The Honor able P. Kevin Castel, of the United States District Court for the Southern * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 0 8
- 4 7 9 3
- cr(L), 08
- 5 2 6 8 (con) United States v. Gar dner/Gla dden U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2009 (Argued: J anuar

y 6, 2010 Dec ided: Marc h 10, 2010)

Docke t Nos. 08-4793-c r(L ), 08-5268( con)

_______________ U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , Appellee , —v.— E DW AR D G ARDNER , also known as Ale x and KEN R OY G L ADD EN , a lso kn ow n a s K e nr oy F low e rs , also known as Micha el Richardson. De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts .

_______________ B e f o r e : F EI NB ER G and K ATZ MANN , Circuit Judges , C AS TEL , District Judge
. *

_______________ Appea l from J udg ments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Jed S. Rakoff, Judge ), date d September 25, 2008 ( Gar dner) and Nove mber 14, 2008 (Gladde n), followinga jury trial, convictingdefe ndants of conspira cy , drugand fire arm off enses2

and se nte nc ingGa

rd ne r t o 1 80 months ’ i mpr iso nme nt a nd Gl a dd e n to 30 0 mo nth s’ imprisonment. W e hold that when a defe ndant ac quires a f

irea rm using dr

ug s as pay

ment he possesses the fir ear

m in furthera

nce of a drugtraff

icking crime. We a ccor dingly aff irm the judgme nt of the district court.

_______________

J EN N I FER E. B UR NS , Assistant United States Attorney (Michae l D. Maimin, Assistant United States Attorney , of counsel ), for Preet B hara

ra, United States Attorney

for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, NY, for Appellee
. B EV ER L Y V AN N ESS (Curtis J . Fa rber , of counsel), Ne w York, N Y, for Defendant-

Appellant Edward Gardner
. D EV I N M C L A U G H LIN , L ang rock, Sper ry & Wool, L L P, Middl ebury , VT, for Defendant-

Appellant Kenroy Gladden
.

_______________ K ATZ MANN , Circuit Judge : The thre shold issue presente d on appea l is whether a cquiringa fire arm usingdrug s as pay ment constitutes possessing that f irea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A) . Def endant- Appellant Edwa

rd Ga rdner appea ls from the September 25, 2008 judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Rakoff , J. ). De fenda

nt-Appellant Ke nroy

Gladden a

ppeals fr om the November 14, 2008 judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Rakoff, J. ). Gar dner a nd Gladden w ere convicted, f ollowing a

jury trial, of conspira cy , drugand fire arm offe nses, including a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A) , which prohibits the possession of a firea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime. A t trial, the district court instructed the juryI n this opini on, we a ddress only Gar dner a

nd Gladden’ s challeng es to their convic tions 1 under 18 U .S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A). I n a compa

nion summary

order , we a ddress a

nd reje ct Gar dner and Gl a dd e n’ s r e ma ini ngc ha lle ng e s to the ir c on vic tio ns , b ut i n li g ht o f i nte rv e nin g pr e c e de nt, we v ac at e t h ei r s en t en ce s an d re m an d th ei r c as es fo r r es en t en ci n g.

3 that it c ou ld f ind a vio latio n o f t

his pr ov isi on

if it una nim ou sly c on c lud e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt that the defe ndants “a cquire d the fire arm by paying f or it with drug s involved in the conspirac y .” On appe al, Gar dner a

nd Gladden c ontend that ac quiring a fire arm usingdrug s as pay ment does not constitute possession of that fire arm in fur thera nce of a drugtraff

icking crime, a

nd the re fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y and the re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support their convic tions under 18 U.S.C. §(c)( 1)(A) . We hold that acquiringa fire arm using dr ug s a s p ay

me nt c on sti tut e s p os se ssi ngthat f ir e arm in f ur the ra nc e of a dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ri me in vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c )( 1) (A ). We t he re fo re c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y ins tr uc te d th e jur

y and that th e re wa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt de fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio ns . 1 I This case beg an with an unde rcove r investig ation into crac k coca ine sales in the B ronx. Under cover

ag ents purcha sed cr ack c ocaine from Na jir Wi lliams, who became a c ooperating wi tne ss i n th e c a se a g a ins t G ard ne r a nd Gl a dd e n. At

tr ia l, Wi lli ams t e sti fi e d to the re latio ns hip betwee n Gar dner a

nd Gladden a

nd their drugtraff

icking activities, and the jury conclude d beyond a re asonable doubt that Gardne r and G ladden we re involved in a drugtraff

icking
c o n s p i r a c y. Relevant to this appea l, Wi lliams testified about an occ asion when G ardne r and G ladden acquir ed two fire arms with drug s. On that occ asion, Wil liams testified that he, Ga rdner and4

Gladden w ere sitti ng in Gladden’ s SUV when a Pontiac car

pulled up next t o them and par ked. A fe w minutes later, a

man enter ed the pa sseng er se at of Gla dden’s SUV with a bla ck bac kpack. The man a sked for

$600 for two guns that were in the backpa ck. Gladde n stated that he did not
wa nt t o p ay c a shfo r t he g un s, but in ste a d w ante d to g ive the man “ so me wo rk ,” me anin g so me
cra ck coc aine, f

or the guns. The man r esponded that he “[didn’t] know about that” a nd that he wanted some cash, at which point he put the guns back inside the ba ckpac k, told them to give him a minute and exited the vehicle. Williams t hen sawthe man ente r the Pontiac a nd noticed that th e re wa s ano the r o c c up ant i n th e dr ive r’ s se a t of that ve hic le . Wh e n th e man r e tur ne d to Gladden’ s SUV with his backpac k, he stated “ all rig ht, we will take wor k for the guns,” mea

ning that he wo uld

take the dr

ug s f or the g un s. Th e man th e n p ull e d o ut t he g un s a nd ha nd e d th e m to Gladden. G ladden state d that he would g ive the man a n onion, meaningan ounce of cr ack
coca ine, for the g uns, and the man a g ree d. The man the n exit ed Gladde n’s SUV and g ot back inside the Pontiac. After the man exited the SUV, Gladden tur ned to Gar dner a

nd instructed him to ge t an onion, and Gar dner w ent inside the house a nd returne d with the drug s. The man then e ntere d Gladden’ s SUV ag ain and Gla dden hande d him the drug s. Presumably beca use an ounc e of
cra ck coc aine wa s worth more tha n $600, Gladden told the man that, after they finished selling the drug s, they

should give him back $200. The man then pocke ted the drug s and exited Gl ad d en ’s S UV , an d

Gl ad d en h an d edth e f

i re arm s t o Ga rd n er

an d as k edh i mt o “p u tth es e t h i n gs up for me.” Be fore Gar dner a nd Wil liams left, Gladden g ot a ca ll on his phone. Willi ams noticed that the dr iver of the Pontiac was a lso on the phone. Will iams testified that the man on the phone told Gladde n that he did not want cr ack c ocaine and that he w anted powde r coc aine5

instead. Gladde n responde d “that that will take a minute” and that he had to “g o around the blo c k to de a l w iththat.” Ga rd ne r a nd Willi ams the n e xite d th e ve hic le and we nt i ns ide the ir house whe re the y

inspected the g uns. There is no evidence in the rec ord re g ardingwhether Gladden a ctually

swappe d the cr ack c ocaine for powe r coc aine. Gar dner a nd Gladden w ere char g ed with violating 18 U .S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A), which provides that “[a]ny

person who, dur ing a

nd in relation to any

crime of violence or

drug traff icking crime . . . use s or ca rries a firea rm, or who, in fur

thera nce of any such cr ime, possesses a f

irea rm,” shall be subje ct to a pena lty in addition to that for the under lying c rime. At the c on c lus ion

of the ir tr ia l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y a s f oll ow s: [T] he g overnme nt must prove that the def endant you are consideringpossessed this firea rm for the purpose of

further ing the conspirac y

char g ed in Count 1, that is, to help in carry ing out the conspirac y . I n this reg ard, the firea rm does not have to have be en actua lly used. The de fenda

nt must be shown to have possessed the g un for the pur

pose of play

ing some role, e ven if small, in the further ance of the c onspiracy
. Also y ou may

[find] that a g iven def

endant possesse d the fire arm in further ance of the c onspiracy if y ou unanimously

conclude beyond a re asonable doubt that he ac quired the f irea rm by paying f o r i tw i t hdr u g s i n v o l v e d

i nth e c o n s p i r a c y. The jury convicted G ardne r and G ladden of possessing f

irea rms in further ance of a dr ug traff icking crime. II 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) has not alwa y s contained the “possession in further ance ” prong
. Un til 19 98 , th is p ro vis ion a pp lie d o nly

to a pe rs on wh o “ us e s o r c arr ie s a

fi re arm ” “ duri ngand

in
re latio n to any

. . . d ru g tr a ff ic kin g c ri me .” 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (1 99 8) ; seePub. L . No. 105-6

386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998). The Supre me Court interpre ted this provision as it related to a ba rter transac tion in Smith v. United States , 508 U.S. 223 (1993), and W atson v. United States , 5 52 U. S. 74, 79 (2007). In Sm ith , t h e C o u rt co n cl u d edth at a d ef en d an twh o re ce i v eddru gs i nex ch an ge for a firea rm “used” the fire arm “ during and in re lation to . . . [ a] drug traff icking crime.” 508 U.S. at 228-30. W

atson reg arde d the re verse transac tion, whether a defe ndant who re ceive s a gun in exchang e for

drug s “uses” the g un “duringand in re lation to . . . [ a] drug traff icking crime.” 552 U.S. at 76. The Court conc luded that the def endant did not. The Court noted that “[w] ith no
s t at u t o ry d ef i n i t i o no r d ef

i n i t i v e c l u e, th e m ea n i n g o f t h e v er b ‘u s es ’ h as t o turn o nth e l an gu age
as we normally

speak it.” Id . at 79. Examini ng the statutory provision in that light, the Court state d th a t w hil e “ [t]he Go ve rnme nt m ay sa y that a pe rs on ‘u se s’ a fi re arm sim ply by re c e ivi ngit in a bar ter tra nsaction, . . . no one e lse would.” Id
. Di s t i n gu i s h i n g Sm ith , th e Court ana log ize d to a boy who trade s an apple to ge t a g ranola bar, a nd conclude d that it is sensibl e to say that the boy “uses” the apple in the tr ansac tion, but not t hat he “ uses” the granola bar. Id .; see also id. at 81 (citing “common spee ch’s unde rstandingthat the first possessor is the one who ‘uses’ the g un in the trade ”). I n 1998, Congr ess amende d section 924(c )(1) to add the “posse ssion in furthera nce” prongafte r the Supreme Court concluded in Bailey v . United States that possessing a firea rm
near the sce ne of dr

ug traff icking did not constitut e “use ” of a firea rm duringand in re lation to a drugtraff icking crime be cause mere possession does not amount to active e mploy ment of a firea rm. See 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995). F ollowing the a mendment, a de fenda

nt violates section 924(c) (1)( A) if he “possesses a firea rm” “ in further ance of . . . [a] drug tra ffickingcrime.” See Pub . L . N o. 10 5- 38 6, 11 2 St a t. 3 46 9 ( 19 98 ); W atson , 5 52 U. S. at 77 n. 3 ( 20 07 ). Con g re ss d idW ats on ac kn o w l ed ge d t ha t t he st atute ha d b ee n a m en d ed t o i nc l ud e the p o ssessi o n p ro ng aft er the c ase 2 h a d b e e n initiate d . 5 5 2 U .S . at 8 3
. 7 not remar k upon, and the Supre me Court has not addre ssed, whethe r a ba rter tr ansac tion in which a d ef en d an tac qu i re s a f

i re armu s i n g dru gs as p ay m en tfa l l s un d er

th i s p o s s es s i o np ro n g. 2 III On appe al, Gar dner a

nd Gladden c halleng e both the district cour t’s jury instruction and the suffic iency

of the e vidence supporting the ir conviction for possessing a

firea rm in further ance of a dr ug traff icking crime. The same leg al question underlies both c halleng es: Whether acquir ing a

firea rm using dr

ug s as pay

ment constitutes possessing that f irea rm in further ance of a drugtraff icking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A). “ Where, a s here , the de fe nd ant[s ] time ly

c ha lle ng e [] the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur y ins tr uc tio ns on

a le g a l is su e in pr oc e e din g s b e low , th is C ourt re vie ws the va lid ity

of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur

y ins tr uc tio ns de
novo .” United States v. Tureseo , 566 F.3d 77, 83 ( 2d Cir. 2009). L ikewise, we revie w a c laim of insufficient e vidence de novo
. Un ite d S tates v . Yann ott i , 541 F.3d 112, 120 ( 2d Cir. 2008). This Court has not squarely addre ssed whethe r ac quiring a fire arm with drug s constitutes possession of a fir ear

m in furthera

nce of a drugtraff

icking crime. We have, howe ver, a ddresse d this question in dic ta in United States v. Cox , 324 F.3d 77 ( 2d Cir. 2003). The tra nsaction at issue in Coxp r e c e d e d

t h e 1 9 9 8 am e n dm e n ta d d i n g th e p o s s e s s i o np r o n g t o s e c t i o n9 2 4 ( c ) ( 1 )
. In Cox , the question prese nted was whether a def endant’ s acc eptanc e of a

g un as collate ral for

the purcha se price of drug s constituted “use” of a f irea rm duringor in relation to a drug traff icking crime. Id . at 78-79. We held that it did beca use the de fenda

nt “took the gun as collateral for the cash pr ice of

drug s, not in barter of

one commodity

for a nother.” Id . at 84. The de cision thenIn re fer rin g to this d ic ta , W ats on sta te d , “[t]h is vie w m a y o r m a y no t p re v a il, a n d w e d o no t sp e a k to it 3 to d a y . . . . ” 5 5 2 U .S . at 8 3
. 8 went on to desc ribe the the n-pendingsplit among the Courts of A ppeals re g ardingwhether the sim ple re c e ipt

of g un s f or dr ug s w ou ld c on sti tut e “ us e ,” c on c lud ingthat th is s pli t mi g ht d iss ipate in light of Cong ress’s a

mendment to add the possession prong
. Id . at 84 n.2. We stated, “[f]or de fe nd ants c ha

rg e d und e r § 92 4( c ) a ft e r t his ame ndme nt, tr a din g dr ug s f or a g un wi ll p ro ba

bly result in such possession.” Id
. 3 This conclusion has bee n square ly rea ched by

sever al other Courts of A ppeals. See United States v. Mahan , 586 F.3d 1185, 1189 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (“When a de fenda nt acc epts a gun as pay ment for his drug s, his sale—and thus his crime—is incomplete until he re ceive s possession of the fire arm. We fa il to see how possession that completes a drugtraff

icking offe nse is not possession ‘in furthera nce of ’ a dr ug traff icking offe nse.”

) ; United States v. Luke

Sanchez , 483 F.3d 703, 706 ( 10th Cir. 2007) (holding tha t trading drug s for guns constitutes po sse ssi on

in f ur the ra nc e of a dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ri me un de r s ub se c tio n 9 24 (c )( 1) ); United States v. Boy d , 209 F. App’ x 285, 290 (4th Cir. 2006) (pe r cur iam) (“ We conclude that acc epting possession of fire arms as pa y ment for c rac k coca ine is possession in furthera nce of a drug tr a ff ic kin g c ri me .” ); United States v. Fre derick, 406 F.3d 754, 764 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (“As a matter
o f l o gi c, a d ef

en d an t ’s wi l l i n gn es s t o ac ce p tp o s s es s i o no f agunas co n s i d er at i o nfo r s o m e d ru gs he wi sh e s to se ll does promote or f acilitate that illeg al sale.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Dolliver , 228 F. App’ x 2, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (re cog nizi ng the “g rowing consensus” that tradingdrug s for we apons constitutes possession in furthera nce of a drug tr a ff ic kin g c ri me un de r s e c tio n 9 24 (c )( 1) (A )) ; cf. United States v. Bobb , 471 F.3d 491, 496 ( 3d9

Cir. 2006) (“I

n this Ci rcuit, bar

teringcra ck coc aine f

or a gun is not a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A) if the de fenda nt did not actively

solicit the barter

of drug s for a

g un.”). Ag ainst our sug g estion in Coxand this larg e body of per suasive pre cede nt, Gardne r and Gladden r aise two c halleng es. F irst, they argue that the a ct of a cquiringthe gun with drug s (the drugtraff icking crime in this case ) prece des po sse ssi on and the re fo re c ann ot e sta

bli shthe c ri me of possession “in fur

thera nce of ” a dr ug traff icking crime. The y

emphasize the Supreme Court’ s admonition in W

atson that we ne ed to g ive statutory languag e its commonly

used mea ning—“ as
we nor mally speak it,” see 552 U.S. at 79, and conte nd that when one does so, it is clear that whether a def endant possesse s a fire arm in fur thera nce of a drugtraff

icking crime c annot depe nd on whether

he ac quired the f

irea rm with drug s or ca sh. A plain languag e re ading , howeve r, lea ds to the opposite conclusion. First, Ga rdner and Gladden did possess the guns. Not only is this conclusion obvious, but we have held that “re ceipt of guns for drug s . . . involves the ‘possession’ of a firea rm” for the purposes of

section 2D1.1(b)( 1) of the Sente ncingGuidelines. See U nited States v. Smy the , 363 F.3d 127, 129 n.1 (2 d Ci r. 20 04 ). Se c on d, Ga rd ne r a nd Gl a dd e n’ s p os se ssi on

of the g un s furthered

a drug traff icking crime. B ut for their posse ssion of the g uns, they would not have sold the c rac k
coca ine to the g un seller. See M ahan , 586 F.3d at 1188 (citing “the c ommon sense proposition that w he n o ne a c c e pts a

g un in e xch ang e fo r d

ru g s, the g un

is a n inte g ra l pa

rt of the dr ugsa le beca use without the g un— the ‘c urre ncy ’ for the purc hase— the drugsale would not take pla c e .” ); Frederic k, 406 F.3d at 764 (“As a matter of log ic, a de fenda nt’s willingness to ac cept po sse ssi on

of a g un a s c on sid e ratio n f

or so me dr ug s h e wi sh e s to se ll does pr omo te or fa c ili tate that illega l sale.” ( internal quotation marks omitted)) . This case is readily distinguishable f

rom10

W atson , beca

use while it is not natural to say that a per son who trade s drug s for guns “uses” the g uns in the transac tion, it i s natural to say that a per son who trade s drug s for guns “possesses” the g uns “in furthe ranc e of” the transa ction. Moreove r, the ne x us is particularly close in this case beca

use Ga rdner and Gladde n acquir ed the guns for one ounce of cra ck coc aine, a

nd, presumably

beca use this quantity

of cr ack
coca ine was w orth more than the g uns, instructed the seller of the guns to pay

them $200 afte r raisingthe money

by selling the cra ck coc aine. Thus, their possession of the guns promoted further drugtraff

icking in addition to the transaction itself. Ga rd ne r a nd Gl a dd e n a lso argue that th e ir c a se is d ist inguis ha

ble fr om Luke-Sanc hez , Frederic k, and Boyd beca use the foc us of the tra

nsaction her e wa s on acquiringg uns, not selling dr ug s. Th e fa c ts s ho w that th e g un se lle r p re fe rr e d c a sh , b ut e ve ntu a lly a g re e d to a c c e pt d

ru g s; thus, acc ording to Gardne r and G ladden, that the dr ug s beca me a pa rt of the de al was a

mere fortuity and any relation the transac tion had to drug s was incidenta l and not further ed by possession of the guns. They urg e this Court to adopt a test based on the “foc us of the tr ans a c tio n” and

c on te nd that W atson provides support for their ar g ument that the purpose a nd direc tion of the transa ction matter. As an initial matter, we do not ag ree with Gardne r and G ladden that in Luke-Sanc hez and Frederic k, the foc us of the tra nsaction wa s the selling of drug s and not the ac quisiti on of guns. I n Luke-Sanc hez , th e tr ans a c tio n o ri g inate d w he n th e de fe nd ant “ a sk e d .
. . a bo ut t he po ssi bil ity of obtaining firea

rms.” 483 F .3d at 704. L ikewise, in Frederic k, the gun seller de sired ca sh for the transa ction and the de fenda nt “dicker ed with [the gun se ller] and convince d him to take marijuana in partial trade for the gun.” 406 F .3d at 764. Mahan also reg arde d a tra nsaction11

which beg an whe n a per son “off ere d to sell severa l stolen firea rms” to the def

endant. 586 F .3d at 1186. More importantly , the statutory languag e does not support the distinction Gar dner a nd Gladden ur g e. Whether a person who a cquire s a gun with drug s does so in order to obtain the g un (as Ga

rdner and Gladde n did) or to sell drug s, that person fur thers the sa le of the dr

ug s by p o s s es s i n g t h e gu nb ec au s e, i nei t h er ca s e, b u tfo r t h e p o s s es s i o no f t h e gu n , th e s al e o f d ru gs
wo uld no t ha ve oc c ur re d. We d e c lin e to a do pt a “ fo c us of the tr ans a c tio n” te st. We join our sist er c ircuits in concludingthat when a defe ndant ac quires a f

irea rm using drug s as pay

ment, he possesses that firea rm in further ance of a dr

ug traff icking crime in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (A ). We t he re fo re c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a pp ro pr iate ly instructed the jury

that they could find that a g iven def endant possesse d a fire arm in fur thera nce of the drugconspirac y

if the jury

unanimously

conclude d beyond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant ac quired a

firea rm with drug s involved in the conspirac y . We also conclude that there
wa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt Ga rd ne r a nd Gl a dd e n’ s c on vic tio ns un de r t his statut e be c a

us e
a rational trier of f

act c ould have f

ound that they

acquir ed fire arms using drug s as pay ment. See United States v. Aguilar , 585 F.3d 652, 656 ( 2d Cir. 2009). IV For the fore g oing r easons a

nd the re asons stated in the c ompanion summary order , we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment of convic tion.