Motor Vehicle Administration v. Ariel A. Medvedeff, No. 15, September 2019 Term. 

Opinion by Hotten, J. 

MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE— DRIVER’S LICENSES— TEST 

REFUSAL— ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES— IMPLIED CONSENT, 

ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE LAW— Pursuant to Md. Code § 16-205.1 of the 

Transportation Article, the Court of Appeals held that the administrative law judge erred 

in finding that a detaining officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that an 

occupant of the vehicle was driving or attempting to drive while impaired or under the 

influence of alcohol, when he observed the driver of the vehicle failing to stop at a stop 

sign, and upon approaching the driver’s side of the vehicle, found Respondent seated in the 

driver’s seat, smelling of alcohol. Under the reasonable grounds standard articulated in 

Md. Code § 16-205.1, Petitioner was not required to prove that Respondent was actually 

driving or attempting to drive the vehicle while impaired or under the influence of alcohol; 

instead, Petitioner met its burden because there were sufficient facts based on the 

surrounding circumstances to support the officer’s belief that Respondent was driving or 

attempting to drive while impaired or under the influence. Accordingly, the Court of 

Appeals reversed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Circuit 

Court for Carroll County. 
Circuit Court for Carroll County

Case No. C-06-CV-18-000090 

Argued: October 7, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 15

September Term, 2019

__________________________________

MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION

v.

ARIEL A. MEDVEDEFF

__________________________________

Barbera, C.J.,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Booth,

Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, 

Specially Assigned), 

JJ.

__________________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J.

__________________________________

Filed: December 19, 2019
This appeal was taken from a decision of the Circuit Court for Carroll County, which 

affirmed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), holding that an officer did 

not have reasonable grounds to believe Ariel Medvedeff (“Respondent”) was driving or 

attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired, when the officer approached the 

vehicle following a traffic infraction, observed Respondent sitting in the driver’s seat, and 

smelled alcohol on her breath and person. The Motor Vehicle Administration 

(“Petitioner”) appealed the decision by the ALJ and the circuit court, and presents a single 

issue for our review:

Did the administrative law judge err in imposing his credibility 

determinations and inferences from circumstances at the scene of the drunk 

driving arrest to make a legal determination that the detaining officer lacked 

reasonable grounds to suspect that [Respondent], who was seated in the 

driver’s seat after a traffic stop, was driving the vehicle, and therefore the 

officer could not request that she take an alcohol concentration test under 

Transportation Article § 16-205.1? 

For reasons we shall explain infra, we answer that question in the affirmative and reverse 

the decision of the Circuit Court for Carroll County.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The administrative show-cause hearing elicited the following facts. On December 

30, 2017 at approximately 11:45 p.m., Deputy Kathleen Yox (“Deputy Yox”) and another 

unnamed deputy from the Carroll County Sheriff’s Department conducted a routine traffic 

stop of a vehicle they observed failing to stop at a stop sign in Westminster, Maryland. The 

vehicle—a Ford F-350 pick-up truck—made a right turn at the stop sign instead of coming 

to a complete stop. As a result of the traffic infraction, Deputy Yox pulled behind the pickup truck and attempted to pull the driver over. Upon noticing the police vehicle, the driver 
2

of the pick-up truck traveled for a short distance before turning left into a shopping center

parking lot, where Deputy Yox approached the vehicle from behind. At that time, Deputy 

Yox observed Respondent sitting in the driver’s seat. A man, who was later identified 

during the traffic stop as Anthony Crany (“Mr. Crany”), was seated in the back of the truck, 

behind Respondent. 

Upon approach, Deputy Yox detected the odor of alcohol on Respondent’s breath 

and person. Accordingly, Deputy Yox requested that Respondent exit the vehicle and 

submit to a series of Standard Field Sobriety Tests (“SFSTs”) to ascertain whether she had 

been driving while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol. Respondent complied 

with the request to exit the vehicle, while Mr. Crany remained in the backseat.

One of the SFSTs Deputy Yox performed on Respondent was a Preliminary Breath 

Test. The Preliminary Breath Test sample determined that Respondent had a blood alcohol 

concentration (“BAC”) level of 0.14.1 Because Respondent’s BAC exceeded the legal 

limit of 0.08, Deputy Yox determined that she was impaired. During the course of

administering the SFSTs, the alleged passenger, Mr. Crany, exited the vehicle and 

approached the other deputy. Mr. Crany insisted that Respondent had not been driving the 

vehicle when they were stopped. Instead, Mr. Crany alleged that he was the driver and that

Respondent agreed to switch seats with him so that it appeared Respondent was driving at 

the time of the traffic violation. In light of this new narrative, the unnamed deputy

 

1 A breath test is “[a] test of a person’s breath...to determine alcohol concentration.”

Md. Code (Repl. Vol. 2012), Transportation Article (“TRANSP.”) §16–205.1(a)(1)(iii)(1).
3

administered a series of SFSTs on Mr. Crany, which revealed that Mr. Crany was also 

impaired. Ultimately, both occupants were placed under arrest and transported to the local 

police station for a breathalyzer test (“breath test”), where Respondent was informed of her 

right to refuse the test. She was also informed of the potential administrative consequences 

should she refuse the breath test.2 After receiving this information and signing the DR-15 

“Advice of Rights” form, Respondent refused to submit to the breath test and the officers 

confiscated her driver’s license.3 Respondent challenged the suspension of her driving 

privileges before the Office of Administrative Hearings.4 

The Administrative Proceeding 

The ALJ heard this case on May 15, 2018 and considered testimony from 

Respondent and Mr. Crany. Respondent testified that she and Mr. Crany were traveling

from a restaurant in Westminster—where they both had been drinking alcohol—when Mr. 

Crany ran the stop sign. Mr. Crany and Respondent testified that they switched seats 

“almost immediately” after pulling into the parking lot to avoid negative consequences for 

Mr. Crany, who was afraid a drunk driving arrest would interfere with his security 

 

2

“Once a law enforcement officer has detained a suspected drunk driver, the officer 

is to advise the detainee, among other things, of the possible administrative sanctions for 

refusal to take the breath test and for test results that show a blood alcohol concentration 

above certain levels.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 594, 158 A.3d 539, 

542 (2017) (citing [TRANSP.] § 16-205.1(b)(2)). The officer meets this requirement by 

“reading, and providing the driver with, a form created by the MVA for that purpose, 

known as the DR-15 [or Advice of Rights] form.” Id. 

3 An officer is to confiscate the driver’s license if the individual refuses to take the 

test or, alternatively, complies with the request and fails. TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b)(3). 

4 TRANSP. § 16-205.1(f)(1).
4

clearance at work. They alleged that Mr. Crany stopped in the parking lot, turned the 

vehicle off, and climbed over the center console into the backseat with the car keys, while 

Respondent entered the driver’s seat. Both parties also testified that Mr. Crany exited the 

vehicle as Respondent began the field sobriety tests and advised the other deputy on the 

scene that Respondent had not been driving. Respondent testified that, after she had 

observed Mr. Crany exit the vehicle and advise the other deputy that he had been the one 

driving, Respondent confirmed Mr. Crany’s assertion to Deputy Yox. Respondent 

maintained that she had not operated the vehicle that evening. Deputy Yox and the other 

deputy on the scene did not appear or testify at the show-cause hearing to corroborate or 

contradict this version of events. 

Respondent then moved, through counsel, for “No Action,”5arguing that the 

deputies did not observe her driving or attempting to drive, and merely sitting in the driver’s 

seat of a motor vehicle while impaired or under the influence is not sufficient for a driving 

under the influence (“DUI”) arrest. Respondent further argued that it was not possible for 

her to operate or attempt to operate the vehicle while intoxicated because the truck had 

been stopped when Deputy Yox observed her sitting in the driver’s seat, and the keys were 

in the backseat with Mr. Crany at that time. The ALJ interpreted the Motion for No Action 

as a motion “based on [the] argument that the MVA has failed to meet its burden of proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the Licensee was driving or attempting to drive[,]”

 

5

“If the ALJ finds that the criteria [under TRANSP. § 16-205.1] has not been met, 

the ALJ takes “no action”—i.e., overturns the suspension.” Krafft, 452 Md. at 596, 158 

A.3d at 543 (citing COMAR 11.11.02.07A). 
5

and clarified that the appropriate standard in a test refusal case is whether the detaining 

officer has reasonable grounds to believe the Licensee was driving or attempting to drive. 

See Krafft, 452 Md. at 607–08, 158 A.3d at 550. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the ALJ determined that the investigating officers 

did not have reasonable grounds to believe Respondent was operating or attempting to 

operate a motor vehicle6at the time she was detained and asked to submit to a breathalyzer, 

as required under TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b). The ALJ reached this conclusion based on the 

“credible” testimony of Respondent and her witness, Mr. Crany, as well as the DR-15A

certification prepared by Deputy Yox. Specifically, in his findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the ALJ stated that he found the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 

The Officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the Licensee was 

driving or attempting to drive at the time that the officer requested that the 

Licensee take the test. The Licensee testified, and a corroborating witness 

who was present, testified credibly that she did not drive the vehicle at all on 

the date of the incident. The Licensee got behind the wheel after the vehicle 

was stopped by the police officer for a traffic violation. She was then asked 

to exit and perform SFSTs, which she failed. She does not dispute that she 

consumed alcohol on the evening in question. While she was performing 

SFSTs, the passenger exited the vehicle and indicated to another police 

officer who was present at the scene that he had been the one actually driving. 

He was then subjected to SFSTs, arrested, and transported to the station. 

While at the station, both the Licensee and the passenger were asked to take 

the test. At this point in time, the police officer was aware that the passenger 

had indicated that the Licensee had not been driving, and therefore[,] did not 

have reasonable grounds at that time to believe that the Licensee had been 

driving based on the fact that the passenger had told the other officer that he 

was the driver and had been arrested and also asked to take a test, which he 

consented to. Other indicia that the police officer did not have reasonable 

grounds to believe the Licensee was driving include the fact that the keys 

 

6 TRANSP. § 11-114 defines “drive” as “to drive, operate, move, or be in actual 

physical control of a vehicle, including the exercise of the control over or the steering of a 

vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.” 
6

were in the possession of the passenger, who was in the back seat when the 

police officers came upon the car. 

The ALJ accepted Respondent and Mr. Crany’s testimony that the vehicle was 

turned off and the keys were in the backseat with Mr. Crany when Deputy Yox initiated 

the traffic stop. Accordingly, the ALJ found that the officers could not have reasonably 

believed Respondent was driving when they approached the vehicle. The ALJ also found 

that the police were “aware” that Mr. Crany was driving when they arrived at the police 

station and asked Respondent to submit to a breathalyzer. The ALJ found that there could 

not have been reasonable grounds to believe she was driving at the time the breathalyzer 

would have been administered because the deputies knew, before arriving at the station,

that Mr. Crany and Respondent had “switched operation of the vehicle,” and Mr. Crany 

was the driver at all relevant times—not Respondent. In rendering findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, the ALJ relied heavily on the DR-15 incident report/certification that 

Deputy Yox prepared, which stated that the officers found “through investigation that 

passenger [and] driver switched operation of the vehicle.” Based on these findings, the 

ALJ took “no action” on the order of suspension and Respondent’s driving privileges were 

reinstated.

The Circuit Court Proceeding

Petitioner sought judicial review of the ALJ’s determination that, at the time 

Respondent was asked to submit to the chemical breath test, the officers were “aware that 

the passenger had indicated that [Respondent] had not been driving and therefore did not 

have reasonable grounds.” The Circuit Court for Carroll County upheld the ALJ’s 
7

determination, finding that the incident report was “pivotal” to the final decision because 

it reflected that the passenger and driver had switched positions. The circuit court also 

upheld the ALJ’s credibility finding. In reviewing the “credible testimony of the 

witnesses” in conjunction with the incident report and officer certification, the circuit court 

found that it was reasonable for the ALJ to reach this conclusion. The Motor Vehicle 

Administration subsequently petitioned this Court to review the decision of the 

administrative agency pursuant to Md. Code (Repl. Vol. 2012), § 12-305 of the Courts and 

Judicial Proceedings Article. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, this Court “look[s] through” 

the decision of the circuit court and directly evaluates the decision of the agency. Brutus 

630, LLC v. Town of Bel Air, 448 Md. 355, 367, 139 A.3d 957, 964 (2016). We review the 

legal conclusions of an administrative agency de novo, “accord[ing] some weight to an

[administrative] agency’s interpretation and application of a statute that it administers.” 

Krafft, 452 Md. at 603, 158 A.3d at 547 (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 

15, 997 A.2d 768, 776 (2010)).

Findings of fact, however, are reviewed based on “substantial evidence” from the 

record. Id. Under the “substantial evidence” test, a reviewing court looks at the relevant

evidence to determine “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the 

factual conclusion the agency reached.” CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation, 

448 Md. 412, 426, 139 A.3d 990, 999 (2016) (citation omitted). While the reviewing court 

is tasked with assessing whether the evidence is sufficient to support the administrative 
8

agency’s final determination, the reviewing court should not “substitute its judgment for 

the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency [from which the 

appeal is taken].” Gigeous v. E. Correctional Inst., 363 Md. 481, 496, 769 A.2d 912, 922

(2001) (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 

596–97, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). “The reviewing court also must review the agency’s

decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative 

agencies are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity.” Balt.

Lutheran High Sch. v. Emp’t Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662–63, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985).

It is the responsibility of the administrative agency to review the record and reach a logical 

conclusion, “but where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can be drawn, it is 

for the agency to draw the inferences.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Before this Court, Petitioner argued that the ALJ allowed Respondent to litigate the 

issue of the identity of the driver at the show-cause hearing and substituted the judgment

of the ALJ for that of the detaining officer. Petitioner contends that, in doing so, the ALJ 

ignored the officer’s professional assessment of the situation and focused on the testimony 

of Respondent and her witness. Petitioner further argued that the ALJ’s reliance on his

own interpretation of the officer certification in reaching the conclusion that Deputy Yox 

lacked reasonable grounds to believe Respondent was driving or attempting to drive a

vehicle while impaired or under the influence of alcohol was improper. An Amicus Curiae 

supported the Respondent’s position in brief and in oral argument, contending that the ALJ 

did not exceed his authority in weighing the credibility of Respondent and Mr. Crany to 
9

reach his final conclusion that Deputy Yox lacked reasonable grounds to request the breath 

test.7 

Reasonable Grounds in Test Refusal Cases 

At a license suspension hearing in a test refusal case, the ALJ assesses: (1) whether 

the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was driving or attempting to 

drive, (2) whether there was evidence of alcohol intoxication or impairment, (3) whether 

the officer advised the licensee of their rights in accordance with the statute, and (4) 

whether the licensee refused the breathalyzer after being made aware of those rights.

TRANSP. § 16.205.1(f)(7)(i)(1)–(4). Factors two through four are not in dispute. 

Accordingly, our consideration is focused on whether the detaining officer had reasonable 

grounds to believe Respondent had been driving or attempting to drive while impaired or 

under the influence of alcohol. Petitioner relies on Motor Vehicle Administration v. Krafft

in support of its claim that the ALJ “committed legal error” by failing to view the 

circumstances and reasonableness of the request for a breathalyzer from the perspective of 

the investigating officer. We agree. 

Instead of assessing the reasonableness of the request for the breathalyzer, the ALJ 

focused the inquiry on who was actually driving the vehicle when Deputy Yox initiated the 

stop. Although the ALJ was careful to differentiate between the preponderance of the 

evidence standard Respondent relied on at the show-cause hearing, and the reasonable 

grounds standard this Court clarified and applied in Krafft, the ALJ’s final determination 

 

7 Respondent did not file a response to Petitioner’s brief or participate in oral 

argument before this Court. 
10

that the deputies lacked reasonable grounds to suspect Respondent was driving while 

impaired or under the influence of alcohol was premised on whether the ALJ believed 

Respondent was, in fact, the driver of the vehicle. The ALJ allowed Respondent and her 

witness, Mr. Crany, to testify regarding who had been driving when the traffic violation 

was committed and based his final conclusion, in large part, on their “credible” testimony. 

However, the officer’s belief that Respondent was driving was reasonable because, almost 

immediately after observing the traffic violation, Respondent was observed sitting in the 

driver’s seat. Moreover, Deputy Yox smelled alcohol on her breath and person and 

Respondent failed a series of sobriety tests, including a preliminary breath test. Therefore,

the ALJ erred in finding the officers lacked reasonable grounds, in light of the evidence 

presented. 

In Krafft, this Court held that there is no requirement that the responding officer 

prove that the person who refused the sobriety test had, in fact, been driving or attempting 

to drive the motor vehicle while impaired pursuant to the “implied consent, administrative 

per se law.”8 TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (authorizing law enforcement to request that an 

 

8

 TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is also known as the “implied consent, administrative per 

se law.” See Krafft, 452 Md. at 592–94, 158 A.3d at 541–42 (“[The implied consent,

administrative per se law] authorizes a law enforcement officer to request a suspected 

drunk driver to submit to a chemical test to determine blood alcohol content in certain 

circumstances. If the test shows a blood alcohol concentration above a certain amount, or 

if the individual refuses to take the test, an administrative suspension of the individual’s 

driving privileges follows. [T]he statute provides that anyone who drives (or attempts to 

drive) a motor vehicle in Maryland ‘is deemed to have consented’ to take a breath test to 

determine blood alcohol concentration ‘if the person should be detained on suspicion of 

driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.’”)(footnote omitted). 
11

individual they reasonably believe is operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol submit to a breath test). There, this 

Court reviewed the administrative decisions in two separate test refusal cases. In each case, 

the administrative law judge overturned the suspension of driving privileges, finding that 

it was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the individuals who refused the 

breath test were actually driving the vehicle at the time. This Court rejected that 

conclusion, clarifying that the reasonable grounds standard under TRANSP. § 16-205.1

does not require proof of driving by a preponderance of the evidence.

9

 Krafft, 452 Md. at

607, 158 A.3d at 549–50 (“[A] showing that an officer had [] reasonable grounds to believe

that something is true is different from proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

was true.”). 

“[A] suspension for a test refusal is to be upheld only if the law enforcement officer 

who detained the suspected drunk driver had ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the 

individual was driving (or attempting to drive the vehicle) while impaired by alcohol.” Id. 

at 596, 158 A.3d at 543. In a test refusal case, an officer must have reasonable grounds to 

believe the licensee was driving or attempting to drive a vehicle while impaired, thereby 

triggering the implied consent law, before they can request the breathalyzer. Id. In such 

 

9

 “To the extent that a preponderance of evidence standard can be said to apply at 

an administrative license suspension hearing, it is that the [Motor Vehicle Administration] 

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds at 

the time the officer requested the test. This is not the same thing as a showing, by a 

preponderance of evidence, that the individual was in fact driving (or attempting to drive) 

while impaired.” Id. at 608, 158 A.3d at 550.
12

cases, reasonable grounds equates to “reasonable articulable suspicion.” Motor Vehicle 

Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254, 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007). We have stated that 

reasonable articulable suspicion is a “common sense, nontechnical conception that 

considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people 

act.” Shea, 415 Md. at 19, 997 A.2d at 778 (citing Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 507, 970 

A.2d 894, 903–04 (2009)). Reasonable articulable suspicion (or reasonable grounds under

TRANSP. § 16-205.1) is a considerably lower burden than the probable cause required for 

an arrest. It requires “less in the way of quantity and quality of evidence[.]” Id. 

Reasonable suspicion is a totality of the circumstances inquiry that must be based on more 

than a “hunch” or an unparticularized set of facts. Id. As is the case in the criminal law 

context,10 the circumstances surrounding the request for a breath test are “viewed through 

the eyes of a reasonable, prudent, police officer.” Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 542, 144 

A.3d 771, 781 (2016) (citing Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 356, 958 A.2d 356, 365 (2008)). 

As such, when determining whether an officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion, “[a] 

factor that, by itself, may be entirely neutral and innocent, can, when viewed in 

combination with other circumstances, raise a legitimate suspicion in the mind of an 

 

10 Although TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is a civil statute, we have applied the criminal 

law concept and definition of reasonable articulable suspicion to test refusal cases under 

this statute. See Krafft, 452 Md. at 607, 158 A.3d at 550 (stating that “[t]his Court has 

interpreted the ‘reasonable grounds’ standard to mean ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’”); 

Shepard, 399 Md. at 254, 923 A.2d at 107 (finding that reasonable grounds equates to a 

reasonable articulable suspicion); see also, Shea, 415 Md. at 16, 997 A.2d at 776-77 

(clarifying that, despite this Court’s consistent holding that ‘reasonable grounds’ equates 

to the Fourth Amendment quantum of suspicion in criminal law[,]” the statute should not 

be treated or viewed as “quasi-criminal.”).
13

experienced officer.” Id. at 543, 144 A.3d at 781 (citing Crosby, 408 Md. at 508, 970 A.2d 

at 904). 

For example, in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Carpenter, we addressed the 

“salient issue” of whether the arresting officer in that case reasonably inferred from her 

observations at the scene of a car accident, that Mr. Carpenter was driving while impaired 

or under the influence of alcohol. 424 Md. 401, 416, 36 A.3d 439, 448 (2012). After being 

dispatched to the scene of a two-car accident on West Pulaski Highway, an officer from 

the Elkton Police Department observed damage to a Chevrolet Cavalier and a Ford truck. 

Id. at 404, 36 A.3d at 441. The officer determined, after observing the damage to the Ford 

truck, which was registered in Mr. Carpenter’s name, and speaking with eye witnesses at

the scene, that Mr. Carpenter had been driving the truck at the time of the accident. Id. at 

404–06, 36 A.3d at 441–42. The officer also determined Mr. Carpenter was intoxicated 

because, upon approaching him, she noticed his “watery eyes, slurred speech, and dilated 

pupils[.]” Id. at 406, 36 A.3d at 442. Mr. Carpenter also admitted to consuming two beers 

earlier that evening. Id. After this admission and observation, the officer administered

several of the SFSTs, which Mr. Carpenter failed. Id. The ALJ determined—based on the 

officer’s testimony regarding what she observed at the scene of the accident—that the 

officer had the requisite reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Carpenter was driving, despite 

not having seen Mr. Carpenter operating the vehicle. Id. at 404, 36 A.3d at 441. The circuit 

court overturned the ALJ, finding that the officer who detained Mr. Carpenter and 

requested the breath test did not have reasonable grounds to do so. Id. at 403, 36 A.3d at 

440. We agreed with the ALJ and reversed the circuit court, holding that, taken together, 
14

the officer’s observations led her to infer that Mr. Carpenter was intoxicated and had been 

driving his vehicle when the accident occurred, and such an inference was reasonable. Id. 

at 416, 36 A.3d at 448. 

Here, Deputy Yox similarly had reasonable grounds to believe Respondent was 

driving under the influence of alcohol, even though she did not see Respondent operating 

the vehicle. When Deputy Yox approached the vehicle after pulling Respondent and Mr. 

Crany over, she saw Respondent sitting in the driver’s seat. Upon interacting with 

Respondent, Deputy Yox determined that her breath smelled of alcohol. She also smelled 

alcohol on Respondent’s person. After requesting that Respondent exit the vehicle, Deputy 

Yox administered standard field sobriety tests, which included a preliminary breath test. 

The results of the preliminary breath test revealed a BAC level of 0.14—well over the legal 

limit. Respondent also failed the other SFSTs. Considering the Respondent’s poor 

performance on the sobriety tests and her position in the driver’s seat when the officer 

approached, Deputy Yox’s belief that Respondent was driving when she observed the Ford 

pick-up truck failing to stop at the stop sign was reasonable. The fact that Deputy Yox did 

not offer any testimony before the ALJ is immaterial to the determination of whether she 

had reasonable grounds to believe, based on her observations at the scene, that Respondent 

was driving the vehicle. Even if Deputy Yox accepted the narrative presented by Mr. 

Crany, Respondent positioned herself as the driver of the vehicle shortly after the operator 

of the vehicle was observed committing a traffic violation. It was not unreasonable for 

Deputy Yox to infer from Respondent’s positioning that she was driving or attempting to 
15

drive. Deputy Yox was not required to ignore these observations and accept the narrative 

presented by Respondent and Mr. Crany as truth. 

The ALJ erred in effectively second guessing the professional judgment of the 

detaining officer, absent evidence that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to 

believe Respondent was driving under the influence or impaired by alcohol. See Shea, 415 

Md. at 19, 997 A.2d at 778 (“The analysis requires courts to give appropriate deference to 

the training and experience of the law enforcement officer and to the officer’s ability to 

make reasonable inferences from his or her observations, based on that training and 

experience.”) (internal citations omitted). Although the ALJ seemed to believe that the 

certification indicated the officers believed Respondent and Mr. Crany attempted to 

deceive the officers by switching positions in the vehicle, the use of the phrase “switched 

operation of the vehicle” does not lend itself to a finding that the detaining officers did not 

believe Respondent was driving the vehicle that night, or that it was unreasonable for them 

to suspect Respondent was driving under the circumstances. The issue of who was, in fact, 

driving the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop is irrelevant to the question of whether the 

officer reasonably believed or could have reasonably inferred Respondent was driving or 

attempting to drive from the surrounding circumstances, because Petitioner need only 

prove that a reasonable officer could reach this conclusion. Even if Deputy Yox was 

uncertain regarding whether Mr. Crany or Respondent was driving at the time of the traffic 

violation, the applicable standard does not require certainty—it is enough that Deputy Yox 

could infer that Respondent was driving from her observations at the scene. 
16

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed supra, we hold that Deputy Yox had reasonable grounds

to suspect Respondent was driving or attempting to drive while impaired or under the 

influence of alcohol. In accordance with the principles we articulated in Krafft, Petitioner 

was not required to prove the fact of driving. Instead, we assess whether the detaining 

officer had reasonable grounds to believe, based on the facts and circumstances presented, 

that Respondent was driving or attempting to drive while impaired or under the influence. 

Thus, we find that the ALJ erred in granting the Motion for No Action. 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR CARROLL COUNTY

REVERSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS 

TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 

HEARINGS FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT 

WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO 

BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.