MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

C. Anthony Ashford

Ashford Law Group, P.C.

Chesterton, Indiana

Benjamen W. Murphy

Law Office of Ben Murphy

Griffith, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carlos Barrientos,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 17, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A03-1508-CR-1128

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court.

The Honorable William E. Alexa, 

Judge.

Cause No. 64D02-1407-F2-5995

Barteau, Senior Judge

Statement of the Case

[1] A police officer stopped Carlos Barrientos while driving and, as a result of their 

encounter, found a controlled substance in Barrientos’ car. In this interlocutory 

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appeal, Barrientos requests reversal of the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Barrientos raises four issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting Barrientos’ claim 

that a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution by asking Barrientos to sit in a 

police car during a traffic stop and by searching Barrientos’ 

vehicle.

II. Whether the trial court erred in rejecting Barrientos’ claim 

that a police officer violated article I, section 11 of the 

Indiana Constitution by asking Barrientos to sit in a police 

car during a traffic stop and by searching Barrientos’ 

vehicle.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 8, 2014, Detective Alfred Villarreal of the Lake County Sheriff’s 

Department was parked along Interstate 90 in Porter County. He was on patrol 

in an unmarked car. Detective Villarreal was approached by a man who 

identified himself as an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. 

The agent explained he was investigating a vehicle that might be transporting 

controlled substances in a hidden compartment. The agent told Detective 

Villarreal the make, model, and color of the vehicle and further stated it had a 

yellow temporary license plate issued by the State of Illinois.

[4] Later, as Detective Villarreal was driving on Interstate 90, he saw a vehicle that 

matched the description the agent had given him. He followed the vehicle and

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determined it was going eighty miles per hour, well over the speed limit of 

seventy miles per hour. The detective also saw the vehicle cross the highway’s 

fog line. Detective Villarreal stopped the vehicle.

[5] Barrientos was driving the vehicle, and he was accompanied by his mother and 

his nephew. Detective Villarreal approached the vehicle on the passenger side. 

He told Barrientos that he had stopped him for speeding and asked for a driver’s 

license and vehicle registration. Barrientos produced those documents.

[6] Next, Detective Villarreal asked Barrientos to get out of the vehicle and sit in 

his patrol car. Barrientos was wearing a t-shirt and shorts, and Detective 

Villarreal asked Barrientos to lift up his t-shirt to show that he did not have a 

weapon tucked into his shorts before allowing Barrientos to enter the patrol car. 

Barrientos complied.

[7] After they both sat down in the car, Detective Villarreal checked Barrientos’ 

license on his computer to determine whether the license was valid and whether 

Barrientos had any arrest warrants. The detective also examined the vehicle 

registration. Detective Villarreal asked Barrientos where he was going, and 

Barrientos said he was going to South Bend to attend a child’s birthday party. 

As they talked, Detective Villarreal noted that Barrientos was “fidgety” and his 

answers seemed to be “hesitant” or “questionable.” Tr. p. 16. However, they 

also laughed together because the detective had mistakenly believed Barrientos’ 

nephew was an adult due to being tall, and Barrientos explained his nephew 

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was only fifteen years old. Detective Villarreal did not find any irregularities in 

Barrientos’ documents.

[8] Detective Villarreal walked back to Barrientos’ vehicle to ask the passengers 

where they were going. Barrientos’ mother said they were “just taking a ride 

and going to see a family member in general.” Id. at 17.

[9] Next, Detective Villarreal returned to his car, where Barrientos was waiting. 

The detective sat down, returned Barrientos’ driver’s license and vehicle 

registration, and gave him a verbal warning for speeding. Detective Villarreal 

then told Barrientos he was “all set.” Id. at 19. Barrientos appeared to be 

relieved and told the officer he would watch his speed. Next, the following 

exchange occurred, as described by Detective Villarreal:

I asked him if he had anything illegal in the vehicle. I told him 

that we get a lot of weapons and drugs that come through here, 

and I asked him if he had anything illegal in his vehicle and he 

said no. I asked him if he had any weapons in the car; he said 

no. I asked him if he had any drugs in the car; he said no. And I 

asked him if he had any large amounts of U.S. currency; and he 

said no. I then asked him right after that if I could do a – my 

words were ‘a quick search of his car.’ And he said – I believe he 

said, ‘Yes, no problem’ or ‘no problem.’ And I reiterated, ‘So I 

could search your car? I can search it?’ And he said yes or yeah, 

one of the two.

Id. at 21.

[10] After Barrientos consented to the search, Detective Villarreal had Barrientos’ 

mother and nephew go sit in the patrol car with Barrientos. The detective and 

two other officers who arrived at the scene searched Barrientos’ vehicle and 

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found a hidden compartment in the dashboard. The officers opened the 

compartment and found a package of what appeared to be a controlled 

substance. Subsequent testing revealed that the officers had found 482.81 

grams of heroin.

