Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A04-1608-CR-1792 | February 16, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Theron Hunter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 16, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

69A04-1608-CR-1792

Appeal from the Ripley Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sharp, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

69C01-1601-F5-3

Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Theron Hunter pled guilty to level 5 felony failure to register as a sex offender 

with a prior conviction and was sentenced to six years executed. He now 

appeals, claiming that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2016, the State charged Hunter with level 5 felony failure to register 

as a sex offender with a prior conviction.1 The State later alleged that Hunter

was a habitual offender based on two prior convictions for class C felony child 

molesting. In June 2016, Hunter agreed to plead guilty to the level 5 felony 

count, in exchange for which the State agreed to dismiss the habitual offender 

count. Sentencing was left to the trial court’s discretion. The court accepted 

Hunter’s plea and held a sentencing hearing. In its sentencing order, the court 

found Hunter’s criminal history to be a “significant aggravating factor” and 

noted that the presentence investigation risk assessment score put Hunter “in 

the High risk category to reoffend.” Appealed Order at 2. The court also 

acknowledged Hunter’s guilty plea but noted that he had “received a substantial 

benefit” with the dismissal of the habitual offender count, and therefore the 

court found “that the mitigating aspect of the plea is diminished in this 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17 (sex offender who knowingly or intentionally fails to register when required under 

this chapter commits level 6 felony; offense is level 5 felony if sex offender has prior unrelated conviction for 

offense under this section).
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context.” Id. at 3. The court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the 

mitigating factors and sentenced Hunter to six years executed. Hunter now 

appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Hunter asks us to reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), 

which provides that this Court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, 

after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that 

his sentence is inappropriate. Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015). The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not 

to achieve the perceived correct result in each case. Id. at 973. “We consider 

not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any 

other factors appearing in the record.” Wells v. State, 2 N.E.3d 123, 131 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately 

turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 

done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” 

Brown v. State, 52 N.E.3d 945, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. The 

question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate but whether the 

sentence imposed is inappropriate. Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 

2015).
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[4] “The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Blair v. State, 62 N.E.3d 424, 

430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The crime that Hunter committed is failure to 

register as a sex offender with a prior conviction, which is a level 5 felony. Ind. 

Code § 11-8-8-17(b). The sentencing range for a level 5 felony is one to six 

years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b).

[5] In determining the appropriateness of a deviation from the advisory sentence, 

one factor we consider is whether there is anything more or less egregious about 

the defendant’s offense “that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense 

accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Wells, 2 

N.E.3d at 131. In a letter attached to the presentence investigation report, 

Hunter claimed that he had registered with local authorities only two days after

the deadline,2that he had been working a “split schedule” six or seven days a 

week3 and caring for a terminally ill friend during his free time, and that the 

registration date “slipped [his] mind temporarily” because he had been 

“stressed and challenged at and around the time of this violation.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 57. Hunter relies on this letter in arguing that “[t]he nature of 

[his] offense is that an offender accidentally forgot his registration date and 

 

2 The sentencing transcript indicates that Hunter was required to register every ninety days because of his 

status as a sexually violent predator, which was due to the age of his niece, who was one of his victims. Tr. 

at 10, 15-16.

3 According to the letter, Hunter worked from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m., 3:00 to 6:00 p.m., and 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. 

Appellant’s App. at 57.
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completed his requirement two days after the deadline.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. 

We note that Hunter’s version of events was not submitted under oath subject 

to the penalties for perjury. The trial court was not required to believe it in any 

event, and the sentencing order does not indicate that it did.4 Given Hunter’s 

prior conviction for failure to register, the court may well have been skeptical of 

Hunter’s claims. The nature of the offense may not be particularly egregious, 

but we must also account for Hunter’s character in determining the 

appropriateness of his sentence.5

[6] “When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the 

defendant’s criminal history. The significance of a criminal history in assessing 

a defendant’s character varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior 

offenses in relation to the current offense.” Wells, 2 N.E.3d at 131 (citation

omitted). In 1994, Hunter was convicted of class C felony child molesting.6 He 

violated his probation for that offense by committing another class C felony 

 

4

For this reason, we are unpersuaded by Hunter’s reliance on Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007), as it relates to his character. We also find Douglas unpersuasive because it involves a first offense for 

failure to register.

5 The State argues that “[t]his is [Hunter’s] second charge for failing to register as a sex offender as required 

by the court, which makes this crime particularly egregious.” Appellee’s Br. at 10. Without wishing to 

minimize Hunter’s crime, we disagree. The legislature made a first offense punishable as a level 6 felony and 

accounted for the seriousness of a second offense by elevating it to a level 5 felony. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17. If 

this were Hunter’s third offense, we might find the State’s argument more persuasive.

6 According to Hunter, this conviction triggered his obligation to register as a sex offender. Appellant’s Br. at 

8. Hunter asserts that the trial court “could not use the triggering offense to enhance a sentence.” Id. (citing 

Douglas, 878 N.E.2d at 881). The trial court did not rely solely on the 1994 child molesting conviction to 

enhance Hunter’s sentence, and the court was well within its discretion in using Hunter’s second child 

molesting conviction and probation violation to impose a sentence greater than the advisory term.
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molestation, for which he was convicted in 2000. In 2013, he was convicted of 

class D felony failure to register as a sex offender and also was found to be a 

habitual offender. In its sentencing order, the trial court stated that “[t]he sole 

purpose of the Sex and Violent [Offender] Registry is to protect the community 

and keep contact with individuals who have been convicted of certain offenses” 

and found Hunter’s criminal history to be “a significant aggravating factor in 

this context.” Appealed Order at 2. The court also noted that the presentence 

investigation risk assessment score put Hunter “in the High risk category to 

reoffend.” Id.

[7] Hunter is a repeat offender in the truest sense of the phrase, having twice 

committed both child molesting and failure to register as a sex offender. He 

victimized some of the most vulnerable members of society and then failed to 

comply with the registration requirements that are designed to protect the 

public from sexual predators like him. After Hunter was convicted of his first 

child molesting offense, he took advantage of the trial court’s leniency and 

violated his probation by committing a second molestation. Hunter accepted 

responsibility for his current offense and conserved judicial resources by 

pleading guilty, but, as the trial court correctly observed, he received a 

substantial benefit in return when the State agreed to dismiss the habitual 

offender count. Clearly, Hunter learned nothing from his prior contacts with 

the criminal justice system, and he is unable to obey the law even under close 

judicial supervision. In sum, Hunter has failed to persuade us that his sentence 
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is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. 

Therefore, we affirm.

[8] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.