REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 02416

September Term, 2013 

_________________________ 

SUSAN BUCKINGHAM, CO-PERSONAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OF JOHN D. 

BUCKINGHAM, et al.,

v. 

JEFFREY B. FISHER, et al., SUBSTITUTE 

TRUSTEES. 

_________________________ 

 Woodward, 

 Berger, 

 Friedman, 

 

JJ.

_________________________ 

Opinion by Friedman, J.

_________________________ 

 Filed: May 27, 2015 
Maryland Rule 14-211 sets out the process for determining whether to grant or deny 

a motion to stay and dismiss a foreclosure sale. First, the trial court will review the motion 

and the record and, if it sees fit, may elect to hold an initial hearing where the trial court 

considers the motion and hears arguments from parties to the foreclosure proceedings.1

 If 

the court determines that the motion on its face states a valid defense to the foreclosure, a 

temporary stay of foreclosure is entered and the second step, an evidentiary hearing on the 

merits of the defense, is scheduled. On the other hand, if the trial court determines that the 

motion does not raise a facially valid defense, it may deny the motion without holding an 

evidentiary hearing on the merits, thereby allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. We 

are asked to consider what the pleading standard is for stating a facially valid defense that 

will require a trial court to move to that second step of holding a hearing on the merits. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 John and Elizabeth Buckingham were husband and wife who resided at 17 Darby 

Court, in Bethesda, Maryland. They owned the property as tenants by the entireties. On 

 

1 We note that Rule 14-211(b)(1) gives a trial court the discretion to deny a motion 

based on the record, without first holding an initial hearing. The trial court in this case 

opted to first hold an initial hearing before denying the Buckinghams’ motion. Although 

the trial court did not explicitly state its reason for holding an initial hearing, which it 

referred to in its Order denying the motion as an “emergency hearing,” it was likely because 

the Buckinghams’ motion was filed one day before the foreclosure sale was scheduled to 

take place. In a situation where the trial court has more time to review the motion and the 

record, however, the court may decide to grant or deny the motion, or to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the merits, without holding an initial hearing. 
-2- 

September 11, 1997, the Buckinghams purportedly executed a refinance deed of trust 

(“1997 deed of trust”) for the benefit of Virginia Commerce Bank. The 1997 deed of trust 

secured a $600,000 debt owed under a prime equity line agreement and disclosure with 

Virginia Commerce Bank, and was recorded in the Montgomery County land records on 

October 9, 1997. The 1997 deed of trust was modified on several occasions during the 

subsequent years: on June 15, 1999; on November 25, 2005; on March 26, 2006; and on 

June 30, 2006. Each modification acknowledged the original 1997 loan and deed of trust. 

 The Buckinghams defaulted on November 16, 2010, by failing to make the 

payments due under the modified loan agreement. Virginia Commerce Bank sought to 

foreclose the deed of trust and appointed the appellees in this case as Substitute Trustees 

(“Trustees”). On December 7, 2011, before the Trustees initiated the foreclosure action, 

Elizabeth died, leaving John as the surviving tenant by the entireties. The Trustees filed 

an Order to Docket Suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on September 6, 

2012, seeking to foreclose the deed of trust based on the November 2010 default. John 

Buckingham was the sole named defendant as the surviving tenant by the entireties and 

sole owner of the property at 17 Darby Court. But due to John Buckingham’s poor health, 

he was no longer capable of acting for himself in legal proceedings. Therefore, the Order 

to Docket Suit was served on John’s son, David Buckingham, who had been appointed as 

the guardian of his father’s property. 

John died on October 17, 2012, shortly after the foreclosure action was filed against 

him. After John’s death, two of his other children, Richard and Susan Buckingham (“the 
-3- 

Buckinghams”) were appointed as the co-personal representatives of John’s estate. The 

Trustees amended the Order to Docket Suit on July 11, 2013, to reflect the fact that John 

Buckingham had died and that the subject property was no longer owner-occupied, as well 

as to join Richard and Susan Buckingham as the personal representatives of John’s estate.2

 

A foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 19, 2013. Richard Buckingham 

received notice of the foreclosure sale on December 5, 2013. On December 18, 2013, 

Richard and Susan Buckingham filed a Motion to Stay Sale of Property and Dismiss 

Foreclosure Action, pursuant to Rule 14-211. They sought a temporary stay of the sale and 

dismissal of the foreclosure action, challenging the validity of the 1997 deed of trust and 

the Trustees’ right to foreclose. The Buckinghams alleged that their mother, Elizabeth’s 

signature on the 1997 deed of trust was a forgery.

