Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Reeves, 2015 IL App (4th) 130707

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

RUSSELL A. REEVES, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket Nos. 4-13-0707, 4-13-0708 cons.

Filed June 2, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, Nos. 07-CF-343, 

08-CF-17; the Hon. Michael D. Clary, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of 

Springfield, and Alan D. Goldberg and Christofer R. Bendik, both of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Randall Brinegar, State’s Attorney, of Danville (Patrick Delfino, 

David J. Robinson, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 On June 24, 2013, defendant, Russell A. Reeves, filed a motion to amend the written 

sentencing judgment for his consecutive sentences in case Nos. 07-CF-343 and 08-CF-17 to 

reflect a specific number of days of credit for simultaneous presentence custody on separate 

charges. Four days later, the trial court summarily dismissed the motion. Defendant filed a 

notice of appeal, and the court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to 

represent defendant. On appeal, OSAD moves to withdraw its representation of defendant, 

contending any request for review would be without merit. We grant OSAD’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In June 2007, the State charged defendant with six counts of aggravated criminal sexual 

assault in case No. 07-CF-343 for two 1998 incidents involving two different victims. Counts I 

through III alleged defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon V.W. by the use of 

force or threat of force and caused V.W. bodily harm during the commission of a felony home 

invasion in August 1998. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2)-(4) (West 1996). Counts IV through VI 

alleged defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon R.S. by the use of force or 

threat of force and caused R.S. bodily harm during the commission of a felony home invasion 

in May 1998. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2)-(4) (West 1996). Police arrested defendant and placed 

him in custody on June 4, 2007. Thereafter, the State charged defendant with possession of 

contraband in a penal institution in case No. 08-CF-17 for possessing a weapon on January 9, 

2008, while in custody on the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges in case No. 

07-CF-343. 

¶ 4 In July 2008, defendant proceeded to a bench trial before Judge Nancy S. Fahey on case 

No. 08-CF-17. The trial court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing 

contraband in a penal institution. In September 2008, the parties appeared for sentencing on 

defendant’s possession of contraband in a penal institution conviction. The court noted 

defendant was set for trial later in September 2008 on the aggravated criminal sexual assault 

charges in case No. 07-CF-343. The court continued the sentencing hearing on case No. 

08-CF-17 in the hopes of resolving all matters at the same time. 

¶ 5 In October 2008, defendant entered into a partially negotiated plea deal on the aggravated 

criminal sexual assault charges in case No. 07-CF-343. Defendant pleaded guilty to all six 

counts and, in exchange for his plea, the State agreed to a cap of no more than 30 years’

imprisonment on all counts in case No. 07-CF-343 and case No. 08-CF-17. No one addressed 

sentencing credit at any time during the hearing on the guilty plea. 
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¶ 6 Seven months after accepting the guilty plea, Judge Fahey held a sentencing hearing on all 

charges from case Nos. 08-CF-17 and 07-CF-343. Following evidence in aggravation and 

mitigation, the court found counts I through III and counts IV through VI merged into two 

offenses. The court sentenced defendant as follows: 

“In 07 CF 343, on Count 1, you’ll be sentenced to 12 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections. Counts 2, and 3 will merge. You’ll serve 85 percent of that time. That will 

include three years of mandatory supervised release. On Count 4, you’ll be sentenced 

to 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Counts 5 and 6 will merge into 

that count. On that count, you’ll serve 50 percent of the time, and that will also carry 

three years mandatory supervised release. In 08 CF 17, you’ll be sentenced to five 

years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, plus two years[’] mandatory supervised 

release, and you will serve 50 percent of that time. What credit does Mr. Reeves have?”

The State advised the trial court judge: “Your Honor, in 07 CF 343, he has 718 days[’] credit. 

The dates are from June 4th, 2007, through today, May 21, 2009. Then in 08 CF 17, he has 499 

days[’] credit. The dates are January 9, 2008, through today’s date, May 21, 2009.” The court 

accepted this credit and informed defendant he would receive 718 days’ credit on case 

No. 07-CF-343 and 499 days’ credit on case No. 08-CF-17. The sentences were to run 

consecutively. The written sentencing judgment provided for “credit in 07CF343 from 6/4/07 

to 5/21/09; 08CF17 from 1/9/08 to 5/21/09. Def[endant] to serve 85% of sentence in [count I] 

07CF343.”

¶ 7 Defendant appealed case No. 08-CF-17 in June 2009, docketed as case No. 4-09-0406. In 

July 2010, this court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss No. 4-09-0406. In April 2012, 

defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief regarding the alleged failure by the trial 

court to properly admonish defendant prior to accepting the plea in case No. 07-CF-343 

regarding the three-year period of mandatory supervised release attendant to his sentence of 

imprisonment. That petition was summarily dismissed. 

¶ 8 At some point, it came to defendant’s attention the Department of Corrections credited him 

with 718 days of credit on case No. 07-CF-343 and no credit for the 499 days of credit on case 

No. 08-CF-17. Staff at Shawnee Correctional Center declined to credit defendant the 499 days 

on case No. 08-CF-17 because the date range overlapped with the time spent in custody on No. 

07-CF-343. In June 2013, defendant filed a motion to amend the written sentencing judgment 

to reflect the actual number of days of credit in each case, not just the date ranges defendant 

spent in simultaneous presentence custody. A docket entry in the record shows Judge Michael 

D. Clary denied the motion on June 28, 2013, because “[t]he mittimus shows the sentences on 

these cases as imposed by the court.”

¶ 9 This appeal followed. The appeal of case No. 07-CF-343 was docketed as case No. 

4-13-0707 and the appeal of case No. 08-CF-17 was docketed as case No. 4-13-0708. In 

December 2014, this court allowed defendant’s motion to consolidate the appeals. OSAD was 

appointed and moved to withdraw, filing a brief in support of its motion. On its own motion, 

this court granted defendant until January 15, 2015, to file additional points and authorities. 

Defendant responded pro se, the office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor (SAAP) 

filed a brief, and defendant filed a reply brief. We have considered the record and we conclude, 

as did OSAD and SAAP, no meritorious issues can be raised as to the dismissal of defendant’s 

motion to amend the written sentencing judgment. 
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¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 OSAD contends the supreme court’s ruling in People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 703 

N.E.2d 901 (1998), controls and precludes defendant from receiving 499 days’ credit toward 

his sentence in case No. 08-CF-17. In Latona, the supreme court construed section 5-8-4(e)(4) 

of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e)(4) (West 1994)). The supreme court 

held, “to the extent that an offender sentenced to consecutive sentences had been incarcerated 

prior thereto on more than one offense simultaneously, he should be given credit only once for 

actual days served.” Latona, 184 Ill. 2d at 271, 703 N.E.2d at 907. OSAD contends defendant 

was simultaneously in custody on the charges in case No. 07-CF-343 during the 499 days 

defendant was in custody after the State charged him in case No. 08-CF-17. Because he was 

already in custody, and because his sentences are to be served consecutively rather than 

concurrently, defendant is not entitled to two days’ credit for each single day he was in 

simultaneous presentence custody. 

¶ 12 Defendant argues a person convicted of a crime must be sentenced in accord with the law at 

the time the offense was committed. Defendant argues Latona is inapplicable because he 

committed the two rapes in case No. 07-CF-343 in May and August 1998, and the Latona

decision came down on November 19, 1998. Defendant argues the law before the Latona

decision allowed defendants serving consecutive sentences to receive credit more than once 

for each day of presentence custody served. In his motion for an amended sentencing judgment 

before the trial court, defendant argues he was entitled to double credit under People v. 

Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996) (simultaneous presentence custody credit 

applicable to concurrent sentences for separate offenses). We find this argument unavailing, as 

it ignores the salient point SAAP raises–defendant requests sentencing credit for the 

possession of contraband charge, a crime committed in 2008. By 2008, the law was clearly 

settled under Latona. Defendant’s argument also ignores precedent from this court’s holding in 

Feazell v. Washington, 291 Ill. App. 3d 766, 768, 684 N.E.2d 1052, 1053 (1997) (finding 

Robinson inapplicable to consecutive sentences and holding defendants sentenced to 

consecutive sentences are entitled to only one day of credit for each day of presentence custody 

served). 

¶ 13 OSAD further points out defendant does not claim his plea bargain promised the double 

sentencing credit. Some decisions have held a defendant is entitled to double sentencing credit 

when the specified days of credit are included in the terms of the plea agreement. People v. 

McDermott, 2014 IL App (4th) 120655, ¶ 27, 12 N.E.3d 148. See also People v. Clark, 2011 IL 

App (2d) 091116, 956 N.E.2d 1078; People v. Lenoir, 2013 IL App (1st) 113615, 987 N.E.2d 

1015. The record does not show any indication the State and defendant agreed to double credit 

for the 499 days defendant served in simultaneous custody on case Nos. 07-CF-343 and 

08-CF-17. The plea agreement hearing contains no reference to sentence credit, but the parties 

clearly contemplated a separate sentencing hearing. Calculating sentence credit at the plea 

agreement hearing would have been fruitless as there was no determined date for the 

sentencing hearing. 

¶ 14 At sentencing, the State began its argument by stating, “Your Honor, it’s my understanding 

that the plea was for a maximum of 30. That maximum being a combination of the two counts 

in the counts on the two victims in the ’07 case [(No. 07-343)], and the contraband case in the 

’08 case [(No. 08-CF-17)].” The State concluded by saying, “[M]y recommendation is for the 

30 years broken down 12 and 12; 12 for Counts 1 through 3 in the ’07 case, 12 years in Counts 
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4, 5, and 6 in the ’07 case. Lastly, six years in the ’08 case. I do have credits when the [c]ourt 

requests them.” The court ultimately ordered 718 days’ credit in No. 07-CF-343 and 499 days’

credit in No. 08-CF-17. Even if defendant had raised a benefit-of-the-bargain argument, we 

conclude these statements do not suffice to support defendant’s McDermott claim. The record 

shows only the State and the court mentioned sentence credit–neither defendant nor his 

counsel ever mentioned sentence credit. The record does not “clearly show[ ] the terms of the 

parties’ agreements included specified amounts of sentence credit” or the double sentence 

credit days were “essential, bargained-for terms of defendant’s plea agreements.” (Emphasis 

added.) McDermott, 2014 IL App (4th) 120655, ¶ 30, 12 N.E.3d 148. Moreover, the terms of a 

plea agreement are set at the plea hearing, not at sentencing, and sentence credit was never

mentioned at the October 2008 plea hearing. 

¶ 15 To summarize, the rule in Latona controls in this case, where defendant seeks to apply 

double credit for simultaneous time served in presentence custody to his sentence for a crime 

committed a decade after the Latona decision was filed. Further, Latona did not change 

existing law, as evidenced by this court’s holding in Feazell. Defendant does not, and cannot, 

raise a benefit-of-the-bargain argument where no evidence shows the parties ever agreed to 

specific days of “double credit” for presentence time spent in custody. We agree with OSAD 

and SAAP, i.e., the case presents no meritorious issues for review. 

¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment 

against defendant as costs of this appeal. 

¶ 18 Affirmed.