Filed 7/10/15 In re M.C. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B259200

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK47956)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa 

Sullivan, Judge. Affirmed.

Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, 

and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *
2

Father Michael C. appeals from the jurisdiction and disposition order finding that his 

son M.C. was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions

(b) and (g),1 and removing M.C. from father’s custody. Father contends substantial 

evidence did not support the jurisdictional finding. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

1. Detention on Initial Petition

Eleven-year-old M.C. was removed from his mother in May 2013 after a referral 

alleged physical abuse by mother. M.C. reported that mother punched and kicked him and 

pushed his head against a refrigerator.2 The social worker with the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) interviewed maternal grandmother 

and learned that mother, father, and M.C. had been living with maternal grandmother for the 

past five months, though father worked “all the time and [was] not home.” M.C. had a 

black eye and a sore rib from mother’s punching and kicking him. He also showed the 

social worker bruises on his legs from when mother hit him with an extension cord. 

Maternal grandmother saw mother hit M.C. and told him to run. She also told mother to 

stop or maternal grandmother would call the police. M.C. had seen mother hit father and 

seen mother threaten to hit maternal grandmother. M.C. thought both he and mother had 

“anger issues,” and he wanted them to get counseling. M.C. had a lengthy record of 

disciplinary issues at school for bullying and harassing other students. Maternal 

grandmother was willing to provide care for M.C. and have mother move out of the home so 

M.C. could stay there.

Mother and father had been together for 16 years but were not legally married. The 

social worker contacted father by telephone. Father is a truck driver. He was working out 

 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother is not party to this appeal. Mother had a prior dependency case in 2002 in 

which the court sustained allegations that she had inappropriately physically disciplined 

M.C.’s half sister, had a history of marijuana use, and had a criminal conviction for assault 

with a deadly weapon.
3

of town and had not been home for a month. Father denied knowing about any physical 

abuse by mother. The removal order DCFS obtained applied only to mother, not father. 

Father explained that he was on an out-of-state run but would return home in two weeks. 

He gave DCFS permission to place M.C. in a foster home until he returned. DCFS placed 

M.C. with maternal grandmother. The placement was against mother’s wishes; she blamed 

maternal grandmother “for what [was] going on.” Father did not want to decide whether to 

place M.C. with maternal grandmother because he did not “want to be . . . caught in the 

middle” of mother and maternal grandmother. But he did not have any concerns about 

maternal grandmother caring for M.C. Father said he would fax a letter giving maternal 

grandmother authorization to attend to M.C.’s medical and educational needs.

At the detention hearing, the court found a prima facie case for detaining M.C. from 

mother. The court released M.C. to father with the understanding that father planned to 

leave M.C. with maternal grandmother while he was out of town working.

2. Jurisdiction and Disposition on Initial Petition

M.C. indicated that, if father continued to do long-term trucking jobs, he would want 

to live with maternal grandmother. According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, 

maternal grandmother was concerned that father might want to take M.C. on the road with 

him because she felt trucking was not an appropriate lifestyle for a child. She felt that M.C. 

needed his father, but father did not have a home, and M.C. could not live with father while 

he drove from state to state on his trucking jobs. Maternal grandmother was happy to 

continue caring for M.C. if that was what father wanted, but she needed financial help. She 

explained: “I am on a fixed income, social security and I can’t afford to pay for all the 

things [M.C.] needs. I need money for gas, clothes, shoes and other things, too.” The social 

worker explained to maternal grandmother that she was not eligible to receive funding from 

DCFS because M.C. had not been detained from father and was in father’s custody. If 

father could not provide maternal grandmother with funds to care for M.C., then father 

would have to make another plan for his care.

Father was hoping that maternal grandmother would permit M.C. to stay with her, 

though father wanted to take M.C. on his trucking runs for a period while M.C. was on 
4

summer break from school. But he wanted M.C. to stay with maternal grandmother until 

M.C. could reunify with mother. Father indicated that he was aware maternal grandmother

needed financial help to care for M.C. He was in training on the job and had not received a 

paycheck yet. He would complete training in June 2013, and once he did, he would start 

sending money to maternal grandmother to provide for M.C.’s needs. He was upset that 

maternal grandmother persisted in asking the social worker for financial assistance because 

he had spoken to maternal grandmother about his training, and he thought they had an 

understanding that he would send her money once he was paid.

Mother pleaded no contest to the petition. The court sustained the allegation under 

section 300, subdivision (a) that she had inappropriately disciplined M.C. using an extension 

cord and belt. The court dismissed without prejudice the section 300, subdivision (b) 

allegations that mother physically abused M.C. and father knew of it or reasonably should 

have known but failed to protect M.C. It also dismissed without prejudice the allegation

that mother had an 11-year history of illicit drug use and was a current abuser of marijuana. 

