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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-CF-0182

THOMAS R.JONES, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CF1-14717-09)

(Hon. William M. Jackson, Trial Judge)

(Argued April 29, 2015 Decided July 9, 2015)

Lisa D. Chanel, appointed by the court, for appellant.

David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald 

C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth 

Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt, and Jeff Pearlman, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FISHER, Associate Judge, NEBEKER, Senior Judge, and KRAVITZ, 

Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

KRAVITZ, Associate Judge: Appellant Thomas R. Jones was tried before a 

Superior Court jury in March 2011 on charges of first-degree premeditated murder

while armed, assault with intent to kill while armed, aggravated assault while 

 



 Sitting by designation pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-707 (a) (2012 Repl.).
2

armed, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, carrying a pistol without 

a license in a gun-free zone, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The 

charges arose from an incident on the night of July 3-4, 2009 in which two men 

were shot, one fatally, inside a passenger van parked in the 4400 block of Ord 

Street, N.E., in the District of Columbia. The jury returned a partial verdict at the 

end of the trial, acquitting appellant of first-degree premeditated murder while 

armed and convicting him of carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone 

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury was unable to reach 

unanimous decisions on the other charges, including the lesser-included offense of 

second-degree murder while armed, and the trial judge declared a mistrial on the 

unresolved charges and later dismissed them on the government’s motion. At 

sentencing, the judge imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of eight years for 

carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone and twelve years for 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by (1) admitting evidence of his 

prior possession of a “Bulldog” revolver, one of two types of pistols capable of 

firing the bullets recovered from the decedent’s body; (2) denying his request for a 

mistrial or a continuance following the government’s mid-trial disclosure of 

information relating to a potentially exculpatory witness; (3) inviting the jury to 
3

return a partial verdict without a sufficient indication that the jury had decided any 

of the charges; (4) failing to give the jury a special unanimity instruction on the 

charges of carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone and possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon; (5) imposing unreasonable limits on the jurors’

responses to questions posed during a poll of the jury; (6) denying his motion for a 

judgment of acquittal on the charges of carrying a pistol without a license in a gunfree zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (7) failing to instruct 

the jury on an essential element of the offense of carrying a pistol without a license 

in a gun-free zone; and (8) imposing illegal sentences for carrying a pistol without 

a license in a gun-free zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 

We agree that the twelve-year prison term imposed for possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon was illegal in that it exceeded the maximum sentence 

allowed by law at the time appellant committed the offense. We therefore vacate 

appellant’s sentence on that charge and remand for resentencing within applicable 

statutory limits. We otherwise affirm appellant’s convictions. 

 

1

In a pro se brief appended to his counsel’s initial brief on appeal, appellant 

argues further that the trial judge erred by summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief under D.C. Code § 23-110 (2012 Repl.). This claim of error is 

not properly before us. It is not encompassed by the notice of appellant’s direct 

appeal from the judgment of conviction, and the record reflects that a separate 

notice of appeal, from the denial of appellant’s § 23-110 motion, was mailed to the 

trial judge’s chambers but never docketed by the Clerk of the Superior Court. 
4

I. FACTS

We will outline here the essential facts and circumstances relating to the 

events of July 3-4, 2009. To the extent additional facts and circumstances are 

necessary to our analyses of appellant’s contentions on appeal, we will include 

them within our discussions below. 

Appellant Thomas R. Jones called his friend Jeffrey Stuckey on the night of 

July 3, 2009 and asked for a ride to Mr. Stuckey’s house. Appellant and Mr. 

Stuckey had grown up together and were very close. Mr. Stuckey picked up 

appellant and brought him over to 4401 Ord Street, N.E., where Mr. Stuckey lived 

with his girlfriend, Shaunice Frazier; Ms. Frazier’s 13-year-old son, Antonio 

Frazier; and Ms. Frazier’s adult godson, Lee’ante Brown. Those three, as well as 

several other adults and children, were at the house when appellant and Mr. 

Stuckey arrived. 

Appellant, Mr. Stuckey, Mr. Brown, and others went to the basement to 

shoot dice and drink liquor. Some of the adults, including Mr. Stuckey, also 
5

smoked marijuana and took ecstasy. Antonio Frazier and the other children were 

allowed to remain in the basement despite the nature of the activities. 

Several of the people present in the basement testified that appellant had a 

gun on his person. Shaunice Frazier told the jury she saw the butt of a gun 

protruding from appellant’s jacket pocket as appellant kneeled down to shoot dice. 

Antonio Frazier and Mr. Stuckey testified that at one point the gun fell out of 

appellant’s pocket onto the floor. Mr. Stuckey stated that this made him concerned 

for the safety of the children in the basement and that he told appellant to put the 

gun back in his pocket. Appellant did as he was told, albeit not before Mr. Stuckey 

recognized the gun as a .44 caliber “Bulldog” revolver he had seen in appellant’s 

possession on previous occasions.

Later the same night, appellant’s brother, Calvin Jones, called appellant and 

proposed an outing to a strip club. (To avoid confusion, we will refer to Calvin 

Jones primarily as “Mr. Jones” or “appellant’s brother.”) Like appellant, Mr. Jones

had grown up with Mr. Stuckey and was very close to him. Appellant agreed to 

the plan, and Mr. Jones and another friend, Andre Smith, rode over in Mr. Jones’s 

van to the Ord Street house, where they picked up appellant, Mr. Stuckey, and Mr. 

Brown. 
6

The men went first to a nearby gas station to buy cigars on their way to the 

strip club. Mr. Smith drove the van, while Mr. Stuckey sat in the front passenger 

seat and Mr. Jones was seated in the second row directly behind Mr. Smith. 

Appellant and Mr. Brown sat in seats in the second and third rows, although their 

precise seating locations were the subject of conflicting testimony at trial.

 

At some point, appellant and Mr. Stuckey got into a heated argument inside 

the van. Mr. Stuckey chided appellant and swore at him, causing appellant to 

become increasingly angry. As the argument escalated, Mr. Stuckey said he no 

longer wanted to go to the strip club, and the men drove back to the house on Ord 

Street. 

Shots rang out inside the van once the van came to a stop in front of 4401 

Ord Street. One of the shots hit Mr. Stuckey in the left side of his neck. Mr. 

Stuckey testified that he did not see anyone fire a gun inside the van, but he said he 

believed appellant was the shooter. Mr. Stuckey jumped out of the van and ran 

into the house, telling Shaunice Frazier as he entered that “Tom [appellant] just 

shot me.” 
7

Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith testified that they did not actually see anyone fire 

the shots inside the van, either. Both men told the jury, however, that they saw a 

gun in appellant’s hand after the shots were fired. Mr. Jones testified that he saw a 

chrome revolver in appellant’s hand immediately after the shots rang out and Mr. 

Stuckey left the van, and he said he yelled at appellant to get out of the van as soon 

as he saw the gun. Mr. Smith testified that he saw a chrome gun in appellant’s 

hand as appellant then left the van and ran off into the neighborhood. 

Once appellant was out of the van, Mr. Brown stated that he, too, had been 

shot, and Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones drove him in the van to a nearby hospital. 

