alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Norman T. WHITAKER, Plaintiff, v. Frank R. GRAVES, United States Chess Federation, et al., Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

June 23, 1955.

See also 18 F.R.D. 246.

*439B. Negron, New York City, for plaintiff.

Saul Rubins, New York City, for defendants.

DIMOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiff moves, pursuant to rule 34, F. R.C.P., for production of documents. The motion is resisted upon the grounds that the documents demanded contain confidential information and that the information which is sought can be gotten through other means.

The action is based upon plaintiff’s expulsion from the United States Chess Federation. He alleges that he was illegally expelled from the Federation and seeks, inter alia, damages and reinstatement.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff’s expulsion was effected by by a “farcical” procedure. It appears from the affidavits submitted on this motion that plaintiff was expelled as a result of an alleged majority vote of the members of the Executive Committee of the Federation. The documents demanded by plaintiff are the ballots that were cast.

It is clear that the ballots are in the possession of defendants and, considering the theory of plaintiff’s claim, it appears that there is good cause for their production.

Defendants argue that the ballots are privileged because “[t]he deliberations of boards or committees of corporations, whether stock or membership, are privileged and closed, and should not be made the subject of a discovery or inspection.” Defendants cite no authority in support of this and I do not believe it is sound.

Defendants fail to make any valid showing that plaintiff can get the information which on the face of things he certainly appears to be entitled to. Defendants say, however, that the ballots contain the signatures of the voters, that some of them are accompanied by remarks and that certainly plaintiff does not need to know the identity of the person who cast each vote and that person’s personal opinions of him, if any. The identity of the voters may furnish the plaintiff with leads as to whether the counting was properly done so that plaintiff is entitled to see the signatures of the voters and comments made by them may furnish leads on the same subject.

The motion is granted.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION

 

(PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002)

 

(Subsections(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)

 

Pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of ApogeeTechnology, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify,that:

 

The quarterly report on Form10QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 (the “Form 10QSB”) of the Companyfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form10QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated:  August 16, 2004 | /s/    | Herbert M. Stein                                                                                                   |   |
|------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   | Herbert M. Stein                                                                                                   |
|                         |   | Chairman of the Board,                                                                                             |
|                         |   | President, Chief Executive  Officer and  Treasurer (principal financial officer and  principal accounting officer) |

 

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retainedby the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----
NUMBER 13-12-00082-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ROGER POMPA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 214th District Court 

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Roger Pompa, attempts to appeal his conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. The trial court has certified that this Ais a plea-bargain case, and 

the defendant has NO right of appeal.@ See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
2

On January 30, 2012, this Court notified appellant=s counsel of the trial court=s 

certification and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether 

appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel=s findings 

as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to the 

existence of any amended certification.

On February 14, 2012, counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel=s 

response does not establish that the certification currently on file with this Court is 

incorrect or that appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. 

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be 

dismissed if the trial court=s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of 

appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, this 

appeal is DISMISSED. Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

1st day of March, 2012.
=================================================================

This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

No. 237 SSM 28

Mary T. Heltz,

 Appellant,

 v.

Bruce S. Barratt et al.,

 Respondents.

Submitted by Scott R. Hapeman, for appellant.

Submitted by Andrew J. Kowalewski, for respondents.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules,

order affirmed, with costs. Plaintiff failed to produce

admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact concerning

whether defendant Barratt had an opportunity to avoid the

collision. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Read, Smith, Pigott,

Rivera and Abdus-Salaam concur.

Decided December 17, 2014
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25369 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25370 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25371 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25372 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25373 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25374 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25375 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25376 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25377 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25378 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25379 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25380 1988
HeinOnline -- 134 Cong. Rec. 25381 1988
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

MICHAEL LOMBARDI

v.

PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD

PETITION OF: DANA E. GREENSPAN,

ESQ. :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 34 MM 2023

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 5 th day of September , 2023, the “Application for Leave to Withdraw

Appearance” is GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Elwood Shepard, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Heavenly Hot Dogs, Inc. (the ACompany@), certify that:



1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of the Company;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.  I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and I have:



a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report (the "Evaluation Date"); and



c) presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;



5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and



b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and





Date: May 31, 2005

By: /s/ Elwood Shepard

Elwood Shepard

Chief Executive Officer





Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles McLaurin, Appellant.

[826 NYS2d 279]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (West, J.), rendered December 11, 2002, convicting him of assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court properly permitted the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant, if he testified, as to the existence of, and facts underlying, his 1988 felony convictions of burglary in the first degree and kidnapping in the second degree. There is no per se rule requiring preclusion of a conviction for impeachment *820purposes because the conviction is remote in time *(see People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 459 [1994]; *People v Mollo,*273 AD2d 481 [2000]). This is particularly true where the crime involves dishonesty and has great relevance to a defendant’s veracity and willingness to place his or her own self-interest over that of society *(see People v Rockwell,*18 AD3d 969 [2005]; *People v Davis,*299 AD2d 420 [2002]). The court properly weighed the probative value of the defendant’s prior conviction against its potential prejudicial effect *(see People v Williams,*292 AD2d 474 [2002]). The prior convictions demonstrated his willingness to place his own interests above those of society and would therefore be relevant on the issue of his credibility on the witness stand. Considering the length of the defendant’s incarceration as a result of his 1988 convictions (seven years), the convictions were not so remote in time as to mandate preclusion *(see People v Mack,*6 AD3d 551 [2004]). The fact that the defendant was the only witness for the defense increased the importance of his credibility and his testimony, and did not mandate a ruling prohibiting inquiry into the 1988 convictions *(see People v Hayes,*97 NY2d 203, 208 [2002]; *People v Cruz,*21 AD3d 967 [2005]).

