Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 279

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV 

No. CV-16-29

ARDITH LARAY MOSSHOLDER

 APPELLANT

V.

DANIEL COKER, MARTHA COKER, 

AND MINOR CHILDREN

 APPELLEES 

Opinion Delivered May 3, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 23DR-07-57] 

HONORABLE H.G. FOSTER, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge

Appellant Ardith Laray Mossholder (“Laray”) appeals the July 7, 2015 order entered by 

the Faulkner County Circuit Court awarding appellee Martha Coker permanent guardianship 

of Laray’s children, H.C. (born July 7, 2004), and D.C. (born August 13, 2005). On appeal, 

Laray argues that the circuit court erred in awarding guardianship to Martha because she did 

not properly intervene; she was an unsuitable guardian; and she failed to prove that Laray was 

unfit. We affirm.

This case has a long history.1 Laray and appellee Daniel Coker (Martha’s son) were 

married on August 18, 2003. H.C. and D.C. were born of the marriage. Laray and Daniel 

 1On the topic of length, we note that Laray’s abstract (1500 pages) and addendum (1208 

pages) include far more material than is necessary for our review of the issues on appeal. Both 

the abstract and addendum include irrelevant information regarding matters of contempt, 

attorney’s fees, service, withdrawal and substitution of counsel, continuances, subpoenas, etc. 

Our rule on abstracting provides that the abstract should be limited to the “material parts” of 

all the transcripts. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5) (2016). Likewise, the contents of the addendum 

are to be limited to only those items necessary to an understanding of the issues on appeal or 
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2 

separated on or about July 1, 2006, and Daniel filed for divorce on January 7, 2007. A divorce 

decree with an integrated property settlement was entered on February 20, 2008, wherein, 

among other things, Daniel was granted a divorce, and the parties were awarded joint legal 

and physical custody of the children. 

Daniel married Kathleen Coker (“Kathy”) in August 2008. Laray married Joshua 

Mossholder in 2008.2 

The record reflects that in March 2008, Laray began making reports to the Arkansas 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office that 

Daniel was sexually abusing H.C. and D.C.3 On September 30, 2008, Daniel filed a petition 

for change of custody, alleging that a material change in circumstances had occurred. He 

 

our jurisdiction. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8). We have pointed out that an abstract and addendum 

can be deficient for containing too much material, as well as too little. McElroy v. Ark. Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 117, at 1 n.1, 432 S.W.3d 109, 111 n.1 (citations omitted). 

Although we decline to order rebriefing, we caution counsel against such practices in the 

future.

2The record is conflicting as to the actual date of the Mossholders’ wedding. Joshua 

said that they were married in August 2008. Laray testified that they were married in March 

2008. A summary of events prepared by an attorney ad litem provided that the Mossholders’ 

August 2008 marriage license was signed by Laray as the minister performing the marriage but 

that a second Mossholder marriage license, dated November 12, 2008, was signed by the 

justice of the peace. 

3From March 2008 to December 2011, Laray made at least sixteen reports of abuse to 

DHS. Eleven of the reports alleged that Daniel sexually/physically abused H.C. and/or D.C. 

One report alleged that Daniel and Kathy sexually abused H.C. and D.C. Two reports alleged 

that D.C. was sexually abusing H.C and/or his half-sister (Laray and Joshua’s daughter). One 

report alleged that the children’s daycare physically abused D.C. All were determined to be 

unfounded or unsubstantiated. During this same time frame, Laray made two separate reports 

to the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office that Daniel sexually abused the children. Both cases 

were closed based on lack of evidence. 
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3 

claimed that Laray had made “numerous complaints” that he had sexually abused H.C. and 

D.C. that were unfounded and were detrimental to the parties’ children. Laray responded and 

counterclaimed for custody, claiming that the allegations of sexual abuse were true and 

supported by physical evidence. An attorney ad litem was appointed for the children on 

January 28, 2009. 

Between 2009 and 2012, Laray and Daniel filed multiple motions (i.e., change of 

custody, modify visitation, contempt) against each other, and temporary custody of the 

children was transferred back and forth between them. In June 2012, an emergency hearing 

was held wherein the attorney ad litem reported to the circuit court that there had been 

numerous allegations of abuse, that she believed Laray was exacerbating the children’s fear 

and negativity about Daniel by calling him a pedophile and a rapist, that what the children 

were reporting was unbelievable, that the children’s counselors were not trained to determine 

whether the children were telling the truth, that the children had been forced to undergo 

multiple examinations and no physical evidence of abuse had been found, and that the parties 

and their children needed to be evaluated by a forensic psychologist, which had been 

previously ordered by the court. The ad litem stated that Daniel had submitted to the 

evaluation but that the psychologist could not conclude the evaluation until Laray submitted 

to the testing. The attorney ad litem stated that Laray would not follow court orders. 

