### FILED OCTOBER 20, 

### 2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division Ill

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISIONTHREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,


### v. DENNIS WALLACEPATTERSON, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 33814-2-111

OPINIONPUBLISHED INPART

LAWRENCE-BERREY, 

### J.

- Dennis Patterson appeals his convictions for disorderly conduct and interference with a court. He argues a provision ofthe disorderly conduct statute, RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b), is unconstitutionally overbroad and infringes onprotected speech. He also argues the Statepresented insufficient evidence ofhis intentto disrupt or interfere with courtproceedings. Inthe publishedpartofthis opinion, we concludethe challengedprovision ofthe disorderly conduct statute does notreach a substantial amount ofconstitutionally protected speech, andtherefore is not overbroad. Inthe unpublishedpart ofthis opinion,
we reject his second argument andhis argument contained in his statement ofadditional grounds for review (SAG). Wetherefore affirm.No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
FACTS Mr. Pattersonbelieves that several elected Stevens County officials, including judges, are not authorizedto performthe duties oftheir offices becausethey have not compliedwith state laws relatingto taking, filing, and bondingtheir oaths ofoffice. Although he has broughthis concerns to the attention ofcounty and state officials, his
concerns have notbeen addressed to his satisfaction. Believingthat certain county officials, including District CourtJudge GinaTveit, were acting outside ofthe law, Mr. Pattersonbelievedhis only option was to presenthis grievance inpersonto Judge Tveit in her courtroom before she called a session to order. Onthe morning ofJanuary 5, 2015, Mr. Patterson and several others who shared his beliefs gathered in the gallery ofJudge Tveit's courtroom. Judge Tveithears the traffic infraction docket on Monday mornings, and her courtroom was full that morning with people waiting to have their infractions consideredby her. As Judge Tveit entered the courtroom, Mr. Pattersonremained standing and beganto loudly readhis prepared statement. Judge Tveittold Mr. Patterson that courtwas in session, buthe interrupted her and continued explainingwhy she lacked authority tojudge anyone. Judge Tveit, trying to speak overMr. Patterson, said a courtrule prohibitedpersons in the audience from speaking. Continuing, she explained courtproceedings were recorded, and the reason
2No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
audience members were prohibited from speaking was to preserve the full record. Judge Tveit, still attempting to speak overMr. Patterson, saidhis loud speaking was disrupting courtproceedings. She then declared court was in recess, and ordered him to leave. Mr. Patterson continued to question thejudge's authority. A deputy sheriffstationed in the courtroom approached Mr. Patterson and told him he was trespassing. Mr. Patterson did not leave. The deputy physically removed Mr. Patterson from the courtroom and placedhim under arrest. As this was happening, another man in the courtroom began to loudly read a prepared statement. He, too, was removed. Judge Tveit returned to the courtroom. Proceedings were immediately interrupted again by a third person loudly reading a statement. Once this thirdpersonwas removed from the courtroom, order was restored and Judge Tveit was able to proceed withthe morning infraction docket. The interruptions delayed courtproceedings by 20 minutes. The State charged Mr. Patterson with disorderly conduct and interference with a court. At the trial, Judge Tveittestified she has a duty to maintain control ofthe courtroom, and order is important for effective and efficient administration ofcourt business. She testified she recessed courtthatMonday morning because Mr. Patterson would not stop talking loudly, and his actions prevented her from hearing cases. Judge
3No. 33814-2-111 State v. Patterson
Tveit acknowledged there is no procedure in place for a citizen to directly address ajudge ifthey have a grievance or issue with thatjudge. And a sign posted outside the courtroom informs the public that contact or conversationwith ajudge outside ofthe courtroom is prohibited. Ajury found Mr. Patterson guilty ofboth counts. He appeals his convictions. ANALYSIS A. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO PROVISION OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT STATUTE Mr. Patterson first argues the provision ofthe disorderly conduct statute under which he was convicted is overbroad and infringes on constitutionallyprotected speech under the First Amendmentto the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 ofthe Washington Constitution. The interpretation ofconstitutional provisions and legislative enactmentspresents
a question oflaw reviewed de novo. City of Spokane v. Rothwell, 166 Wn.2d 872, 876, 215 P.3d 162 (2009); Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. State, 167 Wn.2d 514,523,219 P.3d 941 (2009). Generally, legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 753, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). The party challenging an enactmenthas the burden ofproving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Voters Educ. Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 161 Wn.2d 470, 481, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007). But in 4

# l No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
the free speech context, "'the State usually bears the burden of justifying arestriction on speech.'" State v. lmmelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6, 267 PJd 305 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Voters Educ. Comm., 161 Wn.2d at 482). The disorderly conduct statute, RCW 9A.84.030, makes it a misdemeanorto engage in four proscribed forms ofspeech and/or conduct. The provision at issue here is RCW 9A.84.030(l)(b). Itprovides that: (1) A person is guilty ofdisorderly conduct ifthe person: (b) Intentionally disrupts any lawful assembly ormeeting ofpersons without lawful authority. RCW 9A.84.030. Mr. Patterson makes a facial overbreadth challenge to this provision. In a facial challenge, a person may argue the statute is overbroad without first demonstrating that his
or her own conduct could not be regulated by a sufficiently specific statute. lmmelt, 173 Wn.2d at 7. Such a challenge is permitted because FirstAmendment overbreadth doctrine is largelyprophylactic, aimed at preventing any "chilling" ofconstitutionally protected expression. As a result, courts will permit facial overbreadth challenges when the statute in question chills orburdens constitutionally protected conduct. Overbreadth doctrine also has a constitutionally mandated "core", in which a defendant has aright not to be sanctioned exceptunder a constitutionally valid rule of law. When a defendant convicted under a criminal statute challenges the statute as overbroad, he or she is asserting that the conviction rests on an unconstitutional law. Application ofthe overbreadth doctrine is strong 

### 5No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson medicine, however, and should be employed by a court sparingly and only as a last resort. State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 122, 857 P.2d 270 (1993) (citations omitted). "[O]ur article I, section 5 analysis ofoverbreadth follows the analysis underthe First Amendment." Bradburn v. N Cent. Reg'lLibraryDist., 168 Wn.2d 789, 804, 231 P.3d 166 (2010). A court's first task in an overbreadth challenge is to determine whether the enactment at issue reaches a substantial amount ofconstitutionallyprotected speech or expressive conduct. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 7; City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987). An enactment is overbroad ifit "'sweeps within its prohibitions'" a substantial amount ofconstitutionallyprotected conduct. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 6 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 839, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992)). Criminal statutes must be scrutinizedwith "particularcare," and those that make a substantial amount ofconstitutionallyprotected speech unlawful may be held facially invalid even ifthere is also a legitimate application. Hill, 482 U.S. at 459. But "[a] statute or ordinance will be overturned only ifthe court is unable toplace a sufficiently limiting construction on a standardless sweep oflegislation." Luvene, 118 Wn.2d at 840.

6No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
To determine whether a statute sweeps too broadly, we must first construe it. We will abstain from declaring a statute unconstitutional ifwe can fairly give the statute a
narrow construction. "In cases involving a facial challenge to a statute, the pivotal question in determining whether abstention is appropriate is whetherthe statute is 'fairly subjectto an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the
... constitutional question.'" Hill, 482 U.S. at 468 (quotingHarman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35, 85 S. Ct. 1177, 14 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1965)). The provision here is short and direct, with few words orphrases subjectto judicial construction. One wordthatrequiresjudicial construction is "disrupt." That word can be construedto mean a slight disruption orto mean a substantial disruption. One phrase that requiresjudicial construction is the exception, "without lawful authority." The lawful authority exception can refer to law enforcement or it can referto any specific recognized authority-such as aprincipal in a school or a teacher in a classroom. So to render RCW 9A.84.030(l)(b) constitutional, we give the scope ofthe statute a narrow reading, and the exception a broad reading. Therefore, we hold RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b) requires the State to prove the intentional disruption was substantial, meaning that it reasonably caused the meeting to be delayed or canceled. We also hold thatthe State must prove the disrupter did nothave specific recognized authority to disrupt the
7No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson meeting. 1 "[T]he overbreadth doctrine attenuates as the sanctioned behaviormoves from pure speech toward conduct." lmmelt, 173 Wn.2d at 8. Here, the disorderly conduct provision sanctions conduct more than speech. Although an assembly ofpeople may be substantially interrupted by words as readily as by conduct, the statute is speech neutral, and focuses on the disruption rather than the viewpoint expressed by the disrupter. For example, had Mr. Patterson stood and loudly read the Wizard ofOz, and continued to read loudly after thejudge ordered him to stop, thejudge still would have recessed court. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld aprovision ofKentucky's disorderly conduct statute. Under the provision in question, apersonwas guilty ofdisorderly conduct if, "'with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, orrecklessly creating a risk thereof, he
... [ c]ongregates with otherpersons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order ofthe police to disperse."' Id. at 108 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. §437.016(l)(t) (1968)). In upholding the provision, the courtnoted the Kentucky statute

1Mr. Patterson relies on People v. Rapp, 492 Mich. 67, 821 N.W.2d 452 (2012) to establish the provision here is substantially overbroad. AlthoughRapp involved a Michigan State University ordinance that criminalized conduct similarto the provision here, we depart from that court's result primarily because that courtbroadly construed the ordinance instead ofnarrowly construing it, as ourprecedentrequires ofus. 8No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson

was construed very narrowly by the state court so to encompass only insubstantial protected speech or activity. Colten, 407 U.S. at 111. Having set forth the above principles, we now undertake the task ofweighing "the amount ofprotected speech proscribed by the [law] against the amount ofunprotected speech that the [law] legitimately prohibits." Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 11. We note the provision, as construed, would prohibit very little protected speech or conduct. A person who merely intends to make his or her views known would notbe subjectto the law's proscription. Instead, only the person who intends to substantially disrupt a meeting so the meeting is delayed or canceled would be subjectto the law'sproscription. A person generally has a free speech right to make his or her views known, but the rubric offree speech does not include the intentto substantially interfere with a meeting. Notably, the United States Supreme Court has held: The rights offree speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions orbeliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee ofliberty implies the existence ofan organized society maintainingpublic order, without which liberty itselfwould be lost in the excesses ofanarchy. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,554, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 

### L. Ed. 2d 471 (1965). We conclude that, because RCW 9A.84.030(1)(b) does not reach a substantial amount ofconstitutionallyprotected speech, it is not overbroad. 9No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
The remainder ofthis opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions. RCW 2.06.040. B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Mr. Patterson next argues the State failed to prove he intended to disrupt or interfere with a courtproceeding, but onlyprovedhe intended to exercise his constitutional right to petition the government for redress ofhis grievances. In so arguing, Mr. Patterson challenges both his disorderly conduct conviction and his interference with a court conviction. In a criminal case, the State mustprovide sufficient evidence to prove each element ofthe charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence, the proper inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier offact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence mustbe drawn in favor ofthe State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." Id. Furthermore, "[a] claim of insufficiency admits the truth ofthe State's evidence and all inferences thatreasonably
10No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson

can be drawn therefrom." Id. In a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence, circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004). This court's role is not to reweigh the evidence and substitute itsjudgment for that ofthejury. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980). Instead, because thejurors observedthe witnesses testify firsthand, this court defers to thejury's resolution ofconflicting testimony, evaluation ofwitness credibility, and decision regarding the persuasiveness and the appropriate weightto be given the evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). As we have held above, the pertinentprovision ofWashington's disorderly conduct statute required the State to prove Mr. Patterson intendedto substantially disrupt the courtroom to cause it to be reasonably delayed or discontinued. Mr. Patterson does not argue Judge Tveit's decision to recess was unreasonable orthat he had specific authority to disrupt. The interference with a court statute provides, in relevantpart: Whoever, interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice
... in or near a building housing a court ofthe state ofWashington

... resorts to any ... demonstration in or near any such building
... shall be guilty ofa gross misdemeanor.

11No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
RCW 9.27.015.2 Here, Mr. Patterson argues his only intent was to petitionJudge Tveit for a redress ofhis grievances, not to disrupt the morning's courtproceedings. Buthe did disrupt the court proceedings. And he continued to disrupt the courtproceedings after Judge Tveit announced court was in session, and while she articulated the reason whypersons from the audience were required to be quiet. Judge Tveittestified she believed it was necessary to call a recess so that order could be restored in the courtroom. IfMr. Patterson's purpose was to petition Judge Tveit and not to disrupt the courtproceedings, he might have found a less onerous method than causing a cacophony at the beginning of the morning docket and requiring everypersonwho had court business to wait an additional 20 minutes to have their matters considered. When evidence supports both an innocent explanation and a criminal explanation,
ajury is entitledto infer guilt. State v. Bockob, 159 Wn.2d 311, 340-41, 150 P.3d 59 (2006). Mr. Patterson was entitled to make his argumentto thejury, and thejurywas entitled to disbelieve it. State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577,587, 183 P.3d 267 (2008). Because a rational trier offact could have found that Mr. Patterson acted with the intent

2 RCW 9.27.015 does not contain a mens rea element. However, the court's instructions added an intent elementto this offense. We express no opinion as to whether RCW 9.27.015 would be declared unconstitutionally overbroad underthe test we 12

### No. 33814-2-111 State v. Patterson

to substantially disrupt the courtroom, we will not disturb ajury's finding when it is based
on substantial evidence. C. APPELLATE COSTS In compliance with this court's local rule, Mr. Patterson filed a supplemental brief with appropriate argument, supported by a current declaration offinancial circumstances, establishing his current and future inability topay an award ofappellate costs. We therefore deny the State an award ofappellate costs. STATEMENTOFADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW In his SAG, Mr. Patterson argues he was arrested and convicted unlawfully because he was exercising his constitutional right. Specifically, Mr. Patterson argues: "It is a foregone conclusion that ifeven the United States Congress can't criminalize our right to peaceably assemble and redress ofour grievances then county and state government officers can't. Absent a constitutional amendment, neither can ajury." SAG at 2. Although phrased differently, this is the same argumentwe addressed above: Mr. Patterson was entitled to argue to thejurythat his intent was onlyto peaceably assemble and seek government redress ofhis grievances. Butthejurywas also entitled to
articulate today. 13No. 33814-2-III State v. Patterson
disbelieve him and find that he intended to throw the courtroom into disorder. We all have the right to peaceably assemble andpetition the government for redress ofour grievances. But as with all constitutional rights, this right is qualified. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 554 (the constitutional guarantee ofliberty implies the existence ofan organized society maintainingpublic order). Lawrence-Berrey, J. WE CONCUR:


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