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KELLER v. KELLER—DISSENT

PRESCOTT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part. I agree with part I of the majority opinion and, on

the basis of the reasons set forth therein, concur that

the present appeal is not moot. I do not agree, however,

with the majority’s conclusion in part II of the opinion

that the orders at issue were sufficiently clear and

unambiguous to support a finding of contempt under

the circumstances presented. Because I would reverse

the judgment of the court, I respectfully dissent.

The majority opinion accurately sets forth the facts

and procedural history as well as the law that guides

our review of the court’s finding of contempt. It is

important, however, to emphasize the following: ‘‘Civil

contempt is committed when a person violates an order

of court which requires that person in specific and

definite language to do or refrain from doing an act

or series of acts. . . . Whether an order is sufficiently

clear and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for

a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt remedy

is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely

upon some clear and express direction of the court.

. . . One cannot be placed in contempt for failure to

read the court’s mind. . . . It is also logically sound

that a person must not be found in contempt of a court

order when ambiguity either renders compliance with

the order impossible, because it is not clear enough to

put a reasonable person on notice of what is required

for compliance, or makes the order susceptible to a

court’s arbitrary interpretation of whether a party is in

compliance with the order.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 695, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). It is

with these principles in mind that I depart from the

majority’s conclusion in the present case that there was

a sufficiently clear and unambiguous order to support

a finding of contempt.

The automatic order in Practice Book § 25-5 (a) (2),

by its very terms, applies to a ‘‘party vacating the family

residence,’’ in other words, a move from the marital

home. Although it may make sense as a matter of policy

to construe that order as also pertaining to subsequent

moves, the ambiguity regarding whether it does apply

to later moves prevents the plaintiff from being held in

contempt under the circumstances of the present case.

With respect to the June, 2012 order, the order is

ambiguous in several significant regards. First, it does

not indicate whether notice of a change in address must

be given in writing or whether an oral or electronic

notification is permissible. Second, the order provides

no definitive time frame in which notice must be given.

In this case, the record is clear that the plaintiff, Beth

Keller, had told the defendant, Richard Keller, where
she was living, and that, prior to the filing of the motion

for contempt, he had gone to her new residence to drop

off the children. In fact, it was undisputed that the

defendant had driven to the plaintiff’s new residence

twice on the day immediately following the plaintiff’s

move. Additionally, the plaintiff could not have violated

the obligation to provide the defendant with a new

telephone number because her number had not

changed.

In concluding that the plaintiff could not be held in

contempt under the circumstances presented and with

respect to these ambiguous orders, I do not want to

minimize the obligation of a divorcing parent to work

cooperatively with the other parent so as to meet the

best interest of their children. Nevertheless, a finding

of contempt cannot be justified in circumstances in

which the plaintiff either attempted to comply or was

subject to an ambiguous order. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.