1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: Augus t 22 , 201 6 4 N O. 33, 637 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO , 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v

. 8 VER ONIC A G RA NILL O , 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF LU NACO UN TY 11 D an ie l V ir am on te s, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 Charles J. Gutierr ez, Assistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 for Appellee 17 Bennett J. Ba

ur, C hief Public De fender 18 Mary Bar ket, A ssistant Appellate D efender 19 San ta Fe, NM 20 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 FRENC H, Judge. 3 { 1} This appeal re quires us to con strue the me ns rea fo r int en tio na l chi ld abu se by 4 en dange rm en t. N MS A 1978 , § 30- 6- 1( D )( 1) (2 009)

. V er oni ca G ranil lo ( D ef en dant) 5 ap pe al s he r co nvi ct ionf or int en tio na l ch ild ab use by en dange rm en t, a rg uin g th at ( 1) 6 the e vid en ce w as ins uf fi ci en t; (2 ) the j ur

y w as im pr ope rl y ins tr uc ted as to the 7 el em en ts o f the c ri m e; a nd ( 3) the dis tr ic t c ourt i m pr ope rl y lim it ed he r cl osi ng 8 ar gum en t. D ef

en dant’ s in suf

fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce a rg um en t r ai se s th e m ai n is sue 9 in this case—the r equisite me ns rea fo r i n t en t i o n al ch i l d ab u s e b y en d an g er m en t . We 10 hol d th at int en tio na l chi ld abu se by en dange rm en t re qui re s a cons ci ous obj ec tiv e to 11 endanger the child. Bec ause we agree with D efendant that the evidence w as 12 insufficient to prov e the re quisi te me ns rea , we rever se her conviction for intentio nal 13 ch il d abu se by end an ge rm en t. We do no t re ach Defen da nt ’s rem ai ni ng arg um en ts

. 14 BACKGRO UND 15 { 2} A w itn ess testi fi ed a t tri al that a

c ar ve er ed ont o th e w ro ng s ide of

the r oa d, 16 co nti nue d dr ivi ng tha t w ay f or appr oxi m at el y

f ive or si x bl oc ks, and i n so doi ng 17 forced “ quite a fewcars o ff t h e road.” T he witness noted the license plate num ber, 18 cal le d t he po li ce, an d k ep t t he car wi th in ey es ig ht

.2

1 { 3} Upon arrival, L ieutenant Conrad Jacquez of the City of D em ing Police 2 De partm ent observed the car stop in the center of the road, then start and sto p twice 3 m o re , ev entually

com ing to rest on the wr ong si de of the road. Lie utenant Jacquez 4 ini tiate d atr af

fi c sto p. 5 { 4} Lieutenant Jacquez knocked on the driver’ s si de w i nd ow , r e c e i ve d no r e spon se, 6 an d kn oc ke d a ga in. Whe n De fe ndant rol le d dow n th e w ind ow , she ha d astr ong odor 7 of al co hol , blo odsh ot and w at er y ey es , slurr ed spe ec h, a nd d id n ot f oc us h er e y es igh t 8 on Lie ut en an t Ja cque z w hil e the y spo ke

. T he re w as a n op en , ha lf -e m pty bot tle of 9 w his ke y

on the pa sse nge r se at

a nd a f ull bot tle of

w his ke y on the f loo r of the f ro nt 10 pa sse nge r se at

. 11 { 5} A thr ee -y ear- old c hil d w as in the ba ck of the car. O ff ic er Ro be rt

Ram ir ez , w ho 12 ha d arr ive d to a ssi st, obs er ve d th e chi ld unbuc kle him se lf fr om his ch ild se at , stand 13 up, a nd t

ur n aro und. 14 { 6} L ie ute nant J ac que z m ade two atte m pts to adm ini ste r fi el d so br ie ty te sts to 15 D ef en dant, but

abandon ed

both be ca

use D ef en dant w as una

ble to stand. L ie ute nant 16 Ja cque z pla ce d D ef

en dant unde r ar

re st. 17 { 7} O nc e arre ste d, D ef en da nt b e c a m e v e r

b a l l y a nd p hy sic al ly be lli ge re nt. 18 L ie ute nant Ja cque z re ad D ef en dant the N ew Me xic o Im pli ed Co nse nt A ct an d she 19 ag re ed

to a blo od t es t. A t the hos pital , D ef en dant— sti ll ve rb al ly

abusi ve a nd3

1 phy sic al ly

unc oope rativ e—

r e f u se d to e xit

the pol ic e car. D ef

en dant w as not

te ste d f or 2 the pr es en ce of

a lc ohol or

dr ugs. 3 { 8} De fendant wa s charged and tried not onlyfor intentional child abuse, of which 4 she w as c onvi ct ed , but a lso fo r: ag gr av at ed

dr ivi ng unde r the inf

lue nc e of 5 into x i ca ting liq uor or drugs un der N MSA1978 , § 66-8-102(D) (2010, am ended 6 2016 ), on w hic h the j ur y w as una ble to re ac h ave rd ic t; dr ivi ng w ithasus pe nde d or 7 re voke d li ce nse un de r N MS A 197 8 § 6 6- 5- 39 ( 2013 ), on whic h th e j ur y a cquitte d; 8 and failure to m aintain a lane on a laned road un der N MSA1978 , § 66-7-317 (1978 ), 9 on whic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt di re ct ed ave rd ic t i n f

