# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 14-0465

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4


# M C 

# G IN N E S 

# I N D U S T R IA L 

# M A IN T E N A N C E 

# C O R P O R A T IO N 

# , A P P E L L A N T 

# ,

v
. 

# T H E 

# P H O E N IX 

# I N S U R A N C E 

# C O M P A N Y A N D 

# T H E 

# T R A V E L E R S 

# I N D E M N IT Y



# C O M P A N Y 

# , A P P E L L E E S

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## C E R T I F I E D 

## Q U E S T I O N F R O M T H E 

## U N I T E D 

## S T A T E S 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## F I F T H 

## C I R C U I T



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued January 15, 2015

C H I E F 

## J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which J U S T I C E 

## G R E E N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## joined.

J U S T I C E 

## B O Y D 

## filed a dissenting opinion, in which J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## joined.

The standard- form commer cial g ener al liability (“CGL ”) insurance policies at issue in this

case g ive the insurer

“the r ight a

nd duty to defe nd any

suit ag ainst the insured see king da mag es”. 1



## The United States Court of Appea ls for the Fifth Circuit asks whether “s u it” includes superf und 2



## clea nup proce eding s cond u cted by the Environmental Protection Ag ency (the “EPA”) under the

T h e p o l i c i e s , i s s u e d i n t h e l a t e 1 9 6 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , w e r e t h e n c a l l e d c o m p r e h e n s i v e g e n e r a l l i a b i l i t y p o l i c i e s 1 b u t h a v e s i n c e b e e n m o r e a c c u r a t e l y r e f e r r e d t o a s c o m m e r c i a l g e n e r a l l i a b i l i t y p o l i c i e s

. T h e a c r o n y m r e m a i n s t h e s a m e

. S e e J E F F R E Y W

. S T E M P E L , L A W O F I N S U R A N C E C O N T R A C T D IS P U T E S § 1 4

. 0 1 ( 2 d e d

. 1 9 9 9 )

.

5 7 1 F

. A p p ’ x 3 2 9 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. 2

## fede ral Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and L i ab ility Act of 1980

(“ CERCL A”)

. We ag ree with the overw helming majority of jurisdictions to have consi d er ed t h e

3



## issue that the answe r is y es.
I

A
Relief from pollution was first aff orded in suits for nuisance and other common law cause s
of action. The United States Supreme Court held that litigants could bring suit based on the fede ral

4



## common law of nuisance as long as the common law had not been displaced by fede ral statute. The 5 6

P u b

. L

. N o

. 9 6

- 5 1 0 , 9 4 S t a t

. 2 7 6 7 ( c o d i f i e d a s a m e n d e d a t 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § § 9 6 0 1

– 9 6 7 5 )

. 3

S e e 3 E N V IR O N M E N T A L L A W P R A C T IC E G U ID E § 1 6

. 0 1 ( M i c h a e l B

. G e r r a r d e d

. , 2 0 1 3 ) ( i n d i c a t i n g t h a t s u i t s 4

u n d e r t h e c o m m o n l a w r e m a i n i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e m o s t e n v i r o n m e n t a l l e g i s l a t i o n d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f d a m a g e s , C E R C L A b e i n g t h e m a j o r e x c e p t i o n ) ; D a n i e l M

. S t e i n w a y , E n v i r o n m e n t a l L a w a s a S y s t e m , i n E N V IR O N M E N T A L L A W H A N D B O O K c h

. 1 , § § 3

. 8

– 4

. 4 ( T h o m a s F

. P

. S u l l i v a n e d

. e m e r i t u s , 2 2 d e d

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( e l e c t r o n i c
v e r s i o n ) ( d i s c u s s i n g c o m m o n l a w s o u r c e s o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l l i a b i l i t y ) ; J e f f B e l f i g l i o , N o t e , H

a z a r d o u s W

a s t e s : P r e s e r v i n g t h e N u i s a n c e R e m e d

y , 3 3 S T A N

. L

. R E V

. 6 7 5 , 6 7 6 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ T h e c o u r t s o f f e r e d d a m a g e s a n d i n

j u n c t i v e r e l i e f f

r o m p o l l u t i o n u n d e r t h e c o m m o n l a w l o n g b e f o r e e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t a t u t e s e x i s t e d

. N u i s a n c e h a s b e e n t h e m o s t p o p u l a r d o c t r i n e
u s e d b y t h e c o u r t s i n a t t a c k i n g p o l l u t i o n p r o b l e m s

. ” ) ; R o b e r t R

. L o h r m a n n , C o m m e n t , T h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l L a w s u i t : T r a d i t i o n a l D o c t r i n e s a n d E v o l v i n g T h e o r i e s t o C o n t r o l P o l l u t i o n , 1 6 W A Y N E L

. R E V

. 1 0 8 5 , 1 1 1 5

– 1 1 2 3 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; N o t e , S t r i c t L i a b i l i t

y f o r G e n e r a t o r s , T

r a n s p o r t e r s , a n d D i s

p o s e r s o f H a z a r d o u s W

a s t e , 6 4 M IN N

. L

. R E V

. 9 4 9 ( 1 9 8 0 )

.
I l l i n o i s v

. C i t

y o f M i l w a u k e e , 4 0 6 U

. S

. 9 1 , 9 9

– 1 0 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ( “ ‘ A s t h e f i e l d o f f e d e r a l c o m m o n l a w h a s b e e n 5 g i v e n n e c e s s a r y e x p a n s i o n i n t o m a t t e r s o f f e d e r a l c o n c e r n a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p ( w h e r e n o a p p l i c a b l e f e d e r a l s t a t u t e e x i s t s , a s t h e r e d o e s n o t h e r e ) , t h e e c o l o g i c a l r i g h t s o f a S t a t e i n t h e i m p r o p e r i m p a i r m e n t o f t h e m f r o m s o u r c e s o u t s i d e t h e S t a t e ’ s o w n t e r r i t o r y , n o w w o u l d a n d s h o u l d , w e t h i n k , b e h e l d t o b e a m a t t e r h a v i n g b a s i s a n d s t a n d a r d i n f e d e r a l
c o m m o n l a w a n d s o d i r e c t l y c o n s t i t u t i n g a q u e s t i o n a r i s i n g u n d e r t h e l a w s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g T e x a s v

