Filed 5/9/13 P. v. Hix CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

RONALD STEWART HIX, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B244640 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. 1PK05401) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Christian R. Gullon, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of Chad R. Maddox and Chad R. Maddox for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis Asayama and Roberta Schwartz, Deputy 

District Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2 

 Defendant and appellant Ronald Stewart Hix (defendant) appeals from the 

judgment entered following his guilty plea and conviction of driving a vehicle while 

having a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher, a misdemeanor in violation of 

Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). Defendant contends the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

 A misdemeanor complaint filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney 

alleged that on or about August 11, 2011, defendant drove a vehicle while being under 

the influence of alcohol, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and 

drove a vehicle while having a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher, in violation of 

Vehicle Code section 23512, subdivision (b). 

 Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 

1538.5 on the ground that his arrest was illegal because the arresting officer had no 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and detain him. Defendant’s motion to 

suppress was heard and testimony was taken in connection with that motion on January 

24, 2012. 

 Officer Rivera, a patrol officer assigned to the City of Pomona with 20 years of 

experience, testified that on August 11, 2011, at 1:00 a.m., he was driving northbound on 

San Antonio Street when he saw a vehicle stopped on the right curb with its brake lights 

on. The driver of the vehicle was talking to a female pedestrian standing on the curb. As 

Rivera’s vehicle approached, defendant’s car pulled away from the curb, turning 

eastbound onto Hawthorne Place. Rivera stopped and asked the pedestrian what was 

going on, and the pedestrian responded that the driver had been trying to start a 

conversation with her. Rivera asked the pedestrian if she knew the driver, and she said 

no. When asked by the prosecutor whether Rivera had an opinion as to whether or not 

the pedestrian was a prostitute, Rivera responded that it “wouldn’t surprise me,” given 

the time of day and the area, which was known for narcotics and prostitution. 

 Rivera then proceeded to follow defendant’s vehicle as it proceeded eastbound on 

Hawthorne Place, a residential street with cars parked along both sides. Defendant was 
3 

driving within the speed limit, his vehicle was not weaving back and forth, and Rivera 

observed no Vehicle Code violation. Rivera noticed, however, that defendant’s vehicle 

was veering toward the cars parked along the south curbline and came within a foot of 

hitting those cars, even though there was ample room on the street -- approximately 25 

feet -- between the cars parked on either side. Rivera then “conducted a traffic stop, a 

welfare check to find out if the driver was okay.” He did so by activating the red light on 

his black and white patrol car, thereby indicating that he wanted defendant to pull over. 

Defendant was in the process of making a southbound turn from Hawthorne Place onto 

Mountain View Avenue, and Rivera observed that the front tire of defendant’s vehicle 

came within three feet of striking the curb. 

 At the conclusion of Officer Rivera’s testimony, the trial court heard argument 

from the parties and denied defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds that the officer 

had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that warranted further investigation and 

that the stop was a reasonable exercise of the officer’s community caretaking function. 

 Defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion to 

suppress and pleaded guilty to driving a vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 

.08 percent or higher. The charge of driving a vehicle while under the influence of 

alcohol was dismissed. Defendant was placed on three years of summary probation and 

was ordered to pay fines, fees, and penalty assessments and to comply with the terms and 

conditions of his probation. 

 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Appellate Division of the 

Los Angeles County Superior Court affirmed the conviction in case No. BR049880. On 

November 13, 2012, we granted defendant’s petition to transfer and ordered the case 

transferred to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1000, 8.1002.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Applicable legal principles 

 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from 

unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement authorities. To be considered 

reasonable, a search and seizure must generally be conducted pursuant to a valid warrant 
4 

issued by a judicial officer. A warrantless search or seizure may be conducted only if it 

comes within a specific judicially recognized exception. (Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 

413 U.S. 433, 439 (Dombrowski).) One such exception is that an officer may stop and 

detain a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. (People v. 

Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082.) For a detention to be reasonable, the detaining 

officer’s suspicions must be supported by “specific articulable facts that, considered in 

light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the 

person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 

224, 231.) Another exception, known as the community caretaking exception, applies 

when the search or seizure is conducted as an exercise of a law enforcement officer’s 

community caretaking function. (See Dombrowski, supra, at pp. 441, 447-448; People v. 

Madrid (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055-1056.) 

II. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

 Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the facts and 

circumstances known to Officer Rivera support an objective suspicion that defendant was 

driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, in violation of the 

Vehicle Code. The trial court found that Officer Rivera’s account was credible, and we 

may not review that finding. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 [credibility of a 

witness and the truth or falsity on which that determination depends is the exclusive 

province of the trier of fact].) 

