COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MICHAEL GEORGE KESELICA, S/K/A 

 MICHAEL GEORGES KESELICA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1105-95-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 FEBRUARY 4, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Stanley P. Klein, Judge 

 Richard S. Stolker for appellant. 

 Kimberley A. Whittle, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; Richard H. Rizk, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Michael George Keselica appeals his conviction for 

embezzlement. He contends that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to try the case. We disagree and affirm. 

 I. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 So viewed, the evidence showed that Robert A. Winstead 

resided in Fairfax County until December 4, 1993. In 1989, 

appellant was Winstead's "financial adviser, telling [him] which 

stocks were available, and what stocks were a good buy." 

Winstead testified that he and appellant "were good friends," and 

that Winstead "even had [appellant] over to speak to [Winstead's] 
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Men's Brotherhood at [Winstead's] church." Appellant "would call 

[Winstead at his home], by phone" and recommend stocks to buy. 

Winstead would agree to purchase shares over the phone. 

Appellant sent Winstead invoices requiring payment within seven 

days of placing an order. Pursuant to appellant's instructions, 

Winstead wrote out and mailed personal checks to appellant's 

residence in Gaithersburg, Maryland. From May 1990 until 

November 1990, per appellant's instructions, Winstead wrote ten 

checks made payable to First Montauk Securities. Winstead mailed 

the checks to appellant. Winstead never received "ownership 

certificates" for the stocks purchased, so he telephoned 

appellant and asked about them. Appellant told Winstead that the 

stocks were "in a street name." Although he was concerned about 

the absence of ownership certificates, Winstead continued to buy 

stocks from appellant; however, Winstead continued to ask about 

the certificates, and appellant continued to explain that "it was 

in a street name." It was not until June 1993 that appellant 

informed the Winsteads that he had misappropriated their money in 

order to support a cocaine addiction and discussed repayment. 

 In a letter dated February 18, 1994, appellant told Winstead 

that "[w]hen we first did business together when I was with Dean 

Witter I was not guilty of fraud, deceit and greed. I was your 

normal stockbroker and family man. However, several years later 

is when my life started going downhill because of my addiction to 

cocaine." 
3 

 Elta Winstead, Robert's wife, testified that she also 

purchased stock from appellant between May 1990 and November 1990 

for which she wrote four personal checks. Like her husband, she 

mailed personal checks to appellant believing that he would 

purchase stock with the funds. 

 During an interview with Detective Purvis Dawson, appellant 

confessed his wrongdoing and confirmed Winstead's account of 

events. In a handwritten statement provided to Dawson, appellant 

admitted that he advised Winstead "to purchase more Perpetual 

stock" in order to "convert the funds to [his] own use to 

purchase more coke." According to appellant, "[a]s [he] became 

more involved with the drug [he] found [him]self lying more and 

stealing more to feed [his] habit. [He] would continue to make 

interest payments to Mr. Winstead to give him the impression that 

[the] investments were doing well." 

 On appeal, appellant argues that he gained lawful possession 

of the Winsteads' money, and did not convert or form the intent 

to convert the funds until later, when he was in Maryland. 

Appellant contends that no elements of the offense were committed 

in Virginia, and that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to prosecute the case, thereby rendering his 

judgment of conviction void. 

 II. 

 If any person wrongfully and fraudulently 

use, dispose of, conceal or embezzle any 

money, bill, note, check, order, draft, bond, 

. . . or any other personal property, 
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tangible or intangible, which he shall have 

received for another or for his employer, 

principal, or bailor, or by virtue of his 

office, trust, or employment, or which shall 

have been entrusted or delivered to him by 

another . . . he shall be guilty of 

embezzlement. Embezzlement shall be deemed 

larceny and upon conviction thereof, the 

person shall be punished as provided in 

§ 18.2-95 or § 18.2-96. 

Code § 18.2-111. 

 Virginia's venue statute provides: 

 Prosecution for offenses committed wholly or 

in part without and made punishable within 

this Commonwealth may be in any county or 

city in which the offender is found or to 

which he is sent by any judge or court; and 

if any person commit larceny or embezzlement 

beyond the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth 

and bring the stolen property into the same 

he shall be liable to prosecution and 

punishment for larceny or embezzlement in any 

county or city into which he shall have taken 

the property as if the same had been solely 

committed therein; . . . provided, that if 

any person shall commit embezzlement within 

this Commonwealth he shall be liable as 

aforesaid or to prosecution and punishment 

for his offense in the county or city in 

which he was legally obligated to deliver the 

embezzled funds or property. 

Code § 19.2-245. 

 "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce 

and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in 

punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the 

effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its 

power." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). The 

concept enunciated by Justice Holmes in Strassheim, i.e., that a 
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state may punish someone for acts done outside its borders where 

the acts were intended to produce and actually produced 

detrimental effects within the state, has been termed the "Result 

Theory." See State v. Miller, 755 P.2d 434, 437 (Ariz. 1988) 

(discussing four theories to determine whether Arizona had 

jurisdiction; one theory, based on international law, was termed 

the "Result Theory");1 see also Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., 

Annotation, Where is Embezzlement Committed for Purposes of 

Territorial Jurisdiction or Venue, 80 A.L.R.3d 514 at § 7 (1977) 

(explaining that, in a proper case, territorial jurisdiction may 

be exercised by state in which accused was only constructively 

present at time of offense if the accused "put into operation an 

agency or force which does harm in another jurisdiction"). 

 Virginia adopted the "Result Theory" in Travelers Health 

Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd, 

339 U.S. 643 (1950). In Travelers, the defendant company 

(Travelers) offered and sold "membership contracts" that were 

deemed securities. The contracts/securities were offered solely 

through mail solicitations; however, Travelers failed to apply 

for the requisite securities permit. To obtain a permit, a 

prospective seller had to execute a document agreeing that 

service could be effected on it through the Secretary of the 

 

 1 The other theories included "Failure to Perform a Duty," 

"Accomplice Theory," and "Conspiracy Theory." 755 P.2d at 

439-40. 

 
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Commonwealth. Travelers argued that because it conducted no 

business in Virginia and "transacted [its] entire business 

outside the state through the mails," Virginia had no 

jurisdiction to prosecute the company for securities violations 

in Virginia. Id. at 884, 51 S.E.2d at 265. 

 The Supreme Court phrased the issue as whether "the 

Commonwealth possess[es] the jurisdiction and power to deal with 

the commission of crimes of this nature within its borders and 

punish same, although the transactions are principally carried on 

from without the State through the United States mail." Id. at 

891, 51 S.E.2d at 268. The Court established the following 

general rule: 

 "A question often arises as to the 

jurisdiction of a crime where the accused, 

while in one state, sets in motion a force 

which operates in another state, as where a 

shot is fired at a person across a state line 

or an injurious substance is sent to a person 

in another state with the intent to injure 

him. In such cases the view has generally 

been taken that actual presence in a state is 

not necessary to make a person amenable to 

its laws for a crime committed there; for if 

a crime is the immediate result of his act, 

he may be made to answer for it in its 

courts, although actually absent from the 

state at the time he does the act." 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 In finding Travelers amenable to prosecution in Virginia, 

the Court explained: "'It has long been a commonplace of 

criminal liability that a person may be charged in the place 

where the evil results, though he is beyond the jurisdiction when 
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he starts the train of events of which that evil is the fruit.'" 

Id. at 892, 51 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting United States v. 

Steinberg, 62 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 

229 (1933) (citing, inter alia, Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 284, 

285)). The Court added that there are "[a]dditional authorities 

to the effect that a person may be guilty of crime by reason of 

the use of the mails, and that the crime is deemed to be 

committed in the State where the mail is received and the 

prohibited results occur." Id. at 892, 51 S.E.2d at 269. 

 In Gregory v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 89, 360 S.E.2d 858 

(1987), the defendant was convicted of fraudulent removal and 

conversion of a tractor and trailer in violation of 

Code § 18.2-115 (fraudulent conversion). Gregory, a resident of 

 Botetourt County, Virginia, had earlier pledged the tractor and 

trailer to a Botetourt County bank as security for a loan. 

Gregory, 5 Va. App. at 90, 360 S.E.2d at 859. Pursuant to the 

loan, Gregory agreed that he would not sell the rig without the 

bank's consent. Id. at 90-91, 360 S.E.2d at 859. Gregory later 

admitted that he sold the tractor in Louisiana without the bank's 

consent. Id. 

 Gregory contended that the Virginia circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction because the alleged criminal acts did not occur in 

Virginia. He also asserted that his criminal intent was not 

formed until after he removed the vehicle from Virginia. The 

trial court agreed that Gregory did not form the "intent to 
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convert the secured property [until] after he removed it from 

Virginia," yet it found Gregory guilty. Id. at 92, 360 S.E.2d at 

860. We affirmed the conviction and held that "nothing in the 

language of [Code § 18.2-115] requires proof that the fraudulent 

intent to dispose or the actual disposal of the secured property 

occurred within the boundaries of Virginia." Id. at 93, 360 

S.E.2d at 860. Applying the result theory, we concluded that 

"[w]here harm is caused in Virginia by criminal acts partially 

committed within this Commonwealth, such acts can be prosecuted 

here." Id. at 94, 360 S.E.2d at 861 (quoting from Travelers, 188 

Va. at 892, 51 S.E.2d at 269, that "'a person may be charged in 

the place where the evil results, though he is beyond the 

jurisdiction when he starts the train of events'"). See also

Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 440-41, 477 S.E.2d 

759, 764 (1996) (finding that Virginia court had jurisdiction to 

prosecute out-of-state parent for parental abduction where 

Virginia parent delivered child to defendant out-of-state and 

defendant failed to return child to Virginia). 

 Here, the facts showed that while appellant was in Maryland, 

he used the telephone and the mails in a continuing scheme to 

solicit funds from the Winsteads for the sole purpose of 

diverting their funds to his own use. Appellant purposely lied 

about the absence of stock certificates and made sham interest 

payments in order to continue his embezzlement scheme and inflict 

further harm on the Winsteads in Virginia. 
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 The record established that appellant, while located in 

Maryland, set in motion a scheme intended to produce and which 

did produce immediate detrimental effects in Virginia, namely, 

the fraudulent taking of money from Virginia residents and its 

attendant conversion to his own use. Appellant used the mails 

and telephone system to produce the intended detrimental effects. 

 Appellant's reliance on Moreno v. Baskerville, 249 Va. 16, 

452 S.E.2d 653 (1995), is misplaced. In that case, Moreno sold 

drugs to a man named Moore in Arizona, who transported the drugs 

to Virginia. Unbeknownst to Moreno, Moore sold them to two men 

in Virginia. Id. at 17-18, 452 S.E.2d at 654. The Supreme Court 

held that Virginia courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case 

and reversed the convictions. 

 Applying a proximate cause analysis, the Court stated that 

"[t]he act of distribution by Moore to [Virginia buyers] 

intervened. The situation here is entirely unlike a case in 

which a shot fired across a state line 'immediately' results in 

harm, thus enabling the forum state to exercise extraterritorial 

jurisdiction over the assailant." Id. at 19-20, 452 S.E.2d at 

655. Despite its finding that Moreno's acts did not cause the 

immediate result in Virginia, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 

rule of law in Virginia 

 that actual physical presence in a state is 

not necessary to make an individual amenable 

to its criminal laws if the crime is the 

"immediate result" of the accused's act; 

[and] under such circumstances, the accused 

may be tried in the state's courts even 
10 

though actually absent at the time the act 

was committed. 

Id. at 19, 452 S.E.2d at 655. 

 Here, appellant's acts caused the immediate and intended 

result or harm, and no intervening acts broke the causal chain he 

set in motion. Therefore, Moreno is distinguishable from and 

inapplicable to the facts of this case. Because appellant set in 

motion a criminal scheme, the immediate result of which caused 
11 

the intended harm in this state, Virginia had jurisdiction to try 

the case. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is valid and is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.