alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31(a)

CONSTELLATION ENERGY GROUP, INC.        CERTIFICATION

I,
Mayo A. Shattuck III, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this report on Form 10-K of Constellation Energy Group, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a15(f) and 15d15(f))
for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
March 3, 2006

|/s/MAYO A. SHATTUCK III                                      |  | 
|------------------------------------------------------------ |  | 
|Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer |  | 

---



QuickLinks
August 25,2005 

Via facsimile 9 18-287-47 1 1 

and First Class Mail 

Geoffrey M. Standing Bear, :Esq. 

7 15 Kihekah 

P.O. Box 1049 

Pawhuska OK 74056 

Re: Classification, Nova Gaming Bingo system version 4.2.5.9 

'11,ld Dear Mr. Standing Bear: 

This is in response to your letter of August 16, 2005, on behalf of your client, Nova 

Gaming, and to the request $or the classification of its current Bingo system, version 

4.2.5.9. 

This office issued an opinion letter on April 4, 2005, concluding that Nova Gaming's 

Bingo system version 4.2.0.1 :! was Class 11. Since then, in the ordinary course of 

business, Nova has added features and fixed bugs and is now seeking to place version 

4.2.5.9 in Tribal casinos. We have reviewed a list from Nova of all of the new features 

and bug fixes incorporated into version 4.2.5.9 that were not in 4.2.0.12. We have also 

reviewed a report from BMM test labs, which concludes that none of those modifications 

alters in any way the game play described in our April 4 letter. 

Accordingly, the opinion expressed in our April 4 letter that Nova Bingo system is Class 

I1 applies as well to the Bingo gaming central server file, BGC.EXE, version 4.2.5.9, 

which has an SHA-1 signature of 9064954e3392cd2fia549d68f32cb 15 1 7c8fle6e. 

I recognize that future bug fixes and added features will once again provide your client 

with the problem of having no opinion from this ofice on the classification of the current 

version of its game. My staff and I are currently discussing ways that we might remedy 

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 1441 L St NW, Suite 9100. Washington. DC 20005 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 202.632.7066 WWW.NlGC.GOV 

REGIONAL OFFICES Portland. OR; Sacramento. CA; Phoenix. AZ; St. Paul. MN;Tulsa, OK 
Geoffrey Standing Bear 

P. 2 

this. Please feel free to call Michael Gross, Senior Attorney, at 202-632-7003, so that we 

%d might discuss our ideas with you. 

Sincerely, 

Tn, '3-av 

Penny J. Coleman 

Acting General Counsel 

cc: David Waters, Nova VP Engin'eering
#### SULZBACHER v. TRAVELERS INS. CO.

No. 881.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

May 13, 1942.

*492Miller, Gumbiner, Sheffrey & Van Valkenburgh, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

Mosman, Rogers & Bell, of Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

OTIS, District Judge.

The only purpose of writing any memorandum in connection with these motions is to make clear the court’s position on one matter which was discussed in the argument of counsel. Learned counsel for plaintiff contended that there was no function for the court to discharge in connection with requests for admissions under Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and answers to such requests for admissions. Although counsel has found some district court opinions which appear to support his contention (doubtless they were entirely correct under the particular facts disclosed in the cases involved), he is certainly in error in the abstract proposition he has advanced.

Rule 36 authorizes requests for admissions but only as to “relevant documents” and “relevant matters of fact.” Certainly any party of whom a request for admissions has been made under the rule may challenge the relevancy of the documents and admissions sought'and may do that by motion before answering the request. For example (to take an extreme illustration), if a party should ask his adversary to admit that the moon is made of green cheese the adversary might properly move the court to suppress such a request.

Not only may the court pass upon the relevancy of matters which are sought in a request under Rule 36, but the court also has certain implied powers arising from the investment of the judicial power and of the power to supervise and control the trial of a case in all of its steps. The court should not hesitate to suppress a request for admissions which was absurdly onerous. Undoubtedly there is an implied provision in the rule that it shall be reasonably used and used consistently with the general purposes for which Rules of Civil Procedure were prescribed by the Supreme Court.

I think it is sufficiently debatable with respect to the particular requests to which objection is made by defendant whether they are relevant that the motion to suppress the requests should be overruled. I think also that it is sufficiently debatable whether the responses objected to by defendant in its motion to strike certain responses are within the authorization of the rule that that motion also should be overruled.

Defendant’s motions referred to in the caption of this memorandum are overruled. Exception allowed to defendant. So ordered.
#### VAN HORN v. CHICAGO ROLLER SKATE CO.

No. 53 C 1142.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

Oct. 30, 1953.

Breen, Brumlik & Schaffenegger, Chicago, 111., for plaintiff.

Olson & Trexler, Chicago, 111., for defendant.

LA BUY, District Judge.

Plaintiff herein has filed a motion for a more definite statement as to defend-, ant’s First Defense. Said First Defense alleges the complaint fails td state a claim in either count thereof against these defendants upon which relief can be granted.

It is clear that plaintiff’s choice of motion to accomplish what he desires is improper. A motion for a more definite statement will lie only where the moving party is required or permitted' to file a responsive pleading. Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A. The procedural device to test the sufficiency of a defense is provided by *23Rule 12(f), that is, a motion to strike “any insufficient defense”. However, a court may treat a motion not complying with the rule as though it were properly framed thereunder where no prejudice or harm would result from the court so doing. But, regardless of whether the court considers the instant motion as a motion to strike, it appears that Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanctions the language of the defendant’s First Defense.

Rule 84 provides:

> “The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.”

The rule, as amended in 1948, included as new matter the statement that the forms are “sufficient under the rules”. The notes of the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Amendments to the Rules state with respect to that amendment as follows:

> “The amendment serves to emphasize that the forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient to withstand attack under the rules under which they are drawn, and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to that extent. * * * ”

The insertion of the phraseology “sufficient under the rules” strengthens the conclusion that all forms contained in the Appendix, when properly used, may be relied upon as being invulnerable to attack under the rules.

The court adopts this conclusion with reluctance. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to abstract the vagaries and the mysteries inherent in the old common law system of pleading which served to obstruct the processes of justice and to substitute therefor a system of pleading which would give fair notice to the litigants and to the court of the issues involved in the law suit. Indeed, if the defendant had moved to dismiss the instant complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, he would be required under Rule 7(b) (1) to state with particularity the grounds therefor. It seems logical to the court that whether the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the complaint by way of answer or by way of motion the requirements should be the same.

An order has this day been entered overruling the plaintiff’s motion directed to the First Defense in defendant’s answer.
#### Herbert C. HINDLE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL BULK CARRIERS, Inc., Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Aug. 9, 1955.

William L. Standard, New York City, Lester E. Fetell, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiff.

Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, New York City, Roland C. Radice, New York City, of counsel, for defendant.

DIMOCK, District Judge.

This is a motion for discovery and inspection made by plaintiff pursuant to Rule 34, F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C. All phases of the motion except one were decided during the course of the oral argument. This opinion concerns itself only with the undecided phase of the motion.

Plaintiff seeks permission to board defendant’s ship in order to take photographs and measurements of the area of the alleged occurrence of the accident which is the subject of the action. Defendant consents to this request but conditions its consent upon the demand that each person boarding the vessel pursuant to it deliver to defendant a general waiver of liability. Plaintiff resists the imposition of this condition.

Plaintiff is entitled to the relief which he asks. The only question is whether defendant is entitled to have the relief conditioned upon the waivers.

Defendant says that it is entitled to the waivers and cites orders made by Judge Learned Hand and Judge Edelstein in Jankevics v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., Civ. 50-717, and Continental Grain Co. v. S.S. Kurt Arlt, A. 185-269, respectively, in support of its contention. It is noteworthy that, in Gimenes v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 37 F. 2d 168, where Judge Woolsey carefully considered the problem of inspection of ships by hostile litigants, he laid down many conditions but waiver of liability was not among them. Each of the orders of Judge Learned Hand and Judge Edelstein makes delivery of a waiver a condition of boarding. It does not appear, however, from defendant’s papers whether the plaintiff, in the first case, or the libelants, in the second case, opposed the ships’ imposition of this condition. It has been my experience that plaintiffs usually acquiesce.