 Officer Rivera was an experienced police officer with 20 years of experience. He 

observed defendant’s vehicle stopped at approximately 1:00 a.m. and defendant 

conversing with a pedestrian in an area of Pomona known for narcotics and prostitution. 

Rivera followed defendant’s vehicle onto a residential street where cars were parked on 

either side. Although defendant was proceeding slowly at only 25 miles per hour, and 

there was ample room on the street between the cars parked on either side of the street, 

defendant’s vehicle was veering toward the cars parked along the southern curbline and 

came within a foot of striking those cars. Rivera also observed defendant attempting to 
5 

make a southbound turn during which the front tire of defendant’s vehicle came close to 

striking the southwest curb. 

 The facts presented support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part 

of defendant. Defendant’s veering toward parked cars and coming within a foot of 

hitting those cars while proceeding at a low rate of speed on a street with ample room to 

maneuver his vehicle, his near miss of the curb, and the fact that these things occurred at 

1:00 a.m. in an area known for narcotics dealing were sufficient to support an objective 

suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. 

Defendant accordingly was not detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

III. Community caretaking exception 

A. General principles 

 “The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement derives from the 

expanded role undertaken by the modern police force.” (People v. Madrid, supra, 168 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1055.) “‘The policeman, as a jack-of-all emergencies, has “complex 

and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons 

committing serious criminal offenses”; by default or design he is also expected to “aid 

individuals who are in danger of physical harm,” “assist those who cannot care for 

themselves,” and “provide other services on an emergency basis.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 

1056, fn. 3.) This is especially true with regard to motor vehicles. As recognized by the 

United States Supreme Court in Dombrowski: “Because of the extensive regulation of 

motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can 

become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of policecitizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen 

contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may 

believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that 

nature. Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is 

no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be 

described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 
6 

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” 

(Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 441.) 

Dombrowski concerned a warrantless police search of an impounded vehicle 

owned by a defendant who was also a police officer. (Dombrowski, supra, 413 at p. 

435.) The defendant, who was intoxicated and incoherent at the time of his arrest, did not 

have his service revolver on his person. (Id. at p. 436.) The purpose of the search was to 

retrieve the revolver as “standard” police department procedure in order “to protect the 

public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious 

hands.” (Id. at p. 443.) The revolver, and other evidence leading to the defendant’s 

subsequent murder conviction, were recovered from the defendant’s vehicle. (Id. at p. 

437.) The United States Supreme Court held the warrantless search of the vehicle to be 

constitutionally valid because the officers reasonably believed the vehicle contained a 

gun and was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals. (Id. at p. 448.) 

 The California Supreme Court extended the community caretaking exception set 

forth in Dombrowski to the search of a home that appeared to have been burglarized in 

People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464. The court in Ray noted that police officers 

regularly perform “‘community caretaking functions’ -- helping stranded motorists, 

returning lost children to anxious parents, assisting and protecting citizens in need.” (Id. 

at p. 467.) The court distinguished the warrant exception for exigent circumstances from 

the community caretaking exception and concluded the “emergency aid” doctrine was a 

subcategory of the latter exception. (Id. at p. 471.) The “emergency aid” component of 

the community caretaking exception “requires specific, articulable facts indicating the 

need for ‘“swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property 

. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 472-473.) The court in Ray further noted, 

however that “circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless 

entry, including the protection of property, as ‘where the police reasonably believe that 

the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 473.) 

The Supreme Court set forth the following standard for applying the exception: “The 

appropriate standard under the community caretaking exception is one of reasonableness: 
7 

Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to 

act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions? . . . ‘[I]n 

determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his 

unparticularized suspicions or “hunches,” but to the reasonable inferences which he is 

entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be 

able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded that his action was 

necessary.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 476-477.) 

B. The community caretaking exception may justify a vehicle stop 

 Defendant in the instant case contends the community caretaking exception should 

not be applied to permit the stop of a vehicle and the detention of the person inside. This 

argument was considered and rejected by the First Appellate District in People v. Madrid, 

a case involving a vehicle stop based on a police officer’s observation that a passenger 

entering the vehicle was sweating, walked with an “unsteady” gait, and appeared to be 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs, to have a medical problem, or to have been a 

victim of an assault. The officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle “‘to check on [the 

passenger’s] well being’” and after questioning the driver, recovered hypodermic needles 

and heroin. (People v. Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp.1053-1054.) The defendant 

unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police and was subsequently 

convicted of possession of heroin for sale. In appealing his conviction, the defendant 

argued that the community caretaking exception should not apply to warrantless vehicle 

stops. The First Appellate District rejected a categorical exemption for vehicle stops: 

“We are unwilling to adopt appellant’s position that the reasonableness of a vehicle stop 

can never rest on the officer’s perception that an occupant’s welfare requires this action.” 

(Id. at p. 1058.) 

 The court in Madrid applied our supreme court’s reasoning in Ray that “the 

community caretaking exception applies when police officers ‘acted reasonably to protect 

the safety and security of persons and property’ [citation], that is, when ‘a prudent and 

reasonable officer [would] have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or 

her community caretaking functions’ [citation].” (People v. Madrid, supra, 168 
8 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) We agree with the First Appellate District’s reasoning in 

Madrid that the community caretaking exception may justify a warrantless vehicle stop of 

a moving vehicle. 

C. The community caretaking exception justified the vehicle stop 

 After determining that the community caretaking exception may justify a vehicle 

stop, the court in Madrid concluded that a reasonable officer would not have perceived 

the need to do so under the circumstances presented in that case. (People v. Madrid, 

supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) The court in Madrid cited as “instructive” the 

approach taken by the Texas court of criminal appeals in Wright v. State 

(Tex.Crim.App.1999) 7 S.W.3d 148, in which a deputy sheriff stopped a vehicle after 

observing a rear passenger lean out the rear window and vomit. The Wright court 

acknowledged that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement may 

apply in such circumstances and set forth a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to 

whether the officer acted reasonably in stopping the vehicle to determine whether the 

individual needed assistance: “‘(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the 

individual; [¶] (2) the location of the individual; [¶] (3) whether or not the individual was 

alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and [¶] 

(4) to what extent the individual -- if not assisted -- presented a danger to himself or 

others.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059.) The court 

in Madrid applied these factors and concluded the vehicle stop in the case before it was 

not reasonable. 

 The court in Madrid first determined that the stop had been based on the officer’s 

observations of the passenger, and that “the balance would weigh more heavily in favor 

of the officer’s action if the officer believed the driver was in great distress; an extremely 

ill driver is a danger not only to himself but to other members of the public as well. 

[Citation.]” (Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) Second, the court in 

Madrid determined that no facts indicated that the defendant or his passenger were in 

need of help. Before the stop, the passenger observed by the detaining officer “had 

exhibited a low level of distress.” (Id. at p. 1060.) The only facts the officer articulated 
9 

as grounds for detention were that the passenger walked with an unsteady gait, at one 

point used a nearby shopping cart to stop himself from falling, and appeared to be 

sweating. Yet the passenger was able to walk 50 feet to the defendant’s vehicle without 

assistance, he was not alone, and neither defendant nor the passenger indicated they were 

in need of help. The court further determined that nothing about the location “sitting in 

the passenger seat of a vehicle being lawfully driven through a shopping center parking 

lot,” suggested that the passenger or defendant were in need of additional aid. (Ibid.) 

Finally, the court in Madrid determined that the facts did not support a reasonable 

conclusion that the passenger presented a danger to himself or others. The court rejected 

the argument that stopping the vehicle was justified in order to avert a possible drug 

overdose, because an inference by the officer that the passenger was suffering from a 

drug overdose, based solely on the officer’s observations that the passenger was walking 

with an unsteady gait and sweating was “unreasonably speculative.” (Id. at p. 1060.) 

 In concluding that the stop could not reasonably be justified under the community 

caretaking exception, the court in Madrid observed that “‘[R]easonableness “depends ‘on 

a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free 

from arbitrary interference by law officers,’” [citation].’ [Citation.] In engaging in this 

weighing process, courts must act as vigilant gatekeepers to ensure that the community 

caretaking exception does not consume the warrant requirement. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) 

 Applying the factors used in Madrid to the instant case, we conclude that detention 

of defendant’s vehicle was justified under the community caretaking exception. Here, 

unlike Madrid, defendant was the driver and not the passenger of the vehicle. He was 

unaccompanied by any passenger who could assist him. Officer Rivera observed that 

defendant’s vehicle was veering toward cars parked on the street and came within a foot 

of hitting those cars, despite ample room on the street for his car to proceed without 

coming too close to the parked cars. While making a southbound turn, the front wheel of 

defendant’s vehicle came close to hitting the southwestern curb. These observations 

would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that defendant might be in need of assistance, 
10 

either because he was disoriented or because he was having difficulty controlling his 

vehicle. Officer Rivera’s detention of defendant’s vehicle was a reasonable exercise of 

his community caretaking function. Defendant was not detained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 _____________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ 

We concur: 

_____________________________, Acting P. J. 

ASHMANN-GERST 

_____________________________, J.* 

FERNS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.