. P a n k e y , 4 4 1 F

. 2 d 2 3 6 , 2 4 0 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 1 9 7 1 ) ) ) ; s e e a l s o F e d e r a l C o m m o n L a w o f N u i s a n c e R e a c h e s N e w H i g h W a t e r M a r k a s S u

p r e m e C o u r t C o n s i d e r s I l l i n o i s v
. M i l w a u k e e I I , 1 0 E N V T L

. L

. R E P

. 1 0 1 0 1 , 1 0 1 0 1 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( “ T h e f e d e r a l
c o m m o n l a w o f n u i s a n c e , w h i c h w a s u n k n o w n a t t h e t i m e t h e N a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t a l P o l i c y A c t w a s e n a c t e d [ i n 1 9 6 9 ] , a p p e a r s t o b e c o m i n g t o t h e f o r e a s a d o c t r i n e o f

f e r i n g a d a p t a b l e a n d e f

f e c t i v e r e l i e f t o v i c t i m s o f p o l l u t i o n

. ” )

.
C i t y o f M i l w a u k e e v

. I l l i n o i s , 4 5 1 U

. S

. 3 0 4 , 3 1 7 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e F e d e r a l W a t e r P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t 6 A m e n d m e n t s o f 1 9 7 2 d i s p l a c e d a f e d e r a l c o m m o n l a w n u i s a n c e c l a i m f o r p o l l u t i o n o f L a k e M i c h i g a n )

. 

### 2

## Resource Conservation and Recove ry Act of 1976 and other fede ral statutes often ser ved as other 7



## bases for suits by the EPA. State and local g overnme nts sued on state statutes and under the 8



## common law. 9



## The enactment of CERCL A in 1980 chang ed the landsca pe drama tically , g iving the EPA
“broa d power to command g overnme nt ag encie s and private parties to clea n up hazardo u s waste
sites.” The EPA has two options for obtaini n g a clea nup under CERCL A. “I t may conduct the 1 0



## clea nup itself and later seek to rec over its costs from potentially responsible parties [(‘PRP s’)] in a subsequent cost rec overy act i o n ”—a lawsuit—“or it can compel t he P RPs to perf orm the cleanup (either voluntarily or involuntarily ) throug h administrative or judicial proce eding s.” “[E] very one 1 1

4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 6 9 7 3 ( 1 9 7 6 )

. T h e 1 9 7 6 v e r s i o n o f t h e R C R A p r o v i d e s i n p a r t : “ [ U ] p o n r e c e i p t o f e v i d e n c e t h a t 7 t h e h a n d l i n g , s t o r a g e , t r e a t m e n t , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o r d i s p o s a l o f a n y s o l i d w a s t e o r h a z a r d o u s w a s t e i s p r e s e n t i n g a n i m m i n e n t a n d s u b s t a n t i a l e n d a n g e r m e n t t o h e a l t h o r t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t o r m a y b r i n g s u i t o n b e h a l f o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o i m m e d i a t e l y r e s t r a i n a n y p e r s o n f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e a l l e g e d d i s p o s a l t o s t o p s u c h h a n d l i n g , s t o r a g e , t r e a t m e n t , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , o r d i s p o s a l o r t o t a k e s u c h o t h e r a c t i o n a s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y
. ”

S e e H a z a r d o u s W

a s t e : E P A , J

u s t i c e I n v o k e E m e r

g e n c y A u t h o r i t

y , C o m m o n L a w i n L i t i g a t i o n C a m p a i g n 8 A g a i n s t D u m p S i t e s , 1 0 E N V T L

. L

. R E P

. 1 0 0 3 4 , 1 0 0 3 5 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; J u s t i c e ’ s H a z a r d o u s W

a s t e P r o s e c u t o r E x

p e c t s t o F i l e 1 0 0 N e w C a s e s T

h i s Y e a r , 1 0 E N V ’ T

. R E P

. 2 2 4 3 , 2 2 4 3 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e R e s o u r c e C o n s e r v a t i o n a n d R e c o v e r y A c t

“ l a r g e l y c o d i f

i e d t h e c o m m o n l a w o f p u b l i c n u i s a n c e ” ) ; N o t e , A l l o c a t i n g t h e C o s t s o f H a z a r d o u s W

a s t e D i s p o s a l , 9 4 H A R V

. L

. R E V

. 5 8 4 , 5 9 3 n

. 4 1 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t s u i t s h a v e a l s o i n v o k e d t h e R e f u s e A c t o f 1 8 9 9 c h

. 4 2 5 , § 1 3 , 3 3 U

. S

. C

. § 4 0 7 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , t h e F e d e r a l W a t e r P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t § 5 0 4 , 3 3 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 6 4 ( S u p p

. I I I 1 9 7 9 ) , a n d t h e S a f e D r i n k i n g W a t e r A c t § 1 4 3 1 , 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 3 0 0 i ( 1 9 7 6 )

. T h e s e s t a t u t e s c a n b e i m p o r t a n t a d j u n c t s t o t h e R C R A s i n c e t h e y p r o v i d e e x p l i c i t l y f

o r r e c o u p m e n t o f a b a t e m e n t e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t , s e e , e

. g

. , 3 3 U

. S

. C

. § 1 3 2 1 ( f ) ( S u p p

. I I I 1 9 7 9 )

. ” )

.

S e e A l l o c a t i n g t h e C o s t s , s u p r a n o t e 8 , a t 5 9 3

– 5 9 4

. I n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P a

p e r C o

. v

. O u e l l e t t e , 4 7 9 U

. S

. 4 8 1 9 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t a d d r e s s e d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l C l e a n W a t e r A c t a n d s t a t e l a w o f
n u i s a n c e

. T h e C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e l a w o f t h e s t a t e i n w h i c h p o l l u t i o n h a s i t s s o u r c e m a y i m p o s e h i g h e r c o m m o n l a w r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a n f e d e r a l l a w , a n d t h e r e f

o r e t h e s o u r c e s t a t e ’ s l a w o f n u i s a n c e m a y b e a v a i l a b l e a s a n a d d i t i o n a l
r e m e d y
. 4 7 9 U

. S

. a t 4 9 7

– 5 0 0

.

K e y T r o n i c C o r

p

. v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 5 1 1 U

. S

. 8 0 9 , 8 1 4 ( 1 9 9 4 )

. 10

R o n a l d E

. C a r d w e l l & J e s s i c a J

. O

. K i n g , C o m p r e h e n s i v e E n v i r o n m e n t a l R e s p o n s e , C o m p e n s a t i o n , a n d 1 1 L i a b i l i t y A c t , i n E N V IR O N M E N T A L L A W H A N D B O O K , s u p r a n o t e 4 , c h

. 9 , § 3

. 0

. 

