FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D22-2632

LT Case No. 2016-10991-FMDL

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ANTHONY T. LITSCH, III

Appellant,

v.

JULIE LITSCH n/k/a JULIE MILLS, 

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County. 

Matthew M. Foxman, Judge. 

Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law 

Firm, Orlando, for Appellant.

Julie Mills f/k/a Julie Litsch, Fox Lake, IL, pro se. 

October 13, 2023

WALLIS, J.

Anthony Litsch (“Appellant”) appeals an order denying 

rehearing of a joint decision by Florida and Illinois courts to 

transfer jurisdiction over child custody matters from Florida to 

Illinois. Appellant argues that the Florida court erred in ceding 

jurisdiction to Illinois, in violation of the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). We agree and 

reverse.
2

Facts

The parties were married in 2009, had one child in 2010, and 

separated in 2014. In 2016, Julie Mills f/k/a Julie Litsch

(“Appellee”) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Volusia 

County, Florida. In October of 2016 the Florida court entered a 

Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, finding jurisdiction 

over the subject matter and the parties. In the judgment, the court 

ratified and incorporated agreements regarding shared parenting 

and timesharing, and it reserved jurisdiction to enforce those same 

agreements. The parties agreed that Appellant had been 

exercising the majority of the timesharing with the child in Florida 

since the inception of the case and that Appellee would not remove 

the child from Florida without agreement by Appellant in writing 

or order of the court. 

In November 2020, the parties agreed to have the child 

temporarily live with Appellee in Illinois. They memorialized that 

agreement by a handwritten statement from Appellant with the 

understanding that they would revisit this placement depending 

on how the child responded to living in Illinois. 

In February of 2022, the child was hospitalized. Shortly after 

the hospitalization, Appellant communicated with Appellee 

expressing disappointment due to not being informed of the 

hospitalization and notifying Appellee of his intention to travel to 

Illinois in order to bring the child back to Florida. Appellee 

thereafter retained counsel and notified Appellant of her intent to 

keep the child in Illinois. In response, Appellant filed several 

motions in the Florida court in an effort to regain primary 

timesharing in Florida.

Ultimately, on September 27, 2022, the Illinois court 

conducted a UCCJEA hearing to determine which state had 

jurisdiction. The parties, their attorneys, and both trial judges 

appeared at the hearing via remote video connection. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Illinois court entered a written order 

stating that Illinois was the home state of the child for purposes of 

the UCCJEA and that, over Appellant’s objection, Florida ceded

and Illinois accepted jurisdiction of the case. The Florida court did 

not enter a corresponding order. Appellant’s motion for rehearing 

in the Florida court was denied and he timely appealed. We have 
3 

jurisdiction over this final order pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(a).

Discussion

Appellant correctly asserts that the Florida court erred in 

ceding jurisdiction to the Illinois court by concluding that Illinois 

was the child’s home state.1 Under the UCCJEA,2 the 

determination of a child’s home state applies to initial custody 

determinations. See § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016) (stating that 

a court may make “an initial child custody determination,” inter 

alia, if that state is “the home state of the child on the date of the 

commencement of the proceeding”); McIndoo v. Atkinson, 159 So. 

3d 227, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[T]his ‘home state’ rule applies 

to an initial child custody determination”...).

However, once a court has made an initial child custody 

determination under section 61.514, that court has “exclusive, 

continuing jurisdiction” over the determination until:

(a) A court of this state determines that the child, the

child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not

have a significant connection with this state and that

substantial evidence is no longer available in this state

concerning the child's care, protection, training, and

personal relationships; or

1 A child’s “home state” is “the state in which a child lived 

with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 

consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a 

child custody proceeding.” § 61.503(7), Fla. Stat. (2022). 

2 The UCCJEA (sections 61.501–.542, Florida Statutes) has 

been adopted in 49 states, including Florida and Illinois, to, inter 

alia, “[a]void jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of 

other states in matters of child custody” and “make uniform the 

law” with respect to subject of the UCCJEA. § 61.502, Fla. Stat. 

(2022).
4 

(b) A court of this state or a court of another state

determines that the child, the child's parent,[3] and any

person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this

state.

§ 61.515(1), Fla. Stat. (2022).

3 The legislature’s use of the word “parent” in section 

61.515(1)(b) appears to be a typographical error because the same 

provision in the uniform act and in other states uses the word 

“parents,” not parent. See, e.g., Unif. Ch. Custody Jurisd. & Enf’t 

Act § 202 (2022); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 36/202 (2022). In addition, 

section 61.516 allows a Florida court to modify the custody 

determination of a court of another state if it determines that “the 

child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not 

presently reside in the other state.” § 61.516, Fla. Stat. (2022). 

Construing subsection (1)(b) literally would create irreconcilable 

conflict between that subsection and subsection (1)(a) and section 

61.516, would undermine the purposes of the UCCJEA, and would 

lead to the absurd result of establishing different standards for the 

courts in different states to determine which court has jurisdiction. 

For example, if section 61.515(1)(b) applied literally in this case, 

subsection (1)(a) would require a Florida court to determine, in 

part, that the child and both parents do not have a significant 

connection with this state,” but subsection (1)(b) would only 

require the Illinois court to determine that the child and one parent

do not presently reside in Florida. Although Florida courts have 

previously discussed this discrepancy, they have consistently 

required that both parents no longer reside in Florida before 

finding that Florida no longer has exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction. See DeStefanis v. Han Ming Tan, 231 So. 3d 537, 540 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting both provisions and concluding that 

Florida no longer had jurisdiction because neither parent lived in 

Florida anymore); Tidwell v. Tidwell, 983 So. 2d 742, 743 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2008) (same); Steckler v. Steckler, 921 So. 2d 740, 745 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2006) (“[S]o long as the former husband is still a resident 

of Florida, sufficient contacts still remain in the state such that 

Florida may retain jurisdiction.”).
5

Alternatively, a Florida court with exclusive, continuing 

jurisdiction “may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if 

it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the 

circumstances and that a court of another state is a more 

appropriate forum.” § 61.520, Fla. Stat. (2022). Before doing so, 

however, the court must consider whether it is appropriate for a 

court of another state to exercise jurisdiction, by considering all 

relevant factors, including eight statutory factors. § 61.520(2), Fla. 

Stat. (2022). 

Neither section 61.515 nor section 61.520 uses the phrase

“home state,” much less uses it as a basis for Florida to cede its 

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to another 

state. Consequently, the Florida court erred in ceding its UCCJEA 

jurisdiction to Illinois on the ground that Illinois was now the 

child’s home state because the child had been living in Illinois for 

more than six months. See Beehler v. Beehler, 351 So. 3d 1257, 

1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“This exclusive jurisdiction in fact 

persists until a trial court of this state ‘determines that the child, 

the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not have 

a significant connection with this state and that substantial 

evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's 

care, protection, training, and personal relationships.’”); Sosa v. 

Pena, 351 So. 3d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Pursuant to section 

61.515(1), a Florida court retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 

after making a custody determination until it determines both 

parents and the children do not reside in or have a significant 

connection to the state.”); Bock v. Vilma, 279 So. 3d 1246, 1248 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The UCCJEA ‘does not operate to divest a 

court of continuing jurisdiction unless virtually all contacts have 

been lost with the forum state.’” (quoting Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 

2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990))); Baker v. Tunney, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1239 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding Florida was child’s home state and 

would remain child’s home state until it relinquished jurisdiction, 

thus its dismissal of custody petition and New York’s assumption 

of home state jurisdiction was improper); Steckler, 921 So. 2d at 

744 (“Under section 61.515, Florida Statutes (2005), Florida 

retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child custody 

issues.”).
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Appellee correctly asserts that the Florida court based its 

decision on more facts than merely the amount of time the child 

had been living in Illinois. The Florida court stated that Illinois 

was now the child’s home state, and Illinois assuming jurisdiction 

would serve the child’s best interest because the child had been 

living in Illinois for a “lengthy period of time” and receiving 

services there to address his needs. The Florida court also agreed 

with the Illinois court’s additional findings that the child had been 

living in Illinois based on the parties’ prior agreement, the child 

attended school and therapy in Illinois, the child was involved in 

the community, and that continuity was important for the child. 

However, these statements do not support the Florida court’s 

decision to cede its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to Illinois 

under section 61.515(1)(a) or (b), nor could they have because 

Appellant still resided in Florida and the child still had significant 

contact with Florida. Nor do these statements support ceding 

jurisdiction under 61.520 (inconvenient forum) because the 

findings do not conform to the statutory requirements of that 

section. Cf. Poliandro v. Springer, 899 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2005) (reversing order dismissing paternity petition and 

finding Alabama had jurisdiction based solely upon discussion 

between two judges; court failed to allow parties to be present, 

record did not contain factual basis to support ceding jurisdiction, 

and specific findings would be required on remand).4

4 Although Appellant does not challenge the Illinois court’s 

statement that the parties agreed that the child could relocate to 

Illinois, we believe the Illinois court made that statement merely 

to explain why the child had been living in Illinois. We do not think 

that the trial court relied on the 2020 relocation agreement as a 

basis for concluding that Illinois was now the child’s home state. 

Instead, it relied on the length of time the child had resided in 

Illinois and the child’s contacts with Illinois. Consequently, 

Appellant cannot be faulted for not challenging on appeal the 

Illinois court’s statement about the agreement (and the Florida 

court’s agreement with that statement). Even if the Illinois court 

had relied on the 2020 relocation agreement to support its decision, 

that agreement could not be considered a tipsy coachman ground 

to affirm because, as Appellee correctly notes, it did not comply 

with section 61.13001(2)’s requirements that a relocation 
7 

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying rehearing and 

remand with instructions to the Florida court to vacate its decision 

to decline its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, and to "follow the 

procedures established in the UCCJEA in determining whether it 

should proceed to hear any matter related to the custody of the 

child.” Bosh v. Mathis, 99 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Those 

procedures include giving each party the opportunity to present 

evidence. Cf. Douglas v. Johnson, 65 So. 3d 605, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2011) (stating that an “opportunity to be heard” under UCCJEA 

(section 61.518) means an opportunity to present witnesses or 

evidence); Poliandro, 899 So. 2d at 444 (“The case is reversed and 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. If, after considering the evidence, the court still 

decides to transfer the case, the order must contain specific factual 

findings.”).5 

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. 

EDWARDS, C.J., and MACIVER, J., concur. 

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

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agreement must define timesharing going forward and be ratified 

by the court. Thus, it cannot be a basis to conclude that UCCJEA 

jurisdiction over child custody matters had already changed from 

Florida to Illinois when the child moved to Illinois with Appellant’s 

consent.

5 We express no opinion on what the outcome of this hearing 

should be.