alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 166 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 166

   Expressing support for designation of March 3, 2019, as National 
                   Triple-Negative Breast Cancer Day.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 28, 2019

 Mr. Morelle submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                 the Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Expressing support for designation of March 3, 2019, as National 
                   Triple-Negative Breast Cancer Day.

Whereas triple-negative breast cancer was recognized as a distinct type of 
        cancer in 2006;
Whereas triple-negative breast cancer disproportionately affects young women, 
        Black and Hispanic women, and those with BRCA gene mutations;
Whereas triple-negative breast cancers are estrogen receptor-negative, 
        progesterone receptor-negative, and HER2-negative, making them distinct 
        from other breast cancers;
Whereas there is no targeted therapy for triple-negative breast cancers;
Whereas 10 to 20 percent of all breast cancer diagnoses are designated as 
        triple-negative;
Whereas triple-negative breast cancer can be more aggressive and more likely to 
        spread and recur;
Whereas triple-negative breast cancer accounts for around 25 percent of all 
        deaths from breast cancer in the United States; and
Whereas March 3, 2019, would be an appropriate date to designate as National 
        Triple-Negative Breast Cancer Day: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports the 
designation of National Triple-Negative Breast Cancer Day to create 
awareness of the devastating effect of these cancers on American 
families and the need for strong action to eradicate triple-negative 
breast cancer.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3567 Reported in Senate (RS)]

                                                       Calendar No. 489
111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3567

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, as the ``Navy Corpsman Jeffrey 
                   L. Wiener Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 12, 2010

Mr. Schumer (for himself and Mrs. Gillibrand) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

                             July 28, 2010

              Reported by Mr. Lieberman, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, as the ``Navy Corpsman Jeffrey 
                   L. Wiener Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NAVY CORPSMAN JEFFREY L. WIENER POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Navy Corpsman Jeffrey L. Wiener Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Navy 
Corpsman Jeffrey L. Wiener Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 489

111th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 3567

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 100 Broadway in Lynbrook, New York, as the ``Navy Corpsman Jeffrey 
                   L. Wiener Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 28, 2010

                       Reported without amendment
```
#### EUREKA-SECURITY FIRE & MARINE INS. CO. v. AMERICAN STORES CO. et al.

Civ. No. 6226.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

Sept. 21, 1946.

Milford J. Meyer and C. Laurence Cushmore, Jr., both of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Rawle & Henderson, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

The complaint is quite sufficient to enable the defendant to make a responsive pleading. Consequently, the motion for a more definite statement will be denied.

Inasmuch as resort to discovery procedure is indicated, it may be well to say a word now about the defendants’ rights in that respect.

It is not intended to state any general rule governing the scope of discovery in negligence cases. It is a field, conspicuously, for the discretion of the Court. There have been cases involving requests for particularizing allegations of negligence in which this Court has denied such requests, but they have usually had to do with the contributory negligence of an individual plaintiff and, in them, the Court was of the opinion that very little would be gained by requiring amplification. For example, in one case where the complaint was based on injuries received while descending an allegedly defective ladder and the defense was contributory negligence, it would seem both unnecessary and useless to require the defendant to state anything more than that the plaintiff slipped or fell off the ladder by reason of his own carelessness.

This case is different. The charge of negligence may be based upon defective equipment or with the physical condition of a place or building, in which case the defendants should certainly be informed of alleged defects. Or it may have to do with the negligence of agents or employees, in which case the defendants are entitled to know which employees, provided that information can be given, and what they did that caused the damage. These facts can and should be brought out by discovery procedure.
96-2247.

#### State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins.

In Mandamus. On motion for admission *pro hoc vice*of Ellen Dolíase Wilcox. Motion granted.
M A N D A T E

THE STATE OF TEXAS

TO THE 131ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas on March 11, 2015, the cause upon appeal to

revise or reverse your judgment between

Ravi Botla, M.D., Appellant

V.

Salvador Del Toro, Jr., Appellee

No. 04-15-00061-CV and Tr. Ct. No. 2013-CI-19135

was determined, and therein our said Court of Appeals made its order in these words:

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the petitioner’s

request for permission to appeal an otherwise non-appealable order is

DENIED. Petitioner’s motion to stay is DENIED, and this cause is remanded

to the trial court. Costs of court for this petition for permissive appeal are

taxed against petitioner Ravi Botla, M.D.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District of Texas, in this behalf and in all things have the order duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS the Hon. Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of

Texas, with the seal of the Court affixed and the City of San Antonio on July 10, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DISTRICT, AT SAN ANTONIO

No. 04-15-00061-CV

Ravi Botla, M.D.

v.

Salvador Del Toro, Jr.

(NO. 2013-CI-19135 IN 131ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

MOTION FEE

INDIGENT

SUPREME COURT CHAPTER 51

FEE

STATEWIDE EFILING FEE

FILING

MOTION FEE

$10.00

$25.00

$50.00

$20.00

$100.00

$10.00

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

KIMBERLY KELLER

DIANA FAUST

DIANA FAUST

DIANA FAUST

DIANA FAUST

DIANA FAUST

Balance of costs owing to the Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, Texas: 0.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK OF THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the cost bill of

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, showing the charges and

payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my hand and the Seal of the COURT OF APPEALS for

the Fourth District of Texas, this July 10, 2015.

KEITH E. HOTTLE, CLERK

Cynthia A. Martinez

Deputy Clerk, Ext. 53853
# Instructions

# $100,000 Machine

# Multi

# Gaming Machine
#### The State ex rel. Richard, Appellant, *v.*Seidner, Warden, Appellee.

[Cite as *State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner*(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 116.]

(No. 96-1245

Submitted February 18, 1997

Decided April 2, 1997.)

*Donald L. Richard, Sr., pro se.*

*Betty D. Montgomery,*Attorney General, and *Charles L. Wille,*Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

*117
      *Per Curiam.*

Richard asserts in his sole proposition of law that the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying his second motion for relief from the judgment dismissing his habeas corpus petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. But an evidentiary hearing is not required where the motion and attached evidentiary material do not contain allegations of operative facts which would warrant Civ.R. 60(B) relief. *Richard,*76 Ohio St.3d at 151, 666 N.E.2d at 1136, citing *S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Kidney*(1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 661, 667, 654 N.E.2d 1017, 1021.

Richard’s motion and attached evidentiary material did not allege operative facts entitling him to Civ.R. 60(B) relief. As we recently held in a separate case involving Richard, his claim challenging the validity or sufficiency of the indictment is not cognizable in habeas corpus. *State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner*(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 68, 69, 671 N.E.2d 28 (“ * * * Richard’s claim challenges the validity or sufficiency of his indictment, is nonjurisdictional in nature, and should have been raised on appeal of his criminal conviction rather than in habeas corpus.”); see, also, *State ex rel. Durkin v. Ungaro*(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 191, 192, 529 N.E.2d 1268, 1269 (Civ.R. 60[B] motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a timely appeal.). In addition, the indictment attached to his second motion for relief from judgment specifically alleged that the charged offense occurred in Cuyahoga County.

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Richard’s second motion for relief from judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals properly determined that Richard failed to provide the court with any reasons justifying relief from its previous judgment dismissing his habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
#### Federal National Mortgage Association, Appellant, v Peter L. Katz et al., Respondents.

[822 NYS2d 759]

In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.), entered January 5, 2005, which denied its motion for summary judgment and, upon searching the record, awarded summary judgment to the defendants dismissing the complaint.

*756Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the respondent Spark Real Estate, Inc.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion for summary judgment since it failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to such relief *(see*CPLR 3212; *Ayotte v Gervasio,*81 NY2d 1062 [1993]).

Although the defendants did not move for summary judgment, the Supreme Court had the authority pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party with respect to an issue that was the subject of the motion before the court *(see Dunham v Hilco Constr. Co.,*89 NY2d 425, 429-430 [1996]; *Murray v Murray,*28 AD3d 624 [2006]; *Goldstein v County of Suffolk,*300 AD2d 441, 442 [2002]). Under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court properly exercised that authority in awarding summary judgment to the defendants dismissing the complaint. Schmidt, J.P, Santucci, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.
- FILED IN |. RECEIVED IN
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JUL 13 2015



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Exhibit 10.(b)

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

 

We hereby consent to the use in this Registration Statement on Form N-4 (File No. 333-179649) of our report dated March 28, 2013, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of Protective Life Insurance Company and subsidiaries, which appears in such Registration Statement.  We also consent to the use in this Registration Statement on Form N-4 (File No. 333-179649) of our report dated April 23, 2013, relating to the financial statements of Protective Variable Annuity Separate Account, which appears in such Registration Statement.  We also consent to the reference to us under the heading “Experts” in such Registration Statement.

 

 

	
/s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
    
	
 
    
	
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
    
	
Birmingham, Alabama
    
	
July 11, 2013
#### WOERTER v. ROSENTHAL.

No. 2181.

District Court, S. D. California, Central Division.

July 13, 1942.

Samuel S. Gilbert and R. M. Hemperly, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Milton Davis (of Walley & Davis), of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

J. F. T. O’CONNOR, District Judge.

This is an action on a promissory note for $13,964.97 with interest. The defendant answered and, among other defenses, interposed the bar of the statute of limitations. Thereafter, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Said motion raises the issue of the statute of limitations.

This court has heretofore considered the question of interposing the statute of limitations as a bar to recovery under a motion to dismiss where the facts alleged in the complaint clearly established that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Wright v. Bankers Service Corporation, D.C., 39 F.Supp. 980; Wright v. Gibson, 9 Cir., June 15, 1942, 128 F.2d 865. Also, Abram et al. v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., D.C., 46 F.Sup.p. 969, filed June 3, 1942. Several authorities are cited in each of the foregoing cases. However, the complaint alleges: “ * * * plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such information and belief alleges that the defendant has not resided within the State of California for a period of four years since the accrual of the cause of action herein sued upon.”

This allegation in the complaint raises a question of fact as to whether or not the statute of limitations is a bar to the action, and the issue, therefore, cannot be determined upon affidavits.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56 (c), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; Chemical Foundation, Inc., v. Universal-Cyclops Steel Corporation, United States District, D.C.W.D.Pa., April 2, 1942, 2 F.R.D. 283; McElwain v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 2 Cir., Feb. 21, 1942, 126 F.2d 210; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, page 3184, § 56.04.

The motion of the defendant is denied.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 4/16/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

BILLY EUGENE MARSHALL,

Plaintiff - Appellant, v. LARRY FIELDS, GARY D. MAYNARD, Warden; ANITA TRAMMEL, MICHAEL CRAIN, JERRY RICHARD, DELORES RAMSEY; SECURITY MAJOR VIEUX, DARRELL EPPERLY, BOBBY BOONE,

Defendants - Appellees. Nos. 95-5212 & 95-5266 (D. Ct. No. 94-C-1069-B) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This appeal is from an order of the district court dismissing pro se appellant’s civil- 2 -

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during administrative disciplinary procedures that are alleged to have occurred in 1991 and 1992. Appellant appeals on the grounds that the district court erred in finding that appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm. Construing appellant’s complaint and all of the pleadings filed on appeal liberally, as we must, appellant alleges that appellees violated his constitutional rights through a series of disciplinary actions and proceedings that occurred during the years 1991 and 1992. In this appeal, appellant alleges that the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations had run because the collateral consequences of the disciplinary actions taken at that time continue to impact appellant. We have reviewed appellant Marshall’s brief, the pleadings, and the district court’s order, as well as the entire record on appeal. We agree with the district court that the applicable statute of limitations is the Oklahoma statute of limitation for personal injury actions, which is two years. Based upon our review of this record, we find no error in the determination of the district court that all of the actions alleged by appellant occurred outside the two-year statute of limitations period and are therefore barred. We AFFIRM the dismissal of the action. The mandate shall issue forthwith. ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Baltek Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jacques Kohn, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/JACQUES KOHNJacques Kohn
President and Chief Executive Officer
April 14, 2003 |  |  |  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 

22

---

QuickLinks
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-41373

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE SANTOS CARRILLO-MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:11-CR-659-1

Before JONES, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Santos Carrillo-Martinez (Carrillo) appeals his 72-month sentence

followed by a three-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty

plea conviction to being an alien found unlawfully in the United States. Carrillo

argues that the district court plainly erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement

of his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a prior crime of

violence conviction because the Government failed to show by a preponderance

of the evidence that his prior offense encompassed the elements of a generic

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 15, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 11-41373 Document: 00512242583 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2013
No. 11-41373

burglary offense. He contends that the Texas burglary statute contains a unique

element that includes a lawful entry onto property without the consent of a

person who has a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. We

have recently rejected a similar argument. See United States v. Morales-Mota,

704 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, the district court did not commit error,

plain or otherwise, in making the enhancement. See id.; United States v.

Puckett, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 

Asserting that his sentence was procedurally and substantively

unreasonable, Carrillo argues that the district court erred in imposing a term of

supervised release contrary to the guideline recommendation that “ordinarily”

a term of supervised release would not be imposed if the defendant is a

deportable alien. Review is for plain error because Carrillo did not object in the

district court to the imposition of the term of supervised release. See Puckett,

556 U.S. at 135. The district court’s explanation reflected the consideration of 

relevant sentencing factors and provided a justification for imposing the term of

supervised release. The district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in

imposing the three-year term of supervised release. See United States v.

Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2012).; Puckett, 556 U.S. at

135.

The sentence is AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 11-41373 Document: 00512242583 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/15/2013
#### In the Matter of Dashawn W. and Others, Children Alleged to be Abused. Antoine N., Appellant; Ronnelle B., Respondent; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

Submitted August 6, 2012;

decided August 28, 2012

Motion for poor person relief granted.