Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Springfield Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n,

2016 IL App (4th) 150564WC

Appellate Court 

Caption

SPRINGFIELD COAL COMPANY, LLC, Appellant, v. THE 

ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.

(Thomas Hoff and Michael W. Frerichs, State Treasurer and ex officio

Custodian of the Rate Adjustment Fund, Appellees).

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-15-0564WC

Filed October 31, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 

14-MR-1323; the Hon. Leslie J. Graves, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Circuit court judgment vacated; appeal dismissed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Julie A. Webb, Kenneth F. Werts, and Brittany N. Meeker, of Craig & 

Craig, LLC, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.

Bruce Wissore, of Culley & Wissore, of Harrisburg, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Harris, and Stewart 

concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent, Springfield Coal Company, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the circuit 

court of Sangamon County, which confirmed in part and set aside in part the decision of the 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding benefits to claimant, 

Thomas Hoff, pursuant to the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 

et seq. (West 2008)). We find that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review the 

Commission’s decision where claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped after 

the 20-day filing period set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 

2014)), and he failed to file proof of mailing the written request for summons in the circuit 

court within 20 days after he received the Commission’s decision. For this reason, we vacate 

the decision of the circuit court and dismiss the appeal. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The facts necessary to the resolution of this case are not in dispute. Claimant began 

working as a coal miner in the late 1970s. Claimant’s last mining shift was in January 2008, at 

respondent’s Crown III mine. On April 27, 2009, claimant filed an application for adjustment 

of claim, seeking benefits under the Act for injuries allegedly resulting from the inhalation of 

coal mine dust while working for respondent. Following a hearing, an arbitrator concluded that 

claimant established that he suffers from coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and that his 

disablement occurred within two years of the date of last exposure to the hazards of the disease. 

See 820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2008). Although the arbitrator rejected claimant’s request for a 

wage-differential (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 2008); see also 820 ILCS 310/7 (West 2008) 

(providing that the Act incorporates the recovery provisions of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), he awarded claimant 50 weeks of permanent partial 

disability (PPD) benefits, representing a 10% loss of the person as a whole (820 ILCS 310/7, 

8(d)(2) (West 2008)). 

¶ 4 Both parties sought review of the arbitrator’s decision before the Commission. In a 

unanimous decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. A copy of 

the Commission’s decision was received in the office of claimant’s attorney on October 20, 

2014. Claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of 

Sangamon County pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/19(f) (West 2014)). To 

this end, on October 21, 2014, claimant mailed to the Commission a notice of intent to file for 

review in the circuit court. The notice of intent was file-stamped by the Commission on 

October 24, 2014. Claimant also submitted a written request for summons to the clerk of the 

circuit court, which was file-stamped on November 12, 2014. 

¶ 5 On December 5, 2014, respondent filed in the circuit court a motion to quash the summons. 

In the motion, respondent argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to entertain 

claimant’s action for judicial review because it was filed more than 20 days after the 

Commission’s decision was received by claimant’s attorney. See 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) (West 

2014). Claimant responded to the motion, arguing that he fulfilled the jurisdictional 

requirement for filing an action for judicial review of a decision of the Commission by mailing 

all of the necessary documents to the clerk of the court within 20 days of his attorney’s receipt 

of the decision. Claimant attached several exhibits to his response, including a cover letter 

executed by claimant’s attorney and the affidavit of Amy Edwards, an administrative assistant 
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in claimant’s attorney’s office. The cover letter, dated November 5, 2014, is directed to the 

clerk of the circuit court. In the cover letter, claimant’s attorney states that he enclosed the 

original and one copy of the request for summons, the original and six copies of the summons, 

and payment to cover the filing costs. Edwards’ affidavit was notarized on December 30, 2014. 

In the affidavit, Edwards states that on November 5, 2014, she mailed to the clerk of the circuit 

court claimant’s written request for summons and summons “with prepaid postage by placing 

same in the post office box located at 101 W. Church Street, Harrisburg, IL 62946 at 

approximately 4:25 p.m.” Claimant also filed with the circuit court a “Motion for Leave to File 

Out of Time,” in which he asked to supplement the record with Edwards’ affidavit.

