United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-1491

___________

Kurt Dixon; Big Mamou, Inc., *

*

Plaintiffs/Appellees, *

*

v. *

*

Mike Lowery, individually and in *

his official capacity; Tim Calhoun, *

individually and in his official capacity, *

* Appeals from the United States

Defendants/Appellants, * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Louie Caudell, in his official capacity *

as Chief of the Little Rock Police *

Department; City of Little Rock, *

Arkansas, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

No. 01-1632

___________

Kurt Dixon; Big Mamou, Inc., *

*

Plaintiffs/Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

Mike Lowery, individually and in *

his official capacity; Tim Calhoun, *
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individually and in his official capacity, *

Louie Caudell, in his official capacity *

as Chief of the Little Rock Police *

Department, City of Little Rock, *

Arkansas, *

*

Defendants/Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: December 11, 2001

Filed: August 16, 2002

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Mike Lowery and Tim Calhoun (appellants) appeal from the district court's

denial of their motion for summary judgment. They argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity from suit by Kurt Dixon and the Big Mamou, Inc. (collectively

referred to as "Dixon") because they did not violate a clearly established

constitutional right when they helped a private party acquire possession of the Big

Mamou–a restaurant that had been owned and operated by Dixon–and that their acts

did not constitute an unreasonable seizure of property under color of state law. Dixon

cross-appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of

Little Rock (the City) and its chief of police. Among other contentions, Dixon argues

that the City and police chief ratified the acts of the law enforcement officers when

they allowed the officers to remain at the Big Mamou in the face of his complaints

that he was being improperly deprived of the property. We affirm in part and remand

in part.
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I. BACKGROUND

Dixon operated the Big Mamou restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas. Aaron

Omar (Omar) approached Dixon about consolidating the Big Mamou with a daiquiri

bar chain. Under this arrangement, Dixon would own forty-nine percent of the new

establishment and would be paid a salary, and remodeling would be done in a manner

that would not interfere with the restaurant's operations. Dixon was to continue

operating the Big Mamou at all times. On the condition that Omar would present

Dixon with proof of his forty-nine percent ownership and a note in the amount of

$25,000 in order to close the deal, Dixon signed an asset purchase and sale agreement

with the closing date left blank, a bill of sale, an assignment of lease, and a letter

authorizing Omar's company to use the Big Mamou's business and liquor licenses.

Omar and his business partner told Dixon they would send him a copy of the

paperwork and advise him of the closing date, but failed to do so. Dixon repeatedly

demanded that Omar provide him with a copy of the preliminary and executed

documentation, but Omar refused.

Omar later pressured one of Dixon's employees into giving him a key to the Big

Mamou. Dixon still had not received documentation of his ownership or

consideration for the transaction when he learned that Omar had obtained a key.

Consequently, Dixon changed the locks to the restaurant. Omar learned that his key

to the Big Mamou no longer worked and confronted Dixon. Dixon demanded the

documentation to close the transaction, and Omar threatened to tear up all existing

paperwork and then left.

Omar subsequently sought the assistance of his friend, Harold Allison, who

was with the enforcement division of Arkansas Alcohol Beverage Control, and

together they contacted Captain Lowery at police headquarters. According to

Lowery, Omar said that "he needed to hire some off-duty officers to go out [to the Big

Mamou] and stand by while the locksmith changed the locks, and then he wanted the
1

Although Lowery also arranged for eight other officers' off-duty employment

at the Big Mamou, and other officers were involved on the date Dixon was

dispossessed of the Big Mamou, this appeal only involves Lowery and Calhoun.

Nonetheless, given that we are reviewing issues arising from appellants' motion for

summary judgment, we draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving parties.

Avemco Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv., Inc., 242 F.3d 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2001);

Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1998).

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officers to secure the business because he had valuable equipment in there and he was

going to close the business and renovate it." Lowery accepted Omar's offer of

employment but did not further investigate Omar. Lowery approved his own off-duty

employment and that of Sergeant Calhoun.1

 

Lowery and Calhoun proceeded to the Big Mamou in city police cars and were

the first to arrive at a parking lot near the Big Mamou. When Omar and a locksmith

arrived, Lowery and Calhoun, wearing their uniforms, badges, and side arms,

accompanied them to the restaurant. Officers asked employees of the Big Mamou

how many exits were in the restaurant and where they were located. Lowery and

Calhoun stood watch while the locksmith changed the locks. Lowery also stood

watch while one of Omar's business associates placed a closed sign on the restaurant's

door. Calhoun accompanied Omar, Omar's business associate, and their attorney into

the restaurant. When an employee went into the kitchen to telephone Dixon, an

officer followed the employee. Lowery and Calhoun told employees that they needed

to leave the restaurant. They also stood watch while the workers gathered their

belongings and left. Officers escorted employees to the front door of the restaurant

and locked the door behind them. Some of the officers stayed inside. Lowery and

Calhoun took possession of the keys to the restaurant when Omar left. After Omar

departed, Dixon and his family arrived and found the door was locked. Lowery and

Calhoun allowed them inside for about ten minutes. All of Dixon's business records

remained inside the restaurant and, under the officers' watch, fixtures and personal

property were removed.
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Dixon filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs Division of the Little Rock

Police Department and he and his employees had given statements to Internal Affairs

by December 11, 1998. On December 17, 1998, Omar gave a statement to the

Internal Affairs Division, revealing that, under the contract between himself and

Dixon, he owed Dixon $25,000. Lowery and Calhoun, along with other Little Rock

law enforcement officers, maintained their "off-duty" employment at the Big Mamou

until December 31, 1998, when Dixon filed suit and the chief of police told them to

terminate their work at the Big Mamou.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact regarding the qualified immunity defense and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 868 (8th

Cir. 1998). More specifically, we must determine if appellants have established that

there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dixon asserted a violation

of a federal right and whether that right was clearly established. Id. "The relevant,

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). When various courts

have determined that certain factually similar conduct is a constitutional violation, the

constitutional right to be protected against such conduct is considered clearly

established even if courts have not agreed upon a precise formulation of the violation.

Id. at 2157.
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B. Constitutional Violations and Reasonableness

Dixon has asserted a violation of his constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He

claims that the officers unlawfully seized his real and personal property and remained

in possession of that property for some time after the initial seizure. 

Among other safeguards, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

seizures of property. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61-

62 (1992). A seizure of property occurs when "'there is some meaningful interference

with an individual's possessory interests in that property.'" Id. at 61 (quoting United

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). It is well settled that a seizure carried

out without judicial authorization is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a welldefined exception to this requirement. E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

443, 474, 484 (1971); Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1994); United States

v. South Half of Lot 7 and Lot 8, Block 14, 876 F.2d 1362, 1371 (8th Cir. 1989); see

also Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71 (stating that, had officers acted pursuant to a court order

in seizing a mobile home, "a showing of unreasonableness . . . would be a laborious

task indeed," and that "had the ejection . . . properly awaited the state court's

judgment it [was] quite unlikely that the federal court would have been bothered with

a § 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation"); Michigan v. Tyler, 436

U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (stating that, under the Fourth Amendment, "'one governing

principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been

followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private

property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by

a valid search warrant'") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387

U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)). Absent exigent circumstances or a valid consent, prior to

the state assisting in depriving a party of possession, a neutral officer or magistrate

must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the claiming party is

entitled to the relief requested. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66; see also Mitchell v. W. T.
2

Appellants argue that Dixon is unable to "establish his right to exclusive

possession of the premises." However, he was denied any possession, despite the

purported arrangement for him to continue to operate the restaurant while retaining

a forty-nine percent interest. An interest amounting to less than all of the proverbial

"bundle of sticks" is nonetheless a protected property interest.

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Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 625 (1974) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (finding that in

the due process context, constitutional requirements are satisfied where state law

requires that a creditor furnish adequate security and "make a specific factual showing

before a neutral officer or magistrate of probable cause" prior to the state aiding in

sequestering property of a defaulting debtor, and then accords an opportunity for an

adversary hearing promptly after sequestration to determine the merits of the

controversy). We have said that authorizing governmental seizures to be carried out

without a determination by a judicial officer could lead to improper seizures and

"would make a nullity and mockery of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees"

and "[t]his we refuse to do." South Half, 876 F.2d at 1371. These constitutional

protections exist regardless of whether an officer is acting in a criminal or civil

capacity. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 69, 71; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335

(1985). 

In this case, appellants, for good reason, do not challenge the established law,

but instead question whether Dixon had a continuing property interest sufficient to

support a constitutional violation. Lowery and Calhoun argue that documentation,

including an asset purchase and sale agreement and a lease assignment, precluded

Dixon from having a clear right to sole possession of the property.2

 In particular, they

argue that Dixon's lease assignment to Omar demonstrates that Dixon was not

deprived of a constitutionally protected property right. Appellants' Brief at 10, 13-14.

However, appellants acknowledge that Dixon had an arguable, if disputed,

interest in the Big Mamou. They state that "[w]hile Dixon might have had success

in setting aside the contract for sale or the assignment of the lease in an action based
3

To avoid unlawful dispossession, Arkansas has in place various means to

determine whether a tenant is improperly holding over and to peaceably resolve such

matters through legal means. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 18-16-201 (ejectment for

nonpayment of rent); Bolin v. Drainage Dist. No. 17, 176 S.W.2d 143 (Ark. 1943)

(unlawful detainer action); Dell v. Gardner, 25 Ark. 134 (Ark. 1867) (assumpsit

action for use and occupation).

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upon a fraudulent inducement to sign these documents, the fact remains that until he

did so, he was not clearly entitled to possession of the property to the exclusion of

Omar." (Emphasis added). Appellants' argument misses the mark. Dixon's claim is

not concerned with whether Omar could be excluded, but whether Dixon could be

excluded. In that vein, appellants have conceded a great deal in stating that they "do

not . . . dispute Dixon's argument that he had been tricked into signing and delivering

up" the documents upon which appellants relied in assisting Omar. To borrow

appellants' phrase "the fact remains" that Omar was not clearly entitled to sole

possession of the property to the exclusion of Dixon. 

Dixon obviously had arguable property interests. Employees alerted appellants

that Dixon had not received documents necessary to finalize the arrangement and that

they did not think the deal between Dixon and Omar was complete. Moreover, the

purchase and sale agreement stated that the "Seller shall relinquish possession upon

closing," but it was apparent that no closing had transpired, as indicated by the

absence of a closing date. Also, the purchase agreement included assumption of

lease obligations as only one component of the purchase price and, again, the sale had

not closed. 

Even if we were to presume that the deal had been consummated and that Omar

had assumed the lease, the evidence is clear that Dixon still maintained an interest in

various items of personal property on the premises and possibly in all aspects of the

business itself. Omar had not bothered to pursue eviction through appropriate

means.3

 Indeed, Omar advised the officers that he did not have a court order allowing
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him to take possession of the premises, and there was an obvious disagreement over

who was entitled to possession. Furthermore, in a deposition, Calhoun acknowledged

his belief that Dixon had a possessory interest when he referred to Omar indicating

that he was no longer going to "allow [Dixon] to continue to rent" the Big Mamou.

(Emphasis added). Essentially, in the face of an apparent property dispute,

appellants chose to decide on the spot who should prevail. 

Appellants' argument that Dixon's property rights were not clear falls short.

Even if a claim to continued possession is in dispute, that possessory interest is still

constitutionally protected. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 58-59, 72; cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407

U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (indicating that in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

protection of "property" is not limited to "safeguard only the rights of undisputed

ownership," but has been read broadly to extend protection to "'any significant

property interest'" and that the appellants had been "deprived of such an interest in

. . . replevied goods–the interest in continued possession and use of the goods" that

they had acquired under "conditional sales contracts that entitled them to possession

and use of the chattels before transfer of title" (citation omitted)); Gentry v. Lee's

Summit, 10 F.3d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1993) (indicating that when the government

entity acted "abruptly and summarily" in the face of "evidence that might be

characterized as contrary to the conclusion that . . . premises were abandoned," it

"gambled that it was correct in its conclusions"). In Soldal, allegations that a trailer

home was removed from a rented lot in a mobile home park, in the presence of

officers who knew there was no eviction order, sufficed to constitute an actionable

seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, despite the trailer having been

removed pursuant to the park owner's claim that the trailer owner had failed to pay

rent for the lot. 506 U.S. at 58-59, 72. In Gentry, a leasehold and trade fixtures were

protected by the Constitution despite the city's belief that they had been abandoned.

10 F.3d at 1343-44. There, we concluded that the city could not "escape § 1983
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liability unless [the plaintiff] had no interest for the Constitution to protect." Id. at

1345. 

Although we may not require officers to "parse a state court order with the

legal acumen of lawyers and federal judges," Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First

Nat'l Bank, 286 F.3d 498, 503 (8th Cir. 2002) (4-1-4 decision) (plurality opinion of

Loken, J.), we do require that, absent exigencies or consent–neither of which were

present here–officers rely on the legal acumen of a neutral judicial officer in such

disputes. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66, 71-72; South Half, 876 F.2d at 1371. The Court has

said, again in the context of due process, that an officer's on-site assessment is no

substitute for an "informed evaluation by a neutral official." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83;

accord Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 625. A claimant's assertions to law enforcement officers

"test no more than the strength of [his] own belief in his rights." Fuentes, 407 U.S.

at 83. The reasoning in due process cases like Fuentes and Gentry helps demonstrate

the wisdom behind the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 

Appellants attempt to recast the posture of the matter by claiming that Dixon

did not have a clear property right to sole possession, but what is important is that he

had a property interest that was clearly in dispute. E.g., Soldal, 506 U.S. at 58-59, 71-

72. Whether Dixon had a protected property interest is a material fact that is still in

dispute and therefore is not an appropriate issue for summary judgment. Cf. id.;

Gentry, 10 F.3d at 1345. Under the Fourth Amendment, seizure of property without

a warrant, in circumstances such as those present in this case, is unreasonable. E.g.,

Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66, 71-72; South Half, 876 F.2d at 1371. Lowery and Calhoun

admit the lack of exigent circumstances in their statement, "There was no dispute

going on while [they] were there, and the actual takeover by Omar . . . was peaceful."

They ask us to leave every property seller who has entered into a purchase and sale

agreement, but not yet received compensation for their property, vulnerable to having

their property confiscated through the assistance of law enforcement officers. We

decline their invitation. 
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Law enforcement officers in general are well aware of the need for a neutral

determination of property rights. See Jackson v. Arkansas, No. CACR96-1015, 1997

WL 556302, at *1 (Ark. App. Sept. 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (discussing

sheriff's deputies' refusal to evict tenant because it was a "civil matter"). Remarkably,

officers' awareness of the need for some judicial determination in this particular

situation is validated by Calhoun's own statement to the Internal Affairs Division and

an Internal Affairs report of its investigation. Calhoun stated that he and Lowery

explained to Omar that the only way police could ask those in possession of property

to leave was "if [the ouster] actually had an eviction notice[,] which they said they did

not have." Similarly, in response to a deposition question regarding why Calhoun

knew it was inappropriate to become involved in civil disputes over property,

Calhoun stated "that's up to the courts to decide . . . I can't look at something . . . and

decide who's right or who's wrong on civil matters." Perhaps even more telling of

reasonable officers' knowledge is the Internal Affairs report, which states that "[t]he

general isolation of municipal police officers in civil or chancery matters such as

evictions and/or property disputes as is clearly in evidence in this matter is so well

established as to make it utterly inconceivable that two experienced, senior officers

such as Captain Lowery and Sergeant Calhoun would behave as has been alleged by

Mr. [Dixon]. While Captain Lowery and Sergeant Calhoun obviously assisted in

securing the business after the fact, they did not close the business or evict the

employees." 

Although the Internal Affairs Division's analysis helps establish that "it would

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted," Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156, its ultimate conclusion exonerating Lowery

and Calhoun is not determinative for summary judgment purposes. E.g., Avemco Ins.

Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv., Inc. 242 F.3d 819, 821 (8th Cir. 2001) ("We view the

facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment may only

be granted if there are no disputes concerning material facts and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations omitted.)). The report further
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indicates that various individuals' statements about what the officers did were in

conflict, with some individuals indicating that the officers participated in ousting

them from the premises. Such conflicting evidence on this equally material fact

disqualifies the matter as one for summary judgment. Id. 

It is undisputed that Lowery and Calhoun arrived at the Big Mamou in a city

police car, wearing badges, uniforms, and side arms. After parking the police car in

front of the restaurant's entrance, they stood watch while Omar had the locks changed.

They also accompanied Omar and company into the restaurant and stood watch while

employees gathered their belongings. After they helped clear the employees from the

building, they took possession of the key and locked the restaurant. When the Dixons

and Mrs. Dixon's parents arrived, the latter were told "I just got you all out of here

and now I gotta kick all of you out again." When Dixon arrived, he found the door

locked and was allowed entrance by Lowery and Calhoun for about ten minutes.

They advised him that he could contact Omar and that "this whole thing was a civil

process, but maybe if they could get together they could work it out without having

to go to court." Although appellants cite various state cases regarding the effect of

an apparent lease on parties' possessory interests, they fail to acknowledge that which

they have previously recognized–that law enforcement officers are not the appropriate

arbiters of these disputed interests.

