### JMRNNY Doe v Opus Dei 2024 NY Slip Op 31998(U) June 10, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 951154/2021 Judge: Hasa A. Kingo Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.NYSCEF DOC. NO. 65 INDEX NO. 951154/2021 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/10/2024


### SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. HASA A. KINGO Justice

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JMRNNY DOE, Plaintiff,

- V
- OPUS DEi, OAKCREST SCHOOL, C. JOHN MCCLOSKEY Defendant.

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### SM

INDEX NO. 951154/2021 MOTION DATE 11/15/2021 MOTION SEQ. NO. 002
DECISION 

### + ORDER ON MOTION

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35, 37, 39,40,41,42,43,44,45,52,54,57,59 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL 

### Withthe instantmotionDefendant Oakcrest School ("Oakcrest") moves, pursuantto CPLR § 321l(a)(S), to dismiss PlaintiffJMRNNYDOE's ("Plaintiff') complaint as against it for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffopposes the motion. Forthe reasons discussed herein, the motion is denied. BACKGROUNDANDARGUMENTS 

### Plaintiff alleges that she endured sexual abuse by Defendant, John McCloskey ("McCloskey"), while attending Oakcrest in 2003, at which time she was approximately eight years old. Plaintifffurther asserts that in 2002, McCloskey assaulted other women, including her mother. According to Plaintiff, her mother lodged complaints with Defendants concerning McCloskey's conduct. Despite these complaints, Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to take measures to preventMcCloskey from engaging in further misconduct and instead placed him in a school environment. Plaintifffurther recounts learning ofanother incident in 2002 wherein McCloskey abused another student. She contends thatDefendants possessed knowledge ofMcCloskey'sproclivity for sexually abusing students dating backto the 1980s. Plaintiffargues that had Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrestundertaken appropriate actions following the 2002 incidents ofabuse, she would not have suffered while attending Oakcrest. Consequently, Plaintiffmaintains that Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrestbear liability for McCloskey's actions. In support ofthe instantmotion, Oakcrest contends thatthis court lacks generaljurisdiction over it pursuant to CPLR § 

### 301, as Oakcrest is neither organized under New York law nor headquartered within this State. Oakcrest asserts that it is a not-for-profit school, incorporated in the District ofColumbia and located in Virginia, and that it performs no services in New York. Consequently, Oakcrest maintains that it is not "athome" in New York, and thus, Plaintiffcannot establish general personal jurisdiction over it. Oakcrest further argues that the only basis for

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jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 301, as alleged in the complaint, pertains to Opus Dei, which purportedly has an office in New York. However, Oakcrest argues that the presence ofan office ofan unrelated entity does not confer generaljurisdiction over Oakcrest. Moreover, Oakcrest asserts that while the complaint does not invoke specificjurisdiction under CPLR § 302 as a basis for maintaining this action in New York courts, such specific jurisdiction would be equally unavailing. Oakcrest contends that the absence of any substantive connectionbetween Oakcrest, Opus Dei, and theunderlying allegations is clearly delineated in the affidavit of Matthew Buonocore, which Plaintiff cannot credibly dispute. Therefore, Oakcrest argues that the court lacks a valid basis to exercisejurisdiction over it, necessitating the dismissal ofall claims against Oakcrest. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffemphasizes that the decision to place McCloskey in the school where she was subsequently sexually abused was made in New York by Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrest. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' negligence occurred in New York, leading to her abuse by Defendants' agent, servant, and/or employee. Plaintifffurther asserts that Oakcrest has failed to disclose that she was a student at the school during the period ofabuse and points to the school's website, which indicates that it is "guided by" Opus Dei. Consequently, Plaintiffargues that the facts overwhelmingly support that this case should notbe dismissed as to Oakcrest and that dismissal would be premature at this stage without the benefit ofdiscovery. DISCUSSION In 2019, NewYork State enacted the Child Victims Act which, 

### interalia, (1) extended the statute of limitations on criminal cases involving certain sex offenses against children under 18 (CPL§ 30.10 [f]); (2) extendedthe time which civil actions basedupon such criminal conductmay be brought until the child victim reaches 55 years old 

### (see CPLR § 208[b]); and (3) opened a one -year window reviving civil actions for which the statute oflimitations has already run (even in cases that were litigated and dismissed on limitations grounds), commencing six months after the effective date ofthe measure, i.e. August 14, 2019 

### (see CPLR § 214-g). "On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" 

### (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). Pursuantto CPLR § 321l(a)(8), "[a] party may move forjudgmentdismissing one ormore causes of action asserted against him on the ground that

... the court has no jurisdiction of the person ofthe defendant." The court can exercise either general or specificjurisdiction over a defendant 

### (see CPLR §§ 301, 302). Generaljurisdiction occurs when a defendantis presentin NewYork, eitherbyvirtue ofbeing headquartered in the state or maintaining a principal place ofbusiness in the state 

### (see Magdalena v. 

### Lins, 123 AD3d 600, 601 [1st Dept 2014]). New York courts can exercise general jurisdiction over subsidiaries, and vice versa, if several factors demonstrate near identical ownership interests between the parent and subsidiary, including financial dependence,

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### interferenceinthe selection and assignment ofthe subsidiary's executivepersonnel, and the degree ofcontrol exercised by the parent over the subsidiary 

