NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0586n.06 No. 09-6097 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
KAI TL YN CAL AWAY, a Minor, by Natural M other an d N e x tF r i e n d , K a t h l e e nC a l aw ay, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. J ODI SCHUCKER, Def endant- Appellee , and
U.T. MEDI CALGROUP, I NC., De fe nd ant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OnAp p e a l f

r o m t h e U n it e d St ates Dis tr ic t C o urt f

o r th e We s te rn District of Tenne ssee

B e fo re : B OG GS, SI L ER, and MO OR E, Cir c uit

Judg e s. BO GGS, Circuit J udg e. Kathleen Calaw ay (C alaway ), ac ting on be half of he r daug hter Kaitly

n, filed this diver sity action ag ainst Dr. Jodi Schucker (Schucke r). The district court conclude d that the action was barre d by the doctrine of re s ju dic ata and g rante d summary judgme nt to Schucker . Calawa

y now appeals the di strict court’s judgment, claiming that the e vidence befor e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e sta bli shthat Ca lawa

y ’s c la ims ha d b e e n re so lve d pre vio us ly on the me ri ts. We ag ree , and we there fore reve rse the district c ourt’s judg ment and re mand to the district court for fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

This a g ree ment is unde r seal with the Tenne ssee circ uit c ourt and ha s not been plac ed on the 1 rec ord in this case. - 2 - I Calawa y ’s suit aris es o u t of Schucke r’s a lleg ed neg lige nce dur ing the birth of Calawa y ’s daug hter, Ka itly

n. On Fe bruar

y 20, 1996, Calawa

y went into labor and wa s admitted to the Reg ional Medica l Center at Me mphis. At the tim e, U.T. Me dical Gr oup empl o y ed p h y sicians and medic al personne l who staffe d the Medica l Center, includingSchucker . Shucker spe cialized in obstetrics and g y necolog y . At the time Calawa y was a dmitted, S ch u ck er was on duty as the Unive rsity

of Te nn e sse e “ in h ou se ” fa c ult y me mbe r s up e rv isi ngthe re sid e nt p hy sic ians . After Calawa y was a dmitted to the Medical Center , she was place d under the car e of r esident phy sicians and, e ventually , Schucker
. Alleg edly as a result of neg lige nt conduct by Schucker and her subor dinates, Calawa y experience d complications during labor that led her newbor n daug hter, Ka itl y n, to s uf fe r s e ve re and

pe rm ane nt i nju

ri e s. On J anuar

y 31, 1997, Calawa

y filed suit, on behalf o f h er d aughter , ag ainst the Medica l Center a nd U.T. Medical Group in Tenne ssee circuit court. She proce eded on the t heory that U.T. Me dic a l G ro up and

the Me dic a l Ce nte r w e re vic ari ou sly lia ble fo r the ne g lig e nc e of

the ir e mpl oy e e s, including Schuc ker. Schuc ker w as not a pa rty to the action. On J une 16, 2002, U.T. Me dical Gr oup and Calaw ay enter ed int o a Settlement Ag ree ment and Rele as e. P ursuant to that ag ree ment, the circ uit court issued an “ ORDER OF D I SMI SSAL

1 WI TH PREJ UDI CE AS TO THE DEF ENDAN T, UT MEDI CALGROUP, I NC., ONL Y,” to which both parties conse nted. The or der state d:No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 3 - Come now the Plaintiffs a nd Def endant UT Medica l Group, Inc., only , upon statements of c ounsel, and the e ntire re cord in this case, the Court finds that the matte r a g a ins t U T M e dic a l G ro up , Inc ., on ly , s ha ll be and is h e re by dis mis se d w ith pr e jud ic e , how e ve r, sa id dis mis sa l spe c if ic a lly e xclu de s a

ny c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t Dr. Jodi S chucke r, individually
. . . .

