F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C H U C K C L O S E ; L A

D D I E J O H

N D I L L , individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

S O T H E B Y ’ S , I

N C ., a New York corporation, Defendant-Appellee. N o. 16-56234

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-08604- MW F -F F M

T H E S A M F R

A N C I S F O U

N D A T I O N ; C H U C K C L O S E , individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; L A D D I E J O H N D I L L , individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

C H R I S T I E ’ S , I

N C ., a New York corporation, Defendant-Appellee. N o. 16-56235

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-08605- MW F -F F MC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

2

T H E S A M F R

A N C I S F O U

N D A T I O N ; C H U C K C L O S E , individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; L A D D I E J O H N D I L L , individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v

.

E B A Y I N C ., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 16-56252

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-08622- MW F -PL A

O RDER

F iled December 3, 2018

B efore: Danny

J . B o g g s, * J a

y S. B y bee, and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es.

Order

* T h e Ho n o rab le Dan n y J

. B o g g s, Un ited States Circu it J u d g e f o r th e U.S. Co u rt o f

A p peals f o r th e Six th

Circu it, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 3

SUMMARY * *

Attorneys’ F ees

The panel g ranted defendants-appellees’ applications for attorney s’ fees pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6 and the California Resale Roy alties Act
, following the panel’s opinion affirming in part and reversing in p ar t the district court’s dismissal of claims for resale roy alties.

I n Close v

. Sotheby’s, Inc.
, 8 94 F .3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that p laintiffs’ claims for resale roy a lties under the CRRA were ex pressly preempted by

the 1976 Copy

rig ht Act, a nd the p a nel affirmed the dismissal of claims involving
art sales postdating the Copy rig ht Act’s effectiv e d ate o f J anuary 1
, 1978. The panel reversed the dismissal of CRRA claims to the ex tent that they involved sales occurring before J anuary 1, 1978, but after the CRRA’s effective d a t e o f J anuary 1, 1977.

G ra nting the applications for attorney s’ fees, the pane l held that defendants w ere entitled to fees under the CRRA’s fee-shifting provision, which mandates a fee award t o the prevailing party in any action under the CRRA. The p anel rejected plaintiffs’ arg ument that f ees were not available under the CRRA because the effect o f the panel’s deci sion

was to v oid the CRRA, i n cluding its fee-shifting provision. The panel referred t he fee applications to the Appellate Commissioner to calculate the amount of fees to be awarded.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

4

ORDER

I n Close v

. Sotheby’s, Inc.
, 8 94 F .3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018),

we held that p l a i n t iffs’ claims for resale roy alties under the Cal i f o r nia Resale Roy alties Act (“CRRA”) are ex pressly preempted by the 1976 Copy r ig ht Act. W e thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal o f plaintiffs’ claim s that involved
any art sales postdating the Copy rig ht Act’s effective date o f J anuary 1, 1978. W e r e v ersed, h oweve r , the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ CRRA claims to the ex tent t h ey involved sales occurring before J anuary 1, 1978 (but after the CRRA’s effective d a t e of J anuary 1
, 1977), because those claims are not preempted by federal copy rig ht law.

Defendants Sotheby ’ s and eB ay have filed applications for attorney s’ fees pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6. They seek fees under the CRRA fee-shifting provision, which mandates a fee award to the “ prevailing party in any action b r o u gh t under” the CRRA. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3). Plaintiffs arg u e that fees are not avai l able u n der the CRRA because the effect of our decision was to voi d t h e CRRA, including its fee-shifting p r ovi s ion. W e disag ree. We hold that Sotheby ’s and eB ay are e ntitled to fees under the CRRA fee-shifting provision a

nd refer the applications to the Appellate Commissioner to calculate the amount of fees to be awarded.

I

. B ACKGROUND

The backg round o f t his case is detailed in the panel’s opinion. I n brief, the California Resale Roy alties Act of 1976 (“CRRA”) required the seller of a work of fine art o r t he seller’s ag ent to w i thhold 5% of the sale price and pay it to the artist

. C a l

. Civ. Code § 986(a). Artists could bring anC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 5

action to enforce this requir em ent under the following provision:

I f a seller or the seller’s ag ent fails to p a y an artist the amount equal to 5 percent of the sale of a work of fine art by t h e a r t i st or f ails to transfer such amount to the Arts Council, the artist may b r ing an action f or damag es within
t h ree y ears after the d ate of sale or one y ea r after the discovery of the sale, w h i c hever is l o n g er. The prevailing party in any action broug ht under this p arag r aph shall be entitled
to reasonable attorney fees, in an am ount a s determined by

the court.

Id. § 986(a)(3).

Plaintiffs filed this action ag ainst Sotheby ’ s, Christie’s, and eB ay seeking roy alties for resales of artwork dating back
to the CRRA’s J anuary 1
, 1 977 effective date. After c laims involving out-of-state sales were filter e d o u t on dormant Commerce Clause g rounds, see Sam Francis Found. v

. Christies, Inc.
, 784 F .3d 1320, 1 322 (9th Cir. 2 015 ) (en banc), the parties litig ated the claims involving in-state sales. The d istrict court g ranted defendants’ motion to dismiss those cla i m s o n two g rounds: (1) the CRRA claims were preempted, and (2) eB ay was n o t a seller subject to the CRRA.

On appeal, we a ffirmed in part, reversed in part, a nd remanded. Close

, 894 F

. 3d at 1076. W e held that all CRRA claims that involved sales a fter the effective date of the 1976 Copy rig ht Act—J anuary 1, 1978—were ex pressly p reempted by the Copy

rig ht Act’s preemption provision, 1 7 U.S.C.C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

6

§ 301(a). Close

, 894 F

. 3d at 1068–72. W e thus affirmed the district court’s d ismissal of those c laims. B ecause this holding disposed of all claims ag ainst eB ay , we d eclined to rule on eB ay ’s alternative arg ument that it was not subject to the CRRA. I

d. at 1068 n.6.

W e further held that any CRRA claims that involved sales before the 1976 Act’s effective date, to the ex tent they ex ist,

are not ex p ressly preempted, because the operativ e federal law at the time of these sales—the 1909 Copy r ig ht Act—did
not contain an ex press preemption provision. I d

. a t 1072. Nor are such claims barred by conflict preempt i o n

. Id. at 1072– 7 4 (discussing Morseburg v. Balyon

, 6 21 F .2d 972, 977–78 (9th Cir. 1980)). W e thus r e v ersed the district court’s dismissal of any c laims involving sales b etween the CRRA’s effective d ate of J anuary 1, 1977 and the 1976 A ct’s effective date of J anuary 1, 1978—i.e., sales that occurred in 1977. Id. at 1074.

After we denied a petition for rehearing

, Sothe b y ’ s a nd eB ay filed timely applications for a ttorney s’ fees p ursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, seeking fees u nder the CRRA feeshifting provision, Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3). Plaintiffs
oppose these applic a

t i o n s , arg uing that the CRRA fee-shifting provision is preempted b y f e d eral law and that Sotheby ’s is
not a prevailing party

. B ecause this is a diversity case, state law g overns b oth “the rig ht t o fees” a nd “the method o f calculating the f

ees.” Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
, 67 F .3d 1470, 1 478 (9th Cir. 1995). The preemptive effect o f

a federal statute is a question of federal law. See AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 214 (1985).C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 7

I I . ANAL YSI S

The CRRA fee-shifting p r ovision provides: “The prevailing party in any acti o n broug ht u nder this p arag raph shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees, in an amount as determined b y the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3). Three features of this provision are sig nificant. F irst, b y u s i n g the phrase “prevailing party ,” this provision g rants defendants a s well as plaintiffs the opportunity for a fee award. See Jankey v. Lee , 290 P.3d 187, 191 (Cal. 2012). Second, by using the phrase “shall be entitled,” fee-shifting under this provision is mandatory

. See id. at 192; Hsu v. Abbara

, 891 P.2d 8 0 4, 809 (Cal. 1995) (ex plaining that “[ t] he words ‘shall be entitled’”

mean that the court is “ obligated to award a t t orney fees[ ] whenever the statutory conditions have been satisfied”). A nd third, the fee-shifting provision was adde d t o the CRRA in 1982, see 1982 Cal. Stat. 6434, and it applies only to c laims involving sales o f art that occurred on or af t e r J a n u a ry 1, 1983, see Cal. Civ. Code § 986(f). Thus, the only claims that remain pending on rem a n d

— those involving sales in 1977—do not fall within the fee-shifting provision.

Plaintiffs oppose the f

e e applications on two g rounds,

a r gu i n g t h a t t h e C R R A f e e- s h i f t i n g p r o v i s i o n i s unenforceable because it is preempted, and that Sotheby ’s is not a prevailing party . W e address each arg ument in turn.

A. Preemption

Plaintiffs contend that the CRRA fee-shifting provision is preempted and unenforceable. They raise two ar g u m ents: first, that our opinion in this case rendered the CRRA“null and void” and thus there is no surviving attorney s’ fees provision to apply ; and second, that the 1976 Copy rig ht A ctC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

8

i t self preempts the attorney s’ fees provision of the CRRA

. W e disag ree with both arg uments.

1. The CRRA fee-shifting prov i sion is not “null a nd void”

Acc o r ding to plaintiffs, our decision in this c ase means that, as of J a

nu ar y 1
, 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Copy rig ht Act), “the CRRA was null and void and c ould not th e r e after b e enforced” and, according ly

, the 1982 amendments to t h e CRRA are ineffectual because “a

n o n ex istent statute cannot b e amended.” This arg ume n t misapprehends the effect of our decision.

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that the “Constitution, a nd the L aw s o f t he United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof

. . . s h a l l b e t h e

s u preme L aw of the L and.” U.S. Const. art. VI
, cl. 2

. A s a consequence, “J

udg es in every

State shall be bound thereby

, any Thing in the Constitution or L a w s o f a n y S tate to the Contrary notwithstanding

. ” Id. W hen we adjudg e a state law preempted under this provision, w e do not render the law null and void in some ultimate sense, such as a presidential veto; rather, our judg ment renders the law unenfo r c e ab le in the

case before us. W e , a s judg es, cannot e nforce the state law because the “L aws of the United States” are “ s upreme” a nd displace the “L aws of any State to the Contrary .” Id.

The doctrine of preemption therefore provides “a rule of decision” that “instructs co u r t s w hat to do when state a nd federal law c lash.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.
, 1 3 5 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015); see also Gilchrist v. J i m Slemons Imports, Inc.
, 803 F .2d 1488, 1 497 (9th Cir. 1 986) (describing preemption as “a cho i c e

- o f

- l a w q uestion”). W h enC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 9

a state law, “in [ its] application to [ a particular] case, come[ s] into collision with an act o f Cong ress,” the state law “must
y ield to the law of Co n gr e s s .” Gibbons v. Ogden

, 22 U.S. ( 9 W heat.) 1, 210 (1824); cf. M assachusetts v. M

el l o n , 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ( d e s c r ibing the power “to r eview and annul” a statute as “little more than the neg ative p ower to dis r e gard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way of the e n f orcement o f a leg al rig ht”); Marbury v. Madison

, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (ex plainin g t h a t when “both [ a state] law and [ federal law] apply to a particular case,

. . . the court must determine which of t h ese c onflicting rules g overns the case,” enforcing the “superior” law and “ disreg arding” t h e inferior law). The effect o f our judg ment is to render the preempted state l a w inoperative with re s pect to the claims before us. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
, 370 F .3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[ T ] he [ preemption] doctrine g enerally concerns the merits of the c laim itself—namely

, whether it i s viable a nd which sovereig n’s law will g overn its resolution.”).

