J-S13044-23

2023 PA Super 109

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JONATHAN BOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2642 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-09-CR-0004420-2021

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 13, 2023

Appellant, Jonathan Boyd, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County after the trial court, 

presiding over Appellant’s stipulated waiver trial, found Appellant guilty of 

possessing a firearm while being a person not to possess,1 carrying a firearm 

without a license,2 possession of a small amount of marijuana,3 possession of 

drug paraphernalia,4 operating a vehicle without a valid inspection,5 and 

improper sun screening.6 Herein, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order 

denying his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained through the 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

3 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i).

4 35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(32).

5 75 Pa.C.S. § 4703(a).

6 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1).
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execution of a search warrant on a vehicle in his control at the time. We 

affirm.

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as 

follows:

[On July 28, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed against Appellant

charging him with the above-referenced offenses stemming from 

the search of his vehicle.] On December 29, 2021, Appellant filed 

a Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence, challenging the legality 

of a traffic stop and the sufficiency of a search warrant 

subsequently issued pursuant to that stop. 

On June 21, 2022, [the trial court] denied Appellant’s Motion to 

Suppress and made the following findings of fact and conclusions 

of law:

We heard from [the affiant,] Officer Francis Ludovici 

with the Bensalem Township Police Department[,] 

who has been a police officer for approximately five 

[years], [with the last two and a half years spent] with 

Bensalem Township. Officer Ludovici has an extensive 

history including military service, making him familiar 

with firearms. He’s also familiar with drug cases and 

drug interdiction cases, having received training in 

that regard as well.

On July 25, 2021, Officer Ludovici was working the 

7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. shift. He was in uniform in a 

marked police vehicle in Bensalem Township, Bucks 

County. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on Route 1 

between Knights Inn and the Comfort Inn in 

Bensalem, he noticed a silver Chrysler sedan with 

dark windows. He believed the tint exceeded the legal 

limits. He also believed that the inspection stickers 

appeared to be counterfeit. His initial reaction was 

that the color [of the inspection stickers] was off. The 

stickers, even though he [only] had a brief period of 

time to view them, [were] close enough [for Officer 

Ludovici] to make that distinction.
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He pulled behind the vehicle and initiated a traffic 

stop. He approached the passenger’s side and noticed 

there were two occupants in the vehicle. However, 

before noticing the two occupants, he directed that 

the driver lower the windows so that he could see 

inside the vehicle.

[Officer Ludovici] identified [Appellant] as the 

operator of the vehicle. He requested identification 

and information from [Appellant]. [Appellant] was 

able to provide his operator’s license [and] proof of 

insurance. It should be noted that throughout the 

stop, [Appellant] was on the phone trying to retrieve 

. . . his insurance information . . . .

Officer Ludovici does not recall if [Appellant] provided 

him with the necessary registration paperwork. 

However, he was able to subsequently learn that the 

vehicle was registered to [Appellant].

At all times relevant to the car stop, the Officer’s body 

cam had been activated and was admitted as C-1.

[Officer Ludovici] testified that at the time [Appellant] 

appeared nervous. He also testified that he noticed 

numerous air fresheners in the vehicle, and, based 

upon his experience, those air fresheners are common 

to mask the odor of narcotics. He believed he noticed 

the odor of marijuana. [Appellant] admitted to having 

smoked marijuana previously, but [he] did not have—

or claimed to have not been smoking—marijuana in 

the vehicle or recently. He did not have a medical 

marijuana card.

During the stop, [Officer Ludovici] noticed a [gun] 

holster in the backseat of the vehicle. He was 

concerned for his safety and requested another officer 

to keep an eye on the vehicle and its occupants while 

he contacted the radio room for additional 

information. He inquired whether [Appellant] was 

permitted to carry a firearm. He learned he was not. 

He also learned that [Appellant] had a prior conviction 

for aggravated assault.
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[Appellant] was asked to step outside of the vehicle 

and agreed to do so. He was asked if there was a 

firearm in the vehicle. [Appellant] said no and 

subsequently granted consent to search the interior of 

the vehicle. After searching the interior of the vehicle, 

Officer Ludovici then opened the trunk of the vehicle. 

