Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

County of McLean v. States Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group, Inc.,

2015 IL App (4th) 140628

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE COUNTY OF McLEAN, JAMES SOUK, CHARLES 

REYNARD, and JOHN BROWN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATES 

SELF-INSURERS RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC., DefendantAppellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-14-0628

Filed June 2, 2015

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 13-MR-214; 

the Hon. Albert G. Webber, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Joel D. Bertocchi and Dana A. Rice (argued), both of Hinshaw & 

Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, and Duana J. Grage, of Hinshaw & 

Culbertson, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Michael E. Raub (argued), of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of 

Urbana, for appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Pope and Justice Holder White concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In May 1994, authorities in McLean County arrested Alan Beaman for the August 1993 

murder of Jennifer Lockmiller. In March 1995, a jury convicted Beaman of that offense, and 

the trial court subsequently sentenced him to 50 years in prison. In May 2008, however, the 

supreme court reversed Beaman’s conviction, concluding that the State unlawfully withheld 

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). People v. 

Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 890 N.E.2d 500 (2008). In January 2009, the State dismissed all 

charges against Beaman. 

¶ 2 In April 2012, Beaman filed suit in federal court against McLean County; former McLean 

County State’s Attorney Charles Reynard; former McLean County Assistant State’s Attorney 

James Souk; and former McLean County Deputy Sheriff John Brown (collectively, plaintiffs), 

asserting (1) civil rights violations pursuant to section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)) and (2) 

several state-law tort claims, including malicious prosecution. 

¶ 3 In April 2013, plaintiffs filed in the trial court a complaint for declaratory judgment, 

seeking a ruling that defendant, States Self-Insurers Risk Retention Group, Inc., was obligated 

to pay the costs of plaintiffs’ legal defense against Beaman’s federal lawsuit pursuant to an 

insurance policy that was in place when Beaman was exonerated. In June 2014, the court 

granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, finding, for purposes of Beaman’s 

malicious-prosecution claim, that the dismissal of the charges against him in January 2009–not 

his arrest or prosecution in the 1990s–constituted the date of the “occurrence” that resulted in 

his “personal injury” within the meaning of the insurance policy. Because the court concluded 

that Beaman’s malicious-prosecution claim ripened during the policy period, it ordered 

defendant to pay the cost of plaintiffs’ defense against Beaman’s federal lawsuit.

¶ 4 Defendant appeals, arguing that the “occurrence” of Beaman’s “personal injury” within the 

meaning of the insurance policy was his arrest and prosecution, not his exoneration. We agree 

and reverse. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 6 The following facts were gleaned from the parties’ pleadings and supporting exhibits on 

file. 

¶ 7 Initially, for clarity, we note that three separate legal proceedings are relevant to this case: 

(1) the criminal prosecution, conviction, and ultimate exoneration of Beaman; (2) Beaman’s 
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subsequent federal lawsuit against plaintiffs seeking damages for his wrongful conviction; and 

(3) plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action against their insurance provider, defendant. This 

appeal arises from a final judgment in the declaratory judgment action, in which the trial court 

ordered defendant to pay the costs of plaintiffs’ defense against Beaman’s federal lawsuit. The 

supreme court’s decision overturning Beaman’s conviction set forth the factual details 

underlying the State’s prosecution of Beaman, which we need not repeat. See Beaman, 229 Ill. 

2d at 59-71, 890 N.E.2d at 502-08. Suffice it to say, the parties do not dispute that Beaman was 

investigated, arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced during the 1990s. The insurance policy 

at issue in this case was in place from March 2008 until March 2009, during which time the 

supreme court overturned Beaman’s conviction and the State dismissed the charges against 

him. 

¶ 8 Before turning to the declaratory judgment action and the insurance policy at issue in this 

appeal, we briefly review the allegations set forth in Beaman’s federal lawsuit against 

plaintiffs. 

