20-1166

Bohlinger v. Abbott

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 9th day of February, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT:

DENNIS JACOBS,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

Michael Bohlinger,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 20-1166-cv

Abbott Laboratories Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee,

Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Nutrition Manufacturing, Inc.,

Defendants.

1

_____________________________________

1 The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case to conform 

to the caption above.
2

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: LUCAS C. BUZZARD (D. Maimon 

Kirschenbaum, on the brief), Joseph & 

Kirschenbaum LLP, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: ROBERT S. WHITMAN (Howard M. Wexler, 

Anne Dana, on the brief), Seyfarth Shaw LLP,

New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Oetken, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Bohlinger appeals from a judgment, entered on March 11, 

2020, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Oetken, J.),

granting Defendant-Appellee Abbott Laboratories Inc.’s (“Abbott”) motion for summary 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Bohlinger challenges the district court’s 

ruling that he failed to submit sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on his age 

discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”). We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, 

which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, resolving all 

ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. YaChen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only when the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We have discretion to affirm 
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a district court’s grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record. Deep Woods 

Holdings, L.L.C. v. Sav. Deposit Ins. Fund, 745 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2014).

Pursuant to the NYCHRL, employers and their agents are prohibited from discriminating 

against an employee based on the employee’s “actual or perceived age.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code 

§ 8-107(1)(a). To establish a claim for discrimination under the NYCHRL, Bohlinger “need only 

show that [Abbott] treated [him] less well” than other employees, “at least in part for a 

discriminatory reason.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 103, 110 

n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Golston-Green v. City of New York, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656, 667 (App. Div.

2020) (holding that to establish liability under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must simply show “he was 

subject to an unfavorable change or treated less well than other employees on the basis of a 

protected characteristic”); Watson v. Emblem Health Servs., 69 N.Y.S.3d 595, 598 (App. Div.

2018) (“A plaintiff may prove her case if she proves that unlawful discrimination was one of the 

motivating factors, even if it was not the sole motivating factor, for an adverse employment 

decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under this standard, “[t]he employer may present 

evidence of its legitimate, non-discriminatory motives to show the conduct was not caused by 

discrimination, but it is entitled to summary judgment on this basis only if the record establishes 

as a matter of law that ‘discrimination play[ed] no role’ in its actions.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 

n.8 (second alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38

(App. Div. 2009)).

Bohlinger’s claim is based on two discrete decisions in which Abbott allegedly 

discriminated against him because of his age. The first decision occurred in 2015 when, pursuant 
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to Abbott’s nationwide specialization of its pediatric sales representatives, Peter Youngs, the 

regional sales director at the time, in consultation with Susan Schultz, Bohlinger’s immediate 

supervisor at the time, categorized Bohlinger as a Pediatric Sales Specialist (“PSS”) who would

market and sell pediatric products to both hospitals and doctor’s offices on Long Island.

2

 As a 

result of this 2015 specialization, Bohlinger was assigned a sales territory with the lowest 

“workload” of any sales representatives working in Abbott’s Long Island district. 

The second decision occurred approximately two years later, in 2017. Between 2016 and 

2017, the territories for every sales representative in Abbott’s Long Island district suffered a 

decrease in workload, either because of a decline in the number of child births or representatives 

having less access to hospitals or pediatric offices in the district. Although every sales 

representative saw a workload decrease, only Bohlinger’s workload decreased below the threshold 

that Abbott had designated as acceptable. Consequently, Zariq Siddiqui (who by then had 

replaced Peter Youngs as the regional sales director), and Eric Brown (Bohlinger’s direct 

supervisor at the time) discussed reassigning Bohlinger to an open territory in the Philadelphia 

district, which was located in New Jersey (where Bohlinger lived), to raise Bohlinger’s workload 

above Abbott’s minimum threshold. Brown asked Bohlinger if he would consider a reassignment 

to the territory in New Jersey. After some consideration, Bohlinger declined the reassignment 

and retired thereafter. 

2 The other sales representatives in Abbott’s Long Island district were designated as either Hospital 

Sales Specialists, responsible for marketing and selling pediatric products to only hospitals, or Office Sales 

Specialists, responsible for marketing and selling pediatric products to only doctor’s offices.
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The district court concluded that the portion of Bohlinger’s age discrimination claim based 

on the 2015 specialization was untimely and held that the continuing violation exception to the 

NYCHRL’s three-year statute of limitations did not apply. As to the portion of the age 

discrimination claim based on the 2017 reassignment, the district court held that there was 

insufficient evidence of age discrimination to survive summary judgment. As discussed below, 

we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment because Bohlinger has 

failed to put forth sufficient evidence regarding these two decisions, either individually or 

collectively, from which a rational jury could find that Bohlinger’s age played a role in these two 

decisions.

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I. The 2015 Specialization

With respect to the 2015 specialization, Abbott contends that it was a business decision 

ultimately designed to increase overall sales. More specifically, Abbott explains that when 

crafting the 2015 specialization, it determined Bohlinger’s workload by considering various

factors, including Bohlinger’s workload hours, his designated role as a PSS, the geographical 

location of hospitals and offices, and the desire to limit the transfer of relationships to a new 

representative. Abbott also provides its reasoning for transferring two high workload hospitals

from Bohlinger to another sales representative. According to Abbott, it “identified a shift in 

which . . . nurse practitioners, dieticians, and system administrators,” rather than doctors, were 

influencing hospitals’ decisions to use Abbott’s products. App’x at 467. As a result of this shift, 

3 Because we conclude that the age discrimination claim fails on the merits and affirm on that basis, 

we need not address the district court’s ruling on timeliness. 
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Abbott began placing more value on “strong relationships with nurses, skill at conducting inservices . . . , and high call activity.” Id. Because Bohlinger’s strengths were not in these areas, 

Abbott elected to transfer responsibility for two of his high workload hospitals to another sales 

representative with those strengths. 

Bohlinger argues that Abbott is not entitled to summary judgment because its explanations 

are not “‘legitimate, clear, specific and non-discriminatory.’” Appellant’s Reply at 19 (quoting 

Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995)). We disagree. Abbott articulated that 

it determined Bohlinger’s workload under the 2015 specialization by considering various neutral, 

business-related factors with the goal of optimizing the sales representatives’ skills and 

maximizing pediatric product sales. These reasons, on their face, are legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 

Thus, the ultimate question is whether there is evidence from which a “reasonable jury 

could conclude either that the defendant’s ‘reasons were pretextual,’ or that the defendant’s stated 

reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least ‘in part on 

discrimination.’” Ya-Chen Chen, 805 F.3d at 76 (quoting Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 

N.Y.S.2d 27, 35, 41 (App. Div. 2012)). Under the NYCHRL, “[i]f the plaintiff responds [to 

defendant’s evidence of a non-discriminatory reason] with some evidence that at least one of the 

reasons proffered by the defendant is false, misleading, or incomplete, . . . such evidence of pretext 

should in almost every case indicate to the court that a motion for summary judgment must be 

denied.” Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d 112, 124 (App. Div. 2011). 
7

Bohlinger contends that Abbott’s reasons are simply “incomplete.” Appellant’s Br. at 45.

Specifically, Bohlinger maintains that Abbott failed to articulate exactly how it used the identified 

factors to arrive at its decision to assign Bohlinger a lower workload as compared to his younger 

peers. We find that argument unpersuasive. It is clear from the record that Abbott engaged in a 

discretionary, rather than formulaic, decision-making process, which considered a blend of 

subjective and objective business-related factors. This type of business decision does not lend 

itself to being explained using the precision that Bohlinger demands, and the failure to provide 

Bohlinger with such details does not render the reasons “incomplete” or discriminatory.

More importantly, the record lacks evidence that assigning Bohlinger a lower workload 

was motivated, in any part, by age discrimination. It is uncontroverted that, following Bohlinger’s 

change in workload, Abbott paid him a larger bonus, promoted him, and raised his pay, and there 

is no evidence that any of these actions could be viewed as unfair or less favorable when considered 

in the context of how other sales representatives in the district were treated. Moreover, Bohlinger 

testified that he worked with Schultz to help “create[]” the workload plan that he now claims was 

discriminatory.4 App’x at 345. 

In short, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Abbott’s explanation of 

Bohlinger’s change in workload in 2015 is incomplete such that it, or any other evidence in the 

4 Because Schultz testified that Bohlinger’s workload was “set in stone” before she had presented 

him with his new workload assignment, App’x at 361, Bohlinger contends that there is some dispute as to 

whether Bohlinger had any actual role in shaping his workload. That argument, however, misses the point. 

