[Cite as Hinton v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 2018-Ohio-237.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Morris K. Hinton, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 17AP-187 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 16CV-6908)

Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

et al., 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 23, 2018 

 

On brief: Morris K. Hinton, pro se. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and George 

Horváth, for appellees. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BRUNNER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Morris K. Hinton, appeals a decision and entry of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entered February 23, 2017, that granted summary 

judgment to defendants-appellees, Ohio Bureau of Sentence Computation ("OBSC") and 

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction ("ODRC") (collectively referred to as 

"appellees"). Because we agree with the trial court that credit for good behavior is deducted 

from the minimum but not the maximum measures of an indeterminate sentence, we 

overrule Hinton's assignment of error and affirm. 

I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 

{¶ 2} On December 19, 1994, following Hinton's guilty plea to two counts of rape, 

the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Hinton to two indefinite sentences 

of 9 to 25 years, to be served concurrently with each other. (Dec. 19, 1994 Jgmt. Entry case 
No. 17AP-187 2 

No. B 945589, Ex. A attached to July 25, 2016 Compl.) Over 21 years later, on July 25, 

2016, Hinton filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against appellees alleging that 

three years of credit for good behavior, having been applied to the minimum term of his 

sentence, should also have reduced his total sentence. (Compl.) Hinton's complaint 

included copies of correspondence between Hinton and appellees indicating that Hinton 

and appellees reached an impasse on the issue. (Exs. B-C attached to Compl.) 

{¶ 3} Appellees answered, admitting most of the pertinent background facts, 

including that Hinton began serving his 9-to-25-year sentence on December 27, 1994. 

(Sept. 26, 2016 Answer at ¶ 1-51.) On October 21, 2016, after filing its answer, appellees 

filed "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED, INSTANTER WITH THEIR 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN THE ALTERNATE MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT AT PAGE 13 OF 

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS IRRELEVANT." (Emphasis sic.) (Oct. 21, 2016 Mot. for 

Summ. Jgmt.) Essentially, appellees' motion had the potential of being four motions in 

one−a motion to strike certain news articles attached to the complaint, a motion for 

summary judgment, a request that the trial court consider the motion for summary 

judgment, and, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 4} Exhibits were filed with the four-in-one motion, the trial court treated it as a 

summary judgment motion, and the parties addressed it in the record as a motion for 

summary judgment. (Feb. 23, 2017 Decision in passim; Feb. 21, 2017 Entry at 2.) The trial 

court did not need to give separate notice under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) that it was considering 

summary judgment, since an answer had been filed, and appellees' out-of-rule motion to 

dismiss was in the alternative to its motion for summary judgment.2 

 

1 In an apparent typographical error, appellees also admitted that Hinton's maximum sentence expired on 

December 13, 2009 (rather than 2019). (Answer at ¶ 5.) 

2 In addition, in an entry filed on February 21, 2017, the trial court stated that the parties in a conference on 

October 25, 2016, discussed the fact that the trial court would be considering the defendants' motion for 

summary judgment and any responses thereto. (Feb. 21, 2017 Entry at 2.) Also, Hinton filed a "VERIFIED 

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S [sic] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," 

acknowledging that he was responding to a motion for summary judgment and not a motion to dismiss. 

(Nov. 7, 2016 Memo. in Opp.) 
No. 17AP-187 3 

II. JURISDICTION3

{¶ 5}

"Whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested by a court's 

examination of the case or otherwise, the court has a duty to 

consider it, for the court is powerless to act in the case 

without jurisdiction." Id., citing Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 

Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 518 N.E.2d 941, and Wandling v. Ohio Dept. 

of Transp. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 368, 371, 604 N.E.2d 825. 

As a result, "[e]ven though not asserted, lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte, by the court at 

any stage of the proceedings." Id., citing Fox v. Eaton Corp. 

(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 238, 358 N.E.2d 536. 

