United States Court of Appeals

 for the eighth circuit

 ___________

 

 No. 96-4135

 ___________

 

 United States of America, *

 *

 Appellee, * Appeal from the United

States

 * District Court for the

Western

 v. * District of Missouri.

 *

 Bruce C. Pompey, *

 *

 Appellant. *

 ___________

 

 Submitted: June 10, 1997

 

 Filed: August 1, 1997

 ___________

 

 Before BOWMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit 

 Judges.

 ___________

 

 MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

 

 Bruce C. Pompey appeals from the sentence imposed on him 

 following his plea of guilty to a charge of conspiring to

possess 

 heroin with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 

 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Mr. Pompey believes that the 

 district court erred in increasing his offense level by two

levels 

 for obstructing justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. His plea 

 agreement with the government stated that "[t]he parties agree

that 

 there are no adjustments to be made for obstruction, pursuant

to 

 § 3C1.1," and Mr. Pompey maintains, and the government admits,

that 

 the

 
 

 

 

 

 
 

 government provided information to the probation officer

preparing 

 the presentence report that Mr. Pompey put pressure on his

sister 

 not to testify against him, thus furnishing the basis for the 

 district court's upward adjustment. Mr. Pompey characterizes

the 

 government's action as a breach of the plea agreement and asks

for 

 its specific enforcement, either by remanding for resentencing 

 without the upward adjustment or by imposing a specific

sentence 

 ourselves. We affirm the district court.(1)

 

 We begin our consideration of this case with the

observation 

 that the portion of the plea agreement involved in this case

does 

 not promise anything. The words are declaratory, not

promissory. 

 They might simply be, and are probably best construed as,

statements 

 of law, and, moreover, they are followed immediately by the 

 declaration that "[t]he defendant understands [that] these 

 calculations and estimates are agreements between the parties

only 

 and that the Court is not bound by them."

 

 Mr. Pompey argues, however, that the words fairly imply a 

 promise on the government's part not to seek an upward

adjustment in 

 his sentence for an obstruction of justice. The government 

 seemingly agrees with this position, but believes that it

discharged 

 its obligation by not requesting the upward adjustment at the 

 sentencing hearing. Mr. Pompey, however, evidently maintains

that 

 the government's obligation under the agreement extended to the 

 point that it was not supposed to supply information to the

court 

 that might support a finding that he obstructed justice.

 

 We are not disposed to imply such a promise from the words

of 

 the plea agreement, not just because we think, although we do,

that 

 it would be difficult to argue that they will support such an 

 implication, but also because it is not to be supposed that

parties 

 to a plea agreement would contract to keep information relevant
to 

 sentencing from the court. We therefore decline to imply the

kind 

 of promise that Mr. Pompey

 

 (1) The Honorable D. Brook Bartlett, Chief Judge, United

States 

 District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

 

 -2-

 

 

 

 

 
 

 believes the words of his plea agreement will support. Even if

we 

 were to do so, we would not be inclined to enforce such a

promise 

 specifically, it being contrary to public policy if not to law,

and 

 the most relief that we might give Mr. Pompey would be to allow

him 

 to withdraw his guilty plea, a remedy that he has specifically 

 eschewed before the court.

 

 Mr. Pompey also argues that the conduct in which he

engaged did 

 not amount to an obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1

provides 

 for a two-level adjustment to the offense level "[i]f the

defendant 

 willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or

impede, 

 the administration of justice during the ... prosecution ... of

the 

 instant offense." In this case, Mr. Pompey wrote several

letters to 

 his sister urging her not to testify against him, and

indicating 

 that he could not be convicted without her testimony. Mr.

Pompey 

 points out correctly that he made no threats and that in United 

 States v. Emmert, 9 F.3d 699, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 

 513 U.S. 829 (1994), we upheld denial of an adjustment for 

 obstruction of justice when the defendant had admonished a 

 government witness to "stay strong" and "be quiet." But we did

so 

 because we believed that the sentencing court correctly

concluded 

 that the defendant's statement was not sufficiently unambiguous

to 

 warrant an adjustment. Mr. Pompey's letters, in contrast, are 

 hardly ambiguous. In them, he repeatedly urges his sister and 

 coconspirator Alicia Pompey not to testify against him. We

think 

 that this is a clear attempt to impede her testimony and thus

impede 

 the administration of justice. The public is entitled to the 

 truthful testimony of citizens who witness crimes, and Mr.

Pompey's 

 letters can easily be read as encouraging his sister to make

herself 

 unavailable when her testimony was needed.
 

 Mr. Pompey argues that he did no more than a lawyer might

have 

 done in advising a client to invoke her Fifth Amendment right

to 

 remain silent. It is a sufficient answer to this argument,

although 

 there are others as well, that one of Mr. Pompey's suggestions

was 

 that his sister plead guilty "but don't come to trial against

us." 

 In such

 

 -3-

 

 

 

 

 
 

 a circumstance, having already pleaded guilty, Ms. Pompey would

no 

 longer be entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.

 

 A true copy.

 

 Attest:

 

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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