### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 3, 200 7 S es sio n
R. D. S. v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Appeals, Midd le Sect ion

Circuit Courtfor Will iam son Coun ty No. II-CR04274 R .E. Lee Davies, Judge

No. M2005- 00213-SC-R11- JV - Filed February 6, 2008

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J

. , co n cu rr i n g an d d i s s en t i n g.

Iconcur in the majority ’s analy sis of the alleg ed Miranda violations in Parts I and I I (A). I respe ctfully

dissent, howeve r, as to the m ajority ’s conclusions in Part I I(B ) conc erningthe motion to suppress the evide nce disc overe d in R.D.S’s truck. A motion to suppress evidence must be raised be fore trial, and a party waives “any defe nse, objection, or reque st by failing to c omply with .

. . rules requiring such matters to be raised pr e-tria l.” Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 12 (b )( 2) (C ), (f ). I n a dd iti on , a

mot ion to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e mus t st a te “ wi th particula rity the g rounds on which it is made.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 47( c); see also State v. Bur ton, 751 S.W .2d 440, 448 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that the de fenda nts waived their c halleng e to a wi tne ss’ s in -c ourt

ide nti fi c a tio n b e c a

us e the de fe nd a

nt f a ile d to fi le a

mot ion to s up pr e ss o n th os e g rounds bef

ore tria l). R.D.S.’s motion t o suppress did not s t at e wi t h particula rity any g round for
s u p p r e s s i o n b a s e d

o n a n a l l e g e d

i l l e g a l s e a r c h i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F o u rt h A m e n d m e n t o r a rt i c l e I, section 7 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. R.D.S. t h er ef o re waived the issue conce rning the illeg al
sear ch.

I t is wi thi n o ur

dis c re tio n to c on sid e r i ssu e s that have be e n wa ive d, bu t thi s dis c re tio n s ho uld be “spa ring ly exercised.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b), Advisory Comm’n Com ments. Our exerc ise of thi s d isc re tio n is g e ne ra lly lim ite d to sit

uatio ns in whi ch our c on sid e ratio n o f a n is su e pr e ve nts needle ss liti g ation, preve nts injury to the interests of the public, or preve nts prejudice to the judicia l pr oc e ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( b) . T he ma jor ity ’s decis io n tod a y

e ff e c tuate s n on e of

the se g oa ls. I nstead, it rew ards a

party who has fa iled to raise a

n issue at any

point prior to appellate r eview.

Even if we overlook this obvious waiver, R.D.S. did not raise the issue of the validity

of the
se a rc h d ur ingthe su

pp re ssi on he a ri ngin t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Th e g ro un ds fo r R.D .S. ’s mot ion to s up pr e ss the evidenc e found in his truc k we re lim ited to the following : 1) that his statements wer e made wi tho ut “ a n in te lli g e nt, kn ow ingor vo lun tary

waive r o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c ouns e l and his2

ri g ht n ot t o in c ri minate him se lf ” in v iol a tio n o f M ir a nd a ; and 2) that any

e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a s a re su lt o f t ho se state me nts sh ou ld be su pp re sse d as fr

uit of the po iso no us tr e e . Coun se l f or R.D .S. focuse d entirely

on the issue of the voluntar iness of the stateme nts made by R

. D. S

. E arly in the suppression hea

ri n g, t h e court a sked, “D oes [the S.R .O.] need [R.D.S .’s per mission t o sear ch the vehicle] on school prope rty ? Idon’t think so, does she? ” Def ense c ounsel replied, “ No, y our Honor, but it g oes to his voluntariness as to w hether he went out to the truck voluntarily o r n o t

. ” D uring
c los inga rgume nt o n th e mot ion , d e fe ns e c ouns e l argue d on ly that th e e vid e nc e of

the se a rc h s ho uld be suppre ssed base d upon Miranda violations, including the voluntariness of the statements made by R.D.S. The trial court c lear ly understood the issue pr esente d. When the trial court r econve ned for a second da

y of the hearing , it summarized its ruling denying the motion to s uppress, stating , “He wasn’t in any

kind of custodial interrog ation. His statement was r eally voluntary

as they wer e walking out to the pickup truck.” Counsel for R.D.S. continued to argue the involuntarine ss of the statements. At no time did he ar g ue any other g round for

the suppression of e vidence

. A cl o se examination of the re cord r evea ls that R.D.S. failed to question the validity of the
sear ch on school g rounds in either the juvenile court or the circ uit court and c erta inly raised no issue as to which standa

rd s h o u l d b e applied to se arc hes by school resour ce of

fice rs. Althoug h the majority attempts to justify its consideration of t he validit y of t he search by ref ere ncing an sing le, out-of-c ontext comment by the trial judg e, it is overw helmingly clea r from the t otality of the re cord that neither pa

rty questioned whe ther the se arc h was va lid. Further more, the tria l court’s mention of pr ob a ble c a us e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o r a ise a n is su e that was no t set forthin t he mot ion

to s up pr e ss evidenc e. See T enn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)(C), ( f).

On a pp e a l, R .D .S. a

rgue d f or the fi rs t ti me that D e pu ty

L a mbe rt did no t ha ve pr ob a ble c a us e to searc h his truck. “I t is e lementar y that a party may not take one position reg ardingan issue in the trial court, c hang e his strateg y or posi tion in mid-stream, and advocate a differ ent ground or rea son in [ an appe llate cour

t] .” State v. Adki s s o n, 899 S.W .2d 626, 635-36 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994) (q u o t i n g S t at e v

. Do b b i n s , 7 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 7 , 6 4 1 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 8 ))

. Fu rt h er , a t ri al j u d ge “ca nnot be put in error

as to a matter

upon which he did not rule .” State v. Dotson, 454 S +.W.2d 174, 177 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) ( quoting Ga rner v. State ex rel. Askins, 266 S.W.2d 358, 362 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)) . Given t h e fa i lure of R.D.S. to raise the issue of the va lidity of the
sear ch, it should come as no surpr ise that the trial cour t failed to state whe ther it applied the
rea sonable s u s p i cion standar d or the proba ble ca use standar d to searc hes conduc ted by school
re so ur c e of

fi c e rs

. As interesting as this iss ue may be in the abstra ct, the majority corr ectly states that the re cord is de void of any fac tors that would allow the majority to determine w hich standar d to apply . Fa ced wi th a n in a de qu a te re c or d, the ma jor ity is le ft to make the a

bs tr a c t pr on ounc e me nt that a re a so na ble suspicion standard a

pplies to those office rs who ar e assi g ned to schools on a “ regular ba sis” and assig ned duties “suc h that he or she may be conside red a school officia l a s well as a la w enf orce ment office r.” D eprive d of the fa cts nec essar y to properly

resolve the issue, the m ajority simply rema nds this case to the tria l court to “de velop the re cord in orde r for the trial co u rt t o deter

mine whether pr ob a ble c a us e or re a so na ble su sp ic ion

sta nd a rd a pp lie s to the se a rc h of

R.D .S. ’s tr

uc k. ” Iwo uld3

not provide R.D.S. w ith a second oppor tunity to develop an issue that he neg lected to r aise at trial
a nd wo uld a wa it a c a se in w hic h th e iss ue wa s p ro pe rl y pr e se rv e d. Ire sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OL DE R, JUS TI CE