. . . . I T I S TH ERE F OR E O RD ERE D, AD JU DGE D A ND DE CRE ED tha

t th is c a se is d ism iss e d w ithpr e jud ic e a s to UT Me dic a l G ro up , Inc ., on ly , a nd sa id dismiss al excludes Dr. Jodi S chucke r, individually
. . . . On Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 02 , Ca lawa y fi le d th e pr e se nt a c tio n, on be ha lf of he r d a ug hte r, a g a ins t Schucker in the Unit ed S tates Dist rict C ourt for the Western Dis trict of Tennessee. Calawa y soug ht to r e c ov e r f

or Schu c ke r’ s n e g lig e nc e in d e liv e ri ngKa itl y n Ca lawa y , w hic h w a s so me of

the same conduct that she previously alleg ed in the suit ag ainst U.T. Medica l Group. Shortly afte r Calaway fi l ed t he ac tion, Schucker move d for summary judgme nt on the g rounds that the orde r of dismissal in Calaway ’s ac tion ag ainst U.T. Medical Group g ave r ise to res judi cata . The district cour t initi ally reje cted this argument, concludingthat the dismissal was not a judg ment on the merits and thus did not g ive rise to re s ju dic ata . Howeve r, whe n Schucker
rene wed her motion for

summary judgme nt in 2009, the district court cha ng ed its mind. The court conclude d that interveningchang es in Tenne ssee law –in particu l ar , the dec ision of the Tenne ssee Court of Appea ls in Gerbe r v. Holcom b , 219 S.W .3d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)–had established that
an a g re e d ju dg me nt o f d ism iss a l op e rate d a s re s ju dic ata . As a re sult, the court found t hat the orde r of dismissal in C alawa

y ’s ca s e aga inst U.T. Medical Gr oup g ave r ise to re s ju dic ata and bar

red Calawa y ’s claim ag ainst Schucker . The c ourt there fore g rante d summary judgme nt to Schucker.No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 4 - Calawa y filed a Rule 59( e) motion to alter or amend the district c o u rt ’s j u dg ment. On Aug ust 18, 2009, the district court issued an order de nying that motion. The court ac knowledg ed that it ha d be e n inc or

re c t whe n it a sse rt e d th a t Ge rb e r c ha ng e d pr ior Te nn e sse e law. Ne ve rt he le ss, the cour t concluded tha

t the order of di smissal in Calawa y ’s case aga inst U.T. Medical Group g ave rise to re s ju dic ata beca

use, ac cordingto the court, the r ecor d ref lected the parties’ intent to c onclude that c a se on

the me ri ts. Ca lawa

y fi le d a tim e ly a pp e a l. II On appe al, Calawa

y argues that the dist rict cour t erre d when it g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of S c hu c ke r. Th is c ourt re vie ws a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt de

novo . Have nsure, L.L.C

. v. Prudential I ns. Co. of Am. , 595 F.3d 312, 315 ( 6th Cir. 2010). Summ ary judgme nt is appropr iate wher e “the pleading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entit led to judgment a s a matter of l aw.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2). The party moving f or summary

judgme nt bear s the initial burden of identifying those parts of the record that de monstrate the a bsence of any g enuine issue of mater ial fac t. Have nsure, 59 5 F .3 d a t 31 5. On c e the mov ingpa rt y ha s satis fi e d it s burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific fac ts showing that there is a g enuine issue f or trial. Moldowan v. City of W arren , 578 F.3d 351, 374 ( 6th Cir. 2009). A g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts if there is suffic ient evidenc e fa voring the nonmoving pa

rty for a jury to return a

verdic t for that party
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In deter mining whe ther
a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t e xists , “ thi s c ourt

dr aws a ll i nf

e re nc e s in the lig ht m os t f avo ra ble toNo. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 5 - the nonmoving pa

rty .” Have nsure, 5 9 5 F. 3 d at3 1 5 (c i t i n g Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us v . Ze nit

h R ad io Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Fe dera l courts sitting in diversity must afford state-c o u rt j u d g ments the same pr eclusive eff ect that they would have under the law of the state in which they wer e re ndere d. Evans v. P earson En te rs. , 434 F.3d 839, 849 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Tennessee re cognizes the traditional doctrine of res jud ic ata , which is “a claim prec lusion doctrine that promotes fina lity in liti g ation.” Lien v. Couch , 993 S.W .2d 53, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). The doc trine bar s “a se cond suit betwee n the same pa rties or their pr ivies on the same c ause of action with re spect to all t he is sues which we re or could have been litigated in the former suit.” Creech v. Addington , 2 81 S.W. 3d 36 3, 37 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 9) . Apa rt y
as s er t i n g re

s ju dic ata must show that “(1) a court o f co m petent jurisdiction rende red the prior judgme nt, (2) the pr ior judg ment was final and on the mer its, (3) the same pa rties or their pr ivies
wer e involved in both proce eding s, and (4) both p roceeding s involved the same c ause of action.” Lien , 9 9 3 S
. W
. 2 d

at 5 6 (c i t i n g Le e v . H

all , 7 90 S .W .2 d 29 3, 29 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 0) ). In th is
cas e , th e p arti e s d is p u te o n ly w h e th e r Shu c k e r h a s s a ti s f ie d h e r b ur d e nw it

hr e s p e c t t o th e second element–that is, whe ther S hucker has provided sufficie nt evidenc e to establish that the judg ment of dismiss al in Calawa

y ’s ac tion ag ainst U.T. Medica l Group wa s a judg ment “on the mer its.” Tenne ssee law

limit s the extent to whic h a v oluntary dismiss al enter ed by

consent of the parties is “on the merits” and g ives rise to re s ju dic ata . Under Tenne ssee law, a voluntary dismiss al normally does not prejudice the plaint iff’s r ight to re -file the sa me ac tion. See Te nn . R. Civ . P. 41 .0 1; Garrett v. Corry Foam Prods, Inc

. , 596 S.W .2d 808, 810-11 (Te nn. 1980). F urther, the mereNo. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

Tenne ssee ha s pre s er v ed t he distinction betwee n courts of la w and c ourts of equity , and 2 courts of e quity

g ener ally enjoy broad pow er to dismiss actions with or without prejudice. Long v. Kirby -S mi th , 292 S.W .2d 216, 220-21 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1956). A d d it io n a ll y , u n d e r

th e r u le of ret raxi t , “a judg ment of dismissal, when base d upon and 3 enter ed in pursuanc e of the ag ree ment of the pa rties, m ust be understood, in the absenc e of a ny thing to the contra

ry , expressed in the ag ree ment and conta ined in the judg ment itself, to amount to such an adjustm ent of the m erits of the controversy by the par ties themselves throug h the judg ment of the courts as w ill constit ute a de fense to another act ion after war ds broug ht upon the same c ause of action.” Lindsay v. Allen , 8 2 S
. W
. 1 7 1 , 1 7 3 (T en n . 1 9 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Park er , 120 U. S. 89, 95 (1887))
. - 6 - fac t that a cour

t of law g rants such a

dismiss al “with prejudice” is insufficient to g ive the judg ment 2 of dismissal claim-prec lusive eff ect–in fact, “an order of dismissal ‘with prejudice’ should be treated
as a me re nons u it and the words ‘ with full prejudice’ disreg arde d as surplusag e.” Ga rre tt , 596 S.W. 2d a t 80 9-10 ; see also Agrolinz, Inc. v . Micro Flo Co. , 202 F.3d 858, 861 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (noting that Tenne ssee la

w p r o v id e s th a

t t h e “w ords ‘with pre

judice’ inc orporated into the stipulation of dis mis sa l are wi tho ut l e g a l si g nif ic anc e and wi ll no t ba

r a su bs e qu e nt su it. ’” ). Th is is so be c a us e Tenne ssee ha s rejec ted the common-la w rule of re tra

x it , Ga rre tt , 5 96 S.W. 2d

a t 80 9- 10 ; Patrick v. Dickinson , 526 S.W .2d 449, 452 (Tenn. 1975) , under which “a dismiss al by ag ree ment of the pa rties is e qu iva le nt t o, and

is tre a te d a s, a

pu bli c re nunc iatio n on the pa rt of the c omp la ina

nt o f t he c la im
a sse rt e d b y hi m in hi s p le a din g a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant, and he is the re a ft e r e sto pp e d to br ingit forwa rd ag ain,” Lindsay v. Allen , 82 S.W . 171, 174 (Tenn. 1904)
.