¶ 6 On January 20, 2015, the parties appeared before the circuit court regarding the parties’ 

motions. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the circuit court entered an order denying 

respondent’s motion to quash and allowing claimant’s motion for leave to file out of time. On 

the merits of claimant’s action for judicial review, the circuit court set aside the Commission’s 

PPD award and substituted a wage-differential in its stead, but otherwise confirmed the 

decision of the Commission. Thereafter, respondent initiated the instant appeal. 

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 8 On appeal, respondent first argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review 

the Commission’s decision where claimant failed to file proof of mailing the written request 

for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the decision. Claimant 

responds that he fulfilled the jurisdictional requirement for filing an action for judicial review 

of a decision of the Commission by mailing all of the necessary documents to the clerk of the 

circuit court within 20 days of his attorney’s receipt of the Commission’s decision.

¶ 9 While Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are presumed to have 

subject-matter jurisdiction, this presumption does not apply to workers’ compensation 

proceedings. See Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. Kennedy, 377 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502 (2007); 

Sprinkman & Sons Corp. of Illinois v. Industrial Comm’n, 160 Ill. App. 3d 599, 601 (1987). 

Rather, on appeal from a decision of the Commission, the circuit court obtains subject-matter 

jurisdiction only if the appellant complies with the statutorily mandated procedures set forth in 

the Act. See Residential Carpentry, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d at 502. “[T]o vest the courts with 

jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, strict compliance with the provisions of the Act 

is necessary and must affirmatively appear in the record.” Illinois State Treasurer v. Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 15; see also Jones v. Industrial Comm’n, 188 Ill. 

2d 314, 320 (1999). 

¶ 10 Before proceeding further, we note that the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard 

of review. Respondent asserts that the inquiry regarding whether the circuit court has 

subject-matter jurisdiction to review an administrative decision presents a question of law 

subject to de novo review. Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13. Claimant contends 

that the appropriate standard of review depends on whether the circuit court held an 

evidentiary hearing as to its jurisdiction. Citing Household Finance Corp. III v. Volpert, 227 

Ill. App. 3d 453, 456 (1992), claimant maintains that where an evidentiary hearing is 

conducted, the circuit court’s determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Conversely, 

claimant asserts that when the circuit court determines jurisdiction solely on the basis of 

documentary evidence, a de novo standard of review is applied. Equity Residential Properties 

Management Corp. v. Nasolo, 364 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31 (2006). According to claimant, the 
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standard of review in this case is abuse of discretion, since the circuit court held an evidentiary 

hearing on January 20, 2015. 

¶ 11 It is well established that issues involving questions of subject-matter jurisdiction under the 

Act are reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 13 (addressing 

whether Illinois State Treasurer was required to file an appeal bond to obtain judicial review of 

a decision of the Commission); Farris v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2014 IL 

App (4th) 130767WC, ¶ 46 (noting that the jurisdictional requirements set forth in the 

Workers’ Compensation Act are questions of law subject to de novo review). Despite this 

authority, claimant insists that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies in this case. 

As noted above, in support of this position, claimant directs us to two principal cases, 

Household Finance Corp. III, 227 Ill. App. 3d 453, and Equity Residential Properties 

Management Corp., 364 Ill. App. 3d 26.

¶ 12 We are puzzled by claimant’s reliance on Household Finance Corp. III and Equity 

Residential Properties Management Corp. for several reasons. First, neither of these cases 

concerned review from an administrative decision. Second, unlike the instant case, neither case 

involved whether the appellant complied with any statutorily required prerequisites for the 

circuit court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue in Household Finance Corp. III 

was whether the plaintiff established “due inquiry” to personally serve the defendant before 

effectuating service by publication pursuant to section 2-206 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, ¶ 2-206). Household Finance Corp. III, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 454. 