When they arrived at the hospital, however, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones decided not 

to bring Mr. Brown inside because they were aware of an outstanding warrant for 

Mr. Jones’s arrest and did not want to come in contact with the police. Instead, 

Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith left Mr. Brown in the hospital parking lot, where Mr. 

Brown bled to death from one of the gunshot wounds he suffered in the van outside 

the Ord Street house – a shot that entered Mr. Brown’s thigh and severed his ileac 

artery. Security guards found Mr. Brown’s body in the parking lot in the early 

morning hours of July 4, 2009. 
8

The medical examiner recovered a .44 caliber bullet and a nickel-plated 

bullet fragment from Mr. Brown’s body during an autopsy. A firearms expert 

testified that both items were fired from the same gun – either a .44 Special 

marketed by Charter Arms (with the moniker “Bulldog” imprinted on the side of 

its chrome handle) or a .44 Magnum marketed by U.S. Arms Corporation. 

No other physical or forensic evidence tied appellant to the shootings. The 

police did not recover the gun used in the incident, and the bullet that hit Mr. 

Stuckey in the neck remained lodged in Mr. Stuckey’s shoulder at the time of trial 

and was not the subject of ballistics testing. Mr. Jones, moreover, cleaned all of 

the blood from the interior of the van before the police could search the vehicle for 

evidence. 

The parties stipulated that the distance between a set of trees in front of 4401 

Ord Street, N.E. and Kenilworth Elementary School, located at 44th and Ord 

Streets, N.E., was less than 200 feet and that a school custodian, if called as a 

witness, would testify that for several years, including the dates July 3-4, 2009, 

there was a sign posted on the school’s grounds prohibiting the possession of 

illegal firearms within 500 feet. The parties stipulated further that as of July 3-4, 
9

2009, appellant had a prior felony conviction and did not have a license to carry a 

pistol in the District of Columbia.

Appellant defended against the charges by challenging the credibility of the 

government’s witnesses and suggesting that his brother, Mr. Jones, was the real 

shooter. He impeached the government’s witnesses with lies and inconsistencies 

in their statements to the police and grand jury and with evidence of their prior 

convictions, criminal activities, and motives to curry favor with the government. 

He exposed the witnesses’ alcohol and drug use in the hours before the shootings

and raised questions about the plausibility of the government’s version of events,

given the location of several bullet holes found in the van’s interior, conflicts in the 

testimony concerning the seating arrangement inside the van, and expert medical 

testimony about the trajectories of the gunshot wounds suffered by Mr. Brown and 

Mr. Stuckey. Finally, he emphasized his brother’s efforts to avoid contact with the 

police on the night of the shootings and to destroy critical evidence of the van’s 

link to the crime, and he elicited testimony that his brother punched Mr. Brown in 

the face during a fight over alcohol sometime before the night of July 3-4, 2009. 

As indicated, the jury found appellant guilty of carrying a pistol without a 

license in a gun-free zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
10

acquitted him of the first-degree premeditated murder while armed of Mr. Brown. 

The jury was unable to reach unanimous decisions on any of the other charges, 

resulting in a mistrial on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder 

while armed of Mr. Brown, the charges of assault with intent to kill while armed 

and aggravated assault while armed of Mr. Stuckey, and three counts of possession 

of a firearm during a crime of violence relating to the charges of murder, assault 

with intent to kill, and aggravated assault. With the subsequent dismissal of the 

charges left unresolved by the jury, the only matters before us on appeal are 

appellant’s convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone 

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Evidence of Prior Gun Possession

The prosecutor notified appellant’s lawyers by letter five days before trial 

that the government intended to present evidence of appellant’s possession of a 

gun on at least three occasions in the year leading up to the shootings on July 3-4, 

2009. The prosecutor stated in the letter that Mr. Stuckey had previously described 

the gun he saw fall out of appellant’s pocket on the night of the shootings as a .44 
11

caliber Bulldog revolver. The prosecutor stated further that when he asked Mr. 

Stuckey at a witness conference how he knew the gun was a Bulldog revolver, Mr. 

Stuckey said he had seen appellant carrying the gun at least three times in the year 

before the shootings and, on one of those occasions, had been close enough to the 

gun to see the model name “Bulldog” stamped into the metal. 

Neither party filed a written motion in limine addressing the admissibility of 

the evidence outlined in the prosecutor’s letter. During a discussion of preliminary 

matters on the first day of trial, however, the prosecutor advised the judge that he 

intended to elicit testimony from Mr. Stuckey regarding three or four occasions in 

the “several months” leading up to the shootings on which Mr. Stuckey observed 

appellant carrying a Bulldog revolver, including one occasion on which Mr. 

Stuckey actually touched the gun and saw the name “Bulldog” stamped on it. The 

prosecutor proffered that he had learned the information directly from Mr. Stuckey

on the day he sent the letter to appellant’s lawyers, and he explained that the 

testimony was important to the government’s proof of appellant’s involvement in 

the shootings because a firearms expert would testify that bullets recovered from 

Mr. Brown’s body were fired from a single weapon, either a .44 caliber Charter 

Arms Bulldog revolver or a .44 caliber U.S. Arms Magnum revolver. The 

prosecutor stated further that Mr. Stuckey’s testimony about the prior incidents 
12

would enable the jury to understand how Mr. Stuckey knew the gun he saw in 

appellant’s possession on the night of the shootings was a .44 caliber Bulldog 

revolver. 

Appellant objected to the admission of the evidence, arguing that the 

government’s disclosure of the proffered testimony was untimely and that the 

alleged incidents of prior possession of the weapon were too remote in time to be 

relevant. The trial judge overruled appellant’s objection. The judge explained that 

appellant was charged with murder and carrying a gun and that the probative value 

of the evidence of appellant’s prior possession of a Bulldog revolver outweighed 

any risk of unfair prejudice to him. 

At trial, Mr. Stuckey testified on direct examination that a “.44 Bulldog” fell 

out of appellant’s jacket pocket in the basement of Mr. Stuckey’s home prior to the 

shootings on the night of July 3-4, 2009. Asked by the prosecutor how he knew it 

was a .44 Bulldog, Mr. Stuckey stated that he had seen appellant carrying the gun 

three times before the night of the shootings and that on one of those occasions he 

had actually held the gun in his own hands and seen the name Bulldog “branded on 

the gun.” The prosecutor, however, never asked Mr. Stuckey when the prior 

incidents occurred, and Mr. Stuckey said nothing to place any of them in time. 
13

Appellant’s lawyer asked no questions about the prior incidents on crossexamination of Mr. Stuckey and made no further objection at trial to the testimony

about them. 

Appellant now contends that the trial judge erred in admitting Mr. Stuckey’s 

testimony about the incidents of prior gun possession because the government’s 

disclosure of the evidence was untimely, the earlier incidents were too temporally 

remote, the testimony actually presented at trial did not support the prosecutor’s 

pretrial proffer, the judge failed to give the jury a proper limiting instruction, and 

the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfair 

prejudicial effect. We find no reversible error. 

