*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-11427

Summary Calendar

_____________________

SARAH L. WILSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:95-CV-205-C

_________________________________________________________________

August 7, 1997

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sarah L. Wilson appeals the district court’s grant of the

Social Security Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment,

affirming the Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security

benefits to Wilson. Wilson argues that the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his determination that she was not disabled
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because she was able to perform the duties of her past relevant

work. Wilson contends that, by statutory definition, she did not

engage in past relevant work and, therefore, the ALJ’s decision did

not comport with relevant legal standards. Wilson argues further

that the ALJ failed to compare Wilson’s residual functional

capacity with the actual demands of her previous work and that the

ALJ erred by failing to apply the correct standards for evaluating

pain by failing to develop evidence on the possibility that her

mental impairment would cause her pain.

Wilson failed to raise these issues in her appeal to the

Appeals Council. This court has jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner’s final decision only when a claimant has exhausted

her administrative remedies. Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210

(5th Cir. 1994). Wilson’s failure to raise these issues before the

Appeals Council deprives this court of jurisdiction to review them.

See id. These claims are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

Wilson argues that the ALJ’s finding at Step Three that she

did “not have an impairment listed in or medically equal to one

listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4,” was not

supported by adequately articulated findings. Because the ALJ

proceeded to Step Four, although he determined that Wilson did not

have an impairment at Step Three, this court must infer that a

severe impairment was found at Step Three. See Reves v. Sullivan,
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915 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d

1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (“If the ALJ proceeds past the

impairment step in the sequential evaluation process the court must

infer that a severe impairment was found.”). Therefore, Wilson’s

contentions that the ALJ committed error in his findings at Step

Three have no basis and are without merit.

Wilson also contends that the district court erred by denying

her motion to remand for consideration of new and material

evidence. The district court did not err by denying Wilson’s

motion to remand because she presented no new and material evidence

and did not show good cause for her failure to submit the evidence

earlier. See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995).

The district court’s denial of the motion is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.