The defendant contends that the testimony of the complainant and the police officers who responded to the scene was not credible. However, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see People v Wells,*18 AD3d 482 [2005]; *People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event are without merit. Miller, J.E, Ritter, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31(g)

CERTIFICATIONS

 
I, Jay A. Lewis, certify that:  
1.
I have reviewed these annual reports on Form 10-K of Entergy Gulf States, Inc.;  
2.
Based on my knowledge, these reports do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by these reports;  
3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in these reports, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrants as of, and for, the periods presented in these reports;  
4.
The registrants' other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrants and have:   
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrants, including their consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which these reports are being prepared;   
b)  Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;   
c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants' disclosure controls and procedures and presented in these reports our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by these reports based on such evaluation; and   
d) Disclosed in these reports any change in the registrants' internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants' most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants' internal control over financial reporting; and  
5.
The registrants' other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants' auditors and the audit committee of the registrants' board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):   
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants' ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and   
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants' internal control over financial reporting.

		/s/ Jay A. Lewis
6/1/2023
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Sophie Ackermann, Appellant. New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services, Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Submitted April 8, 2013;

decided May 7, 2013

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Todd Bradley GRAY, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 05-6372.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2006.

Decided: June 19, 2006.

Todd Bradley Gray, Appellant Pro Se. Fernando Groene, Office of the United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Todd Bradley Gray seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration and motion to amend. An order denying a § 2255 motion is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gray has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Gray’s motion to be released on his own recognizance. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
Z.
2 ya
a 2
Y, oO
NG com’?

June 15, 2012

Notice of Regulatory Review Schedule
Dear Tribal Leader:

On behalf of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC or Commission), we invite you to
participate in a consultation meeting on the Notice of Regulatory Review Schedule Group Three
regulations. Specifically, we seek input on the following regulations:

Group 3:
(a) Part 543 — Minimum Internal Control Standards for Class II Gaming; and
(b) Part 547— Minimum Technical Standards for Gaming Equipment Used with the
play of Class II Games.

This schedule is the result of the NIGC’s review and consideration of comments received in
response to the Notice of Inquiry published on November 18, 2010 and subsequent Notice of
Regulatory Review Agenda published on April 4, 2011 in the Federal Register. We know that the
best results can be achieved after meaningful consultation with Indian tribes and we look forward
to your participation.

The NIGC recognizes and respects the sovereignty of Indian tribes and the government-to-
government relationship that exists between the United States and tribal governments.
Accordingly, the NIGC is committed to implementing the President’s November 5, 2009
Executive Memorandum on Tribal Consultation with Indian tribes and Executive Order 13175
prior to and during any rulemaking process.

As such, we invite all Tribal leaders to share their views with the Commission on Groups One
and Three regulations at a consultation scheduled for July 19, 2012 in Shelton, Washington, from
9 a.m. to 4 p.m., at the following location:

Little Creek Casino Resort
Sa-Heh-Wa-Mish Room
91 West State Route 108
Shelton, Washington

For those Tribal leaders unable to attend this consultation, we invite you to submit written
comments by e-mail to reg.review@nige.gov, or by U.S. mail to National Indian Gaming
Commission, Attn: Regulatory Review, 1441 L Street, NW, Suite 9100, Washington, DC 20005.

The Commission intends to post comments received and transcripts of each consultation on the
NIGC website under the heading “Tribal Consultation,” on the left-hand side of the NIGC home
page, www.nige.gov.

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 1447 L St. NW, 0, Washington, DC 20005 Tel: 202.632.7003 Fax: 202.632.7066 WWW.NIGC.Gov

id, OR; Sacra A; Phoenix, AZ; St. Paul, MN; Tulsa, OK

REGIONAL OFFICES


For planning purposes, and to accommodate all who want to attend the consultation, please RSVP
to Rita Homa, Executive Secretary, at (202) 418-9807 or by e-mail at

consultation.rsvp@nige.gov. Information regarding the time and location of each tribal
consultation will be posted on our website.

We are committed to working together on a government-to-government basis to maximize the
results of this regulatory review process. We look forward to meeting with you should your
schedule allow.

Thank you for your interest and participation in this regulatory review process.

Sincerely,
Voces Sapa Cott ASS

Tracie L. Stevens Steffani A. Cochran Daniel J. Little
Chairwoman Vice-Chairwoman Associate Commissioner
96-346.

#### State v. Baker.

Montgomery App. No. 15051. Reported at 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 676 N.E.2d 883. On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.

Moyer, C.J., dissents.
***NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION***

***MICS CLASS II - AUDIT CHECKLIST***

***LINES OF CREDIT (LCR)***

Page 1 of 8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

FRANCISCO GARCIA-GASTELUM, 

a.k.a. Francisco Garcia, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10221 

D.C. No. 4:14-cr-00507-FRZ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frank R. Zapata, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2018**

Before: FARRIS, BYBEE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Francisco Garcia-Gastelum appeals from the district court’s judgment 

revoking his supervised release and challenges the six-month sentence imposed 

upon revocation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we dismiss.

Garcia-Gastelum argues he should have received a downward variance due 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 22 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-10221 

to his previous mental incapacity. Because Garcia-Gastelum has fully served his 

custodial sentence and is not subject to an additional term of supervised release, we 

dismiss the appeal as moot. See United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 

(9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. King, 891 F.3d 868, 869–70 (9th Cir. 

2018). 

DISMISSED.