alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3.5

                                    A Novo SA
                              31, rue des Peupliers
                         F-92660 Boulogne cedex, France

                                                              December 14, 2001

A Novo Broadband, Inc.
3015 Greene Street
Hollywood, FL 33020

A Novo Americas LLC
1114 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036

Ladies and Gentlemen:

         Reference is made to that certain Bridge Loan Agreement dated as of
August 29, 2001, as amended by letter dated December 13, 2001, by and among A
Novo Americas LLC ("Parent"), A Novo Broadband, Inc. ("Borrower"), and A Novo SA
("Lender"). Unless otherwise provided herein, all capitalized terms used herein
have the meanings assigned to them in the Bridge Loan Agreement. Borrower has
requested and Lender and Parent have agreed that the loan made under the Bridge
Loan Agreement shall be subordinated to Borrower's bank debt in order to enable
Borrower to increase such bank debt to meet Borrower's operating cash
requirements. Lender and Parent have agreed to execute the bank's required form
of subordination agreement, on the condition that the Conversion Price be
amended as provided herein.

         The Bridge Loan Agreement is amended to change the Conversion Price to
$1.40, which is greater than the average of the closing sales prices of the
Borrower's common stock on the 10 trading days preceding the date hereof
($1.25).



                                            Very Truly Yours,


                                            A NOVO SA



                                            By:/s/ Henri Triebel
                                               --------------------------
                                            Henri Triebel, Chairman of the Board




<PAGE>


Agreed and Accepted:
A NOVO BROADBAND, INC.



By:/s/ Louis Brunel
   ---------------------------
Louis Brunel, President

A NOVO AMERICAS LLC



By:/s/ Louis Brunel
   ---------------------------
Louis Brunel, Executive Manager
_______________________________________ __ Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 28, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh 128055 Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices

v SC: 128055 COA: 256827 Wayne CC: 02-010935-01 GEORGE ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 3, 2004 order of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

p0919 I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 28, 2005

Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Indar Pittam, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 456]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated November 7, 2005 *(People v Pittam,*23 AD3d 412 [2005]), modifying a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered June 18, 2003.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Florio, J.E, Crane, Mastro and Rivera, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31(h)

CERTIFICATIONS

 
I, Jay A. Lewis, certify that:  
1.
I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Entergy Louisiana, LLC;  
2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  
3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrants as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  
4.
The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:   
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including their consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;   
b)  Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;   
c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and   
d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and  
5.
The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):   
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and   
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

			/s/ Jay A. Lewis
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 10-K
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         1,790
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  18,395
<ALLOWANCES>                                   8,408
<INVENTORY>                                    28,257
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               55,716
<PP&E>                                         27,922
<DEPRECIATION>                                 13,168
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 98,960
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          28,047
<BONDS>                                        8,215
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       72
<OTHER-SE>                                     42,252
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   98,960
<SALES>                                        161,860
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               161,860
<CGS>                                          130,763
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  130,763
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               26,513
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             3,801
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,467
<INCOME-TAX>                                   365
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,102
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,102
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .15
        

</TABLE>
97-662.

#### State ex rel. Campbell v. Miller.

In Procedendo. On answer of respondent. Answer treated as motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss sustained. Cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         469,150
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      127
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               469,277
<PP&E>                                       5,286,344
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,744,520)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,976,286
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           40,723
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,014,733
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,976,286
<SALES>                                        262,896
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               262,896
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               146,652
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              74,448
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 20,423
<INCOME-TAX>                                    20,423
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             20,423
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    20,423
<EPS-BASIC>                                       3.99
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.99


</TABLE>
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 7270

DELVIN JAMES WILSON , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, D.O.C. Director , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Virginia

. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:19

- cv - 00657

- JAG

- RCY )

Submitted : March 23, 2021 Decided: March 26, 2021

Before THACKER, QUATTLEBAUM, and R USHING , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Delvin James Wilson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Delvin James Wilson seeks to appeal the dis trict court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s ass essment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.
Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wilson has not made the requisite showing. Wilson fails to contest the district court’s procedural default finding , and therefore has forfeited appellate review of his underlying § 2254 claims. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014). Further, the record supports the district court’s determination that Wilson’s claims were procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability , deny Wil son’s motion seeking leave to file a motion for a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before this court and argument would n ot aid the decisional
process. DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jason Smikle, Appellant.

