NO.03-13-00066-CR JUL 08 2015

ORIGINAL Abe!Acosta,Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

RECEIVED IN

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

MAURICE SAMUEL ARRINGTON APPELLANT

Vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE

FILED

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVl'oiURT 0F CRIMINAL APPEALS

; JUL 10 2015

Abel Acosta, Clerk

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

COMES NOW: Maurice Samuel Arrington, Appellant in the above

styled cause, and respectfully urges this Court to grant

discretionary review of the above named cause.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant request oral argument to clarify any judgments

made in the determination of the above styled and numbered case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

December 8, 2011, and affidavit was filed by detective Carl

Pergande, with magistrate Bill Cooke. A Search and Arrest warrant

was issued December 8, 2011. December 9, 2011, the search warrant

was executed. Appellant was arrested approximately 6 to 8 blocks
away form premises after leaving residence. Appellant went to

trial and received a 35 year sentence from the judge after being

found guilty by a jury.
NO. 03-13-00066-CR

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

MAURICE SAMUEL ARRINGTON

Vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

APPELLANT

APPELLEE

FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS ..

CAUSE NUMBER 69198

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

APPELLANT, PRO-SE

MAURICE SAMUEL ARRINGTON

TDCJ-CID No.1833454

Ramsey One Unit

1100 FM 655

Rosharon, Texas 77583
NO.03-13-00066-CR

MAURICE SAMUEL ARRINGTON

Vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

The undersigned Appellant certifies that the following

listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case, this

listing is made so that the judges of this Court may evaluate

possible disqualification or recusal.

1. MAURICE SAMUEL ARRINGTON - APPELLANT

2. DUANE GRAEFF - ATTORNEY AT PRE-TRIAL FOR DEFENDANT

3. JON JON DURMITT - ATTORNEY AT TRIAL FOR DEFENDANT

4. HONORABLE MARTHA JANE TRUDO - PRE-TRIAL COURT JUDGE

5. HONORABLE FANCY JEZEK - TRIAL COURT JUDGE

6. MICHEAL WALDMAN - ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE

7. CLERENCE TERRY CLARK - ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE

8. HONORABLE HENRY LOUIS GARZA - DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE (APPEAL)

9. BOB DOYLE - ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE (APPEAL)

Maurice Samuel Arrington

TDCJ-CID No.1833454

1100 FM 655

Rosharon, Texas 77583
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Bailey v. US. 133 S.Ct. 1031

2. Crim. Law § 46.3

3. Crim. Law § 46.4

4. II. v. Gates. 462 US at 239

5. Lary v. State. 15 S.W.3d 581

6. Lowery v. State. 843 S.W.2d 136

7. Moran v. State, 213 S.W.3d 917

8. Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 US 291

9. Serrano v. State. 123 S.W.3d 63

10. State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 399

11. Stone v. State, 17 S.W.3d 348

12. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668

13. Tex. C.C.P. art. 38.23

14. Tex. R. Evid. 609(c)2

15. Tex. R. Evid. 609(B)

16. US v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353
ISSUE NUMBER ONE: (A) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

Before the execution of the search warrant December 9, 2011,

Appellant was observed by officers entering premises to be

searched then leave. Approximately 5 to 7 blocks away from

premises, officers conducted a stop of Appellant at gun point,

handcuffed Appellant, and placed Appellant in the back seat of a

police car. Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later detective

Pergande questioned Appellant about multiple addresses without

reading Mi randa warnings. A search team was then dispatched and

assembled to conduct a search of the premises.

REVIEW OF ISSUE

A person may not be detained incident to the execution of a

search warrant unless the person is within the immediate vicinity

of the premises to be searched. Bailey v. U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1031;

Detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant are

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the limited

intrusion on personal liberty is out weighed by the special law

enforcement interest at [133 S.Ct. 1043] stake. Once an

individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be

searched, however, detention [must] be justified by some other

rationale. Supreme Court §19

Secondly, suspects must be informed of their Fifth Amendment

rights once they are in custody. Any statement made by a suspect

in custody before he/she is aprised of these rights will be

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inadmissible. These rights must be presented to the suspect due

to the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that being

interrogated while in custody is an inherently coercive

situation. In Texas [must] be informed of their Miranda Warnings,

Bailey Tex. C.C.P. Art.38.23. Interrogation is referred to as

questioning initiated by law enforcement officers - either direct

questioning or its functional equivalent. The term interrogation

refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or

actions on part of police (other than those normally attendant to

arrest and custody), e.g., "(routine booking questions") that

police should reasonably expect to elicit an incriminating

response. Rhode Island v♦ Inni s, 446 U.S. 291, Moran v. State,

213 S.W.3d 917, C.C.P. art. 38.21.

ARGUMENT

Appellant argues that attorney Jon Jon McDurmitt was

ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence of

alleged statements given to detective by Appellant due to an

illegal arrest, the failure or detective to aprise Appellant of

his Miranda right, [and] the lack of evidence of the alleged

statements since statements were not recorded or video taped.

