THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2021 WY 92

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2021

August 11, 2021

BRADLEY DEAN JACKSON,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-21-0015

Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County

The Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. 

Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; 

Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy P. Zintak, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Zintak.

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers 

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in

the permanent volume.
1

FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Bradley Jackson of strangulation of a household member. On 

appeal, Mr. Jackson argues that the district court erred when it admitted evidence that he

violated a no-contact order when he called the victim after his arrest, and that the victim’s 

hearsay statement recorded on the responding officer’s bodycam should not have been 

allowed as an excited utterance. We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Jackson raises three issues:

I. Was Mr. Jackson prejudiced by the admission of evidence 

that he violated a no-contact order when he called the victim 

from jail? 

II. Did the district court err when it determined the victim’s 

statement on the responding officer’s bodycam was an

excited utterance? 

III. Did cumulative error deprive Mr. Jackson of a fair trial?

FACTS

[¶3] Bradley Jackson and K.W.’s five-year relationship ended after Mr. Jackson came 

home from the bar, accused K.W. of cheating, repeatedly threw her to the bed, choked 

her, and smothered her with a blanket. The couple’s upstairs neighbors overheard the 

commotion and called the police. Corporal Nevada Krinkee arrived on the scene, heard a 

thud and a scream, then knocked on the door and announced himself. K.W. answered the 

door, and Corporal Krinkee entered the apartment. Corporal Krinkee directed 

Mr. Jackson and K.W. to separate areas of the apartment while they waited for a second 

officer to arrive on the scene. When the second officer arrived, he took Mr. Jackson into 

the hall and Corporal Krinkee spoke to K.W. in the living room. 

[¶4] Initially, K.W. reported that Mr. Jackson had arrived home drunk and had shoved 

her. Corporal Krinkee did not believe her initial statement. As he questioned her, K.W.’s 

story evolved. About ten minutes after Corporal Krinkee arrived at the apartment, K.W. 

fully disclosed her version of the night’s events. She reported that Mr. Jackson arrived 

home from the bar, went into the bedroom, and accused her of cheating on him with a 

friend. Mr. Jackson then went to the kitchen and after several minutes returned, threw the 

blankets off K.W. and onto the floor, and when K.W. stood to retrieve them, he pushed 

her back onto the bed with his hands around her neck and his thumbs pushing into the 

underside of her jaw. K.W. asserted that she could not breathe and felt a throbbing pain 
2

around her neck. This happened three times. Mr. Jackson also placed the blankets over 

K.W.’s head, making it difficult for her to breathe. He then discovered K.W.’s phone and 

took it to the kitchen. K.W. chased after him, smacked the phone out of his hand, and 

picked it up. As she backed out of the kitchen, Corporal Krinkee knocked on the door. 

[¶5] Corporal Krinkee took photos of K.W.’s injuries, including a mark under her chin 

and bruises on her arms. He arrested Mr. Jackson, who was charged with strangulation of 

a household member. The circuit court ordered Mr. Jackson to have no contact with 

K.W. Despite this order, Mr. Jackson called K.W. twice. K.W. did not answer 

Mr. Jackson’s first call, but she did speak to him when he called later in the day. In the 

jailhouse recording, she told Mr. Jackson that they were not supposed to be talking and 

Mr. Jackson said: 

Okay. So I just wanted to let you know like this is really bad 

for me, really bad. So, I’m not sure what you told those guys 

but it’s really bad for me. Griz [his dog] will be gone. I 

won’t have a job left. I’ll probably have to sell the truck. At 

least my house is rented maybe that will still be there. I just 

wanted to let you know, I’m not sure what you said, but it’s 

way bad. And everything else goes without saying. You 

know I am obviously sorry as [expletive] and everything else. 

But thanks for getting it. I don’t know who you’ve talked to 

otherwise. Anyone?

The pair then talked for a few more seconds about who K.W. had spoken with and her 

injuries. Then she indicated again they were not supposed to be speaking, and they hung 

up. Mr. Jackson then called a friend and admitted he had called K.W. even though he 

was under a no-contact order. 

[¶6] The State filed a pretrial notice that it intended to introduce the phone calls and the 

fact Mr. Jackson made them in violation of a no-contact order. The State argued that the 

evidence was admissible as “post-crime guilty mind evidence” and therefore not subject 

to W.R.E. 404(b), but asserted it was admissible even if the court determined Rule 404(b) 

applied. At the first pretrial conference, the district court proposed excluding the 

existence of the no-contact order to avoid the Rule 404(b) issue. The State opposed this 

suggestion, arguing Mr. Jackson’s violation of the no-contact order was “guilty-mind 

evidence” and therefore outside Rule 404(b), and “among the State’s more probative 

evidence.” Mr. Jackson objected to the admission of the recorded phone calls, but,

despite making a propensity argument, agreed they were not subject to Rule 404(b). The 

district court took the issue under advisement and, at the second pretrial conference, ruled

in the State’s favor and undertook a brief 404(b) analysis despite both parties stating it 

did not apply. The district court allowed the evidence that Mr. Jackson violated a no-
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contact order when he called K.W., but excluded Mr. Jackson’s contempt of court 

conviction.

[¶7] The State also filed a pretrial notice that it intended to introduce Corporal 

Krinkee’s bodycam video of K.W.’s statement. It asserted the bodycam video was 

admissible under the excited utterance exception in W.R.E. 803(2). Mr. Jackson

preserved his objection to the evidence at the second pretrial conference and asserted the 

district court should determine the admissibility of the evidence when it was presented at 

trial. At trial, both sides admitted parts of the bodycam footage. At one point, the State 

moved to introduce a five-minute portion of Corporal Krinkee’s bodycam video. 

Mr. Jackson objected and argued that it was misleading and the State should show the 

entire video. The district court overruled the objection and said, “[I]f you want additional 

portions of that body-cam video to be admitted, you can do that on crossexamination. . . . There was some discussion at pretrial about the hearsay component of 

that. And the Court finds that there’s sufficient foundation that it qualifies as an excited 

utterance.” On cross-examination, Mr. Jackson’s attorney questioned Corporal Krinkee 

about K.W.’s statements to him about her injuries. The State objected to the questioning 

on hearsay grounds, and the district court overruled the objection because it had admitted 

the statements as excited utterances. 

[¶8] Mr. Jackson’s theory was that he committed domestic battery, but not 

strangulation, because he did not impede K.W.’s breathing or circulation. Compare

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (“A household member is guilty of 

domestic battery if he knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another household 

member by use of physical force.”) with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-509(a) (“A person is

guilty of strangulation of a household member if he intentionally and knowingly or 

recklessly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a household member by impeding 

the normal breathing or circulation of blood.”). The jury convicted Mr. Jackson of 

strangulation of a household member, and the district court sentenced him to three to five 

years in prison. Mr. Jackson appeals. 

DISCUSSION

I. Mr. Jackson Was Not Prejudiced by the Admission of the Recorded Phone Calls

[¶9] Prior to trial, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce Mr. Jackson’s jailhouse 

phone calls, including the fact that they were made in violation of a no-contact order, as 

evidence at trial. The State, citing Palmer v. State, 2009 WY 129, 218 P.3d 941 (Wyo. 

2009), argued the calls were “guilty-mind” evidence and therefore not subject to a 404(b) 

Gleason analysis, and Mr. Jackson agreed with the State’s assertion. The district court

recognized the potential 404(b) problem and conducted an abbreviated analysis of the 

issue: “In conducting the 404(b) analysis, the Court finds that the evidence is being 

offered for a proper purpose, that is, state of mind of guilt, that the evidence is relevant, 
4

and the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice.” At oral 

argument on appeal, Mr. Jackson’s counsel argued that trial counsel on both sides 

misapplied the Palmer analysis and suggested that the jailhouse phone calls should have 

been subjected to a 404(b) analysis. Mr. Jackson asked this Court to clarify whether 

Palmer excluded all “guilty-mind” evidence from a 404(b) analysis. We take this 

opportunity to do so. 

A. Palmer, Rule 404(b), and Consciousness of Guilt Evidence

[¶10] “A core principle of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) ‘is that the defendant in a 

criminal case should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of 

past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged.’” Blanchard 

v. State, 2020 WY 97, ¶ 18, 468 P.3d 685, 691 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Vinson v. State, 

2020 WY 93, ¶ 17, 467 P.3d 1009, 1012 (Wyo. 2020)). To protect against this, the State 

is required to give notice of its intent to use 404(b) evidence. Gutierrez v. State, 2020

WY 150, ¶ 4, 477 P.3d 528, 530 (Wyo. 2020). This notice then triggers a Gleason

hearing in which the district court must follow “a mandatory procedure . . . for testing the 

admissibility of 404(b) evidence.” Putnam v. State, 2020 WY 133, ¶ 31, 474 P.3d 613, 

622 (Wyo. 2020). To be admissible: 

(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the 

evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of the 

evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential 

for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must 

instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 

considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 

admitted. 

Id. (quoting Moser v. State, 2018 WY 12, ¶ 21, 409 P.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Wyo. 2018)). 

[¶11] In Palmer, we excluded certain instances of “guilty-mind,” also called 

“consciousness of guilt,” evidence from the 404(b) analysis. There, the State proffered 

evidence from a witness that Mr. Palmer and another party asked the witness to provide a 

false alibi for Mr. Palmer. Palmer, 2009 WY 129, ¶ 10, 218 P.3d at 944. The State 

asserted the evidence was not character evidence under Rule 404(b), but rather “guiltymind” evidence. Id. at ¶ 13, 218 P.3d at 945. We held, the “W.R.E. 404(b) analysis does 

not apply to post-crime ‘guilty mind’ evidence such as that offered by the State in the 

instant case.” Id. (emphasis added). Palmer did not place all “guilty-mind” or 

“consciousness of guilt” evidence outside the 404(b) framework. 

[¶12] Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted 

in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes.” Not all 
5

guilty-mind evidence is evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” and therefore may 

not require 404(b) analysis. However, guilty-mind evidence may also be evidence of 

other crimes, wrongs, or acts. In those circumstances, other jurisdictions categorize 

“guilty-mind,” or “consciousness of guilt” evidence as a proper purpose to be analyzed 

under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 973 F.3d 603, 619 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(Threat of violence against a witness was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show 

consciousness of guilt); United States v. Almeida, 748 F.3d 41, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2014) 

(upholding district court’s decision that defendant’s use of false identification was 

admissible under Rule 404(b) as consciousness of guilt); United States v. Simmons, 470 

F.3d 1115, 1125 (5th Cir. 2006) (defendant’s state-court testimony was admissible under 

Rule 404(b) because it was admitted to show consciousness of guilt, not that he “was a 

bad person, and, therefore, must have [committed the crime]”); United States v. Hayden, 

85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Evidence of witness intimidation is admissible to 

prove consciousness of guilt and criminal intent under Rule 404(b).”); United States v. 

Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1329 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“[T]he standards for admission of Rule 

404(b) evidence were satisfied. The testimony . . . was not offered to prove Mickens’ bad 

character or criminal propensity, but rather to prove his consciousness of guilt.”); see also

1 McCormick On Evid. § 190.5 (8th ed.), Westlaw (database updated January 2020)

(“[A] variation of the reasoning permits proof of a consciousness of guilt as evidenced by 

criminal acts of the accused that are designed to obstruct justice or to avoid 

punishment.”). We join the jurisdictions that consider “consciousness of guilt,” or 

“guilty-mind” evidence a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). If the State proposes using 

evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to show the defendant’s “consciousness of 

guilt” it must give notice of that intent and the court must apply the standard Gleason

analysis. 

B. Standard of Review

[¶13] Mr. Jackson filed a pretrial demand for notice of the State’s intent to use 404(b) 

evidence. Therefore, we review first for an abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. State, 2020 

WY 142, ¶¶ 20-21, 476 P.3d 224, 232 (Wyo. 2020). Here, because the parties argued the 

evidence fell outside Rule 404(b), the district court only made a cursory 404(b) ruling1

1 In his written appeal, Mr. Jackson argued the district court erred when it admitted evidence that he 

violated a no-contact order when he called K.W. because it was irrelevant and prejudicial under W.R.E. 

401 through 403. During oral argument, we asked Mr. Jackson’s counsel whether Rule 404(b) applied to 

this case and he said, “I do think it’s a 404(b) analysis. I do think the court did kind of apply a 404(b) 

analysis.” See Bourke v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP, 2013 WY 93, ¶ 42 n.8, 305 P.3d 1164, 1174 n.8

(Wyo. 2013) (declining to address potential venue issue because it was not briefed and neither party 

“conceded or contended that the objection to venue was waived when they were asked about that 

possibility at oral argument”). Because the district court did “kind of apply a 404(b) analysis,” and 

because we conclude the evidence should have been analyzed under W.R.E. 404(b), and counsel asserted 

at oral argument that Rule 404(b) should apply, we discuss it under that rule. The W.R.E. 401 through 

403 relevancy and balancing tests are the second and third elements of the 404(b) analysis. Putnam, 2020 
6

and did not review any of the Gleason factors.

2 “Our task in reviewing a district court’s 

decision on the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is to determine whether 

the district court abused its discretion, not to apply the Gleason/Vigil [v. State, 926 P.2d 

351 (Wyo. 1996)] test anew.” Miller v. State, 2021 WY 16, ¶ 17, 479 P.3d 387, 392 

(Wyo. 2021). The district court identified “state of mind of guilt” as the proper purpose

but did not evaluate the factors. “[A]buse of discretion, or the lack thereof, cannot be 

determined by reviewing a record that contains no information as to how that discretion 

was exercised.” Cercy v. State, 2019 WY 131, ¶ 39, 455 P.3d 678, 691 (Wyo. 2019) 

(quoting Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 28, 57 P.3d 343). Because the district court made a 

404(b) ruling without examining the Gleason factors, our inquiry turns to whether 

Mr. Jackson was prejudiced by the admission of the 404(b) evidence. Miller, 2021 WY 

16, ¶ 17, 479 P.3d at 392. “[A]n error is prejudicial when ‘there is a reasonable 

WY 133, ¶ 31, 474 P.3d at 622. 2 The Gleason factors are: 

1. How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad act? 

2. Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering 

the prior bad acts evidence? 

3. Is other evidence available?

4. Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?

5. How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior 

bad act? 

. . . The trial court should [then] weigh [the following] factors against the 

probative value of the evidence: 

1. The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act. The more reprehensible 

the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant 

for the prior act. 

2. The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act. 

Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act 

if the victim was especially vulnerable. 

3. The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act. The 

more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw 

the improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it 

again. 

4. The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad 

act. When the prior act is a more serious offense than the charged crime, 

the introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in a different 

and unfavorable light. 

5. The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and 

forbidden inferences. Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more 

probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted 

by Rule 404(b). 

6. Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction. The jury may be 

tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment

for the prior bad act. 

Lajeunesse v. State, 2020 WY 29, ¶ 11, 458 P.3d 1213, 1218 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Gleason v. State, 

2002 WY 161, ¶ 27, 57 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Wyo. 2002)). 
7

probability that the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error 

not occurred.’” Id. at ¶ 18, 479 P.3d at 392 (quoting Mitchell, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 21, 476 

P.3d at 232). 

C. No Prejudice

[¶14] Mr. Jackson does not argue that the calls were inadmissible. Rather, he asserts he 

was prejudiced when the State introduced evidence he violated a no-contact order when 

he called K.W. from jail. To support his argument, Mr. Jackson points to the number of 

times the State referenced the no-contact violation and the State’s statement at the pretrial 

conference that it was “among the State’s more probative evidence.” He does not, 

however, explain how there is a reasonable probability the result would have been more 

favorable to him without the evidence. 

[¶15] There was plenty of other evidence to support the jury’s conviction. K.W. 

testified in detail about Mr. Jackson strangling her, the upstairs neighbors testified about

what they overheard, including Mr. Jackson’s statement, “How about I [expletive] 

strangle you,” multiple witnesses testified about K.W.’s injuries and the State introduced 

photographs of the injuries, the nurse practitioner who examined K.W. at urgent care 

testified that the carotid artery was located underneath the visible abrasions on K.W.’s 

neck, and the State introduced a recorded phone call in which Mr. Jackson admitted he 

grabbed K.W. by the neck. Considering the record, there is no reasonable probability the 

verdict would have been more favorable to Mr. Jackson without the evidence that he 

violated a no-contact order when he called K.W. from jail. 

II. The District Court Did Not Err by Admitting the Bodycam Video as an Excited 

Utterance

A. Standard of Review

[¶16] The parties disagree about whether we should apply an abuse of discretion or a 

plain error standard. The State filed a pretrial notice of intent to introduce W.R.E. 803(2) 

excited utterance evidence and analyzed the five factors. At the second pretrial 

conference, the State discussed the factors and asserted the purpose of the filing was to 

give notice so the court was prepared to rule on the issue at trial. Mr. Jackson lodged a 

general objection to the evidence, stating: “[W]e would prefer to reserve our objection. 

We will raise an objection to the evidence that the State wants to introduce in their notice 

here.” The district court assured the parties it would review the evidence before the trial. 

At trial, the State moved to introduce a five-minute portion of the bodycam footage rather 

than the entire video. Mr. Jackson objected on completeness grounds and the district 

court ruled: “Based on that objection, Exhibit 26 is admitted. There was some discussion 

at pretrial about the hearsay component of that. And the Court finds that there’s 

sufficient foundation that it qualifies as an excited utterance. So 26 is admitted.” 
8

[¶17] Because Mr. Jackson did not object on hearsay grounds at trial we would normally 

review for plain error. Gutierrez, 2020 WY 150, ¶ 5, 477 P.3d at 530. Plain error review 

is premised on the idea that, “[w]ithout a proper objection, the district court did not have 

an opportunity to address and, if appropriate, correct the error.” Buszkiewic v. State, 

2018 WY 100, ¶ 33, 424 P.3d 1272, 1282 (Wyo. 2018). Further, “[i]t is a basic premise 

of appellate practice that to preserve an issue for appeal, that issue must be called to the 

attention of the trial court in a clear manner.” Cowboy’s LLC v. Schumacher, 2018 WY 

61, ¶ 16, 419 P.3d 498, 503 (Wyo. 2018) (citations omitted). Here, the excited utterance 

issue was clearly called to the district court’s attention. The State thoroughly briefed the 

issue, Mr. Jackson lodged a general objection to the evidence at the second pretrial 

conference, the district court was fully apprised of the excited utterance argument, and it

ruled the bodycam footage qualified as an excited utterance when the State moved to 

admit it at trial. Thus, in this case, we review for an abuse of discretion. See Garland v. 

State, 2017 WY 102, ¶ 17, 401 P.3d 480, 485 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting 1 Christopher B. 

Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 1:10 (4th ed. 2013)) (a party who 

lodged an objection pretrial does not need to renew the objection if the court entered a 

definitive ruling either pretrial or during the trial). 

B. W.R.E. 803(2) Excited Utterance

[¶18] “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” W.R.E. 

801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible. W.R.E. 802. However, there are several 

exceptions to the general rule, including W.R.E. 803(2), which permits excited 

utterances. An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition 

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 

condition.” W.R.E. 803(2). This Court has identified five factors courts should consider 

when applying the excited utterance exception: “(1) the nature of the startling event; (2) 

the declarant’s physical manifestation of excitement; (3) the declarant’s age; (4) the lapse 

of time between the event and the hearsay statement; and (5) whether the statement was 

made in response to an inquiry.” Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 48, 346 P.3d 909, 924 

(Wyo. 2015) (citations omitted).

[¶19] Review of the bodycam footage reveals that the first factor weighs in favor of 

admission. K.W. was the victim of a violent crime that took place in her own home. 

Mr. Jackson asserts the second factor weighs against admission because K.W. shows 

little emotion for the first four to five minutes of the video. However, K.W. visibly 

exhibits more emotion as her discussion with Corporal Krinkee continues and she tells 

him more about the full scope of the altercation with Mr. Jackson. By the time she 

explains the strangulation, K.W. is crying and rocking on the sofa. Thus, the second 

factor weighs toward admission. The third factor is neutral. Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 

77, ¶ 23, 253 P.3d 136, 143 (Wyo. 2011). The fourth factor also weighs toward
9

admission. While it is unclear how much time passed between when Mr. Jackson 

strangled K.W. and her statement to Corporal Krinkee, it is undisputed that the altercation 

between K.W. and Mr. Jackson was ongoing and only stopped when Corporal Krinkee 

knocked on the door. Bruce, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 50, 346 P.3d at 925. 

[¶20] The fifth factor weighs against admission. K.W. made her full statement only 

after extended questioning from Corporal Krinkee, when he made it clear he did not 

believe K.W.’s initial statements. When K.W. finally told her full story, she described

what Mr. Jackson did, but did not say she could not breathe until Corporal Krinkee 

suggested it with a leading question. Further, it was Corporal Krinkee, not K.W., who 

described Mr. Jackson’s actions as “strangulation.” This is different than the open-ended

questioning in other cases and more akin to “detailed interrogation-style questioning that 

might negate the use of the excited utterance exception.” 30B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. 

§ 6819, Westlaw (database updated April 2021); Compare Sanchez, 2011 WY 77, ¶ 23, 

253 P.3d at 143 (no indication victim’s statements were in response to the officer’s 

inquiry); Boykin v. State, 2005 WY 15, ¶ 10, 105 P.3d 481, 484 (Wyo. 2005) (The 

victim’s non-responsive answer to the clerk’s inquiry suggested her response was 

spontaneous and not the result of reflection.); Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 963 (Wyo. 

2000) (finding that the fifth factor weighed in favor of admission because the victim 

made her statement before the doctor asked any questions); Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 

1022 (Wyo. 1999) (“[M]any of the victim’s statements were not really in response to the 

dispatcher’s inquiries, and it appears that the questioning was really an attempt by the 

dispatcher to calm the victim.”); with United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 973-75 (10th 

Cir. 2012) (suggesting that officer’s detailed questioning asking the victim to walk him 

through what happened, as opposed to simply asking “what happened,” indicates a lack 

of spontaneity but not significantly enough to satisfy plain error), overruled on other 

grounds by United States v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2017). 

[¶21] Here, though the fifth factor weighs against admission, the first, second, and fourth 

factors weigh in its favor. Further, while the factors are a helpful tool, the ultimate 

inquiry “remains whether the ‘declarant’s condition at the time was such that the

statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and 

deliberation.’” Bruce, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 48, 346 P.3d at 924 (quoting Sanchez, 2011 WY 

77, ¶ 22, 253 P.3d at 143). The video shows that K.W. was very upset when she

responded to Corporal Krinkee’s questions. While her answers occurred in response to 

his questioning, they appear spontaneous rather than the result of reflection. The district 

court could reasonably find the statement was an excited utterance. Therefore, it did not 

abuse its discretion. 

III. No Cumulative Error

[¶22] Mr. Jackson argues that the combination of the two issues results in prejudicial 

error, even if the issues on their own do not. “Cumulative error occurs when two or more 
10

nonreversible errors have the potential to prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a 

single reversible error.” McGill v. State, 2015 WY 132, ¶ 21, 357 P.3d 1140, 1148 (Wyo. 

2015) (citing McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, ¶ 27, 155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007)). 

“In conducting a cumulative error evaluation, we consider only matters that we have 

determined to be errors.” Bogard v. State, 2019 WY 96, ¶ 69, 449 P.3d 315, 332 (Wyo. 

2019) (quoting Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 45, 184 P.3d 687, 701 (Wyo. 2008)). Here, 

we found that Mr. Jackson was not prejudiced by the admission of the “guilty-mind” 

evidence, and the district court did not err when it admitted the bodycam video as an 

excited utterance. Thus, there is no basis for Mr. Jackson’s claim of cumulative error. 

CONCLUSION

[¶23] Mr. Jackson was not prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that he violated a 

no-contact order when he called the victim and the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it admitted the bodycam video as an excited utterance. Finding no error 

occurred, there is no basis for Mr. Jackson’s cumulative error claim. Affirmed.