¶ 9 A. Beaman’s Federal Lawsuit Against Plaintiffs

¶ 10 In April 2012, Beaman filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for 

the Central District of Illinois, alleging, in pertinent part, that plaintiffs (along with other 

defendants who are not parties to this declaratory judgment action) concealed exculpatory 

evidence showing that (1) Beaman did not have the opportunity to murder Lockmiller and (2) 

another viable suspect existed. Beaman asserted that Reynard, Souk, and Brown were 

intimately involved in the murder investigation and the withholding of material, exculpatory 

evidence from Beaman and his defense counsel. 

¶ 11 Beaman’s complaint set forth the following individual counts pursuant to section 1983: (1) 

violation of Beaman’s constitutional right to due process and a fair trial; (2) conspiracy to 

violate Beaman’s constitutional right to due process and a fair trial; and (3) “failure to 

intervene” to prevent a violation of Beaman’s right to due process and a fair trial. Additionally, 

Beaman’s complaint set forth the following individual state-law claims: (1) malicious 

prosecution; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) 

respondeat superior; and (5) indemnification. (We note that each count of Beaman’s 

complaint incorporated, by reference, his allegation that plaintiffs violated his constitutional 

rights by concealing exculpatory evidence.) 

¶ 12 B. Plaintiffs’ Declaratory Judgment Action

¶ 13 In April 2013, plaintiffs filed the declaratory judgment action at issue in this appeal. In 

their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendant issued an insurance policy to McLean County 

for the period of March 2008 through March 2009, which provided coverage for the county 

and its employees against third-party claims for personal injury, bodily injury, and property 

damage. Plaintiffs asserted that the policy imposed a duty upon defendant to (1) pay all defense 

costs for plaintiffs and (2) indemnify plaintiffs for any judgment entered against them in 

Beaman’s federal lawsuit. (We note that only defense costs are at issue in this appeal because, 

in July and August 2013, the federal district court dismissed plaintiffs from Beaman’s lawsuit, 

with prejudice.) 
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¶ 14 1. The Policy at Issue

¶ 15 The insurance policy defendant issued to plaintiffs from March 2008 until March 2009 

contained the following pertinent provisions. (Italicized portions of the policy are set forth, as 

in the original policy document, to indicate terms for which the policy provided its own 

specific definition.) 

¶ 16 Section I of the insurance policy provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

“COVERAGE PART I. PUBLIC ENTITY LIABILITY COVERAGE 

(OCCURRENCE COVERAGE) 

 A. Insuring Agreement 

 [Defendant] agrees to pay on behalf of the insured the damages *** which the 

insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, personal injury[,] or 

property damage to which Coverage Part I applies. 

 Coverage Part I applies only if the bodily injury, personal injury[,] or property 

damage is the result of an occurrence during the policy period and in the coverage 

territory.”

¶ 17 Section IV, which set forth definitions of terms used in the policy, defined “damages” as 

including, among other things, the costs of defending against a legal claim. The policy defined 

“personal injury,” in pertinent part, as follows:

“Personal injury means injury (other than bodily injury or property damage) caused by 

one or more of the following offenses: 

 1. False or wrongful arrest, detention, imprisonment[,] or malicious prosecution. 

 2. Wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy 

***.

 3. A publication or utterance: 

 a. Of libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging material; 

b. In violation of an individual’s right of privacy;

 4. Piracy, plagiarism, unfair competition, idea misappropriation under implied 

contract, infringement of copyright, title or slogan, registered trade mark, service mark 

or trade name, arising out of the insured’s advertising activities; or 

 5. Any act which gives rise to any liability under any federal civil rights statute, any 

state employment related law, or the Fair Labor Standards Act, if such act is committed 

during the policy period.”

The policy defined “occurrence” as follows: 

“With respect to personal injury, only the offenses defined under personal injury. For 

any claim for personal injury, the date of the occurrence is the date that the first offense 

took place or is alleged to have taken place.”

