[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-14994

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00086-RWS-ECS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MIGUEL ALVARADO-LINARES, 

a.k.a. Joker, 

DIMAS ALFARO-GRANADOS,

a.k.a. Toro,

ERNESTO ESCOBAR,

a.k.a. Pink Panther,

a.k.a. Flaco, 

JAIRO REYNA OZUNA,

a.k.a. Flaco, 

 Defendants - Appellants.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 20, 2017)

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Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and MELLOY,

∗ Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Following several murders tied to MS-13 gang activity in and around 

Atlanta, a jury convicted the defendants of RICO, Violent Crime in Aid of RICO 

(“VICAR”), and/or firearm offenses. Individual defendants raise several 

arguments on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the indictment, alleging Speedy 

Trial Act violations, attacking one verdict as internally inconsistent, and 

challenging the sentences imposed. In addition, defendants allege the district court 

incorrectly instructed the jury as to the meaning of “aiding and abetting” and as to 

the relative roles of the jury and the court in determining punishment. We affirm 

in all respects. 

I. Background

The four defendants in this appeal, Miguel Alvarado-Linares, Ernesto 

Escobar, Dimas Alfaro-Granados, and Jairo Reyna-Ozuna, were members of a 

local subgroup of the international MS-13 gang. Alvarado-Linares was the local 

leader, and the local group shared a pool of “gang guns.” The jury answered 

several specific questions as to each defendant for enhancement or conviction 

purposes. Also, as to firearm counts, the jury determined whether each defendant 

brandished a weapon and whether a death resulted. All four defendants were 

convicted of RICO conspiracy with some being found to have an enhancement for 

RICO involving murder. All four defendants also were convicted of different 

accompanying individual counts for related VICAR and/or firearm offenses. 

 ∗ Honorable Michael J. Melloy, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

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Evidence at trial focused upon several individual violent crimes. In one 

instance, Defendant Alvarado-Linares directed and participated in the executionstyle murder of a fellow gang member, Lal Ko, who was suspected of being a 

police informant. A different gang member actually committed the shooting. 

Defendant Alfaro-Granados also participated in this murder.

In another instance, a different gang member wanted to “calm down” or 

leave the gang. Defendant Alvarado-Linares directed this gang member to perform 

a murder as the price of being allowed to leave. Alvarado-Linares and AlfaroGranados selected a rival gang member to be murdered. These two defendants 

followed in a separate car when, on a highway, the departing member shot and 

killed one of the rival gang members and non-fatally shot a second rival gang 

member.

In a third instance, Defendant Escobar and another gang member fought

with rival gang members at a gas station where the rival gang members worked. 

After the fight, and after leaving the gas station, Escobar called Defendant ReynaOzuna and reported the fight. Reyna-Ozuna purportedly held a leadership role at 

the time. Reyna-Ozuna, Escobar, and other gang members later returned to the gas

station. Reyna-Ozuna provided a .45 caliber handgun, and Escobar and another 

gang member took the gun to a secluded vantage point near the gas station. From 

that vantage point, Escobar or the other gang member shot and killed one of the 

participants from the earlier fight, a sixteen-year-old rival gang member.

The jury found Alvarado-Linares guilty on nine Counts, including RICO 

conspiracy with an enhancement for murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

multiple VICAR murders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(1); and 

multiple firearm offenses. Alvarado-Linares received three life sentences and six 

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terms of years with several of the terms to be served consecutive to the life 

sentences.1

 1 The jury found Alvarado-Linares guilty as follows:

Count 1: RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

Count 2: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder of fellow gang 

member Lal Ko in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(1);

Count 3: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 2) in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(iii);

Count 4: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder on the highway in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(1);

Count 5: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 4) in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(C)(i);

Count 8: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder at the gas station 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(3);

Count 9: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 8) in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(C)(i);

Count 10: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder of another gang 

member in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(3);

Count 11: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 10) in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(C)(i).

Alvarado-Linares was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 4; 

concurrent twenty-year sentences on Counts 8 and 10; a ten-year sentence on Count 3 and 

twenty-five-year sentences on Counts 5, 9, and 11, with the ten- and twenty-five-year sentences 

to be served consecutive to each other and to all other sentences.

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The jury found Escobar guilty on three Counts, including RICO conspiracy 

with an enhancement for murder, a VICAR murder, and a weapons charge. 

Escobar received two concurrent life sentences and a consecutive term of years.2

The jury found Alfaro-Granados guilty on five Counts, including RICO 

conspiracy with an enhancement for murder, two VICAR murders, and two firearm 

Counts. Alfaro-Granados received three concurrent life sentences with two

consecutive terms of years.

3

 2 The jury found Escobar guilty as follows:

Count 1: RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

Count 18: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting murder in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a);

Count 19: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 

924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

Escobar was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on Counts 1 and 18 with a 

consecutive ten-year sentence on Count 19.

3 The jury found Alfaro-Granados guilty as follows:

Count 1: RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

Count 2: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder of fellow gang 

member Lal Ko in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(1);

Count 3: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 2) in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(iii);

Count 4: VICAR, namely, aiding and abetting the murder on the highway in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1959(a)(1);

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Reyna-Ozuna was found guilty of RICO conspiracy but without an 

enhancement for RICO conspiracy involving murder. He was found not guilty of 

the VICAR murder at the gas station and not guilty of a § 924(j) charge alleging 

the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a violent crime resulting in death. 

But, he was found guilty of a lesser-included § 924(c) charge for using or carrying 

a firearm. In addition, the jury specifically found that Reyna-Ozuna did not 

actually brandish a firearm. Reyna-Ozuna received a sentence of ninety-six

months on the RICO Conspiracy Count, and a consecutive sixty months for the

§ 924(c) firearm conviction.4

 We present additional facts material to individual 

arguments below.

 

Count 5: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence (the VICAR offense of Count 4) in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(C)(i).

Alfaro-Granados was sentenced to concurrent life sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 4; a tenyear sentence on Count 3; and a twenty-five-year sentence on Count 5, with the ten- and twentyfive-year sentences to be served consecutive to each other and to all other sentences.

4 The jury found Reyna-Ozuna guilty as follows:

Count 1: RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), without an 

enhancement for murder;

Count 19: Aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 

924(c)(1)(A)(i).

Reyna-Ozuna received a ninety-six-month sentence on the RICO count and a 

consecutive sixty-month sentence for the firearm count.

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II. Discussion

a. Alvarado-Linares

Alvarado-Linares argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

over his case because the indictment failed to allege facts that could support the 

existence of an “association in fact” for purposes of demonstrating a RICO 

enterprise. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial 

to establish this same element of the RICO offense. He also argues the indictment 

alleged merely a series of intrastate, state-law offenses and failed to demonstrate a 

substantial effect on interstate commerce. Having reviewed the detailed and 

extensive indictment, we find these arguments to be wholly without merit and 

affirm the judgment in this regard without further comment. See United States v. 

Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“An indictment is 

considered legally sufficient if it: ‘(1) presents the essential elements of the 

charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended against, and 

(3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar 

against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.’” 

(quoting United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1046 (11th Cir. 2002))); United 

States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding 

that a RICO conspiracy as a whole must have an effect on interstate commerce and 

finding the requisite nexus based upon participation in a national-scale gang).

Alvarado-Linares also alleges a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161, arguing that the calculation of the time period in which he should have 

been indicted by federal authorities should have started with his arrest on state 

charges. Accordingly, he argues that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss 

his indictment, and also in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing to 

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explore the extent of cooperation between state and federal law enforcement 

officials. Additional facts are necessary for examination of these arguments.

Alvarado-Linares was arrested on state charges on January 24, 2009. While 

still in state custody, he was indicted federally on October 27, 2009, for being an 

illegal alien in possession of a firearm. The State then dropped its charges and, on 

November 4, 2009, he was taken into custody by federal authorities on the firearm

charge. Subsequently, on February 24, 2010, while still in federal custody, he was 

indicted on the present counts, and the government dropped its initial firearm 

charge. 

