alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 50846 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

–

Appellee ,

v. AGUSTIN SERGIO DELEON GARZA, also known as Agustin S. Garza, also known as Agustin Garza, also known as Agustin DeLeon Garza , Defendant

– Appellant

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 5:14

- CR

- 247

- 1

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: * Agustin Sergio DeLeon Garza appeals the within

- guidelines life sentence imposed following his conviction of seven counts related to kidnaping, ransom, and money laundering . He contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than needed to achieve the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 8, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-50846 Document: 00514025500 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/08/2017No. 15

- 50846

2 Because DeLeon Garza did not raise a substantive reasonableness objection in the district court, his arguments , as he c oncedes, are reviewed for plain error only , based on this court’s precedent

. See United States v. Mondragon

- Santiago , 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Peltier , 505 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, DeLeon Garza argues that p lain error review should not apply to preserve the issue for further review. To establish plain error, he must show that the district court committed a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 12 9, 135 (2009). Even if he does so, we will correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Id

. DeLeon Garza has not shown error, plain or otherwise, in connection with his sentence. We presume that a within

- guidelines sentence , such as DeLeon Garza ’s , is reasonable. See United States v. Jenkins , 712 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2013). A defendant can rebut the presumption only if he shows that the district court ignored an important senten cing factor, afforded substantial weight to an irrelevant or inappropriate factor, or clearly erred in weighing the factors. Id

. DeLeon Garza’s arguments do not make this showing. Rather, he has shown only a disagreement with the propriety of the senten ce imposed, which does not suffice to show substantive unreasonableness. See United States v. Ruiz , 621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010) . The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Case: 15-50846 Document: 00514025500 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/08/2017
II 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3507 

To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval 

of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 17, 2010 

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. ENSIGN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear 

cooperation with foreign countries, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL AP4 PROVAL OF AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL 

5 NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 

6 (a) COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.—Section 

7 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 

8 d.) is amended in the first sentence— 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3507 IS

1 (1) by striking ‘‘not’’ the first and second place 

2 it appears; 

3 (2) by inserting ‘‘only’’ after ‘‘effective’’ the 

4 first place it appears; and 

5 (3) by striking ‘‘: Provided further,’’ and all 

6 that follows through ‘‘such agreement’’. 

7 (b) SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.—Section 131 

8 a.(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160 a.(1)) is amended— 

9 (1) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘secu10 rity,’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘security.’’; 

11 and 

12 (2) by inserting after the second sentence the 

13 following: ‘‘Such subsequent arrangement shall not 

14 take effect unless the Congress enacts a joint resolu15 tion of approval, according to the procedures of sec16 tions 123 d. and 130 i. of this Act. Any such nuclear 

17 proliferation assessment statement shall be sub18 mitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

19 House of Representatives and the Committee on 

20 Foreign Relations of the Senate no later than the 

21 31st day of continuous session after submission of 

22 the subsequent arrangement.’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 3507 IS

1 SEC. 2. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO 

2 AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR CO3 OPERATION. 

4 Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 

5 U.S.C. 2153) is amended by adding at the end the fol6 lowing: 

7 ‘‘e. The President shall keep the Committee on For8 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Com9 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and cur10 rently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating 

11 to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear co12 operation pursuant to this section prior to the President’s 

13 announcement of such initiative or negotiations. The 

14 President shall consult with the appropriate congressional 

15 committees concerning such initiative or negotiations be16 ginning not less than 15 calendar days after the initiation 

17 of any such negotiations, or the receipt or transmission 

18 of a draft agreement, whichever occurs first, and monthly 

19 thereafter until such time as the negotiations are con20 cluded.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-6180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus CURTIS LEE WATSON, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (CR-88-201, CA-00-112-A) Submitted: May 11, 2000 Decided: May 18, 2000 Before MURNAGHAN, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Curtis Lee Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Orin Samuel Kerr, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Curtis Lee Watson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Watson , Nos. CR-88-201;CA-00-112-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 21, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[877 NYS2d 604]

#### Matthew Bennett, Appellant, v Class N’ Style Travel & Limousine Ltd., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

