J-S59023-11

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

ELTON EUGENE HILL, :

:

Appellant : No. 646 MDA 2011

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 27, 2006,

Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County,

Criminal Division at No. CP-22-CR-0001407-1998

BEFORE: PANELLA, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015

Appellant, Elton Eugene Hill (“Hill”), appeals the order dated December 

27, 2006 denying his petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (“PCRA”). Pursuant to an opinion issued on 

November 21, 2014, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s previous 

decision. Commonwealth v. Hill, 104 A.3d 1220 (Pa. 2014). On remand, 

we affirm the trial court’s order.

In our prior decision, we set forth the following relevant factual and 

procedural history of this case:

In the early morning of April 8, 1998, intruders 

broke into the home of Mark and Kim Davis and 

threatened the Davis’ young children with a baseball 

bat. One of the intruders, James Purcell (“Purcell”) 

raped Ms. Davis. Mr. Davis was able to subdue 

Purcell and call the police. He left his teenage son to 

guard Purcell while he ran outside to pursue Hill, age 

17 at the time, whom he saw sitting in a car at the 
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bottom of his driveway. Mr. Davis followed Hill in an 

attempt to get a license plate number, but Hill 

turned his car around and attempted to run Mr. 

Davis off the road.

On April 21, 1998, detectives from the Derry 

Township Police Department, including Detective 

Daniel Kelly (“Detective Kelly”), arrived at Hill’s 

parents’ home where Hill resided. Detective Kelly 

asked Hill to meet him at the police station. Upon 

his arrival at the police station, the police escorted 

Hill to an interrogation room to await the arrival of 

his parents. When they arrived and joined Hill, 

Detective Kelly read a form containing his Miranda1

rights and gave Hill and his parents a chance to 

consult privately. Detective Kelly then presented 

them with a two-part form, the top part entitled 

“Constitutional Rights (Adults)” and the bottom 

“Waiver of Rights Miranda Warnings.” Hill’s parents 

signed the top part of the form but not the bottom 

part, and Hill did not sign either part. Detective 

Kelly testified, however, that both Hill and his 

parents verbally agreed to consent to an interview 

without the presence of an attorney. N.T., 4/25/06, 

at 106. At the conclusion of the interview, Detective 

Kelly arrested Hill, and three days later (on April 24, 

1998), the Commonwealth filed a criminal 

information charging Hill with various criminal 

offenses.2 Hill’s parents then retained an attorney, 

Herbert Goldstein (“Attorney Goldstein”).

On April 25, 1998, Hill was transported from county 

prison back to the police station. Attorney Goldstein 

met with Hill and advised him that he was about to 

be taken downstairs for a polygraph examination and 

that he should tell the truth.3 Attorney Goldstein, a 

representative of the district attorney’s office, and 

Detective Joseph Steenson (“Detective Steenson”), 

the polygraph examiner, met to determine and agree 

on the questions to be asked during the polygraph 

examination. At the outset of the polygraph 

examination, with Detective Kelly present (but 

without Attorney Goldstein), Detective Steenson read 
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Hill a form that contained a recitation of his Miranda

rights, which Hill then initialed and signed. That 

form, however, has apparently been lost and is not 

part of the certified record on appeal. Detective 

Kelly soon left the room and the polygraph 

examination proceeded to conclusion. Attorney 

Goldstein sat outside the examination room for some 

period of time, but went back to his office prior to 

the completion of the polygraph examination and did 

not return.

At the conclusion of the polygraph examination, 

Detective Steenson asked and received a short 

written statement from Hill. After a break, Detective 

Kelly re-entered and Detective Steenson left, at 

which time Detective Kelly proceeded to interrogate 

Hill. Detective Kelly did not ask questions from 

those approved by Attorney Goldstein prior to the 

polygraph test, but rather testified that his 

interrogation involved a comparison between Hill’s 

answers during the polygraph test with those made 

during the prior April 21, 1998 interrogation with his 

parents present. Id. at 122. At trial, Detective Kelly 

testified that Hill began to cry uncontrollably, made 

incriminating statements, and drew diagrams of the 

crime scene. N.T., 11/18/98, at 283 ff., 297-98. 