Equity Residential Properties Management Corp. presented a similar issue, i.e., whether the 

plaintiff conducted an adequate investigation into the defendant’s whereabouts, thereby 

entitling it to forego personal service and rely on constructive service by posting pursuant to 

section 9-107 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9-107 (West 2004)). Third, 

and most important, neither Household Finance Corp. III nor Equity Residential Properties 

Management Corp. provide for an abuse-of-discretion standard. The standard of review 

employed in Household Finance Corp. III was manifest weight of the evidence. Household 

Finance Corp. III, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 455-56. In Equity Residential Properties Management 

Corp., the court stated that it would review the circuit court’s ruling de novo because “it was 

based entirely on documentary evidence.” Equity Residential Properties Management Corp., 

364 Ill. App. 3d at 31. However, the court did not indicate what standard of review it would 

apply if the circuit court’s ruling had been based on more than just documentary evidence. 

Given that the cases cited by claimant do not support the application of an abuse-of-discretion 

standard, and in light of prior precedent from both the supreme court and this court, we find 

that de novo review is appropriate in this case. 

¶ 13 Parenthetically, we point out that, even assuming that the appropriate standard of review 

depends on whether the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing, claimant’s suggestion that 

the circuit court’s ruling on the jurisdictional issue was entered following such a hearing finds 

no support in the record. In the notice of hearing accompanying the motion to quash, 

respondent stated that it would appear before the court to argue the motion on January 20, 

2015. The docketing order from January 20, 2015, which is the only order in the record 

pertaining to the proceeding on that date, merely provides that the parties were present with 

their attorneys and that the trial court denied the motion to quash and allowed the motion for 

leave to file out of time. The docketing order does not indicate that the trial court considered 

anything more than documentary evidence in rendering its decision. Moreover, a transcript of 
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the January 20, 2015, proceeding was not made a part of the record, so we do not know what 

evidence, if any, was presented to the court on that date. Based on this record, de novo review 

would be appropriate in this case even if the appropriate standard of review depended on 

whether the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing as to its jurisdiction. See Stein v. Rio 

Parismina Lodge, 296 Ill. App. 3d 520, 523 (1998) (applying de novo review where circuit 

court did not hear any testimony on jurisdictional issues). With the appropriate standard of 

review determined, we now turn to the merits. 

¶ 14 At issue is whether claimant complied with section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 

310/19(f)(1) (West 2014)), which sets forth the requirements for seeking judicial review of a 

decision of the Commission. Section 19(f)(1) provides in relevant part as follows: 

“(f) The decision of the Commission acting within its powers *** shall, in the 

absence of fraud, be conclusive unless reviewed in this paragraph hereinafter provided. 

***

 (1) Except in cases of claims against the State of Illinois ***, the Circuit Court 

of the county where any of the parties defendant may be found ***, shall by 

summons to the Commission have power to review all questions of law and fact 

presented by such record. 

 A proceeding for review shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of 

notice of the decision of the Commission. The summons shall be issued by the clerk 

of such court upon written request returnable on a designated return day, not less 

than 10 or more than 60 days from the date of issuance thereof, and the written 

request shall contain the last known address of other parties in interest and their 

attorneys of record who are to be served by summons. Service *** shall be made 

upon the Commission and other parties in interest by mailing notices of the 

commencement of the proceedings and the return day of the summons to the office 

of the Commission and to the last known place of residence of other parties in 

interest or their attorney or attorneys of record. The clerk of the court issuing the 

summons shall on the day of issue mail notice of the commencement of the 

proceedings which shall be done by mailing a copy of the summons to the office of 

the Commission, and a copy of the summons to the other parties in interest or their 

attorney or attorneys of record and the clerk of the court shall make certificate that 

he has so sent such notices in pursuance of this Section, which shall be evidence of 

service on the Commission and other parties in interest.” 820 ILCS 310/19(f)(1) 

(West 2014). 

Thus, in order to perfect jurisdiction in the circuit court, the appellant must file a written 

request for summons within 20 days after receiving the Commission’s decision. 820 ILCS 

310/19(f)(1) (West 2014); Esquivel v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 402 Ill. App. 

3d 156, 159-60 (2010). 

