Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1503-CR-128 | November 18, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Jodi Kathryn Stein 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kezalis Harris, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

November 18, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A04-1503-CR-128 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Steven Rubick, 

Magistrate 

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G19-1409-CM-44609 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1503-CR-128 | November 18, 2015 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary 

[1] Kezalis Harris’s car was stopped by police because the car’s license plate was 

improperly displayed. As the police officer approached Harris’s car on foot, he 

observed a temporary license plate in the rear window of the car; he also saw 

Harris pour a liquid out of the car window, smelled the odor of alcohol coming 

from the car, and found that Harris was “aggravated” and said repeatedly that 

the officer had stopped him for no reason. Harris ultimately consented to a 

chemical breath test, the result of which was 0.129. Harris was charged with 

Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated and Class C 

misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more.1

 At trial, Harris 

filed a motion to suppress the evidence of intoxication, arguing that the police 

officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. Because the evidence shows 

that Harris’s temporary license plate was improperly displayed, we find that the 

police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the car, and thus we affirm the 

denial of the motion to suppress. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] In September 2014, Officer David Wooten of the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department was on patrol duty when he saw a car driving eastbound on 

10th Street with no visible license plate in the license-plate holder on the back of 

 

1

 ACE stands for “alcohol concentration equivalent,” as in, “an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 

eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol . . . .” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1. 
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the car. When the car started to turn, Officer Wooten activated his emergency 

lights for a traffic stop. Once he had stopped the car and approached on foot, 

the officer could see that there was, in fact, a temporary license plate in the leftside rear window of the car. Officer Wooten also saw Kezalis Harris, the driver 

of the car, “pouring a liquid out of the vehicle window.” Tr. p. 13. The officer 

detected “the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle.” Id. at 14. Harris 

seemed “aggravated . . . [k]ept saying I stopped him for no reason.” Id. at 15. 

[3] Officer Wooten requested Harris’s information and then walked back to his car 

to request a DUI car from dispatch. IPD Sergeant Michael Duke responded to 

the call and asked Harris to step out of the car so he could conduct a Horizontal 

Gaze Nystagmus test on him. Harris continued to protest that there was “no 

reason for [the police] to be talking to [him] at all” and Sergeant Duke observed 

that Harris had red and glassy eyes and the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his 

breath. Id. at 20. After Harris was unable to perform the walk-and-turn test 

and took a portable breath test, Sergeant Duke advised Harris of Indiana’s 

Implied Consent Law and Harris agreed to take a chemical breath test. The test 

result was 0.129, and Sergeant Duke placed him under arrest. 

[4] The State charged Harris with Count I, Class C misdemeanor operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated; and Count II, Class C misdemeanor operating a 

vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more. At a bifurcated bench trial in January and 

March 2015, Harris moved to suppress evidence of his intoxication, arguing 

that Officer Wooten did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Harris’s car 

because his license plate was in a valid location. The trial court denied Harris’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1503-CR-128 | November 18, 2015 Page 4 of 7

motion to suppress. Following the admission of evidence, Harris was found 

guilty as charged. Harris now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[5] On appeal, Harris argues that the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights because Officer Wooten’s stated justification for the stop—that there was 

no license plate in the car’s license-plate holder—was based on what Harris 

characterizes as a “mistaken belief of the law” regarding the proper display of 

license plates. Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Because Officer Wooten lacked reasonable 

suspicion to stop the car, the argument continues, the evidence of Harris’s 

intoxication was improperly admitted and should have been suppressed. We 

disagree. 

[6] This Court reviews admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Croom v. 

State, 996 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied. We will reverse a 

trial court’s decision when it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before it. Id. We do not reweigh evidence, and we consider 

conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. However, the 

question of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigatory stop is reviewed de novo. Id. at 439-40. 

[7] Harris argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress under 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourth 

Amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches and seizures of 
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a person. Id. at 440. A traffic stop of a vehicle is also a “seizure” within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. But a brief investigatory stop may 

occur when justified by a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is 

involved in criminal activity. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968)). In 

determining reasonable suspicion, we must examine the “totality of the 

circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 

“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. 

(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). In the context of an 

investigatory stop, an officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his 

on-the-spot evaluation reasonably suggests law-breaking occurred. Id. “It is 

well-settled that a police officer may briefly detain a person whom the officer 

believes has committed an infraction or an ordinance violation.” Goens v. State, 

943 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 

1149, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). 

[8] Here, we find that Officer Wooten had reasonable suspicion to stop Harris’s car 

because his temporary license plate was improperly displayed. License plates, 

including temporary license plates, are statutorily required to be displayed upon 

the rear of the vehicle, securely fastened, in a horizontal position, and 

illuminated by a white light so as to be clearly visible from fifty feet. Ind. Code 

§ 9-18-2-26 (providing that license plates, including temporary license plates, 

shall be displayed upon the rear of the vehicle and securely fastened in a 

horizontal position to the vehicle for which the plate is issued); Ind. Code § 9-

19-6-4(e) (“Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp must be placed and constructed 
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so as to illuminate the rear registration plate with a white light and make the 

plate clearly legible from a distance of fifty (50) feet to the rear.”); Merritt v. 

State, 829 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ind. 2005) (“Together, these provisions require that 

the license plate be displayed upon the rear of the vehicle, securely fastened, in 

a horizontal position, and also be illuminated at night by a separate white light 

so as to be clearly legible from fifty feet.”). The evidence shows that Harris’s 

temporary plate was located inside the rear window of the car. Because this is 

an improper license-plate display, Officer Wooten had reasonable suspicion to 

stop the car. Houston v. State, 898 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 

(“[N]on-compliance with the Indiana statutory requirements concerning 

placement, secure attachment, illumination and legibility of a license plate may 

serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion for law enforcement officers to make a 

traffic stop to ascertain whether the display fully complies with all statutory 

requirements.”), trans. denied. 

[9] Harris maintains on appeal, as he did at trial, that Indiana Code section 9-32-6-

11, which governs “interim plates,” is somehow relevant to this matter.2

 That 

statute provides that it is permissible to display an interim plate in the following 

manner: affixed to “the left side of a window facing the rear of the motor 

 

2 In Indiana, there are three types of paper license plates: temporary registration permits, temporary license 

plates, and interim dealer plates. Croom, 996 N.E.2d at 440 n.3. According to statute, only interim plates can 

be displayed in the rear window of a car. The reason for this exception is not clear, and this is an area of law 

that the legislature may want to reconsider. In any event, Officer Wooten testified unambiguously at trial 

that Harris had a “temporary plate.” See Tr. p. 7, 9. 
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vehicle that is clearly visible and unobstructed.” Ind. Code § 9-32-6-11. Harris 

does not argue that his license plate was an interim plate; instead he contends 

that Officer Wooten did not have a “good-faith belief” that Harris’s plate was 

improperly displayed because the officer did not “run the plate at any time to 

determine whether it was an interim or temporary plate.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. 

Leaving aside the fact that Officer Wooten testified he couldn’t see any license 

plate on Harris’s car at the time of the traffic stop, Harris’s argument is 

inapposite because the evidence shows that Harris’s plate was an improperly 

displayed temporary—not interim—license plate, and thus Section 9-32-6-11 is 

irrelevant. 

[10] In light of the above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Harris’s motion to 

suppress, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation here because 

Officer Wooten had reasonable suspicion to stop Harris’s car. 

[11] Affirmed. 

Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.