### (see Goel v. 

### Ramachandran, 111 AD3d 783 [2d Dept 2013]). New York's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary. Indeed, a court can exert specific personaljurisdiction over a defendant corporation or entity if the court finds that any ofthe executives ofthat entity have contacts with the State ofNew York 

### (see FIA LeveragedFundLtd v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 150 AD3d 492, 493 [1st Dept 2017]). The Court ofAppeals has repeatedly recognized that CPLR § 302(a)(l) "is a 'single act statute' and proofofone transaction in NewYork is sufficientto invoke jurisdiction" 

### Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]). In addition to the 'single act,' personal jurisdiction attaches where: (1) 'the defendant's activities here were purposeful;' and (2) there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted." In this matter, the court finds that it possesses both general and specific (long-arm) jurisdiction over Oakcrest. Thisjurisdiction is established by the occurrence ofcertain negligent acts within New York and by Oakcrest's status as an alter ego and integral part, or extension, of Defendant Opus Dei. Consequently, Oakcrestis deemedtobe "athome" in NewYork, where Opus Dei is headquartered, and wherethe initial negligent acts led toPlaintiffs abuseby theDefendants' agent, servant, and/or employee. The evidence currently available to Plaintiffindicates that Oakcrest is intrinsically linked to Opus Dei, functioning as its extension and arm, thus rendering Oakcrest subject tojurisdiction in NewYork. At this preliminary stage ofthe proceedings, affording Plaintiffthe benefit ofevery favorable inference, such evidence is sufficient to establishjurisdiction. Discovery is required to enable Oakcrest to substantiate any contrary position definitively. Furthermore, Oakcrest's official website corroborates this direct association with Opus Dei. A review of the website reveals that Oakcrest operates under the guidance of Opus Dei's teachings and spirituality. Specifically, the website proclaims: "Guided by the teachings ofthe Catholic Church and the spirituality ofOpus Dei, we weave together arich liberal arts curriculum, one-on-one mentoring, character development, and service to create a vibrant environment that graduates confident women who will make a difference in all they choose to do." This statement further substantiates the close ties between Oakcrest and Opus Dei, reinforcing thejurisdictional basis over Oakcrest in NewYork. Contrary to Oakcrest's assertions, this case is distinguishable from 

### Aybar v. Aybar, 169 AD3d 137 (2d Dept 2019). In the present matter, Oakcrest, while based in Virginia, is alleged to be an integral part ofthe Opus Dei religious order and its extensive network of entities, which includes schools, universities, and churches. This implies that although the abuse transpired in Virginia, the negligence, particularly the negligenthiring, supervision, and retentionthatfacilitated the abuse, originated in NewYork, where Defendant Opus Dei is headquartered. This case does notmerely involve Oakcrest's registration in NewYork. Instead, it concerns an institution that is supervised, controlled, and maintained by Opus Dei, whose principal place of

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business is in New York. It is further alleged that Opus Dei's influence and operational reach extendedinto otherparts ofthe country, including Virginia. Beyond generaljurisdiction, there is also a basis for specificjurisdictionhere. To be sure, it is alleged that McCloskey was transferred from New York to Oakcrest-apurposeful act that invokedtheprivileges andbenefits ofNewYork State. There exists anunequivocalnexusbetween the transfer ofMcCloskey, who is alleged to have committed tortious acts within New York, and Plaintiffs subsequent injuries, which occurred at Oakcrest following McCloskey's transfer. Indeed, the transaction, conduct, and arrangement between Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrest to place McCloskey in the school, where he subsequently abused Plaintiff after these entities had notice ofhis previous assaults, including those againstthe Plaintiffsmother, constitutes a tortious act withinNew York State. Plaintifffurther alleges that McCloskey was an agent, servant, or employee ofDefendant Opus Dei. Therefore, either Defendants Opus Dei and Oakcrest are the same entity and both employed McCloskey, thereby conferring general jurisdiction, or, if Oakcrest's affidavit is accepted, Oakcrestenteredinto some arrangement, contractual orotherwise, withDefendantOpus Dei to hire McCloskey andbring him to the Oakcrest campus, thus conferring specific long-arm jurisdiction. This verytransaction, which occurredinNewYork, is what allegedlyledto Plaintiffs abuse. Moreover, it is alleged thatpart ofMcCloskey'srole withinDefendant Opus Dei involved receiving assignments in New York and traveling throughout the country to disseminate Opus Dei's message to its institutions. Additionally, McCloskey was purportedly a New York resident at the time ofthe alleged negligence and tortious conduct. While Matthew Buonocore contends that Oakcrest never employed McCloskey, the facts as stated inthe complaint suggest otherwise, necessitating discoverybefore a conclusive determination canbe made. Affording Plaintiffthe benefit ofevery favorable inference, it is evident that dismissal at thisjuncture wouldbe inappropriate. The pleading mustbe liberally construed, andbased onthis standard, the court finds that Plaintiffhas alleged facts that align with a cognizable legal theory. Therefore, there is sufficient contact for this matterto proceed against Oakcrest. Accordingly, itis hereby ORDERED thatthe motionto dismiss for lack of jurisdictionis denied inits entirety. This constitutes the decision and order ofthe court.

6/10/2024

DATE CHECK ONE:

APPLICATION: CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:

# ~ CASE DISPOSED GRANTED 

# 0 DENIED SETTLE ORDER INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN
951154/2021 DOE, JMRNNYvs. OPUS DEi ET AL Motion No. 002

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