alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JENKINS v. BLACK & WHITE CAB CO. (THORNE, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, et al.).

Civ. A. No. 1341-53.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

Nov. 4, 1953.

*6William J. Walsh, Washington, D. C., for defendant and third-party plaintiff, John Elmer Thorne.

Collins, Anderson & Saunders, Carlton L. Saunders, Washington, D. C., for third-party defendant.

PINE, District Judge.

This is an action for damages growing out of personal injuries. Defendants are a taxicab company and the driver of the taxicab involved. The driver, by order of court, was granted leave to make the Amalgamated Casualty Insurance Company a third-party defendant on the ground that it has a contractual obligation *to*indemnify defendant and to defend him, and that the Insurance Company has refused to recognize its liability thereunder. Thereafter the Insurance Company moved to vacate the order, claiming that it was improperly made a third-party defendant, and that is the question presently at issue.

Rule 14(a) of F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C.A., provides that a third-party complaint may be served upon a person “who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.” The third-party complaint would therefore appear clearly to come within the rule, and several authorities support third-party proceedings of the character here involved. Jordan v. Stephens, D.C. W.D.Mo.1945, 7 F.R.D. 140. Pucheu v. National Surety Corp., D.C.W.D.La.1949, 87 F.Supp. 558. A. B. & C. Motor Transp. Co. v. Moger, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1950, 10 F.R.D. 613. Further, to allow the third-party complaint to remain would appear to be consonant with the purpose of third-party practice to avoid the time and cost of two actions, unless the combining of the two would be prejudicial. The prejudice principally relied on by the Insurance Company in this case is the fact that the jury would be informed that the defendant carried liability insurance, evidence of which generally would be ground for a mistrial; but here the law and regulations1 thereunder require the operators of taxicabs to carry liability insurance and to display insurance “stickers” at all times for the protection of pedestrians as well as passengers. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the injection of insurance into the case would be prejudicial, for the requirements of the law are presumed to be known, and in addition, in this case they are common knowledge.

Motion of third-party defendant will be denied. Counsel will submit order accordingly.

1

. D.C.Code 1951, Title *44, § 301; Stewart*v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 247.
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09

- 17

- 00387

- CR

____________________

DUSTIN DANIEL HARDING , Appellant

V.

T HE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 359th District Court Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16

- 04

- 04189

- CR

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dustin Daniel Harding appeals his conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a

child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b) (West Supp. 2018 ). 1 A jury found

Harding guilty and sentenced him to 75 years confinement. T he attorney appointed

to represent Harding in his appeal filed an Anders brief, which asserted that the

attorney carefully reviewed the record and the law and found no meritorious claims

1 We cite the current version of the statute as subsequent amendments do not

affect our di sposition.2 on which he could argue Harding’s conviction should be reversed. After receiving

Harding’s Anders brief, we gra nted an extension of time to allow Harding to file a

pro se response. Harding requested an extension to file a pro se brief, and we granted

his request. However, Harding did not file a brief with the court.

We have reviewed the record and agree with Harding’s counsel that no

arguable issues exist to support an appeal. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738,

744

– 45 (1967); High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 810

– 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);

Currie v. State , 516 S.W.2 d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Therefore, it is not

necessary that we appoint new counsel to rebrief Harding’s appeal. Cf. Stafford v.

State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring the court of appeals

to appoint other counsel only if it dete rmines that there were arguable grounds for

the appeal). Given our conclusion that no arguable gr ounds exist to support

Harding’s ap peal, we affirm the trial court’ s judgment. 2

AFFIRMED.

_________________________ CHARLES KREGER

Justice

2 Harding may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.3 Submitted on December 4, 2018 Opinion Delivered January 30, 2019

Do Not Publish

Before McKeith en, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002


(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


In connection with the Quarterly Report of CHS
Inc. (the Company) on Form  10-Q for the
quarterly period ended November 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, John Schmitz, Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and result of operations of the Company.



| |                                                         
| | --------------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ JOHN SCHMITZ                                        
| |                                                         
| | John Schmitz                                            
| | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
    Officer

January 12, 2005
No. 4782.

(Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans.)

[St. Paul, J., sitting alone.]

#### H. A. HOFFMAN vs. ED. ALLNET.

Woodville & Woodville for plaintiff and appellee.

E. A. Parsons for defendant and appellant.

ST. PAUL, J.

Plaintiff sued as the “holder and owner” of three promissory notes. Defendant pleaded want of consideration, and afterwards filed an exception of “no cause of action” based on the facts that the notes sued on were payable to the order of another than plaintiff and were not indorsed.

There are. two ways of acquiring the ownership of promissory notes; by negotiation, and by assignment. (Norton on Bills, pp. 196-200 [Pars. 87-89].) The assignment need not be in writing.

Hughes vs. Harrison, 2 La. 89.

Therefore, when plaintiff alleged that he was the “owner” of the notes sued on, he stated a cause of notion and was not bound to set forth the evidence on which he relied to prove the truth of his allegation, or the nature of the title by which he claimed ownership, unless called upon by timely exception so to do.

Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co. vs. De Luppe, 119 La. 952.

The exception of no cause of action was, therefore, not well taken and was properly overruled.

On the merits, plaintiff has shown that the notes came *55into his hands *by*a series of assignments going back to the original payees, and defendant has failed in his defense of want of consideration.

December 13, 1909.

Judgment affirmed.
**Exhibit 32.1****CERTIFICATION**I, Michael D. Dale, Chief Executive Officer of ATS Medical, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 29, 2008 (the“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Actof 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); andThe information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.          Date: May 7, 2008         /s/ Michael D. Dale       Name: Michael D. Dale  Title: Chief Executive Officer
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 1 8

- 3 0 37 7

BAHRAM ZAMANIAN, Medical Doctor; BAHRAM ZAMANIAN, M.D., A PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff s

– Appell ant s,

versus JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT No. 2, Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana, Doing Business as East Jefferson General Hospital,

Defendant

− Appell ee

.

Appeal from th e United States District Court for the Eas tern District of Louisiana No. 2 :1 7

- CV

- 1087

Before SMITH , BARKSDALE , and HO , Circuit Judges

. P ER CURIAM : *

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 14, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce Cle rk Case: 18-30377 Document: 00514794518 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2019No. 1 8

- 3 0 37 7

2 Bahram Zamanian sued the defendant hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violation of his federal and state due process rights and breach of con

tract when the hospital suspended his admitting privileges for an incident regard ing a particular cardiology patient. Th e district court, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) , dismissed the due process claims for fail ure to state a claim. Zamanian then appealed only the state and federal due process
claims.
The district court carefully explained its reasoning in a comprehensive order filed August 14, 2017. Among other things, the court pointed out that “[p]lain tiff’s suspension was reviewed by two separate committees, a panel of physicians over a three

- day hearing, and the hospital’s Board of Directors. He

c onducted discovery, presented and cross

- examined witnesses, submitted affi

davits, and gave his statement on the incident through writing and before the different committees/panels.”
We have reviewed the briefs, the applicable law, and relevant parts of
the record and have heard oral argument. The judgment is AFFIRMED, essen

tially on the basis of the district court ’s analysis

. Case: 18-30377 Document: 00514794518 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/14/2019
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mednan Redzeposki, Appellant.

[822 NYS2d 444]

Upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals (7 NY3d 725 [2006]), judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Caesar Cirigliano, J.), rendered February 24, 2004, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of grand larceny in the fourth degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of IV2 to 3 years and 1 year, unanimously affirmed. We have reexamined the facts of this case in light of the remittitur, and find no basis to reverse the conviction. Concur—Tom, J.P, Mazzarelli, Andrias, Friedman and Catterson, JJ.
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#### Yuman LOPEZ-CANCINOS, and Yocari Castillo De Lopez, Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, United States Attorney General, et al., Respondents.

Nos. 05-71479, 05-75535, [ AXXXXX-XXX ], [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 6, 2006.

Decided June 2, 2006.

*722Yuman Lopez-Cancinos, Tucson, *AZ,*pro se.

Yocari Castillo De Lopez, Tucson, *AZ,*pro se.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, District Counsel, Office of the District Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Phoenix, AZ, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Before FARRIS and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and SCHIAVELLI,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable George P. Schiavelli, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM**

Petitioners Yuman Beltran Lopez-Cancinos (“Yuman”) and Yocari Selenita Castiño de Lopez (“Yocari”) (collectively, “Petitioners”), husband and wife, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ■ (“Board”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their claims. Specifically, Yuman appeals the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and voluntary departure. Yocari appeals the denial of her asylum claim. We affirm.

The Court is without jurisdiction to review the denial of Yuman’s claims for asylum and voluntary departure because the petition for review raises no cognizable constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); *Ramadan v. Gonzales,*427 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005).

Turning to the remaining claims, we review the rejection of Yuman’s withholding of removal and CAT claim and Yocari’s asylum claim under the substantial evidence standard, and must affirm even.if it is possible to draw differing conclusions from the evidence. *Pedro-Mateo v. I.N.S.,*224 F.3d 1147,1150 (9th Cir.2000).

*723In light of the detailed country reports in the record below, we conclude substantial evidence supported the rejection of those claims on the grounds that changed country conditions in Guatemala rebutted any claims of potential future persecution. *Cf. I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (recognizing the improved conditions in post-civil war Guatemala). We recognize that there was contrary evidence introduced by Petitioners regarding conditions in Guatemala. However, that evidence was insufficient to compel reversal. *I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only *supports*that conclusion, but *compels*it....”) (Emphasis in original).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Robert J. GILL, Plaintiff, v. Julius STOLOW and Harry Stolow, co-partners, doing business under the firm name and style of J. & H. Stolow, Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Oct. 13, 1955.

*509See also 18 F.R.D. 323.

Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley, New York City, for plaintiff.

Joseph F. Minutólo, New York City, for defendants.

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge.

On September 1, 1955, I filed an opinion granting plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer of defendant partnership and enter default judgment against it pursuant to Rule 37(d), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A., for the failure of co-partner Harry Stolow to appear for the taking of his deposition on July 27, 1955. Defendant now moves for reargument of the motion for default judgment and for an order setting aside the default. After consideration of the affidavits and memoranda submitted on re-argument, I am of the opinion that there has been no reason shown why I should not adhere to my original decision. Presentation of Harry Stolow at this late date cannot cure his failure to appear when the Court ordered him to do so. Nor do the affidavits presented on reargument add any new substance to the excuses offered in behalf of Mr. Stolow on the original motion. Default judgment will therefore be entered in accordance with my original opinion.

I am also of the opinion that the objections raised against holding the partnership in default for Mr. Stolow’s nonappearance are without substance. Rule 37(d) provides that the failure of a party’s “managing agent” to appear for taking of a deposition justifies a default against the party. This language is adequate to cover the nonappearance of a partner such as Harry Stolow was admitted to be by defendant’s answer.

*510 The Question of damages here is a complex one, difficult to determine. The damages sought are substantial, composed of a number of elements, and based in part upon the uncertain value of rare stamps. I am of the opinion that such damages can be determined only after a hearing, at which the defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence on all the issues relating to the amount of damages. Although defendant has requested a jury trial in this case, he has no right to have the matter referred to a jury after default. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 172 (2d Ed. 1951). Nor does Rule 55(b) (2), F.R. C. P., require that a jury determine the damages. Although it is no doubt within my discretion to order a jury trial on this issue, in view of the defendant’s dilatory tactics I think it is inappropriate to further delay the proceedings by placing the matter on the heavily burdened jury calendar. The plaintiff’s damages should be determined on a hearing before the Court without a jury.

Settle order on notice.
Exhibit
23.1





Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm





To the
Board of Directors and Stockholders


Balchem
Corporation





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements (Nos.
333-155655, 333-118292, 333-118291, 333-78355, 333-44489, 333-5912 and 333-5910)
on Form S-8 of Balchem Corporation and subsidiaries of our report dated March
12, 2010 relating to our audits of the consolidated financial statements, the
financial statement schedule and internal control over financial reporting,
which appear in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Balchem Corporation for the
year ended December 31, 2009.





/s/McGladrey
& Pullen, LLP


New York,
New York


March 12,
2010








67
---

EXHIBIT 99c

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Arbor, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Costas Takkas, in my capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
  Company.


|Date: May 1, 2003 | _______________________
    Costas Takkas, Chief Executive Officer
|----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------
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#### In re: Steven R. JOHNSON, et ux., Debtors. First Mariner Bank, Movant-Appellant, v. Steven R. Johnson, a/k/a Steven Roderick Johnson; Theresa Antoinett Johnson, a/k/a Theresa Washington Johnson, a/k/a Theresa A. Washington, Debtors-Appellees, and Nancy Spencer Grigsby, Trustee.

No. 09-2205.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 18, 2010.

Decided: Jan. 6, 2011.

John Russell Griffin, C. Edward Hartman, III, Hartman & Egeli, LLP, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Steven R. Johnson, Theresa Antoinett Johnson, Ap-pellees Pro Se.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

First Mariner Bank appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting the Debtors’ Motion to Avoid Lien. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *First Mariner Bank v. Johnson,*Nos. 8:09-cv-00053-RWT; 08-*71418682 (D. Md. Dec. 24, 2008 & Sept. 3, 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*