alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. %

CASEY TILLISON § IN THE COURT OF

§

v. § CRIMINAL APPEALS

§ RECEIVED IM

THE STATE OF TEXAS § OF TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

JUL 10 2015

Pro Se Motion for Extension of Time

TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW AkeSACOSfa,Gferk

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

COMES NOW the Appellant/Petitioner in the above-styled and numbered cause and

respectfully moves this Honorable Court to extend the time for filing the Appellant's ^tition for

Discretionary Review in this cause and in support thereof would show to the Coun"TneAPPEALS

, „ . JUL 10 Z3^5 following:

1. The style and number of this case in the Court of Appeals, is: CasW $®Mdn,&\eTk

The State ofTexas, Appeal No. 10-14-00403-CR.

2. The style and number ofthe case in the trial court is: The State ofTexas v. Casey

TiUison; Cause No. 36,116-CR; from the 40th Judicial District Court ofEllis County, Texas.

3. The Appellant was convicted of the felony offense of Probation Violation -

Aggravated Sexual Assault Child, a First Degree Felony.

4. Judgment was entered on December 4, 2014 and punishment was assessed at 65

years confinement in the Texas Department ofCriminal Justice—Institutional Division.

5. Trie conviction was affirmed in the Court of Appeals on July 2,2015.

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 1
6. The deadline for filing the Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review in this

cause is August 1, 2015.

7. An extension oftime for a period ofsixty (60) days is requested that would make

the due date August 31, 2015.

8. No prior request for an extension oftime has been made.

9. The facts relied upon to show good cause for the requested extension is, as

follows: The Appellant/Petitioner was represented by court appointed counsel during the appeal

of this case to the Court of Appeals. The Appellant/Pertioner has elected to proceed pro se.

Therefore, additional time is needed for the Appellant/Petitioner to either prepare and file the

Petition pro se or to seek legal assistance in filing the Petition.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Appellant /Petitioner respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court extend time for filing the Petition for Discretionary Review in

this cause to JdJ>^ 3> , 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

TiUison

TDCJ # 01973717

William G. McConnell Unit

3001 S. Emily Drive

Beeville, Texas 78102

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 2

h
\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The Appellant/Petitioner hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Motion has been mailed to the District Attorney, Appellate Division, Ellis County Courthouse,

109 S. Jackson Street, Waxahachie, Texas 75165, and mailed via U.S. mail, to the Office of the

State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711, on the 7?%

day of2utj___, 2015.

Casey TiUison

PRO SE MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - Page 3
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

Order 

July 10, 2015

151479-81 & (51)(52)

SHELBY BAUMGARTNER, LORETTA COLE

and MARGARET SIBLE,

Petitioners-Appellants,

v SC: 151479

COA: 313945

State Tenure Commission:

PERRY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 12-001101-ED

Respondent-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

SARA AUBERT, PHILIP DAVID, PAULA

JUSTIN, KELLEE BEILFUSS, LISA BEILFUSS

and KAREN KNAPP,

Petitioners-Appellants,

v SC: 151480

COA: 314158

State Tenure Commission:

REED CITY AREA SCHOOLS BOARD OF 12-000016-ED

EDUCATION,

Respondent-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

CARMEN ADAMO WRIGHT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v SC: 151481

COA: 314696

State Tenure Commission:

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE FLINT 12-000011-ED

COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,

Respondent-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 10, 2015

t0706

2

Clerk

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. 

The application for leave to appeal the March 12, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals 

is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions 

presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to stay the precedential effect of 

the published opinion of the Court of Appeals is DENIED. 

BERNSTEIN, J., would grant leave to appeal.
- 492 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S 302 N ebraska R eport STATE v . SAVAGE Cite as 302 Neb. 492



### S tate of 

### N ebraska 

### , appellee 

### , v



### . C ourt n ey 

### J. S avage 

### , appella ___ N.W.2d ___ Filed March 15, 2019. No. S-17-1166.

suppleme n tal opi n 

### Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: S us 

### I

. S tro n g 

### , Judge. Supplemental opinion: Former opinion modi

fied. Motion for rehearing overrul Darik J. Von Loh, of Hernandez Frantz, Von Loh, appellant. Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee.
H eavi c a n 

