UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4876

AARON CURTIS LEWIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-03-17)

Submitted: May 26, 2004

Decided: July 6, 2004

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas E. Johnston, United States Attorney,

Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg,

West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Aaron C. Lewis appeals from his conviction and 275-month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of crack cocaine and eleven substantive counts of distributing

crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846 (2000). We affirm. 

At trial, numerous witnesses testified that they purchased crack

cocaine from Lewis, including Joseph Lockett. According to Lockett,

he began purchasing crack cocaine from Lewis when his (Lockett’s)

New York source "dried up" in late 2001. Lockett’s testimony was the

basis for Lewis’ convictions on five of the substantive counts. The

district court also included the sales to Lockett in determining Lewis’

relevant conduct at sentencing. 

Lewis first argues that Lockett’s testimony was insufficient to support his convictions on counts two, five, seven, nine, and ten because

his testimony was unsubstantiated, uncorroborated, and not credible.

The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support

it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). "[S]ubstantial

evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,

862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The uncorroborated testimony of one

witness or an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Lewis argues that Lockett’s testimony was inherently incredible

because his statements regarding the profit he made on re-sales of

crack cocaine were "nonsensical and mathematically impossible."

However, Lewis’ counsel extensively cross-examined Lockett on this

issue as well as on his inconsistent testimony before the grand jury.

It was the jury’s exclusive prerogative to credit or discredit his testimony; credibility determinations are not subject to review by this

court. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). 

2 UNITED STATES v. LEWIS
Next, Lewis asserts that the district court erred in relying on

Lockett’s testimony in determining his relevant conduct. In determining drug quantity, a district court must consider whether the government has established drug quantity by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596, 604 (4th Cir. 1996).

Witness credibility is not generally subject to appellate review.

Saunders, 886 F.2d at 60. The district court did not clearly err in its

calculation of drug quantity. United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195,

210 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard). 

Finally, Lewis contends that the district court misinstructed the jury

on the conspiracy count in that it (1) used the term "involved" in the

conspiracy without providing the jury with any direction as to determine how the drugs were "involved," and (2) omitted the "reasonably

foreseeable" language with regard to his liability under Pinkerton v.

United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). However, as Lewis concedes, he

did not object to the instruction. Therefore, these claims are reviewed

for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732-35 (1993). There was no error. 

Our review of the instruction, viewed in the context of the entire

charge, clearly conveyed to the jury that the word "involved" meant

the drugs either distributed or possessed with intent to distribute by

the conspirators. The charge accurately and fairly stated the law. See

United States v. Rahman, 83 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover,

this court has specifically held that the "reasonably foreseeable" language with regard to a defendant’s liability under Pinkerton is not

required in the jury instructions so long as its instruction "is not qualitatively different from" the language approved by this court in United

States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1990). United States v.

Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1381 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding Pinkerton

instruction that omitted "reasonably foreseeable" language). Here, the

district court’s instructions were not "qualitatively different" from the

language approved by this court in Chorman; therefore, the court did

not err in omitting the "reasonably foreseeable" language. 

We therefore affirm Lewis’ convictions and sentence. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. LEWIS 3