NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD EVANS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

USF REDDAWAY, INC., an Oregon 

Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-35603

D.C. No. 

1:15-cv-00499-EJL-REB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2018**

Portland, Oregon

Before: WARDLAW and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and LEFKOW,*** District 

Judge.

Edward Evans appeals following the district court’s final order granting 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joan Lefkow, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 16 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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summary judgment to USF Reddaway, Inc. As the parties are familiar with the 

facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we affirm.

Having filed a complaint alleging retaliation in violation of the “complaints 

clause” of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”), 49 U.S.C. 

§ 31105(a)(1)(A), Evans was required to show that he engaged in a statutorilyprotected activity. Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i).1 This portion of the STAA protects 

employees who have “filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a 

violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety or security regulation, standard or 

order.” Id. § 31105(a)(1)(A)(i). 

Evans argues that his complaints to the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration and Reddaway management about poor conditions at two terminal 

lots on his trucking route were related to several Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Regulations that govern the commercial trucking industry. Specifically, Evans 

points to regulations of driving in extreme weather and road conditions (49 C.F.R. 

 

1 Because the STAA was amended in 2007 to incorporate the burdens of 

proof in the whistleblower provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment 

and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”), we apply the AIR-21 burdenshifting framework. See 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(1) (“All complaints initiated under 

this section shall be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 

42121(b).”); cf. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(applying AIR-21 burden-shifting framework to retaliation claim under the 

Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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§ 392.14), driving while the operator’s alertness is impaired by “fatigue, illness, or 

another other cause” (49 C.F.R. § 392.3), and conducting mandatory vehicle safety 

inspections (49 C.F.R. §§ 392.7, 392.9). 

Evans’ complaints—dirt, dust, gravel, ruts, poor lighting, and lack of 

fencing/security at the two Reddaway terminals—relate to general workplace 

safety conditions at the lots, rather than commercial motor vehicle safety or 

security. Thus, his complaints are not reasonably related to a violation of a 

commercial motor vehicle safety regulation and are therefore not protected activity 

under the STAA.

AFFIRMED.