In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 9, 2024

S24A0599. COBB COUNTY v. FLOAM et al.

 PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

“Courts are not vehicles for engaging in merely academic 

debates or deciding purely theoretical questions. We ‘say what the 

law is’ only as needed to resolve an actual controversy.” Sons of 

Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Commissioners, 315 

Ga. 39, 39 (880 SE2d 168) (2022) (“SCV”). This case presents an 

actual controversy; the Cobb County Commission has asserted an 

unprecedented power to change acts of the General Assembly, and 

members of the Cobb community have made serious arguments that 

the County’s action was unconstitutional. But we are not empowered 

to decide those arguments merely because an actual controversy 

exists; the plaintiffs before us must also seek relief of the right kind. 

And the relief sought here is not relief that the plaintiffs can receive 
2

even if they are right about the unconstitutionality of the County’s 

action. Accordingly, their claim must be dismissed.

David and Catherine Floam sought a declaratory judgment 

that the Cobb County Board of Commissioners acted 

unconstitutionally when it passed an amendment (“BOC 

Amendment”) changing commission district boundaries that had 

been enacted by the General Assembly in 2022. The trial court ruled 

for the Floams, concluding that the BOC Amendment exceeded the 

County’s Home Rule powers under Article IX, Section II, Paragraph 

I of the Georgia Constitution (the “Home Rule Paragraph”). Cobb 

County appeals, arguing three grounds for reversal: (1) the Floams 

lacked constitutional standing because they did not allege an 

individualized injury; (2) the Floams could not pursue declaratory 

relief because they did not show they faced uncertainty as to their 

future conduct; and (3) the trial court erred on the merits in 

concluding that the BOC Amendment was barred by provisions of 

the Home Rule Paragraph. We conclude that although the Floams 

had constitutional standing, they did not show any uncertainty as 
3

to their future conduct that warranted declaratory relief. Therefore, 

the trial court erred in granting such relief, and we reverse. We do 

not reach the merits of the constitutional arguments.

The record shows the following.1 In early 2022, the General 

Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, Act 562, which revised 

district boundaries for Cobb County commission districts. Act 562 

was supported by less than a majority of the County’s legislative 

delegation and departed from the usual “local courtesy” tradition in 

which a majority of a county’s legislative delegation determines

which local redistricting maps are enacted through local legislation.

Unhappy with this, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners 

(“BOC”) in October 2022 passed the BOC Amendment to amend Act 

562 and create new maps identical to those unsuccessfully proposed 

by the majority legislative delegation. The BOC Amendment 

1 Although this case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment to 

the Floams, the parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Compare Cowart v. 

Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (“In our de novo review 

of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we must view the evidence, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to 

the nonmovant.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
4

provided that it was effective January 1, 2023, so the November 

2022 elections were conducted using the General Assembly’s maps. 

In the summer of 2023, David and Catherine Floam joined an 

existing lawsuit seeking declaratory relief against Cobb County.2

They sought a declaratory judgment that the BOC Amendment was 

unconstitutional under the Home Rule Paragraph and that Act 562 

as passed by the General Assembly is legal and binding; they also 

sought an order declaring that, until the validity of the BOC 

Amendment was determined, the County must not hold any

elections using the County Map and that the County should compel 

the Board of Elections to act accordingly. In their complaint, the 

Floams alleged that the General Assembly’s map placed them in 

District 1, they voted in that district in the November 2022 general 

elections, and the BOC Amendment placed them in District 3. The 

Floams argued that the BOC Amendment affected them in the 

following ways: their commissioner is different from the one they 

2 The lawsuit was initially filed by Cobb County Commissioner Keli 

Gambrill, the trial court dismissed her claims for lack of standing, and she 

ultimately did not appeal that dismissal. 
5

voted for; their legal districts are unknown to them; they have voted 

and intended to vote in future elections; they have an interest in 

voting in a legal district; and they have an interest in having the 

laws of this State properly executed and the public duty in question 

enforced. The Floams alleged that the County had a public duty to 

follow the rule of law and to enforce and implement a legal district 

map so the Cobb County Board of Elections could conduct a lawful 

election, and that voters had a public right to “free and fair elections” 

and a public right to vote in an election based on “lawfully created 

and lawfully implemented district maps.” 

