C L D

- 0 6 0 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19

- 2 9 1 5

___________

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A

v.

T E R R E N C E G I B B S

,

a / k / a T

, a / k / a T e r r y

, A p p e l l a n t

________________________ ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the E a s t e r n District of Pennsylvania

( D

. C

. Crim. No. 2:96

- cr

- 00539

- 002 )

Distr ict Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, II I

_________________________________ ___

Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant

to Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

D e c e m b e r 5

, 2 0 1 9

Before: J O R D A N

, K R A U S E

, a n d M A T E Y

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : December 11, 2019 )

__ ___ __ _ __ _

OPINION *

__ ___ __ _ __ _

* This disposition is no t an opinion of t he full Court a nd pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does no t

constitute binding precedent.2

PER CURIAM

Terrence Gibbs i s s e r v i n g a l i f e s e n t e n c e f

o r hi s l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n a d r u g

c o n s p i r a c y

. W e a f

f i r m e d G i b b s ’ s c on v ic t i o n s a n d s e nt e n c e o n appeal

. S ee U n i t e d S t a t e s

v

. G i b b s

, 190 F.3d 188

, 2 2 0 (3d Cir. 1999) ( c o n c l u d i n g

, int er a l i a

, “ t h at t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

d id n o t c l e ar l y e r r i n a t t r i b u t i n g 1 5 0 k i l o g r a m s o f p o w d e r c o c a i n e a n d 1

. 5 k i l o g r a m s o f

c r a c k t o G i b b s a s a l e a d e r of th e co n s p i r a c y ” )

. N u m e r o u s p o s t

- j u d g m e n t m o t i o ns f

i l e d b y

G i b b s h a v e b e en u n s u c c e s s f u l

.

R e c e n t l y

, G i b b s f

i l e d w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a m o t i o n f o r a p p o i n t m e n t o f c o u n s e l

.

T h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f t h e m o t i o n w a s t o s e c ur e a s s i s t a n c e i n f i l i n g a n a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r

r e l i e f u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 0 4 o f t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t o f 2 0 1 8 ( “ F S A ” )

, P u b

. L

. N o

. 1 1 5

- 3 9 1

, 1 3 2

S t a t

. 5 1 9 4 ( 2 0 1 8 )

. 1 S e c t i o n 4 0 4 g i v e s r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t t o p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F a i r

S e n t e n c i n g A c t o f 2 0 1 0

, P u b

. L

. 1 1 1

- 2 2 0

, 1 2 4 S t a t

. 2 3 7 2 ( 2 0 1 0 )

, t h a t increased the drug

quantities necessary to trigger mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for cr ack

cocaine offenses

. S e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. H e g w o o d

, 9 3 4 F

. 3 d 4 1 4

, 4 1 7 ( 5 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 9 )

.

I n h i s m o t i o n f

o r c o u n s e l

, G i b b s a r g u e d t h a t h e is e l i g i b l e f o r r e l i e f u n d e r S e c t i o n

4 0 4 b e c a u s e h e c o n s p i r e d t o p o s s e s s a n d s e l l b o t h p o w d e r a n d c r a c k cocain e

, a s d e t a i l e d

i n t h e G o ve r n m e n t ’ s s u p e rs e d i n g i n d i c t m e n t a n d a s i n d i c a t e d b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s

1 C f

. U n i t e d S t a t e s v

. W i r s i n g

, N o

. 1 9

- 6 3 8 1

,

_ _ _ F

. 3 d

__ _ , 2 0 1 9 W L 6 1 3 9 0 1 7

, a t * 7

, * 9

( 4 t h C i r

. N o v

. 2 0

, 2 0 1 9 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t 1 8 U

. S

. C

. “ § 3 5 8 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e

v e h i c l e f o r a F i r s t S t e p A c t m o t i o n

, ” a n d t h a t “ [ a ] l l d e f e n d a n t s w h o a r e s e r v i n g s e n t e n c e s

f o r v i o l a t i o n s o f 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( i i i ) a n d ( B ) ( i i i )

, a n d w h o a r e n o t e x c l u d e d [ b y

S e c t i o n 4 0 4 ( c ) ]

, a r e e l i g i b l e t o m o v e f o r r e l i e f u n d e r t h e A c t ” )

.3

i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y

. A t t a c h e d t o h i s m o t i o n w a s a l e t t e r f r o m t h e F e d e r a l C o m m u n i t y

D e f e n d e r O f f i c e f o r t h e E a s t e r n D i s t r i c t o f P e n n s y l v a n i a declin i n g to file a Section 404

-

based a p p l i c a t i o n o n Gibbs ’ s behalf after it concluded , primarily, t h a t G i b b s w a s

c o n v i c t e d only o f p o w d e r

- r a t h e r t h a n c r a c k

- c o c a i n e o f f e n s e s

.

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n ie d G i b b s ’ s m o t i o n

, d e c l i n i n g t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l “ [ b ] e c a u s e

a n y m o t i o n f

o r reduction o f s e n t e n c e u n d e r t h e F i r s t S t e p A c t w o u l d b e u n s u c c e s s f u l

. ”

A c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e l e t t e r f r o m t h e F e d e r a l C o m m u n i t y D e f e n d e r

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

e x p r e s s e d t h a t G i b b s “ i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l f o r a s e c o n d l e g a l

o p i n i o n

. ” G i b b s appealed

.

W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r 2 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 9 1

. S e e I s i d o r P a i e w o n s k y A s s o c

. , I n c

.

v

. S h a r p P r o p s

. , I n c

. , 9 9 8 F

. 2 d 1 4 5

, 1 5 0

- 5 1 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 3 ) ; O h n t r u p v

. F i r e a r m s C t r

. , I n c

. ,

8 0 2 F

. 2 d 6 7 6

, 6 7 8 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 8 6 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. O u r r e v i e w i s f o r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t io n

. S e e

H o u s e r v

. F o l i n o

, 9 2 7 F

. 3 d 6 9 3

, 6 9 7 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 1 9 )

. W e m a y a f f i r m o n a n y g r o u n d s

s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d

. S e e N i c i n i v

. M o r r a

, 2 1 2 F

. 3 d 7 9 8

, 8 0 5 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( e n b a n c )

.

A d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s s e s s i n g a m o t i o n f o r c o u n s e l first determine s whether the

litigant’s cas e has arguable mer it. See Tabron v. Grace , 6 F. 3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).

If th a t threshold is met

, the court then consider s a n o n

- e x h a u s t i v e l i s t o f several

additional factors

. See id. at 155

- 57 ; s e e a l s o Shifflett v

. Korszniak , 934 F.3d 3 56, 367

(3d Ci r. 20 19) ( “ Under [ T a b r o n ]

, counsel should b e appointed where an indigent plaintiff4

w ith a potentiall y meritorious claim is not fully able to prosecute his or her own case in

light of the overall c omplexity of the case

. ” )

.

E v e n a s s u m i n g

, a r g u e n d o

, t h a t t h e r e i s a r g u a b l e m e r i t t o G i b b s ’ s a n t i c i p a t e d

a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r r e l i e f u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 0 4 o f t h e F S A

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s

discr etion i n d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n f o r c o u n s e l

. T h e r e i s n o r e a s o n t o a p p o i n t c o u n s e l t o

b r i e f a p u r e q u e s t i o n o f l a w

— t o w i t

, w h e t h e r G i b b s i s s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e f o r “ a v i o l a t i o n

o f a F e d e r a l c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e

, t h e s t a t u t o r y p e n a l t i e s f o r w h i c h w e r e m o d i f

i e d b y s e c t i o n 2

o r 3 o f t h e F a i r S e n t e n c i n g A c t o f 2 0 1 0

, ” F S A § 4 0 4 ( a )

, 1 3 2 S t a t

. a t 5 2 2 2

— t h a t G i b b s

h a s a l r e a d y c o m

p e t e n t l y presented b e l o w ( i n h i s c o u n s e l m o t i o n ) a n d i n t h i s C o u r t ( i n h i s

s u m m a r y

- a c t i o n r e s p o n s e )

. S e e Mo ntgomery v. Pinchak , 294 F.3d 492, 501 (3d Cir.

2002) ( “ Perhaps the most significant of T a b r o n ’ s post

- threshold factors is the plaintiff ’ s

ability to p resen t his or her case

. ” )

. T h e o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l t h u s b e a f f i r m e d

.

See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27. 4 (2011) ; 3d Cir. I.O.P . 10.6 (2018). 2

2 Gi b bs argues on appeal that it was error for the Distri c t Court “ to sole ly rely on the

assessment ” of the Federal Community Defender

. W e understand the order on review to

instead ha ve denied the mot ion for counsel based on the District Court ’ s own assessment

that Gibbs fail ed t o sa tisfy the Tabron threshold of arguable merit

, even if th at assessment

echo ed the substance of the Federal Co mmunity Defender ’ s letter

. Our understanding i s

supported by t he District C ourt ’ s re liance on United States v. F reeman , 783 F. App ’ x 164

( 3d Ci r. 2019) (per curiam)

.