Unlike Audio Odyssey–where this court disagreed about whether seizure of a

business pursuant to a writ of replevin for personal property was unreasonable–here

there was no court order to seize any property. Cf. 286 F.3d at 502-03 (plurality

opinions of Hansen, C.J., & Loken, J.) (indicating that an initial seizure of a business

was constitutionally reasonable because the deputy sheriff relied on a writ of

replevin). Also in contrast to that case, the officers commandeered the facility

themselves to the exclusion of the current possessor, which is evidenced by their

various alleged statements. For instance, when an employee attempted to turn a big

screen television off, one officer is alleged to have said "no you just leave that on,
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we're going to make ourselves at home, we're going to be staying here at night. And

we're going to make ourselves at home." The officers continued to occupy the Big

Mamou until Dixon filed suit and their superiors ordered them to terminate their

employment at the Big Mamou–a period of more than three weeks. 

 

Given the record, we find that appellants are not entitled to summary judgment

on the issue of qualified immunity. Dixon has properly asserted a violation of a

constitutional right and there are sufficient facts alleged to support the finding that

reasonable officers in appellants' positions would have known that their conduct

violated that right.

C. Seizure

Appellants further claim that no action taken by them resulted in the unlawful

seizure of any property in which Dixon had a proveable interest, and that "[a]t all

times, [they] were present only to provide security to the building and to stand by in

the event there was a breach of the peace between Dixon and Omar." Given the facts

we have discussed thus far, appellants' assertion is unpersuasive. 

Lowery and Calhoun admit that they were present while Omar had the building

re-keyed, that Omar gave them a key, that they were standing by while Omar

determined that "the premises were going to be peacefully returned to him,"and that

they remained at Omar's instruction to provide security overnight. They argue that

it "was only after Omar . . . had stated [he] was exercising his right as the owner to

close the business early[ ] and had changed the locks and left them to provide

security" that ""[a]t most, [they] told people they needed to wait outside for the

Dixons, or told them to get their things together and leave." In other words,

appellants argue that they did not take part in seizing the property because they only

asked employees to leave after Omar took over the premises. They ask us to draw

a line between their actions prior to and after the locksmith changed the lock. This
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we will not do. Appellants' alleged actions on both sides of and during the re-keying

helped effectuate the seizure of the Big Mamou.

The facts of this case are much like those of Soldal. In Soldal, a trailer park

owner alerted the sheriff's department that she was going to remove plaintiff's trailer

home from the park and "requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any

possible resistance." 506 U.S. at 58. The deputies accompanied the park owner while

her employees took possession of the trailer, and one deputy explained to the trailer

owner that he was there merely to see that the trailer owner did not interfere with the

park owner's work. Id. As earlier indicated, the Court concluded that the alleged

facts sufficed to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 72. We find no meaningful distinction between the situation in Soldal and the

one before us. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the district court denying

appellants summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

D. Cross-Appeal

On cross-appeal, Dixon argues that the policies and practices of the City and

police chief that allowed its supervising officers authority to determine the

appropriateness of their off-duty work led to the violation of Dixon's constitutional

rights. As the district court recognized, Dixon has failed to establish that the policies

and actions of the City and police chief evidence deliberate indifference to the rights

of individuals like Dixon. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989);

Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 934 (8th Cir. 1991). We therefore affirm

the decision of the district court on this point. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

More troubling is Dixon's claim that the City and chief of police essentially

ratified officers' actions when it failed to order them to cease their "round-the-clock

occupation" of the Big Mamou after Dixon promptly complained to Internal Affairs

about the deprivation of his property by the officers and after all of his employees had
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given statements to Internal Affairs. The officers were not ordered to cease their

occupation until well after Omar advised Internal Affairs that he owed Dixon $25,000

for the property. A decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion may

result in municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions it officially sanctioned

or ordered. Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1401 (8th Cir. 1988). Unfortunately,

the record below provides us with no guidance on whether there are disputes of

material facts on the issue of municipal liability for the alleged ratification of the

officers' occupation. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-84

(1986); Williams, 863 F.2d at 1401. Because the court failed to respond to Dixon's

complaint that the City and police department ratified the officers' actions, we remand

for development of the record as to whether municipal liability may be imposed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and consistent with precedent, for the failure to order

the officers to cease this off-duty employment earlier. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-

84; Williams, 863 F.2d at 1401.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons we have stated, we affirm the decision of the district court in

all respects, except as to whether summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of

liability of the City and police chief for allowing the officers to maintain their

employment at the Big Mamou until December 31, 1998. On the latter issue, we

remand for the court to address Dixon's complaint and develop the record.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.