UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________________ ) SONYA PETTAWAY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1721 (RBW) ) ) TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ) ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., ) ) Defendants, ) _______________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Sonya Pettaway, brings this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (the “ERISA”), 29 U.S. C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and 1133 (2006), against the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (the “Teachers’ Association”), Standard Benefit Administrators (the “SB Administrato rs”), and the National Academy of Sciences Group Total Disability In surance Plan (the “Academy Plan” or “Plan”) (collectively the “defendants”) alleging that the defendants violated the ERISA by wrongfully terminating her benefit coverage and by not fo llowing proper procedures in the course of administering her claim. See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 13, 16-17. The defendants deny the allegations. See Answer of the National Academy of Sc iences Group Total Disability Insurance Plan (“Def. Acad.’s Answer”) ¶¶ 1, 16-20; Answer of the Teachers’ Association and the SB Administrators (“Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Answer ”) ¶¶ 16-19. The Court previously ruled that the plaintiff’s claims were not time-barred under the doctrine of equitable tolling, Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America , 547 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2008) (Walton, J.),2 and currently before the C ourt are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 1 Upon consideration of the parties writte n submissions and the administrativ e record in this case, for the reasons set forth below the Court must deny th e plaintiff’s motion and grant summary judgment

to the defendants.

I. BACKGROUND A. The Academy Plan During the time period relevant to this litigation, the plaintiff was employed by the National Academy of Sciences (the “Academy”) and enrolled in the disab ility plan it sponsored as a benefit for its employees. Compl. ¶ 6; Def. Acad.’s Answer ¶ 6. See generally Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. A to Declaration (“ Decl.”) of Shelia Wright (Nati onal Academy of Sciences Total Disability Insurance Plan). The Academy Plan is accompanied by a Summary Plan Description. See generally Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. B to Decl. of Shelia Wright (Total Disability

1 The Court also considered the following papers filed in connection with the parties’ summary judgment motions: (1) Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’ s Stmt.”); (2) Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plai ntiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”); (3) Plaintiff’s Opposition to NA S Group Total Disability Insurance Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Acad.’s Mot.”); (4) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant s’ Teachers Insurance Annuity Association and Standard Benefit Administrator Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’ s Opp’n to Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mot.”); (5) Plaintiff’s Reply to the Briefs Opposing Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Sumitted [sic] by NAS Group Total Disability Insurance Plan, Teachers Insu rance Annuity Association, and Standard Benefit Administrator (“Pl.’s Reply”); (6) Defendant National Academy of Sciences Grou p Total Disability Insurance Plan’s Statement of Facts in the Administrative Record (“Def. Acad.’s Stmt.”); (7) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant NAS Group Total Disability Insurance Plan’s Mo tion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Acad.’s Mem.”); (8) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Pl aintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Acad.’s Opp’n”); (9) Reply Memorandum of Points and Authoritie s in Support of Defendant NAS Group Total Disability Insurance Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (10) Defendants Teachers Insurance Annuity Association’s and Standard Benefits Administrator’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Joint CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (“Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem.”) (this includes a Statement of Facts that is largely similar to the one submitted by the Academy Plan; fo r the most part the Court refers to the facts outlined in the Academy Plan’s Statement); (11) Defendants Teachers Insurance Annuity Association’s and Standard Benefits Administrator’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plai ntiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Opp’n”); and (12) Defendants Teachers Insurance Annuity Association’s and Standard Benefits Administrator’s Reply in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.3 Insurance Plan Summary Plan Descri ption) (the “Plan Description”). 2 The Academy Plan was created pursuant to the ERISA as an employee benefit plan, it is underwritten by the Teachers’ Association, 3 Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Answer ¶ 7, and the SB Administrators serve as the administrator of the Academy Plan, 4 Compl. ¶ 5; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 6; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Answer ¶ 5. The Academy Plan states that participants “shall be entitled to benefits under the Plan as set forth in the Policy,” Acad. Plan at 4.1, whic h is identified as “the Group Policy [number] D1129 issued by the [Teachers’ Association],” id. at 1.6. See generally Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. C to Decl. of Shelia Wright, (D-1129 Group Total Disability Insurance Certificate) (the “Policy”) at A.R. 26-169. 5 If a participant qualifies, she receiv es benefits in the form of monthly

2 The Academy Plan and the Plan Description have their own pagination and section numbers. Neither document is however bates numbered. For the sake of simplicity, when referring to these documents, the Court will cite to their respective page or section number.

3 Employer sponsored benefit plans covered by the ERISA include: Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing its participants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accide nt, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions). 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).

4 The Teachers’ Association served as administrator of the Academy Plan until approximately 2003, at which point the SB Administrators became the admini strator on behalf of the Teachers’ As sociation. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 2. The plaintiff admits that both organizations served as administrators of the Academy Plan, Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 6, and does not draw any le gal distinction between these two entities, e.g. , Pl.’s Mem. at 2-4; Pl.’s Opp’n to Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mot. at 1-4. In part I.A of this Memorandum Opinion and when directly quoting an Academy Plan document, the Court will use the specific name of one of the two entities. In the remainder of this opinion the Court will simply refer to the organization that administered the plaintiff’s claim as the “Teachers/Administrator.”

5 The administrative record in this cases is bates numbered STND1139-00001 to STND1139-01540, Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul ¶ 2, and portions of th e record have been submitted to the (continued...)4 payments equal to sixty percent of her basic mo nthly salary, up to a certain amount, as well as annuity premium benefits to compensate for lost retirement contributions. Id. , at A.R. 164-65. According to the Policy, benefits are awarde d to participants who are “totally disabled” or have a “total disability.” Id. , at A.R. 165. The terms are used interchangeably and are defined

as follows: (1) for the Elimination Period shown in Part I, and for the next 24 months, being completely unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform the mate rial and substantial duties of your Normal Occupation; and (2) after those 24 months, being una ble due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perfor m the material and substantial duties of any occupation for which you are reasonably qualified by education, training, or experience. You must be under the Regular Care of a Physician, other than yourself or a member of your family.

Id. , at A.R. 143. 6 The Elimination Period applicable to the plaintiff’s claim is six months, meaning that after receiving benefits for twenty four months, the definitio n of total disability

shifts from the first defi nition to the second. See id. , at A.R. 165 (providing the two definitions

(. . . continued) Court as attachments to the parties’ various filings. Wh en citing to the administrative record, the Court will first indicate the particular filing the record was submitted with, and then use the designation “A.R.” followed by the last three or four digits of the bates numbering.

6 Regular care is defined as: (1) regular in-person visits with your Ph ysician as frequently as required under standard medical practice to effectiv ely manage and treat your disabling sickness or injury. Your physician must be a Physician whose specialty, expertise and experience are appropriate for the care and treatment of your Total Disability; and (2) a reasonable program of care and treatment that is, in accordance with accepted medical practice, expected to enhance your ability to work, and which is provided by a Physician whose specialty, expertise and experience are appropriate for the care and treatment of your Total Disability.

Id. , at A.R. 143.5 of the Elimination Period). In other words, and re levant to the dispute in this case, in order to receive benefits after the first twenty four mont hs of payments, participants must be under the “Regular Care of a Physician” and demonstrate they are “unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform the material and substa ntial duties of any occupation for which [they] are reasonably qualified by educatio n, training, or experience.” Id. , at A.R. 143.

In order to demonstrate their entitlement to benefits, participants must provide “proof of [their] Total Disability” to th e Teachers’ Association. Id. , at A.R. 146. According to the Policy, examples of the kinds of proof required are “sta tements of treating physic ians; copies of test reports or examinations; x-rays; hospital records; medical examinations by impartial specialists at [the Teachers’ Association’s] expense; investigations conducted by [the Teachers’ Association] or outside agencies.” Id. , at A.R. 146. The Plan De scription adds that the “insurance carrier may require a medical exam.” Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. B to Decl. of Shelia Wright (Plan Description) at 8. The Policy also states that “[w]ritten proof of continued Total Disability is required at reasonable intervals to be determined by [the Teachers’ Association],” and further indicat es that “[a]ll proof must be satisfactory to [the Teachers’ Association].” Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. C to Decl. of Shelia Wright at A.R. 146. With respect to the Teachers’ Association’s role in administering claims, it is given that authority from two sources. Def. Acad.’s Mem ., Attach. B to Decl. of Shelia Wright (Plan Description) at 3, 8. The first source for this au thority is found in the Pl an Description under the

section entitled “Total Disabilit y,” which provides that “the dete rmination of your total disability is made solely by the insurance carrier[,]” id. , Plan Description at 3, and the Teachers’

Association is listed as the insu rer for the Academy Plan in a later section of the Plan Description titled “Summary of ERISA Information,” id. , Plan Description at 12. The second source for the6 authority, also found in the Plan Description under the heading “Claims Procedures,” states that the “[Teachers’ Association] has full power and discretionary authority under the group policy to control and manage the operation and administ ration of the group policy, subject only to the participant’s rights of review and appeal under the group policy.” Id. , Plan Description at 8. The

same section declares that the [Teachers’ Association] has all th e powers necessary to accomplish these purposes in accordance with the terms of the group policy including, but not limited to, th e following: (1) determining the benefits and amounts payable ther efor[e] to any participant or beneficiary; (2) establishing and ad ministering a claims review and appeal process; and (3) interpre ting, applying, and administering the provisions of the group policy.

Id. , Plan Description at 8. If the Teachers’ Association denies an applic ation for benefits, the Policy states that the

Teachers’ Association must send a written denial to the claimant “specify[ing] the reason(s) for the denial, the provisions of the contract on wh ich the denial is based, and how to ask for a review.” Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. C to Decl . of Sheila Wright at A.R. 147. Participants therefore have the right to appeal a deni al of an applicati on for benefits. Id.

B. The Plaintiff’s Medical Condition The plaintiff, who is college educated, was employed as a technical trainer at the Academy and was enrolled in the Academy Plan when she injured her back in an automobile accident on January 10, 2000. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 3; Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 13. She did not report to work the next day and remained on leave un til she eventually underw ent back surgery in September 2000. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4; Def. Acad.’ s Stmt. ¶ 13. On October 5, 2000, the plaintiff was approved for long term disability benefits. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 13.7 About a year later, in November 2001, the Teachers/Administrator started contacting the plaintiff requesting updates regarding her condition. Id. ¶ 17. In January 2002, the plaintiff provided to the Teachers/Administrator records from her treating physician, Dr. Bernard Stopak, a neurosurgeon. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 13; Def. Aca d.’s Stmt. ¶ 19. Dr. Stopak’s records reflected that he had not seen the plainti ff in about a year, and he later advised the Teachers/Administrator that he did not have proper authorization to c onduct further diagnostic studies of her condition. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 19. In light of this in formation, the Teachers/Administrator asked the plaintiff to undergo an Indepe ndent Medical Examination (“IM Examination”) to assess her

current condition. Id. ¶ 20. After some scheduling difficulties, 7 the plaintiff underwent the IM Examination on August 28, 2002. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11. Dr. Arthur Korbine, the exam ining physician, reported that the plaintiff was a “healthy appearing female who ge ts up easily from the chair[,] . . . walks in a normal fashion[,]” and walks “equally well on heel s and toes.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem.,

Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 321. Examination of her lower extremities showed “normal strength, tone, reflex and sensor y exam” and that “[s]traight leg raising causes back pain but no leg pain.” Id. Dr. Kobrine’s impression was th at the plaintiff “continues to complain of symptoms of ra diculopathy but has had no diagnostic study since surgery,” 8 and recommended that the plaintiff undergo a Magne tic Resonance Imaging scan (“MRI”). Id. On November 13, 2002, after a further review of pl aintiff’s “file by an independent physician

consultant and a transferable skills assessmen t,” the Teachers/Admini strator informed the

7 The defendants point out instances in the record showing that, between March and July 2002, they had a great deal of difficulty communicating with the plaintiff, had some of their letters returned as undeliverable, and were forced to rescheduled the location and date of the IM Examination several times. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 5-7. The plaintiff only indirectly refutes these allegations, sa ying she underwent the August 2002 IM Examination after she was “properly informed” abou t it. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11.

8 Radiculopathy is a disorder of the spinal nerve roots. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 1503 (27 th Ed. 2000).8 plaintiff that it would stop paying her benef its after December 2002 because her condition did not qualify as a total disability as defined by th e Policy. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 11; Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶

30. On November 20, 2002, the plaintiff appealed the decision to terminate her benefits. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12. In support of her appeal, the pl aintiff provided a personal letter she had written explaining her condition, a copy of the recent August 2002 IM Examination report, and a report from Dr. Stopak dated November 28, 2000. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 7. Other than her letter, id. , Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 836, the Teachers/Administrator already had copies of the other documents, and it therefore affirmed the denial of her claim because the plaintiff had not submitted any new ev idence. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 31. The January 14, 2003 denial letter from the Teac hers/Administrator informed th e plaintiff that her appeal request “must be accompanied by medical documentation including, but not limited to, physicians’ office notes, test repor t results, hospital records, th erapy notes, consultation and/or narrative reports that support your disability.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl.

of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 839. Thereafter, the plaintiff sa w several physicians in the first few months of 2003, and records from these visits were provided to the Teachers/Administrator. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12; Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 33. Included among the docum ents provided was “a Lumbosacral Myelogram with a Post Myelogram” Computer ized Axillary Tomography scan (“CT scan”), both performed on February 21, 2003. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12. Accordin g to the radiologists’ reports accompanying these procedures, the myelogram exhibited a “mild ventral extradural defect at L3-4” and a “[s]table first degree retrolisthes is at L4-5[,]” Defs. Teachers’/A dm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1327, and the CT scan showed a “[m]ild circumferential disk bulge9 at L3-L4” and a “[m]inimal circumfe rential disk bulge at L4-L5.” Id. , at A.R. 1328. Also

included in the submission were more recent re ports from Dr. Stopak, showing that he had scheduled a second back surgery for April 23, 2003, in part because the plaintiff’s condition had become “more aggravated” following a slip a nd fall in Atlantic City in January 2003. Id. , at A.R. 351, 361. The surgery was postponed, howeve r, because the plaintiff had to attend a medical hearing around that same time and therefor e the surgery had to be rescheduled. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 34. On April 22, 2003, the plaintiff was involved in a second automobile accident. Id. She was examined two days later by Dr. Stopak who recommended, “with no question in [his] mind,” that the plaintiff undergo a second back surgery for a “total decompressive lumbar laminectomy [of] L3-4 and L4-5.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Me m., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 361. In a follow-up note, dated July 8, 2003, Dr. Stopak predicted that the plaintiff’s postsurgery recovery time would be at least three to six months, a nd estimated that after recovering the plaintiff would “be able to return to work wi th restrictions of avoi ding excessive bending and lifting over [twenty] pounds.” Id. , at A.R. 379. On August 12, 2003, the Teachers/Administrator se nt a letter to the plaintiff confirming

the reinstatement of her disabili ty benefits. Def. Acad.’s Stmt . ¶ 36. Dr. Arnold Kraminer, the reviewing physician for the Teachers/Administra tor, based the decision on the pending surgery, and suggested that the Teachers/Administrator cont act the plaintiff three to six months after the surgery to inquire a bout her condition. Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Kraminer indicat ed, however, that if “for any reason the planned surgery [was] not perfor med[,] updated medical information should be

obtained and the file should be referred for me dical review.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem.,

Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1277.10 In compliance with this recommendation, the Teachers/Administrator sent letters to the plaintiff on November 7, 2003 and December 2 1, 2003, requesting updates on her condition. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 37. During subsequent tele phone conversations, the plaintiff informed the Teachers/Administrator that she would pr ovide the information requested. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 9. However, by March 1, 2004, the Teachers/Administrator had not yet received any new records from the plaint iff and another letter was sent to the plaintiff requesting that she provide the information. Id. On March 12, 2004, the plaintiff s ubmitted additional documents to the Teachers/Administrator, and these records showed th at she did not have the second back surgery. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 38. Also included in this submission was a letter from Dr. Stopak, dated January 23, 2004, stating that the plaintiff is “per manently disabled” and “cannot return to any type of gainful employment.” 9 Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 15. On June 7, 2004, the Teachers/Administrator asked the plaintiff to provide additional information to substantiate her disability claim, Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 39, noting that they did “not have sufficient medical documentation to subtant[iate ] your current limits and restrictions or that you are under the Regular Care of a Physician.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl.

of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1380. On J une 24, 2004, the plaintiff provided a “supplemental neurosurgical report” from Dr. St opak, declaring that the plaint iff “continues to have . . .

9 The body of this letter from Dr. Stopak reads in full: The above referenced patient is permanently disabled due to her intractable low back and leg pain. She cannot return to any type of gainful employment. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl . of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1440.11 incapacitating back and leg pain” and that her “[p]rognosis is guarded.” 10 Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 16. The

Teachers/Administrator considered this letter to be an “unsubs tantiated statement” containing “minimal information[.]” Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 40. Thus, after coordinating logistics with the plaintiff, the Teachers/Administrator scheduled an IM Examination as well as a Functional Capacity Exam (“FC Examination”) for July 27, 2004, to be administered in Florida, where the plaintiff said she would be at th at time. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 17; Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 41. However, the plaintiff did not appear for either examinati on. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 18; Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 41. On August 12, 2004, the Teachers/Administrator se nt the plaintiff a letter stating they were discontinuing her benefits. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 18. The letter reviewed the evidence the plaintiff had provided, recounted the Teachers’/Administrat or’s difficulties in communicating with the plaintiff, and stated her benefits were bei ng discontinued because th e Teachers/Administrator “lack[ed] objective medical documentation to sup port [her] inability to perform any occupation for which [she would] qualify based on her educa tion, training, experience , and capabilities.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl . of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1391. On October 18, 2004, the plaintiff appealed th e discontinuation of her benefits. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 43. The Teachers/Administrato r responded by letter dated November 1, 2004, and offered the plaintiff the opportunity to undergo another IM Examination and an FC

Examination. Id. ¶ 44. The plaintiff did not respond to the offer, and follow-up letters were

10 The text of this supplemental report reads in full: [Plaintiff] continues to have . . . incapacitating back and leg pain. We are still waiting to schedule the surgery on [the plaintiff] as previously mentioned. The lumber reexploration and disectomy at two levels, L3-4 and L4-5 and a fusion. Prognosis is guarded. In the meantime there is no way she can return to any type of work whatsoever at this time.

Id. , at A.R. 1439.12 mailed to her on December 21, 2004, and January 8, 2005, both requesting that the plaintiff undergo the IM and FC Examinations. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. On January 25, 2005, the plaintiff pr ovided additional records to the Teachers/Administrator. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 19. 11 Included were more records from Dr. Stopak, dated September 16, and 17, 2004. Id. ¶¶ 19-21. In his Ortho/Neur o Physician’s Report dated September 16, Dr. Stopak observed that the plain tiff walked “with a marked limp favoring the right leg in a bent over antalg ic position,” and that she “experi enced great difficulty changing positions from sitting to standing and mounting the examining table.” Id. , Ex. 7 at A.R. 426. He noted associated numbness and subjec tive weakness of her right leg. Id. Dr. Stopak’s impression was that there had been “exacerbatio n of previous pathology of the spine with ruptured lumbar discs at the L3 -4 and L4-5 levels and a grade I retrolisthesis at L4-5 with instability.” Id. The plaintiff’s prognosis was listed as “[g]uarded,” and Dr. Stopak added that the plaintiff “is not ready to return to work.” Id. Surgery in the form of a total decompressive lumbar laminectomy was recommended. Id. In the September 17, 2004, Ortho/Neuro Questionnaire, Dr. Stopak indicated that the plaintiff was “unable to walk, sit, stand, lift, carry, push, pull or perform repetitive actions with her hands.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 20. 12 In February 2005, the Teachers/Administrator con ducted a review of the plaintiff’s claim. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 46. Her records were reviewed by Dr. Mary Lindquist, a consulting

11 There is disagreement as to when these materials were submitted, with the defendants representing that these documents were submitted in October 2004 as part of the plai ntiff’s appeal. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 43-46. However, whether they arrived in October 2004 or January 2005 is no t material to the outcome of the case. What matters is that the defendants received these documents and considered them during their reviews of the plaintiff’s appeal.

12 The plaintiff provides no citation for this document, Pl.’s Stmt ¶ 20, and it does not appear to be included among the plaintiff’s exhibits or the administrative record filings in this case. The defendants provide a reference to the document in the record, Def. Acad.’s Opp’n at 15, and challenge its favora bility to the plaintiff’s case, id. at 16. Nevertheless, the Court must accord the plaintiff the be nefit of the doubt and assumes her description of the document is accurate.13 physician for the Teachers/Administrator with a specialty in internal medicine. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of An drew M. Altschul at A.R. 1413. Dr. Lindquist summarized the plaintiff’s medical history, including the recently submitted reports from Dr. Stopak. Id. Dr. Lindquist found some in consistencies between Dr. Stopak’s findings and those of the other physicians who had in terpreted the plainti ff’s records, notably the results of the February 2003 CT scan. Id. , at A.R. 1412. In particular, Dr. Lindquist observed that the radiologist’s interpretation of this st udy varied significantly from Dr. [Stopak]’s interpretati on, wherein he describes ‘ruptured lumbar discs at L3-4 and L4-5 with grade-1 retrolisthesis at L4-5 with instability’ in his note from September 16, 2004. The only significant finding described was righ t L3 nerve root impairment. The patient’s history and physical exam findings, however, are not consistent with an L3 radicuplopathy.

Id. Dr. Lindquist also noted the plaintiff s failu re to undergo the IM and FC Examinations, and

commented on the absence of further medical evidence to review. Id. , at A.R. 1411-1412. She opined that from the documentation provided, “it is likely that the claimant would be capable of work in the sedentary, possibly light categories of work,” id. , at A.R. 1411, and concluded that “the medical information provided does not s upport that the claimant has limitations and

restrictions due to her back condition that would preclud e her performing any gainful employment[,]” id. On March 9, 2005, the Teachers/Administrator referred the plaintiff’s file for a

transferable skills assess ment. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 48. The response to the referral concluded that the plaintiff “does not ha ve limitations or restrictions which would prevent her from performing full-time, sedentary level work.” 13 Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl.

13 The Teachers/Administrator used the definition of the sedentary work employed by the Department of Labor, which provides: (continued...)14 of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1422. The skil ls assessment identified six occupations in the Washington D.C. area, including the positions of personnel clerk, user support analyst, and administrative assistant, that “match the [plain tiff’s] functional capacit y, education, training, and experience.” Id. , at A.R. 1420-21. On March 15, 2005, the Teachers/Administrator sent the plaintiff a letter explaining the reasons for closing her benefits’ claim. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 48. This letter summarized the plaintiff’s medical condition as reflected by all the documents she had submitted, and concluded the Teachers/Administrator was denying her reques t for benefits because she was found to be “capable of performing other occupations for which you are reasonably qualified by your education, training, experience, and physical f unctional abilities.” Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1428. The letter added that “[y]ou are entitled to one independent revi ew under the terms of your group coverage. We have completed

that review and we will not be able to be of further assistance to you. This concludes the administrative review process by the Quality Assurance Unit.” Id. On May 5, 2005, a representative from the Distri ct of Columbia Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation (the “D.C. De partment of Insurance”) informed the Teachers/Administrator that the plaintiff was a rranging to have an IM Examination conducted. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 50. Several months earli er, in November 2004, the plaintiff had filed a complaint with the D.C. Department of Insurance, and following that filing the

(. . . continued) Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standi ng are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (2009).15 Teachers/Administrator and the D.C. Department of Insurance were in contact concerning the status of the plaintiff’s claim. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 12. The D.C. Department of Insurance representative inquired if the Teacher s/Administrator would be willing to pay for the examination, and the Teachers/Administrator agreed to do so. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 50. The plaintiff submitted to an FC Examination on June 21, 2005, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 26, and it was concluded that she was generally capab le of performing sedentary work. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1478. The FC Examination reported that confirming whether the plaintiff could work a full eight hour day was “difficult to predict” because the extent of he r self-limiting activities “heavily influenced the

outcome of the test.” Id. , at A.R. 1484. According to the report, during the examination the plaintiff “self-limited on 79% of the 14 tasks” she performed, meaning she “stopped the task before a maximum effort was reached[,]” whic h can be caused by “1) Pa in, 2) Psychological issues such as fear of reinjury, anxiety, depres sion and/or 3) Attempts to manipulate the test

results.” Id. 14 The FC Examination also observed several “Function to Function Test

Inconsistencies” and found that the plaintiff was “making tasks more difficult than necessary.”

Id. , at A.R. 1481-82. Specifically, th e FC Examination reported:

 Gait was antalgic on [r]ight side at beginning of test and antalgic on left side when leaving after the test.

 During the walking test in the mobility section, [the plaintiff] only ambulated 20 feet, however, she walked into the clinic and out of the clinic to her ca r without stopping and that [is] over 50 feet.

 Could not push empty sled with Upper body resting on handle, even though she stated she shopped in that position.

14 The report further states that “[a]lthough it is difficult to determine the cause of self-limiting behavior, . . . research indicates that motivated clients self-limit on no mo re than 20% of test items” and that “[i]f the self-limiting exceeds 20% then psychological a nd/or motivational factors are affecting test results.” Id. , at A.R. 1484. Moreover, the plaintiff “failed 7 of the 7 consistency criteria” on a “Hand Strength Assessment” test, which according to the “User’s Guide” for the test, there is a “significantly less than one in one million” chance that a patient will fail all seven consistency criteria. Id. , at A.R. 1483 (emphasis in original).16 [The plaintiff’s heart rate] during her maximal pushing and pulling test was actually lower during the performance of the task than when she was walking to the chair and resting.

 During her stair ambulation test, [the plaintiff] ambulated up the stairs leading with the le ft foot, however, instead of descending down the st airs with the right leg (the involved leg), she lead with the left leg. This gait pattern puts all of her body weight on her right leg. During level surface ambulation, [the plaintiff] avoi ded placing full weight on the right leg via antalg ic gait pattern.

Id. One month later, on July 21, 2005, the plaintiff underwent another IM Examination. Def. Acad.’s Stmt. ¶ 55. The evaluating neurologist, Dr. John Hennessey, revi ewed the plaintiff’s medical history, including all the records subm itted by Dr. Stopak, and conducted a physical and neurological examination. Defs. Teachers’/Adm ’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M.

Altschul at A.R. 1526-32. As to Dr. Stopak’s findings, Dr. Hennessey pointed out that Dr. Stopak’s examination of the plaintiff followi ng her second automobile accident “actually” showed “an improvement” from her exam two m onths before the accident, even though Dr. Stopak’s assessment of the plaintiff’s condition “at this point is exacerbati on of prior pathology.”

Id. , at A.R. 1531. Dr. Hennessey also thought it puzzling that Dr. Stopak mentioned the plaintiff’s incapacitating back and leg pain in Ju ne 2004, but failed to say on what side of her body she was experiencing the pain. Id. Following his physical exam, Dr. Hennessey’s as sessment was that the plaintiff “had an

incredible amount of breakthr ough weakness which, quite frankly, was completely inconsistent

with what she did on her feet in walking to the office and getting on and off the exam table.” Id. , at A.R. 1528. He further commented that “the re are gross inadequacies between what the [plaintiff] can perform when she’s not on the ex am table versus what she does on the exam17 table.” Id. , at A.R. 1526. Dr. Hennesey concluded that “my objective findings do not correlate with the [plaintiff’s] stated diagnosis and findings.” Id. In terms of the plaintiff’s ability to return to work, Dr. Hennessey admitted that this was difficult to determine because of the plaintiff’s self-limiting behavior, but opined that the she “is ready for sedentary activity and I would probably start her off on half-day activity, namely, four hours with . . . breaks every [thirty] mi nutes to one hour based on needs.” Id. , at A.R. 1525. Dr. Hennessey predicted that the plai ntiff could “return to full-time work in a sedentary capacity within a month or two of starting half a day work cycles.” Id. On September 26, 2005, the Teachers/Administrato r sent a letter to plaintiff informing her of their conclusion that she “no longer meets the definition of Disability as defined in the group policy.” Id. , at A.R. 1519. The letter further revi ewed the appeals process previously conducted by the Teachers/Administrator and explai ned that it satisfied the independent review under the Policy. Id. , at A.R. 1516-19. The letter concluded:

You are entitled to one independent review under the terms of your group policy and the Employee Benefits – Quality Assurance Unit has previously provided that revi ew. You previously requested copies of the records used in our decision to close your claim. That has also been provided to you. Therefore, this concludes our handling of this claim.

Id. , at A.R. 1516. On March 26, 2006, the plaintiff attempted to supplement her file with additional records

but the Teachers/Administrator refused to cons ider them, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 32-33, and advised the plaintiff in a letter on April 12, 2006, that they were declining to further review her claim. Id. ¶ 33. The letter noted that the terms of the gr oup policy and Department of Labor regulations provide for only one administrative review of he r claim, Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A

to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1540, and that the Teach ers/Administrator “has already18 completed an administrative review of your cla im and respectfully decline[s] to review your

claim file.” Id. , at A.R. 1539. Having exhausted her administ rative remedies, the plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of the termina tion of her long-term be nefits, arguing that the defendants violated the ERISA by wrongfully denying her disability benefits and by following improper procedures

in the course of their administ rative review of her claim. Co mpl. ¶¶ 1, 13, 16-17. The plaintiff seeks reinstatement of her long te rm benefits, award of the benef its she has not received since September 2004, payment for lost pension contribu tions, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees. Compl. ¶ 18. The defendants deny all of the plaintiff’s allegations and maintain that they

acted in accordance with the te rms of the Academy Plan and th e ERISA when they rendered the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s benefits. 15 See generally Def. Acad.’s Answer; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Answer. Based on the administrative record submitted to the Court, Def. Acad.’s Plan (Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul regarding the admi nistrative record ), both parties seek summary judgment. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), this Court must find that “the pleadings, the disc overy and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that th e movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). U nder Rule 56(c), if a part y fails “to establish the existence of an element essential to that part y’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” summary judgment is warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S.

15 The Teachers/Administrator also ar gue in the alternative that this case is barred by the contractual limitation period. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 20-21. However, because the Court finds agai nst the plaintiff on all of her claims, it does not address this argument.19 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual disput e between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supporte d motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). In other words, only “disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclud e the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. Under the ERISA, a participant in or a benefi ciary of a covered plan may sue to “recover benefits due to h[er] under the terms of the pla n, to enforce h[er] rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify h[er] rights to future benef its under the terms of th e plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Although the “ERISA does not set out the appropriate sta ndard of review for [courts to apply] in actions unde r § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benef it eligibility determinations,”

