alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Arthur Stamm et al., Appellants, v Deloitte and Touche, Respondent.

[608 NYS2d 498]

—In an action to recover damages, *inter alia,*for accounting malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.), dated February 24, 1992, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

It is well established that New York courts are not compelled to retain jurisdiction in any case which has no substantial nexus to New York *(see, Banco Ambrosiano v Artoc Bank & Trust,*62 NY2d 65, 73; *Silver v Great Am. Ins. Co.,*29 NY2d 356, 361). The burden rests upon the defendant challenging the forum to demonstrate that private or public interests *414militate against litigation going forward in this State *(see, Islamic Republic v Pahlavi,*62 NY2d 474, 479, *cert denied*469 US 1108; *Bader & Bader v Ford,*66 AD2d 642). Among the factors which the court must weigh when deciding a motion to dismiss on such ground are the residency of the parties, the potential hardship to proposed witnesses, the availability of an alternative forum, the situs of the underlying action, and the burden which will be imposed upon the New York courts, with no one single factor controlling *(see, Islamic Republic v Pahlavi, supra; Neville v Anglo Am. Mgt. Corp.,*191 AD2d 240, 241-242). The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and whatever result is reached will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has failed to consider all the relevant factors *(see, National Bank & Trust Co. v Banco De Vizcaya,*72 NY2d 1005, *cert denied*489 US 1067; *Islamic Republic v Pahlavi, supra; Banco Ambrosiano v Artoc Bank & Trust, supra; Varkonyi v S.A. Empresa De Viacao Airea Rio Grandense [Varig],*22 NY2d 333).

Upon consideration of all of the relevant factors involved, we find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in dismissing the action on the ground of forum non conveniens *(see, Islamic Republic v Pahlavi, supra; Silver v Great Am. Ins. Co., supra; Bader & Bader v Ford, supra).*Sullivan, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert L. Worden, Appellant.

Submitted July 16, 2012;

decided August 28, 2012

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Timothy E Donaher, Esq., Monroe County Public Defender, 10 N. Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30290

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BRADLEY W. LAEGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CR-10012

- - - - - - - - - -

February 16, 1998

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Bradley W. Laeger appeals his conviction for willfully

failing to file income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7203. First, Laeger argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that

venue was improper in the Western District of Louisiana. A

person’s principal residence is a proper venue for a charge of

failing to file an income tax return. United States v. Rice, 659

F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1981). Laeger admits that his primary
No. 97-30290

-2-

residence for the years in question was in Pineville, Louisiana,

a town in the Western District of Louisiana. His argument that

he was tried in an improper venue is without merit.

Laeger also contends that the district court erred in

refusing to instruct the jury that he was not presumed to know

the law. We find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion. See United States v. Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 350

(5th Cir. 1997). The district court’s instructions, taken as a

whole, were a correct statement of the law and clearly instructed

the jurors on the factual issues relevant to this case. See id. 

The district court properly instructed the jurors on the

“willfulness” requirement for the offense, as well as the effect

of a “good faith misunderstanding of the obligation to file a

return”. These instructions did not prejudice Laeger’s defense

theory.

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I,
Paul M. Zaidins, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of American Locker Group Incorporated;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



|Date: September 4, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/PAUL M. ZAIDINSPaul M. Zaidins
Chief Financial Officer
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   I, Elwood Shepard, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Heavenly Hot Dogs, Inc. (the ACompany@), certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and I have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report (the "Evaluation Date"); and  c) presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;  5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and   Date: October 31, 2007  By: /s/ Elwood Shepard Elwood Shepard Chief Executive Officer  Chief Financial Officer
STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

MICHAEL BRANNAN AND, STACY NO. 2021 CW 1344

STONE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON

BEHALF OF THEIR DECEASED WIFE

AND MOTHER, DEBORAH BRANNAN

VERSUS

DEVANG LODHAVIA, MD; ESTATE OF

MARIO BELTRAN, MD; EAST BATON

ROUGE MEDICAL CENTER D/ B/ A

OCHSNER MEDICAL CENTER BATON

ROUGE; NICOLE JOHNSON - SMITH, RN; 

EDWARD WILLETT, MD; JON M. CUBA, 

MD; LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; 

PROASSURANCE SPECIALTY

INSURANCE; LOUISIANA MEDICAL

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

LAMMICO); INTERSTATE FIRE & JANUARY 31, 2022

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

In Re: Devang Lodhavia, M. D., applying for supervisory writs, 

19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton

Rouge, No. 683, 452. 

