[Cite as State v. Lux, 2012-Ohio-112.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2010 CA 30 

v. : T.C. NO. 09CR521 

CURTIS R. LUX : (Criminal appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 : 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 13th day of January , 2012. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

JAMES D. BENNETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0022729, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 201 West 

Main Street, Safety Building, Troy, Ohio 45373 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

MARK A. DETERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0085094, 371 West First Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Curtis R. Lux was convicted of gross sexual imposition after a jury trial in the 

Miami County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court sentenced him to one year in prison 

and ordered him to pay court costs. Lux appeals from his conviction and sentence, raising 

three assignments of error. We will address them in an order that facilitates our analysis. 
2

I 

{¶ 2} Lux’s second assignment of error states: 

{¶ 3} “APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY 

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.” 

{¶ 4} In his second assignment of error, Lux claims that his conviction was based 

on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 5} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has 

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the 

jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997). When reviewing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction, the relevant inquiry is whether any rational finder of fact, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 

N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 

L.Ed.2d. 560 (1979). A guilty verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable 

minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” Id. 

{¶ 6} In contrast to the sufficiency of the evidence standard, “a weight of the 

evidence argument challenges the believability of the evidence and asks which of the 

competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or persuasive.” Wilson 

at ¶ 12. When evaluating whether a conviction is contrary to the manifest weight of the 
3

evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 

N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 7} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must defer to 

the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular 

witnesses. State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 

1997). However, we may determine which of several competing inferences suggested by 

the evidence should be preferred. Id.

{¶ 8} The fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not 

render the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. Wilson at ¶ 14. A 

judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175. 

{¶ 9} The State’s evidence at trial reveals the following facts: 

{¶ 10} On October 30, 2009, twelve-year-old Brittany spent the evening with her 

friends, D.B. and J.B., who are sisters. Brittany told her mother that she would spend the 

night at D.B. and J.B.’s home, while the sisters told their parents that they planned to spend 

the night at Brittany’s house. In fact, the girls planned to meet one of D.B.’s friends and to 

stay at that girl’s house, but D.B.’s friend failed to meet them at the prearranged location. 

The girls tried, unsuccessfully, to find another friend to stay with. Brittany ultimately 
4

suggested that they go to Lux’s house. (Lux knew Brittany’s sisters.) At the time, Lux was 

36 years old. 

{¶ 11} When Lux answered his door, Brittany told him that they did not have 

anywhere to stay and she asked him if they could stay at his house. Lux responded that they 

could sleep in his van, and he unlocked the vehicle for them. Lux later brought the girls 

some snacks, water, and blankets. J.B. got into the front passenger seat, D.B. took the 

middle bench seat, and Brittany got into the rear seat of the van. Lux got into the rear seat 

with Brittany. 

{¶ 12} According to Brittany’s testimony at trial, at some point, Lux “got vertically 

on top of me and *** started kissing my neck.” Lux put his hand under Brittany’s shirt, 

unbuttoned and unzipped her blue jeans, and put his hand down her pants. Lux rubbed 

Brittany’s “vaginal area.” After Lux pulled his hand away, Brittany rolled over and later 

fell asleep. J.B. testified that she saw Lux and Brittany tickling each other, and D.B. heard 

Brittany and Lux “giggling and talking;” neither sister saw any sexual activity between 

Brittany and Lux. 

{¶ 13} In the morning, the girls went to the sisters’ house. Brittany told J.B. that 

she had “made out” with Lux; J.B. told D.B., who told her mother. J.B. and D.B.’s mother 

contacted the police. 

{¶ 14} On November 1, 2009, Brittany was interviewed at her home by Troy Police 

Officer Joel Misirian. Brittany was hostile to the officer, and she told him that Lux “was 

just kissing my neck.” Brittany denied that any other sexual activity had occurred. 

{¶ 15} After leaving Brittany’s home, Officer Misirian talked with Lux at his 
5

residence. Lux told the officer that the three girls had come to his house and appeared to be 

scared. Because he lives with his mother, Lux was not able to have them stay in the house 

and he offered to let them stay in his van. Lux indicated that he sat in the back of the van 

with Brittany while the other girls sat near the front. Lux said that Brittany kissed him and 

he kissed her back. Lux further said that Brittany let him touch her breasts and underwear 

and that Brittany tried to guide his hand down her pants. Lux admitted that he had touched 

her vaginal area, but denied that he had penetrated Brittany with his hand. 

