Interim Decision #2039 

MATTER OF JOLLEY 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-18168898 

Decided by Board March 19, 1970 

Respondent, by formal renunciation'of U.S. nationality before an American 

Consul at Toronto, Ontario, Canada, on May 16, 1967, thereby lost United 

States citizenship under section 349(a) (6) of the 'Immigration and Nationality Act, he being presumed under section 349(c) of the Act to have voluntarily performed the expatriating act since he has not testified or offered any evidence to support a conclusion that his renunciation was other 

than voluntary.• 

CHARGES: 

Order : Act of 1952—Section 291(a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251 (a) (1) 1—Excludable at time of entry, to wit, immigrant, no visa 

(section 212(a) (20); 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (20)). 

Lodged: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)1—Excludable at time of entry, to wit, person who departed from or remained outside United States 

to avoid or evade training or service in the 

armed forces in time of war or national emergency (section 212(a) (22); 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) 

(22)). 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 

Peter E. Rindskopf, Esquire 

859 1/2 Hunter Street, N.E. 

Atlanta, Georgia 30314 

(Brief filed) 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Irving A. Appleman 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

(Brief filed) 

Joseph W. Monsanto 

Trial Attorney 

(Brief filed) 

This is an appeal from an order of a special inquiry officer 

dated November 25, 1968, finding the respondent deportable on 

both charges above stated and granting voluntary departure 

within 90 days, with an alternate order for his deportation to 

* Reaffirmed, 441 F.2d 1245 (C.A. 5, 1971). 

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iterim Decision #2039 I 

anada if he fails to depart when and as required. The appeal 

ill be dismissed. 

The facts have been fully stated and the evidence has been critally examined in the special inquiry officer's exhaustive and able I 

pinion, and need not be repeated here at length. The special inuiry officer concluded that the evidence had been properly admited into the record and that it established clearly, convincingly, 

,d unequivocally that the respondent is an alien and that he is 

leportable as charged. We concur in those conclusions. 

At, the hearing, the respondent denied that he is an alien and 

hat he is deportable. Indeed, he refused to concede that he is the 

Jerson to whom much of the documentary proof related. Consemently, the threshhold question presented is one of identity. 

The order to show cause, dated March 20, 1968, charges that 

Thomas Glenn Jolley, the respondent, is not a citizen or national 

if the United States; that he is a native of the United States and 

undetermined citizenship; that he renounced his United States 

citizenship before an American consul at Toronto, Ontario, Canada on May 16, 1967; that he entered the United States at Detroit, Michigan on an unknown date subsequent to May 16, 1967, 

for the purpose of resuming his residence; and that at the time of 

entry he was not in possession of a valid immigrant visa. Deportability was charged under section 241 (a) (1) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act on the ground that he was inadmissible at 

entry under section 212(a) (20) of the Act for lack of the required visa. 

At the deportation hearing, respondent was represented by 

counsel, who conceded that respondent is the Thomas Glenn Jolley named in the order to show cause (Tr. p. 10). Called as the 

Service's first witness over his attorney's objection, respondent on 

advice of counsel refused to answer most of the questions on 

self-incrimination grounds. He did testify that he is 24 years old 

(Tr. p. 26) and that he is married (Tr. p. 27); that he is Thomas 

Glenn Jolley, married to Margaret Elizabeth Townsend, aged 20, 

a citizen of the United States born in Atlanta, Georgia (Tr. p. 

80) ; and that he had lived in Canada (Tr. p. 93). 

Admitted into evidence over respondent's objection was a certified copy of a birth certificate (Ex. 6) attesting to the birth of 

Thomas Glenn Jolley on January 26, 1944 in Greensboro, North 

Carolina. Also admitted over objection were certified copies (Ex. 

7) of the following: (1) an oath of renunciation of allegiance 

under section 349(a) (6) of the Act, signed and sworn to on May 

16, 1967 before the American consul at Toronto, Ontario, Canada 

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Interim Decision #2039 

by Thomas Glenn Jolley, born at Greensboro, North Carolina on 

January 26, 1944; (2) a supporting affidavit, executed by Thomas 

Glenn Jolley on the same day before the same American consul; 

and (3) a Consular Certificate executed May 31, 1967 and approved by the State Department on June 16, 1967, reciting that 

Thomas Glenn Jolley, born at Greensboro, North Carolina on January 26, 1944, had expatriated himself on May 16, 1967 under 

section 349 (a) (6) of the Act. 

James R. Coplen, a Service investigator, testified over objection 

that he had interviewed the respondent at the latter's home on 

March 19, 1968, during the course of an investigation into the respondent's immigration status. Mr. Coplen testified that he had 

then asked the respondent whether he was the Thomas Glenn Jolley who had renounced his citizenship in Canada and he said he 

was; that respondent stated he had last entered the United States 

through the port of Detroit, Michigan, but he refused to state 

what name he had used or what he told the officials when he entered (Tr. p. 60). 