At the conclusion of the emergency hearing, the circuit court found that the children 

were suffering emotionally due to the “long extensive history with repeated investigations of 

allegations made by [Laray] . . . against the father . . . resulting in repeated interviewing, 

questioning and examinations of the children, that were ultimately unfounded.” The court 
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4 

ordered the parents and children to undergo an evaluation by forensic psychologist Dr. Paul 

Deyoub. The court further ordered that H.C. be placed in Daniel’s temporary custody because 

Laray continued to make unfounded allegations of abuse against Daniel.4 Laray was denied 

visitation with the children until she and the children submitted to Dr. Deyoub’s evaluations. 

Dr. Deyoub performed forensic psychological evaluations of the parties and their 

children in December 2012. In sum, Dr. Deyoub found that Daniel had no diagnoses. In great 

detail, he documented his evaluation of Laray and diagnosed her with cyclothymic (a mood 

disorder) and borderline personality disorder. He found that both H.C. and D.C. denied any 

sexual abuse by their father and indicated that Laray told them that their father sexually abused 

them. Dr. Deyoub stated that he was unable to find that Daniel abused his children and that 

the children “are being harmed by these constant allegations and unending examinations.” Dr. 

Deyoub recommended that Daniel be awarded primary physical and legal custody of the 

children and that Laray have supervised visitation with the possibility of unsupervised 

visitation at a later date upon approval by the court. 

A hearing was held on August 26–31, 2013, wherein twenty-four witnesses testified. 

The circuit court held another hearing on September 5, 2013, to announce its ruling. The 

circuit court noted that Martha testified that she stood ready to accept custody of H.C. and 

D.C. and that she orally moved to intervene in the case. The court granted her oral motion to 

intervene. The court found that the children had been abused; however, it stopped short of 

identifying who subjected the children to the abuse. The court stated that there was evidence 

 4At the time of this hearing, D.C. had been admitted into a long-term-care facility based 

on allegations made by Laray that D.C. had sexually abused his half-sister. 
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5 

presented that Daniel sexually abused H.C. and D.C. and evidence that Laray abused them by 

manipulating and coaching the children to lie and say he did. As such, the court found that 

neither parent was fit to have custody and placed the children in the temporary custody of 

Martha. The court noted that Daniel and Kathy were living with Martha and would “be around 

the children a lot.” The court also awarded Laray three-day-a-month visitation to be supervised 

by Martha.5 

On January 21, 2014, Martha filed a petition for guardianship of H.C. and D.C.6 A 

hearing on her petition was held January 21, 2015. Martha, Laray, and the children’s counselor, 

Lena Hancock, testified. In an order filed on July 7, 2015, the circuit court found that Martha 

was suitable and qualified to be the permanent guardian of H.C. and D.C. and that the 

guardianship was in their best interest. The court therefore granted Martha’s petition for 

guardianship.7 The court further found that Laray was unsuitable, stating that (1) she “engaged 

in conduct that constitutes poisoning the minds of the children,” (2) she coached the minor 

children to make untrue statements, and (3) the allegations of sexual abuse lodged against 

Daniel were unfounded. In making this finding, the court found that Laray was not a credible 

witness based on “days and days” of testimony. The court suspended Laray’s visitation until 

 5In a subsequent order entered March 11, 2014, the circuit court reduced Laray’s 

visitation to one day per month based on the recommendations of the attorney ad litem and 

the children’s counselor, who stated that frequent visitation with Laray was detrimental to the 

children. In this same order, Daniel was awarded unsupervised visitation, and Laray was 

ordered to pay child support in the amount of $90 per week. 

6Daniel consented to the guardianship. 

7Letters of guardianship were entered on July 21, 2015, and Martha’s acceptance of 

appointment of guardian was entered the same day. 
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6 

such time that she received counseling for the diagnoses made by Dr. Deyoub and she 

petitioned the court to have visitation reinstated. Laray filed a timely appeal. 

Laray’s first point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting Martha’s petition 

for guardianship because she did not properly intervene. Specifically, Laray contends that 

Martha violated Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) because she “has still not filed a 

motion to intervene.” 

Rule 24(c) provides that a “person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to 

intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefore 

and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which 

intervention is sought.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 24(c) (2016). In Bradford v. Bradford, 52 Ark App. 81, 

88, 915 S.W.2d 723, 727 (1996), we held that although Rule 24(c) requires a party seeking 

intervention to state in a separate pleading the claim or defense to be advanced, when there is 

no surprise or substantial prejudice, the court can, and often does, treat the pleadings as 

amended to conform to the proof. See also Winn v. Bonds, 2013 Ark. App. 147, at 7–8, 426 

S.W.3d 533, 537–38 (affirming the circuit court’s grant of a grandparent’s oral motion to 

intervene in a divorce action where it was clear from other written responses of the 

grandparent that she was seeking to intervene in the custody matter and the absence of a 

separate written motion to intervene did not result in surprise or prejudice to the appellant). 

Martha did not file a written motion to intervene in this case. However, this does not 

defeat her intervention. At the August 2013 hearing, Martha testified that she was willing and 

able to take custody of H.C. and D.C. At the September 5, 2013 hearing, in which the circuit 

court announced its rulings related to the August 2013 hearing, the court stated that it recalled 
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7 

that although Martha had not filed a verified petition or pleading seeking to intervene, she 

requested custody of the children. All counsel, including Laray’s, agreed. The court again asked 

Martha if she was willing to take custody of the children, to which she responded yes. The 

circuit court then ordered that temporary custody of the children be given to Martha. No 

objection was made at this hearing. The November 7, 2013 order formalizing the circuit 

court’s September 5 oral findings provided that “Martha Coker . . . testified under oath that 

she stands ready to take custody of the children. Based on the uncontroverted oral motion 

before the Court, Martha Coker is permitted to intervene in this case.” Thereafter, on January 

21, 2014, Martha, as an intervenor, filed a petition for guardianship, to which Laray responded. 

A hearing was held on Martha’s petition for guardianship one year later, on January 21, 2015. 

Laray attended the hearing and testified. 

We review a circuit court’s decision permitting a party to intervene for an abuse of 

discretion. Winn, 2013 Ark. App. 147, at 6, 426 S.W.3d at 537. Here, the circuit court allowed 

the pleadings to conform to the proof presented at the August 2013 hearing. No objections 

were lodged by Laray at that time or at the September 5, 2013 hearing wherein the court 

confirmed that Martha had orally moved to intervene and granted the oral motion. Further, 

Laray fails to cite evidence of surprise or prejudice in support of her point on appeal. There is 

none because she responded to, and defended against, Martha’s petition for guardianship. 

Accordingly, we hold that under the circumstances presented in this case, the circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion in allowing Martha to intervene. 

Laray’s second point on appeal is one of two challenges to the circuit court’s order 

granting Martha’s petition for guardianship. Guardianships are special proceedings that are 
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governed by statute. In re Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289, at 5, 467 S.W.3d 129, 132. 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-210 (Repl. 2012) provides:

Before appointing a guardian, the court must be satisfied that:

(1) The person for whom a guardian is prayed is either a minor or otherwise 

incapacitated; 

(2) A guardianship is desirable to protect the interests of the incapacitated person; and

(3) The person to be appointed guardian is qualified and suitable to act as such.

When the incapacitated person is a minor, the key factor in determining guardianship is the 

best interest of the child.8 Fletcher v. Scorza, 2010 Ark. 64, at 11, 359 S.W.3d 413, 420 (citing 

Blunt v. Cartwright, 342 Ark. 662, 30 S.W.3d 737 (2000)). 

We review probate proceedings de novo, but we will not reverse a finding of fact by 

the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 10, 359 S.W.3d at 420. A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., 359 S.W.3d at 420. In cases 

involving children, we afford even more deference to the circuit court’s findings because our 

appellate courts have made it clear that there is no other case in which the superior position, 

ability, and opportunity of the circuit judge to observe the parties carries a greater weight than 

one involving the custody of a child. Sherland v. Sherland, 2015 Ark. App. 342, at 3, 465 S.W.3d 

3, 6. 

Laray’s first challenge to the guardianship order is that the court erred in finding that 

Martha was a suitable guardian. Laray’s sole argument under this point is a regurgitation of the 

 8On appeal, Laray does not challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding. 
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evidence she claims supports her persistent allegation that Daniel sexually abused H.C. and 

D.C.9 She contends that Martha is an unsuitable guardian because much of the abuse occurred 

in her home and that she “has demonstrated that her need to protect Daniel is paramount to 

the safety and best interest of [H.C. and D.C.].” 

