alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 12, 2019

No. 04-18-00844-CV

TITLE SOURCE, INC., Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Houston Forward 

Times,

Appellants

v.

HOUSECANARY, INC. f/k/a Canary Analytics, Inc.,

Appellee

From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CI06300

Honorable David A. Canales, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appeal number 04-18-00509-CV is an appeal of an order signed by the trial court on July 

3, 2018, in which the trial court granted HouseCanary Analytics Inc.’s motion to reconsider 

whether to seal certain exhibits. The appeal was set at issue on November 26, 2018, and 

originally set for oral argument submission on February 14, 2019. The appellant’s unopposed 

motion to reschedule oral argument was granted, and the appeal is set for oral argument 

submission on April 29, 2019.

Appeal number 04-18-00844-CV is an appeal of an Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter 

or Partially Vacate the July 3, 2018 Sealing Order as to Exhibits that HouseCanary Filed Publicly 

on July 11, 2018 and an Order on Media Intervenor’s Motion to Modify and/or Clarify the July 

3, 2018 Sealing Order. Both orders were signed by the trial court on October 25, 2018, and the 

notices of appeal were filed on November 7, 2018, and November 13, 2018. The appeal was set 

at issue on March 8, 2019.

Because the issues presented in both appeals will involve an analysis of the law 

governing sealing orders and the issues arise from the same factual background, the court is 

considering consolidating the two appeals. Under the proposed consolidation, the records and 

briefs for the two appeals shall remain separated; however: (1) the same panel will be assigned to 

both appeals; (2) both appeals will be argued together; and (3) the court will dispose of both 

appeals with the same judgment, opinion, and mandate. It is therefore ORDERED that any 

objection to the proposed consolidation must be filed in this court no later than March 22, 2019. 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that if an objection is filed, any response to such objection must be 

filed in this court no later than March 29, 2019.

It is so ORDERED on this 12th day of March, 2019.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: _____________________________

Keith E. Hottle,

Clerk of Court
This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 DANIEL J. SECRIST and KEN 2 LONG, on their own behalf and 3 on behalf of a class of similarly4 situated State employees, 5 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 6 v. No. A-1-CA-36950 7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 8 NEW MEXICO STATE 9 PERSONNEL OFFICE, and 10 JUSTIN R. NAJAKA, New 11 Mexico State Personnel Director, 12 Defendants-Appellants. 13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 14 David K. Thomson, District Judge 15 Shane Youtz 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellees 18 SaucedoChavez PC 19 Christopher Saucedo 20 Albuquerque, NM 21 for Appellants 222 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 HANISEE, Judge. 2
{1} Summary dismissal was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of 3 proposed summary disposition. No memorandum opposing summary dismissal has 4 been filed and the time for doing so has expired. DISMISSED. 5
{2} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 8

WE CONCUR: 9

10 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 11

12 DANIEL J. GALLEGOS, Judge 13
#### PUSHPAMALAR SATCHITHANANTHAN, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-70211.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 17, 2006.*

Filed Nov. 21, 2006.

Markandu S. Vigneswaran, Law Offices of Markandu S. Vigneswaran, Hacienda Heights, CA, for Petitioner.

Before KENNEDY **, HALL and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

**

The Honorable Cornelia G. Kennedy, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

*675MEMORANDUM ***

Pushpamalar Satchithananthan, a native and citizen of Sri Lanka, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition in part and dismiss in part. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. *Salaam v. INS,*229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir.2000). Agent Schultz testified that Satchithananthan has been identified by name as a key member of a smuggling ring. In light of this evidence, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to credit Satchithananthan’s testimony in the absence of any corroborative evidence. *Wang v. INS,*352 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir.2003). Indeed, “where the IJ has reason to question the applicant’s credibility, and the applicant fails to produce nonduplicative, material, easily available corroborating evidence and provides no credible explanation for such failure, an adverse credibility finding will withstand appellate review.” *Sidhu v. INS,*220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2000). Given that Satchithananthan has corresponded with her Canadian family since coming to the United States, such corroboration was “easily available.” *See Chebchoub v. INS,*257 F.3d 1038, 1044-45. Because the IJ’s determinations that: (1) there were “weaknesses in the record” sufficient to raise doubts about Satchithananthan’s credibility; and (2) Satchithananthan failed to produce easily available corroboration are supported by substantial evidence, “we are bound to accept the IJ’s credibility ruling.” *Li v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting *Wang,*352 F.3d at 1259).

In the absence of credible testimony, Satchithananthan failed to meet her burden of demonstrating eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

We lack jurisdiction to review Satchithananthan’s claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture because she failed to exhaust the claim before the BIA. *See Barron v. Ashcroft,*358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore dismiss this claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
96-2523.

#### Martin v. Gen. Motors Corp.

Trumbull App. No. 96-T-5387. Reported at 77 Ohio St.3d 1548, 674 N.E.2d 1186. On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.

Douglas, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., dissent.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6753
ANTHONY LAMBERT, SR., Petitioner - Appellant, versusSTATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Albermarle Child Support Enforcement Agency, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-96-833-5-BO) Submitted: November 20, 1997 Decided: December 9, 1997 Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion. Anthony Lambert, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). The district court rejected the magistrate judge's analysis and found the case to be moot. We find that the case is not moot, see Leonard v. Hammond , 804 F.2d 838, 842-43 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that habeas corpus challenges to civil contempt orders for failure to pay child support are "capable of repetitionyet evading review"), but that, as the magistrate judge found, Appellant's claims are meritless. We therefore grant a certificate of appealability and affirm as modified for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge. Lambert v. North Carolina , No. CA-96-833-5-BO (E.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 1997). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3356 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3356

To amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the maximum age for 
 children eligible for medical care under the CHAMPVA program, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 13, 2010

 Mr. Feingold introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the maximum age for 
 children eligible for medical care under the CHAMPVA program, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE OF MAXIMUM AGE FOR CHILDREN ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAL 
              CARE UNDER CHAMPVA PROGRAM.

    (a) Increase.--Section 1781(c) of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``twenty-three'' and inserting ``twenty-
        six''; and
            (2) by striking ``twenty-third birthday'' and inserting 
        ``twenty-sixth birthday''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to medical care provided on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 2. CANCELLATION OF HUMAN LUNAR MISSION UNDER CONSTELLATION PROGRAM 
              OF NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

    (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration may 
not obligate or expend any amount to support a human lunar mission, 
including any such mission under the Constellation Program of the 
Administration.
    (b) Exception.--The Administrator may use amounts obligated or 
otherwise made available before the date of the enactment of this Act 
for a human lunar mission, including amounts for a human lunar mission 
under the Constellation Program, to wind down any activity or 
operations related to such mission.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 21

   SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT


        The Company has the following subsidiaries including significant
   subsidiaries as defined in Regulation S-X, each incorporated in the
   jurisdiction stated opposite its name.  All of the following subsidiaries
   are 100% owned by the Company.  The Company has additional subsidiaries
   which, if considered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not
   constitute a "significant subsidiary" as such term is defined in
   Regulation S-X.

                                                     Jurisdiction of
   Name of Subsidiary                                Incorporation  

   Bandag A.G..........................................Switzerland
   Bandag Canada Ltd...................................Canada
   Bandag Europe N.V...................................Belgium
   VV-System AG........................................Switzerland
   Bandag Licensing Corporation........................Iowa
   Bandag Incorporated of S.A. (Proprietary) Limited...South Africa
   Bandag New Zealand Limited..........................New Zealand
   Bandag do Brasil Ltda...............................Brazil
   Bandag B.V..........................................Netherlands
   Bandag de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.......................Mexico
Exhibit 32.2  Certification  Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned hereby certifies that:  (1) I have reviewed the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P.  (the "Report") to which this statement is an Exhibit;  (2) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (3) The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P.  By:Inland Real Estate Investment CorporationGeneral PartnerBy:/s/ Donna UrbainName:Donna UrbainTitle:Principal Financial Officer with respect to Inland Land Appreciation Fund, L.P.Date:November 4, 2010
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-7477

