NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 22-2793 

__________ 

ROSEANNA CARRERO, o/b/o K.S.C. a Minor, 

 Appellant 

v. 

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02037) 

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

April 11, 2023 

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: April 12, 2023) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

 Roseanna Carrero, on behalf of her minor daughter child, K.S.C., appeals from the 

District Court’s order affirming a determination that K.S.C. was not disabled under the 

Social Security Act. For the following reasons, we will affirm. 

 Carrero filed an application on behalf of her minor child, K.S.C., for supplemental 

security income (SSI) benefits. The application was based on, among other things, 

K.S.C.’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder 

(ODD), and specific learning disabilities. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) denied the application, holding that K.S.C. was not disabled during the 

relevant period because her impairments did not meet or functionally equal the severity 

of any impairments listed in the applicable regulations. (ECF 13-2, at 11-25 of 48.) On 

October 4, 2021, the Appeals Counsel denied Carrero’s request for review. (ECF 13-2, at 

2-5 of 48.) 

Carrero, with the assistance of an attorney, commenced an action on behalf of 

K.S.C. in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (ECF 

1.) The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that the District 

Court affirm the agency’s decision because it was supported by substantial evidence. 

(ECF 19.) The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation and denied Carrero’s appeal of the Acting Commissioner’s decision. 

(ECF 20.) Carrero, proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal.1

 (ECF 22.) 

1

 Although a non-lawyer parent generally cannot represent their child in federal court, see 

Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991), Carrero may do 

so here because we conclude that her own interests are at stake. See Machadio v. Apfel, 

276 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002). 
3 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over any legal conclusions by the agency but review the ALJ’s factual findings to 

determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. See Allen v. Barnhart, 

417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). In this context, “substantial evidence” “‘does not mean 

a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hartranft v. Apfel, 

181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65, 

(1988)). 

To qualify for SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant under the age 

of 18 must demonstrate that she is “disabled” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1382. 

“The Commissioner [of the Social Security Administration] delegates the determination 

of disability at the hearing level to an administrative law judge with review by the 

Appeals Council.” Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 

2021). In making the disability determination, an ALJ must consider, in sequence, 

whether the claimant: (1) is doing substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe 

impairment, and (3) has an impairment that meets or medically equals the severity of an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d). 

Here, the District Court determined that substantial evidence supported the Acting 

Commissioner’s decision that, although K.S.C. was not doing substantial gainful activity 

and had severe impairments, her claim failed at the third step because her impairments 

did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal an impairment listing. We agree. 
4 

The ALJ concluded that the medical records demonstrated that K.S.C. had a 

documented history of ADHD, ODD, learning disorders, and separation anxiety disorder. 

But the ALJ held that those impairments, although severe, did not meet or functionally 

equal the severity of any listed impairments. This conclusion was based on treatment and 

educational records, medical opinions, and Carrero’s testimony. That evidence, which 

was summarized by the Magistrate Judge (ECF 19, at 2-7), demonstrated that while 

K.S.C. required mental health treatment, case management services, and placement in a 

“life skills classroom,” her conditions were stable and she was progressing academically. 

For instance, the evidence indicated that K.S.C. had intact mental status examinations, 

appropriate affect and thought processes, normal speech and thought content, and ageappropriate insight and judgment. 

Carrero argues that the “[A]cting Commissioner ... did not look into [K.S.C.’s] 

disability diligently ....” Appellant’s Br., 1. This assertion apparently refers to her 

claim, made in the District Court, that the ALJ failed to discuss her testimony and a 

“function report” that she completed. But the ALJ’s decision did reference Carrero’s 

testimony, noting that she explained that K.S.C. is not able to grasp reading and math, 

that she is defiant, that she does not complete tasks, and that she experiences anxiety. 

(ECF 13-3, at 11 of 53.) Although the ALJ did not specifically discuss the function 

report that was completed by Carrero, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that any 

error was harmless. See Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that 

“[a]n error is ‘harmless’ when, despite the technical correctness of an appellant’s legal 

contention, there is also ‘no set of facts’ upon which the appellant could recover”). 
5 

Indeed, because the function report contained information that was essentially the same 

as that provided in Carrero’s testimony and in K.S.C.’s medical records, the ALJ’s failure 

to specifically address the report did not affect the decision to deny relief. See Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an ALJ’s error is harmless if it 

is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 

 In her brief, Carrero asserts that the agency applied the “wrong law,” namely 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

(“IDEA”). Appellant’s Br., 1. It is clear, however, that the ALJ properly evaluated only 

whether K.S.C. was disabled under the Social Security Act. Carrero also states that 

“since the time of the first initial claim in 2019,” K.S.C. “developed a new disorder, 

[f]ocal seizures, and is now taking medication for that disability as well.” Id. But 

“[b]ecause this evidence was not before the ALJ, it cannot be used to argue that the 

ALJ’s decision was not supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 

125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991). Similarly, the Carrero’s indication that K.S.C. “was deemed 

eligible for Social Security Income on April 1, 2022” has no bearing on our decision. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.