### 3

## who is potentially responsible for hazardous-w aste contamination may be forc ed to contribute to the

costs of clea

nup.” The only defe nses are an act of God, an act of war , and in some instances, an act 1 2 

## or omission of a third party

. 1 3



## As amend ed , CERCL A also cre ates a proce ss that beg ins in the EPA and ends, only if

nece ssary , in the courts. The proce ss starts with a notice letter informing the rec ipient t h at i t is a potentially responsible party (“PRP”). The letter may invite the PRP to neg otiate with the EPA over 1 4



## its liability

. But be cause defe nses to liability are limit ed, the invitation is effe ctively a dema nd. 1 5 1 6



## The EPA can r equest infor mation and sanc tion a PRP ’s fa ilure to respond w ith signific ant fines. 1 7



## I t can issue a “unilater al administrative order ” direc ting a PRP to conduct a “re medial investiga tion

U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. B e s t

f o o d s , 5 2 4 U

. S

. 5 1 , 5 6 n

. 1 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) ( q u o t i n g P e n n s y l v a n i a v

. U n i o n 12 G a s C o

. , 4 9 1 U

. S

. 1 , 7 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n o f B r e n n a n , J

. ) ) ; s e e 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 9 6 0 7 ( a )

.

4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 9 6 0 7 ( b )

. 13

S e e I n t e r i m G u i d a n c e o n N o t i c e L e t t e r s , N e g o t i a t i o n s , a n d I n f o r m a t i o n E x c h a n g e , 5 3 F e d

. R e g

. 5 2 9 8 , 5 3 0 2 14 ( F e b

. 2 3 , 1 9 8 8 ) ; s e e a l s o S i d n e y S

. L i e b e s m a n , C o m m e n t , T r i g g e r i n g a n O b l i g a t i o n : R e c e i p t o f a n E P A P R P L e t t e r a n d A n I n s u r e r ’ s D u t

y t o D e f e n d , 5 V IL L

. E N V T L

. L

. J

. 4 7 9 , 4 8 0 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; R o b i n K

. L u c e , C o m m e n t , I f t h e T h r e a t i s C l e a r : P R P L e t t e r s a s a “ S u i t ” W

i t h i n t h e D u t

y t o D e f e n d C l a u s e , 3 D E T

. C O L L

. L

. R E V

. 1 2 7 5 , 1 2 7 9 ( 1 9 9 3 )

.
I n t e r i m G u i d a n c e o n N o t i c e L e t t e r s , N e g o t i a t i o n s , a n d I n f o r m a t i o n E x c h a n g e , 5 3 F e d

. R e g

. 5 2 9 8 , 5 3 0 2 ( F e b

. 15 2 3 , 1 9 8 8 ) ; s e e a l s o L u c e , s u p r a n o t e 1 4 , a t 1 2 7 9

.
S e e T r a v e l e r s C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. v

. A l a

. G a s C o r p

. , 1 1 7 S o

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 5 ( A l a

. 2 0 1 2 ) ( q u o t i n g M i c h

. M i l l e r s 16 M u t

. I n s

. C o

. v

. B r o n s o n P l a t i n g C o

. , 5 1 9 N

. W

. 2 d 8 6 4 , 8 7 2 ( 1 9 9 4 ) , a b r o g a t e d i n p a r t b y W i l k i e v

. A u t o
- O w n e r s I n s

. C o

. , 6 6 4 N

. W

. 2 d 7 7 6 ( M i c h

. 2 0 0 3 ) )

.

4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 9 6 0 4 ( e ) ( 2 ) , ( 5 ) ( g r a n t i n g a u t h o r i t y t o r e q u e s t i n f o r m a t i o n a n d s e t t i n g o u t s t a t u t o r y p e n a l t i e s o f 17 $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 p e r d a y f

o r n o n c o m p l i a n c e ) ; 4 0 C

. F

. R

. § 1 9

. 4 ( a d j u s t i n g s t a t u t o r y p e n a l t i e s f o r i n f l a t i o n )

. 

### 4

## and fea sibili ty study ”, or else—the else being civil penalties and punitive damag es. The EPA need 1 8 1 9



## turn to the courts only for enfor ceme nt of its decisions. A PRP cannot seek judicial revie w until the

proce ss is complete, and then only for EPA actions that are arbitra ry and capr icious, based on the 2 0



## ag ency ’s own rec ord. As a prac tical matter, courts aff ord PRP s no hope of relief , and conseque ntly 2 1 

## they have no choice but to comply with the EPA’s direc tives. There will seldom b e a court 2 2



## proce eding

. B

I n the 1960s, petitioner McGinnes I ndustrial Waste Corporation dumped pulp and paper mill

waste sludge into disposal pits near the San J acinto River in Pasadena , Texas (“the Site”). I n 2005,

4 2 U

. S

. C

. § § 9 6 0 4 ( b ) ( a u t h o r i z i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t t o c o n d u c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a n d s t u d i e s ) , 9 6 2 2 ( a ) ( g r a n t i n g t h e 18 P r e s i d e n t a u t h o r i t y t o “ e n t e r i n t o a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n y p e r s o n ” , i n c l u d i n g a P R P , t o “ p e r f o r m a n y r e s p o n s e
a c t i o n ”

— t h a t i s , t o s e t t l e ) , 9 6 0 6 ( a ) ( “ T h e P r e s i d e n t m a y
. . . i s s u e [ ] s u c h o r d e r s a s m a y b e n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t p u b l i c h e a l t h a n d w e l f

a r e a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t

. ” )

.
I d

. § § 9 6 0 6 ( b ) ( 1 ) , 9 6 0 7 ( c ) ( 3 )

. 19

I d

. § 9 6 1 3 ( h ) ( l i m i t i n g f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n y a c t i o n “ t o r e v i e w a n y c h a l l e n g e s t o r e m o v a l o r r e m e d i a l 20

a c t i o n ” t o t h e c a u s e s o f a c t i o n a u t h o r i z e d b y C E R C L A i t s e l f ) ; s e e L u c i a A n n S i l e c c h i a , J u d i c i a l R e v i e w o

f C E R C L A C l e a n u p P r o c e d u r e s : S t r i k i n g a B a l a n c e t o P r e v e n t I r r e p a r a b l e H a r m , 2 0 H A R V

. E N V T L

. L

. R E V

. 3 3 9 , 3 4 1

– 3 4 3 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ( “ T h e s e [ j u r i s d i c t i o n a l ] l i m i t a t i o n s r e f l e c t t h e ‘ c l e a n u p f

i r s t , l i t i g a t e l a t e r ’ p h i l o s o p h y b e h i n d [ C E R C L A ]

. ” )

.