Laray’s argument must fail because the circuit court did not believe that Daniel sexually 

abused H.C. and D.C. The court stated in its order that “the allegations of sexual abuse against 

the father are not credible, they are not founded and that they have not been proven and 

shown.” The court further found that Laray “has coached the minor children to make untrue 

statements.” There was a mountain of evidence to support this finding. 

There were at least twelve DHS and two Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office 

investigations instigated by Laray wherein she alleged Daniel sexually abused the children. 

These were all found to be unsubstantiated. The record reflects that H.C. and D.C. denied the 

abuse and revealed that their mother told them to lie about it. Dr. Deyoub, who performed a 

forensic psychological evaluation of Laray, Daniel, and the children, concluded that Daniel did 

not sexually abuse the children and did not have “pedophile tendencies.” Dr. Deyoub also 

concluded that Laray’s personality test results were very elevated, which demonstrated 

psychopathic, paranoid, and “hypo-mania” tendencies. He diagnosed her with borderline 

personality disorder and opined that her test results “undermine[d] her allegations . . . almost 

 9For support, Laray cites the testimony of Josh Mossholder, Ronna Coker (Daniel’s 

half-sister), Kelly Hamman (mental-health therapist), Dr. Dawn Doray (clinical psychologist), 

and Karen Martin (nurse practitioner)—all of whom testified at the August 2013 hearing that 

H.C. and D.C. told them (the witnesses) that Daniel sexually abused them (the children). She 

also cites the testimony of twenty-year-old Dakota Coker, Ronna’s son and Daniel’s nephew. 

Dakota testified that when he heard H.C. and D.C. say that Daniel had sexually abused them, 

it reminded him that Daniel had sexually abused him fifteen years ago. 
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completely.” He found that her test results were consistent with her manipulating her children 

to lie about their father sexually abusing them. Dr. Deyoub further testified that the children 

reported to him that Daniel did not abuse them but that Laray told them to say he did. Dr. 

Deyoub placed no weight in the reports and testimony of the experts on which Laray relied. 

Dr. Deyoub stated that these experts merely treated H.C. and D.C. for abuse that did not 

occur; they did not perform forensic evaluations to determine whether the abuse occurred or 

whether the allegations were fabricated. He added that the children’s false allegations of abuse 

against their father, along with the mental and physical examinations resulting therefrom, have 

been very detrimental to the children. Dr. Deyoub concluded that Daniel should have sole 

custody of the children and that Laray have supervised visitation.10

Lena Hancock, the children’s therapist, testified at the guardianship hearing that the 

children told her that their father did not abuse them and that they felt sadness for making 

false statements about their father at the request of their mother. Hancock stated that there 

was no evidence that Daniel sexually abused the children or that D.C. sexually abused H.C. or 

his half-sister. She further testified that Laray manipulated and coached the children to say 

they had been abused by Daniel when they had not. According to Hancock, much of the 

treatment she provided to the children addressed their sadness and guilt about being dishonest 

about the abuse at the request of their mother. She added that Laray was a source of anxiety 

and distress for the children. Hancock further testified that the children were doing well in 

 10This testimony of Dr. Deyoub was elicited at the August 2013 hearing when the 

circuit court was making a temporary custody decision as between Laray and Daniel. 

Accordingly, at that hearing Dr. Deyoub was not asked his opinion about the suitability of 

Martha to have custody of the children. She did not file for guardianship until January 2014. 
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Martha’s custody, that they had a very good relationship with her, and that it was in their best 

interest to remain in Martha’s custody. 

Finally, Martha testified at the guardianship hearing that she had had custody of H.C. 

and D.C. since the August 2013 hearing and that they had been doing well. They were happy 

and stable. They had good attendance and grades at school. Martha stated that she had cared 

for the children since they were born and that she had been a constant in their lives. She 

testified that she fed and clothed them. She took them to school and church. She said that she 

had filled the role of mother to them and that she was financially and emotionally able to care 

for the children. 

Based on this evidence, the circuit court found that Daniel did not abuse his children 

and that Laray coached the children to say he did. We hold that these findings are not clearly 

erroneous. Accordingly, Laray’s entire argument that Martha is not suitable is without merit. 

All that remains is a significant amount of evidence that Martha is suitable. Therefore, we 

conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Martha is a suitable guardian.

Laray’s second challenge to the guardianship order is that Martha did not meet her 

burden of proving that Laray is unfit. She claims that Martha “presented no evidence, no 

testimony or expert, and no witnesses to prove Laray was an unfit parent.” 