JUSTIN GORE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STACEY KINCAID; SERGEANT CABLE, Sheriff; MDS GRADY,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

FAIRFAX ADULT DETENTION CENTER,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-00908-TSE-IDD)

Submitted: March 29, 2019 Decided: April 10, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Justin Gore, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Justin Gore appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(2012) action without prejudice for failing to comply with the court’s order to explain his 

alleged violation of a consent order to withdraw money from his inmate trust account.∗

 

We conclude that Gore’s response, which the district court docketed as a notice of appeal, 

is actually an explanation in compliance with the court’s order. We therefore vacate the 

district court’s dismissal order and remand the case for the district court to consider 

Gore’s explanation in the first instance and to conduct further proceedings as necessary. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

 ∗ The district court’s dismissal without prejudice on procedural grounds is final 

and appealable. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th 

Cir. 2015).
CONSENT
OF MILLER AND LENTS, LTD.


INDEPENDENT
PETROLEUM ENGINEERS





As independent petroleum engineers,
Miller and Lents, Ltd. hereby consents to the use of references in the Form 10-K
of EnerJex Resources, Inc. of our estimates of reserves as of March 31, 2010 and
to all references to our firm included in this Form 10-K.





The Form 10-K contains references to a
certain report prepared by Miller and Lents, Ltd. for the exclusive use of
EnerJex Resources, Inc. The analysis, conclusions, and methods contained in the
report are based upon information that was in existence at the time the report
was rendered and Miller and Lents, Ltd. has not updated and undertakes no duty
to update anything contained in the report. While the report may be used as a
descriptive resource, investors are advised that Miller and Lents, Ltd. has not
verified information provided by others except as specifically noted in the
report, and Miller and Lents, Ltd. makes no representation or warranty as to the
accuracy of such information. Moreover, the conclusions contained in such report
are based on assumptions that Miller and Lents, Ltd. believed were reasonable at
the time of its preparation and that are described in such report in reasonable
detail. However, there are a wide range of uncertainties and risks that are
outside of the control of Miller and Lents, Ltd. which may impact these
assumptions, including but not limited to unforeseen market changes, actions of
governments or individuals, natural events, economic changes, and changes of
laws and regulations or interpretation of laws and regulations.





MILLER
      AND LENTS, LTD.Texas
      Registered Engineering Firm No. F-1442By:
              /s/ Leslie A. FallonLeslie
      A. FallonVice
      President





Houston,
Texas


July 13,
2010
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3259 

To amend subtitle A of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 

Reform Act of 2004 to make the operation of such subtitle permanent law. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 26, 2010 

Mr. KOHL (for himself, Mr. LEAHY, and Mr. HATCH) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend subtitle A of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 to make the operation of such subtitle permanent law. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Antitrust Criminal 

5 Penalties Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004 Extension 

6 Act of 2010’’. 

7 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET. 

8 The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 

9 Reform Act of 2004 (15 U.S.C. 1 note) is amended by 

10 striking section 211. 


pwalker on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3259 IS

1 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENT. 

2 The amendment made by section 2 shall take effect 

3 immediately before June 22, 2010. 