Holding that a state law is preempted by federal law does not, however, render the entire state law “nonex istent” in the
way that plaintiffs arg ue. T h e s t a te law continues to ex ist until the leg islat u r e that enacted it r epeals it. At the same time, an y portion of the law that is preempted is unenforceable in court u n t i l Cong ress removes the preemptive federal law o r the c o u r t s reverse course on the effect of the federal law. See J onathan F

. Mitchell, The Writo f

- Erasure Fallacy

, 1 04 V A

. L

. R E V

. 933, 953 (2018) (“[ S] tate statut e s that contradict ‘supreme’ federal law continue to e x ist as ‘laws,’ even as they g o un e n f o rced, a nd they would become enforceable if federal law were amendedC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

10

o r r einterpreted to remove the c o nflict.”). 1 Preemption i s

1 W e are aw are t

h at, as f ar b ack a s M

a r b u r y , th ere is l an g u ag e

su g g estin g th at an u n co n stitu t io n al o r p reem

p ted law is “ v o id ” an d m

u st b e treated as “ th o u g h it b e n o t l aw

. ” M a r b u r y , 5 U.S. at 1 77 ; see a lso

, e.g

. , Kewa nee O il Co

. v. Bicro n Co rp

. , 4 1 6 U

. S

. 4 7 0
, 4 7 9 (1 9 7 4) (co n sid erin g w

h eth er a state l aw w as “ v o id u n d er th e Su prem acy Clau se”); C

h i., In d ia n a

p olis, & Lo u isville Ry. Co

. v. H a ckett

, 2 2 8 U .S. 5 5 9
, 5 6 6 (1 9 1 3 ) (statin g th at “ an u n co n stitu tio n al act is n o t a l aw ” an d is

“ i n o perativ e as if it h ad n ev er b een p assed ”); Ex p a rte S ieb o ld

, 10 0 U .S. 3 7 1
, 3 7 6 (1 8 7 9) (“ A n u n co n stitu tio n al law is v o id

, an d is as n o la w

. ” ) ; Du ke En erg

y Tra d in g & M

ktg

., L.L.C. v. D a vis
, 2 6 7 F .3 d 1 0 4 2
, 10 5 8

– 5 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 01 ) ( fi n d in g s tate reg u latio n s “ v o id u n d er th e Su prem acy Clau se”). In d eed , o n e co u rt h as g o n e s o f ar as t o d eclare th at p reem pted
state law s “ are v o id ab in itio .” An tilles C e m e n t Co rp

. v. Fo rtu n o , 6 7 0 F.3 d 3 1 0, 3 2 3 (1 st Cir. 2 0 1 2). S u ch sw eep in g pro n o u n cem en ts m ay

o v erstate th e actu al ef

f ect o f j u d icial rev iew an d th e Su p rem acy Clau se. A f ed eral l aw p assed in v io latio n o f t h e Co n stitu

t io n ’ s p ro ce d u r a l
req u irem en ts m ay b e v o id ab in i tio

, s ee Mester Mfg

. Co

. v. INS
, 8 7 9 F.2 d 5 6 1
, 5 7 0 ( 9 t h Cir. 1 9 8 9 ), b u t state law s th at clash w ith f ed eral law (in clu d in g t

h e Co n stitu

tio n ) m ay b e am en d ed b y th e l eg i slatu re th at

en a c t e d t h em

. It is m o re accu rate to state th at th ese law s are “ w ith o u t ef f ect,” rath er th an treat th em as n o n ex isten t. Cip o llo n e v. Lig gett Grp

., In c. , 5 0 5 U.S. 5 0 4, 5 1 6 (1 9 9 2 ) (q u o tin g Ma ryla nd v. Lo u isia na , 4 5 1 U .S. 7 2 5
, 7 4 6 (1 9 8 1 )); a cco rd Ha r ris ex rel. H

arris v. Fo rd Mo to r Co

. , 1 1 0 F .3 d 1 4 1 0
, 1 4 1 5 (9 t

h Cir. 1 9 9 7 ). P reem

p ted law s are co n stitu

tio n ally

u n en f o rceab le, b u t th ey

are n o t sn ip ped f

ro m th e statu te b o ok s.