Elizabeth’s signatures on the lien instruments attached to the 

Order to Docket are not hers and are forgeries, thereby 

rendering the lien instruments void ab initio and 

unenforceable. The Affidavit of John W. Hargett, III, a forensic 

document examiner, expressing his expert opinion that there is 

a strong possibility that Elizabeth S. Buckingham did not sign 

these lien instruments, is attached hereto.3

 

2

John Buckingham’s illness and death, his personal financial and corporate 

business dealings, and relationships with and among his heirs and survivors, have 

generated a substantial amount of litigation in the courts of Maryland. Nothing in the 

factual recitation contained in this Opinion is intended as anything more than helpful 

background and will not bind courts that may have to make specific determinations on 

these issues.

3 The Buckinghams also supported this allegation with the affidavit from David

Buckingham, who alleged that he was familiar with his mother’s handwriting and that the 

signatures on the instruments were not hers. 
-4- 

In addition to this forgery defense, the Buckinghams also alleged that the notice of 

sale was insufficient to inform interested parties of the details of the foreclosure sale

because it conflicted with the Order to Docket Suit in terms of the lien instrument upon 

which the foreclosure sale was based. The Buckinghams argued that (1) the notice of sale 

listed the 1999 modification to the 1997 deed of trust, rather than the 2006 modification 

referenced in the Order to Docket Suit, as the instrument being foreclosed upon, and (2) the 

notice of sale stated that the foreclosure sale was proceeding pursuant to an instrument 

executed by “John D. Buckingham, c/o David T. Buckingham, as Guardian for Person and 

Property,” but that John was not under guardianship at the time the instrument was 

obtained. Additionally, the Buckinghams claimed that notice was not served on counsel, 

Christopher Fogelman, despite the fact that Fogelman had been their counsel of record for 

over a year. The Buckinghams claimed that they had not been aware of the scheduled sale 

until Richard received the notice by mail on December 5, 2013. 

An initial hearing on the Buckinghams’ motion was held in the Circuit Court for 

Montgomery County on the day it was filed. The circuit court heard arguments from the 

Buckinghams and the Trustees and, at the conclusion of the arguments, denied the 

Buckinghams’ motion without scheduling a hearing on the merits. The circuit court 

ordered the Trustees to reschedule the sale and to provide Fogelman with all filings to cure 

the lack of service. The sale was rescheduled for January 30, 2014 and the property was 

sold on that date for $1.4 million. 
-5- 

DISCUSSION 

We are asked to determine whether the trial court properly denied the Buckinghams’ 

motion to stay and dismiss the sale, or whether Maryland Rule 14-211 required the circuit 

court to first hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the asserted defenses. We will 

begin by analyzing Rule 14-211 and considering what the proper pleading standard for 

stating a facially valid defense is under the rule. Next, we will look at the forgery defense 

asserted in the Buckinghams’ motion and determine whether their motion stated a facially 

valid defense that required the trial court to hold a hearing on the merits. Finally, we will 

consider whether the defense related to defective notice asserted in the Buckinghams’ 

motion required a hearing on the merits. 

I. Maryland Rule 14-211 

This case centers on the application of Rule 14-211, which allows an interested party 

to a scheduled foreclosure sale the right to file a motion to stay the sale and dismiss a 

foreclosure action. Rule 14-211 went into effect in May of 2009. This Court has explained 

the purpose of the rule, quoting a letter from the Rules Committee to the Court of Appeals, 

which stated:

A number of significant changes are recommended to the Rule 

governing a stay of the sale (proposed Rule 14–211). The Rules 

Committee proposes to detach that procedure from the Rules 

governing injunctions and to deal with it in a Rule specific to 

foreclosure sales. The Rule attempts to strike a fair balance by 

providing borrowers and others with sufficient standing, who 

have a legitimate defense to the foreclosure, a reasonable and 

practical opportunity to raise the defense, but not allowing for 

frivolous motions intended solely to delay the proceeding. 
-6- 

Bechamps v. 1190 Augustine Herman, LC, 202 Md. App. 455, 461-62 (2011). 