The court entered a home-of-father placement order, on the condition that M.C. would stay 

with maternal grandmother while father was working. The court ordered family 

reunifications services for mother, family maintenance services for father, and counseling 

for M.C. to address abuse and bullying issues.

3. Six-month Review

Maternal grandmother had been caring for M.C. throughout the six-month review 

period with no financial assistance from father, and father had not faxed her a letter giving 

her authority to tend to M.C.’s medical and education needs, as he said he would at the time 

of detention. She continued to be willing to care for him, but again expressed that she 

needed financial assistance. She was also concerned that she did not have written consent 

from father to tend to M.C.’s medical and education needs. Father did buy M.C. school 

clothes prior to the start of the new school year. He had visited with M.C. three times 

during the six-month review period and called sporadically. But when maternal 

grandmother tried to call father, he never answered his phone. Maternal grandmother did 
5

not have regular contact with mother either. Mother was also travelling with father on his 

trucking jobs.

M.C. had been in counseling and was making progress, in terms of his aggressive 

behaviors. His therapist was recommending conjoint therapy with father, as soon as father 

could make it in for an appointment. Maternal grandmother indicated she was able to enroll 

M.C. in counseling because the staff at the counseling office knew her and permitted her to 

do it. The social worker indicated in the DCFS report that she was concerned neither parent 

had given maternal grandmother written consent to deal with M.C.’s medical and education 

needs, even after several requests from DCFS. The social worker had tried to contact both 

parents by phone and had not received return calls from either one. DCFS was planning to 

seek a warrant removal order from father and was hoping to formally place M.C. with 

maternal grandmother. Because of the lack of financial assistance from father, the failure to 

provide medical and educational consents after repeated requests, and the parent’s ignoring 

the social worker’s phone calls, DCFS felt father’s plan for M.C. was “no longer . . . safely 

appropriate.” DCFS further felt both parents had “basically abandoned their son with[out] 

making plans and provisions for his overall safety and well being.”

At the January 2014 review hearing, the court found conditions for taking jurisdiction 

continued to exist and ordered continued services for the parents.

4. Subsequent Petition

In April 2014, DCFS filed a subsequent petition3 containing allegations under section 

300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition alleged (1) father had made an inappropriate 

plan for M.C.’s ongoing care and supervision by leaving M.C. with maternal grandmother, 

who was unable to provide ongoing care and supervision for M.C. without assistance from 

 

3 Section 342 governs subsequent petitions and states: “In any case in which a minor 

has been found to be a person described by Section 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts 

or circumstances, other than those under which the original petition was sustained, sufficient 

to state that the minor is a person described in Section 300, the petitioner shall file a 

subsequent petition.”
6

father; (2) father failed to maintain medical insurance for M.C., resulting in his mental 

health services being terminated; and (3) father failed to inform maternal grandmother of his 

whereabouts and failed to maintain regular contact with maternal grandmother and M.C. 

The court found a prima facie case for detaining M.C. from father and ordered him placed 

with maternal grandmother.

The social worker’s statements in support of the removal order and the 

jurisdiction/disposition report set forth the following. The social worker had been trying to 

contact father since July 2013 to ask him to send a medical and educational consent for 

M.C. After three unreturned calls on three different days in July, the social worker tried 

mother, who returned her call and was traveling with father. Mother stated that the social 

worker had not received a faxed letter of consent because the fax machines at all the rest 

stops they tried did not work. The social worker explained she needed to speak to father to 

determine whether there was an issue with M.C. being placed in father’s custody. Mother 

replied, “do what you gotta do and we will do what we gotta do,” then hung up the phone. 

Four days later, the social worker left father another message requesting that he send a 

medical and educational consent letter. After approximately two weeks went by and she 

had not received the consent letter, the social worker called father again. He answered, but 

when the social worker identified herself, he hung up the phone. She called back and left 

another message. By November 2013, the social worker still had not received the consent 

letter. She called and left mother and father still another message.

After the review hearing in January 2014, the social worker spoke to father, who said 

he had left the consent letter at maternal grandmother’s house (“on the top of the TV”) when 

he was in town during M.C.’s holiday break. The social worker alerted maternal 

grandmother, who then found the letter.4

 

4 The letter, dated January 11, 2014, stated in pertinent part: “To whom it may 

concern, [¶] I [father] give my permission to [maternal grandmother] for only school and 

medical issues for [M.C.]. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me . . . .”
7

In February 2014, M.C.’s therapist called the social worker to say she had to 

terminate his services because he no longer had insurance through Medi-Cal. The social 

worker left messages with mother and father to see whether they could resolve the Medi-Cal 

issue, but as of April, M.C. still did not have medical insurance. Maternal grandmother was 

concerned because M.C. was much more stable when he was receiving counseling services. 

M.C. displayed defiant behaviors with maternal grandmother, displayed anger issues, and 

appeared unmotivated.

The social worker met with mother and father informally in April 2014. Mother was 

living in Las Vegas and said she did not have a place to live in California. Father and 

mother asked about mother being M.C.’s caretaker. The social worker informed them that 

she could not be his caretaker for the time being because the court had detained M.C. from 

her for physical abuse. Father had no family or other support system to help with M.C.

(other than maternal grandmother). Both parents reported that they did not have medical 

insurance at the time either, and they “d[id] not have the time to fix the issue” for M.C. at 

the moment. Father said he planned to have his truck driving job only until the end of the 

year, and then he would find local work. Father reported that he gave M.C. money and 

purchased clothes for him when he visited, which M.C. confirmed. Maternal grandmother, 

however, never received any financial support from father. M.C. was growing out of the 

clothes father bought for him. Father did not want to give money directly to maternal 

grandmother because of “ongoing issues between all parties.”

According to M.C., he had a cellular phone that his parents had given him, and he 

talked to them on it every day or every other day. Father visited him when he was in town 

several times, and M.C. went trucking with him and mother during M.C.’s holiday break in 

December 2013 and spring break in 2014.

By July 2014, M.C. had improved in terms of his behavior and defiance with 

maternal grandmother, but he wanted to live with mother and father and was upset that he 

could not. Father still had his trucking job and was willing to participate in conjoint 

counseling over the phone or in person with notice. Mother had begun complying with the 

case plan that the court ordered, and she and father were trying to find a residence in 
8

Victorville to be closer to M.C. and make reunification more productive. Maternal 

grandmother continued to be willing to care for M.C. but could not without financial help 

from father.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court struck the allegation that father 

failed to maintain medical insurance for M.C., on the ground that father did not have a legal 

obligation to provide medical insurance, but it otherwise sustained the subsequent petition

and found M.C. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The court 

ordered M.C. removed from father and suitably placed with maternal grandmother. The 

court explained its ruling thusly: “The evidence in this case regarding the allegations is 

based primarily on the evidence from the caretaker. [¶] So, clearly, if this was an 

appropriate plan and one that was being supported by the parents, the caretaker wouldn’t be 

struggling and making the statements that the caretaker was making. [¶] The parents have 

not put themselves in a position to be able to care for their children by their choices at this 

time. [¶] So the choices would be foster care or grandma. [¶] So that’s why grandma’s 

involved.”

The court ordered individual counseling for M.C. and conjoint counseling with both 

parents if recommended by M.C.’s therapist. It also ordered father to complete a parenting 

class for adolescents and family counseling, including with the maternal grandmother. It 

granted father unmonitored visitation. Father filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Father contends we must reverse because substantial evidence did not support the 

court’s jurisdictional finding that M.C. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions 

(b) and (g). We disagree.

In reviewing the jurisdictional findings of the court, “we look to see if substantial 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this 

determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings 

and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the 

court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the 

trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the 
9

evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient 

facts to support the findings of the trial court.” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 

315, 321.) If supported by substantial evidence, we must uphold the challenged findings, 

even though substantial evidence to the contrary may also exist, and the juvenile court might 

have reached a different conclusion had it determined the facts and weighed credibility 

differently. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

In relevant part, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides for juvenile court 

jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will 

suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her 

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” The relevant part of 

section 300, subdivision (g) provides for juvenile court jurisdiction if “[t]he child has been 

left without any provision for support.” Section 300, subdivision (g) does not require a 

finding of harm or risk of harm. (In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 153.) Further, the 

ground that a child has been left without any provision for support does not require the 

additional finding that the parent is “‘unwilling or unable’” to provide care or support for 

the child. (D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1128-1129.)

Here, substantial evidence supported the court’s conclusion that father had left M.C. 

without any provision for support. Father’s plan was for maternal grandmother to care for 

M.C. while he was traveling for his trucking job. Father has no other family or support 

system that could care for M.C. while he was on the road. Mother could not take care of 

M.C. because he was detained from her on the initial petition in May 2013. Father was 

aware from the first that maternal grandmother had limited income and needed financial

assistance to care for M.C. In June 2013, father said that he would complete training that 

month and could begin sending money to maternal grandmother. He believed he and 

maternal grandmother had an understanding about this. He never did send money to her. 

Father contends he did not fail to provide any support for M.C. because he bought him 

school clothes and gave him money when he visited. This argument is unavailing. There is 

no evidence in the record of how much money he gave M.C., but that money does not 

appear to have ever made it from the child to maternal grandmother. Father did not want to 
10

give money directly to maternal grandmother because of unspecified “ongoing issues.” 

Whatever the ongoing issues, father had designated a caregiver who said she could provide 

care only if father provided financial assistance. Father did not do so, and he could not 

identify any other possible caregivers.

Father further argues that he did not leave M.C. without any provision for support 

because maternal grandmother had been supporting M.C. on an ongoing basis without his 

financial assistance. He points out there was no evidence that M.C. “suffered malnutrition, 

or was left homeless, or was without daily necessities.” First, section 300, subdivision (g) 

does not require a finding that the child be suffering from these conditions. Section 300, 

subdivision (b) requires “the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide 

the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment,” but that is not the 

ground for jurisdiction at issue here. Second, that maternal grandmother had somehow 

managed to care for M.C. without assistance during the year that he was living with her does 

not mean her need was any less real, especially if the situation was going to continue. She 

was on a fixed income of social security. She had consistently requested financial 

assistance right up to the jurisdiction hearing on the instant petition. It is understandable 

that maternal grandmother would have tried to stretch her income rather than put M.C. out 

of her home. But father’s argument amounts to speculation that she could continue to care 

for M.C. indefinitely without assistance. Her continued requests for assistance were 

evidence to the contrary.

In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, on which father relies, does not 

compel a contrary result. In that case, the mother suffered from troubling delusions and had 

admitted psychiatric problems. (Id. at p. 1314.) Her employer had recently terminated her 

for refusing to undergo therapy. (Id. at p. 1315.) The father lived in Brazil and erratically 

sent support of $900 per month. (Ibid.) The children were temporarily placed in protective 

custody with distant relatives for six days and then permitted to return to their mother’s 

home well before the jurisdiction hearing. (Ibid.) The petition contained allegations under 

section 300, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (g). (Matthew S., at p. 1315.) The section 300, 

subdivision (g) allegations stated “that the children have been left without any provision for 
11

support in that their father is employed in Brazil and [the mother] has primary physical 

custody.” (Matthew S., at p. 1315.) After the allegations relating to one child were 

dismissed, the court sustained the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations, among others, as 

to the other child and permitted him to reside with the mother under family maintenance 

services. (Matthew S., at p. 1318.) The appellate court held substantial evidence did not 

support the finding that the child had been left without provision for support under section 

300, subdivision (g) because, while the mother’s financial resources were strained and she 

had recently lost her job, she had been supporting the children for years, continued to do so, 

and was seeking new employment. (Matthew S., at p. 1320.) Also, there was “no evidence 

of malnutrition, deprivation of shelter, clothes or medical care.” (Ibid.) Thus, the child in 

Matthew S. lived with and was supported by his mother. Here, by contrast, father 

acknowledged he could not care for M.C. and had to make another plan for the child’s care. 

The mother in Matthew S. never said she needed financial assistance to care for her children, 

unlike the caregiver here.

Because substantial evidence supported the court’s jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (g), and the court’s jurisdiction may rest on a single ground, we need not 

consider whether jurisdiction was also appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b).

(D.M. v. Superior Court, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) Still, we note that the section 

300, subdivision (b) case on which father primarily relies, In re V.M. (2010) 191 

Cal.App.4th 245, is distinguishable. The In re V.M. court held substantial evidence did not 

support the juvenile court’s finding that the child had suffered or was at substantial risk of 

suffering serious physical harm or illness (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). (In re V.M., supra, at 

p. 252.) The child’s mother was deceased and she had lived with her maternal grandparents 

all her life, but the father had consistently visited her. (Id. at p. 248.) The father had been a 

professional truck driver for 19 years. (Id. at p. 249.) He always provided for his child

financially and the grandparents were never required to seek a court order for him to pay 

child support. (Ibid.) He paid whatever the grandparents asked, varying from $100 to $500 

per month. He never refused the grandparents’ request for money. (Id. at p. 250.) He gave 

cash to the grandparents when he picked up the child for visits, and he had the 
12

grandmother’s bank account number and deposited money directly into it when he was 

driving out of state. (Ibid.) He had just paid to repair the grandmother’s car. (Id. at p. 249.) 

He also paid for part of the child’s private school tuition. (Id. at p. 250.) At some point, the 

grandparents actually told the father that they could take care of the child without his help 

and they needed nothing further from him. (Ibid.) This case, in which father has never 

given maternal grandmother financial support, is quite manifestly different.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

FLIER, J.

WE CONCUR:

RUBIN, Acting P. J.

GRIMES, J.