3 This does not mean, however , that a volunt ary dismiss al can never g ive rise to res judicata. Rather, the “[t] he decisive test [for whether such a dismiss al gives rise to re s ju dic ata ] i s whether the judg ment of dismissal was on the merits.” Ga rre tt , 5 9 6 S
. W
. 2 d at8 1 0 (q u o t i n g Long v. KirbySm ith , 2 92 S.W. 2d

21 6, 22 1 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 95 6) ). Th is t ur ns on the int e nt o f t

he pa rt ie s:No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 7 - The e x tent to which a judg ment or dec ree enter ed by consent is conc lusive in a su bs e qu e nt ac tio n sho uld be g ov e rn e d by the int e nti on of the pa rt ie s a s e xpre sse d in the ag ree ment which is t h e b as is of the judg ment and g ather ed fr om all the circ umstances, r ather

than by a mec hanica l application of the g ener al rules g overning the scope of estoppel by

judgme nt. Long , 2 92 S.W. 2d

a t 22 0; see also Agrolinz , 2 0 2 F. 3 d at 8 6 1 (q u o t i n g Long , 292 S.W
. 2 dat 220); Lindsay , 82 S.W . at 174 (“ I n some States, a dismissal by ag ree ment is reg arde d as a ba r to a subsequent suit on the same issues. [B]ut the better rule is that it must be affirmatively shown either that the dismissal or nonsuit was upon examination of the merits, or that the intention of the par ties
wa s to f in a ll y s e tt le th e c o n tr o v e r s y b y th e a g r e e me n t, o r to me r g e th e c a u s e o f a c ti o n in the judgme nt . . . .” (quotation marks a nd citations omitt ed)) . Thus, under Te nnessee law, a voluntar y dismi s s a l b y c o n s e n t o f th e p arti e s ma y b ar r e a s s e rti o n o f a c la im , b u t o n ly to th e e xte n t that the parties intende d t h e d i s m i ssal to resolve the me rits of the cla im and establish re s ju dic ata . See Ga rre tt , 5 96 S.W. 2d

a t 80 9 ( “ Th e su

bje c t or de r, in its e lf

, and the re ma ind e r o f t

he c ourt re c or d in which that order was enter ed demonstrate that it wa s not a deter mination of the plaintiff’s rig ht of action on theme rit

s , unless the words ‘ with prejudice ’ ca n be held to have that eff

ect.” ). I n this c ase, the district c ourt relied on two piece s of evidenc e to c onclud e t h at C alaway intended the or der of

dismiss al in her a ction ag ainst U. T
. M ed i ca l Group to re solve Calawa y ’s neg lige nce c laims on the merits. First, the c ourt noted that Calawa y an d U. T
. M edica l Group reque sted the orde r of dismissal pursuant to a “ Settlement Ag ree m en t an d R elea se,” thoug h the district court did not actua lly revie w that ag ree ment. Seco n d , t he district cour t focused on the langua g e of

the or de r o f d ism iss a l it se lf , n oti ngthat Ca lawa

y ’s “ int e nti on to re no un c e ” he r c la imsNo. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 8 - ag ainst U
. T
. M e d ic a l G r o u

p w a s ma n if e s te d b y “ th e f a c t t h a t c e rta in

p arti e s in c lu d in g [S c hu c k e r]
wer e excepted f

rom the orde r of dismissal.” This constituted error
. First, without knowing the contents of the Settlement Ag ree ment and Release –which has never been place d on the rec ord–it is impossible to de termine if that ag ree ment expressed a n intent to resolve Calaw ay ’s neg lige nce c laims on the merits. See Long , 292 S.W .2d at 220 (indicating that the c laim-prec lusive eff ect of a judg ment depends on the intent of the par ties
a s e xpre sse d in the a g re e me nt t hat is the ba sis of

the jud g me nt) . Se ttl e me nt a g re e me nts fr e qu e ntl y specify that the par ties are not addre ssing the me rits of the cla ims asserted. F urther, in g ener al, a
re le a se is m e re ly