The Speedy Trial Act requires that an individual arrested on federal charges 

be indicted within thirty days from the date of the arrest. See § 3161(b). AlvaradoLinares asserts that state and federal authorities communicated extensively during 

his state custody and that the state was merely holding him on its charges until 

federal authorities could indict him on federal charges. Based on the alleged 

collaborative conduct between state and federal officials, Alvarado-Linares argues 

that the date of his state arrest should have been treated as if it were a federal arrest 

and he should have therefore been indicted by federal authorities within thirty days 

of that state arrest, or by February 23, 2009. Because the federal authorities missed 

this deadline for indicting him on federal charges that Alvarado-Linares imputes to 

them, he asks that his indictment be dismissed or, in the alternative, that a hearing 

be held to explore the state and federal prosecutors’ intentions, actions, and 

communications.

Alvarado-Linares raised the Speedy Trial Act issue below. A magistrate 

judge issued a report and recommendation denying relief. Alvarado-Linares 

objected, and the district court adopted the recommendation. We therefore review 

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de novo the denial of relief on Speedy Trial Act grounds. See United States v. 

Williams, 314 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. Twitty, 

107 F.3d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1997). We review for abuse of discretion the 

district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing. Diveroli v. United States, 803 

F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).

It is long and well-settled in this Circuit that, notwithstanding any 

coordination between state and federal officials, the time within which federal 

authorities must indict a defendant under the Speedy Trial Act is measured by the 

date of the federal arrest, not any state arrest. See United States v. Russo, 796 

F.2d 1443, 1450–51 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 277 

(11th Cir. 1987). Accord United States v. Lewis, 732 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Woolfork, 399 F.3d 590, 595-96 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Alvarado-Linares nonetheless argues that, for purposes of Speedy Trial Act 

calculations, we should impute the state arrest date to federal authorities when the 

state has held the defendant only as a “ruse” to give federal authorities time to 

charge the defendant. It is true that we have recognized the possibility of a narrow 

“ruse” exception for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act when federal immigration 

officials detain an immigrant, “not to effectuate deportation, but rather as a ‘mere 

ruse[] to detain a defendant for later criminal prosecution.’” United States v. Noel, 

231 F.3d 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2000)); accord United States v. Drummond, 240 F.3d 

1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001).

But this potential “ruse” exception is limited to a situation in which federal 

immigration officials detain an immigrant ostensibly to remove him from the 

country, while in reality they actually hold him solely for the purpose of bringing 

federal criminal charges. The government correctly points out that AlvaradoCase: 13-14994 Date Filed: 06/20/2017 Page: 9 of 16 
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Linares identifies no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority recognizing a 

ruse exception in a situation like the present case: state confinement on state 

charges followed by federal arrest and indictment on federal charges. Joint state 

and federal investigations are the norm, and extensive discussion back and forth 

between state and federal authorities is not uncommon. Because state authorities at 

all times held sovereign discretion as to how they separately might handle their 

own prosecution or non-prosecution for state offenses, it was not error to deny 

relief as to this issue. And, given the strength of the government’s position in this 

regard and the absence of authority to support Alvarado-Linares’s theory, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. See 

Diveroli, 803 F.3d at 1263–64 (no abuse of discretion in denial of a hearing where 

authority would not otherwise permit relief).

b. Escobar 

Like Alvarado-Linares, Escobar challenges the indictment and alleges a 

Speedy Trial Act violation. Escobar, however, did not raise either of these issues

below, so our review is merely for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 

F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (“An appellate court may not correct an error the 

defendant failed to raise in the district court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is 

plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an 

appellate court may then exercise its discretion . . . only if (4) the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

(citations omitted)). The facts Escobar asserts to support his Speedy Trial Act 

argument are substantially similar to the facts Alvarado-Linares presents, and 

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Escobar asserts no independent arguments regarding the indictment.5 Because we 

find no error in Alvarado-Linares’s case even under de novo review, we find no 

plain error in Escobar’s case. Without error, there cannot be plain error.

Escobar also asserts an Eighth Amendment challenge to his life sentence. 

