The H onor abl e Ri cha r d K
. Eat on, J udge of t he U ni t ed St at es C our t of I nt er nat i ona l Tra de, s i t t i ng by * d e sig n a tio n . 1 08- 1007- cr U SA v. Pope
UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m, 200 8 (A rgue d: J anu ary 16 , 20 09 Dec id ed: Fe br uar y 3, 200 9) Do cket No . 08 -1 007 -c r U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee , v. S T EV EN W. P O PE , a lso kn ow n a s St ev en W il lsa m, a lso kn ow n a s St ep he n Po pe , a lso kn ownas St evenM cQu een , al s o kno wn as St eve W. Po pe, als o kno wn as St er n W. Po pe, als o kno wn as Will

iam S. P op e, De fe ndant -A ppe lla nt . B ef or e: C AB RA N E S and L I V I NGS T ON , Circuit Jud ges , and E A T ON , Judge
. * Def end ant St evenW. P op e app eals fr om a F ebruar y 28 , 20 08 j ud gm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( San dr a L . T own es , Judge ) convicting him, fo llo win g a gu

ilt y pl ea, o f t

wo c ou nt s of

ban k b ur glar y, i n v io lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 21 13(a). T he D is tr ict Court sentenced defenda nt principally to seven y ears of impr isonment purs uant to an upwa rd dep ar tu r e. O n ap peal , P op e ma kes tw o ce nt r al ar gum ent s : ( 1) th at his s ent enc e was pr oce du r ally
un re a son a bl e b ec a use the Di stri ctC ou rt e rron eo usl y a pp li ed a tw o-l ev el en ha nc em en t to Pop e’ s ba se offense level under Sec tion 2B2.1(b)(4) of the United States Sentenci ng Guideline s, for poss ession of

a dan ger ou s weap on ; an d (

2) th at the n on -g

ui del in es s ent enc e was s ub s tan ti vely un r eas on abl e be caus e it
was mo r e t hantw

ice the m axi mu m r eco mm end ed s ent enc e un der th e Gu id eli nes andth e var

ian ce was based only on Pope’s criminal history. We hold today that Se ction 2B2.1(b)(4) r equires only posses sion2

of a da ng er ou s we a po n, a nd the re fore a pp li es e ve n i f a de fe nd a nt d id no t use the ob je ctin qu estio n a s a weap oninth e co ur s e of

com mi tt in g the c r im e. We c on clu de that

th e s ent enc e was bo thpr oce du r ally ands ub s tan ti

vely r eas on abl e. Af fi r med
. J AM E S G ATTA , Assis tant United States Attorney (Benton J. Camp bell, U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , on the brief , Em ily B erger , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , o f c o unsel ) , Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern Di s tr ict of New Yor k, B r oo kly

n, NY, for Appellee. C OL L EE N P. C A S S I DY , Fe der al D ef end er s of New Yor k, I nc. , App eals B ur eau, New

Yor k, N Y, fo r D ef

en dant -A ppe lla nt . J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Def end ant St evenW. P op e app eals fr om a F ebruar y 28 , 20 08 j ud gm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( San dr a L . T own es , Judge ) convicting him, fo llo win g a gu

ilt y pl ea, o f t

wo c ou nt s of

ban k b ur glar y, i n v io lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 21 13(a). T he D is tr ict Cou r t s ent enc ed d ef

end ant , p ur s uan t t o anup war d d epar tu r e, t o s evenyear s of im pr is on men t, th r ee yea rs of super

vised release, restitution of $2,244.55, and a special a ss essment of $200. On a ppeal, Pope mak es tw o ce nt r al ar

gum ent s : ( 1) th at his s ent enc e was pr oce du r ally un r eas on abl e be caus e the D is tr ict Court erroneously applied a two-level e nhance ment to Pope’s base off ense leve l pursuant to Section 2B2.1(b)(4) of

the United States Sentenc ing Guideline s (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guideline s”), for poss ession of a dan ger ou s weap on ; an d ( 2) th at the n on -g