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a denial of benefits challenged unde r § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be revi ewed under a de novo standard, not under the more deferential arbitrary and capri cious standard, “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine the eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan .” Fitts v. Fed Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n , 236 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Firestone , 489 U.S. at 115). Therefore, in order to determine whether defe rential or de novo revi ew applies, the Court

must examine whether the administrator or fiduci ary whose decision the plaintiff is challenging was granted discretion to make eligibility de terminations. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (“Glenn”), __ U.S. __, __, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2008). In making this determination, the Court is “guided by principles of trust law” and may “not interfere to control [the defendants’ eligibility determination] in the exercise of a discretion [,] [if that discretion was] vested in them20 by the instrument under which they act.” Firestone , 489 U.S. at 111 (emphasis in original); see

also Glenn , __ U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2348 (“Where the plan provides to the contrary by granting ‘the administrator or fi duciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits,’ ‘[t]rust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate.” (emphasis in original) (citing Firestone , 489 U.S. at 111, 115). “In determining whether a plan grants the administrator discretionary authority, the reviewi ng court should focus on ‘the character of the authority exercised by the administ rators under the plan,’ not on whether the plan uses the word ‘discretion’ or any other ‘magic wor d.’” Wright v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 618 F. Supp. 2d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (Walton, J.) (cit ing Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc. , 952 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The parties dispute what standard of re view the Court should apply in this case. 16 Pl.’s Mem. at 2-3; Def. Acad.’s Mem. at 2-3; Defs . Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 16-17. The plaintiff offers a two-step argument for why de novo review is appropriate. First, wh ile she concedes that the Academy Plan and the Plan Description grant discretion to the Academy to administer the Plan, Pl.’s Mem. at 3; Pl.’s O pp’n to Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mot. at 2, she argues that because the Academy had no hands-on role either in the denial of her claim or her ad ministrative appeal, the Academy Plan and the Plan Description are essen tially irrelevant to her particular case. See Pl.’s Mem at 3; Pl.’s Opp’n to Acad.’s Mot. at 2- 4. Instead of analyzing the impact of these documents, the plaintiff urges the Co urt to scrutinize the Policy itself. Pl.’s’ Mem. at 2-3; Pl.’s Opp’n to Acad.’s Mot. at 2-3. And second, focu sing on the Policy itself, the plaintiff contends that it “does not reference the [A cademy] [P]lan document,” Pl.’s Mem. at 3, and that its terms

16 The plaintiff even declares the standa rd of review is the “core issue” for th e Court to decide in this case, Pl.’s Reply at 1, and contends further that this “case is primarily about the standard of review and whether it has been abused.” Id. at 2.21 “fail to articulate a grant of discretion to [the Teachers/Administrator].” Pl.’s Opp’n to

Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mot. at 2. In response, the defendants ma intain that the deferential st andard of review should be employed, emphasizing language found in the Acad emy Plan and the Plan Description, and asserting that the Teachers/Administrator were ex pressly granted discretionary authority to make eligibility determinations. Def. Acad.’s Mem. at 2-3; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 16-17. Upon reviewing the Academy Plan, the Plan Desc ription, the Policy, and the applicable legal authority, the Court agrees with the defendants’ position that the Teachers/Administrator is the administrator of the Academy Plan and is em powered with the expre ss discretion to render benefit eligibility decisions, and therefore, the defe rential standard of review must be applied in

this case. To begin with, the plaintiff’s argument re garding Academy personne l not being involved in administering her specific claim and theref ore her emphasis on the Policy itself is misplaced. 17 As the Supreme Court has made clear, in determini ng the standard of review to employ the Court must examine whether the “benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone , 489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). See Wright , 618 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (“[T]h e reviewing court should focus on ‘the character of the authority ex ercised by the administrators under the plan .’”) (emphasis added) (citing Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc. , 952 F.2d 1450, 1453) (D.C. Cir. 1992); Costantino v. Washington Post Multi-Option Benefits Plan , 404 F. Supp. 2d. 31, 38 (D.D.C.

17 The plaintiff’s related argument concerning the Policy not referencing the Academy Pl an is factually incorrect. The cover page of the Policy lists the Academy as the empl oyer. Def. Acad.’s Mem., A ttach. C to Decl. of Shelia Wright at A.R. 169. Even more plainly, the section of the Policy describing the participant’s rights under the ERISA clearly designates the Academy as the plan administrator. Id. , at A.R. 138. The fact that the policy does not expressly mention the SB Administrators is hardly surprising, given that the policy dates back to 1998 and the SB Administrators did not assume administration responsibilitie s until 2003. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 2.22 2005) (“In determining whether an employee welf are benefits plan confers discretion on a fiduciary, courts . . . look to the plan documents .”) (emphasis added). The Plan Description is an important component of benefit plans under the ERISA, as the statute requires that a Plan Description be created and pr ovided to participants in th e plan by employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (requiring employers to prov ide participants with a copy of a Plan De scription that shall

“be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average pl an participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonab ly apprise such particip ants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.”); see also id. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (instructing benefit plan fiduciaries to discharge their duties “i n accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan”) (emphasis added). Acco rdingly, it is proper to consider the Plan Description as part of the empl oyee benefit plan in analyzing wh ether a grant of discretionary authority was made to the administrators of the Academy Plan. See Brubaker v. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. , No. 00-2511, 2005 WL 3198969, at *3 (D.D .C. Sept. 26, 2005) (“the [Plan Description] should be considered part of the Plan documents”); Costantino , 404 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (“Because the [Plan Description] granted th e [administrator] discretionary authority to determine . . . benefits and [to] interpret provisions of the [Washington Post Long-Term Disability] Plan . . . [,] the Court must apply the abuse of discretion standard to a review of [the] decision to terminate . . . benefits.”); Guyther v. Dept of Labor Fed. Credit Union , 193 F. Supp. 2d. 127, 130 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[Plan De scriptions] often control over conflicting language in plan agreements anyway, because (it is thought) employ ees actually read the summaries.”); see also Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots Employed by MarkAir , 293 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e conclude the [Plan Description] is a plan document and should be considered when interpreting an ERISA plan.”); Whiteman v. Graphic Commc’n s Int’l Union Supplemen tal Ret. & Disability23 Fund , 871 F. Supp. 465, 466-67 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding th e plaintiff was entitled to benefits where she met the language set ou t in the [Plan Description] ev en though she did not meet the language set out in the be nefit plan itself). Turning to the Academy Plan and its Plan Description, the Court has no trouble concluding that they grant the Teachers/Administr ator discretion to admini ster benefit claims. Under the Academy Plan, the plan administra tor, the Academy, Acad. Plan at 3.1 (“The Academy shall be the Plan Admi nistrator and the ‘Named Fiduci ary’ within the meaning of Section 402 of [the] ERISA”), has “absolute power , authority and discreti on to administer the Plan,” id. at 3.2, and has the authority to “appoint such accountants, counsel, specialists and other persons as it deems necessa ry or desirable in connection with the administration of the Plan,” id. at 3.2. The Plan Descriptio n provides that the “determina tion of your disability is made by the insurance carrier,” Plan Description at 3, which is clearly identified as the Teachers’

Association in the s ection describing the participant’s rights under the ERISA, id. at 12. Moreover, the Plan Description expressly declar es that the “[Teachers’ Association] has full power and discretionary authority under the grou p policy . . . subject onl y to the participant’s rights of review and appeal under the group policy.” Plan Description at 8. The same paragraph

adds that the [Teachers’ Association] has all powers necessary to accomplish these purposes in accordance with the terms of the group policy including, but not limited to, th e following: (1) determining the benefits and amounts payable theref ore[e] to any participant or beneficiary; (2) establishing and ad ministering a claims review and appeal process; and (3) interpre ting, applying, and administering the provisions of the group policy. Plan Description at 8.24 Accordingly, because the Academy Plan and the Plan Description contain the requisite “empowering language” conveying discretion to the Teachers/Administrator as the Plan’s administrator, the Court must employ a discre tionary, or “reasonableness” review to the eligibility determination. 18 Block , 952 F.2d at 1453; see also Wagener v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan-Non Bargained Program , 407 F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (sta ting that where a court is reviewing an interpretation of a benefits plan provision by an admi nistrator or fiduciary under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and the plan’s langua ge “reasonably supports” that interpretation, a court must defe r to the administrator or fiduci ary); Mobley v. Continental Cas.

Co. , 405 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[A] deferent ial standard of review allows the plan administrator to reach a conclusion that may tec hnically be incorrect so long as it is reasonably supported by the administrative record.”). With respect to plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of § 1133 of the ERISA, Compl. ¶ 13, the Court notes that these claims are also reviewed under a deferential, or reasonableness standard and the polestar here is whether there has been “substantial compliance” with this provision and its accompanying regulations. Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co. , 142 F.3d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

18 As noted in an earlier footnote, supra note 4, the plaintiff does not dispute that both the Teachers’ Association and the SB Administrators served as administrators of her claim, Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 6, and does not distinguish at all between the two organizations in the arguments made in her filings, e.g. Pl.’s Mem. at 2, 4; Pl.’s Opp’n to Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mot. at 1-4. Neve rtheless, the Court observes that alt hough the SB Administrators is not expressly named in the Plan documents, the SB Administrator’s actions at issue in this case would still be reviewed under a deferential standard because th e SB Administrators is a fiduciary of the Academy Plan under the ERISA. The ERISA provides that a “fiduciary” is a “person . . . with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets , . . . or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such pl an.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Having taken over the administration duties from the Teachers’ Association in 2003, the SB Administra tors operates the component of the Academy Plan responsible for administering benefits and appeals, it has discretion to render benefit eligibility determinations. Thus, the SB Administrators also qualifie s as a fiduciary by virtue of its role as the claims processor. See Wright , 618 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53 (finding a party qualified as an ERISA fiduciary because the extent of its designated role under the plan brought it within the statutory definition).25 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. The Wrongful Deni al of Benefits Claim The plaintiff argues the defendants wrongl y requested that she provide “objective medical documentation” to prove her claim, wh en all the Policy requires, according to her interpretation of it, is that she “show she is in fact ‘disabled.’” Pl.’s Mem. at 4. The plaintiff claims she established her disability through her multiple submissions of medical records, particularly those from her tr eating physician, Dr. Stopak. Id. at 4-5. The defendants respond that the record in this case, even considering all the documents the plaintiff emphasizes, shows that she is not totally disabled within the mean ing of the Policy. Def. Acad.’s Mem. at 17-20;

Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem. at 4-9. The de fendants acknowledge that the Policy does not use the exact phrase “obj ective medical documentation,” but none theless assert that they have a right to demand objective proof of the plaintiff’s disability as the most logical means of administering the Policy. Def. Acad.’s Opp’n at 5-6; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Opp’n at 4-5. For the following reasons, the Court ag rees with the defendants. To demonstrate a disability, the Policy requi res a participant to pr ovide some “proof of Total Disability,” which can be in the form of “s tatements of treating physicians, copies of test reports or examinations, x-rays ; hospital records; [or] medical examinations by impartial specialists.” Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. C to Decl. of Sheila Wright at A.R. 146. It is understandable that the Policy does not use the exact phrase “objective medical documentation,” because the Policy identifies examples of the t ypes of medical “proof” a participant can submit to objectively demonstrate total disability. See Maniatty v. UNUM Provident Corp. , 218 F. Supp. 2d 500, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“While plaintiff argues that the plan does not state that objective evidence is necessary to establish disability, the plan does state that ‘proof’ of26 continued disability must be provided . . . and the very concept of proof connotes objectivity.”). Indeed, as the defendants correctly point out, Def. Acad.’s O pp’n at 5-7; Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Opp’n at 4-6, if objective me dical evidence was not required, reviewing the validity of long term disability claims would be meaningless because plan administrators would be forced to accept as adequate all su bjective claims of participants. See Williams v. UNUM

Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 250 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648-49 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“[I]t is hardly unreasonable for the administrator to require an objective component to such proof [of disability].”) (citing Maniatty , 218 F. Supp. 2d at 504); Coffman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 715, 732 (S.D. W.Va. 2002) (“Were an opposite rule to ap ply, [long-term disability] benefits would be payable to any participant with subjective and effervescent symp tomotology simply because the symptoms were first passed th rough the intermediate step of self-reporting to a medical professional.”), aff’d , 77 F. App’x. 174 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co.

of Boston , 542 F.3d 1352, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We do not believe . . . that [the administrator’s] preference for medical opinions grounded in objective medical evidence is

somehow indicative that its decisi on was unreasonable . . . .”); Parkman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am. , 439 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2006) (“It is not unr easonable for a plan administrator to deny benefits based upon a lack of objective evidence.”). With respect to the plaintiff’s other argume nt, the Court cannot find that the defendants’ conclusion that the plaintiff was not “totally disabled ” within the meaning of the Policy was unreasonable. As discussed above, a plan admini strator’s determination “will be upheld ‘so long as it is reasonably supported by the administra tive record.’” Hall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 559 F. Supp. 2d 38, 48 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Mobley , 405 F. Supp. 2d at 48)). A discretionary

decision “will be found to be reason able if it is “the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning27 process and if it is supported by substantial ev idence,” Buford v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 290 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Brogan v. Holland , 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997)), and the Court “must not over turn a decision found to be reason able even if an alternative

decision also could have been considered reasonable.” Buford , 290 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (citing

Block 952 F.2d at 1452). Here, the defendants had ample evidence in the administrative record actually showing that the plaintiff did not meet th e requirements necessary to dem onstrate her total disability under the Policy, namely, the absence of proof that sh e was under the “Regular Care of a Physician” and proof that she was incapable of performing “the material and substantial duties of any occupation” she was qualified to perform. Def. Acad.’s Mem., Attach. C to Decl. of Shelia Wright at A.R. 143. For example, the plain tiff admits seeing a doctor just once between November 2000 and February 2003, see Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 12, and it is not clear how often she was treated or examined by any physician in the time period between April 24, 2003 and September 16, 2004. Id. ¶¶ 15-19. More significant, though, and what the defendants ultimately relied upon in closing her claim, is that multiple eval uations of the plaintiff’s medical records and capabilities found her able to pe rform some amount of sedentar y work. Indeed, that was the conclusion reached by the August 2002 IM Examination conducted by Dr. Kobrine, the February 2005 review by Dr. Lindquist, the March 2005 transf erable skills assessment, the June 2005 FC Examination, and the July 2005 IM Examination conducted by Dr. Hennessey. And although the FC Examination qualified its conclusion because of the plaintiff’s extensive self-limiting behavior, it was not unreasonable for the Teachers/Administrator to rely on it as a basis for concluding that the plainti ff could perform several types of sedentary work. See Chalker v. Raytheon Co. , 291 F. App’x. 138, 144 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding it not unreasonable for an28 administrator to rely on an FC Examination th at “may” have had “some flaws” because it was “not so flawed that it could not have provided . . . any reasonable basis to terminate [the participant’s] benefits”); Hensley v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. , 123 F. App’x. 534, 539 (4th Cir. 2004) (reliance on FC Examinations as a basis for finding that plaintiff “was capable of sedentary occupation” even though the physical ther apist could not “assess [the plaintiff’s] full physical capacities” was not unreasonable “g iven her non-cooperation in both FC Examinations”); Wise v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co , 403 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (recognizing that FC Examinations are “the best means of a ssessing an individual’s function level”). Also, the fact that it took about a year to fina lly have the plaintiff undergo the July 2005 IM Examination cuts sharply against the criticisms she raises about the decision denying her request for benefits. Cf. Black v. Pitney Bowes Inc. , No. 05-108, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65338, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008) (finding the plaintiff’s “failure to submit to an IM[ Examination] and to provide the informati on . . . requested of him both constitutes an independent procedural default warranting denial of his appli cation, and provides a basis for a reasonable decision-maker to discount the evidence of disability he provided”). On this record there was more than substantial evidence to support the determination that the plaintiff was capable of performing some amount of sedentary work, and therefore was not totally disabled under the Policy. 19 That judgment was reasonable a nd the Court may not disturb it.

19 The cases the plaintiff cites in support of her argument, even if they were binding authority on this Court, present factual scenarios that are markedly different from the one he re. For example, in Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 274 F. App’x. 251 (4th Cir. 2008), the administrator relied on a “clerical error” in denying the claim, the medical record at issue having the word “norma l” inserted (likely instead of “abnormal”) to describe the claimant’s vision. Id. at 256. This conclusion was supported by the surrounding context of the apparent erroneous notation, which used terminology unmistakably referring to a visual impairment, and the administrator’s own expert even admitted the claimant was “legally blind” in th e same eye characterized as “normal” in the challenged me dical record. Id. And in Donovan v. Eaton Corp. , 462 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2006), the administrator denied a claim for benefits based on an older physician’s statement declarin g the claimant was not disabled, even though the claimant more recently underwent testing and the same doctor submitted a sworn affidavit attesting to the claimant’s disability. Id. at 328- 29.29 The plaintiff also argues the defendants ar bitrarily disregarded th e conclusions of her treating physician, Dr. Stopak, and gave unfair weight to the opinions of their own paid

consultants. See Pl.’s Mem. at 5-9. The defendants respond that it is fair to rely on their own experts, and that Dr. Stopak’s conclusions were specifically considered and ultimately rejected during the process of evaluating the plaintiff’s cl aim. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Opp’n at 3-8; Def. Acad.’s Opp’n at 8-17. The Court finds the defendants’ position more convincing. The medical records the plai ntiff points to, particularly Dr. Stopak’s reports from 2004, simply do not support the weighty significance sh e places on them. Dr. Stopak’s January 2004 report declaring the plaintiff “permanently disabled ” and incapable of “return[ing] to any type of gainful employment” is comprised of just two sentences. Supra note 9. And his neurological report from June 2004 stating that the plaintiff has “incapacitati ng pain” and cannot return to work consists of only five sentences. Supra note 10. Significantly, neither document demonstrates that Dr. Stopak saw or physically examined the plain tiff on those particular dates,

nor shows he conducted or ordered and reviewed any diagnostic tests, thus calling into question his familiarity with the plaintiff’s condition at th ose specific times, as well as the persuasiveness of his findings. See Hensley , 123 F. App’x. at 538-39 (discoun ting evidence from plaintiff’s treating physicians when they referred only to subjective symptoms expr essed by the plaintiff and absent any supportive objective medical evidence); Arthur v. Hart ford Life & Accident Ins.

Co. , 20 F. App’x. 574, 575 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirmi ng denial of benefits where the treating physicians opinions were “conclusory and inconsis tent” with other records in the record); Myers v. Iron Workers Dist. Council of S. Ohio & Vicinity Pension Trust , No 04-966, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39191, at *32-33 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2005) (giv ing little to no weight to plaintiff’s30 treating physician’s conclusory opinion unsupported by clinical observation or examination results), aff’d , 217 F. App’x. 526 (6th Cir. 2007). Dr. Stopak’s reports from September 2004 ar e more thorough, and demonstrate that he examined the plaintiff at that time and found her unfit to return to work. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that a plan administrator is not required automatically to defer to the conclusions of the treating physician, Bl ack & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord , 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003), and that the ERISA does not “impose a heightened burden of explanation on administrators when they reject a treating physician’s opinion.” Id. at 831. 20 In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim, Doctors Lindqui st and Hennessey specifically c onsidered the evidence provided by Dr. Stopak, and they both found inconsistencie s and contradictions in his findings. Dr. Lindquist noted the different inte rpretations offered by Dr. Stopak and the original radiologist who interpreted the February 2003 CT scan. Dr. Hennessey commented that Dr. Stopak’s examination results actually show that the plaintiff’s condition improved between her appointments with him in February and April 2003. And Dr. Hennessey observed with seeming consternation that Dr. Stopak’s note from June 2004 failed to mention on which side of her body the plaintiff was experiencing “incapacitating” le g pain. Defs. Teachers’/Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A

to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1531. In any event, “[i]t is not an abuse of discretion to value the opinions of the insu rer’s own medical consultants ove r those of the participant’s treating physician.” Doley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , No. 05-277, 2006 WL 785374, at *2

20 In light of the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Nord , the plaintiff’s reliance on Ferguson v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 268 F. Supp. 2d 463 (E .D. Pa. 2003), is entirely misplaced. In Ferguson , the district court found that the plan administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not “give any weight, let alone controlling weight” to the opi nions of the plaintiff’s tr eating physicians and therefor e violated the “treating physician rule.” Id. at 468. However, Ferguson was decided before the Supr eme Court decision in Nord , which squarely rejected the use of the treating physician ru le to employee benefit claims in ERISA cases. See Nord , 538 U.S. at 829 (“courts have no warrant to order application of a treating physician rule to employee benefit claims made under [the] ERISA”).31 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2006); see Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Plan , 370 F.3d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that conflicting report s from a claimant’s “treating physician” and the plan’s “reviewing physicians . . . is typical of th e evidence used in disability determinations,” which can cause “[r]easonable people [to] disagr ee on whether [a claimant] was ‘disabled’ for purposes of [an] ERISA plan. Because that is so , the administrator [could] not be characterized as acting arbitrarily in taking th e view that [the plaintiff] was not [disabled]”); Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan , 542 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Accepting selfreported symptoms at face value is more of le ss required of treating physicians, but by no means required of the administra tor.”) (citing Maniatty , 218 F. Supp. 2d at 504); Roumeliote v. Long Term Disability Plan for Employees of Worthington Indus. , 475 F. Supp. 2d 742, 746 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[a]s long as a plan administrator offers a reasonable explanation based upon the evidence for its decision, it may choose to rely upon the medi cal opinion of one doctor over that of another doctor.”), aff’d , 292 F. App’x. 472 (6th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff also contends that the Teachers’ /Administrator’s conflict of interest played a

role in their decision and that this should be “clo sely evaluated” by the Court. Pl.’s Mem. at 3-4. Admittedly, this is an additional factor the C ourt must consider in analyzing whether the defendants have interpreted or applied the prov isions of the Academy Plan correctly. Glenn , __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. at 2348 (“[A] conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion . . . [, but it does not] impl[y] a change in the standard of review, say from deferential to de novo.”) (inter nal quotations omitted) (citing Firestone , 489 U.S. at 115). Here, the alleged conflict arises from the fact that the Teachers/Administrator both administers the claims and pays the benefits, an d therefore, may have a financial interest in denying claims. See Glenn , __ U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 2348 (re iterating that where an insurer32 both evaluates claims and pays benefits a conflict of interest exists). However, in this case, the plaintiff “has offered no evidence that any alleged ‘self-interested behavior ’ actually affected the . . . decision to deny . . . [the] benefits” sought by the plaintiff, Becker v. Weinberg Group, Inc.

Pension Trust , 473 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62 (D.D.C. 2007), and in light of the Court’s earlier discussion concerning the efforts undertaken by the Teachers/Administrator to communicate with the plaintiff, evaluate her file followi ng each of her multiple reco rd submissions, schedule and reschedule several IM and FC Examinations, and ultimately pay for these examinations in the summer of 2005 despite having denied her app eal three months earlier, the Court cannot find that any conflict resulting from their dual role s improperly influenced the ultimate benefits

determination.

B. The Plaintiff’s Proc edural Violations Claim The plaintiff makes two relate d arguments in alleging the de fendants violated her rights under § 1133 of the ERISA. Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11. First, she argues that the

Teachers/Administrator denied her claim on appeal on March 15, 2005, for a reason different than initially stated on Augus t 12, 2004, largely due to the information provided in Dr. Lindquist’s report. Id. at 9-10. The plaintiff therefore c ontends she should have been permitted to appeal Dr. Lindquist’s findings, and that not permitting her to do so constituted a violation of § 1133 of the ERISA. Id. Along the same lines, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants violated § 1133 of the ERISA when, in March 2006, they di d not allow her to appeal the “dispositive basis” for the September 26, 2005 denial, which she identifies as the June and July 2005 FC and

IM Examinations. Id. at 10-11. For their part , the defendants maintain that they followed the procedure required by the ERISA and the accompanyi ng regulations in resolving the plaintiff’s33 claim. Def. Acad.’s Opp’n at 17-21; Defs . Teachers’/Adm’or’s Opp’n at 9-10. For the following reasons, the Court ag rees with the defendants.

Based on a review of the reco rd, the plaintiff’s claim was denied for the same reason on each occasion — her inability to demonstrate that she was disabled under the terms of the Policy. In particular, the August 12, 2004 deni al letter recited the applicable definition of total disability, outlined the history of the Teachers’ /Administrator’s interactions with the plaintiff at that time, and informed the plaintiff that because the Teachers/Administrator “lack objective medical documentation to support your inability to perf orm any occupation which you qualify for based on your education, training, experien ce and capabilities, we have no alternative but to terminate the group disability benefits.” Defs. Teachers’ /Adm’or’s Mem., Ex. A to Decl. of Andrew M. Altschul at A.R. 1391. Similarly, the March 15, 2005 denial letter set forth the disability criteria under which the plaintiff’s claim was being a ssessed, reviewed all the evidence she had submitted, and explained why her claim was be ing denied. The letter concluded: Based on our review, we find that you are capable of performing other occupations for which you are reasonably qualified by your education, training, experience, and physical functional abilities. As you no longer meet the Definiti on of Disability under the terms of your group policy, we find that the decision to close your claim with payment to you through Augus t 31, 2004 is correct and must be upheld.

Id. , at A.R. 1428. The September 26, 2005 letter st ates that the Teachers/Administrator “have again concluded that you no longer meet the defi nition of Disability as defined in the group policy. Therefore, no further benefits ar e payable from the [Academy Plan].” Id. , at A.R. 1519. In contrast to what the plainti ff suggests, the FC and IM Examin ations were not the dispositive reasons for denying the plaintiff’s claim in Sept ember 2005; rather, they served as additional34 confirmation that the plaintiff was capable of pe rforming some level of sedentary work, and was therefore unable to satisfy th e definition of total disability as defined in the Policy. While there is support for th e notion that a benefit plan administrator has failed to provide the full and fair review required by § 1133 if it denies a claim for one reason initially,

and then relies on a different basis on the appeal, e.g. , Gagliano v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.

Co. , 547 F.3d 230, 234-237 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding a procedural violatio n of § 1133 when the

administrator denied claim in th e second termination letter on a diffe rent basis than it did in the first termination letter); Wenner v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada , 482 F.3d 878, 882 (6th Cir. 2007) (declaring that a full and fair review had no t been provided when the defendant denied the “claim for one reason, and then turn [ed] around and terminat[ed] [the plaintiff’s] benefits for an entirely different and theretofore unmentioned reason”), that is simp ly not that case here. As the record reflects, the fundamental reason for the deni al of the plaintiff’s claim remained the same. Indeed, the change was that th e weight of the evidence against the plaintiff had even grown stronger. The plaintiff’s argument also misreads the scope and requirements of the ERISA administrative appeals process in several respects. First, the fact that the Teachers/Administrator sent her file to Dr. Lindquist dur ing the appeal is exactly what the ERISA regulations require as part of providing “a full and fair review.” 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3) (2009). Where an initial

claim denial is based on a medical judgment, as is the case here, the regulations state that during the review of the claim the plan administrators must “consult with [an a ppropriate] health care professional” who was not involved in the initial claim denial. Id. §§ 2560.503-1(h)(3)(iii), (h)(3)(v). In addition, the review must consider all evidence submitted by the plaintiff, even if it35 was not considered during the initial denial. Id. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iv). 21 Therefore, the fact that Dr. Lindquist reviewed the plainti ff’s records during the course of the administrative appeal, and

the Teachers/Administrator discussed this review in their March 15, 2005 de nial letter, was not a

violation of the statute but rather how it is intended to operate. Moreover, the text of the ERISA, the regul ations governing the administrative appeal process, and the Academy Plan all contemplate that a participant is entitled to one full and fair

review of the initial deni al of their claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (pr oviding claimants “a reasonable opportunity” for “a full and fair review ” in accordance with regulations issued by the Department of Labor); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(1 ) (noting a claimant “shall have a reasonable opportunity to appeal an advers e benefit determination” under the ERISA); Acad. Plan at 6.2 (indicating that the Academy “shall schedule an opportunity for a full and fair hearing of the issue” if the claimant desires an appeal) (empha sis added); Plan Description at 7-8 (providing that the claimant can appeal and obtain “a full and fair hearing” af ter an initial claims denial). The plaintiff admits that her claim was deni ed in August 2004, and that she subsequently appealed this decision in January of 2005. Pl .’s Stmt. ¶¶ 18-19. And when her appeal was denied on March 15, 2005, the plaintiff had been a fforded the full and fair review of her claim required by the ERISA. While not characterized as such by the plain tiff, “her overall argument can be construed as one that [she] is entitled to further a ppeals because the final decision was based on new

evidence , as opposed to a new reason .” Balmert v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. , No. 07-95, 2008 WL 4404299, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2008) (emphasis in original), aff’d , 594 F.3d 496,

21 If, on appeal, the plan administrator denies a particip ant’s claim for benefits, then the claimant has a right to obtain the physician consultant ’s report free of cost, id. § 2560.503-1(j)(3), and use that report as evidence when challenging the benefit denial in federal court. See id. § 2560.503-1(j)(4) (providing that denial letters must inform the claimant of their right to bring a civil action under § 1132(a) of the ERISA).36 (6th Cir. 2010). In other words, because Dr. Li ndquist’s report was the last report completed before her claim was denied in March 2005, the plaintiff contends th at she never had the opportunity to respond to that report with her own evidence and therefore should have been afforded another appeal. This argument has been rejected by a number of courts. As recently observed by the Tenth Circuit, allowing “a claimant to receive and rebut medical opinion reports generated in the course of an administrative ap peal – even when those reports contain no new factual information and deny benefits on the same basis as the initial de cision – would set up an unnecessary cycle of submission, review, re-s ubmission, and re-review.” Metzger v. UNUM

Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 476 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007); see Midgett v. Washington Group Int’l Long Term Disability Plan , 561 F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir. 2009) ( noting that an extra cycle of review would undoubtedly prolong th e appeal process which is nor mally supposed to take forty five days to complete) (citing Metzger , 476 F.3d at 1166); Glazer v. Re liance Standard Life Ins.

Co. , 524 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008) (agree ing with the reas oning in Metzger ); Kao v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 647 F. Supp. 2d 397, 417 (D.N.J. 2009) (“[I]f read according to the plaintiff’s view, the regulations set up an endl ess loop of opinions rendered under § (h)(3)(iii).”) (citing Metzger , 476 F.3d at 1166); Skipp v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. , No. 06-2199, 2008 WL 346107, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 6, 2008) (cal ling the approach in Metzger “helpful and instructive.”). This same reasoning applies to the plainti ff’s argument that in March of 2006 she was denied the opportunity to challenge the Septem ber 25, 2005 denial of her claim. As stated earlier, her claim was denied in September 2005 because she was found to be capable of performing sedentary work and thus was not tota lly disabled under the Policy. The FC and IM Examinations were not the dispositive basis fo r this conclusion, and di d not provide a new or37 novel rationale for the denial; instead, they adde d support to the same fundamental finding when her claim was denied in August 2004 and agai n in March 2005. Furthermore, by March 2006, the Teachers/Administrator had already satisfied th eir obligations to provide the plaintiff a full and fair review of the denial of her claim, and accordingly were not required under either the ERISA or the Academy Plan to provid e her yet another appeal. IV. CONCLUSION The ERISA controls whether the plaintiff is en titled to long-term disa bility benefits under the Academy Plan. With respect to her claims for wrongful denial of her claim for such benefits,

the Teachers/Administrator are the administrators of the Academy Plan, which allocates them discretionary authority to interp ret and apply its terms. Based on the record in this case, the

Court is unable to find that the defendants’ deci sion to deny the plaintif f long-term disability benefits or their judgment about what medical evidence to rely on are legally flawed as arbitrary and capricious. And in regards to the plainti ff’s claim of procedural non-compliance with the requirements of the ERISA, the Court finds that the defendants provided the plaintiff a full and

fair review of her claim and therefore satisfi ed their obligations unde r the statute and the applicable administrative regulations. Acco rdingly, summary judgment is awarded to the

defendants. 22

SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2010

REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge

22 An Order will be entered contemporaneously with th e Memorandum Opinion denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and closing this case.