UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

 HAIGHT, PENLAND, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class GEORGE R. GALVAN 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140320 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and Fort Huachuca 

Douglas K. Watkins, Military Judge 

Colonel Timothy J. Cody, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Joseph A. Keeler, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Major Amy E. Nieman, JA; Captain Brian 

D. Andes, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major Daniel D. Derner, JA; Captain 

Steve T. Nam, JA (on brief).

31 March 2016 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

PENLAND, Judge: 

A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted 

appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of failure to obey a lawful 

order, one specification of false official statement, two specifications of rape, one 

specification of larceny, and one specification of adultery, in violation of Articles 

92, 107, 120, 121, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 

907, 920, 921, and 934 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the 

adjudged sentence of a dishonorable discharge and confinement for two years. 

We now review appellant’s case under Article 66, UCMJ. We have 

considered matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. 

Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982); they lack merit. 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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Appellant assigns two errors, one of which warrants discussion but no relief: 

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS 

DISCRETION WHEN HE DENIED THE DEFENSE’S 

FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE OF COLONEL (COL) SK 

“BRINGING IN AN EXPECTATION” THAT “THE 

ARMY HAS A SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM” AND 

THERE “WASN’T A GREAT NUMBER OF FALSE 

REPORTS” OF SEXUAL ASSAULTS. 

During group voir dire, trial defense counsel asked about the panel members’ 

attendance at training sessions regarding sexual assault prevention and response. 

All of the members indicated they had received such training in the previous twelve 

months. Colonel (COL) SK and several other panel members indicated that in the 

context of the training they had been briefed on statistics regarding the incidence of 

false reports. All panel members responded in the negative when asked whether they 

believed “all or most sexual assault allegations are true” and whether “all or most 

sexual assault allegations brought to court-martial are true.” Then, all panel 

members responded affirmatively when defense counsel asked: “How many on this 

panel believe that the Army has a sexual assault problem?”

The defense continued by specifically focusing on the prosecution of sexual 

assault allegations. All panel members responded negatively when asked: whether 

they “believe that the Army is not doing enough to prosecute alleged sexual 

assaults?”; whether they felt “the best thing to do [in response to such an allegation] 

is to bring that case to trial, so that our Soldiers see that the Army is serious about 

prosecuting sexual assault?”; and, whether any of them believed acquittal of such a 

charge would “contribute to the perception that sexual assaults are not taken 

seriously in the military?” 

Defense counsel subsequently followed up on several of these points during 

individual voir dire with COL SK:

Q: Sir, one of the questions I had asked when I was 

doing the questioning is, whether folks had some 

knowledge of statistics from trainings about false -- you 

know, how often reports of sexual assault are false and 

you had mentioned you did have some familiarity with 

those statistics. What, if any, statistics have you been 

given regarding how often a report of sexual assault is 

false? 

A. Well, I don’t remember the specific statistics or 

what the outcome was, but I do remember in part of the 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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training that we were, let’s say, given those statistics. I 

don't remember specifically. 

Q. You don’t remember them specifically; do you 

remember if the statistics were one way or the other 

saying “On average, most sexual assault reports are not 

false,” or “On average, most sexual assault reports are 

false?” 

A. No. It wasn’t couched in that way. 

Q. Do you remember how it was couched, sir? 

What they were? 

A. It was just merely statistics that some reports 

are inaccurate. 

Q. I realize I just asked this to you, sir, but I’m just 

trying to ask it in different ways to make sure I get at it. 

Do you feel that there was, even though it wasn’t couched 

in that way, when they gave you those statistics and some 

reports are inaccurate or false and others are not; do you 

remember if, specifically, there was some type of talk of 

“More of these reports are not false” of “More of these 

reports are true than are false.” Things like that? 

A. No. I would say probably more than less than. 

Q. Meaning more of the reports are false than are 

true? 

A. Well, more are on the less side in terms of it 

wasn’t a great number of false reports. 

Q. Okay, so if you can--as you recall the training 

when they were talking about statistics, there were not a 

large number of false reports. 

A. Right. 

Q. Any reason to doubt anything you’ve heard in 

that training as to whether it’s true or not? 

A. No. 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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Q. Sir, on one of the questions I asked of 

everybody and everybody gave an affirmative answer was 

whether or not you all believe the Army had a sexual 

assault problem. You were one of everybody who said 

“Yes, I believe the Army has a sexual assault problem.” 

Why do you believe that, sir? 

A. Well, I mean it’s like anything else. I’ve been 

in the military a long time, since ‘82, and the same thing 

with drunk driving. It started off very small and then the 

Army had a campaign against the problem to get after and 

make folks aware that there is a mission. It’s the same 

thing with sexual assault. It’s the Army trying to get after 

what they believe is an issue. 

Q. Do you believe that the Army has a sexual 

assault problem that is different from, say, any college 

campus anywhere in the United States? For example, it’s 

more prevalent here than in other places? 

A. Well, I’ve seen the reports where the Army says 

it’s higher on average than out in the civilian populations. 

Q. So some of the reports you’ve seen have showed 

that the Army does actually have a higher rate of sexual 

assault than out in other populations? 

A. [Affirmative response.] 

After the military judge questioned COL SK about his enlisted service as a 

military policeman, government counsel followed with one question based on those 

asked by the defense: 

Q. Sir, [defense counsel] asked you about the 

various reports that you’ve read as to sex assault maybe 

being higher in the military than in the civilian world. If 

you were to be a panel member on this case, could you put 

all of that aside and decide this case solely on the facts 

and the evidence that come before you, and the 

instructions that are provided by the military judge? 

