[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellant

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,

Appellee :
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: No. 694 CAP

Appeal from the Order entered on 12/30/2013 in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Philadelphia County at Nos. CP-51-CR-0417523- 1992, CP-51-CR-0417792-1992 and CP-51-CR-0418063-1992
SUBMITTED: January 20, 2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,

Appellant :
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: No. 695 CAP

Appeal from the Order entered on 12/30/2013 in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Philadelphia County at Nos. CP-51-CR-0417523- 1992, CP-51-CR-0417792-1992 and CP-51-CR-0418063-1992
SUBMITTED: January 20, 2016

CONCURRING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: July 19, 2016
Although I concur in the result, I have difficulty w ith the notion that the failure of
Appellant’s trial counsel to adduce scientific blood-spatt er or blood-flow evidence
relative to an impeachment concern meets the prejudice threshold. To the degree that
this evidence undercuts James White’s testimony that two o f the victims were killed in
the back a van, and that the body of at least one was t hrown or pushed from the
vehicle, it would seem to me that the impact could hav e been considerably countered by[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] - 2

the prosecution through the mere observation that the bodies apparently had been
exposed to the elements for a substantial period of ti me before they were discovered.
See, e.g. , N.T., July 22, 1993, at 122-123 (reflecting the te stimony of a detective that
Kevin Anderson’s body “had been obviously been [sic] the re for quite some time,” “[h]is
clothes were soaked,” and “[t]here was not a great amoun t of blood around the head
area, which you would [n]ormally see from a head woun d,” since “ [i]t had like been
washed away during the night by the rain ” (emphasis added)).
I also find it problematic to charge criminal defense a ttorneys with pursuing this
type of scientific evidence relative to an impeachment c oncern, particularly where there
is another readily available trial strategy that woul d seem to carry as much or more
force. In this regard, three experienced trial attorn eys relied upon cross-examination of
the Commonwealth’s experts, as well as arguments invoki ng the jurors’ common
experience, to highlight the incongruity arising from the fact that none of the victims’
bodies or clothes evidenced signs of injury or disturbance on account of having been,
as James White described it, thrown or pushed from a movi ng vehicle. 1

1 One difficulty facing the defendants in their effort s to counter the core elements of White’s testimony was the unlikelihood that two brothe rs and their companion from New York would have been randomly killed on the same night in an uncoordinated fashion by different actors in different areas of Philadelphia. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the murders strongly suggested some sort of coor dination in the killings entailing one or more elements of transportation. In addition to supplying such an explanation, White’s account was complemented by substanti al corroboration in material respects, including through the testimony of the sister of two of the victims describing a recent meeting between Appellant and the three victims in New York. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 39 n.24 (discussing this and other corroborative det ails); see also N.T., July 29, 1993, at 82 (reflecting the depiction, by Appellant’s trial counsel, of the sister as “a crucial witness for” the prosecution, a s “[s]he gives corroboration that [Appellant] was involved in the shooting of those three men”). Although certainly evidence tending to disprove discrete details of White’ s account could have affected the jurors’ assessment of its truthfulness, from my point of v iew, the corroboration of other important details and the absence of any other plausibl e explanation for the three (continuedJ)[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] - 3

For these reasons, I am more concerned about the trial judge’s conduct in
essentially inserting himself into the case by thwarting relevant and legitimate crossexamination concerning the condition of the bodies an d clothes, and effectively directing
the jurors not to take such matters into account. For ex ample, the following lines of
discourse occurred during the cross-examination of a medica l examiner by a

codefendant’s counsel:

Q. How about if the body is pushed from a moving van

, would you expect to see some bruising or scrapes?

[The Prosecutor]: Objection. We don’t know how fast th e van was going or whether it was slowing to a halt.

The Court: I will sustain the objection.

[Counsel for Codefendant Bennett]: This is the Commonwealth’s case we’re talking about.

The Court: I will sustain the objection.

[Counsel for Codefendant Bennett]: This is evidence presented by the Commonwealth.

[The Prosecutor]: We are talking about questions posed to Mr. White, with dramatic flare being injected by [def ense counsel].

(Jcontinued) apparently related killings diminishes the likelihood t hat such impact would have been dispositive.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the jury acqu itted Appellant’s codefendant Rick Bennett -- who White depicted as having been involved in the planning and execution of the robberies and homicides in issue -- of most of the cri minal charges lodged against him. Thus, it can be inferred that the jurors, in fact , doubted or disbelieved some very material details of White’s account while nevertheless re turning verdicts of guilt with respect to Appellant.[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] - 4 The Court: I will sustain the objection. There are too many variables. This witness cannot answer that.

Q. You just indicated the surface makes a difference, is t hat correct?

A. Yes.

Q. As you talk about –

The Court: Hold it. I will sustain an objection.

Look, if someone is thrown from a moving van and lands o n a pile of soft rags, that would have no effect.

[Counsel for Codefendant Bennett]: That’s not the e vidence.

[Counsel for codefendant Wilson]: It’s not the eviden ce in this case. The evidence in this case is they were thrown out onto the street.

[Counsel for Appellant]: That was testified to by th e witness.

[Counsel for Codefendant Wilson]: From a moving va n.

The Court: This doctor cannot answer a question based on his examination as to exactly what happened to the bo dy after the shooting.

[Counsel for Codefendant Wilson]: Judge, we are all owed, Your Honor, to ask a witness –

The Court: You are allowed to ask the witness what I allow you to ask.

[Counsel for Codefendant Wilson]: That’s patently o bvious, Your Honor.

The Court: I will sustain the objection.[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] - 5

N.T., July 28, 1993, at 162-164 (emphasis added); see also id. at 165 (reflecting the
Court’s comments “[t]here are too many variables here,” and “[t]his doctor cannot
possibly tell you how the body fell without some exter nal markings on the body”).
Furthermore, the court admonished:

I will ask the jury to disregard that rather silly remark of [counsel for codefendant Wilson].

This court has the duty of allowing all proper question s and not allowing a lot of nonsensical questions

. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). The trial court thus not o nly precluded relevant and
legitimate cross-examination, it discounted and denigrat ed the defense position as to
the matter and, again, essentially instructed the jury to disregard a material avenue of
impeachment relative to the Commonwealth’s central wi tness.
Particularly given that the inappropriateness of the trial court’s conduct is patently
obvious from the record, was highlighted through seria l mistrial motions, see, e.g. , id. at
171, and was actually one of the issues raised in the post -sentence motions, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 44 n.28, I agree with the PCRA court that the ste wardship of
Appellant’s counsel on direct appeal in failing to adva nce a claim was deficient. See

Commonwealth v. Williams , CP-51-CR-0417523-1992, et al.

, slip op. at 49 (C.P. Phila.
Dec. 30, 2013) (“[T]here can have been no reason to con sciously refrain from raising
the trial court’s clear abuse of discretion in its imprope r and grossly unbalanced limiting
of cross-examination of the medical experts before the Supreme Court.”). In terms of
prejudice, the majority ably develops the many other problems with the testimony by the
corrupt and polluted source who served as the Commonwea lth’s central witness against
Appellant. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 39-40. The trial court’s inappropriate and
substantial downplaying of a material impeachment conc ern in relation to such[J-89A&B-2015][M.O. – Donohue, J.] - 6

testimony seems to me to be an error of an essentially st ructural magnitude, impairing
the integrity of the verdict.

Justice Dougherty joins this concurring opinion.