NO. 96-331 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

FORREST M. SANDERS, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel. 

DARRELL E. BECKSTROM, Chief, 

DRIVER IMPROVEMENT BUREAU, 

Respondent and Respondent 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Bars, Judge Presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Forrest M. Sanders, Pro Se, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; 

Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Alan J. Hall, Deputy City Attorney, Billings, 

Montana 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter and West Publishing Companies. 

Forrest Sanders appeals the decision of the Thirteenth 

Judicial District court, Yellowstone county, affirming the 

suspension of his Montana driver's license pursuant to § 61-8-402, 

MCA. We affirm. 

We restate the following two issues raised on appeal: 

1. Did the District Court err in finding that Officer Longin 

possessed reasonable grounds to believe that Sanders was driving 

under the influence of alcohol? 

2. Did the District Court properly issue amended findings of 

fact and conclusions of law to correct an error in the procedural 

history of the case? 

On October 30, 1995, Billings City Police Officer Tony Longin 

observed a vehicle make a right turn without stopping for the red 

light. The vehicle over-accelerated when it turned, causing it to 

fishtail and back end into the center lane of traffic. Officer 

Longin followed the vehicle and observed that it slowed at the next 

intersection, where it made another right turn without stopping for 

the red light. 

Officer Longin activated his overhead lights and stopped the 

vehicle. The driver exited and yelled that he had not done 

2 
anything wrong. Officer Longin instructed the driver to return to 

his vehicle and then asked for his driver's license, proof of 

insurance, and registration. The driver produced his license, 

which identified him as Forrest Sanders. 

Officer Longin smelled intoxicants on Sanders' breath and 

noticed that his speech was slurred. When Officer Longin again 

requested Sanders to produce his proof of insurance and 

registration, Sanders called him a "punk" and told him to 'If--- 

Off." Officer Longin asked Sanders to perform field sobriety 

tests, which Sanders refused. 

Based on his experience and these observations, Officer Longin 

concluded that Sanders was under the influence of alcohol and 

arrested him. Sanders was transported to the Yellowstone County 

Detention Facility. There, Officer Longin read him an implied 

consent advisory form and requested him to submit to a breath test. 

Sanders refused. Accordingly, the Montana Department of Justice 

suspended Sanders' license pursuant to 5 61-8-402, MCA. 

Sanders petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 61-8-403, 

MCA, to review his license suspension, which it affirmed. Sanders 

appeals. 

1. Did the District Court err in finding that Officer Longin 

possessed reasonable grounds to believe that Sanders was driving 

under the influence of alcohol? 

Sanders contends that Officer Longin lacked reasonable grounds 

to believe that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. 

More specifically, he claims that the police lacked probable cause 

to pull him over. 

3 
We review a district court's denial of a petition for 

reinstatement of a driver's license to determine whether the 

court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions 

of law are correct. Bauer v. State (1996), 275 Mont. 119, 122, 910 

P.Zd 886, 888. In reinstatement proceedings, a presumption of 

correctness attaches to the State's act of revocation. The burden 

of proving that the suspension was improper lies with the driver. 

Jess v. State, Dept. of Justice, MVD (1992), 255 Mont. 254, 259-60, 

841 P.2d 1137, 1140. 

When the District Court considered Sanders' petition 

challenging his license suspension pursuant to 5 61-8-403, MCA, its 

review was limited to whether Officer Longin had reasonable grounds 

to believe that Sanders was driving under the influence of alcohol. 

See Grinde v. State (1991), 249 Mont. 77, 79, 813 P.2d 473, 475. 

The reasonable grounds provided for in 55 61-8-402 and -403, MCA, 

are essentially the same test as particularized suspicion provided 

for in § 46-5-401, MCA, and discussed in State v. Reynolds (1995), 

272 Mont. 46, 47-50, 899 P.2d 540, 541-42. Bauer, 910 P.2d at 889. 

Section 46-5-401, MCA, supports an investigative stop if the 

arresting officer has a particularized suspicion that an offense 

has been committed. Section 46-5-401, MCA, provides: 

Investigative stop. In order to obtain or verify an 

account of the person's presence or conduct or to 

determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer 

may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in 

circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that 

the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is 

committing, or is about to commit an offense. 

4 
The issue of whether particularized suspicion exists in order 

to justify an investigative stop is fact driven. Revnolds, 899 

P.2d at 542-43. If, after making a justified investigative stop, 

the police officer reasonably believes the driver to be under the 

influence of alcohol, he can make an arrest and require submission 

to a chemical test. Grinde, 813 P.2d at 476. An investigative 

stop may ripen into probable cause to arrest through the occurrence 

of facts or incidents after the stop. ~, Jess 841 P.Zd at 1141. 

The District Court found that Officer Longin observed Sanders' 

vehicle traveling on North 27th Street. The vehicle slowed for a 

red light, but failed to make a complete stop before making a right 

hand turn. While making the turn, Sanders' vehicle fishtailed into 

another lane of traffic. Sanders made another right turn without 

stopping for the red light. Based on these observations, Officer 

Longin concluded that additional investigation was necessary and 

initiated a traffic stop. 

After stopping Sanders, Officer Longin smelled intoxicants and 

observed Sanders' slurred speech. Sanders also exhibited 

difficulty in finding his driver's license and refused to comply 

with Officer Longin's instructions to produce proof of insurance 

and registration. Based on these findings, the District Court 

concluded that Officer Longin possessed reasonable grounds to 

believe that Sanders was operating his vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol and that his license was properly suspended 

pursuant to § 61-8-402(3), MCA. 

5 
The District Court considered the relevant factors under § 61- 

8-402, MCA, and properly denied Sanders' petition for reinstatement 

of his driver's license. We hold that the District Court's 

findings are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not 

clearly erroneous. 

Sanders argues that the District Court erred when it found 

that the traffic lights where he failed to stop were red. He 

submitted testimony at the reinstatement hearing from Scott 

Spurlock, Billings City Signal Supervisor, concerning the timing 

and sequence of traffic lights in downtown Billings, in an attempt 

to prove that it would be impossible for him to run two consecutive 

red lights. The court found Spurlock's "confusing testimony" did 

not confirm Sanders' theory that it was impossible for him to run 

two consecutive red lights because Spurlock did not know at what 

speed Sanders was traveling. Witness credibility and the weight to 

be given to their testimony are to be determined by the trier of 

fact, and disputed questions of fact and credibility will not be 

disturbed on appeal. State v. Ahmed (1996), 924 P.2d 679, 686, 53 

St.Rep. 804, 808, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 25, 1996) 

(No. 96-6901). 

We affirm the District Court's order denying Sanders' request 

to permanently enjoin the Montana Department of Justice from 

suspending his driver's license and dissolving its previous order 

granting him interim injunctive relief. 

2. Did the District Court properly issue amended findings of 

fact and conclusions of law to correct an error in the procedural 

history of the case? 

6 
Following the reinstatement hearing, on May 8, 1996, the court 

issued findings and conclusions that summarized the history of the 

case: 

Petitioner, Forrest Sanders, pursuant to 5 61-8-403, MCA, 

requests this Court reinstate his driving privileges 

which were suspended for a period of 90 days by the State 

of Montana . . on or about October 30, 1995. 

On May 15, 1996, the court issued amended findings and 

conclusions that restated the previous findings and conclusions, 

except that the ninety-day license suspension was amended to six 

months. Sanders claims that the District Court lacked jurisdiction 

to amend his license suspension from ninety days to six months. We 

are unpersuaded by Sanders' argument. 

The Montana Department of Justice is responsible for 

determining the applicable driver's license suspension period in 

accordance with § 61-8-402, MCA. A notable exception to this rule 

is explained in Matter of Orman (1986), 224 Mont. 332, 731 P.2d 

833. In Orman, a police officer mistakenly informed a defendant 

that if he failed to submit to the offered chemical test pursuant 

to 5 61-8-402, MCA, that his license would be suspended for ninety 

days. The officer was unaware that the defendant had previously 

declined a similar chemical test in the last five years. We 

concluded that under the circumstances, the defendant could not 

have his license suspended for a period longer than that explained 

to him by the officer. m, 731 P.2d at 835. 

That is not the situation here. Neither party presented 

evidence at the reinstatement hearing that Officer Longin had 

informed Sanders that his license would be suspended for a period 

7 
less than six months. After the hearing, Sanders' attorney signed 

a stipulation that Sanders had been read an implied consent form 

notifying him of the six-month suspension. Sanders cannot argue 

now that he was read anything different. 

We hold that the District Court properly amended its findings 

of fact and conclusions of law affirming the six-month suspension 

of Sanders' license. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: 

/ 

Ju$tices