Legally, the statements were not admissible in Court, and were

harmful to Appellant since there was no evidence of the

statements and Appellant couldn't even remember if he had even

made the statements. The admission of these statements

uncontested by attorney harmed Appellant's credibility in trial,

and violated Fifth Amendment Constitutional right of Appellant.
ISSUE NUMBER ONE: (B) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

Upon viewing the affidavit for the search warrant it is

noticed by Appellant that the affidavit for the search warrant

contained limited information involving Appellant. In the

affidavit, the information contained is:

(1) Detectives Credentials

(2) Name and Address of Appellant

(3) Statement from un-named informer

(4) Officers belief

(5) Background check of Appellant

(6) Description of Appellant's parked vehicle

REVIEW OF ISSUE

In Serrano v. State, 123 S.W.3d 53, the Court of Appeals of

Texas, Austin, reversed and remanded this case because the

affidavit contained insufficient evidence.

Serrano is very similar to Appellant's case. Granted, there

was no motion ever filed by Appellant's court appointed attorney

to suppress the evidence due to lack of evidence.

In Appellant's case alike Serrano, and Lowery v. State, 843

S.W.2d 136, the affidavit alleges, there was a reliable informer,

The affiant relied heavily upon an unidentified confidential

informant, in which the affidavit states the informer merely

states "Appellant is in possession of cocaine and is selling

cocaine." A mere conclusory statement gives the magistrate

virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding

probable cause. [I]ts actions cannot be a mere ratification of
the bare conclusions of others. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103

S.Ct. 2317.

ARGUMENT

Appellant's attorney Jon Jon McDurmitt, should have

immediately attacked the sufficiency of the affidavit by filing a

motion to suppress the evidence obtained from it, due to the lack

of evidence presented on the face of the affidavit. Stri ckland

This was a costly error by defense attorney on Appellant's

behalf. The issuance and the execution of the search warrant

stemming from the affidavit which did not contain probable cause

was a violation of Appellant's Fourth Amendment Constitutional

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

What Appellant is arguing is; there was no substantial basis

for crediting the informant's hearsay statement. Officers failed

to corroborate the informant's tip except to confirm Appellant's

parked vehicle, which was consistent with innocent activity. The

affidavit does not state the statement was against penal

interest, nor repeated by other informants. There was no accurate

prediction of future behavior. This tip was alleged to be a first

hand observation, but it contained no particular level of detail

regarding Appellant's premises or his criminal activity. State

v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 399.

It was defense counsel's duty to pay attention to this and

file motion to suppress the evidence due to lack of probable

cause. By not doing so counsel denied Appellant the opportunity

of a possible dismissal of the charges due to an unreasonable
search and seizure which violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment

Constitutional right. Furthermore, by counsel not objecting to

the validity of the affidavit the issue was not preserved for

appeal only leaving Appellant an open door under ineffective

assistance. Stri ckland

ISSUE NUMBER ONE: (C) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

Appellant's court appointed Jon Jon McDurmitt, failed to

file motions to disclose informant(s) and for exculpatory

evidence during pre-trial, and also upon Appellant's previous

filing of these motions, failed to follow through with them. Also

upon Court's denial to disclose the identity of the informants,

Appellant's attorney failed to motion the Court to perform an

in-camera review or motion the Court to dismiss the charges upon

denial of disclosure, and in-camera review.

REVIEW OF ISSUE

If it appears from the evidence... that an informer may be

able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of a

material issue... on guilt or innocence in a criminal case, and

the public entity invokes the privilege, the Court shall give the

public entity an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to

determining whether the informer can in fact supply that

testimony if the Court finds that there is reasonable [15 S.W.3d
584] probability that the informer can give the testimony, and

the public entity elects not to disclose the informers identity,

the Court... [shall], on motion of the defendant, and may, on the

Courts own motion, dismiss the charges as to which the testimony

would relate. Tex. R. Evid. 508(c)2, Larv v. State. 15 S.W.3d

581.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed,

in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, since

access to counsels skill and knowledge is necessary to accord

defendant's the ample opportunity to meet the case of the

prosecution to which they are entitled. Crim. Law § 46.3, Right

to Counsel. A fair trial is one in which evidence subject to

adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribune for

resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. Tri al

§ 1 - Fair Trial. The right to counsel is the right to effective

assistance of counsel. Crim. Law § 46.4 counsel-effectiveness.

Counsel can deprive a defendant the right to effective assistance

of counsel simply by failing to render adequate assistance. Crim.

Law § 46.4. "see" Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668

ARGUMENT

Appellant argues that attorney Jon Jon McDurmitt was

ineffective for (1) not filing a motion to disclose informant(s) ,

(2) Not following up on Appellant's previous motion to disclose

informant(s). Upon Court's denial of the motion to disclose

informant(s), attorney should have moved the Court to perform an

in-camera review to determine if disclosing the informer was

-6-
necessary for a fair determination at trial, and if trial court

refused; motion the court to dismiss charges against Appellant

from which the informer testimony would relate. Furthermore, the

trial court may argue that it was not necessary to disclose the

informer because the court would not be using testimony from the

informer to aide in procuring a conviction. That would be false

due to the fact that the members of the jury were given copies of

the affidavit in support of the search warrant with the

allegations of the informer to the affiant that Appellant "Is in

possession of cocaine, is selling cocaine and that informer was

in the residence with" Appellant. That alone [is] testimony.

Testimony from an unidentified person, whose identity was

unavailable to the Appellant prior to, or during trial in order

for Appellant to prepare a defense. Trial counsel for Appellant

should have objected and asked the Court then in trial to declare

a mistrial due to the fact that the informers testimony had been

elicited to the jury and defense had no way to cross examine the

witness that was undisclosed by the Court.

ISSUE NUMBER ONE: (D) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

Counsel was ineffective for eliciting testimony regarding

prior aggravated Battery Conviction that could not have been

mentioned otherwise.
REVIEW OF ISSUE

In Stone v. State, 17 S.W.3d 348 2000 Tex.App. Lexis 2496.

Appellant's conviction was reversed and case remanded, because

record showed ineffective assistance of counsel. Court held,

under facts of case, counsel's decision to elicit testimony

regarding prior murder conviction could bot be considered

reasonable trial strategy, so counsel's performance was deficient

representation that fell below objective standard of

reasonableness.

Texas Rule of Evidence 609(b) states that evidence of a

prior conviction may not be used for the purpose of attacking the

credibility of a witness if more than ten years has elapsed since

the date of the conviction unless the court determined, in the

interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction

supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially

outweighs its prejudicial effects.

It is common practice for a defense attorney to elicit from

his own client evidence regarding a prior' conviction when counsel

knows or reasonably believes that if he does not bring it up

first, the State will. The belief is that getting the issue out

first will "pull the sting" from the impact of its coming from

the State. However, in this case, the State could not have

introduced evidence of Appellant's prior conviction. The Court

would have been required to make that ruling under the applicable

law 609(b).

ARGUMENT
Appellant is arguing that counsel's performance was

deficient because there was no need for him to elicit the

testimony regarding the prior aggravated battery on a police

officer from him, and in doing so diminished Appellant's

credibility. Appellant contends that while it is a common trial

tactic, when a defendant who has been earlier convicted of a

felony is going to testify, to admit to his prior conviction

before the State hammers him with it on cross examination. Such

reasoning does not apply here in that the State could not have

used the: conviction to impeach his credibility, because the

conviction was too remote in time under Texas Rule of Evidence

609(b) (vernon Supp.2000). However, evidence of a conviction is

not admissible under this rule if the date of conviction or the

release of the witness from confinement is more than 10 years

earlier, whichever is the later date in which, Appellant was

released from confinement in May of 2001 and trial was commenced

at the end months of 2012, well over eleven years.

ISSUE NUMBER TWO: ABUSE OF DISCRETION

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

Appellant filed motions in order to obtain the identity of

the informant(s) involved in Appellant's case in order to in

trial interrogate to establish the credibility, the truthfulness

and the accuracy of the informer(s) allegation. The Court denied

Appellant's motion without requiring the public entity to perform

-9-
an in camera review to determine rather the informer(s) identity

was necessary to the fair determination of guilt/innocence.

REVIEW OF ISSUE

Tex. R. Evid. 508(a) of the rule establishes the privilege

and Tex. R. Evid. 508(c) provides three exceptions to the

privilege. Relevant here is the sound exception which reads: If

it appears from the evidence that an informer may be able to give

testimony necessary to a fair determination of a material issue

on guilt or innocence in a criminal case, and the entity invokes

the privilege, the court shall give the public entity en

opportunity to shovv in camera facts relevant to determining

whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony. If the

court finds that there is a reasonable probability that the

informer can give the testimony, and the public entity elects not

to disclose the informers identity, the court shall on motion of

the defendant, and may, on the court's own motion, dismiss the

charges as to which the testimony would relate.

Whenever it is shown that an informant was an eyewitness to

an alleged offense then certainly that informant can in fact give

testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issues of

guilt or innocence. Lary v. State, 15 S.W.3d 581, 2000 Tex.App.

Lexis 1811

This rule created a four step process for resolving

prosecution claims of privilege for informers; namely, (1) the

evidence must show that the informer may be able to give

necessary evidence, (2) the prosecutor must invoke the privilege,

-10-
(3) the trial court must permit the prosecution to show in camera

whether the witness can give testimony, and (4) if the court

determines the informer can give testimony, and the prosecution

does not disclose their identity, the charge must be dismissed.

ARGUMENT

The withholding of the name of the informant and the failure

of the trial court to make a determination that the informant's

testimony was not necessary for a fair determination of the

identity issue deprived Appellant of the opportunity to hear the

informant's testimony and deprived him the opportunity to cross

examine the witness. See Lary, supra. That is true because if the

evidence is not legally sufficient, Appellant is entitled to an

aqui ttal .

Appellant contends, trial court erred in not holding an in

camera review after denying Appellant's motion to disclose

informants. In doing so the court denied Appellant a fair trial.

Informant was a eye witness to criminal activity, gave a

statement to police about criminal activity and was in a

residence during criminal activity. Furthermore, the information

given to police by informant assisted police to procure a search

warrant in which drugs were found and Appellant was arrested, and

charged. This is a reversible error as it is volative to

Appellant's fourteenth Amendment Constitutional Rights to be

confronted by witnesses against him.

Furthermore trial court erred in allowing the written

testimony of the Informant into the hands of the jury upon not

-11-
disclosing the informer. The members of the jury were given

copies of the affidavit in support of the search warrant which

states the Informant told affient that he/she was in the

residence with Appellant and that Appellant "is in possession of

cocaine and is selling cocaine". This is considered testimony.

Rather it is written or spoken by the Detective or the Informant,

The jury sees it as information from [another] witness. A witness

who's testimony was underhandedly [used] in the trial proceeding

by the prosecution by simply not mentioning the statement of the

Informant , but by giving the jury a legal document to read of

the Informants al1egations ,and denying Appellant the right to

cross examine the allegations.

ISSUE NUMBER THREE: Appellant contends that his conviction was

based on perjured testimony given by detective Pergande who

played a major roll as a state's witness. This perjured testimony

prejudiced Appellant as it gave the jury an untruthful visual of

the events that may or may not have taken place which caused

Appellant's trial to be unfair.

CONTRADICTING STATEMENTS FOUND IN

TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS

A. Volume 6, p.42, line(s) 19-25, p.43 line(s) 1-5

B. Volume 7, p.20, line(s) 19-22

Originally in volume 6 Pergande states he got the keys from

Wilburn at the initial traffic stop. In volume 7 Pergande's story

changes. At the initial traffic stop the keys were confiscated,

•12 -..
and Appellant did not have [any] keys. So the only way for

Pergande to leave the initial traffic stop, and then come back

to inform Wilburn he would also be under arrest would be if he

used Wilburn's keys to unlock the door.

A. Volume 6, p.39 line(s) 14-19

B. volume 7, p.14 line(s) 13-25

Once Pergande realizes the [possibility] that the defense

may have radio transmissions, his story changes as to alerting of

TRU/SWAT members. These are two completely different stories

which in no way could be misstatement showing that Pergande was

trying to cover something up.

A. Volume 6, p.36, line(s) 6-14

B. Volume 6, p.39 line(s) 14-19

First Pergande states he "didn't see Maurice Arrington on

the particular date". (Referring to December 8, 2011) Then his

story changes to say he did see Appellant with two females enter

the apartment for a short period of time. Pergande already stated

he had not see Appellant on December 5, or 6, of 2011. December

7, 2011 is the day Pergande alleged to have gotten Appellant's

address and statement from the confidential informant, where as

Pergande stated he then drove past the apartment and he "did see

a red SUV type vehicle parked outside". This said in (affidavit

for search warrant), where as there was no mention of this

alleged observation, of two females December 8, 2011. Pergande

stated he did not see Appellant that day so they waited until the

nest day and he had another detective from his office conducting

surveillance. The only time Appellant was mentioned being seen

-13-
December 9, 2011 was by detective Mallow who notified Pergande

that Appellant was with another [male] carrying groceries to the

apartment.

A. Volume 6, p.43, line(s) 4-5

B. Volume 6, p.100, line(s) 5-10

Statements inconsistent as to when Pergande arrived to the

execution of the search warrant.

A. Volume 6, p.37, line(s) 17-24

B. Volume 7, p.48, line(s) 7-12

C. Volume 6, p.93, line(s) 3-11

Detective Pergande is right about the small window of

opportunity driving by a 12-15 foot space (which is actually more

accurate at 10-12 foot space) would give him to look in. With

detective Mallow stating Pergande told him he saw Appellant

[walking up the stairs], in such a small window of space not

wanting to be noticed, there was no wy to watch Appellant go all

the way up the stairs to the end of the balcony [and] watch

Appellant unlock the door.

The Court of Appeals will not permit a conviction based on

testimony tainted by perjury. U.S. v. Blackburn. 9 F.3d 353

To obtain reversal on grounds that government relied on

perjured testimony, defendant must show that (1) contested

statements were actually false, (2) that there were material and

(3) that the government knew they were false.

(1). The contested statements are all contradicted by the

detective's own words. The trial transcripts prove an array of

inconsistent statements and allegations made by the detective.

14.
There is no guarantee that any of the statements are true, but

there [is] a guarantee that at least one of the statements in

each of the above contested statements was made with a reckless

disregard for the truth.

(2). The detective was the only [physical] witness the

prosecution had to depend on to point the finger at Appellant. No

other officer could testify to Appellant doing any wrong. All of

the 0\ther officers were only witnesses as to the evidence aquired

at the execution of the warrant. And Appellant has not seen any

evidence that other officers did anything but their

job. Detective Pergande, being the only [physical] witness

against Appellant told multiple conflicting stories in order to

either cover up his own wrong doings, or to inflame the jury

against Appellant to secure a conviction. The perjured testimony

was material because the testimony of an officer is perceived by

the jury to be evidence and evidence tells a story which in this

situation can incarcerate a person or set them free.

(3). The government/State knew that the statements were

untrue. (1) Police/Detectives are state employees therefore, they

are a part of the state and if the officer is giving false

testimony, being part of the state, then the state knows. (2) A

prosecutor holding trial knows when his only witnesses story

changes, and being an officer of the state himself, it should be

his [duty] to correct the issues and not push for a conviction

knowing his evidence is tainted.

IS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I here by certify that on July 6, 2015, a true and correct

copy of the Appellant's P.D.R was mailed to the attorney for the

State by U.S First Class Mail addressed to Henry Garza, District

Attorney, P.O. BOX 540 Belton, Texas 76513-0540

r^OL ^

Maurice Samuel Arrington

Appellant Pro-Se

I, Maurice Samuel Arrington, TDCJ No.1833454, being

presently incarcerated in the Ramsey One unit of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division, in

Brazoria County, Texas, verify and declare under penalty of

perjury that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

Executed in this the 6th day of July 2015.

Maurice S. Arrington

TDCJ-CID No.1833454
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-13-00066-CR

Maurice Samuel Arrington, Appellant

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 426TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 69198, HONORABLE FANCY H. JEZEK, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Maurice Samuel Arrington guilty of possession with intent

to deliver a controlled substance weighing four grams or more but less than 200 grams. Punishment

was assessed at thirty-five years in the institutional division of the Texas Department ofCriminal

Justice. We will affirm the judgment.

Appellant's court-appointed appellate attorney has filed a motion to withdraw

supported by a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets

the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds on the merits to be advanced. See 386 U.S. 738,

744 (1967); Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d763,766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);see also Pensonv. Ohio,

488 U.S. 75 (1988). Appellanthimself filed a pro se brief raisingfourteenissuescontainingan array
of complaints including errors in admitting and excluding evidence, prosecutorial misconduct,

ineffective assistance of counsel, and judicial bias.

We have reviewed the record, including the appellate briefs filed by counsel and

appellant pro se. We agree with counsel that the record presents no arguably meritorious grounds

for review and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Garner, 300 S.W.3d at 766;

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Appellant's counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. The judgment of conviction

is affirmed. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).

Jeff Rose, ChiefJustice

Before ChiefJustice Rose, Justices Puryear and Pemberton

Affirmed

Filed: March 5,2015

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