alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT RANDY A. HART, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-1185 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed October 16, 2019. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Polk County; William D.Sites, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Waiter v. State, 965 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Henry v. State, 933 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Steward v. State, 931 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Shortridge v. State, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
KHOUZAM, C.J., and CASANUEVA and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 114 (Tuesday, June 16, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 28557]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-14067]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-64,221]


Hella Electronics Corporation, Including Workers of Hella 
Corporate Center, USA, Formerly Known as Hella North America, Including 
On-Site Leased Workers from Westaff, Flora, IL; Amended Certification 
Regarding Eligibility To Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and 
Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance

    In accordance with Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
2273), and Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974 (26 U.S.C. 2813), as 
amended, the Department of Labor issued a Certification of Eligibility 
to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Assistance on January 9, 2009, applicable to workers of 
Hella Electronics Corporation, Flora, Illinois, including on-site 
leased workers from Westaff. The notice was published in the Federal 
Register on February 2, 2009 (74 FR 5870).
    At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the 
certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers produce 
sensors and relays such as accelerator pedal sensors, washer pumps and 
various other electronics for automobiles.
    The intent of the Department's certification is to include all 
workers of the subject firm adversely affected by the shift in 
production of accelerator pedal sensors, washer pumps and various other 
electronics for automobiles to Mexico.
    New information shows that the worker group included workers of 
Hella Corporate Center, USA, formerly known as Hella North America. The 
Department has determined that these workers were not separately 
identifiable from the workers of Hella Electronics Corporation.
    Based on these findings, the Department is amending this 
certification to include workers of Hella Corporate Center, USA, 
formerly known as Hella North America working at the Flora, Illinois 
location of the subject firm.
    The amended notice applicable to TA-W-64,221 is hereby issued as 
follows:

``All workers of Hella Electronics Corporation, including workers of 
Hella Corporate Center, USA, formerly known as Hella North America, 
including on-site leased workers from Westaff, Flora, Illinois, who 
became totally or partially separated from employment on or after 
October 13, 2007, through January 9, 2011, are eligible to apply for 
adjustment assistance under Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
and are also eligible to apply for alternative trade adjustment 
assistance under Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974.''

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 6th day of May 2009.
Richard Church,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. E9-14067 Filed 6-15-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
Exhibit 99(a)3

             [Letterhead of Clark, Thomas & Winters]




                         March 11, 1996


Gulf States Utilities Company
639 Loyola Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Attn:  Scott Forbes

     Re:  SEC Form 10-K Gulf States Utilities Company (the
          "Company") for the year ending December 31, 1995

Dear Mr. Forbes:

      Our  firm  has rendered to the Company two opinion  letters
dated  September 30, 1992 and August 8, 1994, concerning  certain
issues  presented  in  the appeal of PUCT  Docket  No.  7195  now
pending in the Texas Supreme Court.  In connection with the above-
referenced  Form  10-K, we confirm to you as of the  date  hereof
that  we  continue to hold the opinions set forth in  the  letter
dated  August 8, 1994 and in the September 30, 1992 letter  which
addressed  the  recovery of $1.45 billion of abeyed  construction
costs.1

CLARK, THOMAS & WINTERS,
A Professional Corporation



By:   /s/ CLARK, THOMAS & WINTERS,
          A Professional Corporation



_______________________________
1    The opinion letter dated September 30, 1992 indicates that
the amount of River Bend plant costs held in abeyance was $1.45
billion.  The more correct amount, as indicated by the Company in
its securities filings to which those opinions related, is $1.4
billion.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ROBERT HARRY THOMAS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 484 MAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 2016

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal and Motion to Answer are DENIED.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 113 (Monday, June 15, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 28278]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-13921]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--ASTM International

    Notice is hereby given that, on May 18, 2009, pursuant to Section 
6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 
15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), ASTM International (``ASTM'') has 
filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing additions or changes to its 
standards development activities. The notifications were filed for the 
purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of 
antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. 
Specifically, ASTM has provided an updated list of current, ongoing 
ASTM standards activities originating between February 2009 and May 
2009 designated as Work Items. A complete listing of ASTM Work Items, 
along with a brief description of each, is available at http://www.astm.org.
    On September 15, 2004, ASTM filed its original notification 
pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice 
published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of 
the Act on November 10, 2004 (69 FR 65226).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on February 17, 
2009. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on March 13, 2009 (74 FR 10966).

Patricia A. Brink,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. E9-13921 Filed 6-12-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
Exhibit 32.1
                    CERTIFICATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 63 1350, the President/Chief Executive Officer of
Art's-Way Manufacturing Co., Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify that
this Form 10-KSB and the financial statements thereto fully comply with
the requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-KSB and the
financial statements thereto fairly present, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

By: /s/ John C. Breitung

Name: John C.Breitung
President and Chief Executive Officer

Date 2/28/06
<PAGE>   1
                                                                EXHIBIT 11
                           CONTINENTAL CIRCUITS CORP.
                STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE
                                   (Unaudited)
                      (In thousands, except per share data)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                      Three months ended                   Nine Months Ended
                                                    May 3,         April 30,            May 3,         April 30,
                                                   --------------------------          ------------------------
                                                    1997              1996              1997              1996
                                                   ------            ------            ------            ------

<S>                                                <C>               <C>               <C>               <C>
Weighted average shares outstanding (1)             7,457             7,413             7,450             7,428

Net income                                         $2,379            $1,380            $5,629            $5,933

Net income per share                               $ 0.32            $ 0.19            $ 0.76            $ 0.80
</TABLE>


--------------------------

(1)   Common stock equivalents, which were dilutive, were included in the
      computation of weighted average number of shares outstanding.
## The Smokejumper and Hotshot Status Reports Have Moved

Please update your bookmarks for these reports to the following URL addresses:

**Smokejumper Status Report:**

http://www.nifc.gov/smokejumper/reports/smjrpt.php

**Hotshot Status Report:**

http://www.nifc.gov/smokejumper/reports/hotshotrpt.php
#### UNITED STATES of America, v. Yury MARIN-QUINTERO, Defendant.

No. 05 Cr. 965.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Aug. 4, 2008.

Daniel Lawrence Stein, Lead Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, SDNY, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

David Meister, Lead Attorney, Clifford Chance US, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

*DECISION AND ORDER*

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Pro se defendant Yury Marin-Quintero (“Marin-Quintero”) pled guilty to a charge of conspiring to import approximately 300 grams of heroin into the United States, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 963. The Court sentenced MarinQuintero to a term of incarceration of 60 months.

On July 23, 2008, Marin-Quintero filed the instant motion seeking immediate deportation to Colombia, pursuant to Section 242(h)(2) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 USC § 1242(h)(2)(a) (“ § 1242”). MarinQuintero argues that he qualifies as an “alien,” as that term is defined in Section 101(a) (8) of the INA, and thus that he is eligible for immediate deportation. For the reasons stated below, Marin-Quintero’s motion is DENIED.

*DISCUSSION*

Section 1242 provides in pertinent part that:

> The Attorney General is authorized to deport an alien in accordance with applicable procedures under [the INA] prior to the completion of a sentence of imprisonment—

> in the case of an alien in the custody of the Attorney General, if the Attorney General determines that (i) the alien is confined pursuant to a final conviction for a nonviolent offense ..., and (ii) such deportation of the alien is appropriate and in the best interest of the United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1242(h)(2)(a).

The statute is clear on its face. It confers authority on the Attorney General, prior to the completion of their sentence, to deport aliens who are confined for conviction of nonviolent offenses. However, *510this authority is entirely within the sole discretion of the Attorney General; nothing in the statute mandates deportation. *See Thye v. United States,*109 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir.1997). Nor does the law, as the Government’s opposition points out, create a private right of action for an alien to compel deportation. *See, e.g., Loaiza v. INS,*No. 98 Civ. 1112, 1998 WL 863126, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1998).

*ORDER*

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion of Yury Marin-Quintero for an order of immediate deportation is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
#### W. Robert McCARTHY, Plaintiff (Alfred F. Bracher, Jr., Robert P. Morrissey, John F. Miller, co-partners, trading as Jones, Miller & Company; Jeanette Bohrer, Joel L. Bohrer, Raymond Spitalnick, Donald Spitalnick and Joseph Spitalnick, Harry G. Schnitzler, John F. Miller and Leonard Cowen, Applicants for Intervention) v. The AUTOCAR COMPANY and the White Motor Company, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 15751.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

July 5, 1955.

George W. McKeag, Philips, Farran & McKeag, Robert C. Kitchen, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

C. L. Cushmore, Jr., Thomas Raeburn White, Philadelphia, Pa., Payne & Steingarten, New York City, White, Williams & Scott, Philadelphia, Pa., for Autocar Co.

Robert T. McCracken, John F. Headly, Joseph W. Swain, Jr., Montgomery, Mc-Cracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., John H. Watson, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio,, for White Motor Co.

KIRKPATRICK, Chief Judge.

In the present case, unlike the Northeast Clackamas case, cited by the petitioners, the parties who wish to intervene, if allowed to do so, would not beintervenors in the real sense. They do-not desire to prosecute or to defend the original lawsuit. All they are asking for is to be allowed to prosecute their own similar and independent causes of action at the same time that the nonresident plaintiffs are prosecuting theirs.

In Wichita R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124, the Court held that joinder of a party who was of the same citizenship as the plaintiff would not defeat jurisdiction of the original cause of action, since that party was primarily concerned' with the results of that cause of action. It is quite different to hold that diversity is not required where the “intervenor” is attempting to assert his own independent cause of action, even though it arises from the same transaction as the original one.

In summary — in cases where the intervenor is attempting to prosecute or defeat the original cause of action, the courts are concerned with whether or not there is jurisdiction of that original-cause of action. In the present ease where the proposed intervenors are asserting an independent cause of action, the Court must concern itself with whether or not it has jurisdiction of the intervenors, cause of action.

The original order of this Court is affirmed.
#### Talib Alnur SPRUILL, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Gene M. JOHNSON, Director, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 06-6418.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2006.

Decided: June 20, 2006.

Talib Alnur Spruill, Appellant Pro Se.

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Talib Alnur Spruill seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying as successive his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Spruill has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
#### YAN TU ZHAO, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES,1 Respondent.

No. 04-3425-AG.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 25, 2006.

Thomas Y. Massucci, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Stephen J. Sorenson, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Utah, Dustin Pead, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, UT, for Respondent.

Present JAMES L. OAKES, RICHARD J. CARDAMONE and DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judges.

1

. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales is automatically substituted for former Attorney General John Ashcroft.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Yan Tu Zhao, through counsel, petitions for'review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

When moving to reopen removal proceedings based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, strict adherence to *In re Lozada,*19 I. *&*N. Dec. 637, 1988 WL 235454 (BIA 1988), is not always required. However, we have held that petitioners who seek to reopen based on ineffective counsel must still “comply substantially” with *In re Lozada’s*procedural requirements. *See Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,*409 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir.2005). Two of those requirements are to (1) establish that former counsel has been informed of the allegations of ineffective counsel and given an opportunity to respond and (2) that a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authorities had been filed, and if not, *36why. *Zheng,*409 F.3d at 45 n. 1. Although Zhao filed a complaint with the proper disciplinary authorities, he admits that he did not notify his prior counsel of his accusations nor did he provide him with an opportunity to respond. He claims his failure to notify is excusable because it was reasonable for him to assume that the bar authorities would notify his prior counsel for him. It is correct that a valid explanation as to why a disciplinary complaint was not filed against a petitioner’s former counsel may excuse the failure to file a complaint. *See In re Lozada,*19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. Putting aside whether a similar exception exists for *In re Lozada’s*notice requirement, Zhao did not even provide an explanation to the BIA of why he did not notify prior counsel. Thus, even if the BIA would have entertained Zhao’s explanation for why he did not comply with *In re Lozada,*we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion where he provided it with no such explanation.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Having completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).
01/25/2001 15: 09 9879091 JE PAGE 23

~

~ ~ 987497o

9674091 22223 Hl9hway 29 ~ RanaMrta Road P 0. Bc~ 1035 Mlddtelowvi, GA 95481

JOSE 99~ON UI, Ctiejmian

V ~IIFLA REVES. VIcs.CbaIrpor~nn UJYA RIV~A, $ecretary RESOLuTION NUMBER 2ooO-1~-os AJIQ~E GAWPE4RIONU. lluaaur,r

I4ASKOLA RIVERA, keprB5ontatIvD

IN TILE MATTER OF: Authorizing Fingerprint cards to be completed by an authorized law

enf~rcement agency tbr the Middletown Rancheria Tribal Gaming Commission.

WI-JEREAS, The Middletown Rancheria is a federally recognized Indian Tribe as defined under the

Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, governed under the General Council of the

Middletown Rancheria and;

WHEREAS, The Middletown Rancheria owns and operates the Twin Pine Casino as provided for

under the Tribes duly enacted Tribal Gaming Ordinance authorizing such activities; and

W}IEREAS, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 provides the regulatory authority by which

the Middletown Rancheria caii regulate gaming activities conducted within the

boundaries otits Rancheria and;

WHEREAS, The Middletown Rancheria established the Middletown Rancheria Tribal Gaming

Commission to comply with the MiddIet~wn ~ancheria Tribal Gaming Ordinance, the

provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, regulations enacted by the National

Indian Gaming Commission, and provisions of any Tribal-State Compact governing Cl;~ss

Ill gaming on Micidletown Rancheria Tribal lands.

NOW TI-IEREFORE RE IT RESOLVED, that the Middletown Rancheria hereby authorii~es

the Middlet~wn Rancheria Tribal c:;aming Commission to enforce all provisions of the

Tribes and Federal Regulations or provisions of any Tribal-State Compact

RE IT FUTHER RESOLVED, that Fingerprinting cards anti process be compLeted by the Lake

County Sheriffs Department of California or until the time that the Tribal Gaming

Commission has met the required training for fingerprinting.
01/25/2001 15:09 9879091 JE PAGE 24

i~1tddIetown l(anc1i~ria

Resoiu~vn Nijmbc~r ~OOO-1~-O~

P.~g.2

CERTLEICATIQN

This is to certify that the foregoing Resolution was duly adopted by the General Council of the

Middletown Rancheria at a General Council meeting held o the 2~ day ofDecemb~ 2000 at which

time a quorum was present, by a vote of~Q FOR. and OPPOSED and ABSTAINING.

and that this Resolution has not been changed. rescinded or amenckd in any way.

Jo~Sirnon U, Tribal Chairman Dat

Riv~ra, Tribal Secretary L)ate