The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other 

things, that the Floams lacked standing. The trial court denied the 

motion, concluding that the Floams had standing because they 

alleged an individualized injury flowing from the constitutionality 

of the BOC Amendment. The trial court concluded that because the 

BOC Amendment changed the Floams’ district after they voted in 

another one, “if the [BOC Amendment] is determined to be 

unconstitutional, . . . then the Floams have identified a harm that is 
6

concrete, actual and particular to them.” The court also concluded 

that the lawsuit was consistent with the purpose of a declaratory 

judgment, because “the Floams’ suit seeks relief from the 

uncertainty and insecurity of their voting rights and voter status in 

light of the disputed districts.” 

The trial court later granted the Floams’ motion for summary 

judgment and denied the County’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment. At issue in this appeal, the parties disputed whether the 

BOC Amendment was within the County’s authority under the 

Home Rule Paragraph. 

The trial court concluded that Cobb County’s BOC Amendment 

was barred by two exceptions to the Home Rule Paragraph and was, 

therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of authority under the 

County’s constitutional Home Rule powers. 

The County appealed. In response, the Floams filed motions to 

expedite the appeal and to lift the supersedeas stay imposed by 

OCGA § 5-6-46 (a). The County opposed both motions. We granted 

the Floams’ motion to expedite the appeal but held in abeyance their
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motion to lift the stay. We held oral arguments on April 17, 2024. 

1. On appeal, the County argues that the Floams do not have 

constitutional standing to challenge the constitutionality of the BOC 

Amendment because they were required to establish an 

individualized injury. The County argues that their claims are based 

only on generalized grievances and not on particularized harms. We 

disagree; to challenge county legislative action, the Floams needed 

only to establish standing as community stakeholders interested in 

their local government following the law, and they have done that. 

Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite necessary to invoke a 

court’s judicial power under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. 

Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I. (“Judicial Power Paragraph”);

SCV, 315 Ga. at 44-45 (2) (a). As we recently explained in SCV, it 

has long been the law that “[w]here a public duty is at stake, a 

plaintiff’s membership in the community provides the necessary 

standing to bring a cause of action to ensure a local government 

follows the law.” Id. at 61 (2) (c) (iii). We arrived at that conclusion 

based on precedent showing that for nearly 100 years prior to the 
8

adoption of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Georgia had allowed 

citizen, taxpayer, resident, or voter suits to challenge various county 

and city actions without demonstrating a particularized injury 

because those community stakeholders had a cognizable interest in 

having their government follow the law. See id. at 53-61 (2) (c) 

(collecting cases). 

The County argues that this standing rule does not apply 

because the Floams are challenging the constitutionality of the BOC 

Amendment. In support, the County relies on long-standing 

precedent that, in order to challenge the constitutionality of state

statutes, the Georgia Constitution requires a more particularized 

injury similar to the federal Article III injury-in-fact requirement. 

See SCV, 315 Ga. at 54 (2) (c) n.13 (citing cases). This Court early 

on recognized that our judicial review was sometimes precluded in 

a way that is akin to the Article III injury-in-fact requirement. We 

first held in 1884 that

[c]omity to a co-ordinate department of the government 

requires, according to many decisions of this and other 

courts, that causes shall not be disposed of upon 
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constitutional grounds when it is possible to avoid such 

questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of parties[.] 

Bd. of Ed. of Glynn County v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353, 354-

355 (1) (1884) (involving challenge to state legislation that created 

board of education and changed funding procedure). Two years later, 

we again emphasized that separation of powers precluded our 

review of a challenge to a state statute regarding a liquor law, 

concluding that it is only when “the law operates upon the private 

property of an individual, and that is seized or destroyed or 

confiscated, or the individual is arrested and indicted thereunder for 

its violation” can the “portion of the law thus affecting his private 

property and personal liberty . . . be assailed by him as 

unconstitutional or illegal[.]” Scoville v. Calhoun, 76 Ga. 263, 269 

(1886). It soon became well settled that a court “will not listen to an 

objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose 

rights it does not affect, and who has, therefore, no interest in 

defeating it.” Reid v. Mayor, Etc. of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755, 757 (6 SE 

602) (1888). These cases show the particularized injury requirement 
10

for challenges to state statutes has long been rooted in principles of 

separation of powers. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III

(“The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain 

separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one 

shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others 

except as herein provided.”).

But a county commission is not a part of State government, 

much less a branch co-equal with the State’s judicial branch. For 

that matter, the constitutional separation of powers principle does

not even apply to counties or municipalities. See Bldg. Auth. of 

Fulton County v. State of Ga., 253 Ga. 242, 247 (5) (321 SE2d 97) 

(1984) (adhering to cases decided prior to adoption of 1983 

Constitution that held “that the constitutional provision applies only 

to the state” and concluding that just as the Separation of Powers 

Provision did not apply to municipalities, it also did not apply to 

county governments because “a county commission is both the 

executive and legislative branch”). Consequently, the animating 

reason to require a particularized injury to challenge state
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legislative actions is not present for challenges to county or 

municipality legislative actions. 

Cobb County correctly argues that there is recent case law 

from this Court seemingly imposing a particularized injury 

requirement for challenges to county ordinances. But a closer review 

of those cases shows that they are analytically unsound and cannot 

be squared with SCV. Even so, in only one case did our holding align 

with the County’s argument, and we overrule that case today. 

First, some of those cases uncritically imported without 

analysis the particularized injury required to challenge state

actions. See, e.g., Manlove v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 

285 Ga. 637, 638 (680 SE2d 405) (2009) (in evaluating challenge to 

county noise ordinance, citing Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. 

Burgess, 282 Ga. 433 (651 SE2d 36) (2007), which involved a 

constitutional challenge to state regulations governing Georgia’s 

Medicaid program). But, as discussed above, the reason for requiring 

a particularized injury for state actions does not carry over to local 

governments. 
12

Other cases imposing the particularized injury requirement to 

county ordinances did so on the basis of federal standing 

jurisprudence. See, e.g., Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners 

Assn. v. Cunard, 306 Ga. 788, 791 (1) (b) (833 SE2d 505) (2019) 

(citing case law that cited United Supreme Court precedent and 

holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue declaratory relief 

against enforcement of county’s stormwater ordinance where the 

“threat of an injury in fact” was “actual and imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical”);3 Granite State Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. 

City of Roswell, 283 Ga. 417, 418 (1) (658 SE2d 587) (2008) (applying 

federal standing jurisprudence to challenge of city sign ordinance);4

3 Polo Golf cited Women’s Surgical Center v. Berry, 302 Ga. 349 (806 

SE2d 606) (2017), which in addition to directly citing United States Supreme 

Court precedent on standing, also contained a “see also” citation to 

GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, 299 Ga. 26 (785 SE2d 874) 

(2016), but that case addressed whether a plaintiff could pursue declaratory 

relief (i.e., had statutory standing), not whether a plaintiff had standing under 

the Georgia Constitution. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, 299 Ga. at 28-31 (1).

4 Granite State cited Bo Fancy Productions v. Rabun County Bd. Of 

Commrs., 267 Ga. 341, 344-345 (478 SE2d 373) (1996), as showing that 

“Georgia jurisprudence” was consistent with the federal case law cited in 

Granite State. See Granite State, 283 Ga. at 420 (1). It is unsurprising that Bo 

Fancy was consistent with federal case law because (1) it involved an 

appellant’s attempt to block a county’s enforcement of a state statute, which 
13

see also Grady v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 289 Ga. 

726, 727 (1) n.1 (715 SE2d 148) (2011) (relying on Granite State and 

case law that relied on Granite State to conclude that appellant had 

“unquestioned standing to lodge a facial challenge to the provision 

of the [county] ordinance under which he was convicted, as he clearly 

suffered an ‘injury in fact’ when he was penalized”). None of these 

cases considered standing under the Georgia Constitution, and they 

were wrong to rely on federal standing jurisprudence to consider 

challenges to county ordinances, because “federal standing doctrine 

does not control” the nature of the state judicial power. See SCV, 315 

Ga. at 46 (2) (a). 

Moreover, these cases all post-date the adoption of the 1983 

Constitution. As described above and discussed more fully in SCV, 

requires a particularized injury, and (2) it was a challenge based on First 

Amendment grounds. Bo Fancy, 267 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (a). Neither Bo Fancy, 

nor the case cited therein (Stewart v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 760, 764 (1) (130 SE2d 

822) (1963)), is relevant here because neither involved constitutional 

challenges to county legislation. See Bo Fancy, 267 Ga. at 344-345 (2) (a). 

Moreover, Granite State was the only one of these cases to conclude that 

standing was lacking; the others all either failed to address standing or found 

standing was present, and so have little precedential force on this point. And 

there was no indication in Granite State that the plaintiff would have cleared 

SCV’s community stakeholder standing threshold, either.
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the Judicial Power Paragraph had a fixed meaning based on 

consistent and definitive precedent that allowed community 

stakeholders to sue to challenge county action. The cases post-dating 

the 1983 Constitution cannot change the meaning of the Judicial 

Power Paragraph. See Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 235 (2) (c) (i) (806 

SE2d 505) (2017) (“[T]here are few principles of Georgia law more 

venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional

provision means today what it meant at the time that it was 

enacted.”).5

5 Because Granite State is the only case that held that the plaintiffs 

lacked a particularized injury to challenge a county ordinance, it is the only 

case we need consider whether to overrule. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, 

we consider whether to retain incorrect precedent by balancing “the 

importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it 

decided right.” State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 123 (2) (829 SE2d 367) (2019)

(citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). In making this 

determination, we often consider, among other things, “the age of precedent, 

the reliance interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most 

importantly, the soundness of its reasoning.” Olevik, 302 Ga. at 244-245 (2) (c)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Also relevant is the extent to which the 

decision was the result of actual legal reasoning. See Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 

876, 887-888 (885 SE2d 725) (2023) (stare decisis did not require retaining a 

decision that was “unreasoned (bordering on accidental)” and “in conflict with 

our own decisions”); Ammons v. State, 315 Ga. 149, 171-172 (1) (880 SE2d 544) 

(2022) (Pinson, J., concurring) (“If the past decision in question is unreasoned, 

or if it disregards the basic legal principles that courts use to do law, the 

argument for overruling is easier to make.”).
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Here, the Floams’ standing is firmly established. Because the 

Floams are residents of Cobb County, they are community 

stakeholders in that government. As we made clear in SCV, 

community stakeholders have standing to enforce a public duty. 

SCV, 315 Ga. at 60 (2) (c) (iii). The entire dispute in this case is about 

We have already explained that Granite State did not offer any reasoning 

for importing the particularized injury requirement applicable to challenges to 

statutes. And we have typically applied stare decisis with less force to 

constitutional decisions, meaning that there is “less room . . . for the other 

factors to preserve [incorrect precedent].” Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245 (2) (c) (iv). 

None of the remaining factors support retaining Granite State’s rule. It was 

decided 16 years ago, and we have overruled decisions much older than that. 

See, e.g., Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017)

(overruling 45-year-old precedent); State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661-662 (748 

SE2d 910) (2013) (overruling 38-year-old precedent). There are no reliance 

interests at stake, and Granite State has not become “deeply entrenched in our 

jurisprudence.” See, e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 

309 Ga. 44, 60 (3) (c) (844 SE2d 749) (2020) (in considering age of precedent 

and reliance interests, noting that the precedent at issue had not “become 

deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence”); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) 

(b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most common in 

contract and property cases where parties may have acted in conformance with 

existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions). Finally, the rule 

articulated in SCV is much more workable than the particularized-injury rule 

similar to the injury-in-fact rule that is part of federal standing jurisprudence. 

See, e.g., Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F3d 1110, 1115-1117 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring) (noting difficulty and inconsistency in 

applying the injury-in-fact requirement). Because none of the stare decisis 

factors weigh in favor of retaining Granite State, we overrule it. And we 

likewise disapprove any other cases to the extent that they could be read to

impose a particularized injury requirement to challenge the constitutionality 

of county actions, legislative or otherwise. 
16

that public duty. In enacting Act 562, the General Assembly set the 

electoral district lines for Cobb County. Although the parties dispute 

whether Cobb County had the authority to revise those district lines, 

it could only do so if the Home Rule Paragraph allowed. Whether 

this case is framed as a duty to follow Act 562 or a requirement to 

follow the Home Rule Paragraph, in either case, the heart of the case 

concerns Cobb County’s duty to follow the law. This is sufficient to 

confer standing for the Floams’ challenge to the BOC Amendment. 

See SCV, 315 Ga. at 61 (2) (c) (iii) (“Where a public duty is at stake, 

a plaintiff’s membership in the community provides the necessary 

standing to bring a cause of action to ensure a local government 

follows the law.”); see also Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 

272 (3) (b) (i) (840 SE2d 423) (2020) (“Williams, as a citizen of 

DeKalb County, generally has standing pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24 

to bring a claim seeking to require a public official to perform the 

public duties that the General Assembly has conferred upon that 

official.”); League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County v. City 

of Atlanta, 245 Ga. 301, 303-304 (1) (264 SE2d 859) (1980) (“We hold 
17

that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. In this state, it is 

established that a citizen and taxpayer of a municipality, without 

the necessity for showing any special injury, has standing” to 

challenge city council committee appointments as ultra vires actions 

by municipal officer).6

2. The County next argues that even if the Floams have 

constitutional standing, they cannot obtain a declaratory judgment 

because they do not face the requisite uncertainty about future 

decisions they may face. We agree. 

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the courts of this State 

are authorized “to declare rights and other legal relations of any 

interested party petitioning for such declaration” “[i]n cases of 

6 The County also argues that the Floams could not assert taxpayer 

standing because redistricting legislation does “not create an illegal debt, cause 

illegal expenses to be incurred, result in increased taxes, or misappropriate 

funds.” The County cites SCV for this proposition, but SCV did not hold that a 

plaintiff’s interest in having their local government follow the law was 

dependent on illegal expenditures; indeed it recognized that one’s membership 

in the community sometimes is sufficient to confer standing to sue a local 

government “even in cases where no tax dollars [are] directly implicated.” SCV, 

315 Ga. at 59 (2) (c) (ii). In any case, the County’s argument ignores the fact 

that there are expenses incurred by preparing for and conducting elections, 

which are predicated upon electoral district lines; if the redistricting is illegal, 

taxpayers face a substantial risk of injury as a result.
18

actual controversy” and “in any civil case in which . . . the ends of 

justice [so] require[.]” OCGA § 9-4-2 (a), (b). Although the Act is to 

be “liberally construed and administered[,]” the text of the Act also 

plainly states that its purpose “is to settle and afford relief from 

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other 

legal relations[.]” OCGA § 9-4-1. This language has been part of the 

Act since it was first enacted in 1945. See Ga. L. 1945, pp. 137, 139, 

§ 13. In one of the first cases interpreting the Act, this Court made 

the following observation:

Doubtless [the Act] was designed to afford security and 

relief against uncertainty and to guide parties to a 

contract or occupying other legal or jural relations as to 

their future conduct with a view to avoid litigation, rather 

than in aid of it, and to settle and fix rights at a time 

before there had been breaches of contracts, violation and 

disregard of rights of others, and thus promote peace, 

quiet, and justice, with the ultimate end always 

constantly in view that one of the chief purposes is to 

declare rights rather than to exclude them.

Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 67 (1) (35 SE2d 915) (1945) (citation 

omitted). We explained the Act was designed to “give additional 

protection to persons who may become involved in an actual 
19

justiciable controversy, in that they differ between themselves as to 

what their rights are, and who wish to find them out before taking 

some dangerous step which might or might not be authorized.” Id. 

at 68 (1). 

Since that initial observation about the Act’s design, this Court 

has consistently and repeatedly focused on whether an adjudication 

of rights was necessary in order to help or protect the petitioner or 

plaintiff. Early on, we said that a petition for declaratory relief will 

lie only

when there be some fact or circumstances which 

necessitate[s] a determination of disputes, not merely for 

the purpose of enforcing accrued rights[,] but in order to 

guide and protect the petitioner from uncertainty and 

insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act 

or conduct which is properly incident to his alleged rights, 

and which future action without such direction might 

reasonably jeopardize his interest.

Aldridge v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 203 Ga. 285, 291 (3) (46 

SE2d 578) (1948) (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also City 

of Atlanta v. Hotels.com, 285 Ga. 231, 234-235 (674 SE2d 898) (2009)

(“[T]o state a claim for declaratory judgment, a party need only 
20

allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in which future 

conduct depends on resolution of uncertain legal relations.”). 

Since that early construction of the Act, our holdings have 

repeatedly rejected claims for declaratory judgment when a 

declaration of rights would not direct the plaintiff’s future conduct

or involved only a determination of rights that had already accrued. 

See, e.g., Clein v. Kaplan, 201 Ga. 396, 406 (1) (40 SE2d 133) (1946) 

(“petition did not state a proper cause for declaratory relief” because 

it was “nothing more than a simple creditor’s action, asking the 

distribution of a corporation’s assets in equity”); Gibbs v. Forrester, 

204 Ga. 545, 549 (2) (50 SE2d 318) (1948) (action to declare that the 

plaintiff and the defendant were not husband and wife failed 

because the only issue was one of fact known to the parties and the 

petitioner was “not asking the court for any light before taking a 

step in the dark”); Sumner v. Davis, 211 Ga. 702, 703 (2) (88 SE2d 

392) (1955) (declaratory judgment action should have been 

dismissed because the petitioner alleged no facts showing that an 

“adjudication of their rights [was] necessary in order to relieve them 
21

from the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their 

rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their 

interest”); Ga. Southern & Fl. Railway Co. v. State Highway Dept., 

216 Ga. 812 (120 SE2d 122) (1961) (declaratory judgment did not lie 

where the rights of the parties had already accrued and where the 

petitioner alleged with certainty and definiteness that it owned the 

land being allegedly appropriated by the highway department); 

Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541 (123 SE2d 721) (1962) 

(declaratory judgment action could not be maintained where 

plaintiff failed to allege need for guidance as to his future conduct 

but rather merely sought declaration that constitutional 

amendment was void); Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Ga. Assn. 

of Petroleum Retailers, 219 Ga. 665, 670 (1) (a) (135 SE2d 330) (1964)

(declaratory action seeking to invalidate a contract was improper 

where the petitioner was not uncertain as to any rights under 

contract, had already “elected its course” by taking certain actions 

to renounce the contract as invalid and unenforceable, “and hence 

ha[d] no need for guidance as to what step to take”); Salomon v. 
22

Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 220 Ga. 671, 672 (1) (141 SE2d 424) (1965) 

(“[w]hatever rights the plaintiffs may have been denied . . . [or] 

acquired” by the stockholders’ meeting, there was no cause of action 

for declaratory relief because the plaintiffs’ rights had already 

accrued and there were no factual allegations showing that an 

adjudication was “necessary in order to relieve the plaintiffs from 

the risk of taking any future undirected action incident to their 

rights, which action without direction would jeopardize their 

interests”); Womble v. Ga. State Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 221 

Ga. 457, 459-460 (1) (145 SE2d 485) (1965) (State Board’s claim that 

declaratory judgment was “necessary to relieve the parties ‘from the 

risk of taking any future undirected action incident thereto,’” was 

conclusory and totally unsupported by any allegations of facts or 

circumstances showing any risk or uncertainty); Fourth St. Baptist 

Church of Columbus v. Bd. of Registrars, 253 Ga. 368, 369 (1) (320 

SE2d 543) (1984) (claims for declaratory relief were properly 

dismissed where plaintiffs “face[d] no uncertainty or insecurity with 

respect to their voting rights, nor any risk stemming from 
23

undirected future action”); Morgan v. Guar. Nat. Companies, 268 

Ga. 343, 345 (489 SE2d 803) (1997) (“Because [the petitioner] has 

not demonstrated a need for a legal judgment that would control its 

future action, in that its defenses to any claim under the policy can 

be presented when suit is entered . . . , a declaratory judgment action

was inappropriate.”); Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 214 (1)

(518 SE2d 879) (1999) (trial court erred in ruling on declaratory 

judgment action where plaintiff did not assert that it faced a risk of 

taking future undirected action and defendant argued that only the 

plaintiff sought declaratory relief); Gwinnett County v. Blaney, 275 

Ga. 696, 703-704 (1) (572 SE2d 553) (2002) (petition seeking 

declaration that petitioner was entitled to payment of incurred legal 

fees under a county indemnification plan was not authorized 

because the petitioner sought a determination after legal expenses 

had already been incurred and a finding that plan would have 

covered the petitioner in the lawsuit would not “portend, much less 

determine, any questions of [petitioner’s] coverage” in future legal 

actions against him); SJN Props. v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 
24

296 Ga. 793, 803 (2) (b) (iii) (770 SE2d 832) (2015) (declaratory relief 

properly denied where claimant failed to show that it faced any 

uncertainty or insecurity as to any of its own future conduct, but 

rather sought an adjudication that would impact the future conduct 

of the defendant); Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 311 

Ga. 682, 695-696 (3) (c) (859 SE2d 33) (2021) (appellants’ claim for 

declaratory relief was properly dismissed because, even if the 

agency’s decision was wrong, the appellants faced no uncertainty as 

to an alleged right), disapproved of in part on other grounds by Bray 

v. Watkins, 317 Ga. 703, 704-705 (895 SE2d 282) (2023). 

Applying that framework here, the Floams’ allegations are 

insufficient to support declaratory relief. The thrust of the Floams’ 

“uncertainty” is that they do not know in which district they reside, 

but this is not the kind of uncertainty required by our case law. A 

request for declaratory relief is a request for “prospective relief—

relief from the threat of wrongful acts and injuries yet to come.” 

Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 434 (III) (C) (801 SE2d 867) (2017). 

The Floams allege several past injuries resulting from the BOC 
25

Amendment, but they have not alleged threatened future injury that 

a declaration would prevent them from suffering.

The Floams alleged in their complaint that they should belong 

in District 1 per the General Assembly’s redistricting, they voted in 

that district in November 2022, and as a result of the allegedly 

illegal BOC Amendment, they are represented by a commissioner 

different from the one for whom they voted. The Floams also assert 

on appeal that they are uncertain whether their November 2022 

votes “functionally counted.” 

It is not clear what the Floams mean by the uncertainty as to 

whether their votes “functionally counted.” Regardless, their past

votes have no relation to any uncertainty as to their future conduct.

The Floams frame their right as the right to be represented by the 

person for whom they voted. But any violation of such a right 

occurred once the BOC Amendment took effect, and the Floams have 

not alleged how that past violation creates uncertainty as to their 

future conduct. They merely argue on appeal that they cannot 

“confidently participate in their government or rely on their 
26

commissioner to represent their interests because they would not 

know who their lawful commissioner is for the next [two] years.” No 

doubt, everyone has a right to participate in their government, 

contact their representative, and even campaign or support a 

candidate, but the Floams do not point to any authority for the 

proposition that they have a right to do so “confidently.” And nothing 

about the BOC Amendment infringes on their right to political 

participation. The Floams may be uncertain about which county 

commissioner should represent them, but they do not show any

future action they risk taking based on this uncertainty. 

Their uncertainty regarding whether their 2022 votes 

“functionally counted” or whether they can participate in their local 

government affairs “confidently” is simply insufficient to warrant 

declaratory relief. See City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 

307 Ga. 877, 880 (838 SE2d 834) (2020) (“[T]he relief sought by a 

plaintiff must have some immediate legal effect on the parties’ 

conduct, rather than simply burning off an abstract fog of 

uncertainty.” (emphasis added)). 
27

With respect to future elections, no declaratory relief lies here 

either. The Floams may be uncertain as to whether they lawfully 

reside in District 1 or District 3, but this uncertainty, without more, 

is insufficient to support a declaration. The Floams must allege that 

they are at risk of taking some undirected future action incident to 

their rights and that such action might jeopardize their interests. 

They have failed to do so.

The Floams alleged in their complaint that they will vote in 

future elections, including those for the BOC, and there is no 

allegation that they will not be allowed to vote in such elections. The 

Floams allege that they might vote in the “wrong” district, but they 

know what district they are assigned under the BOC Amendment; 

they have no decision to make about where to vote. 

By seeking a determination on the validity of the BOC 

Amendment, the Floams are not asking for guidance with respect to 

actions they might take or alleging that they risk taking some 

dangerous step that may or may not be authorized. The Floams’ 

uncertainty, then, does not concern their own future conduct. 
28

Instead, by asking for a declaration that the BOC Amendment was 

illegal, the Floams are merely attempting to enforce rights that had 

already accrued and attempting to direct the future actions of the 

County, which is insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. 

See Williams, 308 Ga. at 271 (3) (a) (citizen could not pursue 

declaratory relief to challenge legality of county ordinances because 

he did not “allege or argue that he face[d] any uncertainty or 

insecurity as to his own future conduct”); SJN Props., 296 Ga. at 803 

(2) (b) (iii) (claimant failed to show that it faced any uncertainty or 

insecurity as to any of its own future conduct and instead sought an 

adjudication that would impact the future conduct of the defendant); 

Sapp v. ABC Credit & Inv. Co., 243 Ga. 151, 159 (5) (253 SE2d 82) 

(1979) (petitioner did not show that a declaratory judgment was 

“necessary to relieve her of the risk of taking some future undirected

action incident to her rights which might jeopardize her interest”

when she had already acted when her petition was filed); see also

Drawdy v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 277 Ga. 107, 109 (586 SE2d 228)

(2003) (“The law is well established that declaratory judgment is not 
29

available where a judgment cannot guide and protect the petitioner 

with regard to some future act[.]” (citation and punctuation 

omitted)); Venable v. Dallas, 212 Ga. 595, 595 (94 SE2d 416) (1956)

(“[O]ne walking in full daylight, who knows where he is going and is 

confident of the course he is pursuing, has no need either of artificial 

light or judicial advice.”); Shippen, 200 Ga. at 68 (1) (the Act is 

intended to “give additional protection to persons who may . . . wish 

to find [their rights] out before taking some dangerous step which 

might or might not be authorized”).

To be clear, the fact that there are two competing maps does 

create significant uncertainty for many.7 But the Floams have not 

shown that this uncertainty affects their future conduct. They have 

not established that they are insecure about some future action they 

plan to take, and they have not shown a need to declare rights upon 

7 In its amicus brief, the Cobb County Board of Elections and 

Registration (“BOER”) pointed to its own uncertainty as to whether the BOC 

Amendment was valid and asked for some resolution in time for it implement 

a redistricting map before the qualifying period that began on March 2, 2024. 

Given BOER’s duties in administering elections, that is the kind of uncertainty 

that would support a declaratory judgment. But BOER is not a party to this 

case, and the Floams cannot use a nonparty’s uncertainty to establish their 

own standing. 
30

which their future conduct depends. See Sexual Offender 

Registration Rev. Bd. v. Berzett, 301 Ga. 391, 393 (801 SE2d 821)

(2017) (“The proper scope of declaratory judgment is to adjudge 

those rights among parties upon which their future conduct 

depends.” (emphasis added; citation and punctuation omitted)). 

Instead, the Floams’ claims boil down to an attempt to enforce 

accrued rights and guide the future conduct of the defendants or the 

BOER. Because the Floams have not shown that they qualify for 

declaratory relief, we reverse. We express no view about the correct 

resolution of the very serious constitutional issues with the BOC 

Amendment.8

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

8 Although we do not reach the issue, we are thankful for the amicus 

brief filed by the Attorney General, which addressed the issue of Cobb County’s 

authority under the Home Rule Paragraph to pass the BOC Amendment. The 

Attorney General took no position on the Floams’ standing. 
31

 BETHEL, J., concurring.

I agree with the opinion of the Court and join it in full. I write 

separately to note my concern about the possible effect of further 

delay in reaching the merits of the Cobb County Commission’s effort 

to redistrict itself, which it seems will inevitably be reached. A 

delayed loss by Cobb could give rise to calamitous consequences 

inflicting serious expense and practical hardship on its citizens. 

Accordingly, I urge Cobb to act with all dispatch in obtaining a final 

answer on the legal merits of its chosen path.

I offer the following illustration not to suggest what will 

happen, but only to show what might happen, assuming Cobb’s 

merits argument ultimately fails.9 It is clear that Cobb has asserted 

a novel application of the constitutional Home Rule powers that has 

never been decided by this Court, though the only Georgia court to 

reach the merits of Cobb’s argument found it untenable. We 

9 While this hypothetical presumes that Cobb’s argument on the merits 

ultimately fails, I do not suggest that will be the likely outcome, and I reiterate 

that is not a question we decide here. Given the merits arguments presented 

thus far, however, it seems fair to observe that Cobb has a substantial risk of 

losing and it seems unwise to ignore that risk.
32

concluded today that the present action is not the proper vehicle by 

which to litigate this issue. But sooner or later, a proper party will 

almost certainly bring a proper claim, and a court will decide the 

novel issue raised in this case. A review of the record and the current 

posture of the Cobb County Commission suggests that an adverse 

merits decision for Cobb could feasibly result in at least one current 

Commission member to be found to lack residency in his or her 

district. And Cobb is currently conducting elections for two seats 

under the contested maps. Litigation during and even after those 

elections seems inevitable. But litigation takes time, and it is easily 

within the realm of possibility that several months could pass before 

such litigation is concluded, particularly if Cobb continues to pursue 

what could be interpreted as a deliberately leisurely litigation 

strategy. 

Indeed, depending on the timeline of any future litigation, it 

would not be inconceivable for Cobb to find itself with three vacant 

Commission seats and the Commission unable to form a quorum, 

leaving its citizens without duly elected representation. To avoid 
33

these possibilities, it seems to me that Cobb has an interest in 

reaching a merits-based resolution as quickly as possible. I urge 

Cobb to act with all due haste in securing finality.