ui del in es s ent enc e was s ub s tan ti vely un r eas on abl e be caus e it
was mo r e t hantw

ice the m axi mu m s ent enc e un der th e Gu id eli nes andwas bas ed o nly onPo pe’ s
cr im in al his to ry. F or

th e r eas on s s et

fo r thbel ow, we co ncl ud e that th e s ent enc e was bo thpr oce du r ally and substantively reasonable , and a ccordingly affirm the judgment of the Dis trict Court. We write to clarify that U.S. S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(4) requires only possess ion of a dange rous wea pon; it applie s even if the defendant did not use the objec t in question as a dangerous wea pon in the course of committing the
cr im e.3 BAC KGROUND I. F act ua l O ver

vi ew OnOct ob er

19, 200 6, P op e bu rglar

izeda br anchof

Cit ib ank inB r oo kly

n, New Yor k. H e was among a group of individuals that entered the bank by cutting a hole in the fence be tween the ba nk and th e adj acen t p r op er ty , an d b r eaki ng the b ank ’s r ear win do w. T hey

th en f or cedop en the s af

es lo cat ed i n th e ban k’s te lle r

ar ea an d s to le ap pr ox im ate ly $ 1,0 78. 78. OnJ uly 22 , 20 07, Po pe b ur glar izeda Chas e B ank

br anchinQu een s , N ew Yo r k. H e andat leas t o ne o th er

per s onbr ok e a s id e win do w of th e ban k, u s in g a s led geh amm er . T hey th en s to le app r ox im ate ly $ 1,1 65. 77 i n co in s fr om coi n s af es lo cat ed i n the b ank ’s te lle r ar ea. B as ed u po n the f

act s of th es e t wo b ur glar ies , a f ede r al gr andju ry inth e Eas te r n D is tr ict of New Yor k r et ur nedan i ndictmen t o n Augus t 2 , 20 07, char gin g P op e with t

wo c ou nt s of

ban k b ur glar y, i n violation of 18 U.S. C. § 2113(a), a nd two counts of bank theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 2113(b). On Sep te mb er

21, 200 7, P op e pl eade d gu ilt y t o the t wo c ou nt s of

ban k b ur glar y, p ur s uan t t o a p lea agreeme nt. I n an ti cip ati onof

s ent enc in g, the U ni te d S tat es Pr ob ati onOf fi ce ( “P r ob ati onOf

fi ce”) pr epar ed a P r es ent enc e I nv es tigat

io n Rep or t ( “P SR”) . T he P SR s et fo r tha bas e of

fe ns e lev el o f t

welv e f or each of the bank burglaries, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(a)(2). (We note that the statutory maximum for each cou nt

was tw ent

y year s . See

18 U .S. C. § 2 113 (a) .) T he P SR thenapp lie d, pu r s uan t t o U .S. S.G
. § 2B2.1(b)(4), a two-level e nhance ment for pos sess ion of a dea dly we apon bec ause Pope had used a sledgehamme r to br eak i nto the Chase Bank branc h during the July 22, 2007 burgla ry. Purs uant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, two points were adde d to reflect Pope’s conviction of two counts of bur glary. The adj us te d, com bi nedof

fe ns e lev el f

or bo thbu rglar

ies was s ixt een , whichwas th en r edu cedby thr ee lev els fo r accep tan ce o f r es po ns ib ili ty , p ur s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 3 E1. 1( a) a nd(b ). T he f in al ad ju s te d of fe ns e lev el wa s calc ul ate d t o b e thi r te en.4