av or of the D ef en dant. 10 SUFFICI ENCY OF THE EVIDE NCE 11 { 9} D ef

en dant arg ue s th at

he r co nvi ctio n for

int en tio na l c hil d a

buse by 12 endangerm ent m

ust be reversed because the S tate fa iled to present suffic ient evidence 13 that the c hil d w as e ndange re d, a nd e ve n if D ef en dant end an ge re d th e ch ild , she did 14 not do so with the requisite state of m ind. Essentially , D efendant argues that evidence 15 wa s lacking of bot h the ac tus re us and the me ns rea . E ith er ins uf fi ci en cy re qui re s th is 16 Co ur t t o re ve rs e. Sta te v . V igi l , 201 0- N MS C- 003, ¶

15, 147 N

. M. 537 , 226 P

. 3d 6 36 17 (“ [O ] bse rv ing that a

c onvi ct ionof

c hil d abus e cannot be sus ta ine d in the ab se nc e of 18 sufficient evidence of both [the ac tus re us and the me ns rea . ] ” , ( c i tin g Sta te v . 19 Schoon maker , 200 8- N MS C- 010, ¶ 48, 143 N

. M. 373, 176 P. 3d 1105 ( Schoon maker4

1 II )). Se e Sta te v . P adi lla , 200 8- N MS C- 006, ¶ 12, 143 N

. M. 310 , 176 P

. 3d 2 99 2 (“ T y pic al ly , c ri m ina l l ia

bil ity is pr em ise d up on a

de fe ndant’ s c ulp ab le c ondu ct , the 3 ac tus re us , c oupl ed with a def endant’ s culpable m ental state, the me ns rea .”). 4 Stand ard of R eview 5 { 10} W e re view a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determ ine “ whether 6 subs tan t i a l e v i d e n c e o f e i t h e r a d i r e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n t i a l n a tu r e e x i s t s t o s upport a 7 ve rd ic t of

gui lt be y ond a re as ona

ble doub t w ith re spe ct to ev er y el em en t es se nti al to 8 a conviction.” Sta te v. Sut phi n , 1988 -N MS C- 031, ¶ 21, 107 N

. M. 126 , 753 P

. 2d 1 314. 9 “ [Appe llate c ourts] vie wthe ev ide nc e in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the gui lty

ve rd ic t, 10 ind ulg ing a ll re as ona

ble inf er en ce s and r es olv ing a ll co nf lic ts i n th e ev ide nc e in f

av or 11 of the verdict.” Sta te v . A sto rga , 2015-NMS C-007, ¶ 57, 343 P.3d 1245 (internal 12 quot ation m arks an d citation om itted). T he ultim ate question is “ whether a rational 1 3 ju ry co uld

have f o und b ey ond a reasonable doub t the essential facts re quired for a 14 convictio n.” Id . (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d)

. 15 { 11} We r ev i ew an y q u e s t i o n o f s t a t u t o r y i n t er p re t at i o n ra i s ed b y De fe n d an t ’s 16 arg um en t d e n ov o a s a q ue st io n o f la w. State v. Chavez , 200 9- N MS C- 035, ¶ 10, 146 17 N

. M. 434 , 211 P

. 3d 8 91. Whe n w e int er pr et ast at ut e, “ [the appe llate c ourt’ s] m ai n 18 goal .

. . is to giv e ef

fect to the L egislature’ s intent.” Sta te v . A lm anza r , 2014-NMS C19 001, ¶ 14, 316 P. 3d 183 (a lte ratio n in or igi na l) ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and c itatio n17 In Co nsau l , our S upr em e Co urt st at ed

that, in the cr im ina l c ont ex t, “ ne gli ge nt 1 18 child abuse” sho uld th erea fter be labeled “ reckless child abuse” without future 19 re fe re nc e to n eg lig en ce . 201 4- N MS C- 030, ¶ 37. W e com

ply w iththat i nstru ct ionin 20 th is op in io n, wh il e ack no wled gi ng th atth e st atut ory tex t re ad s “ ne gl ig en tl y .” 5 1 om itt ed ). T ex tua l am

big uity is re sol ve d in favor of the de fe ndant, in ac co rd an ce w ith 2 th e ru le of l en it y . Sta te v . Co nsau l , 20 14 -NMSC -0 30 , ¶ 40 , 33 2 P .3d85 0. 3 Ch ild Ab use by En dangerm ent 4 { 12} Ch ild

abuse by e ndangerm en t “ co nsi sts of ape rs on know ing ly , int en tio na lly 5 or[rec kl es sl y ], an d wi th ou t ju st ifi ab le cau se , cau si ng or per m it ti ng a ch il d t o b e . . 1 6

. pla ce d inasit

ua tio n th at

m ay e ndange r the c hil d’ s li fe or he al th[

. ] ” Se ct ion30- 6- 7 1( D )( 1)

