[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. G.K., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2858.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2858

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. G.K., APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. G.K., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2858.]

Criminal law—R.C. 2953.52—Sealing of court records in criminal cases—Under 

the plain language of the statutes governing the sealing of court records in 

criminal cases, records of dismissed counts in an indictment may not be 

sealed until records of counts in the indictment for which the offender was 

convicted are eligible to be sealed—A court does not have inherent 

authority to seal records when the legislature has enacted specific 

legislation governing the sealing of the records at issue—Court of appeals’ 

judgment reversed and trial court’s judgment reinstated.

(No. 2021-0124—Submitted February 8, 2022—Decided August 19, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,

No. 109058, 2020-Ohio-5083.

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DEWINE, J.

{¶ 1} This case requires us to interpret the statutes that control the sealing 

of court records in criminal cases. The offender in this case was indicted on 

multiple counts. He pleaded guilty to one count, and the state dismissed the 

remaining counts as part of a plea deal. Everyone agrees that at the time the

offender filed his application to seal, he was not eligible to have the record of his 

conviction sealed. The question before us is whether the offender could nonetheless 

apply to have the record of the dismissed counts sealed. We conclude that he may 

not. Under the plain language of the statutes governing sealing, the dismissed 

counts in the indictment may not be sealed until the conviction is eligible to be 

sealed. The court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion, so we reverse its 

judgment.

I. G.K. pleads guilty to one count of a multiple-count indictment

{¶ 2} G.K. and his cousin George Moses were named as codefendants in a 

2009 indictment. Moses was accused of raping his cognitively impaired adult 

daughter. The victim initially said that G.K. had also raped her. Based on that 

allegation, G.K. was charged with three counts of rape, one count of gross sexual 

imposition, and one count of kidnapping. G.K. also helped hide Moses’s computer 

from the police, allegedly to conceal evidence of an attempted rape. As a 

consequence, the state charged G.K with obstructing justice and tampering with 

evidence.

{¶ 3} G.K. reached a plea deal with the state. He pleaded guilty to the 

obstructing-justice charge, the state dismissed the remaining charges against him, 

and the judge sentenced him to community control. According to G.K.’s attorney, 

the state agreed to the deal because its investigation revealed that G.K. had not 

assaulted Moses’s daughter. Moses, on the other hand, entered guilty pleas to 

multiple counts of rape and kidnapping and was sentenced to 60 years in prison.
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II. The statutes governing the sealing of criminal records

{¶ 4} In August 2014, G.K. filed an application in the Cuyahoga County 

Common Pleas Court to have the record of the dismissed counts in the indictment 

against him sealed.

1 There are three relevant statutes that govern the sealing of 

court records in criminal cases. An overview of these statutes is helpful to

understanding the proceedings below.

A. The conviction-sealing statute

{¶ 5} A criminal record containing a conviction may be sealed under certain

circumstances. Former R.C. 2953.32, 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 337, which we will 

refer to as the “conviction-sealing statute,” outlines the requirements for a 

conviction record to be sealed. First, an offender must qualify as an “eligible 

offender” based on the number and type of his prior convictions, see former R.C. 

2953.31(A), 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 337, and the crime itself must be eligible for 

sealing, see former R.C. 2953.36, 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 337. Then, once the 

applicable statutory waiting period for the crime of conviction has expired, “an 

eligible offender may apply to the sentencing court * * * for the sealing of the 

conviction record.” Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). The statute provides a list of 

factors for the court to consider in determining whether to seal the record of the 

conviction. See former R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). If the court determines that the 

offender is eligible for sealing and that the statutory factors support sealing, the 

court “shall order all official records pertaining to the case sealed” and “all index 

references to the case deleted.” Former R.C. 2953.32(C)(2). In that event, “[t]he 

proceedings in the case shall be considered not to have occurred.” Id.

1. The parties agree that the law in effect at the time that G.K. filed his application controls in this 

case. See State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, paragraph two 

of the syllabus (the statutory law in effect at the time of filing an application to seal criminal records 

is controlling).
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B. The nonconviction-sealing statute

{¶ 6} A different statute applies to sealing records of acquittals and 

dismissals. R.C. 2953.52 (the “nonconviction-sealing statute”)states: “Any person, 

who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury or a court or who is the defendant 

named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information, may apply to the court 

for an order to seal the person’s official records in the case.” R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). 

Similarly, when a grand jury returns a “no bill” in a criminal case, declining to 

indict the named defendant, that person may apply to seal the official records in the 

case. R.C. 2953.52(A)(2).

{¶ 7} The trial court is required to make several findings before sealing 

records under this provision. First, the court must determine whether one of three 

dispositions has taken place: (1) “the person was found not guilty in the case,” (2) 

“the complaint, indictment, or information in the case was dismissed,” or (3) “a no 

bill was returned in the case.” R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(a)(i). Additionally, certain time 

periods must have passed with respect to dismissals and no bills. See id.; R.C. 

2953.52(B)(2)(a)(ii). Next, the court must find that there are no criminal charges 

pending against the applicant. R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(b) and (B)(4). The court must 

also consider any written objections filed by the prosecutor. R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(c). 

And the court must weigh “the interests of the person in having the official records 

pertaining to the case sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government 

to maintain those records.” R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(d). If the statutory requirements 

have been met and the trial court finds that the interests weigh in favor of sealing, 

“the court shall issue an order directing that all official records pertaining to the 

case be sealed and that * * * the proceedings in the case be deemed not to have 

occurred.” R.C. 2953.52(B)(4).

C. The multicount-sealing provision

{¶ 8} Different counts in an indictment will sometimes be resolved in 

different ways. R.C. 2953.61 (“the multicount-sealing provision”) addresses the 
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sealing of related charges that had different dispositions. At the time G.K. filed his 

application, that section provided, 

When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a 

result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the 

charges has a final disposition that is different than the final 

disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the 

court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such time 

as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the records 

in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed * * *.

Former R.C. 2953.61, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 175, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2554, 2562.

2

{¶ 9} We have explained that under the multicount-sealing provision, 

“when multiple offenses have different dispositions, an application to seal a record 

may be filed only when the applicant is able to apply to have the records of all the 

offenses sealed.” State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 

401, ¶ 17. This conclusion rests on the plain language of the provision: when a 

person is charged with related counts that are resolved in different ways, the person 

“may not apply to the court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until 

such time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the records in all 

of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed.” Former R.C. 2953.61. In short, 

2. The lower courts relied on subsection (A) of the current version of R.C. 2953.61. That provision 

is substantially similar to the former version. R.C. 2953.61(A) now reads: 

[A] person charged with two or more offenses as a result of or in connection with 

the same act may not apply to the court pursuant to section 2953.32 or 2953.52 of 

the Revised Code for the sealing of the person’s record in relation to any of the 

charges when at least one of the charges has a final disposition that is different 

from the final disposition of the other charges until such time as the person would 

be able to apply to the court and have all of the records pertaining to all of those 

charges sealed pursuant to section 2953.32 or 2953.52 of the Revised Code.
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when multiple counts stem from the same act, an applicant is not eligible to have 

any of the counts sealed until he is eligible to have them all sealed. See Pariag at 

¶ 17.

III. The trial court denies G.K.’s application to seal,

and the court of appeals reverses

{¶ 10} At a hearing on his application, G.K. conceded that he was not 

eligible at that time to have his obstructing-justice conviction sealed because of his 

prior criminal record. See former R.C. 2953.31(A). But he maintained that the trial 

court could seal the portions of the record pertaining to the dismissed charges 

pursuant to the nonconviction-sealing statute.

{¶ 11} The state responded that the nonconviction-sealing statute permits a 

court to seal a record only when the applicant was acquitted or the entire indictment 

was dismissed, neither of which happened in G.K.’s case. And the state contended 

that in addition to that barrier, the multicount-sealing provision prevented the court 

from sealing only part of the record.

{¶ 12} The trial court denied the motion to seal based on the multicountsealing provision. It found that the obstructing-justice charge arose “in conjunction 

with” the dismissed charges. See R.C. 2953.61. Therefore, the trial court

concluded that the dismissed charges could not be sealed until G.K.’s conviction 

for obstructing justice was eligible for sealing.

{¶ 13} G.K. appealed, and a divided panel of the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment denying his application to seal. 2020-

Ohio-5083, 161 N.E.2d 824. The court of appeals determined that (1) the 

nonconviction-sealing statute authorized the sealing of records of individual counts 

within a multicount indictment and (2) the multicount-sealing provision did not 

preclude sealing a portion of the record even though G.K. was ineligible to have his 

conviction sealed. Id. at ¶ 44-60, 70. The court of appeals further held that even if 

none of the sealing statutes authorized the sealing of the records of the dismissed 
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7

countsin this case, the trial could exercise its inherent authority and order the counts 

to be sealed. Id. at ¶ 61-69.

{¶ 14} The state appealed to this court, challenging the Eighth District’s 

conclusion that the nonconviction-sealing statute permits the sealing of individual 

dismissed counts even when the entire case is not eligible to be sealed. See 162 

Ohio St.3d 1420, 2021-Ohio-1201, 166 N.E.3d 10. The state further contests the 

court of appeals’ invocation of the doctrine of inherent authority as a mechanism 

for sealing criminal records that are not statutorily eligible for sealing. The state 

has not appealed the court of appeals’ conclusion that the multicount-sealing 

provision did not preclude the sealing of G.K.’s records, so we have no occasion to 

consider whether that aspect of the court of appeals’ decision was correct.

IV. Analysis

A. G.K. is not eligible to have his records sealed

{¶ 15} G.K. has relied on the nonconviction-sealing statute as the basis for 

having the records of the dismissed charges in the indictment against him sealed. 

That provision permits a person “who is found not guilty of an offense” or “who is 

the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information” to apply 

for an order to seal “the person’s official records in the case.” R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). 

G.K. was not acquitted, nor was his indictment dismissed. Individual counts in the 

indictment were dismissed, but the indictment was not. Indeed, G.K. stands 

convicted of one charge in the indictment. Thus, the trial court could not make the 

necessary finding that G.K. either “was found not guilty in the case” or “the 

complaint, indictment, or information in the case was dismissed.” R.C. 

2953.52(B)(4). The records of the dismissed counts in G.K.’s indictment therefore 

cannot be sealed under the nonconviction-sealing statute. It’s that simple.

B. The court of appeals misapplied the clear statutory language

{¶ 16} Though the language of the nonconviction-sealing statute is clear on 

its face, the Eighth District reached a different result. The court of appeals began 
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by explaining that the nonconviction-sealing statute “permits sealing where the 

applicant (1) ‘is found not guilty of an offense by a jury or a court’ or (2) ‘is the 

defendant named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information.’ ” 2020-

Ohio-5083, 161 N.E.2d 824, at ¶ 27, quoting R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). Despite starting 

with that simple premise, the court of appeals nevertheless deemed the 

nonconviction-sealing statute ambiguous. Id. at ¶ 32-33. The court determined that 

the statutory language permitting a person “who is found not guilty of an offense” 

to apply for “an order to seal the person’s official record in the case,” R.C. 

2953.52(A)(1), created an ambiguity with respect to whether sealing may be 

ordered only for an entire indictment or for individual charges within the same 

indictment, 2020-Ohio-5083 at ¶ 33.

{¶ 17} Having found the language ambiguous, the court of appeals turned 

to extratextual sources—such as legislative history—to try to figure out what the 

legislature would have wanted to happen in a situation such as G.K.’s. See id. at 

¶ 36-43. But in doing so, it relied on legislative analysis of amendments that took 

effect after G.K. had applied to have his dismissed charges sealed. See id. at ¶ 37-

39, citing 2013 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 143 (effective Sept. 19, 2014) (“S.B. 143”). 

Those amendments are not applicable to this case. Moreover, the legislation relied 

on by the court of appeals, S.B. 143, did not make any changes to the 

nonconviction-sealing statute. Nevertheless, the court of appeals looked to changes

that the legislation made to other sealing statutes and applied what it perceived to 

be the rationale for those changes to the unamended nonconviction-sealing statute. 

See 2020-Ohio-5083 at ¶ 37-39. For example, the court interpreted the 

amendments to the conviction-sealing statute to permit sealing individual 

convictions, and based on its reading of those amendments, the court presumed that 

the legislature must also have intended to “allow for trial courts to seal individual 

charges that do not result in a conviction,” id. at ¶ 37.

{¶ 18} There are obvious flaws in the court of appeals’ analysis. First, the 
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9

fact that the legislature amended the conviction-sealing statute but declined to 

amend the nonconviction-sealing statute does not suggest that the legislature 

wanted the same changes to apply to both statutes; it suggests the exact opposite. 

We must presume that the legislature chose not to amend the nonconviction-sealing 

statute for a reason. See Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio 

St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 26 (“the General Assembly’s use of 

particular language to modify one part of a statute but not another part demonstrates 

that the General Assembly knows how to make that modification and has chosen 

not to”).

{¶ 19} Second, there is nothing ambiguous about the nonconviction-sealing 

statute when it is applied to a partially dismissed indictment. By its plain terms,

the statute does not authorize the sealing of such records. A person may apply to 

have his records sealed under the nonconviction-sealing statute if he was “found 

not guilty of an offense” or was “the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, 

indictment, or information.” R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). G.K. does not fit into either of 

those categories. He was not found not guilty of an offense, and he was not named 

in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information. Certain counts in the 

indictment were dismissed, but the indictment was not—one count remained.

{¶ 20} This reading accords with other portions of the nonconvictionsealing statute. Once the trial court finds that the applicant has satisfied the 

requirements of the statute and determines that sealing is appropriate, “the court 

shall issue an order directing that all official records pertaining to the case be sealed 

and that * * * the proceedings in the case be deemed not to have occurred.” R.C. 

2953.52(B)(4). A court cannot seal “all official records pertaining to the case,” id., 

while simultaneously maintaining the record of the conviction in the case, see State 

v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 19.

{¶ 21} The judge concurring below expressed concern that reading the 

nonconviction-sealing statute to apply only when an indictment is dismissed, rather 
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than when individual counts are dismissed, would mean that a defendant could 

never have his case sealed—even if all charges against him were dismissed—unless 

all codefendants named in the same indictment were also eligible to have their 

records sealed. See 2020-Ohio-5083, 161 N.E.2d 824, at ¶ 77 (Keough, P.J., 

concurring). We think this concern is unfounded. The nonconviction-sealing 

statute authorizes a qualifying person to “apply to the court for an order to seal the 

person’s official records in the case.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). The

law therefore permits the sealing of a case with respect to an individual defendant. 

It does not, however, permit the sealing of dismissed portions of an indictment 

against a defendant when other portions of the indictment against that defendant do 

not qualify for sealing.

{¶ 22} Thus, under a straightforward application of the nonconvictionsealing statute, G.K. is not eligible to have his records sealed.

C. A court does not have inherent authority to seal records when the legislature 

has enacted specific legislation governing the sealing of the records at issue

{¶ 23} After concluding that G.K was eligible to have his conviction sealed 

under the statutory framework, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial 

court for it to determine whether G.K. had any pending charges that would prevent 

his application from being granted and to weigh the state’s interest in maintaining 

the records against G.K.’s interest in having them sealed. 2020-Ohio-5083 at ¶ 60.

{¶ 24} The court could have stopped there. But instead, without any party 

having raised the issue, the court opined that courts possess inherent authority to 

seal records. It concluded that even if the legislature did not “leave room” for an 

applicant to have dismissed counts in a record containing a conviction sealed, id. at 

¶ 61, a trial court nevertheless possesses inherent authority to seal the records of 

the dismissed charges under this court’s holding in Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio 

St.2d 374, 421 N.E.2d 1303 (1981). 2020-Ohio-5083, 161 N.E.2d 824, at ¶ 62. 

And it said that the circumstances of this case would warrant invoking that 
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purported inherent judicial authority to order G.K.’s dismissed charges to be sealed. 

Id. at ¶ 63.

{¶ 25} Pepper Pike involved assault allegations brought by an ex-husband 

as a “vindictive tool to harass” his ex-wife. Id. at 377. The criminal charge was 

ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Id. At the time, there were no statutes 

governing the sealing of criminal records pertaining to acquittals or dismissals. See 

id. at 376-377. Thus, this court held that under the “unusual and exceptional 

circumstances” presented in that case, and in the absence of statutory authority, the 

trial court could invoke its inherent judicial authority to seal the records of the 

criminal proceedings. Id. at 377.

{¶ 26} We have since explained that the Pepper Pike decision was rendered 

in “the absence of legislative guidance” with respect to sealing records of 

nonconvictions. State v. Radcliff, 142 Ohio St.3d 78, 2015-Ohio-235, 28 N.E.3d 

69, ¶ 20. We no longer lack that guidance. After Pepper Pike was decided, the 

General Assembly enacted the nonconviction-sealing statute, providing a 

mechanism for sealing records of criminal cases that resulted in acquittals, 

dismissals, and no bills. That legislation explicitly limits the sealing of records of 

dismissed charges to situations in which the entire case is eligible to be sealed.

{¶ 27} “[I]t is the role of the legislature to address the statutory scheme on 

sealing records,” id. at ¶ 36, and we may not, under the cloak of inherent judicial 

authority, intrude upon the province of the legislative branch to make policy 

judgments in this area. The nonconviction-sealing statute plainly does not permit 

the sealing of records of individual counts that were dismissed from an indictment. 

A court may not deviate from the requirements of a statute simply because it would 

prefer that the statute had been written differently. Inherent judicial authority is not

an end-around to legislative dictates.

V. Conclusion

{¶ 28} The statutes that control the sealing of records in criminal cases do 
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not authorize the sealing of records of counts that were dismissed from an 

indictment when, as here, the offender was convicted of one or more counts in the 

indictment. Under the law in effect at the time G.K. filed his application to seal, he 

was not eligible to have his conviction sealed. If he becomes eligible, he may then 

apply to have his case sealed under the applicable provisions.

{¶ 29} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment denying G.K.’s application to seal.

Judgment reversed

and trial court’s judgment reinstated.

KENNEDY, FISCHER, and HESS, JJ., concur.

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J.

STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in judgment only.

MICHAEL D. HESS, J., of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

DONNELLY, J.

_________________

O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring.

{¶ 30} I agree with the majority opinion that under the plain language of the 

statutes governing the sealing of court records in criminal cases, the record of the 

dismissed counts in appellee G.K.’s indictment may not be sealed until the record 

of his conviction on the remaining count from the same indictment becomes eligible 

to be sealed. I write separately, however, to highlight the barrier that the 

nonconviction-sealing statute, R.C. 2953.52, imposes on a defendant such as G.K., 

who was charged with several felony offenses that have been characterized as false 

and were ultimately dismissed.

{¶ 31} Because G.K. was convicted of a single count in a multicount 

indictment, he is not currently eligible to have the records of the dismissed counts 

in the indictment sealed pursuant to R.C. 2953.52. The practical result for G.K. is 

that the presence of the dismissed charges on his criminal record may disqualify 
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him from job opportunities, educational opportunities, and stable housing. See 

generally brief of amici curiae Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Legal Aid 

Society of Columbus, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, and Community Legal Aid 

Services (Aug. 25, 2021).

{¶ 32} We rely on what the General Assembly has written when statutory 

language is unambiguous, as the legislature is the ultimate arbiter of public policy. 

But I am not convinced that when the General Assembly enacted this statutory 

scheme to assist people convicted of crimes with a pathway for reentry to society, 

it intended to impose the high price that G.K. must pay in the form of collateral 

consequences and the stigma of crimes for which he was never convicted. While 

the statutory scheme allows courts to weigh competing interests and conclude that 

it is not in the public interest for charges to be sealed, R.C. 2953.52 automatically 

bars courts from even considering whether to seal dismissed charges such as G.K.’s. 

This barrier serves no apparent purpose and infringes on the public-policy reasons 

supporting the records-sealing statutes. Just as it is up to the legislature to make 

policy judgments with regard to sealing records of convictions, it is also within its 

purview to consider removing the barrier to sealing records of dismissed charges. 

In the interest of fairness and justice, it should do so.

STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Zukerman, Lear & Murray Co., L.P.A., Larry W. Zukerman, Brian A. 

Murray, and Adam M. Brown, for appellee.

Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., Christopher J. Weber, and Sasa 

Trivunic, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Municipal and 

County Court Clerks.

Koehler Fitzgerald, L.L.C., and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, urging reversal for 
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amicus curiae Ohio Clerk of Courts Association.

Sierra Cooper, Patrick Higgins, Katherine Hollingsworth, Thomas Mlakar, 

and Steven McGarrity, urging affirmance for amici curiae Southeastern Ohio Legal 

Services, Legal Aid Society of Columbus, Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, and 

Community Legal Aid Services.

Hannah Christ, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Case Western Reserve 

University Second Chance Reentry Clinic.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin

and Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defenders; and Russel Bensing, urging 

affirmance for amici curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender and Ohio 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

_________________