T he P SR al s o n ot ed P op e’s ext ens ive cr im in al his to ry, an d i t as s ign ed him fo ur te en c r im in al hi s to ry po in ts fo r

fo ur pr io r con vic ti on s . F ir s t, onJ anu ary 30 , 19 92, Po pe w as con vic te d o f a tt emp te d burglary of a pharmac y in Quee ns, New York. Sec ond, on June 15, 1994, he was convic ted of
att emp te d b ur

glar y of a bev er age dis tr

ib ut io n ce nt er inHem ps te ad, New

Yor k. T hi r d, onSep te mb er 26, 2001, Pope w as convicted of burglarizi ng a R ite Aid store in New York, NewYork. Fourth, on May 30, 200 1, he wa s convicted of attempted possess ion of dangerous contraband in prison. Pope
r ecei vedth r ee cr

im in al h is to ry po in ts fo r

eachof th es e f ou r con vic ti on s , f or a to tal of tw elv e po in ts . Fu r th er mo r e, b ecau s e he com mi tt ed the 2 006 and200 7 b ank bu rglar ies while s till o n p ar ol e f

or hi s 200 1 b ur glar y co nv ict io n, Po pe w as as s ign ed t

wo ad di ti on al cr

im in al his to ry po in ts , f

or an ad ju s te d
to tal of fo ur te en p oi nt s , es tab lis hi ng acr im in al his to ry cat ego ry of

VI . F in ally, the P SR d et ail ed fo ur te en p r

io r con vic ti on s , f or cr im es in clu di ng a tt emp te d m ans laught er andgr andlar cen y, f

or whi ch Po pe w as no t as s es s ed any cr im in al h is to ry po in ts bec aus e the o ff ens es wer e r emo te inti me. The re co mme nd ed sen te nc in g ra ng e i n th e P SR wa s thi rty -th re e t o fo rty -on e m on ths.

II. Sentencing On January 31, 2008 , the Distr ict Court issued a notice to the parties that it was “contempla ting upwardly de parting from the appli cable Sentenci ng Guideline s r ange and imposing a non-Guideline sentence of imp risonment for a period of seven (7) years o n each C ount to run concurrently. ” Ap pellan t’ s App . at 54 ( emp has is inth e or

igi nal ). As gr ou nd s fo r

this po te nt

ial dep ar tu r e, the D is tr

ict Cou r t l is te d, int er ali a , “the f act s andcir cum s tan ces s ur r ou ndin g the d ef end ant ’s ar r es t an d u nd erlyi ng the i ns tan t i ndictmen t; . . . the history and charac terist ics of the defendant; . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the def end ant ; an d . . . the l

ike lih oo d o f r ecidivi s m. ” Id
. By letter dated February 13, 2008, Pope, through counsel, objected to the Probation Department’s inclusion of the two-level enha ncement for poss ession of a dang erous weapon, on the5

ground that the sledgehammer wa s not us ed or poss essed as a wea pon, but instead to facilitate the burglary. Pope then argue d that his appropriate base offense level wa s twelve, whi ch corresponds to a Guid eli nes r ang e of

thir ty to thir ty -s evenmo nths , an d that he s ho ul d b e s ent enc ed w ithi n that r ang e. I n r es po ns e t o P op e’s ob ject io ns , the P r ob ati onOf

fi ce f ile d a F ebruar

y 19 , 20 08 a dd end um to th e P SR. I n the ad den du m, th e P r ob ati onOf fi ce m ain tai nedth at the t

wo- lev el en han cem ent

s ho ul d b e app lie d to Pope because “the re is no quest ion that a sledge hammer is capabl e of inflicting dea th or s erious bo di ly i nj ur

y.” PS R Seco ndAdd end um of Fe b. 19, 200 8. At a sentencing

hearing on February 20, 2 008, defense counsel rene wed his argument rega rding th e t wo- lev el en han cem ent

fo r th e po s s es s io n o f adan ger ou s weap onwhile co mm it ti ng abu rglar y. De fe nse co un sel sta te d th a t “ the sle dg eh a mme r, si nc e i t ha s oth eruse s, o bv io usl y, it ’s m ostl y u sed a s a tool, was not poss essed as a wea pon.” Appe llant’s App. at 64. Defense counsel then argued tha t the Di s tr ict Cou r t s ho ul d n ot

im po s e a s ent enc e abo ve the ap pl icab le G ui del

in es r ang e be caus e, int

er ali a , no on e was har medinth e co ur s e of th e bu rglar

ies , an d acc or di ngl

y, the s er io us nes s of

th os e of fe ns es
was pr op erly ca ptur ed b y the S ent enc in g G ui del in es . H e als o ar

gue d that , wi thth e exc ept io n o f P op e’s
on e co nv ict io n f or att emp te d m ans laught er , h e hadno hi s to ry of vio len t c r im e andth us hi s cr

im in al hi s to ry di d n ot

war r ant an u pwar d d epar tu r e. Following these statements, and arguments made by the government, the District Court im po s ed a s ent enc e. T he D is tr ict Cou r t ac cep te d the P SR init s ent ir et y. I t thens tat ed that

it had “c on sid er ed the fa ct ors p ursu a nt t o 1 8 U .S .C . § 3[ 5] 53 (a )(1 ), the na tur e a nd ci rc um sta nc es o f th ese of fe ns es , an d the his to ry andchar act er is ti cs of this def end ant .” Id

. at 74. The District Court noted:

[I]t ’s ju s t o bv

io us to me that

we n eedto pr ot ect

th e pu bl ic f r om fu r th er

cr im es by thi s defendant, a nd this is the only wa y. . . . [H]e’ s s till, as you say, a t for ty-nine yea r old, committing burglaries. For that reason, it is my intent—and I will—sentence the6

defendant a bove or outside of the Guideline range. I think the sentence is necessary for det er r enc e, i f n othi ng e ls e, an d t o p r ot ect th e pu bl ic f r om M r . P op e. Id . at 77-78. The District Court then sentenced Pope princi pally to two concurrent seven-year terms of in car cer ati onfo r

th e t wo c ou nt s of

bu rglar y. P op e f ile d a t im ely n ot ice o f a pp eal.

DISCUSSI ON Onapp eal, Po pe m akes tw o ce nt r al ar gum ent s . F ir s t, he ar

gue s th at his s ent enc e was pr oce du r ally un r eas on abl e be caus e it was bas ed u po n a l egally i nco r r ect app lic ati onof

a tw o- lev el enh ance men t t o h is bas e of fe ns e lev el f

or po s s es s io n o f adan ger ou s weap on . Se con d, Po pe ar gue s th at his non-guidelines sentence wa s s ubstantively unreasonable beca use it was more than twice the
max im um r eco mm end ed s ent enc e un der th e Gu id eli nes and , acc or di ng t o d ef end ant , the d epar tu r e was based solely on Pope’s criminal history. Because we conclude that Pope’s s entence was both pr oce du r ally ands ub s tan ti vely r eas on abl e, we af

fi r m the s ent enc e im po s ed b y the D is tr ict Cou r t.

I. St an da r d o f R evi ew At th e ou ts et , we n ot e that

“[a] s ent enc in g ju dge has ver y wid e lat itud e t o d ecid e the p r op er degr ee o f p unis hm ent

fo r an i ndivi du al o ff

end er anda par ti cul ar

cr im e.” United Sta tes v. Cavera , 55 0 F.3d 180, 188 (2d C ir. 2008) ( en banc ). We r evi ew s ent enc es on ly f or “r eas on abl ene s s ,” United Sta tes v. Boo ker , 54 3 U. S. 2 20, 262 (2 005 ), fo r whi ch w e app ly a “ def

er ent ial abu s e- of -dis cr et io n s tan dar d, ” Gal

l v. United States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 , 59 8 ( 200 7) ; se e g

en er all y Sims v. Blot

, 53 4 F .3d117 , 13 2 (

2d Cir . 20 08) (“ A distr ict court has abused its dis cretion if it based its r uling on an e rroneous view of the law or on a clea rly erroneous ass essment of the evide nce, or rendered a de cision that cannot be l ocated within the
r ang e of permi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (

in te r nal alt er ati on , ci tat

io ns , an d quo tat

io n m ar ks om it te d) ). T hi s fo r m o f a pp ell ate r evi ew in clu des tw o co mp on ent s : p r oce du r al r evi ew an d s ub s tan ti ve r evi ew. Gal

l , 128 S. C t. at 597. The procedural revie w focuses on whether any tec hnical error s were made, inc luding7

(1 ) “ faili ng t o cal cul ate (o r im pr op erly calculat

in g) th e Gu

id eli nes r ang e,” (2) “ tr eat

in g the G ui del

in es as
man dat or y,” (3 ) “ faili ng t o co ns id er th e [1 8 U. S.C. ] § 3 553 (a) fa ct or s ,” (4) “s elec ti ng as ent enc e bas ed
onclea rly err on eou s fa ct s ,” o r (5 ) “ faili ng t o ad equ ate ly ex pl ainth e ch os en s ent enc e—i ncl udin g an exp lan ati onfo r

any d evi ati onfr om th e Gu id eli nes r ang e.” Id

. The subs tantive revie w, in contrast,
assess es “‘whether the District Judge abused his dis cretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors
s up po r te d’ th e s ent enc e im po s ed. ” United Sta tes v. J ones , 53 1 F .3d163 , 17 0 (

2d Cir . 20 08) (q

uo ti ng Gal

l , 128 S. Ct . at

600). With r es pec t t o the ap pl

icat io n o f as pec if

ic s ent enc in g en han cem ent , “w e gi ve d ue d ef

er enc e to th e di s tr

ict cou r t’ s app lic ati onof

th e Gu id eli nes to th e f

act s .” Uni

te d St ate s v . S ic ur el la , 36 7 F .3d82, 85 ( 2d Cir . 20 04) . T hat

s aid , “w e r evi ew is s ues of law de novo .” Id

. In the case before us, we reviewthe Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s in te r pr et ati onof

U.S .S. G. § 2B 2.1 (b )(4) , whichis a leg al i s s ue. Acco r di ngl y, we r evi ew the interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(4) de novo.

II. P r oc ed ur al

Rea son ab le ne ss: App li cat io n o f U .S .S .G . § 2B2 .1( b) ( 4) The Guidelines provide a two-lev el enha ncement to a de fendant’s base offense level “[i]f a dan ger ou s weap on(i ncl udin g a f ir ear m) was po s s es s ed” incon nec ti onwith a b ur glar y. U .S. S.G
. § 2B 2.1 (b )(4) . T he ap pl

icat io n n ot es to this pr ov

is io n s tat e that

th e t er m “ dan ger ou s weap on ” is def in ed i n the c om men tar

y t o U .S. S.G . § 1 B 1.1 . T he ap pl icat io n i ns truct

io ns fo un d ther e de fi ne a “d a ng er ou s we a po n” a s: (i ) anin s trum ent

capa bl e of

in fl ict in g de athor

s er io us bo di ly i nj ur

y; o r (ii) an o bj ect

th at is no t anin s trum ent

capa bl e of

in fl ict in g de athor

s er io us bo di ly i nj ur

y bu t ( I) c lo s ely r es emb les s uchan i ns trum ent ; o r (I I) the d ef

end ant us ed the o bj ect

ina man ner

th at created the i mpress ion that the objec t was such an instrum ent ( e.g. a def end ant wr app ed a han d i n a t owe l d ur

in g a b ank

r ob ber y t o cr eat e the ap pear ance of a gu n)
. U.S .S. G. § 1B 1.1 , ap p. n. 1( D)
.8

