IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT 

DALLAS, TEXAS 

Johnathon Ramey § 

Appellant § 

 § 

vs. § APPEAL NUMBER 

 § 05-18-00254-CR 

State of Texas § 

 Appellee § 

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court of 

Dallas County, Texas 

No.F-17-35064 

Appellant Counsel’s Anders Brief 

 

RONALD L. GORANSON 

 3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Ste. 1124 

 Dallas, Texas 75219 

 (214) 651.1122 

 (214) 871-0640 (fax) 

 State Bar No. 08195000 

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

 Ramey 

ACCEPTED

05-18-00254-CR

FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS

5/31/2018 2:34 PM

LISA MATZ

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 5/31/2018 2:34:11 PM LISA MATZ Clerk

5th Court of Appeals

FILED: 06/04/2018

Lisa Matz, Clerk
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page ii 

Identity of Parties and Counsel 

Appellant Johnathon C. Ramey 

 TDJC # 2182808 

John Middleton Unit 

13055 FM 3522 

Abilene, TX 79601 

 Appellant’s Counsel Ronald L. Goranson 

 3838 Oak Lawn, Ste. 1124 

 Dallas, Texas 75219 

 (214) 651.1122 

 (214) 871-0620 (facsimile) 

 SBOT No. 08195000 

Appellant’s Trial Counsels Mr. Clayton C. Smith 

3300 Oak Lawn Avenue, Ste. 600 

Dallas, Texas 75219 

SBOT NO. 24050002 

(214) 774-1125 

State of Texas Faith Johnson, 

 District Attorney 

 SBOT No. 00794284 

 Dallas County, Texas 

 Appellate Attorney Lori Ordiway 

 SBOT No. 12327300 

Trial Attorneys Maxim Ternosky 

 SBOT No. 24088516 

Assistant District Attorneys 

Frank Crowley Courts Building, LB 19 

133 N. Riverfront Boulevard 

Dallas, Texas 75207 

214-653-3600 

214-653-5774 (facsimile) 

 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................... 1 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 2 

POTENTIAL POINT OF ERROR ............................................................................ 3 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................................... 4 

• EVIDENCE ..................................................................................................... 4 

SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 9 

APPELLANT COUNSEL'S ANALYSIS OF THE CASE ................................ 10 

A. INDICTMENT ......................................................................................... 10 

B. PLEA PAPERS ........................................................................................ 13 

C. JUDGMENT ADJUDICATING GUILT ................................................. 16 

D. POTENTIAL GROUND OF ERROR ..................................................... 19 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 27 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 27 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - APPELLANT ...................................................... 28 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .....................................................28
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page iv 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES: 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) .............................................. 1, 9, 28

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) .... 23 

Edwards v. State, 921 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no 

pet.) ....................................................................................................................... 22 

Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ........................... 22 

Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49, 54-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ................................. 12 

Fryar v. State, ___ S.W.3d, ___, (Tex. App. – Dallas, 05-14-01255-CR, 

02/02/2015) ............................................................................................................ 2 

Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) .......................................... 9 

Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.) ................... 9 

Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) ........................................ 2, 9 

Lawal v. State, ,368 S.W.3d 876, 885 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no 

pet.) ....................................................................................................................... 25 

Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016) ....................... 11, 12 

McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) ... 23, 24, 25 

Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) .............................. 24 

Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) .................................... 23 

Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) .................................. 21, 22 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page v 

O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) .............. 23 

Simpson v. State, 67 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ........ 25 

Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. 

ref'd) ...................................................................................................................... 22 

Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 268, 273 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) .......................... 12 

Valle v. State, 747 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tex.App. —Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) ....... 25 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page vi 

STATUTES: 

Texas Penal Code 

Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01 (a)(1) and (b)(2)(A) ........................................................... 10 

Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01 (b-2) ............................................................................... 2, 11 

Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01 (b)(2)(A) .............................................................................. 2 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 1.14(b) .................................................................. 12 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 1.15 ....................................................................... 23 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 21.01 through 21.17 ............................................. 12 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 21.19 ..................................................................... 12 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 42.01 ..................................................................... 16 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 44.02 ....................................................................... 3 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 

Tex. R. App. Pro. Rule 9.4(i)(1) .............................................................................. 28 

Tex. R. App. Pro. Rule 9.4(i)(3) .............................................................................. 28 

Tex. R. App. Pro. Rule 25.2 ...................................................................................... 3 

 Constitutions 

Art. V of the Texas Constitution .............................................................................. 12 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 1 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT 

DALLAS, TEXAS 

Johnathon Ramey § 

Appellant § 

 § 

VS. § APPEAL NUMBER 

 § 05-18-00254-CR 

State of Texas § 

 Appellee § 

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court of 

Dallas County, Texas 

No.F-17-35064 

Appellant Counsel’s Anders Brief 

To the Honorable Justices of the Court of Appeals: 

Preliminary Statement: 

 Counsel for Appellant is appointed in this case1. Counsel has 

determined that there are no legal or factual issues that arguably could be 

raised for appellate review in this case. Counsel has determined that that 

this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Counsel has filed a 

motion to withdraw. This brief presents an evaluation of the record showing 

 

1

 This Appeal brief is identical to the brief filed contemporaneously in Ramey v. 

State, #05-18-00253-CR except for several page references. 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 2 

why there are no arguable grounds to advance. A copy of the motion to 

withdraw, this brief, the trial court’s record and the statement of facts are 

being sent to Appellant at his last known address with a letter advising him 

of his right to respond to this brief or file his own Appellant’s Brief. See

Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 315, 319-320 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014); Fryar 

v. State, ___ S.W.3d, ___, (Tex. App. – Dallas, 05-14-01255-CR, 

03/06/2015). 

Statement of the Case: 

 Appellant Johnathon Ramey was charged in two indictments with 

separate cases of felony assault – family violence. 2

 In F-17-35063 (05-18-

00253-CR) he was charged with a third-degree felony assault on November 

5, 2017, contrary to Tex. Penal Code, §22.01(b)(2)(A). (R-253, p. 7). In F17-35064 (05-18-00254), he was charged with second-degree felony assault 

on November 7, 2017, contrary to Tex. Penal Code §22.01(b-2). (R-254, p. 

7) The complainant in each case was the same person. On February 6, 2018 

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and pled guilty. The plea was an 

“open plea.” (SF, pp. 5-7) In other words, there was no plea bargain with 

 

2

 The matters were tried together and the issues raised are identical. Counsel will 

identify the Clerk’s record in each case by the letter “R” and the last three digits of the 

Appeal number. In other words, one clerk’s record will be identified as “R-253” and the 

other as “R-254.” The case was tried together so there will only be one designation for 

the statement of facts – “SF.” 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 3 

reference to the sentence. After a hearing on punishment, the trial court 

assessed a sentence of six years on each case (R 253, p. 29-30; R-254, p. 23-

24; SF, p. 84) 

 The Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal in each case. (R 253, p. 

40; R 254, p. 39) The Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of 

Appeal indicates each case was not a plea bargain case and the 

Defendant/Appellant had a right to appeal. (R 253, p. 20; R254, p. 27) 

 This jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Art. 44.02 of the 

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. This Brief was due on May 30, 2018. Appellant has 

filed a Motion to extend the filing date one day to May 31, 2018. The cause 

is properly before this Court of Appeals. 

Potential Point of Error 

 The trial court should have sua sponte entered a plea of not guilty 

after the Appellant denied committing any of the facts necessary to state an 

offense of family violence. 

 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 4 

Statement of Facts: 

 Evidence: 

On February 6, 2018 Appellant pled guilty in both cases. (SF Vol. 2, 

p. 6) The State introduced without objection Appellant’s judicial 

confession. (SF Vol. 2, p. 6). Stephanie Parker testified on punishment. 

She identified the Appellant. (SF Vol. 2, p. 9) She stated they began dating. 

She stated the Appellant lied about everything – his job, his house, his car. 

(SF Vol 2, pp. 9-10) She described two incidents that were not the subject 

of the indictments. (SF Vol. 2, pp. 12 and 13) After a while she called 

things off because of a drinking problem, drugs, selling drugs and his 

behavior was getting more violent. (SF Vol. 2, p. 13) When Appellant got 

out of prison she allowed him to stay for a few weeks so he could help her 

with recovery from surgery. (SF Vol. 2, p. 13) After being out with friends, 

she came home and found several suit cases in her living room. (SF Vol 2, 

p. 14) Appellant was intoxicated. (SF Vol 2, p. 15) She then described 

several incidents of assault, including choking (SF Vol 2. pp. 15-21) The 

State offered State’s Exhibits 1-10 – photos taken by the police that evening 

showing her injuries (St Ex. 1-4) and the scene (St. Exs. 5-10). The defense 

had no objection and the photos were admitted (SF Vol 2, p.21; Vol 3, pp. 7-

16). At one point the Appellant left the room and she went into her 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 5 

bathroom, locked the door and called 911. (SF Vol 2, p. 23) The State then 

offered the 911 tape. The defense had no objection and the tape was 

admitte3d and played. (SF Vol 2, pp. 24-25) During the 911 call she stated 

Appellant broke into the bathroom. She terminated the call. He slapped her 

one time on the leg, grabbed his back pack and left. (SF Vol 2, p. 25) She 

found he phone and called 911 again. (SF Vol 2, p; 25). This portion of the 

tale was played for the court. (SF Vol 2, p. 26). 

 After the police left, Appellant began texting her. (SF Vol 2, p. 28) 

Copies of the texts were identified as State Exhibits 17-19. The exhibits 

were admitted with no objection by the defense. (SF Vol 2, pp. 29) 

She testified that he convinced her ex-husband and her to sit down and have 

a conversation. She stated that Appellant convinced them it was a one-time 

drinking problem, it would never happen again and that he needed help. She 

stated “we” agreed to help him and allowed him back. (SF Vol 2, p. 29). In 

one of the text’s (State’s Exhibit 19) she testified that Appellant tried to 

convince her to lie to the police about the incident. (SF Vol. 2, p. 30) She 

stated that she and her ex-husband met with Appellant at a restaurant. 

Appellant told her that he had not drank in almost a year, he did not realize 

the effect it had on him and that it would never happen again. He asked for 

help. She agreed to get him in with their church and with AA and get him to 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 6 

a safe place. (SF Vol 2, p. 31) Ms. Parker testified that Appellant came 

back to her residence that night. She went to work the next morning. She 

started getting strange text messages from him while at work. The State 

introduced the text messages as State’s Exhibits 20-26 (SF Vol. 2, p. 32; SF 

Vol 3, pp. 20-32). There was no objection to the exhibits. (SF Vol 2, p. 32). 

The text messages stated Appellant was going to flee, move to Galveston, 

get a new identity, and move to Thailand forever. (SF Vol 2, pp. 32-33) 

The texts continued, getting weirder and weirder. (SF Vol 2, p. 34) Ms. 

Parker left work early and returned home. She called her ex-husband and 

left him on the line. (SF Vol. 2, p. 37) When she tried to open the door, 

there appeared to be another key in the lock. (SF Vol 2, p. 37) Appellant 

opened the door. As soon as she walked in, he attacked her, slamming her 

against the door. (SF Vol 2, p. 37) The Appellant appeared to be 

intoxicated. (SF Vol 2, p. 38) She went to the bathroom. When Appellant 

left the room, she asked her ex-husband to call 911. (SF Vol 2, p. 38) 

Appellant came into the bathroom and slammed into her. HE slammed her 

against the vanity and her head against the sink. She bolted for the front 

door, but he slammed it shut. He had an electric razor in his hand. “[T]his 

time he really strangled [her].” (SF Vol 2, p. 38) He kept saying he was not 

going back to prison. (SF Vol. 2, p. 39) Ms. Parker’s ex-husband arrived 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 7 

and calmed things down. Appellant was convinced to leave. While getting 

his things together, she testified he attacked her again, jumped on top of her, 

pushing and screaming at her. (SF Vol 2, p. 42) State’s Exhibits 11-15 were 

introduced and admitted without objection. (SF Vol 2, p. 42) The exhibits 

showed the damage to the bathroom door and the electric razor that was used 

to cut her neck. (SF Vol 2, pp. 43-44) She also identified a piece of paper 

with her name and address that was covered in blood. The exhibit was 

introduced into evidence without objection. (SF Vol 2, pp. 46-47) 

 The Appellant testified. (SF Vol 2, pp. 52-81) He acknowledged he 

had the option for a negotiated plea to prison, a jury trial or an open plea, but 

he and defense counsel “decided to do an open plea and ask for mercy from 

the Court.” (SF Vol 2, p. 52) He stated he grew up in foster care – 21 foster 

homes, 13 high schools. He also stated he attended two colleges. (SF Vol 2, 

p. 53) He stated he had been to State Jail before, but not to prison. He 

stated that he was willing to do any of the programs recommended after a 

CATS evaluation. He stated that he had enrolled in a BIPP program for 

about ten weeks. He stated he had an alcohol program and was going to an 

AA program. (SF Vol 2, pp. 54-55) He explained how he and Ms. Parker 

cut their hands on the mirror and the bloody envelope (SF Vol 2, pp. 58-59). 

The following then occurred: 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 8 

Q Do you have anything else to tell the Court at this time? 

A I just want to say that a lot of this stuff that -- that was 

said in those affidavits and by Ms. Parker isn't all -- all the 

truth. A lot of that stuff was -- was – was blown kind of out of 

proportion. 

THE COURT: Why don't you tell me what happened. (SF 

Vol. 2, p. 60) 

The Appellant then testified that although he and Ms. Parker argued, he did 

not assault her – he did not slam her up against anything, he never twisted 

her arm, punched her in the stomach or choked her. (SF Vol 2, p. 61) When 

asked by the court why she would make all that up, he stated she wanted his 

Facebook passwords and they argued about that. She immediately stated he 

was being shady. He knew she had trust issues, but he never thought she 

would try to get him thrown into prison. (SF Vol 2, pp. 61-62) 

 On cross-examination Appellant again denied that he punched Ms. 

Parker, he never choked her, never slammed her against the wall, he did 

nothing physical from his end. (SF Vol. 2, p. 66). He denied taking the 

phone from her while she was calling 911. (SF Vol 2, p. 67) He stated she 

made up the allegations about choking and punching her on the second 

incident. (SF Vol 2, p. 68) The State then reviewed his criminal record. 

(SF Vol 2, pp. 71-76) 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 9 

 On Re-direct Appellant stated he did not want a jury trial, that he was 

pleading guilty and that he was asking for probation. (SF Vol 2, pp. 77-78) 

Summary 

 Under Anders, a court-appointed attorney may not raise an issue in an 

appeal if he makes a conscientious examination of the case and finds the 

appeal wholly frivolous. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

See also Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009), Kelly v. 

State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) and Jeffery v. State, 903 

S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.). An appointed attorney 

must withdraw from a frivolous appeal by filing a motion to withdraw and a 

brief in support of the motion. Id. The brief is commonly known as an 

Anders brief. Id. The purpose of an Anders brief is to show counsel 

performed a conscientious examination of the record and the appeal is so 

frivolous that the indigent appellant should be denied his right to appointed 

counsel on appeal. Id. After the appellant is given an opportunity to respond, 

the court makes a full examination of the record to detect whether the case is 

frivolous. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Appellant’s counsel has reviewed the 

transcript, the sentence received by Appellant, and the factual basis for the 

sentence. As set forth below, there are no non-frivolous issues. 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 10 

APPELLANT COUNSEL’S ANALYSIS OF THE 

CASE 

A. Indictment: 

 The offense of assault family violence as applied in this case is 

defined in Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) and (b-2): 

§ 22.01. Assault 

(a) A person commits an offense if the person: 

(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily 

injury to another, including the person's spouse; 

(b-2) [Amended by Acts 2017, Texas Acts of the 85th

Leg. - Regular Session, ch. TBD] Notwithstanding 

Subsection (b)(2), an offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a 

felony of the second degree if: 

(1) the offense is committed against a person 

whose relationship to or association with the 

defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 

71.003, or 71.005, Family Code; 

(2) it is shown on the trial of the offense that the 

defendant has been previously convicted of an 

offense under this chapter, Chapter 19, or Section 

20.03, 20.04, or 21.11 against a person whose 

relationship to or association with the defendant is 

described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 

71.005, Family Code; and 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 11 

(3) the offense is committed by intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal 

breathing or circulation of the blood of the person

by applying pressure to the person's throat or neck

or by blocking the person's nose or mouth. 

 Section 22.01(b-2)(2) enhances the offense of assault causing bodily 

injury from a class A misdemeanor to a second-degree felony. See Marshall 

v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016) As relevant here, the 

offense is a second-degree felony if it is committed against “a person whose 

relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section ... 

71.005 [defining household], Family Code” and if “it is shown on the trial 

of the offense that the defendant has been previously convicted of an offense 

under this chapter ... against a person whose relationship to or association 

with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, 

Family Code and the offense is committed by intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the 

person by applying pressure to the person's throat or neck or by blocking the 

person's nose or mouth” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b-2). 

 Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, the State was required to 

prove (1) appellant (2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (3) caused 

bodily injury to the complainant (4) who is a member of appellant’s 

household, (5) had previously been convicted of an assault involving family 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 12 

violence and (6) did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 

impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the complainant 

by blocking her nose or mouth See Marshall v. State, supra. 

 The indictment in this case tracks the statutory language. It alleges 

that the Appellant intentionally, knowingly and recklessly caused bodily 

injury to Stephanie Parker by various means and that prior to the incident he 

had been previously convicted of an assault against a family member in a 

specified case in Denton County, Texas and that he intentionally, knowingly 

and recklessly impeded the complainant’s normal breathing and circulation 

by applying pressure to her throat and neck and by blocking her nose and 

mouth. (R 254, p. 7). 

 No objections were made to the indictment. The failure to object to 

the form or substance of the indictment prior to trial constitutes a waiver of 

the error, if any. See Tex.Const. art. V, § 12(b); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. § 

1.14(b); Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49, 54-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Studer 

v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 268, 273 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The indictment 

contains all the requisites as required by Arts. 21.01 through 21.17 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure. There are no defects of form or substance in 

the allegations in the indictment that prejudice the substantial rights of the 

Appellant. See Art. 21.19, Tex. Code Cr. Proc. 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 13 

B. Plea Papers 

 A document titled Plea Agreement was filed in this case. (R 254, p. 

19-22) The first part states that the defendant will plead guilty, and it will be 

an “open plea.” (R253, p. 32). The document included a section titled 

“Court’s Admonitions to Defendant” where the trial court stated Appellant 

was charged with the offense of “Assault FV (enh)(imp)” and the 

punishment range for a second degree felony at 2-20 years and an optional 

fine up to $10,000. (R 254, p.20). The document includes admonitions 

about the Appellant’s right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses and his right to testify in his own behalf if he chooses to. (R 254, 

p. 20). The court also advised that the prosecutor’s recommendation on 

punishment was not binding on the court, and if the court rejected the plea 

bargain, the Appellant would be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. (R 

254, p. 20) The court then stated that if the punishment was not greater than 

the plea bargain, the Appellant would not be able to appeal the case with 

certain exceptions not applicable in this case. (R 254, p. 20). The court then 

advised the Appellant about certain time limits he and his counsel had to 

prepare. (R 254, p. 20). The trial court then stated that if the Appellant 

received unadjudicated community supervision and violated the conditions 

of probation, Appellant would be subject to arrest and a hearing to determine 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 14 

if guilt should be adjudicated. If guilt was adjudicated, then the full range of 

punishment would be open to the court. (R 254, p. 20). 

 The plea agreement document continued with a section titled 

“Defendant’s Statements and Waivers.” (R 254, p. 20). The Appellant 

stated that he was the accused and was mentally competent, that he 

understood the nature of the accusation, the range of punishment and the 

consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contender. (R 254, p. 20). He stated 

that he knew he had an absolute right to a jury trial, a right to remain silent, 

that anything he said could and would be used against him, that he had the 

right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him and the right 

to be tried upon an indictment returned by the Grand Jury. (R 254, p. 20) 

After acknowledging immigration issues not relevant to his case, he waived 

his right to be tried upon an indictment returned by the Grand jury, any 

defects in the indictment, the right to a jury trial and the right to remain 

silent. (R 254, p. 21) He also waived arraignment, the reading of the 

indictment. He waived the appearance (R 254, p. 21), confrontation and 

cross-examination of witnesses, his right to ten days to prepare for trial after 

the appointment of counsel and the preparation of a pre-sentence report, (R 

254, p. 21) The next paragraph includes a judicial confession where the 

Appellant admits that he committed the offense of “Assault FV (enh) on 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 15 

__________ exactly as alleged” in the indictment. (R 253, p. 21) He 

affirmed that his plea and judicial confession were freely and voluntarily 

made and not influenced by any consideration of fear, persuasion or delusive 

hope of pardon or parole. (R 254, p. 21) He stated he understood the 

admonitions regarding unadjudicated community supervision. (R 254, p. 

21) He stated he understood his rights under the Uniform Extradition Act. 

He stated he understood he did not have a right to appeal the plea if the 

Court followed the terms of the State’s recommendation as to sentencing. 

(R 254, p. 21) Appellant signed the plea agreement stating that his attorney 

explained the document to him, that he understood it and that the plea, his 

statements and waivers were knowingly, freely and voluntarily made with 

full understanding of the consequences. He asked the trial court to accept 

his plea. (R 253, p. 34) 

 The Appellant, his defense counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge 

signed the document and it was filed with the court clerk. (R 254, p. 21) 

 A document entitled “Judicial Confession was introduced into 

evidence as State Exhibit 1. (R 254, p. 30-31; SF, p. 6) The document 

signed by the Appellant and his counsel states that the Appellant consents to 

the stipulation of evidence and waives the appearance, confrontation and 

cross-examination of witnesses and that he consents to the introduction of 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 16 

the “Judicial Confession.” (R 254, pp. 30-31; SF-Plea Vol. 2, pp. 6; State’s 

Exhibit 1 – hereinafter cited as “ST Ex 1”). The “Judicial Confession” then 

states that, after waiving his state and federal constitutional rights against 

self-incrimination, and after being sworn, upon oath, committed the offense 

as detailed in the indictment: 

C. Judgment of Conviction 

 The Judgment of Conviction (R 254, pp. 23-25) appears to be proper 

and states each of the applicable requirements of Art. 42.01 of the Code of 

Criminal Procedure. The Judgment was signed by the trial court and entered 

of record. It reflects: 

1. The title and number of the case; 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 17 

2. That the case was called and the parties appeared, naming the 

attorney for the state, the defendant, and the attorney for the 

defendant; 

3. The plea of true to the offense charged; 

4. The submission of the evidence; 

6. The verdict or findings of the court; 

7. That the defendant was adjudged guilty of the offense as found 

by the finding of the court, and that the defendant be punished in 

accordance with the court's finding as to the proper punishment; 

8. That the defendant was sentenced a term of confinement; 

 9. The county and court in which the case was tried; 

 10. The offense for which the defendant was convicted; 

11. The date of the offense and degree of offense for which the 

defendant was convicted; 

 14. The term of sentence; 

 15. The date judgment was entered; 

16. The date sentence was imposed; 

 17. The date sentence was to commence and any credit for time 

served; 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 18 

18. The terms of any order entered pursuant to Article 42.08 Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure that the defendant's sentence is to run 

concurrently with another sentence or sentences; 

19. The terms of any plea bargain (The record indicates that this 

case did not have a plea bargain on the issue of sentence (R 254, p. 

19; SF- Vol. 2, pp. 6, 52); 

20. The defendant's thumbprint was taken in accordance with 

Article 38.33 of the code of criminal procedure (Article 38.33 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the defendant’s right 

thumbprint be rolled legibly on the judgment or docket sheet in the 

case. This was not done, but the Judgment states: “Thumbprint 

Certificate attached.” (R 254, p. 24). In the Record on Appeal is a 

document titled “Judgment Certificate of Thumbprint.” (R 254, p. 25). 

The document appears to comply with the requirements of the statute. 

Further there is nothing in the record to indicate that the fingerprint is 

for anyone other than the Appellant. No objection was lodged below 

to the failure of the Judgment or the docket sheet to include a rolled 

fingerprint of the Appellant’s right thumbprint.); 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 19 

21. The trial court did not order the defendant to repay a reward or 

part of a reward under Articles 37.073 and 42.152 of the code of 

criminal procedure; 

22. The trial court did not order restitution to be paid to the victim; 

23. The Appellant was not required to register as a sex offender; 

24. The Appellant’s state identification number was entered; and 

25. The state incident number was entered. 

D. Potential Ground of Error 

 During the hearing on punishment the Appellant clearly testified that 

he was not guilty. (See pages 10-11 above and SF Vol 2, pp. 61, 63-64, 66, 

67, 68, 69). However after making the initial statements to the trial court on 

direct examination, he following occurred: 

Q (BY MR. SMITH) Now, Mr. Ramey -- now, we basically -- 

we are doing an open plea here; do you understand that? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And you entered a plea of guilty? 

A Yes. 

Q And we gave up our right to a jury trial? 

A Yes, sir. 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 20 

THE COURT: I'm a little bit confused. If you didn't do any of 

the things that she says, that she has testified that you did, why 

are you pleading guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: I guess I know how the court system 

works. I know -- I know how I look. I know how she looks. I 

know that it doesn't look good for me. I just -- I really want to 

get back out there 

to my kids. She -- she has no reason to fear me whatsoever. She 

-- like I said, she'll never see me again for -- for -- for the rest of 

her life and the rest of my life. I -- the only thing I want to do is 

get back to my children. My relationship with my daughter was 

very, very close one, and she hasn't seen her father now in over 

a year and a half. And my son is two-years-old and I've been 

locked away for almost a year now. (SF Vol 2, pp. 64-65) 

After his cross-examination, the following occurred: 

REDIRECT EXAMINATION 

BY MR. SMITH: 

Q Johnathon, do you want to have a jury trial? 

A No, sir. 

Q All right. Are you pleading guilty? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And, again, you're asking for a chance at probation to 

prove to the Court you -- you can do it? 

A Yes, sir. And I -- I also enrolled in the BIPP class. I've 

done ten weeks and I plan to continue after I get out of here. 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 21 

Q And you're asking for a chance at the felony domestic 

violence specialty court program? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q IOP? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q High-risk caseload? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Anything -- anything, but for prison, is what we're asking 

for here? 

A Yes, sir. I'm asking for the chance to get out there and be 

able to be a father to my children and lead by example. (SF Vol 

2, pp. 77-78) 

 Prior to 1978 the trial court would have been required to withdraw 

Appellant’s plea and set the case for a trial. See Moon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 

681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 3 However the current law does not require 

 

3

 In a long line of authorities the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that when the 

evidence introduced makes evident the innocence of the accused or which reasonably and 

fairly raises an issue as to such fact and such evidence is not withdrawn, the trial court is 

required on its own motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea or nolo contendere 

plea and enter a not guilty plea for the defendant. E. G. Harris v. State (76 Tex.Cr.R. 

126), 172 S.W. 975 (Tex.Cr.App.1915); Edwards v. State (134 Tex.Cr.R. 153), 114 

S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1938); Navarro v. State (141 Tex.Cr.R. 196), 147 S.W.2d 1081 

(Tex.Cr.App.1941); Rayson v. State (160 Tex.Cr.R. 103), 267 S.W.2d 153 

(Tex.Cr.App.1954); Fite v. State (163 Tex.Cr.R. 279), 290 S.W.2d 897 

(Tex.Cr.App.1956); Richardson v. State (164 Tex.Cr.R. 500), 300 S.W.2d 83 

(Tex.Cr.App.1957); Edworthy v. State, 371 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Cr.App.1963); Reyna v. 

State, 434 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Swanson v. State, 447 S.W.2d 942 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 22 

such action. The trial court is not required to withdraw a defendant's plea of 

guilty sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty when a defendant enters a 

plea of guilty before the trial court after waiving a jury, even if evidence is 

presented that either makes the defendant's innocence evident or reasonably 

and fairly raises an issue as to his guilt. See id. at 682. The Moon decision 

reasoned that it is the trial court's duty to consider the evidence submitted 

and, as the trier of facts, the court may find the defendant guilty of the crime 

charged or a lesser offense or it may acquit the defendant. Thus, no valid 

purpose would be served to require a trial court to withdraw a guilty plea. 

See Moon, 572 S.W.2d at 682; Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d 300, 303 

(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd); Edwards v. State, 921 

S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). 

 The entry of a valid guilty plea “has the effect of admitting all 

material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge.” Ex parte Williams, 703 

S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). In a trial before the court, once a 

 

(Tex.Cr.App.1969); Hays (Hayes) v. State, 484 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Lee v. 

State, 503 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550 

(Tex.Cr.App.1975); Gates v. State, 543 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Woodberry v. 

State, 547 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Malone v. State, (548) S.W.2d (908) 

((Tex.Cr.App 1977). This rule has been recognized and applied even when a jury has 

been waived and the plea is before the court without a jury. Burks v. State (145 Tex.Cr.R. 

15), 165 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Cr.App.1942); Gonzales v. State, 480 S.W.2d 663 

(Tex.Cr.App.1972); Faz v. State, 510 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Trevino v. State, 

519 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Cooper v. State, 537 S.W.2d 940 

(Tex.Cr.App.1976); Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 23 

defendant enters a valid guilty plea, no constitutional “fact questions” 

remain for the purposes of his constitutional right to a factual sufficiency 

review of the evidence used to convict him. The State is no longer required 

to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. In fact, for the purposes 

of federal due process, a plea of guilty is itself a conviction awaiting only 

determination of punishment. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 

S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see also O'Brien v. State, 154 S.W.3d 

908, 910 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding no federal due process 

right to factual sufficiency review). In Texas, however, the State is also 

bound by statute to support the plea with sufficient evidence. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. Under Article 1.15, Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, the State is required to introduce evidence demonstrating the 

defendant's guilt. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. A judicial 

confession alone is usually sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 

1.15 “so long as it embraces every constituent element of the charged 

offense.” Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). 

 A defendant relinquishes his right to complain about the State's proof 

of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when he voluntarily enters his guilty 

plea. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no 

pet.) Due process is not denied by a conviction based on a plea of guilty 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 24 

accompanied by a strong factual basis for the plea and a defendant's clearly 

expressed desire to enter it despite his professed innocence. McGill v. State, 

supra; Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 

(1970)). The number of cases in which defendants change their mind about 

the waiver of their right to plead not guilty is small, the appearance of 

evidence inconsistent with guilt is unpredictable to the court, and cases are 

common in which there is some evidence in the defendant's favor but he has 

validly chosen to plead guilty after weighing the advantage of such a plea 

against the chance of acquittal. See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350. After a trial 

court has implemented the constitutional rights entailed in the entry of a 

guilty plea, it is "appropriate that the defendant be required to take some 

affirmative action to don the armor again" if he wants an appellate court to 

review the factual sufficiency of the evidence against him. See id. 

 If a guilty-pleading defendant decides mid-trial that he wants to 

compel the trial court to evaluate the evidence under the reasonable doubt 

standard, he must seek to withdraw the plea of guilty. McGill v. State, supra 

If he fails to do so, he is precluded from having an appellate court review the 

evidence against him under the traditional legal and factual sufficiency 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 25 

analyses. McGill v. State, supra ; Simpson v. State, 67 S.W.3d 327, 329 

(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.). 

 In Valle v. State, 747 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tex.App. —Fort Worth 

1988, no pet.) the Appellant testified as to the reasons he pled guilty. The 

Court stated: 

“The fact that appellant entered a plea of guilty in hope of 

escaping the possibility of a higher sentence does not invalidate 

the plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 

27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202 (5th 

Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1036, 102 S.Ct. 577, 70 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1981). This is not fear of bodily harm, improper 

inducements or ‘terror’ which the statute is meant to 

circumvent. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; see 

also Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.1978).” 

 In Lawal v. State, ,368 S.W.3d 876, 885 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 

2012, no pet.) the Houston Court of Appeals stated: 

 “A defendant may withdraw his plea as a matter of right, 

without assigning a reason, until judgment is pronounced or the 

case is taken under advisement by the trial court. Jackson v. 

State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Jagaroo v. 

State, 180 S.W.3d 793, 802 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 

2005, pet. ref'd). If, however, a defendant desires to withdraw 

his guilty plea after the court has taken the case under 

advisement, withdrawal of the plea is within the sound 

discretion of the court. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515; Jagaroo, 

180 S.W.3d at 802. After a trial court has admonished a 

defendant, received the plea and evidence, and passed the case 

for pre-sentence investigation, the case has been taken under 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 26 

advisement. DeVary v. State, 615 S.W.2d 739, 740 

(Tex.Crim.App.1981); Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 802.[1] Because 

Lawal did not seek to withdraw his plea until the case had been 

taken under advisement, he could not withdraw the plea as a 

matter of right. 

* * * 

 Nevertheless, because the judge is free to make any 

finding based on the evidence regardless of the plea, withdrawal 

of a guilty plea is not required even when evidence in a PSI 

raises an issue of a defendant's innocence. Fisher v. State, 104 

S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no 

pet.); Graves v. State, 803 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.App.-Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd). Proper admonishments by a trial 

court establish prima facie proof that a guilty plea was entered 

knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 

197 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Houston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 212, 

217 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The burden 

then shifts to the defendant to show he pleaded guilty without 

understanding the consequences of his plea and, consequently, 

suffered harm. Houston, 201 S.W.3d at 217. A defendant has a 

“heavy burden” to prove in a subsequent hearing that he entered 

the plea involuntarily. Id.” 

 In the pre3sent case there is absolutely no indication that Appellant 

wished to withdraw his plea of guilty. The transcript clearly shows that 

although the Appellant denied doing the acts alleged in the indictments, he 

clearly wished to continue with his plea of guilty and try to get a probated 

sentence. Without some hint the Appellant wished to withdraw his plea, 

counsel on appeal cannot make an effort to raise the issue on direct appeal. 

 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 27 

Conclusion 

 Based on the review of the Clerk’s Record and the Statement of Facts 

it is counsel’s belief that there are no arguable grounds of error to present to 

this Court of Appeals. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Ronald L. Goranson

 RONALD L. GORANSON 

 3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Ste. 1124 

 Dallas, Texas 75219 

 (214) 651.1122 

 (214) 871.0620 (fax) 

 State Bar No. 08195000 

 Email – rlgatty@aol.com 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 

Appellant's Brief was delivered to Ms. Lori Ordiway, Assistant District 

Attorney, Appellant Division, Dallas County District Attorney’s Office, 133 

N. Riverfront Blvd, 10th floor, Dallas, Texas, 75207 this May 31, 2018. 

 /s/Ronald L. Goranson 

 RONALD L. GORANSON 

 
Appellant Ramey’s Anders Appeal Brief Page 28 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - APPELLANT 

I certify that the above Appellant’s Anders Brief was placed in an 

envelope properly addressed and mailed to: 

Johnathon C. Ramey 

TDJC # 2182808 

John Middleton Unit 

13055 FM 3522 

Abilene, TX 79601 

on this May 31, 2018. I further certify that a copy of the Statement of Facts 

and the Appellate Record have been forwarded to Appellant at the above 

address, along with a letter advising him of his right to file an appeal brief 

and the address of this Court of Appeals. Also enclosed was a copy of a 

motion requesting an extension of time within which to file him brief. 

 /s/Ronald L. Goranson 

RONALD L. GORANSON 

Certificate of Compliance 

 Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

counsel for Appellant certifies that there are 6507 words in this document 

pursuant to the inclusions and exclusions required by Rule 9.4(i)(1), Texas 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 /s/Ronald L. Goranson 

 RONALD L. GORANSON