Filed 10/30/14 Marriage of Pham-Held and Held CA4/3 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

In re Marriage of MONGTHU PHAMHELD and DRU D. HELD. 

MONGTHU PHAM-HELD, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

DRU D. HELD, 

 Respondent. 

 G048307 

 (Super. Ct. No. 06D006569) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Renee E. 

Wilson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. 

 Mongthu Pham-Held, in pro. per.; The Tu Firm and Hoang Huy Tu for 

Appellant. 

 Law Office of N.R. Bauer, Nene R. Bauer; Law Office of Thomas 

Armstrong and Thomas Armstrong for Respondent. 

* * * 
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 Mongthu Pham-Held (wife) appeals from a judgment of dissolution entered 

in February 2013 giving her the family residence (house). She contends the family court 

erroneously valued the house as of the date she purchased Dru D. Held’s (husband) share 

in August 2006, instead of at the time of trial in March 2012. According to wife, the 

court abused its discretion when it “barred” her from giving her opinion regarding the 

value of the house at the time of trial. But because this claim is not supported by the 

record, which contains no evidence of the value of the house other than at the time of the 

buyout, no abuse of discretion occurred and the judgment is affirmed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 A few months after marrying in February 2003, the parties jointly 

purchased the house with each paying an equal amount. They separated in June 2006 and 

husband moved out of the house. 

 The parties agreed wife would purchase husband’s share of the house. In 

August 2006, husband signed an interspousal transfer grant deed giving wife sole title to 

the house. The deed was recorded the next month. 

 The trial court set the matter for an eight-hour trial in May 2012 regarding 

the disposition of the house. Under a stipulation and order, wife was to provide husband 

with, among other things, an appraisal of the residence. She did not do so. 

 Wife attempted to introduce an appraisal report from September 2011 that 

would purportedly show the house was then worth $1.45 million. But because the person 

who wrote the report did not testify, the court deemed the document to be hearsay and 

ruled it did not qualify as a business record. 

 Wife testified the value of the house at the time of escrow in 2006 was $1.9 

million. Husband assessed the house as then being worth slightly more, $1,967,000, 

which was also the agreed upon amount for the buyout. Wife’s forensic accountant – 
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who was not qualified as an expert in real estate or real estate valuations and had never 

seen an appraisal – “believed the property had an exclusive listing for $1.9 million.” 

 Before the submission of the case on March 23, 2012, neither party 

requested a statement of decision. The court issued a tentative decision later that day. 

Six days later, wife requested a statement of decision, which the court denied as 

untimely. On May 18, wife moved for reconsideration. Because the motion was 

untimely and unsupported by appropriate authority, the court denied it without “prejudice 

to bring the appropriate action (not reconsideration) supported by sufficient evidence.” 

Wife took no further action. 

 On February 13, 2013, the court entered its final judgment, among other 

things, awarding wife the house “as her sole and separate property.” It found the house 

was worth $1.9 million. Deducting the amount the parties owed on the property when 

husband transferred his interest to wife, the court found each party’s community share 

was $500,712. Because husband previously “received [$]535,800” (as part of the 2006 

escrow closing), “he was overpaid by [$]35,088,” and was ordered “to reimburse [wife] 

that amount.” 

DISCUSSION 

 Wife contends the court erroneously valued the house at $1.9 million rather 

than $1.45 million because, given the outstanding indebtedness, the latter would have 

substantially increased the amount of husband’s reimbursement obligation. But the 

record contains no admissible evidence the house was ever worth $1.45 million. 

 “The trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the value of 

community assets as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence 

presented.” (In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 670.) Given the 

scant evidence in the record, no abuse of discretion occurred. 
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 Wife relies on Family Code section 2552, which states, “(a) For the purpose 

of division of the community estate upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation of 

the parties, except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall value the assets and 

liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial. [¶] (b) Upon 30 days’ notice by the 

moving party to the other party, the court for good cause shown may value all or any 

portion of the assets and liabilities at a date after separation and before trial to accomplish 

an equal division of the community estate of the parties in an equitable manner.” 

According to wife, husband never requested an alternate valuation date other than as 

close to the trial date as possible. As such, she argues the court necessarily had to value 

the house as of the time of trial and its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. 

 The problem, however, is that no admissible evidence was presented as to 

the house’s worth near the trial date. Therefore, the court had no alternative but to value 

the house as of the 2006 escrow date. 

 Wife argues the court erred in not admitting her testimony on the value of 

the house near the time of trial. But the page of the reporter’s transcript that she cites, 

does not relate to either her testimony or the 2011 appraisal report purportedly valuing 

the house at $1.45 million at the time of trial. “We are not required to search the record 

to ascertain whether it contains support for [wife’s] contentions.” (Mansell v. Board of 

Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.) 

 Nevertheless, our perusal of wife’s testimony shows that after her counsel 

asked her whether the 2011 appraisal report indicated the house was then worth $1.45 

million, the court stopped the proceedings to address another matter. Upon going back 

on the record, wife’s counsel did not follow up on the pending question, but rather moved 

to submit the 2011 appraisal report into evidence, which the court denied on the ground it 

was hearsay. At no time did the court prevent wife from testifying as to her personal 

opinion regarding the value of the property at the time of trial. The court also did not “on 

its own, challenge[] the admissibility of” the 2011 report; it sustained husband’s hearsay 
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objection. On appeal, wife does not challenge the exclusion of the 2011 report. Thus, 

although wife is correct that she, as the owner of the property being valued, may give her 

opinion regarding how much the house was worth (Evid. Code, § 813, subd. (a)(2)), she 

has not shown the court “barred” her from doing so. 

 Wife maintains that spouses must share any decrease in the value of a 

community home. She reasons that because the value of the house had depreciated to 

$1.45 million at the time of trial, the court erred in valuing the house as of the time of 

separation in 2006. But the record contains no admissible evidence the house was ever 

worth $1.45 million. 

CONCLUSION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal. 

 

 RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J. 

WE CONCUR: 

MOORE, J. 

THOMPSON, J.