Filed 1/4/22 P. v. Crawford CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and 

 Respondent,

v.

JAMES D. CRAWFORD,

Defendant and 

 Appellant.

 B309442

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. A652896)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Judge. Reversed with 

directions.

Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel and David F. Glassman, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

____________________________

James D. Crawford requested a trial court proceeding 

under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to 

supplement the trial court record of his commitment offenses 

with information relevant to any eventual youth offender parole 

hearing pursuant to In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook) and 

Penal Code section 1203.01.1 The trial court denied Crawford’s 

motion after concluding that Crawford was not eligible for a 

youth offender parole hearing.

The record before us establishes Crawford’s entitlement to 

a Franklin proceeding. We will reverse the trial court’s order and 

remand to the trial court with instructions that the trial court 

conduct a Franklin proceeding forthwith.

BACKGROUND

In two incidents on December 29, 1988, Crawford, who was 

22 years old at the time, murdered Charles Tillman and 

attempted to murder James Delancy, Kevin Adams, Lazon Jones, 

Dwayne Wall, and Reginald Mathis, robbed and attempted to 

murder Jijane Williams, and stole a car. (People v. Crawford 

(Sept. 25, 1992, B056929) at pp. 2-5 [nonpub. opn.] (Crawford I).)

A jury convicted Crawford of second degree murder, six 

counts of attempted murder, one count of second degree robbery, 

and one count of grand theft auto. (Crawford I, supra, B056929 

at p. 6.) The jury found true allegations that Crawford had 

personally used a firearm in committing most of the various 

offenses (all except for Mathis’s attempted murder and the grand 

theft auto charge—the information did not make the allegation 

on those charges), that he inflicted great bodily injury on 

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

Tillman, Delancy, Jijane Williams, and Mathis, and that a

principal was armed with a firearm when Crawford attempted to 

murder Wall, Adams, and Jones. The jury also found true 

allegations that Crawford had been convicted of a prior serious 

felony pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) and that he had 

served a prior prison term for conviction of a violent felony within 

the five years before the commitment offenses under section 

667.5, subdivision (b) as it existed then. 

Based on what we can discern from the limited record 

before us on this appeal, it appears the trial court sentenced 

Crawford to 15 years to life plus five years on the murder count, 

life plus three years on each of two attempted murder counts, life 

plus five years on one attempted murder count, and life on each 

of the three remaining attempted murder counts (each life term 

with the possibility of parole), five years on the second degree 

robbery count, and added a five-year enhancement under section 

667, subdivision (a), all to be served consecutively. On the 

People’s motion, the trial court dismissed the section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) allegation, and did not sentence Crawford 

pursuant to that section. Crawford’s total sentence was 15 years 

to life and six additional life terms with the possibility of parole 

plus 26 years, all counts to run consecutively.2

We affirmed Crawford’s conviction on his direct appeal. 

(Crawford I, supra, B056929 at p. 17.)

In 2014, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260, which 

added section 3051 to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) 

2 Crawford characterizes his sentence as “41 years to life, 

plus six life terms.” The People characterize the sentence 

alternately as “six life terms plus 41 years” and “41 years to life 

plus six life terms.” 
4

“[S]ection 3051 . . . requires the Board [of Parole Hearings (BPH)] 

to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th, 

20th, or 25th year of a [youth] offender’s incarceration . . .” with 

some exceptions. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) When 

the Legislature added section 3051, it made eligible persons 

“convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the 

person had attained 18 years of age . . . .” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, 

§ 4.) In 2015, the Legislature raised the age to 23, and then to 25 

in 2017. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1; Stats. 

2017, ch. 684, §§ 1.5, 3.)

On July 17, 2019, Crawford filed in this court a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus requesting a Franklin proceeding. We 

denied the petition “without prejudice to petitioner’s filing a 

request in the superior court for such a proceeding, pursuant to 

Penal Code section 1203.01” citing Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439. 

(In re Crawford on Habeas Corpus (July 24, 2019, B299113)

[order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus].)

Crawford filed a motion in the trial court on August 25, 

2020 styled as a “MOTION FOR FRANKLIN HEARING (Pen. 

Code, § 1203.01 and In Re Cook, No. S240153 (June 3, 2019)).” 

The motion alleged that Crawford was 22 years old when he had 

committed his “controlling offense,” as that term is defined by 

section 3051, provided the case number, and presented argument 

and authorities requesting a Franklin proceeding.