Pope does not disput e that he possess ed a sledge hammer in the course of burglarizing the Chas e B ank

br anchonJ uly 22 , 20 07. See App ell ant ’s App . at 63. Rath er , P op e argue s th at the D is tr ict Court erred in applying

the enhanc ement bec ause a sledge hammer is “not inherently a w eapon,” and Po pe did no t u s e the s led geh amm er as a weap ondu r

in g the b ur

glar y. Ap pellan t’ s B r . at

15. Hi s
argum ent is witho ut

mer it
. We ha ve consistently “take n a broad vie w of the definition of ‘dange rous wea pon’ under the Sen te nci ng G ui del

in es .” United Sta tes v. Ag

ron , 921 F.2d 25, 26 (2d C ir. 1990). Applic ation Note 1(D) of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 states that a dange rous wea pon need only be “a n instr ument capa ble of inflicting death o r s er io us bo dily i nj ur

y,” anda s led geh amm er

is capa bl e of

caus in g s uchhar m. Acco r di ngl y, a sledgehamme r is a “dangerous weapon” under U.S.S.G. § 2 B2.1(b)(4)
. We nowmust as sess whether the fact that Pope ha d a dang erous weapon with him w hile he was committing one of the burglaries is suf ficient to trigger the two-level e nhance ment, pursuant to U.S .S. G. § 2B 2.1 (b )(4) . Se ct io n 2 B 2.1 .(

b) (4 ) o f the S ent enc in g G ui del in es s tat es th at the t

wo- lev el enhanc ement will apply i f the dangerous weapon “ was posses sed.” Whe n previously construing different pr ovisions of

the Guideline s, we have stated that we wil l “giv[e ] the Guidelines lang uage its pl ainmea ni ng a ndfo r ce.” United Sta tes v. Slo ley , 46 4 F .3d355 , 35 9 ( 2d Cir . 20 06) ; see United States v. Par ne ll , 52 4 F .3d166 , 17 1 (

2dCir . 20 08)
. Cf. Un ivers

al C hurch v. Geltzer

, 463 F.3d 218, 22 3 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1 113 (2007) (“Statutory interpretation alwa ys begins with the plain l angua ge of the statute, ass uming the statute is unambiguous.”). The s ame log ic applies to the provis ion at hand, a nd th er e canbe n othi ng a mb igu ou s abo ut th e pr ov is io n’ s mea ni ng. T he o nly qu es ti on , then , is whe th er Po pe p os s es s ed the s led geh amm er du r in g the b ur

glar y. T he r eco r d s ho ws th at the s led geh amm er us ed inth e co ur s e of

th e bu rglar

y was r eco ver ed the n ext

day a t P op e’s apar tm ent , see App ell ant ’s App . at 49, and , as no te d ab ov e, P op e do es no t d eny th at h e po s s es s ed the s led geh amm er du r in g the b ur

glar y, see id . at 63. The fact that he did not use the sledgehammer as a weapo n is irr eleva nt to the iss ue of9

poss ession. T o hold otherwise would directly contradict the pla in meaning of this provision of

the Guidelines, and w ould lea d to absurd r esults. F or example, a burglar could enter a ba nk carrying
s ever al gu ns andexp lo s ive s andr emainexem pt fr om th e t

wo- lev el s ent enc in g en han cem ent s o l on g as th os e “t oo ls of

th e t r ade” wer e us ed o nly t o b r eak o penth e s af es . Acc or di ngl

y, we ho ld th at U .S. S.G
. § 2B2.1(b)(4) r equires only posses sion of a dangerous weapon, reg ardless of whether the dang erous weap onwas emp lo yed as s uchdu r in g the c om mi s s io n o f acr im e. Cf. Un ited States v. La vender , 22 4 F .3d 939 , 94 1 ( 9th Ci r . 20 00) (h ol di ng that “[ b] ecau s e [d ef

end ant ] p os s es s ed a s cr ewd r

ive r du r in g the [ ban k] robbery, and a screwdriver is properly classified as a dange rous wea pon, the district court did not err by applyi ng the enha ncement to him,” rega rding U.S.S.G. § 2 B3.1(b)(2) (E), which a pplies “if a dang erous weap onwas br andis hed , dis pl ayed , o r po s s es s ed” ). Ba sed on the fa ct s of t he ca se a nd the pl a in la ng ua ge of t he a pp li ca bl e S en te nc in g G ui de li ne s, we hold tha t the Distr

ict Court committed no procedural error in applying the two-level e nhance ment fo r po s s es s io n o f adan ger ou s weap on .

III. Su bs ta nt iv e Re aso na bl en ess We no w t ur n t o P op e’s con te nt io n that th e im po s it

io n o f as even -y ear

no n- gui del

in es s ent enc e was subst antively

unreasonable be cause (1) it was more than twice the maximum sentence under the Guidelines, and (2) it wa s based solely on Pope’s criminal histor y, ac cording to defendant. A t the outset, we note that the Supreme C ourt held in Gal l th at whena s ent enc e is ou ts id e the G ui del in es
r ang e, t he r evi ewing co ur t “ may

no t ap ply a pr es um pt

io n o f u nr eas on abl ene s s .” 1 28 S . Ct . at 597
. Ra ther, the reviewing

court “may consider the exte nt of the deviation, but must give due deferenc e to th e di s tr ict cou r t’ s dec is io n that

th e § 35 53(a) f

act or s , o n a wh ol e, j us ti fy

th e ext ent

of th e var ian ce.” Id
. Moreover, we have never held tha t a district court ’s particular reliance on a factor to justify departing from the Guideline s is suggestive of unreasonableness; we have only said that “ unju st ifi ed reliance upon10

any o ne f act or ” s ugg es ts un r eas on abl ene s s . Uni te d St ate s v . Rat to ball i , 45 2 F .3d127 , 13 7 (

2d Cir . 20 06) (emphasis added). Generally , “[i]f the ultimate sentence is reasonable and the sentenc ing judge did not
com mi t p r oce du r al er r or

inim po s in g that

s ent enc e, we will n ot

s eco ndgue s s th e weight

(o r lack th er eof ) that th e ju dge acco r dedto a giv en f act or or to a s pec if

ic ar gum ent mad e pu r s uan t t o that fa ct or .” United Sta tes v. F

ernand ez , 44 3 F .3d19, 34 (

2d Cir . 20 06)
. As the record demonstr ates here, the District Court f ully considered the sentenc ing factors lis te d i n 1 8 U. S.C. § 35 53(a). B oth i n i ts J anu ary 31 , 20 08 l et te r , an d at th e F ebruar

y 20 , 20 08 sentencing hea ring, the Distr ict Court noted that it was considering not only the na ture and circumstances of the offens e and the hi stor y and c haracteristics of P ope, but also the nee d for det er r enc e andth e ne ed t o p r ot ect th e pu bl ic f r om fu r th er

cr im es —all d if

fe r ent fa ct or s enu mer ate d under 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a

). Thus , contrary to defendant’s assert ion, the District Court r elied on
nu mer ou s fa ct or s to s up po r t i ts var ian ce f r om th e Gu

id eli nes r ang e; the f

act th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s
as s es s men t o f the w eig

ht of th es e f act or s was in fo r med , inpar t, by P op e’s cr im in al his to ry is ent

ir ely appropriate. Defenda nt has pres ented us with no compelli ng reason to second guess the determination of the District Court that these factors warrant a va riance from the Guidelines of the magnitude im po s ed h er e. Ac cor di ngl y, we con clu de that

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s im po s it

io n o f as even -y ear

s ent enc e was not subs tantively

unreasonable, a nd that the Court did not abuse its dis cretion in imposing it.

CONCLUSI ON Fo r th e r eas on s s tat ed ab ov e, we ho ld th at the D is tr ict Cou r t p r op erly ap pl

iedth e t wo- lev el enh ance men t p ur s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 2 B 2.1 (b )(4) , an d co mm it te d n o er r or incon s id er

in g de fe nd ant ’s
ext ens ive cr

im in al r eco r d i n d epar ti ng u pwar d f r om th e app lic abl e Gu

id eli nes r ang e. Ac cor di ngl y, we conclude that Pope’s s entence was both procedurally a nd subs tantively reasonable, a nd the judgment of the Di stri ctC ou rt i s AFFIRMED.