## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it
N o. 10

- 1290 D AVI D N. R AI N a nd P ARAMOUN T I NT ERNAT I ONAL, I NC ., P la intif fs-A pp ella nts, v.
R OLLS -R OYCE C ORPO RA T I ON, D efend a nt-A pp ellee.

A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the S outhernDi stricto f Indian a, Indian apolisDiv isi on. No . 07 C1233-WTL-DML

—WilliamT. Lawrence , Judge .
A RGUED S EP TE MBE R 14, 2010

— D ECI DE D N OVE MBE R 18, 2010

B efore B AUER, F LA UM, a nd H A MI L T ON, C ircu it Judges . F LA UM, Cir cu i tJudg e . D avid R ain an d Param ou nt Int ernati onal, Inc. br ought a br each o fco ntra ct a cti on a gainst Rol l s- Royce Corpor ati on, al l eging tha t Rol l s- Royce twice bre ached a non- dispar age m ent a gr eem ent the par ti es executed in connect i on with the set tl em ent of an ea rl i er law su it. Th e d istri ct cou rt g r a n ted pa rtialsum m ary j ud gm ent in Rol l s- Royce ’ s f avo r on o ne o fthe cl ai m s,2 N o. 10

- 1290 and, f ol l owing a be nch tr i al, ente re d j ud gm en t forRol l sRoyce o n the seco nd cl ai m . Fo r the fol l owing re as on s, we a ffi r m.

I . B a c kg r o und A. F a c t ua l B a c kg r o und Ro l l s- Ro yce manuf ac tu r es a M o del2 50 a i r cr aft en g i ne f o rus e i n h el i co p ters. Ro l l s- Ro y ce ha s a numbero f“ au thor i zed m ai ntenance cente rs ” ( “A M Cs”) and “autho ri zed re w or k f acil i ti es” ( “A RFs”)

— known as the “M odel25 0 FI RST N etw or k”

— th ats er vi ce , r epa i r, a nd o ve r ha ul M o d e l2 5 0 e n g i n e s a r o u n d th e wo r l d

. D a v i d R a i n i s the sol e s hare hol der a nd o ffi cero fPar am ount Inter nati onal, Inc. ( “Par am ount”) , wh i ch i s in the b usi ness of sel l i ng par ts f orthe M od el 250 engi ne to , am ong othe rs , the AM Cs and A R Fs i n the FI RST N etwork

. There f or e, Para m ount a nd Rol l s- Royce ar e di re ct c om peti tor s. R olls -R oy c e a n d R ain h av e a co n te n tio u s h ist or y. In 20 05 , Ro l l s- Ro y ce fi l ed su i t ag ains t Ra i n, Pa r amoun t, an d othe rs , al l eging tha t th ey had m i sappropri ate d Rol l sRo y ce ’ s i n t e l l e c t u a lp r o p e r t y . O n Ma y 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 , the par ti es e xe cut ed a f o r m als et tl ementagre ementa nd dism i sse d the l aw sui t. The ag re em ent, wh i ch i s g overne d b y Indi an a l aw, c o nt ains a no n- di spa r ag em en t provi si on s tat i ng: “N one o fthe Part i es w i l ldi spara ge th e o th er . ” The a g r ee m en t fur th er p r o vi des tha t an y m at e r i a lb r e a c h o fth e s e t t l e me n ta g r e e me n te n t i t l e s the p re va ilin g p ar ty to it s a t t o rn ey ’s fe es p lu s d am ag es in an am ount notl ess than $1, 000, 000.N o. 10

- 1290 3 1. Th e 2007 Te xas Law su it I n 200 7, Rol l s- Royce fi l ed a c om pla i nt i n the U ni ted St ate s Di str i ct Cour t forthe N or ther n Dis tr i ct o fTexas, al l eging tha t the defendants in th at case had obt ai ned Rol l s- Royce ’ s pro pri eta ryi nfo rm ati on fro m a N ew J er seyco rpor ati on

— re fer re d to as the “Pri nci pal Cor pora t i o n”

— owne d b y “ M r . Do e . ” T he c o mpl a i nta s s e r t e d a RI CO cl ai m , i n w hi ch R olls -R oyc e a l l ege d that the defen dan ts ha d c o ns pi r ed wi th“ Pr i nc i palCo r po r at i o n” a nd “D oe” to obtai n a nd use R oll s-Royc e’s prop rietary inform ati on. There i s no di spute that, wh i l e Rain and Param ount we re notnam ed as defe nd ants i n the Texas s uit, th e compl aintus ed th e pse udo ny m s “Mr. Do e” a nd “Princi pal Cor pora ti on” to re ferto Rai n and Param ount.

2 . T he 2 0 0 7He l i o - E x po A l so i n 2 0 0 7, R a i n a t t e nd e d the He l i

- Ex po , a n a nn ua l tr ade s ho w spo ns o r ed bythe Hel i co pte rAssoci at i o n Internati onal( “H A I ”)
. A t the 20 07 H el i-Exp o, Rol l s- Royce , the AM Cs, and the A RFs sp on sor ed a pr i vate custo m er ap p reciat io n ev en t. T he FI R ST N etw ork m em bers p urchased pass es to th e event fro m Rol l s- Royce to gi ve to th ei rc us to m er s. Ra i n obt aine d a pa ss from a n A M C a nd att ended the ev ent. A t the ev ent, Rai n spoke with v ar i ous Ro l l s- Royce em plo yee s

— i ncl ud i ng S cot t Cri sl i p, then the Pres i dent of the Ro l l s- Royce H el i copterDiv i si on

— w i thout i nci dent. W hi l e Rain w as speaking with Rol l s- Royce em p loy ee Tom L eonar d, J effE dw ar ds, a Rol l s- Royce vi ce- presi dent,4 N o. 10

- 1290 approached Rai n. Concer ne d that Rain w oul d “bai t” a Ro l l s - R o y c e e mp l o y e e i n t o ma k i n ga d i s p a r a g i n gc o mm ent about him , Edw ar ds to l d Rain that hi s pre sence at the eve nt w as i napp ro pri ate , and a ske d hi m to leav e. Both Leonar d and anotherRol ls- Royce em plo yee , An d r e w Ma a s c h, w e r e i n th e v i c i n i t y w h i l e Ed wa r ds spoke to Rai n. Rai n exi ted the ev ent thro ug h the hote l l obby, atE dw ar ds’s di re cti on, and Ed w ar ds f ol l owed Rai n out. On his wa y ou t, Rai n passed a busi ness ass oci ate , Eri c W itte rs , and to l d W i tte rs thathe was “g et tin g k ick ed ou t.” A notheri nd i vi du al, S tev e Van Hem er t, al so w as ask ed to l eave t h e event. Van H em er t i s the ge nera lm anage r of a s ho p tha ts e r v i c e s Mo de l2 5 0 e ng i ne s . R e pr e s e nt a ti ves f r o m the AM Cs we r e up s e t tha t Ro l l s - Ro y c e ha d aske d som e o fthei r i nvi ted gues ts

— for w hom they had pu rchased t i cket s

— to l eave the eve nt.

B . P roc ed u ral H is tory On Septem ber25 , 20 07, ap p ell ants fi l ed a b re ach o f co nt r ac t su i t all eg i ngtha t Ro l l s- Ro y ce ha d b r ea ch ed th e no n- di spa r ag ementpr o vi si o n in the 2 006 s et tl ement ag r ee m en t

— on c e b y i n c lu d in g c er ta inalleg at ion s in the Tex as c om pla i nt, and aga i n by esco rt i ng Rai n out of the Hel i

- Ex po ev ent. The dist rict co urt gr anted Rol l sRoyce ’ s m oti on f orpart i alsum m ar y j ud gm ent a s t o the c l aim b as ed on the Texas l aw sui t, fi nd i ng tha t e ven i fRol l s- Royce di spara ged appel l ants by accusi ng the m of bei ng i nvol ved i n ra cket eer i ng and o th er w rongdoi ng, Rol l s- Royce was i m m une fro m l i abi l i ty und erN o. 10

- 1290 5 I nd i ana’ s abso l ute l i ti gat i on pri vi l ege . Fo l l owing a b e n c h t r i a lo n a p p e l l a n t s ’ o th e rb r e a c h o fc o n t r a c tc l a i m, the di str i ct c ou rt hel d that Ro l l s- Royce ’ s t re atm ent o f Rai n at the Hel i

- Ex po ev ent di d n ot co nsti tute dispar age m en t in vio l a t ion of th e s et tle m en t a gr ee m en t. In reach ing tha t con clusion, the co u r t l ooked to Black’s L aw Diction ary to i d en tify t h e plain an d ordina ry m eani ng o f the ter m “di spara ge, ” which i t found to b e: “[ t] o disho nor( som ethi ng or som eone ) by com pari son” or “[ t] o unj ustl y disc re dit or detra ct fro m the re pu tat i on o f ( anothe r’ s pro perty, product o r busi ness)
. ” The t ri alj ud ge f ound that w h ile Rol l s- Royce ’ s a cti on m ay have caused Rai n em bar ra ssm ent, i t di d not detr act from hi s r eputation as a b u s in e s sm an or refl ect p oorly on h is charac ter, hi s pro du cts orhi s b u siness deal i ngs, and thus di d not const i tute dispar age m ent. A pp el l an ts ti m el y a pp eal ed both rul i ngs.

I I . Discussi on A . I nd i ana’ s A bsol ute Li t i gat i on Pri vi l ege and the Tex as Law su it W e review de novo a d istri ct cou rt’s grant of sum m ary j u d gm en t. See Lew is v. D o w ney, 58 1 F
. 3d 467 , 4 72 ( 7th Cir
. 20 09 )
. A gr ant o fsum m ar y j ud gm ent i s a pp ro pri ate w here “there i s no ge nuine i ss u e as to any m ate ri alf act and . . . th e m oving par ty i s e nti tl ed to j ud gm ent a s a m at te r of law .” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 ( c)
. On app el l ate r ev i ew, we r ev i ew the f ac ts and infer en ce s i n the l i g ht m ostf av or ab l e t o the no nm oving par ty. Se eHae f l i ng v. UPS , 169 F.3d 494 , 497 (7th C ir. 1999).6 N o. 10

- 1290 “I nd i ana l aw has l ong re c ogni zed an abso l ute pr i vi l ege th a tp r o t e c t s a l lr e l e v a nts t a t e men t s ma de i n the c ours e ofa j ud i ci alpro ceedin g, re gar dle ss ofthe tr uth or m oti ve behi nd the sta tem ents. ” Ha rtm a n v . Keri, 88 3 N
. E. 2d 774, 7 77( I nd. 2 00 8)
. The p urp ose f o rthe pri vi l ege i s t o “pres er v[ e] the du e a dm i ni str ati on o f j usti ce b y pr ovi ding acto rs i n j ud i c ial proce edi ngs w ith th e freed om to particip ate w ithou t fear offut ure defa m ati on cl ai m s. ” Id. ( ci tat i ons and i nter nalquotati on m arks om i tt ed)

. In the wor ds o fo ne Indi an a co ur t, the pr i vi l eg e r ec o g ni ze s th atthe “ publ i c[ ’ s] i nt er es t i n the fre edom o fexpre ssi on byparti ci pants i n j ud i ci alpro ceedi ngs, uni nhibi te d b y the r i sk ofr esul tant sui ts f or defa m ati on, i s so v i taland neces sar y t o the integr i ty of our j ud i ci alsy ste m thati t m us t be m ade para m ount t o th e rig hto fthe i ndi vi dualt o a l eg alr emedy whenhe has be en wronged. ” M iller v. R einert, 83 9 N
. E.2 d 731, 73 5 (Ind

. Ct
. A p p . 2005) (ci tation om itted ). I n de term in i ngwhethe ra s ta te m en t i s r el ev an t an d per tine nt, s uchtha t i t i s ab so l ut ely pr i vil eged, Indi an a “co u rt s f avo r a l iber alr ule

. ” Id. Onl y tho se a l l eg at i o ns that ar e “ so pal p ab ly irrel evantto the subj ect m att ero f the c ontr ove rs y that no r eas onabl e m an can doubt [ thei r] i rr el evancyand i m prop riety” ar e no t co ver ed by th e p ri v i l eg e. Id. The al l ega ti ons at i ssue ass er ted that D oe an d Princip al ( m ean ing Ra in a n d P aram ou nt ) traffi cked in i ntel l ectualpro pertystol en fro m Rol l s- Royce and fo rm ed an ent er pri se w i th t h e defendants i n that ca se t o r epl i ca te Ro l l s- Ro y ce e ng i ne pa r ts a nd un der cut Rol l s- Royce ’ s business. There can be no doubt that those al l ega ti ons w er e “ pertinent and r el evantto the [ Texas]N o. 10

- 1290 7 l i ti gat i on, ” a s F i fth Ci rcui t p re cedent r equi re d Rol l sR oy c e to al l ege the exi ste nce o fan “ enter pri se” i n or der to p lea d its R IC O c l a im
. See St
. Paul M e r cu ry Ins . Co. v. Wi l l i am s on , 224 F.3d 425 , 439 (5th C ir . 2 000). M oreover, be ca us e th e all eged e nt er pr i se was a n a ss o ci at i o n- i nf act ( as opp os ed to a l ega lenti ty) , Rol l s- Royce was re qui r ed to “ sh o w ev i den ce ofa n o ng o i ngo r g an i za ti o n, f o rm al or info rm al, th at fu n c tio n s a s a co n tin u in g u n it o ve rt im e t hr o ug h a hi er ar ch i ca lo rc o ns en su alde ci si o nm ak in g s tr u c tu re .” Id. at 441. Thu s, the re quir em ents fo r applying Ind i ana’ s abso l ute pri vi l ege ar e s ati sfi ed

— th e a lleg at ion s w e r e m ad e in the c ours e o fa j ud i ci alpro ceedi ng to wh i ch they w er e r el evant
. A pp el l ants never thel ess co ntend that Ro l l s- Ro y ce i s no t i m m une fr o m l i ab i l i tyb ec au se the pri vi l ege does notexte nd bey ond defa m ati on a nd o ther si m i l arto rtcl ai m s t o encom pass br each o fco ntra ct cl ai m s. No Indi an a co ur t ha s a d d r es se d whethe rthe ab so l ut e pr i vi l eg e pr ec l udes no t o nl y t o r t l i ab i l i ty, b ut al so cont ra c tuall i abi l i ty. Fa ced w i th a novelquesti on o f st at e la w an d n o a u th or ity from th e s ta te co u rt s, w e s h all “e xa m i ne the r ea so ni ngo fc o ur ts i n o th erj urisd ic ti o ns add re ssing the sa m e i ssue and a pp l yi ng thei r own l aw f or w hatev ergui dance abo ut the prob abl e di re cti on o fst ate l a w they m ay pr o v i de .” P iscio tta v. O ld N a t. B a nc o rp , 49 9 F.3d 629 , 635 (7th C ir. 2007). Cou r ts i n a numbe rof o th erj ur i sdi ct i o ns ha ve c o nc l ud ed that the abso l ute l i ti gat i on pri vi l ege i s a pp l i cable to bre ach o fco ntrac t acti ons, atl eas t where i m m unity fro m liab ility is co n sis te n t w ith th e p u rp os e o f th e p riv i-8 N o. 10

- 1290 leg e. Se eKe l l y v . Go lden , 35 2 F
. 3d 344, 35 0 ( 8th Ci r. 20 04) ( hol ding that M i sso uri ’ s abso l ute pr i vi l ege pre c lu d ed l i abi l i ty f oran a l l ege d bre ach o fa nondispar age m ent/ c on fid en tia lity ag re em en t b as ed on st at em e n ts m ad e in a j u d icia l p ro c ee d in g); Ell i s v. Kaye

- Kib b ey, 58 1 F
. S up p. 2d 86 1, 8 80

- 81 ( W
. D. M i ch

. 2 00 8) (pr edi ct i ngtha t th e M i chi gan S up re m e Cour t would hol d that the abso l ute l i ti gat i on p ri vi l ege “p re cl ud e[ s] b r e a c h- o f

- c ontr act l i ab i l i ty[ f o r ] o ne w ho g i ve s te st i m o ny o rpr o duce s i nf o r m at i o n in a j udi ci alpr o ce eding

— at l ea stto the ex te nttha t su cha ct i o n w as ne ce ss ary t o c o m pl y wi tha s u b p o e n a o ro the r o r d e r( a n d p e r h a p s e v e n i fth e c o mm uni ca ti o n was m ade i n co ur t i n a j udici al pr o ce eding bu t not req uired by any s u b p oen a or court ord er)”); Wentla nd v. Wa ss , 1 2 6 Ca l

. A pp. 4 th 1 4 8 4 , 1 4 9 2 ( Ca l

. App
. Ct. 3d Dis t. 20 05) ( “w hetherthe l i ti gat i on pri vi l ege appli es to an act i on f orbr each o fco ntra ct turns o n whethe ri ts a ppl i ca ti o n fur th er s th e po l i ci es underl yi ng th e p riv ileg e” ); Tul l oc h v. JPM orga n Ch as e& Co
. , 20 06 W L 1 97 00 9, a t * 5 ( S
. D. Te x. J an . 2 4, 2 00 6) ( co nc l udi ng th a tT e x a s l a w o fab s o l u t e p r i v i l e g e b a r s a l lc l a i ms

— reg ar dl es s o f th e l eg al th eo r i es o n whi ch th ey are base d

— s e e k i n g“ d e f a ma t i o n d a ma g e s , ” me a n i n gd a mage s fori nj uri es “fl owing fro m the c om m unica ti on o f all eged ly fal se state m en t s du ring a j ud ici al procee d ing”). W e fi nd tha t a pp r o a c h t o b e s o un d a nd c o nc l ude that the I n d ian a S up re m e Cour t would l i kel y a pp l y s i m i l ar re aso ni ng. The r efo r e, the que st i o n b ec o m es whethe ra ppl y i ngthe l i ti g at i o n pr i vi l eg e i n thi s ca se woul d pr o m o te the due ad m in ist ra tio n of j u st ice an d free ex p re ss ion by p ar tic i-N o. 10

- 1290 9 p an ts in jud icia l p ro c ee d in gs . W e c on c lu d e t h at it w oul d. The appli cati on o fthe pri vi l ege her e a l l ows Rol l sRo y ce t o pur su e its c l ai m s ag ains t th i r d pa r ti es wi th o ut fearo ffuture l ega ll i abi l i ty ari si ng o ut o fi ts eff or ts to prot ect i ts i ntel l ectual proper ty ri ghts. B y c ontrast, th e f ai l ur e to a ppl y the pr i vi l eg e woul d fr us tr at e th e und er l yi ng pol i cy by disc oura gi ng Rol l s- Royce fro m exer ci si ng i ts fund am entalr i ght t o re sor t to t he co urts to prot ect i ts ri ghts. Appel l an ts c o nten d tha t I ndi an a’ s po l i cyf av o r i ngthe en f o r ce m en t o fc o nt r ac ts c o uns el s ag ains t apply i ngthe l i ti g at i o n pri vi l eg e he r e. Appel l an ts wai ve d thi s ar g um en t b y fa ilin g t o ra ise it b e f o r e t h e d ist ric t c ou rt
. See M ot ev. Aetna Li

f eIns . Co. , 502 F.3d 601 , 608 n.4 (7th C ir. 20 07 )
. M o r eove r, we do no t fi nd a ppel l an ts ’ a r g um en t persuas i ve. A pp el l ants fra m e the i nquir y a s whether the n o n- di spa r ag ementpr o vi si o n i s en f o r ce ab l e. Butthe ag r ee m en t’ s en f o r ce ab i l i tyi s no t ati ss ue . Ra th er, the que s t i o n i s whe the r t o i mpo s e l i ab i l i t y f o r a v i o l ati on o f th a ta g r e e me n t
. Un d e rth e c i r c u ms t a n ce s p r e s e n t e d , we bel i eve t h at the Ind i ana S up re m e Cour t would r efuse to im pose l i abi l i ty base d on the abso l ute l i ti gat i on priv il ege . As n o t e d ab o v e , a pp l y i ngthe p r i v i l e g e h e r e a dvances i ts und er l yi ng purpose . In additi on, appel l ants’ b re ac h of co n tr ac t c laim is larg ely ind ist in gu ish ab le fro m a tor t cl ai m al l eging i nj ury fl owing fro m st ate
m ents m ade i n a j ud i ci al proce edi ng. W h ile appell ants techni cally seek l i quidate d dam age s under the s ett l em ent a gr eem ent, any dam age s they suffer ed w er e ca used sol el y b y the f act that the sta te m ents w er e ( al l ege dly ) to rt iou s. C on se q u en tly , im p os in g liab ility h er e w ou ld10 N o. 10

- 1290 al l o w appe l l an ts t o c i r cumve ntthe pr i vi l eg e byr ec as ting w ha te s s e nt i a l l y i s a t o r tc l a i m a s a b r e a c h o fc o nt ra ct ac ti o n. Appel l an ts a l so a r g ue tha t Ro l ls

- Ro y ce wai ve d the abso l ute pr i vi l ege byag re ei ng to the non- dispar age m ent c l ause. Becau se appell ants did notr ai se a waiv er ar gum ent b el ow, they ar e ba rr ed from doi ng so her e. SeeM ote, 50 2 F
. 3d at 608 n. 4. Fi nal l y, appel l ants re quest that we cer ti fy the qu esti on ofwh etherInd i ana’ s abso l ute l i ti gat i on pri vi l ege appli es t o b r e a c h o fc o n t r a c tc l a i ms t o th e In d i a n a S u p r e me Court. Cert i fi cati on i s a pp ro pri ate o nl y when “ ‘ the c ase co nc erns a matt ero fv i ta lpub l i c co nc ern, wher e th e i ssue w i l ll i kely re c ur in other case s, wh er e r eso l uti on o f the quest i on t o be c er ti fi ed i s o utcom e d et er m i nati ve of the c ase , a n d w h er e the st ate suprem e co urt has y et to h av e a n op p or tu n ity to [d ec id e] . . . th e is su e.’ ” Sta te Fa rm M ut. A uto . In s. C o . v . P a te, 275 F
. 3d 666, 67 2 ( 7th Ci r. 20 01) ( quoti ng In re B a dg er Lines, Inc., 14 0 F .3d 691, 69 8- 99 ( 7th Ci r. 19 98) )
. Even wh er e, as her e, “ther e i s no cl ear gui dance fro m a sta te cour t,
. . . cer tific atio n i s nei ther m andated noral w ays nece ssa ry . ” Id. at 67 3. Because “the pr o ce dur e is no t wi th o utc o st s to the l i ti g an ts a nd to the s ta te c o ur t whi cha l r ea dy m us t co nt en d wi tha c r ow d ed d oc ke t o f its ow n [,]
. . . w e a p p ro ac h th e d ec isi on t o cer ti fy with ci rcum specti on. ” Id. at67 1. U nd erthe ci rcum sta nces o fthi s ca se, we do not bel i eve thatcer ti fi cati on i s warr anted. W hi l e the r esol uti on ofthe questi on i s o u tco m e dete rm i nati ve, the questi on h as n otaris en be for e in In d ian a’s ap p ella te co u rt s. IfN o. 10

- 1290 11 and w hen i t a ri ses ag ai n, the st at e c ourt s wil lbe fre e to reach th ei ro wn co nc l us i o n, o fc o ur se , a nd c ant el lus i fo urpr edi ct i on of Indi an a l aw was c o r r ec t. W i th o ut see i ng an obs tacl e t o future sta te cour t r eso l uti on o f th e issue, we see no need to r equi re the parti es to go th ro u gh an ot h er rou n d of br iefin g a n d arg u m e n t in th is l iti gation. “F in a ll y, althou gh not a p rim ary factor, w e a re enti tl ed to ta ke i nto acco unt w heth erthe re quest f or cert i fi cati on t o the s tat e co urt cam e fro m the party w ho cho se fed eralj uri sdic ti on in the fi rs t pl ace. ” Br own v . A rgos y G a mi n gC o . , L
. P. , 384 F.3d 413 , 417 (7th C ir. 200 4). A s we have expla i ned, “i t’ s no t a pro per al ternati ve to proce edi ng i n the fi rs t instance in state co urt to sue in federa lco urt but as k that the sui t be st aye d to perm i t ce rt i fyi ng the i nter pretiv e is sue t o the s tat e co u r t, th u s a s k i n gth a tth e s u i tb e s p l i tb e t we e n t wo cour ts. ” D oev. Ci ty of Chi cago, 360 F.3d 667, 672 (7th C ir. 20 04 ). H er e, ap p ella n ts h ad th e op tio n of brin gin g t h eir case i n I nd i ana s tat e co urt. That they c hose to pro ceed i n fede r alco ur t unde r m i ne s the i rre que stf o rc er ti fi ca ti o n.

B . T he He l i - E x po I nc i de nt Fol l o wi nga b en cht r i al, we r ev i ew the di st r i ctc o ur t’s concl usi ons ofl aw d e novo and i ts fi nd i ngs o ff act f or c lea r er ro r. Jo hn son v. West, 218 F.3d 725 , 729 (7t h C ir. 20 00 ). Ra inco n t e n d s t h at th e d ist ric t c ou rterr ed in r ea di ngthe c o nt r act t er m “ di spa r ag e” no t to i nc l ude the so rt of pe rs on al em b ar ra ss m en t he su ffer ed as a re su lt ofbeing es cor ted o ut o fthe H el i

- Ex po ev ent.12 N o. 10

- 1290 U nd er Ind iana sta te law , t h e cou rt’s goal in i nt erpr et i nga c o nt r ac t i s to “ g ive effec t to the pa r ti es ’ i nt en t as re aso nabl y m ani fest ed by the l anguage o fthe agr eem en t.” R euille v . E .E . B ran den berg e rC o nstr., Inc., 88 8 N
. E. 2 d 7 7 0 , 7 7 1 ( I n d

. 2 0 0 8 )
. Un l e s s th e t e r ms o fa c o ntr ac t ar e ambi g uo us , the ywi l lb e g i ve n the i rpl ain a nd or d in a r y m ea n in g. Id. Inord er to d et er m in e t h e p lain an d o r di na r y mean i ngo fthe t er m di spa r ag e, the di s t r i ct c o ur tl o o k e d t o Bl a c k ’ s La w Di c t i o na r y ( 7 th e d. 1999 ) , wh i ch defi nes “dis parag e” as “[ t] o disho nor( som eth in g or so m eo n e) b y c o m p a r iso n ” o r “[t ]o u nj u st ly d iscred it or d etract from th e rep ut ation of( an oth er’s pr o per ty, pr o ducto rb us i ne ss )
. ” Oth erc o ur ts a ppl y i ng In d ia n a l aw sim ilar ly h av e loo ke d to d ict ion ar y d efin iti ons i n or der t o disc er n the m ea n i ng o fthe contr act te r m di spa r ag e. F o re xa m pl e, i n Indiana Ins
. C o . v. North V erm illio n C o m m un itySch o o l C o rp . , 66 5 N
. E.2 d 6 30 , 63 5 (Ind

. Ct
. A p p . 1996), th e cou rt re lie d on W ebst er’s N ew W or l d D i cti onar y t o deter m i ne the m eani ng o f“di sparag i ng m ate ri al ” in the conte xt o fan insu ra nce p olic y, c on c lu d in g th at “ to d isp ar ag e” m ea n s to “low er in es te em; di scredi t. ” S i m i l ar l y, i n He r i t ageM ut
. Ins . Co. v. Advanc e d Polym e rTe ch nol ogy, Inc . , 97F. S up p. 2d 91 3, 93 2 (S
. D. I nd

. 20 00) , wh i ch al so i nvol ved the i nter preta
tion o f an insurance pol i cy, the cour t co nsi dered thr ee differ ent di cti onar y d efi ni ti ons bef or e co ncl ud i ng tha t “m aterial th at .
. . disp a r a g e s a pe rson ’s or organ ization’s goo ds, pro du cts orse rv i ces” r efers to m ate ri althat

“ de ni g r a t e [ s ] , di s c r e di t [ s ] o rb e l i t t l e [ s ] [a no the r ’ s ] p r o du c ts .” Fin ally , in We s t f i e l d In s . C o. v. G i l B e hl i ng & Son, Inc ., 20 10 W L 9 89 93 3, a t * 12 (N
. D
. Ind. M ar ch1 5, 2 01 0) , theN o. 10

- 1290 13

c ou rtrelie d on B lac k’s L a w D i c tio n ar y t o c on c lu d e, in th e con t e x t o f yet an oth er i ns ura nc e po li cy, that “d ispa rag emento fg o o ds, pr od ucts, o rs er vi ce s i nv o l ve s th e denig ra ti on, di scr edi ti ng, o r bel i ttl i ng o fa perso n’s o r or ga n iza tio n ’s g oo d s, p ro d u c ts , or se rv ice s.” W e c on c lu d e t h at t h e In d ian a S u p re m e C ou rtw ou ld rely on d ictionary d efi nitions to fi nd that the term “d ispa rag e, ” as i t i s us ed i n the s et tl ementa g r ee m en t, mean s “to di shonorb y com pari son; to unj ustl y di scr edi t o r det r a c t fr o m the r e pu t a t i o n o f; t o l o we r i n e s t eem ; to d en igr at e; to b e l i tt le.” T h e re al d isp u te , ho w ev er , i s w hetherthe ter m “di spara ge” appli es in t he co ntext o f inj u rie s t o a n in d ivid u al’s rep u ta tio n (in a m an n er ak in t o the tort of defam ation), or w he th er i t refers m ore narr owly to ass aul ts on o ne’ s r eputati on in the busi ness orco m m er c i alco ntext. The di str i ct c ourtto ok the l ate r appr o ac h, c o nc l udi ngth at the “ ac t o fe sc o r tingRa i n o ut ofthe eve nt was not desi gned to , and i n f act did not, d etr act fro m Rai n’s r eputati on a s a busi nessm an o r c ar ry w ith it an y in h er en t m es sa ge reg ar d in g h is ch ar ac te r, h i s pr o duct s o rhi s bus i ne ss de al i ng s, ” an d th u s d id n otco n st itu te d isp ar ag em en t. B y c on tr as t, Ra in co nt en ds th athi s per so na le m ba rr as smentc anc o nst itu te d isp ar ag em en t. W e fin d th at th e m ea n in g of t h e w or d “d isp ar ag e” in th e s e t t l e me n ta g r e e me n tp r o p e r l y i s l i mi t e d t o a c t i o ns di sh o no r i ng, di scre di ting, de ni g r at i ngo rb el i tt l i ngthe parti es’ eco nom i c, busi ness or profess i onalinte re sts
. A s the case la w d iscus sed above ind icates, the term dispar age ge nera l l y a ri ses i n the conte xt o fco m m er ci al14 N o. 10

- 1290

Appel l ant s r el y on In d ian a In s. C o. f or theirconte ntio n that 1 R ain’ s personal em barrass m ent const itutes disparagem en t. In In d ian a In s. C o., the insu red , a sch oo l, sued its i n su r er to rec over the cos ts ofdef ending a lawsuit brou ght b y a f orm er teach er. 66 5 N .E.2d 63 0. T he teach er asserte d a nu m b er o f state l a w to r tc l a i m s a g a i n st th e s c h o o l , a l l e g i n g th a tth e sc h o o l ’s a c t i on s h a d c a us e d h i m h umi l i a t i on, e m ba r r a s s m e nt, and a l os s ofs t andi ng a nd r eput at i on withi n the s c hoo l s ys t em an d th e c o m m u n i t y . Id
. at 634. The sc hool’ s ins urance poli cy r e q u i r e d t h e i n s u r e r t o “ p a y o n b e h a l fo fth e i n s u r e d a l l s u ms w hich the ins ured sha ll b ecom e l egall y ob li gated to pay as dam age s be c aus e ofi nj u ry . . . s us t ai ne d by an y pe rs on or organizati on and ari si ng ou t of . .

. the pub li cat ion or utte rance ofa l ib e l o r s l a n de r o r o fo th e r d e f a mat o r y o r d i s p a r a gi ng m a te ri al. ” Id
. a t6 3 3 . T h e c o u r tc o n c l u d e d th a tth e te a c h e r ’s “all egati ons fitw ithin the broa d ly w ritt en confines of‘ other d efam at or y ordi s par agi ng m at er i al, ’ ” a nd thus thatthe i ns ur er had “a duty t o defen d the Sc hoo l against [ the t e a c he r ’ s ] c l a i m s . ” Id
. at 6 35
. Rai n’ s r el i anc e on Indi ana Ins. C o. is m is placed f or t w o reas ons. Fir st, the I n d ian a In s. C o. court did not c onclude that em barrass m ent const itu te d disparageme n t
. R a th e r , th e c o u r tc o n c l u d e d th a t t h e t e a c h e r ’ s c o mpl ai nt

— w hich incl ud ed all egati ons ofrep u tational harm

— al l eg ed the publ i c at i on of“ ‘ other def am at or y ordi s par agi ng m ater ial.’ ” U nd er In d ian a law , a statem en t is d efam ato ry if i tt en ds “to h ar m a per s on’ s r eput at i on by l ower i ng the (c on tin u ed

... ) o rpr o fes si o na li nt er es ts
. F o re xa m ple, i n b o th He r i t age an d Wes tf

ie ld, th e in su ra n c e p olic ies atiss u e s p ec ifica lly referred to d ispa ragem en t of “a p erson ’s or organ ization’s go o ds, pro du cts or servic es . ” See97 F . Su pp . 2d at93 2; 2010 W L 98993 3, at *12 ( em p ha sis add ed ). 1N o. 10

- 1290 15

(
. . . c o ntinu e d) person i n the com m unity’ s es ti m ati on or deterr ing third per sons from deali ng or ass ociat ing w ith the person. ” K el l ey v. Tanoos , 86 5 N. E. 2d 5 93 , 59 6 ( I nd. 20 07 ) ( i nt er nalc i t at i on om itted)

. Theref ore, i t se em s likel y that the court’ s decis ion was based in l arge part on the poli cy’ s incl usi on of the w ord “de f am at or y, ” r athe r thanonthe t er m “di spar agi ng. ” Th e con tract p ro v ision at issue is no t so b ro a d ; it is lim ited to di s par age m en t
. Se c ond, the t ea c he r i n Indi ana Ins. C o. a l l eged har m t o h i s re p u t at i on i n the s c hoo l s ys t em , whi c h c oncei vab ly c ould im pact hi s profe ss ional prospects. R ain al le ged no har m t o h i s r eput at i on as a bus i ne s s m an. Fu rthe rm ore, th e othe r area of law i n w hich the term “di s pa r a g e ” a r i s e s i s i n c o nn e c t i o n wi th the t o rto f p rod uc t d ispa ragem en t, w hich i nd icates th at th e w ord r e l a t e s p r i mar i l y t o a t t a c k s o n b us i ne s s i nt e r e s t s a s o ppo se d t o i ndi vi dual s. In Sa nd erson v. Ind ia na So f t Wa ter Se r vi ces, In c . , 2004 W L 17847 55 (S. D
. Ind

. J uly 23, 2004), then- dist ri ct c ourtJ ud ge H am i l ton con si dered a product dispar age m ent c l ai m as ser ted under Ind i ana l aw . J ud ge H am i l ton note d that the to rt, wh i ch “ has a l so been desc rib ed by co m m en ta to rs as ‘d isp ar ag em e n t of p ro p er ty ,’

‘ s l a nd e ro fg o o ds , ’ ‘ c o mm e r c i a ldi s pa r a g e men t, ’ ‘ t r a de l ibel, ’ and ‘ i nj uri ous fa l seho od[ , ] ’
. . . differ s fro m def am at i o n i n tha ti ts e e k s t o p r o t e c te c o no mi c i nt e re sts r a the rtha n r e pu t a t i o na li nt e r e s t s. ” Id. a t * 7 ( ci ting Pro sse r and K eat on o n the Law o fTor ts § 1 28, at96 3 ( 5th e d. 1984 ) ; Rest ate m ent ( Se cond) ofTor ts §§ 623A, 624 ( 1977 ) ; Am e r i ca n Ac ade m i c Sup pli ers, Inc . v. Be ck l ey- Cardy, Inc. , 9 22 F
. 2d 13 17, 1 32 3 ( 7th Ci r . 1 991) ( apply i ng I l l i no i s an d Ohi o l aw) )
. Co ur ts i n othe rj ur i sdi ct i o ns16 N o. 10

- 1290

I n B an kw est, the Tenth C ir cuiti nter preted the phrase “other 2 defam ato ry or dis paraging m ater ial ” i n an ins urance poli cy b y loo k ing to the scop e of the c o m m ercia l d ispa rag em en t tort. 63 F. 3d at 980. si m i l ar l y hav e r eco gni ze d thatthe tor t o fdi spara gem ent r elat es to busi ness i nter est s, notr eputati onalo nes. S e e Th o mp s o n v . M a ry l a n d Ca s . Co. , 8 4 P.3 d 496, 50 6 ( Col o. 20 04) ( “the tor t o fdi spara gem ent d iffer s fro m def amat i o n in tha t i t f o cus es o n the e co no m i c con sequences o fan inj uri ous stat em ent r atherthan on d am age to rep ut ation”); Z erpo l C o rp. v. D M P C o rp ., 56 1 F. Supp. 404, 40 8 ( E.D. Penn. 19 83 ) (“ [ t] he cause o fact i on f ordi spara gem ent .
. . pro tect s e c on om i c i nter est s by provi ding a r em edy to o ne wh o suffer s pecuniar y l oss from slurs affectin g th e m a rketab il ity ofhis good s”); H ur l b utv. Gul

f A tl ant i c Li

f eIns . Co. , 74 9 S
. W
. 2d 762, 76 6 (Tex
. 1987) (the tort of bu siness disp aragem en t “is part of the b o d y of law conc erne d w ith th e sub j ect of i nt erfer e n c e w ith co m m er c ial or ec on om ic re lat ion s” ); Bankwes tv. Fi de l i ty & D epo sit Co. of M aryl and, 63 F. 3d 974, 980 ( 10th Cir
. 19 95) ( applying Kansas l aw and noting tha t th e t or t v ar iou sly kn ow a s “ ‘d isp ar ag em en t o f p ro p er ty ,’

‘ s l a nd e ro fg o o ds , ’ ‘ c o mm e r c i a ldi s pa r a g e men t, ’
. . . ‘ t r a de libe l’ .

. . [an d ] ‘inj u riou s fa lse h oo d ’ .
. . h as be en br oa d ly i nter prete d to i ncl ud e the publ i cat i on o f‘ othe r f al sehoods h a r mfult o a nyl e g a li nt e r e s to fa no the rtha thas pec uni ary v alue ’ ”) ( ci ta ti o ns o m i tt ed)

. Li k ewi se , the 2 Restat em ent, w hi ch r efer s t o the t or t a s “ i nj uri ous f al sehood, ” co ntra sts act i ons f ordef am ati on, wh i ch “pro tect th e pe r s o na l r e pu t a t i o n o f the i nj ur e d pa r t y, ” with ac tio n s fo r inj u riou s fa lse h oo d , w h ich “ p ro te c t e c on om icN o. 10

- 1290 17

Be c a us e o fthe c omm e r c i a l a nd c ompe t i t i ve r e l a t i on s hi ps 3 betweenthe par t i es i n thi s c as e, our pr edi c t i ons abo utthe li m it ed m eaning of the t erm “disparagem ent” in this conte xt w ould no t ne ces sar il y e xt end to other conte xt s, s uch as f am il y law or other, m ore perso n a l se tt ings, i n w hich parti es m ay agree not to “dis parage” one another. in te re st s o f th e inj u re d p ar t y ag ain st p ec u n iar y los s.” R es ta te m en t (Se c on d ) of T or ts § 62 3A cm t. g. I n deter m i ni ng t h e int enti on o fthe parti es to a contr act, Ind i ana co urts

— i n a ddi ti o n t o a sc erta i ni ng th e p l a i n me a n i n g o fth e c o n t r a c tt e r ms

— have a “ du ty to consi der .

. . the surr oun d in g c i rcum sta nces w hi ch ex i s t e d a tth e t i me th e c o n t r a c twa s ma d e , ” i n c l u d i ng “the nature o fthe agr eem en t, togethe r w i th al lthe f acts an d c i r cumst an ces l ea di ngup to the e xe cut i o n o fthe contr act, the re l ati on o fthe p ar tie s, the nature and si tuat i o n o f the s ubj e c t mat t e r, a nd the a pp a r e nt pu r pose of m aking the co nt ra ct. ” R uff v. C harte r B ehavioral Health Syste m of Northw es t Indiana, Inc. , 69 9 N
. E.2 d 1171, 11 76 ( I n d

. C t
. A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) ( c i t a t i o n o mi t t e d )
. H e r e , t h e c i r c u mst a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n gth e e x e c u t i o n o fth e s e t t l e men t agr eem ent c onfirm o ur co ncl usi on that the par ti es in te n d ed th e n on -d isp ar ag em en t c lau se t o p ro te c t t h eir busi ness i n te re sts
. In part i cul ar, the parti es

— d ire c t b u sin e s s c o m p e t it o rs

— e x e c u t e d th e n o n- di spa r ag ement cl ause as part ofan a gr eem ent t o set tl e a co m m er ci al dispute concerni ng Rol l s- Royce ’ s intel l ectualpro perty
. 3 Fo r th e fo re go in g re as on s, w e co n c lu d e t h at th e H eliEx po i nci dent did notco nsti tute dispar age m ent in vi ol ati o n o fthe s et tl ementa g reementb ec au se the r e i s no i nd i cati on that Rain’s busi ness orhi s r eputati on a s a18 N o. 10

- 1290 busi nessm an was adver sely im pacted. To the co ntra ry, the r eco rd ev i dence i nd i cate s that a pp el l ants’ business as so c iat es , th e A M C s, th ou gh t t h at R olls -R oy c e w as in the wrong f orf or ci ng Rai n to l eave the eve nt. A gain, Rai n ask s t h is Court t o cer ti fy a questi on t o th e I nd iana Su p rem e C ou rt

— na mel y, wh a tthe pro per d e f i n i t i o n o fd i s p a r a g e me n ti s u n d e rth e s e c i r c u mst an ce s. W e dec l i ne tha t r eque st
. “ [ F ] ac t spe ci fi c, pa r ti cul ar i zed decis i ons that l ack bro ad, ge nera lsi gni fi cance ar e n otsu ita b le for c er tific at ion to a sta te ’s h igh es t c ou rt .” Wood br idge P laceA p artm ents v. Washington SquareCa pital, Inc . , 96 5 F. 2d 1429 , 14 34 ( 7th Ci r. 19 92) ( ci ti ng D igine t, Inc. v. Western U nio n A T S, Inc., 958 F. 2d 1388 , 1395 (7t h Cir. 1992 ) ) . Ap pel l ants’ cl ai m i nvol ves the inter preta ti on ofa contr act, and the ter m “d isp ar ag e” as i t i s use d i n that con tract. “Case s invol vi ng the i nter preta ti on o f co n t r a c tu al docu m en ts .
. . by nat ure [ involve] particu lari zed i nquir i es, ” that turn o n th e speci fi c co ntra ct l an g ua g e, a nd the c i r cumst an ce s su r r o undi ngthe c o ntr ac t’s ex ec u tio n . Wood br idge P lace Ap artm ents , 96 5 F.2d at 143 4. M or e o v er, our interp retation of the term “d isp ar ag e” lac ks sign ifica n c e b ey on d th is c as e, as it is l i m i ted to the ter m ’s use i n the parti cul arag re em ent a t i ssue. There f or e, cer ti fi cati on i s no t a pp ro pri ate
.

I I I . Concl usio n Forthe f or ego i ng r ea sons, we A FFIRM the dist ri ct cour t’ s j ud gm ent.

11- 18- 10