United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 10, 2020*

Decided November 12, 2020

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1947

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAWANZA A. WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 15-CR-217

Pamela Pepper,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Jawanza Williams, a federal inmate housed in a New Jersey prison,

1 sought his 

release to home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) in light of the COVID-19 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

1 The circumstances behind Williams’s placement at FCI-Fairton in New Jersey 

are not reflected in the record.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-1947 Page 2

pandemic. The district court denied the order, explaining that only the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons could authorize this request. And to the extent that he sought compassionate 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), added the court, he did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies. We affirm.

In April 2020, Williams moved the district court under § 3624(c)(2) to order the 

Bureau of Prisons to release him to home confinement based on the COVID-19 

pandemic that had “taken over the Tri-State area,” including New Jersey. He pointed to 

the non-violent nature of his conviction, his participation in prison programming, his

familial support, and his completion of more than two-thirds of his sentence. The 

government opposed the motion, arguing first that an inmate’s transfer to home 

confinement could be ordered only by the Bureau, and second that he had not 

exhausted his administrative remedies if he wished to seek compassionate release 

under § 3582(c)(1)(a).

The district court agreed with the government and denied Williams’s motion.

The court explained that the Bureau had sole authority under § 3624(c)(2) to place him

in home confinement. And to the extent Williams sought compassionate release, the 

court could not reach the merits of that request because he had not satisfied 

§ 3582(c)(1)(a)’s exhaustion requirement by showing that he had filed the proper 

request with the warden.

On appeal, Williams generally contends that the district court erred when it 

found that it could not order the Bureau to release him to home confinement under 

§ 3624(c)(2). He seems to believe that the newly enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 

Economic Security (CARES) Act modified § 3624(c)(2) to authorize courts to grant 

inmates’ home-confinement requests. See CARES Act § 12003(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 116–136, 

134 Stat. 281 (2020).

Williams misapprehends the nature of the CARES Act. The act expanded the 

Bureau’s power to “place a prisoner in home confinement” under § 3624(c)(2), 

see CARES Act, § 12003(b)(2), but reserved the determination of “suitable candidates” 

for home confinement to the Bureau. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Increasing Use of Home Confinement at Institutions Most Affected by COVID19, Off. Att’y Gen. (Apr. 3, 2020)). The act carved out no role for the courts in making 

such determinations. Nor for that matter is any such role envisioned under § 3624(c)(2), 

which authorizes the Bureau “to the extent practicable, [to] place prisoners with lower 

risk levels and lower needs on home confinement . . . . ” As the Supreme Court 
No. 20-1947 Page 3

emphasizes, the Bureau has “plenary control” over an inmate’s placement. Tapia v. 

United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011); see United States v. Ko, 739 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 

2014) (explaining that an inmate remains under the Bureau’s custody during home 

confinement).

As for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), Williams disputes the district 

court’s conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. He asserts that 

he filed the “proper Administrative Remedy Procedure” with his warden. In any event, 

he adds, the district court should have waived the exhaustion requirement based on the 

unprecedented nature of COVID-19, which presents an “extraordinary and compelling” 

reason for his release.

The district court correctly denied compassionate release for Williams based on 

his failure to present proof that he had satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion 

requirement. The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to permit an inmate to move 

for compassionate release as long as he exhausted his administrative appeals or the 

facility’s warden did not respond to his compassionate-release request within 30 days. 

See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, No. 20-5748, 2020 WL 6268582, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 

2020); United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. 

Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 20-5997); United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2020).

Williams provided proof of neither. This exhaustion requirement is a mandatory claimprocessing rule. See Franco, 973 F.3d at 468; United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34

(6th Cir. 2020). Waiver cannot apply here because the government timely objected to 

Williams’s failure to exhaust at every opportunity. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. 

of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 18 (2017).

We have considered Williams’s other arguments, and none has merit. 

 

AFFIRMED