NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee

v.

JEREMY PURKEY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0136

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-105016-001

The Honorable Richard L. Nothwehr, Commissioner

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Charles R. Krull

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. PURKEY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Jeremy Purkey timely appeals from his conviction and 

sentence for misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 felony, in violation of 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 13-3102(A)(3), -3101(A)(8)(v)

(Supp. 2014).1 After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable 

question of law that was not frivolous, Purkey’s counsel filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 

2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking 

this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted 

counsel’s motion to allow Purkey to file a supplemental brief in propria 

persona, but he did not do so. After reviewing the entire record, we find no 

fundamental error and, therefore, affirm Purkey’s conviction and sentence

as corrected.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

¶2 On October 7, 2012, two Phoenix police officers, Officer R. and 

Officer G., responded to an emergency 911 call at a convenience store. 

Before the officers arrived at the store, they were informed that a “subject 

with a gun” was “going up to cars” at the gas pumps.

¶3 When the officers arrived, they identified a subject matching 

the description—Purkey—and Officer R. began explaining why they were 

there. Purkey put his hands up and, when asked if he had “any weapon” 

on him, said he “had something in his pocket.” Officer R. could see three 

 

1Although the Arizona Legislature has amended certain 

statutes cited in this decision since the date of Purkey’s offense, the 

alterations are immaterial to the outcome of this case. Thus, we cite to the 

current version of these statutes. 

2We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Purkey. See

State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). 
STATE v. PURKEY

Decision of the Court

3

to four inches of a silver “tube” sticking out of Purkey’s pocket. Purkey 

made a “kick motion” with his leg and the tube popped out of his pocket 

and fell on the ground. After patting Purkey down for additional weapons, 

Officer R. retrieved the tube, and, after unscrewing it, determined it was a 

nunchaku—two sticks connected by a chain. See A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(8)(v). 

One of the sticks contained a “weird shaped knife, dagger, shank, object” 

measuring about three inches long. 

¶4 Purkey told the officers he carried the nunchaku for “personal 

protection” because, as a prohibited possessor, he was not allowed to carry 

a gun. The officers confiscated the nunchaku, drafted their report, and

released Purkey.

¶5 On May 31, 2013, a grand jury indicted Purkey on one count

of misconduct involving weapons (prohibited weapon), and one count of 

misconduct involving weapons (deadly weapon/prohibited possessor),

both class 4 felonies. In addition to the foregoing facts, at trial, the State 

presented evidence Purkey had been convicted of a felony in 2000 (which 

qualified as a historical prior felony conviction under A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(b) 

(Supp. 2014)) and his “civil rights” had not been restored. A jury found 

Purkey guilty on the first count, but not guilty on the second count. 

¶6 During the “trial on the priors,” the State proved Purkey had 

been convicted of a second felony in 2006 (which also qualified as a 

historical prior felony conviction under A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(b)). The 

superior court sentenced Purkey, as a category three repetitive offender, to 

the presumptive term of ten years’ imprisonment, see A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J)

(Supp. 2014), with 295 days of presentence incarceration credit. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Purkey received a fair 

trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was present at all critical stages.

¶8 The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports 

the verdict. The jury was properly comprised of eight members and the 

court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charge, Purkey’s

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the necessity of 

a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a 

presentence report, Purkey was given an opportunity to speak at 

sentencing and did so, and his sentence was within the range of acceptable 

sentences for his offense. See A.R.S. § 13-703(J). 
STATE v. PURKEY

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 In our review of the record, we discovered an error in the 

superior court’s sentencing minute entry. At the sentencing hearing, the 

superior court explicitly sentenced Purkey “as a repetitive offender . . . 

subject to sentencing pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C) and -703(J)” and it

imposed the presumptive ten year sentence applicable to a class three 

repetitive offender. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J). The court’s minute entry, 

however, references “A.R.S. § 13-702,” the sentencing statute for first-time 

felony offenders. We thus correct the sentencing minute entry to remove 

the reference to A.R.S. § 13-702.

CONCLUSION

¶10 We decline to order briefing and affirm Purkey’s conviction

and sentence as corrected.

¶11 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Purkey’s representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Purkey of the outcome of this appeal 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85, 684 P.2d 154, 156–57

(1984).

¶12 Purkey has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, 

if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s 

own motion, we also grant Purkey 30 days from the date of this decision to 

file an in propria persona motion for reconsideration.