Adams v. Cox, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-684, 2010-Ohio-415, ¶ 19. It is incumbent on us to 

consider our jurisdiction, and in doing so we examine two issues: first, whether a final 

appealable order was before us when the motion to strike had not been ruled on by the trial 

court, and second, whether we can entertain an action such as Hinton has filed in 

declaratory judgment. 

{¶ 6} The trial court did not rule on appellees' motion to strike before entering 

judgment for appellees. Under CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Guinther, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-654, 

2013-Ohio-4014, ¶ 24, we previously held that a trial court's failure to rule on a motion to 

strike before granting summary judgment to the moving party is deemed to be a denial of 

the earlier filed motion. See also FitWorks Holdings, L.L.C. v. Pitchford-El, 8th Dist. No. 

88634, 2007-Ohio-2517, ¶ 9 (noting "[i]t is well-settled that, when a motion is not ruled on, 

it is deemed to be denied"). Appellees' motion to strike is denied as by operation of law, 

leaving no matters unaddressed by the judgment of the trial court and a final appealable 

order capable of our review. 

{¶ 7} As for jurisdiction over Hinton's claim in declaratory judgment, we review 

the nature of his claim, whether prior case law permits him to use declaratory judgment as 

a means to seek relief, and whether he has met the statutory requirements of declaratory 

judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721.12, which are jurisdictional. Copeland v. Tracy, 111 Ohio 

App.3d 648, 656 (10th Dist.1996). 

 

3 Although the record includes a number of filings and disputes between Hinton and appellees, we focus only 

on those relevant to the subject matter of this appeal. 
No. 17AP-187 4 

A. The Nature of Hinton's Claim 

{¶ 8} Incarcerated, Hinton seeks an earlier maximum sentence release date for two 

counts of rape. His indeterminate sentence predates the current statutory scheme for "good 

time" by several years. He was sentenced in 1994, and on March 1, 1998, the Ohio Adult 

Parole Authority ("APA") changed the guideline system it used to consider inmates for 

parole.4 What was formerly referred to in law as "good time" as a consideration for early 

release is eliminated under the new guidelines and is now presumed by the requirements 

of the statute. Ankrom v. Hageman, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-984, 2005-Ohio-1546. 

B. Case Law Treatment of Declaratory Judgment for "Good Time" Claims 

{¶ 9} In Hageman, the inmate appellants asserted among other claims that the 

APA did not promulgate new guidelines according to the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. 

at ¶ 7. This Court held that parole guidelines are not a rule and do not fall under the purview 

of the declaratory judgment statute. Id. at ¶ 36, citing Wise v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 84 Ohio App.3d 11 (10th Dist.1992) ("Thus, we concluded in Wise that 

a declaratory judgment action is not the appropriate remedy to preclude utilization of a 

 

4 The revised statute sets up a grid or matrix as guidelines for the APA: 

First, the parole board assigns a risk score. The risk score represents an 

inmate's risk of recidivism and is calculated by analyzing several objective 

factors, including an inmate's prior convictions, incarcerations, age, and 

prior parole and probation history. These factors are given numerical values 

that are added to arrive at a number between zero and eight, with eight 

indicating the greatest risk of recidivism. These risk scores are similar to the 

risk scores used in the matrix. Second, the parole board assigns an offense 

category. The offense category is determined by analyzing the conduct 

leading to the inmate's current incarceration based on the offense of 

conviction. The offense is then placed in categories numbered one through 

13, with 13 being the most serious offense. The offense category is a new 

creation and was not used in the matrix. Third, the parole board evaluates 

the risk score and offense category. The risk score and offense category are 

utilized in a guideline-grid chart to suggest a range of months the inmate 

should serve before being paroled. The horizontal axis of the grid lists the 

eight risk of recidivism factors, while the vertical axis of the grid lists the 13 

categories of offenses. After locating the category of offense along the 

vertical axis and then locating the risk score along the horizontal axis, the 

parole board then finds the intersection of these categories on the grid, 

which suggests a range of months to be served by the inmate before 

becoming eligible for parole. Fourth, the parole board decides whether to 

follow or depart from the suggestion of the guidelines. If it chooses to follow 

the guidelines, the board picks a period within the suggested range that the 

offender should serve. "Good time" as a consideration is eliminated under 

the new guidelines and is now presumed. 

