UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, FEBBO, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

First Lieutenant NATHANEAL H. RAMOS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140475 

Headquarters, United States Army Central 

Kirsten V. Brunson, Military Judge (arraignment) 

Tara A. Osborn, Military Judge (trial) 

Colonel Brendan M. Donahoe, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Kevin K. Robitaille, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan F. Potter, JA; Major Christopher D. 

Coleman, JA; Captain Payum Doroodian, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, JA; Captain John Gardella, JA (on brief). 

20 October 2016 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent. 

FEBBO, Judge: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of violating a lawful general regulation, 

one specification of conduct unbecoming an officer, and two specifications of 

possessing child pornography, in violation of Articles 92, 133 and 134, Uniform 

Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 933, 934 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 

The military judge sentenced appellant to dismissal and confinement for sixty-six 

months. Contrary to the terms of a pretrial agreement limiting confinement to three 
RAMOS—ARMY 20140475 

 2

years, the convening authority erroneously approved the sentence as adjudged.1

 The 

convening authority credited appellant with fifty-two days of confinement against 

his sentence to confinement for dilatory post-trial delay (forty-five days) and 

unlawful pretrial punishment (seven days). 

This case is before the court for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. 

Appellant raises one assignment of error which merits discussion but no relief. We 

find the issues raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 

431 (C.M.A. 1982), to be without merit. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was a member of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In 2012, 

appellant received orders for 367 days2 of active duty and deployed to the Joint 

Training Center Zarqa, Jordan. As appellant’s unit was preparing to redeploy to the 

United States, appellant moved from the barracks in Jordan and left his thumb drive. 

An officer found the thumb drive and determined the thumb drive was named 

“RAMOS.” Further investigation determined that appellant’s thumb drive and laptop 

computer contained multiple images of child pornography. 

 

In addition to over 55,000 images of adult pornography, the thumb drive 

contained “4,557 images of child pornography, four videos of child pornography, 

8,972 animated images simulating the molestation of children, and 13,000 images of 

teen models.” The laptop contained “hundreds of images of child porn[ography], 

hundreds of images of adult porn[ography], over 10,000 images of child erotica, and 

hundreds of animated cartoons of children being molested. Among other charges, 

the government charged appellant with two specifications of possession of child 

pornography. Specification 1 of Charge II charged possession of child pornography 

on the appellant’s thumb drive. Specification 2 of Charge II charged possession of 

child pornography on appellant’s laptop computer. 

 

1

 This court previously granted appellant’s petition for extraordinary relief in the 

nature of a writ of mandamus and corrected the appellant’s approved sentence to a 

dismissal and three years confinement in accordance with the pretrial agreement and 

the staff judge advocate’s recommendation. United States v. Ramos, ARMY MISC. 

20160066 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 12 February 2016) (order). 

2

 The record indicates that the appellant was extended on active duty several times 

for the purpose of this court-martial. The stipulation of fact reflects appellant was 

on continuous active duty between 2012 and the time of his trial on 5 June 2014. 
RAMOS—ARMY 20140475 

 3

As part of the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge went over a stipulation of 

fact with the appellant. The stipulation of fact states that appellant searched the 

internet “thousands of times” using search terms for child pornography. The 

stipulation of fact specifically included twenty-nine images of child pornography 

from the thumb drive and six images of child pornography from the laptop computer. 

In the stipulation of fact, the .jpg file names on the thumb drive and laptop computer 

are different. 

When explaining why he was guilty of the possession of child pornography 

under Article 134, appellant stated he brought images of child pornography to Jordan 

on his thumb drive and laptop computer. At different times, while deployed to 

Jordan, appellant searched for and downloaded child pornography from file-sharing 

websites. Appellant stated he knowingly and wrongfully possessed child 

pornography on both his thumb drive and laptop computer. Appellant stated there 

were hundreds more images of child pornography stored on the thumb drive and 

laptop computers that were not listed in the stipulation of fact. 

Appellant asserts that Specification 1 and Specification 2 of Charge II 

constitute an unreasonable multiplication of charges as it was unclear whether the 

images of child pornography found on appellant’s laptop were also the same images 

of child pornography found on his thumb drive. Appellant did not raise this issue at 

trial. As part of his negotiated pretrial agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to both 

specifications of Charge II. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The appellant entered on unconditional guilty plea. Rule for CourtsMartial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 910(j) provides a “bright-line rule” that an 

unconditional guilty plea “which results in a finding of guilty waives any 

objection, whether or not previously raised, insofar as the objection relates to 

the factual issue of guilt of the offense(s) to which the plea was made.” United 

States v. Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Even if appellant had 

not waived the issue of being found guilty of possessing potentially the same 

images of child pornography on multiple electronic media, he would not obtain 

relief for an unreasonable multiplication of charges. 

“What is substantially one transaction should not be made the basis for an 

unreasonable multiplication of charges against one person.” R.C.M. 307(c)(4). The 

prohibition against unreasonable multiplication of charges “addresses those features 

of military law that increase the potential for overreaching in the exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion.” United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012) 

(quoting United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 337 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). In Quiroz, our 

superior court listed five factors to help guide our analysis of whether charges have 

been unreasonably multiplied: 
RAMOS—ARMY 20140475 

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 (1) Did the accused object at trial that there was an 

unreasonable multiplication of charges and/or 

specifications?3

(2) Is each charge and specification aimed at distinctly 

separate criminal acts? 

(3) Does the number of charges and specifications 

misrepresent or exaggerate the appellant’s criminality? 

(4) Does the number of charges and specifications 

[unreasonably] increase the appellant’s punitive exposure? 

(5) Is there any evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or 

abuse in the drafting of the charges? 

55 M.J. at 338 (footnote added; internal alteration reflects Quiroz’s holding, id. at 

339, that “unreasonably” will be used rather than “unfairly”). The Quiroz factors in 

this case do not balance in favor of appellant. First, as stated above, he did not raise 

the issue of unreasonable multiplication of charges at trial and entered an 

unconditional guilty plea. 

In regards to the second Quiroz factor, this case presents an issue of first 

impression as to whether a soldier may be charged with separate offenses for 

possessing potentially the same images of child pornography on multiple electronic 

media (i.e., on a thumb drive and laptop computer). We find persuasive the analysis 

and holdings of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals addressing this 

issue under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(a) and Article 134, UCMJ. See United States v. 

Campbell, 66 M.J. 578 (N-M.Ct. Crim. App. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 68 M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2009)(“although images were identical, each 

possession on different media was a separate crime.”); United States v. Anderson, 

 

3

 This court may grant relief under our Article 66(c), UCMJ, powers to affirm “only 

such findings of guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as 

[we] find[] correct in law and fact and determine[], on the basis of the entire record, 

should be approved.” Quiroz, 55 M.J. at 338 (quoting UCMJ art. 66(c)). This 

“awesome, plenary, de novo power” provides us with the authority to consider all 

claims of unreasonable multiplication of charges, even if raised for the first time on 

appeal. Id. (quoting United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990)). See 

also United States v. Anderson, 68 M.J. 378, 386 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“[A]pplication of 

the Quiroz factors involves a reasonableness determination, much like sentence 

appropriateness, and is a matter well within the discretion of the [court of criminal 

appeals] in the exercise of its Article 66(c), UCMJ, . . . powers.”).
RAMOS—ARMY 20140475 

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NMCCA 201200499, 2013 CCA LEXIS 517 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 27 June 2013) 

(“Though the images were identical to the originals when viewed, the duplicates on 

the flash drive are separate electronic files, created by the appellant, and embedded 

in different media.”); see also United States v. Planck, 493 F.3rd 501, 504-05 (5th 

Cir. 2007) (“[T]he actus reus is the possession of child pornography; the 

Government need only prove the defendant possessed the contraband at a single 

place and time to establish a single act of possession . . . . [Here, the appellant] 

possessed child pornography in three separate places—a laptop and desktop 

computer and diskettes—and, therefore, committed three separate crimes.”). 

Appellant does not assert that the images are actually identical on his thumb 

drive and laptop computer. However, even if they were identical, the specifications 

alleging a violation of Article 134 for possession of child pornography on 

appellant’s thumb drive and laptop computer do not constitute an unreasonable 

multiplication of charges because they involve distinctly separate criminal acts. 

This distinction is particularly true with images of child pornography since the 

intent of the criminal prohibition is to limit possession, replication, and distribution 

of child pornography regardless of the type of media or storage device. “A contrary 

result would allow amassing a warehouse of child pornographic material—books, 

movies, computer images with only a single count of possession as a potential 

punishment.” Planck, 493 F.3d at 504. The stipulation of fact clearly focused on the 

distinct images of child pornography on each device and the .jpg file names in the 

stipulation of fact were separate and distinct. Appellant did not download and 

possess the child pornography in a single transaction. Instead, appellant searched 

the internet “thousands of times” using search terms for child pornography and 

downloaded the images of child pornography at different times in the United States 

and Jordan. 

Third and fourth, given the extent of appellant’s criminal conduct and the 

terms of a pretrial agreement limiting his confinement to three years, the number of 

charges and specifications neither misrepresents nor exaggerates his criminality nor 

unreasonably increases his punitive exposure. In fact, the government’s charging 

strategy for the child pornography charge minimized his potential criminal liability 

and punitive exposure. The government charged appellant with two specifications of 

violating Article 134 for possessing thousands of images of child pornography and 

four videos of child pornography. 

Fifth, we see no evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or abuse in the 

drafting of the charges because the government simply charged appellant based on 

each separate, distinct criminal act he committed. Moreover, appellant specifically 

offered to, and did, plead guilty to each of the charges and specifications of which 

he was found guilty, including the charges and specifications that he now believes 

constitute an unreasonable multiplication of charges. Under these facts, we find that 
RAMOS—ARMY 20140475 

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Specification 1 and Specification 2 of Charge II do not constitute an unreasonable 

multiplication of charges. 

CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty and the sentence, as corrected by this court, are correct 

in law and fact and are AFFIRMED. 

 Senior Judge MULLIGAN and Judge WOLFE concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: