R ule 1 0 o f t he R ules o f

t he C o urt o f

A p p ea l s o f

T en ne ssee p ro vid es: 1

T h is C o u rt, w ith the c o n c u rr e n c e o f a ll ju d g e s p a rtic ip a ting in the c a se , m a y a ff irm , re v e rs e o r m o d ify t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a f o rma l op i ni o n w o u ld h ave no prec edent i a l v a l u e
. W h e n a c a s e i s de c i de d b y me mo r a n du m o pi n i on i t s h a l l be de s i g n at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ,” s h a ll no t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 18, 200 8 S es sio n JAMES E. DYER, ET AL 

### . v. HILL SER VIC ES PLUMBI NG AND HVAC
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-05-2304 Walt er L. Evans, Chan cellor

No. W2008-00619-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 22, 2008

T h i s ap p ea l ar i s es fr o ma d i s p u t e b et we en an emp l o y ee an d emp l o y er o v er l i fe i n s ura n ce co v er age under a g roup insuranc e policy . The fa cts of thi s case are relatively straig htforwa

rd; the proc edura l history , howeve r, is surprising ly complicated. Ultimately , we dism iss for lack of a final judg ment and re mand to t he tr ia l c ourt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P 3; App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cha nc e r y C our t D ism iss e d; and Rem anded
J. S TEVE N S T A FF O RD , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Reed L . Malkin, Memphis, TN, for Appe llant Steven R. Walker, Memphis, TN, for Appellant
J ulia Be th Crews, Memphis, TN, for Appellee
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION 1

In N ov e mbe r 2 00 4, Jame s D y e r w a s h ir e d b y Hi ll Se rv ic e s Plumb ingand HV AC (“ Hi ll Service s”). Mr. D y er c ompleted enrollment forms i n conjunction wit h his employ ment for among other thi ng s, life i nsuranc e covera g e for himself and his spouse, Fay e Dy er. Hill Service s deducte dP l ai nt i f f s up p o rt ed t hi s argum ent by po i nt i ng t o T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 6

- 7

- 2 3 0 5 (a)( 3 )( H ) and a p o rtio n o f a 2
group po l i cy i nsur ance agreem ent b et ween H i l l S ervi ces and B usi ness M en’ s A ss urance C o m p any o f A m eri ca (“ B M A ”). P la intiff a ttac h e d a p o rtio n o f t h e B M A a g re e m e n t t o it s su m m a ry j u d g m e n t m o tio n , b u t d id no t i n tro d u c e it a s a n e x h ib it at t ri al

. A cco rdingl y , w e d o not co nsi d er t he agreem ent ’ s evi d ent i ary val ue; we si m p l y note t hat i t was present ed t o t he t ri al co urt

. T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 13 (c). -2- the monthly

premiums for the insura

nce c overa g e from his paychec k. Mr. Dyer’ s employ ment was terminated on Ma

rch 31, 2005. On M ay 1, 2005, Mr. Dyer w as re instated by Hill Services. When he was rehire d, Hill Ser

vices deducte d the insuranc e pre miums from his pay chec k as it had bef ore. On J une 25, 2005, Ms. Dyer die d. Mr. Dyer the n made a claim under the g roup life insuranc e policy only to be informed that he had no life insurance cover ag e. Seekingto rec over the face amount ($50,000) of the la psed insuranc e policy , Mr. Dyer, individually

and as a dminist rator of

his wife’s e state, filed a C o m p l ai n t ag ainst Hill S ervic es on Dec ember

20, 2005. The Complaint alleg ed that, by deducting the pre miums from his pay chec k, Mr. Dy er a nd Hill Services ente red in to an implied-in-fa ct contra ct under which Hill Service s was requir ed t o p ro v i d e life insuranc e for Mr. Dyer a

nd his wife. Hill Service s denied that such a contra ct exist ed. Although Mr . Dy er ne ver f ormally amende d his Compl aint, he asse rted, in a Me morandum in S up po rt

fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt, tw o a dd iti on a l c la ims fo r re lie f no t c onta ine d in t he Com pla int

. In th is p le a din g , M r. Dye r asse rt e d th at he wa s e nti tle d to re lie f u nd e r t he do c tr ine of

e qu ita ble estoppel and that Hill S ervic es fa iled to give notice of the t ermination of insurance cover ag e and of h i s r i g h tt o c o n v e rt th e g r o u p p o l i c y t o ani n d i v i d

u a l p o l i c y u p o nt e r m i n at i o no f

e mp l o y m e n t

. In 2 response , Hill S er v i ces addresse d both issues, but argued that the notice issue had not bee n previously

alleg ed. On July

7, 2006, the trial cour

t denied Mr. Dy er’ s summary judgme nt motion. Th e tr ia l c ourt

did n ot state its re a so ns fo r t he de nia l. Unf

or tun ate ly , th e re qu ir e me nt o f T e nn . R. Civ. P . 56.04 for the tr ial court to state the leg al grounds for denying a s ummary judgme nt motion had not y et taken e ffe ct. Followinga benc h trial an Or der w as ente red on Fe b ruar y 29, 2008 dismiss ing the Com pla int . T he tr ia l c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngsp e c if ic fi nd ing s:
Th e re wa s n o p hy sic a l e vid e nc e int ro du c e d o f a c ontr a c t or a lif e ins ur anc e po lic y

in e ff e c t be tw e e n th e Pla int if

f a nd the De fe nd ant. T h e D e f e n d an ti s n o tani n s ur an c e c o mp an y. The Plaintiff did not offe r docum en tary proof that upon r ehire he wa s offe red the same be ne fi ts h e re c e ive d in his pr ior e mpl oy me nt w iththe De fe nd ant. The Plaintiff wa s not sure that he had life i nsuranc e unti l after the death of his wife. The de ductions for life insuran ce pr emiums were made f rom the paychec ks of the Plaintiff, but that, in and of itself, does not establish insuranc e abse nt the introduction o f ani n s ur a n c e p o l i c y. Ther e wa s n o p ro of that any life insuranc e existed as of the da y of the de ath of Plaintiff’s wife.M r. D ye r d o e s n o t ar g u e tha t t h e trial c o u rt e rr e d in find ing tha t an im p lied -in-fac t co n tra c t d id no t ex ist. W e 3

re c e n tly he ld tha t wh e n “a p a rty m a k e s n o le g a l a rg u m e n t a n d c ites n o a u tho rity in s u p p o rt o f a p o sitio n , suc h issu e is deemed wai ved and wi l l not b e cons i dere d on appeal

. ” R od r i guez v. P r i ce , N o. E2007- 02178- CO A- R3- CV , 2008 W L 44 57 23 3 at *5 n

. 2 ( T enn
. Ct

. Ap p. O ct

. 6, 200 8). Accordi ng l y , we wi l l not cons i der t he t r i al cour t ’ s f i ndi ng t hat an im p lied -in-fac t co n tra c t d id no t ex ist. -3- On the ba sis of

the se fi nd ing s, the Cou

rt dis mis se d Mr. Dye r’ s Comp la int fo r B re a c h o f C ontr a c t.
Mr . D y e r p re se nts a

sin g le iss ue fo r r e vie w: wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fi nd ingthat H ill Se rv ic e s w a s n ot l ia

ble fo r t he fa c e amou

nt o f lif e ins ur anc e ($ 50 ,0 00 ) wh ic h wa s to have be e n in eff ect on the life of Mr. Dyer’ s wife. Mr. D y er a sserts that the trial c ourt should h av e fo u n d the do c tr ine of

e qu ita ble e sto pp e l a

pp lic a ble and that H ill Se rv ic e s f

a ile d to pr ov ide Mr . D y e r w ith notice of his conversion right under the insura nce policy

. Be fore addre ssing these issues, howeve r,

3
we mus t f ir st d e te rm ine wh e the r t

his Court ha s su

bje c t matte r jur isd ic tio n to a dju dic ate thi s a pp e a l. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Subject matter jurisdiction conc erns the a uthority of t he court to hear a matter and cannot be waived. Meighan v. U.S. S print Com m c’ns Co. , 924 S.W .2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ). The c ourt may consider subject mat t erj u ri s diction su a s po nte . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( b) ; Ruf f v . St ate , 978 S.W .2d 95, 98 (Tenn. 1998) . The Te nnessee Supreme Court has a lso held that “[u] nless an appe al from an inter locutory

order is provided by the rules or by statute, appe llate cour ts have jurisdiction over f inal judgme nts only .” Bayberry Assocs. v . Jones , 78 3 S.W. 2d 55 3, 55 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) . Ru le 3( a ) o f t he Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure lim its the su bje c t matte r jur isd ic tio n of a pp e llate c ourt s to fi na l ju dg me nts :
In civil actions ever

y final j udg ment enter ed by a trial court from which an a ppeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appe als is appea lable as of rig ht. Ex cept a s otherwise pe rmitted in rule 9 and in Rule 54.02 Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure , if multipl e par

ties or multiple claims for re lief ar e involved i n an action, any order that a dju dic ate s f

e we r t ha n a ll the c la ims or the ri g hts a nd lia bil iti e s of fe we r t

ha n a ll the pa rt ie s is no t e nf

or c e a bl e or app eal a

ble and is s ub je c t to re vis ion

at any tim e befor e entr

y of a final j udg ment adjudicating all the claims, rig hts, and liabiliti es of
a ll p art ie s.
Id

. I f the tr ia l c ourt did no t a dju dic ate a ll of the pa rt ie s’ c la ims , it did no t e nt er a fi nal ju dgment

. Wit hout a final judg ment, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Dy e r d id n o t f

o r ma ll y ame n d th e Co mp la int to a ll e g e th e tw o is s u e s r aised on appea l–notice and e quitable es t o p pel. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02, however, r equire s consideration of the pr oo f p re se nte d at tr ia l in a dd iti on to t he ple a din g s: When issues not raised by the pleading s are tried by

express or implied consent of the pa rt ie s, the y sh a ll be tr e ate d in a ll re sp e c ts a s if the y ha d b e e n r a ise d in

the ple a din g s. Suc h ame ndme nt o f t

he ple a din g s a s ma

y be ne c e ssa

ry to ca us e the m to c on fo rm

to-4-

the evidenc e and to r aise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even a fter judg ment; but fai l u re s o to amend does not a ffe ct the re sult of the trial of these issues. Provided, howeve r, ame ndment afte r ver dict so as to incre ase the amount sued for

in the action shall not be permitted. I f evidence is objected to at the trial on the g round that it is not withi n the issues made by the pleading s, the court may allow the pleading s to be amende d and shall do so fre ely when the pr esentation of the me ri ts o f t

he a c tio n will be su

bs e rv e d th e re by

and the ob je c tin gpa rt y fa ils to satis fy the c ou rt that th e a dmi ssi on

of su c h e vid e nc e wo uld

pr e jud ic e that pa

rt y in maintaining the action or defe nse upon the merits. The court may g rant a continuance to enable the objectingparty to meet such e vidence

. Id . A c c or din g ly , w e are re qu ir e d to e xami ne the re c or d to de te rm ine wh e the r t he pa rt ie s a c tua lly litigated the issues of notice a nd equitable e stoppel.
We find that the parties did tr y the issue of equitable estoppel. At the close of the proof, the attorney for Hill Service s specific ally asked the trial court to f ind the doctrine of

equitable e stoppel inapplicable. A lthough the trial court’s final Orde r does a ddress this issue, the cha ncellor state d at the conc lusion of the t rial that there was no de trimental relianc e by Mr. Dyer. B eca

use detrimenta l relianc e is an e lement of e quitable estoppel, we find that the trial court e ffe ctively , if vaguely , ruled on this iss ue.
We a lso fi nd

that th e pa

rt ie s li tig ate d th e no tic e iss ue . Co un se l f or Mr

. Dye r qu e sti on e d b oth
w i tn e s s e s attr i a l a

b o u t w h e th e r M r
. D ye r w a s g i v e nn o t i c e o f h i s c o n v e r s i o nr i g h tun d e r th e p o l i c y. Couns e l f or Hi ll Servic es di d no t ob je c t to the se qu e sti on s. B e c a us e the se qu e sti on s w e re on ly re le va nt to the iss ue of

no tic e , w e fi nd

tha t, b y no t ob je c tin g , H ill Se rv ic e s tr ie d th e iss ue by c on se nt. See, e .g. , Zack Cheek Bldrs. v. McLe od, 597 S.W .2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1980) (“G ener ally speaking tr ia l by imp lie d c on se nt w ill be fo un d whe re the pa rt y op po se d to the ame ndme nt k ne w o r s ho uld rea sonably

have known of the evidence relating to the new issue, did not object to this evidenc e, and was no t pr e

jud ic e d th e re by .” ); Farrar v. Farrar , 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 1 , 7 4 4 ( T e n n
. 1 9 7 7 )

. F i n a l l y, counsel for

Hill Service s specific ally asked the trial court to make a findingon the issue of notice

. There fore , we f

ind that the issue was litigated.
Al tho ug h th e pa

rt ie s litig ate d the iss ue of no tic e , we fi nd that the tr ia l court did no t a dju dic ate this claim. The trial cour t, at the close of

pro o f, found that Mr. Dy er w as informe d that he wa s require d to rea

pply for life insurance cover ag e whe n he wa s rehire d. This finding, how ever , does not addre ss Mr

. Dy er’ s claim that he had the rig ht to rece ive notice of the conve rsion privileg e whe n his e mp l o y

m e n tw a s t e r

m i n at e d o nM ar c h3 1 , 2 0 0 5

. B e c a u s e th e tr i a l c o urtd i d

n o tr u l e o nthi s issue, the j udg ment is not final, and we are without j urisdiction to adjudicate the issue on a ppeal.
This matter is dismiss ed and r emande d to the t rial court. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the Appellant and his sure ty

.-5- ___________________________________ J. S T E V E N S T A F F O R D , J.