COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Fitzpatrick and 

 Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

ARLINGTON RENAISSANCE HOTEL and 

 HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY 

v. Record No. 0176-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION BY* CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

MARIA ESTHER RAMIREZ OCTOBER 24, 1995 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Benjamin J. Trichilo (Trichilo Bancroft, McGavin, 

 Horvath & Judkins, P.C., on briefs), for appellants. 

 (Arturo Hernandez, on brief), for appellee. 

 Arlington Renaissance Hotel and Hartford Underwriters 

Insurance Company appeal a Workers' Compensation Commission's 

award to Maria Esther Ramirez on account of an injury she 

sustained while at work. Appellants maintain that the commission 

arbitrarily disregarded the deputy commissioner's determination 

that Ms. Ramirez was untruthful concerning her injury and that as 

a matter of law Ramirez did not describe a compensable injury. 

 Ramirez, a housekeeper, testified that she was squatting for 

seven to eight minutes cleaning a bathroom and when she stood up 

her left leg was numb. She stated that as she began to walk she 

twisted her left ankle and fell to the floor. The deputy 

commissioner found her not credible because she was confused 

about the date of the injury and because her testimony was 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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different than earlier descriptions of the injury. The primary 

difference was her failure to mention numbness to her employer or 

doctors' confusion over the date of injury. The commission 

reversed the deputy's finding on credibility, and found that 

working in the squatting position caused her leg to go numb, 

which caused her to fall when she walked. On that basis, the 

commission awarded benefits. 

 The appellants argue that the commission arbitrarily 

disregarded the deputy's findings on credibility, and that 

reversal is required by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 

Va. App. 374, 363 S.E.2d 433 (1987). In that case, we held that 

where the deputy's findings are based on a specific, recorded 

observation of a witness' demeanor or appearance, the commission 

cannot arbitrarily disregard such findings. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 

at 382-83, 363 S.E.2d at 437-38. However, the commission may 

reverse a deputy's findings, including a credibility 

determination based on appearance and demeanor, if it articulates 

a basis for its different conclusion that is supported by 

credible evidence in the record. Williams v. Auto Brokers, 6 Va. 

App. 570, 573, 370 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1988). If the deputy's 

credibility determination is based on the substance of the 

testimony or other evidence in the record, the credibility issue 

is "as determinable by the full commission as by the deputy." 

Pierce, 5 Va. App. at 383, 363 S.E.2d at 438. In such cases, the 

commission has no duty to explain its reasons for believing one 

witness over another, although its conclusion must of course be 
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supported by credible evidence. Bullion Hollow Enterprises, Inc. 

v. Lane, 14 Va. App. 725, 729, 418 S.E.2d 904, 907 (1992). 

 Here, the deputy's determination on credibility was based 

primarily on testimony and other evidence in the record, with 

only a passing reference to "the demeanor of the witnesses." The 

commission reviewed the evidence in the record and decided that 

the claimant was credible, rejecting the deputy's finding to the 

contrary because it was influenced by the claimant's confusion 

over the date of injury. While the commission did not 

specifically address the deputy's statement concerning demeanor, 

it was not required to do so because the deputy made no 

"specific, recorded" observation about demeanor. Also, a deputy 

commissioner cannot render his findings of fact unreviewable 

simply by asserting that his conclusion on credibility was based 

on appearance and demeanor. Williams v. Auto Brokers, 6 Va. App. 

at 574, 370 S.E.2d at 323. 

 Here, the commission based its determination that claimant's 

testimony was credible upon a finding that her "description of 

the accident is consistent throughout all reports." Because the 

record does not support a finding that her testimony was 

consistent throughout all reports in the material facts upon 

which claimant relies to support her claim's compensability, we 

reverse. 

 After claimant had discussed her accident with her employer 

and her physician, never mentioning to anyone her leg being numb 

from squatting, her attorney more than a month later, filed the 
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initial Claim for Benefits stating that claimant's leg was numb 

from squatting. Claimant repeated this accident description in 

her testimony, and the commission relied upon it as proof of the 

cause of her fall. 

 We quote from Commissioner Joyner's dissent what the record 

shows regarding the reports of claimant's fall. 

 The employer offered the testimony of Sandra 

Jones, a personnel officer. Jones testified that July 

11, 1993, was a Sunday and that the claimant did not 

work that day. Jones further testified that when she 

reported the accident on July 14, 1993: 

 . . . She told me, she really didn't know what 

happened, just that she had hurt her foot. She 

didn't know how it happened or exactly when it 

happened. Just that she had hurt her foot and she 

was going to the hospital. (Tr. 24) 

 However, Jones acknowledged that the claimant did work 

Monday, July 12, 1993. The Employer's First Report of 

Accident completed by Jones was then made part of the 

record (Tr. 28). That report reflects an accident 

occurring on Monday, July 12, 1993, which was reported 

on Tuesday, July 13, 1993. The report apparently was 

completed on July 14, 1993, and was based on the 

information provided by the claimant. Therefore, at 

this point, one or possibly two accident dates have 

been alleged, with a history that does not include any 

complaints of squatting or numbness. Evidence has been 

offered as to probable dates between July 10 and July 

14. The claimant reported to the employer, as well as 

to Dr. Evans, that she was simply walking out of the 

bathroom or a bedroom when she twisted her foot. She 

offered no rebuttal evidence as to the accident date 

nor any explanation of the various accident dates noted 

above. Neither did the claimant offer any explanation 

as to the incomplete report to the employer and to Dr. 

Evans. The first indication of leg numbness appears in 

the initial Claim for Benefits filed by claimant's 

counsel on August 23, 1993. 

Without the testimony of her leg numbness from squatting, there 

would be no credible evidence to support an award in this case. 
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The proof would be of no more than an unexplained fall which is 

not compensable. Memorial Hosp. v. Hairston, 2 Va. App. 677, 347 

S.E.2d 527 (1986). An unexplained fall is what claimant reported 

at every reported stage until her attorney filed the initial 

Claim for Benefits over a month after the accident. 

 Thus, because the commission's conclusion concerning 

claimant's credibility is not supported by the record, we reverse 

the award and remand the claim for reconsideration of whether 

claimant's testimony supporting the award was credible. 

 Reversed and remanded.