{¶ 16} After the interview, Officer Misirian contacted Detective Alex Hillman, who 

advised the officer to ask Lux if he would be willing to come to the police station for a 

further interview. Lux agreed, and Misirian drove Lux to the station. Detective Hillman 

interviewed Lux, and Lux made statements consistent with his conversation with Officer 

Misirian. A videotape of Hillman’s interview with Lux was shown to the jury. 

{¶ 17} The following day, Brittany was interviewed at the police station by Detective 

Alex Hillman and a victim advocate named Carmen. Brittany reiterated that Lux had kissed 

her neck, but denied that any other sexual activity had happened. During defense counsel’s 

cross-examination of Brittany, a portion of the videotape of this interview was played for the 

jury. Brittany testified that she subsequently testified for a grand jury, during which she 

stated that Lux had kissed her and put his hand down her pants. 

{¶ 18} Lux testified on his own behalf at trial. He stated that the girls had come to 

his housing looking for a place to spend the night, and he agreed to let them stay in his van. 

Lux indicated that he sat in the back with Brittany, that she slapped him playfully, and he 

tickled her to get her to stop. Afterward, they all fell asleep. Lux further testified that he 
6

awoke to the feeling of “being messed with.” He felt Brittany kiss him and grab his hands. 

Lux denied that he touched Brittany for his or her sexual gratification. Lux stated that, once 

he realized what was happening, he sent the girls home. 

{¶ 19} Based on the evidence, Lux was convicted of gross sexual imposition, in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). That statute provides: “No person shall have sexual 

contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the 

offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to 

have sexual contact when any of the following applies: *** (4) The other person, or one of 

the other persons, is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the 

age of that person.” “Sexual contact” is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone of 

another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the 

person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” 

 R.C. 2907.01(B). 

{¶ 20} Upon review of the record, the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Lux’s conviction. According to the State’s witnesses, Brittany was 12 years old on October 

30, 2009. Brittany testified that Lux kissed her on her neck and touched her breasts and 

pubic area. Officer Misirian and Detective Hillman both testified that Lux confessed to 

kissing Brittany, touching her breasts, and her vaginal area, and Lux’s videotaped statements 

to Detective Hillman at the police station, which were consistent with the officers’ 

testimony, were played for the jury. Although there was no direct evidence that Lux 

touched Brittany for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying himself or Brittany, 

Brittany’s testimony and Lux’s statements to the officers supported such an inference. 
7

Viewed in the State’s favor, there was ample evidence to support Lux’s conviction for gross 

sexual imposition. 

{¶ 21} Lux further claims that the jury lost its way and created a manifest injustice 

when it found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. The credibility of the witnesses and 

the weight to be given to their testimony were matters for the jury to determine. The jury 

did not lose its way simply because it chose to believe the State’s version of the events, 

which it had a right to do. Although Lux testified at trial that Brittany had kissed him and 

grabbed his hands and that he did not touch her for the purpose of sexual gratification, the 

evidence, including Lux’s interview with Detective Hillman, would allow a reasonable jury 

to conclude that Lux was a willing participant in the sexual contact and that he received 

sexual arousal or gratification from their sexual behavior. Reviewing the record as a whole, 

we cannot say that the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction, that the jury lost its way 

in choosing to believe the State’s witnesses, or that a manifest miscarriage of justice 

occurred. Lux’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 22} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

II 

{¶ 23} Lux’s third assignment of error states: 

{¶ 24} “APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL.” 

{¶ 25} In his third assignment of error, Lux claims that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance when he failed to file a motion to suppress Lux’s statements to the 

police. 
8

{¶ 26} We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two prong 

analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 

(1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 

538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

it must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that his errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability 

that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688. Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Id.

{¶ 27} Lux claims that he should have been informed of his Miranda rights by 

Officer Misirian before being transported to the police station, because the officer had 

probable cause to arrest him. Lux further claims that his statements to Detective Hillman 

should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Miranda. Lux 

asserts that his counsel acted deficiently when he failed to raise these issues. 

{¶ 28} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), 

the United States Supreme Court held that the State may not use statements stemming from a 

defendant’s custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to 

secure the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. Police are not 

required to give Miranda warnings to every person that they question, even if the person 

being questioned is a suspect. State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440, 678 N.E.2d 891 

(1997). Instead, Miranda warnings are only required for custodial interrogations. Id.

