alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3.1



RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

OF

APOGENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.



Pursuant to Section 180.1007 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, these Restated Articles of Incorporation supersede and take the place of the
Corporations heretofore existing Restated Articles of Incorporation and any prior amendments thereto.



ARTICLE 1



The name of the Corporation is Apogent Technologies Inc.



ARTICLE 2



The aggregate number of shares that
the Corporation shall have authority to issue is One Thousand (1,000), consisting of one class only, designated as Common Stock, with a par value of $.01 per share.



ARTICLE 3



The address of the registered office of the Corporation is 8025 Excelsior Drive, Suite 200, Madison, Wisconsin 53717. The name of the Corporations
registered agent at such address is C T Corporation System.



ARTICLE 4



The Bylaws of the Corporation may
provide for a greater or lower quorum requirement or a greater voting requirement for shareholders or voting groups of shareholders than is provided by the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law.



* * *



The undersigned, duly elected and acting Secretary of Apogent Technologies Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, in accordance with
Section 180.1007 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, does hereby certify that:



| | 1. | The name of the Corporation is Apogent Technologies Inc.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The foregoing Restated Articles of Incorporation were approved by the Companys Board of Directors and approved and adopted by its sole shareholder on August 2, 2004 and
contain amendments to the Corporations Restated Articles of Incorporation requiring shareholder approval and said amendments were approved by the Corporations Board of Directors and approved and adopted by its sole shareholder on August
2, 2004 in accordance with Sections 180.1003 and 180.1007 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



---

Executed on behalf of the Corporation and dated as of this 2nd day of August, 2004.



/s/ Michael K. BressonName:

Michael K. BressonTitle:

Executive Vice President  Administration, General Counsel and Secretary


---

This instrument was drafted by, and should
be returned to, Mark T. Plichta, Foley & Lardner LLP, 777 East Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202-5306; telephone number (414) 297-5670.
Exhibit 15.1





May 3, 2010





Securities and Exchange Commission


100 F Street, N.E.


Washington, DC 20549





Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-160994, No. 333-153151, No. 333-142199, No. 333-142202, No. 033-52387, No. 333-127223, No. 333-51418, No. 333-49392, No. 333-47194, No. 333-47665, No. 333-47667, No. 033-52387, No. 033-65932, No. 033-65930 and No. 033-28534).





Commissioners:





We are aware that our reports dated May 3, 2010 on our review of interim financial information of AllianceBernstein Holding L.P. (the “Company”) and AllianceBernstein L.P. for the three-month period ended March 31, 2010 and 2009 and included in the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 are incorporated by reference in its Registration Statements referred to above.





Very truly yours,




/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPNew York, New York
#### JIN XIONG ZHOU, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, Respondent.

No. 05-5059-ag.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 14, 2006.

*65John Z. Zhang, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Kevin J. O’Connor, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, James K. Filan, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Bridgeport, CT, for Respondent.

PRESENT: Hon. THOMAS J. MESKILL, Hon. CHESTER J. STRAUB, and Hon. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Jin Xiong Zhou petitions for review of the BIA’s August 28, 2005 decision affirming Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla’s April 13, 2005 denial of his motion to reopen his exclusion proceedings. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

When the BIA summarily affirms the decision of the IJ without issuing an opinion, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), this Court reviews the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. *See, e.g., Twum v. INS,*411 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir.2005). We review the IJ’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. *See id.*at 58. First, we find that the IJ properly construed Zhou’s second motion as a motion to reopen. In his second motion, Zhou pointed to no errors made by the IJ, as is required for a motion to reconsider, but rather offered a completed asylum application, constituting previously unavailable evidence as required for a motion to reopen. *See 8*C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2), (3).

A petitioner is required to show reasonable cause for his failure to appear in order to reopen his exclusion hearings after an *in absentia*order. *In re N-B-*22 I. *&*N. Dec. 590, 592-93, 1999 WL 157627 (BIA 1999); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B). Zhou claims in his brief to this Court that he was detained by the “snakehead” for over a month, during which he missed his exclusion hearing. We lack jurisdiction to consider this claim because Zhou failed to exhaust it before the IJ or BIA. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); *Gill v. INS,*420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.2005). Indeed, Zhou argued in his brief to the BIA only that he had “no excuse” for his failure to appear.