It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that evidence of a defendant’s 

uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to prove the defendant’s disposition to 

commit an offense charged in the case. See Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89 

(D.C. Cir. 1964). Under Drew, evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant 

is admissible only if it is offered to prove a legitimate and materially disputed 

issue, such as motive, intent, common plan, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident, Williams v. United States, 106 A.3d 1063, 1067 (D.C. 2015), and only if 

the trial judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed 
14

the other crimes, Roper v. United States, 564 A.2d 726, 731 (D.C. 1989), and 

determines that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed 

by the risk of unfair prejudice posed by its admission, Williams, 106 A.3d at 1067. 

The Drew rule, however, applies only to evidence of uncharged criminal 

conduct that is independent of the offense charged in the case. Johnson v. United 

States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). The strictures of Drew, 

therefore, are inapplicable to evidence of the defendant’s other criminal conduct

that “(1) is direct and substantial proof of the charged crime, (2) is closely 

intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime, or (3) is necessary to place the 

charged crime in an understandable context.” Id. at 1098. 

We have repeatedly recognized, moreover, that evidence of a defendant’s 

prior possession of the weapon or type of weapon used to commit a charged 

offense can be admitted as direct and substantial proof of the crime charged. See,

e.g., Daniels v. United States, 2 A.3d 250, 254, 262 (D.C. 2010) (upholding the 

admission of testimony in a murder case that the defendant had been seen many 

times with a black or silver gun, where other testimony established that the murder 

weapon was black or silver); Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 710, 712 (D.C. 

1977) (“An accused person’s prior possession of the physical means of committing 
15

the crime [charged] is some evidence of the probability of his guilt, and is therefore 

admissible.”); see generally Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1097 (“Our cases have 

repeatedly held that admissibility of this kind of evidence [possession of pistol 

allegedly used in assault with intent to kill] is based upon a determination of 

whether it was directly relevant to some issue in the case. We have never held, and 

do not do so now, that such evidence must meet the standards established by the 

Drew line of cases.”) (alteration in original) (quoting King v. United States, 618 

A.2d 727, 730 (D.C. 1993)). 

Ultimately, the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s prior possession of 

the weapon or type of weapon used in a charged offense turns on a consideration of 

the temporal proximity of the incidents of prior possession to the charged offense 

and a comparison of the appearance of the weapon previously possessed by the 

defendant with that of the weapon actually used in the charged offense. Williams, 

106 A.3d at 1069. These factors inform the trial judge’s determination of the 

relevance of the evidence and drive the requisite balancing of the evidence’s 

legitimate probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice posed by its admission; 

the more likely it is that the weapon previously in the defendant’s possession was 

the weapon used in the charged offense, the “less relevant” is the length of time 
16

between the earlier sightings and the crime charged. McConnaughey v. United 

States, 804 A.2d 334, 339 (D.C. 2002). 

A trial judge has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence 

of uncharged misconduct as direct and substantial proof of the crime charged under 

Johnson, and on appeal our review of a judge’s ruling admitting such evidence is 

limited to a consideration of whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Busey 

v. United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion 

in the judge’s decision to admit Mr. Stuckey’s testimony based on the prosecutor’s 

pretrial proffer. 

First, the government did not run afoul of any pretrial disclosure obligation. 

We have never determined whether the government must provide pretrial notice of 

its intention to present evidence of a defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct as 

direct and substantial proof of the crime charged under Johnson. In Johnson itself, 

we considered whether, in the Drew context, we should adopt a provision of Rule 

404 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that requires prosecutors in federal cases 

to provide advance notice of the government’s intent to present evidence of other 

crimes at trial. 683 A.2d at 1100 n.17. We declined to impose an across-the-board 

notice requirement for the government’s intent to introduce Drew evidence, 
17

although we acknowledged that “even without a rule or policy requiring such 

notice, the trial court has the discretion to require parties to disclose in advance 

their intention[s] to use evidence of other crimes, and in any event a prosecutor 

may find it prudent to afford such notice.” Id. We understand that many Superior 

Court judges generally require the pretrial disclosure of other crimes evidence and 

that the government routinely discloses its intention to present such evidence even 

without a judge’s order. Advance disclosure has many benefits – it notifies the 

defense of allegations of uncharged criminal conduct the defense must investigate 

and prepare to confront at trial; it informs the judge of often-difficult evidentiary 

rulings the judge may have to make at trial; and, as we stated in Johnson, it “may 

obviate any possible claim of unfair surprise and may avoid a request for [a] 

continuance.” Id. 

We need not decide, however, whether the government always has an 

obligation to disclose Johnson evidence in advance of trial, because even if we 

were to assume the existence of such an obligation, the record reflects that the 

prosecutor notified appellant’s lawyers of his intent to present evidence of the prior 

incidents of gun possession on the day the prosecutor learned of the incidents from 

Mr. Stuckey. On this record, there can be no argument that the government’s 

disclosure was untimely. 
18

Second, the prosecutor’s pretrial proffer amply supported the trial judge’s 

determination that evidence of appellant’s prior possession of a .44 caliber 

Bulldog revolver had significant legitimate probative value despite the temporal 

remoteness of the earlier incidents. As the prosecutor explained to the judge, 

ballistics evidence would show that a .44 caliber Bulldog revolver was one of only 

two types of guns that could have been used in the shootings on July 3-4, 2009, 

and Mr. Stuckey’s testimony would clearly link appellant with a .44 caliber 

Bulldog revolver. Given the likelihood that the gun previously seen in appellant’s 

possession was of the same distinctive type used in the charged offenses, it was 

less concerning that the prior sightings may have occurred several months, or even 

a year, before the charged offenses. See McConnaughey, 804 A.2d at 338-39

(upholding the admission of testimony relating to the defendant’s possession of a 

gun eleven months before the charged offense “in light of the evidence strongly 

suggesting that the gun [seen previously in the defendant’s possession] was the 

gun with which [the victims] were shot”); (Phillip) Johnson v. United States, 701 

A.2d 1085, 1092 (D.C. 1997) (more than one year before the charged offense); 

Coleman, 379 A.2d at 712 (five months before). 
19

We readily conclude, moreover, that the trial judge did not abuse his 

discretion in determining that the probative value of the proffered testimony was 

greater than (and thus not substantially outweighed by) the risk of unfair prejudice

to appellant. The judge understood that the evidence would explain how Mr. 

Stuckey knew the type of gun that fell out of appellant’s pocket on the night of the 

shootings, and it was apparent from the prosecutor’s proffer that the testimony 

could be elicited in front of the jury with a few simple questions of Mr. Stuckey. 

More complex is the question whether the trial judge erred in not striking 

Mr. Stuckey’s testimony about appellant’s prior possession of a Bulldog revolver

when the government failed at trial to elicit any testimony to establish the dates on 

which the prior incidents occurred. Absent evidence of temporal proximity to the 

charged offenses, appellant argues, Mr. Stuckey’s testimony about the prior acts 

of possession was virtually irrelevant, and any limited probative value of the 

evidence was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. 

We agree that the testimony from Mr. Stuckey actually presented at trial did 

not fully support the prosecutor’s pretrial proffer and that without any indication

of temporal proximity the admissibility of the evidence of appellant’s prior acts of 

possession of a Bulldog revolver would have been unlikely. Had appellant 
20

objected at trial on this ground, therefore, the judge would have been required to 

strike the testimony or to provide some other appropriate remedy for the 

government’s failure of proof. See Anderson v. United States, 857 A.2d 451, 458 

n.6 (D.C. 2004); Daniels v. United States, 613 A.2d 342, 347 (D.C. 1992). 