. Abuse by

e ndange rm en t is a spec ia l cla ss of ch ild abuse de sig ne d to pun ish 8 co nduc t tha t “ ex pose s a chil d to asig nif ic an t ris k of harm , even thoug h the child do es 9 not su ffer

a phy sical injury .” Chavez , 200 9- N MS C- 035, ¶ 15 ( int er na l qu otatio n 10 m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ); se e als o State v. G onza les , 201 1- N MC A -0 81, ¶ 20, 150 11 N

. M. 494 , 263 P. 3d 271 (“ [E ] ndange rm en t is s om ethin g th at e xis ts a s an ante ce de nt 12 to an y ha rm th at m ig ht be fal l a chi ld .”), aff’d on o the r gr ound

s by 2013 -N MS C- 016, 1 3 3 0 1 P

. 3 d3 8 0

. Ou r

S up r e me C o u rt c o n c l u d e d t h a t “ b y c l a s s i f

yi n g c h i l d[ ab u s e b y] 14 enda n g er m en t as a third-degree felony , our L egislature anticipated that crim inal 15 pr ose cu tio n w oul d be r es er ve d f or the m ost se ri ous oc curr en ce s, an d not f or m ino r or 16 theoretical dangers.” Chavez , 2009 -N MS C- 035, ¶ 16. I n a cc or danc e w iththe pur pose17 G ive n th at the L eg isl at

ur e ch ose ide nti ca l puni shm en t fo r re ck le ss, kno w ing , 2 18 an d in te nti ona l c hil d a buse by e ndange rm en t, the r ea son that the St at e ch ose to 19 ex cl us iv el y pu rs ue an in te nt io na l t he ory is un cl ear. See M

onto ya , 201 5- N MS C- 010, 20 ¶ 33 ( statin g th at

“ the L eg isl at

ur e ha s ch os en to puni sh a ll ty pe s of c hil d a buse the 21 sa m e wit h re sp ect to th e d efen da nt ’s m en ta l s ta te ”). 6 1 of the c hil d a

buse by e ndange rm en t st at

ute to “ puni sh c ondu ct

that c re at es atr

uly 2 s i g n i fi ca n tri s ko f s er i o u s h ar m t o ch i l d re n [, ]” id. ¶ 22, a child is cons i d er ed 3 e nd ang e r e d on l y w he n pl a c e d at “ a s u bstan tial an d foreseeable ris k of harm .” Id

. 4 (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d)

. 5 Mens Re a for Int entional C hild A buse b y Endanger m ent 6 { 13} W e a n a l y z e f

i r s t w h e t h e r a n y r a t i o n a l j u ry c o u l d h a v e c o n c l ude d be y ond a 7 reasonable doubt th at

D e fendant acted w ith the requisit e m ental state. The L egislature 8 es tabl i s h e dt h r e e s p e c i f i c m e n t a l s t a t e s b y

w h i c h ap e r s o n m a y

c o m m i tc h i l da buse 9 by end an ge rm en t: in te nt io na ll y , kn owi ng ly, an d re ck le ss ly. See State v. M o n t o ya , 10 2015 -N MS C- 010, ¶

40, 345 P

. 3d 1 056. I n th is c as e, D ef en dant w as c harg ed onl y

w ith 11 int en tio na l c hil d a

buse by e ndange rm en t. S he w as no t ch arg ed w ithkno w ing or 12 reck le ss ch il d abu se by end an ge rm en t, n orwas t he jury pr es en te d wi th a st ep -d own 1 3 i n s t ru ct i on for endange rmen tco m m i t t ed kn o wi n g l y o r r ec k l es s l y. Th u s , De fe n d an t ’s 2 14 convictio n required s u ff i ci ent evidence that she com m itted the ac tus re us 15 in te nt io na ll y . Cf. Gonzales , 201 1- N MC A

- 0 8 1 , ¶ 3 0 ( s t atin g th at

ac onvi ct ionf

or c hil d7

1 ab use by

e ndange rm en t r equir es pr oof that th e def

en dant’ s “ cu lpa

ble m en ta l st at e 2 coincided with the act”). Bef ore analy zing whether there wa s sufficient evidence that 3 De fendant acted intentionally , w e m ust first define the me ns rea ap pli ca ble to the 4 cri m e o f in te nt io na l ch il d abu se by en da ng erm en t. Thi s is a qu es ti on of law t ha t we 5 ex am in e d e n ov o. See Chavez , 200 9- N MS C- 035, ¶ 10. 6 { 14} T he L eg isl at

ur e doe s no t de fi ne the m en ta l state “ int en tio na lly ” in S ec tio n 30

- 7 6- 1. Sta te v . Ca be

zue la , 201 1- N MS C- 041, ¶ 23, 150 N.M. 65 4, 265 P. 3d 7 05. N or 8 have our appellate cou rts interpreted the me ns rea r equir em en t f or int en tio na l c hil d 9 ab use by

e ndange rm en t. T he S ta te a rg ue s th at be ca use c hil d abu se is not

aspe ci fi c 10 int en t c ri m e but

ins te ad age ne ra l i nte nt c ri m e, th e m en ta l st at e re qui re d f or 11 int en tio na l c hil d ab use by en dange rm en t is “ onl y a‘ co nsc iou s w ro ngdo ing , ’ or ‘ the 12 purpos eful doing o f an ac t that the law dec lares to be a c rim e. ’ ” State v. B rown , 13 1996 -N MSC- 073, ¶ 22, 122 N .M. 724, 931 P. 2d 69. Ther efore, argues the State, an 14 int en tio na l me ns r ea in thi s c ont ex t r equir es that a pe rs on i nte nd the und er ly ing 15 conduct th at m ight su pport a finding that a child was e ndangered—e.g. , that 16 D ef en dant i nte nde d to dr ive he r ve hic le whil e int oxi cated, wit h a chi ld i n th e 17 car— but not that a pe rs on i nte nde d to e ndange r the c hil d. W e dis ag re e an d e xpl ai n 18 be lo w. 19 { 15} T he c om

m on- lawc l a s s i f

i c at i o nof c ri m es a s r equir ing e ith er “ spe ci fi c int en t” or18 T he U nit ed S ta te s S upr em e Co urt ha s po int ed out in deta il som e of

the 3 1 9 c o n f u s i o n c au s e db y re l i a n c e o n c o mm o n l a wt e r mi n o l o g y: 10 So m et im es ‘ ge ne ra l int en t’ is use d inthe sam e w ay a s ‘ cr im ina l i nte nt’ 11 to m ean the general notion of me ns rea , while ‘ specific intent’ is taken 12 to m ea n t h e m ental state required f or a particular

crim e. Or , ‘ general 13 int ent’ m ay

be use d to e nc om

pa ss a ll fo rm s of

the m en ta l st at e 14 re qui re m en t, w hil e ‘ spe ci fi c int en t’ is lim ite d to the one m en ta l st at e of 15 int en t. Ano ther pos sib ili ty

is that ‘ ge ne ra l i nte nt’ w ill be use d to 16 ch ar ac te ri ze a n in te nt t o do som ethin g ona n un de te rm ine d oc ca sio n, a nd 1 7 ‘s p e c i f

i c i n t e n t ’ t o d e n o t e a n i n t e n tt o d o t h a tt h i n g a tap a rt i c u l a r t i me 18 an d p la ce. 19 United States v. B ailey , 444 U.S

. 394 , 403 ( 1980 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and 20 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). O ur S upr em e Co urt als o caut ion s: “ [the ] spe ci fi c- ge ne ra l i nte nt 21 approa c h ha s be e n c r i t i c i z e d be c aus e i ti s no ta l w a y s c l e a r w he t he r ap a rticular 22 offense is a specif

ic-intent crim e or a general-intent crim e[, ] ” Brown , 1996-NMS C23 073, ¶ 2 3, and im

portantly , “ [t] he specific-gener al intent comm on-law a pproach does 24 not ta ke int o cons ide ratio n th e ex ist en ce of ahe igh te ne d m en s re a as ide f ro m spe ci fi c 25 intent.” Id

. ¶ 27 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted).

8 1 “ general intent” has been the cause of considerable confusion. As a consequence, 3 2 there is a m ovem en t aw ay from the determ ination of me ns rea by r ef er en ce to the 3 “ ve ne rab le ” sp eci fic in te nt /g en eral in te nt di ch ot omy . Bailey , 444 U. S. at 4 03. A s an 4 al te rn at ive to the tr ad iti ona l dic hot om y , the Mod el Pe na l Code de fi ne s f our spe ci fi c 5 cu lp ab le st at es of

m ind : pu rp ose ly, kn owi ng ly, reck le ss ly, an d n eg li ge nt ly. See M odel 6 Pe nal Code § 2. 02 ( 2015 ). O ur ch ild abuse statut e re fe rs to m

ult ipl e spe ci fi c cu lpa

ble 7 state s of m ind : i nte nti ona lly , kno w ing ly , a nd a s c lari fi ed by our S upr em e Co urt,9

1 re c k l es sl y . Montoya , 201 5- N MS C- 010, ¶ 40. T he ti er ed me ns rea str uc tur e of our 2 ch ild abuse statut e is akinto that of the Mo de l P en al Co de

. S tr uctu ral ly, o ur c hil d 3 abuse statute l eans aw ay from the com m on law approach, and instead, is m ore 4 co ns is te nt wit h t he ap pr oa ch of t he Mo de l Pe na l Co de

. 5 { 16} Beca

use of the me ns rea str

uc tur e of Sect io n 30 -6 -1 (D ), a nd f oll ow ing our 6 appellate courts and the United States Suprem e Court that have re lied on th e Model 7 Penal Code, we look to the Mo del Penal Code to inform our definition of an 8 inten tio na l me ns rea . Se e, e . g. , Co nsau l , 2014-NMS C-030, ¶ 37 (citing th e Model 9 Penal Code in establishing another me ns rea standard for the child abuse statute); 10 State v. Carrasco , 199 7- NMSC -0 47, ¶ ¶ 8, 17- 18, 36, 124 N

