UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RICHARD FELMLEE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

DEFENDANT’S; STATE OF 

OKLAHOMA BUREAU OF 

NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS 

DRUGS; DIRECTOR OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA; OKLAHOMA 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; 

DARREL WEAVER, OBNDD Director; 

SANDRA LAVENUE, Attorney OBNDD; 

JAN PRESLAR, Senior Drug Agent, 

previously named as Melton Edminsten 

Senior Drug Agent; TRACIE MCKEDY, 

Registration Officer previously named as 

Traacy McKedy Registration Officer, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-5142 

(D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00803-CVE-TLW) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 14, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Plaintiff Richard Felmlee, an Oklahoma physician appearing pro se, filed a 

complaint alleging Defendants—numerous Oklahoma state agencies and officials—

violated his federal and state rights when he was required to pay a fine as a condition 

to renew his state registration to prescribe controlled substances. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the federal claims. It 

dismissed without prejudice the state-law claims, declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. It also denied Plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration. Plaintiff appeals these rulings, as well as the denial of several 

motions. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. 

We briefly recite the facts, which are thoroughly described in the district 

court’s order. Oklahoma law requires persons who dispense or prescribe controlled 

substances to be registered with the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 

Drugs (OBN). See Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-302. An OBN registrant must renew his or 

her registration annually. See Okla. Admin. Code § 475:10-1-9(b). Plaintiff did not 

renew his OBN registration when it expired on October 31, 2008. In September 

2012, Plaintiff applied for a late renewal and submitted late fees. OBN sent Plaintiff 

a notice that it would hold an administrative hearing to give him an opportunity to 

show cause why his registration should be renewed. See Okla. Stat. tit. 63, 

§ 2-303(A) (describing registration requirements), id. § 2-304 (authorizing OBN to 

deny, revoke or suspend registration); id. § 2-305(A) (requiring that show-cause 

order be issued before refusing to renew registration and that administrative hearing 
3 

be held within 30 days of service of the order). It is undisputed that Plaintiff 

attended the hearing and admitted he had prescribed controlled substances twice after 

his OBN registration expired. The hearing officer recommended Plaintiff’s OBN 

registration be renewed on the condition that Plaintiff pay a $2,500 administrative 

penalty for writing a prescription after his OBN registration expired. The OBN 

Director adopted the recommendation. Plaintiff paid all the required fees and the 

penalty, and his OBN registration was renewed. 

Plaintiff then filed suit against the State of Oklahoma, the OBN, the Director 

of the Oklahoma Attorney General’s Office, the Oklahoma Attorney General’s 

Office, OBN Director Darrel Weaver, Oklahoma Assistant Attorney General Janis 

Preslar, OBN Senior Drug Agent Melton Edminsten, OBN Deputy General Counsel 

Sandra LaVenue, and OBN Registration Officer Tracie McKedy. Because Plaintiff 

has been acting pro se throughout this litigation, we and the district court construe his 

pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 

But we cannot read his mind or make legal arguments for him, see Garrett v. Selby 

Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), and in this case we 

must struggle to make sense of his poorly framed allegations. It appears that 

Plaintiff’s grievances are that his registration should have automatically been 

renewed once he paid his renewal and late fees, that he should not have been required 

to attend an administrative hearing, and that the hearing was conducted improperly. 

The district court reasonably construed the complaint as alleging that Defendants’ 

conduct violated his procedural-due-process rights, the federal Controlled Substances 
4 

Act (CSA), the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), Oklahoma’s Uniform 

Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, and Oklahoma’s Model State Administrative 

Procedures Act. 

The district court rejected the CSA and APA claims because these statutes do 

not govern the conduct of Defendants in granting or denying licenses under the state 

licensing statutes. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 823, 824 (vesting registration responsibilities 

under the CSA with the United States Attorney General); 5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (defining 

an “agency” under the APA as “each authority of the Government of the United 

States”). As for Plaintiff’s due-process claims, the district court construed them as 

arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and ruled that none of the Oklahoma state agencies 

and none of the individually named Defendants in their official capacities were 

“persons” subject to § 1983 liability. See Duncan v. Gunter, 15 F.3d 989, 991 

(10th Cir. 1994) (“Neither states nor state officers sued in their official capacity are 

‘persons’ subject to suit under section 1983.”). On the merits of the due-process 

claims against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities, it ruled that 

Plaintiff had been provided due process because the undisputed evidence 

demonstrated that he had been given the requisite notice of the OBN administrative 

hearing and received a fair hearing before an unbiased tribunal, at which he was able 

to present evidence and present his arguments. See LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 

262, 266 (1998) (“The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard.”). The court then exercised its discretion under 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to decline to take supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
5 

state claims. See Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 

1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court . . . 

usually should[ ] decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”). 

II. 

Plaintiff’s opening brief is as difficult to decipher as his pleadings in district 

court. As best we can determine, he is arguing that the district court erred by 

(1) denying his motions for default judgment, for a more definite statement, for leave 

to amend his complaint to add additional parties, and for more time to conduct 

additional discovery; (2) dismissing his due-process claims because he had 

insufficient notice of the OBN hearing and insufficient time to conduct discovery and 

review OBN’s evidence; and (3) dismissing his claims at the summary-judgment 

stage because he wanted a jury trial. His opening brief also includes allegations and 

arguments that we will not address because Plaintiff did not present them to the 

district court.1

 See McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 

2002) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised 

for the first time on appeal.”). We turn to the preserved arguments. 

The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s 

motions. It correctly denied his motion for default judgment because the Defendants 

 1

 Plaintiff submitted a 67-page reply brief on May 26, 2014. But it was due on 

April 20, 2014, and on May 6, 2014, we denied Plaintiff’s May 4, 2014 motion to file 

an oversized reply brief. He did not seek or obtain permission to file an out-of-time 

reply brief. Because the May 26 reply was filed substantially out of time without 

permission and did not comply with the page and type-volume limits of 

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7), the court will not accept it for filing. 
6 

did not, as Plaintiff mistakenly asserts, file an untimely answer. The Defendants first 

filed a motion to dismiss and were not required to file an answer to the complaint 

before the district court ruled on that motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4). The court 

properly denied Plaintiff’s motion requesting the court to explain its orders and 

Defendants’ motions because the orders and motions were clear and unambiguous. 

The court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion to add new parties to his complaint 

because the proposed amendment would neither cure the fatal flaws in the original 

complaint nor add facts sufficient to state any claim for relief. See Hertz v. Luzenac 

Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 2009) (“the trial court may deny leave to amend 

where amendment would be futile” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to take additional 

discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) because he failed to identify any specific facts 

or issues for which he needed additional discovery or to explain how additional 

discovery would enable him to rebut Defendants’ assertion that there were no 

genuine issues of material fact. See Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores, Inc., 779 F.3d 

1184, 1206 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing required substance and specificity of 

Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking additional discovery). 

On the merits, we review the district court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 

1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013). Our review of the record shows that the court correctly 

ruled that the undisputed facts entitled Defendants to judgment as a matter of law on 
7 

all the federal claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (setting forth the legal standard for 

granting summary judgment). Plaintiff was afforded sufficient due process 

throughout the OBN registration renewal process and he has not alleged any 

cognizable CSA or APA claim against Defendants. He was therefore not entitled to a 

jury trial. 

Given the dismissal of all federal claims, it was proper for the district court to 

decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See Smith, 149 F.3d 

at 1156. We also find no error in the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) 

motion for reconsideration. 

We affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons relied on by the 

district court in its well-reasoned Opinions and Orders of September 15 and 

November 3, 2014. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge