2023 UT App 35

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUINTIN GRILLONE,

Petitioner,

v.

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL,

Respondent.

Opinion

No. 20210794-CA

Filed April 13, 2023

Original Proceeding in this Court

Jeremy G. Jones and Richard R. Willie,

Attorneys for Petitioner

Sean D. Reyes and Sarah Goldberg,

Attorneys for Respondent

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Quintin Grillone seeks judicial review of an order from the 

Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (the POST Council)

suspending his peace officer certification for three years. He 

argues that this agency action was barred by the four-year

catch-all statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code section 

78B-2-307(3), which he asserts applied to this administrative

disciplinary proceeding by virtue of Utah Code section 

53-6-211(3)(c). We disagree and decline to disturb the POST 

Council’s order.
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20210794-CA 2 2023 UT App 35

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2020, the Division of Peace Officer Standards and 

Training (POST)1 issued a Notice of Agency Action advising

Grillone of its intention to suspend or revoke his peace officer 

certification on the ground that he “engage[d] in conduct 

constituting a state or federal criminal offense” in violation of 

Utah Code section 53-6-211(1)(c).2 Specifically, in a later-amended 

notice, POST alleged that six years earlier, in 2014, Grillone—then 

a police officer with the Murray Police Department—gave false or 

misleading information (a class B misdemeanor, see Utah Code 

Ann. § 76-8-504.6 (LexisNexis 2017)) and committed obstruction 

of justice (a class A misdemeanor, see id. § 76-8-306(1) (Supp. 

2022)) when he interfered in a judicial proceeding in an effort to 

have his mother’s traffic citation dismissed.3 Grillone’s conduct 

soon resulted in an internal departmental investigation and a 

misdemeanor charge of giving false or misleading information. 

1. POST, operated under the auspices of the Department of Public 

Safety, is “the program by which law enforcement officers in Utah 

are trained and certified.” State v. Hulse, 2019 UT App 105, ¶ 11 

n.4, 444 P.3d 1158, cert. denied, 456 P.3d 389 (Utah 2019). See Utah 

Code Ann. § 53-6-205 (LexisNexis 2015).

2. At the time of the POST administrative disciplinary proceeding, 

the relevant provision appeared in Utah Code section 

53-6-211(1)(d). The provision has since, without any substantial 

change, been moved to subsection (1)(c). Compare Utah Code Ann. 

§ 53-6-211(1)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022), with id. § 53-6-211(1)(d) 

(2015). We cite the current version of the annotated code for 

convenience.

3. We do not provide a detailed recounting of Grillone’s alleged 

conduct at issue in the underlying disciplinary proceeding 

because it is irrelevant to the issue presented in this petition for 

review.
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20210794-CA 3 2023 UT App 35

Grillone resigned from the Murray Police Department before the 

internal investigation was completed, and the misdemeanor

charge against him was eventually dismissed.

¶3 POST did not become aware of this incident until five years 

later, in 2019, when Grillone applied to reactivate his peace officer 

certification and disclosed the dismissed misdemeanor charge as 

part of the application process.4 Based on this disclosure, POST 

initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against 

Grillone.

¶4 Grillone moved to dismiss the disciplinary proceeding,

arguing that it was barred by the four-year statute of limitations

for civil actions found in Utah Code section 78B-2-307(3). He 

argued that the statute of limitations applied to the proceeding 

because POST disciplinary proceedings were “civil actions”

under Utah Code section 53-6-211(3)(c). An administrative law 

judge (the ALJ) denied Grillone’s motion, stating that section 

53-6-211(3)(c) “was written to differentiate the POST proceeding 

from criminal proceedings” and that our Legislature’s “use of the 

generic term ‘civil actions’” in section 53-6-211(3)(c) “is an easy 

4. Our Legislature has since amended the Peace Officer Training 

Certification Act to require a law enforcement agency that 

becomes aware of allegations that an officer violated section 

53-6-211(1) to conduct an internal investigation and to report its

findings to POST even if the officer in question resigned from the 

agency before the internal investigation could be completed. See 

Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). Similarly, 

our Legislature has also since amended the act to require agencies 

to notify POST, within 30 days, “[i]f a peace officer’s employment 

terminates during an open internal investigation regarding that 

peace officer and involving an alleged violation of Subsection 

53-6-211(1).” Id. § 53-6-209(3). Had these provisions been in place 

in 2014, there would not have been a five-year delay in POST 

becoming aware of Grillone’s conduct.
Grillone v. POST

20210794-CA 4 2023 UT App 35

identifier to accomplish that differentiation.” Accordingly, the 

ALJ reasoned that there is nothing “that would indicate that it was 

the intent of the legislature to designate the POST proceeding as 

anything other than an administrative adjudication process” and 

held that the statute of limitations applicable to civil lawsuits 

therefore did not apply to that administrative proceeding.

¶5 Following a formal hearing, the ALJ found that POST had 

proven by clear and convincing evidence that Grillone committed 

obstruction of justice. The POST Council—the entity responsible

for determining officer discipline—subsequently issued an order 

suspending Grillone’s peace officer certification for three years.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Grillone now seeks judicial review of the POST Council’s 

order and raises a single issue for our consideration. He argues 

that the ALJ erred in holding that the civil statute of limitations

does not apply to POST disciplinary proceedings. “Because this 

case presents only questions of law, we review the [POST 

Council’s] order for correctness.” Morgan v. Department of 

Commerce, 2017 UT App 225, ¶ 4 n.2, 414 P.3d 501, cert. denied, 417 

P.3d 577 (Utah 2018). See generally Kiernan Family Draper, LLC v. 

Hidden Valley Health Centers, LC, 2021 UT 54, ¶ 22, 497 P.3d 330 

(“The applicability of a statute of limitations is a question of law.”) 

(quotation simplified); State v. Graham, 2011 UT App 332, ¶ 14, 263 

P.3d 569 (“Questions of statutory interpretation are matters of 

law, which we review for correctness.”).

ANALYSIS

¶7 In Utah, “[c]ivil actions may be commenced only within the 

periods prescribed in [Title 78B, Chapter 2], after the cause of 

action has accrued, except in specific cases where a different 

limitation is prescribed by statute.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-102
Grillone v. POST

20210794-CA 5 2023 UT App 35

(LexisNexis 2018). See generally In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 

¶ 26, 144 P.3d 1129 (stating that, with the exception of suits 

brought to quiet title to real property, “all actions, whether legal 

or equitable, are subject to a statute of limitations in Utah”). In that

vein, Utah Code section 78B-2-307(3) provides that civil actions

“for relief not otherwise provided for by law” carry a four-year 

statute of limitations. This provision has come to be known as the 

“catch-all statute of limitations,” and it “applies to all causes of 

action . . . in which affirmative relief is sought and another more 

specific statute of limitations does not apply.” In re Hoopiiaina 

Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified). Grillone contends 

that the catch-all statute of limitations barred the administrative 

disciplinary proceeding against him because POST initiated that 

proceeding six years after the events giving rise to the disciplinary

proceeding.

¶8 But this court previously held in Rogers v. Division of Real 

Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), that the catch-all statute 

of limitations does not apply to administrative disciplinary 

proceedings.

5 See id. at 105–06. In that case, a real estate broker 

petitioned for judicial review of the Real Estate Commission’s 

order revoking her real estate broker’s license, id. at 103, arguing 

that the catch-all statute of limitations barred the disciplinary 

proceeding, id. at 105. We disagreed. We stated that “an 

administrative disciplinary hearing is not a civil proceeding” 

because the former is initiated when an agency files a petition 

with an administrative tribunal whereas the latter is initiated by 

filing a complaint in court or by serving a summons with the filing 

of the complaint to follow. See id. at 105–06. See also Phillips v. 

Department of Commerce, 2017 UT App 84, ¶ 14, 397 P.3d 863.

Accordingly, we held “that in the absence of specific legislative 

5. At the time, the catch-all statute of limitations was codified at 

Utah Code section 78-12-25(2). See Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 

790 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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20210794-CA 6 2023 UT App 35

authority, civil statutes of limitations are inapplicable to 

administrative disciplinary proceedings.” Rogers, 790 P.2d at 105.

¶9 Nearly two decades later, in Morgan v. Department of 

Commerce, 2017 UT App 225, 414 P.3d 501, cert. denied, 417 P.3d

577 (Utah 2018), this court again held that the catch-all statute of 

limitations did not bar administrative proceedings initiated 

against an individual for violation of the Utah Uniform Securities 

Act. See id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Citing Rogers, this court reiterated that “in the 

absence of specific legislative authority, the civil statutes of 

limitations in Title 78 are inapplicable to administrative 

proceedings.” Id. ¶ 8. 

¶10 Grillone argues that POST disciplinary proceedings are 

exempted from this general rule by virtue of Utah Code section 

53-6-211(3)(c), which states—with our emphasis—that “[a]ll 

adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil actions, 

notwithstanding whether the issue in the adjudicative proceeding 

is a violation of statute that may be prosecuted criminally.”

Although the Peace Officer Standards and Training Act does not 

define “civil actions,” Grillone contends that our Legislature’s use 

of the term is “clear and unambiguous” and that “[t]he ALJ erred 

by injecting ambiguity into [this] otherwise clear statutory 

language.” Grillone further argues that the definition of “action” 

that applies to the catch-all statute of limitations applies with

equal force to section 53-6-211(3)(c). Specifically, section 

78B-2-101(1) defines an “action” as, in relevant part, “all other 

civil actions in which affirmative relief is sought.”6

¶11 POST counters, arguing that “the term ‘civil actions’ in 

section 53-6-211(3)(c) does not have the same meaning as in 

6. Grillone argues that POST disciplinary proceedings satisfy this 

definition because POST sought affirmative relief from the POST 

Council and because the proceedings include active, adverse 

parties and “closely mirror the proceedings of a district court.”
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20210794-CA 7 2023 UT App 35

section 78B-2-102 and, despite the label, the POST disciplinary 

proceedings are the same types of proceedings that were at issue 

in Rogers and Morgan.” It asserts that section 78B-2-101(1) 

specifically limits its definition of “action” to Title 78B Chapter 2, 

see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-101(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (“The word 

