alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

# Written Statement of
the Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Bandag, Incorporated   Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350

Solely
for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, I, the undersigned Vice
President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Bandag, Incorporated (the
Company), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the Annual Report on
Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Warren W. Heidbreder  
Warren W. HeidbrederVice
President, Chief Financial OfficerFebruary 28, 2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                            <C>        
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           99557
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 99557
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  138460
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              108
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      138342
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    138460
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  2565
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    20279
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (17714) 
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (17714)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (17714)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>
Not presented since all shares of common stock are held by a sole
shareholder.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
```
                  United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit
                       ____________________

No. 97-2386

                          UNITED STATES,
                            Appellee,

                                v.

                          GEORGE SACKO,
                      Defendant, Appellant.

                       ____________________

                           ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this Court issued on March 15, 1999, is amended
as follows:

     On page 7, line 17-18, "as described in the presentence
report" is to be deleted.

     On page 7, line 20-21, "Damon, 127 F.3d at 144-45 (holding
that it is error for a district court to rely on an offender's
uncontested presentencing report)." is to be deleted and replaced
with "Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600 (stating that "the language of     
� 924(e) generally supports the inference that Congress intended
the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant
had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and
not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.)"
```
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT


THIS FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT (this "Amendment") is 
entered into as of September 15, 1998, by and between AUTO-GRAPHICS, 
INC., a California corporation ("Borrower"), and WELLS FARGO BANK, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION ("Bank").


RECITALS

WHEREAS, Borrower is currently indebted to Bank pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of that certain Credit Agreement between Borrower 
and Bank dated as of May 12, 1997, as amended from time to time 
("Credit Agreement").

WHEREAS, Bank and Borrower have agreed to certain changes in the 
terms and conditions set forth in the Credit Agreement and have agreed 
to amend the Credit Agreement to reflect said changes.

NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree 
that the Credit Agreement shall be amended as follows:

	1.  Section 1.1.(b)(i)(A) is hereby deleted in its entirety, 
	and the following substituted therefor:

		"(i) any account which is more than ninety-three 
		(93) days past due;"

	2.  Section 4.3.(e) is hereby renumbered as Section 4.3.(f).

	3.  The following is hereby added to the Credit Agreement as 
	Section 4.3.(e):

		"(e) not later than 20 days after and as of the end of each
		month, Borrower will provide Bank a detailed report which
		evidences that at least 80% of Borrower's invoices for that
		period were billed on the last day of that month;"
                                                                          
	4.  Except as specifically provided herein, all terms and 
	conditions of the Credit Agreement remain in full force and 
	effect, without waiver or modification.  All terms defined in 
	the Credit Agreement shall have the same meaning when used in 
	this Amendment.  This Amendment and the Credit Agreement 
	shall be read together, as one document.

	5.  Borrower hereby remakes all representations and warranties 
	Contained in the Credit Agreement and reaffirms all covenants 
	set forth therein.  Borrower further certifies that as of the 
	date of this Amendment there exists no Event of Default as 
	defined in the Credit Agreement, nor any condition, act or 
	event, which with the giving of notice or the passage of time 
	or both would constitute any such Event of Default.


	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment 
to be executed as of the day and year first written above.

AUTO-GRAPHICS, INC				WELLS FARGO BANK,
							NATIONAL ASSOCIATION


By:  ss/  Robert S. Cope			By  ss/  Debbie Dillard-Bell
 Robert S. Cope					Debbie Dillard-Bell
 President						Vice President
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7270

DELVIN JAMES WILSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, D.O.C. Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Virginia. John A. Gibney, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cv-00657-JAG-RCY)

Submitted: March 23, 2021 Decided: March 26, 2021

Before THACKER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Delvin James Wilson, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Delvin James Wilson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. 

Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wilson has not made 

the requisite showing. Wilson fails to contest the district court’s procedural default finding, 

and therefore has forfeited appellate review of his underlying § 2254 claims. See 4th Cir. 

R. 34(b); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014). Further, the record 

supports the district court’s determination that Wilson’s claims were procedurally 

defaulted. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny Wilson’s motion 

seeking leave to file a motion for a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
----

EX

|                                    | /s/      Herbert M. Stein                                                                                                     |   |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Dated:  January      15, 2010 |                                                                                                                          |   |
|                                    | Herbert      M. Stein                                                                                                         |   |
|                                    | Chief      Executive Officer and President (principal executive    officer)                                                   |
|                                    |                                                                                                                          |   |
|                                    | /s/      Paul J. Murphy                                                                                                       |   |
| Dated:  January      15, 2010 |                                                                                                                          |   |
|                                    | Paul      J. Murphy                                                                                                           |   |
|                                    | Chief      Financial Officer and Vice President of Finance (principal financial      officer and principal accountingofficer) |

----
No. 4841.

(Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.)

#### MRS. JENNIE PASSER vs. PAULINE TRAPPANI.

E. P. Foley for plaintiff and appellee.

A. Landry, G. M. Hornor, U. Marinoni, for defendant and appellant.

*126January 10, 1910.

DUPOUE, J.

The plaintiff sues to recover $200, alleged to have been loaned by her to the defendant.

Her testimony asserts and that of the defendant denies the loan; the District Judge believed the former.

It is argued that the matter is not one of credibility but of sufficiency of evidence, andv that, even if we eliminate all testimony for the defense, the plaintiff has not proved her case with legal certainty.

Thus, it is said that she alternately claims that the money was loaned to the husband, to the wife, and to buy an interest in a grocery store about to be established.

This statement is based on isolated expressions in the testimony of Mrs. Passer who appears to be an illiterate and ignorant woman.

The positive trend of her testimony as a whole clearly shows that, though she negotiated with both husband and wife and there was some proposition looking to her being, a partner in the grocery venture, the final transaction was in the nature of a loan, pure and simple, to the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.
EXHIBIT 21

                                  SUBSIDIARIES

Owned By                             Jurisdiction of
Registrant                           Incorporation                 Percentage
----------                           -------------                 ----------

Dialysis Corporation of America      Florida                            55.7%
DCA Medical Services, Inc.(1)        Florida                            55.7%
DCA of Adel, LLC(2)                  Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of Central Valdosta, LLC(2)      Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of Fitzgerald, LLC(2)            Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of Hawkinsville, LLC(1)          Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of So. Ga., LLC(2)               Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of Royston, LLC(2)               Georgia                            55.7%
DCA of Baltimore, LLC(3)             Maryland                           55.7%
DCA of Chevy Chase, LLC(4)           Maryland                           44.6%
DCA of Rockville, LLC(2)             Maryland                           55.7%
DCA of Manahawkin, Inc.(42)          New Jersey                         44.6%
DCA of Vineland, LLC(5)              New Jersey                         28.6%
DCA of Cincinnati, LLC(6)            Ohio                               33.4%
DCA of Norwood, LLC(3)               Ohio                               55.7%
DCA of Carlisle, Inc.(4)             Pennsylvania                       44.6%
DCA of Chambersburg, Inc. (4)        Pennsylvania                       44.6%
DCA of Lemoyne, Inc. (2)             Pennsylvania                       55.7%
DCA of Mechanicsburg, LLC (2)        Pennsylvania                       55.7%
DCA of Pottstown, LLC(4)             Pennsylvania                       44.6%
DCA of Wellsboro, Inc.(2)            Pennsylvania                       55.7%
Keystone Kidney Care, Inc.(2)        Pennsylvania                       55.7%
DCA of Ashland, LLC(4)               Virginia                           44.6%
DCA of Warsaw, LLC(2)                Virginia                           55.7%
DCA of Aiken, LLC(2)                 South Carolina                     55.7%
DCA of Aiken II, LLC(3)              South Carolina                     55.7%
DCA of Barnwell, LLC(3)              South Carolina                     55.7%
DCA of Edgefield, LLC(3)             South Carolina                     55.7%

---------------

(1) Owned 100% by Dialysis Corporation of America - inactive.
(2) Owned 100% by Dialysis Corporation of America - active.
(3) Owned 100% by Dialysis Corporation of America - under development.
(4) Owned 80% by Dialysis Corporation of America - active.
(5) Owned 51% by Dialysis Corporation of America - active.
(6) Owned 60% by Dialysis Corporation of America - active.
Exhibit 32.2








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Atlas Mining Company on Form 10-K/ A (Amendment No. 2) for the period ending December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Christopher T. Carney, Interim Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

















Atlas Mining CompanyDate:   October 8, 2009
By:
/s/  CHRISTOPHER T. CARNEYChristopher T. CarneyInterim Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32(a)

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





|(1) | The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and    
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods presented in the Report.









|/s/ J. Wayne LeonardJ. Wayne Leonard
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of Entergy Corporation
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:	March 1, 2007
solarmax_ex1023.htm

EXHIBIT 10.23
  
 August 4, 2022
  
 SolarMax Technology, Inc.
 3080 12th Street
 Riverside, California 92507
  
 Ladies and Gentlemen:
  
 Reference is made to the agreement dated March 27, 2019, pursuant to which I exchanged 1,348,213 shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share (“Common Stock”), of SolarMax Technology, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) represented by a Stock Grant for (i) an option to purchase 1,428,432 shares of Common Stock and (ii) a cash payment of $675,000, which was to have been paid by December 15, 2019 and which date was extended to December 31, 2022. This letter will confirm my prior advice to you that I agree that the date by which the cash payment is to be made to me has been extended to the earlier of December 31, 2022 or three business days after the completion of the Company’s initial public offering.  The number of shares in this letter reflect the 0.59445-for-one reverse stock split effective July 15, 2022.
  
 	 Very truly yours,
	  

	  
	  

	  /s/ David Hsu
	  

	 Name: David Hsu
In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 15-1378V 

Filed: March 10, 2016

Unpublished

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

SHARON ALLEN, * 

* 

Petitioner, * Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

* Influenza (“Flu”) Vaccine; Shoulder

* Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Administration (“SIRVA”); Special

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Processing Unit (“SPU”)

* 

Respondent. * 

* 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Maximillian J. Muller, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for petitioner.

Glenn A. MacLeod, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On November 16, 2015, Sharon Allen (“petitioner”) filed a petition for 

compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 

§300aa-10, et seq.,

2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”). Petitioner alleges that as a result

of receiving an influenza (“flu”) vaccine on September 30, 2014, she suffered an injury 

to her left shoulder. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing 

Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of Special Masters.

On March 10, 2016, respondent filed her Rule 4(c) Report in which she concedes 

that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, respondent concluded that petitioner’s alleged injury is consistent with 

shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”), and that it was caused-infact by the flu vaccine she received on September 30, 2014. Id. at 4. Respondent 

further stated that she did not identify any other causes for petitioner’s SIRVA, and that 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the 

undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with 

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)(Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).

v.
2

the records show petitioner has suffered the sequela of this injury for more than six 

months. Id. Therefore, based on the record as it now stands, petitioner has satisfied all 

legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act. Id. at 5.

In view of respondent’s concession and the evidence of record, the 

undersigned finds that petitioner is entitled to compensation. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey

 Chief Special Master
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp el l ant . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T UN I T E D S T AT E S OF AME R I C A, P l ai nt i ff

- A pp el l ee , v. J UA N- MANU E L GU T I E R R E Z - P I NE DA , D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e lla n t. N o. 11- 10126 D . C. N o . 4 : 1 0 - c r - 0 0 8 7 9 - D CB ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt

f orthe D i s tr i c tof

A r i z ona D a vi d C . B ury , D i s tr i c tJ udge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d J a nua ry17, 2012 ** B efo re: L E A V Y , T A L L M A N , an d C A L L A H A N , C i rcu i tJu d g es. Juan-M anuel G ut i erre z- P i neda appeal s f rom the 51 -m on th sent ence i m po se d f o l l o w i n g h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o rr e e n trya f

t e rd e p o rt a t i o n , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 8 U . S. C. § 1 3 2 6 . W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n u n d e r2 8 U . S. C. § 1 2 9 1 , a n d w e a f f i rm. 

# FI LED

JAN 27 2 012 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS11- 10126 2 G ut i e rr e z - P i ne dac ont e nds tha tthe di s tr i c tc ourtpr oc e dur a l l ye rr e d by fa i l i ng t o app re ci at e i t s di sc re t i on , un der Ki m brou gh v. U ni ted States , 552 U . S . 85 (200 7), t o d evi at e f

rom the advi soryse nt enci ng G ui del i nes bas ed on po l i cy d i fferen ces w i th th e G u i d el i n es, an d b y fai l i n g t o ad eq u at el y ad d ress G ut i e rr e z - P i ne da ’ s obj e c t i ons t o the s i xt e e n- l e ve l s e nt e nc i ng e nha nc e m e nt pur s ua ntt o U . S . S . G . § 2L 1. 2( b) ( 1) ( A ) . T he s e c ont e nt i ons a r e be l i e d bythe r e c or d. G u tie rr e z - P in e d aa ls o c o n te n d s th a t th e s e n te n c e is s u b s ta n tiv e ly un re as on abl e und er U

ni ted States v. A m ez cua-V asqu ez , 56 7 F . 3d 10 50 (9th C i r. 2009) , be c aus e the s e nt e nc e doe s nota de qua t e l ya c c ountf orthe a ge of

hi s pr i or conv i ct i on s, hi s i nd i vi du al ci rc um st ance s, and an am endm entt o the G ui del i nes that ha d noty e tbe e n a dopt e d. I n l i ghtof the t ot a l i tyof

the c i r c um s t a nc e s a nd the s e c tio n 3 5 5 3 ( a ) s e n te n c in g f a c to r s , th e s e n te n c e is s u b s ta n tiv e lyr e a s o n ab le . See G al l v. U ni ted States , 5 5 2 U .S . 3 8 , 5 1 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; U n ite d S ta te s v . R u iz -Ap o lo n io , 657 F . 3d 907, 917- 18 ( di s tr i c tc ourtnotr e qui r e d t o c ons i de rG ui de l i ne s a m e ndm e nt thathas bee n p rom ul gat ed bu tno tye tadop t ed). AF F I RME D.