### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1196

S I K G A E K , I N C ORP OR

AT E D, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M ARC US H AR

R I S , et al ., Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 13 C 6 62 4 — Jame s F. Hold erma n, Judg e.
S UB MI TT E D A P RI L 2, 2015

— D E C I D E D J UN E 17, 2015

Before B AU E R

, P O S N E R , and M AN I O N

, Circ uit Judges. B AU E R , Cir cu i t Judge. Plainti ff- appellant, Sik Gaek, Incor

porat ed, sought sanc tions again st defendant-appell ee, Mar cus Har ris, for fees and expenses incu rr ed in connecti on wi t h Ha r r i s’ fai lure to atte nd a deposi tion in contraven tion of a court or der

. The di stric t court declined to i mpose s a n cti ons and2 No. 14-1196
closed the matter

. Appellant a p peals from that or der

. W e 1 affi rm. I. BACKGRO UND I n 2 0 10, appellant fi led sui t in the Uni ted St ates Di stric t Court for the Eastern Di stric t of New Y or k again st Dani el Kim and Y ogi’s II, Inc., allegin g tr ademark infringement under the Latham Act and v arious state law claim s. This di scov ery di spute ari ses out of that pendi ng acti on. Mar cus Harris, a non-party t o the underlyin g New Y or k li tigati on, i s a Chi cago atto rney who fi led sev eral tr ademark ap p l ica t ions for Y

ogi’s II, Inc. On July 17, 2013, appellant
serv ed Harris wi th a sub poena i ssu ed by the Nort hern Di stric t of Illino is, requiring hi s deposi tion and documents relat ed to t he tr ademark appli cati ons he fi led for Y ogi’s II, Inc. The deposi tion di d not t ake place on July 29, 2013, as s chedu led. On Sept ember 16, 2013, appellant fi led a motion to enforce the sub poena
. Th e di stric t court gr anted the motion at a hearin g on October 22, 2013, and or dered Harris to atte nd the deposi tion and p r o d uc e the documents at hi s offi ce at 12:00 p.m. on October 29, 2013. Appellant sent Harris, who w as not present at the October 22 hearin g, a co p y of the or der by mai l and facs i mi le on October 23, 2013, and faxed a le t t e r to Ha rr i s on October 28, 2013, confi rmi ng that the deposi tion

w ould take place in accordance wi th the di stric t court’s or der

.

Appe l l ant also accuses the di stric t cour t judge of “re gio nali sm,” or 1 regi onal b i as. This cl aim i s groundl ess and warran ts no further di scussio n.No. 14-1196 3
On October 29, 2013, one of the appellant’s att o rneys, Thomas P ark, arr i v ed at Harris’ offi ce at 11:45 a.m. to take the deposi tion. Harris w as not there

. P ark spoke to Harris ov er the phone and, according to P ark, Harris stated that he w as aw are of the court or d e r a nd w ould be will ing to do the deposi tion, but t hat i t w ould take him at least one hour or more to arr i v e at hi s offi ce. P ark told Harris tha t if he d i d not arr i v e by 1:00 p.m. i t w ould be tr eated as a “no show .” The deposi tion di d not t ake place. Later that ev ening, Harris faxed a lette r to P ark statin g, “I hav e e ver y intention of complying wi th the court’s or der

... . I can be av aila ble thi s week to be deposed ei ther telephonic ally or by video. Please pro p ose tim es that

w or k wi th y our sch edule.” Appellant di d not res p o nd t o Harris’ lette r or attempt to reschedule. Rather , on Octo ber 30, 2 0 13, the next day

