1 Filed 3/11/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A137796
v. (Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. CRF129128)
MICHAEL CLARENCE WAXLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

___________________ __________________/

The question in this case is whether the od or of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle and the observation of burnt marijuana in a pipe inside the vehicle create probable cause to search that vehicle pursuant to the automobile excep tion to the warrant requirement. The answer is yes, notwithstan ding the fact that possession of not more than 28.5 grams (an ounce) “o f marijuana, other than concen trated cannabis, is . . . an infraction” punishable by a fine. (H ealth & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b).) 1 Under the

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further stat utory references are to the Health and Safety Code. Effective 2011, a person who possesses “not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana . . . is guilty of an infraction punis hable by a fine of not more than $100.” (§ 11357, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2010, ch. 708, § 1.) “California has chosen to treat the offense of possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana as a minor offense that is nonjailable even for repeat offenders.” ( People v. Hua (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1037 ( Hua ).) An infraction, however, is stil l a “crime” under Penal Code section 16.2 automobile exception to the wa rrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle when he or she has probable cause to believe it contains c ontraband or evidence of a crime. ( Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1225 ( Robey ).) Under the current state of California law, nonmedical marijuana — even in amounts within the statutory limit set forth in section 11357, subdivision (b) — is “contraband” and may provide probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception. Moreover, possession of a “215 card” doe s not vitiate probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception. ( People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052 ( Strasburg ).) 2
We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant Michael Waxler’s motion to

suppress. FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND
We have taken the facts from th e preliminary hearing transcript.
The Incident In February 2012, Del Norte County Sher iff’s Deputy Richard Griffin learned a person was illegally dumping trash in a park ing lot behind a Crescent City Safeway. Deputy Griffin drove to the Safeway and stop ped next to appellant’s truck. Appellant was sitting in the driver’s seat. As Deputy Griffin “got close” to appellant’s truck, he smelled “the odor of burnt marijuana” and “saw a marijuana pipe with . . . what appeared to be burnt marijuana in th e bowl.” The pipe was “on the bench seat right next to” appellant. Deputy Griffin searched the tr uck and found a methamphetamine pipe and a small bindle containing suspected methamphetami ne with a street value of about $50. Deputy Griffin’s partner deta ined appellant and “Mirandized” 3 him. Appellant initially said he knew the methamphetamine and methamphetamine pipe were in his vehicle. He claimed the methamphetamine “was not his” and had been left in the truck

2 A “215 card” refers to the government card issued under the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA), also known as Proposition 215. (§ 11362.5, subd. (a).) The Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA) enacted in 2 003 created a voluntary medical marijuana identification card program. (See Strasburg
, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057 [describing CUA and MMPA].)

3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.3 by some friends, who were hitchhikers. Then he “changed his story a couple of times.” Later, appellant said the methamphetamine “had been in his truck for a few days because he’d picked up the hitchhiker . . . upstate” a nd “later he changed his story again to say
he’d received this meth from the hitc hhiker in payment for the ride.” At some point during the conversation, appellant told Deputy Griffin he “had a 215 card” and showed it to him. Deputy Gr iffin was not sure exactly when he became aware of the 215 card, but he learned about it after he searched appellant’s truck. He
remembers he looked at the card after arresting appellant “for the methamphetamine issue.” As Deputy Griffin e xplained, “Even if he has a valid medical marijuana card I
still have to confirm how much he has on him or if there are other issues with it. [H]e
can have a valid card and have half a gram present in a pipe. I’ve seen many times people hide a quarter ounce or more . . . . So I still have to confirm how much marijuana
is inside the vehicle. From my training and experience it’s s till an arrestable offense. [ ] I
have to determine whether it’s legally possessed or not.” The Charges, Motion to Suppress, and Plea The People charged appellant with tran sportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379 (Count 1)) and with possessi on of methamphetamine (§ 11 377 (Count 2)). Appellant moved to suppress, claiming Deputy Griffi n “did not have any reason to believe” appellant was “under the influence of mariju ana or any other drug, . . . attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, or . . . committing any crime at
the time that would warrant a search of the vehicle.” According to appellant, the amount of “co mpletely un-smoked marijuana . . . in the bowl” was a “miniscule” 0.3 grams and “w as well below the personal limits that are allowed by law.” Appellant cl aimed Deputy Griffin’s observation of marijuana in the truck “could not have supported an arrest” because possession of up to 28.5 grams of marijuana is an infraction under section 113 57. Finally, appellant argued the possession of “personal use medical marijuana” was le gal with a doctor’s recommendation. The suppression motion attached a valid physic ian’s statement recommending the use of4 marijuana for medical conditio ns (§ 11362.5) and a valid Washington State medical marijuana card. In opposition, the People argued Deputy Griffin had probable cause to search appellant’s truck after observing “an odor of marijuana.” They also contended the CUA “does not provide immunity from arrest or cr iminal prosecution” and that possession of a
215 card is “an affirmative defense to th e crimes of possessi on and cultivation of marijuana at trial” and does “not protect one fr om a valid search nor arrest.” The parties stipulated appellant had a valid 215 card on the day of the incident. At the conclusion of the preliminary hear ing, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress and held him to answer the charges. The c ourt explained, “I think the possession of the 215 card is an affirmative de fense. The observation of marijuana is sufficient to justify the office r’s investigating further. It’s up to the defendant at that point to say, . . . I’ve got a 215 card. An d once that’s brought to [the law enforcement officer’s] attention I think [the officer] has no fu rther justification. But in the absence of an affirmative defense being asse rted at that time I think he has a right to proceed as he
did.” Appellant pled guilty to possession of me thamphetamine (§ 11377 (Count 2)).
The court dismissed the metham phetamine transportation charge (§ 11379 (Count 1)) and reduced the methamphetamine possession convi ction to a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)). The court suspe nded imposition of se ntence and placed appellant on probation.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review “The denial of the suppression motion may be challenged by an appeal from the judgment entered after defendant ’s guilty or no contest plea. [Citations.] ‘ “The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruli ng on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual finding s, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In dete rmining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure5 was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ ” ( People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 350.)

II. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement “[T]he Fourth Amendment to the Un ited States Constitution permits the
warrantless search of an autom obile with probable cause.” ( Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059.) Under the autom obile exception to the warrant requirement, “[w]hen the police have probable cause to belie ve an automobile contains contraband or evidence they may search the au tomobile and the containers within it without a warrant. [Citation.]” ( People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100 ( Nasmeh ); Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696 [p robable cause to search
exists “where the known facts and circumstan ces are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”].) “The ‘ “specifically established and well-delineated” ’ [citation] automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is rooted in the historical
distinctions between the search of an automob ile or other conveyance and the search of a dwelling. [Citation.]” ( Nasmeh, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 100.) The automobile exception is also “rooted in the reduced expect ation of privacy in a vehicle [and] the fact a vehicle is inherently mobile.” ( People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.A pp.4th 735, 753; California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 394 ( Carney ) [vehicle’s inherent mobility]; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 345 [reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile].) Under the auto mobile exception, “ ‘ “[i]f pr obable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped ve hicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the objec t of the search.” ’ [Citation.]” ( Nasmeh, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100-101; People v. Diaz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 754.)6 III. The Odor of Marijuana and the Observation of Burnt Marijuana Inside a Vehicle Provide Probable Cause to Search Pu rsuant to the Auto mobile Exception
California courts have concluded the odor of unburned marijuana or the observation of fresh marijuana may furnish pr obable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to th e warrant requirement. ( People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 794, superseded by stat ute on another ground in People v. Johnson (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008 [“strong odor of fresh marijuana” gave the officer “ ‘probable cause to believe . . . that contraband may be present’ ”]; People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 667-669, overruled on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 [scent of marijuana emanating from a car’s trunk provided probable cause to a search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement]; Strasburg
, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060; People v. Dey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1320 ( Dey ) [observation of a “useable quantity of mariju ana . . . in the passenger compartment” of the defendant’s car “provided probable cause for the search of the vehicle’s trunk”]; People v. Hunter (2005) 133 Cal.A pp.4th 371, 375 ( Hunter ) [officer saw a “sandwich bag containing a green residue that his tr aining and experience told him . . . was marijuana”]; Robey, supra, 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1254 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [noting the “settled proposition that the smell of marijuan a can establish probable cause to search and, in the context of an automobile search . . . , can provide a sufficient basis to proceed without a warrant”]; see also People v. Fitzpatrick (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 824, 826-827 [probable cause to arrest the defendant who smelled of burned marijuana during a traffic stop].) Appellant concedes the odor of marijuan a justifies the warran tless search of an
automobile under Strasburg . In that case, a division of this court concluded a police officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s car when the officer smelled marijuana immediately after the defendant opened the driver’s side door. ( Strasburg,

supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1058-1059.) As the Strasburg court explained, the officer7 “had probable cause to search defendant’s car for mariju ana after he smelled the odor of marijuana. [Citations.] De fendant admitted smoking mariju ana, and the de puty sheriff saw another bag of marijuana in the car afte r the defendant handed him one. Armed with the knowledge that there was marijuana in the car, ‘a pers on of ordinary caution would conscientiously entertain a st rong suspicion that even if defendant makes only personal use of the marijuana found in [the passenge r area], he might stash additional quantities for future use in other parts of the vehicle . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( Id. at p. 1059.)
The Strasburg court rejected the defendant’s claim that the officer could not “detain him, frisk him, or search his car” because “he immediately produced a doctor’s prescription for marijuana, thus identifyi ng himself as a qualified patient under the [CUA].” ( Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) As the court explained, “[t]he fact that defendant had a medical marijuana prescription, and could lawfully possess an amount of marijuana greater than that [the officer] initially found, does not detract from the officer’s probable cause. . . . [T]he [CUA] provides a limited immunity — not a shield from reasonable investigation. An o fficer with probable cause to search is not prevented from doing so by someone presenti ng a medical marijuana card or a marijuana prescription. Given the probab le cause here, the officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investigation is in fact possessing the marijuana for personal medical n eeds, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession. Unlawful possession of ma rijuana remains a crim inal offense under . . . section 11350, subject to seriously ill persons using marijuan a for medical purposes recommended by a physician . . . not being su bject to criminal liability . . . .” ( Id. at pp. 1059, 1060.) Appellant claims Strasburg is inapposite. According to appellant, when Strasburg was decided in 2007, marijuana possession wa s a misdemeanor and now, possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is a nonjaila ble offense. Appellant is correct that possession of up to an ounce of marijuana is an infracti on, punishable by a fine. (§ 11357, subd. (b).) He seem s, however, to misunderstand th e automobile exception to the warrant requirement. A “warrantless search of an automobile is permissible so long8 as the police have probable cause to believe the car contains evidence or contraband .” ( Robey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1225, italics added, citing Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 48; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Cr iminal Law (4th ed. 20 12) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 266, p. 1083.) “Both federal and California laws ge nerally prohibit the use, possession cultivation, transportation and furnishing of marijuana.” 4 ( City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 737.) Section 11357, subdivis ion (b) has reduced the penalty associated with possession of up to an ounce of mariju ana, but “[t]echnically speaking, marijuana usage is not ‘legal’ in the State of California.” ( In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 769, fn. 10.) Other than certain quan tities of medical marijuana, possession of any amount of marijuana — even an amount within the limit of section 11357, subdivision (b) — is illegal in California and is therefor e “contraband.” (Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 365 [defining contraband as “[g] oods that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or possess”]; 3 Oxford English Di ct. (2d ed. 1989) p. 833 [contraband is “anything prohibited to be imported or export ed; goods imported or ex ported contrary to law or proclamation” or some thing “[f]orbidden, illegitimate, unauthorized”].) Thus, a law enforcement officer may conduct a warran tless search of a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception when the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains marijuana, which is contraband. Here, Deputy Griffin had probable cause to believe appellant’s truck contained contraband after smelling burnt marijuana near the truck and seeing burnt marijuana in the truck, irrespective of whether possession of up to an ounce of marijuana is an infraction and not an arrestable offense (§ 11 357, subd. (b)). Other courts have reached

4 The “CUA and the MMP ‘decriminalize,’ for state purposes, specified activities pertaining to medical marijuana” ( City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 729, 754 ( City of Riverside )) but the CUA does not “decriminalize marijuana on a wholesale basis.” ( People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 773; see also People v. Wayman (2010) 189 Cal. App.4th 215, 223 [“[t]he medical marijuana laws were never intended to be ‘a sort of “open Sesame” regarding the possession, transportation and sale of marijuana in th is state’ ”].)9 similar conclusions. (See State v. Smalley (Or.App. 2010) 225 P.3d 844, 848 ( Smalley ) [police officer had probable cause to sear ch the defendant’s truck pursuant to the automobile exception after smelling mariju ana because marijuana is contraband “regardless of its quantity”]; see also State v. Tovar (Or.App. 2013) 299 P.3d 580 [following Smalley ]; State v. McGrath (Minn.App. 2005) 706 N. W.2d 532, 544 [rejecting the argument “that small, noncriminal amount s of marijuana cannot establish a fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraba nd will be found in a particular place”].) 5 Relying on Commonwealth v. Cruz (Mass. 2011) 945 N.E.2d 899 ( Cruz ), appellant urges us to adopt a rule precluding a law enforcement officer fro m searching a vehicle without a warrant unless: (1) the odor of marijuana suggests the defendant possesses more than 28.5 grams; or (2) the officer obser ves more than 28.5 gr ams of marijuana in
the vehicle. In Cruz , police officers saw two men sitting in side a car parked in front of a fire hydrant. ( Id. at pp. 902-903.) One officer saw the driver light a type of cigar known to mask the smell of marijuan a smoke. Another officer smelled “a ‘faint odor’ of burnt marijuana” from the driver’s si de of the car; the officer “had previously seen the defendant” — the passenger — “sm oking a marijuana ‘blunt.’ ” ( Id. at p. 903.) Based on the “ ‘odor of marijuana’ ” and the nervous way the men were acting, the police officers
ordered the men out of the car and searched it. They discovered crack cocaine on the

5 The District Court of Main e reached a similar result in United States v. Pugh (D.Me. 2002) 223 F.Supp.2d 325, 330 ( Pugh ). There, the defendant argued the police officer lacked probable cause to search pursuant to the au tomobile exception “because possession of small amounts of marijuana and th e presence of open containers of alcohol . . . are only civil violations under Maine law.” ( Id. at p. 330.) The Pugh court rejected this argument, explaining, “Even in amounts within the Maine statutory limit for a civil violation, marijuana is an unlawful drug. Under Maine law, mar ijuana, even in an amount that would only give rise to a civil violation, can be the legitimate object of a search warrant and may be seized and confiscat ed if found. [Citation.] Accordingly, the only question here is whether the marijuana seed and two marijuana roaches — or the cups containing alcohol — provided sufficient cause to justify the search of the trunk.” The court concluded there “was probable cause to search the trunk of the defendant’s car . . . based on the presence of the marijuan a and the surrounding circumstances.” ( Id. at pp. 330, 331.)10 defendant. ( Id. at pp. 903-904.) The trial cour t granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. ( Id. at p. 902.) The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the cocaine. It explained, “Although we have he ld in the past that the odor of marijuana alone provides probable cause to believe criminal activity is underway,[ ] we now reconsider our jurisprudence in light of” the changed “statu s of the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana from a criminal to a civil offense.” ( Cruz, supra, 945 N.E.2d at pp. 904-905.) Despite acknowledging that “possession of mar ijuana, in any amount, remains illegal” and that “any amount of marijuana is considered contraband,” the Cruz court held that to search a vehicle pursuant to th e motor vehicle exception, th e police must have “probable
cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband is present in the car,” not merely some lesser amount. ( Id. at pp. 911-913.) The court also he ld that “without at least some
other additional fact to bolster a reasonable suspicion of actual criminal activity, the odor of burnt marijuana alone canno t reasonably provide suspicion of criminal activity to justify an exit order.” ( Id. at p. 910; see also Commonwealth v. Daniel (Mass. 2013) 985 N.E.2d 843 [following Cruz ].) Cruz does not apply here for at least tw o reasons. First, in contrast to Massachusetts, possession of up to an ounce of nonmedical marijuana in California is a “crime.” (Pen. Code, § 16.) Second, neith er the California Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court ha s limited the automobile exceptio n to situations where the defendant possesses a “ criminal amount of contraband.” As our high court recently stated, the automobile exception applies when “the police have probable cause to believe the car contains evidence or contraband.” ( Robey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1225; see also Maryland v. Dyson (1999) 527 U.S. 465, citing Carney, supra, 471 U.S. 386.) We are bound by the rulings of our Supreme Court ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), no t out-of-state authority ( Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1553). That appellant possessed a valid 215 card does not vitiate Deputy Griffin’s probable cause to search the tr uck pursuant to the automobile exception. First, appellant11 did not tell Deputy Griffin about the 215 car d until after Deputy Gr iffin searched the truck. Second, the Strasburg court considered — and rejected — an identical argument and appellant has not established Strasburg was wrongly decided. ( Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) Under Strasburg , the CUA is “not a shield from reasonable investigation. An officer with probable cause to search is not prevented from doing so by someone presenting a medical marijuana card or a marijuana prescription. Given the probable cause here, the officer is entitled to continue to search and investigate, and determine whether the subject of the investig ation is in fact posse ssing the marijuana for personal medical needs, and is adhering to the eight-ounce limit on possession.” ( Ibid. )
That California has decriminalized medicina l marijuana in some situations and has reduced the punishment associat ed with possession of up to an ounce of marijuana does
not bar a law enforcement offi cer from conducting a search pu rsuant to the automobile exception. Here, Deputy Griffin was entitle d to investigate to determine whether appellant possessed marijuana for personal me dical needs and to determine whether he adhered to the CUA’s limits on possession. “O therwise, every qualified patient would be
free to violate the intent of the medical ma rijuana program expressed in section 11362.5 and deal marijuana from his car with complete freedom from any reasonable search.” ( Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) Deputy Griffin testified at the preliminary hearing that people often posse ss more marijuana than allowed under the CUA and “hide” additional quantities of marijuana in their vehicles . It is well settled that even if a defendant makes only personal us e of marijuana found in the passenger compartment of a car, a police officer may reasonably suspect additional quantities of marijuana might be found in the car. ( Dey, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322; Hunter,

supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 3 82 [“discovery of marijuana in the passenger area of defendant’s car” did not foreclose possibility of additional “drugs being found in the trunk” and noting “marijuana is a drug that can be concealed in a variet y of containers”].) Appellant relies on two cases, Hua, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 1027 and People v.
Torres (2012) 205 Cal. App.4th 989 ( Torres ) to support his argument that “the odor of burnt marijuana and the sight of burnt mariju ana in a bowl” cannot support a warrantless12 search of an automobile. In Hua , police officers approached a noisy apartment and
noticed the “ ‘distinct odor’ of burnt marijuana.” They knoc ked on the door and, while waiting for a response, peered through the open window blinds . They saw several people inside, one of whom inhaled from what appear ed to be a marijuana cigarette, confirming the officers’ suspicion that cr iminal activity was likely under way. The officers entered the apartment without the defendant’s consen t and found “growing marijuana plants and a cane sword.” ( Hua, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1030- 1031.) The trial court denied the defendant’s suppression motion, concludi ng there were “exigent circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 1033.) This court reversed, holding the exigent ci rcumstances doctrine did not justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the apartment. ( Hua, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033.) As we explained, “an entry into a home to preserve evidence from imminent destruction
is limited to evidence of crimes that are not minor” and “California has chosen to treat the offense of possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana as a minor offense that is nonjailable even for repeat o ffenders . . . . [O]ne consequence of that decision is to preclude officers who see this offense being committed fro m entering a home without a
warrant or consent to seize the offender or the contraband, in order to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence of the offense.” ( Id. at pp. 1034, 1037.)
Torres reached a similar result. In that ca se, officers noticed a “strong smell” of marijuana near a hotel room door and entered the room without a warrant. ( Torres,

supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Relying on Hua , the Torres court concluded the officers lacked probable cause to believe destruction of evid ence of a jailable offense was imminent. As the court explai ned, “police only smelled the o dor of burning marijuana. They had no other information about mariju ana possession or any ot her marijuana-related crime occurring in the hotel room . No evidence indicated the officers had reason to fear the imminent destruction of evidence of a jailab le offense. . . . [A] belief that evidence of a nonjailable offense will be imminently destroyed is not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 995.)13 Neither Hua nor Torres assists appellant because those cases concerned warrantless entry into a dw elling and the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine to minor, nonjailable offenses. “T he automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not require a showing of ex igent circumstances. ‘If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to be lieve it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits the police to search the vehicle without more.’ [Citation.]” (4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra , § 266, p. 1083 [“[w]arrantless examinations of automobiles may be proper in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not be” and explaining different rationales for the two types of searches].) “It is axiomatic that the ‘p hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ [Citation.] And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of sear ch or arrest. [Citation.]” ( Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748.) Th e concerns at issue in Hua and Torres do not exist here, where Deputy Griffin searched a vehicle, not a ho me. As our high court recently explained, “[t]he case law on automobile searches . . . reveals that the rationale for allowing a
vehicle to be searched without a warrant is rooted in practical concerns unique to automobiles.” ( Robey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1232.) He re, Deputy Griffin searched appellant’s truck, not his home. As a result, neither Hua nor Torres applies here.
We hold a law enforcemen t officer may search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requi rement where the officer smells burnt marijuana and sees burnt marijuana in the de fendant’s car. The automobile exception is
not limited to situations where the officer smells or sees more than 28.5 grams of marijuana in the vehicle (§ 11357, subd. (b )); the observation of any amount of marijuana — which is currently illegal to possess except as authorized by the CUA — establishes probable cause to search pu rsuant to the automobile exception. Consistent with Strasburg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pa ge 1060, we also conc lude the possession of a14 215 card does not preclude a warrantless autom obile search where there is probable cause
to believe the vehicle contains cont raband or eviden ce of a crime.15 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Jones, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Needham, J.

_____________ ____________ Bruiniers, J.1 Superior Court of Del Norte County, No. A137796, William H. Follett, Judge.

Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Ge neral, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorn ey General, René A. Chacón, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.