Here, t h e CRRA co u ld n o t h av e b een v o i d ab in itio

, b ecau se its ef f ectiv e d ate an ted ated th e ef f ectiv e d ate of th e 1 9 7 6 Co p y rig h t l aw th at p reem p ted i t. T h ere is n o reaso n w h y th e en tire CRRA m ay n o t rem ain on th e b o o k s in Calif

o rn ia u n til Calif

o rn ia ch o o ses to am en d o r rem o v e it. It is tru e th at p ortio n s o f

th e CRRA

are, in ef f ect, d o rm an t—at least u n less

w e rev erse ou r j u d g m en t ab o u t th e preem p tiv e ef f ect o f th e f

ed eral

co p y rig h t law s, t

h e Su p rem e Co u rt rev erses o u r j u d g m en t f or u s, or Co n g ress rem o v es th e p reem p tiv e p ro v isio n o f th e 1 9 7 6 Co p y rig h t A ct or

o th erw i se reco g n izes th e dro it d e su ite

. S ee Clo se , 8 9 4 F.3 d at 10 6 5

– 6 6 (d iscu ssin g sim il a r p ro p o sals). If

, f o r ex am ple, Co n g ress rem o v ed th e p reem p tio n p ro v i sio n f

ro m th e Co p y

rig h t A ct, th e p reem

p ted p o rtio n s ofC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 11

therefore claim-driv e n : when a party successfully invokes preemption a s a defense to a state-law claim

, the court will apply the federal law and the state law will b e disreg a rded to the ex tent the laws conflict. 2

Our opinion in this case made this distinction clear. W e addressed the que s t ion “ w hether plaintiffs’ claims a re preemp t e d b y federal copy rig ht law.” Close

, 894 F .3d at 1064 (emphasis added). Our answer to that question does not control our a

nswer to the que stion whether defendants a re entitled to attorney s’ fees; rather, that question is a matter o f
state law. And nothing in the tex t of the CRRA fee-shifting provision is concerned with how a prevailing party prevailed. Rather, it applies if the “action [ was] brou gh t u nder” the CRRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 9 86(a)(3), which this action indisputably w as. The reason for our dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims is thus irrelevant, a s it does “not affect the character o r ty pe of ac t ion that h as been broug ht.” Tract 19051 Homeowners A ss’n v. Kemp
, 343 P.3d 883, 888 (Cal. 2015). Courts have awarded fees under provisions like this one even when the substantiv e law that houses the fee-shifting provision is inapplicable to the u nderly ing claims. See, e.g. , Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd.

, 611 F .3d 601, 6 14 (9th Cir. 2010); T

r a ct 19051
, 343 P.3d at 889–94 (collecting cases).

th e CRRA w o u ld au to m atically rev iv e; th e CRRA w ou ld n ot h av e to b e

reen acted to b eco m e ef

f ectiv e.

2 In deed

, p reem

p tio n m u s t b e claim

- d riv en , b ecau se “ [p ]reem p t i o n

o rd in arily is an af f irm ativ e d ef

en se f o rf eitab le b y th e p arty en titled to its b en ef it.” S ickle v. To rres Ad

va n ced En ter. So ls., LLC
, 8 8 4 F.3 d 3 38
, 3 4 5 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 1 8 ); see Bra n n a n v. U n ited Stu d

en t Aid Fu n d

s, In c. , 9 4 F.3 d 1 2 6 0
, 12 6 6 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ); Jo hn so n v. Armo red Tra n sp

. o f Ca l., In c. , 8 1 3 F.2 d 1 0 4 1 , 1 0 4 3

– 4 4 (9 th Cir. 1 98 7 ).C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

12

Moreover, plaintiffs’ proposed understanding o f preemption would end up f avoring cer tain defenses over others b y conditioning f ees based on how th e defendant prevailed. W e can easily envision cases in which defendants would forg o a meritoriou s preemption a rg ument in order to preserve the possibility of recovering attorney s’ fees. I n this
case, the rule adva n ce d by plaintiffs would be p a rticularly unfair to eB ay , as we specifically declined to “address eB ay ’s
arg ument that it is n ot subject t o t h e CRRA” g iven our preemption h o lding

. Close

, 894 F .3d at 1068 n.6. I t would be strang e to a llow eB ay to recover a ttorney s’ fees if we h eld that the CRRA is inapplicable to eB ay , but not if we held that the CRRA is unenforceable because it is preempted.

I n sum, we conclude th at our p reemption holding in this

case did not render the CRRA fee-shifting provision “null a nd void.”

2. The CRRA fee-shiftingprovision is not preempted

Plaintiffs also arg ue that the CRRA fee-shifting provision is preempted by the 1 976 Cop y r i ght Act itself. As we

ex p lained in our opinion, two f orms o f preemption a

re

a vailable with respect to the 1976 Copy rig ht Act—ex pre s s preemption a

nd conflict preemptio n

. Id. at 1068. Neither applies here.

F irst, the 1976 Copy

rig h t Act d oes not ex pressly preempt the CRRA fee- s h i f

ting provision. The 1976 Act ex pressly preempts state laws g overning “leg al or equitable rig hts that

are equivalent to an y o f the ex clusive rig h ts within the
g eneral scope of copy

r i ght as specified by section 1 06

. ” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (empha s i s a d d ed). I n other words, “the rig hts a sserted under state law [ must be] equivalent to theC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 13

rig hts c ontained in 17 U.S.C. § 106” for the Act’s preemption provision to apply

. Maloney v. T3Media, Inc.
, 8 53 F .3d 1 0 0 4
, 1010 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The righ t s contained in § 106 a

re the rig hts of r eproduction, preparation

o f derivative works, d istribution, display

, and performan c e. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6). Notably missing is any ment i o n o f attorney s’ fees, which are in fact g overned by a di f f e rent section—17 U.S.C. § 505. The CRRA fee-shifting provision “does n ot fall within the scope o f § 301(a) and therefore is not preempted by the ex press terms of the Copy rig ht Act.” Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W

., Inc. , 786 F .3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2015).

Second, f ee shifting in this case does not conflict with the 1976 Copy

r ig h t Act. Under the CR R A
, f e e shifting applies
to “ a ny action broug ht under this parag raph.” Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3). Under the Copy rig ht Act, f

ee-shifting applies to “any c ivil action under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The applicability o f the two provisions depe n d s o n whether the “action” was b roug ht “under” state or federal law. And h ere, plaintiffs broug ht this a ction under the C R R A

. T he CRRA fee-shifting provision thus applies, and the Copy rig ht Act feeshifting provision does not.

That thi s action involves only state-law c laims disting uishes it f

rom actions broug ht under both federal law and state law. W e have held that a prevailing party in such a

case cannot “resor t t o a state statutory procedure to reach around [ federal-law] attorney s’ fees provisions for fees on [ a federal-law ] c laim .” S.F. Culinary, B artenders & Serv. Emps. W e lfare Fund v. Lucin
, 76 F

. 3d 295, 2 9 8 ( 9 th Cir. 1 996) (emphasis added); c f. Ryan
, 786 F .3d at 762 (n o t i n g that conflict preemption “mig ht” apply in a case involving “a [ state] f ee-shift i n g statute

. . . that permitted a fee award where the Copy

rig ht Act d id not” (emphasis omitted)). TheC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

14

reason is straig htfo r ward—when claims under state law a nd federal law overlap, it is g enerally “impossible to disting uish the fees necessary to d efend ag ainst the [ state-law] cl a i m from those ex pended in defense ag ainst the [ federa l

- l aw] claim.” Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC
, 554 F .3d 742, 745 ( 9 th Cir. 20 0 9 )

. A fee award in this circumstance would
encompass fees for litig ating the federal claim. And g ranting that award under a more g enerous state-law f ee-shifting provision could allow the prevailing party to e v a de the stricter federal-law fee-shifting prov i s ion that would ordinarily apply to the federal claim.

Lucin is instructive. T here, w e held that a request f or fees

u nder a state fee-shifting statute for w ork performed in a n underly ing ERI SA s u i t w as “preempted” by ERI SA’s feeshifting p rovision. 76 F .3d at 2 98. W e d i d not, however, “declare the state statute itself p r e e mpted but o nly any implementation o f it that fails to u se the ap p licable ERI SA standards to determine the propriety of an award of attorney s’ fees for work done in the underly ing ERI SA a ction.” Id. W e thus made clear that “to the e x tent that state law p rovides for attorney s’ fees with respect to a state law action, ERI SA is
not implicated.” Id. And because “ERI SA a ttorney ’s fees provisions d o n o t apply to non-ERI SA actions g enerally

, those provisions likewise do n ot preempt the m g e nerally

. ” Id.

That same principle applies h e r e

. The 1976 Copy rig ht Act’s fee-sh i f

t i ng provision g overns only “action[ s] u nder” the Copy rig ht A ct. 17 U .S.C. § 505. Plaintiffs broug h t their claims ex clusively under the CRRA. T he Copy righ t Act’sC L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 15

fee-shifting provision does not apply to—and has no preemptive effect in—this non-Copy rig ht Act lawsuit. 3

B

. Prevailing Party Status

The CRRA fee-shi fting provision awards fees to a “prevailing p arty .” Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3). Plaintiffs do
not dispute that eB ay is a prevailing party , as w e disposed o f all of the c laims ag ainst eB a y in e B ay ’s favor. See Close

, 894 F .3d a t 1 0 76. Plaintiffs arg ue that Sotheby ’s is not a prevailing party

because the 1977 claims remain p ending on remand. I ndeed, plaintiffs make an abrupt a bo u t-face from their c ontention that defendants “succeeded i n g u tting the entire CRRA, ” now a

rg u ing that they are the prevailing parties because they succeeded in obtaining reversal of some of the previously

dismissed claims.

California courts take a “prag matic approach [ to] determining prevailing party status,” generally looking to “the ex tent to which e ach party has realiz ed its litig ation objectives, whether by judg ment, sett lement or o therwise.” Graciano v. R obinson F

ord Sales, Inc.
, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 281–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ( ci t a t i o ns omitted). And h ere, Sotheby ’s has obtained a judg ment in its favor for all claims involving sales that occurred after J anuary 1, 1978. See Close

, 894 F .3d at 10 7 6. All that remains on remand is the “sliver o f c laims” involving sales that occurred in 1977. Id.
at 1 072. Sotheby ’s is, in any practical sense, a prevailing party

.

3 W e rej ect p l ain tif

f s’ j u d i cial esto p p el arg u m en t, as def en d an ts h av e

n o t tak en “ in co n sisten t p o sitio n s reg ard in g [th eir] en titlem en t to f ees” so

as to b e j u dicially esto p p ed f ro m req u estin g t

h em

. Rya n , 7 8 6 F.3 d at 7 6 3

.C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S

16

Plainti ff

s a rg ue that Sotheby ’s “ cannot be deemed to be
t h e p revailing party ” because of the remanded claims. T h e CRRA fe e

- s h ifting provision, however, applies only to c laims involving sales that occurred after J anuary 1, 1983. See Cal. Civ. Code § 986(f). Sotheby ’s is thus the prevailing party for

a l l of the claims that f

all within the fee-shifting prov i s i o n

. And u n d e r California law, a party who prevails on a feeshifting claim remains a prevailing party “even when such a claim is made with other claims on which attorney fees a re not recoverable.” Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc.
, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 650 (Cal. Ct. A pp. 2015); see Jankey

, 290 P.3d at 198 (“The g eneral rule is that wher e a non-fee-shifting claim overlaps with a fee-shifting claim, it d oes not limit f e e awards under the fee-shifting claim.”). 4 The non-fee-shifting c laims mig ht affect the “ a mount of” the fee award, but they d o n ot neg ate a party ’s “ entitlement to” a f ee award. Graciano
, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 283.

Plaintiffs also contend that “there may b e n o fe e award while, as here, a case is still pending .” B ut California courts, like federal courts, “allow attorney fee awards even where there h as been no decision on the merits.” W inick Corp. v

. Safeco Ins. Co.
, 232 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1 986); accord Anima l Lovers Volunteer A ss’n, Inc. v. Carlucci

, 867 F .2d 1224, 1225 ( 9th Cir. 1989) (“The fa c t [ t h at] the dispute between the parties may continue does not preclude

a fee a wa r d.”). The “case need not be completely f inal” for

4 T h is ru le d isp oses o f plain tif f s’ arg u m en t th at a f

ee aw ard is pro per

o n ly w h en th e p rev ailin g party p rev ails in th e en tire “ actio n .” C alif o rn ia

co u rts h av e ex

p ressly co n sid ered an d rej ected th is arg u m en t, h o ld in g th at th e p h rase “ an y actio n ” in a f ee- sh if tin g statu te “ ref

ers to a n y ‘ cau se of

a c tio n ,’ ” n o t th e en tire law su it. Alema n v. AirTo u ch Cellu la r , 1 4 6 C a l

. Rp tr. 3 d 8 4 9
, 8 6 8

– 6 9 (Cal. Ct. A pp

. 2 0 12 ); see, e.g

. , Ra mo s v. G a rcia
, 2 0 4 Cal. Rp t

r. 3 d 2 1 4 , 2 22 (Cal. Ct. A pp . 2 0 1 6 ).C L O S E V

. S O T H E B Y ’ S 17

fees to be awarded as long as the victory obtained o n the feeshifting claims is “s e cure.” Urbaniak v. Newton
, 24 Cal. R ptr. 2d 333, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitte d ). And here, Sotheby ’ s has obta i n e d a secure victory on all o f the claims for which fees may be awarded.

The cases cited by plaintiffs involve fee requests by a party w h o won a procedural v ictory on appeal that merely continued the litig ation. See Hanrahan v. Hampton
, 4 4 6 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (reversing fee award where the applicants had “no t p r evailed on the merits of any of their claims” on appeal b ut instead only obtaine d a n ew trial); P resley of S

. C a l

. v

. W

helan

, 196 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 983) (declining to award fees for achieving a reversal of summary judg ment). B ut as we h ave ex plained, these cases addressing purely procedural v ictories ar e “ irrelevant” if the prevailing party has “won a determination on t h e merits.” Animal Lovers
, 867 F .2d at 1225. Sotheby ’ s is the “prevailing party ” with respect to all o f the fee-shifting claims and is entitled to a fee award for the work performed on them.

I I I

. CONCL USI ON

Sotheby ’s and eB ay a

re entitled to a fee award under the CRRA fee-shifting p rovision. Their applications for attorney s’ fees (Case No. 16-56234, Dkt. Nos. 72 and 74) a re according ly G RANTED

. 5 W e refer the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to dete r m i n e t h e a p p r o p riate amount of fees to be awarded, subject to reconsideration by this panel. S ee N inth Circuit Rule 39-1.9.

5 P lain tif f s’ m o tio n to strik e d ef

en d an ts’ rep lies in su

p p o rt o f th eir f

ee ap p licatio n s (Case No . 1 7- 5 6 2 3 4 , Dk t. No . 8 2 ) is DENIED

.