¶ 15 In this case, a copy of the Commission’s decision was received in the office of claimant’s 

attorney on October 20, 2014. The twentieth day after October 20, 2014, was Sunday, 

November 9, 2014. Therefore, claimant had until Monday, November 10, 2014, to file a 

written request for summons with the circuit court. See 820 ILCS 310/19.1 (West 2014) 

(noting that the time within which any act is required to be performed under the Act shall be 

computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or 

Sunday or is a holiday). Claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped on 
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November 12, 2014, more than 20 days after claimant’s attorney received the Commission’s 

decision. Thus, on its face, it was untimely. However, in Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶¶ 23, 28, the supreme court held that the request for 

summons filed in the circuit court to commence review of the Commission’s decision is the 

functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and a party may rely on the mailbox rule when it 

appeals the Commission’s decision to the circuit court.

¶ 16 To determine whether the mailbox rule applies to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court, we 

examine the relevant rules of our supreme court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. Sept. 

19, 2014) states in relevant part: 

“Unless received after the due date, the time of filing records, briefs or other papers 

required to be filed within a specified time will be the date on which they are actually 

received by the clerk of the reviewing court. If received after the due date, the time of 

mailing, or the time of delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the 

clerk within three business days, shall be deemed the time of filing. Proof of mailing or 

delivery to a third-party commercial carrier shall be as provided in Rule 12(b)(3) ***.”

Because claimant’s written request for issuance of summons was received after the due date, 

we look to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). That rule states that in 

case of service by mail, service is proved “by certificate of the attorney, or affidavit of a person 

other than the attorney, who deposited the document in the mail or delivered the document to a 

third-party commercial carrier, stating the time and place of mailing or delivery, the complete 

address which appeared on the envelope or package, and the fact that proper postage or the 

delivery charge was prepaid.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). Our supreme court 

has noted that without proof of mailing on file, there is nothing in the record to establish the 

date the document was timely mailed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court. See 

Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 216 (2009). 

¶ 17 In this case, it is undisputed that when claimant’s written request for summons was 

received and filed by the circuit court on November 12, 2014, it was not accompanied by a 

certificate of attorney, or affidavit of another person, stating the time and place of mailing, the 

complete address which appeared on the envelope, and the fact that proper postage was 

prepaid. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014). Thus, claimant failed to comply with 

the proof-of-mailing requirement set forth in Rule 12(b)(3), and the circuit court lacked 

jurisdiction to consider his appeal. 

¶ 18 Claimant contends that because his written request for summons was accompanied by a 

cover letter, it was sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(b)(3). We disagree. The cover letter was 

not accompanied by any certification or affidavit, and nothing is certified or sworn to. 

Moreover, the cover letter does not state the time and place of mailing, the complete addresses 

which appeared on the envelopes, and the fact that proper postage was prepaid. Under similar 

circumstances, a cover letter was deemed insufficient as proof of mailing under Rule 12(b)(3). 

See Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 216 (explaining that “[t]he cover letter contains only a 

date, which, at best, indicates that it may have been mailed on that date” (emphasis added)). 

Claimant also contends that Edwards’ affidavit is sufficient to comply with the 

proof-of-mailing requirement set forth in Rule 12(b)(3). Again, we are compelled to disagree. 

Edwards’ affidavit was not filed with the written request for summons. Rather, it was executed 

on December 30, 2014, more than 50 days after the written request for summons was allegedly 

mailed. Hence, at the time the written request for summons was filed, there was nothing in the 
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record to establish whether the document was timely filed. Therefore, we find that claimant 

failed to comply with the proof-of-mailing requirement in Rule 12(b)(3) and the circuit court 

was not vested with jurisdiction to hear claimant’s appeal.

¶ 19 Claimant acknowledges that, as a general rule, the failure to strictly comply with the 

requirements of section 19(f)(1) deprives the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over 

the appeal. See Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 15; Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 320-21. In 

an attempt to salvage his claim, however, he observes that the Illinois Supreme Court has 

found that, under certain circumstances, substantial compliance with the requirements of 

section 19(f)(1) has been found sufficient to vest the circuit court with subject-matter 

jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, claimant directs us to Jones, 188 Ill. 2d 314. 