BEFORE: MCDONALD, LANIER, AND WOLFE, JJ. 

WRIT DENIED. 

JMM

WIL

EW

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

DEPUTY CLER OF COURT

FOR THE COURT
#### In the Matter of Marquis B., Appellant, v Rason B. et al., Respondents.

Submitted June 4, 2012;

decided August 30, 2012

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### In the Matter of Orange County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Doris Zieran, Respondent, v Mark Marvin, Appellant.

Decided April 5, 2011

*850Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carl A. Wall, Appellant.

[977 NYS2d 394]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Kahn, J.), dated June 18, 2012, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sexually violent offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

*901The defendant contends that the County Court violated his due process right to appear at his risk assessment hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act *(see*Correction Law § 168-n [3]; *People v Gonzalez,*69 AD3d 819 [2010]) when it conducted the hearing in his absence. This contention is unpreserved for appellate review because the defendant’s counsel, who represented him at the hearing, did not object *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Warrington,*19 AD3d 881 [2005]).

In any event, the contention is without merit. “Where it is clear that the defendant’s absence is deliberate, despite knowledge that the [hearing] is about to begin, he or she forfeits his or her right to be present, regardless of whether he or she was informed that the [hearing] would proceed in his or her absence” *(People v Brooks,*308 AD2d 99, 104 [2003]). Here, after being notified of his right to a hearing, at which he would be represented by counsel, as well as of the purpose and date of the hearing, the defendant sent a handwritten letter to the County Court, acknowledging his understanding of his right to a hearing and his right to counsel, but indicating that he did not wish to appear at the hearing. Under these circumstances, the County Court correctly determined that the defendant forfeited his right to be present at the hearing, and properly proceeded with the hearing in his absence *(see People v AbdulJalil,*83 AD3d 809 [2011]; *People v Brooks,*308 AD2d 99 [2003]; *cf. People v Ginyard,*101 AD3d 1095 [2012]; *People v Jackson,*94 AD3d 961 [2012]; *People v Porter,*37 AD3d 797 [2007]). Skelos, J.R, Leventhal, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Consent of KPMG LLP,
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of DirectorsThe
Fairchild Corporation:

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the registration statements (No. 33-38302, 333-49779, 333-62037, 333-97703,
333-82828, 333-16821, 333-70387, 333-70673, and 333-54158) on Form S-8 of The Fairchild
Corporation of our report dated December 13, 2004, with respect to the consolidated
balance sheets of The Fairchild Corporation and subsidiaries as of September 30, 2004 and
2003, and the related consolidated statements of operations and other comprehensive income
(loss), stockholders equity, and cash flows for the year ended September 30, 2004,
the three-month period ended September 30, 2003 and the year ended June 30, 2003, which
report appears in the September 30, 2004, annual report on Form 10-K of The Fairchild
Corporation.

/s/
KPMG LLP

McLean, VirginiaDecember
13, 2004

---

Exhibit 23.2

Consent of Ernst &
Young LLP, Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 33-38302, 333-49779, 333-62037,
333-97703, 333-82828, 333-16821, 333-70387, 333-70673, and 333-54158) of our report dated
March 28, 2003, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Fairchild
Corporation and subsidiaries included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
September 30, 2004.

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

McLean, VADecember 10,
2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE UNAUDITED
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF JUNE 30, 2000 AND THE UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000824840
<NAME> ADVANTAGE LIFE PRODUCTS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### UNITED R. R. OPERATING CRAFTS et al. v. NEW YORK, N. H. *&*H. R. CO. et al. UNITED R. R. OPERATING CRAFTS et al. v. WYER et al.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Dec. 8, 1953.

*366Maurice Finkelstein, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Polier & Midonick, New York City, for defendants Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen.

William J. O’Brien, New York City, for defendant William Wyer, trustee, Long Island R. Co.

Bernard L. Alderman, New York City, for intervenor Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen.

Edward R. Brumley, New York City, for N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co.

CONGER, District Judge.

