IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01790-COA KELVIN TRAVIS, CAROLYN TRAVIS, AND ALL PERSONS OR ENTITIES AND ALL UNKNOWN PARTIES IN INTEREST CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY AND IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED HEREIN APPELLANTS

v. GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/12/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAW N H. BEAM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: MAURICE MCINTOSH FORSYTH ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: TERRY L. CAVES RISHER GRANTHAM CAVES NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: ORDERED DIVESTITURE AND EXCHANGE OF REAL PROPERTY FROM KELVIN AND CAROLYN TRAVIS TO GMAC MORTGAGE LLC DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/14/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND GREENLEE, JJ. LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In thi s a p p eal, we m ust decide whether the c hancellor abused her discretion when, apply ing the doctrines of equitable est o p p e l and unjust e nrichm ent, she ordered the divestiture and exchange of certain real property f rom Kelvin and Caroly

n Travis to GMAC Mortgage LLC. Finding no abuse of discretion, we af

f irm

.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 2002, Donald Travis received a deed f rom R.C. Travis a n d C h a r l e s Travis, his
f ather and u n cle, t o a parcel o f land identif ied as Parcel A, located in Perry County , M i s s issippi. D onald and his w if e, Joe Ann T ravis, contracted with DIMA H o me s t o
constru c t a house on the property described as Parcel A. They pledged the property as security f or the construction loan. DIMA built the h om e according to Donald’s instructions,

on w hat was believed to be P arcel A. Donald believed the house was b u i l t w ithin the boundaries of the deed. Donald and Joe Ann signed a prom i ssory note and deed of trust with
Hom ecom ings Financial Network Inc., p ledging the house, im provem e n ts, and t h e land described as Parcel A as security f or the loan. Hom ecom ings Financial Network paid of f the DIMA construction loan. ¶3. Donald and J oe Ann lived in the hom e f r om May 2003 until s om etim e in 2010 when they def aulted on the loan. Hom ecom ings Financial Network assigned the deed of trust and note to Nationstar Mortgage LLC in Novem ber 2010. The property w ent into f oreclosure. During that tim e, Donald’s brother and sister-in-law, Kelvin and Caroly n Travis, negotiated

to purchase the hom e f

rom Nationstar. Pursuant to the sale, a title s e arch a n d s urvey were perf orm ed, and the survey revealed that the house was located partly of f of Parcel A. In f

act, the house was l ocated partly on Parcel A, Parcel B , and Parcel C. D o n ald and Kelvin’s

m other owned Parcels B and C. Due to the location of the house, the contract f or the sale of the hom e was cancelled. ¶4. In January 2011, Nationstar f oreclosed i ts d eed o f trust a n d convey e d the property to

2Federal National Mortgage Association. Around the sam e tim e, Kelvin obtained a deed f rom his m other to Parcels B and C. He adm itted at trial that he believed this would enable him

to secure a lower purchase pri c e o f t h e house. Federal National M ortgage Association

c o n v e y e d its interest in the property to GMAC Mortgage LLC in February 2012. A f t e r GMAC a cquired the property , it learned t hat the house was not com p letely located on Parcel
A. ¶5. In July 2 012, Kelvin and Ca r o l y n mo v e d i n t o t h e h o u s e a n d lived there f or approxim a tely t h r ee y e ars, r ent f ree. Kelvin c laim e d that he m ade im provem ents prior to

m oving in to the property , but was unable to show any evidence of expenditures. He stated that h e believed he would eventually obtain tit l e to the house and Parcel A, but adm itted knowing all along that GMAC claim ed title to Parcel A. Kelvin f urther adm itted that neither he, nor Travis, nor their m other objected to the location of the hom e during its c onstruction. ¶6. GMAC f

iled suit i n the Perry C o u n t y C hancery Court a gainst Kelvin and Caroly n (Travises) with claim s of equitable estoppel, unjust en r i c h ment, constructive trust, and ejectm ent. The Travises f iled an a nswer but did not plead any af f irm ative def

e nses or assert

a n y c o u nterclaim s . GMAC proposed to t he chancellor a property exchange wherein t h e Travises would receive a 1.12-acre tract of land—an a creage equal to Parcels B and C; and
GMAC would receive a two-ac r e t r a c t o f land containing t he house—an acreage equal to Parcel A

. The chancellor f ound t hat t he Travises were not bona f ide purchasers f

or value, and t heir occupation of the hom e constituted unjust enrichm ent. Apply ing the doctrines of equitable estoppel and u njust e nrichm ent, the chancellor adopted the proposed exchange of

