District of Columbia

Court of Appeals

No. 14-FS-1076

IN RE PETITION OF D.B.;

D.B.,

Appellant.

BKS-35-14

On Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia 

BEFORE: GLICKMAN and MCLEESE, Associate Judges; and REID, Senior Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This case came to be heard on the transcript of record, the briefs filed, and 

was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, and for the reasons set forth in the 

opinion filed this date, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the order denying D.B.’s petition is 

vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

For the Court:

 

Dated: March 10, 2016.

Opinion by Associate Judge Roy W. McLeese.

MAR 10 2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 14-FS-1076

IN RE PETITION OF D.B.;

D.B., APPELLANT

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(BKS-35-14)

(Hon. Jennifer A. Di Toro, Trial Judge)

(Argued December 10, 2015 Decided March 10, 2016)

James B. Outman, with whom Harvey Schweitzer was on the brief, for 

appellant D.B.

Abraham Sisson, with whom Melissa Colangelo and Allen Snyder were on 

the brief, for amicus curiae Children’s Law Center. 

Before GLICKMAN and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and REID, Senior Judge.

MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant D.B. seeks review of an order 

denying D.B.’s request for access to adoption records in order to learn the 

identities of his biological parents. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

3/10/16
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I.

Appellant D.B. was adopted in the District of Columbia in the mid-1960s. 

The Jewish Social Services Agency (“JSSA”) was the adoption agency involved. 

In 2004, D.B. filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking access to the records of 

his adoption. The trial court partially granted D.B.’s request, but D.B. did not 

obtain information identifying his biological parents.

In 2014, D.B. filed a second petition, asking for the names of his biological 

parents as well as all records held by the court and JSSA pertaining to his adoption. 

The trial court partially granted the petition, directing JSSA to act as an 

intermediary and to investigate the identities of D.B.’s biological parents. In 

response, JSSA reported that a search for D.B.’s biological parents had not been 

successful. JSSA also informed the trial court that D.B.’s biological parents “were 

promised confidentiality” and that “JSSA has never released records without the 

specific permission of the client.” The trial court thereafter issued an order 

denying D.B.’s petition, concluding that, “[i]n the absence of a waiver, the 

guarantee of confidentiality shall not be disturbed.”
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II.

D.B. raises a number of objections to the trial court’s ruling: (1) the trial 

court applied an incorrect standard in determining whether D.B. should be allowed 

access to his adoption records, because under D.C. Code § 16-311 (2012 Repl.) the 

trial court was required to grant D.B. such access if doing so was in D.B.’s best 

interest; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing before denying D.B.’s petition; (3) D.B. has a right to know the identity of 

his birth parents, and that right is not superseded by any privacy rights held by 

D.B.’s parents; (4) the trial court abused its discretion by delegating to JSSA the 

court’s statutory authority to decide whether a complete unsealing of D.B.’s 

adoption records was warranted; and (5) section 16-311 denies adoptees their 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. We conclude 

that the case should be remanded for further consideration.

Section 16-311 states that “records and papers in adoption proceedings shall 

be sealed” and “may not be inspected . . . except upon order of the court, and only 

then when the court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be 

promoted or protected.” Perhaps because there was no adversarial briefing in the 

trial court, the order on review did not cite section 16-311 or address the 
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application of that provision to D.B.’s petition. Specifically, the trial court did not 

address (1) whether granting the petition would promote or protect D.B.’s welfare;

(2) whether the welfare of the child is the sole consideration under section 16-311 

or whether instead section 16-311 permits a trial court to take other considerations 

into account; (3) whether section 16-311’s reference to “records and papers in 

adoption proceedings” applies only to court records or also extends to records held 

by District of Columbia agencies or by private adoption agencies such as JSSA; 

and (4) the potential applicability of D.C. Code § 4-1405 (b)-(c) (2012 Repl.) 

(generally providing for confidentiality of certain records held by “child-placing” 

agencies) and Super. Ct. Adopt. R. 79 and 79-I (procedures relating to adoption 

records).

The factual record in this case also is not fully developed. For example, 

there appears to be a dispute about whether D.B.’s biological parents were, or 

could lawfully have been, promised confidentiality at the time of D.B.’s adoption. 

Finally, neither JSSA nor the District of Columbia participated formally in the 

proceedings before the trial court or in this court. JSSA and the District therefore 

have not yet expressed views about the significant legal and factual questions that 

this case poses, and they should be given that opportunity on remand. 
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This court has broad authority to remand a case for further proceedings in

the interests of justice. D.C. Code § 17-306 (2012 Repl.); Leach v. District of 

Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 965 A.2d 849, 860 n.8 (D.C. 

2009). Under the circumstances, we conclude that the interests of justice would be 

served by a remand. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order denying D.B.’s petition and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

So ordered.