¶ 20 Jones addressed an issue regarding language in section 19(f)(1) of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996)), which provided that “no request for 

a summons may be filed and no summons shall issue” unless the party seeking judicial review 

exhibits to the clerk of the circuit court proof that the probable cost of preparing the record of 

proceedings has been paid to the Commission. Proof of payment is demonstrated by filing a 

receipt showing payment or an affidavit of the attorney setting forth that payment has been 

made. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996). In Jones, the claimant’s attorney received the 

Commission’s decision on October 25, 1996. The claimant initiated judicial review of the 

Commission’s decision on November 8, 1996, by filing a request for summons with the circuit 

court. The summons was issued the same day. On November 14, 1996, the claimant’s attorney 

filed an affidavit with the clerk of the circuit court stating that payment of the probable cost of 

preparing the record had been made to the Commission. At issue in Jones was whether the 

circuit court obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the Commission when 

the party seeking review filed a request for summons in the circuit court within the required 

20-day period and exhibited proof of payment for the probable cost of the record within the 

same 20-day period, but exhibited the proof of payment after filing the request for summons. 

Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 316. The supreme court answered this inquiry in the affirmative. Jones, 

188 Ill. 2d at 324-27. Claimant maintains that, pursuant to Jones, he substantially complied 

with section 19(f)(1), thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit court. However, the 

claimant in Jones timely complied with the requirements of section 19(f)(1), albeit not in the 

correct sequence. Here, in contrast, there was a complete failure to comply with the 

requirements of section 19(f)(1), since claimant did not timely file with the circuit court his 

written request for summons. Thus, Jones is distinguishable. 

¶ 21 Claimant also cites to Curtis v. Perkins Insurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1982), and 

Kimbrough v. Sullivan, 131 Ill. App. 2d 313 (1971), for the proposition that substantial or 

partial compliance with Rule 12(b)(3) is sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court. In 

Curtis, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action. Along with the motion, the 

defendant submitted a “certificate” signed by a non-attorney as proof of service. At issue in 

Curtis was whether the proof of service conformed to the requirements of Rule 12(b)(3), given 

that it was in the form of a “certificate” instead of an affidavit and it was not signed by an 

attorney. The court noted that the plaintiff did not allege that he was prejudiced or harmed by 

the failure of the proof of service to conform to the requirements of Rule 12(b)(3). Curtis, 105 

Ill. App. 3d at 566. As such, the court determined that “the deficiency in the proof of service of 

which plaintiff complains had no substantial effect on the disposition of the case below” and 

“amount[ed] to harmless error.” Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 566-67. In Kimbrough, the proof of 
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service on a motion for default judgment did not set forth the place of mailing or the fact that 

proper postage was prepaid. The court found that these defects, standing alone, would not 

warrant reversal. Kimbrough, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 317. Both Curtis and Kimbrough are 

distinguishable. In those cases there was a defect in the form of notice, whereas in this case 

there was a complete failure to comply with Rule 12(b)(3), since claimant failed to file proof of 

mailing the written request for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received 

the Commission’s decision. See Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 217. Additionally, the 

supreme court has declined to apply harmless-error analysis under circumstances such as those 

present here. Secura Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d at 217. 

¶ 22 Claimant also asserts that courts in Illinois have allowed parties to “perfect the record” 

after the time for filing has passed if the defect is “minimal.” In support of this proposition, 

claimant directs us to Berry v. Industrial Comm’n, 55 Ill. 2d 274 (1973), and Lee v. Industrial 

Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 496 (1980). 

¶ 23 Berry, like Jones, involved the provision in section 19(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act requiring proof of payment of the probable cost of the record on appeal prior to the 

issuance of summons. At the time Berry was decided, section 19(f)(1) provided that proof of 

payment is shown by exhibiting to the clerk of the circuit court a receipt showing payment to 

the Commission. In Berry, the claimant timely filed a praecipe for certiorari (the statutory 

predecessor of the request to issue summons) with the clerk of the circuit court. Subsequently, 

he forwarded to the Commission a check for the probable cost of the record on appeal. At the 

time he filed the praecipe, the claimant did not physically exhibit to the clerk of the court a 

receipt from the Commission showing payment of the estimated cost of the record. However, 

he did tender to the clerk a copy of the transmittal letter sent to the Commission with the 

payment. Moreover, prior to issuing summons, the clerk telephoned the Commission to verify 

that the payment had been made in a timely fashion. The circuit court eventually received the 

receipt showing payment of the probable cost of the record to the Commission, but this 

occurred outside of the statutory 20-day period. Under these facts, the supreme court ruled that 

the requirements of section 19(f)(1) had been satisfied. Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 277-78. 