‘action’ as used in this chapter includes . . . all other civil actions in 

which affirmative relief is sought.”) (emphasis added), and argues 

that it is improper to import the definition from one section of the 

Utah Code to another section that serves a different purpose, see 

Feldman v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2021 UT 4, ¶ 48, 484 P.3d 1134 (“The 

legislature is undoubtedly empowered to define a statutory term 

in different ways in different statutory schemes.”) (quotation 

simplified). POST contends, based on the second portion of 

section 53-6-211(3)(c), that the purpose of the reference to “civil 

actions” in that section is “to distinguish the proceedings from 

criminal actions and to clarify that POST administrative 

disciplinary proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature.”

See Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(3)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022) (“All 

adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil actions, 

notwithstanding whether the issue in the adjudicative proceeding 

is a violation of statute that may be prosecuted criminally.”).

¶12 We need not definitively resolve this debate. As Rogers 

made clear, “specific legislative authority” is required for civil 

statutes of limitations to apply to administrative proceedings. 790 

P.2d at 105 (emphasis added). Accordingly, regardless of the 

definition of “civil actions” as used in section 53-6-211(3)(c), the 

threshold issue presented for review is whether section 

53-6-211(3)(c) is sufficiently specific to make the four-year 

catch-all statute of limitations applicable to POST disciplinary 

proceedings. We hold that it is not.

¶13 “Because we will not alter the meaning of a statute by 

judicial fiat, we must try to interpret it in accordance with the 

legislature’s intent,” the best indication of which “is the statute’s 

plain language.” Flowell Elec. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 
Grillone v. POST

20210794-CA 8 2023 UT App 35

UT 87, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d 91. “When looking at the plain language, we 

presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly and deem 

all omissions to be purposeful.” Zilleruelo v. Commodity 

Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19, 506 P.3d 509 (quotation 

simplified). See Flowell Elec., 2015 UT 87, ¶ 34. Accordingly, we are 

“not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already 

there.” Zilleruelo, 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19 (quotation simplified).

¶14 Our Legislature has, in some instances, expressly 

overridden the Rogers rule by providing specific legislative 

authority for statutes of limitations to apply to certain 

administrative proceedings. For example, the Employment 

Securities Act provides that an “[a]ction required for the collection 

of sums due under this chapter” by the Department of Workforce 

Services “is subject to the applicable limitations of actions under 

Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations.” Utah Code Ann.

§ 35A-4-305(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2019). See Morgan, 2017 UT App 

225, ¶ 8 & n.7; Lorenzo v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2002 UT App 

371, ¶¶ 9, 14 n.2, 58 P.3d 873. Our Legislature has also now 

specified that, while the Division of Real Estate may take other 

kinds of enforcement action outside this timeframe, “it may not 

issue a citation,” which carries with it a monetary sanction, “after 

the expiration of one year after the day on which the violation 

occurs.” Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-203(9) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). 

See id. § 61-2-203(4), (10). Additionally, the Utah Uniform 

Securities Act now provides that “[a]n administrative action filed 

under this chapter may be commenced within 10 years after the 

violation occurs.” Id. § 61-1-21.1(2) (2018). These statutes expressly 

impose a statute of limitations on administrative proceedings 

either by incorporating a statute of limitations found in Title 78B 

Chapter 2 or by creating an entirely new statute of limitations.

¶15 Conversely, section 53-6-211(3)(c) makes no such specific 

reference to any statute of limitations. Instead, it merely provides 

that “[a]ll adjudicative proceedings under this section are civil 

actions,” and the purpose of this language—especially in light of 
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20210794-CA 9 2023 UT App 35

the section’s later contrast of civil actions to criminal actions—is 

subject to debate. But even assuming that Grillone’s definition of 

“civil actions” as used in section 53-6-211(3)(c) is correct, such a 

circuitous route for imposing the catch-all statute of limitations on

POST disciplinary proceedings by virtue of section 78B-2-307(3), 

without so much as a reference to that section or to statutes of 

limitations more generally, cannot be said to be specific.

Accordingly, section 53-6-211(3)(c) does not satisfy the “specific 

legislative authority” requirement of Rogers.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, the four-year catch-all statute of 

limitations did not apply to the administrative proceeding at issue 

in this petition for review.7 We therefore decline to disturb the 

POST Council’s order suspending Grillone’s peace officer 

certification.

7. This does not mean, of course, that an agency has “unlimited 

time” during which to initiate administrative proceedings. See 

Phillips v. Department of Commerce, 2017 UT App 84, ¶ 15 n.4, 397 

P.3d 863. Regardless of whether a statute of limitations applies, 

“the doctrine of laches may [still] apply in equity.” Estate of Price 

v. Hodkin, 2019 UT App 137, ¶ 15, 447 P.3d 1285 (quotation 

simplified), cert. denied, 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019).