JMRNNY Doe v Opus Dei

2024 NY Slip Op 31998(U)

June 10, 2024

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 951154/2021

Judge: Hasa A. Kingo

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 65 

INDEX NO. 951154/2021 

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/10/2024 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

NEW YORK COUNTY 

PRESENT: HON. HASA A. KINGO 

Justice 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X 

JMRNNY DOE, 

Plaintiff, 

- V -

OPUS DEi, OAKCREST SCHOOL, C. JOHN MCCLOSKEY 

Defendant. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X 

PART SM 

INDEX NO. 951154/2021 

MOTION DATE 11/15/2021 

MOTION SEQ. NO. 002 

DECISION + ORDER ON 

MOTION 

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 

27, 33, 35, 37, 39,40,41,42,43,44,45,52,54,57,59 

were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL 

With the instant motion Defendant Oakcrest School ("Oakcrest") moves, pursuant to CPLR 

§ 321 l(a)(S), to dismiss Plaintiff JMRNNY DOE's ("Plaintiff') complaint as against it for lack of 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion is denied. 

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENTS 

Plaintiff alleges that she endured sexual abuse by Defendant, John McCloskey 

("McCloskey"), while attending Oakcrest in 2003, at which time she was approximately eight 

years old. Plaintiff further asserts that in 2002, McCloskey assaulted other women, including her 

mother. According to Plaintiff, her mother lodged complaints with Defendants concerning 

McCloskey's conduct. Despite these complaints, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to take 

measures to prevent McCloskey from engaging in further misconduct and instead placed him in a 

school environment. 

Plaintiff further recounts learning of another incident in 2002 wherein McCloskey abused 

another student. She contends that Defendants possessed knowledge ofMcCloskey's proclivity for 

sexually abusing students dating back to the 1980s. Plaintiff argues that had Defendants Opus Dei 

and Oakcrest undertaken appropriate actions following the 2002 incidents of abuse, she would not 

have suffered while attending Oakcrest. Consequently, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Opus 

Dei and Oakcrest bear liability for McCloskey's actions. 

In support of the instant motion, Oakcrest contends that this court lacks general jurisdiction 

over it pursuant to CPLR § 301, as Oakcrest is neither organized under New York law nor 

headquartered within this State. Oakcrest asserts that it is a not-for-profit school, incorporated in 

the District of Columbia and located in Virginia, and that it performs no services in New York. 

Consequently, Oakcrest maintains that it is not "at home" in New York, and thus, Plaintiff cannot 

establish general personal jurisdiction over it. Oakcrest further argues that the only basis for 

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jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 301, as alleged in the complaint, pertains to Opus Dei, which 

purportedly has an office in New York. However, Oakcrest argues that the presence of an office 

of an unrelated entity does not confer general jurisdiction over Oakcrest. 

Moreover, Oakcrest asserts that while the complaint does not invoke specific jurisdiction 

under CPLR § 302 as a basis for maintaining this action in New York courts, such specific 

jurisdiction would be equally unavailing. Oakcrest contends that the absence of any substantive 

connection between Oakcrest, Opus Dei, and the underlying allegations is clearly delineated in the 

affidavit of Matthew Buonocore, which Plaintiff cannot credibly dispute. Therefore, Oakcrest 

argues that the court lacks a valid basis to exercise jurisdiction over it, necessitating the dismissal 

of all claims against Oakcrest. 

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff emphasizes that the decision to place McCloskey in 

the school where she was subsequently sexually abused was made in New York by Defendants 

Opus Dei and Oakcrest. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' negligence occurred in New York, 

leading to her abuse by Defendants' agent, servant, and/or employee. Plaintiff further asserts that 

Oakcrest has failed to disclose that she was a student at the school during the period of abuse and 

points to the school's website, which indicates that it is "guided by" Opus Dei. Consequently, 

Plaintiff argues that the facts overwhelmingly support that this case should not be dismissed as to 

Oakcrest and that dismissal would be premature at this stage without the benefit of discovery. 

DISCUSSION 

In 2019, New York State enacted the Child Victims Act which, inter alia, (1) extended the 

statute of limitations on criminal cases involving certain sex offenses against children under 18 

(CPL§ 30.10 [f]); (2) extended the time which civil actions based upon such criminal conduct may 

be brought until the child victim reaches 55 years old (see CPLR § 208[b ]); and (3) opened a one 

-year window reviving civil actions for which the statute of limitations has already run (even in 

cases that were litigated and dismissed on limitations grounds), commencing six months after the 

effective date of the measure, i.e. August 14, 2019 (see CPLR § 214-g). 

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal 

construction. We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit 

of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within 

any cognizable legal theory" (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). 

Pursuant to CPLR § 321 l(a)(8), "[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more 

causes of action asserted against him on the ground that ... the court has no jurisdiction of the 

person of the defendant." 

The court can exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant (see CPLR 

§§ 301, 302). General jurisdiction occurs when a defendant is present in New York, either by virtue 

of being headquartered in the state or maintaining a principal place of business in the state (see 

Magdalena v. Lins, 123 AD3d 600, 601 [1st Dept 2014]). New York courts can exercise general 

jurisdiction over subsidiaries, and vice versa, if several factors demonstrate near identical 

ownership interests between the parent and subsidiary, including financial dependence, 

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interference in the selection and assignment of the subsidiary's executive personnel, and the degree 

of control exercised by the parent over the subsidiary (see Goel v. Ramachandran, 111 AD3d 783 

[2d Dept 2013]). 

New York's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, provides that a court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary. Indeed, a court can exert specific personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant corporation or entity if the court finds that any of the executives of that entity have 

contacts with the State of New York (see FIA Leveraged Fund Ltd v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 150 

AD3d 492, 493 [1st Dept 2017]). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized that CPLR § 

302(a)(l) "is a 'single act statute' and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke 

jurisdiction" Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]). In addition to the 

'single act,' personal jurisdiction attaches where: (1) 'the defendant's activities here were 

purposeful;' and (2) there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim 

asserted." 

In this matter, the court finds that it possesses both general and specific (long-arm) 

jurisdiction over Oakcrest. This jurisdiction is established by the occurrence of certain negligent 

acts within New York and by Oakcrest's status as an alter ego and integral part, or extension, of 

Defendant Opus Dei. Consequently, Oakcrest is deemed to be "at home" in New York, where Opus 

Dei is headquartered, and where the initial negligent acts led to Plaintiffs abuse by the Defendants' 

agent, servant, and/or employee. 

The evidence currently available to Plaintiff indicates that Oakcrest is intrinsically linked 

to Opus Dei, functioning as its extension and arm, thus rendering Oakcrest subject to jurisdiction 

in New York. At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, affording Plaintiff the benefit of every 

favorable inference, such evidence is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Discovery is required to 

enable Oakcrest to substantiate any contrary position definitively. 

Furthermore, Oakcrest's official website corroborates this direct association with Opus 

Dei. A review of the website reveals that Oakcrest operates under the guidance of Opus Dei's 

teachings and spirituality. Specifically, the website proclaims: "Guided by the teachings of the 

Catholic Church and the spirituality of Opus Dei, we weave together a rich liberal arts curriculum, 

one-on-one mentoring, character development, and service to create a vibrant environment that 

graduates confident women who will make a difference in all they choose to do." This statement 

further substantiates the close ties between Oakcrest and Opus Dei, reinforcing the jurisdictional 

basis over Oakcrest in New York. 

Contrary to Oakcrest's assertions, this case is distinguishable from Aybar v. Aybar, 169 

AD3d 137 (2d Dept 2019). In the present matter, Oakcrest, while based in Virginia, is alleged to 

be an integral part of the Opus Dei religious order and its extensive network of entities, which 

includes schools, universities, and churches. This implies that although the abuse transpired in 

Virginia, the negligence, particularly the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention that facilitated 

the abuse, originated in New York, where Defendant Opus Dei is headquartered. 

This case does not merely involve Oakcrest's registration in New York. Instead, it concerns 

an institution that is supervised, controlled, and maintained by Opus Dei, whose principal place of 

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business is in New York. It is further alleged that Opus Dei's influence and operational reach 

extended into other parts of the country, including Virginia. 

Beyond general jurisdiction, there is also a basis for specific jurisdiction here. To be sure, 

it is alleged that McCloskey was transferred from New York to Oakcrest-a purposeful act that 

invoked the privileges and benefits of New York State. There exists an unequivocal nexus between 

the transfer ofMcCloskey, who is alleged to have committed tortious acts within New York, and 

Plaintiffs subsequent injuries, which occurred at Oakcrest following McCloskey's transfer. 

Indeed, the transaction, conduct, and arrangement between Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrest to 

place McCloskey in the school, where he subsequently abused Plaintiff after these entities had 

notice of his previous assaults, including those against the Plaintiffs mother, constitutes a tortious 

act within New York State. 

Plaintiff further alleges that McCloskey was an agent, servant, or employee of Defendant 

Opus Dei. Therefore, either Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrest are the same entity and both 

employed McCloskey, thereby conferring general jurisdiction, or, if Oakcrest's affidavit is 

accepted, Oakcrest entered into some arrangement, contractual or otherwise, with Defendant Opus 

Dei to hire McCloskey and bring him to the Oakcrest campus, thus conferring specific long-arm 

jurisdiction. This very transaction, which occurred in New York, is what allegedly led to Plaintiffs 

abuse. 

Moreover, it is alleged that part ofMcCloskey's role within Defendant Opus Dei involved 

receiving assignments in New York and traveling throughout the country to disseminate Opus 

Dei's message to its institutions. Additionally, McCloskey was purportedly a New York resident 

at the time of the alleged negligence and tortious conduct. While Matthew Buonocore contends 

that Oakcrest never employed McCloskey, the facts as stated in the complaint suggest otherwise, 

necessitating discovery before a conclusive determination can be made. 

Affording Plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, it is evident that dismissal at 

this juncture would be inappropriate. The pleading must be liberally construed, and based on this 

standard, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts that align with a cognizable legal theory. 

Therefore, there is sufficient contact for this matter to proceed against Oakcrest. 

Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied in its entirety. 

This constitutes the decision and order of the court. 

6/10/2024 

DATE 

CHECK ONE: 

APPLICATION: 

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: 

~ CASE DISPOSED 

GRANTED 0 DENIED 

SETTLE ORDER 

INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN 

951154/2021 DOE, JMRNNYvs. OPUS DEi ET AL 

Motion No. 002 

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HASAA. Kl 

NON-FINAL DISPOSITION 

GRANTED IN PART 

SUBMIT ORDER 

FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT 

□ OTHER 

□ REFERENCE 

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