At that moment, [Appellant] withdrew consent, and 

the officer, without hesitation, closed the trunk and 

did not conduct any further search of the vehicle. He 

told [Appellant] the reason for this was he believed a 

weapon came with the holster and was concerned 

about a weapon in the vehicle. 

[Officer Ludovici also explained] that he, upon further 

examination of the inspection sticker, noticed it was 

counterfeit based upon its color, font size of the 

numbers, the Keystone symbol was not accurate, and 

the emissions sticker had eleven numbers instead of 

ten, and the back of the sticker was not filled out, and 

there was no inspection station number.

It was determined that those numbers had never been 

issued, leading the Officer to conclude it was a 

counterfeit sticker. He also used a light meter on the 

tinted windows and was able to determine that only 

18% of the light passes through the windows, and

70% would be required for inspection.

Bensalem Township has a policy for the impoundment 

of vehicles. . . . [It states,] “Administrative traffic 

impoundment duty tow storage lot includes 

impoundment of a motor vehicle for certain offenses 

including . . . the vehicle is not properly registered 

and/or insured[.] The vehicle administratively 

impounded may be towed to the duty tow lot or in the 

stored facility if need dictates.”

[Appellant] indicated earlier he was unable to provide 

proof of insurance or that the vehicle was properly 

insured or registered pursuant to the administrative 

policy of Bensalem Township Police Department—or 

Bensalem Township. Therefore, the vehicle in 

question was towed pursuant to the administrative 
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traffic and impoundment policy and taken to the police 

storage facility.

Officer Ludovici determined after having the vehicle 

impounded that he would apply for a search warrant, 

and a search warrant was obtained from Magisterial 

District Judge Petrucci. The search warrant was 

admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4, and a search

of the vehicle was executed.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/22, at 1-3.

On June 21, 2022, immediately after the trial court denied Appellant’s 

Motion to Suppress, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated waiver trial and was

found guilty of all charges except operating a motor vehicle without required 

financial responsibility. On September 27, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to 

a downward departure sentence of not less than three months to no more 

than 23 months of incarceration, with a concurrent county probationary period 

of five years. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents the following questions for this Court’s consideration:

1. Was the search warrant for the search of Appellant’s motor 

vehicle issued without probable cause or other legal 

justification in violation of the constitutions of the United States 

and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and did the trial 

court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence?

2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the inevitable discovery 

doctrine applied to the facts of this case?

Brief for Appellant, at 4.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review of a challenge to an 

order denying a motion to suppress. “Once a motion to suppress evidence 

has been filed, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance 
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of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of 

the defendant's rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-

1048 (Pa. 2012); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H) (stating, “[t]he 

Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence and 

of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of 

the defendant's rights”). Our standard of review for an order denying a motion 

to suppress is well-established.

[We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court's 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read 

in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression 

court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound 

by these findings and may reverse only if the [suppression] court's 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of 

the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the [suppression court] are subject to our 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Mbewe, 203 A.3d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation 

marks omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. 

Super. 2018). 

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures by police in areas where individuals have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy.”[] Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 643 

Pa. 408, 173 A.3d 733, 741 (2017). If a person has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in a place, then these constitutional 
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provisions generally require police to obtain a warrant to search 

the place; a search warrant must be supported by probable cause 

and issued by a neutral, detached magistrate. Id. Warrantless 

searches are presumptively unreasonable under the state and 

federal constitutions. Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238, 

924 A.2d 621, 627 (2007).

“Probable cause” is a practical, non-technical concept. 

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 574 Pa. 261, 830 A.2d 554, 560 

(2003). To establish probable cause, the Commonwealth must 

demonstrate that a search meets the requirements of the ‘totalityof-the-circumstances’ test. Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 

188, 988 A.2d 649, 655-56 (2010). Pursuant to that test, when 

presented with an application for a warrant, “[a] magistrate is to 

make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 

‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay 

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 

of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 542 Pa. 418, 668 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1995) (citation and 

some internal quotation marks omitted).

Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 39–40 (Pa. 2021). See also 

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 253 (Pa. Super. 2016) (issuing 

authority must decide that probable cause exists at the time of its issuance 

and make this determination on facts that are described within the four 

corners of the supporting affidavit and closely related in time to the date of 

issuance of the warrant). 

In the case sub judice, the Affidavit of Probable Cause sets forth the 

totality of circumstances prompting the affiant, Officer Francis Ludovici of the 

Bensalem Township Police Department, to apply for a warrant to search the 

trunk of Appellant’s vehicle. At the outset, the Affidavit states that at the time 

of the July 25, 2021 police-citizen interaction, Officer Ludovici had been a 

police officer for over four years, during which he had been involved in 
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hundreds of narcotics investigations resulting in arrests and had received 

specialized drug and narcotics training from local, state, and federal agencies 

related to drug identification, vehicle search and seizures, narcotics field test 

certifications, and interview and interrogations. Affidavit, 7/25/21, at 2. 

At approximately 10:31 a.m., Officer Ludovici was driving his patrol car 

around Street Road and the Lincoln Highway when he observed Appellant 

operating a vehicle with “heavy window tint” and what appeared to be 

counterfeit inspection stickers. Id. The officer executed a traffic stop of 

Appellant’s vehicle in the area of Street Road and the Pennsylvania Turnpike. 

Id.

7

Upon addressing Appellant and his passenger, Tiffany Debnam, the 

officer observed they were overly nervous and avoided eye contact. 

Appellant’s nervousness manifested itself through shaking hands and difficulty 

concentrating while locating paperwork and speaking to the officer. Id. 

The Affidavit also notes apparent efforts made by Appellant to mask the 

odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Specifically, as Officer Ludovici 

approached the vehicle, Appellant

immediately placed a ‘black and mild’ cigarette in his mouth and 

lit it. At this time, your Affiant observed numerous purposely 

placed air fresheners throughout the passenger compartment of 

the vehicle in addition to other masking agents which included 

cologne, and aerosol cans. Your Affiant believed that he smelled 

the odor of marijuana combined with the black and mild cigarette 

____________________________________________

7 Prior to initiating the face-to-face encounter with Appellant, Officer Ludovici 

verified from his patrol car that the vehicle was registered to Appellant and 

that Appellant resided in Philadelphia. Id.
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and overwhelming odor of air fresheners. Boyd was asked about 

the odor of marijuana and admitted that he does in fact smoke 

marijuana but did not have a medical marijuana card. Boyd 

denied having marijuana in the vehicle. Your Affiant knows from 

his knowledge, training, and experience that these masking 

agents are often used by subjects who use and/or sell controlled 

substance(s) to avoid detection by law enforcement.

Id.

Officer Ludovici also addresses in his Affidavit what he views as

significant information acquired about Appellant’s stop at a Bucks County hotel 

known for drug and firearms crime during his visit to Bucks County. “During

the encounter,” the Affidavit continues, 

your Affiant asked Boyd routine questions about his itinerary

including the origin and destination of his trip. He advised your 

Affiant that he left the Knights Inn Hotel located at 2707 Lincoln 

Highway in Bensalem. Boyd said that he was in the process of 

returning home to Philadelphia PA when he was stopped for the 

traffic violations.

Your Affiant is familiar with the Knights Inn as being a high crime 

area. The area of the Knights Inn has been identified as a high 

crime area based on hundreds of arrests that have been made 

specifically in firearms violations, narcotics, and other felonious 

crimes. Additionally, this specific area was designated a high 

crime area by the federal government.

Id. at 2-3.

Relatedly, the Affidavit discusses the officer’s awareness that Appellant’s 

route of travel and the location of the traffic stop has been identified as a

narcotics “Pipeline” highway:

Your Affiant is aware of the fact that exit #351 of the PA Turnpike 

is a major path of travel in the transportation of illicit narcotics 

and weapons to Philadelphia. US Rt. 1 between the Pennsylvania 

Turnpike interchange and Philadelphia, PA has been identified as 

a “Pipeline” highway. A “Pipeline” highway is a roadway that is 
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frequently used by drug traffickers to transport drugs, proceeds 

and weapons between two cities.

Id. at 4.

The officer’s observation of an empty gun holster inside the passenger 

area, and Appellant’s status as a person not to possess a firearm, are also 

described:

Your Affiant directed Boyd to roll down all four windows for officer 

safety reasons. Once the windows were rolled down your Affiant 

was able to see inside of the vehicle. During the conversation with 

Boyd, your Affiant immediately observed a black, Galco handgun, 

pistol holster located on the backseat tucked between the seat 

and the trunk area. 

At that point, your Affiant directed Officer Branford to continue to 

watch the occupants inside of the vehicle while your Affiant 

continued to verify the occupant’s [sic] identities. Your Affiant

contacted 22B and requested to have Boyd queried for a valid 

firearms license. No record was found and it was discovered that 

Boyd did have a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault 

involving a firearms offense which prohibits him from possessing 

a firearm.

Id. at 3.

Finally, the Affidavit states that Officer Ludovici ordered Appellant out 

of the vehicle and asked him if he was in possession of any weapons, if any 

weapons were registered to him, and if anyone in his vehicle could have left 

a weapon inside his vehicle, and he answered “no” to all questions. Id. It 

was at this time, according to the Affidavit, that Appellant claimed he has not 

carried a weapon since his 1998 aggravated assault conviction and prison 

sentence for shooting a person. When the officer asked Appellant why, then, 

was there a gun holster in his car, Appellant replied that the holster was “old,” 
J-S13044-23

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and the officer could throw it out. The Affidavit notes that Appellant’s 

disavowal of the holster was incongruous with its presence in the passenger 

area of a car he currently drove and had owned for only one year. Id.

Appellant contends that the search warrant for the search of his vehicle 

was issued without probable cause because “[n]one of the allegations in the 

officer’s Affidavit, either separately or together, establish a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle.” Brief for 

Appellant, at 19. From this initial overview, Appellant takes each basis 

identified in the Affidavit in isolation and argues that each fails to amount to 

probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. 

Specifically, Appellant cites to authority holding that neither furtive 

movements nor excessive nervousness provides a sufficient basis upon which 

to conduct an investigatory detention,

8

that the odor of marijuana alone does 

not amount to probable cause for a search,

9 and that mere presence in a high 

crime area in no way establishes involvement in criminal activity.

10

 Regarding 

the empty holster lying in plain view in his vehicle, he attempts to distinguish

the underlying facts of a 2020 non-precedential decision of this Court, which 

found probable cause to issue a search warrant from officers’ spotting an

____________________________________________

8 Brief for Appellant, at 19-20 (citing Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 

A.2d 1196, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

9 Id. at 20-21 (citing Commonwealth v. Barr, 266, A.3d 25, 44 (Pa. 

2021)).

10 Id. at 21-22 (citing Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 289 (Pa. 

Super. 2001)).
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empty gun holster in plain view during execution of an arrest warrant in the 

arrestee’s residence.11 “[I]t is certainly more likely that a firearm will be found 

in an individual’s residence where an empty holster is found than in the trunk 

of a car[,]” Appellant baldly argues, and he maintains further that the 

observation of the gun holster in Evans was but one of several factors

supporting the issuance of a search warrant.

Appellant’s argument, however, is founded on a piecemeal assessment 

of the facts presented in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, wherein he finds each 

fact insufficient to sustain probable cause. This approach runs counter to the 

totality of circumstances review of the Affidavit that the magistrate was 

required to make. 

For example, Appellant relies on post-Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”)12

decisional law holding that the odor of burnt marijuana, alone, supplies 

insufficient suspicion of criminal activity to contribute to a finding of probable 

cause. See Barr, supra (holding because aroma of legally vaporized 

marijuana can be indistinguishable from aroma of unlawfully smoked 

____________________________________________

11 Id. at 25 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 229 A.3d 329 (nonprecedential decision) (Pa. Super. 2020). In Evans, we upheld the 

suppression court’s conclusion that probable cause supported the issuance of 

a search warrant. The record showed that officers executing the arrest

warrant knew defendant was not permitted to possess a firearm, observed the 

holster inside a transparent drawer from a lawful vantage point, and sought a 

search warrant based on this observation as well as on observation of other 

indicia of drug dealing. Id. at *8. 

12 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110.
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marijuana, “mere odor” or “plain smell” evidence is insufficient to form 

probable cause of unlawful conduct).

13

 Officer Ludovici’s Affidavit alleged, 

however, that not only did Appellant’s vehicle emit the aroma of marijuana, 

but Appellant also admitted to the officer that he smokes marijuana and does

not possess an MMA card. 

Given this admission, we find the present case aligns more closely to 

cases involving additional facts which, taken together, create sufficient 

suspicion of criminal activity to create probable cause to search for 

contraband. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341 (Pa. 

Super. 2022), a police officer patrolling a housing complex dealing with drug 

and firearms crime approached a car that bore a license plate registered to 

another vehicle and was parked for 45 minutes in a location within the complex 

where cars typically did not park. The officer immediately detected an odor 

of marijuana emanating through the open driver’s side window, and during 

____________________________________________

13 This Court recently explained, 

“Pursuant to the “plain smell” doctrine, Pennsylvania courts 

historically held that the smell of marijuana alone would provide 

officers probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. 

However, the Supreme Court recognized that the 2016 enactment 

of the [MMA], which created a limited exception for legal 

possession and use of medical marijuana under certain 

circumstances, invalidated the “plain smell” doctrine as marijuana 

is no longer per se illegal in Pennsylvania. Barr, 266 A.3d at 41.”

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2022)
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his encounter with defendant, the defendant admitted the car smelled like 

marijuana but denied that he had smoked marijuana and claimed there was 

no marijuana in the car. When the officer said he had been watching the 

defendant for the last 45 minutes, the defendant, who appeared inattentive,

maintained he had been parked there for only 10 minutes.

Based on the totality of circumstances described above, the officer 

asked the defendant to alight from the car, but defendant did not comply. 

After officers eventually removed Appellant from the car, a search of the car 

revealed a loaded firearm under the driver’s seat and a small amount of 

marijuana. The suppression court subsequently denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress evidence discovered in the car, the prosecution withdrew 

charges of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia, and 

a jury found the defendant guilty of, inter alia, possessing a firearm without a 

license.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s order denying his 

motion to suppress evidence, which he maintained was discovered based on 

the odor of marijuana in violation of Barr. We disagreed. Applying a totality 

of circumstances analysis, we reasoned:

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial 

court that the officers had probable cause to conduct the search 

given the peculiar location of the car where vehicles do not 

typically park, the time frame that the vehicle was idle in the high 

crime area, the fact that the vehicle had a license plate registered 

to another vehicle, the odor of marijuana, Appellant's dishonesty, 

and his combative behavior. As a result, we conclude the trial 

court did not err in denying Appellant's suppression motion.
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Arias, 286 A.3d at 349.

We find Arias applicable to the present matter. When coupled with the 

aroma of marijuana and Appellant’s admission that the smokes marijuana and 

possesses no MMA card, the additional presence of: common drug masking 

agents producing an “overwhelming” fragrance in the car; his lighting an 

aromatic cigarette as the officer approached the vehicle; his nervous and

distracted demeanor; his traveling along a known drug-running corridor in a 

car bearing counterfeit inspection stickers; his additional admission that he 

was returning to Philadelphia after having visited the Bensalem Knights Inn,

which is designated a high drug and firearm crime location; the presence of a 

particular gun holster—known by the officer to be sold with a gun included—

on his back seat despite his status as a person not to possess a firearm; and 

his implausible explanation for the presence of the holster, taken together,

formed probable cause to believe marijuana and firearms were in Appellant’s 

vehicle.

14

 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying 

Appellant’s suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.15

____________________________________________

14 With respect to probable cause related to the presence of a firearm, we find

the totality of facts also brings the case sub judice within the rationale of 

Evans, as Officer Ludovici authored the Affidavit of Probable Cause knowing 

that Appellant was not permitted to possess a firearm and having observed 

the holster from a lawful vantage point, while also encountering circumstances 

indicating Appellant’s itinerary involved illicit drugs. Id. at *8. 

15 Given our disposition of Appellant’s first issue, we need not address whether 

the inevitable discovery doctrine provides an alternate basis upon which to 

sustain the order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2023