IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jimi Rose, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 738 C.D. 2021

: Submitted: January 21, 2022

David Piperato, Superintendent; :

Easton Area School Board; :

Easton Area School District; :

and Carl Peterson, Deceased :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE CEISLER FILED: April 21, 2022

Jimi Rose appeals, pro se, from the January 14, 2021 Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Northampton County (Trial Court), which sustained the 

Preliminary Objections filed by David Piperato, Superintendent, Easton Area School 

Board, Easton Area School District, and Carl Peterson, Deceased (collectively, 

School District), to Mr. Rose’s “Petition for High School Diploma Which the 

Petitioner was Wrongfully Deprived Of By the Aforementioned Respondents” 

(Petition) and dismissed the Petition with prejudice. Because we agree with the Trial 

Court that Mr. Rose’s Petition is time-barred, we affirm.

Background

On July 16, 2020, Mr. Rose filed his pro se Petition in the Trial Court, alleging

that the late Carl Peterson, then-Principal of Easton Area High School, wrongfully 

prevented Mr. Rose from receiving his high school diploma in 1961. The Trial Court 

summarized the facts averred in the Petition as follows:
2

The underlying facts of [Mr. Rose’s] lawsuit involve him 

allegedly being deprived of a diploma from Easton Area High School 

in 1961. According to the [Petition], [Mr. Rose] was a student there 

when he was called out of class one day to go to . . . [Mr.] Peterson’s 

office, where his mother was waiting. At that time, [Mr.] Peterson was 

the principal of the school. In his [Petition], [Mr. Rose] acknowledges 

that [Mr.] Peterson is now deceased. [Mr. Rose] alleges that [Mr.]

Peterson suggested to [Mr. Rose’s] mother that she withdraw him from 

school, which she then did. [Mr. Rose] repeatedly asserts that he was 

removed from school for making people laugh. [Mr. Rose], who is an 

African American, believes that he was asked to leave school because 

of his race and in violation of his civil and due process rights. After 

those facts are alleged, [the Petition] devolves into a retelling of [Mr. 

Rose’s] life story, including various incidents that happened before and 

after he left high school. From what relevant details can be gleaned 

from the [Petition], [Mr. Rose] was arrested for the first time a few 

months after leaving school. He then spent years in trouble with the 

law and in and out of prison. [Mr. Rose] believes that if he would have 

received his high school diploma, his life would have turned out 

differently. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/21, at 2-3.1

With regard to his legal claims, Mr. Rose averred as follows:

Even though this [c]ase is not a [f]ederal [c]ase as of yet, [Mr. 

Rose] maintains that at all times relevant his [c]ivil [r]ights and 

[l]iberties were taken away from him by the late High School Principal 

Carl Peterson. 

. . . .

[Mr. Rose] was the victim of w[a]nton, willful, intentional and 

deliberate [c]ivil [r]ights [v]iolations which occurred in the County of 

Northampton, Pennsylvania at the instructions [sic] of the late Carl 

Peterson, Principal of the Easton Area High School in the year 1961.

1 The factual averments in Mr. Rose’s Petition comprise 140 numbered paragraphs.
3

These [c]ivil [r]ights [v]iolations occurred and were wrongfully 

inflicted upon [Mr. Rose] without one single iota of a [r]ight to have a 

[h]earing []or the [r]ight to be [h]eard []or the [r]ight to [c]onsult 

[c]ounsel in the [c]ourse of being stripped of his [r]ights to have an 

[e]ducation which is guaranteed to every American citizen under the 

Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment of the United States 

Constitution.

Pet. at 1 (paragraph numbers omitted). Mr. Rose requested the following relief:

Wherefore, [Mr. Rose] seeks $20,000 for every year he was held out 

of school from then until now and, he seeks $50,000 in punitive 

damages for every year he [w]as [d]enied a [h]igh [s]chool [d]iploma. 

The alternative is for [Easton Area High] School to give [Mr. Rose] a 

[h]igh [s]chool [d]iploma, which would allow [him] to go seek [c]ollege 

[c]ourses and to restore [him] and make him whole.

Id. at 22 (bold in original).

On September 8, 2020, School District filed Preliminary Objections to the 

Petition, seeking dismissal under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) for legal insufficiency. 

School District asserted that Mr. Rose’s civil rights claims were barred by the twoyear statute of limitations, because he did not file his Petition until 59 years after he 

was allegedly forced to withdraw from high school.

2

On January 14, 2021, after briefing by the parties, the Trial Court issued an

Opinion and Order sustaining School District’s Preliminary Objections and 

dismissing the Petition with prejudice. The Trial Court determined that Mr. Rose’s 

right to challenge his removal from high school on civil rights grounds began to run 

in 1961, so the two-yearstatute of limitations expired in 1963. Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/21, 

2

“Although the statute of limitations is to be pled as new matter, it may be raised in 

preliminary objections where the defense is clear on the face of the pleadings and the responding 

party does not file preliminary objections to the preliminary objections.” Petsinger v. Dep’t of 

Lab. & Indus., Off. of Vocational Rehab., 988 A.2d 748, 758 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Here, the Trial 

Court concluded that the statute of limitations defense was clear on the face of the Petition, and 

Mr. Rose did not file preliminary objections to School District’s Preliminary Objections.
4

at 5. The Trial Court also found that Mr. Rose did not articulate any legitimate 

reason for his 59-year delay in filing suit. Id. While Mr. Rose claimed that he did 

not discover who was responsible for his removal from high school until May 2018,

the Trial Court found that his claim was belied by the averments in the Petition, 

because Mr. Rose alleged that he was present when Mr. Peterson asked his mother 

to withdraw him from school. Id. In any event, even assuming that Mr. Rose did 

not learn of Mr. Peterson’s identity until May 2018, the Trial Court concluded that 

the Petition was still time-barred, because Mr. Rose filed it more than two years 

later, on July 16, 2020. Id. Mr. Rose now appeals to this Court.

3

Analysis

On appeal, Mr. Rose first asserts that the Trial Court erred in sua sponte

“changing” his Petition to a complaint “without first consulting with [Mr. Rose] and 

getting [his] approval.” Rose Brief at 1; see id. at 2 (asserting that “nowhere in the 

United States has a [j]udge, sua sponte, taken a [p]etition and converted it into a 

[c]ivil [r]ights [c]omplaint”). In essence, Mr. Rose argues that because he titled his 

filing a “Petition,” rather than a “Complaint,” the statute of limitations does not bar 

his claims for relief. We disagree.

This Court has defined a “petition” as “a written application made to a court, 

or addressed to some governmental authority ex parte, praying for the exercise of 

some action laid before it, or seeking the grant of a privilege, or license.” Koken v. 

Reliance Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 588, 591 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 

3 When the Trial Court dismisses a complaint on preliminary objections, our appellate 

review is limited to determining whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion. Laskaris v. Hice, 247 A.3d 87, 89 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). In considering preliminary 

objections, the court must accept as true all well-pled material facts and all reasonable inferences 

deducible therefrom. Id. A preliminary objection should be sustained only when it is clear and 

free from doubt that the facts pleaded are legally insufficient to establish a right to relief. Id.
5

893 A.2d 70 (Pa. 2006); see Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.1 (stating that a “petition” is “an 

application to strike and/or open a default judgment or a judgment of non pros” and 

“any other application which is designated by local rule [of court]”). A “complaint,”

on the other hand, “is the pleading that initiates an action and sets forth a claim for 

relief.” Koken, 841 A.2d at 591; see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1007 (stating that an action may be 

commenced by filing with the prothonotary either a praecipe for a writ of summons

or a complaint); see also Hartmann v. Peterson, 265 A.2d 127, 128 (Pa. 1970) 

(“Nowhere do the [R]ules [of Civil Procedure] provide for commencing an action 

by a petition.”).

In determining whether to treat a nonconforming filing as a complaint, we 

must consider whether the filing bears the form and substance of a complaint. For 

example, in In re Montgomery, 445 A.2d 873, 873-74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), the 

solicitor for the county prothonotary filed a document titled “Petition for Counsel 

Fees” in the trial court, requesting an award of “reasonable counsel fees” for 

representing the prothonotary during the prior year. The trial court granted the 

petition, and the county appealed. Id. at 874. On appeal, this Court reversed, stating:

First, the gravamen of [the] petition was that [the petitioner] was 

entitled to compensation for services—a claim properly pursued in an 

action at law against the county. As such it would be governed by 

[Pa.R.Civ.P.] 1007 requiring actions at law to be brought by praecipe 

for a writ of summons or a complaint or an agreement for an amicable 

action. A petition for an order is not a praecipe, complaint or 

agreement and the petition in this case should have been dismissed. We 

do not think that the invocation of this rule in this case is an act of 

exalting form over substance . . . because the petition in this case had 

none of the ingredients of a complaint and no response in the form of 

an answer or other adversarial pleading was invited or made.

Id. (emphasis added).
6

Here, unlike the petition for counsel fees in Montgomery, Mr. Rose’s Petition

bore the hallmarks of a complaint in an action at law. First, the Petition included a 

Notice to Defend. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1018.1 (requiring that “[e]very complaint filed 

by a plaintiff . . . shall begin with a notice to defend”). Second, the averments in the 

Petition demonstrated Mr. Rose’s intent to initiate a cause of action against School 

District for the violation of his civil and due process rights. See Pet. at 1, 22. Third,

the Petition included a request for damages in the amount of “$20,000 for every year 

[Mr. Rose] was held out of school” and “$50,000 in punitive damages for every year 

he [w]as [d]enied a [h]igh [s]chool [d]iploma.” Id. at 22. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that the Petition, though improperly labeled, was

effectively a complaint initiating a cause of action against School District. See 

Koken, 841 A.2d at 591 (recognizing that a “complaint is the pleading that initiates 

an action and sets forth a claim for relief”). In fact, in his Response to School 

District’s Preliminary Objections, Mr. Rose repeatedly referred to his Petition as a 

“Complaint.” See Resp. to Prelim. Objs. ¶¶ 2, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, & 24. Therefore, 

we conclude that the Trial Court properly treated Mr. Rose’s mis-styled “Petition”

as a complaint. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/21, at 1 n.1; Trial Ct. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Stmt., 3/9/21, at 2.

Next, Mr. Rose asserts that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Petition as 

untimely because the two-year statute of limitations for a civil rights claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) did not apply to his Petition. Rather, he baldly asserts 

that “there is no [s]tatute of [l]imitations on the [r]ight to have a diploma.” Rose Br.

at 6.

Section 1983 allows a private citizen to challenge conduct by a state official 

who has allegedly deprived him of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides:
7

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 

other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but merely 

serves as a vehicle or . . . ‘device’ by which a citizen is able to challenge conduct by 

a state official whom he claims has deprived or will deprive him of his civil rights.” 

Urbanic v. Rosenfeld, 616 A.2d 46, 52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), aff’d, 631 A.2d 596 (Pa. 

1993). With regard to the pleading requirements for Section 1983 claims, our Court 

has explained:

Although a plaintiff is not required to set forth the statute by stating a 

“Section 1983” cause of action in his complaint, to maintain such an 

action, a plaintiff is required to allege first that a person or persons 

deprived him of some cognizable federal right, privilege or immunity, 

and second, that the person or persons deprived him of that right while 

acting under color of state law.

Clark v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 691 A.2d 988, 990-91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (emphasis 

added).

Based on the averments in the Petition, we conclude that, even though Mr. 

Rose did not specifically reference Section 1983, the gravamen of his Petition was a 

Section 1983 civil rights cause of action. Mr. Rose averred that he “was the victim 

of w[a]nton, willful, intentional and deliberate [c]ivil [r]ights [v]iolations which 

occurred in the County of Northampton, Pennsylvania at the instructions [sic] of the 

late Carl Peterson, Principal of the Easton Area High School in the year 1961.” Pet. 

at 1 (emphasis added). He also averred that he “had his [c]ivil [r]ights and 

[l]iberties [d]enied to him by a [s]chool [p]rincipal who was at all times relevant 
8

[a]cting [u]nder the County Charter and [u]nder [c]olor of [s]tate [l]aw.” Id. at 21-

22 (emphasis added). These allegations fall squarely within the framework of a 

Section 1983 claim. Cf. Clark, 691 A.2d at 990-91; Urbanic, 616 A.2d at 52 (“To 

hold a person liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant 

was acting ‘under color of law.’”).

It is well settled, however, that civil rights claims under Section 1983 are 

subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Burger v. Borough of Ingram, 697 A.2d 

1037, 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997); see Fleming v. Rockwell, 500 A.2d 517, 520 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1985) (“Even assuming [the a]ppellants could make out a sufficient cause 

of action under Section 1983, any such civil rights action [they] could have brought 

is . . . time-barred because, in Pennsylvania, a two-year statute of limitations applies 

to civil rights actions brought under Section 1983.”) (emphasis added).

Here, the alleged civil rights violations occurred in 1961. Mr. Rose did not 

file his Petition until 2020, 59 years later. In response to School District’s 

Preliminary Objections, Mr. Rose asserted that he did not discover the facts 

underlying his cause of action until May 2018. Br. in Support of Resp. to Prelim.

Objs. ¶¶ 6-8; see id., Ex. A.4 However, the Trial Court correctly found that this claim 

was belied by the averments in the Petition, because Mr. Rose alleged that he was 

present in the room when Mr. Peterson asked his mother to withdraw him from 

school. See Pet. at 2. Even if Mr. Rose somehow did not discover Mr. Peterson’s 

4

In his response to the Preliminary Objections, Mr. Rose asserted that he did not know Mr. 

Peterson’s identity until he spoke with an attorney about the matter in October 2019. See Br. in 

Support of Resp. to Prelim. Objs. ¶ 2. However, Mr. Rose appended to his brief a letter that he 

sent to School District on May 30, 2018, wherein he specifically identified Mr. Peterson as the 

person who threw him out of school. See id., Ex A.
9

identity until May 2018, as he claims, the Petition was still untimely, because Mr. 

Rose filed it more than two years later, on July 16, 2020.

5

Furthermore, to the extent Mr. Rose’s Petition alleges due process violations, 

those claims also fail. See, e.g., Pet. at 2 (averring that Mr. Peterson deprived Mr. 

Rose of his civil rights “without . . . the [r]ight to have a [h]earing or the [r]ight to 

[p]rocess an [a]ppeal,” thereby violating his “[d]ue [p]rocess [r]ights”); id. at 21-22 

(referencing the due process clause). Our Court has explicitly declined to create a 

private cause of action for money damages based on a state constitutional violation. 

See Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (en banc) (“To 

date, neither Pennsylvania statutory authority, nor appellate case law has authorized 

the award of monetary damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); 

see also R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Off. of Mental Health, 936 

A.2d 1218, 1226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover 

money damages for an alleged violation of her state constitutional rights). In his 

Petition, Mr. Rose sought damages in the amount of “$20,000 for every year [Mr. 

Rose] was held out of school” and “$50,000 in punitive damages for every year he 

[w]as [d]enied a [h]igh [s]chool [d]iploma.” Pet. at 22. Consequently, we conclude 

that he failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim for money damages.

6

5

In his appellate brief, Mr. Rose admits that, had he filed a civil rights complaint in federal 

court, his complaint would have been time-barred, asserting that he “is very familiar with [f]ederal 

[l]aw and [he] would never file a [c]omplaint because[] he was taught by the Honorable Judge 

Legrome Davis of the United States District Court that any [c]ivil [r]ights [v]iolations must be 

brought within two years.” Rose Br. at 16; see also Rose Reply Br. at 3 (asserting that if he had 

filed a Section 1983 complaint, his “argument would have been that the [s]tatute of [l]imitations 

was tolled until [he] knew that he was injured and that his injuries were proximately caused by 

[School District’s] conduct”).

6

In his appellate brief, Mr. Rose asserts that he “simply want[s] an order directing the 

school officials to give [him] a [h]igh [s]chool diploma.” Rose Br. at 9. However, in his Petition, 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
10

Conclusion

We agree with the Trial Court that Mr. Rose’s Petition was patently timebarred. While we certainly empathize with the struggles and challenges Mr. Rose 

has experienced throughout his life, as described in his Petition, he offers no 

plausible explanation as to why he waited 59 years to file this lawsuit. See 

Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 257 A.3d 766, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2021) (“Statutes of limitations are intended to keep stale claims out of [the] courts.”). 

Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

he specifically requested monetary damages and only requested the issuance of a diploma in “the 

alternative.” Pet. at 22.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jimi Rose, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 738 C.D. 2021

:

David Piperato, Superintendent; :

Easton Area School Board; :

Easton Area School District; :

and Carl Peterson, Deceased :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of April, 2022, we hereby AFFIRM the January 14, 

2021 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County. 

_____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge