NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FOX JOSEPH SALERNO,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. JERRY DUNN; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 17336
D.C. No. 2:13

- cv - 02250

- ROS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 27, 2019 **
Before: WALLACE, FARRIS , and TROTT , Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Fox Joseph Salerno appeal s pro se from the district

co urt’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from his placement in solitary confinement

. We have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e review de novo. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr ., 419

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 29 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 17336

F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Salerno’s due process claim because Salerno failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his designation as a maximum security inmate and resulting placement or maintenance in solitary confinement was not supported by “some evidence.” See Toussaint v. McCarthy , 801 F.2d 1080, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986) (segregation decisions, such as putting a prisoner into solitary confinement, only need to be supported by “some evidence”). Even though Salerno argues that the prison officials improperly considered his suspected gang member status in designating him as a maximum security inmate, he failed to raise a ge nuine dispute of material fact as to whether he would have not been classified as a maximum security inmate and place d in solitary confinement based on facto rs other than his suspected gang member designation

. The district court properly g ranted summary judgment on Salerno’s claim that prison policies designating inmates suspected gang members violated Salerno’s due process rights because Salerno failed to identify a protected liberty interes t implicated by these policies

. See Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 483

- 85 (1995) (a prisoner has no protected liberty interest when the sanction imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship”); Serrano v. Francis , 345 F.3d 1071, 1077

- 78 (9th Cir. 2003) (due3 16

- 17336

proce ss procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”)

. The distr i ct court properly focused the scope of this action on two classification decisions in 2009

. S alerno alleged generally in the operative first amended complaint that his suspect ed gang member designation result ed in him being classified to and maintained in maximum security status for five years

. In response to the district court’s order requesting clarification regarding the scope of the action in preparation for trial, Salerno identified several orders over the course of five years which he contended took into account his suspected gang member status in maintaining his maximum security status. O n the premise that Salerno only alleged that he was labelled a suspected gang member in retaliation for a protected activity that took place in 2009 , t he district court correctly ruled that only two orders from 2009 for med the basis for Salerno’s action

. The district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating trial after it determined that the only issues before the court were issues of law. See City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper , 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (district cou rt “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind , or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient” (citation omitted)) ; see also Switz

. Cheese Ass ’ n, Inc. v. E. Horne ’ s Mkt., Inc ., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966) ( “[T]he denial of a motion for a summary judgment because of4 16

- 17336

unresolved issues of fact does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim. It is strictly a pretrial order that decides only one thing

— that the case should go to trial”)

. Salerno’s allegations that the district court “claimed to have been confused about the nature of the case” is untrue. The tortured journey of this case was caused entirely by Salerno’s constantly changing claims and t heories. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

. AFFIRMED.