4 SEC. 4. GAO REPORT. 

5 Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 

6 of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit a report 

7 to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Rep8 resentatives and the Senate on the effectiveness of the 

9 Antitrust Criminal Penalties Enforcement and Reform 

10 Act of 2004, both in criminal investigation and enforce11 ment by the Department of Justice and in private civil 

12 actions. Such report shall consider, inter alia, the effec13 tiveness of incentives for cooperation, and the timeliness 

14 of that cooperation, in private civil actions. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7713
ROBERT LEE CHESSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FRANK DAVIS, Officer, Washington City Sheriff Department; KEVIN SAWYER, Officer, Washington City Sheriff Department, Defendants - Appellees, andRONALD MCKINLEY, Officer, Washington City Police Department, Defendant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Alexander B. Denson, Magistrate Judge. (CA-96-107-CT-DE-5) Submitted: February 11, 1999 Decided: February 25, 1999 Before ERVIN, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Robert Lee Chesson, Appellant Pro Se. Keith David Burns, FAISON & GILLESPIE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).1 The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). 2 Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on October 28, 1998, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on October 30, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the judgment or order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 3 PER CURIAM:Robert Lee Chesson appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Defendants following a jury verdict in his trial on an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998). 1 We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the magistrate judge. See Chesson v. Davis , No. CA-96-107-CT-DE-5 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 1998). 2 We deny Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
S ee T EX . R. A PP . P. 47. 4. 1 

## COURT OF APPEALS SEC OND DISTRICTOFTEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 2 - 08 - 08 1- CV I N R E R OB E R T GE NE CU NNI NGH AM , R E L AT OR I N D I V I D U A LL Y A N D A S REPRES EN TA TI V E O F TH E ESTA TE O F PAT RI C I A M A U D I N E C U N N I N G H A M , D ECEA SED

----- ----- -- OR I GI NALP R OCE E DI NG

----- ----- -- 

### M E M ORANDU M OP I NI ON 1

----- ----- -- T h e c o u r t h a s c o n s id e r e d r e la t o r ’s p e t it io n f o r w r it o f m a n d a m u s a n d is of t he opi ni on t hatr el i efs houl d be de n i ed. Accor di ngl y, r el at or ’ s pet i t i on f or
w r i t o f ma n d a mu s i s d e n i e d . F u r t h e r , r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t ’ s “ Mo t i o n For Sanct i ons ” i s den i ed. R el at orshal l pay al l cost s of t hi s or i gi na l p roceed i ng, f orw hi ch l et execut i on i ssue. P E R CU R I AM P A N E L B : D A U P H IN O T , H O L M A N , a n d G A R D N E R , J J . DEL I VERE D: M a r c h 12, 2008
#### Amalgamated Dwellings, Inc., Appellant, v Hillman Housing Corporation, Respondent.

[822 NYS2d 499]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Marylin G. Diamond, J.), entered April 7, 2005, which, after a nonjury trial, declared plaintiff not entitled to prescriptive easements over two areas of defendant’s property for pedestrian and vehicular use, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff failed to prove the elements of a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence *(see Ray v Beacon Hudson Mtn. Corp., 88*NY2d 154, 159 [1996]). Absent any proof that plaintiffs use of the disputed area of Hillman Park and Broome Street was open, notorious, continuous and under a claim of right, there is no presumption that such use was adverse or hostile—necessary for a finding of a prescriptive easement—and the burden thus never shifted to defendant property owner to show that the use was instead permissive *(Rivermere Apts, v Stoneleigh Parkway,*275 AD2d 701, 702 [2000] ). On the contrary, the evidence revealed that the relationship between the parties, both of whom were members of Co-Op Village, was one of neighborly cooperation and accom*365modation, thus giving rise to the inference that the use of the disputed areas was indeed permissive *(see Allen v Mastrianni,*2 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2003]; *Bookchin v Maraconda,*162 AD2d 393, 394 [1990]). Nor did plaintiff prove that its payment to the shared management of Co-Op Village constituted payment for upkeep to the disputed areas in such a manner as to create a prescriptive easement. The judgment was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence, particularly where the credibility of witnesses was central to the case *(Saperstein v Lewenberg,*11 AD3d 289 [2004]), and should not be disturbed. We note that defendant concedes the existence of a pedestrian easement, the scope of which is not before us and which must be determined in further proceedings in Supreme Court. Concur—Tom, J.E, Saxe, Friedman, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.