The trial court called the matter for hearing on September 

22, 2020. The trial court’s minute order from that date states 

that the case was “called for habeas corpus petition,” and that 

“[t]he defendant’s petition for a Franklin [proceeding] is denied 

for the following reasons: The petition came before this court on 

4/22/19—it was denied because the defendant did not qualify.”
5

Crawford filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Franklin Proceeding

Crawford contends that the trial court erred when it denied 

his request for Franklin proceedings. Crawford also requests 

that we instruct the trial court to order the BPH to expedite or to 

order an additional interim youth offender parole hearing on 

remand. We agree that the trial court erred when it denied 

Crawford’s request for Franklin proceedings and will reverse the 

trial court’s order denying Crawford’s motion. We will not, 

however, order either the trial court or the BPH to conduct 

Crawford’s next youth offender parole hearing on an expedited 

basis.

“A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the [BPH] 

for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner 

who was 25 years of age or younger [under the relevant 

circumstances] at the time of the controlling offense.” (§ 3051, 

subd. (a)(1).) “An individual subject to [section 3051] shall meet 

with the [BPH] pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 3041.” 

(§ 3051, subd. (c).) Section 3041, subdivision (a)(1) provides that 

“[i]n the case of any inmate sentenced pursuant to any law [with 

an exception that does not apply here], the [BPH] shall meet with 

each inmate during the sixth year before the inmate’s minimum 

eligible parole date for the purposes of reviewing and 

documenting the inmate’s activities and conduct pertinent to 

parole eligibility. During this consultation, the [BPH] shall 

provide the inmate information about the parole hearing process, 

legal factors relevant to his or her suitability or unsuitability for 

parole, and individualized recommendations for the inmate 

regarding his or her work assignments, rehabilitative programs, 
6

and institutional behavior. Within 30 days following the 

consultation, the board shall issue its positive and negative 

findings and recommendations to the inmate in writing.”

Section 3051 specifies that the BPH “shall conduct a youth

offender parole hearing to consider release” and that “[t]he youth 

offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide for a 

meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” (§ 3051, subds. (d), 

(e).) At a youth offender parole hearing, the BPH “shall give 

great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared 

to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent 

growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with 

relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd. (c).)

“If parole is not granted, the [BPH] shall set the time for a 

subsequent youth offender parole hearing . . . .” (§ 3051, subd. 

(g).)3

In Franklin, the California Supreme Court concluded that 

the statutes “contemplate that information regarding the [youth] 

offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the 

offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to 

facilitate the [BPH’s] consideration. For example, section 3051, 

subdivision (f)(2) provides that ‘[f]amily members, friends, school 

personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from communitybased organizations with knowledge about the individual before 

the crime . . . may submit statements for review by the board.’ 

Assembling such statements ‘about the individual before the 

crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of 

the . . . offense rather than decades later when memories have 

3 Crawford’s initial youth offender parole hearing was held 

on February 28, 2017. He was denied parole and his next youth 

offender parole hearing was scheduled for February 29, 2024. 
7

faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or 

community members may have relocated or passed away. In 

addition, section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) provides that any 

‘psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments’ used 

by the [BPH] in assessing growth and maturity ‘shall take into 

consideration . . . any subsequent growth and increased maturity 

of the individual.’ Consideration of ‘subsequent growth and 

increased maturity’ implies the availability of information about 

the offender” closer in time to the offense. (Franklin, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) The court created a mechanism whereby 

a youth offender “may place on the record any documents, 

evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may 

be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and 

the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that 

demonstrates the [youth] offender’s culpability or cognitive 

maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related 

factors. The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an 

opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the 

juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time 

of the offense so that the [BPH], years later, may properly 

discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related 

factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is 

‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime” as 

a youth. (Id. at p. 284.)

In Franklin, the Supreme Court considered what 

procedures would be adequate to provide a youth offender with a 

“meaningful opportunity for release” under the youth offender 

parole hearing statute. (§ 3051, subd. (e); Franklin, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at p. 282.) Based on the record before it, the Supreme 

Court concluded that “[i]t is not clear whether Franklin had 
8

sufficient opportunity to put on the [trial court sentencing] record 

the kinds of information that sections 3051 and 4801 deem 

relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (Franklin, at p. 

284.) Based on the fact that it could not determine from the 

record whether Franklin had had that opportunity, the Supreme 

Court set forth the parameters of what has become known as a 

Franklin proceeding. 

The first step for the trial court in a Franklin proceeding is 

to determine as an initial matter whether the defendant “was 

afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information 

relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. [¶] If the 

trial court determines that [the defendant] did not have sufficient 

opportunity, then the court may receive submissions and, if 

appropriate, testimony pursuant to procedures set forth in 

section 1204 and rule 4.437 of the California Rules of Court, and 

subject to the rules of evidence. [The defendant] may place on 

the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to 

cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth 

offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on 

the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s 

culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the 

influence of youth-related factors.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 

at p. 284.)