February 9, 2009

*9APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Matthew Bennett,*appellant pro se.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Order affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action against defendant Class N’ Style Travel & Limousine Ltd. and two individual defendants to recover unpaid wages. After a nonjury trial, the District Court dismissed the action as against the two individual defendants and awarded plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $4,250 as against Class. A judgment to that effect was entered on May 24, 2006.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the judgment to name First Consumer Credit Management Corp. (FCCM) as the judgment debtor instead of Class, in order to reflect what he alleged was the true name of this defendant. Plaintiff claimed that he had been unable to enforce the judgment against Class because it had gone out of business and transferred its assets to FCCM. The court granted plaintiffs motion to the extent of ordering a hearing to determine the true name of defendant Class, or any name in which this defendant may have conducted business at the time of the occurrence upon which the judgment was based *(see*UDCA 1814; CPLR 5019), with a direction that plaintiff be prepared to present evidentiary proof that FCCM was liable to him for the unpaid wages which were the subject of the instant small claims action. Following the hearing, the court denied plaintiffs motion to amend, and this appeal ensued.

UDCA 1814 mandates that the Small Claims Part inquire into the true name of the defendant and permits a nunc pro tunc order to effect a name correction even after judgment in order to assist a successful plaintiff in enforcing the judgment, as if the defendant had been properly denominated. The standard for permitting the amendment “should be whether there is anything at all about the way the defendant has referred to itself in conducting its business that could reasonably have led the claimant to name the defendant as it was in fact named in the initial small claims papers” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, CCA 1814). In the instant case, the evidence at the hearing did not show that FCCM was conducting business in the name of Class, and therefore supported the District Court’s determination that *10Class was the appropriately named entity against which liability was found. We note that if Class’ conduct violated the laws prohibiting fraudulent conveyances *(see*Debtor and Creditor Law art 10), a motion to amend the judgment is not an appropriate basis to seek relief for such violation *(cf. Parent v Amity Autoworld, Ltd.,*15 Misc 3d 633 [2007]). Consequently, the court did not err in denying plaintiffs motion.

Rudolph, EJ., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.
[974 NYS2d 785]

#### In the Matter of Ray Alfred Jones, Jr., an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

Second Department,

November 13, 2013

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Diana Maxfield Kearse,*Brooklyn *(Mark F. DeWan*of counsel), for petitioner.

*196OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

On October 25, 2012, the respondent entered a plea of guilty in the Supreme Court, Kings County (Walsh, J.), to one count of grand larceny in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 155.40, a class C felony. His subsequent motion to withdraw his plea was granted on December 20, 2012. On January 29, 2013, the respondent entered a plea of guilty to one count of grand larceny in the second degree in the same court (Chun, J.). During the allocution, he admitted that, between April 10, 2007, and April 13, 2007, he stole property with an aggregate value in excess of $50,000 from the complainant. On March 25, 2013, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of lVs to 4 years, and the sentencing court imposed various surcharges and fees.

Although served with a copy of this motion, the respondent has neither submitted a response nor requested additional time in which to do so.

By virtue of his felony conviction, the respondent was automatically disbarred and ceased to be an attorney pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a).

Accordingly, the motion to strike the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b), is granted, to reflect the respondent’s automatic disbarment on January 29, 2013.

Eng, EJ, Mastro, Rivera, Skelos and Dillon, JJ, concur.

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a), the respondent, Ray Alfred Jones, Jr., is disbarred, effective January 29, 2013, and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent, Ray Alfred Jones, Jr., shall comply with this Court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys *(see*22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, effective immediately, the respondent, Ray Alfred Jones, Jr., is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk, or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission, or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in *197any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and it is further, Ordered that if the respondent, Ray Alfred Jones, Jr., has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith to the issuing agency and the respondent shall certify to the same in his affidavit of compliance pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.10 (f).
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVA NIA** 

IN RE: AMENDMENT OF RULE 2.3 OF THE CODE OF JUDIC IAL CONDUCT : : : : : : : NO. 483 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DOCKET

**ORDER**
**PER CURIA M**  **AN D**  **NOW**, this 28th day of March, 2017, it is **ORDERED** , pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania , that Rule 2.3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is amended in the attached form. To the extent that notice of proposed rulemaking would otherwise be required by Pa.R.J.A. No. 103, the immediate prom ulgation of the amendments is found to be in the interests of justice and efficient administration. This Order shall be processed in accordance with Pa.R.J.A. No. 103(b), and the amendments herein shall be effective immediately

.
Additions are shown in bold and are underlined.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Chadon Morris, Appellant.

Submitted July 30, 2012;

decided August 28, 2012

*986Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Lynn W.L. Fahey, Esq., Appellate Advocates, 2 Rector Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10006 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

TORRIS B ERNARD HILL

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 20

- 1854

[ May 27, 2021 ]

Appeal of order denying 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the

Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County ; Sherwood Bauer, Jr. , Judge;

L.T. Case No. 432003CF001639A

.

Torris B. Hill, Arcadia, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke Napodano,

Assistant Attorney Gen eral, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

L EVINE

, C.J., W ARNER and D AMOORGIAN

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000842881
<NAME> GEODYNE ENERGY INCOME LTD. PARTNERSHIP II-E
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         529,568
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  399,132
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               928,700
<PP&E>                                      15,792,474
<DEPRECIATION>                              12,892,276
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,184,543
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          212,341
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,912,968
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,184,543
<SALES>                                      1,971,161
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,039,880
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,384,956
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (345,076)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (345,076)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                 (345,076)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.68)
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</TABLE>
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-81,540-01

EX PARTE LINDA MARIE McKUSICK, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 1415839-A IN THE 183RD DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possessing a

controlled substance and was sentenced to imprisonment. There was no direct appeal.

Applicant was arrested in Webster, Texas, for possessing methamphetamine. The arresting

officer reported that the substance had a weight of approximately 3.5 grams. Applicant was therefore

indicted for possessing 1-4 grams of methamphetamine, which is a third-degree felony. TEX.

CONTROLLED SUBS. ACT §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(a), (c). She pled guilty under a plea agreement for

three years in prison. 
-2-

At the time of Applicant’s plea, no laboratory analysis had been performed on the substance.

Later analysis showed that the substance was methamphetamine but that its weight was far from the

3.5 grams reported by the arresting officer. The true weight was 0.039 grams. Possessing this

quantity of methamphetamine does not constitute a third-degree felony, but it is a state-jail felony.

TEX. CONTROLLED SUBS. ACT §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(a), (b).

Applicant, through habeas counsel, alleges that her plea was not voluntary: “My plea was not

knowing and voluntary because I did not know that the evidence I was charged with possessing did

not contain cocaine. If I had known this, I would not have entered a guilty plea.” A review of the

record does not show that Applicant’s prosecution had anything to do with cocaine. Nonetheless, the

trial court finds, with the State’s assent, “Based on the discrepancies in the actual amount of

controlled substance possessed by the applicant versus the amount necessary to support a conviction

for the charged offense and the applicant’s understanding concerning the relevant ranges of

punishment, the applicant’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.” The trial court’s

finding is supported by the record.

Relief is granted. See, e.g., Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859, 862 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999). The judgment in Cause No. 1415839-01010 in the 183rd District Court of Harris County is

set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Harris County to answer the

charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within

10 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies ofthis opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: September 17, 2014

Do not publish
Exhibit No. 23

 

## **Consent of Independent Registered Public AccountingFirm**

##  

The Board of Directors

Barnwell Industries, Inc.:

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements No. 333-153070 and No. 333-88380 on Form S-8, of Barnwell Industries, Inc. of our report dated December 18, 2008, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Barnwell Industries, Inc. and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2008 and 2007, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, stockholders’ equity and comprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended September 30, 2008, which report appears in the September 30, 2008 annual report on Form 10-K of Barnwell Industries, Inc.

 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP

 

Honolulu, Hawaii

December 18, 2008

 

----
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 19 , 2020

.

In The


## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 20

- 00283

- CV

FRANK JOHNSON , Appellant

V.

DORENA MARINO , Appellee

On Appeal from the 280th District Court

Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Ca us e No. 2020

- 03905

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a judgment signed February 7, 2020 . The clerk’s

record was filed May 27, 2020

. The reporter’s record was filed June 8, 2020

. No

brief was filed.

On October 8, 2020 , this court issued an order st ating that unless appellant

filed a brief on or before November 9, 2020 , the court would dismiss the a ppeal for

want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.3(b).2

Appellant filed no brief or other response. Accordingly, the appeal is or dered

dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justice s Christopher, Wise and Hassan

.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 21, 2018

No. 04-18-00341-CV

IN RE CELADON TRUCKING SERVICES, INC. and Abner Albarez-Carballo

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

 Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

The Real Party in Interest’s Motion to Extend Time to file Response is hereby 

GRANTED. Time is extended to August 8, 2018.

It is so OREDERED on this 10th day of July, 2018.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO: ___________________________________

 KEITH E. HOTTLE,

 Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 13.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of World Wide Ltd. (the "Company") on
      Form 20-F for the period ending January 31, 2003, as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
      Ivan Ebanks, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

December 19, 2003

                                                       /s/ Ivan Ebanks
                                                       -------------------------
                                                       Ivan Ebanks, CEO