In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1195

WOMEN’S HEALTH LINK, INC.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

FORT WAYNE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CORP.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:14‐cv‐00107‐RLM — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 2, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 22, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and YANDLE,

District Judge.

*

  

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendant, colloquially re‐

ferred to as “Citilink,” is a municipal corporation that pro‐

vides bus service in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and also has regu‐

latory authority over advertisements both inside the buses

and on the buses’ exterior. The plaintiff is a nonprofit corpo‐

 

* Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.  
2 No. 16‐1195

ration (which we’ll call Health Link for the sake of brevity)

that provides health care for women in Fort Wayne. It want‐

ed to post the following advertisement in Citilink’s buses:

Citilink refused to allow the ad to be posted. It forbids

public service ads that “express or advocate opinions or po‐

sitions upon political, religious, or moral issues.” Although

the proposed ad did not express or advocate any such opin‐

ion or position, Citilink discovered that Health Link, alt‐

hough it provides a variety of uncontroversial health ser‐

vices, mainly in the form of referrals to providers of health

care, is pro‐life and so suggests (though not in the ad) that

women with unplanned or crisis pregnancies consider

health care and related services that provide alternatives to

abortion, such as adoption counseling. Since abortion is gen‐

erally regarded as a moral issue, Citilink concluded that

Health Link’s proposed ad was ineligible to appear in or on

Citilink buses, even though the ad itself—as any reader of
No. 16‐1195 3

this opinion can see—contains not the faintest reference to

abortion or its alternatives.

Furthermore, anyone seeing the ad (were it to be posted

in the bus) who navigated to its Web address—

womenshealthlink.org (visited June 22, 2016, as were the

other websites cited in this opinion)—would find no sugges‐

tion that Health Link is pro‐life without clicking, in the web‐

site, a link labeled “Get Help,” and then within “Get Help”

another link, labeled “Diaper Project,” where the viewer

learns that Health Link gives diapers to pregnant women

who carry their babies to term rather than aborting them. In

a pamphlet available for download, underneath the heading

“Help You Can Count On—Medical,” the words “abortion”

and “adoption” appear, but just the words—there is no am‐

plification. And finally in a link labeled “About Us” appears

the statement that “Women’s Health Link is leading Fort

Wayne to become a community of choice for life affirming

healthcare for young women,” but “life affirming” is not de‐

fined, nor does it necessarily refer to abortion, see, e.g.,

“Life‐Affirming,” Merriam‐Webster Dictionary, www.merriam

‐webster.com/dictionary/life‐affirming. Absent from the

website (as from the ad) is any discussion of abortion.

The basis on which Citilink refused to allow the ad to be

posted in its buses appears to have been the mention of “life

affirming healthcare” or more likely a connection between

Health Link and Allen County Right to Life—the person

who first emailed Citilink about the ad did so from an Allen

County Right to Life email account, and the two organiza‐

tions share a street address. Yet neither the ad nor Health

Link’s website mentions Allen County Right to Life, though

the link between the two entities was a clue that “life affirm‐
4 No. 16‐1195

ing healthcare” in Health Link’s website might well be a pro‐

life slogan.

It is against this background that Health Link has sued

Citilink charging it with, among other violations of constitu‐

tional rights, arbitrarily denying freedom of expression, the

arbitrariness consisting in the fact that Health Link’s pro‐

posed ad complies fully with the conditions set forth in Citi‐

link’s rules. It is a public service announcement that does not

so much as hint at advocating or endorsing any political,

moral, or religious position. Even if one goes behind the ad

to the organization’s website, one must go to the mission

statement and the “Diaper Project” pages for an indication of

a pro‐life position. Yet the district judge granted summary

judgment in favor of Citilink. He shouldn’t have.

The parties have treated us to an unedifying tour of what

is called “forum analysis.” As we explained in Illinois

Dunesland Preservation Society v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Re‐

sources, 584 F.3d 719, 722–24 (7th Cir. 2009), the Supreme

Court has created a methodology for analyzing the public’s

right to access government property for expressive purpos‐

es, where “forum” denotes public property usable for ex‐

pressive activity by members of the public (“private speech”

in forum jargon). The methodology distinguishes a “tradi‐

tional public forum” from a “designated public forum” and

both from a “nonpublic forum.” See Perry Education Associa‐

tion v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46

(1983).

A traditional public forum is a street, sidewalk, or park,

or some other type of public property that like a street,

sidewalk, or park has for a very long time (“time out of

mind,” as some cases put it, or “from time immemorial,” as
No. 16‐1195 5

others say) been used for expressive activity, such as

marches, picketing, and leafletting. See, e.g., id. at 45. A des‐

ignated public forum, illustrated by a public theater, is a fa‐

cility that the government has created to be, or has subse‐

quently opened for use as, a site for expressive activity. Usu‐

ally, as in the case of a public theater, “designated forums”

are available for specified forms of private expressive activi‐

ty or at specified times: plays, in the case of a theater, rather

than political speeches. Such limitations are permitted; the

public owner of a theater need not throw it open for political

rallies even though it is physically suited for being so used.

But the government is not allowed to discriminate among

the plays performed in the theater on the basis of the ideas

or opinions that the plays express. See Southeastern Promo‐

tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975). “Once a forum

is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, gov‐

ernment may not prohibit others from assembling or speak‐

ing on the basis of what they intend to say.” Police Dept. of

City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S 92, 95–96 (1972).

The third category—the “nonpublic forum”—consists of

government‐owned facilities like the Justice Department’s

auditorium that could be and sometimes are used for private

expressive activities but are not primarily intended for such

use. Government can limit private expression in such a facil‐

ity to expression that furthers the purpose for which the fa‐

cility was created. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educa‐

tional Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).

Some decisions recognize a fourth category, variously

called a “limited designated public forum” (what Shake‐

speare’s Polonius would have called “a vile phrase”), a “lim‐

ited public forum,” or a “limited forum.” The terms denote a
6 No. 16‐1195

public facility limited to the discussion of certain subjects or

reserved for some types or classes of speaker, such as an

open space in a state university in which members of the

university community and their guests—but not uninvited

outsiders—are allowed to give talks. See Gilles v. Blanchard,

477 F.3d 466, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2007).

It is difficult to discern the difference between such re‐

strictions and the selection that the director of a state theater

has to make among theater groups clamoring for access to

the stage. Indeed it is rather difficult to see what work “fo‐

rum analysis” in general does. It is obvious both that every

public site of private expression has to be regulated to some

extent and that the character of permitted regulation will

vary with the differences among the different types of site.

Street demonstrations have to be regulated to prevent block‐

ing traffic, and the use of a state theater has to be regulated

to ration the use of a limited facility and maintain quality,

and obviously the regulations will be very different. The

constant, however, is that regulation is not to be used as a

weapon to stifle speech just because it is unpopular. And

that means that we don’t have to decide which type of forum

makes the best fit with the display surfaces in and on Citi‐

link’s buses; for its refusal to allow Health Link’s ad to be

displayed is an unjustifiable, because arbitrary and discrimi‐

natory, restriction of free speech.

We remind the reader that the refusal to publish the ad

had nothing to do with its contents, which are as we’ve seen

innocuous. Compare American Freedom Defense Initiative v.

Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation

(SMART), 698 F.3d 885, 888, 892–96 (6th Cir. 2012), uphold‐

ing a transit authority’s decision to bar, as a violation of the
No. 16‐1195 7

authority’s ban on political and moral advertisements, an

advertisement that read: “Fatwa on your head? Is your fami‐

ly or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Ques‐

tions? Get Answers! RefugefromIslam.com.” Health Link’s

ad, in contrast to the Fatwa ad, is not political, religious, or

moral––types of ad that Citilink bans, whether validly or in‐

validly, from its buses.

We know that Health Link is pro‐life, but nothing in the

ad reveals that, and Citilink’s official “Policy Governing All

Advertising in or upon Citilink Vehicles and Facilities” is

limited to material forbidden to be contained in ads in or on

its buses. Prohibited is an advertisement that “contains pro‐

fane language,” or “contains an image or description of vio‐

lence,” or constitutes “material that incites, describes, de‐

picts, or represents sexual activities or images or description

of human sexuality or anatomy in a way that the average

adult, applying contemporary community standards, would

find appeals to the prurient interest,” or is libelous, or en‐

courages passengers on Citilink’s buses to disregard transit

safety, and so on. There is nothing wrong with these prohibi‐

tions. Government is not required to allow every interior

surface of a government facility to be plastered over with

obscene, libelous, threatening, vicious, or bigoted placards

and pictures. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298

(1974); Illinois Dunesland Preservation Society v. Illinois Dept. of

Natural Resources, supra, 584 F.3d at 724. But none of the pro‐

hibitions listed in Citilink’s unexceptionable table of exclu‐

sions is violated by Health Link’s proposed ad, the banning

of which can only be deemed discriminatory.

Nothing in Citilink’s statement of policy suggests a con‐

cern with what may lie behind an innocuous ad—which
8 No. 16‐1195

might be a website containing forbidden matter or an organ‐

ization that violated one or more of the restrictions in Citi‐

link’s advertising policy. Nothing in Health Link’s proposed

ad violates any of the restrictions. Probably nothing in its

website either, but the website’s content is irrelevant be‐

cause, to repeat, Citilink’s policy does not extend to web‐

sites.

And if one looks up the list of organizations permitted to

advertise in or on Citilink’s buses, one finds a number that

for aught that appears engage in activities that could be con‐

sidered to be, or to have a flavor of, the moral, the religious,

or the political, including services for immigrant communi‐

ties, a crusade against crime, advocacy of vaccination, pro‐

motion of health care, get‐out‐the‐vote campaigns, and a law

firm that specializes in disability cases and advertises itself—

in apparent violation of Citilink’s ad policy—as consistent

with “Christian character.” Above all, Citilink allows United

Way to advertise in its buses even though the website of

United Way of Allen County lists a number both of abortion

providers, and of health services that have a “pro‐life per‐

spective”—and some local United Ways have provided fi‐

nancial support for Planned Parenthood.

But this is an aside. What is important is not what other

advertisers are permitted to do but that Citilink’s ad censor‐

ship policy is limited to ad content, and the content of

Health Link’s proposed ad lacks the faintest suggestion of a

political, religious, or moral aim or agenda. The district

judge missed this essential point, stating that Citilink’s “re‐

strictions on non‐commercial, political, religious, and moral

speech apply to the advertiser, not to the service providers

listed on their websites.” No, the restrictions are limited to
No. 16‐1195 9

the advertisement; and the ban on non‐commercial speech in

the bus ads is inapplicable to public service announcements,

such as Health Link’s proposed ad.  

Once a government entity has created a facility (the ad

spaces in and on its buses, in this case) for communicative

activity, it “must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself

set.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,

515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Citilink’s refusal to post the ad was

groundless discrimination against constitutionally protected

speech. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147

(1969).  

The judgment in favor of Citilink is reversed with in‐

structions to enter judgment for the plaintiff enjoining Citi‐

link’s refusing to post the plaintiff’s proposed ad in its buses.