### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT NASHVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 8, 200 5
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JO ANN WHI TE POG UE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Marshall County Nos. 15733, 15734, 15735, 15736, 15737 William Charle s Lee, Judge

No. M2004- 00905-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jun e 3, 2005

Th e app e lla nt, Joan n Wh ite Pog ue , p le d g uil ty in the Ma rs ha ll Coun ty Cir c uit Cou rt to f ive c ou nts of delivery

of morphine a nd five c ounts o f s elling mor phine, Class C felonies. The tria l court merg ed ea ch delivery conviction i nto a conviction for selling morphine and sente nced the appellant to an ef fec tive nine-y ear

sentenc e in t he De partment of Corr ection (D OC). On appe al, the appe llant claims the trial court improperly enhanc ed her

sentenc es and imprope rly conclude d that she wa s not entitled to the presumption that she was a favor able candidate for alternative sentenc ing. We ag ree that the trial court improperly applied enhanc ement fac tors and that the a ppellant was e ntitled to the presumption. Upon re view of the rec ord and the parties’ brief s, we c onclude that the trial court e rre d i n i t s s en t en ci n g d et er m i n at i o n s an d re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Reve rsed and Re m ande d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON a n d J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Gre g ory D. Smith, C larksville, Tenne ssee, a nd Michae l J . Colli ns, Shelby ville, Tennesse e, for the appellant, Joann Whi te Pogue

. Paul G . Su mme rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; a nd B re nt C. Che rry , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Weakley E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound At the appe llant’s g uiltyplea he aring , the state pre sented the f ollowing f

actua l acc ount of the crimes: On Nove mber 5, 12, 15, 17, a nd 19, 2002, ag ents from the Se v en t ee n t h J u dicial District Dr ug Ta sk F or c e watc he d a s th e app e lla nt a rrive d at th e ho me of

a c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt andso ld-2-

him morphine pills. The appellant was arr ested and g ave a statement on J anuary 17, 2003. I n the statement, the a

ppellant said that she ha d a pre scription for morphine and beg an selling 30 milli g ram and 80 milli g ram pills i n 2001 for e x tra money . The a ppellant estimated that she ha d sold betwee n $5,000 and $10,000 worth of pills.

At the sentenc ingh e a

rin g , Be th L adner

from the Te nnessee Probation and Parole D epartment testified that she pre pare d the appe llant’s prese ntence report. The appellant g ave a statement for

the report, and ac cording to the statement, the appellant had been diag nosed with liver canc er, a nd her do c tor s h ad presc ri be d mo rp hin e pil ls f or he r. Th e app e lla nt b e g a n ta kin g the dr

ug int ra ve no us ly
a ndse lli ng the pil ls i n o rd e r to pa y he r bil ls. Ms. L a dn e r te sti fi e d tha t a dru g ta sk fo rc e a g e nt a lso g ave a statement for

the pre sentenc e re port. I n the statement, the a g ent stated that the a ppellant admitted to him that she had sold morphine to at le ast twelve people and had sold a b o u t s even hu nd re d p ill s. Ms. L a dn e r t e sti fi e d th a t th e app e lla nt ha s p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r d iso rd e rl y c on du c t, assault, and shoplifting and has be en re ceiving disabilitypay ments since 1995. She stated that the appellant ha d rec eived an alternative sentenc e and drug treatment in the past. She related t hat the appellant ha s three c hildren and that all three w ere in prison.

Detec tive Kevin Patin of the L ewisburg Police Depa rtment testified that he inve stigated the death of a man n a me d Ja me s K e ll y a n d th a t an a u to p s y

r e v e a le d M r
. K e ll y

d ie d o f a mo rp h ine
ov e rd os e . M r. Pa tin ta lke d w ith the app e lla nt ab ou t Mr. Ke lly ’s de a th, a ndthe app e lla nt e ve ntu a lly admitted to him that Mr. Kelly injected morphine at her home about nine hours bef ore his death. On
cross-e x amination, Mr. Patin testified that he pre s en ted evidenc e ag ainst the appe llant to a g rand jury , but the appellant wa s not indicted for Mr. K elly ’s death.

The forty -nine-y ear -old appe llant testified t hat a doctor diagnose d her with liver ca ncer three y e ars a g o a ndpr e sc ri be d mo rp hin e pil ls f or he r. She be c a me a dd ic te d to th e dr ug , b e g a n ta

kin g it intravenously , beg an selling the pi lls, and made excuses to her doctor in order to ge t new morphine presc riptions. Although the appellant was still taking the drug , she stopped abusing it whe n she we nt to j a il f or the c ur re nt o ff e ns e s. She re la te d that in a dd iti on to l ive r c a nc e r, sh e su ff e re d f ro m he patit is C, sleep apne a, and dia

betes. She stated that she took Z oloft for a nx iety and insulin twice a day

for her dia betes. She stated that she cu rr en t l y was underg oing c hemothera py for he r ca ncer

and that doctors expected he r to live another five to te n y ear s. The appellant related that she had not worke d in five y ear s. On cross-examination, she acknowledg ed that Mr. Kelly “shot up” morphine in her home bef ore he died. S he said that with the m oney she m ade f rom selling the morphine pills, she helped some pe ople pay

their re nt and elec tric bills, bailed some peop le out of jail, and donated turkey s to her chur ch. She ac k n owledg ed that she sold morphine pills out of her home and had people se lling and de livering the pills for her.