He argues the evidence at trial showed only that he was involved with the shooting 

at the gas station, not that he actually fired the fatal shot. In fact, the jury 

convicted him of aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to 

a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), but did not 

find him guilty of the greater offense of using a firearm to cause a death, § 924(j). 

According to Escobar, the jury’s finding shows he did not fire the gun, and 

therefore, it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under a proportionality 

principle to impose a life sentence. 

We reject this argument. Regardless of the details of the jury’s findings, the 

limited proportionality principle in the Eighth Amendment does not preclude the 

imposition of a statutorily authorized life sentence for a non-shooter’s involvement 

in a murder. See United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(per curiam) (“[I]f it is grossly disproportionate, the court must then consider the 

sentences imposed on others convicted in the same jurisdiction and the sentences 

imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”); United States 

v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“In non-capital cases, the 

Eighth Amendment encompasses, at most, only a narrow proportionality 

principle.”). Life imprisonment for active participation in a gang-related execution 

simply is not grossly disproportionate to the offense, regardless of whether the jury 

 5 Escobar was arrested on state charges on June 9, 2008. On October 27, 2009, he was indicted 

federally for possessing a stolen firearm, and, on November 3, 2009, he was arrested on that 

federal charge. He was indicted on the present charges on February 24, 2010, and the initial 

federal firearm charge was dropped shortly thereafter.

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found Escobar or a different gang member actually fired the fatal shot. See 18 

U.S.C. § 1963(a) (life sentence for RICO involving murder); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1959(a)(1) (life sentence for VICAR murder).

Finally, Escobar argues the district court erred because it instructed the jury 

that punishment was an issue reserved for the court and that the jury’s role was 

cabined to determining the facts and finding defendants guilty or not guilty of the 

charged offenses. Escobar argues that, because his case involved mandatory 

sentences, there remained no decisions for the court regarding punishment after 

determinations of guilt, thus making the court’s description of roles inaccurate as 

to this case. Again, we reject Escobar’s argument. The district court properly 

instructed the jury using a model instruction that accurately described the relative 

roles of the court and the jury. The fact that no actual discretion remained for the 

court after the finding of guilt is immaterial. It was still proper to instruct the jury 

that its role was to assess the facts and find the defendants guilty or not guilty. See 

United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1577–78 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 

departure from this general instruction is not authorized even in cases involving 

possible insanity defenses and resulting commitments to mental health facilities).

c. Alfaro-Granados

Alfaro-Granados challenges his life sentence as cruel and unusual 

punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. He acknowledges that success of 

such a challenge is “exceedingly rare” under the limited proportionality principle 

applicable to non-capital cases. Flores, 572 F.3d at 1268 (quoting United States v. 

Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005)). He presents no argument illustrating 

his case to be exceedingly rare nor does he distinguish his case from that of his 

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codefendant Escobar. We therefore reject his challenge for the same reasons stated 

above.

d. Reyna-Ozuna6

To review, Reyna-Ozuna was found guilty of Count 1 for RICO conspiracy 

but was specifically found not guilty regarding RICO conspiracy involving murder. 

He was found not guilty of Count 18—the VICAR murder at the gas station. And, 

he was found not guilty of the § 924(j) charge in Count 19 regarding use of a 

firearm in relation to a violent crime causing the death of another. But, he was 

found guilty of what was, from an elements point of view, the lesser-included 

§ 924(c) charge underlying Count 19: use of a firearm in relation to a crime of 

violence (without specifying that the use caused the death of another). In addition, 

the jury specifically found that Reyna-Ozuna did not actually brandish the firearm 

in relation to this count. 

