Docket No. 101418.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

ANTHONYMARCONI, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO HEIGHTS POLICE PENSI ON BOAR D et al. , Appella

nts.

Opinion filed October 19, 2006.–Modified on denial of rehearing May 29, 2007.

PER CURIAM Justice Fitzgerald dissented, with opinion. Justices Kilbride and Burke took no part in the decision.

OPINION

Plaintiff, Anthony

Marconi , filed a

n applica ti on f or a disa bility pensionwith defend an t Chicago Heights Police Pension Board (Board). During the pendency of the Board’s review of plaintiff’s applicationfor a di sabil ity p ension, pl aintiff f iled suit in

the circ uit
court of Cook County, requesting, inter alia , a declaratory

judgment that the Board did not timely c omplete review of his application. While the d eclaratory

action was pending in the circuit court, the Board issued a decision denying plaintiff a disability pension. Plaintiff thereafter filed an act

ion f or administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit cour tultimately confirmed the Board’s decision on administrative review. Soon t here after, the circuit court granted theBoard summary judgment in the declaratory-2- action. On appea

l, the app ellate

court affirmed the grant

of summary judgment i n the declaratory

action, reversed the circuit court’s affirmance of the Board’s decis ion to deny plaintiff a disabili

ty pension, and remanded this cause to the B oard for further proceedings. 361 I ll. App. 3d 1. In addition, the appe llate cou rt also declared section 3–115 o f

the I llinois Pens ion Code (40 IL CS 5/3–115 (West 2002)) unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. Onappeal to this court, the Board cha llenge s only the appe llate court’s reversal of

the Board’s denial

of plaintiff’s disability pension claim on administrative review, and the appellate court’s holding that section3–115 of

the Pension Code (40

IL CS 5/3–115 (West 2002)) is unconstitutional as applied. For the reasons that follow, w e reverse the judgment of the appellate court with respe ct to plaintiff’s administrative review

action, and vacate that portion of the appe llate court’s opinion hol ding sec tion 3–115 o f the Pens i on Code unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff became a sworn member of the Chicago Heights police department

(Department) on October 10, 1988, holdi ng t he rank of p atrol of fi ce r. On Fe br ua ry 8 , 1 99 6, pl ai nt if f w as se nt by t h e Department

to Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, the Department’s own psychiatris t, to determine his fi tnes s for duty. The De partment referred plaintiff to Dr. Wahlstrom af ter pla intiff’s colleagues had reported to the Department’s then-chief of police , Carla O santowsk i, that plainti ff ha d threatened to commit suicide. During plaintiff’s session with Dr. Wah lstro m, plaintiff admitted that he had experienced

thoughts of

committing

suicide a nd had expr

essed tho se thoughts to fellow officers. However, plaintiff tol d Dr. Wahlstrom tha t, at the time of the evaluation, he no longer felt suicidal. D r

. Wa hl st ro m c on cl ud ed th at pl ai nt if f w as fi t t o r et ur n t o d ut y. Plaintiff was again sent by

Chief Osantowski to Dr. Wahlst rom for a fitn ess e valuation on July 24, 1996. Chief Osantowski que stioned

plaintiff’s fitness for duty ba sed upon incidents where plaintiff had exhibited hostility towards others. A s part of the evaluation, Dr. Wahlstrom met with plaintiff for several sessions, and spoke with

Chi ef Osan

towski as w ell as pla

intiff’s longtime-3- girlfriend, Sheila. Dr. Wahlst rom concluded that plaintiff was suffering from major depression and stress related to work and outside factor s. Dr. Wah lstrom note d that the se stress ors included several on-the-job shooting incidents and an FBI inve stigation of the Department. Although Dr. Wahlstrom opined thatplaintiff was fit to

resume duty , this rec omm endati on was contingent on plaintiff continuing in psychotherapy and taking prescribed ps yc hotropic medicati ons. Accordingly , the Department arranged for pl aintiff t o attend biw eekly psychothera

py sess ions with Dr. Wahlstrom. Plaintiff also began taking three pre scription medica tio ns: trazodone, an antidepressant ; Depakote, a mood-stabilizing medication; and clozapine, an antianxiety medication. OnSeptember 9, 1996, Dr. Wahlstro m fax ed a letter to Chief Osantowski informing her that plaintiff had made direct phy sical threats of bodily harm ag ainst her, including a statement that plaintiff wanted to “knock[ ] he r o ut.” Dr. Wahlstrom also warned Chief Osantowski that

plaintiff was unable to exercise reasonable judgment where she was concerned, and that plaintiff stated he was “85% certain” that he would harm her “if he got within arms length of her.” Dr. Wahlstrom d

iagnose d plaintif

f wit h “ major de

pression along w ith stress, related both to work and his outside life circumstances,” and
wrotethat plaintiff’s “perceptions relating to his work environment [were] deterio rating

and unsta ble.” Dr . Wahlstrom

found pla

intiff to be “disable d by

this condition” and, accordingly, declared plaintiff to be unfit for

duty. Dr. Wahlstrom further stated tha t he was “una

ble to determine the recovery

period for

[plaintiff’s] condition at this time.” Based upon Dr. Wa

hlstrom’s report, Chief

Osantowski ordered plaintiff to surrender his credentials. Plaintiff complied, and, at that time, he ceased to be on active duty status. For the next year, plaintiff

wa s p la ce d o n d is ab il it y le av e a nd co nt in ue d t o r ec ei ve hi s p ay. OnApril 22, 1997, pl a intiff filed with the Board an application for duty-relate d disability pension benefits. I n correspondence dated April30, 1 9 97, the Board acknowledge d plaintiff’s application and requested that plaint iff provide the Board with certain information, including medical docum entation and a stat em en t o f p la in ti ff ’s in ju ry. Inaddition, the letter stated that the Board would re quire pla

intiff to be examined by three phy sicians selected

by t he Boar d in accordance with section 3–115 of the Pension Code (40 IL CS 5/3–115 (

West-4- 2002)), and that p lainti ff would be notified by sepa

rate letter of the date, time and

location of the examinations. The Board’s letter further stated that “[o]nce these examinations are complete and the medical reports and Physician’s Certifica te of Disability are r

eceived, the Pension Board will schedule this matter for a hearing .”
Ina letter dated September 24, 1997, plaintiff’s counsel responded

that he had contacted plaintiff’s treating psy chiatrist, Dr. Wahlstrom, concer

ning the cause of plaintiff’s disability. I

n addition, plaintiff’s counsel wrote tha t it was his own “understanding” that “the multiple shootings [plaintiff] was involvedin while on the job great ly contributed

to his disability.” Plaintiff’s counsel also req ueste d that “a hear ing be held as soon as possible.” On October 1, 1997 , th e Board’s counsel wrote a letter to plaintiff’s counsel, enclosed copie s of plaintiff’s personnel records, and stated that the Boar d could now schedule plaintiff to be examined by three physicians selecte d by

the Board. However, counsel for the Boar d also stated

that the personnel record s did not s how an y shooti ngs in which p laintiff was alle gedly in vol ved. Counsel for the Board therefore r equested plaintiff’s counsel to forward

copies of any

documentation regarding plaintiff’s involvement

with any shootings, as the B oard’s physi c ians would “undoubt edly want to re

view those

document s as well.” The Board’s

counsel conclude d the correspondence by writing that “no hearing can be held unti l such time as the Pension Board is in receipt of the reports from its three psy chiatrists.” Plaintiff provided the Board with all requested inf o rmation by Novemb er

12, 1997. The Board then scheduled plaintiff to b e examined by t hree psy chiatris ts and one psycholog ist, all selected

by the Board in accordance with section 3–115 of the Pension Code. Plaintiff’s psychiatric

and psychological evaluations were conducted

on June 30, 1998, July 6, 1998, July 7, 1998, November 20, 1998, a nd December 10, 1998. OnSeptember 2, 1999, the Board held its first hearing on plaintiff’s application. Duringthis proceeding, plaintiff amended his disability application to alternatively r equest a non-duty-related disability pension in the event that the Board denied his request for a disability pension that was duty-re lated. In addition, dur ing this proceeding

the Boa rd admitte d various

exhibits int o evidence, including plaintiff’s personnel re cord s and the reports of the three-5- psychiatris ts and one p syc hologist selected by the

Board to evalua te plaint iff’s condition. Three of these four medical reports conc luded that plaintiff was disab led. We br

iefly overvie w each o f these r

eports seriatim

. Dr. Harley G . Rubens filed a physician’ s certificate dated June 30, 1998, stating that he had examined plaintiff and certifi ed plaint

iff to be disabled

for ser vice wit h in the Dep artment. This cer tificate accompanied

a psychiatric

evaluation report from Dr. Rubens, dated July 7, 1998. In the repo rt , Dr. Rube ns stated that he ba sed his opinion upon a 11⁄2 hour interv i ew with plaintiff conducted on June 30, 1998, as w ell as upon the follow ing add itional inf

ormation: a review of correspondencefromDr. Wahlstrom and Dr. Wahlstrom’s progre ss notes; pertinent police reports from the Department; a list of incident s involving

plaintiff ; and cor responde nce fro m pla intiff’s
at to rn ey. According

to Dr. Rube

ns’ report, plaint

iff sta ted that he was removed fro m ac tive duty and ref erred to Dr. Wahlstrom for evaluation

because the Department thought plaintiff “was a loaded gun.” Plaintiff stated that during his nine years of active duty with the Dep artment, h e was shot at four times. In his report, Dr . Rubens provided details with respect to two of these i ncident s. Plaintiff described the initial shooting incident to Dr. Rube

ns as a situ

ation in whichanother

officer shot at

a suspect who was escaping, and that a t the time the shotwas fired the suspect had been standing be tween that officer and plaintiff. Plaintiff

stated that if the officer had missed the suspect , plaintiff

would hav e been sh

ot. When pla

intiff told his supe rvisors about this incident, plaintiff stated that they re spo nde d that he would “get

used to g etting s hot at.” A ccordin g to Dr. Rubens, plaintiff expresse d disillusion with the D epartme nt, not only

because he felt a la ck of supp ort, but a

lso because the Department had recent ly undergone a corruption investiga tion by the FB I, and plaintiff noted that many of his former

supervisor s were currently in jail. Plaintiff stated that he be came ve

ry depress ed in

1994 when FBI

agents placed him under surve illance as part of their investigation of the Department. According to plaintiff, when the FBI wa s unable to find that he had done any

thing wrong, the IRS then audited his taxreturns

. Dr. Rubens al so noted in his repor

t that duri

n g the interview plaintiff expressed a deep hatred for A frican-Americans, whom he-6- referred to throughout the session by usi ng a der oga to ry rac is t s lu r. In his report, Dr. Rubens described a second shooting incident

involving plaintiff wherein plaintiff engage d in a chas e of a stolen car and the suspects started shooting at him. According to plaintiff, his partner,

anolder African-American man, slept throug h the entire incident, and plaintiff great ly resente d it. Plaintiff

told Dr. Ru

bens that he was la st shotat by a “gang member,” and that h e had ca

lled dispa tch for h elp butt hat the paramedics arrived at the scene be fore his backup did. Pl aintiff told Dr. Ru

bens that “[w]hat g oes on at t

he job now

is differe nt. It use d to be I

cared a bout p eople –now if a[n] [AfricanAmerican] is laying on the stre et I’d just d rive by.” Plaintiff re lated
to Dr. Rubens that he had

nightma res seve ral times a month ab out his being shot at by “ gang

bange rs” and would awa

ken from these dreams d renche d in swea

t. According

to Dr. Rubens, p lain tiff exhibi ted trait s of para

noia where African-Americans were conce rned. Dr. Rubens sta ted that th is

was exemplified by plaintiff’s statement that “my bigge st fear i s that I might shoot some

body who didn’ t do any

thing if I we nt back to work as a police officer.” Plaintiff also stated to Dr. Ruben s that “[i]f I g o back now

I’ ll sho ot the

[Afri can- Amer

ican s]. I use d to bust my tail to make peace with the gangs and everyone else but no more.” Pla intiff also told Dr. Rubens, “I would like to be a cop but I know that Ican’t.” Yet, Dr. Rubens also reported that plaintiff told him that altho ugh plaintiff did not work the firs t year after he was removed fromfull duty

and plac ed on temp orary disability , plaintif f “felt that he could have worked.”
Dr. Rubens also found it notabl e that plaintiff’s judgment “seemed intact except in his dramatic descriptions of how he would shoota[n] [African- A merican] if he had a gun and was on duty and

saw one.” In Dr. Rubens’ view, plaintiff’s statements “seemed to be somewhat

dramatize d and its do

ubtful th at he would, in f act, do so but it is possible.” Dr. Rubens also wrote in his report that he found it “interesting” that plaintiff carried a gun to the inte

rview, “ despite the fears of what he might do.”
Inaddition, Dr. Ruben s also noted that, at the time of the interview, plaintiff was “pleased and satisfie d” with his

relation ship with his girlfriend, Sheila, and her children. According to Dr

. Rubens, plaintiff described to him “fe eling uplifted and excited every day-7- when he wakes up,” and Dr. Rubens concluded that it was therefore “unlikel y that there is any f

orm of psychiatric

care treatment that would enable [p laintiff

] or motivat

e him to return to full-unrestricted police duties, where he might risk his life.” Based upon his interview of plaintiff and review of other pertinent information, Dr. Rubens diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from the following psychologic al disorders: “1. Major depression by

hi st or y, resolved. 2. Acute

stress disorder in the past, resolved. 3. Adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression. 4. Personality disorder NOS.” In support of

his diagnosis, Dr. Rubens wrote in his report that “plaintiff underwent traumatic situations while w orking in the Chica go Height s Police De partmen t,” and that plainti ff was a lso angered by the factthat nobody listened to him and provided backup support for him. D r. Rubens

noted tha

t plaintif f “has a his tory of acting impulsively and later reg retting it,” and “if he were to r eturn to police work, [plaintiff

] might do something

foolish to prove the point that he is to o infirm a

nd too damaged to be a police officer .” Accor di ng ly, Dr. Ruben s found pla intiff to b e disable d for poli c e

wo rk as a r es ul t o f a ps ych ol og ic al di sa bi li ty. The second p syc hi at ri st re qu es te d b y the Boa rd to examin e plaintiff was D r. Henry

Conroe. Dr. Conroe filed a phy sician’s certifi catedated September 29, 1 998, stating that he had examined plaintiff and cert ified plaintiff to be disabled for service within the Department. Thi s c ertificate accompanied a psy chiatric evaluation report from Dr. Conroe da

ted Septe mber 28, 1 998. Dr. C onroe wr ote that he based his opinions upon a two-hour examinationof plaintiff

on July 6, 1998, and also upon the following evidenc e: correspondencefrom plaintiff’s attorney and Dr. Wahlstrom; a phone conversation

with Dr. Wahlstrom; plaintiff’s personnel and medical record s; and poli ce reports of the shooting incident s. At the time of the interview, plaintiff was working part-tim e as a “car jockey” a t an automobile dealership. Dr. Conroe found plaintiff’s mood to be predominant ly ang ry, much of it directed towards Africa n-Ameri cans, to whom plaintiff referred t o t hroughout the interviewby using a de

rogatory racist slur. Howeve

r, according to

Dr. Conroe, plaintiff exhibited “little anxiety or sadness” during the interview.-8- Pl aintiff stated to Dr. Conroe

that his work-rela

ted probl e m s st arted at the time of the first shooting incident. Plaintiff then described to Dr. Conroe four shooting incidents in whic h plaintiff was in vo lved. According to Dr. Conroe’s report, plaintiff de scribed the
events occurring during the first two incidents just as they were related by Dr. Rubens in h is report: when a fellow officer shot at an offender who was positioned between the other officer and plaintiff; andw hen plain

tiff purs ed a stole

n auto and

the offe nders b ega n shooting at him while

his p artner

remained asleep. Dr. Conroe provided additiona l details i n his report with

respect to the other two shooting incident s involving plaintiff . Plaintiff

stated th at o ne incident occurred when suspects were shooting at cars driving toward plaintiff, and the windows of the other cars we re shot ou t. According
to plaintiff, the other incident occurred in approximately July 1996, when plaintiff observed two gangs shooting a t each other, during whicha male positioned near plaintiff was wounded by gunfire. During this incident, plaintiff called for backup, but the paramedics

arrived before his fellow officers did. Plaintiff stated to Dr. Conroe that after the last shooting incident he told hi s su periors that he no longer wanted to be shot at. According to plaintiff, soon thereafter the Department

refer red him to s ee Dr. Wa hlstrom for a fitne ss evaluation.
Dr. Conroe further noted in his report that plaintiff

stated that he had previously been

sent by the Depa

rtment to Dr. Wahlstrom for a fitness examination becau se plai ntiff had made com

ments to his col leagues about com

mitting su icide. Pla intiff expl ained tha

t he mad e thesecomments b ecause

he had pr oblems at home and

was also being followed by t he FBI as part o f its corr

uption inve stigati on of the Department. However, by the time of the interview with Dr. Conroe, plaintiff stated that he no longer had ideations of suicide. Dr. Conroe noted that, nevertheless, plaintiff remained disillusioned with the Department

and harbored resentment that although he ha d been honest, he ha d b een treated during the FB I investigation as being dishonest

. At the time Dr. Conroe interviewed plaintiff, plaintiff stated that he often experi enced d

reams of being sh ot at, and that he wo

uld awaken from thes e dream s soaked i n sweat. Plaintiff also had gained 60 pounds. Because of his employ ment situation, plaintiff was forced-9- to sell his belongings and give up his hobbies. Dr. Conroe noted that plaintiff was still authorized to c arry a weap on and he

brough t it to the interview. Pla intiff stated to Dr. Conroe that he carried the g un everyw here and trusted no one. According to plaintiff, being shotat changed his mind about African-Americans, causing him to have great animosity

agains t them. Plaintiff stated that he loves his work and would love to return to the force, but his ha tred of AfricanAmericans prevented him from doing so.
Dr. Conroe a

lso asked plaintiff about his difficulties with Chief Osantows ki. Plaintiff responded that he had problems with the police chief because the chief and his girlfriend did not get along. Plaintiff believed that his work life and personal life should be kept separate, and it an gered him that the chief discussed his home life at work. However, at

the time of the interview, Dr. Conroe wrote that plaintiff “praised” Chief Osantowski and stated that “he felt that she is doing a fine job.” Based upon his interview with plaintiff and other relevant information, Dr. Conroe di agnos ed plaint iff as suf fering from a “Major Depressive E pisode in Partial Remission,” and found that pl aintiff was ther efore d isabled f or full un restric ted dutie s i n th e Department. Dr. Conroe explained that, in his view, plaintiff lacked the ability to interact safely

with the pu

blic and p laintiff

’s capa city to respond appropr iately to th e demands of his job would be se verely impaired. Dr. Conroe was of the opinion that plaintiff’s disability was “to a large degre e caused by the unique job duties of a police officer
notshared by a

n ordinary c itizen,” and that the “major stressors were his disillusion

ment rela ting to th e investigation of promin e nt Ch icago Height s officials and their con vi ctions for corruption and the shooting incidents while on duty.” The third med ical professional who evaluated plaintiff at the request of

the Board and found plaintiff to be disabled was Dr. Ronald Ganelle n, a neur opsy cholo gist. Dr. Ganellen submitted a p sychol ogical evaluation dated December 10, 1998, in which he opined that plaintiff was disabled for service in the Department. Dr. Ganellen, however, did not initially file a certifi cate of

disability with hi s r eport. As will be discussed later in this opinion, Dr. Ganellen filed a certificate in February

2004, stating that plaintiff was disabled for ser vice in th e Depar

tment.-10- Dr. Ganellen conducted

a psychological evaluation of plaintiff on December

10, 1998. I

n addition

to intervi ewing p laintif f , Dr. Ganellen also ad ministered se veral psyc

hological tests to plaintiff and reviewed Dr. Wahlstrom’s notes. Dr. Ganellen began h is report by observing that the Department had placed p l aintiff on a leave of absence in September 1996, because of his emotional condition, and that plaintiff claimed

tha t he had been unable to handle the respo nsibi lities of his job in a safe manner as the result of workrelated stress. Plaintiff stated to Dr. Ganellen that, earlier in his career
, plaintiff had been given a number of plaques and aw ards for his job p erformance. However, plaintiff began to experience conside rabl e job-related

stress as a result of the FBI inve stigation of the Department

and his being placed under s urveill ance. In addition, plaintiff also informed Dr. G anelle n that he had encountered undercover

FBI agents while on patrol. Plaintiff further stated to Dr. Ganelllen that he ch anged over time in that he developed a tempe r and became intolerant

of Af ri ca n- Am er ic an s, re fe rr in g t o t he m b y a derogatory

racist slur. According

to plaintiff, his attitudes changed as

a result of the crime scenes he observed a nd the four sho otin g incident s in which he was involve d . These were the same shooting incident s des cribed in the reports submitted by Dr. Rubens and Dr. Conroe. According

to Dr. Ganellen, plaintiff

was also upset about the way that he was treated

by the Department. Plaintiff acknowledged that he had stated to a coworker

that plain

tiff wan ted to “pu t a gun in [his] mouth and blow [his] brains out,” but he then thought about the harm that would bef

all his fa mily as a result of that

action, and he knew he

cou ld not do it. Pla

intiff al so told Dr. Ganelle n that he wa s “offend ed” when the Department instructed him to see Dr. Wahlstrom for a fitness evaluation as a result of his talk of suicide.
Dr. Ganelle

n also wro te in

his report that plaintiff stated that he b e cameembroiled in a conflict with Chief Osantowski when she made comments a

bout plain

tiff’s r elationsh ip wit h his girlfriend. Alth ough plaintiff

told the chief to leave his personal business alone, she reportedly c ontinued

to make comments, and plaintiff had words with her. Thereafter, plaintiff stated that he was once again refer red by the Department to Dr. Wahlstrom, an d ha s not returned to work-11- ever since. Dr. Ga

nellen not ed, howe

ver, tha t at the time

of his in terview with plaintiff, plaintiff expressed no anger aga inst Chief Osantowski and held no grudges ag ainst her. When Dr. Ganellen inquired of plaintiff whether he was r eady to return to work as a police of

ficer, pl aintiff stated that he could not safely return to

work bec ause of h

is angr y r eaction s to AfricanAmericans an d h is te nd en cy to act before thinking. Dr. Ganellen
wrotethat plain

tiff “be lieves e ither he

would kill s omeon e if he perceived himself as being in danger, or that he might ge t killed if he hesitated.” Dr. Ganellen noted tha t plaintif f carr ied a gu n with him and that he slept with it by his side. Plaintiff stated to D r. Gane ll en that he experi enced n

ightmar es about t

he shootin

g incide nts , and would wak

e up in a sw eat. H owever, when Dr. Ganelle n asked p laintiff

about his mo od a t the time of the

intervie w, plainti ff resp onded th at h e was not depressed. Plaintiff was pleased that he had found employment, and Dr. Ganellen described plaintiff’s level of ener gy, inter es t in activities and ability to enjoy himse lf as “normal.” In addition, Dr. G anellen noted that plaintiff had not

had any difficulties with conc entration and
was not tr oubled by self-cr itical tho ughts or guilt. Uponcompletion of his evaluation, Dr. Ganellen diagnosed plaint iff w ith paranoid features and wrote that, in his opinion, plaintiff “is notable to return to work as a police officer a tthe present time as he may

prese nt a risk to public safety a s well as to his own safety.” Dr. Ganell en found that plaintiff’s “psy cholog ical function

in g revolv es t o a large extent around efforts to contain ang er and resentment,” and that plaintiff’s anger “can c loud h is judgmen t to such[an extent] that he may react to a si tuation in an unplanned, unpredic table man ner to protect

himself or to get back at the person he percei ves hurt h

im without f

irst thinki

ng abou t the possib le consequences of his actions.” An opposite conclusionwith respect to plaintiff’s disability wa s reached by the fourth doctor to whic h plaintiff was referred by the Bo ardfor

evaluation, Dr. Richard Harris. Dr. Harr is filed a physician’scertificate dated December 11, 1998, stating that he had examined plaintiff and cer

tif ied that plaintiff was not disabled for service w ithin the Department. This certificate accompa nied a-12- psychiatric

evaluatio n authored by Dr . Harris, dated December 9, 1998.
Dr. Harris’ evaluation was based upon two interviews he conducted

with plaintiff on July 7, 1998, and November 20, 1998, for

a period of near ly f our hours

. In addition to interviewing plaintiff, Dr. Harrisalso reli e d on Dr. Wahlstrom’s notes and letters; phone conversations with Dr. Wahlstrom, Chief Osantowski, and plaintiff’s longtime girlfriend, Sheila; police reports of the sho oting inc idents; and pertinent records from plaintiff’s personnel files. Dr. Harris’ 29- page written r

eport wa s by

far the longest of the fo

ur repor ts submitted to the Board.
Dr. Harris w

rote tha t plaintif f bega n the firs tinterview by

stating that he w antedto return

to work bu

t that “the

y don’t want me to

r eturn.” Plaintiff told Dr. Harris that in February 1996, he wa s referre d to Dr. Wahlstrom by Chief Osantowski beca use of a
comment overhea rd by another office r that p lainti ff thought that suicide was better than what he had been going through. Af

ter seeing Dr. Wahlstorm a

t that time, plaintiff

was told that he did not nee d to
return for therapy . Plaint iff stated that he was then referre d to Dr. Wahlstrom a second time because of his hatred against AfricanAmerica ns, and Dr. Harris observed thatplaintiff referred to AfricanAmericans throughout the interview by use of a d eroga tory racist slur. Plaintiff told Dr. H arris that he wa s eventua lly removed from active duty in September 1996 because “I guess they

didn’t like m y att itude.” Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Harris that he had been involved in several shooting incidents, and discus sed with him the

same four inc idents de

tailed in the reports autho red by

Drs. Rubens, Conroe and Ganellen. According

to Dr. Ha

rris, plain tiff state d that a c onflict a rose between him and Chief Osantowski because she accused plaintiff of
nottreating his girlfriend well. Plaintiff stated to Dr. Harris that Chief O santowski called him once per week at home, and ha d tol d plaintiff –both private ly a

nd in public

–that he d

id not l ove his girlfriend. Plain

tiff believe d that the

chief wa s too involv ed in his personal life, and he resented this intrusion. However, at the time of his intervie

w with Dr. Harris, plaintiff state d that h e no longer had animosity toward the former chief, and, in fact, plaintiff believed that-13- “she had done good

wo rk” and that the Department “had benef itted from her approach to police administration.”
Dr. Harris n

oted in his

report that plainti ff “was consiste n tly vague” about the reasons he was removed from active du ty, and that plaintiff seemed “at a los s to explain w

hy h is doctor would not rele ase him to return to work a s a police

office r.” At on e point, plaintiff

told D r. Harris t

hat plain tiff was eventua lly r emoved f rom activ e duty because Dr. Wahlstrom considered him to be a “loaded gun.” Plaintiff
t old Dr. Har ris during the second interv

iew that i f he ret

u rned t o active duty

he would “hurt someone,” and that he would pull his gun first and ask questions later. Plaintiff also stated to Dr. Harris t hat if he returne d to the force he would beat up African-Americansif they gave him any

trouble.
Dr. Harris further repo rted tha t plaintiff stated that although the three psychotropic medica tions prescribed by Dr. Wahlstrom worked
to relax him, t

hey took awa

y ne ither his a

nger and hate ag ainst African-Americans nor his nig htma res of the shootings. Plaintiff stated that in his n

ightma res he relived the shooting incidents and woke up in

a sweat. Dr. Har ris also interviewed the Department’s former c hief of police, Carla Osantowski. She stated that in Febr ua ry 1996, a collea gue of plaintiff’s came to her office and infor med her t

ha t plaintiff was depr essed an d was spe aking o f shooting himself. A s a result, she referred plaintiff to Dr. Wahlstrom for a fitness evaluation. After Dr. Wahlstrom cleare d plaintif f, he re turned to work. However, Chief O santowsk

i again refer red plai ntiff to D r. Wahlstr

om in July 1996, because

plaintiff appear ed to be de

pressed . Sometime thereafter, Dr. Wahlstrom warned her that she may be in dange r because plaintiff had very angry feelings toward her.
Inaddition, as part o f the eva luation, D r. Harr

is also interviewed Dr. W ahlstrom. According to Dr. Harris, Dr. Wahlstrom believed plaintiff “was having a growing

disillusionment with police work and was ‘burned out.’ ” Further, Dr. Harris reported that Dr. Wahlstrom stated that plaintiff

“had improved enough to return to work,” but that Dr. Wahlstrom did not believe plaintiff was capable of doing police work because of “burn out.” According to Dr. Wah l strom, plaintiff also had diff

iculty controlli ng his ang er and expressed hatred of Africa n-Ameri cans. Dr. Harris found it notable that, according to Dr.-14- Wahlstrom, plaintiff

’s a nger agains t Africa

n-Ameri cans and

his discussion of the shooting incident s came after pla intiff ha d been in
treatment fo r nea rly two y

ears. Dr. Harris wrote that even Dr

. Wahlstrom found this to be unusual and “bizarre,” and that there was

no clear e xplanation

as to why plaintiff suddenly began to express

this hatred. According

to Dr. Ha

rris, Dr . Wahls t rom did not believe that plaintiff was capable of doing police work a nd told Dr. H arris that he removed plaintiff from

active d uty because he was concerne d about plaintiff’s potential for violence. Dr. Wahlstrom a lso told Dr . Harris that when he warned Chief Osant ow ski about p laintiff ’s threa ts, it

was only the second time in D r. Wahlstr om’s car eer tha t he had to

warn someone that she was in danger. Dr. Wahlstro m als o told Dr. Harristhat plaintiff had expressed anger on occa sion during their sessions.
Dr. Harrisalso reported that he had a conversation with plaintiff’s girlfriend, Sheila. Sheila stated that plaintiff and Chief Osanto wski had a dispute ov er her. Sheila

explained

that plain tiff was angry with the chief for getting involved in his personal af fairs and resented the chief for telling plaintiff that he did not love Sheila. According to Dr. Harris, Sheila first stated that she had “no idea” why plaintiff had not returned to work, but that it was possible that he did not go back because he might hurt someone. Sheila stated, however, that she was
notaware of

any instance s in

which plaintiff caused harm to another. Sheila recalled that plaintiff’s personality and attitude began to change in 1992 or 1993, and stated that now plaintiff is not as patient

as he once was and had

started u sing a de

rogatory racist slur to refer
to African-Americans. Sheila informed Dr. Harris that plaintiff’s use of the epithet was “getting worse e specially bec aus e the pen sion is pending,” and she wondered if plaintiff’s irritability increased becaus e he was not wo rking. Based upon the infor mation he gathere d in the co urse o f evaluatingplaintiff

, Dr. Har ris wro te in his report that he found plaintiff’s communication to be “confusing,” in that “i t was very difficul tto get a clear picture of the na ture of the problem.” From Dr. Harris’ perspec

tive, the differe nces in plaintiff’s demeanor

in the two interviews were no table

. Dr. Har ris wrote that durin

g his first interviewwith plain tiff, altho ugh plaintiff expressed animosity for-15- Africa n-Ameri cans, used racial slurs, and stated he had recurrent dreamsof the sho oting inc idents, pl aintiff w as not abl e to clea rly communic ate the reasons he was taken off duty. I n addition, plaintiff presented his story without much emotion. In the second interview, howe ver, Dr. Harris noted

that plaintiff kept coming back

to his hatr

ed for A frican -Americ ans, “like a record that was stuck .” Dr. Ha

rris stat ed that pl aintiff “

kept, in a manner of speak ing, coming a

t me with his

hatred. He was un

rele ntin g and it

soon began to f

eel like an assault.” Dr. Harris wrote that plaintiff’ s angry and aggressive

behavior was in str

iking contrast to h

is manner during a number of phone conversations he had previous ly h ad with plaintiff about securing plaint if

f’s medical records and scheduling appointme

nts

. Dr. Harris s tated tha

t he told pla

intiff “d irectly that I

was having

difficul ty d etermini ng the tr uth of the ma tter in re gards t

o his disability application,” and that “I saw my

job as a duty to protect the interest of the pension board/fund and those applicants deserving of a disability benefit.” Dr . Harris wrote that this “frank

comm unication” brought about a change in intera ction between them
, as plaintiff then “settled down,” and there was no further talk of plaintiff’s hatred of African-America ns. Pl aintiff then became very emotional to the pointof tears–an indication, in Dr. Harris’ view, of “more genuine emotion.” According

to Dr. Ha rris, pa rt of the c onfusion he experie nced in listening to plaintiff was due to “brief periods when his thinking was disorganized,” and these

periods occurred during

plaintiff’s “hatredfilled monologues” when plaintiff appeared “ crazy” with ra ge. Dr. Harris stated, “At some point I beg an to believe that he was making

a great e f fort to ma

nipulate me, that is , my

thinking about his disability application. He was g oing out o f his way to demonstr

ate his impairment.” Along these lines, Dr. Harris stated t hat he had reviewed the police records before the interview a nd told plaintiff that “the police r

eports di d not corr

oborate his account of the shootings,”

as the reports demonstrated neither that plaintiff was shot at nor that he was in obvious danger. Dr. Harris wrote , however, that plaintiff “a lw ays had an explana tion for the discrepancy ,” including that the Department

instructed officers not to record in the police repor ts that shots wer e fired at them.-16- Dr. Harris also attributed his confusion in evaluating plaintiff to his belief that plaintiff’s “story ” did not fit together

due to “the many inconsistencies ” in plaintiff’s account. Dr. Harris “question[ed] the overall credibility of [plaintiff’s] account,” a nd noted that a cl ose examination of plaintiff’s case revealed “inc onsistenc ie s , contradictory information , misrepresentation and infor mation that jus t doesn’t fit.” Dr. Harris wrote that, if he were to take plaintiff’s story
at “face value,” he could find that plaintiff would b e eligi ble for a duty-relate d

disability pension, as plaintiff exhibited “overwhelming aggressive

feelin gs that he will not be able to control when performing th e normal

duties of

a police

office r,” and t

his aggr essivene ss would be due to plaintiff having been shot at on numerous occasions and his experiences as a police officer working in a town with a significant African-Americ an population. However, Dr. Harris rejec ted such a conclusion, based upon his interviewof plaintiff and the other information he gathered as part of the evaluat

ion proce ss. Dr. Ha

rris wrotethat plain

tiff “ma y ve ry well have reactions to various police experienc es but the re is no objective evidence demonstrating a reaction of such severity a s to constitute a psychiatric

disorder.” Dr. Harris noted with particular intere st that plaintiff’s anger

towards A frican- Americans, as well as his referenc es to the shooti

ng incid ents, did not surface until almost two years a fter he began tr eatment with Dr. Wahlstrom. According to Dr. Harris, a review of Dr. Wah

lstrom’s tr

eatment n ote s reve aled that plaintiff’s prior references to African-Americans and the shooting incidents was “scant” and became a central part of pla intiff’s discussions only after plaintiff ap pl ie d f or a d ut y- re lated disa

bility pension. Dr. Harr

is wrote that, in his view, plaintiff

was “too actively try ing to convince me and Ifelt mani

pulate d,” a nd opined that plaintiff was engaging in a “conscious attempt to depict himself as barely controlled and

a threat to blacks.”
Dr. Harris then dev e loped his own theor y of what hap pened to plaintiff. In Dr . Harris ’ view, w hen plain tiff was first re ferre d to Dr. Wahlstrom in Fe b ruary

1996, he w as voicin

g suicid al thoug hts because plaintiff had pers onal prob lems and financial worries. When plaintiff was again referre d to Dr. Wahlstrom in July 1996, it was because he had a nger a gainst t he chief for intru sion into his

personal life and blame d her for difficul ties in th e rela

tionship wi

th his-17- girlfriend. Plaintiff was not removed from the force until he made a threatening

statemen t again st Chief Osantowski in September 1996. According

to Dr. Harris, this statement was precipitated by plaintiff’s belief that the chief was the cause of his breakup with his girlfriend, Sheila. Dr. Har

ris found that

plaintiff’s relationship with Sheila was the “most emotionally significant a spect” of plaintiff ’s life and that it caused p laintiff

“some degreeof depression,” although he believed that the dep ression was not “severe.” Based upon the e vidence he reviewed, Dr. Har

ris opine d that plai ntiff’s a nger a t the time o f his removal from the D epartme nt was foc

used sole ly a

gainst t he chief and not related to any othe

r aspects of

police work. I

n fact, Dr. Harr

is noted that there were refere

nces in the record which show that during that time period plaintiff enjoyed police work.
Inaddition, Dr. Harris “question[ ed] how dangerous [plaintiff] was” at the time

of his removal from the force, especially in light of the fact that although Dr. Wahlstrom found that plaintiff could not
return to active d

uty due to his potential for violence, the doctor “appar ently did notseem too c oncerne d about [pla intiff’s ] carrying a gun during the height of his purported dang erousnes s.” Dr . Harris
wrotethat Dr. Wahlstrom’s “tolerance and/or implicit approval” of plaintiff’s carry

ing a gun indicated that plaintiff “was not suff ering froma severe or

even moderate psy

chiatric disturbance characterized inpart by bar

ely controlled ag

gressiveness.” Dr. Harris stated tha t “further evidence for the absence of a specific psychiatric

disturbance is that Dr. Wa

hlstrom ha

d some que stion abou

t t h e benefits of therapy.” Dr. Har ris opine d that “lit

tle was a

ccomplished” in plaintiff’s therapy se ssions with Dr. Wahlstrom because, in D r. Harris’ view, “there wasn’t a spe cific problem to treat.” Ac co rd in gl y, Dr. Harris wrote that he “questioned the severity of [plaintiff ’s] past reported psy

chiatric di sorder ” and, although plaintiff may have experienced “a clear psy chiatric disturbance warranting time off from work,” Dr. Harris noted that plaintiff had a full year of p aid disability leave a nd opined that plain

tiff had s ufficie nt time t o

recover from the p

roblemsh e suffered in July-Septembe r 1996. Dr. Harri s further

wrote tha t, in his opin

ion, any “psy chiatric impairme nt” that resulted in plaintiff’s taking medical le ave fro m work ended well before th e c on cl us io n o f p la in ti ff ’s pe ri od of te mp or ar y dis ability pay ments in Octobe

r 1997. Dr . Harris

also foun

d it nota ble that-18- plaintiff no longer harb ored an ger or resentment towards Chief Osantows ki.
Dr. Harris concluded

his report by

opining that although plaintiff may have be en “burned out” in his job as a

police office

r, burnou t is
nota psychiatric disorde

r. Dr. Harris wrote that hedid not believe that plaintiff was a violent and unstabl e pe rson, and, according to Dr. H arris, th ere is no

objectiv e eviden

ce that p laintiff

suffer s from a psychiatric

impairment which render s him unable to function as a police officer. Dr. Harris concluded his report by diagnosing plaintiff

as having a “Major Depressive D isord er, Sing le Episode , in remission.” After admi tting the se four r

eports a nd three certifi cates in

to evidenc e, the Board stated that its members would review thes e document s prior to the next hea ring, w hich was schedule d fo r October 4, 1999. The Board then adjourned. However, the Board’s next hear ing on pla intiff’s applica tion did
not o ccur until June 11, 2001. At that time, counsel for the Boar d noted that “a

lot of time has passed” since plaintiff’s application for disability was previously conside

red by the Board, and indicated

that the delay wa s connected

to the appointment

of new B oard mem

bers. Counsel noted that becaus e “t wo of the members are new and have absolute ly

no knowledge basically

of what the claim is,” the Board decided to hear only

the dire ct testimony of plaintiff and to defer cross-examination of plaintiff to a later time. Plaintiff testified that he was hired

by the Depa

rtment as a patrol officer in O ctob er 1988, and he wa s first se nt by the Depa rtment to

see Dr. Wahlstrom for a fitness evaluation in February 1996. At that time, two officers had informed Chief Osantowski that plaintiff had made statements that he was thinking of committing suicide. Plaintiff stated that after his evaluation with Dr. Wahlstrom, he was sent back
to work without medication or therapy . Plaintiff tes tified, however, that he was referred back to Dr . Wahlstrom in July 1996 by t he Department

because it though t his w ork was declining and depression

was setting in. At that point, Dr. Wahlstrom prescribed plaintiff three medications–trazodone, Depakote and c lozapine–and returned plaintiff to dut y on the condition that he took his medication and continue d in biwee

kly psychother

apy with him.-19- Plaintiff testified, however, that soon thereafter he was removed fromduty . Plaintiff

stated tha

t a t that timehe did not want to be around other people, he gained a grea t deal of weight, he gave up his hobbies, and he did not

sl eep at n igh t. Inaddition, plaintiff stated that thes e feelings caused him to have difficulties in his longterm

re lationship

with his girlfriend, Sheila, and they separated for

tw o months. According

to plaintif

f, when Ch

ief Osan towski began in qui ring into his personal life it made him angry . Plaintiff stated th at he wanted the chie f to mind her own busine ss, and he believed that what
went on after work was his business. Plaint iff testified that, at that time, he was “lashing out at every thing and any authority

figure that

even tried to tell [him] anything.” Plaintiff stated that he wa s aware that his feelings towards, and comments about, Chief Osantowski led to him being removed from the force, but that now he harbo

rs no ill will or anger towards her. Plaintiff also spoke of the FBI

investigation of the Department and the negative effect that investig ation had onhim. Plaintiff stated that he was placed under surveillance and that F BI o fficers routine ly
sat in car s in fron t of his home. In addition, plaintiff stated that he encountered

undercover FBI agents on three occasions while he was working

. P laintiff testified that this situation made him very uncomfortable, as he bel ieved tha t he was a

lway s bei ng watched. Su bs eq ue nt ly, several officers that plaintiff worked

with–and that he described as “good friends”–were ind icted an d sent to jail. Plaintiff stated that the FBI

investig ation and

its outcome

negatively

affected the way that he

viewed police work because he did not know whom
to t rust. Pla intiff als o stated th at it was hi s belief tha t the FBI investig ation led

the IRS to subseq

uently audit his ta

x returns. Plaintiff then testified with respect to four on-the-job shooting incid ents. These we

re the sa me shootin

g incide nts descr ibed in th e reports submitted by Drs. Rubens , Co nroe, Ga nellen a nd Harr is. Plaintiff testified that these incidents bothered him a great deal and he told his supervisors that he was tired of being shot at, to which they responded

that plaintiff cou ld spea k with a priest. Plaintiff testified that he refused to meet with the priest, and stated that he did not seek any other cou

nseli ng. Accord

ing to pla

intiff, it was afte

r the last-20- shooting incident in Jul y 19 96 that thin gs bec ame diff

icult with h

is girlfriend, and he began having re current dreams about the shooting s. Plaintiff testified that the shooting incident s came up

in the cou rse of hi s psychotherapy

with Dr. Wahlstrom, but not in the beginni ng

. Plaintiff stated that, at the start

of therapy , the focus was more on his anger toward s t he chief and his difficulties with his girlfriend. However, as his therapy c ontinued, plaintiff stated that the trauma he suffered in relation to the shootings began to surfac e. Plaintiff believed that he had made progress in psy

chotherapy . However, at the time of the he aring, plaintiff testi fied tha

t he had not had sessions with Dr. Wahlstrom for the prior six months, as he could no longer affo rd to pay the costs. I

n addition, plaintiff stated that he wa s n o longer taking the psy

chotropi c medications that had been prescribed by Dr. Wahlst

rom. Plain

ti ff further testified that at the time of the hearing he would characterize himself as “normal,” and he stated that he wa s e mp lo yed by a car deal ership as the head valet and worked with Afri can-Ame

ricans w ithout inci dent. The direct examination o f plain t iff then concluded. During the June 11, 2001, proceeding, theBoard also admitted into evidence the dep os ition testimony of Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, plaintiff’s trea ting psychiatris t. Dr. Wahlst

rom testif

ied that the first time he saw plaintiff was on February

8, 1996, when pla

intiff wa s refer

red to him by the Depa rtment for a fitne ss evalua tion afte r he made comments that he wante d to commit s

u icide . Because plaintiff had no prior psychiatric

treatment or hospita

lizations, a

nd beca use plaintiff stated that he was no t prone to

suicidal t

endenc ies at that t ime, Dr. Wa hl st ro m a ll ow ed pl ai nt if f t o r et ur n t o a ct iv e d ut y. Dr. Wahlst

rom testified that plaintiff was again refer red to him for

a fitne ss ex amination in July 1996, and he saw plaintiff on severa l occasions. Dr. Wahlstrom stated that the police chief had referre d plaintiff for eva luation be cause pl aintiff had expres sed hosti li ty towards her. According

to Dr. Wahlstrom, the examination disclosed that plain tiff w as suffe

ring fr om a major

depress ion and an

anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. Dr. Wahlstrom stated that plaintiff

was experiencing stress caused by the FBI inv estigat ion, as well as the severa l shooting incident s in which he had been involved, and, as

a result, p laintiff

had lost a great deal of i dealism

about being a police officer. Although Dr. Wahlstrom did not find that plaintiff was-21- disabled by these cond itions, Dr . Wahlstrom allowed p laintiff

to return t o duty only

on the condition that plaintiff begin taking prescription

psychotropic medica

tion s and atte

nd biwee

kly psychother

apy sessions. By September 1996, however, plaintiff’s co ndition had d e teriorated

and, Dr. Wahlstrom testified, he contacted Chief Osantowski because

plaintif f was making d

irect ph ysi cal thre ats agains ther safety. I

t was only the second time in Dr. Wahlstrom’s

care er that he had to deliver such a warning. Dr . Wahlstrom state d that plaintiff was very

agitated and it was not the kind of situation where he cou ld reas on wit h plai ntiff , even thou gh plaintiff was under his care. Dr. Wahlstrom stated thatplaintiff was angry , depressed and consumed

with hatred

agains tthe chief because he believed that he r interferencein his per sonal life was c ausin g the brea

kup of his relation ship with h is girlfriend, Sheila. Dr. Wahlstrom testified that plaintiff had bec ome more

unstable and t hat plaintiff’s perceptions relatingto his work environment were deteriorating. Upon plaintiff’s suspension from the Department, he continue d to under go ps ychothera

py with Dr. Wa

hlstrom, w

ho opined

that plain

ti ff “i s unable to return to work as a police officer, and that is sec ondary

to the nature a

nd extent o f his menta

l condition and the fact that he him se lf, althoug

h wishing to return , does not f

eel that he can do

so safely.” After hearin g t he d irect testimony of plaintiff and a dmitting the deposition of Dr. Wahlstrominto evide nce, the Board t hen moved

to gener ally continue its revie w of plain

tiff’s a pplication for disa

bility pension and adjourned. No date was set by the Board for the n ex t hearin g. The Bo ard re convened and conducted the next hearing on plaintiff’s application for disability pension on Aug ust 26, 2002. On that date, the Board called severa l police of

ficers t o testify with respect to t he shootin

g incide nts relat ed by plaintiff during h

is testimony and desc

ribed in the reports of Drs. Rubens, Conroe, G anellen and Har ris. Dete ctive Ser

geant B ry an Howa

rd, reti re d Officer Frank Cole, and Serg eant Michael Leuser offered testimony that in some respects corroborated plaintiff’s version of the shooting events, but in oth er re sp ec ts co nt ra di ct ed pl ai nt if f’ s t es ti mo ny. Plaintiff was then cross-examined by members o f the Bo ard, as w ell-22- as the Board’s counsel. Plaintiff’s testimony larg ely mi rrored that offered during his direct examination. The Board then adjourned the hearin g. The Board’s next hearing occurre d on September 16, 2002. P laintif f called Corporal Robert Price of the Park Forest police department

to testi fy with r espect t

o one of the shooting

incident s. Price’s testimony large ly corrobora ted plaint iff

’s t est im ony. In addition, the Board also admitted into evidence sever al doc uments whichreferenced this particular shooting incident and which supported plaintiff’s version of

events. The Board then adjourned the hearin g. The Board n ext

convene d on Octob er 23, 20 02. Durin g this procee ding, the Boa

rd issued

its decisi on deny

ing plai ntif f’ s app lication for disa

bility pension be

nefits. T he Boar d bega n it s writtenruling by acknowle dging that although plaintiff’s application had been pending before the B oard “for som e time,” the delay in hearing plaintiff’s petition “was not the result of any an imus of the Board for the applicant

. ” Rather, the Board explained, the delay “resulted fr om a co mbin ation of unf ortun ate fac tors, ” incl udin g a “misunderstanding that the applicant had abandoned his application and th e B oa rd ’s in ab il it y to co mm un ic at e p ro mp tl y w ith its former attorneys.” The Board then

tu rne d t o t he m eri ts of p lai nt iff ’s a ppl ica ti on. In its decision, the Board wrote that plaintiff’s claim was complicated
notonly by t h e f act that t he medic al prac titioners

disagr eed with respect to whether plaintiff suffered f rom a psy cholog ical disa

bility under the Pension Co de, “but also by conflicting testimony which
casts doubt upon

[plain tif f’s] version of key disability -triggering events.”
Indiscussing plaintiff’s testimony, the Board found plaintiff

to be

a “complex” person. The Board noted that altho ugh it was undisputed that plainti ff had sai d inflammatory things in the pa st, this did not

necessa rily mean th a t plaintiff was unable to perform as a police officer. In addition, the Board noted tha t i t was also uncontroverted that plaintiff refused

to seek c ounseling

after the shooting

incident s,

even though he stated that he wa s distr ess ed b y the eve nt s. In addition, it

was evident that the anger plaintiff had previously held for Chief Osantowski had dissipated. Moreov er , the Board noted that-23- plaintiff himself st

ated dur ing his te stimony

that he wa s n o w “normal ” and that he was no longer under psy chiatric treatment or taking prescription

psychotropic medica

tions. The Board wrote that it found “this particular testimony c ompelling, in light of the fact that the most recent subjective appraisal of [plaintiff], by [pl aintiff] himself, supports the finding that he is not disturbed.” The Boa rd also noted in its decisionthat plain tiff’s r epeate d use of a derog atory

racist sl ur to ref er to Afr ican-American s during

his interviews was “considerably troubling,” especially

as the city of Chica go Height s has a

large African-Amer

ican population. However, the Board was suspic ious of pla

intiff’s use of thi s term, and explained its suspici ons as fol lows: “The Board must consider why [plaintiff] would feel free t o lade n h is psychologica

l interviews with the constant use of that word. [Plaintiff] knew that he wa s being e xamined to determine if

he su ff er ed fr om a p syc ho lo gi ca l d is ab il it y. Give n hi s self-in

terest in achievi ng a fa vorable report, it

seems that pla intiff was using it to alarm the examining physiciansinto believing he suffered from a psy chological impairment

on the bas is that only such a disabled pe rson would use th e word s o ofte n in a p rofess ional setti ng.

*** [A]nother motivation could be to coerce this B oard into granting

a pension so that [plaintiff] would not be able t o subject the City to possible

liability , or subje ct this Board t

o the unfavorable publicity

of ‘putting a

bigoted officer back on the street.’ ”
Inaddition, the Boa

rd found t hat plain tiff’s te stim ony with respec t to the shooti

ng incid ents was “ inconsiste

nt in seve

ral a rea s or rebutted by othe r witnesses.” The Board contrasted plaintiff’ s testimony with that of

Office rs Howar d, Cole an

d Leu ser, and

wrote that it “assign[ed] significant weight to the extent that th[e] testimony [of the othe r officers] refutes [plaintiff’s] versions of the various events.” The Board wrote that plaintiff’s “cre dibility was putdirectly at issue by the testimony

of other credible witnesses in this matter.”
Inits decisi on, the Bo ard a lso closely examined the medical reports submitted by the four phy sicians, in addition to Dr. Wahlstrom’s deposition testimony. The Board f ound that “of the four-24- medical reports, the report by Dr. Harris is the most

lengthy a

nd thoro ugh evaluat

io n of [plaintiff],” and, therefore, the Board determined Dr. Harris’ opinion “to be the most credible and persua sive e valuation, and assigns it great weig ht.” The Board favora bly obse rved thatDr. Harris in his report had highlighted the contradictions in plaintiff’s speech and behavior, and that

Dr. Har ris’ “sincere assessment of

[pla intiff’s] inconsistent statements and demeanor *** was exceedingly

persuasive.” The Boa

rd agr eed with Dr. Harris’ opinion

that plaintiff “manufactured a blend of behavior and statement s in o rder to obtain a disability pension that he is not entitled to.” In conclusion, the Boar

d wrote:
“At worst , [pl ainti ff] ha s conc octed an aggres sivel y bigo te d pe rsona and symptoms of a psy chological disord er t o convince doctors that he cannot perform the duties of a police officer. At be st, it

seem s, [pla

intif f] h as some impedimen

ts, butmedical practitioners simply c ann ot agree if they rise to the level necessary

to qualify for a disa

bility award under

the Pension Code. I

n either case, a warding [plain tiff ] a pension would violate this Board’s fiduciary responsibility to the fund participants.” Therefore, the Board found th at pl ai nt if

f h ad fa il ed to es ta bl is h b y a prepo nderance of the evidence that he suffered f rom a disabi lit y within the meaningof the Pension Code which wou ld entitle him to a disability pension. OnNovember 25, 2002, pla intiff fil ed in the c ircuit

court of Cook County a complaint

for administrative review of the Board’s de cision (administrative review action). Plaintiff alleged that his rights to due process had been violated

as a r es ul t o f t he Bo ar d’ s e xc es si ve de la ys in hearing and ruling on his application for disability benefits. I n addition, plaintiff alleged that the Board’ s deci sion to den y hi m disability pension benefits was erroneous because the decision of the Board was contrary

to the majority of the opinions of the Boa rd’s own physiciansfinding him to be disabled and because the only medical opinion relied upon by the B oard–that of Dr. H arris– was not competent

due to the exces sively lon g time it t ook for th e doctor

to examine plaintiff and render his opinion.-25- OnJanuary 26, 2004, the circuit court entered a written order denying plaintiff’s petition for administrative review and confirming the decision of

the Board deny

ing plaintiff a disability pension. The circuit court he ld

that although plaintiff was evaluated by more than three mental health professionals, he failed to su bmit three certificates of disability as required under

section 3–115 of the Pension Code (40 IL CS 5/3–115 (We st 2002)) . Beca use the circuit court confirmed the Board’s decision on the basis of statutory c onstru cti on, the court decline d to addre ss plaintif f’s addi tional due process argume nt. Plaintiff thereafter filed with the circuit court a mot ion for reconsideration

of its ruli ng in the administrative review action. The circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion for recon sidera tion on February 5, 2004, a nd vaca ted its Janua

ry 22, 2004, order. The circu it

cou rt remanded plaintiff’s cause to the Boar d to allow plaintiff t o obtain and present certificates of disability from Dr. Wahlstromand Dr. Ganelle

n. On Fe

bruary 25, 2004, Dr. Wahlstr om file d a physician’scertifi cate wit h the Boa

rd cert ify ing that plaintiff is di sabl ed for service in the police department. Dr. Ga nellen filed a similar certificate with the Board on Febr uary 27, 2004. OnApril 2, 2004, t he B oard reconvened to consider plaintiff’s applicationinlight of the two additional certificates of disability filed by Drs. Ganelle n and Wahlstrom. The Board then issued an “Amended

Decision ,” which

again denied plaintiff’s application for

a disability pe nsion. Counsel for the Board described the amende d decision as “exactly the

same decision as the Board rendere d before wit h the exception that it references now we have the othe r certificate.” The matter then returned to the circuit court for administrative review of th e B oa rd ’s am en de d d ec is io n. On Ma y 2 0, 2004 , the circuit court issued a written memorandum and order confirming the Board’s amended

decision to deny plaintiff a disa bility pension. The circuit court agreed

with the Board that there was competent evide nce i n the record–both medical and nonmedical–which supported the Board’s de ci si on . A cc or di ng ly, the circuit court held that the Board’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Withrespect to pl aintiff’ s due process claim, the circuit court noted in its written ruling that there were sever al delays in the hea

ring process and, despite the Board’s contention to the contrary , no clear-26- explanation for th e delays wa s prov ided i n the o rigi nal record. N everthe less, the circuit court held that it was “not clear that the de la ys resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s due process rights.” The
court concluded that plaintiff’s hearing was still held at a meaningful time despite t he dela

ys, and that t

here wa s no indica

tion that th ese de la ys impacted the Board’s decision. Theref ore, the circuit court held, the delay s did not de

prive pla intiff of due proc ess. Plaintiff appeale d. The ap

pellate court re versed t he circ uit court’s ruling confirming the Board’s decision to deny plaintiff a disabili

ty pension. The panel held that plaintiff was entitled to a disabi li ty pensionretroactive to the time of his applic ation, on t

he basis t hat “all of the menta

l health professionals, includingDr. Harris, agreed that
at th e t im e o f h is re mo va l f ro m a ct iv e d ut y [ plai ntiff] was suffering froma psychiatric

impairment that rendered him unable t o function

as a police officer.” 361 I ll. App

. 3d at 17-18. Accordingly , the appella te panel hel d that the Board erred in deny ing plaintiff a disability pe nsion i n light of what the panel character ized as the “unanimous” agreement of the medica l evaluators that plaintiff

was d isab led. The appellate court remanded the ca use to the Board, however, to determine whether plaintiff should receive a

line-of- duty disability pension or a nonduty disability pension. The appella

te court also held, however, that section 3–115 of the Pension Code (40 IL CS 5/3–115 (West 2002)) is unconstitutional as applied where, as in plaintiff’s case, one of the three doctors selected by the Boa rd to eva luate the pension a

pplicant d oes not c ertify the applicant’s di sa bi li ty. Spe cifically, the a ppellate court found that plaintiff’s right to due process was violated by the three-doctor certification

require ment bec ause it fa

ils to provi de the ap

plicant w ith any rig htto question the Board’s selection of doctors or to set aside unfavor able certificates. According to the a ppellate panel, where the Board’s doctors do not unanimously certify the applicant disabled ,

as in the instant cause, whatever meritorious arguments the applica nt may raise a t a hear ing hav e no bea

ring on t he outcome of

th e ca se. In other words, the appellate court concluded that unde r this sche me the negative outcome of a hearin g is predetermined, and, therefore, the applica nt has no he aring a

t all.
We granted the Board’s petition for lea ve to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d Rs. 315, 317. As stated, the B oard appeals only from the a

ppellate-27- court’s ruling i

n the admi

nistrativ e revie

w actio n, inc luding the holding that section3–115 of the Pension C ode is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. We allowed the Illinois Municipal Lea gue leave
to file an amicus brief in suppo rt of th e Boar d. The Illinois Publi c Pension Advisory Committee was also allowed to file an amicus brief in support of plaintiff.

ANA LYSIS
Inadministrative cases, our role is to r eview the decision of the administrative agency , nott he deter mination of

the circ uit court. Anderson v. Department of Professional Regulation , 348 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560 (2004 ); Board of Education of Round Lake Area Schools v. State Board of Education , 292 Ill. App. 3d 1 01, 109 (1997). Under the facts pr

esented in the insta

nt cause , theref

ore, our review i s focused solely upon the decision

of the Board. Section 3–148 of the Pension Code (40 IL CS 5/3–148 (West 2002)) provides that judicial review of the decision of the Board is governe d by the Administrative Review Law (735 IL CS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 2002)). See also AFM Messenger

Service, Inc. v. Department of Employ

ment Sec urity , 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390

(2001); Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the Carbondale

Polic e Pens ion Fund , 177 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1997). The Ad ministrative Review Law provides that our r eview extends to al l questions of fact and law presented by the e ntire re cord. 73 5 IL CS 5/3–110 (We st 2002); Internat ional Union

of Operati

ng Engine ers, Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment

Security , 215 Ill. 2d 37, 61 (2005). The statute, however, specifically limits judicial review to the administrative record, and, therefore, we may not hear

newor additional evide

nce in sup

port of, or

in opposition to, the decisionof the a dmini strative agenc y. 7 35 IL

CS 5/3–110 (

West 2002); Robbins , 177 Ill. 2d at 538. The applicable standard of review –which determines the extent of deference affor ded to the administ ra ti ve ag en cy’ s decision–depends upon whether the question presented is a question of fact, a question

of law, or a mixed

question of law and fact. AFM Messenger
, 198 I ll. 2d at 39 0; City of Bel videre v . Illinois State Labor R ela tions Board

, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05 (1998). Rulings on questions of fact will be reversed only if agai n st the manifest weight of the evide nc e. Comprehe

nsive Com munity So lutions, In c. v. Roc kford-28- School District No. 205 , 216 I ll. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005). I n contra st, questions of law are reviewed de novo ( Brans on v. Department of Revenue
, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995)), and a mixed que stion of l aw and fa ct is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard (

AFM Messenger
, 198 I ll. 2d at 39 1-95; City of Bel videre
, 181 Ill. 2d at 205) . We further note that, under any standard of review, a

plaintiff
to an administrative proceeding bears the burden of proof, and relief will be denied if he or she fails to s ustain that burden. See Miller v. Fu lton County Zoning Board of Appeal s, 337 Ill. App. 3d 210, 216 (2003); Iwanski v

. Streamwo od Police

Pension B oard

, 232 Ill. App. 3d 180, 184 (1992).
Inthe instant appeal, the Board contends that

the appellate court erred in setting

aside the

Board’ s decisio n d en yi ng plaintiff a disability pension. Accord

ing to the Boa

rd, plain tiff fai led to mee

t his burden of proof by pr

esenting insufficien

t evidenc e to suppor

t his claim that he is eligible for a dis ability

pension. T

he Boar d first notes that plain t iff proffered little evidence to support his claim for disability apart from

his own testimony, and that plaintiff’s testimony

w as inc onsistent and also contradicted by three witnesses with respect
to events plaintiff claimed were sig nifican t work-r elated s tressors

. In addition, the Board further obser ves that, by plaintiff’s own testimony
at the hearings, plaintiff stated that he was “normal,” and informed the Board that he was not currently receiving psychiatric tre atment or taking any

prescr iption psy chotropi c medications. Finally, the B oard
notes that there were numerous inconsistencies in the medical
te st im on y, and maint

ains, in its

role as finder

of fact , that it pr

operly assigned greater weight to Dr. H arris’ ev aluati on of plai ntiff, as it determined

Dr. Harris’ report

to be the most complete, thorough and persuas ive of the

four med ical eva luations.
Inresponse, plaintiff contends that the appellate co urt co rrectly
set aside the decision of the Board and its judgment

should be upheld. According

to plaintif

f, the ap pell ate cou rt correctly

interpreted Dr. Harris’ report to contain the opi nion that plain tiff suff ered fr om a psychiatric

impairment at the t ime he was removed by the Department

from active ser vice, and that this creates the inference that had Dr. Harris examined plaintiff closer to the time plaintiff was removed from active service, he would have ce rtified that

plain tiff

was disabled. Plaintiff therefore contend s th at the appellate court-29- correc tly found tha

t there w ere “unanimous” medic al o pinions that plaintiff suffer ed from a disabling psychiatric

impairme

nt at the ti me of his removal from active duty that render ed him una

ble to function

as a police officer. Accordingly , plaintiff asserts, the appellate court

c orrect ly set aside the decision of the Board deny ing plaintiff a disability pension. We disagree

. The instant appeal presents the question of whether the evidence of record supports the Board’s de ni al of plaintiff’s application for a disability pension. This is a que stion of fact. The principles which guide our revi ew of this

matter a re well settled. The Administrative Review Law provides that the “finding s and conclu sions of the administr ative ag ency

on questions of fact shall be held to

be prima facie true and correct.”

735 IL CS 5/3–110 (

West 2002) ; Robbins , 177 Ill. 2d at 538. As st ated, theref ore, ru lings on questions of fact will be reversed only if aga inst t he manifest weight of the evidence. International

Union of Oper atin g Engineers, Local 148 , 215 Ill. 2d
at 61. “An admin istrative

agenc y de cision is a

gainst t he manif est weig htof the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clear l y evident.” Abrahamso n v. Illino is D epar tment of Professional Regulation , 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992). Therefore, the “mere fa ct that

anopposite conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing c ourt might have ruled di fferently

will not justify reversal of the a dministrative findings.” Abrahamson , 153 I ll. 2d at 88 . We are a lso mi ndful that
, “[i]n examining an administrative agenc y’s fac tual findings, a reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or s ubstitute i ts judgment for that of an administrative agency .” City of Belvide re , 181 Ill. 2d at 204. If the recor

d contains evidence to support the agency ’s decision, that decision should be affirmed. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Prop erty Tax A

ppeal Boa rd , 102 Ill. 2d 443, 467 (1984).
In the m atter before us, plaintiff applied to the Board f o r consideration

of an award of either a line-of- d ut y or nonduty disability pension. Section 3–114.1 of the Pension Code provides for a line-o f-duty

disability pension a s follows:
“D is ab il it y pe ns io n– Lin e o f d ut y. (a) If a police offic er as the result of sickness, accident

or injury incurred in or resulting from the perfor mance of an act of duty , is found t

o be phy sically or menta

lly d isa b led for service in the polic e depar tment, so as to render necessary his-30- or her suspension or retirement from the p olice service, the police officer s hall b e entitled to a disability retirement pensionequal to the greatest of (1) 65% of the sa lary attac hed to the rank on the police

force h eld by

the offic er at the

date of suspension of duty

or retir ement, (2) the retirement pension that the police officer would be eligible to rec eive if he or she retired (but notincl uding a

ny a utomatic a

nnual inc rease i n that retirement p ension), or (3) the pension provided under subsection (d), if applicable.
A police officer shall be considered ‘on duty’ while on

an y assignment approved by the chief of the pol ic e department

of the municipality he or she se rves, whether the assignment

is within or

outside th e municip alit

y .” 40 I LCS 5/3–114.1(a) (West 2002).
Incontrast, section 3–114.2 of the Pension Code p rov ides for a nonduty pension a s follows: “Disabil ity

pensio n–Not on duty. A police offic er who becomes disabled as a result of an y cau se other than the performance of an act of duty , and who is found to be phy sically

or menta lly disabled so as to re

nder nec essary

his

or her suspension or retirement from police service in th e police departm ent, shal l be entitle d to a disability pension of 50% of the salary a

ttached to the officer’s rank on the police forc e at the date of suspension of duty or retirement.” 40 IL CS 5/3–114.2 (West 2002). Fi na ll y, section 3–115 of the Pension Code pro vi des that in

c onsi deringan applic ation for either a line-of- duty

or nonduty disability pension, certain

procedures must be followed by a pension board. Se ction 3–11 5 provide s in relev ant part :

“A disability pension

shallnot be paid unless there is filed with the boar d certif icates o f the polic e offic er ’s di sa bi li ty, subsc rib ed

and sworn to by the police officer if not under legal disability, or by

a representative if the off icer is under legal disability, and by

the police surgeon (if there be one) and 3 practicing phy sicians selected by the board. The board

may require other evidence of disability .” 40 IL CS 5/3–115 ( West 2002).-31- As the applicant for disability pe nsion benefits, plaintiff had the burden of proof to establi shhis entitlement to either a duty-re lated or nonduty disability pension. After ca refully consider

ing the entire record, we hold th at the Bo ard’s c onclusion that plain

tiff fai led to

s a tisfy his burden of proof in establishing his eligibility for a disability pension is notagains tthe manifest weight of the evidence. We therefore disagree w ith the appellate court’s reversal of the Board’s decision. Cen tral to the appellate court’s reversal of the B oard’s ru ling i s the appellate panel’s interpretation of Dr . Harris’ report. According
to the pa nel, “ all of

the me ntal h ealth profes sion als, i nclud ing Dr

. Harris, agree d that at the time of h is remova

l from active duty [plaintiff] was suffer

ing fro m a psy

chiatric impairment that rendered him unable to function as a police officer.” 361 I ll. App. 3d at 17-18. We disagree not only

with the appellate court’s reading of Dr. Har ris’ report, but also with the con clusions d rawn by the pane l from its interpre tation of t hat report. A fair and accurate rea

ding of Dr. Har ris’ 29-pag e repor

t revea ls that Dr. Harris had serious questions with respect to whether, and if
so, to what exten

t, plaintif f experie nced psy chiatric disturba nces o r disorders at the time of his removal from act i ve duty in September, 1996. For examp le, Dr. H arris writes in his repor t that he not only “question[ed] the seve

rity of the pa st

reported psychiatric disorde

r,” butalso “question[ed] how dangerous [plaintiff] was” at the time of his removal from

the Department, especially in light of the fact

that altho ugh Dr. Wahlstrom found thatplaintiff could not return to active duty due to his potential for violence, the doctor “ appare ntly did not

seem too concerned about

[plaintiff] carrying a

gun during the height of his purported dangerousness.” Dr. Har ris further wrote in his report that, in his view , Dr. Wahls trom’s “t oleranc e and/or

implicit approva l” of plaintiff’s carry

ing a gun indicated that

p laintiff “was
notsuffering from a severe or even moderate psy

chiatric disturbance character izedin part by bare ly controlled aggressive ness.” The overal l
tenor of Dr . H ar ri s’ le ng th y reportis that, even at the time plaintiff

was removed from duty, it is unli ke ly that he suffere d from a psychiatric

disturba nce of su ch sever ity t hat i t prevented plaintiff fromfunctioning as a police officer. This re ading of Dr. Harris’ repor t is confirme d by

Dr. Harris’ statement that “further evidenc e for the-32- absenceof a specific psychiatric disturbance is that Dr. Wahlstrom had some question about the benefits of therapy .” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, Dr. Harris opined

in his report

that he believed that “little was accomplished” in plaintiff’s therapy se ssions with D r. Wah lstrom b ecause, in Dr. Ha

rris’ vie w, “ther e wasn’ t a speci fic prob lem to treat.”
It is with these statements made by Dr . Harris in mind that we
turnto the appellate court opinion below. Inits opinion, the appe llate panel refers to a pa ssage fromDr. Har ris’ rep ort, and r

elies upon this sole statemen

t to suppor

t its findin

g that “all” of the menta

l health profess ionals who evaluated plaintiff “agree d” that he was disabled by a psychiatric

impairment at the time of his rem oval fro m the Department in Sept

ember 19 96. I

n this pass age, D r. Harr

is writes:

“ Giventhat [plaintiff] had a clear psyc hiatric disturbanc e warranting

time off f

rom work, he had a

full y ear of p aid [t em po ra ry] disability . This time off resulted in the reduction of his angry feelings toward the chief. I t was the threat to the chief that prompted the medical leave from work. He has had

s uffic ient time to recover from the acute problems he experienced

in July-September 1996. He i s no longer suffering from a psy

chiatric disability.”
We find that t

he appe llate cou

rt overs tated the

si gn ificanc e of this passa ge from Dr. Harris’ report. First, this statement must be placed inthe prope

r positiona

l context wi

thin Dr. H arris’ r

eport. Th is passa ge immediately follows Dr. Har ris’ statement opining that not only is there “

no eviden

ce that [pl aintiff] is

s uffering from a psychiatric

disorder,” but also Dr. Har ris’ “question[ing] [of] the severity of the pa st repor

ted psy chiatric disorder .” Se co nd, this
statement must also be viewed in light of the broader context of Dr. Harris’ entire 29-page report, which c ontains numerous references to his questions about

pl ain ti ff’ s pa st and pre sen t m ent al s tat e. In addition, the above-excerpted passage r efe rs to Dr. Ha

rris’ review and discussion of

plaintiff’s treatment with Dr. Wahlstrom, and it would indeed be a strained reading of this passag e to conclude that Dr. Harriswas making a specific finding or givi ng his opinion that plaintiff actually suffe

red from a psy

chiatric disturbance whic h prevented him from se

rving a s a police

office r. Bec ause Dr . Harris ’ report is replete with expressions of doubt with respect to whet he r-33- plaintiff suffered from a psychologic al or psychiatric disturbance–let al one whet

her plai ntiff wa s disable d–it was im proper f or the ap pellate
court below to ignore the factual dispute in the m edi cal reports and hold instead, based upon this isolated passage in Dr. Harris’ r e port , that all doctors who examined plaintiff wer e of the unanimous opinion that pl aintiff suffered from a disa bling psychiatr

ic impairment at the time he was removed from active service

. The dissenting

just ice in t his matter, however, agrees with the interpretation

of Dr. Ha rris’ re port m ade by the a

ppellate panel below, and asserts that we have proceeded on “ the fa ul ty premise that the appel late court misread the record in this case.” Slip op. at 40 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). As an initial mat ter, w e note that the dissent’s opinion suffers fro m the identical infirmities as does the appella te court’s decisio n below: it selects certain phrases from Dr. Harris’ 29-page report, isolates them from the re st of the report, and

u ses these isolated phrases to support its preferred interpre tation o f Dr. Harris’ conclusi ons. As set forth in d etail above, Dr. H arris’ report contain s n umerous e

xpressions

of doubt with respe ct to plaintiff’s mental state from the time plaintiff first visited Dr. Wahlstrom to the time that plaintiff eng aged in interviews with Dr. Harris. For example, as noted above, Dr. Har ris state d that, at

the time plaintiff underwent therapy

with Dr. Wahlstrom–which includes the tim e du ring which plaintiff was removed from active duty–“further evidence for

the absence of a specific psychiatric disturbance is that Dr. Wahls trom had some question about the benefits of therapy .” (Emphasi s added.) In explanation, Dr. Har ris wrote that “little was accomplished” in pl ai nt if f’ s t he ra py sessio ns with Dr. Wahlstrom because, in Dr. Harris’ view, “there wa sn’t a spe cific pr oblem to treat.” The disse

nt ignor es these –and all o ther–st atements made by Dr. Harris w

hich ref ute its str ained in terpretat ion of his report, and f ails to address the remainder of Dr. Harr is’ almost 30-p ag e report–which

we have painstak ingly reviewe d and exce

rpted in great detai l abov e–tha t und ermin es the diss ent’s prefer red rea ding.
More fu nd am en ta ll y, we observe that the dissent has lost sight of the fact that, in thi s action for administrative review, it is the decision of the administrative agency –here, the Board

–that is under review,
not the determination of the appellate court. See Anderso n ,348 I ll. App. 3d at 560; Board of Education of Round Lake Area Schools , 292-34- Ill. App. 3d at 10 9. The dissent appears to be confused with respect
to which decision is before us for review. The dissenting justice’s entire three-paragraph a

n aly sis of Dr. Ha

rris’s 29 -page

report is misfocused

upon his belief that the appellate court’s interpretation of Dr. Harris’ report

is correct. Agai

n, we emphasize tha

t our role in this administrative review action is to determine whether the evidenc e of record supports the B oard’

s denial of plaintiff’s application for a disability benefit
, that this inquiry is a question of fact, and tha t the Board’s determination on th is issue ma

y on ly be reversed if we determine that it is against the manifest weight of the evide nce. E.g., Abrahamson
, 153 I ll . 2 d at 88. Under this specific analy tical framewor k, i t is not our task–contrary to the position taken by the dissent–to

rev iew wh ether there is evidence to support the conclusi ons draw

n by the appe llate cou

rt. It is our holding that the re c ord in this case reveals a factual dispute as to plaintiff’s impairment and disability at the time that

the Board r endere d its finding

of fact s and made

its deter mination a s to plaintiff’s eligibility for a disability pension. The record contains conflicting evidenc e–both me dical an d nonmedic al–with

res pect to plaintiff’s eligibility for a disability pension. Faced with this conflict of evidenc e, it was t

he Board’s function , as the f inder of fact, to

assess the credibility of the doc umentary informa

tion and t h e testimony of the witnesses and to determine the appropriate weight to be given the eviden ce. As stated, the findings of fact of an administrative agenc

y–s u ch as the Board–are, by

statute, held to be
p rima faci e true and correct (735 I LCS 5/3–110 (West 2002)) and may only be rev ersed i f they are aga inst the ma nifes t weigh t of the evidence –a very high thre shold to surmount. So long as the record contains evidence supporting the age ncy’s dec ision, that decision should be affirm ed. Commonwealth Edison Co. , 102 Ill. 2d at 467. We hold that this is the case here. The Board issued a

comprehensive 11-page dec ision setting forth

w i thspecificity the re asons for deny ing plaintiff’s claim for a disability pension. In its decision, the Board stated that not only was it presented with confl icting medica l evidence with respect to whether plaintiff suffered from a ps ychologic al disabil ity, but also th at it heard conflicting testimony which cast doubt upon plaintiff’s version of key disability-trigg eringevents. The Board found it notable that plaintiff-35- refused to seek counseling after

each of the shooting incidents, even though h e claime d to be dist ressed by th e events ; that the anger that he previous ly e

xpressed a

gainst Ch ie f Osantowski–and the direct

cause for his removal from active duty –had dissipated; and that plaintiff desc ribed himself as “normal,” no longer under the c are of Dr. Wahlstrom or taking prescription psy chotropic medications. The Board also questioned

the c redibility of plaintiff’s ac count, based upon the Boa

rd’s vie w that not only wa s plaintiff’s testimony inconsiste nt, but also that it was rebutted on several key points by other witnesses. The Board stated that it had assigned sig nificant weight to the extent that the testimony of the other witnesses refuted plaintiff ’s version of even

ts. The Board also assigned

“grea t weigh t” to the report authored by Dr. Harris and the opinions contained therein. The Board explained that Dr. Harris ’ repor t was “ the mo st len gthy and th orough evaluation of [plaintiff]” and, therefore, determined it to be the “most credi b le and persuasive evaluation .” In i ts decision, the Board observed that Dr. Harris had

highlighted the contradictions in plaintiff’s speech and behavior, and that the Board was persuaded by Dr. H arr is’ “sincere assessment of [plaintiff’s] inconsistent statements and demeanor.” The Board a

lso agreed

with Dr. Harris’ suspicion that plaintiff’s repeated use of a derog atory

racist sl ur to ref er to African-Americans during the fo ur medi cal interviews and plaintiff’s expressed hatred toward African-Americans was “manuf actured *** in order

to obtain

a disability pension

that [plaintiff] is not entitled to.” We also observe that even Dr . Ru

bens , in his report finding plaintiff to be disabled, found it notable that plaintiff’s judgmen t “seeme d intact except in his dramatic descriptions of how he w ould sh oot a[n] [AfricanAmerican] if

he had a gun and was on duty and saw one.” Dr. Rubens
wrotethat he believed plaintiff’s statements “to b e some what dramatized

and it is doubtful that he would, in fact, do so but it is possible.” In a

ddit ion, Dr. Ruben s–like Dr . Harris –noted wi th intere st that plaintiff continued to carry a gun despite his own expressed fears of what he might do as a result of his ange r. Inits decision, the Board also focused on the observations made by Dr. Har ris in his r

eport t hat plai ntiff’s anger against AfricanAmericans an d his d iscussion of the sho oting inc idents ar ose only af ter plaintiff had been in treatment with Dr. Wahlstrom for nea rl y-36- two years, a

t a time which coincided with plaintiff’s filing and pursuing his application for a disability pension. I ndeed, according

to Dr. Harris, even Dr. Wahlstrom found this sudden hostility to b e unusual and “bizarre,” and there was no clear

explanation as to why plaintiff suddenly

began to express

this h atred. We note tha t in plaintiff’s own testimony before the Board, he confirmed that at the
start of his therapy with Dr . Wahlstrom, the focus was on his anger toward Chief Osa

ntowski an

d pla i ntiff’s d

ifficult ies with hi s girlfriend, Sheila. Pla

intiff te stified th at as histherapy continued, he began to discu ss the shootings with Dr. Wahlstrom, but offered no explanation as to why

there wa s a

dela y i n the se iss

ues s urfa cing . We also note that , althoug

h plaintif f express ed gre at hatre d and anim osity toward African-Americans in his medical in terview s, and tha

t this hostility led Drs. R

ubens, Conroe a

nd Ganel len to find

plaintiff to be dis able d and unable to return to active duty , any discussion of African-Americans and plaintiff’s hatred towards this grou p was conspicuously absent fr

om his testimony before the B oard.
In additi on, the Board also noted in its decision that although i t

was undisputed

that plaintiff

had said i nflammat ory things in the past, this did not necessarily me anthat plain tiff was unable to perfor m his duties as a police officer. Altho ugh th e Board observed that the doctors who evaluated plaintiff f oun d that pla

intiff ha d become disillusioned with the Department as a result of the FBI investig ation and plaintiff’s perception that the Department was not supportive of him, and that Dr. Wahlstrom had found plaintiff to be “burned out,” the Board agreed with Dr . Harris that being disillusioned with one’s job and being

“burned out” did not consti

tute a psychiatric

disorder.
Inlight of the above, we hold that the Board’s de c ision to de ny plaintiff a disability pension wa s not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record

contains sufficient evidence to support the Board’s decision, and we cannot say that it is clearly evident that the Board should have reached the oppo site co nclusion and grant plaintiff a disability pension.
Inhis brief to this court, however, plaintiff notes that und er the Pension Code, he is owed a fiduciary duty by the Board, and that t

his militates in favor of ou

r se tting aside the decision of the Board denying him a disability pension. We agre e w i th plaintiff that the Pension Code esta

blishes tha

t a pension bo ard owe s a fiduc iary duty-37- toward its participants and beneficiaries. Board o f Trustees of the Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Village of Barrington Ethics Board
, 287 Ill. App. 3d 614, 616 (1997). Section 1–109 of the Pension Cod

e provide s in relev ant part that:
“A fiduciary w

ith respect to a retire men t system or pensionfund esta

blished un

der this Co de shall d

ischarg e his

or her dutie s with

respec t to the retirement syste m or pension fund solely in the

interest of the participants and beneficiaries and: (a) For the exclusive purpose of: (1) Providing benefits to participan t s and thei

r beneficiaries; and (2) Defray

ing rea sonable e

xpense s of administering the retirement system or pe

nsion fund; (b) Withthe care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prude nt man acting in a like capacity

and familiar with such matters would use inthe conduct o f an ente

rprise o f a like c

haract er with lik

e aims.

*** (d) In a ccorda nce with t he provis ions of the

Article of the Pension Code go verning the retirement sy stem or pension fund.” 40 IL CS 5/1–109 (West 2002). This fiduciary duty

, however, is owed to all parti cipa nts in the pensionfund, not

just plaintiff. Perhaps the most important function of a pension board is to ensure adequate financial re sources to cover the Board’ s obliga

ti ons to pay curr

ent and future retirement and d isability benefits to those who qualify f or such payme

n ts. A n importantpart of th

is r espon sibility involves the screening of unqualif ie d or fra

udulent disability claims, so that funds are not unfairly diverted to undeserving applicants. We believe that here
, the Board fulfilled its duty to oversee and sc reen p la intiff’s pension application as required under the Pension Code.
We note that plai nt iff, in his brief to t his court , also pre sents a short argument alleging

that the delay by

the Board i

n proces sing his claim for disability benefits violates “his due pr oc ess rights” and

serves as a “separate ground” for rev ersing

the Boa rd’s den ial of his disability pension be

nefits.-38- The United Sta

tes Supre me Co urt has held that

due proc ess require s, inter alia
, a hearing at a meaning ful time. Clevelan d Board of Education

v. Louder mill , 47 0 U. S. 532 , 54 7, 8 4 L. Ed. 2d 494, 507, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1496 (1985). Although the record before us revea ls lengthy delays in initiating and

completing plaintiff’s hearing, it is not clear that–and plaintiff does not explain how–

the dela ys r esulte d in

a deprivation of plaintiff’s due process right s. Indeed , there is no indication from the record tha t the se delays impacted the Board’s decision. Further, in his brief, plaintiff cites to several cases which he

co ntends support his due process argument. However , plaint iff’ s reliance on Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services , 335 Ill. App. 3d 376 (2003), Cavarretta v. Dep artment of Children & Family Services , 277 Ill. App. 3d 16 (1996), and Stull v. Department of Children &

Family Se

rv i ces , 239 I ll. App. 3d

325 (1992 ), is misplaced, as these

decision s are fa

ctually disti nguishable from the
matter bef ore us. I n each of the cited cases, the Depa rtment of Children and Family Servic es (DCFS) was held to have violated the due proces s right s of th e plai ntiff s by faili ng t o conduct administrative proceedings within stated statutor y deadli nes for t hose pr oceeding s. As a resu

lt, DCFS wa s found to have unre asonably delayed the proc eeding s. In

the instan

t cause , no si milar time lim itations are fou

nd within th e pertin ent sect ions of the

Pe nsio n Code.
Inaddition, we disagreewith plain tiff’s e ntreatie s both in his

brief
to this cour

t and also in his petition for reh earing request ing that this court, in essenc e, d eclare a bright-line rule that onc e an agency ’s delay in processinga disability benefits claim passes a certain point intime, that delay

automatically violates due pr ocess. Not only are

we unwilling to impose s uc h a mandatory de adline on municipal and agency decisions, the United

States Supr

eme Court has rejected such

reason ing. In Heckler v. Day , 467 U.S. 1 04, 81 L . Ed 2d 88, 1 04 S. Ct. 2249 (198 4), the pl aintiffs f iled a c lass action lawsuit seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief on behalf of individuals who sought soci al security disability

benefits and who had suffered substant ia l de la ys inscheduling and issuance of decisions. The Court rejected the argume nts advanced by

plai ntiffs, no ting tha

t “Congr ess repe atedly has been made aware of the long de la ys associated with resolution of-39- disputed disability claims and rep eat edly has consider ed and expressly rejected suggestions that mandatory deadlines be imposed
to cure that problem.” Heckler , 467 U.S. at 111, 8 1 L . Ed. 2d at 96, 104 S. Ct. at 225 3. Recog nizing tha

t “in Congre ss the concern that mandatory

deadlines would jeopardize the quality and uniformity of agency decisions has prevailed o ver consider ation of ti

meliness” ( Heckler
, 467 U.S . at 114 , 81 L. Ed. 2d at 98, 104 S. Ct. at 2255), the Courtconcluded

that it had

no author ity to impose the very dea

dlines that Congress had repeatedly rejected. Heckler , 467 U.S. at 118, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 100, 104 S. Ct. at 2257. Alth ough we agr

ee with pl aintiff i

n the matte

r at bar that a disability claimant is entitle d to a timel

y hearing and dec ision on his

or her appl ication f

or benef its, we re cognize

–as d id the Heckler opinion–thatthe time required bef or e a well-reasoned and sound decisionon such an application ca n be ma de will vary widely on a case-by- casebasis. Indeed, establ is hing str ict or bri ght-lin e time limits for these type s of decision s co uld re sult in in correc t ruli ngs where the deciding body

is pressured for

time in complex ordifficul t

cases. Acc o rdingly

, a case -by -case a ssessmen t must be ma

de to determine whether, under the specific facts a nd circumstances presented, the claimant was deprived of due process. I n the matter at bar
, under

the spec ific fac

ts and cir cumstanc es detai led at len gth in this opinion , we conc lude that plaintiff ’s due pr ocess cl aim fails

. Becau se we uphold

the decision of

the Board deny

ing plaintiff’s applicationfor a

disability pension on thebasis tha t plaintif f failed to satisfy his burden of proof that he was disabled, we need not addre ss the Board’s alternative arg ument with respect

to the constituti onality of section 3–115 of

the Pension Code. It is well settled that “questions regarding the constitutionality of

statutes should be c onsidere d ‘only where essentia

l to the disposition of a case, i.e. , where the case cannot be determined on other grounds.’ ” Hearne v. Illinoi s State Boa rd

of Education
, 185 Ill. 2d 443, 454 (1999), quot ing Bonaguro v. County Officers Electora l Board

, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994); see also People

v. Lee , 214 Ill. 2d 476, 482(2005); In re Detention of Swope , 213 I ll. 2d 210, 2 18 (20 04), q uoti ng In re S.G. , 175 I ll. 2d 471, 479 (1997) (as

a gene ral rule, courts avoid deciding constitutional questions when other, nonconstitutional grounds exist for resolving the case).-40- Indeed, we rec entl y ad dressed a factu ally analog ous situati on in Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of the Matteson Police Pension Fund
, 214 Ill. 2d 5 21 ( 200 5). In Turcol , the appellate court confirmed the pensi on board ’s decis ion in that case to deny

the plaintiff a lineof-duty disability pension. However, the appellate court then went on
to address the plaintiff’s argument that section 3–115 of

the Pension Code was unconstitutional and rejected it. We then granted the plaintiff’s petition for leave to appe al in order to resolve a conflict regarding the construction of the three-phy sician requirement containe d in

section3–115. We subsequently determined, howe ver, that leave to appeal in Turcol

had b een i

mprov iden tly gra nted , as “ [i]t is fundamental that courts should consider the constitutionality of a
statute only when nec essary to dec ide the case.” Turcol , 214 I ll. 2d at 524. We noted that the record revealed that the pensionboard in that

casehad dec lined to a

ward the plainti ff a disability pension on the alternative ground that the plaintiff had fail ed to prov e his di sa bi li ty. Therefore, the appeal in Turcol was dismissed. Ac co rd in gl y, we vacate tha t portion of the appellate court’s judgment holding t

hat sect ion 3–115 o f the Pens io n Co de is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff.

CONCLUSIO

N
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse t

he ju dgment of the appella te court. We

also vac ate th at po rtion of the appellate court’s judgment holding section 3–1 15 of the Pensio n Code unconstitutional

as applied t

o plaintif f. The or der of th e circu

it court of Cook County is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed in part and v

acated inpart; circuit court judgment affirmed.

J USTI CES KIL

BRIDE and BU

RKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

JUS TICE FITZGER ALD, dis senti ng:-41- The majority opinion reverse s the appellate court and upholds the B oard’s decision denying plaintiff a disability pension. Bec ause the majority opinion is b ased on the faulty premise t

hat t he appellate
court misread the record in this ca se, and b ecause the major

ity opinion fails to address the threshold issue raised on appeal, I diss ent. During the appe llate cou

rt’s disc ussion of t

he back ground of this

ca se, the court summarized the medical evidence considered by the Board, including Dr. Harris’ report. 361 Ill. App. 3d at 9-14 . Lat er, in its analysis of the issues, the appellate court concluded that “all of the mental health professionals, including Dr. Harris, ag reed that at the time of his removal from active duty [plaintiff] was suffering from a psychiatric

impairment that rendered him unable to function as a police of ficer. ” 361 I ll. App. 3d

at 17-18. Accord

ing to the majority opinion, the appellate co u rt misrea d Dr. Har ris’ rep ort by

failing to place a certa

in passag e from tha

t report in th e “proper positional context.” Slip op. at 32. I disagree. Alth ough Dr. Harris’ report made plain his view that plaintiff was notcurrently disable d, hi s re port also repeatedly acknowledged plaintiff’s past

ps ych ia tr ic di so rd er an d d is ab il it y. Dr. Harris stated:

“ Given that [plaintiff] had a clear psychiatric disturbanc e

warra nting

time off fro m work

, he had a full ye ar of pai d di sa bi li ty. This time

off res ulted in the

reducti on of his angry f eelin gs toward the chief. It wa s the threat to the c hief tha t prompted the medical leave fromwork. He has had sufficient time to recover from the acute pro blems he experi enced in July-September

1996. He i s no lo n ger suffer ing fro m a psychiat ric disabil

ity

. * * * Office r Marconi is not presently a nd has not been suffer ing (at lea

st since 10/6/97

) from a psychia

tric disorder inter ferin g with his fu nctio ning.

* * * The psychiatric impairment that resulted in medical leave from work ended as far back as, and mos t likely well before 10/6/97.” (Emphases added.)
In ad dition, Dr . Harris ’ stated d iagnosi s was “Ma

jor Depr essiv e Disorder, Single Episode, in Remission.” Thi s diagnosis, together-42- with the foregoi ng passages, clearly support the appellate court’s reading of Dr. Ha

rris’ re port. If the appellate c ourt is to be reversed, it must be on

some othe

r basis. The majority asserts that I am “confused” and have “lost sight” of the fact that “it is the decision of the administrative agency –here, the Board –that is under review, not

the d etermina

tion of the

appella te court.” (Emphases original.) Slip op. at 33. I a m fully cognizant of the decisionthis court ha s been ca lled upon t

o review . Wha t is co nfusi ng, however, is the difference between the major ity’s analy

sis of the case and its analysis of my

dissent. According to the majority opinion, the majority may scrutinize the appellate court’s reading of

the rec ord in this case as part of its review of the Boa rd’s decision (slip op. at 32- 33), but I am precluded fr om condu c ting the same analy sis and reaching a contrary

conclusion.
Inany eve

nt, even if I

agreed with the ma

jority that the a ppellate
court misread Dr. Harr

is’ repo rt, I wou

ld nonethel ess disse

nt becau se the majority fails to consider the threshold issue in this case, na me ly, whether the Board could properly consider evidence of plaintiff’s
current medical condition, as opposed to evidence of his condition at the time he was removed from active duty or at the time he ap p lied for a disability pension. Rely ing on Hahn v. PolicePensio n Fund
, 138 Ill. App. 3d 206 (1985), the appellate c ourt conclude d t hat plaintiff’s medical c ondition a t or near the time of his removal from active duty was the

only relevant

medical e

vidence the Boa rd should

con side r in making its initial determination of eligibility for a disability pensi on. Evidence of plaintiff’s condition at a later date, whichma y in di ca te he im pr ov ed wi th th er ap y, is inappropriate for consideration

at the initial eligibility determination. Rather, suc h evidence is properly consider ed as part of the stat

utory process to verify conti nuin g e ligibi lity . 361 I ll. App. 3d at 17. The

appella te court concluded

that, under the authority of Hahn , the Board’s denial

o f plaintiff ’s applic ation for

a disabili ty p ension wa s cle arly erroneou s inlight of the medical e

vidence speaking to plaintiff’s condition “at the time of his

removal from active duty .” 361 Ill. App. 3d at 18. The majority over l ooks this part of the appellate court opinion, notwithstanding the Board’s argument bef ore this cour

t that it should
notbe restricted in the medi cal evidence it may review. Indee d, the Board urges this court to overrule Hahn

.-43- Si gn if ic an tl y, the appe llate cou

rt’s dete rminatio n that the Board may only consider evide

nce relevant to plaintiff’s medical condition
at the time of his removal from active duty, a nd that the evidence here supported a finding

of disabi lity , compell ed the ap pellate c ourt to consider the Board’s alternative argument for affirming the denial of

a disability pension–plaintiff’s failure to submit three certificates of disa bility from Board-appointed physicians, pursuant to section 3–115 of the Illinois Pens ion Code (40 IL CS 5/3–115 (

West 2002)). After considering this issue, the ap pellate court he ld the stat ute unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. 361 Ill. App. 3d at 29. Alth ough consideration of the Hahn issue by this court would not

necessa rily result in t

he court ’s consid

eration of the constituti o nal issue, the failure to consider the Hahn issue does remove any possibi lity of re aching the constitutional question. I would addr ess the Hahn issue that the Board raises on appeal and let our disposition of that issue dictate the direction the rest of the opinion s hould take. By failing to ad dress t

his issue, the lower courts are left to wonder whether Hahn has been

overrul ed by

this cour t sub silenti

o or simply ignored. For thes e reasons, I

dissent.