On November 20, 1998, a jury found Hill guilty of 

the above-referenced crimes. On March 15, 1999, 

the trial court sentenced Hill to serve an aggregate 

term of not less than 186 months and not more than 

1008 months of incarceration in a state correctional 

institution. On March 7, 2001, this Court affirmed 

Hill’s judgment of sentence, and on November 7, 

2001, our Supreme Court denied Hill’s petition for 

allowance of appeal. 

On May 29, 2002, Hill filed a pro se PCRA petition. 

In February 2003, appointed counsel filed a petition 

to withdraw. On January 29, 2004, the PCRA court 

dismissed Hill’s pro se PCRA petition, but after an 

appeal by Hill’s privately retained counsel, on April 7, 

2005, this Court vacated the PCRA court’s dismissal 
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of Hill’s pro se PCRA petition.4 On April 25, 2006 and 

July 27, 2006, the PCRA court held evidentiary 

hearings, and on December 27, 2006 the PCRA court 

again dismissed Hill’s PCRA petition. On February 9, 

2007, Hill’s counsel filed a statement of matters 

complained of on appeal, but failed to docket an

appeal. On November 15, 2010, Hill filed a new pro 

se PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On November 22, 

2010, the PCRA court appointed Hill new counsel, 

and on March 23, 2011, reinstated Hill’s right to file 

an appeal to the December 2006 dismissal of his 

PCRA petition. 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

 These charges included burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3502, aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702, 

simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701, possession of

an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907, 

possession of a prohibited weapon, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

908, criminal conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, and 

recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2705.

3

 Attorney Goldstein testified that he indicated to Hill

that “this is a lie detector test and you take the test 

and you tell the truth.” Id. at 17. Hill similarly 

testified that Attorney Goldstein’s “exact words were 

‘Just tell the truth and you will be fine. Go 

downstairs with the officer and I’ll see you later.” 

Id. at 71.

4

 Of relevance to the present appeal, in response to 

Hill’s claim that his constitutional rights to counsel 

had been violated, we indicated that “the state of the 

record has not been developed sufficiently” and that 

“[Hill] must be afforded the opportunity to fully 

develop this claim with the assistance of counsel.” 

Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 349 MDA 2004 (Pa. 

Super. April 7, 2005) (unpublished memorandum).
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Commonwealth v. Hill, 42 A.3d 1085 (Pa. Super. 2012), reversed, 104 

A.3d 1220 (Pa. 2014). 

On March 1, 2012, this Court reversed the trial court’s order denying 

Hill’s requested PCRA relief, id., but on November 21, 2014, our Supreme 

Court reversed and remanded this case for further consideration in 

accordance with its decision. Commonwealth v. Hill, 104 A.3d 1220 (Pa. 

2014). On remand, we again consider the two issues raised by Hill on 

appeal:

1. Whether [Hill] was deprived of his constitutional 

right to effective assistance of counsel when his trial 

counsel failed to file a motion to suppress [Hill’s] 

statement on 21 April 1998 as a violation of 

Miranda and its progeny.

2. Whether [Hill] was deprived of his constitutional 

right to effective assistance of counsel when his trial 

attorney abandoned [Hill] at a critical stage in the 

proceedings and when trial counsel failed to file a 

motion to suppress [Hill’s] post-polygraph statement 

on 25 April 1998 as a violation of [Hill’s] right to 

counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution as well as Article I Section 9 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Hill’s Supplemental Brief at 4. In accordance with this Court’s order dated 

December 31, 2014, the parties have filed supplemental briefs addressing 

these issues in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.

When reviewing an order of a PCRA court, our standard of review is 

limited to whether the determinations of the PCRA court are supported by 

the evidence of record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Lesko,
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923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007). Our scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court level. 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.3d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010)). The PCRA 

court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding 

on this Court. Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. 

Super.) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011)), 

appeal granted, 105 A.3d 658 (Pa. 2014). 

Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the defendant bears the 

burden of proving ineffectiveness. Burt v. Titlow, __ U.S. __, __, 134 

S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-

90 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1137 (Pa. 2009) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (Pa. 2007)). The 

test for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel is the same under both 

the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 936 A.2d 12, 19 (Pa. 2007). To obtain relief on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show (1) that there is 

merit to the underlying claim; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for 

his/her course of conduct; and (3) that the ineffectiveness resulted in 

prejudice to the appellant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 

997, 1018 (Pa. 2007). The failure to satisfy any one of the prongs of the 
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test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires rejection of the claim. 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). Trial counsel 

will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. 

Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 304 (Pa. 1999).

For his first issue on appeal, Hill contends that while at the Derry 

Township police station on April 21, 1998, he was subjected to a custodial 

interrogation that occurred in the absence of a valid waiver of his Miranda

rights. Hill’s Supplemental Brief at 24. Hill notes that neither he nor his 

parents completed the written waiver of rights form, as only some portions 

of the form were signed before Lieutenant Kelly began an interrogation. Id.

at 28. In particular, there is no signature in response to the question, 

“[k]nowing these rights, are you willing to answer any questions without the 

presence of a lawyer?” N.T., 4/25/2006, at 110. 

As a general rule, because of the inherently coercive nature of police 

custodial interrogation, statements elicited from an accused in that 

environment are inadmissible unless the accused was informed of and 

voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination and the right to 

counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 471–79 (1966); 

Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 401–03 (Pa. 2001); 

Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1179-80 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(“Statements made during custodial interrogation are presumptively 

involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of her Miranda rights.”) 
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(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 30 (Pa. Super. 2008)),

appeal denied, 2015 WL 1997695 (Pa. April 22, 2015). Waiver is made 

voluntarily if the decision to make it is the product of a free and 

unconstrained choice. Commonwealth v. O'Bryant, 388 A.2d 1059, 1062 

(Pa. 1978). 

In determining whether a waiver is valid, a suppression court looks to 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. DeJesus, 787 

A.2d at 402–03; Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1066 (Pa. 

2013), cert. denied sub nom., Lyons v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1792 

(2014). This Court recently summarized relevant Pennsylvania law 

regarding the waiver of Miranda rights as follows:

We begin by noting that “[i]t is the Commonwealth's 

burden to establish whether [a defendant] knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In order 

to do so, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that 

the proper warnings were given, and that the 

accused manifested an understanding of these 

warnings.” [Commonwealth v.] Baez, 21 A.3d 

[1280,] 1283 [(Pa. Super. 2011] (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 

1122, 1135–36 (2007) (citation omitted)). The basic 

precepts regarding what constitutes a sufficient 

waiver of Miranda rights have been defined through 

a line of cases beginning with Commonwealth v. 

Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309, 1314 (1979) 

(plurality opinion). In that plurality opinion, our 

Supreme Court rejected the more lenient Federal 

constitutional rule that a defendant can implicitly

waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an 

explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Id. at 

1314 (emphasis added); see also North Carolina 

v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 
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286 (1979) (holding that under Federal constitutional 

law, an implicit waiver of Miranda rights could be 

found where an accused expresses an understanding 

of his rights and gives a statement without expressly 

waiving the same). Our Supreme Court elaborated 

that an “explicit waiver” meant “an outward 

manifestation of a waiver such as an oral, written or 

physical manifestation.” Id. at 1314 n.11. 

In Commonwealth v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355, 639 

A.2d 763 (1994), the Court applied Bussey without 

acknowledging its limited precedential value as a 

plurality decision. There, the Court found that the 

defendant had “explicitly waived” his Miranda rights 

by “clearly and unequivocally” indicating that he 

understood his rights and then responding to the 

officer's questions. Id. at 770. In other words, the 

defendant's conduct “clearly manifested an intent to 

waive his rights.” Id. Similarly, in Commonwealth 

v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), our 

Supreme Court held that the defendant's twice 

stating he understood his Miranda rights after they 

were read to him, and answering questions 

immediately thereafter, sufficiently “manifested the 

intent to waive his rights.” Id. at 844 n.13. Finally, 

in Baez, this Court relied on all of the above-cited 

Supreme Court cases in concluding that the 

defendant had sufficiently manifested his intent to 

waive his Miranda rights where those rights were 

read to him, he indicated one time that he 

understood them, and then he answered the 

questions asked by police. Baez, 21 A.3d at 1286.

Commonwealth v. Cohen, 53 A.3d 882, 885-86 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The PCRA court reached the following findings of fact relevant to 

whether Hill waived his Miranda rights before the interrogation on April 21, 

1998:

(3) The police did not begin questioning [Hill] until 

his parents arrived.
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(4) After [Hill’s] parents arrived, Lieutenant Daniel 

Kelly read the Miranda warnings to [Hill] and his 

parents. The police then withdrew and gave [Hill] 

time alone to consult with his parents.

(5) After [Hill] had consulted with his parents alone 

for about fifteen (15) minutes, [Hill’s] father 

summoned the police officers back into the room. 

[Hill] and his parents indicated that they would 

consent to an interview of [Hill]. [Hill] then orally 

indicated that he understood his Miranda rights and 

was willing to submit to questioning. Lieutenant 

Kelly inadvertently failed to obtain a signed waiver 

from [Hill].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/06, at 2-3. Based upon these findings of fact, the 

PCRA court concluded that Hill “was properly advised of his rights by the 

police and thereafter knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily consented” to 

questioning. Id. at 5. 

The certified record supports these findings of fact. At the PCRA 

hearing, Lieutenant Kelly testified as follows:

Q. Did you read that warning form to Mr. and Mrs. Hill 

in the presence of their son? Did you give them 

private time to discuss the matter?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What happened – by the way, how long was that 

private time?

A. I would estimate about 15 to 20 minutes.

Q. Where you and the other officers when they were 

having their quiet time?
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A. We were across the hallway in our office. I believe 

Mr. Hill came out and got us when they were done 

with their quiet time.

Q. Who was in the room during the time when you and 

other officers left the room where [Hill] was?

A. Just [Hill] and his parents, his mother and father.

Q. What happened after the elder Mr. Hill summoned 

you back into the room?

A. Myself and Detective Coulter went back into the 

room. They indicated that they understood the 

Miranda rights and that they were willing to let their 

son speak to – with us. It was at that time on the 

top portion of that form were it says, I believe, 

Constitutional Rights and in parenthesis it says 

“adult,” that portion is for the concerned adult to 

sign that they understand their constitutional rights 

and they consent to the interview.

I had Mr. and Mrs. Hill – I read that to them and 

they did understand their rights and they signed. 

The Xs you see beside their names on the top 

portion of that form are Xs that I myself had put on 

those lines prior to walking back into the room. 

When they signed, it was my error. I failed to have 

them sign again on the bottom. It is kind of 

redundant, but that’s the way the form was. And I 

failed to have them sign the second time at the 

bottom.

Q. You put the tiny little Xs on the line where the 

person is supposed to sign?

A. Correct.

Q. After you read all those rights to [Hill], the II – after 

their quiet time, did he gave [sic] an indication as to 

whether or not he was willing to speak to you on this 

subject?
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A. Yes, he did.

Q. What did he indicate?

A. He indicated that he understood his rights and that 

he would speak without the presence of an attorney.

Q. At any point during the interview on April 21, did 

[Hill] invoke his rights to silence?

A. Never.

Q. Did he invoke his right to counsel?

A. No, never.

Q. Did he bring up – use the word “attorney” at any 

point?

A. No, he never requested – it was never requested, 

never mentioned.

Q. With regards to his parents, at no time during the 

April 21 interview did his parents ever indicate a 

desire to end the interview or have an attorney 

present?

A. No, they never did.

N.T., 4/25/2006, at 101-03; see also N.T., 11/18/1998, at 269. 

Hill and his parents offered strikingly different testimony regarding the 

events of April 21, 1998 at the PCRA evidentiary hearing. Hill testified that 

he and his parents asked for an attorney but the police summarily denied 

the request, telling them Hill did not need one. Id. at 67. Hill also testified 

that because he thought he needed an attorney, he did not sign the waiver 

form. Id. Hill’s mother similarly testified that the police informed them that 
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they did not need an attorney and proceeded to interrogate her son. Id. at 

57-58. Hill’s father testified that he signed the top portion of the waiver 

form but refused to sign the bottom portion because he insisted that his son 

needed a lawyer before any questioning. Id. at 94. He testified that he put 

“X”s on the form next to any line requiring a signature for the waiver of 

Miranda rights, indicating his intent to demonstrate an objection to the 

interview without an attorney present (and to prevent a signature from 

being added by someone else at a later time). Id. at 95.

In its findings of fact, the PCRA court found Lieutenant Kelly’s 

testimony regarding the events of April 21, 1998 to be more credible than 

that of Hill and his parents. As indicated hereinabove, the PCRA court 

makes the credibility determinations and, so long as supported by the 

certified record, they are binding on this Court. Medina, 92 A.3d at 1214-

15. Because Lieutenant Kelly’s testimony amply supports the PCRA court’s 

findings of facts, they are binding here and establish that Hill sufficiently 

manifested his intent to waive his Miranda rights on April 21, 1998. Hill’s 

first issue on appeal thus lacks any merit. 

For his second issue on appeal, Hill argues that in connection with the 

polygraph examination on April 25, 1998, he executed only a limited waiver 

of his constitutional right to counsel restricted solely to the polygraph 

examination itself, and that as a result the post-polygraph interrogation was 

neither consensual nor voluntary. Hill’s Supplemental Brief at 22. 
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The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in its 1982 

decision in Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam).1 In Wyrick, 

the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 

that effectively established a bright line rule that defendants must always be 

re-advised of their Miranda rights before a post-polygraph interrogation 

commences. Id. at 47. In Wyrick, the defendant requested the polygraph 

examination, the post-polygraph interview was conducted by the same 

person who had conducted the polygraph (after he had merely switched off 

the polygraph machine), and the written waiver he signed included language 

much broader than typically contained in a standard Miranda waiver. Id. at 

43-47. Specifically, in addition to the standard Miranda warnings, the 

waiver form also advised the defendant as follows: “If you are now going to 

discuss the offense under investigation, which is rape, with or without a 

lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time or 

speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver 

certificate.” Id. at 44. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth 

Circuit’s suggestion that the government should have reminded the 

defendant of his Miranda rights before proceeding to any post-test 

 

1

 Although Wyrick involved the issue of waiver of the defendant’s Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel, in light of the Supreme Court’s ‘subsequent 

decisions in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) and Montejo v. 

Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), the decision in Wyrick applies equally to 

possible waivers of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well.
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questioning. Id. at 46-47. The Supreme Court ruled that whether Fields 

had waived his right to counsel at a post-test examination had to be based 

upon the “totality of the circumstances,” and that the facts as presented 

demonstrated that new Miranda warnings were not necessary. Id. at 47-

48. 

In our prior decision in this case, we focused our attention principally 

on the breadth and scope of the waiver signed by Hill prior to the polygraph 

examination, following a number of federal and state rulings interpreting and 

applying Wyrick. See, e.g., United States v. Gillyard, 726 F.2d 1426 

(9th Cir. 1984) (standard Miranda warnings, rather than more expansive 

language in the Wyrick warning, did not permit post-polygraph 

interrogation); United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 921 n.4 (3d Cir. 

1987) (“[A]ppellant signed waiver forms which strongly suggested that the 

waiver of rights was applicable only to the polygraph examination.”); United 

States v. Leon–Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 111-12 (1st Cir. 2000) (despite 

signing two waivers, appellant “did not mean he knowingly and intelligently 

waived his rights for post-polygraph questioning.”); Monroe v. Coplan, 

2007 WL 3264853, at *10 (Kan. App. October 11, 2007) (“Unlike the 

situation in Wyrick, the waiver in the present case did not make it clear that 

Mr. Downing would be subject to further questions after finishing the 

polygraph examination.”). We considered it significant that Attorney 

Goldstein pre-approved the questions to be asked during the polygraph 
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examination, as this effort largely served to establish the scope of the 

examination, and thus the scope of the waiver executed in connection 

therewith.

In reversing our decision and remanding the case back to this Court, 

however, our Supreme Court emphasized that to give sufficient “heed to the 

High Court’s teaching in Wyrick,” our principle focus should be on the

continuity of the interrogation at the conclusion of the polygraph 

examination. Hill, 104 F.3d at 1242. 

Thus, there is force in the Commonwealth's 

argument that the panel should have focused on 

factors such as the continuity of the interrogation on 

April 25th, a circumstance dispelling concerns of the 

staleness of the warnings, and the fact that, despite 

being expressly made aware of his rights (including 

the “right to have an attorney present to speak with 

before and during questioning if you so desire” ... and

acknowledging that he understood those rights, 

appellee never invoked them.

Id.

Regarding the continuity of the interrogation after Detective Steenson 

completed the polygraph examination, the PCRA court made the following 

relevant findings of fact:

(11) [Hill] executed a written waiver of his Miranda 

rights, although that written waiver cannot presently 

be located.

(12) [Hill] submitted to a polygraph examination 

and was informed by Detective Steenson that he had 

failed the examination. Immediately after the 

polygraph examination, Detective Steenson and 
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Lieutenant Daniel Kelly interviewed [Hill]. [Hill] 

made incriminating statements in this interview. The 

statements made to Detective Steenson and 

Lieutenant Kelly were part of the interview to which 

[Hill] submitted as part of the Miranda waiver.

(13) [Hill] never invoked his right to silence or to 

counsel during the interview on April 25, 1998.

(14) The police officers made no threats or promises 

to [Hill] before or during the interview.

(15) Attorney Goldstein anticipated that the 

polygraph process would include a pre-test interview 

and a post-test interview, as was customary in such 

cases.

(16) Attorney Goldstein did not insist on being 

present for all aspects of the polygraph process as 

he was aware that if he did so, the polygraph would 

not be administered. Attorney Goldstein determined 

that taking the polygraph was in his client’s best 

interests based on [Hill’s] assertion of innocence, 

and the facts of the case as outlined by [Hill] to his 

said counsel.

(17) The pre-test and post-test interviews by 

Lieutenant Kelly and Detective Steenson were part of 

the polygraph process.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/06, at 2-3. 

The testimony of Lieutenant Kelly at the PCRA hearing supports these 

findings of fact. N.T., 4/25/06, at 105-06, 117-19. Importantly, Lieutenant 

Kelly testified that Hill indicated that he understood his rights and did not, at 

any time on April 25 (before or after the polygraph examination), ask to end 

the questioning or request a lawyer. Id. at 106. Hill testified to the 

contrary, including that when Lieutenant Kelly began the post-polygraph 
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interrogation he (Hill) inquired regarding Attorney Goldstein’s whereabouts 

and was informed that he was not at the police station. Id. at 73. At trial, 

Hill testified that Lieutenant Kelly ignored his request to have Attorney 

Goldstein present and continued to ask him questions. N.T., 11/19/1998, at 

513. Again, however, it was within the PCRA court’s province to make 

credibility determinations, and on this point the PCRA court credited 

Lieutenant Kelly’s testimony over Hill’s. Medina, 92 A.3d at 1214-15. We 

also note that at trial, Hill acknowledged that he understood that he had the 

right not to answer Lieutenant Kelly’s questions and was free to stop the 

interrogation at any time. N.T., 11/19/98, at 608.

The PCRA court’s findings of fact regarding the continuity of the postpolygraph interrogation, which are adequately supported by the certified 

record on appeal, are sufficient to provide a basis for the PCRA court’s 

conclusion Hill knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made his April 25, 

1998 post-polygraph statement to Lieutenant Kelly. Trial Court Opinion, 

12/27/06, at 5. Accordingly, based upon our standard of review, we will not 

disturb the PCRA court’s determination that Hill’s second issue on appeal is 

without merit and the PCRA court did not err in dismissing the PCRA petition 

for this reason.
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2015