Reyna-Ozuna argues it was inconsistent to find him guilty of the § 924(c) 

count for aiding or abetting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of 

violence while acquitting him as to RICO conspiracy involving murder and finding 

he did not brandish the firearm or cause a death. According to Reyna-Ozuna, the 

only identified predicate violent crime was the VICAR murder of which he was 

 6 Reyna-Ozuna challenges his 156-month sentence as cruel and unusual under the Eighth 

Amendment. We reject his challenge for the reasons previously stated. Further, Reyna-Ozuna 

argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erroneously instructed the jury as to the 

correct elements and intent requirement for “aiding and abetting.” He cites Rosemond v. United 

States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1251–52 (2014), a case in which the Supreme Court held aiding and 

abetting the use of a firearm in a drug transaction required a showing that the party not 

brandishing the firearm have advance knowledge that the codefendant would be carrying the 

firearm. Rosemond is factually inapposite for several reasons, primarily because the evidence in 

Reyna-Ozuna’s case showed quite clearly he provided the firearm. In any event, our review is 

for plain error and he has not made the showing required for relief under this stringent level of 

review.

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acquitted (Count 18). Further, the jury found him not responsible for the death 

resulting from the murder of Count 18 when the jury acquitted on the § 924(j) 

charge of Count 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (providing enhanced penalties for 

causing the death of another person through use of a firearm “in the course of a 

violation of” § 924(c)). He argues that, in the absence of some other predicate 

violent crime, his § 924(c) conviction is a logical impossibility and creates an 

inconsistency internal to one count.

In general, inconsistent verdicts as between counts are not grounds for relief 

because a reviewing court can never know “whose ox has been gored.” United 

States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984). If a mistake has occurred and the 

verdicts do not actually reflect the jury’s true opinions, it cannot be known whether 

the jury erred by unintentionally convicting on one of the two counts or by failing 

to convict on one of the two counts. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 

(1932) (“The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that 

either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real 

conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the 

defendant’s guilt.” (citation omitted)). Further, given the shield preventing 

analysis of juror deliberations, it can never be known whether the jury, in fact, 

purposefully engaged in jury nullification as to the acquitted count. See Powell, 

469 U.S. at 66–67. In short, where a jury’s act of lenity can explain a purported 

inconsistency, no relief is available. Id.

Reyna-Ozuna’s case, however, involves a twist. It may, in fact, be a 

mislabeling of this issue to discuss it in terms of an internally inconsistent verdict. 

What he specifically alleges is an inconsistency between an underlying offense 

serving as a contemporaneous predicate, and a compound offense that depends 

upon the jury’s conclusions as to the facts of the predicate. Regardless, what 

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matters is not the presence of an arguable inconsistency; what matters is the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the actual count of conviction. Here, that 

evidence is sufficient.

A similar situation was present in Powell, where the Court rejected the 

theory of relief for inconsistent verdicts. The Court held firmly that an acquittal on 

one count could be deemed an act of lenity and stated that independent review for 

sufficient evidence looking at the facts rather than the outcomes ensured adequate 

protection. There, the Court stated:

[R]espondent’s argument that an acquittal on a predicate offense 

necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a compound felony 

count simply misunderstands the nature of the inconsistent verdict 

problem. Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or 

as an argument that the acquittal on the predicate offense should 

collaterally estop the Government on the compound offense, the 

argument necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the predicate 

offense was proper—the one the jury “really meant.” This, of course, 

is not necessarily correct; all we know is that the verdicts are 

inconsistent. The Government could just as easily—and 

erroneously—argue that since the jury convicted on the compound 

offense the evidence on the predicate offense must have been 

sufficient. The problem is that the same jury reached inconsistent 

results; once that is established principles of collateral estoppel—

which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally 

and found certain facts in reaching its verdict—are no longer useful.

Powell, 469 U.S. at 68.

7

 

 

7 The government argues any alleged inconsistency cannot serve as a basis for relief for ReynaOzuna because Reyna-Ozuna requested the § 924(c) instruction, thus inviting any error that may 

have arisen due to the use of that instruction. Because the inconsistent-verdict argument fails of 

its own accord, it is unnecessary to address the invited error doctrine. Even if it were necessary 

to address the issue, our review of the relevant transcript pages suggests Reyna-Ozuna may not 

have requested the lesser-included instruction in such a specific manner as to make the alleged 

error he now complains of invited error. 

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Applying this standard, we conclude there was more than sufficient 

evidence to convict Reyna-Ozuna of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The 

alleged internal inconsistency is not inherent; it may be explained as a matter 

of lenity or jury nullification, and therefore, relief is unavailable. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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