. M. 64, 946 P

. 2d 1 075 11 (r ef er ri ng t o pr ovi sio ns of the Mod el Pe na l Co de dis cu ssi ng a cc om pli ce li ab ili ty

a nd 12 conspiracy ); see als o U nit ed Sta tes v. U

nit ed Sta tes G

yp sum Co

. , 438 U

. S. 422, 444 13 (1 978) ( re fe rr ing to the Mo de l P en al Co de as a sour ce of gui danc e on the “ re qui sit e 14 but e lus ive m en ta l e le m en t of c ri m ina l of

fe nse s” ) (i nte rn al quo tatio n m arks a nd 15 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). A s us ed in the Mode l P en al Co de , a n in te nti ona l st at e of m ind 16 co rres po nd s t o p ur

po se . See Model P enal Code § 1

. 1 3 ( 1 2 ) ( 2 0 1 5 ) ( “ ‘i n t e n t i o n a l l y’ 17 or ‘ w ithint en t’ m eans purpose ly ”) ; se e als o 1 Way ne R. LaFav e, Subs tanti ve 18 C r i min al La w, § 5. 1( c) a t 33 7 ( 2d e d. 200 3) ( statin g th at “ int en tio n (or purp ose ) to 19 do the f

orbidden act (om issio n) or cause the forbidden r esult” is one of the four ty pes10

1 of me ns rea ). A pe rs on ac ts pur pose ly (i nte nti ona lly ) unde r the Mo de l P en al Co de if 2 it is the pe rs on’ s “ co nsc iou s ob j ec t t o e nga ge in co nduc t of that n at ur e or

to ca use 3 such a result.” Model P enal Code § 2. 02( 2) (a )( i)

. Inor de r to d et er m ine w he the r in the 4 context of Section 30-6-1(D)( 1) a person’ s consciou s objec t m ust be directed toward 5 th e res ul t o f en da ng eri ng a ch il d o r, as th e St at e arg ue s, t he un de rlyin g c on du ct , we 6 ex am in e th e in te nt of th e Leg is la tu re in en act in g Sect io n 30 -6 -1 (D)(1 ). In ess en ce, we 7 m ust de te rm ine wha t so rt

of soc ia l harm

ha s be enpro sc ribed by the 8 Leg is la tu re— co nd uc t or a res ul t. See Josh ua Dr essler, U nde rstandi ng C

rim ina l L aw , 9 § 9. 10( D ) (5 th ed. 2009 ) (s ta tin g that the soc ia l har m pr osc ri be d by

ac ri m ina l st at

ute 10 m ay consist o f w rongful cond uct, wrongful results, or both). 11 { 17} W e co nc lud e the soc ia l harm pr osc ri be d by

the L eg isl at

ur e w ithS ec tio n 30 -6

- 12 1( D )( 1) is a re sul t, not co nduc t. T he le gis la tiv e pur pose of the statut e is t o a ddr es s th e 13 so ci al ha rm cau se d wh en ch il dr en are p ut at “ tru ly sig ni fic an t ri skof s eri ou s h arm .” 14 St at e v. Sc ha af

, 2013 -N MC A -0 82, ¶ 8, 308 P

. 3d 1 60 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and 15 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). T his pur pose is ac hie ve d by pr osc ri bin g the re sul t of e ndange ri ng 16 a ch il d. See § 30- 6- 1( D )( 1) (p ro hib iti ng a pe rs on fr om “ ca usi ng o r pe rm itt ing ac hil d 17 to b e . . . pla ce d inasit ua tio n th at

m ay e ndange r the c hil d’ s li fe or he al th” w ith out 18 j ust if ia ble c au se ). T ha t i s un lik e cr im ina l statut es that pr osc ri be harm fu l c ondu ct

. See 19 Under st an di ng Cr imi na l La w, § 9. 10( D ) at 114- 15 (e xpl ai nin g that a c ri m ina l st at

ute11

1 that pr osc ri be s harm fu l c ondu ct w ith out r eg ar d to apr ohi bit ed res ul t es ta bli she s a 2 “ co nduc t c ri m e” a nd, by c ontra st, ac ri m ina l st at

ute that pr ohi bits a har

m fu l r es ult 3 without refer ence to how the re s ult occurs establish es a “ result crim e”); c om pare § 4 66- 8- 102( C) (1 ) (2 010) (d ef ini ng dri vin g unde r the inf lue nc e of al co hol a s, in re le vant 5 part , “ dr iv[ ing ] ave hic le

. . . if the pe rs on h as a n a lc ohol co nc en tr at ion of ei ght one 6 hundre dth s or

m or e in the pe rs on’ s bl ood[ , ] ” the reby pr oscr ibi ng c ondu ct w ith out 7 regard to a r esult of the condu ct) wi th N MS A 19 78 , § 30 -2- 1( A ) (1 994) ( de fi nin g 8 m ur de r as , in re le vant part , “ the kil lin g of one hum anbe ing by a nothe r w ith out

law fu l 9 ju s t i fi ca t i o n o r e x cu s e, b y an y o f t h e me a n s w i t h wh i ch d ea t h m ay b e c au s ed [, ]” 10 the re by

pr osc ri bin g aharm fu l r es ult w ith out r eg ar d to th e co nd uc t l ea din g to the 11 result). A c rim inal convictio n req u i res th at the proscribed social harm (the ac tus 12 re us ), whe th er a res ul t or con du ct , be pe rfo rm ed wit h th e req ui si te m en ta l s ta te