We agree with the special inquiry officer that the foregoing evidence was properly received and that it establishes clearly, convincingly, and unequivocally that respondent is the Thomas Glenn 

Jolley who executed the renunciation forms at Toronto on May 

16, 1967. In our view, the Service has amply met its burden of establishing that the respondent is an alien. 

The dissenting opinion strongly contends, however, that on this 

record it cannot be said that respondent's act of renunciation was 

voluntary. Even though the respondent did not testify as to the 

circumstances which led him to execute the renunciation, we 

agree that it is clearly inferable that respondent's action was motivated by his desire to avoid induction in our armed forces. That 

this desire may have been based on conscientious scruples does 

not, in our view, make his act of renunciation any the less deliberate or voluntary. There is no evidence that, confronted with the 

choice of facing liability to induction or renouncing his citizenship, the respondent was subjected to influences which overbore 

his free will in making his election. 

Our unreported decision of June 26, 1969 in Matter of Susan B. 

Anthony (A-8823447), cited in the dissenting opinion, is readily, 

distinguishable. The expatriating act in that case (an oath of allegiance) took place in 1954 and the deportation proceedings were 

started in 1961, before the enactment of section 349 (c) of the 

Act. Consequently, under the rule then applicable, as enunciated 

in Nishikawa, v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958), the burden was on 

545 
;erim Decision 4t20:39 

Service to prove not only the expatriating act, but also that it 

Ls voluntarily performed; and this burden could be met only by 

.ar, convincing and unequivocal evidence. The respondent in the 

ithany case testified in the deportation proceedings as to the 

-cumstances surrounding her decision to take the oath of alleance. We concluded, on the basis of her testimony, which we beLved, that the Service had not borne its burden of establishing 

clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that her act was 

duntary. 

The case now before us is not only factually different but is 

wernecl by a different rule. Under section 349(c) of the Act, 

hich now applies, there is a presumption that respondent acted 

Militarily in performing the expatriating act; and the burden is 

a him to rebut that presumption. This he has not done. He has 

of testified, or offered any evidence, to support a conclusion that 

is renunciation of allegiance was other than his voluntary and 

3nsidered choice. 

We must also reject respondent's challenge to section 

49(a) (6) of the Act. Although the Board may not pass on the 

onstitutionality of the statutes we administer, Matter of L—, 4 

. & N. Dec. 556 (BIA, 1951), the Attorney General has laid 

own guide lines for the application of the principles set forth in 

Ifroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 1If anything emerges with 

rystal clarity from the diverse views expressed in Afroyim, it is 

he unchallenged proposition that an articulated renunciation of 

;llegiance is a constitutionally permissible means of expatriation. 

Respondent's alienage having thus been satisfactorily estabished, under section 291 of the Act the burden is upon him to 

wove the time, place, and manner of his entry into the United 

;tates. The respondent has presented no evidence on this issue. 

-laving failed to sustain his burden, under the specific terms of 

section 291 respondent is presumed to be in the United States in 

iiolation of law. There is no evidence to show that at the time of 

its entry at Detroit at an unspecified date he was in possession of 

sn immigrant visa or any document in lieu thereof. The charge 

stated in the order to show cause is clearly sustained. 

We have reached the foregoing conclusion without _ on 

the portions of respondent's Selective Service record (Ex. 9) 

received in evidence over his objection. While we agree with the 

special inquiry officer that these were properly received and that, 

Attorney Generta's Statement of interpretation Concerning Expatriation 

of United States Citizens, 42 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 34 (January 18, 1969); 39 

Fed. Reg. 1079. 

546 
Interim Decision #2039 

when coupled with the other evidence, they sustain the lodged 

charge, we wish here merely to point out that the finding of 

deportability is amply sustained on the original charge, even 

without the Selective Service records. 

We must also reject respondent's thesis tnat, even if the Service's charges have been established, his marriage to a United 

States citizen saves him from deportation under section 241 (f) of 

the Act. He argues that his entry at Detroit must have involved 

fraud and that this brings him within the ambit of section 

241(f). Fraud is not an essential ingredient of the documentary 

charge on which he has been ordered deported. An alien may not 

pull himself up by his own bootstraps and claim he was guilty of 

fraud at entry and thereby eligible for the benefits of section 

241(f). See Ntovas v. Ahrens, 279 F.2d 483 (7 Cir., 1960), cert. 

denied 364 U.S. 826 ; Tsaconas v. INS, 397 F.2d 946 (7 Cir., 

1968) ; Ferrante v. INS, 399 F.2d 98 (6 Cir., 1968). Congress did 

not intend to grant immunity from deportation to all aliens entering by fraud merely because they have the requisite family ties in 

this country, De Vargas v. INS, 409 F.2d 335 (5 Cir., 1969), cert. 

denied 396 U.S. 895. 

Even if fraud were shown to be the basis for the documentary 

charge under section 212(a) (20), so as to bring into play the 

rationale of Mustemi v. INS, 408 F.2d 1196 (9 Cir., 1968), 

respondent would still not be entitled to the benefits of section 

241 (f). That provision requires the alien to be "otherwise admissible at the time of entry." An alien who enters the United States 

without inspection by a knowingly false claim of citizenship, 

thereby completely circumventing the immigration visa system, is 

not "otherwise admissible" within the meaning of section 241 (f), 

Matter of Lee, Interior Decision No. 1960 (A.G., 1969); Gambino 

v. INS, 419 F.2d 1355 (2 Cir., January 7, 1970) footnote 1. 

We have carefully considered the other arguments raised on 

appeal and find them without merit. The same contentions were 

urged before the special inquiry officer and he disposed of them 

properly in his exhaustive opinion. To the cases cited at page 14 

of his opinion, as to the admissibility of respondent's admissions 

to Investigator Coplen, there can now be added Lavoie v. INS, 

418 F.2d 732 (9 Cir., 1969). 

The running of the voluntary departure time authorized by the 

special inquiry officer has been stayed pending this appeal. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal be and it is hereby dismissed. 

It is further ordered that, pursuant to the special inquiry 

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nterim Decision #2039 I 

ifficer's order, the respondent be permitted to depart from the 

Jnited States voluntarily within 90 days of this order or any 

xtension beyond that date as may be granted by the District 

Director; and that, in the event of failure so to depart, the 

respondent shall be deported as provided in the special inquiry 

)fficer's order. 

I 

DISSENTING OPINION: Antlion ,L. Montagu;la, Alternate Member 

Since this record fails to establish by clear, unequivocal and 

-tonvincing evidence that respondent voluntarily and meaningfully 

renounced his United States citizenship, acquired by reason of his 

birth here, I dissent from the majority opinion finding loss of 

American nationality. 

The issue presented here is narrowly circumscribed: Did 

respondent voluntarily and meaningfully intend a renunciation of 

his citizenship? Do the circumstances leading to such renunciation dilute the oath of renunciation and, thus, render it involuntary and ineffective? 

Respondent refused to testify at his deportation hearing other 

than to state his name, place of birth and recent marriage to a 

United States citizen. 

The evidence presented by the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service to establish loss of United States citizenship is, in substance, documentary, with the exception of testimony concerning 

pertain draft records relating to one, Thomas Glenn Jolley, the 

name of respondent; and the testimony of an Immigration inspec-

:or who testified that he interviewed respondent who admitted to 

-Jim that he had renounced his American nationality before an 

American consul in Canada. 

Respondent on May 16, 1967 made formal renunciation of his 

American nationality pursuant to section 349 (a) (6) of the Immi-

;ration and Nationality Act, before an American consul in 

Toronto, Canada, and at the same time, and as part thereof, 

stated, "I do not wish to break the laws of the United States. 

These laws (Selective Service) conflict with my present beliefs" 

(Ex. 7). 

Prior thereto, on March 5, 1967, respondent had attempted to 

secure reclassification of his draft status without success. He had 

been ordered to report for induction on June 13 and again on 

August 7, 1967, but failed to do so. He had already departed for 

Canada on March 31, 1967. He was classified I—A on April 18, 

1967 and again on July 19, 1967. On April 7, 1967, while in 

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Interim Decision # 2039 

Canada, respondent wrote his draft board requesting a 1-0 classification (that of a conscientious objector available for civilian 

work contributory to the maintenance of the national health, 

safety or interest). On April 18, 1967 and again on July 19, 1967, 

as stated, he was classified I—A. Respondent returned to the 

United States sometime after May 17, 1967, the exact date not 

having been established. 

It was after all efforts to secure a change in his draft status, 

that respondent executed the renunciation on May 16, 1967. So, in 

reality, the renunciation was to avoid regular army service. He so 

indicated in the oath of renunciation; and in his letter to the local 

draft board relative to his renunciation of American nationality. 

Thus, as indicated, the issue narrows to whether respondent's 

renunciation constituted a voluntary and meaningful act. 

There is no need here to discuss the effect of various provisions 

of the statute relating to loss of citizenship' or, the several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to the 

constitutionality thereof,' for we are here concerned with the 

right to renounce American nationality. Section 349 (a) (6) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act; Act of July 27, 1968, section 

1999 of the Revised Statutes. Even in the absence of a statute, 

formal renunciation of nationality usually has been considered an 

act of expatriation. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295 (1873); Borchard, The 

Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 552, 681. However, 

since 1940, our statutes have recognized the expatriative effect of 

a formal renunciation of nationality made before an American 

diplomatic or consular officer outside the United States. Section 

401(f), Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1169; section 349 (a) (6), 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a) (6). In addition, a 1944 Act codified in 1952, sanctions renunciation of citizenship in the United States during time of war, if approved by 

the Attorney General. Section 401 (i), Nationality Act of 1940, as 

amended, 58 Stat. 677; section 349(a) (7), Immigration and 

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a) (7). 

The Immigration and Naturalization Service receives communications from persons in the United States imprisoned for crime 

who wish to renounce their citizenship, and those who wish to 

avoid military service. It would appear that on the basis of the 

Afroyim ruling emphasizing a citizen's voluntary choice to re1 Section 1481, Title 8, U.S.C.A. 

2 Savorgnan v. Unitpd States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950) ; Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) ; Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) ; 

Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964). 

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Interim Decision #2039 

nounce, that some doubt would exist if a statute attempted to circumscribe that choice. The exception would be where a state of 

war exists and by reason thereof prohibiting renunciation. However, there are no procedures in the present laws as was the case 

involving Japanese renunciants during World War II. See 

Kiyama v. Rusk, 291 F.2d 10 (9 Cir., 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 

866; McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766 (9 Cir., 1951); Acheson v. 

Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9 Cir., 1949). 

In Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), which involved the 

constitutionality of section 401(e), Nationality Act of 1940, relating to loss of American nationality by voting in a foreign election, the court questioned the power of Congress to expatriate 

without consent. However, there is unanimity in the right of voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself. However, the court did not indicate what constitutes voluntary relinquishment of citizenship. As indicated in the Attorney General's 

interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim as to 

what constitutes voluntary renunciation, it is necessary to look to 

earlier decisions of the court. In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 

(1958), overruled by Afroyim, the Chief Justice stated that it has 

long been recognized that citizenship may not only be voluntarily 

relinquished through exercise of the right of expatriation but also 

by other actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to this 

country; and in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958), Justice 

Black stated that, of course, a citizen has the right to abandon or 

renounce his citizenship and that Congress can enact measures to 

regulate and affirm such abjuration. 

The Afroyim ruling apparently does not affect the right, of renunciation of citizenship under section 349(a) (6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act upon which the respondent's act is 

used. Hence, for example, expatriation may result by naturalization in a foreign state or the taking of a meaningful oath of allegiance to a foreign state, and the like. But even in these situations the act must he voluntary and meaningful. 

The rule should be no less here. It would seem that in all such 

cases, including renunciation, the person involved should be 

given, to the extent possible, an opportunity to state fully all the 

facts and circumstances, and the motives and purposes surrounding the expatriative act, with emphasis on ascertaining the intent 

in performing such act. While respondent gave very limited testimony, the other evidence of record appears clear on this important aspect of the case. 

Whatever else may emanate from respondent's conduct in 

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Interim Decision #2039 

violating the draft laws, criminal proceedings or otherwise, his 

continued attempts at reclassifications, both before and after he 

left the United States, his stated reasons at the time of renunciation and his letter to the draft board the following day, all concerned with his prospective status in the military, evince a clear 

intent that his act was involuntary. While renunciation cannot be 

used as "on again, off again" to justify a change of mind, 

respondent's act was not a normal act of renunciation. He did not 

acquire a new nationality but became a "man without a country." 

The possibility of deportation is remote, if not indeed, improbable. 

The circumstances of this case bring it squarely within the 

ruling of this Board in the Matter of Susan B. Anthony, 

A-8823447 (June 26, 1969), that the taking of an oath of allegiance to the British Crown was, because of surrounding circumstances, involuntary, and, hence, not expatriative. And in the case 

of Baker v. Rusk, decided by a Federal District Court in California in March 1969, it was held that an oath of allegiance to King 

George V was not meaningful. The renunciation must involve 

duress, whether economic or otherwise. Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 

551 (3 Cir., 1956). Where the renunciant's intent is clear, as 

here, that renunciation is the result of factors not consonant with 

a normal desire to abandon or change citizenship, then the 

burden on the sovereign is a heavy one. The loss must be established by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Nishikawa 

v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129; Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 926 (1955); 

cf. Matter of Jacuzzi, A-16841893, approved by Attorney General Rogers February 2, 1959. In the absence thereof, retention of 

citizenship is favored. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 

118 (1943); Chin Chuck Ming v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 849 (9 Cir., 

1955); Yee Mee v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 199 (U.S.D.C., W.D. Pa., 

1955); Fletes-Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215 (U.S.D.C., S.D.. 

Cal., 1958) . 

Because of the conclusion reached herein, it is unnecessary to 

reach other issues presented by this record. 

I would hold that respondent retains his American citizenship 

acquired at birth. 

551