F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A UR EL I O D UR AN G ONZAL ES ; M A R IA C. E S TR ADA ; M AR I A LU I SA M A RT I N EZ D E M U N G U IA ; I R MA P A LA CI O S D E B ANUE L OS ; LU C IA M U N I Z D E ANDR ADE ; K AR I NA N O R IS ; A DR I ANA P OUP AR I NA ,

Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts ,

v. U. S. D EP A RT M EN T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY and J AN E T N AP OL I TANO , Secre tary of the De partment of H o m e l an d

S e c ur i ty, Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 09-35174

D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01411- M JP

ORDER AND OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the Wester

n District of Washington Marsha J . Pechman, Chief D istrict J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted Se pte mbe r 2 1, 20 11 —Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed Ma rch 29, 2013
Be fore : Wi lliam C. C anby , J r., B arr y G. Silverman, and Con su e lo M . Ca lla

ha n, Cir c uit Judg e s.G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Orde r; Opinion by

J udg e Silverman; Dissent by

J udg e Callaha

n

SUMMAR

Y *

Im m igr at ion The pa nel orde red w ithdrawn its orig inal Oc t ober 25, 2 011 opinion, publis hed at 659 F .3d 930, and filed a superse ding opinion and a new dis s en t, in plaintiffs’ appea l of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dismi ss al of the ir a c tio n s e e kin gto a d j u s ts t atu s an d

w a i v e i n a dm i s s i b i l i ty.
In the s uperse ding opinion, the panel vacated t he district c ourt ’s jud g me nt and or de rs de nying pla int if fs ’ mot ion s to ame nd c la ss c e rt if

ic atio n a nd to f ile an ame nd e d c omp la int , followingrema

nd in Duran Gonzales v. D epartment of Ho melan d S

e c ur ity , 508 F.3d 1227 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (“ Duran Go nz ale s I ” ), wh ic h h e ld t

hat pl a int if

fs we re inel igi ble to adjust status beca

use they wer e not elig i b l e t o rec eive I -212 waiver s beca

use the re quisite ten-year

period ha d not elapsed since they

last depar

ted from the Unite d States. The pane l rema nded for rec onsideration of pla intiffs’ motions t o amend to a dd a challeng e to the retroa ctive applicati o n o f Duran Go nz ale s I , in light o f t he ne w r e tr oa c tiv ity

te st s et f or th i n the interve ning e n banc de cis i o n in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder , 702 F.3d 504 ( 9th Cir. 2012).G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 3

Dissenting, Judge Cal l ah an would affirm the district court’s dismi s s al o f petitioners’ c ase. She w ould find that this co urt’s adoption of a new r ule in 2012 in the unrelated case Ga rfi as -R od

rigue z does notchang e the r etroa ctivity of the or ig ina l 2007 op ini on in thi s ca se . Jud g e Ca lla ha n w ou ld rathe r hold that under the prudential law-of-the -ca se doctrine , Duran Gonzales I rema ins re tr oa c tiv e and a pp lic a ble to pe tit ion e rs
.

CO UN SEL
Matt A dams ( argue d) , N or thw est Immi g ra

nt R ights Pr oje c t, Seattl e, W as h i n gt o n ; T ri n a R ea l mut o , Be thW er l i n , Americ an Immigration L aw Foundation, Washing ton, D .C.; Marc Va n Der Hout, Stacy

Tolchin, Van D er H out , Br iga g liano & Ni g hti ng a le , LL P, Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia , f or Pla int if fs

Ap pe lla nts

. Eliz abeth J

. Stevens (ar gued) and Sherea se Pratt, Un ited States Depa

rtment of Just ice, Washing ton, D.C.; P riscilla ToYi nCh an , O f

f ic e o f th e U n it e d

St ate s A tt o r

n e y , Se att le , Was hin g ton , f

or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lle e s.

OR DE R
Th e op ini on

fi le d o n O c tob e r 2 5, 20 11 , 6 59 F .3 d 930, is withdrawn. Asuperse ding op i n i on and dissent will be filed concur re n t ly with this order. The Petition for Rehe aringEn B anc fi le d o n D e c e mbe r 9 , 2 01 1 is de nie d a s mo ot.G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

4
OP IN ION
SI LVERMAN, Circuit J udg e: Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nts are Au

re lio Dura

n Go nza le s and

six oth e r Me xica

n c iti zen s. Ea c h of

the se a lie ns wa s p re vio us ly deporte d or re moved and then subse quen t l y ree ntere d the United States without inspe ction. Fr om within the United States, these individuals applied for an adjustment of status and an I -2 12 wa ive r o f t

he ir in adm is sib ili ty

du e to t he ir previous remova l a

nd unlawful ree ntry . Plaintiffs construed Ninth Circuit law at the time as permitting the m to seek such a wa iver, notwith s t anding the statutory require ment that ten y ear s elapse be tween an alien’s last depar ture fr om the United States and his or her

waiver application. See Perez- Gonzalez
v . A sh c ro ft , 379 F .3 d 783 (9 th Cir . 200 4) . The y fi le d s uit to challeng e the application of the ten-year require ment to deny the m w a ive rs
. After our dec ision in Perez- Gonzalez , howeve r, t he B oard of Immigration Appeals had in fac t disag ree d with aspec ts of that decision and c onstrued the statutory scheme to require satisfac tion of the ten-year require ment, even f

or I -212 waiver applicants a lrea dy

unlawfull y p resent in the United States. On t h e first appe al in this matter, we de fer red to the BIA’ s re as o n ab l e s t atut o ry i n t er p re t at i o n , ci t i n g National Cable &Telecomm unications Assoc ia ti o n v. Brand X Inte rnet Servic es , 545 U.S. 967, 981–85 (2005). Duran Go n z ales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1235–39, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007) (“ Duran Gonzales I

”). N inth Ci rcuit l aw ther eby beca me consistent with the ag ency ’s position.
On re mand , re

je c tin g Pla int if

fs ’ o bje c tio ns and

mot ion s, the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th e B IA’ s r

ule wo uld

have fullG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 5

retroa ctive eff

ect, denied motions to amend the complaint and c la s s d e f in it io n a s f

uti le , an d d is mi s s e d th is c la s s a c ti o n
. We a ff ir me d th is r uli ngin Oc tob e r 201 1, but st ay e d th e mand ate pendingthe re solution o f en banc pr ocee dings in Ga rfi as Rodriguez v. Holde r , 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (e n banc)

. Ultimately , that decision cha ng ed the r etroa ctivity test for case s in which Brand X mandates de fer ence to an ag ency ’s statut or y int e rp re tatio n, e ve n if

the re is a c ontr ary pr ior Ni nth Circuit case . Be cause the mandate never issuedfor our opinion on t h i s ap p eal a nd there has bee n an interve ning chang e in authority , we de cl i n e to apply the putative law of the ca se, vac ate the district c ourt’s j udg ment, and re mand for rec onsideration of the motions t o am en d the complaint and c la ss d e fi nit ion in light of the ne w re tr oa c tiv ity te st s e t f or th in Garfias-Rodriguez

.

BACK GR OUND
Plaintiffs were all previously deporte d or re mo ved and then unlawf

ully ree ntere d the United States. After returning to the United States, they filed applications for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. That statute “a ll o we d the Attorney Gene ral to adjust the status of an al i en who had enter ed the United States without inspection to that of a leg al pe rm ane nt re sid e nt p ro vid e d th at th e a lie n ( 1) wa s a dmi ssi ble to t he Un ite d St ate s and

the be nefi cia ry

of an imme diate ly available immigra

nt visa, and (2) paid an a

pplication fee five times the usual fee .” Du ra n G onza le s I , 508 F.3d at 1230. Plaintiffs’ path t o adjustment of status was c omplicated by two provisions of the I lleg al Immigration Re fo rm and Immigration Responsibi lity Act of 1996. The first appe are d to deny Plaintiffs relief. 8 U .S.C. § 1231(a )(5) provides “f or automatic re instatement of an a lien’s prior removal orG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

6

A r e c e n t d e c is io n inte rp re ts the ten -yea r b a r to re q u ire the a lien to 1 sp e n d ten ye a rs o u tsid e the U n ited S ta te s. C arr i l l o de P al aci os v. H ol der , N o
. 09

- 7 2 0 5 9 , 20 1 3 W L 3 1 0 3 8 7 , at * 6 (9t h C i r. Jan. 28 , 20 1 3 ). deportation order whe n an alien ha s ree nt er ed the United States il leg ally ,” and f

urther pr ovides that “‘the alien is not elig ible and may

not apply

for a ny relief ’ fr om removal.” Dura n Gon za le

s I , 5 08 F .3 d at 12 30 (q

uo tin g8 U .S. C. § 1231(a) (5))

. Th e se c on d s e c tio n su g g e ste d a po ssi ble e xce pti on

to t his bar. A lthough 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9)( C)(i)(I I ) re nders inadmissi b le any

previously

remove d alien “who enter s or attempts to reente r the United Sates without be ing a dmitted,” Section 1182(a) (9)( C)(ii) cr eate s an exception for:
an alien seeking admission more than 10 y ear s afte r the date of the alien’s last de parture from the United States i f, prior to the a lien’s ree mbarkation at a p l ace outside the United S t at e s o r att e mp t t o b e r e a dm i tt e d fr om a fore ign c ontiguous terri tory , the Secr etar y of Homeland Sec uri t y

has conse nted to the alien’s r eapply

ing f or admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (C)(ii). Two a ppare nt require ments for thi s e xce pti on

be c ame the su

bje c t of lit ig atio n in t

his Cir c uit : (1 ) th at t h e a p p li c ati o nb e ma d e f

r o m o uts id e th e U n ite d States; and (2) that the alien reque st the waiver more than te n y e ars a ft e r h is o r h e r l a st d e pa rt ur e fr om t he Un ite d St ate s. 1
Pla int if fs so ught F or

m I -2 12 wa iv ers of

ina dmi ssi bil ity pursuant to 8 U.S .C. § 1182(a) (9)( C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 from within t h e United St ates, a nd applications forG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 7

O ur 200 7 deci s i on i n t hi s ca s e s t at ed t ha t : “ T he I

- 21 2 wai ver 2
a p p lica tio n is p e n d ing in fo u r o f the c a se s a n d h a s b e e n d e n ie d , alo n g w ith the a d ju stm e n t o f st a tu s a p p lica tio n s, in th e re m a inin g thr e e c a se s.” D u ra n G o n za l es I , 508 F. 3d a t 1231. adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). United States Citi zenship and Immigration Services denie d three of the Plaintiffs’ applications on the ground that the ten-year period ha d n ot e la

ps e d s inc e the d ate s o f t he a pp lic ants ’ l a st de pa rt ur e s fr om the Un ite dS t a t e s. 8 U .S. C. 2 § 11 82 (a )( 9) (C )( ii)

. Al le g e dly , Pla int if fs too k the se ste ps to secur e waivers in reliance on our opinion in Perez- Gonzalez
v . A sh c ro ft , 379 F.3d 783 ( 9th Cir. 2004). Perez-Go n zalez held that an a l i en could apply for a For m I -212 wa iver fr om within this country : “[T] he I NS committed lega l er ro r whe n it conclude d that Perez-Gonzalez could not apply for a For m I -212 wa iver fr om within thi s co untry .” 379 F .3d at 789. Perez- Gonzalez a ls o “ c o n c lu d e d th at an a li e n w h o was ina dmi ssi ble un de r s e c tio n 2 12 (a )( 9) (C )( i) of the Ac t c ou ld apply for a waiver under 8 C.F .R. § 2 1 2 .2 even though the a lie n’ s la st d e pa

rt ur e fr om t he Un ite d St ate s o c c ur

re d .

. . le ss tha n 1 0 y e ars pr ior

to t he date of

his re qu e st f

or c on se nt t o rea pply for a dmission.” Ma tte r o f To rre s- Ga rc ia , 23 I . & N

. De c. 8 6 6 , 8 7 6 (B IA 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Perez- Gonzalez , 379 F.3d at 79 4 n .1 0) ; se eals o D uran Go nz ale s I , 508 F.3d at 1241.
In J anuar y 2006, the Board of Immigration Appea ls ruled in Ma tte r of Tor

re s- Ga rc ia that individuals such as Plaintiffs wer e not elig ible for r elief, s ince a n I -212 wa iver of i n admissibili ty

require s the alien’s c ompliance with the statu t ory “ten- y ear bar,” even if

that alien is applying f

rom wi thi n th e Un ite d S tat es. 23 I . & N. De c . at 87 6; Mo ra lesIzquierdo v. D

HS, 600 F.3d 107 6 , 1079 (9th Cir. 2010)G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

8

T h e B I A r ea s on ed: 3

P er ez - G on z al ez a l l ows a n a l i en t o obt ai n a s ec t i on 21 2(a) ( 9)( C ) ( i i ) wai ver nu nc pro t un c e ven t houg h s uch
a w a i ver would have b een unavail ab l e t o hi m had he
s ough t i t pros pect i vel y , t her eby pl aci ng hi m i n a bet t er po s i t i on by as ki ng f

org i ven es s t han he woul d hav e been i n h ad h e as k ed per mi s s i on
. Su ch a n i n t er pr et at i on con t r adi ct s t he cl ear l anguage o f s ect i on 2 1 2 (a)( 9 )( C )( i i ) and t he l egi sl at i ve p o l i cy und erl y i ng sect i o n 21 2 (a)( 9 )( C ) general l y
. W e f i nd that t he m o re reasonab l e i nt erpret at i o n of t he st at ut o ry f ram ewo rk di s cus s ed above i s t hatan al i en may not obt ai n a wai ver o f t h e se c tio n 2 1 2 (a )( 9 )( C )( i) g ro u n d o f i n a d m issib ili ty, ret roac t i vel y or p rosp ect i vel y , wi tho ut regard t o t he 1 0

- y ear l i m i t at i o n s et f

o rt h at s ect i o n 21 2 (a)( 9 )( C )( i i ).

M a tter o f T o rre s- G a rc ia , 23 I

. & N

. D ec
. a t 876.

In b o th o f t h e se 2 0 0 9 d is tr ic t co u rt c a se c a p tio n s, D u ra n G o n z a le s’s 4
s u r n ame i s mi s s pel l ed. (citation and quot at i o n marks omitted). DH S su bs e qu e ntl y 3 issued a “me morandum direc t[ ing] field off icer s that an alien inadmissible under § 212(a) (9)( C) could not f ile for c onsent to rea pply until that alien had lived abr oad for 10 y ear s.” Gonzalez v. DHS, No. C06-1411-MJP , 2009 WL302283, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2009) . In September 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit to challeng e thi s m emora ndum as a violation of Perez- Gonzalez

and sought injunctive and declaratory relief , a tempora

ry restra ining or der, a

nd class ce rtifi ca t ion. Gonzalez v. DH

S, No. C06-1411-MJ P, 2009 W L506848, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2009)

. The district cour t cer tified 4 Plaintiffs’ proposed class and issued a pr eliminary injunction. Go nzales v. DHS, 239 F.R.D. 620, 627, 629 (W.D. Wash. 2006).G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 9

Th e g ov e rnme nt f

ile d a n inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l, a nd in D u ra n G o n z a les I

, w e he ld t

hat, p ur su ant t o th e Sup re me Court’s decision in Brand X , 5 4 5 U

. S. at 9 8 1

– 8 5, we we re compelled to follow the BI A’ s 2006 opinion in TorresGa rc ia . In Brand X

, the Sup re me Court “ he ld t hat th e c ir c uit c o urtmu s ta

p p l y Chevron defe re nce to a n ag ency ’s interpre tation o f a s tatute re g ardle ss of the circ uit court’s contra ry prec edent, pr ovided that t he court’s ea rlier pr ece dent w a s an inte r

p r e tati o n o f a s tatuto r

y amb igu it

y .” Du r an Gonzales I

, 5 0 8 F. 3 d at 1 2 3 5

– 3 6 (c i t i n g Brand X , 545 U.S. at 980–82). I n our 2007 opinion in Du ra n G onza le s I , w e he ld that be c a us e the B IA’ s Tor

re s- Ga rc ia ru lin gwa s a

“ c le arl y rea sonable” interpre tation of a statute by the ag ency

char g ed with interpretingand enf orcingthe statute, and be cause our prior opinion in Pe re

z- Go nz ale

z was ba sed on t h e statute’s ambiguity , Brand X

required t h at we de fer

to the BIA’s interpre tation. Id . at 12 37 –3 9, 12 42

. Our op ini on state d th at, “[ p ] ursuant to In reTorre s- Ga rc ia , plaintiffs as a matter of law ar e not elig ible to adjust their status beca u s e they are in e li g ib le to r e c e iv e I

- 2 1 2 w a iv e r s .” Id . at 1242. Acc ording ly , we va cate d the district court’s injunction and rema nded the matter

. Id . at 1242–43.
Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehea ringand sug g estion for reh ea ri ngen banc which included a n argument that the opinion should not be applied retroa ctively . The pa nel denied the petition for re h earing , a majority of the a ctive judg es dec l i n ed the sug g estion for re hearing e n banc, a nd our mandate issued in January 2009, over a year

afte r the opinion was filed.
On re mand, Plaintiffs sought to pre vent the re troac t ive ap plication of Duran Gonzales I t o cl as s m emb er s wh o s e I212 waiver

applications we re f

iled pr ior to that decision andG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

10 in p ur po rt e d r e lia

nc e on pr e e xistin g Ni nth

Cir c uit pr e c e de nt. Gonzalez , 2 0 0 9 W L3 0 2 2 8 3 , at* 4 ; Go n zalez , 2 0 0 9 WL 506848, at *4. To this e nd, they filed a motion to amend the complaint to add a c halleng e to Du ra n G onza le s I’s re tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic atio n a s we ll as a mot ion to a me nd the c la ss definition and nar

row it to a subset of the cer tified class. Id. at *3 . In th e fi rs t of a

pa ir of or de rs , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld that Du ran Gonzales I wa s b ind ingand de nie d Pl a int if

fs ’ motion for provisional class ce rtification and prel iminary injunctive re l ief. Gonzalez , 2 0 0 9 W L 3 0 2 2 8 3 , at* 4

. It re je c ted Pla int if

fs ’ a rgume nt a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity be c a us e “[t] he C i rc u it Court st ated c onclusively that the B IA’s int e rp re tatio n o f t

he statut e a

pp lie d to Pla int if

fs ,” and he ld that “[t] he re troac tive application of Tor re s G arc ia is s imp ly not an open que stion before this Court.” Id . The dist rict court proc eede d to deny Plaintiffs’ motions t o amend the class def inition and for leave to file an ame nded complaint as futile bec ause ne ither ame ndment coul d chang e the presumptive re troac tive eff ect of Du ra n G onza le s I

. Gonzalez , 2009 WL506848, at *4. The c ourt then dismissed the ac tion. Id . Pl a int if

fs tim e ly a

pp e a le d, arguin gthat Duran Go nz ale s I s h o u l d b e g i v e np r o s p e c t i v e e f

f e c to n l y. On Octobe r 25, 2011, we issued D u ra n G o n z a le s II , the or ig ina l ve rs ion of thi s op ini on , e xpre ssl y ho ldi ngthat Duran Gonzales I would have f ull retroac tive eff

ect. Duran Gonzales v. DH

S, 659 F.3d 930, 939–41 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (“ Duran Gonzales II

” ). Ho we ve r, we sta

y e d th e mand ate pending the resolution of the en banc proce eding s in Ga rfi as Rodriguez v. Holder , 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en ba nc). Ultimately , that en banc dec ision iss ued and se t forth a differ ent test for r etroa ctivity in Brand X c a se s, the mul tifac tor inquiry

articulated in Montgomery W ard & Co., Inc. v. FTC , 691 F.2d 1 3 22, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982). Ga rfi as -G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 11

Rodriguez , 7 02 F .3 d at 517 –2 0. Th e g ov e rnme nt u rg e s u s to a pp ly the la w- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine and ho ld t hat Duran Gonzales I has alre ady

settled the re troac ti vity

question for this case. We re

ject that ar gu m ent and hold that the interveningen banc decision in Garfias-Rodriguez requ ires us to withdraw our pr io r o p i nion, vacate the district cour t’s judgme nt, and remand t he case for further proce eding s. The district court must de cide in the first instance whether or not Pla int if fs ’ dua l motio ns to a

me nd are sti ll f uti le in l ight o f t

his Court’s adoption of the Montgomery W ard re tr oa c ti vit

y te st for c ases in which Brand X compels our de fer en ce t o an ag ency ’s statutory

interpre tation.
JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Al tho ugh th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of le ave to a

me nd is revie wed f

or abuse of discre tion, Gardner v. Ma r tino , 56 3 F .3 d 9 81 , 9 90 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) , a s is an ord e r o n c la ss cer tification, Parra v. Bashas’, Inc ., 53 6 F .3 d 97 5, 97 7 ( 9th Cir. 2008), the esse nce of Plaintiffs’ appea l is that the district c ourt e rr e d in

ho ldi ngtha

t Du ra n Go nz ale

s I a pp lie d to the m. This underlying c onclusion of l aw is revie wed de novo. See Citi zens for Clean Gov’t v . City of San Diego , 474 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2007).
DI SCU SSIO N
A. Whether Duran G

onzale s I M ay Be Re tr oa c ti ve ly A pp li e d U nder Ga r

fia s -Rodriguez

and Mo ntg

omer y Wa rd
. This brings us to the question of whethe r Duran Gonzales I m ay still be re troac tively

applied in light of G a r fia s-G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

12

A gai n, by a sep arat e o rder, i ss ued co ncurrent l y herewi t h, we have 5 wi t hd rawn t hat pri o r op i ni o n. Rodriguez

. Du ra n G onza le s I did no t e xpre ssl y

a dd re ss retroa ctivity . Instead, the pa nel mere ly

stated that P laintiffs “as a matter of la

w ar e not eligi b l e t o adjust their status be c a u s e th e y ar e in e li g ib le to r e c e iv e I

- 2 1 2 w a iv ers.” 508 F.3d at 1242. But re ach i ngthis conclusion did not e xplic itl y re so lve the re tr oa c tiv ity qu e sti on , and re tr oa c tiv ity was cl ea rl y

prese nted to us on this second appe al, which resulted in an initial opinion affir ming the r etroa ctive application of Du ra n Gonza le s I

. C i t i n g Ha rp e r v . V

irg ini a 5 Departme nt of Taxation , 50 9 U.S. 86, 97–98 (1993), we stated that “[b]ecause this cour t applied its holding in [ Duran Go nz ale s I ] to the par

ties befor e it, the rulingis retroa ctive.” Duran Gonzales II

, 6 59 F .3 d at 93 9. We a dd e d th at even if Dur an Gonz ale

s I c o u ld n o t b e r e a d

a s “ c le ar ly

h o ld in gthat it had retroa ctive app l i ca tion (by applying its rulingto the parti es be fo re it) , th e fa c t th at [Du ra n G onza le s I ] di d not otherwise ‘re serve the question whether its holdi ngshould be appli ed to the par

ties befor e it’ would be dispositive.” Id

. (qu o t i n g Harper , 509 U.S. at 97–98).
Our re cent e n banc opinion in Garfias-Rodriguez a do pts a diffe rent test for

retroa ctivit y th at i s now the law of the Ninth Circuit. Although re cognizi ngthat wh en we de cided Du ra n G onza le

s I , th e c ontr oll ing

Sup re me Co urt rule he ldG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 13

W e n ot ed: 6

T he Sup rem e C o urt has em p hasi zed t hat ret roac t i ve appl i cat i o n i s t he pres umpt i ve nor m, an d i mp l i ed t hat
a n y e x c e p tio n s to this r u le m u st b e na rr o w
. H arper , 5 0 9 U

. S. at 9 5

– 9 6

. It has al so em p hasi zed t hat we are no t t o p erfo rm a retro ac t i vit y an alysi s o n a ca se-b y- ca se bas i s , bu t t h at w e mu s t de ci de wh et h er a r u l e s h ou l d be
re tro a c tive (o r n o t) a s a p p lied to a ll c a se s c u rr e n tly p e n d ing

. Id

. a t 96–97.
G arf i as- R od r igu ez , 70 2 F.3d at 51 7 (paral l el ci t at i o ns o m i t t ed ). that r e tr oa c tiv e a

pplic atio n w a s th e pr e sumpt iveno rm , 6 Garfias-Rodriguez

ad o p t eda d i ff

er en tap p ro ac h , h o l d i n g: [W ]hen we overturn our own pr ece dent followinga contr ary

statutory interpre tat i on b y an ag ency

authorized under Brand X , we anal y ze whether

the ag ency ’s statutory interpre tati on (to which we defe r) a pplies retro a c tiv e ly

un de r t he te st w e a do pte d in Montgomery

W ard [ &Co. , I

nc . v FTC , 6 91 F.2d 1322, 1333 ( 9th Cir. 1982)] i f the iss ue is f a ir ly ra ise d b y the pa rt ie s. 702 F.3d at 520. Garfias-Rodriguez held that such instance s of Brand X defe renc e must be treated as “ if t h e age ncy had chang ed its own rules,” id . at 5 1 6 , and thus cha ng ed the presumptive norms for

case s such as this one to “ al low[] us to take into acc ount the intricac ies of a B rand X p robl em.” Id . at 518. We explained that in appl ying the Mo ntgom e ry W ar d test, “we have done so on a ca se-by-ca s e basis, for example, by analy

zing whether a petitioner actually relied onG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

14

a p a s tr u l e , o r b y c o n c l u d i n gth atr e tr o a c t i v i ty as applied is impermissible.” Id . at 519 (e mphasis in origina l). We then proce eded to a

pply the five- fac tor Mo ntg

om e ry W ar d test to Gar fias-Rodriguez himself. The fa ctors include: (1 ) whe the r t

he pa rt ic ula r ca se is o ne of

fi rs t imp re ssi on , ( 2) whe the r t he ne w r

ule re pr e se nts an a

br up t de pa rt ur e fr om w e ll e sta bli sh e d p ra c tic e or

me re ly atte mpt s to fi ll a v oid in an unsettled are a of la w, (3) the extent to wh ich the par

ty ag ainst whom the ne wr u le is a p p li e d r e li e d o nth e f o r me r r u le , (4) the de g ree of the bur d en which a retroa ctive orde r impo s es on a pa rty , and (5) the statut or

y int e re st i n a

pp lyinga ne w r ule de sp ite the re lia

nc e of a pa

rt y on the old standard.
Id

. at5 1 8 (qu o t i n g Mo ntgom e ry W ar d , 691 F.2d at1333). We nonetheless conc luded that Gar fias-Rodriguez was not entitled to relief be cause the bal ance of fa ctors fa vored the g overnme nt. Id . at 523.
P l a i n t i f f s ar gu e th a tw e s h o u l d

a p p l y Garfias-Rodriguez to t hei r ca se , v a c ate the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the ir action, and rema

nd the case to the district c ourt to ap p l y the Mo ntgom e ry

W ar d test in the first instance.G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 15

B. The Law- of- th e -C ase D oc tr ine Wil l N otBe Appli ed Here W here Ther e Has Been An Interve nin g Change in Au thority.
Be fore we c an apply

the Mo ntgom ery W

ard te st t o Plaintiffs, w e must c onsider whether the holding in Ga rfi as Ro dr igu e z should be applied t o this case. The g overnme nt argue s th at th e law- of

-t he -c a se do c tr ine sh ou ld b e inv ok e d to prec lude its application here . We disag ree
. In this contex t , the prude ntial law-of- the-c ase doc trine prec ludes one panel of an appellate court from rec onsidering questions which have alre ady been decide d on a prior a ppeal in the same c ase. He

gle r v . B or

g , 5 0 F .3 d 1472, 14 75 (9 th Cir. 1995). Howeve r, we have noted that there are exceptions to this prudential rule: Although a

n appellate panel’ s observa nce of the doctrine is discretionar y , a prior de cision sh ou ld b e fo llo we d unle ss ( 1) the de c isi on is c le arl y e rr on e ou s and

its e nf or c ement wo uld work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening contro lling author ity

makes re consideration appropr iate, or ( 3) substantially differ ent e vid e nc e wa s a dd

uc e d at a su bs e qu e nt t

ri a l.
Id . Hav ing a

nnounced a

retroa ctivity

test for Brand X case s that is at od ds wi th t

he ana ly tic a l f ra me wo rk inv ok e d in Du ra n G onza le

s I , we a re c ompelled to co nclude that the l e g a l c h an g e e f

f e c t e d b y Ga rfi as -R od

rigue z fa lls sq ua re ly within the second ex ce ption for “inter veningcontrollingG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

16

T h e wi t h dr aw n pa n el de ci s i on f r om t h i s s ec on d a ppea l r el i ed i n par t on 7 M or al es - I

z qui er do , 6 0 0 F.3d at 1 0 8 9 , whi ch reject ed t he ap p l i cat i o n of t he
m ul t i

- f act o r M o n t

g o m ery W

a rd t es t f or r et r oact i vi t y wh er e t h e c ou r t s def er to the B IA ’s inte rp re ta tio n o f a sta tute

. D u ran G o n zal es I I , 659 F. 3d at 93 5– 36 & n. 3. T hat ca s e and our r el i anc e on i t wer e e xpr es s l y over r ul ed b y t he en b anc co urt i n G arf i as- R od r igu ez
. 702 F

. 3d a t 516. authority .” Acc ording ly , we will not apply the law- of-the- 7 case doctrine to ba

r application of Garfias-Rodriguez

. C. Appli cati on of

The Montgom ery Ward Test on Re m and
We have withdrawn our prior opini on on this appeal a nd here by vacate the district c o u rt ’s j udg ment. We will not dece rtify the class, since n o s u ch motion was made be low. I ns te a d , u

p o n r e ma

n d , th e g o v e r

nme n t w il l h av e an opportunity

to file such a motion, if it so chooses. Plaintiffs will also ha

ve an opportunity

to re-f ile any motions t o amend the complaint and the c lass definition, as we ll as any motion fo r a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n, if

the y so c hoos e. I f t

he se motions are filed, the district court shall rec onsider whe ther ame ndme nts to t

he c omp la int

and c la ss d e fi nit ion

a re sti ll futile in light of

the Montgomery

W ard te st a nd F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure 23 ’s re qu ir e me nts fo r c la ss a c tio ns
. We express no opinion on t he viability of any cl ai ms or any clas s or subclass de finitions under the ana ly tical framework a

nnounced in Ga r

f i a s -R o d r iguez–i.e. , whether

the Mo ntgom e ry

W ar d fac tors can be adjudicated on a c lass-wide basis. Particularly

g iven the stag e of this litigation and the fact that th e re c or d h a s n ot b e e n f ull y de ve lop e d, a s inG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 17

See al s o Car r i l l o de Pal aci os , 2013 W L 310387, a t * 4–5 ( ap p l y i ng 8 M ont gom er y W ar d t est t o pe t i t i o ner’ s case where co m p l et e ad m i ni st rat i ve reco rd was avai l ab l e o n pe t i t i o n f o r r evi ew o f

a B IA de ci si o n). Garfias-Rodriguez , it wo uld no t be pr op e r f

or us to a pp ly 8 th at te s t in th e f

ir s t in s ta n ce. C f

. L ocal Joint Exe c. Bd. of Culinary/Bartende r

Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc. , 244 F.3d 1152, 1161 ( 9th Cir. 2001) (holding that where “the fac tual rec ord is suf

ficiently well develope d

. . . we m ay evaluate for ourselves whether the provisions of Rule 23 have been satisfied” and no r emand is nec essar y ).
CO NC LU SION
Th e d istri c t c ourt ’s jud g me nt i s VA CA TED , a nd thi s c a se is REMAND ED fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.

C ALLAH AN , C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g:
In 2007, we held that petitioners “as a matter of law are no t e lig ibl e to ad

jus t the ir status be c a

us e the y are ine lig ibl e to rec ei v e I -2 12 waiver s.” Duran Gonzales v. D HS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1242 (9th Cir. 2007) (“ Du ra n Gonza le

s I ”). I n J anuar y 2009, we de nied petitioners’ r equest for r ehea ringand rehe aringen banc , which included a n argumentthat our op ini on sh ou ld not be a

pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly ; ou

r m and ate issued on J anuar

y 23, 2009. In October

2011, we i s s u ed an op ini on re ite ratin gtha

t Du ra n G onza le

s I had full re troac tive e ff e c t, Duran Gonzales v. D HS, 659 F.3d 93 ( 9th Cir. 2011), and petitioners f

iled a petition for rehe aringand re hearing e n banc. T here afte r, in Octobe r 20 12, we issued a n en bancG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

18 opinion in Garfias-Rodriguez , 702 F.3d 504 ( 9th Cir. 2012), adoptinga new

rule for retroa ctivity

in cer tain case s. I respe ctfully

disag ree with my

colleagues t hat our adoption of a new rule in 2012 in an unre lat ed ca se cha ng es the retroa ctivity

of our 2007 opini o n
. R ather , Iwould hold that under the prudential law-o f-the-ca se doctrine , Duran Gonzales I rema ins retroa ctive and appl icable to the pe tit ion e rs
. I The prude ntial law-of- the-c ase doc trine pre cl u des one panel of an appellate court from re consideringquestions that have alrea dy been decided on a prior a ppeal in the same ca se. In He gle r v . B or

g , 50 F.3d 1472, 14 7 5 (9th Cir. 1995), we explained:
“Unde r the law of the c ase doc trine, one pa nel of an a pp e llate c ourt wi ll n ot a s a g e ne ra l r ule rec onsider questions which a nother pa nel has decide d on a prior appea l in the s am e c ase.” Merritt v. Mac key , 9 32 F .2 d 1 31 7, 13 20 (9 th Cir

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( i n t e r

n a l qu o t at i o n s an d

b r a c k e ts om i tted). Althoug h an appe llate pane l’s o b s erva nce of the doctrine is discr etionary , a prior dec ision should be followed un l es s (1) the de c isi on

is c le arl y

e rr on e ou s a

nd its enfor ceme nt would work a ma nifest injustice, (2) inte rvening c ontrolling a uthority makes rec onsideration appr op ri ate, or (3) substantially

differ ent evidenc e wa s adduced at a s ubsequent trial. Id . The doc trine, howeve r, applies only

to issues considere d and ac tually decide d by the first court. UnitedG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 19

