Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

Order 

December 18, 2015

152404

In re JACKSON, Minor. SC: 152404

COA: 325838

Ingham CC Family Division:

14-001407-NA

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 28, 2015 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

The Court has become aware that, during the pendency of this appeal, the trial 

court finalized the adoption of the minor child, in violation of In re JK, 468 Mich 202 

(2003). It appears that no one informed the trial court of the father’s appeal of the 

termination of his parental rights. In order to prevent any recurrence of the problem, we 

ORDER any trial court finalizing an adoption to provide the following findings on the 

record: 

I have determined that any appeal of the decision to terminate parental 

rights has reached disposition, that no appeal, application for leave to 

appeal, or motion for rehearing or reconsideration is pending, and that the 

time for all appellate proceedings in this matter has expired.

MCCORMACK, J. (concurring). 

I concur with the Court’s decision to deny leave to appeal because I believe that 

the respondent-father received sufficient notice that the prior termination of his parental 

rights could be used as a ground for terminating his parental rights in this case. I write 

separately, however, to articulate more generally my reservations about using 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) as a statutory basis for termination. 

“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is 

perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests . . . .” Troxel v Granville, 530 US 

57, 65 (2000) (opinion by O’Connor, J.) (punctuation omitted). Parents are 

constitutionally entitled to have their fitness adjudicated before the state may infringe on 

this constitutionally protected relationship. See, e.g., In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 422 

(2014); Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 658 (1972). And when the state seeks to 

adjudicate a parent’s fitness it must be done through fundamentally fair procedures. See, 

e.g., Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 769 (1982) (requiring the state to establish a 

parent’s unfitness with clear and convincing evidence); see also MCL 712A.19b(3).
2

MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) permits termination of a parent’s rights to his or her child if 

the state can establish that the parent’s rights to another child were involuntarily 

terminated in a prior proceeding. There is no requirement that the prior adjudication be 

proved relevant or material to the current allegations against the respondent. By 

requiring only that the state establish a prior involuntary termination, 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) creates a statutory presumption that a parent is unfit to parent a 

child presently before the court. In my view, this presumption excuses the state from 

having to meet its evidentiary burden before infringing on a parent’s constitutionally 

protected relationship with his or her child. Other state courts have addressed this 

concern when their states’ analogous statutory presumptions were challenged by 

requiring the state to proffer additional evidence of the parent’s unfitness to parent the 

child currently at issue. See, e.g., In re JL, 20 Kan App 2d 665, 672-673 (1995) (holding 

that a Kansas statute creating a statutory presumption of unfitness based on a prior 

termination can be rebutted by any evidence supporting a finding of fitness); Florida 

Dep’t of Children & Families v FL, 880 So 2d 602, 609 (Fla, 2004) (holding that a 

parent’s rights may only be terminated on the basis of a similar Florida statutory 

presumption if the state also establishes that there is “a substantial risk of significant 

harm to the current child”). 

The statutory presumption at issue in MCL 712A.19b(3)(l)—that a parent’s 

unfitness may be based solely on a prior involuntary termination—raises significant 

constitutional questions that are not complained of in this case but nevertheless trouble 

me. When someone is accused of a crime, due process does not permit the state to put 

forth evidence of a prior conviction as sufficient proof to convict him or her of the new 

charge. To the contrary, we go to great lengths to provide an accused with fair process 

that does not allow his or her criminal history to play a role in the present adjudication. I 

do not see why similar process is not due a parent in jeopardy of losing the constitutional 

right to control the care and custody of his or her children. 

My concerns regarding the constitutionality of MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) 

notwithstanding, I concur with the Court’s decision to deny leave to appeal in this case 

because the respondent-father has complained only of the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte

use of his prior termination as grounds to uphold the trial court’s result specifically 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 18, 2015

p1215

3

Clerk

because, the respondent argued, there was no finding that his prior termination did not 

violate Sanders, 495 Mich 394. There is no evidence, however, that the respondentfather’s prior termination was impermissible under Sanders or that he was unaware his 

prior termination could be used to terminate his parental rights. The respondent-father 

directly appealed the trial court’s termination of his parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), which permits the state to terminate a parent’s rights on the basis 

of a prior termination that involved serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual 

abuse and a showing that the parent has not been rehabilitated; thus, the respondent was 

plainly aware that his prior termination was at issue in the present proceeding. 

Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the respondent-father’s arguments merit further 

review.