### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 16-4182
I V Y T

. T U C KE R

, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

U NI T E D S TAT E S O F A M E RI C A , Respondent-Appellee.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the

Ea stern Di s tri ct o f Wi sco nsi n No s . 2 :1 4 -cv -0 1 3 0 3 -LA a nd 2 :1 4 -cv -0 13 04 -LA — Lynn A de lma n, Judg e
.

A RGU E D A P RI L 11, 2018

— D E C I D E D M A Y 10, 2018

Befor e B AU E R

, S YKE S , and B AR

RE TT , Circuit Judges

. B AU E R , Cir cuit Judge. In 2010, a j ur y c o n v i c ted Peti ti oner Iv y T uc k e r of conspi r ing to d i s tr ibute mor e than one gr am of her oin in v i olati on of 21 U.S .C. §§ 841(a)(1) a nd (b)(1)(A). He
w as sentenced to 40 y ear s’ i mpr i sonment after the di s tr i ct
cour t found that hi s dr ug di str ibuti on r esulted in a d eath. After h i s conv i cti on w as affi r med on di r ect appeal, T ucker fi l ed a2 No. 16-4182 peti ti on pur suant to 28 U.S .C. § 2255, allegi ng that he r ecei v ed ineffecti v e assi stance of counsel

. The di str i ct cour t deni ed hi s peti ti on, and thi s appeal follow ed.

I. BACKGROUND On June 23, 2009, a super seding indi ctment char ged T ucker
an d nine co-defendants wi th conspi r a cy to di str i bute mor e than one gr am of h e r o in. P ar agr aph Thr ee of the indi ctment included the addi ti onal allegation that “[o]n Januar y 9, 2009, death r esulted fr om the use of her oi n di str ibuted by the conspi r acy

.” A l l of T

ucker ’s co-defendants pleaded gui lty; T ucker pr oceeded to tr i al. Pr i or to tr i al, T

ucker and the gov er nment enter ed into a sti pulat io n t o omi t all ev i dence of the c ausati on of the death
r efer enced in P ar agr aph Thr ee and r equest that the di s tr i ct
cour t decline to instr uct the j ur y on that por ti on of the i n di ctment. On the fi r s t day of tr i al, the gov er nment or ally pr esented the di str i ct cour t wi th the following d escr i pti on of the par ti es’ agr eement: The gov er nment beli e v e s that [ the causati on of death i ssue i s] a sentencing factor a nd a ddr esses the mandator y mini mum sentence in t hi s c ase, whi ch w ould be 20 y ear s
... . The m a n d ator y min i mum of 20 y ear s i s sti ll in play , a n d the gov er n ment beli ev es i t’s ev en mor e of a sentencin g factor than an element of the offense, and the g o v er nment and defense beli ev e that i t mi g h t be s omewhat pr ej udi c i al to Mr

. T ucker

. Based u po n t he fact that w e hav e a y oung female who di ed because of the di str ibuti on of thi sNo. 16-4182 3

contr olled s ubstance—that i t may be a p pr opr i

ate for the case to be tr i ed on the conspi r acy , and to leav e the i ssue of causati on of t h e ov er dose death

... or r e mov e the causing death aspect. Include that as p ar t of any sentencin g fac t o r i f the—or the sentencing phase of thi s case. (si c) The cour t asked defense counsel i f that w as a cor r ect
r eci tati on of the par ti es’ di scussi on and counsel state d t h a t i t
w as. Accor dingly

, the gov er n ment di d not pr esent any ev i dence
r egar ding a death, and the cour t omi tted P a r agr aph Thr ee’s char ge of a r esulting death when i t read the indic t m e nt t o t h e j ur y
. On October 14, 2010, the jur y conv i c ted T u c k e r o f conspi r acy and, in r esponse t o the only addi ti onal speci al
v er di ct questi on, found t h a t t he offense inv olv ed mor e than one ki logr am of her oi n. Pr i or to sentencing, the Uni ted S tates P r obati on Offi c e fi led
a Pr e se n tence Inv esti gati on Repor t (“PS R”), whi ch explained that T ucker ’s base offense lev el under the S entencing G u idelin es w as 32 based on hi s conv i cti on under 21 U.S

