J-S41038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARTY MOHOSKI,

Appellant No. 2180 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 10, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-06-CR-0000712-2007

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015

Appellant, Marty Mohoski, appeals, pro se, from the court’s dismissal 

of his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On January 29, 2007 [Appellant] was involved in a verbal 

argument with Rita Osieki, his landlord and sometimes 

paramour, from whom he rented a room at 1044 Moss Street in 

the city of Reading, Pennsylvania. The verbal argument 

eventually escalated into Appellant’s protracted, vicious physical 

attack on Ms. Osieki that only ended when neighbors called the 

police and Appellant fled the scene.

. . . After several years and various court-appointed 

lawyers, along with delays caused by Appellant’s filing of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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meritless motions and an interlocutory appeal, the case 

proceeded to trial on October 19, 2009. Appellant represented 

himself throughout the two-day jury trial, with the assistance of 

standby counsel. [On October 20, 2009, the jury convicted 

Appellant of aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, reckless 

endangerment, and two counts of simple assault, and the judge 

convicted Appellant of summary harassment.1 The court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of not less than eight 

and one-half nor more than twenty-five years’ incarceration.]

On October 2[7], 2009, Appellant was appointed appellate 

counsel, who filed an appeal on behalf of Appellant on or around 

November 17, 2009. Counsel for Appellant failed to file a brief, 

and accordingly the appeal was dismissed on January 13, 2011. 

Appellant filed an application for reconsideration of the dismissal 

with the Superior Court, which was denied on April 11, 2011. 

On May 17, 2011 [the trial] court granted Appellant’s petition 

[for allowance of appeal] and allowed him to appeal nunc pro

[tunc], granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis, and 

appointed new appellate counsel. New appellate counsel filed a 

[n]otice of [a]ppeal on June 7, 2011.

On January 23, 2012 Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

was affirmed and on February 9, 2012 Appellant filed a pro se

[PCRA petition]. Accordingly, [the PCRA] court appointed PCRA 

counsel Osmer Deming to assist Appellant in the disposition of 

his PCRA petition. . . .

(PCRA Court Opinion, 3/04/15, at 1-2).

On August 30, 2013, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw as 

counsel with a supporting Turner/Finley2 no merit letter. The PCRA court 

granted counsel’s petition to withdraw on October 24, 2014.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2902(a)(1), 2705, 2701(a)(1) and (3), and 

2709(a)(1), respectively.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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On November 5, 2014, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its 

intention to dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

Appellant filed a pro se response on November 18, 2014.

The PCRA court dismissed the petition on December 10, 2014.3 

Appellant timely appealed on December 26, 2014.4

Appellant raises nine issues for our review:5

[1.] Did the trial court err in permitting Appellant to be tried 

without having the benefit of adequate time for preparation and 

subpoenaing of witnesses, with full knowledge that Appellant had 

received discovery information and casefile only [five] days prior 

to trial?

[2.] Did the trial court err in permitting highly prejudicial 

inferences by Commonwealth witnesses in front of the jury 

without giving cautionary/curative instruction?

____________________________________________

3 We note that at the time Appellant filed his notice of appeal, the PCRA 

court’s December 10, 2014 order had not been docketed. (See Per Curiam

Order, 1/13/15, at 1). On February 3, 2015, this Court directed the PCRA 

court to enter the December 10, 2014 order on its docket. (See Per Curiam

Order, 2/03/15, at 1). The PCRA court complied and “the January 13, 2015 

show-cause order [was] discharged.” (Per Curiam Order, 2/13/15, at 1) 

(emphasis and capitalization omitted). Therefore, we will deem the PCRA 

court’s December 10, 2014 order as filed on that day. (See Docket, at 24); 

see also Pa.R.A.P. 905(5).

4

Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) 

statement on January 14, 2015. The court entered its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on March 4, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

5 We have renumbered Appellant’s issues for ease of analysis and 

disposition.
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[3.] Did the Commonwealth’s attorney commit instances of 

misconduct in the form of presenting false testimony, misstating [sic] facts, and urging the jury to draw inferences not 

supported by evidence at trial, and was Appellant prejudiced by 

these actions?

