This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

28449 

Vol. 74, No. 114 

Tuesday, June 16, 2009 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 21 and 27 

[Docket No. SW021; Notice No. 27–021–SC] 

Special Conditions: Robinson 

Helicopter Company R66 Helicopters, 

14 CFR 27.1309, Installation of an 

Autopilot (AP) Stabilization 

Augmentation System (SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for installing an Autopilot 

Stabilization Augmentation System (AP/ 

SAS) in the Robinson Helicopter 

Company (Robinson) Model R66 

helicopter. This helicopter will have 

novel or unusual design features 

associated with installing a complex 

AP/SAS that has potential failure modes 

with more severe adverse results than 

those envisioned by the existing 

applicable airworthiness standards. The 

applicable airworthiness standards do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

This proposed special condition 

contains the added safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

by July 31, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: Mail two copies of your 

comments to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Attn: Rules Docket (ASW–111), Docket 

No. SW021, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137. You may deliver 

two copies to the Rotorcraft Directorate 

at this address. You must mark your 

comments for: Docket No. SW021. You 

may inspect comments in the Rules 

Docket weekdays, except Federal 

holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

George Schwab, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate 

(ASW–112), Aircraft Certification 

Service, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas, 76137; telephone (817) 

222–5114; facsimile (817) 222–5961. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to take part in this 

rulemaking by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel on 

these special conditions. You can 

inspect the docket before and after the 

comment closing date. If you wish to 

review the docket in person, go to the 

address in the ADDRESSES section of this 

document between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring additional expense or 

delay. We may change these special 

conditions based on the comments we 

receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On November 1, 2006, Robinson 

proposed a change to the certification 

basis, through the FAA’s Los Angeles 

Aircraft Certification Office (LA ACO), 

that would include installing an AP/ 

SAS as part of the application for type 

certification for the Robinson Model 

R66 helicopter. The Robinson Model 

R66 helicopter is a part 27 Normal 

category, single turbine engine, 

conventional helicopter designed for 

civil operation. The helicopter is 

capable of carrying four passengers with 

one pilot, and has a maximum gross 

weight of approximately 2,650 pounds. 

The major design features include a 2- 

blade, fully articulated main rotor, a 2- 

blade anti-torque tail rotor, a skid 

landing gear, and a visual flight rule 

(VFR) basic avionics configuration. 

Robinson proposes offering the Hoh 

Aeronautics, Inc. two-axis AP/SAS as a 

factory installed option. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.17, Robinson must 

show that the Model R66 helicopter 

meets the applicable provisions of 14 

CFR part 27, as amended by 

Amendments 27–1 through 27–40. 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness standards, as 

they apply to the type certification, do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under § 21.16. 

Special conditions, as appropriate, are 

defined in § 11.19, and issued by 

following the procedures in § 11.38 and 

become part of the type certification 

basis under § 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the Type Certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special condition 

would also apply to the other model 

under § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Robinson Model R66 helicopter 

will be required to show compliance 

with the current applicable 

requirements without the optional AP/ 

SAS system. The Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. 

AP/SAS system will constitute a novel 

or unusual design feature when 

installed in the Model R66 helicopter. 

Although this AP/SAS system performs 

non-critical control functions, the 

possible failure modes for this system 

and their effects on the ability of the 

helicopter to continue safe flight and 

landing are more severe than those 

envisioned when the present safety 

standards were promulgated. Therefore, 

additional safety standards are 

necessary. 

Discussion 

Failure Condition Categories 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 


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28450 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 16, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

Catastrophic or Hazardous/Severe-Major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

Major failure conditions. 

To comply with the provision of the 

special condition, we propose to require 

that Robinson provide the FAA with a 

Systems Safety Assessment (SSA) for 

the final Hoh Aeronautics Inc. AP/SAS 

installation configuration that will 

adequately address the safety objectives 

established by the Functional Hazard 

Assessment (FHA) and the Preliminary 

System Safety Assessment (PSSA), 

including the Fault Tree Analysis 

(FTA). This must ensure that all failure 

modes and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

AP/SAS. The SSA process, FHA, PSSA, 

and FTA are all parts of the overall 

Safety Assessment (SA) process 

discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 

(AC) 27–1B (Certification of Normal 

Category Rotorcraft) and SAE document 

ARP 4761 (Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on civil airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 

This special condition requires that 

the AP/SAS system installed on a 

Robinson Model R66 helicopter meet 

these requirements to adequately 

address the failure effects identified by 

the FHA, and subsequently verified by 

the SSA, within the defined design 

integrity requirements. 

Applicability 

As discussed, this special condition is 

applicable to the Robinson Model R66 

helicopter with the Hoh Aeronautics, 

Inc. AP/SAS installed as a factory 

option under the pending application 

for the Robinson Model R66 type 

certificate. Should Robinson Helicopter 

Company apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating this same 

factory installed option Hoh 

Aeronautics, Inc. AP/SAS novel or 

unusual design feature, this special 

condition would also apply to that 

model, under the provisions of 

§ 21.101(b)(1). 

Conclusion 

This action affects only the Robinson 

R66 model series of helicopter with the 

novel or unusual design features of a 

Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. AP/SAS installed. 

It is not a rule of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and 

27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports, 

Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) proposes the following 

special conditions as part of the type 

certification basis for Robinson Model R66 

helicopters: 

For installation of a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. 

Autopilot/Stability Augmentation System on 

a Robinson Model R66 helicopter, the system 

must be designed and installed so that the 

failure conditions identified in the 

Functional Hazard Assessment and 

addressed by the System Safety Assessment, 

after design completion, are adequately 

addressed in accordance with the Definitions 

for the Failure Condition Categories and the 

Requirements (including the design integrity, 

design environmental, and test and analysis 

requirements) of this special condition. 

Definitions 

Failure Conditions are conditions that 

result from a failure and are classified, 

according to the severity of their effects on 

the rotorcraft, into one of the following 

categories: 

(1) No Effect—Failure Conditions that 

would have no effect on safety; for example, 

Failure Conditions that would not affect the 

operational capability of the rotorcraft or 

increase crew workload; however, could 

result in an inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

(2) Minor—Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and would involve crew actions that 

are well within their capabilities. Minor 

failure conditions would include, for 

example, a slight reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities, a slight increase in 

crew workload such as routine flight plan 

changes, or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

(3) Major—Failure conditions which would 

reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or the 

ability of the crew to cope with adverse 

operating conditions to the extent there 

would be, for example, a significant 

reduction in safety margins or functional 

capabilities; a significant increase in crew 

workload or result in impairing crew 

efficiency; physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries; or physical discomfort to 

the flight crew. 

(4) Hazardous/Severe-Major—Failure 

conditions that would reduce the capability 

of the rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 

cope with adverse operating conditions to the 

extent there would be: 

(i) A large reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities; 

(ii) Physical distress or excessive workload 

that would impair the flight crew’s ability to 

the extent that they could not be relied on 

to perform their tasks accurately or 

completely; or 

(iii) Possible serious or fatal injury to a 

passenger or a cabin crewmember, excluding 

the flight crew. 

Note: Hazardous/Severe-Major failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by use of proper 

procedures, which, if not carried out 

correctly or in a timely manner, may result 

in a Catastrophic Event. 

(5) Catastrophic—Failure Conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities to 

occupants, fatalities or incapacitation to the 

flight crew, or result in the inability of the 

rotorcraft to continue safe flight and landing. 

Requirements 

Robinson must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all applicable 

design and operational aspects of the AP/ 

SAS with the failure condition categories of 

No Effect, Minor, and for non-complex 

systems whose failure condition category is 

classified as Major. Robinson must also 

comply with the requirements of this special 

condition for all applicable design and 

operational aspects of the AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of Catastrophic 

and Hazardous/Severe-Major, and for 

complex systems classified as a Major failure 

condition category. 

A complex system is a system whose 

operations, failure modes, or failure effects 

are difficult to understand without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, Fault Tree 

Analysis, Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

Functional Hazard Assessment, etc.). 

a. Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition categories 

defined in this special condition relate to the 

corresponding aircraft system integrity 

requirements. The design integrity 

requirements for the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. 

AP/SAS as they relate to the allowed 

probability of occurrence for each failure 

condition category, and the proposed 

software design assurance level, are as 

follows: 

Major—Condition classified as a ‘‘Major 

failure condition’’ and resulting in Major 

effects must be shown to be improbable, or 

at or less than 1 × 10¥5 failures/hour, and 

associated software must be developed to the 

RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) software design assurance 

Level C. 

Hazardous/Severe-Major—Condition 

classified as a ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major 

failure condition’’ and resulting in 

Hazardous/Severe-Major effects must be 

shown to be extremely remote or at or less 

than 1 × 10¥7 failures/hour, and associated 

software must be developed to the RTCA/ 

DO–178B (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) software design assurance 

Level B. 

Catastrophic—Condition classified as a 

‘‘Catastrophic failure condition’’ and 

resulting in Catastrophic effects must be 

shown to be extremely improbable or at or 

less than 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour, and 

associated software must be developed to the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 114 / Tuesday, June 16, 2009 / Proposed Rules 28451 

RTCA/DO–178B (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) Level A software design 

assurance level. 

b. Design Environmental Requirements 

Robinson must qualify the AP/SAS system 

equipment to the appropriate environmental 

level in the RTCA document DO–160F 

(Environmental Conditions and Test 

Procedures for Airborne Equipment), for all 

relevant aspects. This must show that the 

AP/SAS system performs its intended 

function under any foreseeable operating 

condition, which includes the expected 

environment in which the AP/SAS is 

intended to operate. Some of the main 

considerations for environmental concerns 

are installation locations and the resulting 

exposure to environmental conditions for the 

AP/SAS system equipment, including 

considerations for other equipment that may 

be affected environmentally by the AP/SAS 

equipment installation. The level of 

environmental qualification must be related 

to the severity of the considered failure 

condition and effects on the aircraft. 

c. Test & Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with these requirements may 

be shown by a variety of methods, which 

typically consist of analysis, flight tests, 

ground tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is partly related to 

the associated failure condition category. If 

the AP/SAS is a complex system, compliance 

with the requirements for aspects of the AP/ 

SAS that can result in failure conditions 

classified as Major may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with appropriate 

testing to validate the analysis. Compliance 

with the requirements for aspects of the AP/ 

SAS that can result in failure conditions 

classified as Hazardous/Severe-Major may be 

shown by flight-testing in combination with 

analysis and simulation, and the appropriate 

testing to validate the analysis. Flight tests 

may be limited for this classification of 

failures due to safety considerations. 