A. Absolutely, ma’am. 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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Defense counsel challenged COL SK for cause, arguing inter alia: 

Colonel [SK] said he had heard statistics that there 

are not a large number of false reports of sexual assault 

and that he has no reason to doubt the truth of those 

statistics, so he’s got a going in position that, on the 

average, most of those reports of sexual assault are going 

to be true. 

Government counsel opposed the challenge, arguing, inter alia: 

He believes that some reports are inaccurate. There 

were not a large number of false reports. He did say that 

the reports that [sic] are higher in the Army than with 

civilians, but that the Army is trying to resolve an issue, 

like DUI. He also answered Defense’s voir dire questions 

about--in the affirmative, about whether or not someone 

would lie or embellish things to get what they wanted, as 

well as if he could envision a situation in which a person 

might make a false complaint of sexual assault. He was 

able to put aside his military training as an MP and stated 

that he would be able to decide this case on the facts and 

on your instructions. 

Denying the defense challenge, the military judge reasoned: 

I’ve considered the challenge for cause on the basis 

of both actual and implied bias and the mandate to 

liberally grant defense challenges. The challenge is 

denied for the reasons stated by the government, for one 

. . . . 

I’m a little bit troubled by the [sic] trying to make a 

correlation between the statistics on false complaints 

which the court doesn’t have before it and doesn’t have 

personal knowledge of, and what [sic] a member’s belief 

about what they might be. I understand that the defense 

might be concerned with their bringing in an expectation 

but Colonel [SK], specifically, said he could put all of that 

aside and follow my instructions in this case. He actually 

said “Absolutely,” so that challenge is denied. 

 Our superior court has established the standard of review in cases such as 

appellant’s: 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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“A military judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Military judges are 

afforded a high degree of deference on rulings involving 

actual bias. This reflects, among other things, the 

importance of demeanor in evaluating the credibility of a 

member’s answers during voir dire. By contrast, issues of 

implied bias are reviewed under a standard less deferential 

than abuse of discretion, but more deferential than de 

novo.” 

United States v. Woods, 74 M.J. 238, 243 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (quoting United States v. 

Downing, 56 M.J. 419, 422 (C.A.A.F. 2002)). 

“The burden of establishing that grounds for a challenge exist is upon the 

party making the challenge.” United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2001) 

(citing R.C.M. 912(f)(3)); United States v. Wiesen, 57 M.J. 48, 49 (C.A.A.F. 2002); 

United States v. Rolle, 53 M.J. 187, 191 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Warden, 

51 M.J. 78, 81 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Giles, 48 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 

1998). However, “[m]ilitary judges must follow the liberal-grant mandate in ruling 

on challenges for cause . . . .” United States v. Daulton, 45 M.J. 212, 217 (C.A.A.F. 

1996) (quoting United States v. White, 36 M.J. 284, 287 (C.M.A. 1993)); see also

United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 

“Actual bias is personal bias that will not yield to the military judge’s 

instructions and the evidence presented at trial.” Woods, 74 M.J. at 243 (quoting 

United States v. Nash, 71 M.J. 83, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2012)). Our evaluation of implied 

bias has a slightly different focus, based on an “objective test” and “the 

consideration of the public’s perception of fairness in having a particular member as 

part of the court-martial panel.” Id. (quoting United States v. Peters, 74 M.J. 31, 34 

(C.A.A.F. 2015)). 

We recognize and certainly agree with the government’s statement that “[t]he 

question . . . is not whether a member has particular views but whether they can put 

these views aside to evaluate the case on its merits.” Appellee’s Br. 14 (citing 

United States v. Elfayoumi, 66 M.J. 354, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). However, we must 

note that the government, in part, incorrectly briefs the facts of this case: “When 

asked by the trial counsel if he could set aside . . . any prior exposure to SHARP 

training and statistics about false reports, Colonel SK said he could do so . . . .” 

Appellee’s Br. 16. The government also writes that COL SK “unequivocally stated 

that he could put aside the statistics on false reports and follow the military judge’s 

instructions.” Appellee’s Br. 19. In fact, COL SK was not specifically asked by 

either government counsel or the military judge whether he recognized that such 

statistics had no bearing on his duties in appellant's case. Nonetheless, trial defense 
GALVAN—ARMY 20140320 

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counsel did not ask COL SK whether his exposure to false reporting statistics would 

somehow diminish his ability to impartially evaluate appellant’s case in accordance 

with the law and evidence. Based on the circumstances, including COL SK’s vague 

recollection of such statistics, we find appellant did not meet his burden to establish 

that COL SK possessed actual bias. 

Turning to the issue of implied bias, we conclude that members of the public 

would perceive no illegality, unfairness or partiality with COL SK’s service as a 

panel member. See R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N). In making this judgment, we note his 

disagreement during group voir dire with the propositions that all or most reports of 

sexual assault are true or that all or most sexual assault allegations which proceed to 

courts-martial are true. We also note his unequivocal response—“Absolutely, 

ma’am”—to the question of whether he could set aside the possibility that the Army 

has a larger incidence of sexual assaults than the civilian community and decide this 

case solely on the evidence and instructions thereon. We are confident that COL 

SK’s answer was not dependent on any particularized training information to which 

he was exposed and, instead, represented his ability and willingness to serve as an 

impartial factfinder, “the sine qua non for a fair court-martial.” Wiesen, 56 M.J. at 

174 (quoting United States v. Modesto, 43 M.J. 315, 318 (1995)). We find the 

military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the challenge for cause, even 

in light of the liberal grant mandate. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

Senior Judge HAIGHT and Judge WOLFE concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: