IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

 

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

v. Case No. 5D14-1654 

WADE F. LILES, 

 Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

________________________________/ 

Opinion filed April 8, 2016 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County, 

Michael Murphy, Judge. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

William R. Ponall and Michael J. Snure, 

of Snure & Ponall, P.A., Winter Park, 

for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D15-405 

JOHN NATHAN WILLIS, 

 Appellee. 

________________________________/ 
2

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Orange County, 

Timothy R. Shea, Judge. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee. 

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and 

Jeri Delgado, Nancy Ryan and Anne 

Moorman Reeves, Assistant Public 

Defenders, Daytona Beach, and Aaron 

D. Delgado, of Damore, Delgado, 

Romanik & Rawlins, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee. 

ORFINGER, J. 

The State of Florida appeals two orders suppressing the results of warrantless 

blood draws taken from Wade F. Liles and John Nathan Willis during drunk driving 

investigations involving separate traffic crash fatalities.1 In both cases, the trial courts 

found that, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Missouri v. 

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the blood draw results were inadmissible because the 

blood was obtained without a warrant, consent, or any other recognized exception to the 

warrant requirement. The State argues that section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes 

(2011), is a general exception to the warrant requirement that applies even after 

McNeely. We disagree, but reverse based on the good-faith exception set forth in 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 

Wade Liles and John Willis were involved in separate fatal traffic crashes in 2011 

and 2012. While investigating these traffic fatalities, the investigating officers saw 

 1 We have consolidated these cases for purposes of disposition only. 
3

indications that Liles and Willis may have been under the influence of alcohol when the 

crashes occurred and requested blood draws pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), 

Florida Statutes (2011). Both Liles and Willis initially refused. However, they ultimately 

complied with the warrantless blood draws after being told that law enforcement would 

forcibly take their blood, if necessary. After Liles and Willis were arrested and charged, 

both filed motions to suppress the results of the warrantless blood draws. Both trial 

courts granted the motions, finding that McNeely either required a warrant or exigent 

circumstances, and that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not 

apply. 

The review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of 

law and fact that uses a two-step approach. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, 

provided that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review de 

novo a trial court's application of law to the historical facts. E.g., Delhall v. State, 95 So. 

3d 134, 150 (Fla. 2012); Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 2001); Ferguson v. 

State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D62, D62 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 31, 2015).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Amend. IV, U.S. Const. A blood draw conducted at the direction of the police is a 

search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 

757, 767 (1966); State v. Geiss, 70 So. 3d 642, 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). To comply 

with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant or consent 

for a blood draw, or there must be some other exception to the warrant requirement. 

See Kilburn v. State, 54 So. 3d 625, 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). When, as here, no 

warrant is obtained, “[t]he state has the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant 
4

requirement applies.” Id. To satisfy that burden, the State argues that the warrantless 

searches in these cases were reasonable under either of two exceptions: consent or 

exigent circumstances. 

Consent 

A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few well-established 

exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One of the wellestablished exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a 

search conducted pursuant to consent. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 

(1946). The State argues that the warrantless blood draws here should be upheld 

under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. 

The State concedes that Liles and Willis did not give actual consent to the blood 

draws. However, it argues that both blood samples were properly drawn on the 

authority found in section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), the mandatory blooddraw provision of Florida’s implied consent statutory scheme,2 which provides as 

follows: 

 2 This Court and other Florida courts have consistently recognized that section 

316.1933 is part of the trilogy of statutes comprising the implied consent statutory 

scheme. See, e.g., State v. Kleiber, 175 So. 3d 319, 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); State v. 

Murray, 51 So. 3d 593, 595 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kurecka v. State, 67 So. 3d 1052, 

1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Boesch, 

979 So. 2d 1024, 1026 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Bruch v. State, 954 So. 2d 1242, 1244 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Under this statutory scheme, section 316.1932 provides that any 

person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given consent to blood alcohol 

testing if the driver is lawfully arrested on suspicion of a drunk driving offense. § 

316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2011), requires a 

police officer to obtain a driver’s blood when the officer has probable cause to believe 

an impaired driver has caused death or serious injury to a human being and to use 

reasonable force if necessary. Finally, section 316.1934, Florida Statutes (2011), sets 
5

If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe 

that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical 

control of a person under the influence of alcoholic 

beverages, any chemical substances, or any controlled 

substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of 

a human being, a law enforcement officer shall require the 

person driving or in actual physical control of the motor 

vehicle to submit to a test of the person’s blood for the 

purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the 

presence of chemical substances as set forth in s. 877.111 

or any substance controlled under chapter 893. The law 

enforcement officer may use reasonable force if necessary 

to require such person to submit to the administration of the 

blood test. The blood test shall be performed in a reasonable 

manner. Notwithstanding s. 316.1932, the testing required 

by this paragraph need not be incidental to a lawful arrest of 

the person. 

In Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 490-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), review 

granted, No. SC15-1417, 2015 WL 9594290 (Fla. Dec. 30, 2015), this Court recognized 

that statutory implied consent was not equivalent to Fourth Amendment consent, 

explaining that valid consent has long been recognized as a “jealously and carefully 

drawn” exception to the warrant requirement and for a search based upon consent to be 

valid, it must be freely and voluntarily given and cannot be the product of coercion. 

Further, statutory implied consent laws do “not constitute a per se exception to the 

warrant requirement.” Id. at 491; see also State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 237 (S.D. 

2014) (indicating that implied-consent statute did not constitute stand-alone exception to 

warrant requirement). Based on Williams, even if we agree with the State that Liles and 

Willis impliedly consented to the blood draws by driving, they explicitly revoked that 

consent when they refused to submit to the blood draws. Because Liles and Willis did 

 

forth various legal presumptions associated with different blood alcohol levels and the 

testing methods. The mandate found in section 316.1933 is a directive to law 

enforcement to perform the test. See State v. Serrago, 875 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2004) (citing State v. Webb, 753 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). 
6

not consent to the blood draws, we conclude that the warrantless blood searches were 

not authorized by the consent exception. 

Exigency 

 The State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the 

warrantless blood draws. This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the 

exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a 

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 

133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). Applying that 

exception, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless 

blood draw in Schmerber when the officer reasonably believed that the delay involved in 

securing a warrant would result in the dissipation of alcohol in a driver’s blood. 384 U.S. 

at 772. Forty-seven years later, in McNeely, the Supreme Court clarified Schmerber, 

holding that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create a 

per se exigency justifying warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing in all DUI cases, 

though it is a relevant consideration in determining if exigent circumstances exist. 133 

S. Ct. at 1568. Hence, “[a]fter McNeely, law enforcement officers [are] no longer 

categorically permitted to obtain a suspect’s blood sample without a warrant simply 

because the alcohol [is] leaving the suspect’s blood stream.” Commonwealth v. 

Duncan, No. 2013-SC-000742-DG, 2015 WL 2266474, at *5 (Ky. May 14, 2015). 

In drunk driving investigations, the Fourth Amendment mandates that officers 

obtain a warrant unless excused by an exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely, 

133 S. Ct. at 1561. The McNeely Court observed that a warrantless search in exigent 

circumstances is reasonable when “there is compelling need for official action and no 
7

time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 

(1978)). However, there is no general justification for applying the exigent 

circumstances exception when “officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood 

sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.” Id. at 

1561.3 Here, as both trial courts found, the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless blood draws under the 

totality of the circumstances in either case. Indeed, the State made no effort to do so, 

as the blood draws were based solely on the officers’ reliance on section 316.1933(1). 

See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1567 (explaining because state had relied on per se 

approach, “the arresting officer did not identify any other factors that would suggest he 

faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a warrant”). 

We decline to adopt the State’s argument that McNeely does not apply in these 

cases and that the Schmerber rule is as broad as previously believed. After McNeely, 

law enforcement must obtain a warrant or later show that exigent circumstances 

prevented them from doing so. Following McNeely, we must read section 316.1933, 

Florida Statutes, as a directive to law enforcement to obtain blood samples in serious 

and deadly crashes when probable cause exists to suggest impaired driving. To comply 

with McNeely, the statute must assume the blood draw will be obtained with a warrant, 

absent consent or proof of exigent circumstances. Cf. State v. Won, No. SCWC-12-

 3 The Court reiterated that the question of the reasonableness of a warrantless 

search should be answered on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the 

circumstances. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563. McNeely identified certain facts that 

establish whether an exigent circumstance exists, including: natural dissipation of 

alcohol from the body, the time to seek out a magistrate to review a warrant, a DUI 

involving a crash where an investigation must be conducted, and the availability of 

electronic or telephonic warrants. Id. at 1560-62. 
8

0000858, 2015 WL 10384497 (Haw. Nov. 25, 2015) (discussing McNeely, and stating 

that pursuant to statute, warrantless blood alcohol test may be required from driver 

involved in collision resulting in injury or death so long as: (1) police have probable 

cause to believe that driver has committed DUI offense and that blood sample will 

evidence that offense; (2) exigent circumstances are present; and (3) sample is 

obtained in reasonable manner). 

Good Faith and the Exclusionary Rule 

Although we conclude that neither the consent nor exigent circumstances 

exceptions applies to these cases, we nonetheless reverse the suppression of the blood 

draws based on the police officers’ good-faith reliance on section 316.1933. The 

exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy adopted to protect Fourth Amendment 

rights by deterring illegal searches and seizures. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 

2419, 2426 (2011). It is intended to deter police misconduct, not to remedy the prior 

invasion of a defendant's constitutional rights. Montgomery v. State, 69 So. 3d 1023, 

1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to 

“deter future unlawful police conduct,” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976), the 

rule has not been applied in certain circumstances, such as when an officer acts in 

objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, Illinois v. Krull, 

480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987). 

Applying the objective standard of reasonableness mandated by Krull to the facts 

presented here, we conclude that, before McNeely, it was reasonable for the officers to 

have a good-faith belief in the constitutional validity of a warrantless blood draw 

authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a). See, e.g., State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 698 
9

(Fla. 1980) (“There is no constitutional impediment to a blood alcohol analysis with or 

without consent where probable cause has been established.”); State v. McInnis, 581 

So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (recognizing no constitutional right not to have 

blood drawn for testing by brute force and against suspect’s will); see also State v. 

Langsford, 816 So. 2d 136, 138-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding forcible blood 

extraction from defendant does not violate Fourth Amendment when defendant is under 

arrest for DUI provided there is probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI, and blood is 

extracted in reasonable manner by medical personnel, pursuant to medically-approved 

procedures). 

Exclusion of the blood in these two cases would have no deterrent effect on 

future police misconduct. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) 

(recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police 

conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right 

of party aggrieved); United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting 

that Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence weighed more toward preserving evidence 

for use in obtaining convictions, even if illegally seized, than toward excluding evidence 

in order to deter police misconduct unless officers engaged in deliberate, reckless, or 

grossly negligent conduct); Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (“To 

apply the exclusionary rule in this case cannot possibly deter police because they did 

exactly what they were trained to do based on what we (judges) told them was 

appropriate.”). Instead, applying the exclusionary rule in this case would deprive the 

State of the benefit of evidence obtained as a result of the officers’ good-faith conduct. 

Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08 (“Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in 
10

objective good faith . . ., the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty 

defendants [by the exclusionary rule] offends basic concepts of the criminal justice 

system.”). 

Accordingly, although we conclude that Liles and Willis both suffered a Fourth 

Amendment violation, based on the good-faith exception, the trial courts should not 

have suppressed the results of warrantless blood draws taken before the issuance of 

McNeely.4 See, e.g., People v. Harrison, No. 5–15–0048, 2016 WL 683829 (Ill. App. Ct. 

Feb. 18, 2016) (holding that good-faith exception applied to preclude suppression of 

blood draw results because at time of warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw, McNeely 

had yet to be decided and binding precedent allowed for such draws in all DUI cases); 

State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 877-78 (Minn. 2015) (holding that results of 

defendant’s blood test were admissible under good-faith exception, where officer relied 

on and complied with binding appellate precedent, which was later abrogated, that 

allowed warrantless blood draw when there was probable cause to believe that 

defendant was intoxicated when she caused motor vehicle accident); Byars v. State, 

336 P.3d 939, 947-48 (Nev. 2014) (holding that admission of blood draw evidence was 

not erroneous because, pre-McNeely, officer had reasonable good-faith belief in 

constitutional validity of warrantless blood draw); State v. Foster, 856 N.W.2d 847, 859-

60 (Wis. 2014) (holding that good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied to 

 4 Liles’s cross-appeal, challenging whether there was probable cause for the 

warrantless blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), is without merit. See Dep’t 

of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Rose, 105 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 

(recognizing that determination of probable cause to arrest for DUI is based on several 

factors, including odor of alcohol on driver’s breath as well as defendant’s slurred 

speech, lack of balance or dexterity, flushed face, bloodshot eyes, admissions, and poor 

performance on field sobriety exercises). 
11

evidence obtained as result of warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw following arrest 

of defendant on suspicion of operating vehicle while under influence of intoxicant since 

police officers conducting blood draw acted in objectively reasonable belief that their 

conduct did not violate Fourth Amendment; at time of draw, Supreme Court had not yet 

announced McNeely rule); accord State v. Taylor, 79 So. 3d 876, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2012) (holding that good-faith exception applied to police officer's search of defendant's 

vehicle where search occurred prior to issuance of Supreme Court's decision that made 

such search unlawful); Montgomery, 69 So. 3d at 1033 (holding that, although 

defendant was stopped based on unconstitutional noise ordinance, good-faith exception 

applied to drug evidence recovered because ordinance was not held unconstitutional 

until after stop was made and officer's reliance on statute was objectively reasonable; 

exclusion of drugs found in defendant's car would have had no deterrent effect on future 

police misconduct and would have deprived state of benefit of evidence obtained as 

result of officer's good-faith conduct). 

 REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

TORPY and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.