4 2 U

. S

. C

. § § 9 6 0 6 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( D ) , 9 6 1 3 ( j )

– ( k )

. 21

S e e C o m p a s s I

n s

. C o

. v

. C i t

y o f L i t t l e t o n , 9 8 4 P

. 2 d 6 0 6 , 6 2 2 ( C o l o

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( e n b a n c ) ( c i t i n g M i c h

. M i l l e r s M u t

. 22 I n s

. C o

. v

. B r o n s o n P l a t i n g C o

. , 5 1 9 N

. W

. 2 d 8 6 4 , 8 7 1 ( M i c h

. 1 9 9 4 ) , a b r o g a t e d i n p a r t b y W i l k i e v

. A u t o
- O w n e r s I n s

. C o

. , 6 6 4 N

. W

. 2 d 7 7 6 ( M i c h

. 2 0 0 3 ) ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h e “ c o e r c i v e n a t u r e ” o f C E R C L A e n f o r c e m e n t ) ; A

. Y

. M c D o n a l d I n d u s

. v

. I

n s

. C o

. o f N

. A m

. , 4 7 5 N

. W

. 2 d 6 0 7 , 6 2 8

– 6 2 9 ( I o w a 1 9 9 1 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g E P A ’ s p o w e r s u n d e r C E R C L A ) ; s e e
a l s o 4 A E N V I R O N M E N T A L L A W P R A C T IC E G U ID E , s u p r a n o t e 4 , § 3 0

. 0 5 [ 4 ] ( “ B e c a u s e t h e f i l i n g o f l i t i g a t i o n t o s e e k a j u d i c i a l i n

j u n c t i o n [ r e q u i r i n g c l e a n u p ] i s t i m e - c o n s u m i n g a n d r u n s s o m e r i s k t h a t a c o u r t , r a t h e r t h a n [ t h e ] E P A , w i l l
s h a p e t h e s c o p e a n d t y p e o f r e l i e f o b t a i n e d , [ t h e ] E P A ’ s s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e i s t o i s s u e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r a n d t h e n , i f n e c e s s a r y , s e e k e n f

o r c e m e n t o f t h e o r d e r i n a c o u r t o f l a w
. . . . [ B ] e c a u s e t h e r e i s g e n e r a l l y n o p r e - e n f o r c e m e n t j u d i c i a l
r e v i e w o f s u c h o r d e r s , a P R P w h o r e c e i v e s o n e a n d d o e s n o t c o m p l y r u n s t h e r i s k t h a t a c o u r t w i l l l a t e r f i n d t h a t t h e r e
w a s n o t s u f

f i c i e n t c a u s e f

o r t h e f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y a n d i m p o s e s t e e p p e n a l t i e s i n a d d i t i o n t o o r d e r i n g a r e s p o n s e a c t i o n
a t t h e s i t e

. ” )

. 

### 5

## the EPA beg an investiga ting possible environmenta l contamination at the Site. I n November 2007,

the EPA serve d a g ener al notice letter on McGinnes’ s pare nt company , stating that it was a PRP and
offe ring it “the opportunity to enter into neg otiations conce rnin g cl ea n i ng up the Site and reimbursing EPA for costs incurre d”. I n Dec ember 2008, the EPA serve d a simil ar l et t er o n
McGinnes. That letter included 58 reque sts for detailed information cover ing virtually ever y aspec t
of McGinne s’s involvement with the Site. The letter noted that a fa ilure to respond c ould result in penalties of up to $32,500 a day

. I n J uly 2009, the EPA sent McGinnes a specia l notice letter stating that it had deter mined that
McGinnes was responsible for clea ning up the Site and demanding that McGinnes pay $378,863.61
in c osts. The letter require d McGinnes to make a g ood-fa ith of fer to settle with the EPA within 60
d ay s. When McGinnes did not make an offe r, the EPA issued a unilaterial administrative order
direc ting McGinnes to conduct a “re medial investiga tion and fea sibili ty study ” in a ccor dance with
the EPA’s specific ations. The letter war ned McGinnes that its willful failure to com p ly w it h o u t cause
would subject it to $37,500 per day in civil penalties and punitive damag es up to three times the resulting costs to the EPA.

C During the time McGinnes was dumping waste at the Site, it was cover ed by standard- form

CGL insurance policies issued by Phoenix I nsuranc e Company and Trave lers I ndemnity Company (collec tively

“the I nsurer s”). Eac h policy

provided that 2 3

T h e p o l i c i e s w e r e w r i t t e n b y t h e I n s u r a n c e S e r v i c e s O f f i c e , I n c

. , “ t h e i n d u s t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 23 i s s u i n g n e a r l y a l l s t a n d a r d C G L f o r m s

. ” P A J

, I n c

. v

. H a n o v e r I

n s

. C o

. , 2 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d 6 3 0 , 6 3 3 n

. 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 8 )

. 

### 6

## [ t ] h e co mpany will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured s h al l

become leg ally obliga ted to pay as damag es beca use of

. . . proper

ty damag e to which this insurance applies, cause d by an occur renc e, and the company shall have the rig ht and duty to defe nd any suit ag ainst insured seeking damag es on acc ount of such

. . . proper ty damag e,

. . . and may make such investiga tion a nd settlement of any claim or suit it deems expedient . . . .