¶ 18 2. The Parties’ Motions

¶ 19 In November 2013, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 

section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 2012)), 

arguing that the murder investigation and prosecution of Beaman, which happened almost 15 

years before the policy period began, was the “occurrence” resulting in Beaman’s personal 

injury. 
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¶ 20 In January 2014, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending 

that (1) defendant was required to pay plaintiffs’ defense costs in the federal lawsuit if the 

policy covered any one of Beaman’s claims and (2) the policy covered Beaman’s 

malicious-prosecution claim because an element of that tort was the termination of criminal 

proceedings against Beaman, which occurred when the State dismissed the charges against 

him during the policy period. 

¶ 21 In February 2014, the trial court allowed plaintiffs to amend their motion for judgment on 

the pleadings by adding, as an alternative form of relief, a motion for summary judgment 

pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2012)). Plaintiffs requested 

summary judgment because that form of relief, unlike a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

allowed them to present the court with evidence outside the pleadings. Attached as an exhibit 

to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was the subsequent insurance policy defendant 

issued to McLean County for March 2010 to March 2011, which had different language than 

the policy in place from March 2008 to March 2009. Specifically, the subsequent policy 

defined “occurrence” as follows (underlined text indicates language not contained in the 

March 2008 to March 2009 policy): 

“With respect to personal injury, only the offenses defined as personal injury. For any 

claim for personal injury, or a series of related personal injury offenses, the date of the 

occurrence is the date that the first personal injury offense took place or is alleged to 

have taken place.”

Plaintiffs claimed in their motion for summary judgment that defendant’s modification of the 

definition of “occurrence” in the subsequent policy proved that the language in the earlier 

policy was ambiguous. Because defendant drafted the earlier policy, plaintiffs argued, any 

ambiguities must be construed strictly against defendant. 

¶ 22 3. The Trial Court’s Judgment

¶ 23 In June 2014, following a May 2014 hearing, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment. In a written order, the court found that Beaman’s personal-injury claims 

against plaintiffs were not actionable until the State dismissed the criminal charges against him 

in January 2009. Because that dismissal happened during the policy period, the court ordered 

defendant to pay the costs of plaintiffs’ defense against Beaman’s federal lawsuit.

¶ 24 This appeal followed. 

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 26 Defendant argues that the “occurrence” of Beaman’s “personal injury” within the meaning 

of the insurance policy was his arrest and prosecution, not his exoneration. We agree. 

¶ 27 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 28 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 

5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). In this case, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based 

upon its interpretation of the insurance policy. We review both the court’s ruling on summary 

judgment and its interpretation of an insurance policy de novo. Standard Mutual Insurance Co. 
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v. Lay, 2013 IL 114617, ¶ 15, 989 N.E.2d 591; Rich v. Principal Life Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 

359, 371, 875 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (2007). The supreme court has explained the general rules 

governing the interpretation of insurance policies, as follows: 

“In construing an insurance policy, we must ascertain and give effect to the 

intentions of the parties, as expressed in the policy language. [Citation.] The policy 

must be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision. [Citation.] 

Unambiguous words in the policy are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular 

meaning. [Citation.] Where the policy language is ambiguous, courts are to construe 

the policy liberally in favor of coverage. [Citation.]” West American Insurance Co. v. 

Yorkville National Bank, 238 Ill. 2d 177, 184-85, 939 N.E.2d 288, 293 (2010). 

¶ 29 B. The Policy at Issue 

¶ 30 Our analysis begins with the language of the policy describing when coverage applies 

(again, as in the original policy document, we italicize terms that are specifically defined in the 

policy): “Coverage Part I applies only if the bodily injury, personal injury[,] or property 

damage is the result of an occurrence during the policy period and in the coverage territory.” 

Next, the policy defines “occurrence” as follows: “With respect to personal injury, only the 

offenses defined under personal injury. For any claim for personal injury, the date of the 

occurrence is the date that the first offense took place or is alleged to have taken place.” As 

relevant to this appeal, the policy defines “personal injury” as “injury *** caused by *** [the] 

offense[ of] *** malicious prosecution.”