{¶ 29} “Custodial interrogation” means questioning initiated by the police after the 
9

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant 

way. State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22665, 2009-Ohio-1279, ¶ 18, citing State 

v. Steers, 2d Dist. Greene No. 89-CA-38, 1991 WL 82974 (May 14, 1991). In order for a 

defendant’s statements made during a custodial interrogation to be admissible, the State 

must establish that the accused knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her 

rights. Miranda, supra; State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 38, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), 

overruled on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). 

{¶ 30} Based on the record before us, we find no indication that Lux was in custody 

when he was questioned by Officer Misirian or by Detective Hillman. Officer Misirian’s 

testimony at trial reflects that the officer went to Lux’s home and that Lux voluntarily agreed 

to speak with him. They spoke on Lux’s front porch. Nothing suggests that Lux was 

restrained in any way or that he was threatened or otherwise coerced by, or under the control 

of, the officer. Officer Misirian further testified that he had asked Lux if Lux “would be 

willing to come to the police department for a further interview.” Misirian stated that Lux 

agreed and Misirian “transported him as a courtesy ride” to the police station. There is no 

evidence that Lux was in custody when he was transported to the Troy police department. 

{¶ 31} Lux made incriminating statements to Officer Misirian during their 

conversation, which may have provided probable cause for Lux’s arrest, but the existence of 

probable cause did not convert Lux’s voluntary conversation with the officer to a custodial 

interrogation. “The determination whether a custodial interrogation has occurred requires 

an inquiry into ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his 

situation.’” State v. Estepp, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16279, 1997 WL 736501 (Nov. 26, 
10

1997), quoting Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d at 440. Neither an officer’s subjective intent nor the 

defendant’s subjective belief is relevant to the determination of whether an individual is in 

custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. Gaddis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24007, 

2011-Ohio-2822, ¶ 18; State v. Severt, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24074, 2010-Ohio-5389, 

¶ 15. 

{¶ 32} Upon his arrival at the police station, Lux was interviewed by Detective 

Hillman. Even assuming that Lux was in custody during that interview, there is no support 

in the record for Lux’s assertion that he made statements to Detective Hillman in violation of 

Miranda. The videotape of Hillman’s interview with Lux shows that Hillman began the 

interview by giving Miranda warnings to Lux. Lux indicated that he understood each of his 

rights and that he was willing to talk with the detective. Lux signed a waiver of rights form. 

{¶ 33} The fact that Lux had previously made incriminating statements to Officer 

Misirian prior to Detective Hillman’s notification of Lux’s Miranda rights did not render 

Lux’s statements inadmissible under Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 

L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). Lux’s prior statements to Misirian were given voluntarily in a 

non-custodian context. This case does not involve the “question-first, Mirandize-later” 

interrogation practice that Siebert aimed to remedy. Accord State v. Sosnoskie, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 22713, 2009-Ohio-2327, ¶ 62 (concluding that, “[b]ecause the detectives 

were not obliged to read Sosnoskie his Miranda warnings prior to the first confession, the 

absence of those warnings do not affect the voluntariness of the second confession, given 

several days later, after Sosnoskie waived his Miranda rights.”) 

{¶ 34} Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that Lux’s statements to the police 
11

would have been suppressed had a motion to suppress been filed. The record does not 

support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to file such a 

motion. 

{¶ 35} Lux’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

III 

{¶ 36} Lux’s first assignment of error states: 

{¶ 37} “APPELLANT’S SENTENCE IS VOID.” 

{¶ 38} In his first assignment of error, Lux claims that his sentence is void for three 

reasons. First, he asserts that his “sentencing” is void, because the judgment entry indicates 

that he was classified as a sex offender under R.C. 2950.09 and 2950.01(E). Second, Lux 

argues that the trial court improperly ordered him to pay court costs. Third, he claims that 

the trial court did not properly notify him about post-release control. 

{¶ 39} On April 12, 2010, Lux was brought before the trial court for “a 2950 hearing 

and also for sentencing.” The trial court informed Lux that he was convicted of “a sexually 

oriented offense by statute. *** [I]t’s a tier two offense[.]” The court told Lux of his 

obligations as a Tier II sex offender and stated that a failure to comply with the requirements 

could result in a separate felony charge. Lux signed a form which acknowledged that he 

had been informed about his Tier II classification. 

{¶ 40} The court then proceeding with Lux’s sentencing. The court heard from 

defense counsel, the prosecutor, and Lux, and it indicated that it had reviewed the 

presentence investigation report. The court stated that it considered “the purposes and 

principles of the sentencing statutes and all the factors of record” and weighed the recidivism 
12

and seriousness factors. The court concluded that Lux was not amenable to community 

control, and it sentenced him to one year in prison and to pay court costs. The court further 

informed Lux that he was subject to a mandatory five years of post-release control and told 

him of the consequences if he violated post-release control. 

A. Sex Offender Classification

{¶ 41} Lux raises that the caption of the judgment entry states, “Entry Determination 

Hearing Pursuant to R.C. 2950.09 and Imposition of Sentence,” and the entry indicates that 

his tier classification was pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(E). Lux argues that R.C. 2950.09 had 

been repealed prior to his classification hearing and that R.C. 2950.01(E) defines Tier I – not 

Tier II – sex offenders. 

{¶ 42} Lux is correct that R.C. 2950.09 had been repealed and that R.C. 2950.01(E) 

defines Tier I sex offenders. Nevertheless, the trial court was required under the current 

version of R.C. Chapter 2950 to classify Lux as a sex offender, and the court properly 

notified Lux that he was required to registered as a Tier II sex offender. See R.C. 

2950.01(F). The improper statutory citations in the judgment entry were, perhaps, 

typographical errors or from an old form, which amounted to harmless error. The errors in 

the statutory citations may be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry. 

B. Court Costs

{¶ 43} Next, Lux asserts that he was improperly ordered to pay court costs. He 

argues that the court failed to consider his present and future ability to pay in accordance 

with R.C. 2929.19(B)(6), to specify the amount of costs at sentencing, and to provide certain 

notifications under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1). 
13

{¶ 44} R.C. 2929.19(B)(6) requires the trial court to consider defendant’s present 

and future ability to pay before imposing any financial sanction under R.C. 2929.18. State 

v. Twitty, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24296, 2011-Ohio-4725, ¶ 23. Financial sanctions 

include, for example, restitution, fines, and reimbursement of the costs of community control 

sanctions, confinement, or monitoring devices. R.C. 2929.18. 

{¶ 45} Court costs are governed by R.C. 2947.23. Court costs are not financial 

sanctions. State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-07-32, 2007-Ohio-6552, ¶ 11. 

Consequently, R.C. 2929.19 is inapplicable to court costs, and the trial court need not 

consider a defendant’s ability to pay under R.C. 2929.19 prior to imposing court costs. E.g, 

id.; Columbus v. Kiner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-543, 2011-Ohio-6462. 

{¶ 46} Under R.C. 2947.23, a trial court is required to impose court costs against all 

convicted defendants, even those who are indigent. See State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 

2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, ¶ 8. However, “despite the mandatory language *** 

requiring the imposition of court costs, a trial court may waive the payment of costs.” 

(Emphasis in original.) State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 

278, ¶ 11. It is also possible that, during the collection process, the clerk of courts may 

waive the collection of court costs for indigent defendants. See White at ¶ 14 (noting that 

R.C. 2929.14 was silent as to the collection of costs from indigent defendants). 

{¶ 47} A defendant seeking a waiver of the payment of court costs must move for 

such a waiver at sentencing. State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 

N.E.2d 164; State v. Stutz, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24489, 2011-Ohio-5210, ¶ 16. The 

trial court, however, has no duty to waive court costs, and R.C. 2949.092 does not provide 
14

standards for such waiver. Id, citing State v. Costa, 2d Dist. Greene No. 99 CA 14, 1999 

WL 957647 (Sept. 3, 1999). An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to waive 

payment of court costs under an abuse of discretion standard. 

{¶ 48} Lux did not request a waiver of the payment of court costs at sentencing. 

Accordingly, he cannot challenge the imposition of court costs on direct appeal. 

{¶ 49} Moreover, the court’s imposition of court costs is not erroneous due to the 

court’s failure to specify the amount of court costs at sentencing. (The judgment entry 

imposes costs in the amount of $1,964.34.) The calculation of the amount of court costs is 

a ministerial act. Threatt at ¶ 21. Thus, we have held that the failure to specify the amount 

at sentencing does not affect the order’s finality and the itemized bill may be calculated later. 

State v. Murillo, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21919, 2008-Ohio-201, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 50} Lux asserts that the trial court’s imposition of court costs was nevertheless 

erroneous, because the court did not notify him that any failure to pay court costs could be 

addressed by an order to perform community service, pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(A)(1). R.C. 

2947.23(A)(1) provides: 

{¶ 51} “*** At the time the judge or magistrate imposes sentence, the judge or 

magistrate shall notify the defendant of both of the following: 

{¶ 52} “(a) If the defendant fails to pay that judgment or fails to timely make 

payments towards that judgment under a payment schedule approved by the court, the court 

may order the defendant to perform community service in an amount of not more than forty 

hours per month until the judgment is paid or until the court is satisfied that the defendant is 

in compliance with the approved payment schedule. 
15

{¶ 53} “(b) If the court orders the defendant to perform the community service, the 

defendant will receive credit upon the judgment at the specified hourly credit rate per hour of 

community service performed, and each hour of community service performed will reduce 

the judgment by that amount.” 

{¶ 54} The trial court did not provide these notifications to Lux at the sentencing 

hearing, and the failure do to so was contrary to the statute. The Ohio appellate districts are 

split, however, as to whether we can review the lack of notification on direct appeal. 

Several appellate districts have held that the issue is not ripe for adjudication until the 

defendant has failed to pay court costs and the trial court has ordered the defendant to 

perform community service. E.g., State v. Gates, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0001, 

2011-Ohio-5711; State v. Barkley, 185 Ohio App.3d 686, 2009-Ohio-5549, 925 N.E.2d 626 

(10th Dist.); State v. Kearse, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-08-29, 2009-Ohio-4111; State v. Nutter, 

12th Dist. Brown No. CA2008-10-009, 2009-Ohio-2964. 

{¶ 55} On the other hand, other appellate districts have addressed the matter and 

found the failure to provide the notice required by R.C. 2947.23 to be prejudicial error. 

E.g., State v. Adams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95439, 2011-Ohio-2662; State v. Ruby, 6th 

Dist. Sandusky No. S-10-028, 2011-Ohio-4864; State v. Moss, 186 Ohio App.3d 787, 

2010-Ohio-1135 (4th Dist.); State v. Gabriel, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09 MA 108, 

2010-Ohio-3151; State v. Dansby, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 08 AP 06 0047, 

2009-Ohio-2975. Such courts have either vacated the order to pay costs and remanded for 

resentencing, e.g., Adams, supra, or modified the sentence such that the trial court cannot 

order community service for the failure to pay court costs, e.g., Gabriel, supra. 
16

{¶ 56} The Ohio Supreme Court has accepted review of the lack of notification issue 

on the Twelfth District’s certification of a conflict between its holding in State v. Smith, 12th 

 Dist. Warren No. CA2010-06-057, 2011-Ohio-1188, which concluded that the issue was 

not ripe for review, and the Fourth District’s holding in Moss, which addressed the issue and 

found prejudicial error.1 State v. Smith, 129 Ohio St.3d 1426, 2011-Ohio-3740, 951 N.E.2d 

89 (S.Ct. No. 2011-0811). 

{¶ 57} We have not previously addressed whether the trial court’s failure to provide 

the required notification under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1) is ripe for review on direct appeal. 

Neither approach is unreasonable. Given that a defendant has not been prejudiced, and 

would not be prejudiced, until he has failed to pay court costs and been ordered to perform 

community service, we understand the position that the appellate court should not address a 

harm which may never materialize. Accordingly, there is some appeal to the approach 

taken by several appellate districts that the issue is not ripe for review on direct appeal. 

{¶ 58} Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized that “no judge has the 

authority to disregard the law by ignoring a statutorily mandated term.” State v. Jarvis, 4th 

Dist. Jackson No. 10CA11, 2011-Ohio-6252, ¶ 6, fn.1, citing State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 

128 Ohio St.3d 236, 2011-Ohio-235, 943 N.E.2d 535, ¶ 19. “A trial court does not have the 

discretion to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that ignores mandatory statutory 

 1

The court ordered briefing on the following issue: “[W]hether a sentencing court’s failure 

to inform an offender, as required by R.C. 2947.23(A)(1), that community service could be 

imposed if the offender fails to pay the costs of prosecution or ‘court costs’ presents an issue ripe 

for review even though the record does not show that the offender has failed to pay such costs or 

that the trial court has ordered the offender to perform community service as a result of failure to 

pay.” 
17

provisions.” State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 20. 

 In addition, as noted by the Fourth District, “absent resentencing and proper notice, the trial 

court cannot impose a community control sanction for failure to pay costs. That result 

clearly does not promote the interests of justice.” Id. Accordingly, we believe the better 

course is to find the issue ripe for determination and to review Lux’s claimed error. 

{¶ 59} As stated above, the trial court did not notify Lux that he could be ordered to 

perform community service if he failed to pay the costs of prosecution imposed under R.C. 

2947.23. This was error. At this juncture, however, it appears that Lux has served his 

one-year prison sentence, and we cannot remand the matter to the trial court for 

resentencing. Accordingly, should Lux fail to pay the ordered court costs, he cannot be 

ordered to perform community service. 

C. Post-Release Control

{¶ 60} Finally, Lux claims that his sentence is void, because the trial court did not 

properly impose post-release control. Lux states that the trial court incorrectly informed 

him at the sentencing hearing that periods of post-release control “could be consecutive.” 

He further asserts that the judgment entry erroneously states that post-release control was 

optional and that he could be returned to prison for up to nine months if he violated 

post-release control. 

{¶ 61} According to R.C. 2967.28, the post-release control statute, Lux was subject 

to a mandatory five years of post-release control based on his conviction for gross sexual 

imposition, a felony sex offense. Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), the trial court was required 

to notify Lux of his post-release control at sentencing. 
18

{¶ 62} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court informed Lux: “In your case, Mr. 

Lux, there’s a mandatory five years post release control. When you get out you will have 

rules and regulations you’ll have to follow for a five year period. This is a sex offense and 

it carries mandatory five years.” Lux’s judgment entry included a mandatory term of five 

years post-release control. It stated: “Once Defendant is released from his term of 

incarceration at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, he has been notified 

that he is subject to mandatory Post Release Control for five years ordered by the Adult 

Parole Authority.” 

{¶ 63} Lux argues that the trial court imposed an optional period of post-release 

control. He cites to another portion of the judgment entry that reads: “After prison release, 

if post-release control is imposed, for violating post release control conditions, the adult 

parole authority or parole board could impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction, 

return defendant to prison for up to nine months for each violation, up to a maximum of 50 

percent of the stated term.” This provision indicates the penalty that may be imposed if 

post-release control were violated. Although it includes the phrase “if post-release control 

is imposed,” the paragraph does not reflect that Lux’s period of post-release control was 

optional. 

{¶ 64} R.C. 2967.28(F)(3) authorizes a prison term to be imposed as a sanction for 

violating post-release control. Unless a releasee’s stated prison term was reduced pursuant 

to R.C. 5120.032, “the period of a prison term that is imposed as a post-release control 

sanction under this division shall not exceed nine months, and the maximum cumulative 

prison term for all violations under this division shall not exceed one-half of the stated 
19

prison term originally imposed upon the offender as part of this sentence.” Id. R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(e) requires the trial court to tell a defendant at sentencing that “if a period of 

supervision is imposed following the offender’s release from prison, *** and if the offender 

violates that supervision or a condition of post-release control ***, the parole board may 

impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term 

originally imposed upon the offender. ***” 

{¶ 65} At sentencing, the trial court told Lux, “If you violate any of those [rules and 

regulations,] the Adult Parole Authority can send you back to the institution for a period not 

to exceed one-half the amount of time you would have served in the first place.” As quoted 

above, the judgment entry further states that “the adult parole authority or the parole board 

could impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction, return defendant to prison for up 

to nine months for each violation, up to a maximum of 50 percent of the stated term.” 

{¶ 66} Lux asserts that the sentencing entry is incorrect, because it states that he 

could be returned to prison for a period of nine months. We disagree. The judgment entry 

reflects the language of R.C. 2967.28(F)(3). Although the entry references the nine-month 

statutory maximum for each violation, the judgment entry further states that the maximum 

period could not exceed one-half of Lux’s prison term, i.e., one-half of a one-year sentence. 

Reading the paragraph as a whole, the judgment entry accurately states that the maximum 

period would be one-half of Lux’s sentence, i.e., six months. We find no error with this 

portion of the trial court’s judgment entry. 

{¶ 67} Lux further claims that the trial court erroneously told him at sentencing that 

post-release control could be imposed as a prison term consecutively to any prison term for a 
20

felony committed while on post-release control. The trial court stated at sentencing: 

{¶ 68} “If you were out and you picked up another felony charge and got convicted 

of it after you got release on Post release control[,] your new sentencing Judge can take the 

balance of your Post release control and run it consecutive to your new sentence and order 

the whole thing to be served in the pen. So here’s how that happens. If you’re out and you 

get picked up[,] let’s say hypothetically for a felony five theft offense, maximum penalty 

twelve months, and you would get ten months in the pen and you’re still on post release 

control, you’re in for your first year of post release control, you’d have four years post 

release control left, your sentencing Judge could take that four years and run it consecutive 

to the one and you’d be doing five years on a theft offense. That’s how that works.” 

{¶ 69} Lux asserts that the trial court’s statement is contrary to R.C. 

2967.28(F)(4)(d). R.C. 2967.28(F)(4), however, addresses the length of post-release control 

to be imposed following an offender’s release from prison on a new felony committed while 

on post-release control.2

 We do not find R.C. 2967.28(F)(4)(d) to be applicable. 

{¶ 70} Rather, R.C. 2929.141 addresses sentencing for an offense committed while 

under post-release control. It provides: 

{¶ 71} “(A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on 

post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court may terminate the 

 2

Specifically, R.C. 2967.28(F)(4)(d) states: “Any period of post-release control shall commence 

upon an offender’s actual release from prison. If an offender is serving an indefinite prison term or a life 

sentence in addition to a stated prison term, the offender shall serve the period of post-release control in the 

following manner: *** 

“(d) The period of post-release control for a releasee who commits a felony while under 

post-release control for an earlier felony shall be the longer of the period of post-release control specified 

for the new felony under division (B) or (C) of this section or the time remaining under the period of 

post-release control imposed for the earlier felony as determined by the parole board or court.” 
21

term of post-release control, and the court may do either of the following regardless of 

whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the original prison term 

for which the person is on post-release control: 

{¶ 72} “(1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison term 

for the post-release control violation. The maximum prison term for the violation shall be 

the greater of twelve months or the period of post-release control for the earlier felony minus 

any time the person has spent under post-release control for the earlier felony. In all cases, 

any prison term imposed for the violation shall be reduced by any prison term that is 

administratively imposed by the parole board as a post-release control sanction. A prison 

term imposed for the violation shall be served consecutively to any prison term imposed for 

the new felony. The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall 

terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony. 

{¶ 73} “(2) Impose a sanction under sections 2929.15 to 2929.18 of the Revised 

Code for the violation that shall be served concurrently or consecutively, as specified by the 

court, with any community control sanctions for the new felony.” 

{¶ 74} In accordance with R.C. 2929.141, the trial court correctly informed Lux that 

the balance of his post-release control (e.g., four years, in the trial court’s example) could be 

imposed as prison time to be served consecutively to any prison sentence that Lux might 

receive for the new felony. 

{¶ 75} In summary, the trial court correctly classified Lux as a Tier II sex offender 

and properly ordered him to pay court costs. The court properly informed Lux at the 

sentencing hearing that he was subject to a mandatory five-year period of post-release 
22

control and that a violation of his post-release control could result in his being returned to 

prison for a term equaling one-half of his sentence; the judgment entry reflects these 

statements. The court also correctly informed Lux at the sentencing hearing that, if he were 

convicted of a felony while on post-release control, the balance of his post-release control 

could be imposed as a prison sentence, to be served consecutively to his new sentence. The 

court failed to inform Lux that he could be required to perform community service should he 

fail to pay court costs. As a result, community service cannot be ordered should Lux fail to 

pay the those costs. 

{¶ 76} Lux’s first assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part. 

IV 

{¶ 77} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. The trial court may correct any 

typographical errors in the judgment entry, consistent with this opinion, through a nunc pro 

tunc entry. 

 . . . . . . . . . . 

FAIN, J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

James D. Bennett 

Mark A. Deters 

Hon. Robert J. Lindeman