United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-2349

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Christopher White

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant

v.

Troy Steele

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: March 9, 2017

 Filed: April 6, 2017

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, and SCHREIER, 1 2

District Judge.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

The Honorable William Jay Riley stepped down as Chief Judge of the United

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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on March 10, 2017. He has been

succeeded by the Honorable Lavenski R. Smith.

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States DistrictJudge for the District 2

of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
Christopher White was convicted offirst-degree murder, armed criminal action,

and first-degree assault following a jury trial in Missouri state court. White

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the State

failed to disclose that a key prosecution witness received favorable consideration in

exchange for his testimony. The district court denied White’s petition, and we 3

affirm.

I.

On the morning of June 21, 2002, three men with guns approached the house

of Freddie Chew. Chew drew his gun and fired one shot at the men. In response, the

men shot and killed Chew. Jeffrey Shockley, a friend of Chew who was present at

the scene, later identified White as one of the shooters.

Shockley testified at White’s trial in January 2004. At the time, Shockley had

state felony charges pending against him for possession of cocaine and unlawful use

of a weapon. On cross-examination, Shockley admitted that these state charges were

pending. On re-direct, he testified that he had not received a deal from the State and

did not expect to “get anything” in exchange for his testimony. The jury found White

guilty of all charges, and he was sentenced to life without parole. Later, Shockley

pleaded guilty to his state felony charges and received a suspended imposition of

sentence and one year of unsupervised probation. 

On direct appeal, White argued that a delay in his prosecution violated his right

to a speedy trial, that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the jury

instructions, and that the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from crossexamining Shockley about whether he was returning to his house to obtain drugs to

The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the

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Eastern District of Missouri.

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sell. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed White’s conviction. White then filed

a motion for state post-conviction relief with the Missouri trial court under Missouri

Supreme Court Rule 29.15, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court

denied the motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. 

In February 2008, White filed a federal habeas petition, reasserting the four

grounds for relief previously raised in the state courts. After White filed his habeas

petition, one of hisfellow prisoners, Darryl Smallwood, provided himwith an internal

public defender conflict-of-interest form regarding his co-defendant, Juane Kennell. 

Kennell’s counsel had written on the form that he “learned that [Shockley’s counsel]

has negotiated a deal for Jeff Shockley to testify against [Kennell] . . . as well as

possibly another defendant, Christopher White.” White’s counsel then obtained

Shockley’s guilty plea transcript, which did not mention a plea agreement but which

revealed that the State had paid to relocate Shockley from his neighborhood. 

On the basis of the conflict-of-interest form and the guilty plea transcript,

White amended his habeas petition in September 2009. He added a claim that the

State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the

existence of a deal with Shockley, and he added a claim that the State violated Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), by failing to correct Shockley’s testimony that he did

not receive a deal. White also maintained his speedy trial and ineffective assistance

claims but abandoned his other two claims. By affidavit, White asserted that he had

received the conflict-of-interest form in January 2009. 

The district court held that White’s Brady and Napue claims were not timebarred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

because they were brought within one year of January 2009, which the court

determined was “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” See 28

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U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Nevertheless, the district court denied White’s amended

petition, holding that all of White’s claims failed on the merits. 

White timely filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, contending that his

habeas petition was denied before he had completed discovery on his Brady claim. 

As a result, the district court granted White an evidentiary hearing. During the

hearing, White and Smallwood both mentioned that Smallwood had given the

conflict-of-interest form to White in 2007 or 2008. Shockley’s former defense

counsel, Robert Taaffe, testified that he never obtained a plea agreement for Shockley

and that there was no “secret deal.” Rather, he explained that around the time the

conflict-of-interest form was dated, the State had made an offer to Shockley, but

Shockley declined the offer because it required him to testify against his brother in

another case. Nevertheless, based on his notes from the time he represented

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Shockley, Taaffe suggested that the prosecutor in White’s case “hinted at a nolle,”

meaning that the charges would be dismissed. The prosecutor also testified and

unequivocally denied making any such hint.

After the hearing, the State disclosed expense records showing that, in 2002,

the St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Victim Services Unit had paid for Shockley to stay

at a hotel for one week and later paid him just over $1,000 to help him relocate to an

apartment in another neighborhood. Despite this additional evidence, the district

court denied White’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Once again, the court

held that White’s Brady and Napue claims failed on the merits, but it issued a

certificate of appealability on the two claims. 

Shockley admitted that at some point he agreed to testify against his brother, 4

but he denied that he did so in order to receive favorable treatment on his own

charges.

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II.

On appeal, White argues that the district court erred in denying his Brady and

Napue claims. The State responds that White’s claims are time-barred, procedurally

defaulted, and without merit. “On appeal of a district court’s denial of a § 2254

petition, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its

conclusions of law de novo.” Wright v. Bowersox, 720 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2013).

A.

The State first argues that White’s Brady and Napue claims are barred by

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. That provision requires a habeas petitioner

to raise claims within one year of “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). White raised his Brady and Napue claims in

his amended petition in September 2009, and the district court held that the petition

was timely because it found that White discovered the conflict-of-interest form in

January 2009. It based this finding on White’s affidavit stating that he received the

form in January 2009. 

The State contends that White’s affidavit is refuted by the subsequent

evidentiary hearing, in which he and Smallwood both testified that White received

the form in either 2007 or 2008. However, these statements alone do not prove that

the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Neither White nor Smallwood

remembered the exact date that White received the form. In fact, White also testified

that he received it after he filed his original habeas petition. Because he filed that

petition on February 29, 2008, this means he could not have received the form in

2007. Moreover, as the State acknowledges, Smallwood’s testimony was

inconsistent, and he admitted to lying about who gave him the form. 

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At most, it is unclear when White received the form. But even where we have

reason to doubt compliance with the statute of limitations, we may proceed to the

merits in the interest of judicial economy. See Shelton v. Purkett, 563 F.3d 404, 407

(8th Cir. 2009) (“[I]nstead of remanding for further development of the

non-jurisdictional statute of limitations defense, we proceed directly to the merits of

Shelton’s habeas corpus petition.”); Trussell v. Bowersox, 447 F.3d 588, 590 (8thCir.

2006) (holding that even though “[i]t is doubtful that Trussell filed his petition within

the one-year limitations period . . . we shall, in the interest of judicial economy,

proceed to the merits of Trussell’s petition”). Accordingly, we proceed to address the

merits of White’s claims.5

B.

“Under Brady v. Maryland, ‘suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either

to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution.’” United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 940 (8thCir. 2016) (quoting

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “[E]vidence is material if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” United States v. Keys, 721 F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2013)

(quotations omitted). “A reasonable probability of a different result is shown when

the government’s failure to disclose undermines confidence in the outcome of the

Likewise, although the State argues that White’s claims have been 5

procedurally defaulted, we decline to address this issue. See Dodge v. Robinson, 625

F.3d 1014, 1017 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Since we can dispose of both claims on the

merits, we do not address the issue of procedural default.”); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available

in the courts of the State.”). 

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trial.” United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 423 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted).

Brady’s disclosure mandate extends to “agreements or understandings between

the government and a witnessfor leniency in exchange for testimony.” United States

v. Rushing, 388 F.3d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405

U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972)). And, under Napue v. Illinois, “a State may not knowingly

use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction.” Napue,

360 U.S. at 269.

1.

The district court found “from a review of the evidence, and after having an

opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses at the habeas hearing, that no

formal or tacit agreement existed between the state and Shockley.” Nothing in the

record suggests that this factual finding was clearly erroneous. 

At the evidentiary hearing, Kennell’s counsel testified that the notation he

made on his conflict-of-interest form may have meant only that Taaffe told him

“we’re trying to negotiate a plea agreement.” Taaffe verified that he did try to

negotiate a plea agreement and that Shockley received a plea offer. However,

Shockley rejected the offer, and we do “not require disclosure of rejected plea offers;

the duty to disclose is dependent upon the existence of an agreement between the

witness and the government.” Rushing, 388 F.3d at 1158.

In addition, although Taaffe testified that the prosecutor “hinted at a nolle,” he

clarified that he did not believe that a “secret deal” existed. The prosecutor

steadfastly denied making any such hint, and the court found his testimony credible. 

Moreover, there was no “nolle.” The prosecution did not dismiss the charges after

Shockley testified at White’s trial, and Taaffe did not mention any contrary

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understanding at sentencing. Rather, Taaffe stressed to the sentencing judge that

there was “no agreement” and “no quid pro quo” in exchange for Shockley’s

testimony against White.

White also points out that Shockley reached an agreement with the State to

testify against his brother in an unrelated case, and he argues that the jury should have

heard about this agreement because it would demonstrate Shockley’s willingness to

make any deal to stay out of prison. However, there is no evidence regarding any of

the terms of this agreement. During the evidentiary hearing, Shockley admitted that

he agreed to testify against his brother, but he denied that he did so in order to receive

anything in return. Rather, he insisted that his brother had instructed him to testify.

In sum, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Shockley received

no hint, deal, or agreement promising favorable consideration in exchange for his

testimony against either White or his brother. Without any such agreement, there is

nothing that the State could have suppressed. As a result, the State also could not

have knowingly used false testimony, because Shockley’s testimony that he did not

receive a deal or expect to “get anything” was not false. Indeed, without a hint or

deal, even if Shockley did expect to get something, the State could not have known

of Shockley’s expectation. Accordingly, the State did not violate Brady or Napue by

failing to disclose an agreement that did not exist.

2.

The district court assumed that the financial assistance provided to Shockley

for staying in a hotel for one week and relocating to another apartment was Brady

material thatshould have been disclosed. Likewise, we assume without deciding that

thisfinancial assistance wassubject to Brady’s disclosure mandate. Nevertheless, the

failure to disclose this financial assistance did not violate Brady because it does not

undermine confidence in the verdict. 

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At the evidentiary hearing, Shockley explained that the police moved him to

the hotel because he had been receiving threats. He also testified that he received

food vouchers but that he did not know who paid for either the hotel or the vouchers

and that he never received cash or anything else of value. The assistance with

relocating to a new apartment was not discussed at the evidentiary hearing, but at

Shockley’s sentencing, Taaffe explained to the sentencing judge that “[h]is life has

been threatened” and that the State “moved him” so that “he’s out of that element.” 

White contends that we found a Brady violation in similar circumstances in

United States v. Librach, but that case involved cash payments that provided the

witness with an incentive to testify. See 520 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1975) (“We have

no doubt that evidence of payments of nearly $10,000 to a witness in circumstances

providing him an incentive to change his testimony is favorable and material to the

defense . . . .”). Here, there is no evidence that this financial assistance provided

Shockley with an incentive to testify. Rather than cash, Shockley received a hotel

stay, food vouchers, and assistance moving out of a neighborhood where he was

receiving threats. Shockley received this assistance in 2002, and White’s trial did not

occur until January 2004. Furthermore, Shockley testified that he did not know who

paid for this assistance and that, in any case, he was motivated to testify in order to

get “revenge” for his friend Chew’s death. 

Moreover, as the district court noted, disclosure of this assistance actually

could have hurt White’s defense at trial. Specifically, evidence that Shockley

received threats could have invited testimony or speculation by the jury that White

had urged individuals to harm Shockley to prevent him from testifying. Under these

circumstances, we detect no error in the district court’s conclusion that this

nondisclosure does not undermine confidence in the verdict. Accordingly, the State

did not violate Brady by failing to disclose this financial assistance. 

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of White’s petition for habeas

corpus. 

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