Sta tes v. Cote , 51 F.3d 178, 181 ( 9th Cir. 1995).
We reiterated our unde rstandingof the doc trine in Ra nc he rs Cattl eme n Action Legal Fund Un i ted Stockgrowers of Am e ric a v . U

.S . D e pa rtm e nt of A gr ic ulture , 499 F.3d 1108, 1 1 1 4 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ), s t at i n g: [T] he district cour

t should abide by

“the g ener al rule” that o ur dec isions at the pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n ph a se do no t c on sti tut e the law of the ca se. See id.; see also City of Anaheim v . Duncan , 658 F.2d 1326, 1328 n.2 (1981). A n y

of our c onclusions on pure issues of law, howeve r, ar e binding

. Se eThi s That And The Other Gift And Tobacco, Inc. v

. Cob b Co un ty , 4 39 F .3 d 127 5, 12 84 –8 5 ( 11 th Cir. 2006); 18 Charles Alan Wright & Ar thur R. Mill er, F eder al P rac tice and Proc edure § 4478.5 (2002) ( “A f ully consi dere d appellate ruling on an issue of law ma de on a pr e lim ina ry inj uncti on a

pp e a l . . . b e c ome [s] the l awo f

th e c a s e f

o r f urth e r p r o c e e d i n g s in the trial cour

t on rema n dand in any subsequent appe al.”)

. The prude ntial considerations underlying the law-of-thecase doctrine suppor

t its application here. I

n Christ ianson v. Colt Industri es Ope rating Cor p. , 486 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1 98 8) , th e Sup re me Court no te d th at: “As most commonly define d, the doctrine [of the law of

the ca se] p o s i t s that when a court decide s upon a rule of l aw, that decisionG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

20
sh ou ld c ontin

ue to g ov e rn

the same iss ue s in subsequent stag es in the same c ase.” Arizona v . Ca lif or nia , 4 60 U. S. 6 05 , 6 18 , 103 S. Ct

. 1382, 1391, 75 L

. Ed.2d 318 (1983) ( dictum). This rule of prac tice promotes the fina lity and eff iciency of the jud i cial process by “prote ctingag ainst the ag itation of settled issues.” 1B J . Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore’ s Fe dera l Practice ¶ 0.404[ 1], p. 118 (1984).
II
Du ra n- Gon zales wa s d e c ide d in 20 07 . Its h old ingis c le ar: “ plaintif

fs a s a matte r o f l aw a

re no t e lig ibl e to a dju st their status bec ause the y are ineli gi b le to rec eive I -212 waiver s.” 508 F .3d at 1242. There is no rea sonable a rgument that the dec ision was not clear and dispositive. Indeed, the district court prope rly

found it to be cle ar a

nd dispositi ve, and it h a s b e e n c ite d b y

nume ro us c ourt s. Altho ugh th e ma

jority re lie s o n th e se c on d e xce pti on in Hegler to jettison t he law- o f- t h e-c ase doc trine in this case, none of the three exceptions r equire or justify such a c ourse. See Hegler , 50 F.3d at 1475. First, the de cision in Du ra n G onza le s I is n ot c lear ly err oneous, nor will its enfor ceme nt work a ma nifest injustice. Ga rfias-Rodriguez , 702 F.3d at 511, affir med Duran Go nz ale s I’s under lying de cision to apply the B IA’s dec ision in In re Torre

s- Ga rc ia , 23 I

. & N. Dec

. 866 (B I A 2 0 06), rathe r than the N inth Ci rcuit’s prior opinion in Pe rezGon za lez v. As hc ro

ft , 379 F.3d 783 ( 9th Cir. 2004). Moreove r, Ga rfi as-R od rigue z re c ognize s th at DuranG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 21

Go nz ale s I proper ly applied the then- applicable standard f or retroa ctivity

. Garfias-Rodriguez , 702 F.3d at 517. Cit ing su c h Su pr e me Court ca se s a s Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 4 0 4 U

. S. 9 7 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , an d Ha r p erv. Virginia. Department of Taxation , 509 U.S. 86 (1993), the e n banc opinion noted: The Supreme Court has emphasized that retroa ctive ap plication is the presumptive no rm , and imp lie d that any e xce pti on s to thi s rule must b e nar

row. Harper , 509 U.S. at 95 –9 6, 11 3 S. Ct. 25 10 . It ha s a lso e mph a size d that we ar e no t to pe rf or m a re tr oa c tiv ity

ana ly sis on a c a se -b y -c a se ba sis , but th at w e mus t de c ide wh e the r a ru le sh ou ld be re troac tive (or not) as ap p lied to all case s curr ently pending

. Id . at 96 –9 7, 11 3 S. Ct. 2510.
Ga r f i a s -Rodriguez , 702 F.3d at 517. The opinion then e xplic itl y state s th at it

is a do pti ng a

“ ne w r ule ” that it believed to be a “better fit for this situation,” wher e National Cable &Telecomm unications Associatio n v
. B r a nd X Interne t Servic es , 545 U.S. 967 ( 2 0 0 5 ) (“ Brand X ”), ma ndates de fe re nc e to a

n a g e nc y ’s statut or

y int e rp re tatio n, that is contra ry t o a prior N inth Ci rcuit opinion. Id . at 51 8. Thus , Ga r f i a s - R o d r igu e z does not sug g est that either the substantive decision in Duran Go nzales I or its retroa ctive application was “ clea rly err oneous.”
Nor does a re view of Garfias-Rodriguez ’s application of the multi-factor

inquiry in Mo ntgom e ry W

ar d & Co. v . FTC , 691 F.2d 1322, 1333 ( 9th Cir. 1982), sugg est that applying Du ra n G onza le

s I’ s s u b s ta n ti v e h o ld in gto th e p e ti tione rs “would work a manife st injust ice.” Hegler , 50 F.3d at 1475.G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

22

In G arf

i as- R od r igu ez , we no t ed t hat t he f i rs t f act o r – whether t he 1 p a rtic u la r c a se is o n e o f f irst im p re ssio n – “m a y no t b e a s w e ll su ited to t he co nt ex t of

i mmi g r at i on l aw , ” an d n ot ed t h at i n a n y e v en t , “ any q uest i o n of unf

ai rnes s i n ap p l y i ng a ne w rul e i n c ases o f ‘ f i rs t i m p res si o n’
o r ‘se c o n d im p re ssio n ,’ su c h a s su rp rise o r d e tr im e n ta l r e lian c e , i s fully
ca pt u r ed i n t h e s ec on d an d t h i r d M o n t g o m ery W

a rd f act ors
. ” 70 2 F. 3d at 5 2 1

. H o wever, i f t he f i rs t f act o r i s ap p l i ed , i t f

avo rs t he g o v e rn m e nt bec au s e t h e ag en cy h as con s i s t en t l y he l d t h at an al i en c ou l d n ot a ppl y f or rei nst at em ent f

rom wi t hi n t he U ni t ed S tat es wi t hi n t en y ears o f havi ng b een rem o ved

. T hus, nei t her P er ez - G on z al ez nor D u ra n G o n za l es I was a case of

f i rs t i m p res si o n, b ut rat her r ep res ent ed dif f erent s t ages i n t he
c o n tinu ing d ia lo g u e b e tw e e n the a g e n c y a n d the N inth C irc u it. In Garfias-Rodriguez , we a pplied the Mo ntgom e ry

W ar d criter ia to Gar fias-Rodriguez and c o n cluded that he did not qualify for r elief. Garfias-Rodriguez , 702 F.3d at 523. Be cause the policies behind the application of the c riteria a re simil ar f or both ca ses, the re sult here is likely to be the same. As in Garfias-Rodriguez , the sec ond and fifth f actor s favor the g overnme nt. Id . at 521–23. In light of the g overnme nt’s interpr et at i on of the unde rlying statutes, the support for that po sit ion by oth e r c ir c uit

c ourt s, and

the B IA’ s d e c isi on

in Torre s- Ga rc ia , Duran Gonzales I was ne ither “a n abrupt de pa rt ur e fr om w e ll e sta

bli sh ed pra c tic e ” no r a

“ c omp le te surprise.” Id

. at 521. Also, the statutory interest in applying the new rule is at le ast as great here as in Garfias-Rodriguez , which re cognized that “non-re troac tivity impairs the uniformity

of a stat u t ory

scheme and the importanc e of un if o r mi ty in immi g r ati o n la

w is w e ll e s ta

b li s h e d

. ” Id . at 523. Assuming that he re, a s in Garfias-Rodriguez , th e f ir st f a c t o r d o e s n o ta

p p l y, and the f

ourth fac tor – the degree of 1G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 23

In G arf i as- R od r igu ez , w e n ot ed: 2

A ltho ugh t he rel i ef he ap p l i ed f

o r i s ul t i m at ely d i scr et i o nary , “ ‘ [t ]here i s a cl ear dif f erence, f

o r t he p urpo ses of ret roac t i vi t y anal y sis, be t ween f aci ng p o ssib le d e p o rta tio n a n d fac ing c e rta in d e p o rta tio n .’” M igu el –M i gu el[ v. G on z al es ] , 500 F. 3d [ 941] , 952 (quo t i ng I

NS v
. St

. Cyr , 5 3 3 U .S . 2 8 9 , 3 2 5 , 1 2 1 S . C t. 22 71 , 15 0 L. E d. 2d 34 7 ( 20 01 ) )

. F urt her mo r e, “dep o rt at i o n al o ne i s a subst ant i al burd en t hat w e ighs agai nst ret ro ac t i ve ap p l i ca t i o n o f an ag en cy adju di cat i on. ” Id

. 702 F. 3d a t 523.
O ur op i ni o n i n G a rf

i a s-R o d ri

g u ez no t es t hat t he “ second and t he t hi rd 3 fac to rs a re c lo se ly in te rtw ine d ,” a n d th a t “[ w ]e h a v e m a d e it c le a r in this
c irc u it tha t t h e se two fac to rs w ill fav o r re tro a c tivity i f a p a rty c o u ld
r eas onabl y ha ve ant i ci pat ed t he cha ng e i n t he l aw s uch t hat t he new r equ i r eme n t w ou l d n ot be a compl et e s u r pr i s e. ” 702 F. 3d a t 521 ( ci t at i on and i nt ernal quo t at i o n m arks om i t t ed ).

T h e Su pr eme Cour t c ommen t ed: 4 [ I ] t i s t he conduct of r emai ni ng i n t he c ount r y af t er e n try tha t i s the p re d ic a te a c tio n ; t h e sta tute a p p lie s to s t op an i ndef

i ni t el y cont i nu i ng vi ol at i o n t hat t he al i en hi m sel f co ul d e nd a t any t i m e b y volunt ari l y l eavi ng t he
co unt ry. I t is t heref

o re t he al i en’ s cho i ce t o co nt i nue burd e n – fa vo rs pe tit io ners, they

would have to make a 2 strongshowingon the sec ond fac tor, relianc e, just to balance the fa ctors. B ut petitioners wo uld be har d presse d to make s u ch a s h o wi n g. The opinion in Garfias-Rodriguez su g g e sts 3 that incurringan additional filingfee and disclosingon e’s il legal pr e se nc e in t

he Un ite d St ate s ma

y no t c on sti tut e relianc e. See70 2 F .3 d at 52 2; see also Fe rnandez-Vargas v. Gonzales , 548 U.S. 30, 44–46 (2006). Thus, it d o es n ot 4G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

24

hi s i l l egal presence, a ft er i l l egal reent ry and af t er t he ef f ect i ve d at e o f

t he new l aw, t hat s ub ject s hi m t o t he
new and l es s ge ner ous l ega l r egi me, not a pas t ac t t hat he i s hel p l ess t o undo up t o t he m o m ent t he G o v e rn m e n t f

ind s h im o u t.
548 U

. S. a t 44. ap p ear t h atm ai n t ai n i n g D u ra n G o n z a l es I ’s re tr oa c tiv ity would work a

“manife st injust ice.”
Th e t h i rd Hegler

exception does not apply beca use no trial was he ld on remand. M o reover, petitioners’ eff ort on rema nd to challeng e Du ra n G onza le s I’s re troac tive eff

ect and to nar row the c lass did not prese nt “substantially differ ent evidenc e.” Hegler , 50 F.3d at 1475. The majority , howeve r, reasons in just a single se ntence , that the sec ond Hegler

excep t i o n is met. I t states: “Having annou n ced a re troac tivity test for Brand X

case s that is at odds with the analy

tical fra mework invoke d in Dur an Go nz ale s I , we a re c ompelled to conclude that the leg al c h an g e e f f e c t e d b y Garfias-Rodriguez

fa lls sq ua

re ly wi thi n the sec ond exception f

or ‘interve ning c ontrolling a uthority .’” Maj. at 15–16.
B ut Garfias-Rodriguez

is not an “interve ning c ontrolling a uth or ity .” F ir st, it co me s af te r the iss ua

nc e of our m and ate in Du ra n G onza le

s I . Second, as note d, Garfias-Rodriguez accepted that the court should def er to the inter

veningG O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 25

T h e en ba n c cou r t e x pl ai n ed: 5 [W ]e a d d re sse d the e ff e c t o f To rr es–G a rc ia in D ur an G o n za l es I , 50 8 F.3d 12 2 7

. A p p l y i ng the f ram ewo rk
e sta b lishe d b y Chev r on a n d Br and X , we def erred t o t he B IA ’ s i nt erpret at i o n of § 21 2 (a)( 9 )( c) i n To rres– G a rc ia , and ov er r u l ed P er ez –G on z al ez
. I d. a t 1242. W e f o und t hat i n P er ez –G on z al ez we had d etermi ned t hat t he rel evant s ect i o ns o f t he IN A were am b i guo us an d t h at t h e B I A h ad n ot , a t t h at t i me, i s s u ed a c o n tro lli n g d e c isio n th a t re so lve d this a m b igu ity. Id

. at 1 2 3 7

– 3 8 ; s ee Br and X , 5 4 5 U .S . a t 9 8 2 , 1 2 5 S . C t. 2688. W e con cl u ded t h at t h e B I A’ s i n t er pr et at i on of § 21 2 (a)( 9 )(C )(i )( II ) i n T o rre s– G a rc ia w a s “c le a rly
rea s on abl e an d i s t h er ef or e en t i t l ed t o Chev r on d ef erence und er Br and X

. ” D u ra n G o n za l es I , 508 F. 3d at 12 4 2

. A cco rdingl y , we co ncl ud ed t hat “ we are b o u n d b y the B IA ’s inte rp re ta tio n o f th e a p p lica b le
s t at u t es i n I

n r e T o rre s– G a rc ia , ev en t houg h t hat inte rp re ta tio n d iff

e rs fro m o u r p rio r in te rp re ta ti o n in P er ez –G on z al ez
. ” Id

. 702 F. 3d a t 511.

T he en b anc o p i ni o n s t at es: “ W e co ncl ud e t hat a liens who are 6 i n admi s s i bl e u n der § 212( a) ( 9) ( C) ( i ) ( I ) ar e n ot e l i g i bl e f or a dj u s t men t of
s t at us un der § 24 5(i ) , an d over r ul e Acos t a t o t he ext ent i t h ol ds ot her wi s e. ” G arf

i as- R od r igu ez , 702 F. 3d a t 514. ag ency ’s d ec i s ion. 702 F.3d at 511. Thus, Ga rfi as 5 Rodriguez

agree s with the substance of Du ra n Go nz ale s I

. I n d eed, Garfias-Rodriguez a c c e p te d the Boa rd of Immigration Appeals deci s ion in In re Briones , 24 I . & N

. De c . 3 55 , 3 71 (B IA 2 00 7), and he ld t hat it wa s r e a so na

ble and entitled to def

ere nce. 702 F.3d at 514.

6
Th e e n b anc c ourt

the n a pp lie d it s r

uli ngto G arf

ia sRod ri gue z an d in do ing so a do pte d a ne w ru le

. B ut Ga rfi as -G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY

26

G a rf i a s-R o d rig u ez d i d no t p rese nt a l aw - o f

- t he

- ca se iss ue b ec au se 7 t here was no f

i nal de ci si o n by t he N i nt h C i rcui t

. A l t ho ugh a t hree- judge p a n e l ha d initially d e n ie d G a rfia s-R o d rig u e z ’s cla im fo r r e li e f, G a rf i a sR od r igu ez v. H ol der , 649 F. 3d 942 , 95 3 ( 9t h C i r
. 20 11 ) , t hat opi ni on ne ver b e c a m e fin a l a n d w a s su p e rs e d e d b y o u r g ra n t o f re h e a rin g e n b a n c
. See G arf i as- R od r igu ez v. H ol der , 67 2 F.3d 11 2 5 (9t h C i r. 20 1 1 ).

T he d i rec t i o n t hat t he M o n t g o m ery W

a rd s t andar d i s t o be app l i ed 8
ca s e- by

- ca s e r ai s es qu es t i on s a s t o w h et h er a c l as s ac t i on c an be mai nt ai ned wh en a r el i ef t ur ns on t he appl i cat i on of t he i ndi vi dual i zed i nq ui ry s et f

o rt h i n M o n t

g o m ery W

a rd

. T he m ajo ri t y l eaves i t t o t he di s t r i ct cour t t o wr es t l e wi t h t hi s i s s ue i n t he f i r s t i ns t anc e. R odriguez

s ay s n o th in ga

b o ut t h e la w - o f

- th e - c a s e d o c trin e, and do e s no t ind ic ate that it wa s to be a pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly

to past in s t an ces in which the Ninth Circuit had defe rre d to an interveningag ency

decision pursua

nt to Brand X

. Rathe r, in 7 light o f t he fa c ts that the a

pp lic atio n of the ne w s tand ard did not result in any

relief to Garf ias-Rodriguez, and t h at five judge s took ex ception to the majority opinion in five diffe rent opinions, it seems questionable that the six judges i n the majority contempla t ed that the ne w standar d they wer e adopting would be applied retroa ctively

. I f they h ad , one wo uld have e xpe c te d th e m to so ind ic ate

. Ins te a d, the y he ld that the Mo ntgom e ry W

ard standard w as to be a

pplied on a case -by -ca se basis wher e the issue is fairly raised. 702 F.3d

8 at 519–20.
Her e, the r etroa ctivity

of D u ra n G on za les I

is n ot f a ir ly raised. Du ra n G onza le

s I stated that, as a

matter of la

w, pet it ione rs we re “ no t e lig ibl e to a dju st the ir status be c a

us e they are ineligible to r ece ive I -212 wa iver s .” 508 F .3d at 1242. Petitioners soug ht rehe aring and rehea ring en banc, but their re quest was de nied and our mandate issued on J anuar y 23, 2009. That should have be en the e nd of the matter

.G O N ZA LES V

. U. S. D EP ’ T O F H OMEL AND S E C UR I TY 27

Pe tit ion e rs , h ow e ve r, pe rs ist e d in re ite ratin gthe ir argume nts c on c e rn ingret ro a c tiv ity

bo th i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt and thi s c ourt until , w e ll a ft e r w e ha d issu e d a n o pin ion de nying the ir se c on d a pp e a l, t he ir argume nt f

ound fa vo r i n a no the r c a se conce rninganother

statute.
Pe tit ion e rs ’ p e rsis tenc e may be a dmi ra

ble , b ut t his is prec isely the ty pe of situation that is cover ed by the law- ofthe-c ase doctrine. O therwise, the order ly development of

the law will be i n h i b ited as pane ls may be re luctant to make a dju stm e nts fo r fe ar the y wi ll und e rm ine pr ior fi na l de c isi on s. Also, parties will be e n courag ed to follow petitioners’ le ad and continually raise alre ady -dec ided issues in the hope that duringthe re sulting dela y s o me dec ision will issue that supports their per spective.
Th e pr ud e nti a l c on c e rn s und e rl yingthe law- of -t he -c a se do c tr ine sh ou ld b e c ontr oll ingwh e re , a s h e re , th e qu e sti on is whether a new Ninth Circuit opinion i n a sepa rate and distinct c a se , whic h a do pts a

ne w r ule of re tr oa c tiv ity , s ho uld

a pp ly to a ru lin gthat ha s b e e n f

ina l f or y e ars . Pe tit ion e rs , who se c la ims we re de te rm ine d to be ba rr e d a s a mat ter of lawin Duran Gonzales , n ow

fi ndthe mse lve s f

or tui tou sly a g a in befor e the Nint h Circuit. Be cause Iwould find that petitioners’ situ ati on does not come w ithin any of the thre e exceptions to the law-of- the-c ase doctrine that we r ecognized i n Hegler , 5 0 F

. 3 d at 1 4 7 5 , I w o u ld h o ld th at o ur 2012 d e c is io nin Garfias-Rodriguez does not cha

ng e the retroa ctivity of our 2007 opinion in Du ra n G onza le s I

. Acc ording ly , Iwould aff

irm the distri ct cour

t’s dismiss al of petitioners’ c ase.