This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

27254 

Vol. 74, No. 109 

Tuesday, June 9, 2009 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0521; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–187–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 737–300, –400, and –500 Series 

Airplanes Equipped With a Digital 

Transient Suppression Device (DTSD) 

Installed in Accordance With 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST00127BO 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 737–300, –400, and –500 

series airplanes. This proposed AD 

would require revising the maintenance 

program to include new fuel system 

limitations for airplanes modified in 

accordance with STC ST00127BO. This 

AD also requires inspections and checks 

of the DTSDs and corrective actions, if 

necessary. This proposed AD results 

from fuel system reviews conducted by 

the manufacturer. We are proposing this 

AD to prevent a potential of ignition 

sources inside fuel tanks, which, in 

combination with flammable fuel 

vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire 

or explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by July 24, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Goodrich Corporation, 

Fuel and Utility Systems, 100 Panton 

Road, Vergennes, Vermont 05491–1008; 

telephone 802–877–4476; e-mail 

lgd.TechPubs.Oakville@goodrich.com; 

Internet http://www.goodrich.com/ 

TechPubs. You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(telephone 800–647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marc Ronell, Aerospace Engineer, ANE– 

150, FAA, Boston Aircraft Certification 

Office, 12 New England Executive Park, 

Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; 

telephone (781) 238–7776; fax (781) 

238–7170. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2009–0521; Directorate Identifier 

2008–NM–187–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 

Among other actions, SFAR 88 

requires certain type design (i.e., type 

certificate (TC) and supplemental type 

certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate 

that their fuel tank systems can prevent 

ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This 

requirement applies to type design 

holders for large turbine-powered 

transport airplanes and for subsequent 

modifications to those airplanes. It 

requires them to perform design reviews 

and to develop design changes and 

maintenance procedures if their designs 

do not meet the new fuel tank safety 

standards. As explained in the preamble 

to the rule, we intended to adopt 

airworthiness directives to mandate any 

changes found necessary to address 

unsafe conditions identified as a result 

of these reviews. 

In evaluating these design reviews, we 

have established four criteria intended 

to define the unsafe conditions 

associated with fuel tank systems that 

require corrective actions. The 

percentage of operating time during 

which fuel tanks are exposed to 

flammable conditions is one of these 

criteria. The other three criteria address 

the failure types under evaluation: 

single failures, single failures in 

combination with another latent 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 109 / Tuesday, June 9, 2009 / Proposed Rules 27255 

condition(s), and in-service failure 

experience. For all four criteria, the 

evaluations included consideration of 

previous actions taken that may mitigate 

the need for further action. 

We have determined that revising the 

maintenance program to include new 

fuel system limitations for airplanes 

modified in accordance with 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST00127BO are necessary to reduce the 

potential of ignition sources inside fuel 

tanks, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in 

fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

We have reviewed Goodrich 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness (ICA) for Boeing Model 

737–300/400/500 Airplanes, Document 

T2007–0010–0101, Revision D, dated 

January 16, 2007. The ICA includes 

Section 2.2.3, ‘‘Scheduled Inspections/ 

Operational Checks,’’ and Section 10.1, 

‘‘Fuel System Limitations’’ (hereafter 

referred to as ‘‘the instructions’’). These 

fuel system limitations are identified as 

critical design configuration control 

limitations (CDCCLs), which are 

limitation requirements to preserve a 

critical ignition source prevention 

feature of the fuel tank system design 

that is necessary to prevent the 

occurrence of an unsafe condition. The 

purpose of a CDCCL is to provide 

instructions to retain the critical 

ignition source prevention feature 

during configuration changes that may 

be caused by alterations, repairs, or 

maintenance actions. A CDCCL is not a 

periodic inspection. 

The scheduled inspections/ 

operational checks are periodic 

inspections/checks of certain features 

for latent failures that could contribute 

to an ignition source. The instructions 

describe the following procedures to 

detect discrepancies of the following 

components of the left wing, right wing, 

and center tanks: 

• Digital transient suppression 

devices (DTSD): Initial operational 

check. 

• DTSD safe-side harnesses: 

Inspection for critical bond damage, 

which includes measuring the bonding 

resistance across the ground strap and 

verifying the resistance is less than 2.0 

milliohms. 

• DTSD safe-side harnesses: 

Inspection for physical separation of the 

harness from other airplane wiring, 

hydraulic tubing, structure, control 

cables, and bleed air ducts. Separation 

is required to ensure that threat 

conditions do not develop that could 

compromise the safety of the wiring 

entering the fuel tank. 

Accomplishing the actions specified 

in the service information is intended to 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This Proposed AD 

We are proposing this AD because we 

evaluated all relevant information and 

determined the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the same 

type design. This proposed AD would 

require revising the maintenance 

program to include the scheduled 

inspections/operational checks 

specified in Section 2.2.3 and the fuel 

system limitations specified in Section 

10.1 of the Goodrich ICA for airplanes 

modified in accordance with STC 

ST00127BO, and accomplishing the 

actions specified in the scheduled 

inspections/operational checks and the 

CDCCLs described previously, except as 

described below in ‘‘Differences 

Between the Instructions and This 

Proposed AD.’’ 

Differences Between the Instructions 

and This Proposed AD 

The instructions do not specify an 

initial compliance time for doing the 

scheduled inspections/operational 

checks. This proposed AD would 

require an operational check of the 

DTSDs prior to the accumulation of 

39,000 flight hours after modification in 

accordance with STC ST00127BO, or 

within 12 months, whichever occurs 

later. This proposed AD would require 

a general visual inspection for critical 

bond damage of the DTSD safe-side 

harnesses (critical bond damage 

includes measuring the bonding 

resistance across the ground strap and 

verifying the resistance is less than 2.0 

milliohms) prior to the accumulation of 

4,000 flight hours after modification in 

accordance with STC ST00127BO, or 

within 6 months, whichever occurs 

later. This proposed AD would also 

require a general visual inspection for 

physical separation of the DTSD safeside harnesses from other airplane 

wiring, hydraulic tubing, structure, 

control cables, and bleed air ducts prior 

to the accumulation of 24,000 flight 

hours after modification in accordance 

with STC ST00127BO, or within 12 

months, whichever occurs later. 

The instructions also do not specify 

corrective actions if any discrepancy is 

found. This proposed AD would require 

that if any discrepancy is found, 

applicable corrective actions must be 

done in accordance with the applicable 

section of the Goodrich Aircraft 

Maintenance Manual (AMM) 

Supplement with Wiring Diagrams for 

737–300/–400/–500 FQIS with Goodrich 

Digital Indicators and Transient 

Suppression Device, STC Number: STC 

ST00127BO, Revision 5, dated 

December 20, 2006, as specified in the 

instructions. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

would affect 12 airplanes of U.S. 

registry. The following table provides 

the estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this proposed AD. The 

average labor rate is $80 per work hour. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours 

Cost per 

product 

($) 

Fleet cost 

($) 

Revision to maintenance program ........................................................................................................... 8 640 7,680 

Operational check, per cycle ................................................................................................................... 1 80 960 

Bond damage inspection, per cycle ........................................................................................................ 1 80 960 

Separation inspection, per cycle ............................................................................................................. 1 80 960 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

27256 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 109 / Tuesday, June 9, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

Boeing: Docket No. FAA–2009–0521; 

Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–187–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) We must receive comments by July 24, 

2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 737– 

300, –400, and –500 series airplanes, 

certificated in any category, equipped with a 

digital transient suppression device (DTSD) 

installed in accordance with Supplemental 

Type Certificate (STC) STC ST00127BO. 

Note 1: This AD requires revisions to 

certain operator maintenance documents to 

include new inspections. Compliance with 

these inspections is required by 14 CFR 

91.403(c). For airplanes that have been 

previously modified, altered, or repaired in 

the areas addressed by these inspections, the 

operator may not be able to accomplish the 

inspections described in the revisions. In this 

situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), 

the operator must request approval for an 

alternative method of compliance according 

to paragraph (m) of this AD. The request 

should include a description of changes to 

the required inspections that will ensure the 

continued operational safety of the airplane. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28: Fuel. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD results from fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent a potential of 

ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which in 

combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion 

and consequent loss of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Revision to the Maintenance Program To 

Add CDCCLs 

(g) Within 30 days after the effective date 

of this AD, revise the maintenance program 

to incorporate the fuel system limitations 

specified in Section 10.1 of the Goodrich 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 

(ICA) for Boeing Model 737–300/400/500 

Airplanes, Document T2007–0010–0101, 

Revision D, dated January 16, 2007. 

Revision to the Maintenance Program To 

Add Scheduled Inspections/Operational 

Checks 

(h) Within 30 days after the effective date 

of this AD: Revise the maintenance program 

to incorporate the scheduled inspections/ 

operational checks specified in Section 2.2.3 

of the Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 737– 

300/400/500 Airplanes, Document T2007– 

0010–0101, Revision D, dated January 16, 

2007; except that the initial inspections/ 

checks required by paragraphs (i), (j), and (k) 

of this AD must be done at the compliance 

times specified in those paragraphs. Repeat 

the inspections/checks thereafter at the 

applicable compliance times in the column, 

‘‘Frequency,’’ of the table specified in Section 

2.2.3 of the Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 

737–300/400/500 Airplanes, Document 

T2007–0010–0101, Revision D, dated January 

16, 2007. 

Initial Inspections and Repair if Necessary 

(i) Prior to the accumulation of 39,000 

flight hours after modification in accordance 

with STC ST00127BO, or within 12 months 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Do an operational check of the 

digital transient suppression devices (DTSD) 

in accordance with Section 2.2.3., 

‘‘Scheduled Inspections/Operational 

Checks,’’ of the Goodrich ICA, for Boeing 

Model 737–300/400/500 Airplanes, 

Document T2007–0010–0101, Revision D, 

dated January 16, 2007. If the DTSD fails the 

operational check, repair before further flight 

in accordance with the section of the 

Goodrich Aircraft Maintenance Manual 

(AMM) Supplement with Wiring Diagrams 

for 737–300/–400/–500 FQIS with Goodrich 

Digital Indicators and Transient Suppression 

Device, STC Number: STC ST00127BO, 

Revision 5, dated December 20, 2006, that 

corresponds to the operational check 

specified in Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 

737–300/400/500 Airplanes, Document 

T2007–0010–0101, Revision D, dated January 

16, 2007. 

(j) Prior to the accumulation of 4,000 flight 

hours after modification in accordance with 

STC ST00127BO, or within 6 months after 

the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Do a general visual inspection 

for critical bond damage of the DTSD safeside harnesses (critical bond damage 

includes measuring the bonding resistance 

across the ground strap and verifying the 

resistance is less than 2.0 milliohms), in 

accordance with Section 2.2.3., ‘‘Scheduled 

Inspections/Operational Checks,’’ of 

Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 737–300/ 

400/500 Airplanes, Document T2007–0010– 

0101, Revision D, dated January 16, 2007, 

which includes Items 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Table 

6 in Section 10.1, ‘‘Fuel System Limitations.’’ 

If any damage is found, repair before further 

flight in accordance with the section of the 

Goodrich Aircraft Maintenance Manual 

Supplement with Wiring Diagrams for 737– 

300/–400/–500 FQIS with Goodrich Digital 

Indicators and Transient Suppression Device, 

STC Number: STC ST00127BO, Revision 5, 

dated December 20, 2006, that corresponds to 

the general visual inspection specified in 

Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 737–300/ 

400/500 Airplanes, Document T2007–0010– 

0101, Revision D, dated January 16, 2007. 

(k) Prior to the accumulation of 24,000 

flight hours after modification in accordance 

with STC ST00127BO, or within 12 months 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Do a general visual inspection 

for physical separation of the DTSD safe-side 

harnesses from other airplane wiring, 

hydraulic tubing, structure, control cables, 

and bleed air ducts, in accordance with 

Section 2.2.3., ‘‘Scheduled Inspections/ 

Operational Checks,’’ of the Goodrich ICA for 

Boeing Model 737–300/400/500 Airplanes, 

Document T2007–0010–0101, Revision D, 

dated January 16, 2007. If any damage is 

found, repair before further flight in 

accordance with the section of the Goodrich 

Aircraft Maintenance Manual Supplement 

with Wiring Diagrams for 737–300/–400/ 

–500 FQIS with Goodrich Digital Indicators 

and Transient Suppression Device, STC 

Number: STC ST00127BO, Revision 5, dated 

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 109 / Tuesday, June 9, 2009 / Proposed Rules 27257 

December 20, 2006, that corresponds to the 

general visual inspection specified in 

Goodrich ICA for Boeing Model 737–300/ 

400/500 Airplanes, Document T2007–0010– 

0101, Revision D, dated January 16, 2007. 

No Alternative Inspections/Checks, 

Inspection/Check Intervals, or CDCCLs 

(l) After accomplishing the actions 

specified in paragraphs (g) and (h) of this AD, 

no alternative inspections/checks, 

inspection/check intervals, or CDCCLs may 

be used unless the inspections/checks, 

intervals, or CDCCLs are approved as an 

Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) 

in accordance with the procedures specified 

in paragraph (m) of this AD. 

AMOCs 

(m)(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Marc 

Ronell, Aerospace Engineer, ANE–150, FAA, 

Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New 

England Executive Park, Burlington, 

Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238– 

7776; fax (781) 238–7170. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 2, 

2009. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–13494 Filed 6–8–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0522; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–127–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; 328 Support 

Services GmbH Dornier Model 328–100 

and –300 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above that would 

supersede an existing AD. This 

proposed AD results from mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI) originated by an aviation 

authority of another country to identify 

and correct an unsafe condition on an 

aviation product. The MCAI describes 

the unsafe condition as: 

* * * A number of * * * rudder spring 

tab lever assemblies [of the rudder] were 

found cracked. 

This condition, if not corrected, could lead 

to failure of the rudder flight control system 

and consequent loss of control of the aircraft. 

* * * 

* * * * * 

The proposed AD would require 

actions that are intended to address the 

unsafe condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by July 9, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact 328 Support 

Services GmbH, Global Support Center, 

P.O. Box 1252, D–82231 Wessling, 

Federal Republic of Germany; telephone 

+49 8153 88111 6666; fax +49 8153 

88111 6565; e-mail 

gsc.op@328support.de; Internet http:// 

www.328support.de. You may review 

copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221 

or 425–227–1152. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2125; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2009–0522; Directorate Identifier 

2008–NM–127–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

On April 26, 2004, we issued AD 

2004–09–16, Amendment 39–13605 (69 

FR 24953, May 5, 2004). (A correction 

of that AD was published in the Federal 

Register on May 12, 2004 (69 FR 

26434)). That AD required actions 

intended to address an unsafe condition 

on the products listed above. 

Since we issued AD 2004–09–16, we 

have determined that it is necessary to 

reduce the repetitive interval and 

require the replacement of certain 

rudder spring tab lever assemblies. 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2008–0107, 

dated June 23, 2008 (referred to after 

this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products. 

The MCAI states: 

On 14 March 2002, an incident occurred 

with a Dornier 328–100 where the captain 

reported that the rudder was unresponsive. 

The aircraft landed without any further 

difficulties. A visual inspection of the rudder 

assembly was carried out and the spring tab 

assembly was found to be cracked and 

partially missing. During subsequent 

inspections of other aircraft, a number of 

additional rudder spring tab lever assemblies 

were found cracked. 

This condition, if not corrected, could lead 

to failure of the rudder flight control system