, appellant fi led a motion to hold Harris in contempt for fai ling to atte nd the deposit io n on October 29, 2013, and seeking sanc tions in the form of fees and expenses in
excess of $6,800. Harris fi led an affi davit attached to hi s reply , whi ch explain ed that he w as on v acati on the w ee k o f October 22, 2013 , ce lebrating hi s father’s 70th bi rt hday wi th hi s fami ly in New Y

or k Ci ty , and that he fi rst becam e aw are of the di stric t c ourt ’s or der of October 22, 2013, on October 29, 2013, at 12:41 p.m., when h e spoke wi th P ark on the phone. Durin g that conv ersation, Harris clai ms that he told P ar k t ha t he

w ould rush t o his offi ce for the deposi tion, but w ould not be

a ble to get there unti l about 2:00 p.m. Accordi ng to Harris, P ark refused to t a ke hi s deposi tion on October 29 becau se he (P ark ) had to catch a tr ain back to the ai rpor t at 1:00 p.m. Harris then offered to be deposed on the spo t v ia telephone, but P ark refused.4 No. 14-1196
On Nov ember 6, 2013, Harris’ atto rney sent a lette r to P ark via emai l, facs i mi le tr ansm i ssi on, reg ular mai l, and cert ifie d mai l. The lette r stated: “Mr

. Harris conti nues to be av ai lable for deposi tion, as he has been since he found out about thi s matter for the fi rst tim e on October 29, 2013

... . Please contact me via emai l

... at y our earlies t conv eni ence to sch edule hi s deposi

tion.” On Nov ember 8, 2013, Harris ’ atto rney called P ark ’s offi ce in an atte mpt to reschedule the deposi tion; a receptioni st informed Harris’ a tto rney that P ark w as not av ai lable but

w ould call back on Nov ember 11, 2013. W he n P a rk fai led to call Harris on Nov ember 11, 201 3, Harris’ atto rney sent P ark another emai l that w as sub stanti a l l y si mi lar to the emai l sent Nove mb e r 6. Nei ther P ark nor any other repr esentativ e of appellant responded to Harris or hi s lawy ers. On D ecember 17, 2013, the di stric t c ourt held a hearin g on appellant’s motion for contempt and sanc tions

. The d i stric t court or dered appellant to take and complete Ha rr i s’ depo si

tion that same day

, and appellant di d so. The court also
or dered all pending motions, inclu ding appellant’s motion for cont e mpt and fees and expenses, moot

. On January 7, 2014, appellant fi l e d a renew ed motion for sanc tions in t he form of fees and expenses in excess of $6,800. The di stric t court enter ed

an or der denyi ng appellant’s motion on Januar y 8 , 2014, and closed the matter . Thi s appeal f ollow ed.

II. DISCUSSION The ini tial inqui ry in any appea l is wh e ther the court to which the appeal has been take n has jurisdi cti on to enter tain t he appeal. C ongr ess has g ranted the Uni ted St ates Court s o f Appeals jurisdicti on ov er all final deci si ons of the federalNo. 14-1196 5
di stric t courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final de cis io n i s one whi ch ends the li tigati on on the m erits and leav es nothin g f or the di stric t court to d o bu t execute the judgment. Midland Asphalt Corp. v
. United States , 489 U

. S

. 7 9 4, 798 (1989). Or di

naril y , a pret rial di scov ery or der , such as a r e fus al to i mpose di scov ery -related sanc tions, i s not final in the sens e that i t winds up the underlying laws ui t. Mulay Plastics, Inc. v
. Grand T

. W

. R. Co. , 742 F .2d 369, 370 (7th Ci r
. 1984). St ric tly speaking, how ev er , the finali ty r ule i s not wi thout ex cepti ons. The federal courts of appeals hav e recog niz e d th a t a p re tr i al di scov ery or der may consti tute a final appealable or der when i ssu ed by a di stric t court in a n anci llary proceeding, and sai d di stric t court i s not wi thi n t he j ur isdi cti on of the ci rcui t court havin g appellate jurisdi cti on to re vi ew the final adjudi cati on of the main acti on. See Natta v
. Zletz, 379 F .2d 6 1 5 , 6 1 8 (7th Ci r
. 1967); Carter Prods., Inc. v
. Eversharp, Inc. , 360 F .2d 868, 872 (7th Ci r
. 1966); see also Hooker v
. Continen tal L i f e In s. Co. , 965 F .2d 903, 9 0 5 (10t h Ci r
. 1992); Micro Mot ion, Inc. v
. Exac Corp. , 876 F .2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Ci r
. 198 9 ); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, etc. , 649 F .2d 387, 388 (6th Ci r
. 1981); Republi c Gear Co. v. BorgW arner Corp. , 381 F .2d 551, 554 (2d Ci r
. 1967); Horizons T itanium Corp. v
. Norton C o. , 2 9 0 F .2d 421, 424 (1st Ci r
. 1961). Here, the di stric t court or der denyi ng sanc tions w as i ssu ed in a jurisdi ction not that of the main proceeding. Consequently , appellants cannot obtain effecti v e rev i ew of the or der as part of an appeal
o f a final adjudi cati on of the main acti on; the Second Ci rcui t lack s j ur i sdi cti on ov er both the di stric t court that enter ed the
or der at i ssu e and non-party Harris. Furt herm or e, thi s c ase w as fi led in t he Nort hern Di stric t of Illinoi s solely for the purpose
o f o bt aining di scov ery from Harris; after that object w as6 No. 14-1196 accompl i shed, the di stric t court deni ed appellant’s motion for
sanc tions and closed the matter , ending the anci llary li tigati on. There i s nothin g left fo r t he di stric t court to do. Rather , the only i ssu e remain ing i s the v ali di ty of the di stric t court’s or der , and appellant can only obtain meaningful rev i ew of that or der in thi s court. For these reasons, w e hold that thi s court has jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the di stric t court ’s order

. As for the merits, Feder al Rule of Ci vil Pr o cedure 3 7 (b ) ( 2 ) ( A) gr a n ts d i stric t courts the pow er to i mpose appropr i

ate sanc tions fo r violati ons of di scov ery or ders. W e rev i ew those sanc tions only for an abus e of di screti on. Domanus v
. Lewicki, 742 F .3d 290, 295 (7th Ci r
. 2014). W e do not find that the di stric t courtabus ed i ts di screti on here. Appellant contends that Fed eral Rule of Ci vil Procedure 37(b) (2)( C) ma nd a tes the asses sment of fees and costs in the ci rcumstances of thi s case. That Rule states, “the court mus t
o r der the di sobedi ent party

... to pay reasonable expens e s, including atto rney’ s fees, caus ed by the fai lure, unl es s t he fai lure w as sub stanti ally justifi ed or other ci rcums tances make

an a w a r d of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Ci v
. P

. 37(b) (2)( C) (emphas i s added). The quali fyi ng l anguage of the final claus e makes clear that fees are no t mandatory

. Harris’ fai lure to atte nd the deposi tion on October 29, 2013, w as an inadv ert ent and i rr ep r o a chab le inci dent. As Harris explain ed in hi s affi davit, he w as out of town the week of October 22, 2013, and

w as not present at the hearin g on October 22, 2013, where the di stric t court enter ed the pert inent or der , nor di d he receiv e the lette rs that appellant mail ed and faxed to his offi ce regar ding the or der

. When Harris fi rst becam e aw are of the court’s or der , he offered to rush to hi s offi ce t o t ake the deposi tion asNo. 14-1196 7
sch eduled, albei t i t a few hours late; ap p ellant, how ev er , r efus ed to gr ant hi m thi s minor conces si on. Harris further offered to conduc t the deposi tion on the spot by telephone, but appellant refused thi s offer as w ell. Thereafter , Harris reached out to appellant no less than four tim es, each tim e informi ng appellant that he w as av ai lable to sch edule the deposi tion at appellant’s earlies t conv eni ence, y et appellant di d not respond to any o f Harris’ commu ni cati ons. The di stric t court w as int imately fami li ar wi th the parties and the facts and ci rcumstances underlyin g thi s di scov ery di spute. The court’s deci si on not t o im pose sanc tions for Har ris ’ i nadv ert ent fai lure, whi ch he w ent out of hi s w ay to rectify , di d not consti tute an abus e of di screti on. III. CONCLUSION For thes e reasons, the di stric t court’s or der denyi ng appellant’s moti on for sancti ons i s AFFI RMED.