the re lin qu ishme nt o f a c la im, ra the r tha n a re so lut ion of the me ri ts of the c la im. See 76 C.J .S. Re le as e § 1 (2 01 0) ; cf. Ri chland Country Club, Inc. v. CRC Equities, Inc. , 832 S.W .2d 55 4, 557 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 1) (“ [A] r e le a se is a c on tr a c t and

ru le s o f c on str

uc tio n a pp lie d to contra cts are used in construinga re lease . The c ardina l rule is to asce rtain the intention of the parties.” (citations omitted)). Thus, the bare fac t that Calawa y and U.T. Me dical Gr oup reque sted the orde r of dismissal pursuant to a Settlement A g ree ment and Release does not show that Calawa y
and U. T. Me dic a l G ro up int e nd e d th e or de r o f d ism iss a l to re so lve Ca lawa y ’s c la ims on the me ri ts. See Long , 292 S.W .2d at 218, 220-22 (f inding that a

volu n tary

dismiss al “with full pre

judice” enter ed pursua

nt t o an agr eeme nt betwee n the par ties did not give r ise to res judicata beca use the ag ree ment prese rved the plaintiff’s rig ht to reasse rt his claims). Turningto the text of the orde r of dismissal, without knowing the contents of the Settlement Ag ree ment and R el ease, that order provides little insight into the intent of the par ties. The orde r
mere l y p ro v i d es that the dismissal is “with prejudice” as to U.T. Medic al Group but “ withoutNo. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 9 - prejudic e ” a s to s e v e r a l o th e r p arti e s , in c lu d in g Sc hu c k e r . In d e e d , th is la n g u a g e s u g g e s ts th at Calawa y and U.T. Me dical Gr oup did not intend the dismi ssal to resolve the me rits of Calawa y ’s claims or to establish re

s ju dic ata , as i t specific ally provides that the di smissal does not prejudice Calawa y ’s claims ag ainst S ch u cker (a pr ivy of U.T. Me dical Gr oup). More over, w ithout any evidenc e re gar d i n g the contents of the Settlement Ag ree ment and Relea se, treating the dismissal order as a ba r to Cal away ’s ac tion would effe ctively look upon “dismissal by ag ree ment of the parties [as] equivalent to . . . a public re nunciation on the par t of [C alawa

y ] of the cl ai m asser

ted by [her] i n [her] pl eadingag ainst the defe ndant.” Lindsay , 82 S.W. at 174 . I n o the r w or ds , it wo uld
conver t the Tenne ssee c ircuit court’ s order into an impermissible re tra x it
. Se e Ga rre tt , 596 S.W .2d at 808-10 (holdingthat a conse nt order of dismiss al “with pre

judice” did not g ive rise to re s ju dic ata beca use nothing in the rec ord demonstrated that the dismissal was a de termination of the plaintiff’ s rig hts “on the merits,” and allowing the words “with prejudice ” alone to r ender the decision “on the merits” would g ive the trial c ourt the powe r to issue a re tra x it). As sh e did

be low , h ow e ve r, Shu c ke r a rgue s th a t Gerbe r v. Holcom b , 219 S.W .3d 914, “cla rified” Tenne ssee law and “affir matively resolved the issue of whether consent judgme nts are ‘f i n al j u d gm en t s o nt h e m er i t s ’ f o r t h e p urp o s es o f ap p l yi n g re s ju dic ata .” Appellee ’s B rief at 23. I n Gerbe r , the Tenne ssee Court of A ppeals he ld: Much like a judgme nt on the merits, an agree d judgme nt of dismissal in s ettlement of a c ontroversy is “ conclusive, not only on the matters actua lly raised and litigated, but it is also conc lusive on every other matter

that could have been litig ated a nd decide d as an inc ident to or essentially connec ted wit h the s ubject matter of the prior litigation.”No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