Ankrom v. Hageman, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-984, 2005-Ohio-1546, ¶ 4. 
No. 17AP-187 5 

rule not properly adopted in accordance with statutory procedures. We later 

followed Wise to find that declaratory judgment is not the proper method to contest the 

utilization of a rule regarding the APA's death penalty clemency procedure that was not 

properly promulgated. See Coleman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 

212, 215, 685 N.E.2d 241. Thus, pursuant to Wise and Coleman, appellees would be 

precluded from using a declaratory judgment action to challenge the promulgation of the 

guidelines."). 

{¶ 10} But Hinton, who was sentenced before March 1, 1998, does not challenge how

guidelines were promulgated, and his claim does not concern clemency for the death 

penalty. Rather, he challenges appellees' application of sentence reduction guidelines to 

his sentences, claiming in his sole assignment of error prejudice to his "liberty interests." 

(Hinton's Brief at ii.) He does not challenge the underlying judgment of the sentencing 

court. 

{¶ 11} We previously stated that collateral civil attacks by an inmate who filed an 

original action for a writ of mandamus against ODRC and the chief of OBSC seeking 

recalculation of his end of sentence date was a civil action and a collateral civil attack on the 

judgment. State ex rel. McGlown v. Mohr, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-478, 2015-Ohio-1554, ¶ 1, 

6. In McGlown at ¶ 6, we cited State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158 (1997), syllabus 

("Where a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking 

vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights 

have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 

2953.21.").5

{¶ 12} Because McGlown's action had been filed in mandamus it could be treated as 

a postconviction motion for two reasons. First, R.C. 2731.02, authorizing writs of 

mandamus, permits courts to issue them simply on the information of the party beneficially 

interested. Second, under Hageman, we held that what are now essentially "good time" 

guidelines are not rules. Mandamus commands the performance of an act that the law 

specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. R.C. 2731.01. Under 

 

5 A petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 must demonstrate "a denial or infringement of 

the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the 

Constitution of the United States." R.C. 2353.21(A)(1)(a). In McGlown, we did not reach this question, 

because we treated the mandamus petition as a postconviction motion and denied it for failure to satisfy 

R.C. 2969.25(A), requiring an affidavit detailing prior civil actions filed. 
No. 17AP-187 6 

Hageman and in this context, mandamus, like declaratory judgment, cannot issue based 

on guidelines. McGlown does not apply to Hinton's appeal, and his action in declaratory 

judgment should not be converted to a postconviction motion as we did in McGlown for a 

prisoner's original mandamus action. 

{¶ 13} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals has held, citing Reynolds, that 

determining whether a motion is for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) 

requires examining whether the petition is (1) filed subsequent to the defendant's direct 

appeal; (2) claims a denial of constitutional rights; (3) seeks to render the judgment void; 

and (4) requests vacation of the judgment and sentence. State v. Archibald, 11th Dist. No. 

2014-L-005, 2014-Ohio-4314, ¶ 20, citing Reynolds at 160. Because the movant in 

Archibald did not seek to vacate his sentence or render it void, but rather to modify it from 

consecutive to concurrent, the Eleventh District found his motion should not be converted 

to a motion for postconviction relief. Id. at ¶ 20. Hinton does not seek to render a judgment 

void or to vacate his sentence. And his claim of prejudice to his liberty interests is in the 

absence of knowing whether he is entitled to a particular release date because of the 

application of "good time" credits under prior law. Under Archibald, his action should not 

be converted to a postconviction motion.

{¶ 14} The Second District Court of Appeals has also distinguished Reynolds, stating 

that Reynolds "must be narrowly construed" and reaches "only a motion * * * that fails to 

delineate specifically whether it is a postconviction release petition or a Crim.R. 32.1 

motion," referring to poorly delineated motions as "irregular 'no-name' motions [that] must 

be categorized by a court in order for the court to know the criteria by which the motion 

should be judged." (Emphasis sic.) State v. Spencer, 2d Dist. No. 2006 CA 42, 2007-Ohio2140, ¶ 11. See also State v. Meadows, 6th Dist. No. L-05-1321, 2006-Ohio-6183, ¶ 19. 

