Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1506-CR-587 | December 31, 2015 Page 1 of 5 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Donald J. Berger South Bend, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General Tyler G. Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jorge Navarro, A

ppellan t -Defendant,

v. 

### State of Indiana, A

ppelle e -Plaintiff December 31, 2015 Court of Appeals Case No. 71A03-1506-CR-587 Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth C. Hurley Trial Court Cause No. 71D08-1409-F6-184

Vaidik, Chief Judge.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1506-CR-587 | December 31, 2015 Page 2 of 5 

# Case Summary

[1] Jorge Navarro refused to exit his car an d fled from three police officers who pursued him with activated lights and sire ns at speeds of ninety miles per hour. At his trial for resisting law enforcement, Navarro testified that he knew police officers were pursuing him. He now ar gues that there is insufficient evidence that he knew he was fleeing from a po lice officer. However, the evidence presented at trial, including Navarro’s testimony, is sufficient to support his conviction. 

# Facts and Procedural History

[2] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Sept ember 20, 2014, So uth Bend Police Department Officer (SBPD) Joseph Care y, who was wearing his police uniform and driving a marked police car, was disp atched to investigate the report of a loud noise. Officer Carey noticed a si lver car speeding through a residential neighborhood. The officer then noticed th at the car had stopped in the middle of the street and was backing up toward the officer’s car. When the silver car stopped, Officer Carey noticed that it s front end was damaged and smoke was coming out of the engine or the front tire. Officer Carey asked the driver, Navarro, if he was okay. Navarro aske d the officer if he wanted to race.

[3] Officer Carey turned on his car’s over head lights and dashboard camera and approached Navarro’s car. As he and Navarro were talking, Navarro reached around the center console area. Concer ned for his safety, O fficer Carey radioedCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1506-CR-587 | December 31, 2015 Page 3 of 5 for back-up assistance. The officer also asked Navarro, who appeared intoxicated, to exit his car. Navarro began revving his engine and refused to comply with the Officer Ca rey’s request. SBPD Officer Devon Johnson arrived at the scene, activated the lights on his police car, and also ordered Navarro to exit his car. SBPD Officer Anuar Velazquez arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, and the three o fficers attempted to remove Navarro from the car. When they were unsuccessful, Officer Ca rey deployed his Taser. Navarro put his car in gear and fled with the three o fficers in pursuit wi th activated lights and sirens. SBPD Officer Greg Howard ev entually joined in the pursuit, which reached speeds of ninety miles per hour.

[4] As his tires began to smoke, Navarro st ruck a curb, exited his vehicle, and threw himself on the ground. He was a rrested and charged with resisting law enforcement with a vehicle. At trial, Na varro testified that he knew the officers were pursuing him because of the lights and sirens behind him. He also admitted that “driving away from the poli ce was a really bad choice.” Tr. p. 94. A jury convicted Navarro as char ged, and he appeals his conviction.


# Discussion and Decision

[5] Navarro’s sole argument is that there is insufficien t evidence to support his conviction. On a challenge to the su fficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Bell v. State , 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is probative evidence from whichCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1506-CR-587 | December 31, 2015 Page 4 of 5 a reasonable fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm. Id.

[6] In order to convict Navarro of resisting law enforcem ent with a car, the State had to prove that he knowingly or inte ntionally fled from a law enforcement officer after the officer iden tified himself by visible or audible means, including operation of the officer’s siren or em ergency lights, and ordered Navarro to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a). The offense is a Level 6 felony if the person, while committing the offense, operates a vehicle in a manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person. I.C. § 34-44.1-3- 1(b). To be convicted for resisting la w enforcement, the evidence must show that the defendant knew or had reason to know that th e person he resisted was a police officer. Mason v. State , 944 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied

.
[7] Here, Navarro’s sole contention is that there is insuffici ent evidence that Navarro “kn[e]w that it was a police officer who ordered him to stop.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. However, our revi ew of the evidence reveals that Officer Carey, the first officer to approach Na varro’s car, was wearing a uniform and driving a marked police car. During hi s initial conversation with Navarro, the officer activated his emergency lights. Tw o other officers arrived at the scene in marked cars with activated emergency ligh ts before Navarro fled. In addition, Navarro admitted at trial that he knew police officers were pursuing him because of the lights and si rens behind him as well as the conflict he had with the officers before he fled . This is sufficient eviden ce to prove that NavarroCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1506-CR-587 | December 31, 2015 Page 5 of 5 knew that it was a police officer who ordered him to stop and to support his conviction of resist ing law enforcement.

[8] Affirmed. Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.