¶ 24 Lee involved the form of the bond that must be filed pursuant to section 19(f)(2) of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, ¶ 138.19(f)(2)). The bond at issue in 

Lee was signed by one of the two respondents as principal and by the other as surety. The 

claimant moved to dismiss the respondents’ appeal to the circuit court, arguing they were 

improperly acting in both capacities and that a bond in proper form was jurisdictional. The 

circuit court allowed the motion to dismiss. The respondents then submitted a motion to vacate 

the order quashing the writ of certiorari accompanied by a subsequent tender of bond with the 

two respondents as principals and a third party as surety. The circuit court rejected the 

respondent’s motion and the accompanying bond. On appeal, the supreme court held that, 

although the form of the original bond was “irregular,” the irregularity did not defeat the circuit 

court’s jurisdiction. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d at 498-99. The supreme court remanded the matter to the 

circuit court with directions that it determine the sufficiency of the second bond. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d 

at 501. If the bond was found sufficient, the circuit court was ordered to consider the merits of 

the appeal. Lee, 82 Ill. 2d at 501. 

¶ 25 Berry and Lee are distinguishable for the same reasons as Jones, Curtis, and Kimbrough. In 

both Berry and Lee, compliance with the statutory requirements was timely done even though 

irregular in some aspect. In Berry, for instance, although the claimant did not exhibit proof of 
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payment of the probable cost of the record to the court, the clerk verified that the payment was 

timely made prior to issuing summons. In Lee, the original appeal bond, although irregular, 

was timely filed. As noted above, here, claimant’s written request for summons was 

file-stamped after the 20-day filing period set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act, and he failed 

to file proof of mailing the written request for summons in the circuit court within 20 days after 

he received the Commission’s decision. Given claimant’s complete lack of compliance with 

both section 19(f)(1) of the Act and Rule 12(b)(3), we cannot categorize the defects in this case 

as “minimal.”

¶ 26 Claimant insists that this is not a case “where a party omitted an essential step in the appeal 

process, thereby divesting the circuit court of notice and jurisdiction,” because the 

Commission and parties were notified of the appeal by the notice of filing the appeal on 

October 21, 2014, and the issuance of the summons by the circuit court, which occurred on 

November 19, 2014. We disagree as claimant did “omit[ ] an essential step in the appeal 

process.” Significantly, he did not timely tender his written request for summons, and he has 

not demonstrated proof of mailing within the statutorily mandated time frame, thereby 

divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction to consider his appeal. Claimant also insists that a 

finding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction would elevate form over substance and run 

contrary to the principle that “doubts as to the timeliness of appeals should be resolved so to 

favor review in the appellate court.” In re Marriage of Morse, 143 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853 (1986). 

In this case, however, there is no “doubt” as to the timeliness of claimant’s appeal. The record 

clearly establishes that claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped by the circuit 

court more than 20 days after his attorney received the Commission’s decision, and he failed to 

timely comply with the proof-of-mailing requirement in our supreme court rules. As the 

supreme court has admonished, “the appellate court does not have the authority to excuse the 

filing requirements of the supreme court rules governing appeals.” Secura Insurance Co., 232 

Ill. 2d at 217-18. Thus, we are without authority to excuse claimant’s noncompliance.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 28 In short, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision where 

claimant’s written request for summons was file-stamped after the 20-day filing period set 

forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act and he failed to file proof of mailing the written request for 

summons in the circuit court within 20 days after he received the Commission’s decision. 

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the circuit of Sangamon County as having been 

entered in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, thereby reinstating the Commission’s 

decision, and dismiss the instant appeal. 

¶ 29 Circuit court judgment vacated; appeal dismissed.