[978 NYS2d 508]

Appeal from a resentence of the Erie County Court (Michael F. Pietruszka, J.), rendered January 19, 2012. Defendant was resentenced by imposing periods of postrelease supervision upon his conviction of attempted murder in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant was convicted following a jury trial *1358of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]), four counts of attempted murder in the second degree (§§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]), and five counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (§ 265.01 [2]), and he appeals from a resentence with respect to that conviction. County Court originally sentenced defendant to, inter alia, consecutive and concurrent determinate terms of imprisonment of eight years for the attempted murder counts, and we affirmed the judgment of conviction *(People v Smikle,*1 AD3d 883 [2003], *lv denied*1 NY3d 634 [2004]). The sentencing court had failed, however, to impose periods of postrelease supervision with respect to the attempted murder counts as required by Penal Law § 70.45 (1). To remedy that error *(see*Correction Law § 601-d), the court resentenced defendant prior to the completion of his sentence to the same terms of imprisonment and imposed the requisite periods of postrelease supervision.

We reject defendant’s contentions that the imposition of post-release supervision was irrational and that by our prior decision we implicitly affirmed the legality of his sentence, thus precluding the court from imposing periods of postrelease supervision at resentencing. To the contrary, as noted above, postrelease supervision is mandated by statute *(see*Penal Law § 70.45 [1]; *see generally People v Davis,*37 AD3d 1179, 1180 [2007]), and we conclude that “ ‘in resentencing defendant the court simply corrected the error . . . made at the time of the original sentence and thus that the resentence was proper’ ” *(People v Fomby,*103 AD3d 1100, 1100 [2013], lv *denied 21*NY3d 1073 [2013]; *see People v Sparber,*10 NY3d 457, 472 [2008]; *see generally People v Howard,*96 AD3d 1691, 1692 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 1103 [2012]).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the 10V2-year gap between his original sentence and his resentence violated his statutory right to have his sentence pronounced “without unreasonable delay” (CPL 380.30 [1]; *see People v Diggs,*98 AD3d 1255, 1256 [2012], *lv denied*20 NY3d 986 [2012]), and his constitutional due process rights *(see People v Thomas,*68 AD3d 514, 515 [2009]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Finally, the periods of postrelease supervision do not render the sentence unduly harsh or severe. Present — Centra, J.R, Peradotto, Garni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         108,888
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       1,710,688
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,993,003
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  (2,283,613)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,993,003
<SALES>                                        432,650
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,331
<CGS>                                          399,049
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  442,949
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                49,929
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             261,951
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (307,550)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (307,550)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (307,550)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (170.86)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (170.86)
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7216

DAVID J. KOCAYA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;

CHARLES MOLONY CONDON, Attorney General of the

State of South Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. William B. Traxler, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-97-137-6-21AK)

Submitted: July 22, 1998 Decided: July 31, 1998

Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David J. Kocaya, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. Kocaya v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrections, No. CA-97-

137-6-21AK (D.S.C. July 31, 1997). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2

             CERTIFICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 63 1350, the Chief Financial Officer of
Art's-Way Manufacturing Co., Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify that
this Form 10-K and the financial statements thereto fully comply with
the requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-K and the
financial statements thereto fairly present, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

By: /s/ John C. Breitung

Name: John C. Breitung
Chief Financial Officer

Date 2/23/04
#### BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, Enterprise Productions, Inc., and Sunset Securities Co., Plaintiffs, v. LOEW’S INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 3, 1956.

*492Schwartz & Frohlich, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin & Krim, New York City, for defendant.

SUGARMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs move “for an order directing defendant to furnish and produce upon the pretrial examination of defendant’s officers” certain correspondence, reports, memoranda, communications, other documents and classifications, etc. (Motion No. 33 — December 1, 1955 motion calendar).

For the reasons set forth in the decision of a companion motion (No. 32 — • December 1, 1955 motion calendar) between the same parties the instant motion is denied. D.C., 18 F.R.D. 489.

As was there pointed out a “deponent who is examined pursuant to Rule 26 is required to disclose the existence and custody of pertinent records but he is not required to produce them for inspection upon oral demand.”1

This denial is without prejudice to a motion by plaintiffs for discovery and inspection under F.R.Civ.P. 34 showing the requisite good cause.

It appears that a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 45(d) (1) would now serve no purpose for the extent to which such a subpoena might be used, i. e. “the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of [the] books [and] documents” — F.R. Civ.P. 26(b), has been accomplished by testimony already elicited from defendant’s officers at depositions already taken.

It is so ordered.

1

. Chemical Specialties Co., Inc. v. Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., D.C.N.J., 10 F.R.D. 500, 502.
EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Brainworks Ventures, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB/A for the period ending March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lawrence Stumbaugh, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.

 

|   |   |   |                                                    |
|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|        |   |   | /s/ Lawrence Stumbaugh                                  |
|   |   |   |                                                         |
|   |   |   | Lawrence Stumbaugh, Chief Executive OfficerJuly 3, 2003 |