. C. § 841(a)(1). How ev er

, the PS R r ecommended that, pur suant to U.S .S .G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), the b ase l ev el should incr ease to 38 because hi s offense inv ol v e d m or e than one ki logr am of cocain e and “the offense of c onv i cti on establi she[d] that death
or ser i ous bodi ly inj ur y r esulted fr om the u s e o f the substance.” T ucker ’s sentencing hear ing occur r ed on Febr uar y 3, 2012. At the hear ing, the gov er nment pr esented ev i dence and c alled
sev er a l wi tnesses to establi sh t h a t the her oi n T ucker di str ib-4 No. 16-4182
uted w as sold to Amanda W ar d , who ov er dosed a nd di ed. The di str i ct cour t found that, although other dr u gs w er e inv olv ed, the her oi n di str ibuted by th e m e mb er s of the conspi r acy w as the pr oxi mate cause of W ar d’s de a t h

. T her efor e, the cour t
a d o p t e d the findings of the PS R, whi ch establi shed a Gui delin es r ange of 3 60 months’ to li fe i mpr i sonment, and sentenced T ucker to 40 y ear s in pr i son wi th f i v e y ear s of s u per v i sed
r elea s e
. T

u c ker ’s counsel di d n ot obj ect to the cour t’s speci fi c finding a s to W

ar d ’ s death, n or i ts adopti on of the other findings in the PS R. T ucker ’s conv i cti on w as affi r med on di r ect appeal. See United States v
. T ucker, 714 F .3d 1006 (7th Ci r
. 2013). T ucker then fi led a p eti ti on under 28 U.S .C. § 2255, r ai sing a nu mber of c lai ms of ineffecti v e a ssi stanc e o f counsel. Those included clai ms that hi s tr i al counsel fai led to obj ect to cer tai n i mpr oper testi m ony and ev i dence, as w ell as gener al clai ms that hi s appellate counsel fai led to contest the sentencing enhancements the di str i ct cour t appli ed. Whi le the p eti t io n w a s pending, T ucker fi l ed, and the di str i ct cour t gr anted, a “Moti on to E xpand the Recor d ” to include the s peci fi c ar gument at i ssue in t hi s appeal. In that moti on, T

ucker ci ted Unit e d States v
. Lawler, 8 18 F .3d 281, 285 (7th Ci r
. 2016), wher e w e held fo r t he fi r s t ti me that § 2D1.1(a)(2) can apply only “when a resulting death (or
s er i ous bodi ly inj ur y) w as an element of the cr i me of c o n v i c ti on, p r ov en bey ond a r easonable doubt or admi tted by the defendant.” Ev en though Lawler w as deci ded w ell after T ucker
w as sentenced, T

ucker ar gued that hi s tr i al counsel r ender ed ineffecti v e assi stance by fai ling to challenge the appli cati on of § 2 D1.1(a)(2) in li ght of the fact that the j ur y ma d e no fin dingNo. 16-4182 5

r egar ding W

ar d’s d eath in his case. The di str i ct cour t deni ed T ucker ’s peti ti on i n i ts enti r ety , and T ucker ti mely appealed. II. DISCUSSION T u c ker appeals only fr om the deni al of hi s clai m that h is tr i al counsel r ender ed ineffecti v e assi stance by fai ling to challenge the di str ic t cour t’s appli cati on of the § 2D1.1(a)(2) enhancement. W

e r ev i ew de novo the deni al of a § 2255 peti ti on based on a clai m of ineffecti v e assi stan c e o f counsel. Fountain
v. United States , 211 F .3d 429, 433 (7th Ci r . 2000). T o succeed on a clai m of ineffecti v e assi stanc e o f c o u nsel T ucker must sati sfy the t w o - pr onged bur den set for th in Strickland v
. W

a s h ington , 4 66 U.S

. 668 ( 1 984). The “defi ci ent per for mance” pr ong r equi r es hi m to “show that counsel’s
r epr esentati on fell b elow an obj ecti v e standar d of r easonableness.” Id. at 6 8 8

. U pon maki ng that showing, he must then demonstr ate th at “ther e i s a r easonable pr obabi li ty that, but for counsel’s unpr o f e s s ional er r or s, the r esult of the pr oceedi ng
w ould hav e been di ffer ent.” Id. at 694. B ecause i t i s di sposi ti v e, w e need only addr ess the fi r st pr ong of the i nqui r y
. S ecti on 2D1.1(a)(2) of the Uni ted S tates S entencin g Gui delin es sets a base offense lev el of 38 i f the defendant i s conv i c ted of di str ibuting one ki logr am or mor e of h er oin “and the offense of conv i cti on est ab l ishes that death or ser i ous bodi l y inj ur y r esult e d fr om the use of the substance.” In 2016, thi s Cour t follow ed the Thi r d , Fi fth, and S i xth Ci r cui ts in holding that the enhancement only appli es wher e the r esultin g death or ser i ous bodi ly inj ur y “w as an e l e m ent of the cr i me of conv i cti on, pr ov en bey ond a r easonable doubt or admi tted by the defendant.” Lawler, 818 F .3d at 285.6 No. 16-4182
As a result of the par ti es’ sti pulati on, the j ur y in T u c k e r ’s
case di d not hav e the oppor tuni ty to make such a finding. T ucker contends that hi s cou n s e l’ s fai lur e to obj ect to the di str i ct cour t m aki ng the finding a t sentencing and a pplyi ng § 2D1.1 (a ) (2) consti tuted defi c i ent per for mance. Despi te the fact that Lawler w as deci ded ov er four y ear s after hi s sentencing hear ing, he a r gues that the state of the law in other ci rcui ts
w as such that i t w as unr easonable for hi s counsel to allow the
cour t to make that finding wi thout obj ecti on. Thi s ar gument i s unper suasiv e. Putti n g to one si de the appr opr i ate i mpact of r ulings fr om other ci r cui ts on counsel’s fai l ur e to obj ect, T u cker ’s ar gument i gnor es that hi s counsel made the str ategi c d eci si o n t o c ompletely r emov e fr om the j ur y the factual questi on of whether a death r esulted fr om the dr ug di str ibuti on. By agr eei ng to cede the deter min ati on of that i ssue to the di str i ct cour t at sentencing, T ucker ’s c ounsel made the ca l c u l a t i on that T u cker w as mor e li kely to achi ev e an acqui ttal on t h e dr u g char ge i f the j ur y di d n ot hear any ev i dence r egar d in g a d eath. “I t is w ell establi shed that our scr uti ny of counsel’s tr i al str a tegy i s to be defer enti al and that w e do n ot second guess the r e a sonable t a c t ical deci si ons of counsel in assessing whether hi s p er for

mance w as defi ci ent.” Johnson v
. Thurmer, 624 F

. 3 d 786, 792 (7th Ci r
. 2010). It w as sur ely a r easonable tacti cal deci si on to str i ke a d eal that w ould pr ev ent t h e g o v er nment fr om putti n g ev i dence befor e the j ur y that T ucker ’s dr u g dealing r esulted in the death of a 22-y ear -old w oman. It i s tr ue, as T

ucker poin t s out, that a t the ti m e of hi s sentencin g, thr ee of our si ster ci r cui ts had ei ther expli ci tly h eld
or suggested that § 2D1.1(a)(2) appli es only wher e the r e s u lti ngNo. 16-4182 7
death i s establi s hed bey ond a r e asonable doubt (or as p ar t of
a plea agr eement). See United States v
. G reenough , 669 F .3d 567, 574–75 (5th Ci r
. 2012); U n ited States v
. Rebmann , 321 F .3d 540, 544 (6th Ci r
. 2003); United States v
. P ressler, 256 F .3d 144, 157 n.7 (3d Ci r
. 2001). How ev er , that w as n ot establi shed in thi s Ci r cui t unti l Lawler, and w e hav e held that a f a i lur e to anti ci pate a change or adv ancement in the l aw does not quali fy as ineffecti v e assi stance. Lilly v
. Gilmore, 988 F .2d 783, 786 (7th Ci r
. 1993). Regar dless, the questi on of wheth e r T ucker ’s c ounsel should hav e known, based on exis t ing case law , to m ake the
ar gument i s not di sposi ti v e in thi s case because he m ade a str a tegi c deci si on n ot to do so. By agr eeing to the sti pulati on, he made the r e a so n able calculati on that hi s cli ent w ould be better off i f the jur y di d not hear any ev i dence r e g a r d in g t he
r esulting death. It w ould lea d to an absur d r esult i f T ucker
w er e able to gai n the benefi t of taki ng that factual i ssue away fr om the j ur y

, only t o t u r n ar ound and ar gue that the di s tr i ct
cour t w as also bar r ed fr om resolv ing i t. Because the i s s ue w as n ot y et settled in thi s Ci r cui t, and because T ucker ’s c ounsel made a r e a s o n a ble tacti cal deci si on, w e c annot say that the fai lur e to obj ect to the appli cati on of the enhancement consti

tuted defi ci ent per f or mance. See Johnson , 624 F .3d at 792.

III. CONCLUSION For the for egoi ng r easons, the j udgment of the di str i ct cour t i s AFFIRMED.