NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-625

ELEUTHERIOS T. HOUVOURAS1

vs.

PHYLLIS M. HOUVOURAS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial on remand in the Probate and Family 

Court, Eleutherios T. Houvouras (husband), appeals from a 

judgment enforcing his prenuptial and postnuptial agreements 

with Phyllis M. Houvouras (wife). We affirm.

Background. Two days prior to their wedding on July 4, 

1987, the husband and wife signed a prenuptial agreement and in 

the years that followed amended that agreement five times. 

Neither spouse worked during the marriage, and the parties each 

had two adult children from previous marriages. In 2015, the 

1 Eleutherios T. Houvouras died during the pending appeal. 

Estate Administrators Theodore N. Houvouras and Katina P. 

Houvouras obtained permission of this court to be substituted 

for the deceased. We continue to refer to the husband and wife 

as the parties.
2

husband suffered two strokes and after returning home from a 

rehabilitation facility required twenty-four hour care for a few 

months.

The following year, in March 2016, the husband moved to New 

Jersey with his ex-wife and two children. In June 2016, the 

wife filed a complaint for separate support, and the husband 

counterclaimed. One month later, the husband filed a complaint 

for divorce and claimed the prenuptial agreement and postnuptial 

amendments were "invalid and unenforceable." A judge of the 

Probate and Family Court consolidated the complaints for trial.

On December 4, 2017, following a trial, the judge issued a 

judgment of divorce nisi and made extensive findings of fact. 

The judge carefully examined the prenuptial agreement and the 

five postnuptial amendments and concluded that the terms were 

fair and reasonable. After specifically addressing the 

"significant change" in the husband's health status and 

increased medical needs following the last amendment, the judge 

concluded that, despite this significant change, enforcement of 

the parties' prenuptial and postnuptial agreements would be fair 

and reasonable.

The husband appealed that judgment and claimed that his

necessary expenses, including healthcare costs, impaired his 

ability to meet his contractual obligations to the wife. This 

court remanded the matter primarily to revisit the calculation 
3

of the husband's weekly expenses, with particular emphasis on 

medical expenses. See Houvouras v. Houvouras, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 

1109 (2019).

On remand, the judge conducted another trial over five days 

and focused on the husband's expenses. In meticulous and 

detailed findings, the judge found that the husband, age ninetyseven, "despite his medical issues," "has the clear ability to 

comply with his contractual obligations" to his wife. The judge 

also credited the testimony of the wife's expert on health

insurance claims and ordered, among other things, that the 

husband comply with the agreements. In part, the judge reasoned

that the husband did not require twenty-four hour care, and his

"failure to make reasonable efforts to avail himself of the 

benefits of his health care coverage is the primary reason" that 

he lacked sufficient funds to pay alimony as agreed. The 

husband now appeals from that judgment as well as the denial of 

his motion for relief from judgment and the denial of his motion 

to alter and amend the judgment.

During the pendency of this appeal, on a motion by the 

wife, the trial judge imposed an appeal bond in the amount of

$220,000, representing the amount of unpaid alimony following 

the trial on remand. The husband never satisfied that bond and 

sought relief from a single justice of this court. After the 

single justice denied relief, the husband filed a notice of 
4

appeal. The appeal from the single justice decision has been 

consolidated with the appeal from the decisions of the Probate 

and Family Court.

Discussion. 1. Findings on necessary healthcare. "Upon 

appeal, we accept a trial judge's findings of fact unless they 

are clearly erroneous and do not review questions of fact if any 

reasonable view of the evidence and the rational inferences to 

be drawn therefrom support the judge's findings" (quotation and 

citations omitted). Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 467 Mass. 1, 

8 (2014). "We uphold the findings of a judge who saw and heard 

the witnesses unless we are of the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made" (quotation and citations omitted). 

Id. Without a specific citation to the record, the husband 

contends that the trial judge found in the first trial "that he 

needed 24-hour [healthcare] assistance" and in the remand trial 

"abused [her] discretion in reversing course" without any 

meaningful explanation. We disagree.

The record does not support the contention that the judge 

reversed course or otherwise abused her discretion. In her 

findings from the first trial the judge indicated that the 

husband initially received twenty-four hour care that tapered to 

more limited care: "Upon returning to the marital home [from a 

rehabilitation facility], Husband received 24-hour care. For 

several weeks, a physical therapist, occupational therapist, and 
5

a nurse came to the marital home to care for Husband. 

Commencing in August 2015, Husband no longer had overnight 

aides." The wife later hired certified nursing assistants to 

provide care "throughout most of the day." These findings are 

consistent with the judge's findings following the trial on 

remand: "For a few months after his return [from a 

rehabilitation facility] Husband received twenty-four (24) hour 

care at the former marital home." Thus, we do not see any 

inconsistency in these findings or any clear error.

We also disagree with the husband's premise that the judge 

was bound by her findings from the first trial. When remanding 

the case, this court did not restrict the judge's consideration 

of the evidence in a second trial. Also, during the second 

trial, the judge heard conflicting evidence on the need for 

twenty-four hour care. The husband's expert, a rehabilitation 

counselor, testified that twenty-four hour care was necessary, 

but the wife's expert, a neurologist, testified that the husband 

had "intermittent needs for assistance during the day" and "does 

not require round-the-clock care." The judge did not credit the 

testimony of the husband's expert and concluded that he "did not 

have a full understanding" of the husband's "acts of daily 

living" and developed a life care plan that was "largely 

speculative." The judge credited the testimony of the wife's 

expert and concluded, "while Husband may desire or benefit from 
6

around-the-clock care, it is not a medical necessity." "The 

judge's evaluation of competing expert testimony involved an 

assessment of credibility and weight, both of which were within 

the province of the judge." FOD, LLC v. White, 99 Mass. App. 

Ct. 407, 414-415 (2021). See North Adams Apartments Ltd. 

Partnership v. North Adams, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 607 (2011) 

("Deference is also given to the trial judge's credibility 

assessments of experts"). We discern no abuse of discretion. 

See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

2. Health insurance claims expert. The husband next 

contends that the court erred in qualifying the neurologist 

hired by the wife as an expert on health insurance claims. "A 

trial judge has wide discretion to qualify an expert witness and 

to decide whether the witness's testimony should be admitted." 

Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 533 (2001). "The 

crucial issue, in determining whether a witness is qualified to 

give an expert opinion, is whether the witness has sufficient 

education, training, experience and familiarity with the subject 

matter of the testimony" (quotations and citations omitted). 

Id. "The admission of expert testimony will be reversed only 

where it constitutes an abuse of discretion or other error of 

law." Id. We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

Here, the witness testified that he was a medical doctor 

specializing in neurology with formal education in "health 
7

insurance" as part of his residency training. His background

included treating over 10,000 stroke victims as well as 

conducting research at the National Institute of Health about 

strokes and neural regeneration. His practice included 

developing patient care plans to manage and treat the 

consequences of a stroke. He also did research about providing 

cost-effective care to patients through Medicare. As a resident 

and fellow, he learned "to understand what insurance will cover 

and won't cover." He further testified that without such 

knowledge, "you cannot otherwise, in today's day and age, take 

care of patients unless you understand how insurance claims 

work." In his role as a practicing physician, he needed to 

"understand whether a procedure is covered or not because it 

will make a difference" in treatment. As an example, he said 

that if a claim is denied, he will engage in "peer to peer" 

review with an insurance company representative, most often a 

neurologist, and discuss the treatment options. He also worked 

as a healthcare fraud investigator on false health insurance and 

Medicare claims. Based upon this testimony, the judge had a 

"reasonable basis" to qualify the expert, and we discern no 

error. Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 843, 852 (1990). 

3. Evidence at remand trial. Without any citation to the 

record showing instances where the judge specifically excluded

evidence, the husband claims that the trial judge prevented him 
8

from presenting evidence of his "actual medical condition." "An 

issue not raised or argued below may not be argued for the first 

time on appeal." Rabinowitz v. Schenkman, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 

538, 542 (2023), quoting Century Fire & Marine Ins. Corp. v. 

Bank of New England-Bristol County, N.A., 405 Mass. 420, 421 n.2 

(1989).

Even if considered, the claim lacks any support in the 

record. The husband's contention that the judge generally 

excluded such evidence or failed to consider his medical 

condition at the time of trial is belied the volume of evidence 

presented on this topic as well as by the judge's extensive 

findings of fact. For example, the judge heard testimony from 

the husband, his medical expert, his certified public 

accountant, and his children. As the judge summarized in her 

findings, she considered this testimony along with 176 exhibits, 

including 106 exhibits from the first trial, and she considered 

the parties' stipulation of uncontested facts from the first 

trial. The judge also noted the central focus of the remand 

trial: "[T]he Court on remand reviewed the Husband's reasonable 

living and health-related expenses, especially given his 

disability, and assess[ed] whether or not he can pay his own 

expenses if the Postnuptial agreement is enforced." At bottom, 

the judge gave the parties a full and fair opportunity to 

present evidence supporting their respective positions and made 
9

findings that were unfavorable to the husband's contentions. We 

discern no error.

4. Appeal bond. Finally, the husband asserts that the 

judge erred in ordering him to post an appeal bond without an 

evidentiary hearing. Given our consideration of the appeal 

despite the husband's failure to post the bond as ordered, we 

conclude that this claim is moot. See DiMasi v. Secretary of 

the Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 190 (2023) (issue moot where no 

actual controversy remains or party claiming grievance ceases 

having personal stake in outcome); Rasten v. Northeastern Univ., 

432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168 (2001) 

(appeal moot where "hearing that [petitioner] sought to have 

continued took place as scheduled").2 Accordingly, the appeal 

2 We need not, and do not, reach the new claims raised by 

the husband in his reply brief. See Spinosa v. Tufts, 98 Mass. 

App. Ct. 1, 16 (2020).
10

from the orders of the single justice concerning the appeal bond 

is dismissed as moot.

Judgment affirmed.

Orders denying motions for

relief from judgment and to 

alter and amend judgment 

affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, 

Singh & Hodgens, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: September 20, 2024.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.