As an alternative to rescinding his *in absentia*order, Zhou argues that the birth of his second child constituted a change in circumstances that gives rise to a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of which he may reopen his exclusion *66proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i) in order to apply for asylum. The IJ found that, even if his change in personal circumstances constituted a “change in circumstances” under the regulation, Zhou exercised unreasonable delay in bringing his motion. The IJ’s denial of the motion was by no means an abuse of discretion, given that Zhou waited more than two years from the birth of his second child to bring this information to the IJ’s attention.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED and the motion for summary denial is DISMISSED as moot. The pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30290 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus BRADLEY W. LAEGER, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CR-10012

- - - - - - - - - - February 16, 1998 Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM: * Bradley W. Laeger appeals his conviction for willfully failing to file income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. First, Laeger argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that venue was improper in the Western District of Louisiana. A person’s principal residence is a proper venue for a charge of failing to file an income tax return. United States v. Rice , 659 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1981). Laeger admits that his primaryNo. 97-30290 -2- residence for the years in question was in Pineville, Louisiana, a town in the Western District of Louisiana. His argument that he was tried in an improper venue is without merit. Laeger also contends that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that he was not presumed to know the law. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Pankhurst , 118 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1997). The district court’s instructions, taken as a whole, were a correct statement of the law and clearly instructed the jurors on the factual issues relevant to this case. See id

. The district court properly instructed the jurors on the “willfulness” requirement for the offense, as well as the effect of a “good faith misunderstanding of the obligation to file a return”. These instructions did not prejudice Laeger’s defense theory. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
For Immediate Release Media Contact: Mavis Harris

 (202) 632-7003

 

 

2018 Indian Gaming Revenues of $33.7 Billion Show a 4.1% Increase

WASHINGTON, DC – Thursday, September 12, 2019 – Today, Vice Chair Kathryn Isom-Clause, 

and Associate Commissioner E. Sequoyah Simermeyer of the National Indian Gaming Commission 

(NIGC) released the Fiscal Year 2018 Gross Gaming Revenue numbers. FY 2018 revenues total $33.7B,

an overall increase of 4.1% over FY 2017. 

The GGR for FY 2018 is the highest in Indian gaming history; and, unlike previous years, all of the 

NIGC’s administrative regions experienced positive growth in FY 2018. The Portland Region showed 

the highest growth, with an 8.2% increase, followed by the Oklahoma City Region with a 7.3% increase. 

Graphics that show the growth across each of the NIGC Regions are available for download on the 

NIGC website.

“The GGR calculation process is an example of the partnership between tribes and the NIGC to ensure 

effective regulation for a successful tribal gaming industry,” said Vice Chair Kathryn Isom-Clause. 

“These numbers reaffirm the industry’s health as a stable economic driver for Indian Country,” she said.

Revenues are calculated based on 501 independently audited financial statements, comprised of 241

federally recognized Tribes across 29 States. The GGR for an operation is calculated based on the 

amount wagered minus winnings returned to players. 

“The annual GGR tells a positive story about Indian gaming’s economic success and the industry’s

ongoing contribution to a strong economy. It also tells the story of how collaboration among tribes,

industry and the regulatory communities can build a strong reputation for reliability and integrity in the

GGR calculation,” said Commissioner Simermeyer.

For more detailed information, refer to our National Indian Gaming Commission website.

###

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act created the National Indian Gaming Commission to support tribal self-sufficiency and the integrity of 

Indian gaming. The NIGC has developed four initiatives to support its mission, including: (1) To protect against anything that amounts to 

gamesmanship on the backs of tribes; (2) To stay ahead of the Technology Curve; (3) Rural outreach; and (4) To maintain a strong 

workforce within NIGC and with its tribal regulatory partners. NIGC oversees the efficient regulation of 520 gaming establishments 

operated by 247 tribes across 29 states. The Commission’s dedication to compliance with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ensures the 

integrity of the growing $33.7 billion Indian gaming industry. To learn more, visit www.nigc.gov and follow us on Facebook and Twitter.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Weinflash, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 74]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard D. Carruthers, J.), rendered January 5, 2004, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and sentencing him to a term of three years’ probation, unanimously affirmed.

*560Defendant originally pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, with the understanding that upon successful completion of two years of interim probation supervision (IPS), he would be permitted to withdraw that plea and re-plead to fourth-degree possession, with a promised sentence of three years’ probation. The court also promised that defendant would receive credit toward his probationary sentence for the two years of IPS. However, the latter promise would have been illegal, since the court was not authorized to credit defendant with two years of probation served prior to sentencing (Penal Law § 65.15 [1]). After defendant successfully completed the two years of IPS, he appeared before the court to replead and for sentencing. Defendant was made fully aware, at the time that he agreed to replead to fourth-degree possession, that he would not be getting credit for the two years of IPS, and that service of three years’ probation without credit was a condition of granting him permission to replead to the lesser charge, despite the court’s original promise to the contrary. Defendant made no objection when entering his plea or at the time of sentencing, regarding the violated promise that he would receive such credit. Thus, defendant has waived any present objection *(see People v Roman,*222 AD2d 269, 270 [1995]). Defendant’s remedy for the court’s inability to fulfill its promise would have been to withdraw the felony plea and go to trial, but he voluntarily chose, instead, to take the misdemeanor plea with the full term of probation. In any event, defendant received a benefit from his two years on IPS, in that he was then permitted to re-plead to the lesser charge, with a sentence that involved no prison time. Finally, we note that CPL 410.90 (3) provides a mechanism for favorable termination of a sentence of probation prior to its completion. Concur—Tom, J.P, Saxe, Friedman, Sullivan and McGuire, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Morris Builders, LP, et al., Respondents, v Empire Zone Designation Board et al., Appellants.

Submitted October 29, 2012;

decided December 11, 2012

*951Motion to strike addendum to appellants’ brief and references thereto in appellants’ brief granted and this material is deemed stricken.
#### Jeffrey Prince BRADLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James M. SCHOMIG, et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 05-15781.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2006.

Decided June 20, 2006.

Debra A. Bookout, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Rene L. Hulse, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Las Vegas, NV, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: NOONAN, SILER,* and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Jeffrey Prince Bradley appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein he contends several grounds for issuance of the writ. He was convicted of home invasion, burglary, second degree kidnapping using a deadly weapon, and of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm.

Bradley alleges constitutional error as follows: (1) failure to sever the trial on the first three offenses from the ex-felon in possession of a firearm; (2) admission of hearsay testimony at trial; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose a plea agreement signed in exchange for the victim’s testimony; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. All fail because there was no prejudice. *See Brecht v. Abrahamson,*507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993).

The testimony and evidence at trial was more than ample to prove every element of each offense of which Bradley was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. None of the errors above, even if true, diminish this fact. The mention of Bradley’s prior convictions was *de minimis*and accompanied by limiting instructions. *See Zafiro v. United States,*506 U.S. 534, 540, 113 *749S.Ct. 938, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (holding that juries are presumed to have complied with limiting instructions). Furthermore, there is little to suggest that the prior convictions were used to fill in any evidentiary gaps. *See Bean v. Calderon,*163 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir.1998). The balance of Bradley’s grounds fail to establish that but for the errors the jury would have decided differently, or that they resulted in a conviction unsupported by other evidence. *See United States v. Nielsen,*371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
#### Anthony D. WILLIAMSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 06-6002.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 22, 2006.

Decided: June 28, 2006.

Anthony D. Williamson, Appellant Pro Se. Karen Breeding Peters, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Anthony D. Williamson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the district court’s denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williamson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit 32(c)

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,
Kenneth W. DeFontes, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that to my knowledge:

(i)    The
accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii)   The
information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Baltimore Gas and Electric
Company.

|                                                                                            |  | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ KENNETH W. DEFONTES, JR. Kenneth W. DeFontes, Jr.
President and Chief Executive Officer |  | 

Date: February 27, 2009

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QuickLinks
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATIONS**I, P. Bruce Camacho, certify that:1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Fortis Benefits Insurance Company;2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.Date:August 12, 2005             /s/ P. Bruce Camacho     P. Bruce Camacho      President and Chief Executive Officer
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard N. Myers, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 1337 C.D. 2019

:

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

AMENDING ORDER

NOW, this 13

th day of December, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that

the Opinion and Order filed on November 3, 2023 is hereby withdrawn and replaced 

with the attached amended Opinion and Order, amending the citation in footnote 3 

on page 9. The footnote now reads as follows: 

“... the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution, U.S. Const. amend IV.” 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge