M edi cal Li abi l i t y an d In s ur anc e I mp r ovement Act , 65t h Le g. , R. S. , ch

. 817 , 197 7 T ex. G en. Laws 203 9 (a s 1 am end ed ) ( f

o rme r T EX . R EV . C IV . S T AT . A NN . ar t. 4 5 9 0 i, § § 1 .0 1 -1 6 .0 2 ), r epe al ed by A c t o f J u n e 2 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 th L e g ., R .S ., c h . 2 0 4 , § 1 0 .0 9 , 2 0 0 3 T e x . G e n . L a w s 8 4 7 , 8 8 4 (e ff e c tive S e p t. 1 , 2 0 0 3 ). M a n y o f t h e p ro v isio n s o f f o rm e r a rtic le 4 5 9 0 i a re n o w c o d ifi e d a t T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § § 74

. 0 0 1

- . 5 0 7 (V ernon 2 0 0 5 and V ernon S up p . 20 0 8 ). B e c a u se the o rig ina l l a w su it w a s fil e d b e fo re S e p te m b e r 1 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e p ro v isio n s o f f o rm e r a rtic le 4 5 9 0 i ap p lied to it

. C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS AL FREDO MO RENO AND F RANCES MORENO, I

NDIVI DUAL L Y AND A S HEI RS AND REPR ESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF BERNA DETTE MORENO, DECEASED, Ap pe lla nts , v. AD OLFO P ALOM I

NO -H E R NAND E Z, M.D., Appellee

. § § § § § § § § No . 0 8- 07 -0 00 10 -C V

Appea l from the 120th District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC#2005-2771)

O P I N I O N Appellants, Alfredo and Fr ance s Moreno, I ndividually and as Heirs and Represe ntatives of the Es tate of

B e rn a de tte Mo re no , De c e a se d, a pp e a l the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the ir c la ims a g a ins t Appellee , Adolfo Palomino-Her nandez, M.D. (“ Dr. Palom i n o ”) , and the tria l court’s a war d of

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Dr . Pa lom ino . We re ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g and re mand fo r t ri a l. I. BACKG ROUND This is a medical malpractice case with a convoluted history . On August 28, 2003, the Morenos filed a lawsuit under f ormer a rticle 4590i, sty led Alfredo Moreno and Franc es More no,

1 Individually and as Heirs and Re presentatives of the Estate o f B er n adette More no, Dec eased v

.Ed

war d C. J ua re z, M. D. , I nd iv idu all y , E dwa rd C. Ju ar e

z, M. D. , P .A . d

/b/ a E as tsi deMe dic al C

ar e Ce nte r, Ro

yMa lph ur

s, J os e ph A. Qu int

an a, J r. , M .D ., J os e ph A. Qu int

an a, J r. , M .D ., P. A. d/b

/a Cardiology Care Consul tants, Adolfo Palomino-Hernande z, M.D. and El Paso Healthcare System , Lt d

. d /b /a D e l S o l M e dic a l C enter , Ca us e No . 2 00 3- 37 28 , in the 12 0th

Di str ic t Co ur

t of El Pa so County (the “ 2003 L awsuit”). The Morenos furnished a n expert repor

t by Charles F . L ander s, M.D. (the “ L ander s Report”). D r. Palomino filed a motion to d i smiss t he L ander s Report, which wa s de nie d b y the tr ia l c ou

rt

. On Ap ri l 18 , 200 5, the Mo re no s n on su ite d th e 20 03 L aws uit . Awe e k late r, the y fi le d th is action, pursua

nt to chapter

74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Dr. Palomino was named a s one of the de fenda nts in the Appellants’ Orig inal Petition herein. On June 15, 2005, the Ap pe lla nts fi le d th e ir

F ir st A me nd e d O ri g ina l Pe tit ion , w hic h d id n ot n ame Dr . Pa lom ino a s a defe ndant. Dr. Palomino was likewise not named in their S econd Amended Orig inal Petition, which was filed on July

12, 2005. On J anuar

y 19, 2006, the tri al court entered a n Ag ree d Scheduling Orde r and D iscovery Control Pl an. The SchedulingOrde r set the tria l date as beg inning on April 7, 2006. The Sche duling Orde r also provide d that “[t] he deadline to join additional parties ha s passed.” On J anuar y 30, 2006, Dr. Quintana

filed a motion for le ave to de signate Dr. Palomino as a r espo n s ible third party . The

n e x td a y , t h e A p p e l l an t s f i l e d th e i r T h i r d A m e n d e d

O r i g i n a l P e t i t i o n . O n c e a g a i n , th e n e w l yamende d petition did not na me Dr. Palomino. The trial court g rante d Dr. Quintana’ s motion for leave on Fe bruar

y 22. On Marc h 2 1, the Ap pe lla

nts fi le d the ir F ourt

h Ame nd e d O ri g ina l Pe tit ion , in wh ic h th e y

didO n or ab o ut A p ri l 10 (t hree da y s af t er t he t ri al d at e d esi gnat ed i n t he A greed Sche d ul i ng O rder), t he co urt 2 gra nted sum m ary jud gm en t i n favo r o f D r. Q u in ta na an d D el S o l M ed i ca l C en t er, l ea ving o nly D r. P alo m i no as a d e fen d a n t.

S e c tio n 1 3 .0 1 p ro v id e d , i n p e rtine n t p a rt: 3 ( d) N ot l at er t han t he l at er of t he 18 0t h day af t er t he dat e on whi ch a hea l t h c ar e l i abi l i t y cl ai m i s f i l ed o r t he l ast da y of any ext end ed pe ri o d est ab l i shed und er Sub sect i o n (f ) or ( h) of

t hi s sect i o n, t he cl ai man t s h al l , f

or e ac h ph y s i ci an or h ea l t h c ar e pr ov i der a g ai n s t w h om a c l ai m i s a s s er t ed: (1) f urni sh t o c o unsel for ea ch p hy si ci an o r healt h c are p rovider o ne o r m o re expe rt r epor t s , w i t h a c u r r i cu l u m v i t ae of e ac h e x per t l i s t ed i n t h e r epor t ; or (2) volunt ari l y nonsui t t he act i o n agai nst t he p hy si ci an o r heal t h care pro vi d er.

. . . ( f ) T he cour t may , f

or g oo d cau s e s hown af t er mo t i on an d hea r i ng , ex t end a ny t i me peri od s peci f i ed on c e a g a in n ame Dr . Pal om ino a s a de fe nd ant. Th e Ap pe lla nts re -s e rv e d th e L and e rs Re po rt , 2 wi tho ut c ha

ng e fr om i ts o riginal for m, o n D r. Pa lom ino on July 5, 20 06 . D r. Pa lom ino mov e d to dis mis s, a sse rt ingthat th e Ap pe lla nts fa ile d to ti me ly

joi n h im a

nd fa ile d to se rv e the ir

e xpe rt re po rt

. Th e tr ial cou rt grante d th e mot ion and awa rd e d atto rn e y ’s fe e s to Dr . Pa lom ino . T he Ap pe lla nts contend that the tr ial court e rre d in doing so. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Di sm iss al o f the Cl aimAg ain stDr . P alo m ino The dismissal of a he alt h -c ar e liability claim is g ener ally

revie wed unde r an a

buse of discretion standa

rd. American Transi tional C are Ctrs., Inc. v. Palac ios , 4 6 S. W. 3 d 8 7 3 , 8 7 7 ( T e x. 20 01 ); P o n c e v . E l P a s o H e a lt h c a r e Sys., Ltd. , 55 S.W. 3d 34 , 3 6 ( Te x. Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 01 , p e t. denied) . Howeve r, to the extent that the issue involves statutory construction, we apply

a de novo standard of

revie w. Ponce , 5 5 S. W.3 d at 36 ; NCED Mental Health, Inc . v. Kidd , 214 S.W .3d 28, 32 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.)

. Be cause th e 2 0 0 3 L aw s u it w a s f il e d p r io r to Se p te mb e r 1 , 2 0 0 3 , it w a s s u b je c t to the pr ov isi on s o f f

or me r a rt ic le 45 90 i, s e c tio n 1 3. 01

. I t is un dis pute d th a t th e Ap pe lla nts ha d ti me ly 3i n Su bse ct i on (d) of t hi s sec t i on f

or a n a dd i t i onal 30 d ay s . O nl y one e xt ens i on may be gr ant ed un der t hi s subsect i o n.

. . . (h ) T h e a ff

e c te d p a rtie s m a y a g re e to e x te n d a n y ti m e p e rio d sp e c ifi e d in S u b se c tio n (a ) o r (d ) o f t h is s ec t i on . An ag r ee men t u n der t h i s s u bs ec t i on i s bi n di n g a n d s h al l be h on or ed by t h e cou r t i f s i g n ed by the a ff e c te d p a rtie s o r th e ir c o u n se l an d fi le d w ith the c o u rt.

. . . ( n) I f a c l ai mant nons ui t s a h eal t h c ar e l i ab i l i t y c l ai m agai ns t a phy s i ci an or h eal t h c ar e pr ovi der b ef o re f i l i ng a co st bo nd and s eeks t o ref i l e t he same o r a si m i l ar hea l t h c are li ab i l i t y cl ai m agai nst t he p h ysic ia n o r h e a lth c a re p ro v id e r, the c la im a n t sha ll fil e a $ 7 ,5 0 0 c o st b o n d fo r e a c h p re v io u sly n on s u i t e d p h y s i c i a n or h e a l t h c a r e pr ov i de r a t t h e t i me of t h e f i l i n g of t h e h e a l t h c a r e l i a bi l i t y c l a i m. I f t h e cl ai man t f

ai l s t o f i l e t h e $7, 500 cos t bon d f or ea ch ph y s i ci an or h ea l t h c ar e pr ov i der , on mot i on and heari ng t he co urt s hal l ord er t he f i l i ng of t he co st b o n d a n d th e c l ai m ant s hal l pa y t he m o vant reasonab l e at t o rney ’ s f ees i ncurred i n ob t ai ni ng rel i ef unde r t hi s subsect i o n. A ct of M ay 1 , 19 9 5 , 74 t h Leg., R

. S., ch. 14 0 , § 1 , 19 9 5 T ex. G en. Law s 9 8 5 , 98 5

- 8 7 (f o rme r T EX . R EV . C IV . S T AT . A NN . art

. 45 9 0 i , § 1 3

. 0 1 (d), (f ), (h) , (n) ). se rv e d th e L and e rs Re po rt on Dr . Pa lom ino in t

he 20 03 L aws uit

. Be cause the cur

rent a ction was filed a fter Septe mber 1, 2003, their c laims are now g overne d by c ha pte r 7 4 o f t

he Te xas C ivi l Pr a c tic e and Re me die s Co de . Sec tio n 7 4. 35 1( a ) c ur re ntl y pr ov ide s: (a) I n a hea lth care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day afte r the date the orig inal petition was filed, ser ve on ea ch par

ty or the pa rty ’s attorne y

one or more e x pert re ports, with a curr iculum vitae of eac h expert listed in the re port for eac h phy sician or health care provider ag ainst whom a li ability claim is asserte d. The date f or ser ving the repor

t may be extended by

written a gre ement of the aff ecte d pa rt ie s. Ea c h d e fe nd ant p hy sic ian o r h e a lth care pr ov ide r who se c on du c t is implicated in a re port must file and ser ve any objection to the suffic iency of the re po rt no t late r t

ha n th e 21 st d ay

a ft e r t he date it w a s se rv e d, fa ili ngwh ic h a ll objections are waived. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 74.351(a)

. The Appe llants argue first that sec tion 33.004(e) of the Civil P rac tice and Remedies Code permitted t heir joi nder of Dr. P alomino, following his desig nation as a r esponsible third party by Dr. Quintana. Sec tion 33.004(a) a llows for t he designation of responsible third parties. Subs ections (a ) and (e ) provide:(a) A def endant may

seek to desig nate a person as a responsible third party by filing a motion for leave to de signate that person as a r esponsible third party . The motion must be filed on or be fore the 60th day befor e the tria l date unless t h e court finds g ood cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.

. . . (e) I f a pe rson is desig nated unde r this se ction as a responsible third party , a cla imant is not barre d b y l i m itations from seekingto join that person, even thoug h such joinder would otherw ise be ba rre d by limit ations, if t he cla imant seeks to join that pers o n n o t later tha

n 60 day s after

that person is desig nated a s a re sponsible third p arty. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 33.004(a) , (e)

. Ap pe lla nts c on te nd

that th e langua g e of

the statut e and

its le g isl a tiv e his tor

y ind ic a te that it applies to t h i s ca s e, and they cite us to the followingexchang e betwe en Senator s Hinojosa and Ratliff: SEN AT OR

HI NO JOSA : Whe n a

de fe nd ant n ame s a

re sp onsi ble thir d p art

y , a s I un de rs tand

it, the pla int if

f h a s 6 0 d ay s to br ingthe th ir d part y int o th e su it, e ve n if limit ations would otherwis e h av e ru n ag ainst that person. I s that true in a medic al malprac tice cla im too, because on pag e 63 of the bill it seems to say that the two-y ear statute in those case s applies notwithstanding a ny other law ? SENATOR RATL I FF : Yes, if health ca re pr oviders ar e g oing to have the be nefit of the desig nation of re sponsible third parties, t hen they have to abide by the same r ules a s e ve ryon e e lse . Thi s 60- da y pr ov isi on wo uld a

pp ly in he a lth c are lia

bil ity c la ims

. S. Conf. Com m. Rep. on H.B. 4, S.J. of Tex ., 78th L eg ., R.S. 5005 (2003). By its terms, however , subsection (e) applies only to “limitations .” The above e x chang e does not indicate a spe cific le g islative intent to apply this provision t o th e 1 2 0 -d ay require ment set out in section 74.351. Moreove r, to the extent that there is a conflict betwee n the t wo s tatutes, section 74.002(a) provides that “[i] n the event of a conflict betwee n this c hapter and another law, including a rule of proc edure or evide nce or court rule , this chapter c ontrols to the ext ent of the conflict.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 74.002(a) . Section 74.351 does not expressly addre ss thetimeliness of the requir ed expert re port in this case.

The Appe llants also argue that the r eport wa s, in an y ca s e, t i mely filed. Dr. Palomino responds that the r efilingof a he alth-ca re liability

claim does not re s tart the 120-da y time period contained in se ction 74.351(a)

. He r elies on Mokk ala v. Me ad , 178 S.W .3d 66 (Tex. App.--Houston [14t h District] 2005, pet. denied) . I n Mo k k ala , the Mea ds filed a he alth-ca re liability

claim under chapte r 74. Id. at 68. They serve d their required ex pert’s r eport a nd his curric ulum vitae 121 and 12 2, re sp e ctiv e ly , d ay s a ft e r f ili ngthe ir or ig ina l pe tit ion . T he Me a ds the n n on su ite d th e ir c la ims

a g a ins t the a

pp e lla nts and , a fe w day s late r, ame nd e d th e ir pe tit ion and a g a in n ame d th e a

pp e lla nts

. Id. at 68-69. The Mea ds ag ain nonsuited their cla ims ag ainst the ap p el l ants, and, this time, they filed a

ne w a c tio n a g a ins t th e m, a sse rt ing the same c la ims

. Th e a pp e lla nts mov e d to dis mis s th e Me a ds ’ claims with prejudice for failing to ti mely serve their expert’s re port and c urriculum vitae, a nd the trial court de nied t he motion. Id . O n a pp e a l, t he Me a ds a sse rt e d th a t th e y ha d a n a bs olute ri g ht t o nonsuit under Texas Rule of Civil P roce dure 1 6 2 , an d t h at, by nonsuiting their c laims, they wer e place d in the same position they would have been ha d they not broug ht the initial lawsuit. Id . at 70. The F ourtee nth Court of Appea ls disagree d. I t looke d to the languag e of the statute and noted that section 74.351(a ) re fer s a t o health-c are liability claim, not a lawsuit. The court conclude d that “under the plain languag e of section 74.351(a) , the 120-day period is trig g ere d on t h e d at e t he claimant files a

petition alleg ing a

particula r health ca

re liability

claim, not the date she files another lawsuit assertingthat same c laim.” Id. at 71. The c ourt al s o co n cluded that section 74.351(a) did not conflict with Rule 162. Id. at 73. I t r e a so ne d that, in e na c tin g that se c tio n, the L e g isl a tur e re mov e d p ro vis ion s und e r f or me r a rt ic le 4590i that permitted a plaintiff to nonsuit an action, if he failed to f urnish an expert re port within theT he ve rsi o n i n ef f ec t f ro m S ep t em b er 1 , 2 0 0 3 , t ho ug h A ug ust 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 , w as the sa m e, ex ce p t t ha t , i n the fi rst 4 s ent enc e, “ t he cl ai m wa s f i l ed” was s ubs t i t ut ed f

or “ t he ori gi nal pet i t i on was f i l ed. ” See A c t o f Ju n e 2 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 th L e g ., R. S. , c h

. 204, § 10. 01, 2003 T ex . G en . La ws 847, 875; T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § 74

. 3 5 1 (a). require d time. T he court noted that, under section 74.351(a) , the only means for a plaintiff to ext end the 120-day deadline for serving an expert repor t is by ag ree ment of the a ffe cted pa rties. Id. at 76. The c ourt conc luded that “[a]llowing a plaintiff to r estart the period for serving an expert re port by sim ply no ns uit inghe r h e a lthc are lia bil ity c la im a nd re fi lin g that

same c la im, c ou ld e ff

e c tiv e ly expand the 120-day

period to we ll over two y ear s. Such a proce dure is inc onsistent with the policies

. . . set forth a

bove.” Id. (s tatut or

y c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Daughtery v. Schie ssler , 229 S.W .3d 77 3, 77 5 ( Te x. Ap p. -- Ea stl and 20 07 , n o p e t.) (h old ing that a no ns uit wi thi n 1 20 da y s o f f ili ngc la im did not ex tinguish the runningof the 120-da y limit ation period ). Relying on Park v. Lync h , 19 4 S.W. 3d 95 (T e x. Ap p. -- Da lla s 20 06 , no pe t.) , th e Ap pe lla nts

c on te nd that Mo k k ala does not establish that the 120-day period beg an to run, because the version of sec t ion 74.351(a) in e ffe ct for a cause of ac tion accr

uing be fore September 1, 2005, c ontains lang uag e that it only

applies to “a

n action” f

iled on or after the eff

ective date. The plaintiffs in Pa rk

4 orig inally filed a medica l malprac tice lawsuit in Denton County under f ormer a rticle 4590i. Id. at 96 . A ft e r t

he de a dli ne fo r t

he fi lin g of the ir e xpe rt

re po rt s, the pla int if

fs fi le d a mot ion fo r n on su it wi t h o ut prejudice , which wa s g rante d by the cour t. Id. a t 9 7

. O n th e s am e d ay th e y f ile d th e ir motion for nonsuit, the plaintiffs then filed an a ction under c hapter 74 in Dallas Co u n ty . The plaintiffs filed their e x pert re port within 120 day s of the date they fi l ed t h e s ec o n d lawsuit. The de fe nd ants mov e d to dis mis s, arguin g that th e pla int if fs fa il ed to tim e ly

fi le the ir e xpe rt re po rt , b e c a u s e th e 1 2 0

- d ay t i m e p e r i o d b e g ant o r

un w h e n th e y f

i l e d th e i r i n i t i a l l aw s u i t i n D e n t o nC o u n ty. The trial c ourt denied the motion, and the court of a ppeals a ffirme d. Id. at 100-01. The court explained that, in adopting the 2003 v er s i o n of sec tion 74.351, the L eg islature spec ified that thesection applies “ only to an action filed on or af ter the e ffe ctive date ” of Septe mber 1, 2003. Id. at 99 . T he L e g isl a tur e fu

rt he r p rov id ed th at “[a]na c tio n f ile d b e fo re the e ff

e c tiv e date of

thi s A c t, inc lud ingan a c tio n fi le d be fo re that date in whic h a pa rt y is j oin e d o r d e sig nate d a ft e r t hat date , is g overne d by

the law in ef

fec t immediately

befor e the c hang e in l aw made by this Act . . . .” Id. (citingAct of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, §§ 1.03, 23.02(a), ( d), 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 84 7, 84 9, 86 4, 89 8- 99 ). Th e a pp e lla nts argue d that sec tio n 74. 35 1 ap pli e d to a hea lth -c are lia bil ity

c la im , a s o p p o s e d t o a l aw s u i t , an d tr i g g e r e d th e 1 2 0

- d ay t i m e p e r i o d , b e c a u s e th e c l a i m s i n b oth lawsuits were the same. Id. at 100. The court di sag ree d and conc luded that the dea dline for f iling expert repor

ts in the Dallas lawsuit was 120 day s from the date that lawsuit was f iled. Id. at 100-01. We ag ree with Park to the extent it is a pplicable to the prese nt c ase. The 120-day deadline did not beg in to run with the filing of the 2003 L awsuit. Howe ver, D r. Palomino does not argue that the 120-da

y deadline beg an to run whe n the 2003 L awsuit was f iled, but that it bega

n to run when the 2005 L awsuit, in which he w as or i g inally named a s a def

endant, wa s filed. Nonsuit of the Appellants’ c laims ag ainst him in t he 2005 Law suit did not toll the running of the 120-da

y limit ations period. See Mo k k ala , 178 S.W .3d at 76. This lawsuit was filed on A pril 25, 2005; if the Ap pe lla nts we re fo rc e d to re ly so le ly up on the ir July 20 06 , f ili ngof the ir e xpe rt ’s re po rt , w e wo uld ag ree with Dr. Palomino. In this unique fact pattern, howe ver, the Morenos did timely serve the L ander s Report on Dr. Pa lom ino in t

he 20 03 L aws uit . T his re po rt wa s th e same re po rt

that w a s, e ve ntu a lly , r e -s e rv e d in the pre s e n t s u it

. D r . Pa lo mi n o c h a ll e n g e d th e r e p o rt d

ur in g th e 2 0 0 3 L aw s u it , an d th e tr ia l c ourt ruled at that time that the report was s u ff i ci ent. The Appellants argue that the r eport mee ts the require ments of sec tion 74.351. Dr. Palomino doe s not a ddress the repor t’s adequa cy

under se ction 74.351, but contends that the re port’s adequac y is irreleva

nt, beca use it was not timely

serve d in theprese nt case

.

In University of Tex. H

ealth Scienc e Ctr. at San Ant onio v. Ripley , 230 S.W .3d 419, 420 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2007, no pet.) , the plaintiffs, as r epre sent at i ves of the de cede nt’s estate, broug ht a n action ag ainst the University of Texas H ealth Science Center (the “Hospital”) in fede ral court for alleg edly neg lige nt acts that resulted in dece dent’s death, following by pass s urg ery . During the cour se of the f

eder al ac tion, the plaintiffs filed an ex pert re port and a curr iculum vitae. Pursuant to the cour

t’ s s c h e d u li n g o r d e r , th e H o s p it a l w a s r e qu ir e d to f il e an y o b je c ti o n s to th e p r oposed expert testimony

within thirty

day s of its submis sion. The Hospital did not object to the repor t. The fe de ra l c ourt

did , h ow e ve r, su

bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nt t he Ho sp ita l’ s mo tio n to dis mis s, ba se d o n E le ve nth A m e n dm e n ti m mun i ty. There afte r, t he plainti ffs brought an action in state court under se ction 74.351. Id. at 420-21. The plaintiffs did not se rve an expert’s re port or cur riculum vitae within 120 day s, and the Hospital moved to dismiss the claims. The tr i al court denied the motion, and the San Antonio Court of Appea ls affirme d. The appellate court noted t hat s ection 74.351(a) required that the re port be ser ved not later than the 120th day afte r the date the cla im was filed. Id. a t 421. Th e c ourt re a so ne d th a t, althou g h th e e xp e rt r e p o rt h a d b e e n s e r v e d p r io r to th e f

il in g o f th e s e c ti o n 7 4

. 3 5 1 claim, the plaintiffs satisfied the statute by havingserve d the expert repor t prior to the passag e of 120 da y s from the date of

the claim. Id . at 422-23. As in Ripley , the Morenos in this case timely filed their report in the prior action. They then

re- serve d the re port following Dr. Palomino’s desig nation as a r esponsible third party . We hold that the Appellants, having onc e ser ved the r eport (a lbeit during the pendency of t he 2003 L awsuit), metW e no t e al so t hat t he 2 0 0 3 L a n d ers R ep o rt s erved t he l egi sl at i ve p urpo ses be hi nd t he exp ert
- repo rt 5 r equ i r eme n t

. Long bef or e t h e pa s s ag e of

120 day s af

t er t h e or i g i n al pet i t i on was f i l ed-

- i n dee d, w el l be f

or e t h e pet i t i on w as fi l ed

- - D r. P alo m i no ha d b ee n furnished t he rep o rt t o wh i ch he wa s enti t l e d . S ec t i o n 7 4 .35 1 (a) p ro vid es that “a c la im a n t sha ll, no t l at er t ha n t he 12 0t h da y af t er t he d at e t he o ri gi nal p et i t i o n was f i l ed , s erve” (emp hasi s ad d ed ) a r ep o rt an d c u r r i cu l u m v i t ae ; n ot h i n g i n t h at l an g u ag e pr ec l u des s er v i ce of t h e r epor t an d t h e cu r r i cu l u m v i t ae be f or e t h e pet i t i on i s f i l ed. the technic al re quirements of the statute. We sustain the Appellants’ sec ond issue. 5 B. Dism issal B ased on Violation of the Schedu ling O rder We revie w a t ri al court’s enfor ceme nt of a sche duling or der unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. Roskey

v. Continental Cas. Co. , 1 90 S.W. 3d 87 5, 87 9 ( Te x. App.- -Dal las 2 00 6, pe t. denied) . A trial co u rt abuses its discre tion when its action is arbitrar y or unre asonable or without any ref ere nce to a

ny g uiding r ules or princ iples. Ho us ing Au th. of City

of E l P as o v . G ue rra , 963 S.W .2d 946, 952-53 (Te x . App.--E l Paso 1998, pe t. de nied). In this case, the sc heduling order was enter ed on January 19, 2006. I t pr ovided that “[t] he dea dline to join additional parties has passe d.” On Janu ary 30 , D r. Qu int ana

fi le d h is m oti on

fo r l e ave to de sig nate Dr . Palo min o as a re sp on sib le th i r d p arty. T h e Ap p e l l an t s f

i l e d o b j e c t i o n s t o th e m o t i o n f

o r l e av e o n F e b r

u ar y 2 2 ; o n th e s am e d ay, the trial court, notwithstanding the languag e of the Ag ree d Scheduling Orde r, g rante d the motion for leave to desig nate. Pursuant t o t h e sche duling or der, the deadline to f ile dispositi ve motions was F e br ua ry 27 and the de a dli ne to a

me nd ple a din g s w a s Ma

rc h 1 7. Th e Ap pe lla

nts fi le d th e ir

F ourt h Am e nd e d O ri g ina l Pe tit ion on Marc h 2 1, a dd ingDr . Pa lom ino to t he laws uit

. Section 33.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code pr ovides that, if a r esponsible third party is designated, a c laimant is not barre d by limit ations from see king to join t h at p er son, even th o u g hj o i n d e r

w o u l d o th e r w i s e b e b ar

r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s , i f

j o i n d e r i s s o u g h tn o tl a t e r th an6 0 d ays from the date the per son is designated. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE A NN . § 33.004(e)

. Considering the limited waiver of the limitations bar c ontained in sec tion 33.004(e), it is appare nt that th e purp os e of the statut e is to pe rm it a pla int if f to join a s a def

e nd ant a pe rs on de sig nate d a s aT h e cou r t g r an t ed D r . Q u i n t an a l ea v e t o de s i g n at e D r . Pal omi n o a s a r es pon s i bl e t h i r d pa r t y on l y 44 da y s pr i or 6 t o t he t r i al dat e c ont ai ned i n t he Schedul i ng O r der. N ot wi t hs t andi ng t hat the d eadl i ne t o joi n a dd i t i onal par t i es ha d p ass ed , we f

i nd no ab use of

dis cret i o n i n t he co urt ’ s havi ng grant ed such l eave at t hat t i m e. H o wever, t he ef f ect of t he c o u rt’s ru ling w a s tha t, if it h a d the n c o n tinu e d to insist u p o n the A p ril 7 trial d a te , t h e A p p e llan ts’ m o tio n fo r le a v e to join D r. P al o m i no as a d ef end ant wo ul d have b een t i m el y (f o r l i m i t at i o ns p urpo ses ) i f f i l ed 16 da y s af

t er t he t ri al be gan. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § 3 3. 00 4(e)

. W e d o not b el i eve t hat t he Legi s l at ur e c oul d hav e i nt ended s uch a re su lt. re sp on sible th ir d p art

y by ano the r d e fe nd ant. In th is c a se , D r. Qu int ana so ug ht l e ave to d e signate Dr. Palomino as a r esponsible third party afte r the date for joinder had pa ssed under the sche duling

o r d e r . W h i l e th e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a r e s p o n s i b l e th i r d p arty i s n o te qu i v a l e n tt o th e j o i n d e r o f a p arty, 6 the trial cour

t’s ref usal to allow the joinder of Dr. Palomino, wh i ch wa s appar ently based on the pa ssa g e of

the joi nd e r de a dli ne in t

he sc he du lin g or de r, and

its su bs e qu e nt d ism iss a l of

the c la ims ag ainst Dr. Palomino, was an a buse of discr etion. We sustain this issue. C. Att orneys’ F ees In I ssue Thre e, the Appe llants appea l the trial court’ s awa rd of attorney s’ f

ee s to Dr. Palomino. Bec ause we have deter mined that the trial court err ed in g rantingDr. Palomino’s motions to dismi ss, we sustain the Appe llants’ third issue. III . C ON CL USI ON We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g dis mis sin g the Ap pe lla nts ’ c la ims and

re mand fo r t ri a l.

KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice October 23, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ.