alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
GROSS GAMING REVENUE TRENDING

(In Billions)

$30.0

$27.9 $28.0 $28.5

$25.0

$15.0

$10.0

$5.0

$0.0

FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14

Indian gaming industry showed continuous growth
in the past ten years, except during FY08-F YO9
when the entire global economy receded. Source: National Indian Gaming Commission
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3372 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3372

  To modify the date on which the Administrator of the Environmental 
    Protection Agency and applicable States may require permits for 
                    discharges from certain vessels.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 13, 2010

Mrs. Boxer (for herself, Ms. Murkowski, Mrs. Murray, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. 
    Nelson of Florida, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Begich, Mr. Inhofe, Ms. 
   Landrieu, Mr. Vitter, Ms. Snowe, and Mr. Cochran) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                      Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To modify the date on which the Administrator of the Environmental 
    Protection Agency and applicable States may require permits for 
                    discharges from certain vessels.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DISCHARGES INCIDENTAL TO NORMAL OPERATION OF VESSELS.

    Section 2(a) of Public Law 110-299 (33 U.S.C. 1342 note) is amended 
by striking ``during the 2-year period beginning on the date of 
enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``during the period beginning on 
the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 18, 
2013''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AT JUNE 30, 1997, AND THE STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE SIX MONTHS
ENDED JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         314,500
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   45,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,100
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                       8,281,500
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,630,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,321,400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,025,900
<BONDS>                                      2,525,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,321,400
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,806,700
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,559,500
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (6,800)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                23,400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             119,700
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                134,300
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            134,300
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   134,300
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.67
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Carl Edward WILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chris HESS, District Attorney; Calvin Hill, Public Defender; D.T. Sheehan, Officer # 2167, Asheville Police Department; T.J. Jones, Officer #2206, Asheville Police Department; State of NC 28th Judicial District, General Court of Justice Criminal Court Division District and Superior Courts, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 06-6435.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2006.

Decided: June 20, 2006.

Carl Edward Wiley, Appellant Pro Se. Curtis W. Euler, City Attorney’s Office, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees.

*408Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Carl Edward Wiley appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Wiley v. North Carolina,*No. l:06-cv-00038, 2006 WL 456491 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
#### STOM v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 13857.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

Nov. 25, 1953.

*285Richter, Lord & Farage, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Philip Price, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

WELSH, District Judge.

We hold that the matter complained of by the plaintiff has merit. However, we refuse to grant said plaintiff’s motion for judgment under Rule 37, Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C., because we feel defendant and its counsel acted in good faith. So that the defendant and its counsel will have knowledge of their duty in the event they are confronted with similar situations in the future the following brief statement of the case is given.

After defendant made answer to interrogatories propounded by plaintiff, plaintiff took the oral depositions of one C. S. Caswell, who had been identified as a witness by the defendant in its answers to plaintiff’s interrogatories. In the course of the oral depositions plaintiff’s counsel learned that said C. S. Caswell had given statements to the defendant, and the matter presently complained of by plaintiff for which she seeks judgment is that the defendant in its answers to certain of plaintiff’s interrogatories did not make use of the information contained in those statements. Defendant’s contentions, which we feel are made in good faith but which we overrule, are that there is no duty to furnish a particular witness’ version of an occurrence in the absence of an interrogatory specifically requesting it and that the information contained in the statements of the said C. S. Caswell was in conflict with other information in defendant’s file and therefore defendant was unwilling to rély on the information contained in the statements.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for judgment under Rule 37 will be denied.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT TR INITY C HR ISTIAN C ENTER OF SANTA ANA, INC . , a C a l ifornia C orporation; INTER

NATIONAL B R OADC ASTING, INC ., a C a lifornia C orporation, Plaintiffs - Appe lla nts, v. JOSEPH M C VEIGH, a

n individual, De fe nda

nt, And TYM OTHY S. M AC L EOD, a n individual, De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 14-55198 D.C . No. 8:13-c v-01334-DOC R NB M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia Dav id O. C arte r, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 12, 2016 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia 

# FIL ED FEB 17 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.B e fore : KLEINFELD, M c KEOW N, a nd IKUTA, C irc uit Judge s . Trinity C h ristia n C e nte r and Inte rnationa l B roa d c a s ting a ppe a l the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dismi ssing the ir m a lic ious prose c ution a c tion a ga inst Ty m othy M a c Le od. W e a ffirm . The unde rly ing a c tion upon whic h the m a lic ious prose c ution a c t ion wa s pre d ic a te d wa s te rm inate d in fa vor of Trinity

upon volunta

ry dism i ssa l. S

e e Mac Donald v . J

osly n , 275 C a l. App. 2d 282, 289 (C a l. C t. App. 1969). The re solution of the

a ttorne y s’ fe e s issue wa s irre le va nt to whe the r the volunta

ry dism issa l wa s a

favora ble te rm ination on the

m e rits. The m a lic ious prose c u tion a c tion in this c a se the re fore a c c rue d, if a t a l l, on M ay

7, 2012. Unde r C a lifornia la w, a one -y e ar statute of lim ita tions a pplie s to m a l ic ious prose c ution a c t ions, Le e v . Hanle y , 61 C a l. 4th 1225, 1236 (C a l. 2015), a nd tha t one -y e ar sta

tute of lim ita tions e xpire d in this a c t ion on M ay 7, 2013. Thec om pla int in this a c tion— file d on August 9, 2013— wa s the re fore untim e ly . The suit wa s not a

SLAPPba c k a c tion unde r C a l. C ode C iv. Proc . § 425.18 be c a use the unde rly ing a c t ion wa s volunta rily dism isse d rathe r tha

n “ dism isse d pursua nt to a spe c ia l m o tion to strike .” The re fore , the distric t c o urt prope rly

2awarde d attorne y s’ fe e s to M a c Le od. W e a ffirm the distric t c ourt’ s fina l judgm e nt for the re a sons se t

forth in its Oc tobe r 31, 2013 a nd Ja nua ry 21, 2014 orde rs. AFFIRM E D.

3
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, Elwood Shepard, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Heavenly Hot Dogs, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:  (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2012 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Date: August 8, 2012  /s/ Elwood Shepard Elwood Shepard President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer)     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been furnished to Heavenly Hot Dogs, Inc. and will be retained by Heavenly Hot Dogs, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
MOTION DOCKET

96-2720.

#### State ex rel. McGhee v. Anderson.

Richland App. No. 96CA85. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal of right from the decision of the Court of Appeals for Richland County entered on November 18,1996. It appearing to the court that the record in this cause was filed on December 24, 1996, but the receipt of the record inadvertently was not docketed until March 14, 1997,

IT IS ORDERED by the court, *sua sponte,*that appellant’s merit brief shall be due within forty days of the date of this entry, and the parties shall otherwise proceed in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. VI.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Santiago, Jr., Appellant.

Submitted November 13, 2012;

decided November 19, 2012

Motion for assignment of counsel granted and Timothy P Donaher, Esq., Monroe County Public Defender, 10 N. Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614 assigned as counsel to the appellant on the appeal herein.
97-341.

#### Bunger v. Lawson Co.

Butler App. No. CA96-05-107.

Moyer, C.J., Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissent.
ITRONICS INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                         COMPUTATION OF LOSS PER SHARE
        FOR THE THREE AND NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,1997 AND 1996

                                  EXHIBIT 11


                       Three Months Ended Sept 30,  Nine Months Ended Sept 30,
                       ---------------------------  -------------------------
                               1997        1996           1997        1996
                            ----------  ----------     ---------  ----------
Common and common
 equivalent shares used in
 determining net loss per
 share

Weighted average number of
 common shares outstanding
 during the period(1,000's)     32,476      29,674        31,000      29,236

Common equivalent shares           -           -             -           -
                            ----------  ----------    ----------  ----------

                                32,476      29,674        31,000      29,236
                            ==========  ==========    ==========  ==========


Net income Loss)            $(111,806)   $ (50,541)    $(338,547)  $(133,733)

Cumulative preferred dividends
for the period                ( 6,240)     ( 9,880)      (26,000)    (29,640)
                            ----------   ----------    ----------  ----------

Net income (loss) less
 cumulative preferred
 dividends for the period   $(118,046)   $ (60,421)    $(364,547)  $(163,373)
                            ==========   ==========    ==========  ==========

Earnings (Loss) per share   $( 0.0036)   $( 0.0020)    $( 0.0118)  $( 0.0056)
                            ==========   ==========    ==========  ==========

                                      


                                      15

<PAGE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R., A MINOR

PETITION OF: M.R., MOTHER :

:

:

:

: No. 32 WAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 21st day of March, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6519** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. JEROME RICO EVANS, a/k/a Wank , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Wilmington
. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. ( 7:10

- cr - 00013

- F

- 1 ; 7:12

- cv - 00029

- F )

Submitted : Ju ly 18 , 2013 Decided: July 23, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Jerome Rico Evans, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May

- Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Jerome Rico Evans seeks to appeal the district court’s order s denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2013 ) motion and his self

- styled motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 36, and has filed a motion for a certificate of appealability . The district court’s order s

are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Evans has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We3 dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
(October 24, 2006)

#### Christos Alexopoulos, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Respondents, and Brooklyn Union Gas Company, Defen*829dant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. Doric and Stavros Contracting, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

[824 NYS2d 318]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant and third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mega, J.), dated February 18, 2005, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it, and granted that branch of the motion of the third-party defendants Thomas Varghese and Elcey Thomas which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured after stepping into a depression in the sidewalk surrounding a gas valve box, causing him to fall. The valve allegedly was installed by the defendant Brooklyn Union Gas Company (hereinafter BUG) or one of its contractors in or about 1972. The sidewalk where the valve is located is adjacent to the property owned by the third-party defendants Thomas Varghese and Elcey Thomas.

The Supreme Court properly determined that BUG failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Ayotte v Gervasio,*81 NY2d 1062 [1993]; *Pacheco v Keyspan Corp.,*28 AD3d 729 [2006]; *Kovits v Savings Bank of Utica,*11 AD3d 987 [2004]; *Adler v Suffolk County Water Auth.,*306 AD2d 229 [2003]; *cf. Pierre v City of New York,*273 AD2d 368 [2000]; *Verdes v Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,*253 AD2d 552 [1998]; *Delano v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,*231 AD2d 671 [1996]; *Kobet v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,*176 AD2d 785, 786 [1991]).

The court did not err in granting that branch of the motion of Thomas Varghese and Elcey Thomas which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against them. They established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that they did not own the land upon which the valve box was located and *830did not create the alleged defect or make special use of the surrounding sidewalk *(see Pierre v City of New York,*296 AD2d 389 [2002]). In opposition, BUG did not raise any triable issues of fact. Schmidt, J.E, Fisher, Dillon and Covello, JJ., concur.
| 1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Art’s-Way Manufacturing Co., Inc.; and |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                 |                      |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Date: April 16, 2012 |  /s/ Jason D. Feucht |
|                 | Jason D. Feucht           |
|                 | Chief Financial Officer   |
#### Geraldine Vitale, Appellant, v John Anthony Vitale, Respondent.

[977 NYS2d 258]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated April 2, 2008, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Schellace, Ct. Atty Ref.), dated March 16, 2012, which denied her motion for an award of an attorney’s fee and an expert fee.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In a matrimonial action, an award of an attorney’s fee or an *615expert fee is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court *(see Cusumano v Cusumano,*96 AD3d 988 [2012]). An award of attorney’s and expert fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a) will generally be warranted where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties *(see Chesner v Chesner,*95 AD3d 1252 [2012]; *Palmeri v Palmeri,*87 AD3d 572 [2011]; *Fredericks v Fredericks,*85 AD3d 1107 [2011]). An award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a) ensures that the nonmonied spouse will be able to litigate the action and do so on equal footing with the monied spouse *(see Finnan v Finnan,*95 AD3d 821 [2012]; *Many v Many,*84 AD3d 1036 [2011]; *Coven v Coven,*82 AD3d 1144 [2011]). In determining whether to award fees, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties, together with all of the other circumstances of the case, which may include the relative merit of the parties’ positions *(see Chesner v Chesner,*95 AD3d 1252 [2012]; *Chaudry v Chaudry,*95 AD3d 1058 [2012]; *Perry v Perry,*88 AD3d 861 [2011]). A court may consider whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation *(see Brantly v Brantly,*89 AD3d 881 [2011]; *Fredericks v Fredericks,*85 AD3d 1107 [2011]; *Aloi v Simoni,*82 AD3d 683 [2011]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for an award of an attorney’s fee and an expert fee pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a), since there was no significant disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances *(see Kaminash v Levi,*102 AD3d 837 [2013]). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s conduct unnecessarily prolonged this litigation *(see Beth M. v Joseph M.,*12 Misc 3d 1188[A]. 2006 NY Slip Op 51490[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2006]).

In addition, the failure of the plaintiffs former attorney to substantially comply with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3 precluded him from seeking unpaid fees from the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendant may not be compelled to pay such fees *(see Rosado v Rosado,*100 AD3d 856 [2012]). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s current attorney failed to comply with 22 NYCRR 202.16 (k) (3), precluding an award of fees to him *(see Mimran v Mimran,*83 AD3d 550 [2011]; *Covington v Covington,*249 AD2d 735 [1998]). Dillon, J.E, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Cohen, JJ., concur.