appeal from an order granting the respective petitions and ordering

respondents to correct the assessment rolls and to refund the tax

overpayments with costs. In appeal No. 2, respondents appeal from a

final order and judgment incorporating the decision. We note at the

outset that appeal No. 1 must be dismissed inasmuch as the order

granting the petitions is subsumed in the final order and judgment in

appeal No. 2 (see M&T Bank v Choice Granite Products Ltd. [appeal No.

2], 115 AD3d 1163, 1164).

Petitioner is the lessee under a 20-year triple net lease of a

1.39 acre parcel of real property located at 689 East Ridge Road in

the Town of Irondequoit, which is improved by a 13,274-square-foot

single-tenant retail pharmacy. Rent is $358,634 per annum or
-2- 357 

CA 14-00962 

approximately $27.02 per square foot. The pharmacy building was

constructed in 2002 under a build-to-suit arrangement with

petitioner’s predecessor, Eckerd Drugs. The build-to-suit arrangement

in this case involved the assemblage of two separate parcels of real

property situated on a corner location in an established commercial

corridor with good access from both roads. Under the terms of the

lease, petitioner is responsible for, among other things, the payment

of real property taxes. The property was sold in 2005 in what the

parties agree was an arm’s length sale for $4,903,634. At all

relevant times, the property was assigned an assessed value of

$3,650,000 by respondent Terie Huseby, assessor of the Town of

Irondequoit. Petitioner commenced five proceedings pursuant to RPTL

article 7 challenging those assessments. A nonjury trial was

conducted at which the parties presented expert testimony. In

granting the petitions, Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that the

2005 sale of the subject property was not of “any probative value” in

determining the fair market value of the fee simple interest in the

property and that it was proper to disregard the actual rent in

arriving at a value using the income capitalization method. We

reverse.

We note at the outset that respondents do not dispute that

petitioner came forth with substantial evidence, in the form of the

appraisal report and testimony of its expert, to rebut the presumption

of validity of the tax assessments (see generally Matter of Techniplex

III v Town & Vil. of E. Rochester, 125 AD3d 1412, 1412-1413). Nor do

respondents contend that the approach to valuation used by

petitioner’s expert, which rejects national chain drugstore

comparables on the ground that they are “build-to-suit” and, thus,

subject to above-market leases which encompass purchasing, often at a

premium, and assembling various pieces of property, demolition and

construction costs, is not plausible (see Matter of Brooks Drugs, Inc.

v Board of Assessors of City of Schenectady, 51 AD3d 1094, 1095, lv

denied 11 NY3d 710). 

Within this framework, an appellate court is empowered to make

new findings of value where the trial court “ ‘has failed to give to

conflicting evidence the relative weight which it should have’ ”

(People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 61, quoting Matter of

City of New York [Newton Creek], 284 NY 493, 497 [emphasis omitted]),

giving due deference to the trial court’s power to resolve credibility

issues by choosing among conflicting expert opinions (see Brooks

Drugs, Inc., 51 AD3d at 1095). 

It is well settled that real “[p]roperty is assessed for tax

purposes according to its condition [and ownership] on the taxable

status date, without regard to future potentialities or possibilities

and may not be assessed on the basis of some use contemplated in the

future” (Matter of Addis Co. v Srogi, 79 AD2d 856, 857, lv denied 53

NY2d 603; see RPTL 302 [1]; Matter of BCA-White Plains Lanes v Glaser,

91 AD2d 633, 634-635, appeal dismissed 59 NY2d 673). Although several

methods of valuing real property are acceptable, “the market value

method of valuation is preferred as the most reliable measure of a
-3- 357 

CA 14-00962 

property’s full value for assessment purposes” (Matter of General

Elec. Co. v Town of Salina, 69 NY2d 730, 731), because “[t]he best

evidence of value, of course, is a recent sale of the subject property

between a seller under no compulsion to sell and a buyer under no

compulsion to buy” (Matter of Allied Corp. v Town of Camillus, 80 NY2d

351, 356, rearg denied 81 NY2d 784). A recent sale has been

characterized as evidence of the “highest rank” in determining market

value (Matter of F. W. Woolworth Co. v Tax Commn. of City of N.Y., 20

NY2d 561, 565 [emphasis omitted]; see Plaza Hotel Assoc. v Wellington

Assoc., 37 NY2d 273, 277, rearg denied 37 NY2d 924). The scope of a

“market” need not be limited to the locale of the subject property

and, depending on the nature of the use, it may encompass national

and/or international buyers and sellers (see e.g. Matter of Saratoga

Harness Racing v Williams, 91 NY2d 639, 646). 

In support of its case, petitioner presented the testimony of

appraiser Christopher Harland, who valued the property unencumbered by

any lease. Harland employed the comparable sales approach and income

capitalization approach in arriving at his valuation. He valued the

subject property at $1.44 million to $1.49 million on the relevant

taxable status dates. The properties he used for comparison in his

analysis consisted primarily of commercial retail properties located

in the same general geographic area. None, however, were currently

occupied by national pharmacy chains nor subject to build-to-suit

leases. Indeed, Harland’s sales comparables consisted of a Dollar

Tree store; a Staples office supply store; a retail bicycle shop; and

a kitchen retail store. Although Harland’s appraisal recognized that

a number of recent sales of retail drugstores had occurred in the

region, he concluded that it was “not appropriate to use these sales”

and gave them “little weight . . . in valuing the subject property.”

On the other hand, respondents’ expert, Ronald Rubino, testified,

and his appraisal concluded, that there is an established national

submarket for the sale and purchase of built-to-suit net lease

national chain drugstores, which provides an abundance of drugstore

comparable sales, both local and regional, for use in the sales

comparison approach. Respondents’ expert testified that such a

submarket is the subject of a national real estate publication which

he incorporated into his appraisal. The publication is published

quarterly by PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, and provides detailed data

for buyers and investors in numerous national submarkets including,

inter alia, the National Net Lease Market, the National Medical Office

Buildings Market, the National Retail Market, and the National Strip

Shopping Center Market (see PwC Real Estate Investor Survey,

http://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/real-estate/publications/pwc

-real-estate-investor-survey.jhtml [accessed June 18, 2015]). 

Respondents’ expert specifically referenced the “National Net Lease

Market Report” in his testimony and appraisal. Moreover, petitioner’s

expert also utilized the April 2005 “Net Lease Drug Store Market

Report” as a source for capitalization rates and other market data. 

That report is published by The Boulder Group, which describes itself

as “a boutique investment real estate service firm specializing in

single tenant net lease properties. The firm provides a full range of
-4- 357 

CA 14-00962 

brokerage, advisory, and financing services nationwide to a

substantial and diversified client base, which includes high net worth

individuals, developers, REITs, partnerships and institutional

investment funds” (The Boulder Group, http://bouldergroup.com/

[accessed June 18, 2015]). Thus, we conclude that there is no serious

dispute that the submarket identified and relied upon by respondents’

expert exists, and sales and rental data for that submarket is readily

available (see Brooks Drugs, Inc., 51 AD3d at 1095; Matter of Eckerd

Corp. v Gilchrist, 44 AD3d 1239, 1241, lv denied 10 NY3d 707). It is

noteworthy that petitioner’s expert also recognized that the

boundaries of the applicable submarket “are not purely physical or

geographical” and, “to the extent that the market is the meeting place

for buyers and sellers of real estate of a given type, the

participants who deal within its confines set the boundaries of the

market.” Nonetheless, in his appraisal, petitioner’s expert

disregarded the applicable submarket and relied upon properties that

are clearly outside of the well-recognized parameters of the net lease

national drugstore market.

On the other hand, in reaching his valuation through the use of

the sales comparison approach, respondents’ expert identified and used

nine commercial properties, eight of which were improved and occupied

as national retail drugstore chain locations. Those eight properties

were clearly within the recognized parameters of the national net

lease submarket. The average sale price for those comparables was

$4,924,378. Respondents’ expert testified that the recent sale of the

subject property was a “very good indicator” of the market value of

the subject property, and was the “best comparable” to which he gave

the “most weight.” Petitioner’s expert testified that the 2005 sale

of the subject property played no role in his valuation.

Petitioner’s expert also used the income capitalization method. 

When using that method, actual rental income is often, as a general

rule, the best indicator of value (see Techniplex III, 125 AD3d at

1413; Matter of Schoeneck v City of Syracuse, 93 AD2d 988, 988; see

also Matter of Merrick Holding Corp. v Board of Assessors of County of

Nassau, 45 NY2d 538, 543). In reaching a valuation using the income

capitalization method, petitioner’s expert also rejected the actual

contract rent, which he described as “substantially above market.”

Moreover, petitioner’s expert rejected the rents of other net lease

national drugstore properties in arriving at his determination of

market rent. Instead, petitioner’s expert identified “market rent” by

using the following properties: a Goodwill Industries store and

donation drop-off center, a non-profit corporation serving community

needs; a Petsmart store; an Old Navy clothing retail store; a Gold’s

Gym; a Family Dollar retail store; and a Volunteers of America store,

a nonprofit corporation that serves community needs and operates

thrift or resale stores. Petitioner’s expert did not use any

operating national chain drugstore-occupied properties in his

determination of “market rent” and arrived at a market rent of $12.00

per square foot. 

On the other hand, respondents’ expert utilized 11 rental
-5- 357 

CA 14-00962 

comparables, nine of which were occupied and used as national chain

drugstores in the applicable market. The use of these comparables

demonstrated that the adjusted comparable median market rent for these

similar national chain drugstores was $36.76 per square foot, which

yielded a valuation between $3,590,000 to $3,940,000 on the relevant

valuation dates. 

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the failure of

petitioner’s expert to use the recent sale of the subject property, as

well as readily available comparable sales of national chain drugstore

properties in the applicable market, as evidence of value demonstrates

the invalidity of the expert’s conclusion with respect to the sales

comparison valuation (see Matter of Thomas v Davis, 96 AD3d 1412,

1415, lv denied 21 NY3d 860). We further conclude that petitioner’s

expert’s use of sales not comparable to the subject and outside of the

applicable market should have been rejected by the court as unreliable

(see Matter of Adcor Realty Corp. v Srogi, 54 AD2d 1096, 1096, lv

denied 41 NY2d 806). Moreover, the failure of petitioner’s expert to

use the actual rent, negotiated at arm’s length and without duress or

collusion, as well as the failure to use similar rental comparables

from the applicable submarket as evidence of value, demonstrates the

invalidity of the expert’s conclusions using the income capitalization

method (see Matter of Conifer Baldwinsville Assoc. v Town of Van

Buren, 68 NY2d 783, 785; see generally Techniplex III, 125 AD3d at

1413). We thus conclude that the court’s decision to credit the

appraisal of petitioner’s expert was against the weight of the

evidence (see Matter of Rite Aid Corp. v Otis, 102 AD3d 124, 127, lv

denied 21 NY3d 855; see also Matter of Kohl’s Ill. Inc. #691 v Board

of Assessors of the Town of Clifton Park, 123 AD3d 1315, 1317).

All concur except SCUDDER, P.J., who dissents and votes to affirm 

in the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent for the reasons

set forth in my dissent in Matter of Rite Aid Corp. v Haywood (___

AD3d ___ [July 10, 2015]). 

Entered: July 10, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court