Compliance with the requirements for 

aspects of the AP/SAS that can result in 

failure conditions classified as Catastrophic 

may be shown by analysis and validated by 

appropriate testing in combination with 

simulation. Very limited flight tests in 

combination with simulation may be used as 

a part of a showing of compliance for failures 

in this classification. Flight tests are 

performed only in circumstances that use 

operational variations or extrapolations from 

other flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 11, 

2009. 

Mark R. Schilling, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–14103 Filed 6–15–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Parts 51, 60, 61 and 63 

[EPA–HQ–OAR–2008–0531; FRL–8917–3] 

RIN 2060–AP23 

Restructuring of the Stationary Source 

Audit Program 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The action proposes 

amendments to the General Provisions 

to allow accredited providers to supply 

stationary source audit samples and to 

require sources to obtain and use these 

samples from the accredited providers 

instead of from EPA, as is the current 

practice. In addition, this proposed rule 

incorporates by reference Volume 3, 

‘‘General Requirements for 

Environmental Proficiency Test 

Providers’’ adopted December 22, 2007, 

as an example of an acceptable 

accredited proficiency test sample 

provider (APTSP) technical criteria 

document. This document outlines the 

criteria an accredited provider program 

must meet for the samples to be 

acceptable. 

Requirements pertaining to the audit 

samples have all been moved to the 

General Provisions and have been 

removed from the test methods because 

the current language in the test methods 

regarding audit samples is inconsistent 

from method to method. Therefore, 

deleting all references to audit samples 

in the test methods eliminates any 

possible confusion and inconsistencies. 

Under this proposed amendment, the 

requirement to use an audit sample 

during a compliance test will apply to 

all test methods for which a 

commercially available audit exists. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before July 16, 2009. Under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, comments on 

the information collection provisions 

are best assured of having full effect if 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) receives a copy of your 

comments on or before July 16, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, 

identified by Docket ID Number EPA– 

HQ–OAR–2008–0531, by one of the 

following methods: 

• http://www.regulations.gov: Follow 

the on-line instructions for submitting 

comments. 

• E-mail: Comments may be sent by 

electronic mail (e-mail) to a-and-rdocket@epa.gov, Attention Docket ID 

No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2008–0531. 

• Fax: Fax your comments to: 202– 

566–9744, Attention Docket ID No. 

EPA–HQ–OAR–2008–0531. 

• Mail: Send your comments to: Air 

and Radiation Docket and Information 

Center, Environmental Protection 

Agency, Mail Code 2822T, 1200 

Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, 

DC 20460. Attention Docket ID No. 

EPA–HQ–OAR–2008–0531. In addition, 

please mail a copy of your comments on 

the information collection provisions to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB), Attn: Desk Officer for 

EPA, 725 17th St., NW., Washington, DC 

20503. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Deliver 

your comments to: EPA Docket Center, 

1301 Constitution Ave., NW., Room 

3334, Washington, DC. Such deliveries 

are only accepted during the Docket’s 

normal hours of operation, and special 

arrangements should be made for 

deliveries of boxed information. 

Instructions: Direct your comments to 

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2008– 

0531. EPA’s policy is that all comments 

received will be included in the public 

docket without change and may be 

made available online at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided, unless 

the comment includes information 

claimed to be Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) or other information 

whose disclosure is restricted by statute. 

Do not submit information that you 

consider to be CBI or otherwise 

protected through http:// 

www.regulations.gov or e-mail. The 

http://www.regulations.gov Web site is 

an ‘‘anonymous access’’ system, which 

means EPA will not know your identity 

or contact information unless you 

provide it in the body of your comment. 

If you send an e-mail comment directly 

to EPA without going through http:// 

www.regulations.gov, your e-mail 

address will be automatically captured 

and included as part of the comment 

that is placed in the public docket and 

made available on the Internet. If you 

submit an electronic comment, EPA 

recommends that you include your 

name and other contact information in 

the body of your comment and with any 

disk or CD–ROM you submit. If EPA 

cannot read your comment due to 

technical difficulties and cannot contact 

you for clarification, EPA may not be 

able to consider your comment. 

Electronic files should avoid the use of 

special characters, any form of 

encryption, and be free of any defects or 

viruses. For additional information 

about EPA’s public docket, visit the EPA 


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