¶ 31 We note that plaintiffs and defendant disagree over the meaning of “first offense” as used 

in the definition of “occurrence.” Plaintiffs contend that “first offense” must be interpreted on a 

claim-by-claim basis (i.e., the date the malicious prosecution occurred was the date that the 

first malicious prosecution alleged in Beaman’s complaint occurred). Defendant, on the other 

hand, suggests that “first offense” should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis (i.e., the date 

the malicious prosecution occurred was the date that the first personal-injury claim of any kind 

alleged in Beaman’s complaint occurred). We need not resolve this particular issue, however, 

because we conclude that none of the claims in Beaman’s complaint–including his 

malicious-prosecution claim–occurred during the March 2008 to March 2009 policy period. 

¶ 32 “[T]o state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff [(in this case, Beaman)] must 

allege facts showing: (1) the defendant [(in this case, plaintiffs)] commenced or continued an 

original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in favor of the 

plaintiff; (3) there was an absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (4) the presence of 

malice; and (5) damages resulting to the plaintiff.” (Emphasis omitted.) Hurlbert v. Charles, 

238 Ill. 2d 248, 255, 938 N.E.2d 507, 512 (2010). Plaintiffs argue that because Beaman’s 

malicious-prosecution claim was not fully ripe for adjudication until the criminal proceedings 

against him were terminated, the malicious prosecution “took place” when the State dismissed 

the charges against Beaman. This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the policy. 

¶ 33 Plaintiffs ignore the policy’s special definition of “personal injury.” Specifically, plaintiffs 

erroneously equate the “personal injury” of “malicious prosecution” (as the policy uses those 

terms) with the common-law elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. However, the two 

are not the same. Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “personal injury” fails to construe the terms of the 

policy as a whole. Yorkville National Bank, 238 Ill. 2d at 184, 939 N.E.2d at 293. Construing 

the terms as a whole, the policy clearly defines “personal injury” as “injury *** caused by *** 
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malicious prosecution.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, to conclude that the “occurrence” 

resulting in Beaman’s “personal injury” happened within the policy period, the injury caused 

by the malicious prosecution must have taken place within the policy period. In other words, 

the event that triggers coverage is the actual injury suffered by the prosecuted party, not the 

accrual of the tort of malicious prosecution. 

¶ 34 In this case, Beaman’s injury obviously did not occur during the March 2008 to March 

2009 policy period. We must give the term “injury”–which the policy uses to define the term 

“personal injury”–its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id. To say that Beaman suffered 

his “injury” when he was exonerated would be to ignore the plain and ordinary meaning of the 

term “injury.” As the Second District recently stated in a case strikingly similar to this one, 

“ ‘it is difficult to see how [a criminal defendant’s] release from prison can be described as an 

“injury” in any sense of the word.’ ” St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Zion, 

2014 IL App (2d) 131312, ¶ 23, 18 N.E.3d 193 (quoting Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co. v. 

City of Council Bluffs, 755 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Iowa 2010)).

¶ 35 We note that after briefing in this appeal was completed, the Second District decided 

Indian Harbor Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan, 2015 IL App (2d) 140293, a declaratory 

judgment action involving a malicious-prosecution claim and an insurance policy similar to 

the policy at issue in this case. In City of Waukegan, the insured parties argued (just as 

plaintiffs in this case have argued) that coverage under the policy was triggered at the time the 

criminal proceedings were terminated because “that is the final element for the accrual of the 

tort” of malicious prosecution. Id. ¶ 14. The Second District rejected that argument, holding 

that “the initiation of the allegedly malicious prosecution is the triggering event for coverage of 

a malicious-prosecution claim.” Id. ¶ 30. In so holding, the court noted the following: 

“[The insured] argues that we should read into the policies the language that 

‘personal injury’ means ‘injury arising out of’ malicious prosecution. The problem 

with this argument is that [the insurer’s] policies focus not on the tort of malicious 

prosecution, but on wrongful acts ‘which result in’ personal injury, as the triggering 

event. *** Furthermore, [the insured’s] interpretation ignores that the wrongful act 

must occur within the policy period. Simply put, the policies do not equate a wrongful 

act with a completed cause of action.” Id. ¶ 31. 

¶ 36 The City of Waukegan court relied heavily upon its earlier decision in City of Zion, 2014 IL 

App (2d) 131312, 18 N.E.3d 193, which involved an insurance policy that defined “personal 

injury” the same as the policy at issue in this case. The City of Zion court set forth the relevant 

provisions of the policy at issue in that case, as follows: 

“The law enforcement liability section provides, in pertinent part, that [the insurer] 

will ‘pay amounts any protected person is legally required to pay as damages for 

covered injury or damage’ that (1) ‘results from law enforcement activities or 

operations by or for you,’ (2) ‘happens while this agreement is in effect,’ and (3) ‘is 

caused by a wrongful act that is committed while conducting law enforcement 

activities or operations.’ The policy defines ‘[i]njury or damage’ as ‘bodily injury, 

personal injury, or property damage.’ It defines ‘[p]ersonal injury,’ in pertinent part, as

‘injury *** caused by *** [m]alicious prosecution.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 37 The City of Zion court rejected the insured parties’ argument that coverage was triggered 

once all the elements of a malicious-prosecution claim were in place. Id. ¶ 14. In an analysis 
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that fully applies to the policy at issue in this case, the court explained its interpretation of the 

policy language as follows: 

“[The insured parties] misconstrue the plain language of the policy. Unlike the 

general liability section, the law enforcement liability section does not require that the 

‘offense’ of malicious prosecution be ‘committed’ while the policy is in effect. Instead, 

the law enforcement liability section provides coverage if the ‘injury’ caused by 

malicious prosecution ‘happens’ while the policy is in effect. Accordingly, in order to 

determine whether a malicious-prosecution claim triggers coverage under the law 

enforcement liability section, we need to determine when the ‘injury’ resulting from 

malicious prosecution ‘happens,’ not when the ‘offense’ is ‘committed.’ ” Id.

The Second District concluded that the malicious-prosecution injury happened when the 

plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted–not when he was exonerated–“because the favorable 

termination of a malicious prosecution marks the ‘beginning of the judicial system’s 

remediation’ of the wrong committed, not the commencement of the injury or damage.” Id. 

¶ 23 (quoting Newfane v. General Star National Insurance Co., 784 N.Y.S.2d 787, 792 (N.Y. 

App. Div. 2004)). Likewise, in this case, we conclude that Beaman’s personal injury–that is, 

the “injury *** caused by *** malicious prosecution”–“took place” when Beaman was 

arrested and prosecuted. 

¶ 38 In reaching its holding, the City of Zion court noted that the tort of malicious prosecution is

sui generis. Id. ¶ 22. Citing the New Jersey Superior Court case of Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. 

Insurance Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168, 175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), the City 

of Zion court explained the unique nature of malicious-prosecution claims for purposes of 

determining insurance coverage: 

“[I]n the negligence context, the sustaining of damages is the final element that marks 

accrual of the cause of action; thus, the occurrence triggering insurance coverage is 

simultaneous with the accrual of the cause of action. [Citation.] In the 

malicious-prosecution context, by contrast, the sustaining of damages is not the final 

element. [Citation.] Rather, the cause of action accrues when the criminal proceeding 

has been favorably terminated. [Citation.] According to the [Muller] court, this 

explains why the occurrence triggering insurance coverage of a malicious-prosecution 

claim may precede the accrual of the cause of action. [Citation.]” City of Zion, 2014 IL 

App (2d) 131312, ¶ 22, 18 N.E.3d 193. 

¶ 39 The Second District’s decisions in City of Zion and City of Waukegan are well-reasoned 

and applicable to the policy provisions at issue in this case. Because we conclude that 

Beaman’s alleged personal injury occurred outside the March 2008 to March 2009 policy 

period, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for plaintiffs. 

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further 

proceedings. 

¶ 42 Reversed and remanded.