*199Defendant argues further that since persons coming aboard its vessel pursuant to an order permitting boarding in aid of discovery would be doing so “on their own business and not that of the vessel”, the owner of the vessel is entitled to protection by way of a waiver of liability. I cannot agree. It is unnecessary to determine now the exact extent of the duty, if any, owed by the ship to persons who come aboard for the purpose of obtaining evidence pursuant to court authority. The extent of that duty, whatever it is, is fixed by law. The ship, by permitting access, is not doing a favor and is in no position to stipulate that, in the event of accident, it shall receive treatment more favorable than that to which it would be entitled by law.

Settle order, embodying the decisions made during the oral argument as well as the decision herein, on notice.
97-250.

#### State v. Williams.

Butler App. Nos. CA96-09-180 and CA96-09-181. On motion to expedite. Motion denied.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 17

- 00093

- CR

Bobby BORDELON

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 16

- 2517

- CV

Honorable William Old, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ALVAREZ

, JUSTICE CHAPA , AND JUSTICE RIOS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED.

SIGNED July 31 , 2018.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
#### Brian O’Lear et al., Appellants, v Boy Scouts of America et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[821 NYS2d 903]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), dated July 5, 2005, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Boy Scouts of America and Suffolk County Council, Boy Scouts of America, which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiffs’ 15-year-old son died while on an overnight boy scout camping trip in December 2000. The decedent drowned as *686he attempted to cross a rain-swollen river. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the respondents, Boy Scouts of America and Suffolk County Council, Boy Scouts of America (hereinafter collectively the BSA), were liable for the decedent’s death based upon a theory of negligent supervision. The BSA moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it did not supervise or control the day-to-day activities of the scout troop or the scoutmasters. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding that the BSA established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. We affirm.

A party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, offering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see *Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; *Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see *Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra).*

In the case at bar, the BSA’s affidavit evidence demonstrated that the BSA did not exercise supervisory control over the troop or the adult leaders who accompanied the boy scouts on the subject trip. In opposition thereto, the plaintiffs failed to raised a triable issue of fact in this regard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the BSA’s motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212; *Pitkewicz v Boy Scouts of Am.—Suffolk County Council,*261 AD2d 462 [1999]; *Alessi v Boy Scouts of Am.,*247 AD2d 824 [1998]; see *also Glover v Boy Scouts of Am.,*923 P2d 1383 [1996]).

The plaintiffs’ remaining contention is without merit. Schmidt, J.P, Santucci, Skelos and Covello, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Georgiana H. Jungels, Appellant, v SUNY Buffalo, Respondent. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

Submitted September 10, 2012;

decided November 27, 2012

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from that part of the April 2012 Appellate Division order as dismissed the appeal *916from the October 2009 Workers’ Compensation Board decision, denied; motion for leave to appeal otherwise dismissed upon the ground that the remaining portions of the orders sought to be appealed from do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.0

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, in his capacity as an officer of Barr
Laboratories, Inc. (the "Company"), for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of his knowledge:

(1) The Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended June 30,
2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 26, 2003

/s/Bruce L. Downey
------------------
Bruce L. Downey
Chief Executive Officer

/s/William T. McKee
-------------------
William T. McKee
Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Barr Laboratories, Inc. and will be retained by Barr Laboratories,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of --

The Boeing Company 

Under Contract No. N00019-07-C-0035 

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 60185 

Andrew E. Shipley, Esq. 

Seth H. Locke, Esq. 

Perkins Coie LLP 

Washington, DC 

E. Michael Chiaparas, Esq. 

DCMA Chief Trial Attorney 

Samuel W. Morris, Esq. 

Trial Attorney 

Defense Contract Management Agency 

Chantilly, VA 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: 11 April 2017 

MARK N. STEMPLER 

Administrative Judge 

Vice Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60185, Appeal of The Boeing 

Company, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals
MAILING ADRESS: NIGC/DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 1849 C Street NW, Mail Stop #1621 Washington, DC 20040 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 

202.632.7066

REGIONAL OFFICES Portland, OR; Sacramento, CA; Phoenix, AZ; St. Paul, MN; Tulsa, OK; Oklahoma City, OK; Rapid City, SD

WWW.NIGC.GOV

July 22, 2021

VIA EMAIL

Douglas Lankford, Chief

Miami Tribe of Oklahoma

PO Box 1326

Miami, OK 743555

dlankford@miamination.com

Re: Miami Tribe of Oklahoma Gaming Ordinance Amendments

Dear Chief Lankford:

This letter responds to your April 26, 2021 request on behalf of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma

(Tribe) for the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) to review and approve the 

Tribe’s proposed amendments to its gaming ordinance. The amendments were adopted by Resolution No. 

21-18 on April 26, 2021 and reflect comprehensive review and revisions.

Thank you for bringing these amendments to our attention and providing us with a thorough 

submission of the Tribe’s gaming laws and regulations. The amended ordinance is approved as consistent 

with the requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the NIGC’s regulations. If you have any 

questions or require anything further, please contact Staff Attorney James A. Lewis at (202) 632-7013.

Sincerely,

E. Sequoyah Simermeyer

Chairman

cc: Jerrod Chester, Senior Compliance, via email at: jchester@miamination.com

 Mary Magnuson, Esq., via email at: mmagnuson@thejacobsonlawgroup.com
NO. CAAP-19-0000502

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

REMAX PROPERTIES, authorized agent for RICHARD K. TAHARA

and MARJORIE T. TAHARA, owners of the subject property,

Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant 

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PUNA DIVISION

(CIVIL NO. 3RC-18-1-1186)

ORDER

(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge)

Upon consideration of the "Motion to Strike or Dismiss

Defendant-Appellant Christopher Young's [(Appellant)] Notice of

Redress to the State of Hawaii Legislature for an Investigation

to Address the Treasonous Acts Did Cause Deprivation of

Appellant's Due Process, Equal Access and Protection of the Law

Committed an Act of Mixed War Against We the People; Appellant is

Requesting the Uniform Bonding Code Information from All Bar

Members Involved in This Case Pursuant to Code 5.2(1)-(6), 5.4,

5.5., Filed on April 14, 2020," and "Motion to Declare

[Appellant] a 'Vexatious Litigant' and Order Requiring

[Appellant] to Post Security," both filed on April 28, 2020, by

Plaintiff-Appellee ReMax Properties, authorized agent for

Richard K. Tahara and Marjorie T. Tahara, the papers in support,

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-19-0000502

07-MAY-2020

09:58 AM
and the record, it appears that on February 28, 2020, the court

dismissed the appeal.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are

dismissed as moot.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, May 7, 2020.

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

Chief Judge

2
Exhibit 23.2CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No.333-05987; No. 333-59941; No. 033-62887, No. 333-69306 and No. 333-123232) of Michael BakerCorporation of our report dated March 15, 2005, except for the restatement described in Note 2 (notpresented herein) to the consolidated financial statements appearing under Exhibit 13.1 of theCompany’s 2005 Annual Report on Form 10-K, as to which the date is August 15, 2006, relating to theconsolidated financial statements which appears in this Form 10-K./s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
No. 4780.

(Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.)

#### JAMES M. FERGUSON vs. McGILVRAY PLUMBING COMPANY.

Zacharie *&*Sneed for plaintiff and appellant.

Thilborger & Duffy for defendant and appellee.

DUFOUR, J.

The plaintiff, an engineer of this city, suns to recover the value of services rendered by him in making plans and estimates of cost for certain pipe work for which defendant bid, and, also, for the price of certain goods furnished him.

The plaintiff testifies positively that the defendant employed him to do the work and the latter as positively denies it.

In corroboration of his claim, McGilvray shows that Ferguson was a competitor of his in bidding on the job, and that it would be unlikely that he should resort to a rival for information and calculation in the premises.

He also shows by the representatives of the two largest supply concerns in New Orleans, the Fire Extinguisher Co. and Ahrens & Ott, Inc., that they furnish such plans and estimates, without cost, to any of their good customers, and had frequently done so for the McGilvray Company.

U/nder the circumstances, we are loath to question the correctness of the findings of fact of the trial Judge, who rejected the plaintiff’s contention.

But we think he overlooked the fact that the defendant makes no denial of plaintiff’s claim for $10.14/100 for *9valves furnished by him, to which he testifies, corroborated by an order in writing from McGfilvray.

November 29, 1909.

Judgment reversed, and it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, James M. Ferguson, and against defendant, McGfilvray Plumbing Company, in the sum of ten 14/100 dollars, with legal interest from September 7, 1907, until paid, defendant to pay the costs of both courts.
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-14-0001025 26-DEC-2014 08:40 AM