The trial c ourt found that the a ppellant was a R an ge I , s t andard offe nder. The trial court applied enhanceme nt fac tors (2), that the a ppellant has a “pre vious historyof criminal convictions
or criminal behavior in addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e”; (11), t hat the appellant “ had no hesitation about c ommitt ing a crime w hen the risk to human life was hig h”; and (17) that the “ crime w as commi tted under c ircumstance s under whic h the potential for bodily injury-3-

to a victim was g reat.” See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 5 -1 1 4 (2 ), (1 1 ), (17) . I t also applied enhanc ement fa ctor (16) , that the appellant abused a position of private trust, on the basis that she abused the doctor/patient re latio n s h ip w h e ns h eo b ta in ed the morphine presc riptions from her doc tor. See Te nn. Code Ann

. § 40-35-114( 16). F or three of her convictions, the trial court enhanc ed her sentenc es fr om the three -y ear minimum in the rang e for a Class C felony

to four y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35- 112(a) (3). F or the re maining two c onvictions, th e t ri al court enhanc ed the
se nte nc e s to five y e ars
. Th e tr ia l cou rt or de re d th a t th e fo ur -y e ar s e nte nc e s b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y to eac h other a nd that the five- y ea r s en t ence s be ser ved conc urre ntly . Howeve r, bec ause of the appellant’ s criminal hi story , the trial court ordere d that the conc urre nt four-y ear sentenc es be se rved
consec utively

to the five-y ear s en t ences for a n eff ective se ntence of nine y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-115( b)(2) . Reg arding alternative sentenc ing, the trial court held that the appellant wa s not e ntitled to the presumption that she is a favor able candidate for alternative sentenc ing. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(6). The trial co u rt t h en s t ated that in lig ht of the appe llant’s poor social history and the ne ed to deter others from committing similar crimes, the a ppellant should serve her
se nte nc e s in c on fi ne me nt.
II. Ana lys is

Th e app e lla nt c la ims the tr ia l c ou rt mis app lie d e nh a nc e ment fact ors a ndimp ro pe rl y determined that she wa s not entitled to the presumption tha t s he wa s a fa vorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing. T he state c oncede s that the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctors (11) , (16), a nd (17) to the a

ppellan t ’s s entences. Howe ver, it conc ludes that her f our- a nd five-y ear sentenc es were appropriate in light of the t rial court’s proper application of enhanc ement fa ctor (2) for he r prior c riminal convictions and criminal behavior. We a g ree with the appellant that the trial court misapplied thre e enhanceme nt fac tors in this case. We also ag reethat she was e ntitled to the presumption that she is a fa vorable candidate for a lternative se ntencing

. Appellate r eview of

the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a se ntenc e i s d e n ovo. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . I n conducting it s d e n o v o review, this court consider s the following fac tors: (1) the ev idence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the prese ntence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and cha

rac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved; (5) evidenc e and information offe red by the parties on enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors; (6) any statement by the appellant in her own behalf ; and (7) the pot ential for r ehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-102, - 103, -210; see a lso St ate v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). The burden is on the a ppellant to demonstrate the impropriety o f her se ntence s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments. Moreove r, if the re cord r evea ls that the trial court a dequate ly considere d sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt f acts and circ umstances, this court will accor d the trial court’s determinations a presumption of cor rec tness. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

A. Enhanc ement F actor s
The a ppellant and the state ag ree that the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctors (11) ,-4-

(16), a nd (17) in this case . Reg arding fac tor (11), that th e ap p el l ant had no hesitation about
c omm itt ing a

c ri me w hen the ri sk

to h uman li fe wa s h ig h, the re wa s n o e vid e nc e of a ny ri sk to human life during the transac tions that occur red betwee n the appellant and th e c o n fi d ential informant. As to e nhance ment fac tor (16), that the appe llant abused a position of private trust, the tr ia l cou rt he ld that it

app lie d b e c a us e “ the po sit ion of patie nt t ru st .

. . wa s a

bu se d in a n e ff

ort or in
or de r t o f a c ili ta te the s it uat io n o f the se c ri me s. ” Ho we ve r, in d e te rm ini ng wh e the r t o a pp ly thi s fac tor, the trial court should “look to see whether the off ender formally or informa lly

stood in a
re l at i onship to the victim t hat promoted c onfidenc e, re liability , or fa ith.” State v. Kissinge r, 922 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 2 , 4 8 8 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 6 )

. N o v i c t i mo r s u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d i n t h i s c a s e
. S i m i l ar l y, reg arding fac tor (17), that the crime w as committed under c ircumstance s in which the potential bo dil y inj ury to a vic tim wa s g re a t, n o v ic tim e xiste d in thi s c a se
. Th us , the tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y applied the thre e en h an cement fac tors. The a ppellant also cla ims the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctors under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Howeve r, in light o f o u r s u p re m e court’s rec ent holding in State v. Edw in Gomez, ___ S.W .3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 Tenn. L EXI S 350, at *36-71 (Na shville, Apr. 15, 2005), pe titions to r e he ar f

ile d, (A pr . 2 00 5) , th e app e lla nt’ s B lake ly arg ume nt mus t f

a il.

B. Pre sumption for Alternative Sente ncing

Ne xt, th e app e lla nt c la ims the tr ia l c ou rt imp ro pe rl y

he ld that she wa s n ot a

su ita ble c a nd idate fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . We a g re e . T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 02 pr ov ide s,

(5 ) I n re c og nit ion that st a te priso n c apa c iti e s a ndthe fu nd s to build a nd maintain them are limit ed, convicted felons committing the most severe offe nses, possessing cri m i n al histories evincing a cle ar disreg ard f

or the law s and morals of soc iety , and evinc ing f ailure of pa s t e f f o r ts a t r e h ab il it a ti o n s h a ll b e g iv e n f ir s t p rio r it y

r eg arding sentenc ing involving incar cer ation; and (6) A de fenda nt who d o es not fall within the parameters of subdivision (5) and who is an e specia lly mitigated or standard offe nder c o n v i ct ed of a

Class C, D or E felony

is presumed to be a favor able c andidate f

or alternative sente ncing options in the absenc e o f e v i d e n c e t o th e c o n tr ar y.
I n th e pr e se nt c a se , the app e lla nt wa s c on vic te d of fi ve Cla ss C fe lon ie s. Ne ve rthe le ss, the c ou rt he ld that she wa s not entitled to the presumption that she is a favor able c andidate f or alternative sentenc ing f

or two of he r convic tions. The trial court state d,

This Court is of t h e opinion -- howeve r, I have not se en any case law that squar ely

addre sses this proposition, since the Crimi nal Sentencing Reform Ac t of 1989 has bee n passed. B ut I h ave long since fe lt that the presumption that one enjoy s does not -- the-5- Def end an t d o es not enjoy

that in every

case wher e the De fenda nt stands b e f

o r e th e Co u r t w ith mu lt ip le c o n v ic ti o n s
. Su r e ly , for example, if a per son has broke n into 25 or 30 differ ent hom es, that althoug h they

might have the pre sumption on t he first home a nd pe rh aps the se c on d ho me or thi rd ho me , that the De fe nd a nt su re ly is
no t pr e su me d to be a

c a nd idate fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing on ho me Number 35.

. . . . And g iven that the Court has found that the D efe ndant lacks the presumption which she enjoy ed in a ll of her case s, then the Court d en i es h erre q u es tfo r a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.

. . . . I n th is c a se , s inc e it i s a clo se qu e sti on of la w, the Cou rt wi ll
a llo w t h e D e f

e n d a n tt o r e m a i n u p o n a n ap p e a l b o n d i n t h e sa me amount that has been posted by the Def endant a s her a

ppear ance bond if he r s ur e ty

wi ll r e ma in u po n it

. The Court doe s that beca use it would be an injusti ce if the Court is not correc t conce rning it’s interpretation of the law, g iven the fa c t th a t th e De fe nd a nt’ s li fe e xpe c ta nc y is n ot a s g re a t as ot hers to incar cer ate he r pending the appeal. So perha ps we will g et an a nswer to the Court’s question conce rning i n wh i ch case the pe rson loses their pre sumption. Despite the trial co u rt ’s m i s gi v i n gs , T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 2 (6 ) p l ai n l y s t at es that if a de fenda nt is c onvicted of Class C, D, or E felonies and does not fall within the para meters of subsec tion (5), then the de fenda nt is e ntitled to the presumption. This is true re g ardle ss of how many convictions are involved. See, e.g., State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that defe ndant convicte d of f o u r co u n t s of ar son, a Class C felony , was e ntitled to the presumption that he wa s a fa vorable candidate for al t er n at i v e sentencing ). Given that all of the
app e lla nt’ s c on vic tio ns we re Cl ass C fe lon ie s, sh e wa s e nti tle d to the pr e su mpt ion that sh e is a fa vo ra ble c a nd idate fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing fo r a ll of the m. Th us , thi s c a se mus t be re ma nd e d to t h e t ri al co u rt fo r r es en t en ci n g.-6- III. Conclusi on Upon re view of the rec ord an d th ep a r ti es’ briefs, we aff

irm the convictions; howeve r, finding
erro r i n t h e t ri al co u rt ’s s en t en ci n g d et er m i n at i o n s , we re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE