alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 112 (Friday, June 12, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 28066]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-13858]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[CO200-LLCOF02000-L07770900-XZ0000-241A00]


Notice of Meeting, Front Range Resource Advisory Council 
(Colorado)

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Front Range 
Resource Advisory Council (RAC), will meet as indicated below.

DATES: The meeting will be held July 15, 2009 from 9:15 a.m. to 4 p.m.

ADDRESSES: BLM Royal Gorge Field Office, 3028 East Main Street, Canon 
City, Colorado 81212.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cass Cairns, (719) 269-8553.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 15 member Council advises the Secretary 
of the Interior, through the Bureau of Land Management, on a variety of 
planning and management issues associated with public land management 
in the Royal Gorge Field Office and San Luis Valley, Colorado. Planned 
agenda topics include: Manager updates on current land management 
issues, Paleontology Resources Preservation Act of 2009, and Over The 
River<SUP>TM</SUP> project proposal discussion.
    All meetings are open to the public. The public is encouraged to 
make oral comments to the Council at 10 a.m. or written statements may 
be submitted for the Council's consideration. Depending on the number 
of persons wishing to comment and time available, the time for 
individual oral comments may be limited. Summary minutes for the 
Council Meeting will be maintained in the Royal Gorge Field Office and 
will be available for public inspection and reproduction during regular 
business hours within thirty (30) days following the meeting. Meeting 
minutes and agenda (10 days prior to each meeting) are also available 
at: http://www.blm.gov/rac/co/frrac/co_fr.htm.

    Dated: June 5, 2009.
Roy L. Masinton,
Field Manager, Royal Gorge Field Office.
[FR Doc. E9-13858 Filed 6-11-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-JB-P
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Coydine Mackie, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 43]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth Pickholz, J.), entered on or about May 17, 2005, which adjudicated defendant a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The record supports the level three sex offender adjudication, which was based upon defendant’s prior felony sex crime conviction, a presumptive overriding factor under the applicable guidelines *(see People v Judd,*29 AD3d 431 [2006]). The court properly concluded that defendant’s present circumstances did not warrant a downward departure from his presumptive risk level *(see People v Guarnan,*8 AD3d 545 [2004]).

Defendant’s arguments concerning the choice of risk factors made by the Legislature and the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders *(see*Correction Law § 168-Z [5]) are without merit *(see People v Joe,*26 AD3d 300 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 703 [2006]; *see also People v Bligen,*33 AD3d 489 [2006] [decided herewith]). Concur—Buckley, EJ, Mazzarelli, Marlow, Sullivan and Gonzalez, JJ.
Mr. Robert Ollington 

Managing Director 

Ollington Gaming Pty. Ltd. 

338 Howe Parade 

Garden City, Melbourne, Australia 

Dear Mr. Ollington: 

Thank you for your letters of March 10, and March 20, 1995, 

asking whether a nonbanking dice game would fall within class I1 

gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 

The IGRA divides gaming into three classes. Class I gaming is 

social gaming for minimal prizes or traditional Indian games 

offered as part of tribal ceremonies or celebrations. Class I 

gaming is regulated exclusively by the tribes. Class I1 gaming 

consists of bingo, other games similar to bingo (if played at the 

M 

same location as bingo), and nonbanking card games. Class I1 

gaming is regulated by the Indian tribes with regulatory 6 

oversight by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC). Cj 

Class I11 gaming is all gaming that does not fall within class I 

or class 11, and includes, for example, slot machines, banking 

Q 

card games, casino games, horse racing, dog racing, and tfl 

lotteries. Class I11 gaming is lawful only if it is: (1) r'l 

authorized by a tribal ordinance that is approved by the Chairman 

of the NIGC; (2) located in a state that permits such gaming; and 

(3) conducted in a conformance with a compact (agreement) between 

the Indian tribe and the state. 

Because nonbanking (or banking) dice games do not fall within 

class I or class I1 gaming, such games fall within class I11 

gaming. Therefore, a nonbanking dice game can lawfully be 

conducted by an Indian tribe only if that game is permitted under 

the laws of the state in which the tribe is located and the tribe 

and the state have entered into a compact authorizing the game. 

I hope this responds to your question. 

Sincerely, 

Michael D. Cox 

General Counsel
Respondent’s Waiver of Response to Petition for Review Page 1 NO. 15-0826

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

LIONELL BREAUX AND L. J. BREAUX, L.L.C., Petitioners,

V.

WEST TEXAS PETERBILT (LUB BOCK) INC. D/B/A TEXAS PETERBILT (ODESSA), Respondent.

RESPONDENT’S WAIVER OF RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS:

Comes now Respondent West Texas Peterbilt (Lubbock) Inc. d/b/a

Texas Peterbilt (Odessa) (“Respondent”) and files this, its waiver of

response to Petitioners Lione ll Breaux and L.J. Brea ux, L.L.C.’s Petition for

Review, reserving the right to respond upon request of the Court pursuant to

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.3. FILED 15-0826 11/23/2015 9:33:00 AM tex-7941404 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERKRespondent’s Waiver of Response to Petition for Review Page 2 Respectfully submitted,

UNDERWOOD LAW FIRM, P.C. W. Wade Arnold State Bar No. 00783561 Stephanie J. Larsen State Bar No. 24085425 P. O. Box 9158 Amarillo, Texas 79105-9158 Wade.arnold@uwlaw.com Stephanie.larsen@uwlaw.com (806) 376-5613 (806) 379-0316 [fax]

By: /s/ Stephanie J. Larsen Stephanie J. Larsen

ATTORNEYS FOR WEST TEXAS PETERBILT (LUBBOCK) d/b/a TEXAS PETERBILT (ODESSA)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of November, 2015 a true and correct copy of the above wa s served on the following:

Counsel for Petitioner:

Via Facsimile (432) 368-4287 Mr. Allen R. Stroder 191 Professional Center, Suite 230 6010 Highway 191 Odessa, Texas 79762 allenstroder@cableone.net

/s/ Stephanie J. Larsen Stephanie J. Larsen
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

December 30, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-41608

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TIM C. WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-02-CR-105-1)

--------------------

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Tim C. Williams appeals from his

conviction, sentence, and final order of criminal forfe iture

following his plea of guilty to conspiracy to launder money and

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five

kilograms of cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)

and (h); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. We must examine

the basis of our jurisdiction, and must do so on our own motion if

necessary. S ee Mosley v. Cozby

, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987).2

Under F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(b)(3), the time period fo r filing a

notice of appeal is tolled by the filing of specified postjudgment

motions. Although not listed among the motions in Rule 4(b)(3)(A),

a motion for reconsideration tolls the 10-day period for filing a

notice of appeal. S ee United States v. Brewer

, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143-

44 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Greenwood

, 974 F.2d 1449,

1465-67 (5th Ci r. 1992). Williams’s November 5, 2002, “Opposed

M otion to Vacate Conviction and Sentence, and to Dismiss the

Indictment,” was filed within 10 days of the entry of Williams’s

final judgment of conviction and sentence and thus was a timelyfiled motion for reconsideration. As such, it suspended the time

for filing a notice of appeal. S ee Brewer

, 60 F.3d at 1143-44;

F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 4(b).

As the district court has not ruled on Williams’s motion for

reconsideration, this case must be REMANDED for the limited

purposes of allowing that court to rule on that motion. The

district court is directed to rule on Williams’s motion for

reconsideration as expeditiously as practicable, consistent with a

just and fair disposition of the matter. S ee Burt v. Ware

, 14 F.3d

256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1994). We retain jurisdiction over the

appeal except for the purposes of the limited remand. Williams’s

“Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record with Government’s Motion

and Distri ct Court’s Order Unsealing Sentencing Transcripts” is

HELD IN ABEYANCE pending district court’s ruling in this limited

remand.3

LIMITED REMAND.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donald Hughes, Appellant.

[977 NYS2d 841]

Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Barry M. Donalty, J.), rendered February 29, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (three counts) and course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on the first count of the indictment to a period of 15 years and as modified the judgment is affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of one count each of attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.50 [4]) and course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree (§ 130.80 [1] [b]), and three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [3]). Defendant contends that County Court *1381erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police on the ground that he gave the statement involuntarily. We reject that contention. A statement “is ‘involuntarily made’ when it is obtained by [the police] by means of any promise or statement of fact which creates a substantial risk that the defendant might falsely incriminate himself’ *(People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 413 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]). “To determine voluntariness, courts review all of the surrounding circumstances to see whether the defendant’s will has been overborne” *(id.; see People v Collins,*106 AD3d 1544, 1545 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 1072 [2013]).

Here, the evidence at the *Huntley*hearing, including the videotaped interrogations, establishes that defendant’s statement was voluntarily made and that coercive police activity did not occur *(see Mateo,*2 NY3d at 414). The fact that defendant was told that he failed a polygraph examination did not render the statement involuntary *(see People v Ellis,*73 AD3d 1433, 1434 [2010], *lv denied*15 NY3d 851 [2010]; *People v Melendez,*149 AD2d 918, 918-919 [1989]). Defendant’s claim that he was under duress and confused because of an illness is not supported by the evidence at the *Huntley*hearing. In arguing otherwise, defendant improperly relies on his testimony at trial *(see People v McCurty*[appeal No. 2], 60 AD3d 1406,1407 [2009], *lv denied*12 NY3d 856 [2009]).

We conclude that the sentence is illegal insofar as it imposes a 20-year period of postrelease supervision for attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree *(see*Penal Law § 70.45 [2-a] [e]). “ ‘Although [that] issue was not raised before the [sentencing] court or on appeal, we cannot allow an [illegal] sentence to stand’ ” *(People v Davis,*37 AD3d 1179, 1180 [2007], *lv denied*8 NY3d 983 [2007]). We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision on the first count of the indictment to a period of 15 years. The sentence as modified is not unduly harsh or severe. Present — Scudder, PJ., Centra, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
Number of Gaming Number of Gaming Number of G

Operations Revenues Operations Revenues Operations R

Portland (fka Region I) 47 $2,376,025 46 $2,263,950 1 $

Sacramento (fka Region II) 59 $7,363,493 58 $7,796,488 1 ($Phoenix (fka Region III) 46 $2,773,715 46 $2,874,052 0 ($St. Paul (fka Region IV) 115 $4,402,311 111 $4,224,866 4 $Tulsa (Eastern part of fka Region V) 62 $1,699,940 57 $1,438,228 5 $OK City (Western part of fka Region V) 48 $1,347,242 45 $1,146,047 3 $Washington (fka Region VI) 28 $6,776,100 28 $6,399,841 0 $Totals 405 $26,738,826 391 $26,143,472 14 $Portland Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.Sacramento California, and Northern NevadaPhoenix Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Southern Nevada.St. Paul Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin and WyTulsa Kansas, and Eastern Oklahoma.OK City Western Oklahoma and Texas.Washington Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and New York.

Source: Compiled from gaming operation audited financial statements received by the NIGC through May 11

National Indian Gaming Commission

Tribal Gaming Revenues (in thousands) by Region

Fiscal Year 2008 and 2007

Fiscal Year 2008 Fiscal Year 2007 Increa
#### Saul A. BRAHMS, Plaintiff, v. MOORE-McCORMACK LINES, Inc., Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Aug. 12, 1955.

Jacob Rassner, New York City, for plaintiff.

Dow & Symmers, New York City, William A. Wilson, New York City, of counsel, for defendant.

DIMOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiff moves pursuant to Rule 73 (a), F.R.C.P., for an order extending the time to take an appeal in this case 30 days from July 30, 1955. Rule 73(a) provides that an appeal from a district court to a court of appeals shall be taken “30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from * * * except that upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment the district court in any action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed.”

Judgment was entered in this action on June 30, 1955, D.C., 133 F.Supp. 283, but plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal until August 1, 1955, two days late. Plaintiff’s attorney of record who was his own trial counsel in the case says that he did not learn of the entry of judgment until August 1, 1955. A postal card bearing the notice of entry was *503sent to plaintiff’s attorney by the clerk of the court on July 1, 1955, and received at the attorney’s office presumably in due course. Plaintiff’s attorney swears that he never saw the postal card from the clerk. An associate of plaintiff’s attorney, whom he had instructed to perfect the appeal, swears that he searched the office file on July 27 to see whether a judgment had as yet been entered but the file did not disclose any notification to that effect. Too late, on August 1, 1955, he learned of the entry of judgment. This prompted further search and he found the postal card in the file of another case brought on behalf of plaintiff.

There is no statement that it is the office practice of plaintiff’s attorney to rely on the absence of a notice of entry from the office file as proof that no judgment has been entered. There is no statement that the office practice is to file notices of entry without bringing them to the attention of the lawyer members of the staff. There is no affidavit by any member of the office staff explaining how the postal card found its way into the files. There is not even a statement that none of the lawyers in the office knew of the existence of the notice of entry, let alone an affidavit from each that he had no such knowledge.

This court went a long way to liberalize the Rules’ conception of “failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment” in Resnick v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 11 F.R.D. 76, 77. There knowledge of the party’s attorney of record, as distinguished from his trial counsel, was held not to be knowledge of the party. Here, however, the notice of entry was received in the office of the man who was both attorney of record and trial counsel. It would take a very much stronger case than that made by these affidavits to substantiate a claim that there was (a) a “failure of [the] party” to learn of the entry of judgment and (b) a showing of excusable neglect.

The motion is denied.
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