Filed 8/20/20 P. v. Thomas CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GREGORY ROMEL THOMAS, 

JR.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B298887

(Super. Ct. No. 2015004140)

(Ventura County)

Gregory Romel Thomas, Jr., appeals from the 

judgment after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly 

weapon on a police officer. (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (c).) Thomas 

admitted he suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, 

subd. (a)) and two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),

1170.12). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years-to-life in 

state prison. 

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
2

Thomas contends (1) his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, (2) the trial court erred when it denied his 

Romero motion,2 and (3) his sentence as a third strike offender 

was unauthorized. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A shop owner reported a crime and directed police 

officers to a Toyota Corolla in the parking lot. As Thomas was 

pulling out of the parking stall and driving the Corolla toward 

the officers, one of the officers tried to stop the Corolla. The 

officer walked in front of the car, held up one hand, and shined a 

flashlight on “strobe mode” toward the front of the car. 

Thomas accelerated towards the officer at

approximately 15 to 20 miles per hour. The officer pushed off the 

hood of the car to move out of the way. The officer testified that 

had he not done so, Thomas would have run him over. 

After the jury’s conviction, Thomas retained new 

counsel and moved to strike his two prior strike convictions 

pursuant to Romero. Thomas argued, among other things, that 

his prior strikes were 25 years old and that he did not intend to 

injure the officer. 

The trial court reviewed the probation report, which 

included Thomas’s criminal history. The probation report stated 

that in 1994, Thomas was convicted of two separate armed 

robberies by an Oklahoma state court. He was also convicted in 

federal court of conspiracy to commit carjacking. He was 

released from prison in November 2001 and placed on supervised 

release for three years. In December 2002, he was convicted of 

loitering for the purpose of prostitution and placed on probation 

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

(Romero).
3

for 24 months. In July 2003, Thomas was convicted of providing 

false information to a police officer and ordered to serve 60 days 

in jail. In August 2003, Thomas’s supervised release was 

revoked, and he was ordered to spend eight months in federal 

prison. 

In May 2007, Thomas was convicted of disorderly 

conduct by a Georgia state court and was placed on probation for 

six months. In March 2008, Thomas was arrested, and in 

October 2008, he was convicted of possessing counterfeit currency 

and sentenced to 24 months in custody. In December 2009, he 

was placed on supervised release for five years. In April 2010, 

Thomas was convicted of forgery by a Georgia state court and 

was placed on probation for three years nine months and ordered 

to serve 15 months in jail. In March 2012, Thomas was convicted 

in federal court of passing counterfeit obligations or securities 

and was sentenced to 33 months in federal prison. In February 

2014, he was placed on supervised release for 36 months. A year 

later, he committed the current offense. 

At the hearing, the court stated: 

I am aware of my discretion to strike a strike, and I 

have read and considered the briefing in this case 

and the requests made by the Defense.

However, the crime involved here was violent in 

nature and it involved the potential for death or great 

bodily harm.

Defendant’s prior convictions are numerous. And I 

understand that the strikes are remote in time. 
4

But over the past 20 years, the defendant has served 

both state and federal prison terms and his criminal 

history spans across multiple states. 

The instant conduct occurred when defendant was on 

probation, parole or both.

And efforts at the defendant’s rehabilitation have 

been numerous and unsuccessful. 

When I look at the case law, and frankly, just the 

spirit of the law, I cannot justify striking a strike in 

this case. 

The prosecutor argued that Thomas was a “lifelong 

career criminal.” The prosecutor asserted that “the longest time 

[he] has gone without incarcerating was a two-year period. And 

even during that two-year period, he was on either probation or 

parole. He has never in his adult life not been on probation or 

parole.” 

Defense counsel disagreed with the prosecutor and 

asserted that from “2004 to 2008, Mr. Thomas had four years in 

which he was not under any form of supervision.” Counsel noted 

that he had been on the case for a “limited time” and that he was 

“working with some limited documents.” 

The trial court denied the Romero motion. The court 

found that Thomas was a “career criminal” and that his conduct 

in the current offense was “inherently dangerous.” 
5

DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Thomas contends he received ineffective assistance 

when his counsel did not obtain “a current and accurate copy” of 

Thomas’s criminal history and did not ask for a continuance to do 

so. He argues that had counsel done so, “he would have had 

documentation showing that [Thomas] did enjoy at least one fouryear period of time in which he was not in jail/prison or on 

probation/parole.” We are not persuaded. 

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 

has the burden to show (1) counsel rendered deficient 

performance, and (2) prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient 

performance. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(Strickland); People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1175.) To 

show prejudice, the defendant must prove there was a reasonable 

probability of a more favorable determination in the absence of 

counsel’s deficient performance. (See Strickland, at p. 688.) A 

court need not address both prongs of the test before rejecting a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. If a defendant fails to 

establish either prong, the claim should be denied. (Id. at p. 697.)

Thomas does not show he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

failure to obtain his criminal history. The trial court stated it 

reviewed the probation report, which included Thomas’s criminal 

history. The probation report showed that Thomas was not 

incarcerated and was free from probation or parole from 

December 2004 to May 2007 and from November 2007 to October 

2008. The trial court thus considered these periods in which he 

was free from incarceration or supervision. 
6

Romero Motion

Thomas contends the trial court erred when it denied 

his Romero motion. His contention lacks merit.

We review rulings on Romero motions for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376

(Carmony).) A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prior strike

for sentencing purposes if the defendant falls outside the spirit of 

the “Three Strikes” law. (§ 1385; Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 

pp. 529-530.) The trial court “must consider whether, in light of 

the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present 

felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and 

the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the 

defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or 

in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not 

previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent 

felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

A denial of a Romero motion is an abuse of discretion 

only in those “limited circumstances” where a court was unaware 

of its discretion, considered impermissible factors, or otherwise 

acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner. 

(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) In the absence of such a 

showing, we presume the court acted to achieve legitimate 

sentencing objectives and will not set aside its discretionary 

determination. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 

Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied the Romero motion. Thomas, who was 43 years old at the 

time of sentencing, had a lengthy criminal history. The strike 

offenses occurred in 1994, when he was 19 years old. After he 

was released, he continued to commit crimes. The longest period 
7

that he was not incarcerated or on probation or parole was only

two and a half years (December 2004 to May 2007). Thomas’s 

past attempts to rehabilitate were unsuccessful, and he 

committed multiple crimes while he was on probation or parole. 

He was also on supervised release when he committed the 

current offense. In sum, Thomas’s criminal history reflects that 

he was the type of “‘“revolving door” career criminal to whom the 

Three Strikes law is addressed.’ [Citation.]” (Carmony, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 379; see also People v. Pearson (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 740, 749-750 (Pearson) [25-year continuous criminal 

history supported a denial of a Romero motion].) 

Moreover, the nature of Thomas’s prior strike 

offenses and his current offense were serious and dangerous. In 

the prior strikes, Thomas and codefendants used a gun to kidnap 

and rob their victims of personal items, money, and their car. In 

one instance, the victim was “struck . . . with the pistol, thus 

inflicting serious and grievous wounds.” In the current offense, 

Thomas accelerated his car in an attempt to strike a police 

officer. The court properly considered the violent nature of these

offenses. 

Thomas contends that his case falls “outside the 

spirit of the Three Strikes law” because the majority of his 

criminal history “involved financial crimes devoid of any kind of 

violence.” It is presumed that the trial court considered all 

relevant factors in denying a Romero motion. (Pearson, supra, 

165 Cal.App.4th at p. 749.) The record reflects the court 

considered the written Romero motion, oral arguments, and the

probation report, which included details of his past crimes. There 

was no abuse of discretion.
8

Prior Strikes

Thomas contends his sentence as a third strike 

offender was unauthorized because his 1994 out-of-state/federal 

convictions were not serious felonies within the meaning of the 

Three Strikes law. We review whether a defendant’s prior 

conviction qualified as a strike for sufficiency of the evidence. 

(People v. Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1132-1133.) 

Here, Thomas admitted the 1994 offenses were prior 

strike convictions. By admitting the prior strike enhancement, 

Thomas “waive[d] an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence.” (People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Ronda J. McKaig, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Heather Shallenberger, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.