Appellant, however, raised no objection at trial to the incompleteness of Mr. 

Stuckey’s testimony about the prior acts of gun possession, and he never asked the 

trial judge to strike the testimony or to take any other corrective action. We held 

in Anderson, 857 A.2d at 458-59, that the plain error rule applies on appeal when 

a defendant failed to object at trial to the admission, under Drew, of other crimes 

evidence on the ground that the evidence actually presented to the jury did not 

fulfill the prosecutor’s pretrial proffer, even if the defendant objected before trial 

to the admission of the evidence. We explained that the “continuing objection 

doctrine only applies where the trial court ‘has already had an opportunity to 

decide the point at issue’ while ‘the purpose of the contemporaneous objection 

rule is to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any potential errors at the 

time they are made.’” Id. (quoting McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 45 

n.14 (D.C. 1991)). Therefore, “[w]here a trial court permits the admission of 

evidence subject to the fulfillment of a condition, an opposing party must object if 

it believes that condition has not been fulfilled when the disputed evidence is 
21

presented.” Id. at 459; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 

n.7 (1988) (“It is, of course, not the responsibility of the judge sua sponte to insure 

that the foundation evidence is offered; the objector must move to strike the 

evidence if at the close of the trial the offeror has failed to satisfy the condition.”). 

We have never decided whether the same rule of appellate review applies in 

the Johnson context, but we see no meaningful distinction between the two 

situations and can think of no good reason why a defendant should be excused 

from interposing a contemporaneous objection when evidence of his uncharged 

misconduct admitted conditionally under Johnson fails to fulfill the prosecutor’s 

proffer. We thus limit to plain error analysis our review of the trial judge’s failure 

sua sponte to strike Mr. Stuckey’s testimony about the incidents of appellant’s 

prior possession of a .44 caliber Bulldog revolver. 

Under the plain error doctrine, appellant must establish (1) that the trial 

judge committed error; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; (3) that 

the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) that a failure to correct the error 

would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings. Marshall v. United States, 15 A.3d 699, 710 (D.C. 2011) (citing 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993)). 
22

Appellant has not made the requisite showing. Even if it should have been 

clear to the trial judge that the evidence of appellant’s prior possession of the 

Bulldog revolver lacked probative value without testimony placing it in temporal 

proximity to the charged offenses, appellant cannot establish that the judge’s 

failure to strike the testimony affected his substantial rights or that our failure to 

correct the error on appeal would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. Mr. Stuckey’s testimony about the defendant’s 

prior acts of possession covers less than a page in the transcript of a week-long 

trial, and without the evidence of temporal proximity proffered by the prosecutor 

the testimony was likely less compelling to the jury in any event. Indeed, the fact 

that appellant’s trial counsel chose not to raise the government’s failure to fulfill 

its pretrial proffer suggests to us that counsel reasonably viewed the government’s 

failure more as a benign oversight than as a point of unfair prejudice. 

Finally, appellant complains that the trial judge did not give an instruction 

limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence of his prior gun possession to its 

proper purpose. A limiting instruction is generally required when evidence of 

other crimes is admitted under Drew. Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 243 

(D.C. 1984). An instruction is not always required, however, when evidence of 
23

uncharged criminal conduct is admitted under Johnson as direct and substantial 

proof of the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense; in that circumstance, it is left 

to the sound discretion of the trial judge to decide whether to grant a request for an 

instruction, even though a cautionary directive is usually warranted. Johnson, 683 

A.2d at 1097 n.10. 

Appellant never asked the trial judge to give an instruction limiting the 

jury’s consideration of the evidence of his prior possession of the Bulldog revolver. 

His complaint about the judge’s failure to give a cautionary instruction is therefore

subject to plain error review on appeal. Given the Johnson rule that limiting 

instructions are not always required when evidence of uncharged criminal conduct 

is admitted as direct and substantial proof of the defendant’s guilt of the charged 

offense, we find no error, and certainly no plain error, in the judge’s failure sua 

sponte to give a limiting instruction. 

B. Request for Mistrial or Mid-Trial Continuance

At the end of the first full day of trial, on Wednesday, March 9, 2011, Mr.

Stuckey told the prosecutor he had received a telephone call earlier in the day from 

a person named “Teddy” who said he had “heard from this guy Finny[man] . . . 
24

that maybe . . . [Calvin Jones] had something to do with Lee’ante [Brown] being 

killed.” When the prosecutor asked Mr. Stuckey “how it is that Finny[man] would 

know something about this,” Mr. Stuckey said he did not know but would try to 

talk further with Teddy. 

The prosecutor reported his conversation with Mr. Stuckey to appellant’s 

counsel on the evening of March 9, 2011. The next morning, Thursday, March 10, 

2011, appellant’s counsel raised the issue with the trial judge and moved for a 

mistrial, stating that she needed time to investigate the information provided by 

Mr. Stuckey. The trial judge denied the motion, but he stated that appellant’s 

counsel should be given an opportunity to investigate the information while the 

trial proceeded, and he directed the prosecutor to make Mr. Stuckey available to 

appellant’s counsel for an interview. The prosecutor agreed to arrange a meeting 

between appellant’s counsel and Mr. Stuckey and to defer calling Mr. Jones and

Mr. Smith as witnesses until appellant’s counsel had at least had a chance to speak 

with Mr. Stuckey. The prosecutor called other witnesses in what became an 

abbreviated trial session on March 10, 2011, and the judge recessed the trial until 

the following Monday. 
25

Appellant’s counsel renewed her motion for a mistrial when the trial

reconvened on Monday, March 14, 2011. Counsel reported that in the previous 

four days she had made considerable efforts to locate Teddy – interviewing Mr. 

Stuckey twice, obtaining Mr. Stuckey’s telephone records and calling every 

number listed in them, and going to two locations where Mr. Stuckey said Teddy 

hung out – all to no avail. Counsel stated further that she had no leads on locating

or even identifying the person known as “Finnyman”; her investigators had not 

found anyone who knew the man, and Mr. Stuckey did not know the man’s real 

name. Appellant’s counsel told the judge, however, that Mr. Stuckey said he 

would likely see Teddy within the next two days and would try to get Teddy’s 

telephone number at that time. Asserting that it was critical to appellant’s defense, 

counsel asked for a mistrial or, at a minimum, a few additional days to investigate 

the matter further. 

The trial judge declined to grant either a mistrial or a further delay of the 

trial. The judge noted that “we know nothing about Teddy or his reliability or his 

motivation in calling Mr. Stuckey” and that “we know absolutely nothing about” 

Finnyman or “his reliability, the source of his information and whether or not this 

is anything beyond street rumor.” The judge concluded that the risk of losing 

jurors, who were told during the jury selection process that the trial would last only
26

a week, was too great to justify an additional delay beyond the extended weekend 

recess already provided. 

Appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying 

his mid-trial request for a mistrial or a continuance. We disagree. 

A trial judge’s denial of a request for a mid-trial continuance to secure a 

witness is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Daley v. United States, 739 

A.2d 814, 817 (D.C. 1999). Factors to be considered in determining whether an 

abuse of discretion occurred include the probative value of the absent witness’s 

proffered testimony, the likelihood the witness would have appeared had the 

continuance been granted, the diligence and good faith of the party seeking the 

continuance, the prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance, any

prejudice the opposing party would have suffered had the continuance been 

granted, and the duration of the requested continuance and any likely resulting 

disruption or delay of the trial. Gilliam v. United States, 80 A.3d 192, 202 (D.C. 

2013). At a minimum, a party seeking a continuance to obtain the attendance of a 

witness must show “(1) who the missing witness is, (2) what the witness’[s]

testimony would be, (3) the relevance and competence of that testimony, (4) that 

the witness could probably be obtained if the continuance were granted, and (5)
27

that the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence in trying to 

locate the witness.” Daley, 739 A.2d at 817 (quoting Bedney v. United States, 684 

A.2d 759, 766 (D.C. 1996)). 

Appellant and his counsel certainly acted diligently in investigating the 

information disclosed by the prosecutor. Despite their best efforts, however, 

appellant and his counsel were unable to provide Finnyman’s real name, establish 

the basis of his knowledge of the shootings, or make a proffer of what he might say 

if located and called as a witness. Appellant thus failed to satisfy the minimum 

showing required for a mid-trial continuance and provided no ground on which the 

trial judge could have found Finnyman’s testimony relevant and competent or 

concluded that the denial of the request would be prejudicial to appellant. The trial 

judge nonetheless directed the prosecutor to make Mr. Stuckey available for a 

defense interview, recessed the trial over an extended weekend, and agreed to the 

re-ordering of the government’s witnesses to protect appellant’s ability to crossexamine Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith with information obtained through his counsel’s 

investigation. When those efforts failed to produce anything showing Finnyman’s

alleged statement to be other than an unreliable street rumor, the judge reasonably 

concluded that any further delay of the trial, with its attendant risk of losing jurors, 

was not warranted in the circumstances. We find no abuse of discretion. 
28

C. Partial Verdict

At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on all of the charges in 

the indictment, as well as on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder 

while armed of Mr. Brown. The jury then began to deliberate at approximately 

10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 16, 2011. The jury deliberated throughout the 

remainder of that day, sending notes to the judge only to request a written copy of 

the parties’ stipulations, a marker for the whiteboard, and the password for the 

computer in the jury room. 

The jury resumed its deliberations on the morning of Thursday, March 17, 

2011. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on that second day of deliberations, the jury 

sent the following note to the judge:

Your Honor, for some of the greater offenses, individuals 

on both sides are very firm in their decision and have 

expressed that any more continued deliberations would 

not change their minds based on the evidence before 

them. We have two questions: (1) At what point are we 

considered a hung jury? (2) Are we allowed to consider 

the lesser offenses before making a unanimous decision 

on the greater offenses?
29

The trial judge discussed the jury’s note with the parties. The prosecutor

asked the judge to instruct the jury to continue its deliberations, while appellant 

requested an anti-deadlock instruction. See Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 

(D.C. 1974). The judge considered the parties’ positions and sent a hand-written 

note to the jury, stating: “I have spoken to both sides in this matter and I’m 

instructing you to continue with your deliberations. You might consider going to 

lunch at this time.” 

The jury sent another note to the judge a few hours later. The note, received 

at 2:40 p.m. on March 17, 2011, stated:

Your Honor, we have continued to deliberate. We 

continue to be a hung jury on multiple counts. There 

seems to be no more to discuss.

By then, the judge was selecting a jury in another trial, and he was unable to 

meet with the parties to discuss the jury’s note until 4:00 p.m. Appellant moved 

for a mistrial at that time, asserting, through counsel, that “the tone of the note is 

very sad and very certain.” The prosecutor objected to a mistrial and requested

that the judge instead ask the jury whether it had reached a verdict on any counts. 

The prosecutor argued that portions of the jury’s notes suggested that the jury may 
30

have reached unanimous decisions on some of the charges. The judge asked the 

parties whether either was requesting that he take a partial verdict. The prosecutor 

said yes, while appellant said no and reiterated his request for a mistrial. 

The judge declined to grant a mistrial, concluding that he should ask the jury 

whether it had decided any of the charges. He sent another written note to the jury, 

stating: “Ladies & Gentlemen of the jury: Has the jury reached a verdict with 

respect to any of the counts? If so, which counts?” The jury promptly responded 

with a note indicating that it had reached a verdict on three counts: “The jury has 

reached a verdict on the following counts: Count 1: First degree murder while 

armed. Count 7: carrying a pistol w/o a license. Count 8: possession of firearm by 

a convicted felon.”

The judge then directed the courtroom clerk to escort the jury back into the 

courtroom, where the jury’s foreperson announced verdicts of not guilty on the 

charge of first-degree premeditated murder while armed and guilty on the charges 

of carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone and possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon. Following a poll of the jury (discussed below), the judge 

excused the jurors for the day and asked them to return the next morning, Friday, 

March 18, 2011, to resume their deliberations on the remaining charges. (The 
31

jury’s subsequent deliberations on March 18, 2011 were not fruitful. The jury sent 

two more hung notes, one before and one after the judge gave an anti-deadlock 

instruction, and the judge declared a mistrial on all charges other than the three 

decided on March 17, 2011.) 

Appellant argues that the trial judge improperly invited a partial verdict from 

the jury on March 17, 2011 without a sufficient indication that the jury had reached 

a unanimous decision on any of the counts before it. We are not persuaded. 

Court rules provide that a jury may return a partial verdict “at any time 

during its deliberations.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 31 (b). “Ordinarily, therefore, a 

partial verdict should be accepted when it is offered unless there exists good reason 

to do otherwise.” Wilson v. United States, 922 A.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. 2007). A 

trial judge nonetheless treads a “fine line . . . with respect to partial verdicts” and 

“must be careful not to coerce juries into reaching decisions,” “particularly where 

the jury has given no indication of agreement on any charge.” Speaks v. United 

States, 617 A.2d 942, 952 (D.C. 1992). 

We review a trial judge’s decision to accept a partial verdict for abuse of 

discretion, Wilson, 922 A.2d at 1195, and we find no abuse here. The jury’s notes 
32

leading up to the trial judge’s decision to inquire about the existence of a partial 

verdict strongly suggested the possibility that the jury had reached unanimous 

decisions on some but not all of the charges. The note at 11:00 a.m. on March 17, 

2011 stated that the jurors were split on “some of the greater offenses” and asked 

whether the jury was permitted to “consider the lesser offenses before making a 

unanimous decision on the greater offenses.” The note a few hours later, at 2:40 

p.m., added that “[w]e continue to be a hung jury on multiple counts.” Neither 

note said anything to indicate or imply an impasse on “all” of the charges, and 

since second-degree murder while armed was the only lesser-included offense on 

which the jury had been instructed, the references in the earlier note to a deadlock 

on “some of the greater offenses” and to an interest in considering the “lesser 

offenses” raised the likelihood that the jurors were split on some or all of the lead 

charges in the case – murder, assault with intent to kill, and aggravated assault –

but could have reached agreement on at least some of the “lesser” weapons 

offenses. The statement in the later note that the jury continued to be hung on 

“multiple” (but not “all”) counts added further support for the judge’s view that the 

jury might have reached a partial verdict. 

The trial judge thus reasonably concluded that the jury’s notes indicated the 

possibility of unanimous agreement on some of the charges. The judge’s return 
33

note to the jurors asking whether they had reached a verdict on any of the charges, 

moreover, was plainly worded and appropriately understated so as to avoid any 

sense of coercion among the jurors. We are satisfied that the judge successfully 

treaded the fine line required by our case law. 

D. Special Unanimity Instruction

The trial judge gave a standard “general unanimity” instruction as part of his 

final charge to the jury:

The verdict in this case must represent the considered 

judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, each 

juror must agree on the verdict. In other words, your 

verdict must be unanimous.

See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.405 (5th ed. 

2010). 

Appellant contends that the judge also should have given a “special 

unanimity” instruction on the charges of carrying a pistol without a license in a 

gun-free zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In particular, 

appellant asserts that the judge was required, in the circumstances, to instruct the 
34

jury that all twelve jurors must agree on a particular act of carrying or possession 

of the Bulldog revolver before the jury could find him guilty of either weapons 

offense. Without a special unanimity instruction, appellant argues, there is an 

unacceptable risk that the jury found him guilty of the weapons offenses through

non-unanimous verdicts, i.e., that some jurors found him guilty based on evidence 

of his carrying and possession of the revolver in the basement of the Ord Street 

house while others found him guilty based on evidence of his carrying and

possession of the gun in the van. Appellant contends that the error requires the 

reversal of his convictions on both weapons charges even though he did not request 

a special unanimity instruction at trial. 

The right to a unanimous verdict is an “indispensable feature of the Sixth 

Amendment right to trial by jury.” Scarborough v. United States, 522 A.2d 869, 

872 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). The unanimity guarantee “requires jurors to be in 

substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to 

determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.” Id. at 873 

(quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1977)). Thus, 

whenever one count in an indictment encompasses two or more separate criminal 

acts, the trial judge must instruct the jury that a guilty verdict may be returned only 
35

if all jurors agree “as to the specific act the defendant committed.” Id.; see also

Wynn v. United States, 48 A.3d 181, 192 (D.C. 2012).2 

A special unanimity instruction is not required, however, “when a single 

count is charged and the facts show a continuing course of conduct, rather than a 

succession of clearly detached incidents.” Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255, 

1258 (D.C. 1988). In that event, the alleged actions of the defendant are not

distinct, either factually or legally, and a special instruction is not necessary to 

ensure unanimity among the members of the jury. Id. 

 

2

 The current edition of the standard Red Book instructions contains the following 

instruction on special unanimity:

[Name of defendant] has been charged with one count of 

[name of offense]. You have heard evidence of more 

than one act or incident related to this count. [Describe 

the separate acts/incidents.] You may find [name of 

defendant] guilty on this count if the government proves 

beyond a reasonable doubt that [name of defendant] 

committed either of these acts/incidents. However, in 

order to return a guilty verdict on this count, you must all 

agree that [name of defendant] committed [describe first 

act/incident] or you must all agree that [name of 

defendant] committed [describe second act/incident] 

[repeat if other alternative acts/incidents].

Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.406 (5th ed. 2014). 
36

It is a close question whether a special unanimity instruction was required in 

these circumstances. On the one hand, we have held in the merger context that the 

act of carrying or possessing a weapon “is continuous and may be committed by a 

person who is moving from place to place,” Bruce v. United States, 471 A.2d 1005, 

1007 (D.C. 1984), and there is no evidence in the record that appellant ever broke 

his continuous (and unlawful) carrying and possession of the Bulldog revolver 

throughout the events at issue by putting it away or (as to the charge of carrying a 

pistol without a license) by returning it to his home, place of business, or other 

location at which his carrying of the weapon might not have been unlawful, see id. 

On the other hand, we have recognized that “unanimity and merger inquiries must 

be approached from different perspectives in light of the different constitutional 

principles they are meant to safeguard,” Bryant v. United States, 93 A.3d 210, 219 

(D.C. 2014), and we are concerned, in light of the jury’s inability to reach 

unanimous verdicts on the charges arising from the shootings of Mr. Brown and 

Mr. Stuckey, that the jury also may have been divided on the question whether 

appellant carried and possessed the Bulldog revolver in the van. In this regard, we 

reiterate our recent statement that “[i]n determining whether a special unanimity 

instruction was required, we need only determine that it was possible, based on the 

evidence, for the jury to reasonably perceive separate incidents and then base their 

convictions on different factual predicates.” Id. at 220-21. 
37

We need not resolve this difficult question, however, because appellant’s 

failure to request a special unanimity instruction at trial subjects his claim to plain 

error review on appeal, see id. at 217; Wynn, 48 A.3d at 192, and appellant cannot 

satisfy the plain error standard. Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that 

the trial judge’s failure sua sponte to give a special unanimity instruction met the 

first three prongs of the plain error standard – i.e., that it was a clear error affecting

appellant’s substantial rights – appellant cannot meet the fourth prong of the plain 

error standard by showing that a decision on appeal declining to correct the error 

would seriously erode the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings. See Marshall, 15 A.3d at 710. First, “we can rely on the ‘robust 

intuition and good common-sense of jurors . . . to apply the standard unanimity 

charge to circumstances where special unanimity problems lurk.’” Bryant, 93 

A.3d at 222 (alteration in original) (quoting Shivers v. United States, 533 A.2d 258, 

263 n.14 (D.C. 1987)). We are thus confident that the general unanimity 

instruction the judge gave to the jury at trial reduced the danger of non-unanimous 

verdicts on the weapons offenses. Second, as we discuss below, the government 

presented abundant evidence at trial of appellant’s carrying and possession of the 

Bulldog revolver in the basement of the Ord Street house and in the van in which 

the shootings occurred. As we held in Bryant, the government’s presentation of 
38

ample evidence at trial of a defendant’s commission of all of the separate acts 

constituting an offense precludes the defendant on appeal from “carry[ing] his 

burden on this [fourth] prong of plain error analysis.” Id. at 225. We therefore

find no reversible error. 

 

E. Jury Poll

The trial judge conducted a poll of the jury immediately after the jury’s 

foreperson announced the jury’s partial verdict on the offenses of first-degree 

premeditated murder while armed (not guilty), carrying a pistol without a license in 

a gun-free zone (guilty), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (guilty). 

Without objection from either party, the judge gave the jury the following 

explanation before conducting the poll: 

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I’m going to do what is 

now called a poll of the jury and I’m going to do it by 

seat number. I’m going to ask you if you agree with the 

verdict as stated by your foreperson. If you agree with 

the verdict, say “I agree.” If you disagree with the 

verdict, say “I disagree.” Don’t say anything else. 

Okay?
39

The judge then asked each juror individually for the juror’s answer to the 

question whether the juror agreed with the verdict as stated by the foreperson. The 

record reflects that each of the twelve jurors stated unequivocally either “yes” or “I 

agree” in response to the judge’s question. 

Appellant contends that it was error for the judge to limit the jurors’ 

responses to “I agree” or “I disagree.” Particularly given the absence of a special 

unanimity instruction on the weapons offenses, appellant argues, the judge’s 

directions to the jurors preceding the poll were too restrictive. We are not 

persuaded.

The purposes of a jury poll are to determine whether each individual juror 

agrees with the verdict as announced by the jury’s foreperson and to assure that no 

juror has been coerced into stating agreement with a verdict with which the juror 

disagrees. Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697, 700-01 (D.C. 1993) (citing 

Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336, 340 (D.C. 1978)). “The jury poll is the 

primary device for discovering doubt or confusion of individual jurors and has 

long been regarded as a useful and necessary tool for preserving the defendant’s 

right to a unanimous verdict.” Id. at 700; see generally Super. Ct. Crim. R. 31 (d). 
40

The trial judge has “an appreciable measure of discretion” in determining 

how best to conduct a poll of the jury, Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 357, 360 

(D.C. 2001) (quoting Harris, 622 A.2d at 701), and we have never prescribed any 

particular questions or sets of questions that must be asked. Even where a timely 

objection to the method used to conduct the poll has preserved the issue for appeal, 

we review only for abuse of discretion and “will affirm if we can ‘say with 

assurance that the jury freely and fairly arrived at a unanimous verdict.’” Id. at

360-61 (quoting Harris, 622 A.2d at 701). And where, as here, no objection has 

been made in the trial court, we review for plain error and “will reverse . . . ‘only 

in exceptional circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise 

result.’” Id. at 360 (quoting Brawner v. United States, 745 A.2d 354, 357 (D.C. 

2000)). 

We find no abuse of discretion, and certainly no plain error, in the way the 

trial judge conducted the poll of the jury. The judge addressed each juror 

individually and determined that all twelve jurors agreed with the partial verdict 

announced by the foreperson. No juror expressed any doubt or confusion about the 

partial verdict, and nothing in the record suggests that any juror even hinted at 

having been coerced or induced into falsely stating his or her agreement. Indeed, 

we think it was wise, in the circumstances, for the judge to limit the jurors’ 
41

responses to his polling question. The judge knew the jury was divided on all 

charges other than the three to be resolved through the jury’s partial verdict, and it 

was essential to the jury’s ability to continue its deliberations on the unresolved 

charges that the jurors not divulge any information about their thought processes or 

the substance of their ongoing discussions. See Fortune v. United States, 65 A.3d 

75, 83 (D.C. 2013) (discussing the “weighty” policy reasons for “insulating the 

jury’s deliberative process”). 

 

F. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts at the end of the 

government’s case-in-chief and again at the close of the evidence. The trial judge 

denied both motions. Appellant claims error, asserting that the government’s 

witnesses were so inherently incredible, and so thoroughly impeached, that their 

testimony about his carrying and possession of the Bulldog revolver was legally 

insufficient to support his convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in a 

gun-free zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We disagree. 

A party seeking to exclude a witness’s testimony from consideration based 

on the doctrine of inherent incredibility must satisfy a “stringent test.” Payne v. 
42

United States, 516 A.2d 484, 494 (D.C. 1986). Specifically, the doctrine “can be 

invoked only when the testimony can be disproved . . . as a matter of logic by the 

uncontradicted facts or by scientific evidence, or when the person whose testimony 

is under scrutiny made allegations which seem highly questionable in the light of 

common experience and knowledge, or behaved in a manner strongly at variance 

with the way in which we would normally expect a similarly situated person to 

behave.” In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 496 n.8 (D.C. 1985) (ellipsis in original) 

(quotations and citations omitted). “A certain amount of inconsistency in the 

evidence is almost inevitable in any trial, but it rarely justifies reversal.” Id. at 495. 

Evidence is not legally insufficient to support a criminal conviction merely because 

the testimony of the witnesses has been contradictory and the explanations for the 

inconsistencies difficult to believe. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 

553, 558 (10th Cir. 1978)). To the contrary, “a witness may be inaccurate, 

contradictory and even untruthful in some respects and yet be entirely credible in 

the essentials of his testimony.” Id. (quoting United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 

1069, 1074 (2d Cir. 1969)). 

More generally, whenever we consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence 

presented in support of a criminal conviction, “we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to 
43

determine credibility and to weigh and draw justifiable inferences from the 

evidence.” Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 987 n.3 (D.C. 2008) (citing 

Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)). Although we

are “not a rubber stamp,” Swinton v. United States, 902 A.2d 772, 776 n.6 (D.C. 

2006), we “must deem the proof of guilt sufficient if, ‘after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [we conclude that] any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt,’” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979) (emphasis in original)). 

We are satisfied that the government’s evidence at trial was legally sufficient

to support appellant’s convictions on the weapons charges. Five witnesses testified 

that appellant had a gun on his person on the night of July 3-4, 2009. Ms. Frazier, 

her son Antonio, and Mr. Stuckey all told the jury that appellant had a gun in his 

jacket pocket while he and others shot dice in the basement of the Ord Street 

house; as discussed above, Mr. Stuckey stated that he had seen the same gun in 

appellant’s possession three times before and that he recognized it as a .44 caliber 

Bulldog revolver when it fell out of appellant’s pocket onto the basement floor. 

Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith testified that appellant later had a chrome revolver in his 

hand after several shots were fired inside the van. All of this testimony was 
44

corroborated by undisputed evidence that two people were shot inside the van and 

by the testimony of the government’s firearms expert that the bullets recovered 

from Mr. Brown’s body were fired from either a .44 caliber Charter Arms Bulldog 

revolver or a .44 caliber U.S. Arms Magnum revolver. Although the government’s 

witnesses testified inconsistently on some points and were impeached on others,

appellant has not established that their testimony was disproved as a matter of fact 

or logic or otherwise shown to be inherently incredible. The discrepancies in the 

testimony were properly left for the jury to resolve, and we have no difficulty 

concluding that a rational trier of fact could have resolved the discrepancies in 

favor of the government and found the essential elements of each of the weapons 

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

G. Jury Instruction on CPWL in Gun-Free Zone

The trial judge gave the following instruction to the jury on the offense of 

carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone:

The essential elements of the offense of carrying a pistol 

without a license, each of which the government must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are: number one, that 

Thomas Jones carried a pistol on or about his person;

number two, that he did so voluntarily and on purpose, 

and not by mistake or accident; number three, that 
45

Thomas Jones was not licensed to carry the pistol by the 

Chief of Police of the District of Columbia; and number 

four, he carried the pistol in a place other than his home, 

place of business, or land or premises possessed and 

controlled by him; that the pistol could fire a bullet; and 

that at the time he carried the pistol, he did so in a gunfree zone, that is, within 1,000 feet of Kenilworth 

Elementary School. The term “pistol” means a firearm 

that has a barrel less than 12 inches. 

Appellant contends that another essential element of the offense, omitted 

from the trial judge’s instruction, was the presence of a sign on the premises of 

Kenilworth Elementary School identifying the school and its surrounding area as a 

gun-free zone. Appellant argues that the judge’s failure to include this element in 

the instruction to the jury entitles him to the reversal of his conviction for carrying 

a pistol without a license in a drug-free zone. 

We agree that the instruction was incomplete. The statute defining the 

penalty enhancement for carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone 

makes clear that the enhancement does not apply unless there is a sign on the 

premises identifying the building or area as a gun-free zone: 

All areas within[] 1000 feet of an appropriately identified

public or private day care center, elementary school, 

vocational school, secondary school, college, junior 

college, or university, or any public swimming pool, 
46

playground, video arcade, youth center, or public library, 

or in and around public housing . . . shall be declared a 

gun free zone. For the purposes of this subsection, the 

term “appropriately identified” means that there is a 

sign that identifies the building or area as a gun free 

zone.

D.C. Code § 22-4502.01 (a) (2012 Repl.) (emphasis added). 

A proper instruction on the elements of carrying a pistol without a license in 

a gun-free zone therefore must inform the jury that the school (or other building or 

area) is a gun-free zone only if a sign on the premises identifies it as such. See

Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 8.102 (5th ed. 2010)

(including as an element of the gun-free zone enhancement that “[t]here was a sign 

identifying [the school or other qualifying building or area] as a gun-free zone”). 

The trial judge’s instruction lacked this essential information. 

Appellant, however, lodged no objection to the instruction in the trial court, 

and his claim of instructional error is therefore subject to plain error review on 

appeal. See Bellamy v. United States, 810 A.2d 401, 406 (D.C. 2002). Under the 

plain error standard, an incomplete jury instruction to which no objection was 

made at trial “will not be a cause for reversal where . . . no rational jury, shown by 

its verdict to have found the facts necessary to convict the defendant under the 
47

instructions as given, could have failed, if fully instructed on each element, to have 

found in addition the facts necessary to comprise the omitted element.” Id. 

Appellant is not entitled to reversal. The parties stipulated at trial that 

Kenilworth Elementary School “has a sign placed on the east side of the school on 

44th Street that states that illegal firearms may not be within 500 feet of the school” 

and that a “custodian of the school would testify that the sign has been posted at 

that location for several years, which time includes July 3rd, 2009, and July 4th, 

2009.” The parties read this stipulation (and others) to the jury during the trial, and 

the judge later provided a written copy of all of the stipulations to the jury during 

the jury’s deliberations. In addition, a photograph of the school grounds admitted 

in evidence clearly showed the sign identifying the school and its surrounding area 

as a gun-free zone. In these circumstances, there is no basis for concern that the 

jury, acting rationally, would have declined to find appellant guilty of carrying a 

pistol without a license in a gun-free zone had the trial judge’s instruction properly 

included the requirement that there be a sign on the premises identifying the school 

building and its surrounding area as a gun-free zone. There was no dispute at trial 

over whether the area surrounding Kenilworth Elementary School was properly 

identified as a gun-free zone, and the omission from the judge’s instruction thus 

could not have had any prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case. See
48

(Marques An’Rico) Johnson v. United States, 2015 D.C. App. LEXIS 264, No. 13-

CF-929, slip op. at 15-16 (D.C. June 18, 2015) (“on plain-error review, incorrect 

jury instruction was not reversible error because there was no reasonable 

probability that it had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial”) (citing 

Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 128 (D.C. 2007)).

H. Lawfulness of Sentences Imposed

The trial judge sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 

eight years for carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone and twelve 

years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The judge ordered that the 

prison terms be followed by concurrent three-year periods of supervised release. 

The judge did not specify any mandatory minimum prison time. 

Appellant contends that the twelve-year prison sentence for possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon exceeded the maximum penalty authorized by law at 

the time of the offense. The government conceded this point at oral argument, and 

we agree that the sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon was illegal. 
49

At the time of the events in this case, District of Columbia law provided that 

a felon convicted of possession of a firearm faced a maximum possible sentence of 

ten years in prison and a one-year mandatory-minimum prison term. D.C. Code 

§ 22-4503 (a)(2) (2008 Supp.). The District of Columbia Council soon amended 

the District’s gun control laws, retaining the ten-year maximum and one-year 

mandatory-minimum periods of incarceration for ordinary felon-in-possession 

charges and creating an enhanced penalty of up to fifteen years in prison, with a 

three-year mandatory-minimum term, for possession of a firearm by a person 

previously convicted of a felony defined in the bail statute as a crime of violence. 

See D.C. Code §§ 22-4503 (b)(1) & (d)(1) (2010 Supp.); see also D.C. Code § 23-

1331 (4) (2010 Supp.) (defining “crime of violence”); see generally Council of the 

District of Columbia, Comm. on Pub. Safety and the Judiciary, Report on Bill 8-

151, “Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2009” (June 26, 

2009). However, although it is undisputed that appellant had a prior conviction for 

a crime of violence (second-degree murder while armed), the amendments to the 

District’s gun control laws did not take effect until December 10, 2009, see

Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law 18-88, 56 

D.C. Reg. 7413 (December 10, 2009), and the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits their

retroactive application to appellant even though they were fully in effect by the 
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time of his trial, see Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522 (2000) (citing Calder v. 

Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)). 

The twelve-year prison sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon was therefore illegal in two respects: it exceeded the ten-year 

statutory maximum in effect at the time of the offense, and it failed to specify a 

one-year mandatory-minimum period of incarceration. The sentence must be 

vacated and the case remanded for resentencing on this charge in accordance with 

applicable statutory requirements.3 

Finally, in a Rule 28 (k) statement filed after oral argument, appellant 

contends, for the first time, that his eight-year prison sentence for carrying a pistol 

without a license in a gun-free zone also exceeded the maximum penalty allowed 

by law at the time of the offense. We disagree. First, the law in effect as of July 3-

4, 2009 plainly provided that a felon convicted of carrying a pistol without a 

 

3

 Because District of Columbia law requires the sentencing judge in a felony case

to withhold part of the maximum possible prison term as “back-up time” in the 

event of the subsequent revocation of the defendant’s supervised release, the 

longest prison term that can be imposed at the time of resentencing on the charge 

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is eight years, equal to the ten-year 

statutory maximum penalty in effect at the time of the offense minus the two-year 

period that must be reserved as back-up time. See D.C. Code §§ 24-403.01 

(b)(7)(C) & (b-1) (2009 Supp.). 
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license faced a maximum possible sentence of ten years in prison and a $10,000 

fine. See D.C. Code § 22-4504 (a)(2) (2009 Supp.). Indeed, District of Columbia 

law has authorized a ten-year prison sentence for carrying a pistol without a license 

by a convicted felon for at least the past thirty-five years. See Henson v. United 

States, 399 A.2d 16, 21 (D.C. 1979) (highlighting a felon’s “[e]xposure to a 

possible ten-year sentence under § 22-3204,” the predecessor to § 22-4504 (a)(2)). 

Second, the gun-free zone enhancement doubled the maximum possible sentence 

appellant faced for carrying a pistol without a license. See D.C. Code § 22-

4502.01 (b) (2009 Supp.) (“Any person illegally carrying a gun within a gun free 

zone shall be punished by a fine up to twice that otherwise authorized to be 

imposed, by a term of imprisonment up to twice that otherwise authorized to be 

imposed, or both.”). Appellant thus faced a maximum possible penalty of twenty 

years in prison and a $20,000 fine for carrying a pistol without a license in a gunfree zone. The eight-year term imposed, therefore, was not unlawful. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate appellant’s sentence for the offense of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and remand the case for resentencing 

on that charge. The judgment of the Superior Court is otherwise affirmed.
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It is so ordered.