In Cook, the Supreme Court clarified that the appropriate 

procedural mechanism for a youth offender whose judgment is 

final to request a Franklin proceeding is “to file a motion in 

superior court under the original caption and case number, citing 

the authority of section 1203.01 and [the Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Cook]. The motion should establish the inmate’s 

entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when 
9

such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more 

hearings have already occurred.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 

458.)

1. Eligibility

Crawford filed the document Cook instructs youth offenders 

whose judgments are final to file in order to invoke a Franklin 

proceeding. Although he filed the document without the 

assistance of counsel, Crawford’s motion specifically invokes 

Franklin, cites section 1203.01, and cites “In re Cook, No. 

S240153 (June 3, 2019).” The motion was filed under Crawford’s 

original caption and case number. And it states on its face that 

Crawford was 22 when he committed the “controlling offense” as 

that term is defined in section 3501, subdivision (a)(2)(B). The 

points and authorities are obviously a form, in which Crawford 

filled in blanks to provide information relevant to his case. 

The only information that Crawford did not provide that

Cook says “should” be provided is dates of past and future youth 

offender parole hearings. That information has no bearing on 

Crawford’s eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under 

section 3051. And there is no indication in the record why 

Crawford would be ineligible. To be clear, it appears from the 

record that the trial court believed it was ruling on a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. It was not. And the entirety of the trial 

court’s order is “[t]he defendant’s petition for a Franklin

[proceeding] is denied for the following reasons: The petition 

came before this court on 4/22/19—it was denied because the 

defendant did not qualify.”4

4 We cannot discern from the record why the trial court 

believed Crawford “did not qualify” either for a Franklin

proceeding or a youth offender parole hearing. But we can 
10

The youth parole offender hearing statute makes ineligible 

“those who are sentenced under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, 

subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) or Jessica’s Law (§ 667.61), those who are 

sentenced to life without parole, and those who commit another 

crime ‘subsequent to attaining [26] years of age . . . for which 

malice aforethought is a necessary element of the crime or for 

which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.’ ”5 (Franklin, 

supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 277-278; § 3051, subd. (h); see Stats. 

2017, ch. 675, § 1; Stats. 2017, ch. 684, §§ 1.5, 3 [changing the age 

after which malice aforethought crimes are disqualifying from 23 

to 26].) Nothing in the record suggests that Crawford is ineligible 

for any of these reasons.

Crawford has demonstrated his eligibility for a youth 

offender parole hearing and has complied with the requirements 

the Supreme Court set forth in Cook to secure a Franklin 

proceeding.

2. Prejudice

The People contend that it is relevant that Crawford has 

already had a youth offender parole hearing and that the trial 

court did not err when it denied Crawford’s motion because 

Crawford has not demonstrated that “the youthful offender 

determine from the record that the matter was not before the 

trial court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and Crawford’s 

motion was not heard on April 22, 2019, but rather September 

22, 2020.

5 The People suggest in a footnote that Crawford’s five-year 

sentence enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) is an 

alternate basis for affirming the trial court’s order. We disagree 

with the People’s assertion. Section 667, subdivision (a) is not

included in the list of sentencing statutes precluding eligibility 

for youth offender parole hearings. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
11

parole hearing he received was inadequate under Franklin or 

Cook.” The People argue that where a youth offender has had a 

prior youth offender parole hearing at which the youth offender 

was represented by counsel, that the youth offender is 

disqualified from a Franklin proceeding absent a further 

demonstration that the proceeding was inadequate. The People 

attempt to couple a prior youth offender parole hearing with a 

requirement that a youth offender demonstrate that “he was 

somehow precluded from presenting evidence in that parole 

proceeding that would have addressed the potential age-based 

mitigating factors identified in Franklin and Cook.” 

Based on the People’s contention, after argument in this 

matter we requested supplemental briefing to determine whether

our review was subject to a prejudicial error analysis and, if so, 

whether Crawford had demonstrated that any error was 

prejudicial. As we explain below, we conclude that it is the lack 

of the opportunity to develop the record in the first instance that is 

prejudicial to youth offenders who otherwise qualify for Franklin 

proceedings.6

Youth offender parole hearings and Franklin proceedings 

are inextricably intertwined; Franklin proceedings exist as a 

function of the enactment of the youth offender parole hearing 

statute. But the two are not the same. Youth offender parole 

hearings are, as the name denotes, hearings before the BPH. 

Franklin proceedings take place in and invoke the rules and 

authority of the superior courts. That distinction is critical.

6 We need not and do not consider here whether a prior 

Franklin proceeding bars successive requests for Franklin

proceedings. The record on this appeal does not present that 

question.
12

The youth offender parole hearing statute, tracking 

language from the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. 

Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 75, requires that a youth offender 

parole hearing must provide “a meaningful opportunity to obtain 

release.” (§ 3051, subd. (e); see Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 

283.) To satisfy that requirement, Franklin instructs that a 

defendant must have a “sufficient opportunity to make a record of 

information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole 

hearing.” (Franklin, at p. 284.) The procedural differences 

between trial court proceedings invoked by a motion under 

section 1203.1 and what happens during the youth offender 

parole hearing process define whether a defendant has any 

opportunity—let alone a “sufficient” opportunity—to make a 

record of the relevant information where sentencing occurred 

long before the constitutional vindications the youth offender 

parole hearing statute was meant to provide.

“At least 10 days before any [BPH hearing], the inmate 

shall be permitted to review the file which will be examined by 

the board and shall have the opportunity to enter a written 

response to any material contained in the file.” (§ 3041.5, subd. 

(a)(1).) At the hearing, the inmate “shall be permitted to be 

present, to ask and answer questions, and to speak on his or her 

own behalf.” (§ 3041.5, subd. (a)(2).) But it appears that an 

inmate has neither the right nor the opportunity to call witnesses 

to testify on his or her behalf, nor the authority to compel 

testimony or documents. Indeed, the list of people who are to be 

invited to attend and who may appear at parole hearings is

limited by statute, and the inmate’s right to ask questions does 

not even extend to all of those who choose to appear at the 

hearing. (Ibid.)
13

By contrast, defendants who invoke Franklin by filing a 

motion under Cook and section 1203.1 are able to invoke the 

procedures and authority of the superior court. (Franklin, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Subject to the trial court’s determination—

as the first step of a Franklin proceeding—that a defendant has 

not had sufficient opportunity to develop the record called for by 

the youth offender parole hearing statute, that authority includes 

the power to subpoena witnesses and documents, to have 

evidence presented by “the testimony of witnesses examined in 

open court,” the exercise of the trial court’s oversight and 

discretion, and the rights to investigators and experts necessary 

to create that record. (§ 1204; Franklin, at p. 284; Corenevsky v. 

Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319.)

The distinctions between procedures and law governing 

parole hearings and the procedures and law governing Franklin

proceedings are substantial. Franklin, Cook, and their progeny 

do not guarantee any outcome or the existence of any particular 

evidence as a result of a Franklin proceeding, but they do 

guarantee that the defendant will have an “adequate opportunity” 

in the first instance “to make a record of information that will be 

relevant to the [BPH] as it fulfills its statutory obligations under 

sections 3051 and 4801.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 286-

287, italics added.)

As our colleagues from Division 3 of the Fourth District 

recently observed, even where a Franklin motion does not 

describe the specific evidence a defendant seeks to introduce, no 

authority “mandate[s] such information. And requiring a 

defendant to do so would subvert the ‘simple pleading 

mechanism’ ” the Supreme Court created in Cook. (People v. 

Howard (Dec. 22, 2021, G059213) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___.) That 
14

same division has explained that requiring a defendant to 

provide that information would “put[ ] the cart before the horse. 

We suspect it will take a considerable amount of time and effort 

for appellant and his attorney to prepare for a Franklin

[proceeding]. At a minimum, they will have to gather records, 

letters and other information on appellant’s behalf and look into 

the prospect of psychological testing and a risk assessment 

analysis. Not knowing what their investigative efforts might 

turn up, it would be unrealistic to expect them to make an offer of 

proof at this state of the case.” (People v. Tran (2018) 20 

Cal.App.5th 561, 570, italics added.)

We conclude that the denial of the opportunity afforded by 

Franklin is prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of the trial 

court’s order.

B. Expedited Parole Hearing

Citing no authority for the proposition, Crawford also 

asserts that he is entitled to have his next youth offender parole 

hearing advanced. We disagree.

Crawford’s next youth offender parole hearing appears to 

be scheduled for February 29, 2024. Scheduling of youth offender 

parole hearings is statutory, and there has been no argument 

either in the trial court or here that the BPH erred or violated the 

statutory framework for scheduling Crawford’s parole hearing 

when it set the date for his next hearing. (See §§ 3051, subd. (g), 

3041.5, subd. (b)(3)(C).)

Besides the statutory nature of parole hearing scheduling, 

Crawford asks us to decide an issue that was neither raised nor 

briefed at any point before this appeal—on an issue that we do 

not view as necessarily related to the scheduling of Crawford’s 

next parole hearing. We decline to order the trial court or the 
15

BPH to modify the schedule it has already established for 

Crawford’s next youth offender parole hearing.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is reversed. On remand, the trial 

court will conduct in this matter a proceeding pursuant to 

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 as soon as possible.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CRANDALL, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.