. See 13 P adi lla , 200 8- N MS C- 006, ¶ 12 (“ Ty pica lly , c ri m ina l l ia

bil ity is pr em ise d up on a 14 defendant’ s culpab l e co nduct, the ac tus re us , c oupl ed w ithade fe ndant’ s c ulp ab le 15 m ental state, the me ns rea . ”)

. Be ca use the soc ia l harm

pr osc ri bed byS ec tio n 30 -6

- 16 1(D) (1) is a result—endang ering a child—we holdthat the me ns rea for intentional 17 child abuse byendangerm ent requires a c onsciou s objective to ac h ieve a 18 result—endanger the child. T he State’ s proffer ed definiti on of the me ns rea f or 19 int en tio na l c hil d ab use by en dange rm en t, re qui ri ng no m or e than vo lit ion al c ondu ct ,12

1 is n ot d ir ec te d a t the pr osc ri be d so ci al harm a nd d oe s no t requ ire th e le ve l of 2 cu lpa bil ity int en de d by

the L eg isl at

ur e unde r the pr ope r Mod el Pe na l Code a na ly sis

. 3 { 18} O ur

int er pr etati on of

a n in te nti ona l me ns rea r equir em en t i n th e co nte xt o f 4 Se ct ion30- 6- 1( D )( 1) is in ac co rd w iththe statut or y de fi nit ionof

a n in te nti ona l m en s 5 rea req ui rem en t u se d b y nu m ero us ot he r st at es . F or ex am pl e, by Co lo rad o st atut e, a 6 pe rs on a ct s in te nti onall y “ w he n [ that pe rs on’ s] c onsc iou s ob j ec tiv e is t o c au se the 7 spe ci fi c re sul t pr osc ri be d by the statut e de fi nin g th e of fe nse . ” Co lo. Re v. S ta t. A nn. 8 § 18 -1 -5 01( 5) ( 1977 ). A nd i n T ex as , a per son ac ts i nte nti ona lly “ w ithr es pe ct

to the 9 na tur e of

his c ondu ct

or to a re sul t of

his c ondu ct

w he n it is [tha t pe rs on’ s] c onsc iou s 10 obj ec tiv e or

de sir e to e nga ge in the c ondu ct or c au se the r es ult

. ” T ex . P en al Co de 11 A nn. § 6. 03( a) ( 1994 ); se e als o, e . g. , A ri z. Re v. S ta t. A nn. § 13 -1 05 (1 0) (a ) (1 994) 12 (defining “ intentio nally ” to m ean “ with respect to a r esult or to cond uct described 13 by astatut e de fi nin g an of

fe nse , that a per son’ s obj ec tiv e is to cause that re sul t or t o 14 en ga ge in that c ondu ct ”) ; N

. Y

. P en al L aw § 15. 05( 1) ( Mc K inn ey 196 5) ( “ A pe rs on 15 ac ts i nte nti ona lly w ith re spe ct to a r es ult or to co nduc t de sc ri be d by

astatut e de fi nin g 1 6 an of fe n s e w h e n [ t h a tp e r s o n ’ s ] c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t i v e i s t o c au s e s u c h r e s u l to r to 1 7 en g ag e i n s u ch co n du ct .” )

. T h o s e d ef i n i t i o n s ar e n o tco m

p at i b l e w i t h t h e S t at e’s 18 unde rs tandi ng o f anint en tio na l me ns rea that r equir es no m or e than pr oo f th at th e 19 pe rs on h ad

a n aw ar en es s of

w ha t he w as doi ng.13

1 { 19} O ur re la te d ca se law doe s not dis sua de us fr om ou r in te rpr et at ion of S ec tio n 2 30- 6- 1( D )( 1)

. T his Co urt’ s int er pr et at ionin State v. Schoonmaker of the me ns rea f

or 3 int en tio na l c hil d a

buse r es ult ing in gr eat bo dil y harm is co nson ant wit h our 4 interpretation of the me ns rea f or inten ti on al ch ild

abuse by e ndange rm en t. 200 5- 5 N MC A -0 12, ¶

¶ 25- 26, 136 N

. M. 749 , 105 P

. 3d 302 ( Sc hoon m ak er I ), re ason ing 6 disavowed on other gro unds by Montoya , 2015 -N MS C- 010, ¶ 41 , r ev’d on other 7 grou nds by Schoonmaker II , 20 08 -NMSC -0 10 , ¶¶ 1, 5 4, ov errul ed byCo nsau l , 201 4- 8 N MS C- 030, ¶

38. I n Sc hoon m ak

er I , thi s C ourt st at ed that int en tio na l c hil d a buse 9 re sul tin g ingr eat bo dil y harm r equir es “ a voluntary ac t . .

. suc h a s vi ole ntl y shakin g 10 a ba by , w he n it

is his or he r int en t, pur

pose , or c onsc iou s ob

j ec t t o e nga ge in a 11 ha rm fu l ac t (s ha ke th e b ab y ) orto cau se th e h arm fu l co ns eq ue nc e.” 2 00 5- NM C A12 012 , ¶

26. Our a na ly sis in Schoon maker I em pha siz ed the c onsc iou s ob

j ec t or 13 int en tio n to a ct harm fu lly or ca use harm , a nd the vol unt ar y na tur e of the und er ly ing 14 actions that cause the h ar m wa s de-em phasized. T he Sc hoon m ak er I Co u rt ’s 15 construction of the me ns rea for in tention al chi ld abuse resulting in great bodilyharm 16 is in har

m ony with our interpretation of the me ns rea f or int en tio na l c hil d a

buse by 17 en dange rm en t. 18 { 20} A lth oughboth D ef en dant and the St at e rely onMontoya , that c as e doe s no t 19 guid e our interpretation of the me ns rea f or int en tio na l c hil d a

buse

. 201 5- N MS C- 010.14

1 In Montoya , our

S uprem e Co urt st at ed

that i nte nti ona l and r ec kle ss c hil d a buse by 2 e n d an ge rm en t g en eral ly do n ot req ui re s ep arat e jury ins tru ct io ns . Id

. ¶ 33. That 3 co nc lus ionw as gr ound ed in the fa ct that our L eg isl at

ur e el ec te d e qua l punis hm en t f or 4 child abuse byendangerm ent com m itted with any of t he three statutorily delineated 5 m en ta l s ta te s. Id

. Nonetheless, intentional, knowing, and reckless are distin ct m ental 6 st at es . Cf

. id

. ¶ 38 (stating that child abuse resulting in the death of a child under 7 twelve co mm i t t ed rec klesslyis a lesser- included o ffense of that act com m itted 8 int en tio na lly ); see also Bailey , 444 U. S. at 404 (noting that re cklessness, knowledge, 9 an d purp ose a sc en d inle ve l of c ulp ab ili ty ). T he r el ev an t ques ti on co nte m plate d by 10 the Montoya Court wa s not th e substance of the me ns rea for, specifically , intentional 11 child abuse byendangerm ent, but whether the Constitu tion would allow a j ury verdict 12 fo r ch il d a

buse by e ndange rm en t w he n c om m itt ed int en tio na lly , kno w ing ly , or 13 re ck le ssl y

if the j ur y w as ins tr

uc te d onthe r equir em en ts o f ea chin a sin gle 14 ins tr uc tio n. 20 15

- N M S C

- 01 0, ¶ ¶ 32

- 33

. I n r e sp on se t o t hat qu e st i on , the Montoya 15 Co urt pr ovi de d th e fo llo w ing gui danc e: 16 in m ost

c as es w he n th e ab use doe s no t re sul t i n th e de ath of ac hil d 17 unde r tw el ve , it is not ne ce ssary to spe ci fy the de fe ndant' s m en ta l st at e 1 8 o r t o pr ovi de s e p a r a t e j u ry i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r r e c k l e s s o r i n t e n t i o na l co nduc t; 19 ev ide nc e that the de fe ndant ac te d kn ow ing ly , int en tio na lly or r ec kle ssl y 20 w ill suf

fi ce to supp ort a

c onvi ct ion

. 21 (al te rat io n, em

ph as is , in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s, an d c it at io n o m it te d)

. Id

. ¶ 33; cf

.15

1 Sc had v. A riz

. , 501 U .S

. 624, 632 (1991) (stating that the state c an construct statutes 2 al low ing j ur ies to c onvi ct de spi te dis ag re ei ng a

bout the m eans/the or

y of the 3 com m issio n of a cr im e, includin g the me ns rea , but that pow er is lim ite d by the due 4 pr oc es s c lause ); id. a t 64 9 ( Sc alia , J. , c onc ur ri ng i n part

a nd c onc ur

ri ng i n th e 5 j udgm ent) (stating that “ it has long been the general r ule that when a single crim e can 6 be com m itted in various way s, j urors need not agree upon the m ode of com m issio n”). 7 T ha t gu id an ce do es not im pa ct thi s c as e, w he re D ef

en dant w as c harg ed

und er one 8 specific me ns rea t h eo ry a n d t h e ju ry i n s t ru ct edo n l y u n d ert h at t h eo ry. De fe n d an t ’s 9 ju ry d i dn o td e c i d e t h a t s h e w a s g u i l t y o f c h i l dab u s e b y e n d a n g e rmen tkn o w i n g l y, 10 intentio nally , or recklessly but, instead, rendered a verdict that D efendant com m itted 11 in te nt io na l ch il d abu se . Thu s, Montoya doe s no t speak to the que sti on we f ac e— the 12 me ns rea of intention al child abuse, specifically . N either Montoya nor Schoon maker 13 I dissu ades us from

our interpretation of the me ns rea fo r int en tio na l chi ld abu se by 14 en dange rm en t. 15 { 21} In su m , we c onc lud e that the S ta te ’ s pr opos ed de fi nit ionof

int en tio na l i s 16 m oor ed

to the ina ppl ic a b l e c o m m o n - l aw g e n e r a l i n t e n t

/ s p e ci fi c int en t di ch oto m

y . T he 17 L eg isl at

ur e spe ci fi ca lly he igh te ne d the dif fe re ntm en s re as fo r co m

m iss ion of

c hil d 18 a b us e b y

en da ng erm en t. See M

onto ya , 2 0 1 5

- N M S C

- 0 1 0 , ¶

4 0 ( s t a t i n g t h a tc h ild 19 abuse by

end angerm ent can be com m itted intent ionally , knowingly , or recklessly ).16

1 Be ca use “ [t ] he spe ci fi c-gene ra l i nte nt c om m on- lawappr oa chdoe s no t t ak e int o 2 co nside ration the e xis te nc e of ahe igh te ne d me ns rea as i d e f ro m s p ec i fi c i n t en t [, ]” 3 Brown , 199 6- N MS C- 073, ¶ 27 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ), w e re

j ec t the 4 State’ s approach to Section 30-6-1(D)( 1). I n s t ea d , bec ause the Le gislature has 5 pr ovi de d he igh te ne d m en s re as in a tiered structure, the definition s of an intentio nal 6 m en ta l st at e fr om

the Mo de l P en al Co de a nd o the r j ur isd ic tio ns re qui re ac onsc iou s 7 obj ec tiv e to c au se the pr osc ri be d so ci al harm , a nd the soc ia l harm pr osc ri be d by the 8 Le g islature is the result of endangering a child, we hold th at the me ns rea f or 9 intentio nal child abuse byendangerm ent requires a c onsciou s objective to endanger 10 a ch ild

. 11 { 22} H a vi ng c on c l ud e d t hatt he me ns rea f or int en tio na l c hil d a

buse by 12 endangerm ent requires a c onsciou s o b jective to endanger the child, w e analy ze 13 w he the r the re w as suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to m ee t tha t st an dard

. 14 Suf ficienc y of the Evidenc e of th e Mens Re a 15 { 23} In t h e ab s en ce o f d i re ct evidence of intent, w e look to th e circum stantial 16 ev ide nc e to d et er

m ine w he the r an y

r at ion al j ur

y c oul d have fo und be y ond a 17 reas on ab le do ub t th at Defen da nt ha d a co ns ci ou s o bjec ti ve to en da ng er t he ch il d. See 18 State v. M

artin ez , 2006-NMS C-007, ¶ 16, 139 N. M. 152 , 130 P.3d 731 (stating that 19 int en t m ay

be pr ove n by

c ir cu m stanti al ev ide nc e an d is o ft eninf er re d f ro m f ac ts o f17

1 th e cas e). 2 { 24} Im

portantl y , the ch ild w as str ap pe d int o a ch ild se at

. T ha t is inc onsi ste nt w ith 3 the consciou s creation o f a subs tantial and foresee able risk to the child . E vidence was 4 presented that Def

endant drove po orly , but not in a way that sugg ested that she was 5 purpos ely

courti ng d ang e r. Rather, she drove halting ly . N o testim ony wa s offere d that 6 she sw erv ed at an oth er c ar or a ny oth er targ et

. N or

did the c ar hit a nythi ng. 7 De fendant’ s evident int oxication , like her driving, created risk for the child that was 8 w el l be y ond or din ar

y but that, w ith out m or e, doe s not ind ic at e a co nsc iou s ob j ec tiv e 9 to e ndange r the c hil d. N or do w e fi nd tha t the e vid en ce whe n vi ew ed in 1 0 co m b i n a t i o n

— D e f

e n d a n t ’ s p o o r

b u tn o ta g g r e s s i v e dr i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d , w ith 11 a ch ild st rap pe d inac ar se at —a llo w s ar ea sona

ble inf er en ce that D ef

en dant h ad

a 12 co nsc iou s ob

j ec tiv e to e ndange r the c hil d. 13 { 25} P e rha

ps su bs t a nt i a l e vi de nc e w a s present to sup port a m en s re a ba se d on 14 re ck le ssn es s, but suc h athe or y w as not c harg ed by the S ta te ; thus, the j ur

y w as not 15 in st ru ct edreg ard in g re ck le ss ne ss no r m ay we co ns id er it on rev ie w. W e hol d th at the 16 ev ide nc e was in su ffi ci en t t o s up po rt t he jury’ s v erd ic t t ha t Def en da nt co m

m it te d c hil d 17 abuse by endangerm ent intentio nally , bec ause no evidence was pre sented that it was 18 D ef en dant’ s c onsc iou s ob

j ec tiv e to e ndange r the c hil d. A cc or din gl y , w e re ve rs e 19 D ef en dant’ s c onvi ct ion

. W e do n ot rea chD ef en dant’ s arg um en t tha t sh e did not18

1 endanger the child or Def endant’ s other contentio ns of error. 2 CON CLU SION 3 { 26} W e hold

that the me ns rea f

or int en tio na l c hil d a

buse by e ndange rm en t, Se ct ion 4 30-6-(D) (1), requires a co nscious objec tive to endang er a child. T here w as 5 ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce that D ef

en dant m et

that st an dard

. A cc or din gly , w e re ve rs e an d 6 re m an d to the dis tr ic t c ourt w ithins tr uc tio ns t o va cate D ef

en dant’ s c onvi ct ion

. 7 { 27} IT IS SO ORD ERE D

. 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 9 ST EP HE N G. F R EN C H, Ju dg e

10 WE CO NCUR:

11

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 12 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e

13

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 14 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e