[11] Meanwhile, Barrientos and his mother talked as they sat in Detective 

Villarreal’s car, and a recorder captured their conversation. Barrientos admitted 

to his mother that he had a “drug” in the car. State’s Ex. 2.

[12] The State charged Barrientos with dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony. 

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2014). Barrientos filed a motion to suppress. The trial 

court denied Barrientos’ motion after an evidentiary hearing. Barrientos asked 

the trial court to certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal, and the trial court 

granted the request. Next, Barrientos requested and received permission from 

this Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[13] We review the denial of a motion to suppress similar to other sufficiency 

matters. Dora v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. 

denied. We do not reweigh the evidence but instead consider conflicting 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We also 

consider any uncontested evidence in favor of the defendant. Id.

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[14] Barrientos concedes Detective Villarreal acted lawfully by stopping him because 

he had been speeding. Barrientos instead contends that being placed in the 

detective’s car and having his vehicle searched violated his federal and state 

constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. We address 

the constitutional claims in turn.

II. Fourth Amendment

[15] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant 

part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” The 

Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Thayer v. State, 904 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[16] The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to brief investigatory stops of 

persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Id. Stopping an 

automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 

the resulting detention may be brief. Id. If the detention exceeds the 

investigative scope of the stop, then seized items may be excluded from 

evidence. Id.

[17] Barrientos argues that Detective Villarreal exceeded the scope of the stop by 

asking him to sit in the patrol car. He cites Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 

(Ind. 2001), for the proposition than an officer may not place a motorist in a 

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patrol vehicle during a traffic stop unless it is justified by particular 

circumstances in the case.

[18] Here, Detective Villarreal noted that the road where the stop occurred, 

Interstate 90, was dangerous because it was congested “on that particular day.” 

Tr. p. 7. In addition, the section of the highway where the stop occurred had 

only two lanes. The patrol car was equipped with a dash camera, and its 

recording supports the detective’s assertion of dangerousness, showing heavy 

traffic passing Barrientos’ parked vehicle. Furthermore, Barrientos’ vehicle had 

a temporary license plate issued by the State of Illinois. Detective Villarreal 

explained he frequently has difficulty obtaining accurate information from his

computer about Illinois temporary plates and it is helpful to have the motorist 

in his car to assist him.

[19] Barrientos notes Detective Villarreal repeatedly testified during the suppression 

hearing that he always asks motorists to get into his patrol car during traffic 

stops because doing so allows him to access his car’s computer more easily, 

limits his need to walk back and forth between his car and the motorist’s 

vehicle, makes it easier for him to converse with the motorist, and allows him a 

better opportunity to spot potential criminal activity.

[20] A routine practice of requiring motorists to enter a patrol car during traffic stops

does not appear to comply with our Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson. 

Nevertheless, even where an officer has a general practice of requiring a 

motorist to get out of his or her car and sit in a patrol car during a traffic stop, 

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there may still be facts in a particular case that justify the officer’s request. 

Under the specific circumstances in this case, Detective Villarreal was justified 

in asking Barrientos to sit in the patrol car to minimize the need for the 

detective to walk back and forth along the road during dangerously heavy traffic

and to more easily address any issues arising from Barrientos’ temporary license 

plate.

[21] Barrientos cites several cases in support of his claim, but they are

distinguishable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 

229 (1983), did not involve a traffic stop but rather a citizen’s encounter with 

the police in an airport terminal. In Lucas v. State, 15 N.E.3d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied, a panel of this Court concluded a police officer 

violated the Fourth Amendment by having the motorist get into his patrol car 

because the record was devoid of any particularized circumstances to justify the 

officer’s request. By contrast, in the current case Detective Villarreal noted that 

the interstate was dangerously busy on the day in question. Finally, in Crocker 

v. State, 989 N.E.2d 812, 819-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, this Court 

addressed whether an officer’s request for a motorist to sit in the patrol car 

violated the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.

[22] Next, Barrientos argues that even if the detective acted lawfully in asking him to 

sit in the patrol car, Barrientos’ consent to have his vehicle searched was invalid

because the detective requested permission to search while they sat in the patrol 

car. Barrientos thus argues that he was coerced into consenting.

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[23] Generally, a search warrant is a prerequisite to a constitutionally proper search 

and seizure. Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 1994). A valid consent 

to search obviates the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Id. The 

State bears the burden of demonstrating consent was freely and voluntarily 

given. Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. 2006). A consent to search is 

valid except where it is procured by fraud, duress, fear, intimidation, or where it 

is merely a submission to the supremacy of the law. Id.

[24] Voluntariness of a consent is a question of fact to be determined from the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. Some of the circumstances for consideration

may include: (1) whether the defendant was advised of his or her Miranda 

rights prior to the request to search; (2) the defendant’s degree of education and 

intelligence; (3) whether the defendant was advised of his or her right not to 

consent; (4) whether the defendant has previous encounters with law 

enforcement; (5) whether the officer made any express or implied claims of 

authority to search without consent; (6) whether the officer was engaged in any 

illegal action prior to the request; (7) whether the defendant was cooperative 

previously; and (8) whether the officer was deceptive as to his or her true 

identity or the purpose of the search. Id.

[25] In this case, Detective Villarreal neither Mirandized Barrientos nor told him he 

was free to refuse to consent. In addition, the record is silent as to Barrientos’ 

level of education and whether he has encountered law enforcement in the past. 

These factors must be weighed against the many other factors that favor a 

finding of voluntariness. First, Detective Villarreal returned Barrientos’ driver’s 

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license and vehicle registration before asking for permission to search, so the 

detective was not holding onto the documents as a form of coercion. Second, 

although Barrientos was in the patrol car during the discussion, he was not 

handcuffed or otherwise restrained. To the contrary, Detective Villarreal told 

Barrientos that he was “all set,” thus ending the stop, before requesting consent 

to search. Tr. p. 19. Third, Detective Villarreal was not engaged in illegal or 

deceptive activity when he requested permission to search, and he did not tell 

Barrientos that Barrientos was suspected of a crime. Fourth, Detective 

Villarreal did not claim any authority to search the car even if Barrientos 

refused to consent. Cf. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008)

(motorist’s consent to search his car was invalid because the officer had told the 

motorist that the search was “necessary,” thereby indicating that there was no 

right to refuse).1

 Fifth, Barrientos had been cooperative throughout the traffic 

stop, immediately and unhesitatingly consented to the search, and repeated 

several times that he consented to the search. Sixth, Detective Villarreal 

conversed with Barrientos in a normal tone of voice and no other officers 

arrived on the scene until after Barrientos had consented, so the atmosphere 

was not unduly intimidating. Cf. Thurman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1992) (defendant’s consent to search his car was the product of 

coercion where the defendant gave his consent while being forced to keep his 

1 It appears that Detective Villarreal was also involved in the Campos case. That case involved a traffic stop in 

Northwest Indiana, and its facts closely resemble this case except for the officer’s crucial statement in Campos

that the search was “necessary.” Detective Villarreal did not make a similar statement in the current case.

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hands on his car and was surrounded by five police officers), trans. denied. 

Seventh, the traffic stop was relatively brief in duration, as less than ten minutes 

elapsed between Officer Villarreal stopping Barrientos’ vehicle and Barrientos 

consenting to a search. Defendant’s Ex. 1. Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude that Barrientos’ consent to search his vehicle was 

freely and voluntarily given, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Barrientos’ motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds.

III. Article I, section 11

[26] Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides, in relevant part: “The 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated.” The text of 

article I, section 11 is nearly identical to that of the Fourth Amendment, but 

Indiana’s courts interpret and apply section 11 independently from Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence. State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 

(Ind. 2008).

[27] The purpose of section 11 is to protect those areas of life that Hoosiers consider 

private from unreasonable police activity. Id. at 1206. Under the Indiana 

Constitution, the legality of a governmental search or seizure turns on an 

evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the 

circumstances. Richard v. State, 7 N.E.3d 347, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. 

denied. Among other circumstances, we consider: (1) the degree of concern, 

suspicion or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion 

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the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities; 

and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 

1034 (Ind. 2013). The State has the burden of proving that a search or seizure 

was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Croom v. State, 996 

N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[28] Barrientos argues that Detective Villarreal acted unreasonably by requiring him 

to sit in the patrol car during the stop. The detective knew that violations had 

occurred because he had watched Barrientos speed and drive over the fog line. 

As a result, Detective Villarreal was justified in investigating Barrientos’ 

documents and asking where Barrientos was going.

[29] Turning to the degree of intrusion into Barrientos’ privacy, Barrientos was 

asked to step out of his car and sit in the patrol car. Furthermore, he was asked

to lift his shirt while standing on the side of the road to show he did not have a

gun. It appears that Detective Villarreal could have conducted the traffic stop 

just as effectively if Barrientos had remained in his own vehicle.

[30] On the other hand, Barrientos was not handcuffed. Further, the record 

demonstrates Detective Villarreal’s interaction with Barrientos did not differ 

from what a reasonable person might expect during a routine traffic stop –

reviewing the motorist’s documents via computer, asking general questions 

about the motorist’s destination, and issuing a verbal warning. The detective’s 

tone of voice was level throughout the stop. In addition, the traffic stop was 

effectively over when Detective Villarreal asked for permission to search the 

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vehicle. Further, it appears Barrientos’ sitting in the patrol car did not 

unreasonably extend the duration of the stop, because only ten minutes passed 

between when the stop began and when Barrientos agreed to the search.

[31] As for the extent of law enforcement needs, there were specific circumstances

that led Detective Villarreal to have Barrientos sit in his patrol car. On the day 

and time in question, the highway was very busy, and Detective Villarreal 

prefers to minimize walking back and forth between cars as a safety measure. 

Also, Barrientos’ vehicle had an Illinois temporary license plate, and the 

detective wanted Barrientos to be present as he searched for the plate on his 

computer in case any problems arose. Finally, as our Supreme Court has 

recognized, interstate drug trafficking is a significant issue facing law 

enforcement. “Given that [drug traffickers’] stock-in-trade is inherently fungible 

and highly mobile, but their centers of organization are scattered and secretive, 

law enforcement’s best chance of uncovering the latter is to interdict the former 

as it moves about our nation’s highways.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1036. 

Balancing the three factors, we conclude Detective Villarreal’s decision to have 

Barrientos sit in the patrol car during the traffic stop was not unreasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances.

[32] Finally, Barrientos argues his consent to search his vehicle was invalid under 

article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because he was in custody but 

was not advised that he had the right to refuse Detective Villarreal’s request.

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[33] In Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975), our Supreme Court 

determined that when a suspect is in custody, article I, section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution requires that the suspect must be advised of, and explicitly waive, 

the right to counsel before giving a valid consent to a search. We determine 

whether a person is in custody for purposes of Pirtle by considering all 

circumstances surrounding the encounter and asking whether a reasonable 

person under the same circumstances would believe he or she was under arrest 

or not free to resist the entreaties of the police. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 

867, 873 (Ind. 2009). Relevant circumstances include whether the defendant 

had been read his or her Miranda rights, was handcuffed or otherwise 

restrained in any way, was told he or she was a suspect in a crime, was 

subjected to vigorous interrogation, was told to cooperate, was told expressly or 

impliedly there would be adverse consequences for noncooperation, or was told 

he or she was not free to go. Id. at 874. The length of the detention is also a 

factor. Id. A person stopped by the police during a traffic stop is “seized” and 

momentarily not free to go but is ordinarily not considered to be in custody. Id.

at 873.

[34] Barrientos was restrained in a sense by being asked to sit in the patrol car during 

the stop, but he was not handcuffed or otherwise restricted. His discussion with 

Detective Villarreal was typical of a conventional traffic stop. Detective 

Villarreal spoke in a level voice throughout his conversation with Barrientos. 

At one point, the two men laughed because Detective Villarreal initially 

thought Barrientos’ nephew was an adult rather than a fifteen-year-old. The 

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detective never told Barrientos he was under investigation, did not urge him to 

cooperate, and never threatened him with adverse consequences for 

noncooperation. To the contrary, Detective Villarreal ended the traffic stop by 

giving Barrientos a verbal warning and telling him, “You’re all set,” before 

requesting permission to search the vehicle. Tr. p. 19. Barrientos immediately 

consented to the detective’s request, agreeing several times to the search. 

Finally, the stop did not last very long, no more than ten minutes until 

Barrientos consented to the search.

[35] Barrientos discusses several cases in support of his claim, but they are 

distinguishable. In Friend v. State, 858 N.E.2d 646, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), a 

panel of this Court determined the defendant was in custody, and should have 

been given Pirtle advisements, because he had been detained for forty-five 

minutes, was put in a patrol car and repeatedly told to stay there, and was 

handcuffed - circumstances that are not present in the current case. In Miller v. 

State, 846 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, a panel of this 

Court deemed the defendant to be in custody, and entitled to Pirtle advisements, 

because he was removed from his car and handcuffed. By contrast, Barrientos 

was never handcuffed. Finally, in Crocker, 989 N.E.2d at 819, a panel of this 

Court deemed the defendant to have been in custody because, after an officer 

placed the defendant in a patrol vehicle, the officer immediately administered a 

sobriety test and also lied to the defendant, stating that he knew the defendant 

had marijuana. Neither of those circumstances was present in Barrientos’ case.

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[36] Under the circumstances of this case, Barrientos was not in custody and the 

detective was not obligated to give Barrientos Pirtle advisements while asking 

whether Barrientos would consent to a vehicle search. See Meredith, 906 N.E.2d 

at 874 (Pirtle advisements unnecessary where the record reveals “nothing more 

than a conventional traffic stop.”). The trial court did not err by rejecting 

Barrientos’ claim that his consent to the search was invalid pursuant to Indiana 

Constitution article I, section 11.

Conclusion

[37] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[38] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

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