A s econd case cited by

Schucker , Patton v. Estate of Upchurch , 24 2 S.W. 3d 78 1 ( Te nn . Ct
. 4 App. 2007), likewise de alt with a consent judgme nt that memorialized the parties’ ag ree ment on the rec ord. I n that case , the judgme nt pr ovided that the parties “announc ed in ope n court that all issues and contr oversies ha d been se ttled,” and that “ t h e def endant ha d ag ree d to allow judgme nt to be enter ed ag ainst her in the a mount of . . . ($251,000), whic h was a cce pted by th e p laintiffs.” Id. at 785. - 10 - 2 1 9 S
. W
. 3 d a t 9 1 7
- 1 8 (q u o t i n g Freem an v. Cheroke e W ater Co. , 11 S.W .3d 480, 483 (Tex. App. 2000)). Gerbe r does not control the pr esent c ase . C ontrary to Schucker ’s contention, the ter m “agree d judgme nt of dismissal” in Ge rb e r does not ref er to the t y

pe of dismiss al at issue in this case. Rather, Te nnessee courts use the terms “a greed judg ment” and “ consent judg ment” to re fer to “a contra ct of re cord ma de by t h e parties to the a g ree ment.” Te nn . E nv tl. Cou nc il v . W

ate r Q ua lit

y Control Bd. , 2 5 0 S
. W
. 3d 44, 50-51 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2007). Such a contr act is “e ntere d on the
r e c o r d s o f t h e c o u rt a s p art o f t h e d e c r e e ” an d e sta bli sh e s f ull re s ju dic ata . Third N

at. Bank v. Scribner , 3 70 S.W. 2d

482, 48 6 ( Te nn . 1 96 3) . T he “ a g re e d ju dg me nt o f d ism iss a l” a dd re sse d in Gerbe r was just this ty

pe of or der: it provided that “ the parties announce d that Plaintiff may take a judgme nt for past due installments upon the Note whic h the Complaint is based eac h in the amount of F ive Thousand [dollars] ($5,000.00) [and] that fourtee n (14) installments [are] past due as of the date of the hear ing September 20, 2001.” Gerbe r , 219 S.W. 3d a t 916. In co ntr a st, the or de r i n th is 4

case did not incorporate the terms of the ag ree ment betwee n U.T. Medica l Group and Cala way , nor did it e ve n r e fe re nc e that a g re e me nt. Fur ther, if Gerbe r did a

pp ly to the ty

pe of dis mis sa l or de r at is su e he re , th e de c isi on wo uld conflict with the Te nnessee Supreme Court’s rulingin Garrett v. Corry Foam Prods, Inc. , 596No. 09-6097

Calawa y v. Schucker

- 11 - S.W .2d 808

. I n Ga rre tt , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court held t hat the “de cisive test” f or dete rmining whether a judgme nt of dismiss al g ives rise to res judicata is whether “ the judg ment of dismissal was on the merits.” Id. at 8 1 0 (q u o t i n g Long , 292 S.W .2d at 221) (e mphasis added) . In contra st, Gerbe r held that an ag ree d judgme nt of dismiss al i s “m uch like a jud g me nt o n th e me ri ts” in t hat it
e sta bli sh e s re s ju dic ata . Gerbe r , 219 S.W .3d at 917 (empha sis added). This c lashes with Ga rre tt ’s “dec isive test” bec ause it sug g ests that an orde r of dismissal shou l d h ave c laim-prec lusive eff ect even thoug h it does not resolve the me rits of a c laim. Accor dingly , bec ause “ we must follow the decisions of the state ’s hig hest court when that court has addre ssed t he relevant issue,” Savedoff v. Acc ess Group, Inc

. , 524 F.3d 754, 762 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted), we would not consider Ge rb e r authoritative e ven if it applied to the t y pe of order at issue here
. We theref

ore c onclude that S ch u cker did not produce suf ficient e vidence to show that Calawa y and U.T. Me dical Gr oup intended the or der of dismiss al in Calawa

y ’s ac tion ag ainst U.T. Medica l Group to resolve the merits of Calaw ay ’s neg lige nce c laims. A s a re sult, S chucke r did not establish that she wa s entitled to summary judgme nt on re

s ju dic ata g ro un ds
. III For these re asons, we REVE RSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND t o the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.