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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---

________________________________________________________________

STATE OF HAWAIʻI,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW K. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

SCWC-16-0000630

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-16-0000630; 1PC141000589)

JUNE 30, 2021

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ.

AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CHANG, FOR POLLACK, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Matthew Williams 

(“Williams”) was convicted of four counts of sexual assault 

following a jury trial. At trial, the prosecutor introduced to 

the jury incriminating statements, allegedly made by Williams, 

without previously disclosing them to the defense during 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-16-0000630

30-JUN-2021

09:09 AM

Dkt. 79 OP
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discovery as required by Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure 

(“HRPP”) Rule 16(b)(1) (2016).1 The prosecutor also introduced 

statements, incriminating to the defendant, allegedly made by 

the complaining witness despite the court’s motion in limine 

ruling barring their introduction. Finally, the prosecutor 

engaged in improper, unnecessarily lurid questioning of defense 

witnesses to inflame the passions of the jury. The cumulative 

impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct deprived Williams of a 

fair trial and was, therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

 

1 HRPP Rule 16(b)(1) provides, in relevant part:

(b) Disclosure by the Prosecution.

(1) Disclosure of Matters Within Prosecution's 

Possession. The prosecutor shall disclose to the defendant 

or the defendant's attorney the following material and 

information within the prosecutor's possession or control:

. . . . 

(ii) any written or recorded statements and the 

substance of any oral statements made by the 

defendant, or made by a co-defendant if intended to 

be used in a joint trial, together with the names and 

last known addresses of persons who witnessed the 

making of such statements;

(iii) any reports or statements of experts, which 

were made in connection with the particular case or 

which the prosecutor intends to introduce, or which 

are material to the preparation of the defense and 

are specifically designated in writing by defense 

counsel, including results of physical or mental 

examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or 

comparisons[.]
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Indictment and Pretrial Proceedings

Williams was indicted on April 9, 2014, on one count 

of sexual assault against a minor in the first degree, in 

violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 707-730(1)(c)

(2014),2 and three counts of sexual assault against a minor in 

 

2 HRS § 707-730(1) provides, in relevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the 

first degree if:

. . . . 

(c) The person knowingly engages in sexual 

penetration with a person who is at least fourteen 

years old but less than sixteen years old; provided 

that:

(i) The person is not less than five years 

older than the minor; and 

(ii) The person is not legally married to the 

minor[.]

HRS § 702-206(2) (2014) provides, in relevant part:

(a) A person acts knowingly with respect to his 

conduct when he is aware that his conduct is of that 

nature.

(b) A person acts knowingly with respect to 

attendant circumstances when he is aware that such 

circumstances exist.

HRS § 707-700 (2014) (modified 2016), then extant, provided in 

relevant part:

“Sexual penetration” means:

(1) Vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio, 

deviate sexual intercourse, or any intrusion of any 

part of a person’s body or of any object into the 

genital or anal opening of another person’s body; it 

occurs upon any penetration, however slight, but 

emission is not required. As used in this 

 (continued . . .)
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the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(c) (2014) in 

the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (“circuit court”).3 Prior 

to trial, the government notified the defense in writing of its 

intention to call Alexander J. Bivens, Ph.D. (“Dr. Bivens”) as 

an “expert witness on the dynamics of sexual abuse to the 

incident for which [Williams was] charged.” By letter dated 

October 20, 2014, the defense requested, pursuant to HRPP Rule 

 

(continued . . .)

definition, “genital opening” includes the anterior 

surface of the vulva or labia majora; or

(2) Cunnilingus or anilingus, whether or not the actual 

penetration has occurred. 

For purposes of this chapter, each act of sexual 

penetration shall constitute a separate offense.

3 HRS § 707-732(1), provides in relevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the 

third degree if:

. . . .

(c) The person knowingly engages in sexual contact 

with a person who is at least fourteen years old but 

less than sixteen years old or causes the minor to 

have sexual contact with the person; provided that:

(i) The person is not less than five years 

older than the minor; and 

(ii) The person is not legally married to the 

minor[.]

HRS § 707-700 (2014) (modified 2016), then extant, provides in 

relevant part: 

“Sexual contact” means any touching, other than acts of 

“sexual penetration”, of the sexual or other intimate parts 

of another, or of the sexual or other intimate parts of the 

actor by another, whether directly or through the clothing 

or other material intended to cover the sexual or other 

intimate parts.
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16(b)(1)(iii),4 that the prosecutor provide the defense with a 

report containing Dr. Bivens’ conclusions and opinions, notes 

and/or records of what he had reviewed and done in this case, 

and pleadings and orders in other cases in which Dr. Bivens had 

testified or served as an expert witness. In response, the 

prosecutor provided the defense with over 500 pages of articles 

consisting of the studies and literature Dr. Bivens would be 

relying upon for his expert testimony. The defense filed a 

motion to compel discovery or, in the alternative, to exclude 

testimony of Dr. Bivens, on the basis that the prosecutor failed 

to provide the defense with a written report from Dr. Bivens in 

accordance with Rule 16(b)(1).5

Williams filed two motions in limine on January 20, 

2016 to exclude the testimony of Dr. Bivens and to exclude 

testimony from the complaining witness, T.Y., consisting of outof-court statements that Williams sexually assaulted him. 

 

4 Although defense counsel did not cite HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(iii) in 

his October 20, 2014 letter, defense counsel’s Opening Brief suggests that he 

was requesting an expert report pursuant to HRPP Rule 16.

5 While it is true that the prosecutor did not provide the defense 

with a report of Dr. Bivens’ anticipated expert testimony, there is no 

evidence that such a report existed to disclose in the first place. 

Therefore, it is not clear that the State violated HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(iii). 

We note that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16(a)(1)(G), unlike 

HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(iii), provides: “At the defendant’s request, the 

government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that 

the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.” The Hawai‘i Penal Rules 

Committee should consider whether a similar amendment would be appropriate to 

address situations like the one in this case.
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The circuit court held a hearing on Williams’ motions 

in limine on April 11, 2016.6 The court denied the defense’s 

motion as to Dr. Bivens’ testimony, but granted the motion as to 

the alleged out-of-court statements T.Y. made to S.S. and C.O., 

T.Y.’s friends from school. The court stated that T.Y.’s 

alleged statements would be excluded and “[u]nless the 

government can come up with a hearsay exception, we litigate the 

matter outside the presence of the jury” and the court would 

“generally” not allow the statements. In seeking clarification, 

the prosecutor asked the court, “[w]ith respect to the actual 

statements made, will the court permit these witnesses to 

testify to any changes in behavior that these witnesses observed 

in their friend?” The trial judge responded, “I think that they 

can testify to what is relevant in terms of what they saw and --

what they saw and heard, not meaning statements.”