The Buckinghams filed a motion under Rule 14-211, raising two defenses: a 

challenge to the validity of the lien based on forgery and a challenge to the right of the 

Trustees to foreclose based on defects in the notice of sale. They claim that Rule 

14-211 (b)(2) entitled them to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of both defenses 

because both claims “state[d] on [their] face a defense to the validity of the lien or the lien 

instrument or to the right of the plaintiff to foreclose in the pending action.” The Trustees 

argue that although the Buckinghams’ motion nominally raised defenses, it failed to 

adequately allege all necessary elements of the defenses as required by Rule 14-211(a)(3). 

These arguments present the question of what pleading standard must be met before a 

Rule 14-211 motion cannot be denied without an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 

Rule 14-211(a)(3) sets out the required contents of a motion to stay sale and dismiss 

the foreclosure action. It provides in relevant part: 

(3) Contents. A motion to stay and dismiss shall: 

(A) be under oath or supported by affidavit; 

(B) state with particularity the factual and legal 

basis of each defense that the moving party has 

to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument 

or to the right of the plaintiff to foreclose in the 

pending action; 

(C) be accompanied by any supporting documents 

or other material in the possession or control of 

the moving party 
-7- 

(Emphasis added). It is clear from this provision that the factual and legal bases of a 

defense must be stated “with particularity” and that any available supporting documents or 

material must be provided. 

Rule 14-211(b)(1) sets out the procedures for the initial determination by the circuit 

court and, that if it finds one or more of the grounds for denial, that the court has the 

discretion to deny the motion before holding a hearing on the merits. This section provides 

in part: 

(1) Denial of Motion. The court shall deny the motion, with 

or without a hearing, if the court concludes from the 

record before it that the motion:

(A) was not timely filed and does not show good 

cause for excusing non-compliance with 

subsection (a)(2) of this Rule;

(B) does not substantially comply with the 

requirements of this Rule; or 

(C) does not on its face state a valid defense to the 

validity of the lien or the lien instrument or to the 

right of the plaintiff to foreclose in the pending 

action.

Failure to state a facially valid defense is one of the three grounds for denial at the initial 

determination phase and appears to have been the basis for the trial court’s denying the 

Buckinghams’ motion.4

 Section 14-211(b)(2), however, requires that the court hold an 

 

4 The other two grounds for denying a motion without holding a hearing on the 

merits are (A) untimely filing without good cause; and (B) failure to comply with the 
-8- 

evidentiary hearing on the merits if none of the three grounds for denial provided in 

subsection (b)(1) are present. 

(2) Hearing on the Merits. If the court concludes from the 

record before it that the motion:

(A) was timely filed or there is good cause for 

excusing non-compliance with subsection (a)(2) 

of this Rule, 

(B) substantially complies with the requirements of 

this Rule, and

(C) states on its face a defense to the validity of the 

lien or the lien instrument or to the right of the 

plaintiff to foreclose in the pending action, the 

court shall set the matter for a hearing on the 

merits of the alleged defense. The hearing shall 

be scheduled for a time prior to the date of sale, 

if practicable, otherwise within 60 days after the 

originally scheduled date of sale. 

(Emphasis added). If the court finds that the motion was timely, complies with the 

requirements of the Rule, and states a valid defense, then an evidentiary hearing on the 

merits is required before the circuit court makes a final determination on whether to grant 

or deny the motion. 

 

requirements of the Rule. The trial court in this case did not specify its basis for denying 

the Buckinghams’ motion. Based on the record, however, we agree with the Buckinghams 

that the trial court appeared to conclude that there was good cause for the untimely filing 

and that the motion complied with the requirements of the Rule. Therefore, it seems plain 

that the trial court denied the motion for failure to state a valid defense to validity of the 

deed or the right to foreclose and we will proceed to analyze that decision. 
-9- 

The text of the Rule does not make explicit what level of “particularity” is required 

for a defense to be deemed valid on its face and trigger an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 

But the fact that an asserted defense must be “accompanied by any supporting documents 

or other material in the possession or control of the moving party,” Rule 14-211(a)(3)(C), 

leads us to believe that bare assertions of a broad defense to the validity of a lien instrument 

will not be sufficient. The requirements of stating a defense with particularity and 

supporting those assertions with any available evidence leads us to conclude that, under 

Rule 14-211, the pleading standard is more exacting than the pleading standard for an 

initial complaint. 

We hold that under Rule 14-211, a party must plead all elements of a valid defense 

with particularity. To give content to this phrase, we find instructive the particularity 

requirement for pleading fraud-based claims in Maryland. Maryland courts have long 

found that fraud must be alleged with particularity. See, e.g., McCormick v. Medtronic, 

Inc., 219 Md. App. 485, 527 (2014). This Court has described the meaning of the 

particularity requirement: 

The requirement of particularity ordinarily means that a 

plaintiff must identify who made what false statement, when, 

and in what manner (i.e., orally, in writing, etc.); why the 

statement is false; and why a finder of fact would have reason 

to conclude that the defendant acted with scienter (i.e., that the 

defendant either knew that the statement was false or acted 

with reckless disregard for its truth) and with the intention to 

persuade others to rely on the false statement. 
-10- 

Id. at 528. We further held that “vague allegations fail to meet the standard of 

particularity.” Id. In the context of Rule 14-211, we hold that particularity means that each 

element of a defense must be accompanied by some level of factual and legal support. 

General allegations will not be sufficient to raise a valid defense requiring an evidentiary 

hearing on the merits. We will apply this understanding of the pleading standard under 

Rule 14-211 to the two defenses raised in the Buckinghams’ motion. 

II. Forgery

We turn first to question of whether the Buckinghams’ motion to stay the sale and 

dismiss the foreclosure due to the alleged forgery of the 1997 deed of trust states a valid 

defense under Rule 14-211(b). The Buckinghams argue that their allegation that the 

signature on the deed of trust was not Elizabeth Buckinghams’ was sufficient to compel 

the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of their forgery defense. The 

Trustees argue that the Buckinghams’ motion did not state a facially valid defense because 

they did not allege or provide support to show that the purportedly non-authentic signature 

was not ratified or authorized by Elizabeth. 

A. Standard of Review

Before addressing this, however, we note that there is a disagreement between the 

parties as to what standard of review we must apply in reviewing the decision of the circuit 

court. Because we are asked to answer a question of law—whether Buckinghams’ motion 

stated a forgery defense with sufficient particularity—we review the trial court’s denial of 

the motion for whether it is legally correct. Cf. RRC Northeast., LLC v. BAA Maryland, 
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Inc., 413 Md. 638, 644 (2010) (“Upon appellate review, the trial court’s decision to grant 

[a motion to dismiss] is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct.”). 

In making this determination, we reject the Trustees’ contention that this case should 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. While the denial of an injunction is 

typically reviewed under that standard, Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 243 (2011), the 

Buckinghams are not asking us to review the substance of the trial court’s ultimate decision 

to deny injunctive relief. Rather, they are asking us to determine whether Rule 14-211 

required a hearing on the merits before the decision was made. This is a legal question of 

whether the Buckinghams satisfied the pleading standard under Rule 14-211. If we 

determine that the Buckinghams pleaded their forgery defense with sufficient particularity, 

then the circuit court had no discretion to decline to hold the hearing under Rule 14-211 

and there is no discretion to which we can properly defer. Therefore, we review the circuit 

court’s decision to decline to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits to determine 

whether or not it was legally correct.

B. Sufficiency of the Forgery Defense 

Returning to the Buckinghams’ forgery assertion, it should be remembered that we 

are not addressing the question of whether there actually was a forgery of the deed of trust. 

Rather, we are considering whether the Buckinghams’ motion sufficiently stated a valid 

defense to the foreclosure action such that the circuit court was required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the merits before denying it. We have no doubt that a wellarticulated forgery defense could be found under Rule 14-211 to state “on its face a defense 
-12- 

to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument.” We hold, however, that the Buckinghams 

failed to “state with particularity the factual and legal basis” of their forgery defense, as 

required by Rule 14-211(a)(3). We explain. 

Forgery is one of the two principal bases for finding a deed to be void. Scotch 

Bonnett Realty Corp. v. Matthews, 417 Md. 570, 583 (2011). This Court has defined 

forgery as “[1] a false making or material alteration, [2] with intent to defraud, [3] of any 

writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal 

liability.” Harding v. Ja Laur Corp., 20 Md. App. 209, 212 (1974). This definition is the 

general definition of the crime of forgery, but it has also applied to define forgery when 

claimed as a defense to a lien’s validity. Id. at 212. 

The Buckinghams’ motion alleged the first and third elements of a forgery claim, in 

that they have claimed that Elizabeth’s signature on the deed was false. The Buckinghams, 

however, have failed to assert—with particularity or without—the intent to defraud 

element of forgery. In the absence of any allegation and some evidentiary support for the 

existence of an intent to defraud, they have failed to sufficiently allege the grounds for their 

motion, and, as a result, it was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing. 

III. Notice

 The Buckinghams’ second argument is that certain defects in the notice of sale 

constituted a facially valid defense that required an evidentiary hearing on the merits. In 

their motion, the Buckinghams challenged the notice of a sale on two grounds: (1) that the 

notice of sale and the Order to Docket Suit identified different modifications to the original 
-13- 

1997 deed of trust in describing the lien that was the subject of the foreclosure ; and (2) that 

the notice of sale incorrectly stated that the lien being foreclosed on included David 

Buckingham as a party to the lien as the guardian of John Buckingham, despite the fact 

that David was not John’s guardian at the time of the original execution or later 

modifications. The Trustees, on the other hand, argue that the notice complied with the 

requirements for pre-sale notice under Rule 14-210(a) because the notice adequately 

informed the interested parties of the time, place, and terms of the sale, such that they were 

able to protect their interests in the property. 

Maryland Rule 14-210(a) requires a foreclosing party prior to sale to publish notice 

of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Rule 14-210 provides in relevant part that: 

Before selling property in an action to foreclose a lien, the 

individual authorized to make the sale shall publish notice of 

the time, place, and terms of the sale in a newspaper of general 

circulation in the county in which the action is pending. 

The notice must contain a description of the property that is sufficient to enable an ordinary 

person to identify the property and seek further information. Preske v. Carroll, 178 Md. 

543, 547 (1940). 

Although the parties do not dispute that inadequate notice could be a valid defense 

to the right to foreclose, we hold that the Buckinghams failed to sufficiently state that the 

inconsistencies in the Trustees’ notice could be the basis for stay or dismissal of the 

foreclosure action. Rule 14-211 requires that both the “factual and legal” bases of a 

defense be stated with particularity. Although the Buckinghams pointed out 
-14- 

inconsistencies in the notice, they failed to allege with particularity the legal grounds 

pursuant to which the trial court could determine that the notice would prohibit the Trustees 

from proceeding with the foreclosure sale.5

Importantly, the circuit court also delayed the December 19, 2013 sale until copies 

of all filings were sent to Mr. Fogelman. As a result, the sale did not take place until 

January 30, 2014. This presented an opportunity for any confusion regarding the terms of 

the sale to be cleared up. We hold that the circuit court did not err in declining to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the merits based on the arguments presented and the circumstances 

of the case. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the circuit court’s decision to deny the Buckinghams’ motion to stay and 

dismiss the foreclosure sale without a hearing on the merits. The Buckinghams failed to 

plead with particularity the necessary elements of forgery. They also failed to sufficiently 

allege that any defects in the pre-sale notice constituted a defense to the Trustees’ right to 

carry out the foreclosure sale. No evidentiary hearing on the merits was required prior to 

denial under Rule 14-211. 

 

5 Moreover, we are aware of none. It appears to us that despite minor 

inconsistencies, the notice complied with Rule 14-210(a). The notice did, in fact, inform 

the parties of the time, place, and terms of the sale sufficiently to allow them to protect 

their interests in the property, as evidenced by the fact that they filed a motion to stay and 

dismiss the sale before the sale occurred. The rule does not require that the notice perfectly 

identify the lien instrument upon which the sale is proceeding. 
-15- 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLANTS.