*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in LocalRule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-11021

Summary Calendar

RITA RENEE JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MARVIN T. RUNYON,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:93-CV-1511-R)

March 25, 1997

Before WISDOM, KING, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rita Renee Jones appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgement for her employer, the United States Postal

Service. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district
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court’s order in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND the case for

trial.

Summary judgement is appropriate only where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled

to judgement as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). All

reasonable doubts and inferences must be decided in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thornbrough v.

Columbus and Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir.

1985). As long as there appears to be some evidentiary support

for the disputed allegations, the motion must be denied. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

The only issue on appeal concerns whether the plaintiff

raised any genuine issue of material fact as to her claim of

retaliatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she was

engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an

adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment decision. Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793 F.2d 714,

724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987). In its July

16, 1996 order, the court stated that it “previously found that

Plaintiff raised a fact issue regarding the element of causal

connection. Specifically, Plaintiff provided evidence that

Johnson [Jones’s supervisor] knew about her prior EEO activity
3

and this knowledge led to her eventual termination, thus

demonstrating a causal connection.” The court then found that

Johnson’s affidavit amounted to “uncontroverted evidence that he

[Johnson] did not learn of her prior EEO activity until after her

termination”, and that therefore the plaintiff could not

establish any causal connection. We disagree.

The court had before it an affidavit submitted to the EEO

investigator by Johnson. The affidavit stated in relevant part:

Q: Prior to the notice of said removal, being issued,

did you have knowledge of this complainant filing EEO

complaints? If yes, was reprisal a factor in the

notice of removal being issued?

A: Yes, 10/10/91. Reprisal was not a factor.

Record p. 65. Although the date given is after Jones’s removal,

the answer to the question “Did you have prior knowledge” is

clearly in the affirmative. This answer is cast in a somewhat

different light in Mr. Johnson’s affidavit given in support of

the defendant’s motion for summary judgement. There, Mr. Johnson

states that he “was aware of Ms. Jones’ prior EEO activity as of

October 10, 1991". This conflicts his prior statement. As a

result, whether Mr. Johnson knew of the plaintiff’s prior EEO

activity remains at issue. We find this to be a genuine issue of

material fact within Rule 56 (c).

Because Jones raises only her retaliation claim on appeal,
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the portion of the district courts order dismissing her gender

discrimination claim is AFFIRMED. The courts grant of summary

judgment as to the retaliation claim is VACATED and the case is

REMANDED to the district court for trial on the that issue. It

is so ORDERED.