"Reynolds therefore does not obviate Crim.R. 32.1 

postsentence motions. Instead, Reynolds sets forth a narrow 

rule of law limited to the context of that case." State v. Bush

(2002), 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 237-38, 773 N.E.2d 522, 2002-

Ohio-3993. 

Spencer at ¶ 11. The Second District held that because the motion before the trial court was 

specifically filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, the trial court erred in analyzing it as a petition 

for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. Id. See also Meadows at ¶ 19. 
No. 17AP-187 7 

{¶ 15} Hinton's action in the trial court is a specific action filed in declaratory 

judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721.12(A) with specific criteria by which it should be judged. 

Accordingly, we cannot apply Reynolds as we did in McGlown. We must conduct a 

jurisdictional review under R.C. 2721.12, which specifically requires that we determine 

whether "all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the 

declaration [have been] made parties to the action or proceeding."

{¶ 16} We have previously held that a party that would be affected by the outcome 

of a case is a necessary party, and the failure to include them as a party constitutes a 

jurisdictional defect. Copeland at 656. The statutory elements of declaratory judgment are 

jurisdictional requirements and all affected parties must be named in the complaint. R.C. 

2721.12; Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 316, 2012-Ohio-880, ¶ 19 ("We 

have recognized that naming proper parties and fulfilling service requirements are 

jurisdictional requirements in cases that involve statutes that clearly require such 

for jurisdiction.").

{¶ 17} We find no jurisdictional defects with Hinton's complaint.6 He seeks a 

specific declaration of the rights of clearly delineated parties, all of whom are part of the 

action. Thus, we have jurisdiction to review his appeal of the trial court's denial of his 

claims in declaratory judgment.

{¶ 18} We do note at this juncture that "logic" would point to the need for Hinton to 

name in his complaint those persons who would seek to be heard about a potential earlier 

prison release date, such as the persons contemplated in what is known as Ohio's "Marsy's 

Law" taking effect 90 days after the November 7, 2017 election. However, this provision 

was not a part of the Ohio Constitution or in effect at the time Hinton filed his action. 

Thus we cannot say that Hinton was required to name his victim(s) such that they would 

have the right "to be heard in any public proceeding involving [his] release, plea, 

sentencing, disposition, or parole." Prospective Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10a 

(A)(3). But we cannot say this is the case for future declaratory judgment actions that 

may be brought by prisoners concerning their earlier release once "Marsy's Law" takes 

effect in Ohio.

 

6 We also note since Hinton is not seeking that any state law or rule be held unconstitutional, there is no 

requirement under R.C. 2721.12(A) to serve the attorney general for him to be heard. 
No. 17AP-187 8 

{¶ 19} Finally, and by way of analogy, we note that this Court previously has 

reviewed a prisoner's pro se declaratory judgment action contesting revocation of his 

parole. In that case, the trial court granted summary judgment to the State and the prisoner 

appealed. We did not convert the action to or treat it as a postconviction motion; we 

addressed it in declaratory judgment in the context of criminal post-sentencing matters. 

Helton v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1108, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2938, 

*7 (June 26, 2001). In Helton, we affirmed the trial court's denial of declaratory relief to 

the prisoner, analyzing that declaratory judgment requires that a party establish (1) a real 

controversy between adverse parties; (2) a controversy which is justiciable in character; and 

(3) a situation where speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. Id.,

citing Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 148-49 (1992). 

{¶ 20} En toto, we are convinced that Hinton's situation presents a narrow and 

limited application that allows us to review his claims in declaratory judgment pursuant to 

R.C. 2721.12. The straightforward legal issue Hinton places before us is whether the 

approximately three years of credit he earned for good behavior and participation in prison 

programs, should have reduced his maximum sentence as a logical consequence of 

reducing his minimum sentence. 

III. FACTS 

{¶ 21} In granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, the trial court found 

that Hinton was not entitled to an interpretation of law that reduced his maximum 

sentence, even though his minimum sentence had been reduced so that he could appear 

before the APA earlier than he would have without his "good time." 

{¶ 22} The facts in evidence before the trial court included an affidavit appellees 

attached to its somewhat unorthodox motion for summary judgment of an auditor for 

appellees, Kimberly Guitner. (Guitner Aff. at ¶ 3, Ex. A attached to Oct. 21, 2016 Memo. in 

Opp.) Guitner swore by affidavit that, based on documents attached as sub-exhibits A-1 

through A-12, Hinton's sentence was a 9-year minimum and a 25-year maximum. Id. at 

¶ 10. The expiration of the maximum, according to Guitner, was December 13, 2019. Id. at 

¶ 11. Guitner explained that Hinton's good-time credit, earned credit, and jail-time credit 

(a total of 992 days) has been deducted from his minimum sentence. Id. at ¶ 14-16. As 

previously detailed in a letter to Hinton in January 2016, these credits reduce the minimum 

sentence so that the inmate is eligible for parole sooner. Id. at ¶ 22; see also Guitner Aff. at 
No. 17AP-187 9 

Ex. A-12. But earned and good-time credits, unlike jail-time credit, have no effect on the 

maximum possible sentence. (Guitner Aff. at ¶ 22.) 

{¶ 23} On November 7, 2016, Hinton filed a memorandum in opposition to 

appellees' motion. (Nov. 7, 2016 Memo. in Opp.) Hinton did not disagree with Guitner's 

calculation of his maximum-sentence expiration date based on his original sentence. 

(Diagram, App'x at 11 attached to Nov. 7, 2016 Memo. in Opp.) He argued that he had 16 

years to serve following the completion of his minimum sentence of 9 years. (Nov. 7, 2016 

Memo. in Opp. at 5.) Assuming that approximately three years were deducted from his 

minimum sentence for good-time, earned, and jail-time credits, Hinton reasoned once he 

served 16 years after his minimum 9-year sentence expired, he should have been freed. Id. 

He argued the approximate three-year deduction of credits from his minimum sentence 

also applied in computing his maximum sentence. Id. He argued for a release date of 

December 13, 2016. Id.

{¶ 24} The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, concluding 

that appellees' calculation of Hinton's release date, based on the relevant law and agreed 

facts, was correct. (Feb. 23, 2017 Decision at 6-7.) It also noted that even if Hinton's claims 

were construed as a motion for postconviction relief or a petition for a writ of mandamus, 

they would fail. Id. at 4-5. 

{¶ 25} Hinton now appeals. 

IV. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 26} Hinton presents a single assignment of error for review: 

The Court of Common Pleas Abused Its Discretion when It 

dismissed Appellant Morris K. Hinton's properly filed 

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed in accordance with 

Ohio's Declaratory Judgment Act, pursuant to O.R.C. Chap. 

2721; causing prejudice to Appellant Hinton's liberty interests 

in Good Time credits earned and awarded under Ohio's pre1996 Sentencing scheme in accordance with O.R.C. 2967.19(A) 

and 2967,193(A). 

(Sic passim.) 

V. DISCUSSION 

{¶ 27} Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 56(C) provides that: 

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written 
No. 17AP-187 10 

admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written 

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

When reviewing a trial court's decision on summary judgment, our review is de novo and 

we therefore apply the same standards as the trial court. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 128 

Ohio St.3d 540, 2011-Ohio-1818, ¶ 12; Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 95 Ohio 

St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, ¶ 24. 

{¶ 28} In this case, there appears to be no dispute between the parties as to the 

relevant facts. Hinton was sentenced 9 to 25 years in prison, began serving that sentence 

on December 27, 1994, earned approximately three years of credit, and had a maximum 

sentence expiration date of December 13, 2019. 

{¶ 29} Hinton was sentenced in December 1994. The versions of R.C. 2967.19 and 

2967.193 that were in effect at the time of Hinton's sentencing and commission of the 

crimes for which sentencing occurred were enacted in 1994. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571.7 On 

review of sentencing issues, we are obliged pursuant to R.C. 1.58(B) to apply the statutes in 

effect at the time Hinton was sentenced. Thus, as to matters affecting Hinton's sentence, 

we apply the version of R.C. 2967.19 in effect at the time he was sentenced, which provided 

in relevant part as follows: 

[A] person confined in a state correctional institution is entitled 

to a deduction from his minimum * * * sentence of thirty per 

cent of the sentence, prorated for each month of the sentence 

during which he faithfully has observed the rules of the 

institution. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2967.19(A) (1994). 

{¶ 30} There existed in the law at the time Hinton was sentenced an additional basis 

for minimum sentence reduction for participation in programming, pursuant to R.C. 

2967.193, which provided in relevant part as follows: 

[A]ny person confined in a state correctional institution is 

entitled to earn days of credit as a deduction from his minimum

* * * sentence as follows: 

(1) Two days shall be awarded to the prisoner and be deducted 

from his sentence for each full month during which he 

 

7 Reported online as 1993 Ohio HB 571. 
No. 17AP-187 11 

productively participates in any of the following programs 

approved by the department of rehabilitation and correction: 

(a) Academic or vocational education; 

(b) Prison industries; 

(c) Alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2967.193(A)(1) (1994). 

{¶ 31} By the plain text of both former R.C. 2967.19(A) and former 2967.193(A)(1), 

deductions were from a prisoner's "minimum" sentence. The Supreme Court of Ohio has 

recognized that " '[t]he reasoning for [former R.C. 2967.19] reducing the minimum, rather 

than the maximum, sentence is * * * clear: the intent was to enable earlier parole eligibility, 

not to allow prisoners to unilaterally shorten their court-imposed sentence.' " (Emphasis 

sic.) State ex rel. Vaughn v. Money, 104 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004-Ohio-6561, ¶ 9, quoting 

Gavrilla v. Leonard, 4th Dist. No. 01CA2638, 2002-Ohio-6144, ¶ 12. The Supreme Court 

also agreed with this Court's holding that " '[f]ormer R.C. 2967.19 provides for "good time" 

credit solely for purposes of acceleration of the date that an offender is first eligible for 

parole.' " Vaughn at ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Perry v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. 

No. 03AP-1277, 2004-Ohio-4039, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 32} Accordingly, the credits earned by Hinton for his good behavior and 

participation in prison programs should have been (and were) deducted from his minimum 

sentence. However, though this had the effect of having the APA consider granting parole 

at an earlier point in time from his original sentencing date and thereby potentially 

reducing the minimum amount of time he had to serve, it did not alter the maximum time 

he could be required to serve under the trial court's original sentence. In reaching this 

conclusion, we take into consideration that "in the event of breaking his parole he might 

under certain circumstances be returned to the penitentiary to serve out the balance of 

his time." O'Neill v. Thomas, 123 Ohio St. 42, 49 (1930). That is, were good time permitted 

to reduce the maximum sentence, an inmate released upon having served the minimum 

(and reduced) sentence but who violates parole, could argue that he or she would not need 

to serve all of the remainder of the maximum sentence if denied further community 

supervision. Thus, in following Vaughn, neither we, nor the APA, are in a position to 

reduce a trial court's maximum sentence for indeterminate sentences. 
No. 17AP-187 12 

{¶ 33} Hinton's contention that he was required to serve a minimum sentence of 9 

years plus a possible 16 years so that reducing the 9-year sentence logically reduces the total 

sentence of 9 years plus 16 years misapprehends the nature of his indefinite sentence. 

Vaughn. His sentence was a maximum of 25 years, with a minimum of 9 before he became 

eligible for release. Reducing the 9 years made him eligible for release sooner. It did not 

affect his maximum sentence of 25 years. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 34} Hinton's sole assignment of error is overruled and the decision of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK and KLATT, JJ., concur.