I n May 2008, in the interim b et ween the EPA’s first two notice letters, McGinnes reque sted a
defe nse in the EPA proce eding s from the I nsurer s. The I n s u re rs re fused on the g round that the

proce eding s were not a “suit” unde r the policy

. McGinnes sued the I nsurer s in fede ral district cou rt for a decla ration that the policies obliga ted t hem t o defe nd the EP A’s C ERCL A proceeding s and also seeking attorney fee s alre ady
incurre d. The court g rante d the I nsurer s’ motion for partial summary judgme nt on the duty -to-def end issue, denied McGinnes’ s motion, and cer tified its order for interlocutory appea l. The United States Court of Appea ls for the F ifth Circuit certifie d to us the following que stion : 2 4



## Whether the EPA’s PRP letters and/or unilatera l admin i strative order , issued pursuant to CERCL A, constitute a “suit” within the meaning of the C GL p o l i cies, trig g ering the duty

to defe nd. 2 5



## As usual, the Circuit “disclaim[ed] any intention or desire that the Supreme Court of Texas confine its reply to the prec ise form or sc ope of the question cer tified.” 2 6

T E X

. C O N S T

. a r t

. V , § 3

- c ( a ) ( “ T h e s u p r e m e c o u r t [ h a s ] j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s o f s t a t e l a w c e r t i f i e d 24 f r o m a f e d e r a l a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

. ” )

.
5 7 1 F

. A p p ’ x 3 2 9 , 3 3 5 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. 25

I d

. 26



### 7

## II

We ag ree with the I nsurer s that “suit” commonly ref ers to a proce eding in court. Although 2 7



## the word is sometimes define d more g ener ally as “the attempt to g ain an end by leg al proce ss”, the 2 8



## m o re specific connotation is an attempt throug h proce ss in court. But for three rea sons we thin k
“suit” in the CGL policies at issue must also include CERCL A enfor ceme nt proce eding s by the EPA.

A
When the policies at i s s ue wer e written, the main avenue of redr ess for pollution was by suing in court on common law or statutory claims. One eff ect of CERCL A was to authorize the EPA

to conduct on its own what otherwise would h av e am o u n t ed to pretria l proce eding s, but without having to init i at e a court action until the end of the proce ss. The PRP notice letters serve as pleading s. The EPA obtains discovery throug h reque s t s fo r information, indisti ng uishable from interrog atories under the rules of civil proce dure. I t eng ag es in mediation throug h its invitations to
settle. A unilaterial administrative order rese mbles summary judgme nt. The fines and penalties for
willful non-coope ration i n the process are like sanctions in a cour t proce eding , only

presc ribed by

s t at u t e. An d part of the judicial function is cede d to the EPA by limit ing a PRP ’s opportunity for

re view until the end of the proce ss, and then limit ing that revie w to an abuse of disc re t i o n b y t h e EPA, based on its own re cord.

B L A C K ’ S L A W D IC T IO N A R Y 1 6 0 3 ( r e v
. 4 t h e d

. 1 9 6 8 ) ( d e f i n i n g “ s u i t ” a s “ a n y p r o c e e d i n g b y o n e p e r s o n o r 27 p e r s o n s a g a i n s t a n o t h e r o r o t h e r s i n a c o u r t o f j u s t i c e i n w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f p u r s u e s , i n s u c h c o u r t , t h e r e m e d y w h i c h t h e l a w a f f o r d s h i m f

o r t h e r e d r e s s o f a n i n

j u r y o r t h e e n f

o r c e m e n t o f a r i g h t , w h e t h e r a t l a w o r i n e q u i t y ” )

.
W E B S T E R ’ S T H IR D N E W I N T E R N A T IO N A L D I C T IO N A R Y O F T H E E N G L IS H L A N G U A G E 2 2 8 6 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g 28

“ s u i t ” a s “ t h e a t t e m p t t o g a i n a n e n d b y l e g a l p r o c e s s ” , “ p r o s e c u t i o n o f r i g h t b e f

o r e a n y t r i b u n a l ” , “ a n a c t i o n o r p r o c e s s i n a c o u r t f

o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f a r i g h t o r c l a i m ” a n d “ a l e g a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o a c o u r t f o r j u s t i c e ” )

. 

### 8

## M cG i nnes arg ues that EPA proce eding s are the functional equivalent of a suit, but i n

actua lity , they are the suit itself, only conducte d outside a courtroom. Had the EPA wanted to forc e
McGinnes to clea

n up the S ite befor e 1980, it would have be en re quired to sue first, and the CGL policies would have obl i gated the I nsurer s to defe nd—to challeng e the pleading s, to contest the

scope of discovery , to eng ag e in mediation on a level play ing field, t o re s i s t j u dg ment, and to
settle—all without fea

r of being sanctioned at th e v er y end for not having cooper ated with the
opponent. CERCL A eff

ectively rede fined a “suit” on clea nup claims to mean proce eding s conducte d by one of the parties, the EPA, followed by an enfor ceme nt action in court, if nece ssary

. McGinnes’ s
ri g hts under its policies should not be emasc ulated by the enac tment of a statute intend ed n o t t o
aff ect insura nce, but to strea

mline the EPA’s ability

to clean up pollution. 2 9



## The I ns u re rs arg

ue that to hold that their duty to defe nd applies to EPA enfor ceme nt proceed i ng s is to extend that obliga tion to ever y demand letter. But a simple demand letter
threa tening or pref

acing a lawsuit is nothing like a PRP letter or unil at er al ad minist rative order , which, to use the United States Supreme Court’s choice of words, “command” compliance

. 3 0



## L ikewise, the I nsurer s’ arg ument that a PRP letter or unilatera l administrative order is but a claim,

T h e d i s s e n t a r g u e s t h a t w e a r e r e w r i t i n g M c G i n n e s ’ s p o l i c i e s u n d e r t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , h a d i t a n d t h e 29 I n s u r e r s a n t i c i p a t e d C E R C L A , t h e y w o u l d h a v e a g r e e d t h a t t h e I n s u r e r s w o u l d h a v e t h e r i g h t a n d d u t y t o d e f e n d t h o s e p r o c e e d i n g s

. W e a s s u m e n o s u c h t h i n g

. T h e p a r t i e s u s e d t h e w o r d “ s u i t ” t o r e f e r t o t h e k i n d s o f p r o c e e d i n g s t h e I n s u r e r s h a d t h e r i g h t a n d d u t y t o d e f e n d

. W h e n t h e p o l i c i e s i s s u e d , b e f o r e C E R C L A , t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d w o u l d h a v e c o v e r e d
c l e a n u p e n f

o r c e m e n t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e o n l y p l a c e t h e y c o u l d b e b r o u g h t

— i n c o u r t

. W e h o l d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ’ i n t e n t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e d e f

e a t e d b y a s u b s e q u e n t f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y s t a t u t e t h a t a u t h o r i z e s t h e E P A t o c o n d u c t t h o s e s a m e p r o c e e d i n g s i t s e l f b e f

o r e g o i n g t o c o u r t

. T h e d i s s e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e a l m e a n i n g o f “ s u i t ”

— t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a n d c o s t s i t a c t u a l l y e n t a i l s

— a n d t h u s t h e p a r t i e s ’ b a r g a i n c a n b e c h a n g e d o v e r t i m e b y a f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y s t a t u t e l i k e C E R C L A

. W e d i s a g r e e , n o t d e s p i t e o u r d u t y t o i n t e r p r e t t h e p o l i c i e s a s t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d i n t h e t e x t , b u t b e c a u s e o f i t

.

K e y T r o n i c C o r

p

. v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 5 1 1 U

. S

. 8 0 9 , 8 1 4 ( 1 9 9 4 )

. 30



### 9

## as di stinguished from a sui t in the policies themselves, simply blinks reality . The EPA’s demands
and direc tives, backe d by threa ts of fines and penalties, are more l i k e i n t er locutory ruling s than
cl ai ms. The I nsurer s arg ue that EPA proce eding s are rea lly pre- suit settlement mecha nisms. Th e point is that befor e CERCL A those mecha nisms wer e available to the EPA only in judicial

proce eding s.
The I nsurer s arg

ue that if “suit” i ncludes CER CL A enforce ment proce eding s, it m u s t al so
include all administrative proce eding s. We disag ree

. EPA enfor ceme nt proce eding s are unusual: not only are they like judicial proce eding s, they wer e judicial proce eding s befor e CERCL A was enac ted.

We cannot conclude that CERCL A deprive d McG in n es of the cover ag e for pollution clea nup
enfor ceme nt proce eding s it bought y ear s ear lier.

B

I t is rela tively well-settled, in the Fifth Circuit and o t h er co u rt s, that clea nup costs under

CERCL A are “dama ges ” cover ed by the form CGL policies at issue here

. The I nsurer s do not 3 1 

## dispute this interpre tation of the policies, though they do insist that McGinnes’ s damag es wer e not
the result of an “occ urre nce” —that is, a n acc ident—under the policies. To interpre t the policies as

cover ing the damag es incurre d as a result of pollution clea nup proce eding s without g iving the

S e e , e

. g

. , S n y d e r G e n e r a l C o r p

. v

. C e n t u r

y I n d e m

. C o

. , 1 1 3 F

. 3 d 5 3 6 , 5 3 8

– 5 3 9 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t 31

“ e n v i r o n m e n t a l c l e a n u p c o s t s , w h e t h e r i n c u r r e d b y t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r C E R C L A o r b y a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o
v o l u n t a r i l y u n d e r t a k e s t h e t a s k o f c l e a n i n g u p h a z a r d o u s w a s t e , a r e d a m a g e s a n d t h u s a r e c o v e r e d ” ) ; B i t u m i n o u s C a s

. C o r p

. v

. V a c u u m T a n k s , I n c

. , 7 5 F

. 3 d 1 0 4 8 , 1 0 5 3 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( “ [ G ] o v e r n m e n t c l e a n u p c o s t s , i n c u r r e d i n r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e d u m p i n g o f h a z a r d o u s w a s t e s o n p r o p e r t y , a n d i m p o s e d o n t h e i n s u r e d b y C E R C L A , a r e c o v e r e d b y
. . . t h e p o l i c y
. ” ) ; A e t n a C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. v

. P i n t l a r C o r p

. , 9 4 8 F

. 2 d 1 5 0 7 , 1 5 1 3 ( 9 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( “ T h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f ‘ d a m a g e s ’ f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n o r d i n a r y p e r s o n w o u l d i n c l u d e C E R C L A r e s p o n s e c o s t s

. ” ) ; I n d e p

. P e t r o c h e m

. C o r

p

. v

. A e t n a C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. , 9 4 4 F

. 2 d 9 4 0 , 9 4 7 ( D

. C

. C i r

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ ‘ d a m a g e s ’ i n c l u d e s c o s t s t h e i n s u r e d i s l e g a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o p a y t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d M i s s o u r i a s r e i m b u r s e m e n t f o r t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i n r e m e d y i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l h a r m ” )

. B u t s e e I

n d u s

. E n t e r s

. v

. P e n n A m

. I n s

. C o

. , 6 3 7 F

. 3 d 4 8 1 ( 4 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g M a r y l a n d l a w )

.



### 1 0

## I nsurer s the rig ht and duty to defe nd those proce eding s cre ates perve rse incentives and conseque nces

for insure rs and insure ds alike.
McGinnes arg

ues that an insurer’ s duty to indemnify without a rig ht or duty to defe nd cre ates

an incentive for the insured to mount no defe nse itself, assure d that whateve r damag es result will not
be its responsibility but the insurer’ s. The I nsurer s arg ue that an insured who does not defe nd ag ainst

i n curring damag es m ay be denied cover ag e for brea ching its duty to cooper ate with the i n s u re r t o
avoid s u ch d amag es. Whether either scena rio is likely , both illust rate the problem with a duty to indemnify

without a duty

or rig ht to defend. 3 2



## C Finally , the I nsurer s’ interpr et at i o n of “suit” in these standard- form policies has been 3 3 

## reje cted by thirteen out of six teen state high courts to have considere d the issue: Alabama , Colorado,
Connecti cu t , I owa, Kentucky , Massac husetts, Michig an, Minnesota, Nebr aska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Ver

mont, and Wis consin. Only high courts in California, I llinois , and Maine have 3 4

S e e 1 4 C O U C H O N I N S U R A N C E § 2 0 1 : 1 3 ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t “ b e c a u s e a n y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s s u b j e c t a n 32 i n s u r e d t o o u t

- o f

- p o c k e t e x p e n s e s t o c o r r e c t t h e p r o p e r t y d a m a g e a n d t o e x e c u t e v a r i o u s d o c u m e n t a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e l o s s , i t w o u l d b e h o o v e t h e i n s u r e r t o g e t i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r o c e s s e a r l y o n a n d n o t a l l o w t h e i n s u r e d t o c o m m i t t o t h e c o s t s o f e x t e n s i v e r e m e d i a t i o n ” ) ; 4 A E N V IR O N M E N T A L L A W P R A C T IC E G U ID E , s u p r a n o t e 4 , § 3 0

. 0 5 [ 2 ] [ b ] ( a d v i s i n g t h a t
a r e q u e s t f

o r i n f o r m a t i o n b e u s e d b y t h e P R P “ a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o c l a r i f y i t s r o l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s i t e i n q u e s t i o n a n d , i f p o s s i b l e , t o b e g i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e b a s i s f o r m i n i m i z i n g i t s f

u t u r e l i a b i l i t y a t t h e s i t e ” a n d t h a t r e q u e s t s “ s h o u l d b e c a r e f u l l y e v a l u a t e d a n d a n s w e r e d , m u c h l i k e d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s d u r i n g l i t i g a t i o n ” )

.
A s n o t e d , t h e C G L p o l i c i e s a t i s s u e h e r e a r e s t a n d a r d

- f o r m p o l i c i e s “ d e v e l o p e d b y t h e I n s u r a n c e S e r v i c e s 33 O f f i c e ” a n d a r e “ u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

. ” L a m a r H o m e s , I n c

. v

. M i d

- C o n t i n e n t C a s

. C o

. , 2 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 7 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

.

S e e T r a v e l e r s C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. v

. A l a

. G a s C o r p

. , 1 1 7 S o

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 3

– 7 0 8 ( A l a

. 2 0 1 2 ) ; C o m p a s s I n s

. C o

. 34

v

. C i t y o f L i t t l e t o n , 9 8 4 P

. 2 d 6 0 6 , 6 2 2 ( C o l o

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( e n b a n c ) ; R

. T

. V a n d e r b i l t C o

. v

. C o n t ’ l C a s

. C o

. , 8 7 0 A

. 2 d 1 0 4 8 , 1 0 5 8

– 1 0 6 0 ( C o n n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ; A

. Y

. M c D o n a l d I

n d u s

. v

. I

n s

. C o

. o f N

. A m

. , 4 7 5 N

. W

. 2 d 6 0 7 , 6 2 7

– 6 2 9 ( I o w a 1 9 9 1 ) ; A e t n a C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. v

. C o m m o n w e a l t h , 1 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d 8 3 0 , 8 3 6

– 8 3 8 ( K y
. 2 0 0 5 ) ; H a z e n P a p e r C o

. v

. U

. S

. F i d

. & G u a r

. C o

. , 5 5 5 N

. E

. 2 d 5 7 6 , 5 7 9

– 5 8 2 ( M a s s

. 1 9 9 0 ) ; M i c h

. M i l l e r s M u t

. I n s

. C o

. v

. B r o n s o n P l a t i n g C o

. , 5 1 9 N

. W

. 2 d 8 6 4 , 8 6 8

– 8 7 0


### 1 1

## sided with the I nsurer s’ position, and California, the most rec ent of the three , did so in 1998. Since 3 5


## then, seven state high courts have sided with ins u reds. The results in lower courts are simil arly 3 6 

## lopsided in favor of

the insureds. 3 7

( M i c h

. 1 9 9 4 ) , a b r o g a t e d i n p a r t b y W i l k i e v

. A u t o
- O w n e r s I n s

. C o

. , 6 6 4 N

. W

. 2 d 7 7 6 ( M i c h

. 2 0 0 3 ) ; S C S C C o r p

. v

. A l l i e d M u t

. I n s

. C o

. , 5 3 6 N

. W

. 2 d 3 0 5 , 3 1 5 ( M i n n

. 1 9 9 5 ) ( f i n d i n g d u t y t o d e f

e n d a p p l i e s i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n b y t h e M i n n e s o t a P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A g e n c y ) , o v e r r u l e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y B a h r v

. B o i s e C a s c a d e C o r p

. , 7 6 6 N

. W

. 2 d 9 1 0 ( M i n n

. 2 0 0 9 ) ; D u t t o n

– L a i n s o n C o

. v

. C o n t ’ l I n s

. C o

. , 7 7 8 N

. W

. 2 d 4 3 3 , 4 4 6

– 4 4 9 ( N e b

. 2 0 1 0 ) ; C o a k l e y v

. M e

. B o n d i n g & C a s

. C o

. , 6 1 8 A

. 2 d 7 7 7 , 7 8 6

– 7 8 8 ( N

. H

. 1 9 9 2 ) ; C

. D

. S p a n g l e r C o n s t r

. C o

. v

. I n d u s

. C r a n k

s h a f t & E n g ’ g C o

. , 3 8 8 S

. E

. 2 d 5 5 7 , 5 6 9

– 5 7 0 ( N

. C

. 1 9 9 0 ) ; S t a t e v

. C N A I n s

. C o s

. , 7 7 9 A

. 2 d 6 6 2 , 6 6 7 ( V t

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( f i n d i n g d u t y t o d e f

e n d a p p l i e s i n e n v i r o n m e n t a l c l e a n u p a c t i o n c o n d u c t e d b y t h e V e r m o n t A g e n c y o f N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s ) ; J o h n s o n C o n t r o l s , I

n c

. v

. E m p ’ r s I n s

. o f W a u s a u , 6 6 5 N

. W

. 2 d 2 5 7 , 2 6 3

– 2 6 4 ( W i s

. 2 0 0 3 )

.
F o s t e r
- G a r d n e r , I

n c

. v

. N a t ’ l U n i o n F i r e I

n s

. C o

. , 9 5 9 P

. 2 d 2 6 5 , 2 7 9

– 2 8 7 ( C a l

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t o r d e r s 35 f r o m C a l i f

o r n i a e n v i r o n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s d o n o t t r i g g e r t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d ) ; L a p h a m
- H i c k e

y S t e e l C o r

p

. v

. P r o t

. M u t

. I

n s

. C o

. , 6 5 5 N

. E

. 2 d 8 4 2 , 8 4 6

– 8 4 8 ( I l l

. 1 9 9 5 ) ; P a t r o n s O x f o r d M u t

. I

n s

. C o

. v

. M a r o i s , 5 7 3 A

. 2 d 1 6 , 2 0 ( M e

. 1 9 9 0 ) ( f i n d i n g
n o d u t y t o d e f

e n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r M a i n e ’ s e n v i r o n m e n t a l c l e a n u p s t a t u t e )

.
S e e T r a v e l e r s , 1 1 7 S o

. 3 d a t 7 0 3

– 7 0 8 ; C o m p a s s I n s

. C o

. , 9 8 4 P

. 2 d a t 6 2 2 ; R

. T

. V a n d e r b i l t C o

. , 8 7 0 A

. 2 d a t 36 1 0 5 8

– 1 0 6 0 ; A e t n a C a s

. & S u r

. C o

. , 1 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 3 6

– 8 3 8 ; D u t t o n
- L a i n s o n C o

. , 7 7 8 N

. W

. 2 d a t 4 4 6

– 4 4 9 ; C N A I n s

. C o s

. , 7 7 9 A

. 2 d a t 6 6 7 ; J o h n s o n C o n t r o l s , 6 6 5 N

. W

. 2 d a t 2 6 3

– 2 6 4

.
S e e T r a v e l e r s I

n d e m

. C o

. v

. S u m m i t C o r p

. o f A m

. , 7 1 5 N

. E

. 2 d 9 2 6 , 9 3 3

– 9 3 4 ( I n d

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 9 ) ; S c h n i t z e r 37 I n v

. C o r p

. v

. C e r t a i n U

n d e r w r i t e r s a t L l o y d ’ s o f L o n d o n , 1 0 4 P

. 3 d 1 1 6 2 , 1 1 6 7

– 1 1 6 9 ( O r

. C t

. A p p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t o r d e r s f

r o m t h e O r e g o n D e p a r t m e n t o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l Q u a l i t y c a n t r i g g e r t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d ) ; G u l l I

n d u s

. , I n c

. v

. S t a t e F a r m F i r e & C a s

. C o

. , 3 2 6 P

. 3 d 7 8 2 , 7 9 0 ( W a s h

. C t

. A p p

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t s t a t e l a w “ a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t a c t s ” t r i g g e r t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d ) ; s e e a l s o P r o

f ’ l R e n t a l
, I

n c

. v

. S h e l b y I

n s

. C o

. , 5 9 9 N

. E

. 2 d 4 2 3 , 4 3 0

– 4 3 1 ( O h i o C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r f r o m t h e E P A i s a “ s u i t ” t r i g g e r i n g t h e d u t y t o d e f e n d , a l t h o u g h a P R P l e t t e r i s n o t )

.
F e d e r a l d e c i s i o n s l i k e w i s e f a v o r M c G i n n e s ’ s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

. S e e , e

. g

. , A n d e r s o n B r o s

. v

. S t

. P a u l F i r e & M a r i n e I n s

. C o

. , 7 2 9 F

. 3 d 9 2 3 , 9 3 1

– 9 3 5 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( a p p l y i n g O r e g o n l a w ) ; L a n d O ’ L a k e s , I n c

. v

. E m p ’ r s I

n s

. C o

. o f W a u s a u , 7 2 8 F

. 3 d 8 2 2 , 8 2 7

– 8 2 9 ( 8 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( c i t i n g , i n t e r a l i a , S C S C C o r p

. , 5 3 6 N

. W

. 2 d a t 3 1 5 ) ( a p p l y i n g M i n n e s o t a a n d O k l a h o m a l a w ) ; P a c

. H i d e & F u r D e p o t v

. G r e a t A m

. I

n s

. C o

. , 2 3 F

. S u p p

. 3 d 1 2 0 8 , 1 2 1 3

– 1 2 1 8 ( D

. M o n t

. 2 0 1 4 ) ( f

i n d i n g d u t y t o d e f

e n d p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r M o n t a n a ’ s a n a l o g u e t o C E R C L A ) ; H u t c h i n s o n O i l C o

. v

. F e d e r a t e d S e r v

. I

n s

. C o

. , 8 5 1 F

. S u p p

. 1 5 4 6 , 1 5 5 0

– 1 5 5 2 ( D

. W y o

. 1 9 9 4 ) ; Q u a k e r S t a t e M i n i t

- L u b e , I n c

. v

. F i r e m a n ’ s F u n d I n s

. C o

. , 8 6 8 F

. S u p p

. 1 2 7 8 , 1 3 0 6

– 1 3 1 1 ( D

. U t a h 1 9 9 4 ) , a f f ’ d , 5 2 F

. 3 d 1 5 2 2 ( 1 0 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 5 ) ; T i m e O i l C o

. v

. C i g n a P r o

p

. & C a s

. I

n s

. C o

. , 7 4 3 F

. S u p p

. 1 4 0 0 , 1 4 2 0 ( W

. D

. W a s h

. 1 9 9 0 )

. B u t s e e , e

. g

. , R a y I n d u s

. , I n c

. v

. L i b e r t

y M u t

. I n s

. C o

. , 9 7 4 F

. 2 d 7 5 4 , 7 5 8

– 7 6 4 ( 6 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g M i c h i g a n l a w ) , a b r o g a t e d b y M i c h

. M i l l e r s , 5 1 9 N

. W

. 2 d 8 6 4 ; S i m o n W

r e c k i n g C o

. v

. A I U I

n s

. C o

. , 3 5 0 F

. S u p p

. 2 d 6 2 4 , 6 3 5

– 6 3 9 ( E

. D

. P a

. 2 0 0 4 ) ; H a r l e y s v i l l e M u t

. I

n s

. C o

. v

. S u s s e x C n t

y

. , D e l

. , 8 3 1 F

. S u p p

. 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 3 0

– 1 1 3 2 ( D

. D e l

. 1 9 9 3 )

. 

### 1 2

## “We have repe atedly stressed the importance of uniformity when identical insurance

provisions will nece ssarily be interpre ted in various jurisdictions.” We cannot achie ve uniformity 3 8



## with our decision; the courts have alre ady split. Stil l, “we think it prudent to strive for uniformity as much as possible.” 3 9



## We conclude that i n s u reds in Texas should not be deprive d the cover ag e insureds have in
thirteen other

states.

* * * * *

We answer

the Fif th Circuit’s cer

tified question y es.

Nathan L . Hec ht Chief J ustice Opinion delivere d: J une 26, 2015

Z u r i c h A m

. I

n s

. C o

. v

. N o k i a , I

n c

. , 2 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 7 , 4 9 6

– 4 9 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ; 38

s e e N a t ’ l U n i o n F i r e I

n s

. C o

. v

. C B I

I n d u s

. , 9 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 1 7 , 5 2 2 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ C o u r t s u s u a l l y s t r i v e f o r u n i f o r m i t y i n c o n s t r u i n g i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e , a s h e r e , t h e c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n s a t i s s u e a r e i d e n t i c a l a c r o s s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n s

. ” )

.

T r i n i t y U n i v e r s a l I

n s

. C o

. v

. C o w a n , 9 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 9 , 8 2 4 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 7 )

. 39



### 1 3