The prosecution filed its witness list and amended 

witness list, which did not identify the subject matter to which 

the prosecution’s witnesses would be testifying; at no time 

prior to trial did the prosecutor disclose to the defense 

Williams’ out-of-court oral statements to T.Y.’s father 

(“C.Y.”).

Williams identified eleven witnesses in his filed 

witness list that included himself, his wife, his two children, 

 

6 The Honorable Karen S.S. Ahn presided.
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six non-family character witnesses to testify as to Williams’ 

“nonviolent and non-aggressive character, honesty and integrity” 

and “the absence of any indications of sexual deviancy or 

behaviors that are consistent with the allegations against him,”

and one non-family witness to testify as to her observations of 

T.Y. Of the eleven witnesses listed by the defense in its 

witness list, in addition to the defendant, the court permitted

six witnesses to testify. Of those six witnesses, three were 

the defendant’s family members and three were non-family 

members, including two non-family character witnesses. The four 

excluded witnesses were all male non-family character witnesses. 

B. Trial Proceedings

1. Opening Statements

Several times during her opening statement, the 

prosecutor referenced out-of-court communications T.Y. allegedly 

had with his friends. The defense initially objected on the 

grounds of hearsay and that the statements were precluded by the 

defense’s motion in limine: 

[DEFENSE]: Judge, these are the alleged statements to two 

of his friends which you said is [sic] not coming in.

[PROSECUTOR]: I’m not going into the contents of the 

statement, your Honor. I’m just going to say that he 

talked to two of his friends. That’s it.

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE]: Well, talked about what? I mean, it’s 

irrelevant if he talked to his friends. And tell them 

what? It’s basically suggesting something that she can’t 

go into and we can’t go into.
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[PROSECUTOR]: I’m not bringing in -- even with the 

witnesses, when they testify on the stand, they’re very 

aware that they’re not to go into what [T.Y.] told them, 

the exact statement. I’m just going to say that he 

disclosed to two friends.

[DEFENSE]: Disclosed what?

[PROSECUTOR]: What this man did to him.

[DEFENSE]: Judge, that’s absolutely forbidden.

THE COURT: How are you going to say it, he talked to two 

friends?

[PROSECUTOR]: That he told two close friends what this man 

did to him.

THE COURT: Okay. Hearsay involves actual statements.

. . . .

THE COURT: But their argument is that it comes very close 

to suggesting to the jury that he told them exactly what 

happened. I think you can -- I think you can put forth, if 

you’re going to bring it out, that he talked to two friends

--

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. About the incident.

THE COURT: -- but that’s about it.

[DEFENSE]: Judge, I object. It still creates an inference 

that he talked to them about this event, and we can’t 

examine him without opening the door. And she should not 

be allowed to. Talked to them about what?

THE COURT: Your objection is preserved. Let’s move on.

Several minutes later, the prosecutor again referenced 

out-of-court communications T.Y. allegedly had with his friend, 

S.S., via a disappearing message on a computer application:

One of [T.Y.’s] friends will tell you about how she and 

[T.Y.] sat in [T.Y.’s] room the night she learned about 

what happened. She will tell you how [T.Y.] could not look 

at her, how [T.Y.] could not say what happened. He could 

only write it, and write it he did. Using his computer, he 

sent her a message.

The defense objected, this time alleging that the 

prosecutor had not previously disclosed the statements to the 
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defense during discovery, as required by HRPP Rule 16(b)(1).7 

During a bench conference, the prosecutor stated, “we don’t have 

[the message] either. It’s one of those messages that 

disappears. It’s like through social media but I guess it just 

disappears after you log off, so we don’t have it either. I 

don’t know the contents of the message.”8 The court sustained 

the objection in the presence of the jury and instructed, 

“Ladies and gentlemen, the last assertion by the State about an 

alleged computer message is stricken from the record. You will 

disregard it.”

The defense denied that any sexual contact occurred 

between T.Y. and Williams. The defense contended that the 

charges were based on fabrications T.Y. made up in retaliation 

against Williams’ minor daughter, J.W., for rejecting his 

 

7 The record reflects the following exchange during a bench 

conference: 

[DEFENSE]: Judge, we’re hearing about this message for the 

first time. It’s never been disclosed to us.

THE COURT: The computer message?

[DEFENSE]: Yes. Never been disclosed.

8 Given that the prosecution did not have a written or recorded 

copy of the computer message, it is not clear that the State violated HRPP 

Rule 16(b)(1)(i), which requires disclosure of “the names . . . of persons 

whom the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses in the presentation of the 

evidence in chief, together with any relevant written or recorded 

statements[.]” (Emphasis added.) 

Regardless, the court sustained the defense’s objection on the 

grounds of nondisclosure, stating, “Okay. If it wasn’t -- if the fact that a 

computer message was created was not divulged, I think it’s fair for the 

defense to object. I’m going to sustain that objection. I’ll strike that last 

statement referring to the computer message.” (emphasis added).
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romantic interest in her. The defense stated that J.W., who was 

two years older than T.Y., “had moved on” and that T.Y.’s and 

J.W.’s friendship had ended. According to the defense, because 

there was no physical evidence or other witnesses, the case 

boiled down to credibility: whether the jury believed Williams 

or T.Y. 

2. Dr. Bivens’ Expert Witness Testimony

The State’s expert witness, Dr. Bivens, is a licensed 

clinical psychologist with a private practice on Kauaʻi. Before 

testifying, Dr. Bivens was informed that T.Y. was male and in 

his early teenage years, but attested that “[o]ther than that

. . . I don’t know anything else about anything that’s been 

alleged or anything about this particular case.” Dr. Bivens

testified that victims of sexual abuse who are under the age of 

sixteen typically do not disclose the abuse “for a very long 

time,” a concept known as “delayed reporting.” Dr. Bivens 

explained that many of these victims do not want to disclose 

abuse due to “embarrassment and shame,” “fear of harming the 

people around them” such as upsetting their parents or getting 

the abuser in trouble, fear of being blamed, or fear of losing 

the relationship with the abuser. Dr. Bivens testified that 

male children in particular may delay reporting out of “concern 

that they might be accused of being gay or be teased for being 
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gay[,]” and often have “the most difficult time disclosing 

[sexual abuse].” 

3. Previously Barred and Undisclosed Testimony 

At trial, T.Y. testified that Williams sexually abused 

him on two occasions: the first incident occurring on or about 

March 9, 2012 to and including March 26, 2012; and the second 

incident occurring on or about May 1, 2012 to and including June 

11, 2012. T.Y. testified that he told two friends, C.O. and 

S.S., about the two incidents of abuse.

During S.S.’s testimony, the prosecutor asked S.S. to 

describe the “sudden change in [T.Y.]’s relationship with 

[J.W.]” S.S. responded that she asked T.Y. why he and J.W. were 

not “hanging out anymore” when they “used to be together all the 

time.” The defense objected on hearsay grounds. During a bench 

conference, the prosecutor claimed that S.S.’s testimony bore on

T.Y.’s credibility. The prosecutor argued:

[PROSECUTOR]: Right. And so [T.Y.] -- [T.Y.] wasn’t able 

to verbalize what happened to him, so instead he just typed 

it on the computer. And these instant messages, we don’t 

have them because it disappeared, but I can have [S.S.] 

explain the nature of the program that they were using at 

the time that -- so I’ve never seen these messages. No one 

has them, the disclosure, so I’m not going to go into 

specifically what [S.S.] wrote but that she did -- this is 

the way in which she learned about what happened to him, 

which also goes to explain the changes that she observed in 

[T.Y.].

Although the court had previously sustained--during 

the prosecutor’s opening statement--the defense’s objection to 

the prosecutor’s reference to the computer messages, stricken 
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the reference from the record, and instructed the jury to 

disregard the reference, the court now allowed S.S. to respond 

to the prosecutor’s question about why T.Y. was no longer 

friends with J.W., without describing what T.Y. said in the 

messages:

[PROSECUTOR]: But [S.S.] can explain the computer, the 

program that they were using to communicate. I won’t have 

her go into specifically what she read but just that this 

was the method in which she learned about what happened to 

[T.Y.].

THE COURT: All right.

[DEFENSE]: I think what you previously said is the limit 

to which they can go. We had no idea about any of this. 

It was never disclosed to use. If the prosecutor knew 

about it, she had a duty to tell us. It certainly does get 

into contents, and I think that they were obligated to 

produce them.

THE COURT: Well, the objection -- I think what the defense 

is saying, they continue to object. So I’ll let you ask 

her, I asked him about it, and he didn’t answer me and he 

typed something. That’s it. Okay? 

The prosecutor asked S.S., “Without telling us exactly 

what he wrote, if you can describe at that time [T.Y.]’s 

emotional state when you first asked him this question.” S.S.

then told the jury:

I specifically remember him having this sort of distant 

stare and just recalling it, and immediately when he 

started thinking about it, he turned around, and he didn’t 

want me to see it. But he didn't want to tell me at first, 

so I kept pestering him.

And eventually he told me to go on this messenger app

called Recall. It doesn’t work anymore because they closed 

down the program, but basically he had to type to me

through this messenger app when I’m standing right behind 

him and receiving the messages through my own computer 

because he couldn’t physically talk to me about it. And he 

would tell me the story through that, and I could just feel 

the atmosphere around us. It was so heavy and dark, and he 
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didn’t say a word for at least ten minutes after he wrote 

everything out.

The prosecutor then asked, “After that night when you 

and [T.Y.] were both sitting at your computers, did you have an 

idea of who was involved and what had happened to [T.Y.]?” S.S. 

responded:

Yes. Well, he specifically told me what happened, so I was 

just -- I couldn’t really take in all the information 

because it just didn’t seem like it happened. Like, I 

couldn’t believe it, but I -- I know that he wasn’t lying, 

obviously. He would tell me the truth. And it was just 

bizarre that he wouldn’t like talk to [J.W.], and that made 

a lot of sense after that.

(Emphases added.)

The prosecutor also elicited previously undisclosed 

testimony from C.Y., T.Y.’s father, about Williams. When asked 

by the prosecutor about his interactions with the Williams 

family, C.Y. recalled a “kind of an odd incident” during which

Williams kept asking C.Y. about T.Y.: 

[Williams] insisted on me going down to their house in Laie 

to look at a roofing problem because I’m a roofing 

contractor. And I said, “I’ll meet you down there.” And 

he goes, “No, no, I’m going to ride with you.” And this is 

from Kaneohe. And I said, “Well, I have other estimates to 

do down in Kahuku. Why don’t you just meet me down there.” 

And he goes, “No, I need to ride with you.” I said, “All 

right.” And in 40 years of roofing, I’ve never taken a 

potential customer on that kind of a jaunt. So we got down 

to the house, and all the way down all he could talk about 

was [T.Y.].

(Emphasis added.)

The defense objected, and argued that the prosecution 

had violated HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(ii) by failing to disclose the 

substance of Williams’ oral statements prior to trial: 
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[DEFENSE]: Judge, if there are any statements of my client 

that are being attributed to him now, it’s certainly the 

first time we’re hearing about them. We made a request for 

discovery of any statements which were made by my client. 

We have no idea what these statements are. 

The prosecutor argued that she did not know 

specifically what Williams said to C.Y. beyond generally talking 

about T.Y. The court rejected the prosecutor’s justification 

and noted that Williams’ statement to C.Y. was encompassed by 

HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(ii)’s language requiring disclosure of “any 

written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral 

statements made by the defendant.” Citing HRPP Rule 16, the 

court ultimately sustained the objection as to anything Williams 

said during the car ride with C.Y.:

[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I don’t have any statements either 

other than [C.Y.] is just telling us about the last 

incident that he had with Mr. Williams and going for a ride 

and him talking about [T.Y.]. I don’t know specifically 

anything that pertains to this case other than that he 

wanted to talk about [T.Y.].

[DEFENSE]: Then it’s irrelevant.

THE COURT: Well, I don’t know. It’s an admission, but 

Rule 16 does require that --

[PROSECUTOR]: If it’s any written or recorded statements, 

your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and the substance of any oral statements 

made by the defendant together with the names and last 

known addresses. So if there’s an objection, under Rule 16 

I'm going to have to --

[PROSECUTOR]: He has an opportunity to cross-examine the 

witness, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, we’re talking about a Rule 16 problem, 

and if there’s an objection, I don’t think I have much 

choice but to at this point bar it.

[PROSECUTOR]: Even if it’s not exculpatory, your Honor, 

the State didn’t violate --
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THE COURT: The current Supreme Court is going to come down 

very hard on these. We just got a murder conviction 

overturned on a very complicated murder for one statement 

that the prosecutor asked about. That was it. Actually, 

that was the ICA, but it’s because they are being very 

strict.

So I’m going to -- there’s been an objection, so you 

can’t go into these statements unless you’ve disclosed at 

least the substance of them.

[PROSECUTOR]: So I can’t go into the statement, but I can 

go into the car ride without whatever he had to talk about?

THE COURT: Yeah.

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

(Emphases added.)

Despite the court’s ruling sustaining the defense’s 

objection to C.Y.’s testimony about his conversation with 

Williams, the prosecutor continued questioning C.Y. about the 

conversation, the defense objected two more times, and the court 

sustained both objections. However, the court did not instruct 

the jury to disregard the answers given by Williams, or 

otherwise provide the jury with a curative instruction.

4. Cross-examination of Defense Witnesses

The defense called three female non-family character 

witnesses to the stand: two--Malia Kaʻai-Barrett and Laura 

Morgan--to testify as to Williams’ “nonviolent and nonaggressive character, honesty and integrity” and “the absence of 

any indications of sexual deviancy or behaviors that are 

consistent with the allegations against him;” and one--Autumn 

Butler--to testify as to T.Y.’s relationship with J.W. and 
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T.Y.’s motive to fabricate his allegations against Williams. 

During cross-examination of Kaʻai-Barrett, Butler, and Morgan, 

the prosecutor asked all three witnesses their opinion about 

Williams’ alleged conduct: “sucking a child’s penis is not 

something you would expect to see in public; right?” The 

defense objected in only one instance, and the court sustained 

the objection as being beyond the scope of direct examination.

5. Jury Instructions

At the close of all evidence, the circuit court 

instructed the jury that “[t]rial procedures are governed by 

rules. When a lawyer believes that the rules require it, it is 

his or her duty to raise an objection. It is my responsibility 

to rule on such objections. You must not consider objections 

made by lawyers in your deliberations.” The circuit court also 

instructed the jury that it “must disregard entirely any matter 

which the Court has ordered stricken.”

6. Closing Arguments

During her closing argument, the prosecutor accused 

the defense witnesses, who were mostly family members, of 

collaborating to create false testimony. The prosecutor claimed 

that the defense witnesses had two years to collaborate and 

figure out what they were going to say in court.
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7. Motion for Judgement of Acquittal or New Trial

The jury found Williams guilty on all counts.

Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial on the 

basis of prosecutorial misconduct and insufficiency of the 

evidence. The circuit court9 denied Williams’ motion. On 

September 14, 2016, the circuit court sentenced Williams to a 

mandatory twenty-year term of incarceration and denied Williams’ 

motion for bail pending appeal.

C. Appellate Proceedings

1. ICA Appeal

Williams appealed his conviction to the ICA,

contending that: the prosecutor committed misconduct before and 

during trial that violated Williams’ constitutional right to a 

fair trial; the circuit court erred by permitting testimony of 

out-of-court statements; the circuit court erred by permitting

Dr. Bivens to testify; the circuit court erred by denying 

Williams’ Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for a New 

Trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence of the dates of 

the offenses; and the circuit court erred by limiting the number 

of character witnesses permitted to testify in Williams’ 

defense. The ICA affirmed Williams’ conviction, holding that 

the only instance of prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the 

 

9 The Honorable Glenn J. Kim presided at the hearing on the Motion 

for Judgement of Acquittal or New Trial and at sentencing.
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prosecutor failed to disclose Williams’ alleged statements to 

C.Y. to the defense prior to trial. State v. Williams, 146 

Hawai‘i 116, 117, 456 P.3d 189, 190 (App. 2020). However, the 

ICA held the misconduct to be harmless error. Id. 

2. Certiorari Application

Williams filed an application for writ of certiorari 

with this court on May 1, 2020. In his application, Williams

alleged that the ICA erred by concluding that the prosecutor’s

misconduct did not deprive him of a fair trial. Williams 

contended the ICA also erred by affirming circuit court rulings 

that: permitted improper and previously undisclosed evidence--

including out-of-court statements made by the complaining 

witness and the substance of out-of-court statements made by 

Williams--to be presented at trial; limited the number and type 

of witnesses who could testify on Williams’ behalf; and 

concluded there was sufficient evidence upon which to sustain 

Williams’ conviction. Williams’ application for writ of 

certiorari was granted.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion for A New Trial

The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within 

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 

disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. It is wellestablished that an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial 

court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or 

disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the 

substantial detriment of a party litigant.
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State v. Austin, 143 Hawaiʻi 18, 29, 422 P.3d 18, 29 (2018) 

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

“As a general matter, the granting or denial of a 

motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Kim, 103 Hawai‘i 285, 290, 81 P.3d 1200, 

1205 (2003). “The trial court abuses its discretion when it 

clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or 

principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a 

party litigant.” Id. (citing State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai‘i 172, 

178–79, 873 P.2d 51, 57–58 (1994)). 

B. Admissibility of Evidence

Different standards of review must be applied to trial 

court decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence 

depending on the requirements of the particular rule of 

evidence at issue. When application of a particular 

evidentiary rule can yield only one correct result, the 

proper standard for appellate review is the right/wrong 

standard. However, the traditional abuse of discretion 

standard should be applied in the case of those rules of 

evidence that require a “judgment call” on the part of the 

trial court.

Kealoha v. Cty. of Haw., 74 Haw. 308, 319-20, 844 P.2d 670, 676 

(1993).

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

“Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed 

under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which 

requires an examination of the record and a determination of 

whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
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20

complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” State 

v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai‘i 83, 93, 26 P.3d 572, 582 (2001) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

If there is a reasonable possibility that the 

prosecutorial misconduct might have contributed to the 

conviction, the misconduct is not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt and the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Pacheco, 96 

Hawai‘i at 93, 26 P.3d at 582. “In order to determine whether 

the alleged prosecutorial misconduct reached the level of 

reversible error, the appellate court considers the nature of 

the alleged misconduct, the promptness or lack of a curative 

instruction, and the strength or weakness of the evidence 

against defendant.” State v. Conroy, 148 Hawai‘i 194, 201, 468 

P.3d 208, 215 (2020) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting State 

v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 198, 830 P.2d 492, 502 (1992)).

D. Sufficiency of Evidence

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, “[e]vidence adduced in the trial court must be 

considered in the strongest light for the prosecution[.]” State 

v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai‘i 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010) 

(quoting State v. Richie, 88 Hawai‘i 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241 

(1998)). “The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established 

beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial 

evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” Id. 
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21

III. DISCUSSION

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless Beyond a 

Reasonable Doubt. 

The constitutions of the United States and the State 

of Hawaiʻi guarantee every individual accused of a crime the 

fundamental right to a fair trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; 

Haw. Const. art. I, § 14. “Prosecutorial misconduct may provide 

grounds for a new trial if the prosecutor’s actions denied the 

defendant a fair trial.” State v. Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i 339, 364, 

439 P.3d 864, 889 (2019) (quoting Agrabante, 73 Haw. at 198, 830 

P.2d at 502). In reviewing whether prosecutorial misconduct 

deprived the defendant of a fair trial, we consider three 

factors: “(1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the promptness of 

a curative instruction; and (3) the strength or weakness of the 

evidence against the defendant.” Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 364, 439 

P.3d at 889. “Misconduct requires vacating a conviction when, 

in light of these factors, ‘there is a reasonable possibility 

that the error complained of might have contributed to the 

conviction.’” State v. Underwood, 142 Hawai‘i 317, 325, 418 P.3d 

658, 666 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Rogan, 

91 Hawai‘i 405, 412, 984 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1999)). When no single 

error or prejudicial remark constitutes prosecutorial 

misconduct, “the cumulative weight of such errors may create an 

atmosphere of bias and prejudice which no remarks by the trial 
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22

court could eradicate.” Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 364, 439 P.3d at 

889 (quoting State v. Kahalewai, 55 Haw. 127, 129, 516 P.2d 336, 

338 (1973)). 

In the present case, the cumulative effect of the 

prosecutor’s misconduct deprived Williams of a fair trial. 

Applying the three factors to determine whether the violation of

Williams’ right to a fair trial is harmless, we conclude that it 

was not. See, e.g., State v. Conroy, 148 Hawai‘i 194, 204, 468 

P.3d 208, 218 (2020).

1. Nature of the conduct

Under the first factor--the nature of the prosecutor’s 

misconduct--“we consider ‘the nature of the challenged conduct 

in relation to our criminal justice system generally and the 

special role of the prosecutor specifically.’” Pasene, 144 

Hawai‘i at 365, 439 P.3d at 890 (quoting Underwood, 142 Hawai‘i 

at 325, 418 P.3d at 666). In this case, the nature of the 

misconduct committed by the prosecutor included her: 

(1) failure to disclose out-of-court statements made by the 

defendant; (2) introduction at trial of out-of-court statements 

made by the complaining witness that had been barred pretrial by 

the defense’s motion in limine; and (3) improper and lurid 

questioning of witnesses at trial.10 

 

10 We also note that the prosecutor, during her closing argument, 

accused defense witnesses of collaborating to create false testimony. 

 (continued . . .)
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a. The prosecutor’s failure to disclose statements 

made by Williams violated HRPP Rule 16(b)(1) and 

constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(ii) requires disclosure of “any 

written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral 

statements made by the defendant” prior to trial. We have 

recognized the importance of the pretrial disclosure process, 

stating, “An essential component of the basic tools is the 

process of discovery, which promotes fairness in our adversary 

system.” State v. Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i 120, 136, 456 P.3d 484, 500 

(2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In the present case, at trial, C.Y., the complaining 

witness’ father, testified about an out-of-court conversation he 

had with Williams during a long car ride where “all [Williams]

could talk about was [T.Y.]” This constituted a violation of 

HRPP 16(b)(1)(ii), which requires disclosure of “the substance 

of any oral statements made by the defendant” prior to trial. 

Despite the court sustaining the defense’s continued objections, 

the prosecutor continued questioning C.Y. about the 

conversation. As the defense argued in its opening statement, 

this case hinged on whether the jury believed T.Y. or Williams. 

Williams’ interactions with T.Y. and the nature of their 

relationship were critical to Williams’ claim that no sexual 

 

(continued . . .)

Because this issue is not necessary to the resolution of this case, we 

decline to consider whether it constitutes harmless error.
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contact occurred.11 Evidence that Williams had a fixation on or 

an inappropriate level of interest in T.Y. might have prompted 

the jury to believe that Williams harbored inappropriate 

feelings toward T.Y. that he later acted upon, by committing the 

offenses alleged by T.Y. Thus, the prosecutor’s violation of 

HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(ii) and questioning of C.Y. that elicited 

testimony about previously undisclosed statements by Williams 

constituted misconduct.

b. The prosecutor’s introduction of out-of-court 

statements that had previously been barred by the 

defense’s motion in limine constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct.

This court has expressed concerns about prosecutorial 

misconduct in cases where the defendant’s credibility is 

particularly important. In Underwood, this court stated that

“[t]he potential for prejudice is particularly evident 

where . . . the improper comments specifically concerned the 

credibility of the testimony on which the case turned.” 142 

Hawai‘i at 329, 418 P.3d at 670; see also Conroy, 148 Hawai‘i at

204, 468 P.3d at 218 (“Prosecutorial misconduct affecting the 

issue of defendant’s intent was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

 

11 Seven of the ten witnesses on Williams’ witness list (not 

including Williams) were identified to testify about their “personal 

observations of and interactions with [T.Y.],” T.Y.’s relationships with 

various members of the Williams’ family, and T.Y.’s “motive to fabricate his

allegations” against Williams.
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doubt where the only witness to the altercation were the 

defendant and the [complaining witness].”).

Here, the prosecutor introduced out-of-court 

statements made by T.Y. via computer message that had been 

barred pretrial.12 Evidence of T.Y.’s messages explaining to 

S.S. the alleged abuse was material to Williams’ guilt and/or 

punishment. T.Y.’s messages to S.S. allegedly revealed abuse 

and thus greatly undermined Williams’ credibility and 

corroborated the credibility of the only other witness who could 

testify as to whether the acts did or did not occur: T.Y. The 

effect of its introduction may have imparted to the jury that 

because T.Y. told S.S. about the alleged abuse, he was credible. 

Thus, the prosecutor’s introduction of out-of-court statements 

that were barred by the court’s motion in limine ruling 

constituted misconduct.

 

12 As discussed above, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, when 

the prosecutor first referenced the computer messages in her opening 

statement, the defense objected on the grounds that the messages had not been 

previously disclosed. The court sustained the objection, citing the 

prosecution’s failure to disclose the messages to the defense, though it is 

not clear that the prosecution’s nondisclosure of the computer messages 

violated HRPP Rule 16(b)(1)(i). See supra note 8. However, the court later 

permitted the prosecutor to question S.S. about the computer messages during 

direct examination, over the defense’s objections.

Regardless, the defense’s lack of knowledge about the computer 

messages did not preclude the messages from being covered by the scope of the 

pretrial motion in limine: the content of the computer messages clearly fell 

within those statements covered by the motion, which sought to bar all outof-court statements made by T.Y. alleging that Williams sexually assaulted 

him. In granting the defense’s motion, the court stated that T.Y.’s alleged 

statements would be excluded, that “[u]nless the government can come up with 

a hearsay exception, we litigate the matter outside the presence of the 

jury,” and that the court would “generally” not allow the statements. Thus, 

the prosecutor’s introduction of the evidence of the computer messages 

constituted a violation of the motion in limine.
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c. The prosecutor’s lurid and inflammatory crossexamination of defense witnesses constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct.

“We have recognized that prosecutors ‘should not use 

arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of 

the jury[,]’ as ‘[a]rguments that rely on . . . prejudices of 

the jurors introduce into the trial elements of irrelevance and 

irrationality that cannot be tolerated.’” Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 

370, 439 P.3d at 895 (alterations in original) (quoting Rogan, 

91 Hawai‘i at 413, 984 P.2d at 1239). Even when the statements 

are not calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the 

jury, when the likely result is that the jury will be inflamed, 

the statements are prejudicial. Id. (holding that the 

prosecutor’s reference to Charles Manson “may lead the jury to 

react based on emotion, rather than in an objective way, and 

threatens to introduce an atmosphere of bias and prejudice as 

the jury enters deliberation” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). 

Here, the prosecutor’s questioning of defense 

witnesses--asking whether sucking a child’s penis was something 

they expected to see in public--was improper. The prosecutor’s 

questioning emphasized the lurid nature of the accusations and 

was likely to elicit an emotional response from the jury. The 

questions were rhetorical and called for immaterial information. 

Because the prosecutor’s questioning of defense witnesses was 
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27

calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury it 

constituted misconduct.

2. The promptness or lack of a curative instruction

With regard to the second factor--the promptness of 

the court’s curative instructions--we consider: 

[T]he extent to which a trial court’s instruction to the 

jury minimized or eliminated the prejudicial effect of 

misconduct. When a court promptly addresses the 

impropriety, a prosecutor’s improper remarks are generally 

considered cured by the court’s instructions to the jury, 

because it is presumed that the jury abided by the court’s 

admonition to disregard the statement.

Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 365, 439 P.3d at 890 (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (quoting Underwood, 142 

Hawai‘i at 327, 418 P.3d at 668). 

To determine whether the circuit court’s instructions 

to the jury cured the risk of prejudice to the defendant, we 

evaluate “whether the cumulative effect of prejudicial conduct 

going to the issue of guilt is so strong that it overcomes the 

presumption that the curative remarks of the court have rendered 

the prejudicial remarks harmless.” State v. Pemberton, 71 Haw. 

466, 476, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990). The Pemberton court held that 

although a prosecutor’s improper statements and questioning of a 

witness are typically cured by instructions to the jury to 

disregard them in reaching a verdict, sometimes the improper 

conduct can create an atmosphere of bias and prejudice that “no 

remarks by the trial court could erase.” Id. (internal 
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28

quotation marks and citation omitted). The Pemberton court held 

that the cumulative effect of the prejudicial conduct in that 

case was so pervasive that it overcame the presumption that 

limiting instructions by the circuit court could render the 

prejudicial remarks harmless. Id. (“[T]he fact that defense 

counsel was repeatedly forced to object and the court repeatedly 

forced to sustain those objections and to issue cautionary 

instructions is likely to have had the reverse effect of 

focusing the jury’s attention on that evidence and the fact that 

it was being suppressed.”).

Similarly, in State v. Underwood, where the prosecutor 

told the jury that “defense counsel tried to get the complaining 

witness to make up some story,” we held that a jury instruction 

failed to cure the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s 

statement because: (1) “the instruction did not address the 

problematic nature of the prosecutor’s statements”; and (2) “the 

instruction was general in nature and was delivered to the jury 

along with a large number of other standard instructions before 

closing arguments began.” 142 Hawai‘i at 328, 418 P.3d at 669.

In the instant case, the circuit court’s general 

limiting instruction delivered at the close of evidence failed 

to cure the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s introduction 

of out-of-court statements not produced to the defense prior to 

trial. See Pemberton, 71 Haw. at 475-76, 796 P.2d at 84-85. 
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The jury heard the prosecutor elicit testimony from C.Y. 

describing Williams’ unusual interest in T.Y. Although defense 

counsel objected and the court advised the prosecutor during a 

bench conference that the objection would be sustained, the 

court did not sustain the objection in front of the jury. 

Thereafter, the prosecutor immediately returned to questioning 

C.Y. about the same subject in front of the jury. Defense 

counsel objected again and the court sustained the objection, 

but the court neither struck the testimony, nor gave a curative 

instruction to the jury.

Two days later, the circuit court provided the jury 

with a general instruction, stating, 

Trial procedures are governed by rules. When a 

lawyer believes that the rules require it, it is 

his or her duty to raise an objection. It is my 

responsibility to rule on such objections. You 

must not consider objections made by lawyers in 

your deliberations. . . . You must disregard 

entirely any matter which the court has ordered 

stricken.

As in Underwood, where a general instruction given 

much later amidst various other instructions was not curative, 

142 Hawai‘i at 328, 418 P.3d at 669, here also, the circuit 

court’s general instruction was not curative. Also, because the 

instruction was not promptly given when the prejudice occurred, 

and was instead provided at the close of evidence with a barrage 

of other instructions, the jury would not have known the 
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30

evidence or objections to which the court was referring. 

Additionally, the prejudicial effect of C.Y.’s testimony and the 

prosecutor’s continued questioning on subject matter the court 

had sustained an objection to may have imparted to the jury that 

T.Y.’s testimony was corroborated by C.Y., and, therefore, that 

T.Y. was more credible than Williams. Thus, we cannot conclude 

that the court’s general instruction cured the risk of prejudice 

to Williams.

The circuit court’s specific instructions to the jury 

regarding T.Y.’s computer messages to S.S. also failed to cure 

the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s improper use of those 

statements. The circuit court had ruled at the pretrial hearing 

on the defense’s motion in limine that the State could not 

introduce out-of-court statements made by T.Y. Yet, the 

prosecutor referred to T.Y.’s computer messages during her 

opening statement, even though the statements contained in those 

messages were barred by the defense’s motion in limine.13 The 

court struck from the record and instructed the jury to 

disregard the prosecutor’s reference to the computer messages. 

But despite the court’s ruling during the prosecutor’s opening 

statement and the defense’s continued objections, the prosecutor 

later introduced the same evidence of T.Y.’s computer messages 

during her direct examination of S.S.

 

13 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Prejudice caused by a prosecutor’s willful violation 

of a court’s ruling on a motion in limine is not necessarily 

overcome by a later limiting instruction. Pacheco, 96 Hawai‘i at 

98, 26 P.3d at 587. In Pacheco, the defense filed a motion in 

limine that sought to exclude at trial any evidence of the 

defendant’s prior convictions. Id. at 88, 26 P.3d at 577. 

Although the court granted the motion, the prosecutor referenced 

defendant’s prior convictions during cross-examination and in 

closing arguments. Id. at 98, 26 P.3d at 587. We held that the 

prosecutor’s “willful violation of the circuit court’s in

limine ruling constituted prosecutorial misconduct,” and because 

the circuit court failed to give a curative instruction during 

cross-examination or closing arguments when the statements were 

made, the prejudicial effect could not be overcome. Id.

In Pacheco, the prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s

improper presentation of evidence in willful violation of the 

court’s motion in limine ruling was not overcome because the 

court failed to provide a prompt curative instruction. Id. at 

98, 26 P.3d at 587. We face a similar situation here. As in 

Pacheco, despite the court’s pretrial motion in limine ruling, 

the prosecutor twice presented prejudicial evidence about T.Y.’s 

computer messages to the jury: first, when she referenced the

messages in her opening statement, and again, when she 

questioned S.S. about the messages during direct examination. 
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Because the jury heard that T.Y. told S.S. about the alleged 

abuse from both the prosecutor and S.S., and the court’s only 

curative instruction to the jury was that the message was 

“stricken” the first time it was introduced, after which it was 

again introduced and remained introduced as evidence, we cannot 

conclude that the prejudicial effect was overcome by a curative 

jury instruction. See Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 371, 439 P.3d at 

896 (“Attempts to refer to evidence that has been specifically 

excluded by the circuit court . . . undermine[s] the integrity

of the criminal justice system.”). 

With T.Y.’s and Williams’ credibility a central issue, 

the improper introduction of previously barred evidence of 

T.Y.’s computer messages might have left the jury with the 

impression that T.Y. was more credible than Williams. If the 

jury believed that T.Y. had previously told others about the 

alleged abuse, testimony on T.Y.’s computer messages 

corroborated and bolstered T.Y.’s testimony. And with Williams’ 

relationship with T.Y. another important issue, the improper 

introduction of undisclosed statements by Williams evincing his 

interest in T.Y. might have led the jury to disbelieve his claim

that no sexual contact occurred. Finally, there was no curative 

instruction delivered by the court to address the prosecutor’s 

blatantly lewd question--“sucking a child's penis is not 
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33

something you would expect to see in public, would you?”--posed 

to three defense witnesses on cross-examination. 

We therefore conclude that the circuit court’s 

limiting instructions, and lack thereof, did not cure the 

prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct. 

3. Strength or weakness of the evidence against Williams

“In considering the final factor, reviewing courts 

weigh the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction.” 

Underwood, 142 Hawai‘i at 328, 418 P.3d at 669. “When evidence 

is so overwhelming as to outweigh the inflammatory effect of the 

improper comments, reviewing courts will regard the impropriety 

as ultimately harmless.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). But “[w]hen it cannot be said beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached 

absent the improper conduct . . . the defendant’s conviction 

must be vacated.” Id. Critically, we noted that “[w]hen a 

conviction is largely dependent on a jury’s determination as to 

the credibility of a complainant’s testimony, [] the evidence of 

the offense is not so overwhelming that it renders the 

prosecutor’s improper statements harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 325, 418 P.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Where the complaining witness’ account 

of the events is countered only by the defendant, the potential 

for prejudice is especially heightened when prosecutorial 
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conduct affects the defendant’s credibility. Id. (noting that 

the defendant’s conviction was “ultimately dependent on the 

jury’s assessment of [the complaining witness’] credibility” 

because “only the statements of [the complaining witness] 

herself directly described the actual acts constituting the two 

offenses”). 

In this case, it cannot be said that the prosecutor’s 

use of undisclosed and previously barred evidence and 

inflammatory questioning of witnesses “did not contribute to the 

jury’s determination of guilt.” Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 371, 439 

P.3d at 896. As in Underwood, here, T.Y., the complaining 

witness, was the only witness other than the defendant who could 

describe the actual acts constituting the offenses. Thus, 

T.Y.’s testimony constituted the most significant evidence 

against Williams. The evidence against Williams was not so 

overwhelming that it rendered the prosecutor’s misconduct--

improperly referencing and introducing evidence that had been 

excluded by the defense’s pretrial motion in limine, improperly 

introducing statements by Williams that had not been previously 

disclosed to the defense, and improperly subjecting defense 

witnesses to inflammatory questioning--harmless. Because there 

is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misconduct 

might have contributed to Williams’ conviction, the misconduct 

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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After considering the inflammatory nature of the 

prosecutor’s misconduct, the lack of prompt curative 

instructions from the circuit court, and the relative weight of 

the evidence supporting Williams’ conviction, we find that the

cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct created an

“atmosphere of bias and prejudice” that deprived Williams of a 

fair trial. Pasene, 144 Hawai‘i at 364, 439 P.3d at 889. The 

circuit court erred in denying Williams’ motion for a new trial 

based on prosecutorial misconduct, and the ICA erred in 

concluding that the prosecutor’s misconduct was harmless.

B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It 

Limited the Number of Witnesses Who Could Testify on 

Williams’ Behalf.

Williams alleges the circuit court abused its 

discretion by limiting the number of witnesses permitted to 

testify on Williams’ behalf. When a decision to allow a witness 

to testify is based on Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (“HRE”) Rule 403

(2016),14 it “require[s] a ‘judgment call’ on the part of the 

trial court, [and is] reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 

Richie, 88 Hawai‘i at 37, 960 P.2d at 1245 (quoting State v. 

Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i 1, 11, 928 P.2d 843, 853 (1996)). “An abuse of 

 

14 HRE Rule 403 states, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence.”
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discretion occurs when the decisionmaker exceeds the bounds of 

reason or disregards rules of principles of law or practice to 

the detriment of a party.” State v. Vliet, 95 Hawai‘i 94, 107, 

19 P.3d 42, 55 (2001) (quoting In re Water Use Permit 

Applications, 94 Hawai‘i 97, 183, 9 P.3d 409, 495 (2000)). 

In the present case, the circuit court did not abuse 

its discretion in limiting the number of defense witnesses. The 

defense sought to call ten witnesses other than the defendant, 

seven of whom were non-family members. Of the six witnesses 

permitted to testify, three were the defendant’s family members 

and three were non-family members. Of the three non-family 

witnesses, two testified as to Williams’ good character,15 and 

all were women. All four witnesses excluded by the court were 

male non-family character witnesses. 

Williams raises particular concern before this court 

that no male non-family character witnesses were permitted to 

testify. However, defense counsel did not voice this specific

concern at trial when defense witnesses were being finalized.16

 

15 The third female non-family witness was Autumn Butler, a friend 

of J.W.’s (Williams’ daughter) who also knew T.Y., who was permitted to 

testify that T.Y. was jealous of J.W.

16 For example, the circuit court permitted one character witness to 

testify as to Williams’ interaction with children. The defense selected 

Malia Kaʻai-Barrett, a female non-family member who had observed Williams with 

kids through his involvement with the Hawaiʻi Youth Opera Chorus. If the 

defense wished to have a male non-family character witness, it could have 

selected a potential witness who, according to the defense’s witness list, 

had also observed Williams “regularly interacting with children” and who knew 

 (continued . . .)
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And the record does not evince a basis to conclude that gender 

was a factor relevant to character testimony, or that the 

court’s exclusion of these witnesses was based on their gender.17 

In fact, at trial, defense counsel conceded, “We probably don’t 

need the boy,” while referring to one of the male non-family 

character witnesses18 that Williams now argues the circuit court 

arbitrarily excluded. Defense counsel also posited that the 

testimony of a second male non-family witness19 would largely 

mirror that of the first male non-family witness:

[DEFENSE]: [ ] There are actually two [male non-family 

witnesses], but they’re basically going to testify that 

there were many opportunities for Mr. Williams to have 

molested them or engaged in inappropriate behaviors with 

them. And that didn’t happen, and they’ve basically 

received no information or no reports that that ever 

happened.

Significantly, these concessions by defense counsel 

occurred before the circuit ruled, on relevance grounds, that it 

 

(continued . . .)

Williams through New Hope Church, in lieu of Kaʻai-Barrett. However, the 

defense did not propose this person as a witness.

17 Defense counsel did argue that it was important to have “a couple 

of” non-family witnesses to “corroborate” the testimony of the family 

witnesses. The defense was concerned that the prosecutor would imply to the 

jury that the family witnesses “ha[d] a motive to lie” simply because 

“they’re related to Mr. Williams and they love him.” However, the defense 

did not specify that they wanted male non-family witnesses to testify, and, 

as noted above, several female non-family witnesses testified at trial.

18 According to the defense’s witness list, this proposed witness 

was the son of a family friend who had “been in and out of the [Williams] 

house ever since he was a little boy.”

19 According to the defense’s witness list, this proposed witness 

was a friend of Williams’ son “who spent significant time in the Williams’ 

family home including time alone with [Williams] and occasions when [T.Y.] 

was present.” 
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would not permit the first male non-family witness to testify. 

As defense counsel identified his list of proposed character 

witnesses, the circuit court primarily expressed concern over 

the growing number of witnesses and that the character evidence 

was “becoming cumulative.”

Under HRE Rule 403, it is within the court’s 

discretion to exclude the “needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence.” “In order for evidence to be considered ‘cumulative’ 

for HRE [Rule] 403 purposes, it must be substantially the same 

as other evidence that has already been received.” State v. 

Pulse, 83 Hawai‘i 229, 247, 925 P.2d 797, 815 (1996) (citing Aga 

v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai‘i 230, 241, 891 P.2d 1022, 1032 (1995)). 

Thus, it was within the court’s discretion to exclude cumulative 

evidence by limiting the number of witnesses who were all 

testifying as to the same character traits. Aga, 78 Hawai‘i at 

241, 891 P.2d at 1033 (finding it was not an abuse of discretion 

to exclude the deposition testimony of a second doctor regarding 

the decedent’s alleged hallucinations because such testimony did 

not “offer a different opinion” than that already presented at 

trial and “could be considered cumulative evidence”); see also

U.S. v. Dredd, 833 F. App’x 79, 81 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that 

the trial court “has latitude to exclude cumulative character 

witnesses”). 
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39

Here, five of the six non-family character witnesses 

the defense sought to call would have testified as to Williams’ 

“honesty and integrity.” All six witnesses would have testified 

as to Williams’ “nonviolent and non-aggressive character” and 

“the absence of any indications of sexual deviancy or behaviors” 

consistent with the allegations in this case. Nothing in the 

record indicates the four excluded witnesses would have offered 

a “different opinion” on Williams’ character than that attested 

to by the witnesses the court permitted to testify; they would 

have testified as to the same character traits in different 

interpersonal settings.20 The court’s exclusion of these

witnesses did not prevent the defense from supporting the 

character of the defendant, nor did it prevent testimony that 

would supply a fact not available from other witnesses. Because 

the testimony of the four excluded witnesses would have been 

“substantially the same as other [character] evidence” offered 

at trial, Pulse, 83 Hawai‘i at 247, 925 P.2d at 815, the circuit 

court’s exclusion of these witnesses was not an abuse of 

discretion.

 

20 For example, two of the excluded male non-family character 

witnesses, along with Laura Morgan, who was permitted to testify, were listed 

as “long time family friend[s]” of the Williamses. Another excluded male 

non-family character witness was Williams’ “professional colleague.” All of 

these witnesses would have offered similar opinion testimony as to Williams’ 

character.
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40

C. Sufficient Evidence Existed to Convict Williams.

“This court will not overturn a conviction by a jury 

if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, there is substantial evidence to support the 

conclusion of the trier of fact.” Tetu, 139 Hawai‘i at 226, 386 

P.3d at 863 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

“Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of 

sufficient quality and probative value to enable [a person] of 

reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” State v. Matavale, 

115 Hawai‘i 149, 158, 166 P.3d 322, 331 (2007). 

In the present case, there was substantial evidence 

to convict Williams. The jury heard testimony from T.Y. that 

Williams sexually assaulted him while he was a minor. State 

witnesses S.S. and C.O. also testified as to their observations 

of T.Y.’s emotional, nervous, and fidgety behavior when T.Y. 

told them about the alleged assault. C.Y. testified as to the 

changes in T.Y.’s behavior, including the decline in his 

academic performance, during and after the alleged time frame 

that the abuse occurred. Although Williams denied committing 

the assault and several defense witnesses testified as to his 

good reputation it is within the jury’s purview to believe one 

witness over another. See State v. Jhun, 83 Hawai‘i 472, 483, 

927 P.2d 1355, 1366 (1996) (“In a jury trial, the jury is the 

trier of fact and, thus, is the sole judge of the credibility of 
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41

the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.”). Thus, in 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable for the 

prosecution, substantial evidence supported Williams’ 

conviction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s March 3, 2020 

judgment on appeal is vacated, the circuit court’s order denying 

Williams’ motion for a new trial is vacated, and the case is 

remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

Eric A. Seitz,

(Della Au Belatti,

Gina Szeto-Wong,

Jonathan M.F. Loo, and

Kevin A. Yolken, with him 

on the briefs) for

petitioner/defendant-appellant

Sonja P. McCullen for 

respondent/plaintiff-appellee

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Gary W.B. Chang