3land, im

posed a constructive trust, and ordered the ejectm ent of the Travises f rom the hom e. The Travises now appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. Appellate c ourts r eview appeals f rom a chanc e r y c o urt under a l im ited standard of review. W

ard v. Harrell, 1 86 So. 3 d 410, 412 ( ¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations

om itted). “W e will not disturb t h e c h a n c e l l or’s f actual f indings if they were supported by substantial evidence.” Id. W e will reverse the chancellor only i f she abused her discretion,

was m anif

estly wrong or clearly

erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Id.
DISCUSSION ¶8. For the f

irst t im e on appeal, the Travises argue that GMAC, through its predecessors in i nterest, had a duty to survey the land the subject hom e w as constructed on. T he Travises
f urther c ontend that Donald w as s ubjected t o uneven bargaining power with DIMA Hom es during construction of the house. In addition to being barred, we f ind these argum ents lack

m erit. ¶9. It is w ell-settled law that i ssues not raised at trial are procedurally barred on appeal. Conley v. W

right, 193 So. 3d 663, 666 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ( citing Southern v. Miss. State Hosp., 853 So. 2 d 1212, 1215 (¶5) (Miss. 2003)). Not only did the T ravises f a il to raise these issues a t trial, they also f ailed to p lead any a f

f irm ative d e f

e n s e s o r bring any counterclaim s whatsoever bef ore the chancery court. Additionally , in their brief bef ore this
Cou r t , t h e Travises f

ail to cite any relevant l egal authority to support t heir argum ent. W e have p reviously held that “[ f ]ailure to cite to relevant authority results in a waiver of the issue

4on appeal.” McKnight v. State, 187 So. 3 d 635, 653 (¶66) ( Miss. Ct. Ap p . 2 0 1 5 ) ( q u oting

Bennett v. State, 933 S o. 2d 930, 953 (¶86) (Miss. 2006)). The Travises’ f ailure to b ring their
argum ents bef

ore t he chancery court, as well as t heir f ailure to p resent any r elevant l e g al authority bef ore this Court, waived the consideration of their claim s on appeal. ¶10. Notwithstanding waiver o f their claim s, the Travises’ contention that the chancellor

was m anif

estly w rong i s w ithout m erit. W e note that a “chancellor’s rem edial powers have long been m arked by p lasticity .” Scafidi v. Hill e , 1 8 0 S o . 3 d 634, 654 (¶67) (Miss. 2015) (citing Hall v. W

ood, 443 So. 2d 834, 843 (Miss. 1983)). And “[ e]quity j urisdiction perm its innovation t hat justice m ay be done.” Id. In apply ing the doctrine o f e quitable estoppel, the Mississippi Suprem e Court has stated the f ollowing: [ I]f one ma n k n owingly , though he does it passively by looking on, suf f ers another t o pu r c h a s e , and expend his m oney on land, under an erroneous opinion o f t itle, without m aking known his claim , he should not af t erwards be perm itted to exercise his legal right against such person. It would be an act of f raud and injustice, and his conscience is bound by an equitable estoppel. Elchos v. Haas, 178 So. 3d 1183, 1193-94 (¶31) (Miss. 2015). ¶11. Here, t h e c h a n cellor f ound that the Travises—including Donald, Kelvin, and their

m other—passively looked on w hile GMAC’s predecessor in interest ( DIMA) built the hom e

o n Parcels A, B , and C, without ever m aking known their claim s to Par c e l s B a n d C

. Accordingly , the chancellor f ound they were e qui t a b l y estopped f rom claim ing title to the house and the portions of land upon which it was constructed. ¶12. In r egard to the chancellor’s application of unjust enrichm ent and constructive trust,

our suprem e court has m a de i t clear they are equitable rem edies. Germany v. Germany, 123

5So. 3d 423, 431 (¶20) ( Miss. 2013) (citing McNeil v. Hester, 753 S o. 2d 1 0 5 7 , 1 064 (¶24)

(Miss. 2000)). T he suprem e court has stated, a n d t h e c hancellor so noted, that “[ u]njust enrichm ent applies to situations where t here is no legal contract and the person s ought to be charged i s in possession of m on e y o r p r o perty which in good conscience and j ustice he should not retain but should deliver to another.” Ground Control LLC v. C apsco Indus. Inc.,
120 S o. 3d 365, 3 71 (¶13) ( Miss

. 2 013) (internal citations and quotation m arks om itted). And a constructive trust is “created f or the purpose of preventing unjust e n richm ent by one who h o lds legal title to p r o perty w hich, under principles o f justice and f airness, rightf

ully belongs to another.” Jackson v. Mills, 197 S o . 3 d 430, 439 ( ¶37) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing McNeil, 753 So. 2d at 1064 (¶24)). ¶13. Here, t he chancellor f ound that the T ravises w ere not bona f i de purchasers of

Parcels B, C, or the house, a s they d id not pay any value f or the land or hom e, and they occupied the hom e with actual notice of GMAC’s claim of right. As s uch, the chancellor f ound that the Travises’ occupation of GMAC’s property , w i thout pay m e nt o f value, constituted unjust enrichm ent and w a r ranted t he im position o f a constructive trust. Further, t he property exchange ordered by the chancellor gave the Travises a tract of land com m ensurate with the size and value o f Parcels B and C as originally convey e d to them in 2011. W e do not f ind that the chan c e l lor was m anif estly wrong in her application of these e q uitable doctrines to f ashion the rem edy

herein. Theref

ore, the Travises’ claim

is without m e rit. ¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE P E R R Y C O U N T Y C H A N C E R Y C O U R T IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS OF THIS A P PEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

6I RVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ. , B A R N E S , I S H E E , C A R L T O N , F A I R , W I L S O N , GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

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