### , C.J., M iller


### - L erma n 

### , C assel 

### , S ta c 

### P

apik 

### , and F reude n berg 

### ,

P er 

### C uriam 

### This case is before us on a motion for rehearing filed by the appellant, Courtney J. Savage, concerning our opinion in State v. Savage , 301 Neb. 873, 920 N.W.2d 692 (2018). We overrule the motion, but we modify the opinion as follows: In the subsection “(a) Authentication,” after the fourth sentence of the fourth paragraph, we insert the following language: As for Savage’s contention that the State did not properly authenticate messages sent to him by others, we again disagree. The State was required only to introduce testi

mony sufficient to establish that the evidence was what Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 04/25/2019 09:07 AM CDT- 493 - N ebraska S upreme C ourt A dva nc e S 302 N ebraska R eport STATE v . SAVAGE Cite as 302 Neb. 492


### the State claimed it to be. The State did not claim that messages sent by others were anything more than mes

sages sent to Savage’s cell phone. See State v. Elseman , 287 Neb. 134, 841 N.W.2d 225 (2014). Savage , 301 Neb. at 885, 920 N.W.2d at 703. In subsection “(b) Hearsay,” following the second to the last paragraph, we insert the following paragraph: We also reject Savage’s argument that text messages sent to his cell phone by unidentified individuals contained inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the mat

ter asserted.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-801(3) (Reissue 2016). Messages sent to Savage’s cell phone were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted. They were offered to prove that the statements were made. Savage , 301 Neb. at 887, 920 N.W.2d at 704. The remainder of the opinion shall remain unmodified. F ormer opi n io n modif 

### M otio n for reheari n g overru
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3566

___________________________

Lisa Murphy

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

Laura B. Sparks

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff

v.

Sheriff Chad Ledbetter, Sheriff, Hot Spring County

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Dr. John Doe, Chief, Hot Spring County

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

George Wright, Jail Administrator, Hot Spring County Jail; Corporal Linda Rowe,

Assistant Jail Administrator, Hot Spring County Jail; Lingo, Sargent, Hot Spring

County Jail; Amy Martin, Correctional Officer, Hot Spring County Jail; Brian

Orel, Correctional Officer, Hot Spring County Jail

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Hot Springs

____________

 Submitted: July 6, 2015

Filed: July 13, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________
Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Lisa Murphy appeals following the district court’s1

 adverse

grant of summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Upon de novo review,

we agree with the district court that Murphy failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies on some claims. See King v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 598 F.3d 1051, 1052 (8th

Cir. 2010) (standard of review; administrative exhaustion). We also find that

summary judgment was proper as to the remaining claims, because, based on our de

novo review of the evidence developed below, see Murchison v. Rogers, 779 F.3d

882, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment standard of review), we cannot

conclude that any defendant violated Murphy’s constitutional rights. The judgment

of the district court is affirmed, and Murphy’s motion for appointment of counsel is

denied. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

______________________________

1

The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

James R. Marschewski, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Arkansas, now retired.

-2-
----

**EXHIBIT      (32)-a**

**Bausch      & Lomb Incorporated**

**Certification      Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,**

**18      U.S.C. Section 1350**

| 1.   | the                Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended                December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission                on                the date hereof (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements                of                Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50919

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUIS GEORGIA-LUCIANO,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-00-CR-1006-1-DB

- - - - - - - - - -

February 15, 2001

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Luis Georgia-Luciano appeals his sentence following his

guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry after deportation in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Georgia argues that his sentence

should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a). Georgia acknowledges that his argument is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224

(1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court

review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
No. 00-50919

- 2 -

Georgia’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres, 523

U.S. at 235. 

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
ACCEPTED

06-15-00095-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

7/10/2015 7:25:19 AM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 7/10/2015 7:25:19 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
#### CARTER BROS., Inc., v. CANNON et al.

Civ. No. 206.

District Court, E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

Oct. 4, 1941.

*175Carmack Waterhouse, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Sam J. McAllester, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendants.

DARR, District Judge.

On several motions filed in this case there have been hearings and briefs submitted. Several questions have been eliminated by stipulations and otherwise.

One question left to be determined is upon objections to interrogatories propounded by the defendants.

The objections to interrogatories Nos. 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39, 45, 47, 51, 55, 59, 63, 67, 71, 75, 79, 83, 87, 91, 95, 99, 103, and 107 are that these interrogatories call for opinions and require plaintiffs to make comparisons of structures.

I think these objections are well taken and they are sustained. Boysell Company v. Colonial Coverlet Co., Inc., D. C., 29 F.Supp. 122; Looper v. Colonial Coverlet Co., Inc., D.C., 29 F.Supp. 125.

Not being sure at this stage of the proceedings as to the relationship of the matters inquired about in interrogatories Nos. 118, 119, 120, 128, and 129, I would be better satisfied to require these questions to be answered.

The objections to these interrogatories are overruled.

It is my judgment that interrogatories Nos. 134, 135, 136, and 137 call for information that is not presently necessary in the litigation. There first should be an adjudication of an infringement before the question of damages is taken up.

The objections to these interrogatories are sustained.

As I understand the other objections to the defendants’ interrogatories have been cured by the stipulations or waived by the plaintiff.

There appears to be a portion of the motion made by the plaintiff to strike and for a bill of particulars left for decision.

A part of this motion is to strike paragraph 9 of the answer. I see no harm in leaving this in at present, and this part of the motion is overruled.

Section 4 of this motion asks that the defendants be required to particularize certain patents referred to as a prior art. The rule seems to be that such defense need not be especially pleaded or particularized. Walker on Patents, Vol. 4, p. 2769 and cases cited.

For this reason this part of the motion to particularize is overruled.

The balance of the motion to strike and for a bill of particulars has been eliminated by stipulations.

Let an order be drawn in accord with this memorandum.
---

Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of mPhase Technologies,
Inc., a New Jersey corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10Q for the quarter
ended March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), I, Martin S Smiley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section
1350), that to his knowledge:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                     
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                 
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.

|/s/ Martin S.
      Smiley | 
|-------------------------- | 
|Martin S .Smiley           | 
|Chief Financial Officer    | 
|                           | 
|May 3, 2011                | 



---
EXHIBIT 21.0
**Subsidiaries of Registrant**
• 2 Quaker Road, Inc., a New York Corporation
• 2 Quaker Road, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company
• 265 Livingston Street Corp., a New Jersey Corporation
• Barr Distribution Company, a Delaware Corporation
• Barr Laboratories, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
• Barr Research, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
• Barr Ventures, LLC. A Delaware Limited Liability Company
• BMI, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
• BRL, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
• Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
• Duramed Pharmaceutical Sales Corp., a Delaware Corporation
• Women’s Capital Corp., a Delaware Corporation
EX-1
#### Chateaugay Ore *&*Iron Co. *v.*Blake.

*(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.*

August 2, 1888.)

1. Error, Writ of—Supersedeas Bond—Condition.

A *super sedeas,*t> ond, conditioned that the plaintiff in error “shall prosecute its writ of error to effect, and answer all damages and costs, if it shall fail to make the plea good, *”*is sufficient.

3. Same—Execution before Entry of Judgment.

A *supersedeas*bond executed before the judgment was in fact entered, but not delivered until after its entry, is valid;-but in order that it may not be open to question, leave will be given plaintiffs in error to execute a new bond *nunc pro tunc.*

On Writ of Error from District Court. Motion to dismiss writ for alleged insufficiency of *supersedeas*bond.

*Chittenden, Townsend & Chittenden,*for plaintiff.

*Matthews <k Smith,*for defendant.

Lacombe, J.

I am informed by the clerk that the *supersedeas*bond is in the form in use in this circuit for many years. The condition, viz., that the plaintiff in error “shall prosecute its writ of error to effect, and answer all damages and costs, if it shall fail to make the plea good,” is in the language of the 1000th section of the Kevised Statutes, and sufficient. As to the objection that the bond is defective because it was executed before the judgment sought to be reviewed by the writ of error was in fact entered, I am also of the opinion that the bond is none the less a valid obligation to respond for failure to make good the writ of error in this suit, the bond not having been delivered till after entry of judgment. Inasmuch, however, as the obligors are not parties to this motion, and this decision will therefore not bind them, and the re*805bpondent being entitled to a security which shall be open to no question, the plaintiffs in error should have a new bond executed and filed *nunc pro tunc.*This may be done within 10 days after entry of this order.
Number of Revenues Mean Median

Gaming Revenue Range Submissions (in thousands) Submissions Revenues (in thousands) (in thousands)

Submissions with fiscal years ending in 2021

$250 million and over 43 20,436,417 8.4% 52.4% $475,266 $351,743

$100 million to $250 million 61 10,111,714 12.0% 25.9% $165,766 $158,513

$50 million to $100 million 57 3,878,555 11.2% 9.9% $68,045 $64,057

$25 million to $50 million 67 2,377,253 13.1% 6.1% $35,481 $33,832

$10 million to $25 million 97 1,657,106 19.0% 4.2% $17,084 $17,300

$3 million to $10 million 76 470,022 14.9% 1.2% $6,184 $6,248

Under $3 million 109 94,519 21.4% 0.2% $867 $613

Total 510 $39,025,585

Submissions with fiscal years ending in 2020

$250 million and over 22 $10,250,430 4.2% 36.8% $465,929 $419,028

$100 million to $250 million 58 $9,667,030 11.1% 34.7% $166,673 $162,040

$50 million to $100 million 43 $3,179,021 8.2% 11.4% $73,931 $73,656

$25 million to $50 million 65 $2,396,995 12.4% 8.6% $36,877 $36,114

$10 million to $25 million 101 $1,646,696 19.3% 5.9% $16,304 $15,721

$3 million to $10 million 94 $566,973 17.9% 2.0% $6,032 $5,714

Under $3 million 141 $125,271 26.9% 0.5% $888 $551

Total 524 $27,832,416

Submissions with fiscal years ending in 2019

$250 million and over 33 $15,629,916 6.3% 45.2% $473,634 $386,381

$100 million to $250 million 62 $10,444,602 11.9% 30.2% $168,461 $165,864

$50 million to $100 million 54 $3,798,391 10.3% 11.0% $70,341 $66,958

$25 million to $50 million 67 $2,360,435 12.8% 6.8% $35,230 $34,292

$10 million to $25 million 97 $1,630,332 18.6% 4.7% $16,808 $16,185

$3 million to $10 million 90 $594,918 17.2% 1.7% $6,610 $6,824

Under $3 million 119 $119,948 22.8% 0.3% $1,008 $721

Total 522 $34,578,542

Submissions with fiscal years ending in 2018

$250 million and over 34 $15,702,390 6.8% 46.6% $461,835 $381,315

$100 million to $250 million 59 $9,658,287 11.8% 28.6% $163,700 $163,221

$50 million to $100 million 52 $3,668,802 10.4% 10.9% $70,554 $68,739

$25 million to $50 million 69 $2,439,840 13.8% 7.2% $35,360 $33,559

$10 million to $25 million 94 $1,554,036 18.8% 4.6% $16,532 $16,277

$3 million to $10 million 91 $590,180 18.2% 1.8% $6,485 $6,675

Under $3 million 102 $106,033 20.4% 0.3% $1,040 $910

Total 501 $33,719,569

Submissions with fiscal years ending in 2017

$250 million and over 33 $15,016,924 6.7% 46.3% $455,058 $363,086

$100 million to $250 million 56 $9,058,782 11.3% 28.0% $161,764 $164,374

$50 million to $100 million 54 $3,767,470 10.9% 11.6% $69,768 $69,893

$25 million to $50 million 68 $2,382,602 13.8% 7.4% $35,038 $32,287

$10 million to $25 million 91 $1,494,558 18.4% 4.6% $16,424 $15,749

$3 million to $10 million 89 $575,005 18.0% 1.8% $6,461 $6,754

Under $3 million 103 $108,586 20.9% 0.3% $1,054 $883

Total 494 $32,403,927

Source: Compiled from gaming operation audit reports received and entered by the NIGC through 5/31/2022.

NIGC Tribal Gaming Revenues

Percentage of
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

FREDDY MARTINEZ, A/K/A FREDYS 

A. MARTINEZ, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 70244 

FILED 

JUL 1 5 2016 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is a pro se appeal from a purported decision denying a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge. 

The documents before this court do not indicate that the 

district court has made any decision, written or oral, on a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, or that any such petition is pending in the district court. 

Thus, appellant fails to designate an appealable order. To the extent 

appellant appeals from the district court's March 22, 2016, order denying 

defendant's motion for production of transcripts at state expense, no 

statute or court rule permits an appeal from such an order. Accordingly, 

we lack jurisdiction, Castillo v, State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 

1135 (1990), and we 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A -2)1 
cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Freddy Martinez 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A cat449 

2