Martha is not required to prove that Laray is unfit. Section 28-65-204(a) provides that 

the parent of an unmarried minor, if qualified and, in the opinion of the court, suitable, shall 

be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian of the person. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-

65-204(a) (Repl. 2012). In Fletcher, 2010 Ark. 64, at 12, 359 S.W.3d at 420, our supreme court 

rejected the appellant’s argument that a natural parent must be proved unfit before a 
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guardianship may be entered in favor of someone other than the natural parent. The court 

noted that section 28-65-204(a) “makes no mention of whether the natural parent is ‘fit’ or 

‘unfit,’ as those terms have been used in custody cases.” Fletcher, 2010 Ark. 64, at 12, 359 

S.W.3d at 420. The court held that

the sole considerations in determining guardianship pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 28-

65-204(a) are whether the natural parent is qualified and suitable and what is in the 

child’s best interest. To the extent that any of our prior cases suggest a standard of 

fitness or unfitness in guardianship proceedings involving the statutory natural-parent 

preference, we overrule them. 

Id. at 12–13, 359 S.W.3d at 420. Accordingly, we reject Laray’s argument that Martha was 

required to prove that Laray is unfit. 

To the extent Laray argues that Martha failed to prove that Laray is unsuitable, we 

disagree. There was an even larger mountain of evidence presented in this case to demonstrate 

that Laray is unsuitable. Laray (1) falsely accused Daniel of sexually abusing their children and 

coached their children to report the abuse;11 (2) made reports that D.C. sexually abused H.C. 

and his half-sister that were unsubstantiated and caused D.C. to be committed to a long-termcare facility; (3) manipulated the children by withholding gifts, toys, affection, and even 

visitation when they would not say that Daniel was abusing them; (4) was the stated stressrelated cause for H.C.’s and D.C.’s diagnoses (by Hancock) of trichotillomania, an anxiety 

disorder that resulted in the children pulling out their hair; (5) was diagnosed by Dr. Deyoub 

with borderline personality disorder; (6) denied that she suffered from mental-health issues 

and refused treatment; (7) made no child-support payments during the seven-year pendency 

 11Laray also published these false allegations on social media.
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of the case; (8) violated court orders to pay support from March 11, 2014, forward; (9) 

authored a letter, after her last visit with the children in January 2014, voluntarily withdrawing 

from visitation and had not seen the children since that time; (10) failed to provide holiday or 

birthday gifts, cards, or calls to the children since February 2014; (11) had no home, job, or 

vehicle at the time of the guardianship hearing;12 (12) authored a disturbing and threatening 

email on December 3, 2013, to the attorney ad litem; (13) was involved in a domestic dispute 

with her husband, Joshua, in April 2013, that resulted in her being “tased” by a police officer 

and arrested for second-degree battery (she struck a police officer in the face), resisting arrest, 

second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor, possession of a controlled substance, and 

first-degree terroristic threatening (she yelled “you fucking bitch you’re dead, you’re dead you 

fucking bitch” to another police officer); (14) tested positive for drugs in December 2012; and 

(15) was found by the attorney ad litem, Hancock, and Dr. Deyoub to be unsuitable. This list 

is not exhaustive.

Based on this evidence, the circuit court’s guardianship order found that Laray is not 

suitable to serve as guardian of the minor children, that she “engaged in conduct that 

constitutes the poisoning of the minds of the children,” and that she coached the minor 

children to make untrue statements. The court further found that, based on “days and days of 

testimony” and after the court had “observed [Laray’s] demeanor, manner, inconsistencies in 

her testimony, and obvious attempt to evade,” she is not a credible witness. After considering 

 12Laray testified that she was “between homes” as she had separated from Joshua and 

was living with another man. She further testified that she had been unable to work since 2012 

following an automobile accident. Laray arrived at the guardianship hearing with a cast on her 

leg. She stated that she broke her leg in a motorcycle accident. 
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all the testimony presented and the circuit court’s superior position to weigh and assess the

credibility of witnesses and their testimony, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake was made by the circuit court when it found that Laray is an unsuitable guardian 

for her children. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order awarding guardianship to 

Martha. 

Affirmed. 

GRUBER, C.J., and GLADWIN, J., agree. 

Law Office of Kathryn L. Hudson, by: Kathryn L. Hudson, for appellant.

McKinney & McKinney, PLLC, by: Quincy W. McKinney, for appellee Martha Coker.