[4.] Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to appoint counsel on 

appeal from the [December 10, 2014] order [] dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition?

[5.] Did the [PCRA] court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without a hearing?

[6.] Was pre-trial and standby counsel William Bispels 

ineffective in failing to adequately meet and consult with 

Appellant, in failing to explore potential trial defenses, in failing 

to file any pre-trial motions, in ignoring exculpatory evidence, in 

failing to contact witnesses whose testimony would have been 

exculpatory in nature, in failing to request that the 

Commonwealth produce any evidence of record that Appellant 

had waived his [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure] 600 

rights at Appellant’s Rule 600 hearing, and, as stanby [sic] 

counsel, failing to act as advocate and advise Appellant on 

requested points of law during trial?

[7.] Was appellate counsel Jay M. Nigrini ineffective in failing to 

raise and argue requested meritorious issues on appeal?

[8.] Was PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to comply with the 

standards set forth in Finley?

[9.] Was PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to investigate and 

develop the claims raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition?

(Appellant’s Brief, at vii-viii) (most capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review is well-settled:

When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or 

denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether 

the evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA 

court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Great 

deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these 
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findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the 

certified record.

Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that the issues raised in his PCRA petition have not been previously litigated 

or waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).

. . . An issue is previously litigated if the highest appellate 

court in which appellant could have had review as a matter of 

right has ruled on the merits of the issue. An issue is waived if 

appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at 

trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction 

proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803-04 (Pa. 2014) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544.

Furthermore, a PCRA petitioner is eligible for relief if the claim is 

cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. Cognizable claims 

include constitutional violations and ineffectiveness of counsel that 

undermine the truth-determining process. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) 

and (ii).

We also note that a PCRA petitioner is not automatically 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We review the PCRA court’s 

decision dismissing a petition without a hearing for an abuse of 

discretion.

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition is not absolute. It is within the 

PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a hearing if 

the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no 

support either in the record or other evidence. It is 

the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to 
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examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in 

light of the record certified before it in order to 

determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of 

material fact in controversy and in denying relief 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

In the first issue, Appellant claims that “the trial court err[ed] in 

permitting [him] to be tried without having the benefit of adequate time for 

preparation[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 22) (most capitalization omitted). 

Specifically, he asserts that he was “denied his constitutional right to due 

process in that he was not afforded adequate time to prepare a defense and 

subpoena available witnesses . . . .” (Id. at 24). This issue is waived.

The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed 

to allow him adequate time to prepare for trial was not included in his direct 

appeal of his judgment of sentence. (See Commonwealth v. Mohoski, 

1016 MDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 23, 

2012) (identifying two issues on appeal: sufficiency of evidence and 

limitation on cross-examination of victim)). Accordingly, the first issue is 

waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 

9544.

Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.

The PCRA court found that:

On October 14, 2009 Appellant indicated to the [trial] 

court that, despite his frustrations with the process and with not 
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receiving discovery, he was ready to proceed to trial. The issue 

of inadequate preparation time does not appear to have been 

properly preserved by way of objection at the time of trial, and 

moreover it was not raised on direct appeal. . . . Appellant failed 

to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the case proceeding to 

trial on [October] 19, 2009 . . . .

(PCRA Ct. Op., at 6; see also N.T. Hearing, 10/14/09, at 2-19). Upon 

review, we agree and conclude that the record supports the court’s 

determination that “Appellant failed to raise a colorable claim [for PCRA] 

relief . . . .” (PCRA Ct. Op., at 6). Accordingly, we would find no abuse of 

discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not 

waived.

In the second issue, Appellant claims that “the trial court err[ed] in 

permitting highly prejudicial inferences [of his criminal record] by 

Commonwealth witness[, Police Officer Christopher Cortazzo,] in front of the 

jury without giving [a] cautionary [or] curative instruction[.]” (Appellant’s 

Brief, at 24) (most capitalization omitted). This issue is waived.

The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion that the trial court 

permitted Officer Cortazzo to testify about Appellant’s prior criminal record 

without giving a cautionary or curative jury instruction was not included in 

his direct appeal of his judgment of sentence. (See Mohoski, supra at *5). 

Accordingly, the second issue is waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544.

Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.

The PCRA court found that:
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. . . The issue[] of . . . improper witness statements . . . 

was [not] raised in his [direct] appeal (and [is] therefore 

waived) and . . . [was] not properly raised in his PCRA [p]etition. 

. . . [T]he proper issue in the PCRA would have been whether 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

complained-of behavior[]. Because Appellant represented 

himself at the trial, he is barred from asserting his own 

ineffectiveness. . . . Appellant failed to establish that he was 

prejudiced . . . by any inferences from witness statements.

(PCRA Ct. Op., at 7) (footnote omitted). Upon review, we agree and 

conclude that the record supports the court’s determination that Appellant’s 

claim of improper witness statements is not properly the subject of a PCRA 

petition. Accordingly, we would find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA 

court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not waived.

In the third issue, Appellant claims “prosecutorial misconduct,” 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 25), for “permitting false testimony, mis-stating [sic] 

facts not supported by the record, and overreaching at trial . . . .” (Id. at 

26). This issue is waived.

The record reflects that Appellant’s assertion of prosecutorial 

misconduct was not included in his direct appeal of his judgment of 

sentence. (See Mohoski, supra at *5). Accordingly, the third issue is 

waived. See Fears, supra at 803-04; 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 

9544.

Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.

The PCRA court found that:

. . . The issue[] of prosecutorial misconduct . . . was [not] 

raised in his [direct] appeal (and [is] therefore waived) and . . . 

[was] not properly raised in his PCRA [p]etition. . . . [T]he 
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proper issue in the PCRA would have been whether trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to object to the complained-of 

behavior[]. Because Appellant represented himself at the trial, 

he is barred from asserting his own ineffectiveness. . . . 

Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any of the

alleged prosecutorial misconduct . . . .

(PCRA Ct. Op., at 7 (footnote omitted); see also Rule 907 Notice, 11/05/14, 

at 7-8 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct)). Upon review, we agree and 

conclude that the record supports the court’s determination that Appellant’s 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not properly the subject of a PCRA 

petition. Accordingly, we would find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA 

court’s dismissal of this claim even were it not waived.

In the fourth issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in not 

appointing counsel for the instant appeal “and, as a result, [he] is forced to 

proceed pro se or waive his appellate rights.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 1). This 

issue lacks merit.

It is well-settled that:

[W]hen counsel has been appointed to represent a 

petitioner in post-conviction proceedings as a matter of right 

under the rules of criminal procedure and when that right has 

been fully vindicated by counsel being permitted to withdraw 

under the procedure authorized in Turner, new counsel shall not 

be appointed and the petitioner, or appellant, must thereafter 

look to his or her own resources for whatever further 

proceedings there might be.

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maple, 

559 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Super. 1989)).
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Here, the record reflects that the PCRA court appointed counsel to 

assist Appellant with his first pro se PCRA petition on February 16, 2012. On 

August 30, 2013, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel with a 

supporting Turner/Finley no merit letter. The PCRA court granted 

counsel’s petition to withdraw on October 24, 2014. Accordingly, because 

Appellant is not entitled to appointed counsel for the instant appeal, we 

conclude that the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s request for 

representation. See Rykard, supra at 1183. This issue lacks merit.

In the fifth issue, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his petition without a hearing because the other eight issues have 

merit. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 2-8). We disagree.

The record reflects that the PCRA court certified that it reviewed the 

record and agreed with counsel’s no-merit letter. (See Rule 907 Notice, 

11/05/14, at 1, 3; PCRA Ct. Op., at 5). Furthermore, the court issued its 

own substantive opinion on each issue. (See Rule 907 Notice, 11/05/14, at 

1-8; PCRA Ct. Op., at 4-7). Accordingly, on our independent review of the 

record, we conclude that there is no support for the claims and the PCRA 

court properly determined that Appellant is not entitled to a hearing. See 

Miller, supra at 992. This issue lacks merit.

Appellant claims in the remaining four issues that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief at 8-22, 29-31). 

We disagree.
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It is well-settled that “[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective 

counsel . . . .” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citation omitted). Counsel is presumed effective, and an appellant 

bears the burden to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 

A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). A PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Pennsylvania 

has further refined the Strickland test into a three-prong inquiry. An 

appellant must demonstrate that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or 

inaction; and (3) the appellant suffered actual prejudice as a result. See 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). A failure to 

satisfy any prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test will require 

rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 

(Pa. 2014).

In the sixth issue, Appellant claims that:

. . . [P]re-trial and standby counsel William Bispels [was] 

ineffective in failing to adequately meet and consult with [him], . 

. . explore potential trial witnesses, . . . contact witnesses whose 

testimony would have been exculpatory, . . . request that the 

Commonwealth produce any evidece [sic] of record that 

Appellant had waived his Rule 600 rights[,] . . . and . . . act as 

advocate and advise Appellant . . . during trial[.]
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(Appellant’s Brief, at 19) (most capitalization omitted).6 We disagree.

“A criminal defendant who knowingly and intelligently waives his right 

to counsel so that he may represent himself at trial may not later rely upon 

his own lack of legal expertise as a ground for a new trial.” 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 736 (Pa. 2004) (citations 

omitted). Further, “[t]he law prohibits a defendant who chooses to 

represent himself from alleging his own ineffectiveness. The fact that 

standby counsel was appointed to assist Appellant does not alter this 

conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 773 (Pa. 2009) 

(citations omitted).

Here, the record reflects that Appellant “went through a series of 

lawyers, but ultimately represented himself at trial[,]” (Rule 907 Notice, 

11/05/14, at 2). On May 13, 2009, the trial court appointed Attorney 

Bispels as conflict counsel. On July 10, 2009, Appellant waived his right to 

counsel. (See Waiver of Counsel, 7/13/09, at 1-2; Order, 7/14/09, at 1). 

Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to represent himself at trial and sentencing 

with Attorney Bispels as standby counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief, at ix, xixii, 2, 21; PCRA Ct. Op., at 2, 6; N.T. Trial, 10/19/09, at 1; N.T. Sentencing 

Hearing, 10/22/09, at 1). We note, Appellant acknowledges that “he is well 

____________________________________________

6 We note that Appellant has abandoned his claim of Attorney Bispels’ 

ineffectiveness for “failing to file any pre-trial motions[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, 

at vii; see id. at 19-22).
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aware that he cannot raise claims of his own ineffectiveness[.]” (Appellant’s 

Brief, at 11; see id. at 16).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that:

Because appellant waived his right to counsel and asserted his 

right to self-representation, which was honored after a colloquy, 

he may not rely upon his own lack of expertise as a ground for 

relief, and consequently, we will not consider any ineffectiveness 

claims that arise from the period of self-representation.

Bryant, supra at 737 (citations omitted). Therefore, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief for any issues that implicate his self-representation. See 

id. at 739.

However, Attorney Bispels represented Appellant for two months as 

conflicts counsel. Thus, Appellant’s assertion that Attorney Bispels was 

ineffective for failing to request evidence of his Rule 600 waiver does not 

implicate his self-representation and is reviewable. See id.

The record reflects that Attorney Bispels filed a Rule 600 motion on 

July 7, 2009. (See Rule 600 Motion, 7/07/09). On July 10, 2009, Appellant 

waived his Rule 600 “speedy trial rights[.]” (Order, 7/13/09, at 1). 

Furthermore, Appellant acknowledges that a hearing was held on July 10, 

2009 and he “waived his Rule 600 rights . . . .” (Appellant’s Brief, at 21). 

Because the record confirms that Appellant acknowledges that he waived his 

Rule 600 rights, Attorney Bispels could not be ineffective for failure to

request evidence of his Rule 600 waiver.
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Accordingly, Appellant has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of 

the Pierce test and we find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s 

dismissal of this claim. This issue lacks merit.

In the seventh issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel, Jay M. Nigrini, in failing to raise all his requested issues on direct 

appeal. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 29-31). Specifically, he asserts that 

appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the following requested 

issues: sufficiency of the evidence for aggravated assault, Rule 600 motion 

denial, inadequate preparation time, prosecutorial misconduct, and the 

cumulative effect of the issues. (See id. at 30). We disagree.

The record reflects that appellate counsel raised sufficiency of the 

evidence in Appellant’s direct appeal. (See Commonwealth v. Mohoski, 

1016 MDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at *5 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 23, 

2012) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain aggravated assault conviction)). 

Therefore, this claim was previously litigated. In the instant appeal, we 

have found no merit to Appellant’s claims of the Rule 600 motion denial, 

inadequate preparation, and prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, his claim 

of cumulative error fails. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 

411 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding cumulative claim lacks merit where defective 

individual assertions).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant has failed to meet 

the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we find no abuse of 

discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim. This issue lacks merit.
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In the eighth issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel 

because he “fail[ed] to comply with the standards set forth under Finley[.]” 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 8) (most capitalization omitted). Specifically, he 

asserts that “PCRA counsel clearly failed to list and address each of the [] 

allegations [raised in the PCRA petition] in his ‘no merit’ letter . . . .” (Id.). 

This issue is waived.

It is well-settled that:

If a Rule 1925(b) statement is too vague, the trial judge may 

find waiver and disregard any argument. . . .

When a court has to guess what issues an 

appellant is appealing, that is not enough for 

meaningful review. When an appellant fails 

adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues 

sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is 

impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is 

pertinent to those issues. In other words, a 

[c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the 

court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the 

functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at 

all.

Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 919 A.2d 956 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).

Here, the record reflects that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement 

asserts that “PCRA counsel [was] ineffective in failing to comply with the 

standards set forth in Finley[.]” (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/14/15, at 1 ¶ 

3) (most capitalization omitted).

The PCRA court properly found that “[w]ithout [] a more specific 

assertion of error we are unable to meaningfully address this issue.” (PCRA 
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Ct. Op., at 6); see also Reeves, supra at 2. Therefore, this issue is 

waived.

Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.

The record reflects that PCRA counsel filed a proper Turner/Finley no 

merit letter addressing each of Appellant’s claims on August 30, 2013. (See

No-Merit Letter, 8/30/13, at 3-22). Accordingly, there is no arguable merit 

to Appellant’s ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim. Therefore, Appellant 

has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we would 

find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this claim even 

were it not waived.

In the final issue, Appellant claims ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel “in 

failing to investigate and develop Appellant’s claims raised in his PCRA 

petition[.]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 9) (most capitalization omitted). 

Specifically, he asserts that “PCRA counsel fail[ed] to discern why the claims 

lack merit.” (Id. at 10). This issue is waived.

The record reflects that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement asserts 

that “PCRA counsel [was] ineffective in failing to investigate and develop the 

claims raised in [his] PCRA petition[.]” (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/14/15, 

at 1 ¶ 4) (most capitalization omitted).

The PCRA court properly found that “[w]ithout [] a more specific 

assertion of error we are unable to meaningfully address this issue.” (PCRA 

Ct. Op., at 6); see also Reeves, supra at 2. Therefore, this issue is 

waived.
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Moreover, his claim would not merit relief.

The record reflects that PCRA counsel filed a proper Turner/Finley no 

merit letter addressing each of Appellant’s claims on August 30, 2013. (See

No-Merit Letter, 8/30/13, at 3-22). Accordingly, there is no arguable merit 

to Appellant’s ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel claim. Therefore, Appellant 

has failed to meet the arguable merit prong of the Pierce test and we would 

find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s dismissal of this issue even 

were it not waived.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2015