Regardless of how flexible the workload plan was during those discussions, Bohlinger’s testimony that he 

helped create the workload plan demonstrates that he did not view the plan as unfair or discriminatory when 

it was presented to him.
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record, would “constitute[] evidence of consciousness of guilt, an attempt to coverup the alleged 

discriminatory conduct, or an improper discriminatory motive co-existing with other legitimate 

reasons.” 5 Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 123. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 

properly granted summary judgment in Abbott’s favor with respect to Bohlinger’s age 

discrimination claim based on the 2015 specialization.

II. The 2017 Reassignment

With respect to the 2017 reassignment, Abbott offers the following non-discriminatory 

reason for why Bohlinger was the only sales representative in the Long Island district to be offered 

a reassignment to a new territory in New Jersey (his home state): Bohlinger was the only sales 

representative to have his workload drop below Abbott’s minimum workload threshold and thus

needed to be reassigned to a new territory with an acceptable workload. Bohlinger raises two 

arguments as to why, notwithstanding that non-discriminatory reason, there is sufficient evidence 

to support a reasonable inference of age discrimination.

Bohlinger first contends that Abbott’s reason is incomplete insofar as it leaves out that the

low workload he was assigned under the 2015 specialization caused his workload to drop below 

Abbott’s minimum threshold. Given the absence of any evidence of age discrimination regarding 

the 2015 specialization, as well as the fact that the two decisions occurred more than two years 

5 Although Bohlinger points to, as evidence of age discrimination, the disputed fact that Schultz 

asked him in 2015 “how much longer are you going to be around,” App’x at 311-12, that disputed fact does 

not alter the analysis. As a threshold matter, the regional sales manager Youngs, and not Schultz, was the 

final decisionmaker with respect to the 2015 specialization. In any event, as the district court correctly 

concluded, that alleged lone comment, especially in the context of the other uncontroverted facts in the 

record discussed above, is insufficient to create a reasonable inference of age discrimination that precludes 

summary judgment.
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apart and involved different decisionmakers under different circumstances, no reasonable 

inference of an age-related motivation in 2015 can be drawn even when the two decisions are 

viewed together. 

Bohlinger next argues that Abbott’s reason is “misleading” insofar as Bohlinger’s 

supervisors at the time, Siddiqui and Brown, gave inconsistent testimony about the reasons behind 

the 2017 reassignment. See Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 124 (stating that a plaintiff may establish 

pretext by submitting evidence that a defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons for its actions are 

“misleading”). In particular, Bohlinger points out that when Brown proposed the reassignment 

to Bohlinger, Siddiqui believed no final decision had been made about eliminating Bohlinger’s 

territory in the Long Island district, while Brown understood at that time that Bohlinger’s Long 

Island territory would be eliminated. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that any 

discrepancies in Siddiqui’s and Brown’s testimony with respect to the 2017 reassignment are 

immaterial and, as a result, cannot provide a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive. Both 

Siddiqui and Brown testified consistently as to the reason Abbott offered Bohlinger a 

reassignment—because his workload had become too low. Thus, the purported discrepancies in 

Siddiqui’s and Brown’s testimony were, as the district court correctly reasoned, “variations, if that, 

on the same theme rather than separate inconsistent justifications.” Special App’x at 9 (quoting 

Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Nor has Bohlinger established a discriminatory motive by highlighting differences in 

Siddiqui’s and Brown’s testimony with respect to how the reassignment was presented to 

Bohlinger. Indeed, whether the reassignment was presented as an option or as an ultimatum 
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carries little relevance to the ultimate question why the reassignment was offered to Bohlinger, i.e., 

whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the discrepancies in Siddiqui’s and Brown’s 

testimony demonstrated that the 2017 reassignment was based, in part, on discriminatory animus.

On that question, Bohlinger fails to point to any evidence in the record that would show a genuine 

dispute as to the existence of discriminatory motive. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court properly granted summary judgment in Abbott’s favor with respect to Bohlinger’s age 

discrimination claim based on the 2017 reassignment. 

* * *

We have considered all of Bohlinger’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court