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HANDSOME, INC., ET AL. v. PLANNING

AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE

TOWN OF MONROE

(SC 19262)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa,

Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued October 23, 2014—officially released July 14, 2015

Edward P. McCreery III, with whom were Assaf Z.

Ben-Atar and, on the brief, John H. Van Lenten, for

the appellant (defendant).

Ian Angus Cole, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The defendant, the Planning and Zoning

Commission of the Town of Monroe (commission),

appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which

sustained the appeal of the plaintiffs, Handsome, Inc.

(Handsome), and its principal officers, Todd Cascella

and Mona Cascella,1

from the commission’s decision to

impose conditions on the granting of an extension of

a special exception permit that were not included in

the original permit. The commission claims that the

trial court incorrectly concluded that (1) the plaintiffs

were aggrieved by the commission’s decision and thus

had standing to bring the appeal, (2) the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ related

claim under the Freedom of Information Act, General

Statutes § 1-200 et seq., challenging the propriety of an

executive session that the commission held at a hearing

on the permit extension application, even though the

same claim was pending before the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC), (3) the commission could

not impose additional conditions when it granted the

extension, and (4) the additional permit conditions

were new. The plaintiffs respond that (1) they were

aggrieved by the commission’s decision, (2) the trial

court did not assert subject matter jurisdiction over the

freedom of information claim, and (3) the trial court

correctly determined that the disputed conditions were

new and that the commission could not impose the

conditions when it granted the extension. We conclude

that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the commission’s decision and, therefore, did not have standing to

bring the appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment

of the trial court.

I

FACTS

The trial court made the following factual findings in

its memorandum of decision. In March, 2003, Handsome

filed with the commission an application for a special

exception permit to construct a 20,000 square foot

industrial building on a 9.9 acre property in the town

of Monroe (town). The property is located in a design

industrial zone at 125 Garder Road. Properties in a

design industrial zone are subject to the special exception permit process, which requires compliance with

certain applicable regulations before a special exception permit may be granted.

On March 20, 2003, the commission approved the

permit application, subject to thirty-six conditions and

an expiration date of May 15, 2008. On April 24, 2008,

the commission denied Handsome’s application for a

permit extension because it had not submitted the

required progress reports and had not begun construction of the building.

The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, and, on
September 9, 2010, the court sustained the appeal. The

court determined that Handsome’s application for a

permit extension sought the same relief as the original

permit application and that there had been no intervening changed conditions affecting the property. The

court thus concluded that the commission ‘‘had no

option but to approve’’ the application. The commission

did not appeal from the trial court’s judgment.

Handsome subsequently asked the commission in letters dated October 1 and November 1, 2010, to issue

the permit extension in accordance with the trial court’s

judgment, but the matter did not appear on the commission’s regular meeting agenda until May 5, 2011. At the

start of the meeting, the commission immediately went

into executive session to discuss what it described as

certain general legal matters pertaining to zoning

enforcement. The commission invited several land use

and zoning officials, as well as the town’s first selectman, to participate in the executive session. When the

commission reconvened following the executive session, it granted Handsome’s application and extended

the permit to March, 2013, five years from the expiration

date of the original permit but approximately two years

from the date of the meeting.

The commission approved two motions in connection

with this action. In the first motion, the commission

noted that an original condition of approval had been

the posting of a bond, that a bond must now be set,

and that this would be ‘‘a prerequisite [to] commencement of any [on-site] work in accordance with the regulations of prior approval.’’ The commission added that

‘‘[a]ll prior conditions of approval that were originally

granted with [the] application including all landscaping

plans, judiciary plans, no [top soil]removal from the site

and anything else from the original application should

remain in effect.’’

The commission also approved a second motion stating that ‘‘[n]o work should be conducted at 125 Garder

Road until the [b]ond as recommended by the [t]own

[e]ngineer is posted. A list of items included: that the

requirements that were originally listed remain; that the

[c]ommission be provided with the information on who

the current engineer is for the property owner; that the

required reports from the original approval be provided

to the [c]ommission (work that has been done, work

that will be going on and work to close outthe program);

that the engineer will provide a status of the condition

of the site (as built of current conditions); and, the final

concept plan of what will bring the site to what was

originally intended per the approved permit (calculations remaining of how much processed [on-site]

removal or being brought in to complete the site). Also

included are all of the standing conditions from the

original [permit].’’

In addition, the permit extension was made subject to
five other ‘‘requirements’’ and several ‘‘clarification[s]’’

relating to the original permit approval in March, 2003.

On May 13, 2011, the commission sent a letter to Handsome stating that its application to extend the permit

had been granted.

The plaintiffs timely appealed from the commission’s

decision to the trial court.2 The record was supplemented by the deposition testimony of eleven individuals, including several town officials and commission

members who had participated in the executive session

and had voted to extend the permit. On appeal, the

plaintiffs challenged the imposition of conditions they

alleged had not been part of the original permit. They

also challenged the commission’s decision to set a new

expiration date of May 20, 2013, five years from the

expiration date of the original permit, arguing that the

permit should have been extended to May, 2016, five

years from the date the application to extend the permit

was granted. They finally challenged the propriety of

the executive session held immediately prior to the May

5, 2011 vote to grant the permit extension.

The commission disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claims

and, in addition, contended that the plaintiffs did not

have standing to appeal. The commission argued that

an unrecorded judgment of strict foreclosure against

Handsome before the permit was extended deprived

Handsome of title to the property and that the Cascellas’

status as corporate officers who derived income from

Handsome was insufficient to establish that the plaintiffs were aggrieved.

The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal. The

court first determined that both Handsome and the

Cascellas were aggrieved. It then determined that the

executive session held on May 5, 2011, was not authorized by the Freedom of Information Act and that the

commission was not permitted, pursuant to the trial

court’s order, to impose conditions in connection with

the permit extension that had not been part of the

original permit. It finally determined that the commission’s decision to approve the permit extension retroactive to March, 2008, when the original permit expired,

was contrary to law.

The court subsequently issued the following order:

‘‘The [commission] is directed to approve the special

exception permit . . . conditioned only upon the conditions as voted by the commission in 2003, and recited

in the final decision of March 20, 2003.

‘‘Pursuant to [c]ondition [17] of the 2003 approval,

the commission in a subsequent and separate vote, may

require the posting of a bond . . . for the purpose of

securing completion of the site work or restoration or

stabilizing of the disturbed site dependent on circumstances due to failure to complete, proceed, abandonment, inactivity or other similar lack of improvement,
should it be warranted.

‘‘Any discussion or receipt of information concerning

the posting of a bond by the commission shall take

place during a public session of the commission, so that

any vote will not be tainted by deliberations conducted

during an improper executive session.

‘‘The five year extension shall begin to run from the

date the commission extends the special exception permit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

On July 24, 2013, the Appellate Court granted the

commission’s petition for certification to appeal from

the trial court’s judgment, and the appeal subsequently

was transferred to this court. Additional facts will be

provided as necessary for review of the commission’s

claims.

II

AGGRIEVEMENT

The commission begins by challenging the trial

court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were aggrieved

and thus had standing to appeal. The commission claims

that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved because Handsome was not the legal owner of the property on May

5, 2011, the date the extension was approved, and the

Cascellas, despite their status as corporate officers who

derived income from the corporate entity, were not,

from a legal standpoint, specially and injuriously

affected by the commission’s action. The plaintiffs

respond that the trial court correctly concluded that

they were aggrieved because Handsome did not lose

record title to the property pursuant to an action of

strict foreclosure and the Cascellas were personally

and injuriously affected by the commission’s action. We

agree with the commission.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. Handsome acquired title to 125

Garder Road by way of a quitclaim deed recorded on

November 13, 2001, in the town land records. The instrument was signed by Todd Cascella, the grantor.

On December 20, 2005, MD Drilling & Blasting, Inc.

(MD Drilling), filed a mechanic’s lien on the property

that also was recorded in the town land records. On

February 26, 2006, it filed a notice of lis pendens in the

land records in connection with the mechanic’s lien.

In March, 2006, MD Drilling brought an action against

Cascella & Son Construction, Inc. (Cascella & Son), and

Handsome, seeking to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien.

On December 29, 2009, the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of MD Drilling and

set March 2, 2010, as the law day. The debt amount

was determined to be $27,271.55. Thereafter, the court

granted Cascella & Son’s motion for an extension of

time to postpone commencement of the law days and

set a new law day for June 29, 2010.
After the initial law day had passed but before expiration of the new law day, MD Drilling executed a written

agreement on April 13, 2010, with Todd Cascella, acting

on behalf of Cascella & Son and Handsome. The

agreement provided that MD Drilling would allow Cascella & Son and Handsome to retain possession of the

property if Cascella & Son paid ‘‘the entire amount of

the [debt owed] in monthly installments . . . commencing on March 16, 2010,’’ until the judgment was

paid in full, but that Cascella & Son’s ‘‘failure to issue

any payment, when due,[would] be considered a default

of [the] [a]greement’’ and entitle MD Drilling ‘‘to possession of the property and . . . to take any action it

deems necessary to collect the remaining balance of

the [debt] . . . .’’ In return, MD Drilling agreed that it

would not file a judgment of possession or an order of

ejectment prior to June 30, 2010, and would request a

law day extension until July 29, 2010, if Cascella &

Son made timely payments through June 16, 2010. MD

Drilling also agreed to continue requesting such extensions for as long as Cascella & Son was not in default

of the agreement. Finally, the agreement provided that

the judgment of strict foreclosure would be ‘‘null and

void when the . . . debt [was] satisfied.’’

Todd Cascella subsequently testified at trial that the

required monthly payments were being made and that

Cascella & Son was not in default of the agreement.

The law day was never again postponed, however, and

it passed without redemption of the property by Handsome.3 MD Drilling did not record a certificate of foreclosure in the town land records, did not file a satisfaction of judgment, and did not move to open the

judgment after the law days had passed.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court first

observed that ‘‘[t]he owner of the property which forms

the subject matter of an action before a land use agency

is aggrieved by an adverse decision of the agency.’’ The

court then concluded that Handsome was aggrieved and

had standing to appeal from the commission’s decision

because legal title to real property is not required to

satisfy the test for aggrievement. Rather, the court reasoned that title for this purpose ‘‘is controlled by [the]

deeds recorded on the land records.’’ Thus, because

the judgment of strict foreclosure against Handsome

never had been recorded in the town land records,

Handsome remained the record owner of 125 Garder

Road and had standing to appeal. The court added that

‘‘[t]he fact that an agreement . . . provides for a mechanism for satisfying the judgment of strict foreclosure,

solidifies and enhances Handsome’s interest in the

property’’ and that ‘‘[t]he judgment of strict foreclosure

[rendered] in favor of MD Drilling . . . [was] not sufficient to deny aggrieved status to Handsome . . . .’’ In

support of its conclusion that Handsome’s status as the

record owner of the property, rather than the holder
of legal title, was sufficient to establish aggrievement,

the court cited several cases in which legal title was

deemed unnecessary to satisfy the test for aggrievement. The court next considered the status of the Cascellas and concluded that they also had standing to

appeal on grounds of statutory aggrievement because

their personal and legal interests in the property had

been specially and injuriously affected by the commission’s action.

We begin with the applicable legal principles and the

standard of review. ‘‘Standing is the legal right to set

judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully

invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she]

has, in an individual or representative capacity, some

real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable

right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question

is whether the person whose standing is challenged is

a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue

. . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim

of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing

by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to

attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests. . . .

‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party

claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action,

in other words, statutorily aggrieved, or is classically

aggrieved. . . . [Statutory] [s]tanding concerns the

question [of] whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone

of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute

or constitutional guarantee in question.4

. . .

‘‘The fundamental test for determining [classical]

aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold

determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement

must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and

legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished

from a general interest, such as is the concern of all

members of the community as a whole. Second, the

party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has

been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . . Aggrievement is established if

there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty,

that some legally protected interest . . . has been

adversely affected. . . .

‘‘[I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are remote,

indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant’s

conduct, the plaintiff is not the proper party to assert

them and lacks standing to do so. [When], for example,

the harms asserted to have been suffered directly by a

plaintiff are in reality derivative of injuries to a third

party, the injuries are not direct but are indirect, and

the plaintiff has no standing to assert them.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc.
v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381,

393–95, 941 A.2d 868 (2008) (Cambodian Buddhist

Society).

‘‘Mindful that it is a fundamental concept of judicial

administration that no person is entitled to set the

machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain

redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an

injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity . . . [a plaintiff is] required to plead

and prove some injury in accordance with our rule on

aggrievement. . . . Accordingly, [i]t [is] the function

of the trial court to determine . . . first, whether the

[plaintiff’s] allegations if they should be proved would

constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and second,

if as a matter oflaw they would constitute aggrievement,

then whether [the plaintiff] proved the truth of [the]

allegations. . . . Although the question of whether a

party is aggrieved presents a question of fact in cases

involving disputed facts . . . the question of whether

the pleadings set forth sufficient facts, if presumed true,

to establish a party’s aggrievement presents a question

of law over which we exercise plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local 12924 v.

Dept. of Public Utility Control, 312 Conn. 265, 272–73,

92 A.3d 247 (2014).

A

The commission claims that Handsome was not

aggrieved because it lost title to the property due to

the passing of the law days in the strict foreclosure

action and the absence of a recorded foreclosure certificate does not void the passing of title through the judicial foreclosure decree. We agree.

It is well established that a party may be aggrieved for

purposes of appeal by virtue of its status as a property

owner. Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

278 Conn. 660, 671, 899 A.2d 26 (2006) (owner of property at issue in zoning appeal always is aggrieved); see

also Bossert Corp. v. Norwalk, 157 Conn. 279, 285, 253

A.2d 39 (1968) (‘‘[a]s the owner of the tract in issue,

the plaintiff was certainly aggrieved by the action of

the common council’’). ‘‘[I]n order to retain standing

as an aggrieved person, [however] a party must have

and must maintain a specific, personal and legal interest

in the subject matter of the appeal throughout the

course of the appeal. . . . It is not enough for a party

to have an interest in the property sufficient to establish

aggrievement only at the time of the application to the

commission.’’ (Citations omitted.) Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 94, 558 A.2d

646 (1989). Accordingly, because 125 Garder Road was

subject to a strict foreclosure action prior to the granting of the permit extension, we must examine the law

of strict foreclosure to determine the effect of the foreclosure action on Handsome’s ownership interest at
the time it sought the permit extension and during its

subsequent appeal from the commission’s decision.

This court has stated that, ‘‘[i]n all essential respects

the attributes of foreclosure of mortgages apply to

[mechanic’s] liens.’’ City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport,

Inc. v. Murphy, 120 Conn. 16, 19, 179 A. 339 (1935).

Thus, to the extent the foreclosure of mortgages and

mechanic’s liens involve similar procedural steps, the

law established in mortgage foreclosure actions also

applies to mechanic’s liens.

Connecticut courts have long recognized that, when

‘‘a foreclosure decree has become absolute by the passing of the law days, the outstanding rights ofredemption

have been cut off and the title has become unconditional

in the [lienor] . . . . The [property owner] has no

remaining title or interest . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)

Id., 25; see also First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368,

372, 507 A.2d 997 (1986) (‘‘[t]he judgment of strict foreclosure clearly vested absolute title in the foreclosing

[party] and extinguished any interest of the [owner] in

the foreclosed property’’); JP Morgan Chase Bank v.

Gianopoulos, 131 Conn. App. 15, 21–22, 30 A.3d 697

(under law of strict foreclosure, ‘‘[t]he effect of the

passing of the law day is that . . . title to the property

becomes unconditional in the encumbrancer’’), cert.

denied, 302 Conn. 947, 30 A.3d 2 (2011); Barclays Bank

of New York v.Ivler, 20Conn. App. 163, 166, 565A.2d 252

(same), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989).

This principle also has been recognized in Connecticut’s foreclosure statutes. General Statutes § 49-16,

which pertains to foreclosure certificates, provides in

relevant part that, ‘‘[w]hen . . . the time . . . for

redemption has passed, and the title to the mortgaged

premises has become absolute in the [lienor] . . . he

shall . . . make and sign a certificate . . . [that] shall

be recorded in the records of the town . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In short, ‘‘title . . . become[s] absolute in

the [lienor] . . . the day after all of the law days have

passed without anyone redeeming.’’ 1 D. Caron & G.

Milne, Connecticut Foreclosures: An Attorney’s Manual

of Practice and Procedure (5th Ed. 2011) c. 6-3, pp.

336–37.

In the present case, the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of MD Drilling on

December 29, 2009, and set March 2, 2010, as the law

day. The court subsequently granted Cascella & Son’s

motion for an extension of time to postpone commencement of the law days and set a new law day for June

29, 2010, which appears to have passed withoutredemption. There is no evidence in the record that Cascella &

Son, Handsome or MD Drilling filed a motion to open

the judgment within the appeal period in order to modify its terms. See General Statutes § 49-15.5 Accordingly,

lacking evidence to the contrary, we are compelled to

conclude that Handsome lost title to the property on
June 30, 2010, more than ten months before the commission granted the permit extension.

In Southbury v. American Builders, Inc., 162 Conn.

633, 295 A.2d 566 (1972), in which the defendants conceded that they had no interest in the property in question because of a foreclosure subsequent to the

commencement of the appeal, we recognized that,

‘‘[a]lthough a party may have had an appealable interest

in a controversy, if, after judgment, his interest is either

conveyed or transferred absolutely or terminated by

operation of law, his right to appeal is lost, since he no

longer has any interest in the litigation and is not injured

by the result of the action.’’ Id., 634. In the present case,

apparently unbeknownst to the commission, Handsome

lost title to the property before the permit extension

proceedings because it had failed to pay its debt to the

lienor, to obtain an extension of the law day, or to file

a motion to open and modify the judgment in order to

avoid this consequence. Accordingly, we conclude that

Handsome had no standing to bring the appeal because,

having lost title to the property, it was not aggrieved

by the commission’s decision to impose conditions in

connection with the permit extension.6

The plaintiffs argue that this court should not ‘‘import

the intricacies of foreclosure law into the zoning law

analysis of whether Handsome is . . . aggrieved’’ but,

rather, should rely on decisions such as Paupack Development Corp. v. Conservation Commission, 229 Conn.

247, 640 A.2d 70 (1994), and Purtill v. Town Plan &

Zoning Commission, 146 Conn. 570, 153 A.2d 441

(1959), in which Connecticut courts have looked to the

owner of record for purposes of determining aggrievement. The plaintiffs, however, cite no authority in support of their claim that foreclosure law does not apply,

and, therefore, Paupack Development Corp. and Purtill

are inapposite because neither case involved a judgment of strict foreclosure or addressed the effect of

such a judgment on the ability of a plaintiff, who has lost

title to the property but remains the owner of record, to

maintain an appeal.

Furthermore, there is no legal authority, and the

plaintiffs have cited none, for the proposition that title

acquired by way of a strict foreclosure proceeding is

not absolute until a certificate offoreclosure is recorded

in the land records. Rather, the opposite is the case. In

Ghent v. Meadowhaven Condominium, Inc., 77 Conn.

App. 276, 823 A.2d 355 (2003),theAppellate Court stated

that ‘‘[t]he certificate of judgment of strict foreclosure

[is] not the [muniment] of title.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 288, quoting Connecticut Bar Association, Connecticut Standards of Title (1999) standard

19.7 (c) (Connecticut Standards of Title); see also Connecticut Standards of Title, supra, standard 19.2 (‘‘A

statutory certificate of foreclosure is not a muniment

of title. It merely serves as public notice that a particular
mortgage orlien has been foreclosed. It acts as a pointer

for title searchers directing them to the particular court

action which foreclosed the mortgage or lien. Thus, any

inaccuracies or omissions in such recorded certificate,

regardless of their nature, will not affect the marketability of title.’’). It is ‘‘the foreclosure action [that] changes

the [encumbrance] from a conditional conveyance to

an absolute one and the certificate only evidences the

judicial process by which this has occurred.’’ 2 D.

Caron & G. Milne, supra, c. 21-3, p. 89; see also Connecticut Standards of Title, supra, standard 19.2, comment

(1) (‘‘the foreclosure decree is a muniment of title and

not the certificate of foreclosure’’). This conclusion is

further substantiated by § 49-16, which, as previously

noted, provides that only after the time for redemption

has passed and ‘‘the title to the mortgaged premises

has become absolute in the [lienor]’’ shall the lienor

‘‘make and sign a certificate . . . [that] shall be

recorded in the records of the town . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) We also note that, in the present case, the notice

of lis pendens that MD Drilling filed in the land records

in connection with the mechanic’s lien indicated that

title had been challenged and might no longer be held

by Handsome.

The plaintiffs finally argue that Handsome is classically aggrieved because it has a specific personal and

legal interest in seeking a judicial determination regarding the validity of the new conditions imposed in connection with the permit extension, which serve to

prevent Handsome from completing the project. The

conditions to which the plaintiffs refer are the new

expiration date, approximately two years from the date

the permit extension was granted, and the posting of

what they describe as an ‘‘extremely large bond’’ in the

amount of $100,000.(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

We need not address this claim, however, in light of our

previous conclusion that Handsome had no ownership

interest in the property.7

B

The commission next contends that the Cascellas

lacked standing to assert claims that are derivative of

Handsome and, therefore, that the trial court improperly concluded that they were aggrieved. The plaintiffs

respond that the Cascellas were aggrieved because they

were not only officers of Handsome, but were personal

guarantors of the mortgage on 125 Garder Road and

had cosigned loans for equipment on the site, both of

which were foreclosed. They also argue that they were

beneficiaries of the judgment ordering the commission

to approve the permit extension and were sued personally by the town and the town zoning enforcement officer for allegedly violating the new permit conditions

during the present appeal. We agree with the commission.

As previously noted, the trial court concluded that
the Cascellas were statutorily aggrieved because their

personal and legal interests had been specially and injuriously affected by the commission’s action. The court

explained that, ‘‘[a]lthough the mere status of a corporate or limited liability company shareholder or officer

would not, in and of itself, satisfy the test for classical

aggrievement,’’ the Cascellas had ‘‘provided sufficient

proof of aggrievement’’ because, ‘‘in addition to being

officers of [Handsome], [they] derive[d] considerable

income from [Handsome] and [were] involved in all

management decisions.’’ In reaching this conclusion,

the trial court relied on DiBonaventura v. Zoning

Board of Appeals, 24 Conn. App. 369, 370–71, 376–77,

588 A.2d 244 (agreement between property owner and

property owner’s son allowing son to use property for

car dealership created sufficient interest in property

to allow son to appeal from zoning decision affecting

property), cert. denied, 219 Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 129

(1991), and distinguished the present case from Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 393

(plaintiff not statutorily aggrieved by planning and zoning commission’s denial of application for special

exception because he ‘‘did not own the property’’ that

was subject of application and ‘‘did not own land abutting or within 100 feet of the property’’).

We first note that, to the extent the trial court indicated that the Cascellas were statutorily aggrieved, no

evidence was presented at trial that they satisfied a

principalrequirement of statutory aggrievement in Connecticut, namely, the ownership of land abutting or

within 100 feet of any portion of the land involved in

the decision of the board or commission. See footnote

4 ofthis opinion. Accordingly, we consider only whether

the Cascellas were classically aggrieved.

We agree with the commission that the facts in the

present case are similar to the facts in Cambodian

Buddhist Society and that its reasoning applies here.

In that case, we determined that the president of a

religious society did not have standing to appeal from

the planning and zoning commission’s denial of the

society’s application for a special exception to build a

Buddhist temple on its property because the alleged

injury was ‘‘entirely derivative of the society’s claim as

the owner of the property. The interest in building a

temple on the property is essentially a property interest.

Although the [planning and zoning] commission’s decision might have ramifications for the individual members of the society and the circumstances under which

they practice their religion, the right to build the temple

could not be asserted independently by an individual

member. If the society chose not to appeal from the

[planning and zoning] commission’s denial of the society’s application for a special exception, then any independent challenge . . . would be subject to dismissal

as moot. . . . It is clear, therefore, that, because any
injuries that [the president] suffered as a result of the

[planning and zoning] commission’s decision are in reality derivative of injuries to [the society], the injuries

are not direct but are indirect, and [he] has no standing

to assert them.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

supra, 285 Conn. 396. The court thus concluded that

the president of the society was neither classically nor

statutorily aggrieved. Id., 397–98; see also Ganim v.

Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347–48, 780 A.2d

98 (2001) (‘‘[I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are

remote, indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff is not the proper party to

assert them and lacks standing to do so. Where, for

example, the harms asserted to have been suffered

directly by a plaintiff are in reality derivative of injuries

to a third party, the injuries are not direct but are indirect, and the plaintiff has no standing to assert them.’’).

In the present case, the trial court recognized our

decision in Cambodian Buddhist Society but distinguished the Cascellas’ positions as officers of Handsome from the officer and members of the religious

society on the ground that the Cascellas ‘‘derive considerable income from [Handsome] and are involved in

all management decisions.’’ We do not agree with this

distinction because the lack of a temple in which to

worship occupied just as integral and important a place

in the daily lives of the officer and members of the

religious society as the Cascellas’ income and management responsibilities occupied in their own daily lives.

Indeed, we specifically referred to testimony in Cambodian Buddhist Society that ‘‘the society . . . had no

temple in the state of Connecticut at which its members

could worship . . . the society had purchased the

property [at issue] because [it] possessed the appropriate qualities for a temple . . . the society . . . had

been required to hold religious services in a rented

space . . . it [was] essential to Cambodian Buddhism

that monks live in the temple and that the practitioners

be able to visit the temple where the monks live . . . [it

was] important that the temple be located in a tranquil

environment where the practitioners can enter into a

meditative state . . . the older generation of Cambodian Buddhists [was] dying without being able to introduce the youngest generation to the religion, and if

much more time passe[d] before the society [was] able

to build a temple, there might be no need for one.’’

Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v.

Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn.

389–90.

Moreover, the trial court in the present case overlooked the dispositive legal factor in Cambodian Buddhist Society, which was that the interest in question

was a property interest, and, therefore, ‘‘the right to

build the temple could not be asserted independently
by an individual [society officer or] member.’’ Id., 396.

In the present case, as well, the interest in question

is a property interest that cannot be asserted by the

Cascellas because they are not the owners of the

property.

The plaintiffs argue that the court should be guided

by Loew v. Falsey, 144 Conn. 67, 127 A.2d 67 (1956),

in which we held that the plaintiff, the sole owner of

stock in two corporations over which he exercised control, had standing to bring a mandamus action to compel

the issuance of a building permit, even though the corporation was the owner of the property, because he

‘‘was the beneficial owner’’ or ‘‘equitable owner . . . .’’

Id., 74. We explained in Loew: ‘‘There is no reason why

a permit for the proposed construction could not have

been granted either to [the plaintiff] or to [the corporation]. In short, there is no jurisdictional defect by reason

of the incorrect name of the [plaintiff rather than the

corporation on the permit application]. Under the circumstances, the application as completed complied

substantially with the code requirements. This is all that

the law demands. . . . While the corporation may have

held the legal title to the premises, [the plaintiff] owned

and controlled the corporation. He was the beneficial

owner. By analogy, an equitable owner may properly

apply for a variance under zoning regulations. . . .

Unless it appears otherwise, the equitable owner may

be deemed agent for the holder of the legal title. . . .

The trial court did not err in rendering judgment directing the issuance of the permit.’’ (Citations omitted.)

Id., 73–74.

We disagree that Loew applies in the present case

because the conclusion in Loew that the plaintiff was

the ‘‘beneficial’’ or ‘‘equitable’’ owner of the property

was based on the fact that the corporation held legal

title to the property throughout the proceeding. In this

case, Handsome lost title to the property by way of the

strict foreclosure judgment prior to the granting of the

permit extension and the subsequent appeal, and, therefore, the Cascellas do not have the same relationship

to the current title holder, MD Drilling, that the plaintiff

had with the corporate title holder in Loew. Moreover,

Loew did not involve the effect of a foreclosure action

on a party’s aggrievement and standing to bring a zoning

appeal, which is controlled by the statutory requirement

of aggrievement. Accordingly, Loew is distinguishable

from the present case on both factual and legal grounds.

Insofar as the trial court relied on DiBonaventura v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 24 Conn. App. 376–77,

in which the Appellate Court concluded that an

agreement between the property owner and his son

permitting the son to use the property for a car dealership created in the son a sufficient property interest

to allow the son’s appeal from a zoning decision that

affected the property, we acknowledged DiBonaven-
tura and other similar cases in Cambodian Buddhist

Society but rejected them as inapplicable. Cambodian

Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning &

Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 398 n.9; see,

e.g., Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

supra, 278 Conn. 669–70 (developer that had oral

agreement with landowner to enter into long-term lease

had sufficient interest in property to appeal from zoning

decision affecting property); Primerica v. Planning &

Zoning Commission, supra, 211 Conn. 94–95 (lessee

has sufficient interest in property to appeal from zoning

decision affecting property). We explained that ‘‘cases

in which this court and the Appellate Court have concluded that nonowners of property can have a sufficient

interest in the property to have standing to appeal from

a zoning decision affecting the property . . . are distinguishable . . . because they involved long-term

agreements between the landowner and the nonlandowner concerning the nonlandowner’s commercial use

of the property that arguably gave rise to a property

interest.’’ (Citations omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist

Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning

Commission, supra, 398 n.9.

In the present case, theCascellas occupy a very different position than that of the plaintiffs in the foregoing

cases. As corporate officers, they never represented

themselves as individual partners with Handsome in

connection with the development of the property. In

addition, all communications from local authorities

were directed to Handsome, and the Cascellas acted in

their capacities as corporate officers in representing the

interests of Handsome, not as independent individuals

representing their own distinct interests. Thus, there

could never be an agreement between the Cascellas

and Handsome with respect to development of the property, as in the foregoing cases, because the Cascellas

are part of Handsome. We determined in Cambodian

Buddhist Society that, ‘‘because any injuries that [the

president] suffered as a result of the [planning and

zoning] commission’s decision [were] in reality derivative of injuries to [the society], the injuries [were] not

direct but [were] indirect, and [he had] no standing

to assert them.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 396. In the present case, as well,

we conclude that the Cascellas demonstrated no direct

injury or aggrievement, and, therefore, the trial court

improperly concluded that they had standing to appeal.8

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded

with direction to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and EVELEIGH,

ESPINOSA, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 Todd Cascella is the president and Mona Cascella is the secretary of

Handsome, and we refer to them as the Cascellas. We refer to Handsome

and the Cascellas collectively as the plaintiffs.
2 At the same time, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the FOIC, in which

they alleged that the May 5, 2011 executive session violated the Freedom

of Information Act. The FOIC agreed, but the commission’s appeal from

the FOIC’s ruling was sustained. Both the plaintiffs and the commission

appealed, and this court concluded that the commission had violated the act

by convening the executive session. See Planning & Zoning Commission v.

Freedom of Information Commission, 316 Conn. 1, 4, 8, 110 A.3d 419 (2015).

3 Although Handsome filed motions on June 22, 2010, and July 22, 2010,

‘‘with the consent of . . . MD Drilling . . . and pursuant to a settlement

agreement between the . . . parties’’ to further postpone the law day until

July 27, 2010, and September 28, 2010, respectively, it appears from the

record of the foreclosure proceeding that the trial court took no action on

either motion.

4 General Statutes § 8-8 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Aggrieved person’ means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any

officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with

enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case

of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined

planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, ‘aggrieved

person’ includes any person owning land in this state that abuts or is within

a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the

decision of the board. . . .’’

Although § 8-8 (a) was amended in 2012; see Public Acts 2012, No. 12-

146, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In

the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

5 General Statutes § 49-15 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Any judgment

foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion

of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person

having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and

modified, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a, upon

such terms as to costs as the court deems reasonable, provided no such

judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection.

‘‘(2) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure

may be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer upon

agreement of each party to the foreclosure action who filed an appearance

in the action and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate

aftertitle became absolute in any encumbrancer, provided (A) such judgment

may not be opened more than four months after the date such judgment

was entered or more than thirty days after title became absolute in any

encumbrancer, whichever is later, and (B) the rights and interests of each

party, regardless of whether the party filed an appearance in the action,

and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate after title became

absolute in any encumbrancer, are restored to the status that existed on

the date the judgment was entered. . . .’’

6 We reject the plaintiffs’ argument that Southbury is distinguishable from

the present case because it involved an enforcement action that challenged

the standing of the defendant rather than an administrative appeal that

challenged the standing of the plaintiff. In both cases, the owner lost title

to the subject property as the result of a foreclosure, and, therefore, the

general principle articulated in Southbury that the right to appeal is lost

when an interest is terminated by operation of law also is applicable in the

present case.

7 We disagree with the dissenting justice’s claim that we improperly decline

to address ‘‘the import of Handsome’s agreement with MD Drilling’’ because

Handsome relied on the agreement in support of its claim of aggrievement

throughout the proceedings and the trial court relied on the agreement

in concluding that Handsome’s interest in the property was sufficient to

establish aggrievement.

An objective examination of the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs

did not rely on the agreement as evidence of a possessory interest in the

property in support of their claim of aggrievement throughout the proceedings. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged aggrievement on the basis of

their ownership interest in the property. The first and only time the plaintiffs

clearly argued aggrievement on the basis of a possessory interest in the

property was in their objection to the commission’s motion to dismiss. In

response to the commission’s direct attack on the plaintiffs’ allegation that

Handsome was aggrieved as the owner of the property, the plaintiffs argued

that an ownership interest was not required to prove aggrievement and that

Handsome retained a possessory interest under its agreement with MD
Drilling that was sufficient to establish aggrievement. The plaintiffs’ counsel,

however, did not make that argument at trial. Rather, the plaintiffs’ attorney

elicited testimony from Todd Cascella that Handsome was the owner of the

property, that Handsome’s ownership interest was established by a recorded

deed, which was entered into evidence as the plaintiffs’ first exhibit, and

that Handsome remained the owner of the property as of the date of Todd

Cascella’s testimony. Similarly, in his one and only argument to the court

on the issue of aggrievement at trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel contended:

‘‘[W]hat’s important is the record owner, and the evidence today is [that

Handsome] is the record owner. Lots of times there are liens or there [is]

a lis pendens filed on the land records, [and] anybody going to [the] land

records to determine who the record owner is in this particular case would

conclude that [Handsome] is still . . . the record owner.’’ Thus, although

there was testimony and discussion between the court and the parties’

attorneys regarding the written agreement in the context of the foreclosure

action, including the fact that Handsome continued to do business on the

property and that the judgment of strict foreclosure, together with the

agreement, might create in Handsome a possible license or security interest

in the property, the plaintiffs’ counsel did not argue at trial that Handsome

was aggrieved on the basis of a possessory interest in the property. The

plaintiffs also did not make that argument in their posttrial brief, and they

never sought to amend their complaint to allege a possessory interest as

an alternative ground for aggrievement. As previously discussed, a plaintiff

is required to specifically plead and prove aggrievement, and it is the function

of a reviewing court to determine ‘‘whether the pleadings set forth sufficient

facts, if presumed true, to establish a party’s aggrievement . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Independent Utility Workers, Local

12924 v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 312 Conn. 273. Accordingly,

because the plaintiffs never claimed a possessory interest in the property

in their original complaint, never amended their pleadings to add such a

claim, and never argued at trial that they had a possessory interest in the

property, the dissenting justice’s assertion that the plaintiffs relied on a

possessory or equitable interest in the property throughout the proceedings

as the basis for their claim that Handsome was aggrieved is simply not true.

Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to properly make this argument in their

appellate brief. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Handsome was aggrieved

as the record owner of the property and that ‘‘the courts have looked to

the owner of record for purposes of determining who is aggrieved.’’ In

developing this argument, the plaintiffs attack the commission’s reliance on

Southbury for the principle that ‘‘an owner whose property is foreclosed

lacks standing to prosecute a zoning appeal.’’ The plaintiffs argue that Southbury is distinguishable from the present case because, unlike in Southbury,

(1) the present case is an administrative appeal, (2) the present case involves

the standing of the plaintiffs rather than that of the defendant, (3) the

certificate of foreclosure in the present case has never been recorded, (4)

Handsome is still in possession of the premises, (5) Handsome retains an

equitable interest in the premises as a result of the agreement with MD

Drilling to void the foreclosure upon satisfaction of their payment arrangement, and (6) Handsome would benefit from a judgment in its favor. The

plaintiffs’ reference to the fact that Handsome is still in possession of, and

retains an equitable interest in, the property, however, does not represent

an independent claim that Handsome is aggrieved on the basis of a possessory or equitable interest in the property. It is a statement of fact used to

distinguish Southbury from the present case. The reference is contained in

a mere three lines of the plaintiffs’ appellate brief and is unaccompanied

by any supporting analysis or citation to relevant legal authority. It is well

established that ‘‘[w]e are not obligated to consider issues that are not

adequately briefed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942

A.2d 345 (2008). Issues are deemed inadequately briefed ‘‘when they are

merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion . . . [and] when

they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant

authority and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v.

Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 444 n.40, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). Accordingly,

even if the plaintiffs intended to raise such a claim, they did not adequately

brief it.

We also disagree with the dissenting justice insofar as he asserts that the

trial court relied on the agreement with MD Drilling in concluding that

Handsome’s interest in the property was sufficient to establish aggrievement.
The trial court concluded that Handsome was aggrieved because it was the

record owner of the property, and only then noted that the agreement with

MD Drilling ‘‘solidifie[d] and enhance[d] Handsome’s [ownership] interest

in the property.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court thus found that Handsome

had an ownership interest in the property apart from the agreement with

MD Drilling and that the agreement merely reinforced this interest.

To the extent the court cited Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 669, 899 A.2d 26 (2006), Shapero v. Zoning Board, 192

Conn. 367, 376, 472 A.2d 345 (1984), Antenucci v. Hartford Roman Catholic

Diocesan Corp., 142 Conn. 349, 355, 114 A.2d 216 (1955), Goodridge v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 58 Conn. App. 760, 767, 755 A.2d 329, cert. denied,

254 Conn. 930, 761 A.2d 753 (2000), and Michel v. Planning & Zoning

Commission, 28 Conn. App. 314, 324–25, 612 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 223

Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 824 (1992), for the proposition that ‘‘[l]egal title to

property is not required in order to satisfy the test for aggrievement,’’ it did

so for the purpose of agreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument that Handsome’s

status as the record owner of the property was sufficient to establish

aggrievement, and not for the purpose of showing that Handsome had a

possessory or equitable interest in the property. Only a few lines before the

trial court cited the foregoing cases, itreferred to the commission’s argument

that ‘‘the entry of a judgment of strict foreclosure, even if unrecorded, vests

title in the foreclosing party, and that [Handsome] ha[d] no standing to

prosecute this appeal’’ before concluding that ‘‘[t]his claim is not well taken.’’

The trial court explained that Handsome was the record owner of the

property, that ‘‘[t]itle to real estate is controlled by [the] deeds recorded on

the land records’’ and that ‘‘[l]egal title to property is not required in order

for a party to satisfy the test for aggrievement.’’ It then cited the foregoing

cases in support of its conclusion that legal title is not required. The trial

court made no reference at any point in its decision to an argument by

the plaintiffs that Handsome was aggrieved because of an independent

possessory or equitable interest in the property. In sum, the trial court’s

reference to the agreement with MD Drilling and to the foregoing cases

provides no support for the dissenting justice’s view that the court determined that Handsome was aggrieved on the wholly independent ground

that it had a possessory or equitable interest in the property. Accordingly,

there is no basis in the trial court’s decision for appellate review of such

a claim.

8

In light of our conclusions that Handsome and the Cascellas lack standing, we need not reach the other issues raised in this appeal.