NO. 07-11-0423-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AMARILLO 

PANEL B 

MAY 31, 2012 

LATTHEN CHANCE DOUGLAS, 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

_____________________________ 

FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY; 

NO. 21,590-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, PRESIDING 

Memorandum Opinion 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

 Latthen Chance Douglas was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. 

In seeking to overturn that conviction, he 1) challenges the legal and factual sufficiency 

of the evidence, 2) claims the trial court erred in allowing the sexual assault nurse 

examiner to testify beyond her qualifications, and 3) claims he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment. 
2 

Issues 1 and 2 - Sufficiency of the Evidence 

We review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under the same 

standard as discussed in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

Furthermore, appellant was tried for two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Through 

the first, the State alleged that appellant penetrated the child’s sexual organ with his 

sexual organ. Through the second, it alleged that he penetrated her sexual organ with 

his hand, or digitally. The jury acquitted appellant of the former but convicted him of the 

latter. Now appellant claims that “the uncorroborated testimony of an admitted liar”1

was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We overrule the issue. 

 The child victim testified that while appellant was bathing her, he “put his finger in 

[her] private.” When told to stop by the child, he ignored her. Instead, he stated that 

she “had to wash [her] body good.” The testimony of the child complainant alone is 

sufficient to sustain the conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (West Supp. 

2011); Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Glockzin v. State, 

220 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.–Waco 2007, pet. ref’d). To that testimony, we add the 

testimony from other witnesses to the effect that appellant removed the witnesses from 

the bathroom before he began to wash the child and locked the bathroom doors so no 

one could enter. The foregoing constituted some evidence upon which a rational jury 

could find, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant penetrated the child’s sexual organ 

with his hand. And, while there was conflicting testimony and appellant attacked the 

 1

The child testified at trial that she did not report these incidents immediately because she was 

scared her mother would not believe her “because [she] used to lie and steal a lot.” The child was ten 

years old at the time of trial. 
3 

credibility of the complainant, we defer to the jury’s resolution of those matters. 

Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

 Issue 3 – Testimony of Nurse 

Next, appellant questions the trial court’s decision to allow the sexual assault 

nurse examiner to reveal findings from a study to the effect that a child’s vagina could 

reveal no signs of penetration and appear normal despite the child having engaged in 

sexual intercourse. This was purportedly error because the witness was not a 

pediatrician and lacked the qualifications to discuss the article.2 We overrule the issue. 

Before alluding to the study’s findings, the nurse had testified that 1) the absence 

of any trauma to a child’s vagina despite it having been penetrated sexually did not 

mean no penetration occurred, and 2) “[t]ypically in children it’s not very common” to 

have “positive traumatic findings” in a child who has been sexually assaulted. The 

same witness also explained why that was so by describing the physiology of that 

portion of a female’s anatomy and the effect of estrogen on it. No one objected to any 

of that testimony. Nor did anyone contend that the witness was unqualified to utter 

those comments. Thus, the substance of the study admitted into evidence was no 

different than the testimony previously uttered by the nurse. Given that, the decision to 

allow the nurse to reveal the study’s findings was rendered harmless. Coble v. State, 

330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 3030, 

180 L.Ed.2d 846 (2011) (stating that inadmissible evidence may be rendered harmless 

if the same evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection). 

 2

To the extent that appellant complains of the reliability of the study, that complaint does not 

comport with the objections made at trial and has not been preserved. Heidelberg v. State, 144 S.W.3d 

535, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
4 

Issue 4 – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Finally, appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

when his trial counsel opened the door to the admission of evidence previously ruled 

inadmissible. We overrule the issue for the sole reason that nothing of record illustrates 

the reasoning underlying counsel’s actions. Nor does anything of record indicate that 

either trial counsel or the prosecutor had opportunity to explain why counsel did what he 

did. Therefore, we cannot deem his performance inadequate given the tenor of the 

record before us. See Menefield v. State, No. PD-1161-11, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS

570 (Tex. Crim. App. April 18, 2012). And, that there may be no justifiable reason 

supporting counsel’s conduct is of no import at this time. See id. at *5-6 (concurring 

opinion) (questioning the majority for reversing without addressing the intermediate 

appellate court’s conclusion that no reason could justify counsel’s inaction). 

 Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

 Brian Quinn 

 Chief Justice 

Do not publish.