Applications by the plaintiffs under Rule 60(b)(6), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.A., to vacate and set aside the orders and final judgments of August 31, 1953 entered on the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 205 F.2d 153, and modifying the order of April 27, 1953 dismissing the amended complaints so as to permit plaintiffs to file an amendment to their amended complaints.

Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes relief from a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Plaintiffs place no reliance upon subdivisions (1) to (5) of Rule 60 (b).

Plaintiffs’ reason for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) amounts to this: that the conclusions expressed in the opinion of the Court dated April 16, 1953, 115 F.Supp. 359, as effectuated by the order of April 27, 1953 and judgment of August 31, 1953, entered on the mandate of the Court of Appeals, raise serious questions of the constitutionality of the union shop amendments to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., so that the plaintiffs in view of the irreparable harm ensuing, should now be permitted to challenge these amendments in these suits. Aside from the fact that the plaintiffs have waited six months from the entry of the order dismissing the suits and four months after the affirmances by the Court of Appeals and also aside from the fact that UROC has opportunity to raise the problem in other cases pending (I am not certain, however, how this would benefit the individual plaintiffs here), the relief sought is denied because the plaintiffs could have, and should have, posed the question long prior to the order of April 27, 1953.

My opinion of April 16, 1953 with the subsequent and consequent orders entered thereon did not bring into being the constitutional issue now urged here. Such issue was present and alive when plaintiffs filed their original complaints.
EXHIBIT 32.1
                                  CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO SECTION 13A-14(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
                           AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Peak  Entertainment  Holdings,  Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date therein specified
(the "Report"),  the undersigned,  Wilfred Shorrocks, as Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Wilfred Shorrocks
---------------------
Wilfred Shorrocks
Chief Executive Officer
Date: May 17, 2004

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### TALON, Inc., v. GUTMANN et al.

Civil No. 1743.

District Court, E. D. New York.

April 13, 1942.

Nims, Verdi & Martin, of New York City, for plaintiff, for the motion.

Louis Applebaum, of New York City, for defendants, opposed.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

This is an action for trade mark infringement.

Plaintiff manufactures and sells slide fasteners (sometimes referred to as zippers) under its trade mark “Talon”.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants purchase from junk dealers, and the like, used or second-hand fasteners bearing plaintiff’s said trade mark, and after removing them from dirty, worn-out and discarded articles of merchandise, the defendants after cleaning, disassembling, removing and discarding parts in a different manner, sometimes adding parts, not of plaintiff’s manufacture, redyeing, and otherwise altering the fasteners, sell the slide fasteners, so altered, to manufacturers of new clothing, and other new merchandise.

The plaintiffs also allege that defendants’ manufacturing customers sell said altered merchandise to retailers and they to the public as new merchandise, equipped with new and unaltered slide fasteners wholly of plaintiff’s manufacture.

The witness, Herbert Richard, one of the defendants, on the taking of his deposition on an examination before trial, after describing the step taken by defendants after taking off rags and threads, said that they sent them to a dyer, but objected to giving the name of the dyer.

The question “What is the name of the dyer?” is material and relevant, as the plaintiff is entitled to ascertain the nature of the dyes used, and the method of dyeing, as that bears upon the effect which such redyeing has in changing the quality usually associated with the plaintiff’s slide fastener when first made, and sold by plaintiff. The objection is overruled, and the question must be answered.

Plaintiff requests, and defendants objected to giving, the names and addresses of customers to whom defendants had sold such changed fasteners.

Of course, to require defendants to give the names of all of their customers would be an unreasonable burden, and such information in that volume is unnecessary for plaintiff at this time.

The specific questions presented relate to sales in New Jersey, and to enumerated customers at other places.

These questions should be answered, but for future guidance it will be sufficient if defendants will give the names and addresses of five of its largest customers for the said changed or altered slide fasteners, whether attached to other merchandise or separate, in New York City, three in New Jersey, and one in each of the other States alleged.

The objections to the questions asked with reference to enumerated customers and to other customers as limited herein is overruled, and must be answered.
Exhibit 32.1

# Written Statement of
the Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President of Bandag, Incorporated  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350

Solely
for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, I, the undersigned Chairman of
the Board, Chief Executive Officer and President of Bandag, Incorporated (the
Company), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Martin G. Carver
Martin G. Carver
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

March 15, 2007